

COMMENTARIA IN TERTIUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM

Commentary on the Third Book of the Sentences



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DISTINCTIO I — ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INCARNATION AND RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE POSSIBILITATE INCARNATIONIS ET QUAESTIONIBUS ANNEXIS*)

§ 1. — who had already come in the flesh, the ancients thus believed in Him; and those remaining with the Father believed He was to come in the flesh. And a little later: "But as for when it shall come to pass — inasmuch as it pertains to one and the same liberation of the faithful and the pure — let us attribute the counsel to God, and let us hold fast our obedience to Him." And after much else, having shown that from the beginning there were not lacking — not only among the Hebrew people, but also among the Gentiles — some who believed in the Christ who was to come, he concludes: "Thus the salvation of this religion, through which alone true salvation is truly and truthfully promised, was never lacking to anyone who was worthy of it; he to whom it was lacking was not worthy. And from the very beginning of the propagation of the human race unto its end, it is proclaimed to some unto reward, to others unto judgment." Thus far he.¹

In these words, where he says that the salvation of the Christian Religion was never lacking to anyone who was worthy, the sense in which this must be understood is to be sought from St. Augustine's *Retractationes*:² namely, that he was "worthy" not by his own merits, but by the grace of God. Care must therefore be taken lest we answer that question of the pagans in company with Pelagius, who taught that the first men after sin were saved through the law of nature, the later ones through the law of Moses, and the last through the Gospel of Christ — as though without the grace of Christ either nature or Moses could have profited anyone unto salvation. That perverse doctrine is destroyed by all of Scripture which establishes the necessity of the grace of Christ. For it was said in general by Peter (Acts 4) that apart from Christ there is no other name given under heaven to men by which we must be saved.³ And (Acts 15): "By the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we believe we shall be saved, just as also our fathers."⁴ And Paul says (Gal. 2): "If justification is through the law, then Christ died in vain"⁵ — which can be said in the very same words of nature as well. (Rom. 8): "For what was impossible for the law."⁶ And Christ pronounced a universal sentence (Jn. 10): "I am the door of the sheep: all who came before me are thieves and robbers."⁷ And (Jn. 15): "Without me you can do nothing."⁸ This salvation, then, as we have already shown from St. Augustine, was never lacking to the human race, although in the fullness of time it was proclaimed by Christ Himself, and purchased at the price of His blood, and was exhibited far more abundantly, and spread far more widely, than before His coming.

§ IV — That the Incarnation of God is possible (Possibilem esse Dei Incarnationem)

§ 2. This was likewise a question asked of old by the pagans disputing against the Christian religion: how it could come to pass that God should join human nature to Himself in the unity of person, since the nature of God is infinitely distant from the human. To this question St. Augustine replies in his *Epistola* 3 (to Volusianus; and in *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 29).⁹ Now these reasons — by which it may be taught that this is neither absurd nor impossible — can be gathered partly from the passages already cited and partly from elsewhere.

The first: God, by His omnipotence, can bring about everything that does not involve in itself a contradiction and does not attribute imperfection to God. Such is the subsistence of several natures in one person. And the Angel made use of this argument to the Blessed Virgin, saying: "For nothing will be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37).

The second: It is possible for several supposita (*supposita*) to be conjoined in one individual nature, as Catholic faith holds concerning the Most Holy Trinity; therefore, conversely, it will also be possible for several natures to be conjoined in one suppositum (*suppositum*). Yet just as the former is found only in the divine nature and cannot be found elsewhere, so the latter is found in Christ alone — although by the omnipotence of God it could also come about in others.

The third: The rational soul, which is a spirit lacking all extension and therefore most different in nature from the body, is nonetheless, when conjoined to the body, constituted as one and the same man. It is not, therefore, impossible that God, conjoined to human nature, should constitute Christ as one in person. Athanasius makes use of this comparison in the Creed (*Symbolum*), saying: "As the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ."¹⁰ Other Fathers also sometimes employ the same comparison. This argument is persuasive insofar as it well proves that from two things most different in nature something personally one can be constituted.

The fourth: Among things that have a likeness to one another, union is not only possible but easy. Now human nature is like the divine, inasmuch as it was made to the image and likeness of God; therefore, as regards the nature of the things being conjoined, the union of God with it will be possible, nay even easy — easy, I say, not as regards God, to whom all things are equally easy, but as regards the nature and condition of things which are less distant from one another.

§ 3. Furthermore, although these arguments are to some degree persuasive, they nevertheless do not prove demonstratively or evidently. Such a proof we consider impossible to bring forward for this mystery, which surpasses all reason — just as for the mystery of the Trinity. Wherefore it is necessary that in this matter, as in many others which we believe, faith should supply the deficiency of reason.

§ V — Why the Son rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit assumed flesh (Cur potius Filius, quam Pater aut Spiritus Sanctus carnem assumpserit)

§ 4. To the question why, among the three Persons of the Divinity, it was the Son rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit who assumed human nature, one must not answer that it happened for this reason — that the

Father and the Holy Spirit were unable to assume it. For it must be believed without hesitation that this could equally have been done by all three Persons, just as the arguments set out above, by which the possibility of the divine Incarnation was demonstrated, pertain equally to all the Divine Persons, and most especially that argument which is drawn from the omnipotence of God. For if it falls within the divine omnipotence to unite a created nature to an uncreated one in the Person of the Son of God, it will equally fall within that same omnipotence to effect a like union in the Person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit. Nor, indeed, can any reason be given why this should be less possible in their case. Therefore other reasons must be brought forward for the question proposed; three such reasons are adduced by the Master (in the text) and others are offered by various authors.¹²

§ 5. One reason, then, that can be given for this divine counsel is the following: it was fitting that He who from eternity was the Son of God, born of the Father without a mother, should in time become the Son of man, to be born of a mother without a father. For if the Father or the Holy Spirit had been born in time, a confusion of names would arise, since among the Divine Persons there would then be two sons — one being called son by an eternal generation, the other by a temporal one. The Master placed this reason in third position, deriving it from the book of Gennadius.¹³

§ 6. The second reason: lest the singular property of any of the Persons should seem to have been altered. For example: the property of the Father is innascibility (*innascentia*), from which He would seem to depart if, by undergoing birth through the Incarnation, He — whom Catholic faith denies to be begotten — were said to be begotten. But when the Son of God was made the son of man, His personal property, namely His very nativity, does not appear to be in the least transferred, since an eternal and a temporal generation suitably converge in one and the same Person. St. John Damascene presses this reason,¹⁴ saying, among other things: "For this reason the Son of God becomes the son of man, so that the property may remain immovable. For the Son of God, being such, was made the son of man, incarnate of the Holy Virgin, and did not depart from the filial property."

§ 7. The third reason: that the restoration of nature might be effected through Him through whom nature had been created by the Father — through the Son — according to that word of Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him"; and Ps. 103: "All things Thou hast made in wisdom."¹⁵

§ 8. The fourth reason: that through Him, who was the natural Son of God, we might be made adoptive sons of God — since the perfection of whatever is posterior in any given order must be sought from what is prior in that same order. The Apostle alludes to this reason in Rom. 8,¹⁶ where, having called us sons according to adoption, he added: "But if sons, then heirs — heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs of Christ" — that is, of Him who is the natural Son. And afterwards: "For those whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, so that He might be the first-born among many brethren." And Gal. 4: "God sent His Son, so that we might receive the adoption of sons."¹⁷

§ 9. The fifth reason: that through Him, made visible to us in the flesh, the will of the Father might be made manifest — He who from eternity was the Word of the Father; and that He who from eternity was the intelligible Word abiding in the Father might, through the flesh assumed, become the visible Word going forth from the Father. Hence He Himself testifies repeatedly in the Gospel that He came into the world for this purpose — to make manifest to men the will of His Father.

§ 10. The last reason: that the middle Person in the Trinity might become the Mediator between God and man.

§ VI — To what extent the Incarnation is common to the three Persons (Quatenus incarnatio fit tribus personis communis)

§ 11. That the Son of God alone was incarnate is what Catholic Faith maintains, so that Hermogenes and Praxeas were justly noted long ago for heresy, since they taught that it could not be the case that the Son should assume flesh or undergo suffering without the Father, with whom He shares the same nature. Against this error Tertullian argues in the book whose title is *Against Praxeas*.¹⁸ One may also consult Epiphanius and St. Augustine in their works *On Heresies*.¹⁹ The Sabellians followed afterwards — they who are also called Patripassians — who said that the Father was born and suffered no less than the Son, on the ground that they did not distinguish the Persons in God. Furthermore, a similar error gave occasion to St. Anselm of Canterbury to write the book *On the Incarnation of the Word, addressed to Pope Urban*.²⁰ Now the cause of error for those against whom Anselm argues was this: that, although they thought rightly about the Trinity, yet in contemplating the mystery of the Incarnation they attended only to the unity of nature in God and not to the distinction of the Persons. For the union of human nature with the divine was not effected with respect to the nature, which is common to the three Persons, but with respect to one Person out of three — namely, that of the Son of God — which Person, since it is not common to the others, it follows, as Catholic Faith holds, that the Son of God alone assumed human nature.

§ 12. Moreover, since it is also beyond doubt that the works of the Trinity which are *ad extra* — as theologians say — are inseparable, so that whatever one of the three Persons does must necessarily be attributed to the others as well, it follows that the Incarnation, or assumption of human nature, insofar as it is a certain operation, and indeed absolutely everything that the Son wrought in the assumed flesh, is common to the three Persons. Yet because that union of human nature with the divine, which we call the Incarnation, was effected and terminated in the sole Person of the Son (for it is in that Person that the union of natures subsists), therefore all the Persons are said to have wrought that union and all the other things accomplished in the united flesh; but the Son alone is said to have been incarnate, and alone to have assumed flesh, and — as the Fathers sometimes express it — to have put on flesh; inasmuch as He alone was the end or terminus of that operation according to His personal notion (*notio*). Just as it can happen that three persons cooperate in a clothing, of whom only one puts the garment on himself, and by consequence is the one who is clothed by it; and just as several may haul the same vessel, yet it comes to one alone out of the many. St. Anselm likewise adduces another comparison in the book mentioned above, that of a spring, a stream, and a lake, which it would be permissible to repeat from the Author himself.²¹ But these comparisons, however well they may to some extent declare that what we believe is not absurd, are nevertheless unable fully to lay open to us the ground (*rationem*) and manner of this mystery. For this work of the union accomplished in Christ is perfectly understood by Him alone, by whom alone it could be effected.

§ XII — Why God Did Not Assume the Angelic Nature (Cur Deus angelicam non assumpserit naturam)

§ 13. That Christ by His redemption conferred neither grace nor beatitude upon the holy Angels, but assumed flesh solely for the sake of man fallen into this misery — this we have left manifest, partly from those things which were said above (on this Distinction) and partly from those things said at Distinction 6 of the preceding book.²³ But it is customarily asked what the reason is why the Angelic nature was not assumed by Him in order to free from eternal damnation the Angel that had fallen, just as, in order to free man, He assumed human nature. For the Apostle testifies indeed, in Heb. 2, that the Son of God never took hold of Angels, but took hold of the seed of Abraham. Yet he did not add the reason for this difference. Beyond the inscrutable height of the divine counsel — by which God willed to come mercifully to the aid of fallen man, but not to the Angel — the Apostle Peter saying, in 2 Pet. 2, "That God spared not the Angels that sinned, but delivered them to be reserved unto judgment" — it will be permissible for us also here to set forth certain reasons by which we may show that this was done fittingly and rationally.

§ 14. First of all, however, that reason is not to be assigned, namely that such an assumption, or such a deliberation, was impossible for God. For it is not to be doubted that God could have assumed the Angelic nature, and that this nature, if we consider the omnipotence of God, is no less capable of repair than the human; but just as He leaves many among men altogether without the remedy universally proposed in Christ, so it is not to be wondered at if He proposed no remedy of restoration for any being of Angelic nature after its fall. For just as in those who are freed the mercy of God is to be embraced, so in those who are left behind His justice is to be praised. This exception of the divine judgment being made, then, one reason for the said difference is this: because, as St. John Damascene says in book 2, chapter 4, "What death is to men, that is the fall to Angels."²⁴ By sinning, therefore, the Angel reached a terminus after which it could merit no further; man, however, because by sinning he did not immediately die in body, remained therefore still on the way and did not lose the faculty of meriting. Hence a Redeemer was given to him, by whom, raised up from his fall, he might be able to advance toward beatitude by meriting.

§ 15. A second reason: because the entire Angelic nature did not fall, as the entire human nature fell by the sin of one, and therefore it stands in greater need of restoration than the Angelic, lest it remain entirely in damnation.

A third reason: because the Angel sinned more freely than man, inasmuch as it was not driven or persuaded by any external temptation, but solely by the aversion of its own will from God; whereas man was tempted by another, and by that most cunning of insinulators. Wherefore it could seem less unworthy of restoration.

A fourth reason: because although our first parents sinned by their own will through pride and disobedience, their posterity are nevertheless held bound only by original sin, in which there is very little of the voluntary. But all the Angels who fell sinned by the free choice of their own will.

§ 16. The last reason: because the assumption of human nature pertains more to the perfection of the Universe than the assumption of Angelic nature. For the latter is purely spiritual, whereas the former is composed of body and spirit. Into these two kinds the whole of creation is sufficiently divided. Hence, by assuming man, God in a certain manner assumed both natures — spiritual and corporeal.

§ I — That Christ is True God (Christum esse verum Deum)

§ 17. Concerning the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation there have arisen many errors, which the Master almost all compendiously excludes, when he teaches (in this Distinction) according to the rule of the Catholic faith that Christ is perfect God and perfect man, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh together with all their natural powers. Now all that multiplicity of errors can be reduced to three or four headings. For error has been committed either concerning the divine nature of Christ, or concerning the human, or concerning the union of both, or finally concerning the natural faculties and their acts. On the first and second errors discussion is held in this Distinction; on the rest, elsewhere in their proper place.

§ 18. The first heresy, then, is that of those who deny the divine nature in Christ. Its first author is reported to be a certain Carpocrates, who was thereafter followed by Cerinthus, and his disciple Ebion, all of whom lived in the times of the Apostles and each gave his name to his own sect, as may be seen in Epiphanius, Philastrius, and St. Augustine *De Haeresibus*.²⁶ Their doctrine was also followed afterward by certain others, but the most notable were Paul of Samosata and Photinus. All these were condemned by the Church at various times and places with equal consent, so that a lengthy disputation for refuting their heresy is not needed. Certainly, as regards those first ones who existed in the times of the Apostles, St. Jerome testifies in the *Catalogue of Ecclesiastical Writers* that John, the last of all, wrote his Gospel against them, and did so at the request of the Bishops of Asia.²⁷ Hence, above all the other Evangelists, this Evangelist expressed the divine generation and nature of Christ. This is evident even from the very opening of the Gospel, where the Word, which a little later he says was made flesh, he affirms existed in the beginning with God and was indeed God Himself, and was not itself made, but that all other things were made through it. To the same end the same Apostle directed also his first Catholic Epistle.

§ 19. Moreover, beyond those most open testimonies to the divinity of Christ that exist in John, many other passages are read throughout the Scriptures — as Phil. 2: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God." And Rom. 9: "Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." And Acts 20: "In which the Holy Spirit hath placed you bishops to rule the Church of God, which He hath purchased with His own blood" — where that word "purchased" cannot be referred to any other than to God.²⁸ Finally, that we may also bring reason to bear upon so great a matter: if Christ is not God but a pure man, as the aforesaid heretics taught, then He was not able by His death and passion to offer full satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. Wherefore neither will He be able to be called, truly and properly, the Redeemer of the human race. The Fathers press this argument in many places to show that Christ is true God — among them St. Augustine, Leo, and Fulgentius, and others.²⁹

1. The passage cited is from St. Augustine; cf. *De Retractiones* II, ch. 31, and the context in the earlier discussion of Christ's presence to the ancient faithful.

2. St. Augustine, *Retractiones* II, ch. 31.

3. Acts 4:12.

4. Acts 15:11.

5. Gal. 2:21.

6. Rom. 8:3: "For what was impossible for the law, in that it was weakened by the flesh."
7. Jn. 10:7–8.
8. Jn. 15:5.
9. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 3 (ad Volusianus); and *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 29. [The footnote in the source reads: "(a) (ad Volusianus, l. 10. D. Civit. c. 29.)"; the letter is CXXXVI in the same edition, as the source's footnote indicates: "Seu CXXXVI. in ead. editione."]
10. The Athanasian Creed (*Symbolum Athanasianum*), commonly called *Quicumque vult*.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 3, a. 3.
12. The Master, *In I Sent.* (in the text of this distinction).
13. Gennadius, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, ch. 2.
14. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 4.
15. Jn. 1:3; Ps. 103:24.
16. Rom. 8:17.
17. Gal. 4:4–5.
18. Tertullian, *Adversus Praxeam*.
19. Epiphanius, *De haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus*.
20. St. Anselm of Canterbury, *De Incarnatione Verbi ad Urbanum Papam*.
21. St. Anselm, *De Incarnatione Verbi* (the book mentioned above), on the comparison of the spring, the stream, and the lake.
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.
23. Estius refers to discussions above in this Distinction, and to Distinction 6 of Book I (the preceding book).
24. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 4.
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 27, and III, q. 2, etc.
26. Epiphanius, *De haeresibus*; Philastrius, *De haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus*.
27. St. Jerome, *Catalogus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum* (also known as *De Viris Illustribus*).
28. Phil. 2:6; Rom. 9:5; Acts 20:28.
29. St. Augustine; Pope Leo the Great; Fulgentius of Ruspe.

DISTINCTIO II — THAT CHRIST ASSUMED THE TRUTH OF HUMAN FLESH (*CHRISTUM ASSUMPSISSE VERITATEM HUMANAЕ CARNIS*)

§ II — That Christ assumed the truth of human flesh (Christum assumpsisse veritatem Humanae carnis)

§ 1. A further heresy (*altera haeresis*) bears upon the human nature of Christ, which, being composed of body and soul, has been misunderstood by some with respect to His body and by others with respect to His soul. As regards the body or flesh, certain heretics — such as Cerdon and Marcion, and after them Manichaeus — taught that Christ assumed not a true but a phantasmal flesh; this they taught because, agreeing with certain philosophers that every body is to be shunned, as deriving its origin from an evil principle and therefore evil in itself, they drew the consequence that Christ's body was likewise no true body. St. Augustine refutes this error in almost innumerable places in his disputations against the Manichees, and he lays bare the source of the Manichaean error in his book *De Haeresibus*,² where he also attributes a similar error to the Priscillianists — as does likewise St. Leo in his Epistle 93, ch. 8.³ The dogma of Marcion, however, Tertullian refutes in his book composed against him, *De carne Christi*.⁴ For the confutation of this heresy the perpetual teaching of the Church ought to suffice us, as it is most openly declared also in the Scriptures.

§ 2. For if Christ assumed not a true but a phantasmal flesh, then neither was His birth from His mother true, nor were His human actions and passions true — such as speaking, walking, sleeping, weeping, hunger, thirst, crucifixion, and death itself. All of these things the Sacred Scriptures narrate to us as real. Further, neither was the resurrection true, nor the ascension into heaven true, and that Evangelical saying will be false: "The Lord is risen indeed."⁵ That Prophetic word likewise: "Surely he hath borne our infirmities."⁶ Vain too will be that whole argument of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 15,⁷ by which he endeavours to establish our universal resurrection from the resurrection of Christ. Nay, rather, what he there draws as an absurd conclusion will turn out to be true: "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, your faith is also vain"⁸ — and what follows. It will further follow that Christ was a false witness of His own resurrection, seeing that, among other things, when He was with His disciples He used these words to prove it: "Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have."⁹ These words manifestly exclude the phantasm of the Manichees, since they signify that Christ, both before and after the resurrection, possessed not a phantasmal flesh (such as the disciples thought they were seeing — for they said "because it is a phantasm") but true flesh.

§ 3. Finally, if the flesh of Christ was phantasmal, and in consequence His passion and death were likewise only phantasmal and imaginary — as the Manichaeans consistently teach — then neither have we been truly redeemed through Christ, and the Scriptures promise us through Christ a salvation that is empty and illusory.

And, as the Apostle says, "we are yet in our sins."¹⁰ All these things are of such a character that it is easy to understand that by them the foundations of the Christian religion are subverted.

§ II — That Christ did not assume a celestial body (Christum non assumpsisse corpus caeleste)

§ 4. Another error regarding the flesh of Christ was that of those who said that Christ brought a body from heaven with which He was to be born on earth. Such was the opinion of the Valentinians of old, who attributed to Christ a spiritual or celestial body. They therefore say that He assumed nothing from the Virgin Mary, but passed through her as through a channel or a conduit — as Epiphanius and St. Augustine (in *De Haeresibus*) report.¹² The Anabaptists of our own age followed their error. Now this error too is manifestly contrary to sound faith and to the Scriptures. For Scripture very frequently testifies that Christ was born not with a body received from heaven but from the seed of Abraham and David, and was made from a woman according to the flesh: as in Gen. 22 and Ps. 131, Matt. 1, Lk. 2, Acts 2, Rom. 1, Gal., and elsewhere.¹³ This is further confirmed by the fact that both Scripture and the perpetual tradition of the Church acknowledge the Blessed Virgin truly and properly as the mother of Christ, and in turn Christ as the son of the Virgin — indeed also the son of David and of Abraham. Yet a woman is not properly a mother, just as a man is not properly a father, except when the generation of another takes place from her substance in likeness of nature. Hence, just as Christ is truly the Son of God the Father because He is begotten of the Father's substance and is consubstantial with Him, so too He is truly the son of His human mother because He was conceived and born of her substance according to the flesh — as Athanasius explains in his Creed.¹⁴ To these arguments is added the genealogy of Christ as recorded by Matthew and Luke, which clearly shows that He was born of human beings according to the flesh.¹⁵

§ 5. Moreover, if Christ had a celestial body, then He was not passible nor mortal. For celestial bodies are exempt from corruption. For this reason the benefit of human redemption would by this reasoning be destroyed — redemption which is believed by Catholics to have been accomplished only through His passion and death. Rightly, therefore, does St. Augustine say on Ps. 56: "Jesus was carrying the earth, the flesh which He had received from the earth, namely from His mother."¹⁶ Nor indeed do the words of John the Baptist lend any support to the error described above: "He who is of the earth, of the earth he speaks. He who comes from heaven is above all" (Jn. 3).¹⁷ Nor does that text of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. 15: "The first man is from the earth, earthly; the second man is from heaven, heavenly."¹⁸ For by the former sentence it is signified that he who has no origin other than from the earth speaks only earthly and lowly things from himself; but he who has a heavenly, that is, divine origin — that is, Christ inasmuch as He is the Son of God — has it from himself, or from his own nature, that he speaks heavenly things, that is, divine things. By the latter sentence, however, it is signified that Christ, who is from heaven, that is, who has a divine origin, was made heavenly through the resurrection according to his qualities — that is, impassible, immortal, and glorious. Hence there follows: "As is the heavenly one, so also are those who are heavenly" — namely, all the elect.¹⁹ "For when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him" (1 Jn. 3).²⁰ "And Christ shall reform the body of our lowliness, configured to the body of His glory" (Phil. 3).²¹

§ IV — That Christ had a rational soul (Christum habuisse animam rationalem)

§ 6. The ancient heretics — Apollinaris, Arius, Eunomius, and certain others, though somewhat discordant among themselves in that opinion — endeavoured to remove the intellect, or rational soul (*anima rationalis*), from Christ. For some attributed to Him only a sensitive soul, saying that the Word in Christ abundantly fulfilled the offices of the rational soul; others attributed not even a sensitive soul, on the ground that the Divinity could easily carry out even the functions and offices of the sensitive part in Christ's flesh. Against these men it must be held with undoubted faith that Christ was and is a true and perfect man, constituted of flesh and a rational soul — just as is expressed in the Athanasian Creed²³ — for it is beyond doubt that if either the reality of the flesh or the rational soul be removed, the reality of human nature is destroyed. Just as the soul is the substantial form of man — just as the body is man's material part — as was defined in the Council of Vienne under Clement V and in the Lateran Council under Leo X, and as we have shown (at Distinction 17 of Book II).²⁴

§ 7. The contrary error is destroyed by all those passages of Scripture which attribute a soul to Christ: such as, "My soul is sorrowful even unto death" (Matt. 26);²⁵ and, "I lay down my soul for my sheep" (Jn. 10);²⁶ and, "I have power to take it up again" (Jn. 10);²⁷ and, "Now my soul is troubled" (Jn. 12);²⁸ and that word to the Father, "Into thy hands I commend my spirit" (Lk. 23).²⁹ Indeed, Christ would not have truly died unless by the separation of soul from body — which is the definition of death — nor would He have truly risen from the dead unless by the renewed conjunction of soul with body — which is the definition of resurrection. But lest we pursue at length a matter that is plain and today in no way controversial, it will suffice to have added the words of St. John Damascene from book 3, chapter 6: "All things," he says, "which God planted in our nature, the Word assumed — namely the body and the intellectual soul, and their properties. For He wholly assumed me entire, that He might bestow salvation on the whole of me. For that which is unassumed is incurable."³⁰ Similar words are read in St. Ambrose in the book *De Incarnatione Dominicae Sacramento*.³¹

§ 8. Now what could be objected from the Gospel of Jn. 1, where it is said "The Word was made flesh" (*Verbum caro factum est*) — and not "was made soul" or "was made man" — is resolved by St. Augustine writing on Ps. 56,³² where he answers that "flesh" is set down for the whole man by a most customary manner of speaking in Scripture.

§ V — Whether Christ shares a common species with other men (An Christus communem habeat speciem cum aliis hominibus)

§ 9. The occasion for the question whether Christ is contained under one and the same species (*species*) as other men was furnished by the words of the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] and of St. John Damascene cited by him. For the Master says that nature is not taken in Christ in the way it is taken when it is said that there is one nature of all men. St. John Damascene's words, moreover, are these:³⁴ "Of many and different hypostases (*hypostaseon*)" — he is speaking of men — "one nature is said to exist, distinguishing in no way the one hypostasis from another." "But in our Lord Jesus Christ it is not possible to take a common species (*communem speciem accipere*). For neither was there, nor is there, nor shall there be another Christ, from divinity and humanity, and in divinity and humanity perfect God and likewise perfect man. Hence it is not

permissible to say that there is one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ." So he. From these words it appears at first glance that their meaning is that Christ does not share a common species or nature with other men. The falsity of this opinion is evident from what has been said above. For if in Christ the human nature is whole, perfect, and complete, composed of a rational soul and body, just as it is in all other men, it certainly cannot be denied that Christ is contained in the same common species with other men, and for that reason is placed in the category (*praedicamentum*) of substance.

§ 10. But the words of St. John Damascene — from whose opinion the Master does not depart — when examined more closely, present a meaning altogether different. For they were said, as is clear from what follows, against the heretics Dioscorus, Eutyches, and Severus, who maintained that one nature was compounded (*conflari*) from the two natures in Christ, just as from soul and body one nature of man is compounded. The meaning, therefore, of St. John Damascene's words is this: in men, two natures — but incomplete ones, namely soul and body — come together into one perfect and complete nature, namely the human, which is neither soul nor body but a composite of both, constituting one hypostasis. In Christ, however, the two natures, the divine and the human, do not come together so as to constitute one nature — for in that case Christ could truly be called neither man nor God — and therefore in Christ it is not possible to take one common species or nature communicable to many individuals as in other men. For St. John Damascene teaches in the same place that "Christ" is the name of a Person (*Persona*), inasmuch as in that Person the two natures, the divine and the human, come together. This does not constitute any one species communicable to many suppositis (*suppositis*). Furthermore, the opinion of Eutyches and his followers was condemned by the Council of Chalcedon³⁵ and by the Second Council of Constantinople³⁶ which followed it — both Ecumenical Councils — the later of which, in canon 8, decrees as follows: "If anyone confesses that from the two natures of Deity and humanity a union was made, or says that there is one nature of the incarnate Word, etc., let him be anathema."

§ VI — In what order the parts of human nature were assumed by the Word (Quo ordine partes humanae naturae sunt assumptae a Verbo)

§ 11. The Master teaches that the work of the divine Incarnation was accomplished in the following order: that the Word was united to the soul by means of the spirit (*spiritus*), and to the body by means of the soul (*anima*), and that it was therefore first united to the spirit than to the soul, and first to the soul than to the body. This teaching is drawn from St. Augustine, in the book *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 18, and in Letter 3 to Volusianus,³⁸ and likewise from St. John Damascene, Book III, ch. 6.³⁹ The same matter is treated more fully by the author of the book *De Spiritu et Anima*, chs. 9 and 10 (found among the works of St. Augustine).⁴⁰

§ 12. Now, concerning this threefold ordering, lest anyone fall into error, two things must be noted. The first is that these two terms — spirit (*spiritus*) and soul (*anima*) — are not names for two different realities, but for one and the same thing, namely the rational soul, signifying its different functions. For by "spirit" or "mind" is understood the higher portion, which contemplates divine and eternal things, whereas by "soul" is understood the lower part of the same, which is intent upon human and temporal things — a distinction St. Augustine himself frequently draws.

§ 13. The second thing to be noted is that this teaching signifies neither an order of time nor an order of position, but of nature only. As regards time, it is to be held as a matter of faith that all the parts of human

nature were assumed by the Son of God not in some temporal succession, but in the very same instant, as St. Fulgentius teaches (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 28),⁴¹ and St. Gregory, Book 18 (*Moralia*, ch. 35 and 36, on the text: "Topaz shall not be equal to it"),⁴² and St. John Damascene, Book III, ch. 2.⁴³ Concerning this matter there exist canons of a universal Synod, the text of which is found in Nicephorus, Book 17, ch. 28.⁴⁴

§ 14. Furthermore, still less is the order here to be taken as an order of position, which has place only in the conjunction of bodies. Indeed, such an order is not to be understood in the sense that some things are so united by means of another that, should that intermediary be removed, they would be separated and disjoined. For when, at Christ's death, the soul was separated from the body, the divinity nonetheless remained inseparably united to the body. It remains, therefore, that only the order of nature or of dignity is to be understood here. For since by nature the spirit is more like and more proximate to God than the soul, and the soul more than the body, such an order is established in the assumption of these parts: that the part which most closely approaches the purity of God's nature is understood to have been united first, as most apt for such an excellent union, while the part next in the order of nature is made more capable of the same union through that part as through a mean.

§ I — The flesh assumed by the Word of God is without sin, and on its purification (Carnem a Verbo Dei assumptam sine peccato, deque ejus mundatione)

§ 15. In the preceding Distinction we showed that the flesh assumed by the Word of God was not of heavenly substance, but was taken from the Virgin, as far as the substance and nature of the flesh is concerned as regards quantity. Hence Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2) says: "This flesh, think not to be of heaven, nor of air, nor of any other nature whatsoever, but of the same nature as is the flesh of all human beings."⁴⁶

§ 16. Here, however, it must be added that it is to be held with certain faith that this same flesh of Christ was conceived and born of the Virgin without the stain of original sin and entirely without the tinder (*fomes*) or vice of concupiscence. For as the Angel said to Joseph (Matt. 1:20): "That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit." And to the Virgin (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; and therefore also the Holy One that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." And the whole Church professes in the Creed that Christ was conceived and made incarnate of the Holy Spirit. Hence also Fulgentius, in the same place, speaks thus: "That flesh which God conceived of the Virgin without fault, was born without sin."⁴⁷

§ 17. This follows likewise from the general declaration of the Apostle (Heb. 4:15), by which he excludes all sin from Christ, saying that He was "tempted in all things according to our likeness, yet without sin." To this is added what the Fathers teach: that Christ was born of a Virgin without conjugal intercourse, precisely so that His flesh might not contract any stain of original sin — Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, chs. 2 and 26),⁴⁸ St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine.⁴⁹ The same is shown by manifest reason, and by a twofold argument.

§ 18. The first reason is this: because that flesh, from the very beginning of conception, was the flesh of the Son of God. Therefore, if even for a moment it had been subject to sin, or infected with the vice of concupiscence, it would follow that God was at some time liable to sin, or tainted with the stain of

concupiscence — and this on account of the communication of idioms (*idiomatum communionem*). For if the flesh was subject to sin, then so also was the soul; and by consequence, the man himself and likewise God. But this is both absurd and impossible.

§ 19. The second reason is this: if the flesh of Christ was at any time subject to sin — [and here the argument continues from the canons which the author mentions as reported by Nicephorus]: canon 2 reads: "If anyone says or thinks that the soul of the Lord pre-existed and was united to God the Word before the Incarnation and the Nativity from the Virgin, let him be anathema." And canon 3: "If anyone says or thinks that the body of our Lord Jesus Christ was first formed in the womb of the Holy Virgin, and that the Word of God and the soul, as though having previously existed, were afterwards united to it, let him be anathema."⁵⁰

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 5, a. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Th. 3. q. 4. 5. a. 1*].
 2. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus* [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Haeresibus*].
 3. St. Leo, *Epistola* 93, ch. 8.
 4. Tertullian, *De carne Christi* [composed against Marcion; abbreviation as in source: *lib. contra ipsum*].
 5. Lk. 24:34: "Surrexit Dominus vere."
 6. Is. 53:4: "Vere languores nostros ipse tulit."
 7. 1 Cor. 15.
 8. 1 Cor. 15:14: "Si Christus non resurrexit, inanis est ergo praedicatio nostra, inanis est fides vestra."
 9. Lk. 24:39: "Palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere."
 10. 1 Cor. 15:17: "adhuc sumus in peccatis nostris."
 11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 5, a. 2.
 12. St. Epiphanius [abbreviation as in source: *Epiphanius*]; St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus* [abbreviation as in source: *De Haeresibus*].
 13. Gen. 22; Ps. 131; Matt. 1; Lk. 2; Acts 2; Rom. 1; Gal. (passage unspecified in source).
 14. The reference is to the *Symbolum Athanasianum* (Athanasian Creed).
 15. Matt. 1; Lk. 3 (genealogy of Christ).
 16. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 56: "Portabat terram Jesus, carnem quam acceperat de terra, videlicet matre sua."
 17. Jn. 3:31: "Qui de terra est, de terra loquitur. Qui de caelo venit super omnes est."
 18. 1 Cor. 15:47: "Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo caelestis."
 19. 1 Cor. 15:48: "Qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes."
 20. 1 Jn. 3:2: "cum apparuerit similes ei erimus."
 21. Phil. 3:21: "Christus reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae."
 22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 5, a. 3.
 23. The *Symbolum Athanasianum* (Athanasian Creed).
 24. Council of Vienne (1311–1312) under Clement V; Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) under Leo X; cf. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17.
 25. Matt. 26:38: "Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem."
 26. Jn. 10:15: "Animam meam pono pro ovibus meis."
 27. Jn. 10:18: "Potestatem habeo iterum sumendi eam."

28. Jn. 12:27: "Nunc anima mea turbata est."
29. Lk. 23:46: "In manus tuas commendo spiritum meum."
30. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 6: "Omnia quae in nostra natura plantavit Deus, et Verbum assumpsit, scilicet corpus et animam intellectualem, et eorum proprietates. Totus enim totum assumpsit me, ut toti mihi salutem gratificaret. Quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est."
31. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnatione Dominicae Sacramento* [abbreviation as in source].
32. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 56: "carnem pro toto homine usitatissima Scripturae locutione positam esse."
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 2, in the body.
34. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 3: "Plurium ac differentium hypostaseon unam naturam dici mus, nusquam unius hypostaseos ab altera differentiam statuentes... At in Domino nostro Jesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere. Nam neque fuit, neque est, neque futurus est alius Christus ex divinitate et humanitate, atque in divinitate et humanitate Deus perfectus, idemque homo perfectus. Hinc dicere non licet unam esse naturam in Domino nostro Jesu Christo."
35. The Council of Chalcedon (451).
36. The Second Council of Constantinople (553), the fifth Ecumenical Council; canon 8.
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 6, aa. 1–2 and following.
38. St. Augustine, *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 18; Epistle 3 (*ad Volusianus*) [abbreviation as in source].
39. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 6.
40. The author of the book *De Spiritu et Anima*, chs. 9 and 10, found among the works of St. Augustine. As the footnote in the printed text explains: this book was placed in the Appendix of Vol. 6 in the Benedictine edition, having been rejected as spurious. Boethius (nearly a hundred years after Augustine), Trithemius, and Vincent of Beauvais attributed it to Hugh of St. Victor. Certain anonymous members of the Cistercian Order, according to St. Thomas in the *Disputed Questions on the Soul*, art. 22, ad 1, hold it to be the work of Alcher, abbot of Isaac's familiar acquaintance, to whom Isaac addressed his epistle on the soul. In the Cistercian library it is noted that Alcher wrote the book under the name of Isaac; yet it is not credible that Isaac would have inserted his epistle as part of that book, as Lodovico Ellies Dupin states in the *Bibliothèque Ecclésiastique*, Vol. 3, Cent. 3, in the review of Augustine's works, Vol. 6. However that may be, the author is of uncertain identity; the book is certainly not by St. Augustine, but is not unworthy of being read, as a commentary in which many things worthy of knowledge are found.
41. St. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 28.
42. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XVIII, chs. 35 and 36, on the text: "Non adaequabitur ei topazius" (Job 28:19).
43. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 2.
44. Nicephorus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* XVII, ch. 28; the canons of the universal Synod referenced therein.
45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 5; and q. 31.
46. St. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2: "Hanc carnem non caelestem, non aereae, non alterius cujusquam putes esse naturae, sed ejus cujus est omnium hominum caro."
47. St. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum* (same place): "Illa caro quam Deus ex Virgine sine vitio concepta, sine peccato nata est."
48. St. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, chs. 2 and 26.
49. St. Ambrose; St. Augustine (works cited in context).
50. Canons reported by Nicephorus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* XVII, ch. 28: canon 2: "Si quis dicit aut sentit Animam Domini praefuisse, unitamque esse Deo Verbo ante incarnationem, et nativitatem ex Virgine, anathema sit." Canon 3: "Si quis dicit aut sentit prius formam esse Corpus Domini Nostri Jesu Christi in utero Virginis Sanctae, deinceps unitum esse in Dei Verbum, atque Animam, ut quae prius exstiterit, anathema sit."

DISTINCTIO III — ON THE CONCEPTION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN, ORIGINAL SIN, AND THE TINDER OF SIN (*DE CONCEPTIONE BEATAE VIRGINIS, PECCATO ORIGINALI, ET FOMITE PECCATI*)

§ 1. — the Redeemer Himself would have had flesh in need of redemption, and He who had come to liberate others would Himself have stood in need of another liberator. The Apostle hints at this reasoning in Rom. 8, when he says that God sent His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, that of sin He might condemn sin, and that the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us.¹ For otherwise, just as to the law, so also to Christ it would have been impossible to take away sins. It must therefore be acknowledged that that flesh, before it was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of the Person (*unitas Personae*), or certainly in the very act of conception, was cleansed from every stain not only of sin but also of concupiscence. For since the whole mass of the human race, descending from the lineage of Adam, had been corrupted by the contagion of concupiscence, hence also it is not to be doubted that that flesh which Christ united to Himself through the Incarnation had, in His progenitors, been liable to sin and carnal concupiscence, and this all the way up to His most blessed Mother. Wherefore a cleansing of that same flesh was required, so that it might be hypostatically united to the Son of God — in Whom it would no longer be flesh of sin, but only bearing the likeness of sinful flesh, which in the progenitors had possessed the truth of sinful flesh. When, however, that cleansing of the flesh was accomplished is not clear from the teaching of the Fathers.

§ 2. For St. Augustine, speaking ambiguously of the time of the cleansing in *De Peccatorum meritis*, book 2, chapter 24,² says: "He alone, who, having also become man, remained God, never had any sin, nor took on flesh of sin, though He took it from the nature of sinful flesh. For whatever He assumed of that flesh He either cleansed it in order to assume it, or cleansed it in the act of assuming it" — that is, He either cleansed it before the assumption or in the very assumption itself. And Gregory of Nazianzus, in Oration 38 (which is the panegyric on the Nativity of Christ),³ says that the Blessed Virgin was purified in soul and body before she conceived — which he also repeats in Oration 2 on Easter (which is Oration 42).⁴ John Damascene, however, in *De Fide Orthodoxa* book 3, chapter 2,⁵ seems to place the time of this cleansing in the very conception of the Son of God, saying thus: "After the consent of the Holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came upon her, according to the word of the Lord announced by the Angel, purifying her, and furnished her with the capacity to receive the power of the divinity of the Word, and likewise with the capacity to generate."

§ 3. The same appears to be the opinion of the Master, indicated in the text (in the present Distinction) by these words: "He cleansed Mary thoroughly from sin and also freed her from the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), either by utterly evacuating the tinder itself, as some hold, or by so weakening and attenuating it that no occasion of sinning thereafter remained for her." Thus he. These words gave rise to manifold disputation among the Scholastics, which one may see discussed by them in connection with the present Distinction:

namely, concerning sin and the tinder of sin in the Blessed Virgin, and concerning the removal of each, and whether the Virgin was sanctified or rather preserved from sin. Concerning all of these matters we too must say something briefly in this place.

§ II — The question concerning the conception of the Blessed Virgin in sin or without sin does not pertain to faith (Quaestionem de conceptione beatae Virginis in peccato vel sine peccato, non pertinere ad fidem)

§ 4. The question — whether the Blessed Virgin was conceived under the common law in original sin, or whether by a singular privilege she was preserved from that sin in her conception — is one that has been agitated, by some persons, with a greater and more celebrated contentiousness than was fitting. This question appears to have first arisen and begun around the time of St. Bernard, as is apparent from his Epistle 174 (which is addressed to the Canons of Lyon).⁷ Concerning it, this above all must be held: that it is not one of those questions of which one side is opposed to the faith, but that it must be numbered among the problematic questions, concerning which, with faith and charity (*caritas*) kept safe, one may hold either position; for the reason that the Church's judgment has not yet defined it in either direction. This is evident in the first place from the Constitution of Sixtus IV, issued in the year 1483⁸ (which is found in Book 3 of the *Extravagantes communes*, under the Title *De Reliquiis et Veneratione Sanctorum*, chapter *Grave nimis*). In that Constitution the Pontiff condemns both the assertions of those who affirm that persons holding that the Blessed Virgin was preserved from original sin incur heresy or sin mortally, and those who impute the crime of heresy or mortal sin to those of the contrary opinion; since, as he says, that question has not yet been decided by the Roman Church and the Apostolic See. The Fathers of the Council of Trent renewed this constitution at Session 5⁹ (at the end of the decree on original sin), where they also declare that it is not their intention in that decree, where original sin is treated, to comprehend the Blessed Virgin. Finally, Pius V, in a certain Constitution (whose opening words are *Speculam Domini*), again renewing what had been established by Sixtus IV and the Council of Trent concerning this question, severely rebukes those who, whenever the discussion happens to fall upon this argument, contend so stubbornly on behalf of one side or the other, as though it were a matter of those dogmas which it is necessary to believe with the heart unto righteousness and to confess with the mouth unto salvation; since the Roman Church has up to that time defined nothing concerning this matter. Therefore, one is free to hold whichever part of this controversy one may judge, in accordance with Sixtus IV, to be more pious or more probable. And so long as neither part shall have been defined by the Apostolic See, he wishes it to be lawful for men of learning to dispute and argue either side of that question in public academic disputations or other assemblies of that sort, to assert or to impugn either part by arguments, provided that neither be prejudiced as erroneous.¹⁰

§ 5. Moreover, several Constitutions were subsequently issued by the Holy Apostolic See concerning this question, which it is worth enumerating here at least in summary.¹¹ First, however, it must be added that St. Pius V, in the Constitution *Speculam Domini* here mentioned by the Author, issued in the year 1570 (which is found in the *Magnum Bullarium*, tom. 2, fol. 320, of the Lyons edition of 1673), being Constitution 114 among the other Constitutions of that Pontiff — it must be added, I say, that in that Constitution the aforesaid Supreme Pontiff commands above all: "that no one, of whatever order, rank, or dignity he may be, in popular sermons, or wherever a promiscuous gathering of men and women is customarily convened, presume

to dispute about one side of this controversy, asserting his own opinion and refuting the contrary, or to write or speak in the vernacular about this very question under any pretext of piety or necessity." Those acting contrary to this are subject to the gravest penalties incurred *ipso facto*, from which only the Roman Pontiff for the time being can dispense or absolve. The same Supreme Pontiff Paul V afterwards issued a Constitution in the year 1616¹² (which is the 97th among the Constitutions of the same Pontiff and is found in tom. 3 of the *Magnum Bullarium*, fol. 348, which opens *Regis Pacifici*), renewing the Constitutions of Sixtus IV and Sixtus V, with still other penalties added against those acting to the contrary. The same Supreme Pontiff issued another Constitution in the year 1617¹³ (which is the 105th among the other Constitutions of that Pontiff, and is read in the same tom. 3, fol. 355). In it the Supreme Pontiff, after the approbation and renewal of his own and other Pontiffs' constitutions with the penalties therein added, commands: "that henceforth, until this article shall have been defined by the Apostolic See, or ordered otherwise by His Holiness and the same Apostolic See, no one, of whatever condition, rank, and dignity of person, dare in public concions, conclusions, and all other whatsoever public acts to assert that the Blessed Virgin was conceived with original sin." He wills that those who act to the contrary be subject to the penalties in the Constitutions of his predecessors and in his own Constitution contained. Nevertheless, the Supreme Pontiff declares in § 4 of the same Constitution: "By this provision he does not intend to bring any prejudice to the other opinion, but leaves it in the same state and at the same terms in which it is at present found, except in respect of the matters disposed above." Furthermore, the same Supreme Pontiff, under the same censures and penalties, commands that those asserting in the aforesaid public acts the negative opinion — namely, that she was not conceived with original sin — do not impugn the contrary opinion, nor treat of it in any way. Then Gregory XV issued another Constitution in the year 1622¹⁴ (which is the 29th among the other Constitutions of the same Pontiff, and is found in the same tom. 3 of the *Magnum Bullarium*, fol. 425). In that Constitution the Supreme Pontiff: "Extends and amplifies the Decree of Paul V, for the same reasons to avoid scandals, etc., also to private conversations and writings, commanding and enjoining all and singular persons of whatever condition, rank, and dignity of person, that henceforth, until this article shall have been defined by the Apostolic See or ordered otherwise by His Holiness or the same Apostolic See, even in private sermons and in private writings they do not dare to assert that the Blessed Virgin was conceived with original sin, nor in any way to treat of or handle this affirmative opinion, excepting those who shall have been specially indulged therein by the Apostolic See." By this his Constitution, moreover, the same Supreme Pontiff in no wise wishes prejudice to be done to the contrary affirmative opinion; and he commands all and singular ecclesiastical persons, both secular and of whatever Order and Institute of Regulars, that in the Sacrifice and Divine Office celebrated both publicly and privately they use no other name than that of the Conception, under the penalties contained in his and in other Pontiffs' Constitutions. Finally, Alexander VII, in a Constitution issued in the year 1661, which opens *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum*¹⁵ (and is the 114th among the other Constitutions of the same Pontiff, and is read in tom. 6 of the *Magnum Bullarium*, fol. 163, of the Roman edition of 1672), renewing the Constitutions and Decrees of his predecessors, and in particular those of Sixtus IV, Paul V, and Gregory XV, issued in favor of the opinion asserting that the soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary, in her creation and in its infusion into the body, was adorned with the grace of the Holy Spirit and preserved from original sin, and likewise in favor of the Feast and cultus of the Conception of the same Virgin Deipara, exhibited according to that pious opinion, "renews and commands to be observed and kept under the penalties and censures contained in the same constitutions. And furthermore, all and singular who shall go on to interpret those favors granted by the said constitutions and by the Feast or Cultus exhibited according to

that same opinion as frustrated; or who shall go on to revoke this same opinion, this Feast, or this Cultus in disputations, or directly or indirectly in any way, under whatever pretext or occasion, to speak, preach, treat, dispute, to determine or assert anything contrary to the aforesaid things, or against their arguments, and leaving them unresolved, or in any other imaginable manner of differing shall have dared — besides the penalties and censures contained in the Constitutions of Sixtus IV, to deprive them of the faculty of public teaching, and likewise of the active and passive voice in whatever elections, *ipso facto*. He also prohibits the Supreme Pontiff under the penalties and censures in the Index of Prohibited Books contained, the publishing of books in which the aforesaid opinion, the Feast or cultus according to it is called into doubt, or in which anything is written or read against them as above; or discourses, concions, tracts, disputations contrary to the same are contained, after the aforesaid Decree of Paul V (of the year 1617) already issued or henceforth in any manner to be issued; and holds them and wills and decrees them to be expressly prohibited *ipso facto* without any other declaration." On the other hand, "he forbids that those holding the contrary opinion — namely, that the Glorious Virgin Mary was conceived with original sin — be condemned of heresy or mortal sin or of impiety, under the penalties expressly and inflictingly set out in the Constitutions of Sixtus IV and other Pontiffs, and in his own, since the question has not yet been decided by the Roman Church and the Apostolic See." That which the same Pontiff declares in the beginning of the aforesaid Constitution in favor of the pious opinion concerning the Conception of the Immaculate Virgin Deipara, to omit or pass over in silence, I would think a sin. "Ancient," the Supreme Pontiff says, "is the Piety of Christ's Faithful toward the Blessed Virgin Mother Mary, who sense that the soul of the same Blessed Virgin, in the first instant of its creation and of its infusion into the body, was endowed by a special grace and privilege of God, by reason of the merits of Jesus Christ her Son the Redeemer of the human race, preserved immune from the stain of original sin, and who celebrate the Feast of her Conception with solemn rite; and the number of those who observe this kind of cultus has grown since the Constitutions issued in its commendation by our Predecessor of happy memory Sixtus IV, which the Sacred Council of Trent renewed and commanded to be observed. And this piety and cultus toward the Deipara has been propagated further, since under Roman Pontiffs approving the same by name, Monasteries of Religious Orders and Confraternities, and Indulgences, have been erected; so that already at the most celebrated Academies nearly all Catholics embrace that opinion." "Most recently indeed, in the year 1709, our most holy Lord Clement XI, Pontiff and Maximilian, in order to show the most holy Apostolic See's propensity and intention toward the most pious opinion concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, ordered and commanded by a special Decree that the Feast of the Immaculate Conception be observed as a precept by all the faithful of Christ in the whole world."

Moreover, there would be much to be added here in confirmation of the most pious opinion concerning the Immaculate Conception; but the character of our undertaking does not permit it, and without the indult of the Apostolic See one may not write on this question; besides, there are at hand the volumes of the most illustrious authors in which this question is set forth and discussed *ex professo*, and the opinion of the immaculate Conception, which all the Christian Academies hold and which virtually all the faithful of Christ likewise hold and champion with the most valid arguments, is equally asserted and confirmed in the most luminous manner. But I beseech the Reader not to find it burdensome to read Dionysius Petavius, tom. 5 (p. 2 of the *Theologicorum dogmatum*, Bk. 14, *De Incarnatione*, ch. 2)¹⁶ — and particularly number 10 of that chapter — who handles that argument learnedly, piously, and skillfully, by which the pious opinion is supported above all, drawn from the common sense of all the faithful: who testify with these intimate convictions and with their outward acts and observances that nothing has been produced by God more

chastely, more purely, more innocently, more alien from every filth and stain of sin than the Blessed Virgin; and that the same most blessed Virgin was created entirely without any association with sin whatsoever, and thus without any offence to God of whatever sort.

§ III — Arguments on behalf of the former part of the said question (Argumenta in partem priorem dictae quaestionis)

§ 6. In order that it may be understood which side of the said question possesses greater probability, the arguments of both sides must be set out — not indeed all of those that are customarily assembled by some in this disputation, but only those that seem to carry the greatest weight. Now, that part of the question which ascribes original sin to the Blessed Virgin in her conception relies first upon Scripture, then upon the authority of the Fathers and the number of the Scholastics, and thereafter also upon reason.

For the Scriptures which testify that the human race is subject to original sin are general, indicating no exception; except in the case of him who, in order to condemn sin, willed to appear without sin, in the likeness of sinful flesh. The relevant passages are: Rom. 3, "All have sinned and lack the glory of God"; Rom. 5, "Through one man, etc., in whom all have sinned"; Job 25, according to the Septuagint version, "No one is clean from filth, not even an infant, etc." The principal force of the argument, however, seems to reside in that conditional statement in the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5: "If one died for all, then all have died." For since absolute universality is understood in the antecedent, it is necessary that the same be retained in the consequent. For there is no doubt that Christ died for all without exception. Wherefore it will necessarily follow (if the Apostle's argumentation is sound) that all without exception are dead with that death of which the Apostle speaks — namely, the death of sin — for the abolishing of which Christ endured bodily death.

§ 7. To these general testimonies of Scripture are added also the general statements of the Fathers, by which they similarly appear to admit no exception, save in the God-man. For the purpose of indicating this exception they sometimes restrict the general proposition to those who are conceived by the common law of nature — that is, from the intercourse of man and woman — as does Fulgentius¹⁷ (adding that Christ willed for this reason to be born of a Virgin, so that he might be born without sin).

And St. Augustine¹⁸ (citing from the Commentary of St. Ambrose on Isaiah, which today is not extant, these words: "It has been kept that no one begotten of man and woman should appear exempt from transgression. But he who is exempt from transgression is also exempt from a conception of this kind.") The same St. Augustine¹⁹ says that he nowhere reads in the Divine Scriptures that Christ died also for those who had absolutely no sin whatsoever. And he consistently affirms that Christ died only for sinners; in order to show that even infants, for whom Christ without doubt died, are not born without sin. For the purpose of proving this, having cited the Apostle's statement, "If one died for all, etc.," he says: "He showed that it could not be otherwise: for by this, that he died for all, he proved all to be dead, because one died for all." And what follows. Likewise²⁰ he says it is the singular prerogative of the Mediator that he suffers an undeserved death without fault. And in Epistle 57,²¹ he says it is necessary for all men — save only the corner-stone — to be reborn. And in Tract 84 on John:²² "He alone is the one," he says, "who both had the flesh of man and had no sin." Similar passages are found in the same author at Tract 4 and 36 on John, Bk. 20 of *The City of God* ch. 6, and Q. 33 on Numbers.²³

Likewise in Maximus, Sermons 1 and 2 on the Fast of Lent,²⁴ and passim in other ancient writers. But because these things are said by them in such general terms that they do not specifically name the Blessed Virgin for the purpose of this exception, they do not carry as much weight for proof as those passages in which original sin is expressly attributed to the Blessed Virgin. Nor are those passages to be produced here which ascribe a purification to the flesh of the Blessed Virgin — of which we shall speak later in its proper place (for the purification can be understood only from the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), even though sin did not precede) — but those in which mention of sin is open and explicit.

§ 8. Now these are the following. St. Ambrose²⁵ (on the Psalm *Beati immaculati*) says that Christ exercised the warfare of virtue in flesh that, in his mother, had been subject to sin. St. Augustine²⁶ (*Enarratio* 2 on Ps. 34) says that Mary, descended from Adam, died with the flesh — and the flesh is death because of sin — while the Lord's flesh from Mary died for the blotting out of sins. And²⁷ (*De Peccatorum meritis*, Bk. 2, ch. 24): "Christ alone," he says, "never had any sin, nor did he take on flesh of sin, although from maternal flesh that was of sin." And²⁸ (*De Genesi ad litteram*, Bk. 10, ch. 18) he says that the flesh of the Virgin was conceived from the propagation of sin, but that the body of Christ, because it was not conceived in her in the same way as she had been conceived, was not flesh of sin, but the likeness of sinful flesh — which he repeats in similar words at ch. 20. Fulgentius²⁹ (*De Incarnatione*, Bk., ch. 6): "The flesh of Mary," he says, "which had been conceived by the common human condition in iniquities, was indeed flesh of sin." Maximus³⁰ (*Sermon de Assumptione B. Virginis*) says that she was cleansed and sanctified in her mother's womb from the contagion of original guilt. Eusebius of Emesa³¹ (*Sermon 2, de Nativitate Domini*) says that no one has been found exempt from the nexus of original sin — not even the Mother of the Redeemer herself. The open opinion of St. Anselm is also to this effect³² (*Cur Deus homo*, Bk. 2, ch. 26; *De Conceptu Virginis*, ch. 18), and of St. Bernard in his Epistle to the Canons of Lyon (which is Epistle 174)⁷, where he attacks the contrary opinion *ex professo*. Likewise in *Sermon 2 De Assumptione Virginis*.³³

Other authors are also produced for the proof of this matter, such as Remigius³⁴ (*on Ps. 21*) and one Erardus (*in a Sermon on the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin*), but these are less celebrated in the Church. It must be noted, however —

§ II — On the question whether the Blessed Virgin was conceived in sin or without sin (Quaestio de conceptione beatae Virginis in peccato vel sine peccato)

§ 9. It is permissible, among those preceding, to cite Hugh³⁵ and the Master³⁶ — where the latter says that, according to the concordant testimony of the Saints, it can and ought rightly to be said that the flesh of the Word, before it was assumed, was liable to sin, just as was the flesh of the Virgin herself; but that by the operation of the Holy Spirit it was so cleansed that it was united to the Word immune from all contagion of sin, and so forth. Moreover, what the common and nearly unanimous opinion of the Scholastics is, is not obscure. For St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and virtually all the rest embrace this part of the question without ambiguity. And they endeavour to establish it by reasons, besides the authority of Scripture and the tradition of the ancients. The reasons, however, which are read in those authors are founded for the most part in the one general formal character (*ratio*) of liberation, redemption, and salvation which is through Christ. For these offices of Christ with respect to the human race are assigned in order to sin. For, as the Angel

says: "He shall save His people from their sins"; and the Virgin herself acknowledges Christ as her Saviour, saying: "My spirit hath rejoiced in God my salvation."³⁷ But Christ liberates and redeems man from a threefold servitude — namely, of the Devil, of sin, and of death. Therefore it follows consistently that the Blessed Virgin also was at some time subject to one of these; for if — as is not doubted — Christ truly liberated her, redeemed her, saved her, and truly died for her, then she truly stood in need of liberation and salvation. Another reason is added by St. Thomas⁶ — namely, that she contracted original sin, because she was conceived from the carnal union of both sexes. And the Fathers suggest this reason, as can be understood from the testimonies of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and Fulgentius cited above.³⁸ There is also another reason drawn from the penalties and pains to which, according to the primary ordinance of divine justice, the body and soul were subjected; for these are inflicted upon no rational creature except as arising from, or on the occasion of, some preceding sin — as St. Augustine shows in very many places.

§ IV — Arguments for the other part of the said question (Alterius partis argumenta)

§ 10. Now those arguments are to be set forth by which it seems to be shown that the Blessed Virgin was at no time ever subject to any sin, not even at the very moment of her conception. And because there are in reality no passages of Scripture which, taken in their literal sense, establish the probable signification of this opinion — whereas in their mystical understanding, which is moreover wont to be both various and uncertain, no solid proof can be drawn — therefore arguments must first be sought from the authority of the Doctors of the Church, and then also from elsewhere, for this matter. And indeed from among the Fathers, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Anselm — whose testimonies were adduced on the contrary side — are brought forward as witnesses also for this part. For St. Ambrose (*in Ps. 118, ad ultimum versum*) says: "Receive me not from Sara, but from Mary, that she may be an incorrupt virgin — yet a virgin by grace, free from every stain of sin."³⁹ St. Augustine moreover (*De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 36) says: "Excepted," he writes, "is the Holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honour of the Lord, I wish to have no question at all when sin is under discussion; for we know that to her more grace was granted for overcoming sin from every part, in that she merited to conceive and bring forth Him who is established to have had no sin."⁴⁰ So he reads it — as does the Master (*in hac Distinctione*)⁴¹ and St. Thomas⁴² — although manuscripts indicate that St. Augustine has it somewhat differently, namely: "For whence do we know how much grace was given to her." And in St. Anselm's book (*De Conceptione Virginis*, ch. 18) these words are read: "It was fitting that the conception of that man" — that is, of Christ — "should be from a most pure mother. For it was fitting that this Virgin should shine with such purity that, save God alone, no greater can be understood; since God the Father was disposing to give her His only Son in such a manner that He should be naturally one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Virgin."⁴³ St. Thomas is also cited here, in the third book (*In I Sent.*, dist. 44, art. 3, ad 3), where he says that the Blessed Virgin was immune from original and actual sin.⁴⁴

§ 11. Moreover, among the Scholastics, Scotus, Francis of Meyronnes, and others — few indeed from among the older Doctors of the School, but very many from among more recent ones — hold this opinion. Among whom there intervened at length the determination of the Council of Basel, session 36, made in these words: "We, having diligently examined the authorities and reasons, etc., define and declare that the doctrine asserting that the Glorious Virgin Mary, by the preventing and operating grace of the divine power singular, never actually was subject to original sin, but was always immune from all original and actual guilt, as pious

and consonant with the worship of the Church, with the Catholic Faith, with right reason, and with Sacred Scripture, is to be approved, held, and embraced; and that no one hereafter is to be permitted to preach or teach the contrary."⁴⁵

§ 12. Now the reason for this opinion is drawn chiefly from piety. For it seems very pious to believe that Christ, who, being God, can do all things, preserved His most beloved mother pure and entire from every stain of sin whatsoever, both original and actual; especially since the law of nature seems to demand this, which commands us to honour our parents. So greatly, moreover, does this opinion seem consonant with piety, that the pious ears of many of the faithful cannot bear to hear the contrary opinion. From which consideration also St. Augustine seems to have said, in the passage cited above, that concerning the Blessed Virgin, for the honour of the Lord, when sin is under discussion, he wishes to entertain no question whatsoever.

§ 13. Furthermore, a most weighty argument is drawn from ecclesiastical worship. To this, however, St. Thomas responds, as do many others, that the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin is celebrated not by reason of the quality and manner of her very conception, but because the Church has wished by an annual solemnity to call to mind the divine benefit by which it came about that she was conceived who would afterwards give us the Saviour. For the Church likewise celebrates the Feast of the Conception of John the Baptist on the 24th of September — as is found in the Menologion of the Greeks and in Martyrologies of Usuard and others, one of whom lived some nine hundred years ago and the other some eight hundred years ago — who yet do not think that he was conceived without sin, but celebrate the feast in memory of the divine benefit through his conception, who was to be the forerunner of the Lord. And, correspondingly, even the Office of the divine Conception of the Blessed Virgin, which the whole Roman Church now employs, makes no mention of either preservation from sin or sanctification; and therefore its solemn celebration signifies the annual festivity, because through it joy began for the whole world. The additional reason is given that, since Christ our God was born of the Virgin thus conceived, solely by the law of justice, and other similar reasons are indicated in the same Office. The Church indeed wills to arouse the faithful in manifold ways to recall the benefits of their redemption. Moreover, the indulgences were granted not to the opinion but to the devout celebration of that Feast.⁴⁶

As to the reason drawn from piety, it is answered gravely by St. Bernard in the Epistle 174, and by St. Bonaventure in the present Distinction.⁴⁷ For piety joined with knowledge and judgement is required; and here the common opinion is taught by him to be more consonant with the Faith, and indeed more pious — since it acknowledges Christ as the Redeemer and Saviour of all, and confesses Him on behalf of all the dead. From which it follows generally that the Blessed Virgin cannot be excluded, lest the mother's excellence be amplified to the diminishing of the Son's glory, and the son provoked thereby who wills more to extol the Son than to honour himself. For the praise of the Blessed Virgin and in the class of the Saints, as St. Augustine says (*in Ps. 94*): "Security of praise in praise of God consists in this, that the praiser be safe where he does not fear to blush from praising."⁴⁸ And St. John Chrysostom (*ad popul. Ant.*) says: "The most pleasing honour is that which he himself wills, not that which we think."⁴⁹ And St. Bernard, Epistle 174: "Greatly to be honoured," he says, "is the mother of the Lord: a good queen demands honour, but a virgin queen needs no false honour, heaped up with titles of dignities."⁵⁰ And what follows. Similar things may be read in St. Bonaventure (*in hac Distinctione*) and in Cajetan's special treatise which he composed on this argument. From which one may also learn what revelations are to be held concerning those things usually adduced for this question. On these

things St. Bernard responds generally in the aforementioned Epistle: "I myself," he says, "am easily persuaded concerning Christ's faithful, that by such writings I am not moved, in which neither reason is available, nor firm authority is found."⁵⁰ And indeed, very rightly so. For if Peter the Apostle alleged that a revelation made to him led him to remit to the faithful the prophetic word as something more firm, how much more should we be led back from obscure and suspect revelations to the authority of Scripture and the norm of the ancient tradition.

§ 14. Finally, it must be known that honour is a testimony of virtue; and therefore anyone who honours another with false or uncertain praises is made guilty of falsehood, or at least of dubious testimony — a vice which all Christians ought greatly to shun. And what we have said on this most famous question, salvo the bond of Christian peace and charity and without prejudice to the better opinion, let it be said.

§ VI — That the Blessed Virgin was immune from actual sin (Beatam Virginem ab actuali peccato immunem fuisse)

§ 15. The proximate question is whether the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God, was free from actual sin (*actuali peccato*), so as not even to have sinned venially. Authorities diverse, even contrary in opinion, contribute to the difficulty of this question. These are found in a threefold difference. For some ascribe even light sins to the Mother of the Son of God, simply after she conceived and brought forth, moved by certain passages of Scripture which seem to indicate that Christ reproved His mother inopportunistically and too frequently — as Lk. 2, when to the Son found in the Temple she said: "Son, why hast thou done so to us?"; and He responded: "Why were you seeking me?" etc. And Jn. 2, when, as she was interceding with Him about wine, He heard: "What is that to me and to thee, woman?" And Matt. 12, when, as He was teaching and a kinsman sought to speak with Him, it is recorded in Mk. 3: "He sent them that called him." To these are added the general passages of Scripture testifying that no one lives without sin, as 1 Jn. 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," etc., and other such passages. And the Lord's Prayer, prescribed for all Christians, seems to confirm this, in which they are warned to say daily: "Forgive us," etc. Some of the ancients are found in this opinion. For Origen, expounding that passage in Lk. 2 — "And they themselves understood not the word" — says that Christ's parents did not yet have in Him at that point full faith. And St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 20 (*In Joannem, ad illud*: "They have no wine")⁵² and Hom. 45 *in Matt. ad illud*: "Ecce mater tua" —

§ 16. — attributes to her something of empty glory. These are applied by Theophylact and Euthymius to the same Gospel passages. St. Ambrose also (*super illud Luc. 2*: "What didst thou seek of us?") says: "Elsewhere," he says, "the mother is drawn to the mystery, here the mother is argued against as to what is still human she should demand." These words are read in the Office of the Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany. Item, Maximus, Hom. 2 (*in Epiphania Domini*), says Christ objurgated His mother, because she rashly sought a sign. Furthermore St. Basil (*in Epistola ad Optimum*) and St. Augustine, qu. 73 (*in Quaestionibus Novi Testamenti*), signify that the Blessed Virgin, standing under the cross watching her Son suffer such things, wavered and was disturbed in spirit.⁵³ And St. Augustine (*in Epistola quae habetur inter Augustini epistolas* 58) says that she was afflicted with Christ dying with human weakness and collected herself to bury Him, deeming nothing of His resurrection, because the hope of the things to follow, the admiration of the passion's penalty, had blinded her eyes before her. And again St. Augustine, Tract. 109 (*in Jo.*), among the

many whom he says before Christ's resurrection did not so believe in Him as he himself wished to be believed, also numbers the Mother of God.⁵⁴

§ 17. Furthermore, others hold that the Blessed Virgin was subject to sins only up to that time in which the Holy Spirit came upon her and the power of the Most High overshadowed her, that she might conceive the Son of God. But from that time onwards, on account of the more abundant grace of the Holy Spirit poured over her, they say she was thenceforth entirely free from all sin. This seems to be the opinion of the Master in this present Distinction, where he says that the Holy Spirit, coming upon her, purged her entirely from the tinder of sin (*a fomite peccati*) — either entirely evacuating it, or so debilitating it that no occasion of sinning should at all remain to her. And (§. B.) where, wishing to prove this from the time at which the Holy Spirit sanctified her to conceive the Son of God, he seems to feel that she was immune from all sin from near that time — while he indicates by analogy the words of St. Augustine (*eodem loco citato ex cap. 36, lib. De Nat. et Gr.*) through which he wishes that so much more grace was conferred on her to overcome sin entirely from every quarter — since she merited by conceiving and bringing forth Him who is established to have had no sin. The tinder (*fomes*) of sin is not liberated by this — whence that Augustinian passage is not properly for explaining the present question, and other passages of St. Augustine seem to sound differently. For in lib. 1 (*Contra 2. Epistolas Pelag., cap. 11*), speaking of the concupiscence of the flesh: "Which," he says, "the resisting spirit was able to have in mortal flesh only for the one who did not come to men through it." And lib. 5 (*Contra Julianus, cap. 5*), he makes Christ properly to be without concupiscence of the flesh. Whose cause he assigns not that Mary lacked it in the mother, but that she did not conceive through it; although these passages certainly convince no more than that the Blessed Virgin did not simply — that is, through the whole of life — lack the tinder. Since nothing is the less consistent, that she was free from it for a space of better life — namely at least at the time when she conceived the Son of God from her flesh, whether this purging took place at the very moment of conception, as several hold; or at some earlier time — as is left uncertain by others. For St. Gregory of Nazianzus says (*in Oratione 38, in Natalem Christi, quae est 38, & in Oratione 2. In Pascha, quae est 42*) that before she conceived she was purged in soul and body. Leo (*Serm. 2, de Nativitate Domini*), speaking of the Virgin mother: "Hence," he says, "she drew this purging, hence she conceived." And Bede (*in Homil.: super Missus est, in Festo Annunciationis Dominicae*): "The Holy Spirit," he says, "coming upon the Virgin, purged her mind from all vices, and tempered her heart from all fleshly concupiscence, and cleansed it from desires for temporal things." And similar things are read in the ordinary *Glossa* (*ad illud*: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee"). And in a certain other Homily the same Bede writes that the Virgin's purpose was to flee the frequentation of all men, lest she should be disturbed by the noise of those asking, and lest virginal chastity should be tempted. Which words seem to indicate that she did not lack the tinder of sin before the conception of the Son of God. The same words of St. Anselm pertain (*De Conceptu Virginis*): that the mother of God ought to shine with such purity that, save God alone, no greater can be understood. And of St. Bernard, *Serm. 3 (in Festo Purificationis)*: that the Virgin, made most pure by very birth immaculate, so that after purification no work was now needed.⁵⁵ The clear opinion of John Damascene is lib. 3 (*cap. 2*): after the consent of the Holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came upon her, purging her by which she would be purged. And in the *Carmen (De Annunciatione Virginis)* the same thing is indicated. What the Master thinks of this, however, can be understood from his words (*in textu*). For he affirms the Virgin to have been freed from the tinder of sin entirely by the Holy Spirit coming upon her, though he doubts whether the tinder was thereby entirely extinguished or only debilitated. The Scholastic probationers, moreover, of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others, embrace that opinion which we called more consonant with reason and the Fathers'

sayings — teaching that after the Virgin's sanctification in the womb the tinder (*fomes*) remained in her flesh according to essence, but bound and suppressed and smothered as to exercise and operation, until it was altogether extinguished through that sanctification concerning which the Angel said to her: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee." Then the grace redundant from the offspring conceived flowed back to the mother, so that by it the tinder of the concupiscence of her own flesh might be entirely extirpated.

§ VIII — Whether the tinder (fomes peccati) was in the Virgin and for how long (Fomes peccati an et quamdiu in Virgine fuerit)

§ 18. Since in this Distinction a discussion of the purging of the flesh of Christ is proposed, it is not inopportune to raise here the question of the tinder of sin — that is, the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit — whether and for how long it was in the Virgin. On this matter a manifold opinion is found among the Scholastics.

One: that the tinder was never in her, but that she was at the same time preserved both from original sin and from the tinder.

Another: that in the womb of her mother, after her conception, she was at the same time purged both from sin and from the tinder.

A third: that, with original sin removed from her, the tinder nonetheless remained in her flesh up to the conception of the Son of God; and that then at length it was entirely extinguished in her by the Holy Spirit coming upon her.

A fourth: that even after the conception of the Word of God the tinder remained in her, but so bound and smothered that she was never afterward disturbed by any temptation of it.

The Master (*in textu*) indicates the last two opinions when he says that the Blessed Virgin, with the Holy Spirit coming upon her, was so liberated from the tinder of sin that either it was entirely extinguished in her — as some prefer — or so debilitated that henceforth the occasion of sinning should be entirely absent. That opinion therefore which pleases some, the Master testifies, and he himself does not disapprove it, but proves it rather by the subjective testimonies, omitting the remaining three and disapproving them, showing that the Sanctorum Fathers' testimonies are more conformable.

§ 19. Now it must first be known that there is another question concerning the purging of Christ's flesh, concerning which (*sub initium hujus Distinctionis*) we spoke, — and also concerning the removal of the tinder from the Blessed Virgin. For what might have been taken from the flesh of the virgin when she was to be assumed by the Son of God, whether by the very assumption, or before the assumption, could be purged: just as St. Augustine signifies in the manner (*lib. De Peccat. meritis, cap. 24*) that even the whole Virgin's body is freed from the tinder and from the sin — from a sin from whence that body a peccato prorsus purgavit, and from the tinder (*fomitum ipsum*) fully evacuating, so that to some it pleases, or thus debilitating it, so that the occasion of sinning might thenceforth be entirely absent. These words multiplied the disputation among the Scholastics which may be seen more than by looking at the present Distinction — namely concerning the tinder (*de fomite*) and the sin in the Blessed Virgin, and concerning the twofold ablation and sanctification (*vel sanctificatione vel præservatione a peccato*), of the very Virgin. Concerning which matters we must here say something briefly.⁵⁷

§ 20. It is confirmed: the weighty argument is taken from ecclesiastical worship. Sixtus IV (*in Extravaganti quae incipit: Cum praeexcelsa*) grants the same indulgence to those who celebrate or attend the Office of the Feast of the Conception of the Glorious Virgin, which was granted by Urban IV to those celebrating or hearing the Office of the Feast of Corpus Christi.⁵⁸ Thereafter the Fathers of the Council of Trent, session 5 (*in fine decreti de peccato originali*), renewed the constitutions of Sixtus IV; & declare that it is not their intention in that decree, which treats of original sin, to comprehend the Blessed Virgin. Finally, Pius V in a certain Constitution (*cujus initium est: Super Speculam Domini*) gravely rebuked those who, upon incurring this argument, contend so persistently for either part as if they were treating of those dogmas which must be believed for salvation, with mouth and heart confessed; since the Roman Church has defined nothing on this matter up to that point. And therefore the free faculty is left to each one of opining on this controversy as they judge more probable or more plain. And so long as neither part has been defined by the Apostolic See, it is lawful for men of learning, in public disputations, lectures, or in any other convocation of the kind, to dispute and argue concerning this question, and to put forward arguments for either part, as long as they are resolved with neither side prejudiced as erroneous. And moreover, through the constitutions of Sixtus IV contained therein, the faculty of preaching or teaching the contrary in public was forbidden, and also the books in which that sentence and its celebration or worship are called into doubt, or against which something as above is somehow written or read — Discourses, Disputations against the same — after the Decree of Paul V (*anni scilicet 1617*) edited, or in posterity however to be edited, the Supreme Pontiff prohibits under penalty, and censure in the *Index librorum prohibitorum* contained therein, and it holds as expressly prohibited *ipso facto* without another declaration. "And he forbids and prohibits" the contrary opinion — namely, that the Glorious Virgin Mary was conceived with original sin — from being asserted, held, as *Heresis*, or condemned as mortal sin or *impietatis*, under penalty in the constitutions of Sixtus IV and of other Pontiffs expressed and inserted, *ac infictis*, since with the Roman Church and Apostolic See this question has not yet been finally decided. And in the beginning of the aforementioned Constitution the Supreme Pontiff prefaces in favour of the pious opinion concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother of God: "It is old," he says, "that the Supreme Pontiff of the Faithful of Christ toward His mother the Virgin Mary Pietas, sensing that her Soul in the first instant of its creation and infusion into the body was by the special grace of God and privilege, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ her Son and Redeemer of the human race, preserved immune from the stain of original sin, and in this sense her Conception Festival is observed with solemn rite and celebrated; and the number of those of this kind of worship grew after the edicts of our predecessor Sixtus IV of felicitous memory, in his recommendation of the Apostolic Constitutions, which the Sacred Council of Trent innovated and mandated to be observed, and the worship of the Mother of God grew after the erection in his name of approving Monasteries of Religious Orders of Rome, and Brotherhoods, Indulgences, so that the most celebrated Academies acceding to this opinion, almost all Catholics now embrace it." "And indeed in the most recent year, namely 1709, our Most Holy Lord Clement XI, Supreme Pontiff, to show the affection of the Holy See toward the most pious opinion of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, mandated the Feast of the Immaculate Conception to be observed by all Christ's faithful throughout the whole world with a special Decree and with special precept."⁵⁹

Furthermore, it would be pleasing here to add much to confirm the most pious opinion concerning the Immaculate Conception; but the established arrangement does not allow writing on this question without the indult of the Apostolic See; besides, there are present the clearest volumes of authors in which this question is proposed and discussed, and the opinion of the Immaculate Conception, which all Christian

Academies defend, is asserted and confirmed with the most valid arguments as clearly as most evidently. But I also beseech the Reader to read Dionysius Petavius, tom. 5 (*Theologicorum dogmatum lib. 14, De Incarnatione, cap. 2, num. 3*), where he handles and refutes that argument, upon which the pious opinion chiefly rests, taken from the common sense of all the faithful — who have this fixed in their inmost minds, and by which they can be shown by clear indications that nothing was brought forth from God purer, more innocent, more alien from every lot and stain of sin than the Most Blessed Virgin; and the same most Blessed Virgin —

§ V — A collation of the arguments on both sides (*Collatio argumentorum utriusque partis*)

§ 21. Although the arguments of neither side are of such a kind as to prove that the other must be held by faith, those which have been produced for the former part [i.e., that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin] unquestionably confer upon it the greatest degree of probability from Scripture and from antiquity — and this most especially on account of those sayings of the holy Fathers in which the Blessed Virgin is designated by name. These sayings cannot be drawn to some different meaning except by very great violence. For those passages which have been produced from the Fathers for the posterior part, since they make no specific mention of original sin, readily receive a limitation from other particular contrary statements of the same Fathers, so as to be understood as having spoken only of

— (*here the text passes to a parenthetical remark concerning Augustine's authority*) —

what is evident to anyone who inspects the passage from which St. Augustine's authority was taken, even though, as we there said, the manuscripts do not have an assertion but a question: "Whence, then, this?" St. Anselm, moreover, is correctly interpreted by St. Bonaventure⁶¹ (writing on this Distinction) as having spoken of that purity of the Virgin which she had when she conceived the Son of God. For he speaks of a most pure mother, by which purity — as St. Bonaventure himself expounds — no greater can reasonably be conceived under God; whereas it is beyond controversy that a greater is possible if we attend to the absolute power of God. St. Thomas, however, writing in the third book of the Sentences⁶² (dist. 44, art. 3, ad 3), answers more subtly that purity is measured by recession from its contrary, and that accordingly there can be found something created than which nothing purer can exist in created things, if it has been stained by no contagion of sin; and he says that such was the purity of the Blessed Virgin, who was immune from original and actual sin — namely, at the time when she was made the Mother of God, at which point, that is, the *fomes* [the tinder of concupiscence], which is the material element in original sin, was in her extinguished, and consequently she felt no inclination toward actual sins either. And this is the true mind of the holy Doctor, since elsewhere he teaches most plainly and by consistent assertion that the Blessed Mary was conceived in original sin — including in the same work (in this very Distinction).⁶³ Furthermore, it would be far too absurd to attribute to St. Thomas an opinion which no Doctor before him held, as his contemporary St. Bonaventure testifies; since Thomas is not wont to be the originator of novel opinions but willingly follows, as far as is permissible, the common doctrine — for which reason he is also called by some the Common Doctor.

§ 22. If we now descend to the Scholastics, it is sufficiently apparent from a comparison that the posterior opinion is surpassed by the former in both number and authority. Indeed, Scotus himself proposes his own

opinion very hesitatingly and timidly. For writing on this Distinction,⁶⁴ when he had stated that the common opinion is that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in sin, and had then set forth three possible opinions, he says: "Which of these three has in fact been the case, God knows." And he adds: "If it be not repugnant to the authority of Scripture, it seems probable that the more excellent thing should be attributed to Mary." And to the arguments adduced on the contrary side he replies. From which it is evident that he dared to pronounce nothing absolutely on this question. Francisco de Maronius,⁶⁵ writing on this same Distinction, says: "Notwithstanding that the Blessed Virgin was preserved from original sin, we can nevertheless say, on account of the sayings of the Saints, that she contracted original sin in some manner." By these words he admits that the sayings of the holy Fathers press very forcefully toward holding the former opinion. Indeed St. Bonaventure (in the present Distinction)⁶⁶ pronounces simply and plainly thus: "No one is found to have said — of those whom we have heard with our own ears — that the Blessed Virgin was immune from original sin in her conception."

§ 23. Nor can the definition of the Council of Basel⁶⁷ furnish any great probability to the posterior opinion, and still less any certainty of faith. For that Synod was schismatic — most especially at the time when that decree concerning the Conception of the Virgin was promulgated. For when, in its thirty-fourth session, it had, moved by a schismatic spirit, deprived the undoubted head of the Church, Eugene IV, of the pontificate, the decree on the Conception was issued in the subsequent thirty-sixth session. This is attested more fully by the acts of that Council and by the retractatory Constitution or Bull of Pius II⁶⁸ concerning those same acts. Besides, from the two Constitutions — one of Sixtus IV and one of Pius V — cited above,⁶⁹ it is perfectly plain that this question remains to this day undecided, and that the decision of the Council of Basel on that same question is accordingly judged invalid by those same Pontiffs. To these considerations is added the fact that while the Council of Basel was still in session, the Florentine Synod was assembled by the authority of Eugene, with bishops coming to it from the whole world, both Greek and Latin; and in that Synod, without any exception being added, it is handed down among the dogmas of faith that the Roman Church firmly believes that no one conceived of man and woman has ever been liberated from the dominion of the Devil except through faith in the Mediator, who was conceived without sin, and so forth.⁷⁰ Moreover, the very words of the Basel definition — in which that doctrine is said to be consonant with the Catholic Faith and Sacred Scripture, but without any proof of the matter being added — sufficiently argue that that determination was incautious and rash. From all these considerations it is easily understood that because the schismatic Council presumed to define this, God permitted it to err. Hence this argument does more to support the contrary opinion. For it is suspect that it pleased those assembled in schism to establish something new and unaccustomed.

§ 24. Greater weight attaches to the argument drawn from ecclesiastical cult. To this argument, however, St. Thomas together with most theologians responds by saying that the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin is celebrated by reason of her sanctification performed in the womb of her mother — whether that sanctification, having been accomplished at the very moment of conception, forestalled and excluded the stain of original sin, or whether it cleansed the Virgin, already conceived, from it. For since it is uncertain on which day or at which moment of time that sanctification was performed, the Church rightly commemorates that sanctification on the anniversary of her conception. Others, however, answer no less probably that the Feast of the Conception is celebrated not on account of the quality and manner of her conception itself, but because the Church wished by an annual solemnity to recall the divine benefit by which it came to pass that she was conceived who afterwards would give us the Saviour. For indeed many Churches celebrate the feast of the

conception of John the Baptist on the twenty-fourth of September — which is also found in the Menology of the Greeks and in the Martyrologies of Bede and of Usuard,⁷¹ the former of whom lived more than nine hundred years ago and the latter more than eight hundred — not because they think him to have been conceived without sin, but in memory of the divine benefit begun in some manner through the conception of him who was to be the forerunner of the Lord, as the Office of that feast itself testifies. Hence also in the Divine Office of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin — which the whole Roman Church now uses — no mention is made either of preservation from sin or of sanctification; but it signifies that it celebrates that conception with an annual solemnity because through it joy began for the whole world. The reason is added that through the Virgin so conceived there arose the Sun of justice, Christ our God; and other similar reasons are indicated in the same Office. For the Church wished by manifold means to arouse her faithful to the recalling of the benefits of their redemption. Furthermore, the indulgences were granted not to an opinion but to the devout celebration of that Feast.

§ 25. To the argument drawn from piety, a serious reply has been given by St. Bernard in Epistle 174⁷² and by St. Bonaventure in the present Distinction.⁷³ For the former requires that piety be joined with knowledge and judgment, while the latter teaches that the common opinion is on that account the more secure, because it is more consonant with the faith — and it acknowledges Christ as the redeemer and saviour of all and confesses that He died for all. From this the Blessed Virgin is not in general to be excluded, lest, while the excellence of the mother is magnified, the glory of the Son be diminished — and thus the mother, in her Son, be provoked, she who desires rather that the Son be exalted and honoured than herself. Although to that general argument drawn from the death and redemption of Christ made for all, it may perhaps be responded with some probability that the Blessed Virgin is said to have been redeemed by Christ in that she was preserved from the bondage of sin into which she would otherwise by the common law of human birth have lapsed; and that she died according to the Apostle, because she was certainly to have been subject to the death of the soul — that is, to sin — unless she had been preserved by a special privilege. Yet since this exception is found to be not sufficiently in accord with either Scripture or ancient tradition, this probability is therefore slight and altogether weak given the host of so many great witnesses on the opposing side — witnesses resting on the antiquity both of Scripture and of ancient tradition — so that Pius V rightly indicated in his Constitution mentioned above⁷⁴ that the one opinion seems more pious but the other more probable.

§ 26. As for the praises of the Most Blessed Virgin and of the Saints in general, so that we may know what sort these ought to be — since in this matter one sins not only by defect but also sometimes by excess — there are to be added here three or four sentences of the Saints. St. Augustine, writing on Ps. 94,⁷⁵ says: "The security of praise is in the praise of God. There the praiser is secure, where he does not fear to blush on account of him who is praised." And St. John Chrysostom, Homily 60 (*To the People of Antioch*):⁷⁶ "The most pleasing honour to the one honoured is that which he himself desires, not that which we think fitting." And St. Bernard, Epistle 174:⁷² "But the mother of the Lord is greatly to be honoured — you admonish me rightly — yet honour of a queen loves judgment. The royal Virgin has no need of false honour, laden as she is with true titles of goodness." And the words that follow. Similar things may be read in St. Bonaventure (in this Distinction)⁷⁷ and in Cajetan in the special treatise which he published on this topic.⁷⁸ From which one may also learn what estimation is to be given to the revelations which are commonly adduced in connection with this question. Concerning these St. Bernard gives in the aforesaid letter the following general reply: "I myself am easily persuaded," he says, "not to be moved by writings of this kind, for which neither reason is forthcoming as support, nor is certain authority found to be favourable." So he — and most rightly so. For if

Peter the Apostle adduced a revelation made to him in such a way as nevertheless to send the faithful back to the prophetic word as more firm;⁷⁹ how much more does it befit us to be sent back from obscure and suspect revelations to the authority of Scripture and the standard of ancient tradition.

§ 27. Finally, it must be known that honour is the testimony of virtue; and therefore he who honours anyone with false or uncertain praises incurs the guilt of false, or at any rate of dubious, testimony — a fault which all Christians ought most earnestly to shun. And let these things have been said by us concerning this most famous question, with the bond of Christian peace and charity preserved, and without prejudice to a better opinion.

§ VI — That the Blessed Virgin was immune from actual sin (Beatam Virginem ab actuali peccato immunem fuisse)

§ 28. The next question is whether the Virgin Mother of God was free from actual sin, so as not even to have sinned venially. To this question difficulty is brought by the authorities of those who hold diverse and indeed contrary opinions. These are found to differ in three ways.

Some attribute even light sins to her mother simply, even after the conception and birth of the Son of God, moved by certain passages of Scripture in which she seems to have interposed with her son at an inopportune time and in a womanly fashion: as in Lk. 2, when, finding her son in the temple, she said to him, "Son, why hast thou done so to us?" and so forth, and the son answered, "How is it that ye sought me?" and so forth. And in Jn. 2, when, interceding with her son regarding the wine, she heard, "Woman, what is that to me and to thee?" And in Matt. 12, when, while Christ was teaching, she came with his kinsmen seeking to speak with him; and, as is found in Mk. 3, sending to call him. To these passages are added general texts of Scripture that testify that no one lives without sin, such as 1 Jn. 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," and so forth, and other similar texts. The Lord's Prayer itself, prescribed to all Christians, seems to confirm this, whereby they are admonished to say daily: "Forgive us," and so forth.⁸¹

§ 29. Into this opinion certain things may be read in some of the Ancients. For Origen, expounding that passage of Lk. 2, "And they themselves understood not the word," says that the parents of Christ had not yet had full faith in him.⁸² And St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 20 in John, at the words "They have no wine," and Hom. 45 in Matthew, at the words "Behold thy mother and thy brethren seek thee," attributes to her vainglory (*inanis gloria*).⁸³ To whom similarly Theophylact and Euthymius do the same regarding those gospel passages. St. Ambrose also, on Lk. 2, at the words "How is it that ye sought me?", says: "Here the mother is reproved, in that she still demands what pertains to matters human."⁸⁴ These words are read in the Office of the Sunday within the Octave of Epiphany. Likewise Maximus, Hom. 2 in Epiphany, says that Christ reproved his mother because she rashly sought a sign.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Basil in his Epistle to Optimus, and St. Augustine, qu. 73 in the *Quaestiones Veteris Testamenti*, indicate that the Blessed Virgin, seeing her son under the cross suffering such things, doubted and wavered in spirit.⁸⁶ And in the Epistle that is found among the letters of St. Augustine, Epistle 58 (which is in fact CXXI in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers), it is said that Mary stood by the cross of Christ, so that she mourned for him dead with human infirmity and intended to bury him, with no anticipation in her mind of his resurrection, because the admiration of things to come was obscured in her eyes by the punishment of the passion set before them.⁸⁷ And again St. Augustine, Tract. 109

in John, counts her among the many whom, he says, before the resurrection of Christ believed in him not in the manner in which he himself willed to be believed in — and in this number he counts the mother of God.⁸⁸

§ 30. Moreover others are of the opinion that the Blessed Virgin was prone to sins only up to that time when the Holy Spirit came upon her and the power of the Most High overshadowed her so that she might conceive the Son of God; but that from that time, on account of the more abundant grace of the Holy Spirit poured out upon her, they say she lived entirely free from all sin thereafter. This seems to be the opinion of the Master in the present Distinction, §. A, where he says that the Holy Spirit coming upon her purged her thoroughly and completely from sin — either by fully emptying out the tinder (*fomes*) of sin or by so weakening it that no occasion of sinning thereafter arose for her at all. And when he seeks to prove from the fact that, from the time when the Holy Spirit sanctified her to conceive the Son of God, she was immune from sin, he seems to intimate that before that time she was prone to sin. Something similar seems to be hinted at by the words of St. Augustine (at the same passage cited from ch. 36 of *De Natura et Gratia*) by which he maintains that therefore more grace was conferred upon the Virgin to overcome sin in every part, because she merited to conceive and bear him who is established to have had no sin.⁸⁹

§ 31. The third and final opinion is that the most Blessed Virgin, by a singular privilege of God, was throughout her entire life free and immune from all sin, even venial. This opinion we find expressed with sufficient clarity by the Fathers. For St. Augustine (at the passage cited just above) in treating of actual sins simply affirms that, regarding the Blessed Virgin, when sins are at issue, he wishes to raise no question whatsoever, for the sake of the honor of the Lord.⁹⁰ And St. Ambrose, on the last verse of Ps. 118, pronounces her whole and untouched by every stain of sin.⁹¹ Similar things are found in Anselm in the book *De Conceptu Virginis*.⁹² St. Bernard, however, in Epistle 174, manifestly confirms the same, saying: "I believe also that a more copious blessing of sanctification descended upon her, which would not only have sanctified her birth, but would also have kept her life immune from all sin thereafter, which is believed to have been granted to no other born of women."⁷² And what follows. And in Sermon 2 *de Assumptione Virginis* he denies that she ever had any defilement of her own.⁹³

§ 32. This opinion of those Fathers has been followed in later centuries without scruple and embraced by all the Scholastic Doctors, so much so that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23 (in denying that a man once justified can avoid all sins even venial throughout his entire life), rightly added this exception: "unless by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin."⁹⁴ Furthermore, there would not seem to be a sufficiently certain reason why the whole Church should extol her in the celebration of her praises above all orders of Angels and of just men, unless it acknowledged in her some singular privilege of holiness over all others. And this is not easily assigned to any other thing than that she was pure and free from all actual sin. Therefore, although we read that neither the first nor the second opinion has been condemned as heretical or as erroneous, and perhaps they could not be condemned as such, nevertheless the third opinion the Church holds with such probability that it is rash (*temerarium*) to contradict it.⁹⁵

§ 33. Now among the authors adduced in favor of the first opinion, although it is sufficiently apparent that some of them held that view, the words of others nonetheless admit without difficulty of a more benign interpretation. This will become more apparent if we consider that the Blessed Virgin, although she was immune from all sin, was not therefore free from all ignorance, nor did she at once receive perfect knowledge of the dispensation of the mystery of Christ in the flesh. For the conception and birth of the Virgin, which

were one day to come to pass, she seems to have been ignorant of before she was instructed by the words of the Angel, as her own words to the Angel indicate: "How shall this be done?" and so forth. She also learned of the miraculous conception of the Forerunner only in the sixth month from the same Angel; and that her son, a boy of twelve, had remained behind in Jerusalem she did not know, as the Gospel attests; and, believing him to be in the company and seeking him among her kinsfolk and acquaintances, she was at any rate mistaken. The same is argued well enough by Christ's question: "How is it that ye sought me? Did ye not know that I must be about the things that are my Father's?" And by the Evangelist's words that follow: "And they understood not the word that he spoke to them." Elsewhere she is said to have marvelled at the things that were spoken by Simeon concerning her son; and yet the desire to grasp the mysteries that were being accomplished concerning her son — to whatever degree it was in her — is declared by that saying twice repeated in Luke and said peculiarly of the Blessed Virgin and not of Joseph: that "she kept all these words, pondering them in her heart."

§ 34. From these things premised from Scripture, we say that the passage Jn. 2, "What is that to me and to thee?" and so forth, is not the reproof of one sinning, but the teaching and instruction of one who is ignorant. For he adds: "My hour is not yet come," and shortly after he complies with his mother's petition. The same must be thought of those words, Lk. 2: "How is it that ye sought me?" and so forth. Although even a reproof in general does not bear on fault alone but also on

§ 35. — the error of those who from ignorance seek or do something unsuitable. Hence among the authors cited for the first opinion, even if some of them held that view clearly enough, the words of others admit a more benign interpretation without difficulty. For those who do not ascribe to her a faith wholly complete — such as Origen, Basil, Paulinus, and St. Augustine — do not mean that she doubted in any way about things divinely revealed to her or made known by her son, since by the mouth of Elizabeth it was said to her by the Holy Spirit: "Blessed art thou that hast believed"; but rather that she had a less certain and perfect knowledge of certain mysteries, because concerning these she had not yet been fully divinely instructed. Or certainly, that that doubt and wavering was not about the thing itself, but about the manner of the thing — as when she said to the Angel, to whom she was undoubtedly giving faith: "How shall this be done?" As for the objection drawn from the *Quaestiones Novi Testamenti*, it ought not to move us greatly, since that work is not St. Augustine's, nor even of a reputable author.⁹⁶

§ 36. Furthermore, the glosses of St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Euthymius on the above-mentioned Gospel passages are not received by the Church, since it is more credible that her son was summoned by his mother for some pious cause — namely so that those who are there called the brothers of the Lord, who had not yet believed in him but who were saying, on hearing of his miracles, that he had gone mad, might become partakers of his doctrine and his faith. At all events, Theophylact, writing on Mark, does not simply assert that matter of vainglory, but adds, "perhaps." And in the same place he testifies that the Blessed Virgin, by reason of being endowed with every kind of virtue, was chosen for this purpose, that she might become the mother of God. But when commenting on Luke he entirely omits that earlier annotation.⁹⁷

§ 37. Finally, to the argument drawn from the Lord's Prayer it can be answered, just as the Ancients already except from the general statements of Scripture that deny that any man lives without sin, so also the Mother of God was excepted from the obligation of reciting the words of that same Prayer in her own person, but recited them on behalf of the whole assembly of the faithful — among whom many, indeed apart from her all, were sinners — and that this was her singular privilege.⁹⁸

§ VIII — Whether the tinder of sin (fomes peccati) was present in the Virgin, and for how long

§ 38. Since this distinction treats *ex proposito* of the purification of the flesh of Christ, the question of the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*) — that is, the flesh lusting against the spirit — whether and for how long it was present in the Virgin, is not out of place here. On this matter a multiplicity of opinions is found among the Scholastics. The first is that the tinder was never in her at all, but that she was preserved simultaneously from original sin and from the tinder. The second is that after conception in her mother's womb she was purged simultaneously from sin and from the tinder. The third is that, once original sin had been removed from her, the tinder of sin nonetheless remained in her flesh up to the conception of the Son of God, and that it was then at last utterly extinguished through the Holy Spirit coming upon her. The fourth is that even after the conception of the Word of God the tinder remained in her, but so bound and lulled to sleep that her flesh was never thereafter stirred by any temptation on its account.

§ 39. The Master (in the text) indicates the two last-mentioned opinions when he says that the Blessed Virgin, by the coming of the Holy Spirit upon her, was so freed from the tinder of sin that it was either extinguished entirely in her, as some hold, or so weakened that it was no longer any occasion of sinning for her thereafter. That opinion, then, which the Master testifies to be held by some, and which he himself does not disapprove but rather confirms by the testimonies he adduces, we shall show — setting aside and disproving the other three — to be more in conformity with the judgements of the holy Fathers.

§ 40. First of all, however, it must be known that the question of the cleansing of the flesh of Christ (of which we have spoken at the opening of this distinction) is one thing, and the question of the removal of the tinder from the Blessed Virgin is another. For what was to be taken from the Virgin's flesh by the Son of God could have been cleansed either by the very assumption itself or before the assumption — as St. Augustine suggests in his book *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 24 — even though the whole body of the Virgin might not thereby have been freed from the tinder.¹⁰⁰ Hence that passage of St. Augustine serves not properly to explain the present question, and certain other passages of St. Augustine seem to say something different. For in Book I, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 11, speaking of the concupiscence of the flesh, he says: "She whom the resisting spirit had not in mortal flesh, that man alone could have, who did not come to men through her."¹⁰¹ And in his book *Contra Julianum*, ch. 5, he makes it Christ's own special property to be free of carnal concupiscence, assigning as the reason not that it was not in the Mother, but because the Mother did not conceive through it.¹⁰² Although these passages certainly prove nothing other than that the Blessed Virgin was not simply — that is, throughout her whole life — without the tinder. With this it is nonetheless consistent that she was free from it for some period of her life: namely, at least during the time when she conceived the Son of God from her own flesh, whether the purification took place at the very moment of conception through the grace of the Holy Spirit coming upon her (as many hold), or at some earlier time (which others leave as uncertain).

§ 41. For Gregory Nazianzus says, in his Oration *On the Nativity of Christ* (which is Oration 38) and again in Oration 2 *On the Pasch* (which is Oration 42), that the Blessed Virgin was purified in soul and body before she conceived.¹⁰³ Likewise St. Leo, in Sermon 2 *On the Nativity of the Lord*, speaking of the Virgin Mother, says: "She thence drew purification, whence she conceived."¹⁰⁴ And Bede, in his Homily *On the Gospel*

(*Super Missus est*) for the Feast of the Annunciation of the Lord, says: "The Holy Spirit, coming upon the Virgin, chastised her mind from all filth of vices, and tempered her heart from every impulse of carnal concupiscence, and cleansed her from temporal desires."¹⁰⁵ Similar statements are read in the *Glossa ordinaria* on that text: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee."¹⁰⁶ And in another Homily the same Bede writes that it was the Virgin's purpose to flee the company of all men, lest the silence of one at prayer be disturbed, or her virginal chastity be tempted.¹⁰⁷ These words seem to indicate that she was not without the tinder of sin before the conception of the Son of God. To the same point belong the words of St. Anselm in his book *De Conceptu Virginis*, that the Mother of God ought to shine with that purity than which no greater can be conceived under God.⁹² And the words of St. Bernard, Sermon 3 *On the Feast of the Purification*, that the Blessed Virgin was made most pure by that very immaculate childbirth, so that after the birth no purification was any longer needed.¹⁰⁸

§ 42. The opinion of St. John Damascene is also explicit, in Book 3, ch. 2: that after the consent of the Holy Virgin the Holy Spirit came upon her, by whom she was purified.¹⁰⁹ And in his poem *On the Annunciation of the Virgin* he indicates the same thing.¹¹⁰ What the Master thinks about this matter can be understood from his words in the text: for he affirms that the Virgin was wholly freed from the tinder of sin by the coming of the Holy Spirit upon her, though he is uncertain whether the tinder was entirely extinguished or only weakened. Furthermore, the more approved Scholastics — St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others — embrace the opinion we have stated as more consonant with reason and with the dicta of the Fathers, teaching that after the sanctification of the Virgin effected in the womb there remained in her the tinder according to its essence, yet bound, suppressed, and lulled to sleep as regards its exercise and operation, until it should be wholly removed and extinguished by that sanctification of which the Angel says to her: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee," etc.¹¹¹ For from the Child conceived there overflowed upon the Mother such an abundance of grace that by it the tinder of concupiscence was utterly eradicated from her flesh.

§ VIII — Why Christ was not tithed in Abraham (*Christus quare non sit decimatus in Abraham*)

§ 43. The Master raises the question why Levi is said to have been tithed in Abraham (Heb. 7), whereas Christ is denied to have been tithed in him, given that both were in the loins of Abraham according to the material principle (*rationem materialem*). For when the Apostle in that Epistle was commending the excellence of Christ's priesthood over the Levitical, he employed an argument of this kind: that Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, bearing the type of Christ's priesthood, blessed Abraham and received tithes from him, as is Gen. 14 — at which time both Levi and all the priests who descend from him received a blessing as from their superior, and gave tithes as to their superior; inasmuch as they were then still in the loins of Abraham, and so all those who were afterward born from him are rightly reckoned as having been tithed in Abraham. Since, therefore, Christ too was then in the loins of Abraham, why is He not also said to have been tithed in him by the same right?

§ 44. To this question St. Augustine replies in Book 10 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 20, and in Book 2 of *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 25, and the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Epistle to the Hebrews replies in like manner:¹¹³ that Christ was not in the loins of Abraham in the same way as Levi and the rest who were begotten from

Abraham. "According to the seminal principle (*rationem seminalem*)," says St. Augustine, "Levi was there, by which principle he was to come into the mother through intercourse; according to which principle the flesh of Christ was not there, though according to it the flesh of Mary was there. And a little after: Levi was in the loins of Abraham according to carnal concupiscence, but Christ according to bodily substance. For since there is in seed both a visible corpulence and an invisible principle, both ran from Abraham, or even from Adam himself, to the body of Mary; because it too was conceived and came forth in that manner. But Christ took the visible substance of flesh from the flesh of the Virgin. The principle of His conception, however, came not from the male seed, but came in a far different and higher manner. Therefore according to what He received from His Mother, He was in the loins of Abraham."¹¹⁴ So much is there, and other things to the same effect.

§ 45. But someone will here ask: Why cannot Christ at least rightly be said to have been tithed in Abraham on account of the fact that He was in Abraham according to bodily substance? The solution to this question is indicated by St. Augustine in subsequent words: "Christ," he says, "was not tithed there, He whose flesh thence drew not the heat of the wound but the material of the remedy. For since the tithing itself pertained to prefiguring the remedy, it was that which was being healed that was tithed in Abraham's flesh, not that from which the healing came."¹¹⁵ And what follows. From these words it is understood that only those who were begotten from Abraham according to carnal concupiscence both received a blessing and were tithed in Abraham, and therefore, being liable to the curse and to sin, stand in need of the blessing against the curse and of the tithing against guilt. For the offering of tithes is made precisely so that the priest may intercede for the sins of those who offer. Since, therefore, Christ received from Abraham only the nature and substance of flesh, and did not thereby contract any defect, it follows that He is to be said neither to have received a blessing nor to have given tithes in Abraham — no more than He can be said to have sinned in Adam, in whose loins likewise He was according to bodily substance but not according to carnal concupiscence, as is rightly noted by the Master in the text.

§ 46. Hugh of St. Victor expounds the same sentence of the Apostle in Book 2 of *De Sacramentis*, ch. 5,¹¹⁶ in these words: "The offering is made not for nature but for fault, because if there were no fault, nature would have no need of an offering. In this way, therefore, Levi was tithed in the loins of Abraham, because he had there both nature and fault, who was to receive both nature and fault thence. But Christ was not tithed there, for the reason that He was to receive thence only nature," and so on. Moreover, what was said above at Distinction 30 of Book II — where the question was asked how we are all said to have been in Adam,¹¹⁷ — conduces to the understanding of the present question. Hence it is also understood what St. Augustine says: that Christ was in Abraham and in Adam according to bodily substance. For it is not necessary to concede that in all men there is some portion of matter that was numerically the same as in the first parent; for the truth of that proposition it suffices that each person receives from his proximate parent some portion of bodily substance. And because this has come about continuously through all the generations of mankind derived from the first man, Christ and all others are rightly said to have been in their progenitors, and in the first man himself, according to the substance of the flesh.

§ IX — That the flesh of Christ was not first conceived and then assumed (Carnem Christi non prius conceptam quam assumptam fuisse)

§ 47. Since it has been shown (in the preceding Distinction) that the parts of the human substance were assumed by the Son of God not in any order of time but of nature and dignity only, there must here be briefly added the point that the flesh of Christ was not first conceived in the womb of the Virgin and afterwards assumed by the Word — as happens in the generation of all other men, where the seed is first conceived in a woman's womb and then gradually, by the power of the generative faculty, is formed into a foetus and differentiated into members until it is fit for the reception of the rational soul (although St. Augustine considers it a most difficult and inexplicable question when the foetus begins to live in the womb)¹¹⁹ — but rather that, as soon as the Virgin gave her consent with the words "Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it done," etc., the Son of God formed for Himself from her most pure blood a body, assuming it in the very act of forming it and forming it in the very act of assuming it, together with the rational soul: so that at the very moment of conception, that which was being conceived was perfect God and perfect man.

§ 48. A clear argument for this is drawn from the words of Elizabeth to the Virgin: "Whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?" (Lk. 1:43). For these words were spoken by her under divine inspiration shortly after the angelic announcement, as is evident from the Gospel; within which interval of time it is agreed by all that a foetus cannot be naturally formed. Already, therefore, she was the Mother of God and of the Lord before these words were spoken by Elizabeth, and consequently she was already carrying in her womb a Son who was man, and who was at the same time God and Lord.

§ 49. Another argument is drawn from this: that the conception of the Son of God was brought about not naturally by the power of seed, but miraculously by the power and singular operation of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, just as in other miracles something is wont to be accomplished suddenly and without the lapse of time that a natural operation requires, so must we judge that it came to pass in this most divine work — called by some the miracle of miracles — that from the very moment of conception that which was conceived was perfect God and perfect man.

§ 50. To these considerations are added the judgements of the Fathers. For Fulgentius (in *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 28) affirms that it must be held most firmly that the flesh of Christ was conceived not without the Divinity, nor before being taken up by the Word, but in the very incarnation of the Word itself.¹²⁰ And Gregory (in *Moralia*, Book XVIII, ch. 36, otherwise ch. 35) says that when the Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin, straightway the Word was in the womb, straightway within the womb the Word was made flesh.¹²¹ To these agrees St. John Damascene, who (in Book III, ch. 2) says that immediately after the Virgin's assent — given, namely, by those words: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord, be it done unto me according to thy word" — the Son of God constructed for Himself from her chaste and most pure blood a body animated by a rational and intellectual soul, completed not gradually through successive additions but brought to perfection in one continuous act; and he adds thereafter: "Wherefore simultaneously it was flesh, and the animated flesh of God's Word, rational and intellectual."¹⁰⁹ Something similar is found in the *Glossa ordinaria* (on Jer. 31: "A woman shall compass a man"), though otherwise that Scripture text does not necessarily prove the point.¹²²

There are also two passages on this matter in St. Augustine, namely in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, the last chapter, and in Book II of *De Peccatorum meritis*¹²³ —

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1. Rom. 8:3–4.
 2. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 24.
 3. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 38 (*Panegyric on the Nativity of Christ*).
 4. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 2 on Easter (= Oration 42).
 5. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 2.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, a. 2.
 7. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 174 (to the Canons of Lyon).
 8. Sixtus IV, Constitution *Grave nimis*, in *Extravagantes communes*, Bk. 3, tit. *De Reliquiis et Veneratione Sanctorum*, cap. *Grave nimis* (1483).
 9. Council of Trent, Session 5, decree on original sin (in fine).
 10. Pius V, Constitution *Speculam Domini* (1570).
 11. The summary of subsequent papal constitutions in this paragraph and the following draws upon: Pius V, Constitution *Speculam Domini* (1570), in *Magnum Bullarium* tom. 2, fol. 320 (Lyons ed. 1673), no. 114 among his constitutions.
 12. Paul V, Constitution *Regis Pacifici* (1616), in *Magnum Bullarium* tom. 3, fol. 348, no. 97 among his constitutions.
 13. Paul V, Constitution (1617), no. 105 among his constitutions, in *Magnum Bullarium* tom. 3, fol. 355.
 14. Gregory XV, Constitution *Sanctissimus Dominus Noster* (1622), no. 29 among his constitutions, in *Magnum Bullarium* tom. 3, fol. 425.
 15. Alexander VII, Constitution *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum* (1661), no. 114 among his constitutions, in *Magnum Bullarium* tom. 6, fol. 163 (Roman ed. 1672).
 16. Dionysius Petavius, *Theologicorum dogmatum*, tom. 5, p. 2, Bk. 14 (*De Incarnatione*), ch. 2, no. 10.
 17. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, chs. 2 and 26.
 18. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* Bk. 1, ch. 4, citing from Ambrose's *Commentary on Isaiah*.
 19. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* Bk. 6, ch. 4.
 20. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* Bk. 4, ch. 4.
 21. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 57.
 22. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 84.
 23. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tracts 4 and 36; *De Civitate Dei* Bk. 20, ch. 6; *Quaestiones in Numeros*, Q. 33.
 24. Maximus, Sermons 1 and 2 *De Jejuniis Quadragesimae*.
 25. St. Ambrose, *on the Psalm Beati immaculati*.
 26. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 34, Enarratio 2.
 27. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione* Bk. 2, ch. 24.
 28. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* Bk. 10, ch. 18 (and ch. 20).
 29. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione*, ch. 6.
 30. Maximus, Sermon *de Assumptione B. Virginis*.
 31. Eusebius of Emesa, Sermon 2 *de Nativitate Domini*. [Note: The Homilies and Sermons circulated under the name of Eusebius of Emesa (Eusebius Emissenus) were long ago reclaimed from Eusebius by the learned and attributed to other authors. Eusebius

of Emesa was bishop in Syria or Phoenicia, of noble Edessene parents, trained from early youth in sacred letters under the discipline of the Greek school of Edessa, and instructed by Eusebius of Caesarea while Athanasius, still alive but in exile, was being ordained. Having refused that dignity out of fear of the Alexandrians' hostility, he was driven away; he fled and betook himself to Laodicea to the bishop Gregory of Antioch, who arranged for him to be brought back again to Emesa. There again accused, and after having been found innocent restored, he was at length taken away by the Emperor Constantius and died among the Persians through his hands, buried at Antioch in the year 350. Thus writes Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, Bk. 4, on Eusebius of Emesa. He engaged with the divine books together with Patrophilus, Bishop of Scythopolis, diligently and accurately according to the literal sense, writing commentaries. There still survive fragments of Theodoret's commentaries on these, of which Hieronymus writes to him thus in the book *De Viris Illustribus*: "Eusebius of Emesa, bishop of elegant and rhetorical genius, composed innumerable books pleasing to the people; following history more than others, he is said to have written brief Homilies on the Gospels, which are most studiously read." Under his name there circulated Homilies which in the 11th century were attributed by Guismund against Berengar, and under the Middle 12th century by Gratian; but they in no wise belong to the Syrian Eusebius. Those which circulate on the whole Gospel of the year, and on the seasons and saints, in which St. Gregory the Great is cited, and which are directed against Pelagian errors, are rightly considered by the learned — Baronius, Roberto Bellarmino, Philippe Labbe, Ludovico Elies Dupin, and others — to belong to Bruno of Asti, Bishop of Segni. And from the faith of Peter the Deacon, librarian of Monte Cassino, somewhat more than fifty that survive on faith are thought by the learned — Baronius, Bellarmino, Labbe, Dupin, and others — to be drawn from the writings of Eucherius of Lyon, Faustus of Riez, Caesarius of Arles, and similar Gallic bishops of that era. Sixtus of Siena pronounces them to be the rhapsodies of a Latin writer compiled from Latin Fathers, with a style not unlike Bede or Rabanus, he judges.]

32. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* Bk. 2, ch. 26; *De Conceptu Virginis*, ch. 18.
33. St. Bernard, Sermon 2 *De Assumptione Virginis*.
34. Remigius, on *Ps. 21*; Erardus, *Sermon de Nativitate Beatae Virginis*.
35. Hugh (of St. Victor), Bk. 1 (*Part. 1, lib. 2, cap. 5*) [abbreviation as in source].
36. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, this Distinction.
37. Matt. 1:21; Lk. 1:47.
38. St. Ambrose; St. Augustine; Fulgentius — testimonies cited in the preceding sections of this Distinction.
39. St. Ambrose, *In Ps. 118*, ad ultimum versum.
40. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 36.
41. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, this Distinction, §. B.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, a. 4. — Note: the Benedictine Fathers in the annotation to the praised passage of St. Augustine from *De Natura et Gratia* ch. 36, tom. 10, col. 97, edition of Antwerp 1700, hold the citation of St. Thomas (*ex presentia Distinctione 44, art. 3, ad 8*) to be too violent; and that what St. Thomas actually says there is that the B.V. was not purged from original and actual sin. The words of St. Thomas: "It must be said that purity is intensified by receding from the contrary, and therefore something created can be found than which nothing purer can be in created things, if no contagion of sin has defiled it; and such was the purity of the B.V., who was immune from original and actual sin; yet she was under God inasmuch as she had in her the power to sin." These words, however, reject the interpretation applied by the Author here, as a thoughtful reader will see. Concerning the opinion of St. Bernard, from Epistle 174, the annotation of Fr. Joannes Mabillonius is to be read, as that Epistle is one of the spurious ones added to the same Father's works.
43. St. Anselm, *De Conceptione Virginis*, ch. 18.
44. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 44, art. 3, ad 3.
45. Council of Basel, Session 36.
46. Sixtus IV, *Extravagans* beginning *Cum praeexcelsa*; in *Extravagantium communium lib. 3, Titulo De Reliquiis et Veneratione Sanctorum, cap. Grave nimis*. — Thereafter the following Pontiffs also issued constitutions on this question: Sixtus IV and Sixtus V, with added penalties; Paul V, whose decree (*anni scilicet 1617*) is cited; Gregory XV; and Alexander VII, whose constitution of 1661 begins *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum*, which is no. 114 among the constitutions of the same Pontiff, and is read in *Magni Bullarii* tom. 6, fol. 163, *editionis Romanae anno 1672*. It declares in favour of the pious opinion, that the Soul of the B.V. in its creation and infusion into the body was gifted with the special grace of the Holy Spirit, and preserved from original sin, and not only in favour of the Feast and the worship of the Conception of the same Virgin Deipara, mandating the constitutions

contained therein to be observed; and moreover all and singular persons, ecclesiastics as much secular as regular, of every Order and Regular Institute, mandated, as he commanded with precept, that in the Sacrifice and Divine Office celebrating both publicly and privately, they use no other name than that of the *Conceptionis* in its, and of other Pontiffs his predecessors' *Decretorum constitutionibus contentis*. Moreover Clement XI, in the most recent year namely 1709, mandated the Feast of the Immaculate Conception to be observed throughout the whole world with special precept.

47. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 174 (to the Canons of Lyon); St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, this Distinction.
48. St. Augustine, *In Ps.* 94.
49. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad populum Antiochenum* [Homily on the people of Antioch].
50. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 174.
51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, a. 4.
52. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 20, *In Joannem*; Hom. 45, *In Matthaeum*.
53. St. Basil, *Epistola ad Optimum*; St. Augustine, qu. 73, in *Quaestionibus Novi Testamenti*.
54. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 58 (*inter Augustini epistolas*); St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 109 in *Joannem*.
55. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 3, in *Festo Purificationis*.
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, a. 3.
57. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 24.
58. Sixtus IV, *Extravagans* beginning *Cum praeexcelsa*, in *Extravagantium communium lib. 3, Titulo De Reliquiis et Veneratione Sanctorum, cap. Grave nimis*; Urban IV, decree on the Office of Corpus Christi. — Council of Trent, Session 5, final decree on original sin, canon 6 (*negantes hominem semel iustificatum posse in tota vita peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare, hanc adjecerint exceptionem, nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de Beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia*).
59. Clement XI, special decree of 1709 mandating the universal observance of the Feast of the Immaculate Conception; also: Pius V, Constitution beginning *Super Speculam Domini*, edita anno 1570, which is Constitution 114 among his Constitutions, read in *Magni Bullarii* tom. 2, fol. 320, *editionis Lugdunensis anno 1673*; Paul V, Constitution of 1616, which is no. 97 among his Constitutions, found in tom. 3, *Magni Bullarii fol. 348, quae incipit Regis Pacifici*; Gregory XV, Constitution of 1622, which is no. 29 among his Constitutions, beginning *Sanctissimus Dominus Noster*, found in tom. 3, fol. 355; Alexander VII, Constitution of 1661 beginning *Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum*, found in tom. 6, fol. 163, *editionis Romanae anno 1672*. Dionysius Petavius, *Theologicorum dogmatum*, tom. 5, lib. 14, *De Incarnatione*, cap. 2, num. 3.
60. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, a. 2 [as cited in the section heading *S. Thom. ubi sup.*].
61. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* [here *In III Sent.*], dist. 3, on this Distinction [abbreviation as in source: *in hanc Distinctionem*].
62. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 44, a. 3, ad 3.
63. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [on this Distinction; *abbreviation as in source: in hanc Distinctionem*].
64. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [on this Distinction; *abbreviation as in source: in hanc Distinctionem*].
65. Franciscus de Maronius [Francis of Meyronnes], *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [on this same Distinction].
66. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [in the present Distinction; *abbreviation as in source: in praesentem Distinctionem*].
67. The Council of Basel, Session 36, definition on the Conception of the Virgin.
68. Pius II, retractatory Constitution (Bull) concerning the acts of the Council of Basel.
69. Sixtus IV, Constitution of 1483 (*Extravagantium communium lib. 3, Titulo De Reliquiis et Veneratione Sanctorum, cap. Grave nimis*); Pius V, Constitution *Super Speculam Domini* (1570), cited above in § II and the footnotes thereto.
70. The Florentine Synod (Council of Florence), decree on union with the Jacobites (*Cantate Domino*), defining that no one conceived of man and woman is freed from the dominion of the Devil except through faith in the Mediator who was conceived without sin.
71. Bede, *Martyrology* (died c. 735); Usuard, *Martyrology* (died c. 875); *Menologium Graecorum*.
72. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 174 (*Ad Canonicos Lugdunenses*).

73. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [in the present Distinction].
74. Pius V, Constitution *Super Speculam Domini* (1570); see footnote ⁶⁹ above.
75. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 94.
76. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Populum Antiochenum*, Homily 60.
77. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 3 [in this Distinction].
78. Cajetan, special treatise on the Immaculate Conception [abbreviation as in source: *Tractatu peculiari*].
79. 2 Pet. 1:19: "We have also a more sure word of prophecy" (*habemus firmiorem propheticum sermonem*).
80. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, art. 4.
81. Lk. 2:48–49; Jn. 2:4; Matt. 12:46–47; Mk. 3:31–32; 1 Jn. 1:8.
82. Origen, *Commentary on Luke 2* (*Et ipsi non intellexerunt verbum*).
83. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, Hom. 20 (on Jn. 2:3: "They have no wine"); *In Matthaeum*, Hom. 45 (on Matt. 12:47: "Behold thy mother and thy brethren").
84. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, on Lk. 2:49.
85. Maximus, Hom. 2 in *Epiphania Domini*.
86. Basil, *Epistola ad Optimum*; St. Augustine, qu. 73, *In Quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti*.
87. The epistle found among the letters of St. Augustine, Epistle 58 (= Epistle CXXI in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers).
88. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tract. 109.
89. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 36 (the same passage as cited above).
90. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 36: "Excepta, inquit, Sancta Virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini, cum de peccatis agitur, nullam prorsus habere volo quaestionem."
91. St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Psalmum 118*, on the last verse.
92. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginis*, ch. 18.
93. St. Bernard, *Sermo 2 de Assumptione Virginis*.
94. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23.
95. Footnote (b) in the source: a greater censure than rashness (*temeritas*) is considered deserved by the opinion that attributes even the slightest voluntary stain of sin to the Blessed Virgin. And indeed today, as Dionysius Petavius states (*Theologicorum dogmatum lib. 14, de Incarnatione cap. 2, num. 3*), no Catholic doubts this. Indeed all Catholics firmly and resolutely hold and consider it as established that the Blessed Virgin was pure and immune from even the lightest sin. See Medina, *In 3 partem S. Thomae*, q. 27, art. 4, in his exposition of the article, conclusion 1: "The first conclusion: it is a manifest error against Catholic truth to assert that the Blessed Mary had any actual sin. For in the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23, this conclusion is defined; and it is established from ecclesiastical tradition; and a preacher who seemed to assert the contrary at Rome while improperly explaining the authority of St. Augustine (from *Lib. quaest. Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, qu. 73) was compelled to recant publicly." Such an assertion is indeed contrary to the tradition, sense, and firm persuasion of the entire Catholic Church, which the General Synod of Trent has confirmed, and is therefore deserving of censure on the part of its author.
96. The work *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* is not by St. Augustine, nor by any reputable author.
97. Theophylact, *Commentary on Mark* (on Mk. 3); *Commentary on Luke* (omitting the earlier annotation on vainglory).
98. The Lord's Prayer (*Oratio Dominica*) recited by the Blessed Virgin not in her own person but on behalf of the entire body of the faithful, the exception being her singular privilege.
99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 27, art. 3.
100. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, Book I [II], ch. 24.
101. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, Book I, ch. 11.
102. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, Book V [IV], ch. 5.

103. St. Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 38 (*In Natalem Christi*) and Oration 42 (*In Pascha*).
104. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 2 *On the Nativity of the Lord* (*De Nativitate Domini*).
105. Bede, Homily *Super Missus est*, for the Feast of the Annunciation of the Lord.
106. *Glossa ordinaria*, on Lk. 1:35 ("The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee").
107. Bede, another Homily (unspecified in the source).
108. St. Bernard, Sermon 3 *On the Feast of the Purification* (*In Festo Purificationis*).
109. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Book III, ch. 2.
110. St. John Damascene, poem *On the Annunciation of the Virgin* (*De Annunciatione Virginis*).
111. Lk. 1:35.
112. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 32, art. 8.
113. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book X, ch. 20; *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, Book II, ch. 25; *Glossa ordinaria* on the Epistle to the Hebrews.
114. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, Book II, ch. 25 (text as quoted by Estius).
115. St. Augustine, *ibid.* (subsequent words).
116. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, Book II, ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. De Sacramentis cap. 5.*].
117. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30 (as noted by Estius).
118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 6, art. 4; and q. 33, art. 1 and 3.
119. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 86.
120. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 28.
121. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, Book XVIII, ch. 36 (otherwise ch. 35).
122. *Glossa ordinaria*, on Jer. 31 ("A woman shall compass a man").
123. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, final chapter; St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, Book II.

DISTINCTIO IV — ON THE CONCEPTION OF CHRIST AND THE DIVINE MATERNITY OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (*DE CONCEPTIONE CHRISTI ET DIVINA MATERNITATE BEATAE VIRGINIS*)

§ 1. [Concluding material from the preceding discussion] The Fifth General Council,¹ as reported by Nicephorus,² pronounces anathema upon anyone who holds that the body of Christ was first formed in the womb of the Virgin and thereafter united to the Word of God. Nor, moreover, is this at variance with the present doctrine — namely, what St. Augustine says³ when, treating that text of Jn. 2, "Forty and six years was this temple in building," he states that the perfection of the Lord's body was brought to completion for birth within the same number of days, just as the authority of the Church preserves, receiving it as handed down from our forebears, which he also proves by the words that follow. In agreement with this he writes⁴ as well. From these passages the *Glossa ordinaria* has been drawn, added to the scriptural locus and commenting on similar things. For these passages do not deny that the perfection of the Lord's body was accomplished at the very first moment of conception according to form, the disposition of members, and the truth of human nature, but — as the Master explains — they signify that distinction of members which, at the outset, on account of the smallness of the tiny body, was imperceptible, and which, in that number of days Augustine mentions, was made perceptible; such being the shaped figure of other human foetuses when at last formed.

§ I — *Why the conception of Christ is attributed to the Holy Spirit (Quare conceptio Christi tribuatur Spiritui Sancto)*

§ 2. Divine Authority hands down that Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit. For the Evangelist says that "Mary was found with child of the Holy Spirit"; and the Angel says to Joseph: "That which is born in her," he says, "is of the Holy Spirit"; and to the Virgin herself: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee"; and in the Creed we profess the Son of God to have been conceived of the Holy Spirit. It is asked, therefore, since the whole Trinity was operative in the Incarnation of the Son of God — as we were saying (at the First Distinction) — why that work, whether of the Incarnation or of the conception of the Son of God, is attributed in a special manner to the Holy Spirit.

§ 3. It is answered: for the reason that in the Scriptures the gifts of grace (*dona Gratiarum*), and whatsoever pertains to the sanctification of men, are customarily attributed to the Holy Spirit. Since there is no greater grace, and no more excellent gift than that which was conferred upon Christ according to His human nature — namely, that without any preceding merits, from the very beginning of His humanity, that very man should at the same time be God — and was therefore supremely good, holy and just, and one who

by nature could not sin, it is most fittingly that so great a benefit is ascribed to the Holy Spirit. Hence we too are reminded that we are justified from sins by that same grace through the operation of the Holy Spirit, through which it was brought about that the man Christ could commit no sin. There is therefore signified a twofold benefit, each the greatest and supremely gratuitous: one exhibited to that man, the other bestowed upon the whole human race through the Incarnation of that man.

§ 4. This reasoning, which we have set forth, is transmitted by St. Ambrose writing on Lk. 1,⁶ by St. Jerome in the Letter to Marcella (whose opening is *Mensuram*),⁷ and by Leo, Sermon 8 on the Nativity of the Lord,⁸ and more fully by St. Augustine.⁹ Moreover, that the conception of the Son of God is the greatest benefit of grace, St. Augustine repeatedly urges in the same works.¹⁰

§ 5. To the foregoing reasoning two other not incongruous reasons can be added. One: to signify that the conception of Christ was not unclean, such as is the conception of other men, who are begotten not without lust, but was holy and immaculate. For whatever has been done in a special manner is customarily attributed to the Holy Spirit; hence He is called in Rom. 1 "the Spirit of sanctification." The Angel seems to have hinted at this reasoning when, after those words, "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee," etc., he added, saying: "Therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." The other reason: to signify that the conception of Christ was brought about not by natural means but by a singular miracle. For miraculous works also are attributed in a special manner in the Scriptures to the Holy Spirit. Hence that text at Matt. 12: "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils." Likewise Is. 61, Joel 2, and Rom. 8,¹¹ where the power of miracles is attributed to the Holy Spirit. According to this reasoning, all the passages are rightly understood in which the conception of Christ is ascribed to the Holy Spirit; inasmuch as by this they clearly wish to exclude the natural mode of conception, by which from both sexes the generation of a human being takes place.

§ II — How Christ was conceived of the Holy Spirit (Quomodo Christus conceptus de Spiritu Sancto)

§ 6. From what has been said, it can be understood to some degree that Christ is not said to have been conceived of the Holy Spirit on the grounds that the Holy Spirit was in the place of seed or matter for the Virgin, out of which the flesh of Christ was to be formed. For it is an utterly absurd thought to imagine the Holy Spirit as a corporeal thing out of which a human body is constructed. Nor, again, is it said on the grounds that the Holy Spirit poured into the virginal womb a seminal matter received from elsewhere, or created out of nothing. For, according to the constant teaching of the Fathers, it must be believed that nothing additional came from any other source as matter for the formation and constitution of the body of Christ, but that the whole of it was taken from the substance of the Virgin — so that, on this consideration, one must acknowledge that the Blessed Virgin is in a higher sense the mother of God than any other woman is the mother of her son; inasmuch as from her the son receives not the whole substance of his body, as another woman's son does not receive it entirely from the father, but also a certain part from the father. In this sense, then, it is said: because not by the work of a man, but by the sole power and operation of the Holy Spirit, that body was conceived and formed in the womb of the Virgin, which, at the very moment of its formation, was assumed by the Son of God.

§ 7. Hence also in Rom. 1 Christ is said to have been "made of the seed of David," and in Gal. 4 "made of a woman": because, to be sure, his body was not procreated in the customary mode of generation, but was wrought by the singular operation of the Divinity — as is noted in the *Glossa ordinaria* (on that passage of Rom. 1).¹³ And this is what was signified to St. John Damascene when he says in bk. 3 (ch. 2) that the Son of God, not sowing seed but creating through the Holy Spirit from the most pure blood of the Virgin, compacted a body for himself — using the name "creation" to signify not that making which is from nothing, but a fashioning (*factura*) different from generation which comes from seed.¹⁴

§ 8. In the meantime, however, it is not to be denied altogether that the Holy Spirit was in the place of seed for the Virgin — something which we sometimes read among Orthodox writers. For in seed two formal characters (*rationes*) can be considered, which it has with respect to the body that is generated. One is insofar as it supplies matter to the body; the other is insofar as it has within itself a hidden power of fashioning the fetus into the shape and members of a human body. And indeed in the former formal character it belongs to the material cause; in the latter, to the efficient cause. Therefore, in the former consideration it is most rightly denied that the Holy Spirit was in the place of seed in that conception — in which sense St. Jerome speaks (in the *Explanation of the Creed to Damasus*).¹⁵ In the latter consideration, this very same thing is rightly granted; because what the power of seed accomplishes in the ordinary generation of human beings, the power of the Holy Spirit accomplished far more perfectly and abundantly in the conception and formation of the body of Christ. And it is in this sense that what St. Ambrose says in bk. 2 (*In Lucam*, ch. 7)¹⁶ — and is cited by St. Augustine in the book (*De Peccato originali*, ch. 40)¹⁷ — is to be understood: that the Holy Spirit poured an immaculate seed into the womb of the Virgin. For he means nothing other than that the Holy Spirit wrought in the womb of the Virgin what seed is accustomed to work; that is, as far as operation or efficacy is concerned, the Holy Spirit supplied the place of seed.

§ III — That the Holy Spirit is not rightly called the Father of Christ (Spiritus Sanctum non recte dici Patrem Christi)

§ 9. It is manifest from what has been said that the Holy Spirit is not rightly called the Father of Christ, nor Christ His son, even though He was conceived of Him. St. Augustine declares this to be so absurd — in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 38¹⁹ — that no ears of the faithful are able to endure it. The reason, moreover, is ready to hand: because a father, according to the proper meaning of the word, is called only one who communicates his own substance to another together with a likeness of nature. Now it is established that the Holy Spirit has not communicated to Christ His own substance — neither the divine substance, in which the Spirit proceeds from the Son and not, conversely, the Son from the Holy Spirit, nor the human substance, of which the Holy Spirit is not a partaker. Although, however, certain Scholastics — such as Durandus, Alexander of Hales, and a certain Leporinus, as Albert the Great reports in his commentary on this Distinction²⁰ — think that they can remove the absurdity of the expression by various qualifications, yet, because improper locutions are not to be extended, that manner of speaking is simply to be shunned; lest we be compelled to acknowledge two fathers in the Trinity — indeed, lest we be obliged, what sounds even more absurd, to confess that even the Son of God is by the same reasoning His own father, which will follow with equal logical force. For in truth the Holy Spirit accomplished nothing more in the conception of Christ than the other two Persons. The fuller explanation of this question is to be seen in St. Augustine at the place already mentioned.²¹

**§ IV — That the Blessed Virgin is truly and properly the Mother of God
(*Beatam Virginem vere et proprie esse Dei matrem*)**

§ 10. Certain of the ancient heretics simply denied that the Blessed Virgin was the mother of Christ, for the reason that they said Christ had drawn no substance from her: as the Valentinians, who attributed a celestial body to Christ, and the Manicheans, who assigned to Him a phantasmal body, and any others who held similar doctrines, concerning whom something has been said above (at the second Distinction).²³ St. Augustine appears to have noted this class of heretics when he writes in his commentary on Ps. 9,²⁴ saying that there had been certain most pernicious heretics who declared that Christ had had no mother.

§ 11. Others, however, acknowledged her indeed as the mother of Christ, but denied that she was *θεοτόκος* — that is, the God-bearer — as Photinus and Nestorius did, though from different and distinct foundations. For Photinus, following in the wake of the Ebionites (whose error we have discussed in connection with the same Distinction),²⁵ denied that Mary was the Mother of God for the reason that he said Christ was not God but a mere man, who had nevertheless made such progress through his virtues that he was at length given the name Son of God. Nestorius, however, was unwilling to confess her as the Mother of God because he divided the persons in Christ, saying that one was He who had been begotten from God the Father from eternity, different from that man who in time was born from the Virgin Mother — two sons, in short: one of God the Father, the other of the Virgin Mother; the former constituting God and the Son of God, the latter constituting man and the son of man, with the properties incommunicable to each other on account of the distinctness of the supposita (*suppositorum*). Since this doctrine was long since condemned, together with its author, in the Council of Ephesus (which was the third Ecumenical Council), once the foundation is overturned, what was built upon it is easily demolished — namely, that the Blessed Virgin is the mother not of God but only of a man. But more will be said concerning the Nestorian heresy in what follows.

§ 12. For the proof of the present Catholic doctrine, one argument as a most certain foundation contrary to Nestorius ought to suffice: that in Christ there is one person (*persona*) subsisting in two natures, the divine and the human — namely, the eternal person of the Son of God. This unity of person is necessarily consequent upon the communication of idioms (*idiomatum communicatio*), such that whatever is truly and properly said of that same person subsisting in the divine nature is truly and properly said of the same subsisting in the human nature, and conversely. Hence, just as we confess as Catholics that one and the same is God and man, the Son of God and the Son of man, so we ought to confess that God and the Son of God was born of the Virgin Mary, and consequently that the Virgin Mary is the Mother of God and the Mother of the Son of God.

§ 13. This argument is confirmed by most certain authority. For in the Apostles' Creed we confess the Son of God to have been conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, to have suffered, been crucified, to have died, etc. — and all these things by reason of that communication of idioms flowing from the unity of person which we have described. Nor is it difficult to fortify this doctrine with the testimonies of Scripture. For Is. 7 says that the name of the Son about to be born of the Virgin shall be Emmanuel — that is, God with us — just as Matt. 1 cites and interprets this.²⁶ And again in ch. 9 of the same Prophet, among the names of the Child whom he says has been born for us, he sets down these two: *Deus, fortis* — both of which among the Hebrews are names of God.²⁷ Likewise in Lk. 1 the Angel says to the Virgin: "What shall be born shall be called the Son of God" — that is, shall truly be the Son of God, so that He deserves rightly to be so called; for

to be called something is most frequently taken in this sense in Sacred Letters.²⁸ And Elizabeth, filled with the Holy Spirit, burst forth into these words: "Whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?" — understanding Lord to be without doubt God.²⁸ For by a similar argument Christ Himself elsewhere convicts the Pharisees that He is God, by propounding to them the question concerning the understanding of that passage, "The Lord said to my Lord."²⁹

§ 14. To the same conclusion what the Apostle says serves equally well: in Rom. 1 and Gal. 4, that the Son of God was made of the seed of David and made of a woman.³⁰ For the fact that in the former passage he adds "according to the flesh" (*secundum carnem*) does not imply any impropriety in the preceding expression, but designates the nature according to which the Son of God is said to have been made; nor does that qualification by any means remove the propriety of the expression. Moreover, whatever arguments prove either the Divinity of Christ or the communication of idioms in Him — all those same arguments are valid for proving that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. This is carried so far, indeed, that (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, in his letter to Demophilus,³¹ did not hesitate to call David the father of God, because from his seed Christ God was born. And it is recognized that this has been the Catholic faith of the Church from the beginning, by unbroken tradition, from which the faithful have always venerated the Blessed Virgin as the Mother of God. Wherefore Nestorius, who denied this, was condemned by the consent of the whole world in the Council of Ephesus, and there a decree was issued in these words: "If anyone does not confess that Emmanuel is according to the truth God, and therefore that the Holy Virgin is the God-bearer (*Dei genitricem*) — for she carnally brought forth the Word of God made flesh, according to what is written, 'The Word was made flesh' — let him be anathema."³²

§ 15. The same doctrine is learnedly expounded by Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2, and *De Incarnatione Christi*, ch. 2, 3, and 7),³³ by Petrus Diaconus (*in libro ejusdem tituli*, ch. 3),³⁴ by St. Cyril in many places in his disputations against Nestorius,³⁵ and by St. John Damascene in bk. 3, ch. 12.³⁶ To the same place St. John Damascene also adds these words: "But we shall by no means call the Holy Virgin Christipara (*Christiparam*); because the name was invented by Nestorius in order to remove the appellation of Deipara (*Deiparae*) by the frequency of this term." So he. It is further confirmed and approved that the name Deipara (*Deiparae*) properly belongs to and is fitting for the Blessed Virgin — confirmed first after the Council of Ephesus in the Council of Chalcedon, and then in the second Constantinople Council,³⁷ both of which were universal. On the latter, which rests on the authority of the former, canon 6 reads as follows: "If anyone abusively and not truly calls the Holy Virgin the God-bearer, or does so only by relation as being born of a mere man" — and, a few words intervening: "or if anyone calls her the mother of a man only, or the Christipara (*Christiparam*), as though Christ were not God, and does not specially and properly and according to the truth confess her to be the God-bearer — for the reason that before the ages God the Word was begotten, and in the last days became incarnate of her and was born of her — and who thus does not confess, as is proper, the holy Chalcedonian Council, that she is the God-bearer: let such a one be anathema." Thus far the canon.

§ 16. Now the fact that both the Fathers of this Council and St. John Damascene in the words cited above are unwilling that the Blessed Virgin be called Christipara (*Christiparam*) is not because they think she is truly not the mother of Christ and therefore advise abstaining from that word; but because words pertaining to our Religion and faith ought to be so free from every error that even those which are simply true, but have either been peculiarly appropriated by heretics or are in other ways close to error and bear the appearance of evil,

ought to be avoided by the faithful. Such was the word *χριστοτόκος* — Christipara — which had been craftily introduced by Nestorius so that the name Deipara might be driven from the speech of the faithful by the repeated use of this term. For the rest, because in later centuries that Nestorian error has been extirpated and the peril of a perverse understanding has been removed, it is now the case that the faithful everywhere rightly without distinction call the Blessed Virgin both the Mother of God and the Mother of Christ — even as in the prayers and hymns of the Church she is at times called mother and mother-bearer (*genitrix*) of Christ.³⁸

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1. The Fifth General Council is the Second Council of Constantinople, held at Constantinople under Pope Vigilius and the Emperor Justinian in the year 553, as Henricus Cardinalis De Noris demonstrates (*in Dissertatione De Synodo V, can.*) against the peculiar opinion of Christianus Lupus (*in Dissertatione De quinta Synodo*, ch. 6) who places it in the year 554. Furthermore, the anathema of Nicephorus, *Historia ecclesiastica* XVII, ch. 28, is the anathema from Anathematismus III, in the anathematisms against Origen drawn from Nicephorus bk. 17, ch. 28, as noted by the author; whose words are transcribed above.
 2. Nicephorus, *Historia ecclesiastica* XVII, ch. 28.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 5, treating Jn. 2 ("Forty and six years was this temple in building").
 4. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones* LXXXIII, q. 56.
 5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 32, a. 1.
 6. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* I.
 7. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Marcellam* (opening words: *Mensuram*).
 8. Leo the Great, *Sermo 8 de Nativitate Domini*.
 9. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 38 and following.
 10. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 36, 37, 40, and 41; *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 19; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15; *De Bono Perseverantiae*, last chapter.
 11. Is. 61; Joel 2; Rom. 8.
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 31, a. 5; q. 32, a. 2.
 13. *Glossa ordinaria* on Rom. 1.
 14. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 2.
 15. St. Jerome, *Explanatio Symboli ad Damasum* [abbreviation as in source].
 16. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* II, ch. 7.
 17. St. Augustine, *De Peccato originali*, ch. 40.
 18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 32, a. 3.
 19. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 38.
 20. Albert the Great, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 4 [abbreviation as in source: "in hanc Distinctionem scribens refert Albertus Magnus"].
 21. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 38 (and following).
 22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 35, aa. 3–4.
 23. Reference to Dist. 2 of the same book [abbreviation as in source: "ad 2. Distinctionem"].
 24. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 9* [abbreviation as in source: "in Psal. 9."].
 25. Reference to Dist. 2 of the same book [abbreviation as in source: "circa eamdem Distinctionem"].
 26. Is. 7; Matt. 1.
 27. Is. 9.

28. Lk. 1.

29. Reference to Ps. 109 (110): "Dixit Dominus Domino meo," as cited and expounded by Christ (cf. Matt. 22:44).

30. Rom. 1; Gal. 4.

31. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *Epistola ad Demophilum* [abbreviation as in source: "in Epistola ad Demophilum"].

32. Council of Ephesus (Third Ecumenical Council), anathema [abbreviation as in source: decree cited verbatim in the text].

33. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2; *De Incarnatione Christi*, ch. 2, 3, and 7.

34. Petrus Diaconus, *in libro ejusdem tituli* [i.e., *De Incarnatione Christi*], ch. 3.

35. St. Cyril, various works against Nestorius [abbreviation as in source: "compluribus locis contra Nestorium disputans"].

36. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 12.

37. Council of Chalcedon; Second Council of Constantinople [abbreviation as in source]; canon 6 cited.

38. Footnote (a) in the source: The Greek word *θεοτόκος* (God-bearer), and not merely Deipara, is shown by Petavius, bk. 5 (*De Incarnatione*, ch. 25, n. 1), to have been used by the ancient Fathers against Nestorius, to demonstrate that the Blessed Virgin bore something pertaining to the notions of bringing-forth, begetting, and conceiving: for *parere* (to bring forth) simply means to bear the burden of the womb — which is also said of those things which are not of themselves and properly begotten, as hens lay eggs. They are not said to generate eggs, because these are not similar to those that lay them, and this likeness is contained in the essential definition. But the Greek word *τίκτειν* already signifies to beget, and is said no less of the male than of the female, and also signifies to generate. Since, therefore, Christ is one and the same Divine Person in whom two natures are united, the Divine and the Human, and who according to the flesh was born in the likeness of the Mother, we ought to call the Blessed Virgin not merely Parens but Genitrix. Indeed, if from the common interpretation alone one understands Deipara or Dei Parens, Nestorius will not object. For he conceded that God had been brought forth (*peperisse*) in this sense.

DISTINCTIO V — ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE AND PERSON (*DISCRIMINIS INTER NATURAM ET PERSONAM EXPLICATIO*)

§ I — Explanation of the distinction between nature and person (Discriminis inter naturam et personam explicatio)

§ 1. Before we come to the question treated by the Master (in this Distinction), it must be explained what is signified by the name of Nature, and likewise what by the name of Person, and how these two differ from one another. Therefore, beyond those things which have been said by us concerning Nature and person (around Distinctions 23, 25, and 34 of Book I of the *Sentences*),² for a fuller declaration of the present doctrine concerning the mode of the union of the natures in Christ, it must be known first of all that ignorance of the distinction which must necessarily be established between nature and person gave occasion long ago to the greatest errors in the Church.

§ 2. For the Sabellians, inasmuch as they acknowledged a single nature in God, also confounded the persons, saying that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in reality the same. For which reason they also attributed the Incarnation and the Passion and the entire dispensation of the assumed man equally to all three Persons as to one, whence they were also called Patripassians. The Nestorians, on the other hand, rightly perceiving two natures in Christ, consequently thought that persons also should be distinguished in him, asserting another person of the Word assuming and another of the man assumed. But the Catholic faith, rightly distinguishing between nature and person, avoids both errors.

§ 3. For the nature of any thing is its essence. Although St. Bonaventure rightly notes that one ought to use the word *nature* rather than *essence* here, because *essence* signifies nature with abstraction, whereas *nature* signifies essence with movement. Furthermore, nature also contains several hypostases of the same thing, to which it is communicated substantially. Hence St. Basil in his Letter (to Gregory his brother)³ says: "Nature is that in which several distinct and singular things agree, and which is common to several things differing among themselves; on account of which agreement they are called co-essential" —

§ 4. Person, however, as defined by Boethius (in the book whose title is *On the Two Natures in One Person of Christ*),⁴ is "an individual substance of a rational nature": where by substance understand a thing subsisting in itself. Examples are Michael, Gabriel, Peter, Andrew, and other individuals of this kind. For each of these subsists through itself and has, as they say, its own subsistence (*subsistentia*). But the nature of any thing subsists not through itself and separately, but in another — namely in a person; or at least in a hypostasis or supposit (*suppositum*): the notion of hypostasis or supposit is broader than that of person, comprehending

indeed every individual and incommunicable substance of any nature whatsoever, since person is spoken of only in rational nature.

§ II — How much it matters whether something subsists in its own or in another's hypostasis (Quantum intersit utrum in propria an aliena hypostasi quippiam subsistat)

§ 5. Since every nature subsists in a hypostasis, and intellectual nature always subsists in a person, it nevertheless matters greatly whether a thing subsists in its own hypostasis or person, or indeed in another's — and that circumstance introduces a great diversity, as the Scholastics have subtly noted: namely when one and the same thing now has its own hypostasis and now another's. To make this clear by an example, let us suppose — at least for the purpose of instruction — that the rational soul separated from the body is a person and has its own proper hypostasis, as the Master holds, concerning which matter more will be said later in its proper place. If, therefore, the soul is again united to the body as the form of matter, so as to constitute with it one person of this man — say, John — then, since it subsists in another, namely in John, and is sustained by him, it no longer has its own hypostasis, any more than the remaining things that are in John: such as parts or accidents. All of these subsist in another's hypostasis — namely in John's. But if the body should re-engage the soul, not in such a manner that the soul gives it life and communicates vital operations, but only in such a way that it appears in it and moves it — just as a helmsman moves a ship, or an intelligence moves a heaven, or as good or evil angels sometimes assume bodies for themselves — then indeed, subsisting in the body only after that fashion, it will retain its own hypostasis; because even though it is in the body, it does not constitute with it one single thing in which it subsists.

§ 6. From this diversity it is understood first of all that the thing which is called John is one and not many, so long as soul and body subsist in his person; but that they are many and not one, if the soul is not united to his body as its form, but only governs and moves it, just as bodies assumed by angels are moved. And from this another conclusion is also drawn. For while soul and body subsist in the one person of John, whatever things are in the soul or in the body are likewise attributed to the person in which they subsist. And by reason of the soul this man — say, John — is called good or evil, learned or unlearned, spiritual, eternal; by reason of the body, tall or short, healthy or sick, corporeal, mortal. On the other hand, if the body of this man were to receive his soul only for the purpose of motion, and not also for animation and information, then that thing would not truly be said to be endowed with virtues or sciences, even though the soul existing in it after such a fashion were to abound in both sciences and virtues. The formal character (*ratio*) of this is taken from the distinction of persons or supposits (*suppositorum*). How much, moreover, the proposed example contributes to understanding the union of natures in Christ and to refuting the heresy of Nestorius will be more fully understood from what remains to be said in what follows.

§ III — That neither a nature nor a person assumed a person, but a person assumed a nature (Quod neque natura neque persona personam assumpserit, sed persona naturam)

§ 7. Among the four connections of extremes of the union made in Christ through the assumption of one by another — which the Master sets out in a four-part question (in the text) — two must be rejected as pertaining to the heresy of Nestorius: namely, that a person assumed a person, or that a nature assumed a person. One must be received as altogether Catholic, namely that a person assumed a nature. As for that position which holds that a nature was assumed by a nature, the place it is to occupy will be explained afterwards.

§ 8. The Catholic doctrine is proved against Nestorius from all those testimonies, both of Scripture and of the Fathers, as well as from the daily speech of the faithful, by which they acknowledge and confess the communion of idioms — that is, of the properties (*proprietas*) — of each nature in Christ. For, once this communion is posited, it necessarily follows that there is one single person (*persona*) in Christ, because it is necessary that all those things converge into one supposit (*suppositum*) which are attributes of one and the same singular thing. But that unique person can be conceived as none other than the eternal Person of the Son of God. For if you say it is a human person, which is nevertheless not the same as the Person of the Son of God, it will follow — which is most absurd — that the Person of the Son of God is not in Christ, but is either extinguished in the very incarnation of the Word, or wholly alien to it. It must therefore be admitted that the Person of the Son of God assumed not a person but the human nature.

§ 9. Furthermore, the Scriptures which establish the communion of idioms and, by consequence, the unity of person in Christ are of two kinds. For some attribute divine properties to the man and to the Son of Man; others, on the contrary, attribute human properties to God and to the Son of God. Of the former kind are the following and similar passages of Scripture. Is. 7 and 9: the boy to be born of a Virgin is called God. And Lk. 1: the Son of God. Matt. 16: when Christ asked about the Son of Man, Peter answered that he is the Son of the Living God. And Jn. 3: the Son of Man is said both to have descended from heaven and to be in heaven. The Apostle also, in Heb. 1 and 2, calls that man whom God anoints with the oil of gladness above his companions, and who was made a little lower than the angels, God and the Son of God — whose throne endures for ages, who remaining always the same is the Author and Creator of all things. And in Rom. 9, Christ, born according to the flesh from the Jews, is said to be God over all, blessed. Of the latter kind are the following and similar passages: Jn. 1: "The Word was made flesh." Acts 20: "God acquired the Church with his own blood." Rom. 1 and Gal. 4:⁶ the Son of God is said to have been made of the seed of David and of a woman. Phil. 2:⁷ He who was in the form of God and thus equal to God received the form of a servant in the likeness of men, and humbled himself even to the death of the cross. 1 Cor. 2:⁸ the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified. And most clearly of all in the Creed, we confess the Only-begotten Son of God to have been conceived, born, suffered, crucified, dead, buried, and so forth. Finally, what 1 Jn. 4 says — "Every spirit that dissolves Jesus is not from God" — pertains not only to those who deny either the divine or the human nature in Christ, but also to those who divide Christ into two persons, each of which would have its own discrete and incommunicable properties. For this is most properly to dissolve Jesus, to tear asunder Christ who is one into two persons. There must therefore be acknowledged one unique person in Christ, to whom are attributed both the properties proper to the divine nature and those proper to the human nature, and

who, possessing the divine nature from eternity, received the human nature in time. This doctrine was expressed in his Creed by Athanasius, when he speaks thus of Christ: "Who, although he is God and man, is nevertheless not two but one Christ. One, however, not by the conversion of the divinity into flesh, but by the assumption of humanity into God; one altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person," and so forth.⁹

§ 10. Thereafter, against the Nestorian heresy, the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus expounded this doctrine more fully; among whose anathemas, that of Blessed Cyril, canon 3, reads as follows: "If anyone divides in the one Christ the hypostases (*hypostases*) after the union, joining them only by a connection that is according to dignity or authority, and not rather by that which is according to natural union, let him be anathema." And canon 5: "If anyone dares to say that Christ is a God-bearing man (*θεοφόρος*), and not rather God in truth, let him be anathema."¹⁰ For Nestorius used this name *θεοφόρος* — that is, "God-bearer" — to indicate the distinction of persons out of which he wished Christ to be composed. Other canons ascribed to that same Council speak to the same effect. This doctrine was repeated, albeit on the occasion of different heresies, in the three Oecumenical Councils that immediately followed: the Council of Chalcedon, the second and third Councils of Constantinople.¹¹ It is treated learnedly by St. Cyril in those works written by him against Nestorius, and by Pope Leo in various sermons and epistles, where it is pressed upon the reader.¹² One may also see Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1)¹³ and the same Fulgentius together with Peter the Deacon in two books (*De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*),¹⁴ St. Gregory, Homily 38 (*in Evangelia*),¹⁵ St. John Damascene, bk. 3 (ch. 2 and the following chapters),¹⁶ who treats this argument no less learnedly than copiously.

§ 11. To these it will be permissible to add the declaration that is demanded by reason. For if the Son of God assumed some other person of a man, that man who is called Christ would differ but little from other holy men who are pleasing to God. For the Son of God comes even to such persons and makes his dwelling in them, as Scripture testifies — Jn. 24.¹⁷ And since there God and man have their own proper hypostases (*hypostases*), in Nestorius's sense it may rightly be said that the Person of God assumes at least for a time the person of the man: inasmuch as he is drawn toward him, united to him by friendship and grace, and moreover by the gifts of prophecy and miracles which he works through him. For there too God and man have diverse properties and attributes, so that neither can that man, to whom God is thus conjoined, be truly called God; nor, conversely, can God be called man; nor are both one and the same singular thing. All of which has a far different bearing in Christ, as is manifest from what has been said above and from our Catholic Faith. For Christ is one — not through friendship or grace, or through gifts and operations of the Holy Spirit, by which that man is conjoined to God — but by the unity of the Divine Person (*Personae Divinae*) assuming the human nature. For from this union alone there follows in him the communication of all properties of each nature. Add, moreover, that when with Nestorius we distinguish persons in Christ, not only will the truth of the Incarnation of the Word of God be abolished, but the entire mystery of human redemption will likewise be evacuated, as Leo, Fulgentius, and other Fathers carefully noted.¹⁸ For if the Son of God was neither born in time, nor suffered, nor died, but all these things were done in a purely human person, then the human race was not redeemed through the death of the Son of God; and hence was not redeemed at all, since it could not be redeemed in any other way than by the passion of one who would be of infinite dignity.¹⁹

§ IV — Reply to the objections raised against this (Responsio ad ea quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 12. It is answered: one must now briefly consider the arguments by which it seems to be shown that a person was assumed by the Son of God. The first of these is taken from the definition of person (*persona*). For a person (as defined above by Boethius) is the individual substance of a rational nature (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*). But Christ assumed the human nature not in the species but in the individual (*atomo*), that is in the singular — as St. John Damascene teaches, bk. 3 (ch. 11).²¹ Therefore he assumed an individual substance of a rational nature; and by consequence, a person.

§ 13. Furthermore: the Fathers everywhere acknowledge and say that a man or the Son of Man was assumed — a term which is significative not of the Son as such, but of the Son insofar as he subsists in person. For every man is a person. So St. Augustine speaks most frequently, as in the book *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 11 and 12; Sermon 8 (*de Verbis Domini*);²² Tract 28 in *Joannem*; *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 4; and elsewhere.²³ Furthermore, St. Anselm, in the book *De Incarnatione*,²⁴ says that the Son of God assumed not man in the common sense but this man. But this man is without doubt an individual substance. Again, Innocent III (*in quadam Decretali*)²⁵ says that the Person of the Son of God, when it was incarnate, consumed (*consumpsit*) the person of the man. Which the third anathematism of Cyril also seems to imply. There was therefore in that place a person of the man —

§ IV — Reply to the objections raised against this (Responsio ad ea quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 14. Reply must now be made briefly to the arguments by which it is seen to be shown that the person assumed is from the Son of God. The first of these is taken from the definition of *person*. For a person (by the definition of Boethius, given above) is an individual substance of a rational nature: but Christ assumed human nature not in the species but in the atom, that is, in an individual — and that individual is nothing other than a created supposit (*suppositum*), which is the person of the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person. To this we reply in the following way, following St. Thomas.²⁷ The Son of God did indeed assume human nature in an atom, that is, in an individual; but that individual is nothing other than the supposit (*suppositum*) already constituted, which is the person of the Son of God. Others reply differently, saying that in the notion (*notio*) of person, beyond singularity and incommunicability, there is required also a certain dignity — a dignity that is taken from a more noble property. Since, therefore, human nature in Christ exists, but is conjoined to the most noble and most perfect nature, namely the divine nature, it comes about that human nature, even though it is a singular nature, cannot have the character (*ratio*) of a person; because it does not subsist of itself.

§ 15. To the authorities of the Fathers it must be said that they spoke improperly and sometimes less carefully — especially those who lived before the rise of Nestorianism — when they used the word "man" meaning the human nature. Yet wherever those same Fathers wished to speak more circumspectly and properly, they said not "man" but "humanity" was assumed by the Word. In this way the later theologians, and especially the Scholastics, have spoken more precisely. For in matters that pertain to Religion we must hold to an exact formulation (*ad certam regulam*), as St. Augustine says.²⁸ The words of St. Anselm too bear the same

interpretation.²⁹ Nor did he wish to say anything other than what St. John Damascene says — that human nature was assumed by Christ as an individual (*in individuo*). Furthermore, the word "prevention" (*praeventa est*) in the words of Innocent III does not signify the destruction of something that already existed, but the prohibition and prevention of something that would otherwise have come to be: for the personality of the human nature was prevented by the Divine Person in Christ.

§ 16. To the argument proposed in the last place it must be replied that soul and flesh together constitute a person when both are joined without being joined to something more noble; but they do not constitute one when they exist united in this way. They do indeed constitute a complete and per se subsisting (*per se subsistens*) substance, namely a rational substance. But in Christ both are joined to a more noble nature — that is, the Person of the Son of God — and therefore they do not constitute a person of their own.

§ 17. It must be noted finally that, although in the Trinity nature (*Natura*) and person (*Persona*) do not differ really but only conceptually (*ratione tantum*), as was established in the third book; yet in created things these two must necessarily be distinguished according to reality (*secundum rem*), as St. Thomas teaches.³⁰ Hence from the assumption of a nature it should by no means be seen to follow that at the same time a person or hypostasis is also understood to have been assumed.

§ V — Whether the Divine nature assumed the human nature? (An Divina natura naturam humanam assumpserit?)

§ 18. To that branch of the proposed question — whether the nature assumed the nature — it must be answered affirmatively together with the Master (of the Sentences); although that which is called assuming a nature is not attributed so properly to a nature as to a person. For in the Word's assuming, two things are contained: one is to be the principle of that singular action which we call the assumption; the other is to be its term (*terminus*). Now, it belongs to the Divine Nature according to itself (*secundum seipsam*) to be the principle of the assumption, inasmuch as the assumption itself was accomplished by its power. But to be the term of the assumption does not belong to it according to itself, but by reason of the person in which it subsists and from which it is not really distinct. And therefore, first and most properly, the person is said to have assumed the nature; but secondarily the nature also is truly and rightly said to have assumed, or to have taken to itself, the nature — because it assumed it to the Person of the Word, from which, in the character (*ratio*) of a supposit (*suppositum*), it does not differ, as the Father and the Holy Spirit differ, who accordingly are not to be said to have assumed the nature.

§ 19. This doctrine, moreover, is consonant with the sentences of the Fathers. For Fulgentius says³² that that nature which ever remains begotten from the Father received our nature without sin from a mother. And (toward the end of the same chapter) speaking of the humanity of Christ he adds: "Which it bears united to itself by the highest Divinity." And St. Augustine³³ affirms that the form of God received the form of a servant. That by "the form of God" the nature of God is to be understood is manifest from those words of the Apostle to the Philippians (Phil. 2): "Who, being in the form of God," etc.

§ 20. Furthermore, this too is truly said, according to the attestations of the holy Fathers — that the Divine Nature was incarnate — in this sense, namely, that it was united through the Person of the Son of

God, as has now been said. Peter the Deacon affirms this proposition³⁴ and proves it by the authority of St. Cyril who says the same thing in the Epistle to Successus the Bishop.³⁵ St. John Damascene also affirms it³⁶ when he says that the whole and perfect nature of the Deity was incarnate in one of its hypostases, that is, united to human nature. And a little after he says: "When we say," he adds, "that the nature of the Word was incarnate, according to the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, we say that the Deity was united to flesh." He repeats similar things in chapter 7 and chapter 11, citing again the authority of the same Cyril. Now Cyril has this both in the Epistle just cited and in the Council of Chalcedon, Action 1.³⁷

§ 21. However, it does not follow from these statements that the Divine Nature became flesh, just as we confess that the Word was made flesh. For that expression *incarnari* ("to be incarnate") admits of a twofold interpretation. For either a thing is said to be incarnate because it unites flesh to itself, or assumes the nature of flesh — in which sense we have already shown that the Divinity is truly said to be incarnate: "For it signifies nothing other than two natures ineffably united — one nature of God the Word incarnate," as Peter the Deacon says at the place cited above. Or a thing is said to be incarnate because by that very incarnation it becomes flesh or man. This latter sense is alien to the mind of the Fathers when they said that the Divine Nature was incarnate. For according to their doctrine, and according to the manifest truth of the matter, it is plainly false that the divine nature by the assumption of flesh was made flesh or man, and much less that it was converted into human nature — which is what could also be understood to be signified by such an expression. For it was not a conversion of nature into nature that was effected by the Incarnation, but a nature was conjoined to a nature in the unity of person.

§ VI — *That the union of the incarnate Word was not made in nature*
(Unionem Verbi incarnati non esse factam in natura)

§ 22. Certain persons, wishing to recede as far as possible from the error of Nestorius, so posited the unity of person in Christ that they also attributed to Him a unity of nature, teaching that the union of the two natures, Divine and human, was made in nature. Thus taught Eutyches, Dioscorus, Timothy, Severus, and others after them called the Acephali, whom the heresy of the Monothelites subsequently followed, drawing its origin from the same source. All of whose errors the Church condemned at the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth General Councils. Although all these seemed to agree in the same doctrine — insofar as they attributed a single nature to Christ — they differed among themselves greatly in the manner of constituting that union.

§ 23. For some declared that single nature which they attributed to Christ to be composed of two natures, those nonetheless remaining intact. Others said it resulted from those same natures being mixed and transmuted into a third nature different from both. And among those who posited the natures as remaining, some considered them as perfect, yet united to one another by composition itself, in the manner in which a house is made from stones and timber. Others, however, considering those same natures as imperfect, posited that they were united in the manner in which something simply one is constituted from essential parts, as a man is constituted from soul and body. Those who supposed the natures to be mixed and confused into some third thing followed in natural things that mode by which a mixed body is made from elements.

§ 24. But all these modes, as absurd and impossible, together with the principal dogma of a single nature in Christ, the Church long since rejected. For by the first mode — whereby natures perfectly remaining are

united — there is not constituted anything simply one, but only one in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*). And in this way there would not really be simply one nature in Christ, as those people wish, but one only by composition, in the manner of a house or a heap. The second mode, namely that whereby imperfect things are composed, cannot be attributed to Christ, because each nature in Christ is perfect and complete; so that both cannot concur to the constitution of one nature, as soul and body come together for the composition of human nature as act (*actus*) and potency (*potentia*) — each of them therefore being in itself imperfect. The third mode, moreover, can be applied to the mystery of the Incarnation only most absurdly: both because it would follow that the Divine Nature is mutable and convertible into something else, and because according to this mode of union Christ would be neither God nor man, but something diverse from both — in the manner of what is mixed in natural things.

§ 25. Furthermore, it appears that Eutyches also commended to himself yet another mode of nature's union in Christ — as is gathered from the letters and sermons of Pope Leo I (the Great).³⁹ For while he confessed the union of the two natures in Christ, he nevertheless so described the effect of that very union, that from the two natures one alone — namely the divine — would remain; by no means permitting the substance of the other, that is the human, to remain. "Which," says Leo, "could only be accomplished either by the consumption or by the separation of the human nature from the Divine,"⁴⁰ as he says in Sermon 8 *De Nativitate Domini*, and repeats similar things in Sermon 6 *De Jejuniis septimi mensis*, and in the Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul.⁴¹ And Flavianus, Patriarch of Constantinople, attributes the same view to Eutyches in the two epistles written to Leo (which are contained in the volume of the letters of Leo).⁴² Of the same last heresy one may see in St. Augustine (*Ad Quod vult Deum*) what pertains to the Eutychians, and the second-to-last heresy, which is that of the Timotheites, who from the opposite side posited the Divinity of the Word converted into flesh — just as Eutyches said that the humanity was absorbed by the very Incarnation of the Word. Although that extreme portion of his book is not by Augustine, but has been supplied by another in place of an appendix.

§ 26. St. John Damascene disputes generally against all those who posit a singularity of nature in Christ⁴³ following the doctrine of the preceding Councils, and most especially of the Council of Chalcedon, in whose Creed it is read thus: "We confess that in the last days the Only-begotten Son of God is to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation — the difference of natures never being taken away by reason of the union." To the same point pertains that statement of the Athanasian Creed concerning Christ: "One, however, not by conversion of the Divinity into flesh, but by assumption of the humanity into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person." — and what follows: "For as the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ." As if it were a consequence that, just as from a rational soul and flesh there is composed one human nature, so from the two natures, Divine and human, the nature of Christ is composed. For that similitude produced by Athanasius does not hold in every respect, inasmuch as it was adduced for this purpose only: that through it the personal unity of Christ subsisting in two natures might be declared — as we also noted (around the second distinction of this book) in the explanation of certain words of St. John Damascene.⁴⁴

§ VII — Whether a separated soul is a person (Utrum anima separata sit persona)

§ 27. That a rational soul separated from the body is a person is the opinion of the Master (§ E.), who says that a soul is not a person by reason of its being united to something else as a personalizing principle, but when it exists by itself. "A soul separated from a body," says Hugh of St. Victor,⁴⁶ "is a person." The same is the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor, *Sentences*, bk. 2.⁴⁷ Yet this moved some to hold that a soul united to a body is not a person — since, they argued, it exists in another, namely in the body, and therefore is not by itself and separately subsisting. That which in a rational nature seems sufficient for the formal character (*ratio*) of a person is, however, differently maintained by the common and more probable teaching of the Scholastics: namely, that a soul is neither conjoined to a body nor separated from it as a person. So St. Thomas teaches⁴⁵ — and, writing in this Distinction, Bonaventure and others agree. Their reasoning is: because not every particular substance is a supposit (*suppositum*) or person, but only that in which a complete nature of the species is found. Hence, just as integral parts — such as the hand, the foot, the eye — are not supposits, nor consequently persons, so neither are essential forms; so that a rational soul, even though it subsists separately, does not, however, have the esse of something complete in the nature of some species, but retains nonetheless the nature of a part; and consequently it inclines toward union with the body, so that together with it it may constitute a complete and perfect nature.

§ 28. Furthermore, if a rational soul united to a body is not a person, much less will it be a person when separated from the body. For on the one hand, by a violent separation from the body — which is contrary to nature — there accrues to it the dignity of a person; and on the other hand, it would lose that same dignity again when it is restored to the body. Both of which conclusions are absurd. Therefore,⁴⁸ it is to be concluded that a rational soul, even when separated, is not a person.

§ I — Explanation of the three opinions which the Master pursues in this Distinction (Explicatio trium opinionum quas hac Distinctione prosequitur Magister)

§ 29. The Master, inquiring in what sense certain propositions by which the Incarnation of the Son of God is expressed are to be understood, differs in their exposition in the next Distinction, and adduces in this Distinction three diverse opinions: according to how those propositions receive a different interpretation. Where it must be carefully noted that the first and third opinions, which the Master here recounts, are not so much opinions as heresies pertaining to the condemned dogma of Nestorius, whereas the second is the complete sentence of Catholic faith. For that this may be more fully understood, it must be known that the Nestorians were various in denying the divinity of Christ the man, and did not sufficiently agree among themselves. For some confessed Christ to be God, but in name only — yet with grave interpretations they subverted the Catholic sense of their confession, while having recourse to figures and tropes, saying Christ is called God either because God dwells in him, or because by one will he is entirely with God, or because of the greatness of the honor and the singularity of the conjunction by which that man was accounted worthy of being with God. This, therefore, is the opinion which the Master recounts first: the one according to which

two hypostases (*hypostases*) in Christ are posited — of God and of man — and which is proper to Nestorius himself.

§ 30. Moreover, others of them removed altogether the appellation of God from Christ, and were accustomed to subscribe at times to the most extreme sayings — that he would suffer more in the future. Their dogma was that Christ was clothed with flesh and soul as if with a garment, and accordingly, just as a garment by which a man is clothed is in no way called a man by a trope, so likewise they denied that Christ could be called God, though God might be covered by him as by a garment; and for that reason that man was, to some degree, far below God in honor, and was worthy of some honor. And this is the opinion which the Master recounts in the third place. Indeed Nestorius himself seems to have held something of this sort — as is sufficiently clear from the Epistle of St. Cyril⁵⁰ to Nestorius (the epistle numbered 10, and the letter to Acacius which is numbered 14). In which two passages these things are narrated and condemned as being Nestorius's opinions about Christ: "I venerate him who is clothed, on account of him who is clothed. I adore the invisible on account of the visible."

§ 31. Now the opinion which is placed second by the Master is, without doubt, the very Catholic faith by which we believe and confess Christ to be God and man — yet not two but one Christ. One, I say, not by confusion or conversion of substance, but by unity of person (*persona*). Through which union it comes about, as we showed above, that there is in Christ a certain alternation of the properties of both natures — just as St. John Damascene speaks in bk. 3,⁵¹ (ch. 4) — so that, namely, the properties of the Son of God are attributed to the man, and the human properties and accidents are attributed to God, and that truly and above mere figures of speech — just as happens in other things: which, though they be of diverse nature, nevertheless subsist in the same hypostasis (*hypostasis*).

§ 32. Now, since this Catholic doctrine has been confirmed abundantly by what we have said concerning the prior Distinction, nothing need be added here for its confirmation beyond what the Master adduces; nor need one labor in refuting the first opinion — with whose primary arguments we dealt in the superior Distinction (*superiori Distinctione*). Of the third opinion let us only add this: that it is destroyed by the same arguments by which the first is destroyed and the second is built up. For if there is one person of God and man in Christ, it plainly cannot be said that God willed to appear to mortals clothed only with a garment; for a garment and he who is clothed are not one person, but distinct supposita (*supposita*), if nonetheless a garment may be called a supposit, since it is an artificial thing. Moreover, no one, unless most absurdly, could say that the man who puts on a garment becomes God, and that God is made a man by putting on the garment — just as we are bound to believe and confess according to that word: "The Word was made flesh" (Jn. 1). Finally, there is no communion of properties between a man and a garment, such as we have shown to exist in Christ between God and man. Now what the Apostle says of Christ in Phil. 2 — "made in the likeness of men and found in habit (*habitu*) as a man" — does not at all support this error, no more than do those sentences of the Fathers by which they sometimes compare the human nature of Christ clothed upon as a garment, saying God assumed the nature invisible in visible flesh, as St. Augustine, bk. 3 (*De Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 10; and *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 4; *Item* bk. 9, *De Civitate*, ch. 17; and *In Oratione de quinque haeresibus*, ch. 5)⁵² — and other similar passages from St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and St. Hilary cited at the Master's places. For in the words of the Apostle *habitus* signifies not a garment, but a form, figure, or likeness — in Greek *σχῆμα*. Nor does the Apostle wish anything other than that the Son of God, who was equal to the Father in the form of God, assumed the form of a servant, became like the rest of men — a true man as from eternity he was true God.

The Fathers indeed wished by those improper locutions to signify that God the invisible assumed human nature, made visible in flesh — just as a garment makes men who wear it conspicuous and distinguishes them from others. Although this can also signify that human nature is conjoined to the Deity as something more subordinate, just as a garment is joined to the man rather than the contrary.

§ II — Whether the person of Christ is rightly called composite (Persona Christi an recte composita dicatur)

§ 33. Since in the person of the Son of God two natures, joined to each other and united, subsist⁵⁴ —

§ VII — Whether the separated soul is a person (Utrum anima separata sit persona)

§ 34. The rational soul, once separated from the body, is a person — this is the opinion of the Master⁵⁵ (§ E.), who says that the soul is not a person when united to something else naturally, but that it is a person when it exists by itself. "For when separated from the body," he says, "it is a person, just as an Angel is a person." The same is the position of Hugh of St. Victor.⁴⁷ What moved them to hold this view was that the soul, once separated from the body, stands by itself and apart. This, in a rational nature, seems sufficient for the formal character (*ratio*) of a person. But the more common and more probable teaching of the Scholastics holds the contrary: namely, that the soul is neither a person when joined to the body, nor when separated from it. So St. Thomas teaches,⁴⁵ and in their commentaries on this Distinction, St. Bonaventure and others. The reason for this is: not every particular substance is a hypostasis or person, but only that in which is found the complete nature of a species. Hence, just as integral parts — such as the hand, foot, and eye — are not hypostases or persons, so neither are essential parts; as for example the rational soul, even when separated. For although it subsists by itself, it does not thereby have complete *esse* in the nature of any species, but retains nonetheless the nature of a part; and consequently it retains an inclination toward the body, together with which it constitutes, as it were, a perfect and complete nature.

§ 35. Furthermore: if the soul conjoined to the body is not a person, as the Master himself acknowledges, much less will it be a person once separated from the body. For otherwise, by the separation from the body — which is violent and contrary to nature — the dignity of personhood would be acquired by it, and then the soul would lose that dignity again when restored to the body. Both of these consequences are absurd.

§ I — Explanation of the three opinions which the Master pursues in this Distinction (Explicatio trium opinionum quas hac Distinctione prosequitur Magister)

§ 36. The Master, inquiring in what sense certain propositions by which the Incarnation of the Son of God is expressed are to be understood, and deferring a fuller exposition of them to the next Distinction, sets forth in this Distinction three diverse opinions, according to which those propositions receive a different

interpretation. Here it must be diligently noted that the first and third opinions recounted by the Master are not so much opinions as heresies pertaining to the condemned dogmas of Nestorius; whereas the second is the complete doctrine of the Catholic faith. That this matter may be more fully understood, it must be known that the Nestorians were various in their denial of the Divinity of Christ the man, and did not sufficiently agree among themselves. For certain of them did indeed confess with words that Christ is God, yet subverted the Catholic sense of their confession by perverse interpretations; and having recourse to figures and tropes, they said that Christ was called God for this reason: either because God dwelt in him, or because he was of one will with God in all things, or on account of the divine operation in him — inasmuch as God, through him, had wrought as great works as through no other — or, finally, on account of the greatness and uniqueness of honor whereby that man would be deemed worthy of honor, by reason of God conjoined to him. This therefore is that opinion which the Master recites in the first place, according to which two hypostases in Christ are posited — of God and of man — and which was properly the opinion of Nestorius himself.

§ 37. Moreover, certain others removed altogether from Christ the title of God, and declared that they would sooner suffer the utmost extremities rather than ever subscribe to such a form of speech. But their dogma was this: that Christ had been clothed with flesh and soul as with a garment; and consequently, just as a garment with which a man is clothed is in no way called a man — not even by trope — so they denied that Christ could be called God, even though God was concealed beneath him as beneath a garment; and for that reason that man would be worthy of some honor, but far below God. And this is the opinion which the Master recited in the third place. That Nestorius himself also, as if inconsistent with himself, had some such sentiment, is sufficiently clear from the Epistle of St. Cyril⁵⁷ — in the first of which the following words of Nestorius concerning Christ are reported and condemned: "On account of him who put on the man, I venerate him who was put on. On account of the Invisible, I adore the Visible."

§ 38. Now the opinion placed by the Master in the second position is, beyond all doubt, the Catholic faith itself, by which we believe and confess that Christ is God and man, yet not two but one Christ. One, I say, not by confusion or conversion of substance, but by unity of person (*unitate personae*). Through which union it comes about, as we showed above, that there is in Christ a certain mutual exchange (*alternatio*) of the properties of either nature — as St. John Damascene expresses it⁵¹ — so that, namely, the properties of the Son of God are attributed to the man, and the properties and accidents of the man are attributed to God; and this truly and without trope, in no different way than it occurs in other things: which, though diverse in nature, nevertheless subsist in the same hypostasis. Since, moreover, this Catholic doctrine has been abundantly confirmed by what we said in connection with the preceding Distinction, nothing need here be added to confirm it, beyond what is adduced by the Master; just as there is likewise no need to labor at refuting the first opinion, whose principal arguments we have also already dissolved (in the preceding Distinction).

§ 39. Concerning the third opinion, let us add only this: that it is destroyed by the same arguments by which the first is destroyed and the second established. For if there is in Christ one person of God and man, it certainly cannot be said that God appeared to mortals clothed in the man no differently than in a garment; since a garment and he who is clothed in a garment are not one person, but distinct supposita (*supposita*) — if indeed a garment can be called a suppositum (*suppositum*), since it is an artificial thing. Furthermore, no one could say without the grossest absurdity that a man who puts on a garment becomes the garment; but we must believe and confess that God was made man, according to that text, "The Word was made flesh" (Jn 1:14). Finally, there is no communion of properties between a man and a garment of the sort which we have

shown to exist in Christ between God and man. Now what the Apostle says of Christ in Phil. 2: "made in the likeness of men, and found in fashion (*habitu*) as a man," by no means supports the said error, nor do those sayings of the Fathers whereby they sometimes compare the human nature of Christ to a garment and say that God was clothed in flesh or in man — as St. Augustine does,⁵⁸ as well as other passages cited from the same St. Augustine, from St. Gregory, and from Hilary, as adduced by the Master. For in the words of the Apostle, *habitus* does not signify a garment, but form, figure, or likeness — in Greek *σχήμα*. Nor does the Apostle mean anything other than that the Son of God, who was in the form of God equal to the Father, having assumed the form of a servant, was made like to other men — that is, a true man, just as from eternity he was true God. The Fathers, moreover, by employing such locutions improperly, wished to signify that God, invisible by nature, was made visible by assuming flesh — just as a garment usually renders men conspicuous and distinguishes them from others. Although it can also be signified that human nature is conjoined to the Deity as something more subordinate, just as a garment is joined to the man rather than the contrary.

§ II — Whether the person of Christ is rightly called composite (Persona Christi an recte composita dicatur)

§ 40. Since in the person of the Son of God two natures, joined to each other and united, subsist, the question arises whether the person of Christ can rightly be called composite (*composita*). Very many of the Scholastics — as St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others — consider this manner of speaking not sufficiently proper, for the reason that composition (*compositio*) properly signifies the union of parts coming together for the constitution of some whole — as soul and body for the constitution of a man. On this account it is manifest that the person of Christ is not composite in that sense. For the two natures in Christ are not united to constitute the person, inasmuch as the person pre-existed from eternity before any union of natures; nor can the Divine Nature, which is most perfect, have any composition by way of parts, because a part signifies something imperfect and is ordered to its whole as to something more perfect.

§ 41. However, by the authority of the Fathers and the Councils it is plainly shown that one must grant that the person of Christ is composite from two natures. Thus St. John Damascene frequently speaks in this way,⁵⁹ as in book 3, questions 5 and 7, and in book 4, chapter 5; and in chapter 4 of book 3 he has these words: "In our Lord Jesus Christ we recognize two natures and one hypostasis composed of both." And in chapter 5 of the same: "We also say two natures existing in one composed hypostasis, in one Christ." And in chapter 7: "The hypostasis of the Word which previously was simple has become composite, being composed indeed of two perfect natures — of Divinity and humanity." And in book 4, chapter 5: "The hypostasis of God the Word before the Incarnation was simple and incorporeal; but made incarnate, it became a composite hypostasis from Deity and assumed flesh."

§ 42. To this also pertains what the Master cites under the title of St. Augustine (from the *Sententiae* of Prosper):⁶⁰ that the person of Christ stands and is constituted from God and man — even if today this text is not read either in St. Augustine or in Prosper, it is nonetheless found in Lanfranc writing against Berengarius (before the midpoint of the work) and in Gratian.⁶¹ And St. Augustine has similar words in book 1 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 17, and in Sermon 8 (*De Tempore*).⁶²

§ 43. The same sermon is asserted and confirmed by Peter the Deacon⁶³ using for this the authority of the Council of Antioch in which Paul of Samosata was condemned, and of Athanasius (in the little work whose title is *That Christ is One*), and of St. Gregory the Theologian (in the Sermon on the Daughter). Whose words are cited by the same author. Certain similar things are also read in the Council of Ephesus and the Fifth General Council of Constantinople, canons 4 and 7.⁶⁴ Further, in (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite the word "composite" (*compositus*) is attributed to Christ, in the book *On the Divine Names*, chapter 1,⁶⁵ where he calls Christ at once simple and composite — simple on account of the unity of person, composite not only on account of the composition of human nature from soul and body, but also because the one person of Christ subsists in two natures. By the same reasoning, St. Cyril of Jerusalem (Catechesis 4)⁶⁶ calls Christ "twofold" (*duplex*), because he is both God and man. Likewise Athanasius in his Creed indicates a certain composition of the person of Christ from God and man, when he draws a comparison from that composition by which a man is composed from rational soul and flesh — though the comparison does not hold in all respects, as we showed (in connection with the preceding Distinction).

§ 44. Since, therefore, this manner of speaking — by which the person of Christ is called composite — rests on such great authority, St. Thomas rightly defends it as true⁶⁷ and explains it in this way: because although the Person of the Word, even after the Incarnation, is wholly simple according to what it is in itself — just as the nature of the Word is also simple — yet according to the formal character (*ratio*) of person or hypostasis, to which it belongs to subsist in some nature, it is rightly called composite after the Incarnation from two natures, inasmuch, namely, as it subsists in two natures. For although the subsisting thing itself is one, there is in it on account of this a twofold property of subsisting in each nature — as has already been said.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, aa. 1–2, in the body of the articles.

2. Estius refers to his own earlier discussions: *In I Sent.*, distinctions 23, 25, and 34.

3. St. Basil, *Epistola ad Gregorium fratrem* [abbreviation as in source].

4. Boethius, *De Duabus Naturis in Una Persona Christi* [abbreviation as in source].

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 3, a. 1; q. 4, a. 2.

6. Rom. 1; Gal. 4.

7. Phil. 2.

8. 1 Cor. 2.

9. St. Athanasius, *Symbolum Athanasianum* (the Athanasian Creed), on Christ.

10. Council of Ephesus, Anathemas of St. Cyril, canon 3 and canon 5.

11. Council of Chalcedon; Second Council of Constantinople; Third Council of Constantinople.

12. St. Cyril of Alexandria, works written against Nestorius; Pope Leo I (the Great), various sermons and epistles.

13. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1.

14. Fulgentius of Ruspe and Peter the Deacon, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, two books.

15. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Homily 38.

16. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 2 and following chapters.

17. Jn. 14 (Estius cites "Joan. 24" — likely a misprint or OCR error for Jn. 14:23, where Christ promises the Father and Son will make their dwelling in one who loves him; the page image reads "Joan. 24" which most probably refers to Jn. 14, v. 23).
18. Pope Leo I (the Great); Fulgentius of Ruspe; and other Fathers.
19. This concludes the argument that Nestorianism destroys the mystery of redemption.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 2 (as indicated by the section cross-reference).
21. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 11.
22. St. Augustine, *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 11–12; Sermon 8 (*de Verbis Domini*) — identified in the footnote of the printed text as Sermon LXVII among the sermons of Class P in the Benedictine edition, Tom. V.
23. St. Augustine, Tract 28 *in Joannem*; *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 4.
24. St. Anselm, *De Incarnatione Verbi*.
25. Innocent III, *in quadam Decretali* [citation as in source].
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 2 and q. 4, a. 2 [as cited in the section cross-reference].
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 2.
28. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 10, ch. 23.
29. St. Anselm, *De Incarnatione Verbi*; the same interpretation is held.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 2.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 3, a. 2.
32. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2.
33. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk. 1, ch. 7 and ch. 11.
34. Peter the Deacon, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 2.
35. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistle to Successus the Bishop.
36. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 6.
37. Council of Chalcedon, Action 1 (where the First Epistle of Cyril to Nestorius was read, together with the epistle to Joann the Bishop of Antioch *De Partu Divinae Genitricis Virginis* and on the assumption of the humanity of the Only-begotten Son of God).
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 1.
39. Pope Leo I (the Great), various sermons and epistles (as cited in the volume of the letters of Leo).
40. Pope Leo I (the Great), Sermon 8 *De Nativitate Domini*.
41. Pope Leo I (the Great), Sermon 6 *De Jejuniis septimi mensis*; Epistle 52 to the Bishops of Gaul.
42. Flavianus, Patriarch of Constantinople, two epistles to Leo (contained in the volume of the epistles of Leo).
43. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 3 and 5, and the following chapters.
44. The Athanasian Creed (*Symbolum Athanasianum*), on Christ; cf. also Estius's earlier discussion around Distinction 2 of this book, in the explanation of certain words of St. John Damascene.
45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, art. 1, ad 5; and q. 75, art. 4, ad 2.
46. Hugh of St. Victor, as cited by the Master (§ E.).
47. Hugh of St. Victor, *Sententiae*, bk. 2, ch. 12.
48. The argument summarizes the scholastic consensus as articulated by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure in their respective commentaries on this Distinction.
49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, art. 1 and 2; art. 4.
50. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistle to Nestorius (Epistle 10); and the Epistle to Acacius (Epistle 14).

51. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 4.
52. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 10; *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 4; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 9, ch. 17; *In Oratione de quinque haeresibus*, ch. 5.
53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, art. 4.
54. The text of § II continues on the following page of the printed edition; this chunk concludes at this point.
55. The Master (of the Sentences) [i.e. Peter Lombard], § E. of this Distinction.
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, art. 1, 2, and 4.
57. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistle to Nestorius (Epistle 10, numbered among his letters); and the Epistle to Acacius (Epistle 14).
58. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 10; *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 4; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 9, ch. 17 and 21; *Oratio de quinque haeresibus*, ch. 5. Also other passages from the same St. Augustine, from St. Gregory, and from Hilary, as cited by the Master.
59. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 5 and 7; bk. 4, ch. 5; bk. 3, ch. 4.
60. The *Sententiae* of Prosper [i.e., the *Liber Sententiarum ex Augustino delibatarum* attributed to Prosper of Aquitaine], cited by the Master under the title of St. Augustine.
61. Lanfranc, writing against Berengarius (before the midpoint of his work); Gratian, *Decretum*, De Consecratione, dist. [as cited: "Hoc est quod dicimus"].
62. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk. 1, ch. 17; and Sermon 8 (*De Tempore*). [Note by Estius: This eighth sermon *De Tempore* is placed in the Appendix to vol. 5 in the Benedictine edition; it is considered doubtful by the Lovanienses, and is assigned by some to another author, one of Thapsus, who wrote several works on the Trinity. It is numbered CXVIII by Verulinus and Windingus, who note it is considered spurious.]
63. Peter the Deacon, *De Incarnatione*, ch. 3; using the authority of the Council of Antioch (in which Paul of Samosata was condemned) and of Athanasius (in the work *That Christ is One*) and of St. Gregory the Theologian (in the Sermon on the Daughter).
64. Council of Ephesus; Fifth General Council of Constantinople, canons 4 and 7.
65. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 1.
66. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses*, 4.
67. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, art. 5.

DISTINCTIO VI — ON THE TWO NATURES AND THE ONE PERSON OF CHRIST, AND THE FORMAL CHARACTER (*RATIO*) OF SUBSISTING (*DE DUABUS NATURIS ET UNA PERSONA CHRISTI, AC RATIONE SUBSISTENDI*)

§ 1. On account of the two natures, there is one and another formal character (*ratio*) of subsisting.

§ III — Whether Christ may rightly be said to be two (An recte dicatur Christus esse duo)

§ 2. From the preceding question there arises this one: whether Christ may rightly be said to be two? For this seemed to follow as a consequence from the composition. Now, first of all, the word *two* must be distinguished. For it can be taken either in the masculine or in the neuter gender. If you understand it in the masculine in the question, the most certain answer is that Christ is not two (*duos*) but one (*unum*). For there are not two persons (*personae*) in Christ, but a single one. For just as *alius et alius* signifies a diversity of persons — as when we say in the divine persons that the Son is *alius* — so also these words of the masculine gender, *duo, tres*, and so forth, designate a plurality in persons. But if the neuter gender is understood, even so the answer must be given in the negative.

§ 3. For although the neuter gender belongs to nature: yet because created nature is not predicated of a person (for Peter or Anthony is not human nature, but a man — that is, one having a nature) — for this reason neither in this way is Christ rightly said to be two (*duo*), but one (*unum*), just as also one (*unus*) in the masculine — as among others St. Thomas learnedly proves,² and likewise Bonaventure writing on this Distinction.³ Now as to what is read in the Fathers from time to time — that Christ is *aliud atque aliud* on account of the two natures in Him — as in St. Hilary,⁴ saying that Christ is *aliud* from the Father and *aliud* from the Mother; and in St. Augustine,⁵ where he says that Christ is *aliud* on account of the Word and *aliud* on account of the man, and in the work *Against Felicianus*,⁶ that in the mediator of God and men the Son of God is *aliud* and the son of man is *aliud* — these and similar sentences of this kind are improper and demand a suitable interpretation.

§ 4. For the sense is that there is in Christ, or that Christ has in Himself, *aliud atque aliud* — that is, one and another nature. So St. Augustine explains himself in writing *Against Felicianus*. And it has been said more properly by Gregory Nazianzen in a certain letter to Cledonius⁷ (which is not extant, but the words are found in St. Thomas) that the things from which the Saviour is constituted are *aliud et aliud*, but that He Himself is not therefore *alius et alius* — but simply one (*unum*), even in the neuter gender.

§ I — Whether Christ, insofar as He is man, is something (*An Christus quatenus homo sit aliquid*)

§ 5. To that question which the Master raises among others — whether these propositions, "God is man" and "God was made man," signify that God is something and was made something, and whether it must be said without qualification that Christ, insofar as He is man, is something or a substance — the answer is affirmative. This is proved first of all from the definition of the Apostolic See. For Alexander III, writing to the Archbishop of Reims, as is found in Book 5 of the *Decretals*,¹⁰ against the rash disputations of certain persons, laid down as follows: "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, we command that you forbid under anathema that anyone henceforth dare to say that Christ is not something according as He is man. For just as Christ is true God, so He is true man, subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh." From these words the ground of truth of the said sentence is understood: because just as *Deus* (God), so also *homo* (man) is the name of a substance, and each is said of Christ as of his proper supposit (*suppositum*). Therefore, just as *God*, so also *man*, when said of Christ, signifies that He is some substance, so that each predication is essential: "Christ is God" and "Christ is man." For in both cases a word signifying substance is attributed to its supposit — which one and the same supposit subsists in each nature.

§ 6. Furthermore, whatever testimonies of the Fathers say that Christ is *aliud* as man and *aliud* as God — of which kind we adduced at the end of the preceding Distinction — they manifestly prove that Christ according to each nature is something. Finally, if Christ insofar as He is man is not something, that is, a substance, then human nature will be an accident of Christ — which cannot be said. For it would be either an accident of Christ as man, or of Christ as God: not of Christ as man, because it happens to no man to be a man accidentally; nor yet of Christ as God, since nothing is accidental to God. It may nevertheless be granted that human nature in Christ has to some extent the formal character (*ratio*) of an accident, or of something successive, insofar as it is sustained by the supposit of another nature — namely the divine — so that it does not give that supposit its primary *esse*, but comes to it when it is already complete, and attributes to it an *esse* diverse and different from the prior one.

§ 7. Moreover, this predication, "God is man," or "man is God" (both of which are true and Catholic) — if what is primarily signified by each of the two extremes is attended to — is not essential, but, as St. Bonaventure says writing on this Distinction, a *predication by union* (*praedicatio per unionem*). For the one is predicated of the other for this reason: that the one is conjoined and united to the other in person. But if in the subject of each proposition there is considered the supposit itself, to which neither of the two natures belongs accidentally but essentially, then both propositions will be essential in this respect — as St. Thomas teaches.¹¹

§ II — Whether, just as it is true that God was made man, so it must be confessed that man was made God (*An sicut verum est Deum factum hominem, ita fatendum sit hominem factum esse Deum*)

§ 8. That God was made man through the Incarnation must be held with undoubted faith, because, as the Gospel testifies, "the Word was made flesh" (Jn. 1:14). And in the Constantinopolitan Creed, of the Son of God it is said, "and was made man" — which two expressions have the same force. For also St. Athanasius (*in*

Epistola ad Epitectum)¹³ asserts: "What St. John said — 'the Word was made flesh' — is the same as if it were said, 'God was made man.'" The truth of the said proposition is also proved by reason: because each thing is said to become, or to have been made, that which is newly attributed to it by true predication; but to be man is thus attributed to God and to the Person of the Son of God.

§ 9. But the question is whether, conversely, it is rightly said that man was made God. On this matter the Scholastics dispute variously, and each side of the question relies on its own arguments. The affirmative side relies on these and similar ones. St. Augustine:¹⁴ "Such," he says, "was that assumption, which would make God man and man God." And more openly Gregory Nazianzen in his first Epistle to Cledonius:¹⁵ "God," he says, "was humanized (*humanatus est*), and man — let him be defined however one wishes, or named in any other way." So also St. John Damascene speaks and repeatedly says in Book 3,¹⁶ that the flesh of Christ was deified (*deificata*); on which passage Clichtovaeus comments: "Just as the Fathers receive this proposition, 'God was made man,' so also they receive this one, 'Man was made God.'" Furthermore, as it was said "the Word was made flesh," so St. Augustine, in Homily 44 (which is the 18th among the Fifty),¹⁷ says that the flesh was made the Word (*caro facta Verbum*). And Maximus, in Homily 1 *On the Nativity of the Lord*,¹⁸ says that man passed over into God (*in Deum transivisse*). And in Homily 4, that the flesh was transformed into God (*transformatam esse in Deum*).¹⁹ They add also a dialectical argument: Man is God, and he was not always God; therefore at some point he was made God. Likewise: just as the Divine Nature was united to the human, so also the human to the divine; therefore just as God was made man, so also man was made God.

§ 10. But the negative side is established by St. John Damascene, Book 3,²⁰ saying: "For this reason we do not say that man was deified (*deificatum*), but that God was humanized (*humanatum*). For He who was by nature perfect God was made perfect man." And Petrus Diaconus, chapter 5, *On the Incarnation*:²¹ "God," he says, "was made Christ, but Christ was not made God, as the heretics say, who dare to assert that Christ is God by advancement, not by nature." Also Maxentius, in the *Catholic Profession*,²² citing Athanasius concerning Christ, says: "The Word was made flesh, not the flesh made the Word (*Verbum caro, non caro Verbum factum est*)." And in the Chapters against the Nestorians, he condemns this proposition: "Christ was made God (*Christus Deus factus est*)."

§ 11. To these testimonies is added the argument contrary to the argument set forth above. Christ was always God — for that Person did not at some point begin to be God. Therefore it is not truly said that Christ was made God, and consequently neither that man was made God. For just as *Christ*, so also *man* in such propositions designates the Person of the Son of God, who is known to be God from eternity. On this ground St. Thomas relies²³ to confirm the negative side. And very many others agree with him, saying that this proposition — "man was made God" — is false in proper speech, although it can be granted according to a certain impropriety: namely in this sense, that it was brought about through the Incarnation that this proposition, "man is God," which previously was not true, became true; and the same judgment holds for this proposition, "Christ was made God." And in this manner they explain the testimonies of the Fathers who sound differently. Scotus, however, maintains that this proposition is no less proper than that one — "God was made man" — whose arguments the studious reader may see in Scotus himself.²⁴

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, aa. 1 & 2.

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, a. 1.

3. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* [here: *In IV Sent.*], dist. 6 [abbreviation as in source].
4. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, lib. 9.
5. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 1, ch. 7 & 10; lib. 13, ch. 19; *Tractatus 69 in Ioannem; Enchiridion*, ch. 35.
6. St. Augustine, *Contra Felicianum*, ch. 11 & 12.
7. Gregory Nazianzen, Epistle to Cledonius [*Epistola ad Cledonium*] — not extant, but words preserved in St. Thomas.
8. New distinction heading supplied; Estius's text opens a new *Distinctio VII* at this point.
9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 1 & 2.
10. Alexander III, letter to the Archbishop of Reims, in *Decretales*, lib. 5, tit. *De Haereticis*.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, aa. 1 & 2.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, aa. 6 & 7.
13. St. Athanasius, *Epistola ad Epitectum* [abbreviation as in source].
14. St. Augustine, *De Virginitate*, lib. 1, ch. 13.
15. Gregory Nazianzen, Epistle 1 *ad Cledonium*.
16. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, lib. 3, ch. 17.
17. St. Augustine, Homily 44 (= Sermon 290 among 50, in the Benedictine edition, i.e. Sermo CCXC. inter Sermones Tertiae Classis, Tom. V, as noted in the source's footnote (a)).
18. Maximus, Homilia 1 *de Natali Domini* [abbreviation as in source].
19. Maximus, Homilia 4 [abbreviation as in source].
20. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, lib. 3, ch. 2.
21. Petrus Diaconus, *De Incarnatione*, ch. 5.
22. Maxentius, *Catholica professio* [abbreviation as in source]; citing St. Athanasius.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 7.
24. Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 6 [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO VII — WHETHER CHRIST WAS PREDESTINED TO BE THE SON OF GOD (*AN CHRISTUS FUERIT PRAEDESTINATUS ESSE FILIUS DEI*)

§ III — Whether Christ was predestined to be the Son of God (An Christus fuerit praedestinatus esse Filius Dei)

§ 1. From the words of the Apostle in Rom. 1, speaking of Christ — "Who was predestined to be the Son of God in power" — a dispute has arisen among the Doctors concerning the predestination of Christ: namely, whether Christ was predestined to be the Son of God. Here, in the first place, the sense of Nestorius must be avoided, by which he wished to signify through those words of the Apostle that the man who is called Christ did not possess sonship by nature, but had obtained it by grace — that he might be the Son of God — and had been predestined from eternity to that grace. This sense is contrary to the sound faith by which we believe Christ to be by nature the Son of God, and to be distinguished by this title from others who have been made sons of God through the grace of adoption.

§ 2. While, therefore, both the ancients and the more recent authors acknowledge that Christ was predestined to be the Son of God, they intend that this was said in the following sense: it was predestined from eternity by God — and this not on account of foreseen merits but by grace — that in time the man should be God and God should be man, and consequently that Christ should be the Son of God, which is what the proposed question was asking. For although Christ is by nature the Son of God, yet by grace prepared from eternity that union of two natures in the person of Christ was accomplished. This sense is suggested by the *Glossa ordinaria* (on the said passage of the Apostle)² and by St. Augustine (*De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15),³ where he also establishes the predestination of Christ as the exemplar of our predestination — because, just as it was predestined by grace from eternity that Christ should be the natural Son of God (for the human nature in Christ did not attain by any preceding merits of its own to be united to the Son of God), so too it was predestined by grace that we should receive the adoption of the sons of God.

§ 3. It is also evident from these considerations that the said predestination is not to be attributed to the nature (since the human nature in Christ is not the Son of God) but to the person of Christ — not indeed according to itself, or insofar as it subsists in the divine nature, but insofar as it subsists in the human nature; and for this reason it is not natural to him but attributed through the grace of union that he is the Son of God. Furthermore, as regards the passage of the Apostle, although the Latin interpreters expound it in the manner we have stated, the Greeks, however — such as Origen, St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact,⁴ and others — not improbably render the sense thus: Christ, who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, and thereby is confirmed to be a true man, has also been declared and proved by certain arguments to be

the Son of God — namely "in power," that is, through the power of miracles and through the other things which the Apostle subsequently enumerates. For the Greek word which our Translator renders *praedestinatum* [predestined] carries this meaning for the Greeks.⁵

§ IV — Whether Christ can be called "the Lord's man," "Deified," or "Divine" (An Christus dici possit homo Dominicus, Deificus, Divinus)

§ 4. The ancients are read to have sometimes called Christ as man "the Lord's man" (*homo dominicus*), as St. Augustine does⁷ and likewise Bede.⁸ Yet St. Augustine himself retracts and corrects this in his *Retractations*,⁹ in these words: "I do not see whether it can rightly be said that Christ Jesus, who is the mediator of God and men, is 'the Lord's man,' since he is indeed the Lord; that I should say this, I read it in certain Catholic commentators. But wherever I said this, I would wish I had not said it. For afterwards I saw that it ought not to be said — although it could be defended by some argument." So he. The reason for the retraction is the one which St. Augustine indicated in three words: namely, that he who is truly and properly Lord — according as the appellation of Lord belongs to God — ought not to be called quasi-denominatively "the Lord's man" (*Dominicus*). For it is absurd and contradictory that the same thing should be predicated of the same subject both essentially and denominatively at once. Hence it pertains to the Nestorian heresy to call Christ "the Lord's man," if the term is understood in its proper sense; for by this it is denied that he is Lord by nature. Yet because certain things that are denominative in their verbal form happen to be predicated essentially, the expression could on that account be defended in some measure, as signifying nothing other than that Christ is Lord — just as we say "the Divine Essence" or "the Divine Persons," and likewise (Pseudo-)Dionysius calls Christ "the most Divine Jesus,"¹⁰ and certain authors call him "the divine man" (*homo divinus*): although expressions of this kind are to be expounded rather than employed. Furthermore, the expression can also be understood in this sense: inasmuch as the divine nature is joined to the human nature not through nature but through grace.

§ [I] — Whether Christ's nature was born of the Virgin (An Christi natura sit de Virgine nata)

§ 5. The question which the Master proposes concerning the divine nature alone can be extended also to the human nature: namely, whether both the divine and the human nature can rightly be said to have been born of the Virgin. To this question we reply: since to be born is nothing other than to receive a nature, and this is rightly attributed not to a nature but to a hypostasis, it cannot be said that either the divine or the human nature was born of the Virgin; but rather that Christ, according to his human nature — not, however, according to his divine nature — was born of the Virgin. For from his mother he received not the divine but the human nature. The Master also rightly proves that the divine nature was not born of the Virgin from this: that it was not born of the Father — as is evident from Distinction 5 of Book I,¹² where it was shown that the divine essence properly neither generated nor was generated. And it is the general judgment of St. John Damascene¹³ that birth belongs to the hypostasis, not to the nature. What therefore was said by Fulgentius¹⁴ — "For the eternal and divine nature could in no way be temporally conceived or temporally born of human nature, except according to the reception of a true humanity" — is to be understood in such a way that *nature*

is placed in the position of *person*, or at least is understood to embrace the person by its generality; and this on account of the real identity which in divine things exists between nature and hypostasis. In this sense we also gave notice above, around Distinction 5 of Book I,¹⁵ that many other sayings of the Fathers are to be taken. Nor, again, does the fact that the Fathers frequently assert that the divine nature was truly incarnated prove that the divine nature was born of the Virgin — as we showed at Distinction 5 of this book.¹⁶ For it is not called incarnate because it was made flesh, but because, remaining pure in the unity of the Person of the Word, it was united to flesh.

§ II — Whether there are two nativities of Christ (An duae sint Christi nativitates)

§ 6. The occasion for the question concerning Christ's twofold nativity was given by the ancient heretics, who said that Christ was either merely a man, or merely God, or of a single composite nature. All of these confessed only one nativity in Christ. Against them, the Catholic Church, acknowledging Christ to be both God and man — God by an eternal generation, man by a temporal generation, without any confusion of natures — likewise confesses and believes in two nativities in Christ: one by which, as God, the Son of God, He was born of the Father before all ages, and another by which, as man, the son of man, He was born of a mother in time. This is what the Symbols of our Faith manifestly teach us — the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, and others. Hence the angel said to the Virgin: "That which shall be born of thee shall be holy";¹⁸ and to Joseph concerning the Virgin: "That which is conceived in her";¹⁹ — namely, by a temporal nativity. To this same temporal nativity pertains also that other text of Isaiah: "A child is born to us";²⁰ and other like passages in which Christ is said to have been born or made according to the flesh. And altogether that entire portion of Scripture which confirms that Christ is the Son of man bears witness to this; for one is the Son of man only by a human and temporal nativity.

§ 7. Therefore it must consequently be admitted that Christ was born twice: once eternally from the Father, and again in time from a mother. For thus Fulgentius, in his *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 2, attributes a second nativity to Christ.¹⁴ And by St. Jerome, Vida wrote, no less truly than elegantly: "Grant me, by the gift of thy fostering Spirit, to sing of the King born twice (*Bis genitum canere*)."

§ 8. Furthermore, the Fathers constantly assert the two nativities of Christ. Among them, St. John Damascene, Book III, chapter 7, says: "We confess two nativities of Christ: one which is from the Father and is eternal, and one which is in the last times on our behalf."²¹ And the Fathers of the Second Council of Constantinople, canon 2, decree as follows: "If anyone does not confess that there are two nativities of the Word of God, let him be anathema."²² With this canon, both in words and in sense, chapter 1 of the Lateran Council under Innocent III agrees.²³ Moreover, in the Council of Chalcedon, which is older than all of these, in Act 1, from the Epistle of St. Cyril to Nestorius, a clear testimony to the twofold nativity of Christ is found.²⁴

§ 9. Nor indeed does reason stand opposed to this teaching, as if it were impossible that what already exists should be born, and by being born should begin to be. For just as by the omnipotent power of God it was brought about that one person of Christ subsists in two natures, so also it was brought about that the same person who from eternity received His own *esse* — that is, the divine nature — from the Father, should also in

time receive His other *esse*, namely the human nature, from a mother. It is therefore absurd to say that He was born previously —

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 24, aa. 1, 2, 3.
 2. *Glossa ordinaria*, on Rom. 1.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15.
 4. Origen; St. John Chrysostom; Theophylact — cited collectively as Greek interpreters of Rom. 1.
 5. The Greek term rendered by the Latin Vulgate as *praedestinatum* (ὁρισθέντος, "declared" or "designated") bears, for the Greek Fathers, the sense of being manifested or proved to be, rather than predestined in the Western theological sense.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 3.
 7. St. Augustine, *Octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 36; *Expositio Psalmorum*, Ps. 1, q. 4, q. 7; and elsewhere.
 8. Bede, on 1 Kgs. 1.
 9. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 19.
 10. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 4, par. 3.
 11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 35, a. 1.
 12. Peter Lombard, *In I Sent.*, dist. 5, Book I.
 13. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 6.
 14. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2.
 15. Peter Lombard, *In I Sent.*, dist. 5, Book I — with Estius's commentary thereon.
 16. Estius's commentary on dist. 5 of this (third) book.
 17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 35, a. 2.
 18. Lk. 1:35.
 19. Matt. 1:20.
 20. Is. 9:6.
 21. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 7.
 22. Second Council of Constantinople, canon 2.
 23. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 1.
 24. Council of Chalcedon, Act 1, from the Epistle of St. Cyril to Nestorius.

DISTINCTIO IX — ON THE ADORATION DUE TO THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST (*DE ADORATIONE UTRIQUE NATURAE IN CHRISTO EXHIBENDA*)

§ 1. — before Christ was born of a mother; for according to one thing He always existed, and according to another He began to exist by being born. It must furthermore be confessed that Christ is the natural Son in respect of both nativities — of God the Father by the eternal nativity, and of the Virgin Mother by the temporal one. Yet we must not say there are two sons, lest we divide the persons, but one Son, on account of the unity of the person into which both nativities fall.¹

§ 2. Whether, moreover, two filiations — and indeed real ones — are to be attributed to Christ by reason of his twofold nativity, is disputed problematically among the Schoolmen. The negative position is defended by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, whose arguments are nevertheless refuted with no little probability by Scotus, who holds the affirmative position.²

§ I — Whether the same adoration is to be rendered to each nature in Christ (An utrique naturae in Christo eadem adoratio exhibenda sit)

§ 3. The human nature of Christ, and its parts — body and soul — are not to be worshipped with some adoration other than that which is owed to the Word, as the Nestorians held (whose opinion the Master recorded in the first place); rather, they are to be worshipped with precisely the same adoration as that which is offered to God. The reason for this is the unity of Person in Christ. For honour is properly rendered to the whole subsisting thing, that is, to the hypostasis (*hypostasis*); and since that is one in Christ, one honour or adoration likewise is owed to the whole Christ — namely that which they call *λατρεία*. For thus St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei*, holds that the worship owed to God alone is to be expressed by a single word.⁴ Since, therefore, the humanity of Christ, or its parts, are said to be adored, nothing else is signified, according to the proper force of speech, than that the Word of God Himself — made human, ensouled, or incarnate — is adored. Since this adoration is rendered to the Divine Person, it is the very same that is owed to God, and it is one and the same; even though several grounds of adoration may present themselves. Therefore it must be said absolutely that the flesh and soul of Christ, as also the members of His body, are to be adored with the adoration of *latria* (*adoratione latriae*); this is owed to them by reason of the hypostasis (*hypostasis*) of the Word of God, by which they are sustained and to which they are united — not, however, with the adoration of *dulia* (*adoratione duliae*), as is owed to a mere creature.

§ 4. Hence St. Thomas also, writing on this Distinction,⁵ rejects the first opinion indicated by the Master as Nestorian, saying that it attributes to the humanity a supposit (*suppositum*) other than the eternal supposit.

Now this opinion of a single adoration of Christ has always been handed down by the Fathers as certain. For St. Athanasius, in the Letter to Adelphius, teaches it at length.⁶ And St. Augustine, in his commentary on Ps. 89 — on the words "Adore His footstool, for it is holy" — speaking of the flesh of Christ, which he understands by the "footstool of the Lord's feet," and treating of that adoration of which it was said "Thou shalt adore the Lord thy God," says: "No one eats that flesh unless he first adores it," and so on. And a little later: "Do not look at it as mere earth, but at Him who is holy, whose footstool it is that you adore. For on His account you adore." And what follows.⁷ Similar things are read in the same author in *Sermon 58 on the Words of the Lord*, which sermon is compiled partly from *Tractate 78 on John* and partly from elsewhere.⁸ For, responding to the Arians, he says: "I adore the flesh of the Lord — nay, the perfect humanity in Christ — for this reason, that it was received by the divinity and united to the Deity, so that I may confess not one and another, but one and the same God and man, the Son of God." And the other things recited by the Master. These words contain a sufficiently clear exposition of the present doctrine, adduced also by the similitude of the purple or diadem of a king, to which separately and in themselves no honour properly belongs, but only insofar as they are in some manner one with the King whom we wish to honour.

§ 5. Furthermore, St. Cyril handed down this doctrine against Nestorius as Catholic, in the book *To Evoptius*, Anathema 8, and again in the *Apologia to the Eastern Bishops*.⁹ The same Anathema 8 — which is also Canon 8 of the Council of Ephesus — reads as follows: "If anyone dares to say that the assumed man is to be co-adored with God the Word and co-glorified with Him as one with another, and does not rather worship Emmanuel with one adoration and render to Him one glorification — inasmuch as the Word was made flesh — let him be anathema."¹⁰ And Canon 9 of the Second Council of Constantinople: "If anyone says that Christ is to be adored in two natures, from which two adorations are introduced — one separately to God the Word, and another separately to the man — and does not rather adore God the Word incarnate together with His flesh with one adoration, as has been handed down from the beginning in the holy Church of God, let him be anathema."¹¹ So also Pope Leo, in *Sermon 8 on Lent*, speaking of the divinity and humanity of Christ, says: "Believe each faithfully, adore each humbly, so that in the unity of the Word and flesh there may be no division."¹² St. John Damascene later expressed the same opinion in two places. For in Book III, ch. 8, inferring from the hypostatic union of the natures in Christ, he writes: "Therefore there is one Christ, perfect God and perfect man, whom we adore with the Father and the Spirit with one adoration, together with His immaculate flesh. Nor do we say that His flesh is not adorable. For it is adored in the one hypostasis of the Word, which itself became His hypostasis."¹³ And in Book IV, ch. 5, he says: "The flesh united to God the Word is adored on account of Him and in Him." And he illustrates this with two examples — namely the royal purple and the burning coal — and concludes that the flesh according to its own nature is not adorable, but that it is adored in the incarnate God the Word, not for its own sake but on account of the Word of God united to it according to hypostasis. "For we do not say," he adds, "that we adore bare flesh, but the flesh of God, that is, God incarnate." He thus most rightly distinguishes that which is adored from the cause of adoring. For in matters of this kind, the cause of honour is one thing and the matter of honour is another — just as with a man who is honoured more or less by reason of virtue, knowledge, or power, and not by reason of his human nature.

§ 6. Hence it follows that those who mocked Christ, crucified Him, and variously afflicted His flesh, are rightly held guilty of lèse-divine majesty — evidently because they crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor. 2).¹⁴ Finally, everything that is rightly adduced against the modern heretics to prove the legitimate adoration of the Lord's body in the Eucharist can be referred here; and for this purpose many testimonies of the Fathers exist.

§ II — Resolution of the objections raised against this (Solutio eorum quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 7. Against the one adoration of each nature in Christ, the first and most powerful objection is raised as follows: the human nature of Christ and its parts — soul and flesh — however united to the Word of God, do not exceed the condition of a creature; and therefore it seems unlawful, nay impious, if they are honoured with the same adoration as that which is properly owed to God — that is, with the worship of *latria* — since it is written "Thou shalt adore the Lord thy God," and they are severely rebuked who "served the creature" (Rom. 1).¹⁶ In both passages the Greek word used is that from which *latria* is derived. But the reply to this argument is evident from what has been said above. For since the human nature of Christ subsists in the Divine Person (*Persona Divina*), and honour is properly terminated in the person and not in the nature, it is manifest that when the humanity of Christ is adored, a creature is not adored in such a way that the act does not properly tend to the Creator, who has united a created nature to Himself in the unity of Person. Hence, just as one honour is owed to the King whatever garment he may wear, so one adoration is owed to God whatever nature He may have assumed. Therefore when it is said that God alone is to be served, what is united to God in the unity of Person is not excluded but rather comprehended. And the Apostle in Rom. 1 does not reprove those who serve the creature in any manner whatsoever, but those who "served the creature rather than the Creator, or above the Creator" — which is not the case here at all; rather, the creature is adored in such a way that that adoration properly terminates in none other than the Creator. And this is what St. John Damascene, Book III, ch. 8, declares in these words: "Nor is the creature worshipped. For we do not adore it as bare flesh, but as conjoined to the divinity, so that the two natures of God the Word are resolved into one Person and one hypostasis."¹³ Furthermore, it is not absurdly said that this adoration is in some manner terminated in the creature, when God has deigned to become a creature. For by the communication of idioms (*communicatio idiomatum*) even the creature is properly adored — that is, the Person of the Son of God, of whom "creature" is predicated — as shall be said in its proper place.

§ 8. A second argument is drawn from St. John Damascene, who in Book IV, ch. 3, says: "The flesh of the Son of God, if you separate by subtle understandings what is seen from what is understood, is not adorable as a creature." And then, after interposing two similitudes, he says: "Thus the flesh, according to its own nature, is not adorable" — understand this of the cult of *latria*, but of some other inferior cult. For thus St. Thomas interprets Damascene,¹⁷ saying that adoration of *dulia* is owed to the flesh so understood — as separated from God the Word — not of any kind whatsoever, but of a certain more excellent kind, which they call *hyperdulia*. It will therefore be permissible to venerate the flesh of the Word, considered separately from the Word, with an adoration different from that owed to the Word.

Reply: the flesh of Christ is not to be adored as such — as one understands or imagines it separated from the Word — but as it truly is, namely as conjoined to the Word according to hypostasis. Nor indeed did St. John Damascene and St. Thomas mean anything other than this: that if we imagine the flesh of Christ separated from the Word (which in reality neither is nor ever will be), given that condition posited, the flesh of Christ would not be co-adored with the divinity, but would be venerated with some inferior honour. For this is also what the words of St. Augustine signify in *Sermon 38 on the Words of the Lord*, where he says: "If you separate the man from God, I will never believe in him, nor serve him."¹⁸

§ 9. Another argument is brought forward from the *Glossa ordinaria* on that verse of the Psalm "Adore His footstool," where it is said that the flesh of Christ is adored by us without impiety, because no one spiritually eats His flesh unless he first adores it — not, I say, with that adoration which is called *latria* and is owed to the Creator alone, since the flesh of Christ is a part of humanity, but with that *dulia* which is more worthy. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others, who propose this objection to themselves, attempt to solve it in more than one way. But it must be said that these words are not found today in the *Glossa ordinaria*; and even if they may perhaps be found in some codices, they are additions and insertions — as is probable — made by someone who savoured something of Nestorianism, in accordance with the first opinion set out by the Master in the text. For the earlier words of that Gloss are taken from St. Augustine writing on the Psalm,¹⁹ in which place, as we showed above, he expressly teaches that the flesh of Christ is adored by us without impiety with that adoration of which it was said: "Thou shalt adore the Lord thy God," and so on.

§ III — How the Cross of Christ is to be adored (Quomodo adoranda sit Crux Christi)

§ 10. That the Cross of Christ is rightly adored by the faithful is proved by the perpetual custom of the Church, observed without interruption. Hence in the canticles of the Church one hears that verse: "O Cross, to be adored," and "We adore Thy Cross." Likewise that verse in the poem of Lactantius: "Bend the knee, adore the venerable wood of the Cross," and other things of this kind. Among the Doctors, however, a question is in dispute concerning the kind of adoration to be rendered to the Cross of Christ — namely, whether it is to be adored with the worship of *latria* (*latria*), or with some inferior cult. That the worship of *latria* ought to be rendered to it is seen to be shown by the following arguments.

The first argument: the Church calls the Cross of Christ our unique hope, and awaits justice from it, saying: "O Cross, hail, our unique hope; in this season of the Passion, increase justice for the righteous, and grant pardon to the guilty." Such also is that text of the Apostle, Gal. 6: "Far be it from me to glory except in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ." Moreover, in the ecclesiastical Office various other things are sung by which the worship of *latria* seems to be attributed to the Cross. For it is called the wood of life, the remedy of death, the hope and victory of Christians, and is honoured with other divine titles of this sort.

§ 11. Likewise, St. John Damascene and others testify — as is clear from what we said above concerning the adoration of Christ — that the purple robe and the diadem of a King are adored with the same honour as the King, even though these do not subsist in the same hypostasis (*hypostasis*) as the King. Therefore, the Cross of Christ also, even though it is not hypostatically united to Christ, will have to be venerated with the same adoration as He.²¹ To these considerations is added the authority of St. Basil, cited by the Fathers of the Seventh Synod, and likewise by St. John Damascene, and after him by almost all the Scholastics around this Distinction.²² He says (chapter 18 *On the Holy Spirit, to Amphilocheus*) that the honour paid to an image is referred to its prototype, that is, to its exemplar.²³ Wherefore, since Christ is adored with the worship of *latria*, the Cross of Christ also, inasmuch as it represents Christ crucified to us, will have to be adored with the same worship. Thus, for example, prostration (and the same holds for the rest) before the Cross of Christ is an act of *latria*; but that same adoration is the veneration of the Cross; therefore we venerate the Cross by an act of *latria*. And the same argument holds for images of Christ. But this very point also seems in conformity with

the Philosopher, who (in the book *On Memory and Recollection*) says that the movement towards an image, considered as an image, and towards the exemplar itself is the same.²⁴ St. Thomas has similar things²⁵ — he also, in the third part,²⁶ defends this position both with regard to the image and with regard to the Cross of Christ. Indeed, St. Bonaventure and many other Scholastics likewise come down on his side.

§ 12. For the greater elucidation and confirmation of this position, St. Thomas (in the said article 4) distinguishes a twofold honour with regard to an insensible thing. The first is that which is paid to it insofar as it represents an intellectual nature. The second is that by which a thing is honoured insofar as it is, or was, in any manner whatsoever conjoined to a rational creature. If therefore (in that article) we speak of the Cross on which Christ hung, it is to be venerated by us with the worship of latria in both ways, just as we honour with the same veneration the King and the image and the garment of the King. But if we speak of the effigy of the Cross in any other material, it is to be adored only in the first way, yet nonetheless with the worship of latria. Similar examples may be seen in Medina,²⁷ where he so defends this position as not to fear condemning the contrary one as rash and dangerous in the faith — how rashly this was done by him will be evident from the arguments adduced in favour of the contrary side, which are by no means contemptible.

§ 13. For the clearer understanding of this matter, it must be noted that, beyond the twofold genus of honour with regard to insensible things noted by St. Thomas, there is a third: namely, that by which we hold some thing with veneration on account of the representation of an excellent and honourable nature, or on account of some particular connection with it — which honour the Seventh Synod, in its conclusion or decree (Act 7) and elsewhere throughout,²⁸ calls a certain *honorary adoration* (*honoraria adoratio*). And Tharasus the Patriarch calls it adoration used equivocally (in the same Synod, Act 2, in those passages where he responds to the letter of Pope Adrian²⁹); and the same point is stated more openly together with the Synod (in the letter to the Emperors, Act 7).³⁰ And this honour, even though it does not terminate in the prototype but remains in the type, is nonetheless referred to the prototype on the prototype's account. In this way, therefore, we venerate that Cross to which Christ was fastened, as an instrument of our redemption touched by the members of Christ and drenched with His blood. In the same way also, though not to the same degree, the sacraments of our salvation, the Gospel, the sacred vessels, etc., as the Council there states, are deservedly held worthy of veneration — to which, however, neither the worship of latria nor that of dulia (*dulia*) is exhibited, but a veneration of the kind that is customarily rendered with respect to inanimate things, on account of their signification or any other connection to things that are honourable in themselves.

§ 14. Now this distinction and declaration of the threefold honour is in conformity with the teaching of the Fathers set out in the said Seventh Synod on behalf of sacred images. For that council in its seventh action defines that images are to be venerated — but not, however, with the worship of latria (as we shall shortly prove) — therefore with some other, which is none other than the one just explained. It is also in conformity with what St. John Damascene hands down, book 4, chapter 12 (on the Cross) and chapter 17 (on the adoration of images).³¹

Now, therefore, let the conclusion be stated. Even though that Cross on which Christ worked our salvation, sanctified by the contact of His body, is to be treated with greater veneration than images that merely represent Him, yet we affirm, in conformity with the judgment of the holy Fathers, that the worship of latria is to be rendered neither to these images nor to that Cross.

§ 15. Proof first: The Fathers of the Seventh Synod (which was the Second Council of Nicaea, in their definition) expressly declare that it is not true latria — which belongs to the divine nature alone — but a certain honorary adoration that is to be exhibited both to images and to the Cross of Christ.³² This is also openly taught by Epiphanius the Deacon in his response to the heretics (which is in vol. 2 of the sixth Action of the same Council)³³ and by Tharasus the Patriarch of Constantinople together with the Council (in the letter previously cited), where it is also handed down (as we likewise noted above) that the adoration which, when it is attributed to Christ, is also attributed to His Cross or image, is taken equivocally.

Nor do those satisfy who respond that the Council is speaking of the adoration which is exhibited to the Cross on account of itself, not of that which is on account of the prototype. First, because there can be no doubt about this matter. For the Cross on account of itself — that is, considered as a certain material — is worthy of neither latria nor any other adoration, as St. Thomas himself also admits (in the said article 3 and 4); therefore it is not about this that the Council is speaking. Second, because the Council, both there and in Action 6 and elsewhere, says that when we venerate the Cross and the image we look towards the prototype; and yet it plainly distinguishes the adoration of the Cross and the image from the adoration of the exemplar, and teaches that the former is inferior to the latter. Third, because the Council (in the last Action) says that, by a similar argument to that by which images are venerated, the book of the Gospels and sacred vessels are likewise to be venerated — which things, however, are in no way to be venerated with the worship of latria.

§ 16. To these add: we must follow the customary manner of speaking of the Church, and this is known from the Councils, especially in the definition of an article pertaining to the faith and in the abjuration of some heretical dogma. But the Council, both in the definition just cited and in the abjuration which (in Action 1) Bishop Theodosius performs, does not affirm that the Cross or the images of Christ are to be adored with latria, but simply denies it; therefore we also ought to abstain from that manner of speaking. Similarly, Constantine, Bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, denies it most openly, as the Synod proves (Action 3).³⁴ Hence it is probable — indeed sufficiently certain — that St. Thomas had not read this definition of the Council; for had he read it, he would have spoken otherwise concerning the adoration of the Cross and images of Christ. And that he had not seen it, a great argument (among others) is that throughout this entire matter he makes no mention of that Council. And the reason may have been that perhaps at that time the Acts of the said Council were not yet available in Latin, or at least were not at hand.

§ 17. Proof second: from the various testimonies of the holy Fathers. St. Ambrose, in the Oration on the Death of Theodosius, speaking of Helena, the mother of Constantine: "She found the inscription; she adored the King, not the wood — quite rightly, because this is the error of the pagans. But she adored Him who hung on the wood, inscribed in the inscription."³⁵

Likewise St. Gregory, book 7 (Epistle 109) and book 9, Epistle 9 (to Serenus),³⁶ simply removes the adoration of latria from images, yet teaches in both letters that they are to be preserved and venerated. And in book 7, Epistle 53 (which is to Secundinus),³⁷ you have the words in the following question.

Adrian I, in book 1 *On Images to Charlemagne*, chapter 9,³⁸ says: "According to our faith, we in no way exhibit to images the true worship (*culturam*) that befits the divine nature alone; but a kiss and an honourable salutation." And yet in chapter 8 of the said book the opinion of St. Basil is cited, that the honour of the image passes to the Prototype. Therefore the Pontiff did not understand this saying of St. Basil as the disciples of St.

Thomas wish it to be understood, but means the sense to be that the image is honoured on account of the Prototype.

§ 18. But neither did St. John Damascene interpret the said opinion of St. Basil as they do, but in a plainly contrary manner. For in book 4, chapter 17,³⁹ saying that images are to be adored by reason of the thing represented, and proving this from that opinion of St. Basil — "The honour of the image is referred to the prototype" — he does not mean that the honour of the image and of the Prototype is the same, but different, yet such that the image is honoured on account of the Prototype. That this is indeed what St. John Damascene means is manifestly evident to anyone reading the whole chapter, especially what he says at the beginning: that we human beings honour one another, inasmuch as we are made in the image of God; and he immediately subjoins that opinion of St. Basil as a proof. Therefore in no way can this be understood of one and the same honour, unless one were to say that we human beings adore one another with the worship of latria — which to say would be most absurd.

And further on, speaking of the Mother of God and the Saints, whose honour is referred back to God, adducing a similar example, he again subjoins the opinion of St. Basil, saying: "Thus the honour of the image is referred to the prototype" — the Greek word being *ἀναβαίνει* ("ascends to") or *μεταφέρεται* ("is transferred to") — yet it is established that the Mother of God and the Saints are not honoured with the same honour as God. Which passage of St. John Damascene concerning the Mother of God is expounded by St. Thomas himself (in the said question 25, article 5, to the second)⁴⁰ to mean that the honour of the mother is referred to the Son, because the mother herself is to be adored on account of the Son.

§ 19. Similar things may be observed in the sayings of the holy Fathers. Thus St. Jerome, in the Epistle to Riparius against Vigilantius on the Martyrs: "We honour the servants, so that the honour of the servants may redound to the Lord."⁴¹ Where it is established even from the very passage of St. Jerome that the honour of the servants and of the Lord is not the same, even though the former redounds or is referred to the latter. So also St. Augustine (on Ps. 44, on those words: "In your honour") says: "In Peter, who is honoured, if not He who died for us?"⁴² And indeed the Lord Himself (Matt. 10 and elsewhere): "He who receives you receives Me," etc. — and yet not all are to be received with the same honour as the Lord. Likewise, one's neighbour is to be loved for the sake of God, and the love of one's neighbour is to be referred to God; yet it is not the same love by which I love God and by which I love my neighbour. From all of which it is inferred that, even though the Cross of Christ and His image are honoured on account of Christ, and the honour redounds or is referred to Christ, they are nonetheless not to be venerated with the same honour as Christ.

§ 20. To these is added Innocent III,⁴³ who (in Sermon 1 on the Dedication of a Temple) teaches that there is one image of God the Father which we must venerate with adoration together with the Father — namely, the Only-begotten Jesus Christ, the Son of God — but that it is indeed permissible to adore other images on account of the thing imaged, yet not with latria.

§ 21. Proof third: The conclusion is proved by multiple reasons. If the Cross or image of Christ can be adored with latria, sacrifice could also be offered to it — which was, however, condemned long ago in Carpocrates and the Collyridians, of whom Irenaeus, book 1, chapter 24,⁴⁴ and Epiphanius, heresy 27,⁴⁵ speak. Likewise, if the Cross of Christ is to be adored with the worship of latria because it is something of Christ's, then human beings and angels, who on account of the excellence of their nature are more closely conjoined to God and are made in His image, would have to be adored with the same worship all the more —

and above all the most Blessed Virgin, who bore the Son of God in her womb and brought Him forth from her own body. To this argument St. Thomas responds: since a rational creature is by itself capable of honour, if to it, insofar as it is the image of God, or otherwise insofar as it is conjoined to God, the adoration of latria were to be exhibited, there would be danger of error — namely, that the movement of adoration would come to rest in the rational creature as the terminus of adoration. But against this it must be objected that honour which exists in itself does not exclude honour on account of another. Then, let us suppose the danger of error to be absent in some particular person honouring — as it truly can be absent: in that case, can the worship of latria be exhibited to the Blessed Virgin and to other images of God? Medina concedes this (on article 5 of the said question 25, on the Blessed Mary);⁴⁶ and on the ground of conjunction — yet not absolutely, and he does not prove this assertion of his sufficiently firmly.

§ 22. To these may be added other reasons as well, both for the adoration of the Cross and for that of the image. The attestation of virtue is not given to the Cross or to the image; therefore neither is honour, properly so called. This follows by the definition applied to the thing defined. Likewise, divine honour is not owed to a creature; but the Cross and image are creatures; therefore divine worship is not owed to them, and therefore neither is latria. Likewise, "on account of which each thing is such, that thing is still more so": but the Cross and image of Christ are adored on account of Christ; therefore Christ Himself is all the more to be adored. Add to this that to say the Cross or image ought to be adored with the same worship as God is not without danger — it offends the ears of Catholics, and furnishes occasion for heretics to blaspheme more freely; and therefore such a manner of speaking is deservedly to be avoided.

§ 23. Now we must reply to the arguments adduced on the contrary side.

Reply to the first: The salutations by which we address the Cross in the ecclesiastical Office are figurative expressions (*locutiones tropicae*), in which there is partly personification (*prosopopoeia*) and partly metonymy (*metonymia*). Thus when we address the Cross with these words: "O tree, beautiful and shining," and likewise "O blessed one, on whose arms," etc., it is personification — just as in that passage: "O mountains of Gilboa, let neither dew nor rain fall upon you." Metonymy, on the other hand, is present in the following verse: "O Cross, hail, our unique hope, in this season of the Passion, increase justice for the righteous, and grant pardon to the guilty" — for it is established that this is proper to Christ the Crucified. Again, personification is present when it is said: "O faithful Cross, among all," etc.; likewise, "Bend your boughs, O tall tree"; likewise, "You alone were worthy." Similarly in this antiphon: "O Cross, more brilliant than all the stars," etc. When it is subjoined: "Save the present throng," etc., it is metonymy — for this pertains to Christ the Crucified. A mingling of both figures seems to appear in that antiphon: "O venerable Cross, which hast brought salvation to the wretched; with what praises shall I proclaim thee, since thou hast prepared for us heavenly life?"

Reply to the confirmation drawn from the Apostle at Gal. 6: I respond that the sense is that one must not glory except in Christ the Crucified, or in the Passion and death of Christ which He endured on the gibbet of the Cross, and by which He merited and procured for us every saving good.

§ 24. To the second it must be said: that passage is to be understood of the King clothed in diadem or purple. For if these are not on the body of the King, the same honour that is paid to the King is not paid to them, but a certain veneration — because, that is, they are held and handled with reverence — as St. Augustine himself explains (Sermon 58 *On the Words of the Lord*, near the end).⁴⁷

To the third I reply that the honour of the image is referred to the prototype in this sense: that honorary adoration is exhibited to the Cross or image insofar as it represents the Prototype and on account of the Prototype, even though the genus of honour be different. That this sense is the true and proper sense of the said passage cited from St. Basil is sufficiently clear from what we adduced in the first and second proofs from the Seventh Synod and from Adrian I and from St. John Damascene explaining himself and others.

§ 25. As to the objection concerning prostration (and the same holds for similar veneration) before the Cross of Christ or His image, I reply: that, insofar as it is directed towards the Cross or image of Christ, it is honorary adoration only, but insofar as it is directed towards Christ, it is latria. In support of this reply it must be observed that an external act receives its moral species from an internal act; and the corresponding internal act is twofold. One is that by which the soul is directed towards the Cross or image of the Crucified as a sign — which is honorary adoration; the other is that by which it is directed towards Christ, and this is an act of latria. And by reason of the latter, external prostration, the uncovering of the head, etc. is an act of latria; and in this respect it is not rendered to the image, but to Him whose image it is.

§ 26. That moreover the same external act, with respect to different things, can be both latria and dulia, or even honorary adoration only, is shown by a comparison. Thus, for example, if I uncover my head before Christ and the Blessed Mary together — because, that is, they are mentioned together at the same time — that very same uncovering of the head is latria with respect to Christ, and dulia with respect to the holy Mary. And if by the same external adoration Christ and His Mother and the saints are rightly honoured, why not also images?

Likewise, to celebrate the feast of some saint and to recite his praises in the Church is the worship of dulia with respect to the saint, and the worship of religion with respect to God, whom I intend to honour by such acts. Indeed even the Sacrifice of the Mass, with respect to God to whom it is properly offered in sacrifice, is latria; and with respect to the Blessed Mary or the saints in whose honour or honours it is offered, it is dulia; and with respect to the relics over which the sacrifice is performed, it is a certain honour inferior to both of these. From all which it follows that whenever the Cross is said to be adored with latria, this is to be understood not of the Cross itself but of the Crucified. Hence one should rather say that such worship is exhibited before (*ante*) the Cross or in the presence of (*coram*) the Cross — as may be observed in Innocent III (Sermon 1 on the Dedication of a Temple),⁴⁸ where he has the following: "Hence also it is read elsewhere: 'Christians piously venerate and adore sacred images.' Yet more truly we adore God in the presence of the image than the image in the presence of God. Hence the precept was: 'You shall adore before this altar.' It says not, he says, 'the altar,' but 'before the altar.' And the Prophet: 'I will worship towards thy holy temple.'" The same manner of speaking is found in the Fathers of the Council of Trent (session 25, on sacred images),⁴⁹ where they teach that sacred images are to be venerated, yet not after the manner of the pagans: "But because," they say, "the honour which is exhibited to them is referred to the prototypes which they represent: so that through the images which we kiss, and before which we uncover our heads and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ and venerate the Saints whose likeness they bear." Note here that it does not say 'which we adore,' nor 'to which we uncover our heads and prostrate ourselves,' but 'before which we uncover our heads and prostrate ourselves,' etc.

§ 27. To the passage of the Philosopher, Bellarmine adduces various explanations in book 2 (On the Church Triumphant — that is, On the Relics and Images of the Saints, chapter 24);⁵⁰ but the sense seems to be that the intellect, when it understands something such as a man, a stone, or anything similar, is directed in

the same act or movement both to the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) and to the object. For the species is the image of the object. So also the motion of the eye is towards the visible species and towards colour. But just as the one understanding is not then considered to understand the species, but the man or the stone; and the eye is not considered to see the visible species but the colour: so too one who

--- is taken to be adoring the image. If he wishes to adore it, he must needs adore it with an inferior cult. As regards St. Thomas, although he appears to have held the contrary view, there are nevertheless those who interpret him with probability in accordance with what we noted above — namely, that the cross is adored together with Christ by one and the same external or material act, which act, however, is *latria* with respect to Christ, in whom alone it terminates, whereas it is honorific adoration with respect to the cross. And this they prove from the comparison which St. Thomas himself drew concerning the honor paid to a King and to his garment: for without doubt the King is worthy of greater honor than his garment, yet the garment itself is honored by the same exterior cult together with the King. Furthermore, this can be proved from the same St. Thomas, who, writing upon the Epistle to the Hebrews (chapter 11, Lecture 5, on the words "*and he adored the top of his staff*"), says: "because he adored Christ signified by that staff; just as we also adore the Crucified One and the cross by reason of Christ who suffered upon it. Hence properly speaking we do not adore the cross but Christ crucified upon it."⁵¹ The same author, writing upon the Epistle to the Colossians (chapter 3, Lecture 1, on the words "*which is the service of idols*"), says: "It is idolatry when someone exhibits to some image the honor that is due to God."⁵² From these passages it can be gathered with probability what the holy Doctor's view was.

§ 28. Furthermore, two things must here be noted. The first, from St. John Damascene, is that not only the cross upon which the Savior hung, but also the nails, the lance, the garments, and His sacred shrines — namely, the manger, the sepulchre, and similar objects — are to be adored by reason of the contact of Christ's members.⁵³ Although these things do not represent Christ to us in the way that His cross does, which is peculiarly called in Matt. 24 the sign of the Son of Man. And hence it is, says St. Thomas in the question so often cited,²⁰ "that we venerate the cross in whatsoever material it may be made; but not the image of the nails, or of any other such things." The second thing to be noted is that, although the likeness of the cross, made of whatever material, is to be venerated with a cult of the same kind as the true cross of Christ, it is nevertheless not to be venerated for the same reason. For the wood of the cross, sanctified by the contact of Christ's blood and body, we venerate in such a way that even if the shape were destroyed, we would hold the material of it, divided into the smallest fragments, in the highest honor. The likeness of the cross, however, we venerate solely by reason of representation, just as we do images — as follows.⁵⁴

§ III — On the cult of the image of Christ and of the Saints (De Cultu imaginis Christi & Sanctorum)

§ 29. By what kind of honor images of Christ and of the Saints are to be venerated — the answer sufficiently follows from what we have said above in the preceding question regarding Christ Himself and His effigy. Let this therefore be the conclusion. Although it is most true that the honor of an image is referred to its prototype (*Prototypum*), it does not follow that the same adoration is owed to the image as to the prototype. That images of Christ and of the Saints are to be honored and retained, no Catholic doubts; we do not, however, hold that the image of Christ is to be adored with the cult of *latria* (*latria*) which is owed to Christ,

nor that images of the Saints are to be adored with the cult of *dulia* (*dulia*) which is owed to the Saints themselves — but that they are to be venerated with an honorific veneration (*veneratio honoraria*) which befits signs; in accordance with what has been cited above in the preceding question both from the Seventh General Council and from the holy Fathers. This honorific veneration, however, befits images (though of the same kind) to a greater or lesser degree, according as the things represented by the image are of greater or lesser excellence.

§ 30. As for the many and various objections which heretics advance against this doctrine of venerating images, it is not the purpose of this work to weigh and refute them all. Indeed, from what has already been said, it is not difficult to gather the solution to nearly all of them. Let it suffice, meanwhile, to indicate briefly in this place — taking the occasion of the doctrine concerning the adoration due to the twofold nature in Christ — the foundation and rationale of the ecclesiastical tradition by which, from the very times of the Apostles, there has always been some use of images in the Church; although not so frequent at that time still, when very many were being converted from paganism to the faith of Christ, fresh from the cult of idols. So that the antiquity of this tradition may be understood, we shall review some passages from the Fathers and from ancient histories which commend to us the use and veneration of sacred images.

§ 31. (a) Eusebius, Book 2 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 15, makes mention of the image of Christ sent by Him to the Prince of the Edessenes.⁵⁶ The same author, Book 7, chapter 14, relates that a statue was erected to Him by the woman whom Christ had freed from a flow of blood, and that this statue was held in veneration by Christians up to the times of Julian the Apostate, and that it was moreover distinguished by a remarkable and continuous miracle. In the same passage he also makes mention of images of the Virgin Mother of God and of the Apostles Peter and Paul. These same things are read in Nicephorus, Book 6, chapters 15 and 16, and Book 10, chapter 30.⁵⁷

§ 32. Tertullian also, in his book *De Pudicitia*, writes that Christ was customarily painted in the guise of a shepherd calling wandering sheep to Himself. Evagrius, Book 5 of his *History*, chapter 18, relates that one Anatolius, cast into prison on account of a crime, had recourse to the image of the Blessed Virgin in order to obtain help.⁵⁸ It is also written in the life of Saint Alexius — who lived at Edessa in the times of Saint Augustine — that his name was made known through the image of the Blessed Virgin.

§ 33. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 29 *To the People of Antioch*, complains that on account of illness he had been unable to be present at the celebration in which the life of some martyr was being carried in procession depicted on panels.⁵⁹ Concerning this same matter, Gregory, Patriarch of Alexandria, relates in his *Life of Chrysostom* that he had in his chamber an image of the Apostle Paul rendered to the life. Prudentius, in the *Hymns of Cassianus and Hippolytus*, writes that he himself saw the images of those martyrs and the entire history of their passion depicted in their memorial-shrines.⁶⁰ What St. Basil thought about the veneration of images we have stated above,⁶¹ from chapter 18 of *On the Holy Spirit*. There is also another passage in the same author, in Homily 20. There is likewise a poem of Lactantius (*On the Passion of the Lord*) signifying that the image of the crucified Christ was customarily placed in the midst of churches — a practice which obtains in churches even to this day. St. Augustine also makes mention of ecclesiastical images and paintings from time to time, as in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 2, and Book 1 *On the Harmony of the Gospels*, chapter 10, and Sermon 94 *On Various Matters*.⁶²

§ 34. Moreover, there are in Gregory of Rome three very explicit passages in favor of having sacred images in the Church. The first is Book 7, Epistle 53, *To Secundinus*: "I know indeed," he says, "that you do not venerate the image of the Savior for the reason of worshipping it as though it were God, but so that through the remembrance you may grow warm in love of Him: and we for our part do not prostrate ourselves before it as before the Divinity, but we adore Him whom we remember — as born, or as suffering, or as seated on His throne — through the image."⁶³ In these words it is also to be noted that even then the faithful were accustomed to prostrate themselves before images of Christ and the Saints. The second passage is in Epistle 109 of the same book, addressed to Serenus, Bishop of Marseilles, who with ill-considered zeal had thrown sacred images out of the Church on account of a certain abuse. To him Gregory writes thus: "It has come to our attention that your fraternity, observing certain worshippers of images, has broken and thrown out the images themselves from the churches. And indeed we praise you for having had zeal lest anything made by hand should be worshipped; but we judge that you ought not to have broken those images. For images are employed in churches for this reason — that those who do not know letters may at least read by looking at the walls what they cannot read in books. Your fraternity, therefore, ought to have preserved them and forbidden the people from adoring them: so that both those ignorant of letters might have something from which to learn the knowledge of the historical narrative, and the people might in no way sin in the adoration of a picture."⁶⁴ The third passage is Book 9, Epistle 9, to the same Serenus: "That you forbade images to be adored, we altogether praise; that you broke them, we reprove. For it is one thing to adore a picture, another thing to learn from the history of a picture what is to be adored. What ought not to have been broken was that which had been placed in the churches not for adoration, but solely for instructing the minds of the ignorant."⁶⁵ So he says — obviously understanding the adoration of latria, namely that which is fixed upon the image itself and is not referred to the prototype. This same Gregory sent to the conversion of the English a certain Augustine as bishop, of whom Bede, Book 1 of the *History of the English People*, chapter 25, relates that he carried publicly with his companions an image of the Savior painted on a panel.⁶⁶

§ 35. But when in the course of time there arose the heresy of those who calumniated sacred images as idols — whom the Greeks call Iconoclasts (*Iconomachos*) and Iconoclasts — and the Emperors of the Greeks had for nearly a hundred continuous years attacked these same images, having drawn many bishops too into their opinion, at last in the Seventh Ecumenical Council of Nicaea II it was decreed that in temples, on walls, on panels, on sacred vestments, in private and public places, sacred images of Christ and of the Saints are to be had and retained. The proper and legitimate use of them was also declared there. The same Synod declares that the use and veneration of images is an Apostolic tradition, confirms this with the testimonies of many holy Fathers, and likewise refutes what was urged against the venerable images by the adversaries from the Fathers. Around that time many wrote in defense of sacred images, among whom St. John Damascene, Book 4, chapter 17, explained their use and the manner of their veneration most fully.⁶⁷

§ I — Whether Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is a Person (An Christus quatenus homo sit Persona)

§ 36. Since Christ as man is something (*aliquid*), as we showed above from the definition of the Apostolic See,⁶⁹ the Master here asks whether it must consequently be confessed that Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is a person (*persona*). For if Christ as man is something, that is, a substance; and a rational and individual

substance is the definition of a person — it seems to follow that Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is a person. Moreover, it is simply true that every man is a person. If, therefore, other men inasmuch as they are men are persons, so too is Christ.

§ 37. But it must be answered that, although in some sense it can be conceded that Christ inasmuch as He is man is a person — insofar as the word *homo* placed in reduplication indicates the formal character (*ratio*) of a supposit (*suppositum*), so that the sense would be: Christ insofar as He is the supposit of human nature, is a person — this is how the Master in the text declares it can be understood, and the Scholastics commenting on this passage of the Master, and likewise St. Thomas,⁶⁸ (properly and absolutely speaking) hold that such an expression is not to be admitted but is to be avoided as tending toward the Nestorian dogma, by which two persons are assigned to Christ. For since *inasmuch as* (*in quantum*), properly taken in reduplication, imports the proper formal character (*ratio*) or cause of a thing, and it is certain that the formal character or cause of personality in Christ is not in human nature, and hence is not signified by the word "man" — it follows that Christ, inasmuch as He is man, that is, from the formal character of human nature, is not a person. For in Christ the human nature does not subsist by itself and apart, but is joined to a more excellent nature in the unity of the person which is proper to that more excellent nature. Moreover, nothing eternal belongs to Christ inasmuch as He is man. Since, therefore, in Christ there is no person other than an eternal one — as Catholic Faith holds against the Nestorians — it follows that Christ inasmuch as He is man is not a person, but only inasmuch as He is God.

§ 38. To the argument drawn from the definition of a person, the reply is that "individual substance" in that definition is to be understood as a complete substance subsisting by itself and apart from another, at least from a more excellent one. In this manner human nature does not subsist in Christ, being conjoined to the divine. To the other argument the reply is easy: every man is indeed a person, but it is proper to Christ that He is not a person inasmuch as He is man, but inasmuch as He is God, as is clear from what has been said.

§ II — Whether Christ can be called the adoptive Son of God (An Christus dici possit Filius Dei adoptivus)

§ 39. The other question of this distinction is whether Christ is rightly called the adoptive Son of God by reason of the assumed nature. For this might seem to follow from the fact that the Apostle calls Him "the firstborn among many brethren" (Rom. 8). Since this does not belong to Him by nature — for by nature He is not the firstborn but the only-begotten Son of God — it seems to belong to Him through adoption. For adoption is opposed to natural sonship in the formal character of filiation; so that whoever is not a son by nature may rightly be called adoptive. Nor does the formal character of adoption require that the person adopted should at some time have been excluded from the right of inheritance —

1. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 35, a. 5.

2. Scotus, *In I Sent.* [on the twofold filiation of Christ, against St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure].

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 1; and a. 2.

4. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 1.

5. St. Thomas, *In hanc Distinctionem* [i.e., on this Distinction of the Sentences].

6. St. Athanasius, *Epistola ad Adelphium*.
7. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 89* (on "Adorate scabellum pedum ejus, quoniam sanctum est").
8. St. Augustine, *Sermo 58 de Verbis Domini*, compiled partly from *Tractatus 78 in Ioannem* and partly from elsewhere.
9. St. Cyril, *Ad Evoptium*, Anathema 8; and *Apologeticus ad Orientales Episcopos*.
10. Anathema 8 of the Council of Ephesus (= Canon 8 of the same Council).
11. Canon 9 of the Second Council of Constantinople.
12. Pope Leo the Great, *Sermo 8 de Quadragesima*.
13. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 8.
14. 1 Cor. 2 [i.e., 1 Cor. 2:8: "they crucified the Lord of glory"].
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 1 (*ubi supra*).
16. Rom. 1 [v. 25: "who served the creature rather than the Creator"].
17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* IV [i.e., *In IV Sent.*], q. 2, a. 2.
18. St. Augustine, *Sermo 38 de Verbis Domini*.
19. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 89* [as cited above].
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 4.
21. St. John Damascene, cited in the context of the earlier discussion of the adoration of Christ (cf. above).
22. The Fathers of the Seventh Synod (Second Council of Nicaea); St. John Damascene; the Scholastics commenting on this Distinction.
23. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto ad Amphilochem*, ch. 18.
24. Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* [On Memory and Recollection].
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 3; q. 94, a. 2, ad 1; q. 103, a. 3, ad 3.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 2 and a. 4.
27. Medina, *Commentary on St. Thomas, Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 3 and a. 4.
28. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Synod), Act 7, in its conclusion or decree, and elsewhere throughout.
29. Tharasus, Patriarch of Constantinople, in the same Synod, Act 2, in the passages where he responds to the letter of Pope Adrian.
30. Tharasus and the Synod, in the letter to the Emperors, Act 7 of the Second Council of Nicaea.
31. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 12 (on the Cross) and ch. 17 (on the adoration of images).
32. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Synod), definition in Act 7.
33. Epiphanius the Deacon, response to heretics, in vol. 2 of Action 6 of the Second Council of Nicaea.
34. Constantine, Bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, Act 3 of the Second Council of Nicaea.
35. St. Ambrose, *Oratio de obitu Theodosii* [Oration on the Death of Theodosius].
36. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae*, lib. 7, Ep. 109; and lib. 9, Ep. 9 (to Serenus).
37. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae*, lib. 7, Ep. 53 (to Secundinus).
38. Adrian I (Pope), *De Imaginibus ad Carolum Magnum* [On Images, to Charlemagne], lib. 1, ch. 9 (and ch. 8).
39. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 17.
40. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 5, ad 2.
41. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Riparium contra Vigilantium* [Epistle to Riparius against Vigilantius], on the Martyrs.
42. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 44*, on the words "In honore tuo."

43. Innocent III, *Sermo 1 in Dedicatione Templi* [Sermon 1 on the Dedication of a Temple].
44. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* I, ch. 24.
45. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (Haeresis 27), on the Carpocratians and Collyridians.
46. Medina, *Commentary on St. Thomas, Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 5 (on the Blessed Mary).
47. St. Augustine, *Sermo 58 de Verbis Domini*, near the end. [The source notes this is no. CCXLVII among those rejected into the Appendix of vol. 5 in the Benedictine edition, as noted elsewhere.]
48. Innocent III, *Sermo 1 in Dedicatione Templi*.
49. Council of Trent, Session 25, decree on sacred images.
50. Robert Bellarmine, *De Ecclesia Triumphante* (= *De Reliquiis et Imaginibus Sanctorum*), lib. 2, ch. 24.
51. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, ch. 11, Lecture 5, on the words "*et adoravit fastigium virgae ejus*" ("and he adored the top of his staff").
52. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians*, ch. 3, Lecture 1, on the words "*Quod est idolorum servitus*" ("which is the service of idols").
53. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 12.
54. The paragraph ends here in the source, with the remainder ("*ratione repraesentationis, sicut & imagines, de quibus equitur*") indicating continuation into the following section on images.
55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 3.
56. The footnote in the source (marked *a*) contains an extended scholarly note: Estius states that he does not doubt an error has crept in here, and that it is not Eusebius but Evagrius who records this matter; for Eusebius, Book 1 (*Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 13), makes mention of the letters of Abgar (or Abagarus) to Jesus and of Jesus to Abgar — letters which Abgar, king of Edessa, a city in Syria, had taken from the archives, and which Eusebius transcribes (translated from Syriac into Greek); of the image sent by Jesus to Abgar, however, Eusebius makes no mention, nor does Procopius, as Henry Valesius notes in his annotations on the aforesaid passage of Evagrius. Evagrius is the first to make mention of the image sent by our Lord to that king, as nearly all the learned note; who (Evagrius), recounting the miracles thence produced, takes occasion to mention this matter; what was recounted from him was received in the Council of Nicaea II and approved by the Fathers as exceptionally worthy of credence. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 17, records the same history, saying: "It is also handed down in history that when Abazarus, king of Edessa, had sent a painter by name to express the image of our Lord, and the painter could not accomplish this on account of the splendor radiating from His countenance, the Lord Himself by His own divine and vivifying power impressed His own image upon a cloth and sent it to Abagarus, thus satisfying his desire." Nicephorus, Book 1 (ch. 6) has the same; and regarding that same image there exists a splendid Oration of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, edited in Greek by Father Combefis of the Order of Preachers. Further testimonies from Metaphrastes and Theophanes, and also from Adrian the Pontiff writing to Charlemagne that this history was received and accepted in the Roman Council by Pope Stephen, are adduced by Caesar Baronius, *Annals*, Vol. 1, at the year 31, no. 61. Certainly among the Greeks the anniversary celebration of this feast is attested by their Menologia on XVII Kal. September. Concerning this image not made by human hands see Gretser in his book *On Images Not Made by Hand*. As for what is objected against the history of the letters of Abgar to Jesus and of Jesus to Abgar, Natal. Alexander, *Hist. Eccles.* (Cent. 2, Dist. 3), and Ludovicus Dupin in *Biblioth. (Auct. Eccles. same century)* set it aside learnedly, doctrinally, and piously — as does Ambrof. Garde Bosc., *Hist. Eccles.*, Synops. Tom. 1, p. 5, l. 2, Dissert. 1, qu. 1; and the most erudite Tillemontius, *Memor. (Hist. Eccles. Tom. 1, p. 3, in Vita S. Thomae Apostoli, and Nota VII on the same Life)*. It is true that the statue, carefully set up and erected, which the author here mentions, is reported by Eusebius, Book 4 (*Hist. Eccl.* ch. 18, in the Valesius edition); but that it was venerated by Christians up to the time of Julian the Apostate he does not report; nor could he, since Eusebius is said to have died in the year 340, while Histories relate that Julian was raised to the Empire in the year 355. But that it endured to Julian's time Nicephorus, Book 6 (ch. 15) and Philostorgius, Book 7 (ch. 3) and the Epitome of Photius the Patriarch confirm — as also Henry Valesius in the Latin edition.
57. Nicephorus Callistus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VI, chs. 15–16, and X, ch. 30.
58. Evagrius Scholasticus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* V, ch. 18.
59. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 29 *Ad Populum Antiochenum*.
60. Prudentius, *Hymns of Cassianus and Hippolytus* (i.e., *Peristephanon*, hymns on Sts. Cassianus and Hippolytus).

61. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 18; and Homily 20.
62. St. Augustine: *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 2; *De Consensu Evangelistarum* I, ch. 10; Sermon 94 *De Diversis* (= Sermon CCCXVI in the edition of PP. Benedictines, as noted in the source's own footnote *a* on this sermon).
63. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae* VII, Epistle 53, *To Secundinus*.
64. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae* VII, Epistle 109, *To Serenus, Bishop of Marseilles*.
65. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolae* IX, Epistle 9, *To Serenus*.
66. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum* I, ch. 25.
67. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 17. The source's footnote (*a*) at this point notes: "A rather lengthy annotation on the adoration of the Saints, the veneration of relics, and the cult of images would here have to be appended; and also on the Iconoclast heresy and the heretics of modern times; but lest we prove tedious to readers, it is sufficient to admonish them to consult on this matter Robert Bellarmine [*Controversiarum*, Controv. 4, general bk. 1, and bk. 4], Dionysius Petavius [*Theol. Dogmat.*, at bk. 15, throughout], and Ludovicus Thomassin [*De Incarnatione*, bks. 11 and 12]."
68. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 12.
69. That is, from the definition of the Apostolic See discussed above, at Distinction 7.
70. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 24, a. 4.

DISTINCTIO X — ON THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST: NATURAL OR ADOPTIVE, AND WHETHER CHRIST CAN BE CALLED A CREATURE (*DE FILIATIONE CHRISTI NATURALI VEL ADOPTIVA, ET AN CREATURA DICI POSSIT*)

§ 1. For both the Angel and the first man, created in a state of grace, were sons of God not by nature but by adoption, yet it was never permitted to alienate from them that sonship. How also could anyone who is to be born of another adopt a future person as his son? This opinion seems to be supported by what Hilary says:¹ "In Christ the dignity of power is not lost when the humanity of the flesh is adopted." And by what St. Ambrose says:² concerning the Son: "Not departing from Himself, but acquiring for Himself the right of our adoption." Likewise by what St. Augustine says,³ that by the same grace that man is Christ, from the beginning of faith whatsoever man is a Christian.

§ 2. Now the negative part is confirmed by both authority and reason. For, first, Scripture never calls Christ the Son of God by adoption or by grace, but in very many places indicates that He is the true and natural Son of God. Hence that text of 1 Jn. 5:20: "We know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding to know the true God, and we are in His true Son. This is the true God and eternal life." The same is sounded by the voice of the Father from heaven, and by the confession both of Nathanael and of Peter, and by the other testimonies scattered throughout the Scriptures. And with this argument, albeit negative, the Commentary ascribed to St. Ambrose also works,⁴ saying thus: "I have read, and I have read again the Scriptures, and Jesus as the Son of God by adoption I have found nowhere." And St. Ambrose himself says:⁵ "An adoptive son we say is not a son but by nature." And in another place⁶ he openly denies that Christ is the Son of God through adoption, since He is a son by nature. Likewise St. Hilary, disputing in what manner Christ is the Son:⁷ "We," he says, "are sons of God, but not such is this Son. For He is the true and proper Son — by origin, not by adoption; by truth, not by name; by birth, not by creation." And in another book⁸ he proves at length against the Arians that the name of adoption is not to be admitted in the case of Christ. St. Jerome also⁹ distinguishes between Christ and us thus: that He is a son by nature, we by adoption.

§ 3. Similarly, St. Augustine, *Tractate 82 on John*, says:¹⁰ "We are sons by grace, not by nature; but the Only-Begotten is so by nature, not by grace." Although what follows immediately thereafter, and is cited by the Master, as needing to be referred also to Christ as man, does not pertain to the words immediately preceding, but to that which the Lord says — that He abides in the love of the Father. For St. Augustine's meaning is that this befits the man Christ through the grace of union. But when he denies that the Only-Begotten is a son by grace, he understands the grace of adoption, concerning which he had said that we are sons by grace. To the same effect writes Gennadius:¹¹ "The Son of God, made the son of man, born according

to the truth of nature from God, is the Son of God, and according to the truth of nature from man, is the son of man: so that the truth of one begotten might have the name of son in each nativity not by adoption, not by appellation, but by being born; and He might be true God and true man, one Son," and so on. Finally, the author of the *Glossa ordinaria*,¹² on Phil. 2 ("That at the name of Jesus," etc.), denies that Christ as man is God by adoption — as though Christ were partly true God and partly adoptive God. "To an adoptive God," he says, "the creature does not bend the knee, but to the true one." And again, on the words "because Christ is in the glory of God the Father," reconciling certain words of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine that appear to be in conflict, he says: "By natural donation the Father gave the name above every name to God the Son, not to the man — that is, to Christ according as He is God, not according as He is man; nor was the giving anything other than generating an equal. But by gratuitous donation He gave to Christ as man, not to God, because Christ not insofar as He is God but insofar as He is man received the name of God by grace — not by the grace of adoption but by the grace of union — so that He is not an adoptive God but the true one, before whom every knee is bent." So the Gloss.

§ 4. In these judgments of the Fathers it must be noted that, although they properly direct their pen against the Arians, who declared Christ to be a son of God by adoption in such a way as to deny that He was a son by nature, they nevertheless speak absolutely, employing this argument as most certain: Christ is the Son of God by nature; therefore not by adoption. The *Glossa* furthermore, striking at the dogma of Nestorius, even with the added determination "as man" denies that Christ is God by the grace of adoption, and consequently denies that He is the Son of God.¹³

§ 5. The rationale of this teaching is as follows: just as nativity, so also sonship is properly attributed to the person, not to the nature. But in Christ there is a single person, and that an eternal one, to whom it belongs to be a Son by nature. An adoptive son is called a son by a certain participation. Since, therefore, it is repugnant for something to be attributed to someone both by nature and by participation simultaneously, it follows that Christ, who is the Son of God by nature, cannot be called an adoptive son of that same God — whether this is said absolutely, or with the determination "insofar as He is man."

§ 6. To that, then, which was objected from the Apostle,¹⁴ it must be said that Christ is the first-born among many brethren by the grace of union, not of adoption; and the grace of union does not prevent Him from being, all the same, a son by nature. Moreover, in order that someone should be called an adoptive son, it is not indeed required — as was said above — that he should at some time have been a stranger to the right of inheritance; yet it is required that the sonship should not have been due to him by reason of his origin. This is truly said of every purely intellectual creature, even when created in a state of grace. But it is not true of Christ, to whom as man the sonship was already presupposed to be due by virtue of the hypostatic union.

§ 7. What Hilary says — that the humanity has been adopted — is a less proper manner of speaking, by which he wished to signify that the human nature was assumed and elevated to such dignity as to be united to the Divinity in the Person of the Word. The words of St. Ambrose mean nothing other than that the Son of God, by becoming incarnate, merited for Himself the right of our adoption, so that we might be adoptive sons of God — a thing which, moreover, is to be referred to His merit. St. Augustine, however, does not understand the grace of adoption, but that grace which excludes all preceding merit. For just as without any preceding merits it came about that that man was Christ, so without any preceding merits whatsoever man becomes a Christian. Yet with this difference: that the former, by the grace of union, is the natural Son of God; whereas we, through habitual grace, are made adoptive sons of God through Christ.¹⁵

— *Distinctio XI — Whether Christ Can Be Called a Creature (An Christus dici possit creatura) (continued from previous chunk)* —

§ I — Whether Christ can be called a creature (An Christus dici possit creatura)

§ 8. That Christ, insofar as He is man, is a creature of God — this is not disputed among the Doctors. For human nature in Christ is just as it is in all other creatures; and therefore He, insofar as He is considered as having human nature, is rightly conceded to be a creature. But the question is raised among them whether simply and with no determination added it is to be granted that Christ is a thing made (*factura*) or a creature (*creatura*). On this point the opinions of the Fathers seem to be in conflict with one another.

§ 9. On the affirmative side — after the scriptural texts of Gal. 4, where Christ is said to have been "made of a woman," and Rom. 1, "made of the seed of David" — there is, first and most plainly, the assertion of St. Jerome,¹⁷ with these words: "Many, from fear of being compelled to call Christ a creature, deny the whole mystery of Christ." And he adds immediately: "We freely proclaim that there is no danger in calling Him a creature whom, as a worm and a man and one crucified and a curse, we confess with full confidence of our faith." He also cites that text of Prov. 8 according to the Septuagint: "The Lord created me at the beginning of His ways."¹⁸ Similarly, St. Ambrose, *Sermon 5 on Psalm 118*:¹⁹ "I am not afraid," he says, "lest someone say: 'Do you then assert that Christ was created?' I answer: yes, I say He was created, in the same manner as He was 'made under the law.'" And again: "He was created in order to redeem creatures." He has similar statements in the *Oration on the surrender of the basilicas*. Equally plain is this sentence of St. Leo, *Sermon 3 on Pentecost*:²⁰ "If man had not sinned, the creator of the world would not have become a creature." And there are also numerous passages in St. Augustine where he says that Christ was created and calls Him a creature — for instance in the *Enchiridion*, chapters 38 and 44,²¹ and in the *Sermons on the Seasons*, sermons 13, 16, 19, 25, and 26,²² in the last of which he also cites the same text from Proverbs that St. Jerome cites. Beyond these, St. John Damascene also,²³ disputing in *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 4 on the communication of idioms in Christ, and teaching that the properties of each nature fall under one and the same hypostasis, gave this example: that Christ is called created and uncreated, passible and impassible. And in *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 19,²⁴ citing among other things the aforesaid text of Prov. 8, he finally concludes that by reason of the union according to the hypostasis, the flesh also is said to be deified, and God is said to become incarnate and to become man and to be called a creature, and is called "the last one." Hence also, in a certain ecclesiastical canticle whose author is Richard of St. Victor, it is sung: "By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature."²⁵

§ 10. Moreover, the principal reason is that which is taken from St. John Damascene: namely, that all the properties of each nature converge upon one common hypostasis. Wherefore, just as Christ is rightly called Creator by reason of the Divine Nature, so He seems rightly to be called a creature by reason of the human nature. Furthermore, just as by reason of His body He is said to have been conceived of a mother, so there seems to be nothing absurd if, by reason of His soul, He is said to have been created from nothing — indeed also by reason of the whole of human nature, in that manner, of course, in which we confess every man, taken as a whole, to be a creature.

§ 11. But the negative side seems to be proved by those testimonies adduced by the Master in the text — namely, St. Ambrose,²⁶ where he proves at length against the Arians that Christ is not a creature; and St. Augustine,²⁷ to which we add the authority of St. Hilary,⁸ where he demonstrates this same point vigorously against the Arians. Finally, in the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, and Athanasian Symbols we confess the Son of God to be begotten and not made (*genitum et non factum*) simply and without qualification.

§ 12. For the explanation of this question one must hold fast to the rule of St. Augustine which he sets out in *De Trinitate* III, ch. 13:²⁸ he prescribes that prudent and diligent attention be given to *what, according to what, and on account of what* is said of Christ; and a second rule, which teaches that in those things which are attributed to Christ in the Scriptures and that appear diverse in kind, one must always pay attention to whether the form of God is now at issue, or now the form of the servant — as when Scripture says that the Son is now equal to the Father, now less than the Father, and in other such cases. The Fathers, whenever they assert that Christ is a creature, have regard to the form of the servant and the mystery of the Incarnation; but whenever they deny it, they direct their intention against the Arians, looking to the nature of the Word which He has from the Father.

§ 13. Hence also most of the Scholastics — as St. Thomas, Scotus, and St. Bonaventure — acknowledge that this locution, by which Christ is called a creature, is simply true; yet they judge that such locutions are to be avoided on account of the danger of error and perverse understanding, lest we seem to agree with the Arians, who, asserting Christ to be a creature, referred this not to the assumed humanity but to the very nature of the Word. According to that understanding, that proposition was already long ago rightly condemned by the Fathers as pertaining to the Arian dogma. Therefore in all such propositions — those concerning which a heresy regarding one or the other nature of Christ has at some time existed — such caution is to be employed that we express the nature concerning which the proposition holds indubitable truth. That this was done by the Fathers whenever they wished to speak more circumspectly can be observed. For St. Jerome and St. Ambrose, in the passages cited at the outset,²⁹ explain themselves, testifying that they are speaking of Christ according to the assumed nature. St. John Damascene, elsewhere calling Christ created, adds the determination of nature; for in *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 5,³⁰ when asked whether the hypostasis of the Lord is created or uncreated, he answers that it is uncreated in respect of divinity and created in respect of humanity. The text of Prov. 8 is moreover more correctly read from the Hebrew as: "The Lord possessed me" — as St. Jerome admonishes in the same place cited above. What the Apostle says in Rom. 1 and Gal. 4, that Christ was "made," is not said simply and without qualification either; for by adding "of a woman" and "of the seed of David," he sufficiently expressed the nature according to which He said He had been made.

§ I — Whether Christ ever began to be (An Christus aliquando cœperit esse)

§ 14. The Master of the Sentences asks at the beginning of this Distinction: whether that man, with Christ indicated by a demonstrative, began to be, or whether he always was. Nor does it make much difference whether the question is proposed in this form: whether Christ ever began to be. Here it is presupposed as a truth that Christ according to His divinity always was and never at any time began; whereas according to His humanity He began to be at some point and was not always — so that what seems more to be called into question is how one ought to speak, rather than what one ought to hold.

§ 15. Therefore, in favor of the affirmative part of the question, they bring forward that passage of St. Augustine from Tract 105 (on Jn.): "Before the world was, we were not, nor was He Himself — the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus." And Tract 106: "The Son of God had at some time what He did not yet have — that same man was the Son of God, because He had not yet been a man." They also bring forward that passage from Sermon 8³² on the words of the Apostle: "Before the conception of the Virgin, He was mediator, not assuredly just beforehand; for how was he just who did not yet exist?"³³

§ 16. They bring forward reasons as well. For neither the body nor the soul of Christ existed from eternity, but both began to be in time; therefore that man also, whose these are as essential parts, began to be in time. Likewise, Christ was born in time; but whatever is born in time begins to be by that very nativity. Likewise, Christ as a man by His very nativity did not exist from eternity; therefore this man, with Christ indicated by a demonstrative, did not always exist.

§ 17. Notwithstanding these arguments, St. Thomas rightly teaches³¹ that the proposition by which it is said of Christ that this man began to be must not be granted — being simply false and contrary to the sentence of the Catholic Faith, by which we acknowledge in Christ a single hypostasis (*hypostasis*). For it is necessary that by the word "this man" the eternal supposit (*suppositum*) should be indicated — namely the Person of the Son of God, whose eternity is repugnant to having at some time begun. And although He began according to the assumed nature, yet this cannot simply be conceded of Him. For the word "to begin" (*incipere*) includes a negation of prior subsistence (*subsistentia*), which negation cannot simply be attributed to the Eternal Supposit — One who did not receive *esse* in time in such a way as to have simply not been before. For He always and from eternity existed. Hence He Himself speaks of Himself in the Gospel, Jn. 8: "Before Abraham was made, I am." He could no less truly have said: "Before the world was made, I am." For so He speaks elsewhere, Jn. 17: "Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was made." Of the same eternity of Christ, this is the testimony, Heb. 13: "Jesus Christ, yesterday and today, the same also for ever." And universally all those passages of Scripture which confirm that Christ is God also convince that He is eternal. Of which matter we have spoken above (at Dist. 2 of this book).³⁴ Hence the Fathers everywhere call Him eternal. And even in earlier times Paul of Samosata was condemned for heresy because he said that Christ had not always existed, but that His beginning was from when He was born of Mary — as St. Augustine relates (*Hæresis* 44).³⁵ Likewise, the saying attributed to Arius regarding Christ — "There was a time when He was not, and He was not before He was begotten" — was condemned with anathema by the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea. Those things truly adduced from St. Augustine on the contrary side are to be understood of Christ according to the human nature, as the very circumstance of those passages sufficiently indicates.

§ 18. To the first argument it is answered: that before the conception of the Virgin, Christ was neither a man nor Christ, and had neither soul nor body; yet He Himself existed — for the Supposit was eternal.

§ 19. To the second: it is peculiar to Christ that in being born He did not begin to be, because according to the divine nature He existed before His temporal nativity; and accordingly He existed before He was born of His mother.

§ 20. To the third argument and others of similar kind, the solutions are to be sought from the Dialecticians.³⁶

§ II — Why God assumed flesh from the posterity of Adam (*Quare Deus carnem assumpserit ex posteritate Adae*)

§ 21. To the question which the Master raises in the second place — whether God could have assumed a man from another source than from the race of Adam — the answer is certain: it is possible. For since it involves no contradiction, it is not to be excepted from the number of those things that are subject to the omnipotence of God. Hence St. Augustine writes:³⁸ "God could indeed have taken up a man from elsewhere, in whom He would be, without belonging to the line of that Adam who by his sin bound the human race in debt — just as He created Adam himself, the first man He created, not from the stock of any other. He could therefore, either in this way or in whatever other way He pleased, have created yet another man by whom the conqueror of the former man might be conquered." So far Augustine. Since this is so, the reason must be given why God willed to assume human nature preferably from the posterity of Adam and from the corrupted mass (*massa corrupta*), rather than from elsewhere.

§ 22. One reason, then, of this divine counsel can be rendered: because it is just that he who sinned should make satisfaction. Since Adam was unable to make satisfaction to God in himself for the offence, it was fitting that from his race at least should be assumed that by which satisfaction for the whole race might be accomplished. A second reason: because it pertains to the dignity of man, inasmuch as from that same race is born the conqueror of the devil and of sin, which race had been conquered by the devil through sin. A third reason: because by this the power and mercy of God are commended to us — power indeed, whereby He was able even from corrupted nature to assume that by which He would take away corruption; mercy truly, whereby He so loved the human race that was His enemy, as to unite it to Himself by the indissoluble bond of personal union (*personalis unitas*) in One who was to be born from that race. To these reasons St. Augustine seems to have looked when, in the passage cited a little before, he adds: "But God judged it better that from that very race which had been conquered He should assume a man by whom He might conquer the enemy of the human race."³⁹

§ 23. To these may be added yet another reason: lest the ordinance of God, whereby it had been decreed that the entire human race should be propagated and multiplied from one — and this for the sake of representing the universal principle (*universale principium*) and commending the mutual charity (*caritas*) among men — should by the occasion of sin be in some way broken. Which would have occurred had Christ as man been born from any other stock than that of Adam.

§ 24. If you ask why Adam himself was not assumed, so that in him his own sin might be avenged — since justice demands that the punishment of a sin should follow its author — I answer: if you consider the bare punishment and retribution of sin, that is indeed owed to the one who sinned. But since the penalty which Christ sustained was inflicted not for retribution alone, but also for the satisfaction and reconciliation of the human race, such a satisfier and reconciler was required as would not be a debtor from any other source; and such had to be the purifier who himself stood in no need of purification.

§ III — That sin neither was nor could have been in Christ (In Christo peccatum nec fuisse nec esse potuisse)

§ 25. Although the Master, in answering this question — whether that man, with Christ indicated, could have sinned — does not badly distinguish whether the person or the nature is under discussion, it is nevertheless answered far more correctly and conformably to our Catholic faith absolutely: that Christ, or that man with Christ indicated, neither ever sinned nor could have sinned. For the question encompasses the person. And it is established that the person is none other than the Person of the Son of God. Wherefore, even if it may be conceded and is true, as the Master says, that that soul, had it not been assumed by the Word, could have sinned — yet this must by no means be conceded of Christ, or of that man, if you indicate Christ.

§ 26. Now, that Christ was never subject to any sin we have shown in part above.⁴¹ To this belong these passages of Scripture: Heb. 4: "Tempted in all things according to likeness, without sin." And Heb. 7: "For it was fitting that we should have such a High Priest — holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, who has no need daily to offer sacrifices for his own sins." Likewise Jn. 9, where He Himself says: "Which of you will convict me of sin?" And of Him afterwards, from Is. 53, Peter writes in his First Epistle (1 Pet. 2): "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth." And 1 Jn. 3: "You know that He appeared to take away our sins, and sin is not in Him." Wherever, therefore, sin seems to be attributed to Christ in the Scriptures, it must either be referred to the members of His body of which He is the head — that is, to the faithful, whose sins He bore on the cross — as when He exclaims in Ps. 21: "Far from my salvation are the words of my transgressions," and Ps. 68: "My offences are not hidden from Thee": for Is. 53 interprets those offences saying, "But He was wounded for our iniquities," and again, "The Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all," and "He bore the sins of many." Or else sin must be understood in a figurative mode of speech (*figuratus sermo*), as when it is said in 2 Cor. 5: "Him who knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the justice of God in Him." In the former part the Apostle removes sin properly so called from Christ; in the latter he calls Him sin by a trope (*tropus*), because by the will of the Father He was made a victim for sin — in the way that it is written of the priests in Hos. 4: "They shall eat the sins of my people," that is, the victims customarily offered by the people for sins. A similar passage concerning Christ is Rom. 8: "God sent His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and of sin condemned sin in the flesh" — understanding by "of sin" Christ, who was made the expiatory victim of sin.

§ 27. Now since this is the certain and Catholic doctrine concerning Christ, the other point must also be held with certainty: that Christ could not even have sinned. This is confirmed by the following arguments.

First, because — as we said a little before — the name *Christus* designates the person, which is none other than the Person of the Son of God. If, therefore, that man who is Christ were to sin, it would follow that God sins; which, since it is impossible (for God, who is the highest goodness, cannot will iniquity), it follows that it cannot come about that Christ sin. This argument is taken from the personal union (*personalis notio*) of the natures in Christ, and it concludes correctly, even if sinning be attributed to the human nature insofar as it is nonetheless conjoined to the Word. For since actions properly belong to supposits (*suppositum*), it would in that case also follow that the Person of the Son of God — that is, God Himself — would sin. For concerning the human nature separated from the Word and possessing its own personality, there is no doubt that it could sin like other men.

§ 28. Another argument: because Christ was, from the beginning of His conception, blessed according to the soul with the perfect beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) of God. Wherefore, just as the Angels and Blessed Souls cannot sin on account of the confirmation of the will in good, so neither could Christ sin, and the less so since He enjoyed God according to the soul more perfectly than all others.

§ 29. Likewise: each and every action is more imputed to the principal agent than to the instrument. But the humanity in Christ was the instrument of the Divinity, on the authority of St. Cyril⁴² and St. John Damascene;⁴³ therefore every action of Christ's humanity must be attributed to the Divine Supposit. Since the action of sin cannot be imputed to the Divine Supposit, it follows that it cannot be attributed to the humanity of Christ either.

§ 30. Furthermore, to the confirmation of this point serves the fullness of Grace (*plenitudo Gratiae*) in Christ, of which Jn. 1 and Col. 1 and 2 speak,⁴⁴ from whose fullness all others receive — not only the just men of this life but also of the life to come — as members of that head. This surpassing abundance of Grace, accordingly, does not appear to admit any sin in company with itself.

§ 31. Finally, if Christ could have sinned — as the Master argues — He could also have been damned, which is utterly the most absurd thing, though Durandus concedes it. To these considerations is added the authority of St. John Damascene, who writes in Book III, ch. 13:⁴⁵ "We confess that Christ has all the things which the first Adam had, with the sole exception of sin (*peccantia*), that is, of the possibility of sinning (*peccandi possibilitas*)." And this is, after the Master, the common doctrine of the Scholastics.

§ 32. Wherefore, above all else to be guarded against is the opinion of the one Durandus, which comes very close to the Nestorian heresy in this particular. His words, writing on this Distinction, read as follows: "There is no inconvenience in reality in saying that Christ according as He was man sinned, or that He could have sinned. And as to what is added — if He could have sinned, He could have been damned — let this be conceded. For since 'to be damned' implies punishment, it is no greater inconvenience to say that Christ was damned than that He was dead or that He suffered. Both would have been fittingly done on the part of God if He had willed it. Nor do I see why the Divine Person could not assume the nature of a damned man." So Durandus, who at the same time attempts to resolve the arguments adduced by himself on the contrary side.

§ 33. Nor does Scotus appear to depart greatly from this opinion, denying that the nature assumed by Christ was impeccable by virtue of the union; on the grounds that by virtue of that same union it was not blessed, and that it possessed free will (*liberum arbitrium*) capable of turning to either side. Hence he appears to ascribe the impeccability of Christ solely to the beatitude by which He was confirmed in good — which beatitude does not, on his view, necessarily follow upon the union. But the sounder doctrine on this argument is that of St. Bonaventure⁴⁶ and St. Thomas;⁴⁷ among many others. Now as to what can be objected on the contrary from the standpoint of freedom, this is easily resolved from what was said in the preceding book concerning free will and its proper formal character (*propria ratio*).⁴⁸

1. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* II (past the middle of the book).

2. St. Ambrose, *De Fide* V, ch. 4.

3. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15 (and elsewhere).

4. Commentary ascribed to St. Ambrose [Ambrosiaster], *On the Epistle to the Romans*, ch. 1, on the words "Who was predestined as the Son of God."
5. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento*, ch. 8.
6. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* I, ch. 9 (at the end).
7. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* III (before the middle of the book).
8. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* VI (around the middle).
9. St. Jerome, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios*, ch. 1.
10. St. Augustine, *Tractate 82 in Joannem*.
11. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 2.
12. Author of the *Glossa ordinaria*, on Phil. 2 ("That at the name of Jesus," etc.).
13. The heresy was that of Elipandus, Bishop of Toledo, and Felix of Urgel (Orgellitanus), condemned by Pope Hadrian, by the Synod of Forojulium in the year 792, by the Synod of Ratisbon, and by the Synod of Frankfurt held in the year 794 under Charlemagne, who taught that Christ as man is not the natural Son of God but only the adoptive Son: so as to distinguish two sons in the same person, as is clearly gathered from the Symbol of Elipandus addressed to Etherius of Uxama and to the Abbot Fidelis. It is certainly remarkable why this author here mentions neither this heresy nor its condemnation. For those wishing to consult the principal authorities on this heresy, reference should be made to Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, Vol. V, l. 1, ch. 24 and l. 7, ch. 7, n. 9; and to Lodovico Thomassin, *De Incarnatione*, in the Preface, nos. 10 and 9; also the work *De Unione seu Monotheismo* of the fifty homilies.
14. Rom. 8:29: Christ as "the first-born among many brethren."
15. See the note at (a) in the source: the heresy of Elipandus, etc., condemned in the synods cited above.
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 5.
17. St. Jerome, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios*, ch. 2.
18. Prov. 8 according to the Septuagint: "The Lord created me at the beginning of His ways."
19. St. Ambrose, *Sermo 5 in Psalmum* 118.
20. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 3 de Pentecoste*.
21. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 38 and 44. [In the edition of PP. Benedictines, the Sermons referred to as XIII and XVI are numbered CXCII and CLXXXVI; Sermons XIII and XXVI are referred to the Appendix of the same volume and rejected as CXXXVII and CXXXVIII, adjudged non-Augustinian.]
22. St. Augustine, *Sermones de Tempore*, sermons 13, 16, 19, 25, and 26. [In the same edition, Sermons XVI, XIX, XXV are Sermons CXCII, CLXXXVI, and CXXXVIII; Sermons XIII and XXVI are in the Appendix of the same volume, rejected as CXXXVII.]
23. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 4.
24. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 19.
25. Richard of St. Victor, author of an ecclesiastical canticle: "By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature" (*Potestate non natura fit Creator creatura*).
26. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* I, chs. 6, 7, and 9.
27. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 6; *Liber 83 Quaestionum*, q. 67.
28. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 13.
29. St. Jerome and St. Ambrose in the passages cited at the outset (see above).
30. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 5.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 16, a. 9.
32. Sermon 8 on the words of the Apostle: or, as in the Benedictine edition, Sermon CLXXIV in the First Class; see the page image note.

33. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem* Tract. 105; Tract. 106; *Sermo 8 de verbis Apostoli* (= Sermon. CLXXIV in the Benedictine edition, inter Sermones Primae Classis, Tom. 3).
34. Estius, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 2 of this [third] book.
35. St. Augustine, *De Hæresibus*, hæresis 44.
36. That is, solutions to the third argument and to other arguments of similar form are to be sought from logicians (the Dialecticians).
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 6.
38. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 18.
39. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 18 (continuation of the passage just cited).
40. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 1.
41. Estius, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 3 of this book.
42. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, lib. 31, ch. 7.
43. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* (reference as in source: Damascenus).
44. Jn. 1:16; Col. 1 and 2 (the fullness of grace in Christ, from which all receive).
45. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 13.
46. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 10 (the present Distinction).
47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 1; q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.
48. Estius, *In II Sent.* (preceding book), on free will and its proper formal character (*propria ratio*).

DISTINCTIO XII — THAT CHRIST WAS FULL OF GRACE, AND IN WHAT SENSE (CHRISTUM FUISSE PLENUM GRATIA, & QUO SENSU)

§ I — That Christ was full of grace, and in what sense (Christum fuisse plenum Gratia, & quo sensu)

§ 1. Concerning the grace (*gratia*) of Christ's soul according to its fulness, many testimonies exist in the Scriptures. Luke, in chapter 2, says that the boy Jesus was full of wisdom; and John, in chapter 1, declares that the Word made flesh, who dwelt among us, was full of grace (*gratia*) and truth; and in the same place the Baptist testifies that we have all received from His fulness. And in chapter 3, speaking of Christ, he says: "For God does not give the Spirit by measure" — whereas of the rest of the body of the Church it is written in Rom. 12: "As God has distributed to each the measure of faith"; and in Eph. 4: "To each of us grace was given according to the measure of the gift of Christ." The same fulness of grace the Apostle indicates in Eph. 1,² where he says that the riches of the grace of Christ have overflowed upon us in all wisdom and prudence, and calls Him the head of the body, the Church, which He fills in all things from His fulness. And again in Col. 1,³ he writes that in Christ all fulness dwells. And in chapter 2: "In whom," he says, "are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge"; and a little afterwards: "Because in Him all the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, and you are filled in Him, who is the head of every principality and power."⁴ Treating this passage, St. Augustine, in Letter 57 to Dardanus,⁵ says: "This, we think, is the difference between the head and the other members: that in any member, however eminent — as in some great prophet or apostle — though the Godhead may dwell, yet not in the same way as in the head, which is Christ, does all the fulness of the Godhead dwell. For in our own body, sensation is present in each member, but not in the same degree as in the head, where all five senses together are wholly present; in the other members, touch alone is present." Thus far he.

§ 2. And rightly, to confirm the same point, the Master⁶ adduces that text of Jer. 31: "The Lord will create a new thing upon the earth: a woman shall compass a man." For this was said not only on account of the soul and flesh, but also on account of grace and perfect wisdom — in accordance with that of Eph. 4: "Until we all attain to the perfect man, to the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ." To the same purpose pertains the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit which Is. 11 foretells will be in Christ.⁷ And that anointing of the Holy Spirit which the same prophet foretells in chapter 61 concerning Christ;⁸ which Christ himself acknowledges of Himself in Lk. 4;⁹ which David also, in Ps. 44, with the Apostle confirming it in Heb. 1, sang beforehand concerning Christ, saying: "Therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness above your companions."¹⁰ From which singular and preeminent anointing of the Holy Spirit, surpassing all others, the name of Christ was attributed to Him by way of excellence.

§ 3. Now, if you ask in what manner that fulness of grace is to be understood, I answer first: it does not signify grace that is properly immense or infinite. For although it was exceedingly great and abundant, yet by the very fact that it is created it had to be finite. For all things that were made, God has disposed in measure, number, and weight (Wis. 11).¹¹ And nothing created is absolutely (*simpliciter*) infinite. Moreover, the soul of Christ, being a created thing, has a certain determinate capacity, and therefore could not receive infinite grace. Next, neither is such a fulness of grace signified as Scripture sometimes attributes to other saints as well — as to St. Mary, to John the Baptist, to Stephen, and to others — which consists, namely, in a sufficiency of grace according to the condition and state of each person, or in so much as befitted some excellent member. Therefore it is said that there was in Christ a fulness of grace: partly because it was so great as to fill the capacity of Christ's soul, and, as the Master says, such that God could not have conferred grace upon Him more fully — which you are to understand with reference to the capacity of His soul; or certainly, as St. Thomas says,¹² with reference to the order of divine wisdom: and partly, and most especially, in accordance with the declaration of Sacred Scripture — because the grace of Christ is efficacious and extends itself to all the effects of grace, as a most abundant fountain of graces; and, as St. Thomas puts it, as a kind of universal principle (*principium quoddam universale*) from which flows and proceeds into the members of the Church all the variety of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence it is by reason of this grace that Christ is called the head of the whole Church, as of a body subject to Him, in Eph. 1, 4, 5, and Col. 1 and 2, and elsewhere.¹³ And this is indeed what John the Baptist says — that we all receive from His fulness. Concerning which Peter also writes in his Second Epistle, chapter 1, that through Him all things that pertain to life and piety have been granted, and that exceedingly great and precious promises have been made and given to us, so that through these we might become partakers of the divine nature.¹⁴

§ 4. As for those minor questions — whether there is possible a greater grace in terms of intensity or extension than that which is in Christ; whether the soul of Christ, or any other intellectual creature, could become capable of a greater grace; and likewise, whether the grace whose fulness Scripture attributes to Christ is one habit or several — questions which are debated by some at this point as though they were necessary matters of knowledge — we do not pass over them entirely, yet we do set them aside as not necessary.

§ II — When Christ received the fulness of grace (Quando plenitudinem gratiae acceperit)

§ 5. That the fulness of grace had come to Christ gradually, by progress of age and the exercise of works, and that the more perfect Son of God and one called God merited those virtues and graces in the course of good deeds — this was once taught by Nestorius. Hence that impious utterance of his, noted by the Fathers:¹⁶ "I do not envy Christ His being made God; for I too am capable of becoming the same." Others, again, were of the opinion that it was when the Holy Spirit descended upon the baptized Christ — at the age of thirty years — that the entire fulness of graces and gifts of the Holy Spirit was poured into Him at once. The ordinary Gloss seems to favour this opinion (on that text of Lk. 4: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me"), which states: "Christ was anointed with spiritual anointing above the other saints, when in the Jordan the Spirit in the form of a dove descended upon the baptized one and remained with Him."

§ 6. But the doctrine of the Church condemns both these opinions; and in accordance with it, one must confess that Christ received, from the very moment of His conception, when the Word was united to flesh, the anointing of the Holy Spirit and the fulness of grace (*gratiae plenitudinem*). For otherwise the Spirit would not have been given to Christ from the beginning, or He would have been given only by measure — which His Forerunner denies. Furthermore, if He advanced in grace and wisdom, He was not therefore from boyhood full of wisdom, as Luke testifies. And the prophecy of Jeremiah will be false: "A woman shall compass a man." Certainly it must be conceded that Jesus was anointed with the Holy Spirit from that moment with that singular and preeminent anointing above His companions, from which He received the name of Christ singularly above all the prophets and the just. And there is no doubt that this must be attributed to Him from the beginning of His birth and conception. Hence the angel said to the shepherds in Lk. 2: "Because there is born to you today a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord."¹⁷ And Simeon received the answer from the Holy Spirit that he would not see death before he had seen Christ the Lord.¹⁷ Therefore He was already Christ from the very beginning, and consequently was anointed by the Holy Spirit with the fulness of graces — as St. John Damascene teaches in book 4, chapter 6:¹⁸ "We say that the Son of God is called Christ from the moment when He was conceived in the womb of the Holy Virgin." And he proves this by adding the testimonies of St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Cyril, and St. Athanasius.¹⁹

§ 7. Concerning this matter, the following also has been written most excellently by St. Augustine in book 15 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 26:²⁰ "The Lord Jesus Himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also received it as man; and for this reason He was said to be full of grace. And more plainly it is written of Him in the Acts of the Apostles: 'Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit.' Not certainly with visible oil, but with the gift of grace; which is signified by the visible ointment with which the Church anoints the baptized. Nor indeed was Christ anointed with the Holy Spirit at the moment when the Spirit descended upon Him in the form of a dove as He was baptized. For at that time He deigned to prefigure His own body — that is, His own Church — in which those who are baptized especially receive the Holy Spirit. But by that mystical and invisible anointing, He is to be understood as having been anointed at the time when the Word of God was made flesh — that is, when human nature, without any preceding merits of good works, was joined to the Word of God in the Virgin's womb." Thus far he; adding that it would be most absurd for us to believe that Christ, when He was already thirty years old, received

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 7, aa. 9, 10, 11, 12.

2. St. Paul, Eph. 1.

3. St. Paul, Col. 1.

4. St. Paul, Col. 2.

5. St. Augustine, Letter 57 (Letter CLXXXVII in the edition of the Benedictines of the New Edition) to Dardanus. The footnote in the source reads: "Seu CLXXXVII. in Editione Noviss. PP. Benedictin[orum]."

6. The Master (of the Sentences) [i.e. Peter Lombard], citing Jer. 31.

7. Is. 11.

8. Is. 61.

9. Lk. 4.

10. Ps. 44; Heb. 1.

11. Wis. 11.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 7 (as cited above).
13. Eph. 1, 4, 5; Col. 1, 2.
14. 2 Pet. 1.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 7 (as cited above) and q. 34.
16. The source footnote reads: "Alardus Gazaeus in Commentario ad cap. Cassiani De Incarnatione refert vocem hanc Nestorii fuisse, licet illa eadem vox Ibae tribuatur in Actis Concilii Calcedonensis: *Ego Christus tibi non invideo, quod Deus fis, quam volo etiam Deus ero*. Vel ex his conjecture licet quam cognatae affinesque sint Haeresis Nestoriana, ac Pelagiana, atque hanc illi praluisse. Sed cum in hujusce rei explanatione immorari vetamur: satis sit advertere cap. seu canone quarto Ephesini Concilii eodem anathemate Nestorianos aequae ac Coelestians, qui nempe Pelagiani sunt, conjunctim percelli." That is: Alardus Gazaeus, in his commentary on the chapter of Cassian *De Incarnatione*, reports this utterance to have been Nestorius's, although the same words are attributed to Ibas in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: "I, Christ, do not envy you your being God; for I will also be God if I wish." From this one may conjecture how closely related and akin the Nestorian heresy is to the Pelagian, and that the former paved the way for the latter. But since we are forbidden to linger in the explanation of this matter, let it suffice to note that by the fourth chapter or canon of the Council of Ephesus, Nestorians and Coelestians (that is, Pelagians) are jointly struck with the same anathema.
17. Lk. 2.
18. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 6.
19. St. Gregory Nazianzen; St. Cyril; St. Athanasius [cited by St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 6].
20. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 26.

DISTINCTIO XIII — ON THE PROGRESS OF CHRIST IN WISDOM AND GRACE, AND THE EXTENT OF HIS HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (*DE PROFECTU CHRISTI IN SAPIENTIA ET GRATIA, ET DE LATITUDINE HUMANAЕ CHRISTI SCIENTIAE*)

§ 1. — the Holy Spirit, since John, by whom He was baptized, had been filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb — though in a manner far inferior to that of Christ. To this doctrine of the Fathers all the Scholastics agree, following the Master. And already long ago the Council of Ephesus condemned among the other errors of Nestorius this one as well: that he said Christ had made progress in the virtues, and had at length, by assiduous advance, been brought to the point of becoming a faithful High Priest. Now what was objected to the contrary from the *Glossa ordinaria* appears to have no other meaning than that the spiritual anointing of Christ was designated and declared by the descent of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove — just as, by the voice of the Father descending upon Him, He was declared to be the Son of God. For that the Venerable Bede, to whom that *Gloss* is ascribed, holds nothing different from the other Fathers is clear from the *Gloss* of the same author on that passage of Lk. 3, "*The Holy Spirit descended like a dove upon Him*", where he says: "The Lord was not first anointed with the Holy Spirit after baptism, but the dove is shown for this reason — that we may understand that in His body, that is, in the Church, those who are baptized receive the Holy Spirit in a special way." These words Bede borrowed from the passage of St. Augustine cited above.¹

§ III — In what sense Christ is said to have advanced in grace and wisdom (Quo sensu Christus Gratia et sapientia profecisse dicatur)

§ 2. No small question arises as to how what St. Luke says in chapter 2 — that Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace before God and men — is not contrary to the foregoing doctrine. For from that text it appears that not only growth in age (concerning which there is no question) but also increase and progress in grace (*Gratia*) and wisdom (*sapientia*) is to be attributed to Christ. To this the Master replies: that Christ made progress in grace and wisdom not in Himself but in others — namely, inasmuch as He showed to men the gifts of His grace and wisdom more and more according as His age advanced. This reply he confirms by citing certain words of St. Gregory. Those words, however, are found not in St. Gregory but in Bede (*Homily 11 on Luke*).³ But this exposition appears to be obstructed, first, by the fact that St. Luke places grace and wisdom in the same order as age: and just as he truly and in himself advanced in age, so it appears that he advanced also in grace and wisdom. Then, by the fact that He is said to have advanced not only before men but also before God. This certainly cannot be taken to mean that He advanced not in Himself but in the eyes of God — since it is the same thing for something to occur before God and for it to occur in truth. Hence, some true progress

of Christ in Himself is altogether signified. For this reason, the reply of others is clearer — those who say that Christ truly indeed made progress in grace and wisdom, not however according to the habit (*habitus*) but according to the act (*actus*): because, although the habit of grace and wisdom infused into His soul from the beginning of His conception received no increase, yet from that habit, as His age advanced, ever greater works of grace and wisdom proceeded — greater, I say, according to the truth of the matter, and therefore not only before men but also before God. By this it also came about that the habit itself of His grace and wisdom, which truly did not grow, grew nonetheless in the estimation of men. And in this sense the words of Bede cited by the Master can be taken without difficulty. This same meaning is also indicated by St. John Damascene, Book III (chapter 22),⁴ who says of Christ as follows: "He is said to advance in wisdom and age and grace — in age indeed growing, but through the advance of age bringing into the open the wisdom that was already within Him." And in the words that follow he refers that progress of Christ which is understood to have come about gradually through the accession of grace and wisdom to the Nestorian heresy — not because that assertion necessarily divides the persons in Christ (for the progress of human wisdom seems able to coexist with the hypostatic unity), but because of old even this position of Nestorius was condemned as contrary to Scripture, alien to the Catholic sense, and more consonant with his primary heresy. This explanation also agrees with what is read in St. Cyril, Book X (*Thesaurus*, chapter 7),⁵ where he says of Christ as follows: "When you hear that He Himself advanced in wisdom and grace, do not suppose that anything was added to Him — since He could never stand in need of anything. But because to those who saw and heard Him He showed Himself day by day wiser and more gracious, for this reason it is written that He advanced." Something similar is found also in St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration 8*.⁶

§ 3. There are, however, others who prefer to understand the aforesaid passage of the Gospel of acquired wisdom (*sapientia acquisita*). And these think that even the habit of wisdom, of this kind, was increased in Christ with advancing age. But this is obstructed by the consideration that is joined to it concerning grace. For it is not credible that Christ should have advanced in some acquired habit of grace, whereby He would gradually become more pleasing to God and men. And indeed, the habit of knowledge (*scientia*), which pertains to human things, rather than of wisdom (*sapientia*), by which divine things are known, would seem to be the kind that was acquired and would need to be acknowledged in Christ. Therefore the foregoing exposition must be retained.

§ 4. Furthermore, the words of St. Ambrose in the work *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, chapter 7,⁷ — cited at length by the Master (in the text) — present a greater difficulty for the present question. For treating that passage of Scripture, he appears altogether to interpret it of a true and real increase of wisdom, inasmuch as he argues against those who denied a human mind to Christ. Against them he employs this argument: "In Christ there was knowledge (*scientia*) and wisdom (*sapientia*), which was changed by certain advances of increase. There was therefore a rational mind, as the subject as it were of this mutable knowledge and wisdom — since divine wisdom is acknowledged to be immutable." Now this reasoning of St. Ambrose will be inefficacious if we say that that knowledge and wisdom was increased only in the estimation of men, or according to the acts proceeding therefrom. For the same thing could be said of what is proper to God. Therefore the reply of the Master — who says that according to St. Ambrose Christ advanced in wisdom and in the human sense for this reason, that He advanced as regards the manifestation of Himself to men's sight and their perception of Him — appears by no means to satisfy this question. But since the explanation of this difficulty depends on those matters which will have to be said by us in the next distinction concerning the manifold knowledge (*scientia*) of Christ, we shall defer it to that place.⁸

— *Distinctio XIV — On the manifold knowledge of Christ and the breadth of His human knowledge (De multiplici Christi scientia et latitudine humanae cognitionis ejus) (continued from previous chunk) —*

§ I — How many kinds of knowledge there were in Christ (Quotuplex in Christo scientia fuerit)

§ 5. Knowledge (*scientia*) is in the first place to be acknowledged in Christ as twofold according to a twofold nature: one divine, which He possessed from eternity; the other created, which as man He received in time. And by no means is the opinion of those to be admitted who say that the soul of Christ is made wise and knowing by no other wisdom and knowledge than the eternal wisdom and knowledge of God. In this opinion Hugo of St. Victor seems to have been, who in a little work on the wisdom of Christ says: "We believe that the full, perfect, and entire wisdom of God was in the soul of Christ; and that this same wisdom made that soul fully and perfectly wise, not by participating in it but by wholly possessing it — which it singularly possessed and comprehended ineffably." And a little further on: "I affirm this same thing without hesitation: that either no other wisdom was in Christ, or if there was, it was not equal to that one."¹⁰ This opinion concerning the single wisdom of Christ seems not a little akin to the error of the Monothelites, who confessed one will in Christ, and that a divine one. More correctly therefore does the Master, who, besides the divine, acknowledges also a human wisdom and knowledge in Christ, which he calls gratuitous (*gratuitam*).

§ 6. The ground of this doctrine is as follows. First, because since the soul of Christ is no less — indeed, far more — capable of created knowledge (*scientia creata*) than the souls of other men, if it had none in itself, it would in this respect be the most imperfect of all souls. For what is in potency (*potentia*) to some act (*actus*) is imperfect until it is reduced to act (*actus*). Then, because it would be in vain for there to be in Christ an intellective soul or created intellect, if no habit or act of knowledge were present in it. And lastly, because a certain cognition (*notitia*), such as that by which first principles are known, is naturally innate to all men; which it was therefore absurd to take away from Christ. Wherefore not only those who took away the human will from Christ were condemned in the Sixth Council,¹¹ but also those who denied that there were in Christ two kinds of knowledge or two wisdoms, as St. Thomas testifies.¹² For the doctrine of that Council is common also to the other operations of Christ.

§ 7. These reasons having been diligently considered, it is sufficiently clear that the differing opinion tends in the end so far as to deny that the mind itself — that is, the soul — which is the part of the intellect, was in Christ: which is what the Apollinarists of old taught, moved by nearly the same reasoning by which these persons take away human wisdom from Christ, namely, because the eternal wisdom of the Word suffices for Him most perfectly. The reply to this argument was given by us above (at Distinction 2).¹³ St. Ambrose disputes expressly against this error in the work *On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, chapter 7.⁷

§ 8. Since therefore it is certain that there is in the soul of Christ a created knowledge, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other Scholastics reasonably divide it into three parts:¹⁴ so that one is the beatific cognition (*cognitio beata*) consisting in the vision of God; another is the connatural knowledge (*scientia rerum congenita*) of things; and another is acquired (*acquisita*). Of these, the first and second were present in the soul of Christ from the beginning, but the third came to it with time.

§ 9. By the first cognition, just as He saw God through the divine essence (*per essentiam*), so in God — or in the Word as in a mirror — He saw other things as well; and indeed so much more perfectly than the rest of the blessed, as that soul, personally united to God, received a greater abundance of grace than all others.

§ 10. By the second, however, which by doctors is called implanted (*indita*), infused (*infusa*), or connatural (*congenita*) knowledge, He knew from the beginning things in themselves — that is, through intelligible species of those things impressed on Him in the very conjunction with the Word. This kind of cognition is attributed also to angels, though not in the same degree of perfection. It is this cognition above all that is chiefly to be understood in those texts by which we showed above that the fullness of wisdom and knowledge came to Christ not with time but was present from the beginning — and especially that which is said in Col. 2, that in Christ were hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.¹⁵

§ 11. The third is acquired or experimental cognition (*notitia*), which follows upon sensation — both exterior and interior — the use of which was without doubt present in Christ. It is acquired by the natural light of the agent intellect through abstraction of species from phantasms (*phantasmata*). This function of the intellect must not be said to have been either absent from Christ or idle in Him. And although St. Bonaventure and Durandus and Scotus deny that this knowledge was habitual in Christ — on the ground that the habit of knowledge of those things was already present in His soul beforehand — yet St. Thomas, writing on this passage at another time (in the *Summa*), later retracts this; indicating that he is correcting his earlier position, he acknowledges the habitual [form of this knowledge] in Part 3 (question 12, article 2).¹⁶ For this third kind of knowledge, the Scriptures furnish reminders from time to time — as Heb. 2: "He ought to be made like His brethren in all things, that He might become merciful. For in that He Himself has suffered and was tempted, He is able to aid those who are tempted."¹⁷ And chapter 5: "Though He were the Son of God, He learned obedience from the things which He suffered."¹⁸ Item Is. 7: "Butter and honey shall He eat, that He may know to refuse the evil and choose the good."¹⁹ And all the passages of Scripture which attribute wonder to Christ suggest to us the significance of this experimental knowledge.

§ 12. In this manner, therefore, is to be understood that sentence of St. Ambrose (*in the foregoing Distinction*)²⁰ brought forward by the Master, whereby he says that Christ advanced in the human sense: namely, through experience — that is, cognition of things received through the senses. Not that ignorance preceded that cognition, but because what He knew before He came to know in a new mode of cognizing — that is, by experiencing it through the advance of age. That something similar occurred also in the first parent is indicated by St. Augustine, Book 8 (*On Genesis according to the Letter*, chapter 8).²¹

§ II — How far the human knowledge of Christ extends (Quam late pateat humana Christi scientia)

§ 13. That Christ, in that He is God, knows all things most perfectly through His very Godhead — that is, through divine knowledge — is beyond doubt. For the communion of the properties of both natures (*communicatio proprietatum utriusque naturae*), necessarily consequent upon the unity of the person, most certainly compels this conclusion. Hence, whatever passages of Scripture or arguments show that God knows all things, the same pertain equally to Christ. Hence the Apostle, Heb. 4, speaking of the Word of God — that is, the Son — after other things added: "And there is no creature invisible in His sight. But all things are naked and open to His eyes."²³ And Peter says to Christ confidently, Jn. 21: "Lord, Thou knowest all things."²⁴ And

the other Disciples, Jn. 16: "Now we know that Thou knowest all things."²⁵ To this omniscience of Christ, which He possesses through the grace of union (*gratia unionis*), the Agnoitae in former times contradicted, drawing from the springs of Nestorius. Against them St. Gregory, disputing in the *Register*, Book 8 (Epistle 42),²⁶ says: "Whoever is not an Agnoite — it is utterly impossible —" [and further]: "For whoever confesses that the very wisdom of God was incarnate — with what mind can he say that there is something that the wisdom of God does not know?" And with other words he shows that Christ, as the Word through Whom all things were created, can be concealed from nothing whatsoever.

§ 14. But another question is how far the human knowledge of Christ extends, and whether it must be conceded that the soul of Christ — or Christ insofar as He is man — has within itself cognition of all things. For since a creature can in nothing be equal to the Creator, it seems impossible that the soul of Christ, which is established to be a creature, should have knowledge equal to God's either as regards the perfection of cognition or as regards the multitude of things known. Now this question is not raised about Christ's experimental cognition (for it is certain that Christ did not receive experience of all knowable things) but about knowledge both beatific and connatural. To this question, therefore, it is answered:

§ 15. First: although the soul of Christ contemplates the divine essence far more clearly and perfectly than any other creature — and this on account of the singular and most perfect conjunction of that soul with the Word — it does not nevertheless comprehend the Word itself or the divine essence. The reason for this is that the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite; but every creature is finite. Therefore it is impossible that any creature, however excellent, should comprehend the divine essence, which is absolutely (*simpliciter*) infinite.

§ 16. Second: the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things — not only whatsoever according to whatsoever time at some point exist, that is, all past, present, and future things, whether spoken, or done, or thought, or having any other character of being, but also whatsoever are in the potency (*potentia*) of the creature, never brought or to be brought to act (*actus*) — yet it does not know all things that are in the potency of God. The ground of the former part is this: because it is most fitting to attribute to the soul of Christ every knowledge possible to a creature; especially since Scripture too seems to require this. "For the Spirit is not given to Christ according to measure," says St. John, chapter 3.²⁷ In which Spirit also the spirit of knowledge (*spiritus scientiae*), according to Is. 11,²⁸ is comprised. And the Apostle says in Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. 2.¹⁵ Hence, on that text of Rev. 5, "Worthy is the Lamb to receive wisdom," the Gloss interprets *wisdom* as *cognition*.²⁹ And Fulgentius (in a certain Sermon), as the Master reports, shows by many arguments that that soul has knowledge of all things.³⁰ The ground of the latter part is this: because if it knew all things subject to the divine power (*potentia divina*), it would comprehend all things that God can do, and would thereby comprehend the divine power, and consequently the divine essence — which we showed a little above to be impossible. But since the power (*virtus*) of the creature extends to infinities, not indeed in act (*actu*) but in potency, it follows also that the created knowledge of Christ extends at least in this way to infinities.

§ 17. Third: whatever the soul of Christ knows through the knowledge of the beatific vision (*scientia beatae visionis*), the same is all known by it also through the connatural or infused knowledge — with the sole exception of the divine essence. The ground of this proposition is: because since the soul of Christ had the potency for this so great a knowledge, nothing prevents — indeed it is very reasonable — that that potency was reduced to its full act (*actus*). And to this perhaps more properly pertain those passages of Scripture which

we were just now adducing in order to establish the omniscience of Christ. The ground of the exception is: because the divine essence is not knowable through this knowledge but only through the other, the beatific knowledge.

§ 18. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, to what extent omniscience is to be attributed to the soul of Christ. From this doctrine it is evident that neither as regards the perfection of knowing nor as regards the multitude of knowable things is a knowledge equal to God's to be ascribed to the soul of Christ — but rather one inferior by so much as a creature is inferior to the Creator. With which, accordingly, does not conflict that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 2: "The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. And the things that are of God no one knows but the Spirit of God"³¹ — even if the Apostle were to have added no exception in that passage, which the Master (in the text) presses. Rightly therefore also does Cassiodorus (on that Ps. 38, "Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, and I cannot attain to it")³² say: "The truth of human cognition is shown: because the man assumed cannot be equal to the divine substance either in knowledge or in anything else."

1. St. Augustine, the passage cited above [abbreviation as in source — Estius refers to an earlier citation of Augustine in the preceding chunk].

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, as above, and q. 12, a. 2.

3. The Venerable Bede, *Homilies on Luke*, Hom. 11 [*In Lucam*, hom. 11].

4. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 22.

5. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus* X, ch. 7.

6. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 8.

7. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, ch. 7.

8. [Estius defers the full explanation to Distinctio XIV, which follows immediately below.]

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, qq. 9, 10, and 11.

10. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sapientia Christi* [libellus de sapientia Christi — abbreviation as in source].

11. The Sixth (Ecumenical) Council [the Third Council of Constantinople, 680–681].

12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 9, a. 1.

13. [Estius refers back to his treatment at Distinctio 2.]

14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, qq. 9–11; St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.* [dist. as in source].

15. Col. 2:3.

16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 12, a. 2.

17. Heb. 2:17–18.

18. Heb. 5:8.

19. Is. 7:15.

20. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, ch. 7, cited above at the preceding Distinction.

21. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 8.

22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, as above [qq. 9–12].

23. Heb. 4:13.

24. Jn. 21:17.

25. Jn. 16:30.

26. St. Gregory the Great, *Registrum* (Epistolae) VIII, Epistle 42.

27. Jn. 3:34.

28. Is. 11:2.

29. Rev. 5:12; Glossa ordinaria on Rev. 5:12.

30. Fulgentius, *Sermo* [abbreviation as in source — cited by the Master of the Sentences].

31. 1 Cor. 2:10–11.

32. Cassiodorus, *Expositio Psalmorum*, on Ps. 38(39):6 [on *Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, et non potero ad eam*].

DISTINCTIO XIV — ON THE TWOFOLD KNOWLEDGE AND POWER OF CHRIST, AND ON THE DEFECTS OF HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY HIM (*DE GEMINA CHRISTI SCIENTIA ET POTENTIA, AC DE DEFECTIBUS HUMANAЕ NATURAE AB EO ASSUMPTIS*)

§ III — Resolution of those things which seem to argue ignorance in Christ (Solutio eorum quae ignorantiam arguere videntur in Christo)

§ 1. From the teaching set out above it is gathered that absolutely no ignorance at any time whatsoever is to be ascribed to the soul of Christ, or to Christ as man: inasmuch as it has been shown that from the beginning every knowledge of which that soul is capable was infused into it. For ignorance signifies the absence from an intellect capable of a given cognition of the cognition of any thing whatsoever. For just as a stone is not rightly said to be ignorant because it knows nothing, so a man is not rightly said to be ignorant because he does not possess knowledge of that of which he is in no way capable of attaining cognition. This being so, we must now reply to those things which seem to convict Christ of some ignorance.

§ 2. First, a passage from the Gospel of Mark 13 is objected, where, speaking of the time of judgement, the Lord says: "But of that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father." Since this cannot be understood of the divine knowledge of the Son, which He has in common with the Father, it seems necessarily to be understood of His human knowledge. There are also objected other passages of Scripture: what is said in the Person of Christ, Ps. 34, "They questioned me about things I did not know"; and again, "Scourges were gathered against me, and I knew it not." Likewise Is. 7, concerning Christ: "He shall eat butter and honey, so that He may know to reject evil and to choose good"; and again, "Because before the child knows to reject evil and to choose good"; and ch. 8, "Before the child knows to call his father and his mother," etc. And 2 Cor. 5: "Him who knew not sin He made sin for us." To this also seem to belong those questions: "How many loaves have you?" and "Who is it that touched me?" and concerning Lazarus: "Where have you laid him?" And that in Mk. 11 He sought fruit on the barren fig-tree.²

§ 3. From the Fathers, moreover, a passage of St. Ambrose is brought forward, from the book *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, ch. 7,³ where he not only asserts that Christ truly progressed according to human wisdom and sense — in which sense we have expounded above what was said by him — but also openly attributes ignorance to Him. For commemorating the passage of Is. 8 just cited by us, he says: "The Wisdom of God, Whom things future and hidden do not escape — but as an infant, lacking the experience

proper to that age, through human immaturity, does not yet know." Nor are the words of St. Cyril less [striking], who in book 9 of the *Thesaurus*, ch. 4,⁴ says that Christ as man said He was ignorant of the day of judgement, and that He did so in order to preserve what is fitting to our nature; and he adds: "We ought not therefore, on account of this saying, to brand the Word with ignorance, but rather to admire His mercy: that He did not refuse to descend for our sake to such great humility as to take upon Himself all our things, and even ignorance itself." And a little after: "For since He had not wished to reveal this to the disciples, for a certain hidden reason lest He cause them sorrow, He said that even the Son is ignorant of it, speaking of Himself as man, and not thereby derogating from Himself as God. For He knows as God what He is ignorant of as man." And again, a little further on: "But He is ignorant as man of what He most perfectly knows as God." And many other things follow to the same effect.

§ 4. St. Hilary too seems to have held something of this sort, who, having treated at length in book 9 *De Trinitate*⁵ the said sentence of the Lord, concludes at last (at the end of the book) that Christ, just as He assumed hunger, thirst, and other defects according to the weakness of the flesh, so according to His humanity professed ignorance of that day and hour. Finally, St. Gregory, in book 8, *Epistle 42, to Eulogius*,⁶ disputing against the Agnoitae, says: "The Only-Begotten, made perfect man for us, in the nature of His humanity indeed knew the day and hour of judgement, but nevertheless did not know it from the nature of His humanity. What therefore He knew in that nature, He did not know from that nature: because God made man knew the day and hour of judgement only through the gift of His own Divinity (*Deitatis suae paenitentiam*)." And below: "Therefore the knowledge which He did not have from the nature of His humanity — according to which He was, together with the angels, a creature — this He denied having in common with the angels who are creatures." So he.

§ 5. To these objections we reply briefly as follows. The Lord in Mark denies that the Son knows the day and hour of judgement, not because He is simply ignorant of it either according to His divine nature or even according to His human nature; but because He had not learned it from the Father in such a way that He ought to reveal it further to others. The sense of Christ's words is therefore this: the Son is as one not knowing, because He does not know it in such a way as to make others know it, as the Father knows it — because He makes the Son know it. This sense is declared by that passage in Jn. 15: "But I have called you friends, because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you" — that is, whatever I heard from the Father as things to be manifested to you. And that passage concerning the Holy Spirit, ch. 16: "whatsoever He shall hear He shall speak"⁷ — meaning: the Holy Spirit does not speak that thing to others because He has not heard it from the Father in such a way as to make it known to others. This sense is partly rendered and partly insinuated by St. Augustine⁸ and St. Ambrose⁹ and St. Hilary.⁵ Likewise St. Cyril and St. Gregory (in the places cited above),¹⁰ who almost all adduce for a similar purpose that passage in Gen. 22, where the Lord says to Abraham: "Now I know that you fear the Lord" — that is, I have made you know it. Nor is it an obstacle that just as the Father communicates to the Son, so also the Son communicates to the Holy Spirit knowledge of that day. For the Son did not do this as man — which is the mode in which Christ speaks of Himself here — but as God.

§ 6. To the other Scripture passages, a ready reply can be obtained from commentaries on those passages and from some acquaintance with the idioms of Scripture. For it is established that the word "ignorance," like the word "knowledge," is taken in more than one way in the Scriptures. And that questions are not always signs of ignorance, but sometimes pertain to the benefit and instruction of the one questioned, can be shown

even by human and everyday examples. Hence God also interrogates frequently, as Adam: "Where are you?" and "Where is Abel your brother?" and innumerable things of this sort. Now as regards the passages from the Fathers, St. Ambrose attributes ignorance to Christ not absolutely but in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), as we showed above. For since he teaches that Christ progressed according to a certain kind of knowledge — namely experimental knowledge — the consequence is that, according to this mode of knowledge as well, He should previously not know the things themselves. But because He foreknows them in another mode, He cannot be said to be simply ignorant of such things. As for the disputation of St. Cyril, although it is somewhat ambiguous, so that it is difficult to follow his meaning fully, it nonetheless seems to explain itself through what he repeatedly insists upon in that chapter: that Christ dispensatively (*dispensative*) was ignorant — because, namely, He so conducted Himself in human flesh as though He were ignorant of many things. In which way also St. Hilary speaks, and most of the Greeks, using the word "dispensation."

§ 7. To the words of St. Gregory it must be replied that he wished to signify nothing other than this: that Christ, in knowing all things, does not have that knowledge from the condition of human nature, nor would He have had it, had not such knowledge been gratuitously infused into that nature from the beginning. Hence also the Master repeatedly calls that knowledge gratuitous (*gratuita*) in this and the preceding Distinction. For St. Gregory himself sufficiently indicates that he did not intend to attribute to Christ ignorance even according to His human nature (near the end of the chapter), where he excuses himself for not answering the question: why Christ did not assume our ignorance, so as to free us from ignorance, just as He deigned to die in order to free us from death. Which question would have no place if Gregory were attributing ignorance to Christ as man. The explanation of that question pertains to the next Distinction.

On the twofold power of Christ (De gemina Christi potentia)

§ 8. Just as it has been said of knowledge, so of power (*potentia*) it must be said that in Christ it is twofold: one divine, the other human; the former eternal and uncreated, the latter temporal and created, and inhering in the soul of Christ as its subject. The former is the very Omnipotence of God, proper to the Divine Nature and common to the three Persons: from which, accordingly, Christ is truly and properly called omnipotent, on account of the communication of idioms (*communicatio idiomatum*) of the Son of God and the Son of man. This power Scripture everywhere attributes to Christ: as when Christ is called "the power of God" (1 Cor. 1), and "the mighty God" (Is. 9), who also in Heb. 1 is said to "uphold all things by the word of His power." To Him in the same place is attributed the work of the creation of the world, in the words of Ps. 101: "In the beginning, O Lord, Thou didst lay the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of Thy hands." Concerning which also John says (Jn. 1): "All things were made by Him." And He Himself says of Himself (Jn. 5): "My Father works until now, and I work." And again: "Whatsoever the Father does, the Son likewise does." And ch. 10: "I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again." Which power of laying down His own soul He showed in very fact when, crying out upon the cross, He expired, so that the centurion said: "Truly this man was the Son of God" (Mk. 15). The power of taking it up again He declared when, raising Himself from the dead, He was shown to be the Son of God (Rom. 1).¹² Which work of His He had foretold beforehand in the words of Jn. 2: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." Hence, moreover, the faith of those is praised in the Gospel who, in no way offended by the weakness of His flesh, argued for His omnipotence — as that leper who said: "If Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean." And

those who in some way doubted His power, as he who said: "If Thou canst do anything, help us." Of this power of Christ, St. Ambrose speaks thus in the *Oratio de Basilicis tradendis*:¹³ "Our Lord Jesus is omnipotent: this is our faith."

§ 9. Now the latter power, which belongs to Christ as man, although great, is nevertheless not infinite, nor does it extend to all things; and for this reason neither Christ nor His soul is on account of this power called omnipotent. This can be shown by the following arguments.

First (*Primo*): Omnipotence is proper to God, according to that text of Ex. 15: "Omnipotent is His name." It cannot therefore be communicated to any creature.

Second (*Secunda*): Every creature is finite, therefore its power also is finite: because the power of a finite thing cannot be infinite. Both points are confirmed by the Wise Man, when he says that all things were made by God "in number, weight, and measure."¹⁴

Third (*Tertio*): The soul of Christ could not and cannot create itself, because it could not precede itself; and it is itself also a creature and a certain work: therefore the power of that soul does not extend to every work.

Fourth (*Quarto*): The soul of Christ, like every other creature, was made from nothing. Just as therefore it could not produce itself from nothing, so neither can it preserve itself in being, lest it fall back into nothing. But for this work there is need of a more powerful virtue, which is none other than the divine.

§ 10. From these considerations it is furthermore understood that the knowledge of Christ's soul extends more widely than His power. For whatever He can do, the same He also knows; but not conversely. For He is not ignorant of how He Himself and the whole world were created — which work nonetheless does not fall under His power. But if you object the words of Christ in Matt. (last chapter): "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth"; and of the Apostle, Phil. 2: "He has given Him a name which is above every name" — that is, a power surpassing all created things — we reply that these things are said of the power of Christ not as human but as divine: as St. Jerome expounds the passage in Matt.¹⁵ That power, moreover, is said to be given to Christ as man on account of the grace of union (*gratia unionis*); by which it came about that omnipotence belongs to the man, and it can be truly said: "This man is omnipotent." Although this was true from the beginning of the Incarnation, nevertheless it is afterwards said to be given or bestowed: because it was only after the Resurrection that it began to be manifested to the whole world.

§ 11. In a similar sense is to be taken what Bede says in *Hom. 3 in Lucam* (on the words "He shall be great"):¹⁶ "The power which the Son of God has by nature, the man was going to receive in due time" — which words, cited in the text under the name of St. Ambrose, the Master rightly expounds. For Bede also expounds himself, when he adds: "So that there is one person, man and God."

§ 12. Now, if anyone asks how widely the power of the soul of Christ extends, the answer briefly is that a twofold power belongs to the soul of Christ: one natural, by which it could produce effects proper to a soul — such as to animate and govern the body, to direct all human acts, to illuminate through the fullness of its grace and knowledge all other intellectual creatures; the other miraculous or supernatural, which it possessed insofar as it was the instrument of the Word united to it. For in this way there is attributed to the soul of Christ an instrumental power (*virtus instrumentalis*) for bringing about all miraculous changes or operations that could conduce to the end of the Incarnation and of human redemption — that is, to the restoration of fallen man.

Such are all the miracles which Christ wrought for our sake, and all the miracles which were ever wrought by the Apostles and other Saints. But to this kind belongs neither the creation of things nor their annihilation. Wherefore, just as God alone can create, and God alone can reduce created things to nothing, and God alone can preserve them lest they fall back into nothing — so not even the instrumental power of doing these things can be communicated to any creature, as the received doctrine of St. Thomas holds.¹⁷

§ I — Christ's assumption of the defects of human nature, and for what reason (Christum assumpsisse defectus humanae naturae et quam ob causam)

§ 13. Not only did the Son of God will to assume the truth of human nature — as we showed against the Manicheans and Cerdonians (in the Distinctions of this book)¹⁹ — but He also deigned to assume the defects, vices, and imperfections of that same nature, both of body and of soul. Of the body indeed: such as passibility (*passibilitas*) and mortality (*mortalitas*), hunger, thirst, weariness, wounds, and death itself. Of the soul: such as pain, fear, sadness, tedium, and the like. Of all of which the Evangelical History gives us full assurance. He assumed all these things, moreover, not putatively or in appearance only, as the heretics wished; but in reality and no less truly than He assumed the nature itself. Hence Is. 53 calls Him "a man of sorrows, and acquainted with infirmity." And again concerning Him: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows." And the Psalmist, speaking in the Person of Christ, says in Ps. 57 [Ps. 88 in Vulgate numbering]: "My soul is filled with evils."

§ 14. Now there are four principal reasons why Christ willed to assume the defects of soul and body. The first and foremost: in order to make satisfaction to the Father for the sins of the human race, and by making satisfaction to redeem man from eternal death. Satisfaction of one for another is made when someone takes upon himself the punishment owed on account of another's sin. Since therefore death and mortality, and the other miseries and defects both of body and of soul, are punishments arising from the sin of the first man, it was consequent that Christ should take them upon Himself for the redemption of the human race: according to Is. 53: "But He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our crimes." And again: "For the wickedness of my people I have struck Him." Likewise 1 Cor. 15: "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures." And 1 Pet. 2: "Who Himself bore our sins in His own body upon the tree, that we, being dead to sin, might live to justice; by whose stripes you were healed."

§ 15. The second reason: in order to show the truth of human nature in Himself. For although these defects do not belong to human nature as it was first instituted, yet since that nature is now known to men only as subject to defects of this kind, it could have seemed that Christ had not assumed the truth of human nature but only its phantasmal image, had He assumed it without those defects. Hence the Fathers frequently use this argument against the Manicheans to prove the truth of the assumed nature in Christ — as for instance that He suffered hunger and thirst, that He truly grieved and was saddened, that He endured wounds and death. Moreover even after the Resurrection, St. Thomas, through the sight and touch of the wounds in Christ's flesh, was led to believe the truth of the Resurrection.

§ 16. The third: in order to give us in Himself an example of humility and patience — of humility indeed through the assumption of such defects, and of patience through the endurance of them: according to 1 Pet. 2: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow in His footsteps."

§ 17. The last: that Christ, as head, might be conformed to His members not only in nature but also in passions and infirmities, sharing in the same, and so might compassionate them. This reason the Apostle, writing to the Hebrews, urges once and again: as in ch. 2, when he says: "Wherefore it behoved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might become a merciful and faithful High Priest before God, that He might make propitiation for the sins of the people. For in that wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to help them that are tempted." And ch. 4: "For we have not a High Priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, but one tempted in all things in like manner, without sin."

§ II — Why Christ did not assume all defects except sin (Quare non omnes defectus excepto peccato Christus assumpserit)

§ 18. Since in human nature the vice of fault (*vitium culpae*) is one thing and the evil of punishment (*malum poenae*) another, it is established from what has been said above that Christ did not assume, and indeed could not have assumed, the vice of fault — that is, sin. And if He had even been able to assume it, He nevertheless ought not to have assumed it. The reason for this is: both because sin could not only contribute nothing toward perfecting the work of our redemption — that is, toward making satisfaction to God for the sins of the human race — but could also impede it; for there is no one fitted to make satisfaction for the sins of others who is himself liable to sins. And also because by sinning He could not have given examples of virtue.

§ 19. But concerning certain other defects it is customarily asked why Christ did not assume them: namely, concupiscence or the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), which is followed by a proneness to evil and a difficulty in doing good; likewise ignorance and dullness of mind; and certain particular bodily defects such as diseases, leprosy, mutilation, deformity, and the like. To these the Master replies that Christ assumed only those defects which it was fitting for Him to assume and which were expedient for us. But which these defects are still remains a question.

§ 20. It must therefore be replied that the defects of human nature are of two kinds. For some arose from sin in such a way as also to lead to sin or to impede virtue. Others indeed are from sin, yet do not lead to sin, nor do they retard virtue.²¹

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 3.

2. The Scripture passages objected are: Mk. 13:32; Ps. 34 (Vulg.):15; Ps. 34 (Vulg.):15 (second clause); Is. 7:15; Is. 7:16; Is. 8:4; 2 Cor. 5:21; Mk. 6:38 ("How many loaves have you?"); Lk. 8:45 ("Who is it that touched me?"); Jn. 11:34 ("Where have you laid him?"); Mk. 11 (seeking fruit on the barren fig-tree).

3. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, ch. 7.

4. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, bk. 9, ch. 4.

5. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk. 9, past the middle.

6. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistulae*, bk. 8, Ep. 42, to Eulogius.

7. Jn. 16:13.

8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 12; *Octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 60.
9. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, bk. 5, chs. 7–8.
10. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, bk. 9, ch. 4 (as cited above); St. Gregory the Great, *Epistulae*, bk. 8, Ep. 42 (as cited above).
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 13, a. 2 and following.
12. The Scripture references in this paragraph are: 1 Cor. 1:24; Is. 9:6; Heb. 1:3; Ps. 101 (Vulg.):26; Jn. 1:3; Jn. 5:17; Jn. 5:19; Jn. 10:17–18; Mk. 15:39; Rom. 1:4; Jn. 2:19.
13. St. Ambrose, *Oratio de Basilicis tradendis*.
14. Wis. 11:21.
15. St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 28:18 [abbreviation as in source].
16. Bede, *Homiliae in Lucam*, hom. 3 (on the words "He shall be great," Lk. 1:32).
17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 13, a. 2 and following (received doctrine).
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 14, a. 1 and a. 3.
19. Reference to the Distinctions of Book III of the *Sentences* treating against the Manicheans and Cerdonians.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 14, a. 4; q. 15, aa. 1, 2, and 3.
21. The section ends here as the Latin breaks off at this point in the chunk.

DISTINCTIO XV — ON THE DEFECTS ASSUMED BY CHRIST (*DE DEFECTIBUS A CHRISTO ASSUMPTIS*)

§ 1. In the former class are the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), difficulty in good works, ignorance of things to be done, sluggishness of mind, and whatever is similar to these. These, accordingly, it was in no way fitting for Christ to assume, since He was to be the minister of justice and was to furnish an example of perfect virtue. For as regards ignorance of other things, although this does not lead to sin, it is nevertheless repugnant to the fullness of Christ's knowledge — concerning which subject we have spoken above. Although that ignorance ought not altogether to be called a defect of human nature, as the Master rightly admonishes (in the text): since such ignorance would have existed even in the first man, and exists in part even among the Blessed.

§ 2. Furthermore, the defects of the latter class are divided in two ways. For they are either natural or personal. I call natural those which have been diffused throughout the whole of nature, that is, throughout the entire human race — such as hunger, thirst, toil, pain, mortality, and the like. Personal defects are those which are found not in all but only in certain persons — such as leprosy, blindness, monstrous deformity, and the various kinds of diseases. We say, therefore, that Christ, who had come to redeem human nature in common and without distinction of persons, ought to have assumed the common and natural defects, but not the personal ones, except those which the character of the work peculiarly enjoined upon Him by the Father — namely, the endurance of the Passion on the cross — required to be taken on, such as bruises and wounds.

§ 3. What the Apostle says, therefore, in Heb. 2 and 4,¹ that Christ took upon Himself all our defects except sin — which the Fathers also repeat from time to time in general terms — as Leo (in the letter to Flavian and in the second sermon on the Nativity of the Lord)² and Damascene³ — this must be understood, in light of what has been said above, as referring to all those defects which are common to the entire human race. Under the exception of sin, moreover, there are also understood to be excepted those things which incline toward or lead to sin.

§ III — *That the soul of Christ was subject to the passions (Animam Christi fuisse passionibus obnoxiam)*

§ 4. The passions (*passiones*) of the soul are not all of the same kind (*generis*): some are called corporeal, such as the pains which the soul suffers through sensation in a body that has been injured or ill-affected; others are called animal (*animales*), of which kind are the affections of the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivi*).

Since Christ, therefore, assumed a true body and a true human soul, it must be said that He had a soul subject to the passions of both kinds — yet only to those that are harmless and carry with them merely the character of penalty (*poenalitas*), and not guilt (*culpa*) or the cause of guilt — in the same way as has been said

above concerning the defects of the body. Hence St. Augustine, commenting on that passage of Ps. 87, "My soul is filled with evils,"⁵ writes as follows: "Can the soul not be killed by persecutors, yet can it be filled with evils? If that is so, it must be enquired with which ones. For we cannot say that soul was filled with the vices by which iniquity holds dominion over a man, but perhaps with pains, by which the soul suffers together with its own flesh in the passion of that flesh." And, a few words later: "Why, therefore, should we not say that the soul of Christ was filled not with the sins of man but only with human evils?" — and what follows; where he calls these passions of the soul *the affections of human infirmity* (*humanae infirmitatis affectus*). On account of these, Christ both in the Psalms and in the Gospel declares His soul to have been troubled. Commenting on this matter, St. Ambrose in book 2 (*De Fide ad Gratiam*, ch. 3)⁶ says, among other things: "Peter said, 'I lay down my soul for thee'; Christ says, 'My soul is troubled.'" And below: "It is not His power that is troubled, nor is His Divinity troubled, but the soul is troubled according to the assumption of human frailty. For He who took up a soul also took up the passion of the soul." On these same passions of the mind, St. Augustine in book 14 (*De Civitate*, ch. 9),⁷ disputing against the Stoics, says: "The Lord Himself, having deigned to lead a human life in the form of a servant, employed these passions where He judged they ought to be employed. For where there was a true human body and a true human mind, there was no false human affection," etc. The same thing is manifestly to be found in the Explanation of the Faith to Damasus attributed to St. Jerome:⁸ the words are cited in the Master [of the Sentences].

§ 5. Let us now briefly show individually that these passions of the soul — namely, the pain of sense (*dolor sensus*), sadness (*tristitia*), fear (*timor*), and anger (*ira*) — were present in Christ.

That the pain of sense was in Him is sufficiently demonstrated by the injury to the body and the sense of that injury, both of which were beyond doubt present in Christ: the injury, indeed, in the passion of His sacred body; and the sense of the injury, because in the most perfect soul of Christ no natural power was absent or imperfectly present. Hence the Prophet calls Christ "a man of sorrows," and testifies that He truly bore our sorrows.⁹ That Christ suffered pain is clear from St. Ambrose's testimony¹⁰ — and likewise from Leo's Sermon 24 (*de Passione Domini*),¹¹ who says that Christ suffered pains most grievous even unto the very extremity of death.

§ 6. That sadness was in Christ is taught abundantly by all four Gospels, especially the narrative of His Passion. For He Himself says: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death."¹² And the Evangelist says of Him: "He began to be sorrowful and to be troubled."¹³ Hence St. Ambrose, in the same book ch. 2, speaking of Christ, says: "He took on sadness as man. 'I take up my sadness confidently before the Lord, who preaches the cross.'"¹⁴ And St. Jerome, on Matt. 26,¹⁵ says: "Our Lord, in order to prove the truth of the man He had assumed, was made sorrowful." So also St. Augustine, on Ps. 93:¹⁶ "Sadness was thus assumed by Christ as He assumed flesh," etc. And that there was sadness in Christ is also argued by the fact that He is recorded to have shed tears when about to raise Lazarus¹⁷ and as He entered Jerusalem¹⁸ — tears that were certainly not feigned.

§ 7. That fear also was in Him is testified by the Gospel narrative. For "He began to fear and to be heavy" as the Passion drew near,¹⁹ and from that fear of Passion and death proceeded the prayer: "If it be possible, let this chalice pass from me."²⁰ On these words St. Ambrose, ch. 3 of the same book,⁶ comments: "Christ fears, and while Peter does not fear, Christ fears." To this point belong the many things which in the Psalms are said in the person of Christ, as: "Fear and trembling came upon me" (Ps. 54),²¹ and: "Deliver my soul from fear of the enemy" (Ps. 63).²²

§ 8. Finally, anger also — or rather indignation — Scripture attributes to Christ, as that passage of the Psalm which in the Gospel the disciples understood to have been prophesied of Christ (Jn. 2): "The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up."²³ More explicitly, Mark testifies of Christ in these words: "And looking round about on them with anger, being grieved for the blindness of their hearts, He saith to the man," etc.²⁴ To this also belongs what is read of Christ, that He "groaned in spirit."²⁵

§ IV — Reply to what seems to contradict what has been said (Responsio ad ea quae dictis adversari videntur)

§ 9. Now a reply must be made to those things which, both from reason and from authority, seem contrary to the doctrine set out above. These are roughly as follows.

The first: Christ's soul, as has been said, was from the very beginning endowed with the most perfect vision of God, which excludes all misery; hence it could not be that either pain or sadness should have any place in it.

The second: Sadness is concerned with those things that happen to us against our will, as St. Augustine testifies.²⁷ But nothing happened to Christ against His will, since His will was in all things in agreement with the divine will. Therefore there was no sadness in Him.

The third: Fear is of an evil which either cannot or can only with difficulty be avoided by him who fears it. Since, therefore, Christ could easily have avoided all the evils He suffered, it does not appear that there was any room for fear in Him.

The fourth: It was prophesied of Christ in Is. 42: "Not sad nor turbulent"; and it is said generally of the just man in Prov. 12: "Whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad."

§ 10. To these are added certain passages from the Fathers, namely from St. Hilary, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine, which seem utterly to remove sadness, pain, and fear from Christ and His soul. For St. Hilary, through almost the whole of his tenth book,²⁸ argues at length against those who ascribe to Christ fear of the Passion, pain of punishment, and sadness at death — men whom he calls heretics and whom he refutes copiously from the Scriptures. And among other things he says that even if a blow fell upon Christ, or a wound descended, or nails converged, or the hanging raised Him up, these things indeed brought the onset of the Passion upon Him, yet they did not inflict the pain of the Passion: just as some weapon piercing water, or pricking fire, or wounding the air. He further says that the virtue of Christ's body received the force of the afflicting punishment without any sensation of punishment. He also attempts to dissolve those arguments taken from the Gospel, which we showed above establish that the passions of the soul were in Christ, when they were put forward as objections by his opponents.

§ 11. There are also other passages in the same author where he speaks similarly. For writing on Ps. 68,²⁹ he reproves those who argue that Christ is weak because He wept. And again on the words "I sought one to comfort me and found none": "He seeks," he says, "not the consolation of a comforter, but his faithfulness." And in his commentary on Matt. 26, on the words "My soul is sorrowful, etc.," he says that Christ was sorrowful not unto death but up to death — that is, on account of His disciples.

§ 12. St. Jerome, moreover, in his commentary on Matt. 26, on the words "to begin to be sorrowful,"³⁰ recognizes in Christ the *propassio* (initial impulse of passion) but denies the *passio* (full passion). "For it is one thing," he says, "to be sorrowful, and another to begin to be sorrowful." He was therefore sorrowful, not from fear of suffering — since He was born for that very purpose, that He might suffer — and He rebuked Peter for his timidity and the scandal of all the Apostles, etc. And further on: "But if the heretics interpret the sadness of the Savior's soul not as His affection toward those who were to perish but as passion, let them answer how they explain what is said by the person of God through Ezekiel: 'And in all these things thou hast grieved me.'" And again, on the words "Nevertheless, not as I will": "He asks, not from fear of suffering, but from mercy toward the former people, lest He should drink from them the cup that was offered."

§ 13. Certain similar things are found in St. Augustine as well: as in his exposition of Ps. 21,³¹ where he denies that Christ truly feared the Passion — since He knew He would rise again on the third day — but asserts that He bore the person of His body, that is of the Church, when He said "Why hast Thou forsaken me?" and "Let this cup pass from me," and the like. Likewise in his commentary on Ps. 30:³² "Christ," he says, "did not fear in Himself but in us, and said 'My soul is sorrowful, etc.'" Writing on Ps. 56,³³ he removes all perturbation from Christ, and adds that where Christ said He was troubled, this was said according to the opinion of those who were raging, not according to the conscience of one departing from Him. Again, on Ps. 93,³⁴ he denies that Christ feared or was sad; and on Ps. 95³⁵ he says: "He who seems as if terrified among men is terrible above all the gods" — indicating that He was not truly terrified. And similar sentiments are found here and there elsewhere among the Fathers.

§ 14. In order to reply to these arguments and to receive a sound understanding of what has been said by the above writers, one must recall to mind what was stated above: that in Christ there was neither sin nor any defect that would lead to sin. It must also be known that nothing could have happened to Him against His will, since He was omnipotent; nor could anything happen to Him unforeseen, since He was from eternity the foreknower of all things. It is necessary, therefore, so to acknowledge true passions of the soul in Him, that we at the same time separate from the passions that were in Christ those things which we already above removed from Christ — even though these things are for the most part connected with our own passions. The passions of this sort were, therefore, in Christ in one way, and in us they exist in another way; and this by a multiple distinction. For in us they arise and surge up most frequently beyond reason, frequently against reason; and not rarely they draw reason into their own object and arouse reason into consenting to them. None of these things operate in Christ, since in Him reason perfectly governed the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*), so that no motion arose in the appetite except by the command or disposition of reason; and reason was in no way impeded by such motions from what reason itself found fitting to do. Therefore every passion of the soul in Him was just as voluntary as was the very assumption of human nature itself. As St. Augustine teaches,⁷ and as will be shown more fully in the next Distinction.

§ 15. With these premises, let us come to the resolution of the objections.

To the first, it is answered: the delight of the divine contemplation (*contemplatio divina*) in which Christ's soul rejoiced from the beginning was, by a singular dispensation, so retained in the mind that it was not communicated to the lower parts of the soul, whether sensitive or otherwise; and so nothing prevented pain of the senses or any other affliction of punishment from having its place in those lower parts.

To the second, one must say: it does not belong to the formal character (*ratio*) of sadness that it concern those things that happen to us absolutely against our will, even though this is what very often occurs in us; but only that it concern those things which are in some way involuntary. Therefore just as bitter medicines or a bitter draught, considered in themselves, are involuntary to a man, but exist as absolutely voluntary with regard to their end: so the Passion and death of Christ, considered in themselves, were indeed involuntary for Christ, and for this reason generated sadness in Him; yet they were absolutely voluntary to Him on account of their end, that is, the redemption of the human race.

To the third, it is answered: Christ could, by the power of His Divinity, have avoided and repelled all the evils He suffered. But according to the weakness of the flesh voluntarily assumed, He could not so easily avoid those same things. And for this reason alone He conceived the affection of fear regarding them.

§ 16. To the Scriptures, it is to be answered that they exclude from Christ and from any just man not all sadness but only disordered sadness — that which, namely, arises beyond or against the dictate of reason and draws reason along with it into its object; for in the just, passions do not dominate. In Christ, indeed, none even exist that would overthrow or assail reason, without which it is impossible for others to be just in this life. And this is argued by the adjunct phrase "nor turbulent." For passions which are not subject to the command of reason are rightly called by learned men perturbations and afflictions of the soul.

§ 17. To the words of St. Hilary the answer is nearly the same. For St. Hilary does not wish to say that Christ did not feel nor suffer at all the pains inflicted on His body — which the face of his words might seem to convey — but that such was the sensation of punishment in Him as is not in us, both because in Him there was no involuntary passion of the soul arising from necessity that resisted the will, and because in Him no passion at all disturbed or impeded the rectitude of reason and operation congruent with reason. And this to be the understanding of St. Hilary's words is sufficiently gathered from the fact that he intends to remove only the corrupt infirmity of man from Christ, arguing against the Arians, who from such passions taken as involuntary perturbations argued impotence in Christ, and from this wished to show that He was not of one nature with God the Father, with whom He would not then be of equal power. Hence, among other things, he says: "For it is not fitting that what He would not suffer He should be willing to suffer." That He was willing to suffer, however, is proved from other passages of Scripture. And further on, explaining his own meaning: "Everything that is feared," he says, "must necessarily be avoided while it is feared; and what is weak draws terror from weakness, and whatever has an unchangeable nature has no capacity for suffering" (*dolendi*), etc.³⁶ By which words he shows sufficiently in what sense those passions are to be removed from Christ — namely, insofar as they are usually connected with impotence in avoiding that which inspires fear, or with terror, or with pain.

§ 18. What is to be answered to the words of St. Jerome and St. Augustine, however, is explicitly explained by the Master in the text. But for a greater clarification of those things which have been objected, or which could be objected, from the words of the aforesaid Fathers, the following must first be known: that they sometimes speak thus not only of Christ but also of the Martyrs, as though the torments by which they were afflicted were not even felt by them; as St. Ambrose does concerning St. Lawrence,³⁷ and St. Augustine in his twenty-seventh Tractate on John³⁸ and in his thirtieth Sermon on the Saints.³⁹ And St. Bernard speaks of the Martyrs in general in his sixty-first Sermon on the Canticles.⁴⁰ By words of this kind, however, they did not wish to remove the sensation of pain from the Martyrs, but only meant that the torments did not produce in them what they are wont to produce in others — that is, that the pain arising therefrom did not so affect them

as to disturb the mind and dislodge it from its steadfast state; but they remained so steadfast, as though they had not felt the torments at all, as St. Bernard himself explains so clearly. Since, therefore, the Fathers spoke in this way about the Martyrs — in whom the sensual nature was not yet fully subjected to reason — much more fittingly could they speak in this manner about Christ.

§ 19. Secondly, one must know that Christ, according to St. Augustine in the passages cited above and others, when He asked that the cup of the Passion be taken away, represented our infirmity in Himself and so prayed in the person of His members — not because that prayer in truth pertained to Christ's Person, as we shall show at Dist. 17,⁴¹ but because Christ voluntarily took upon Himself what the weaker members of His body suffer of necessity: namely, sadness and fear of present or imminent evils; and this for the consolation of those who, in their own passions likewise endured for Christ, would suffer these things unwillingly — whereas it would have been in His power, if He had willed, to represent in Himself the person of His stronger members, such as were Lawrence and Vincent and not a few others of both sexes, by approaching and embracing the Passion with alacrity and joy. That this and nothing else was St. Augustine's meaning is plainly proved by his other passages as well as by that which, writing on Ps. 93,³⁴ he subjoins and which is recited by the Master: "But He assumed sadness just as He assumed flesh. For He was sad, as the Gospel says. For if He was not sad, when the Gospel says 'My soul is sorrowful, etc.,' nothing sound is left in Scripture; so that it might be said as well that His body was not real. Whatever therefore is written of Him is true and was done; therefore He was also sad, but He voluntarily assumed true sadness, just as He voluntarily assumed real flesh." These are his words.

§ 20. Thirdly, what St. Jerome says — that Christ was not made sorrowful from fear of suffering, but because of the treachery of Judas, the scandal of the Apostles, the rejection of the Jewish people, and the destruction of Jerusalem — as similar things are found also in St. Hilary in his tenth book,⁴² — demands this sound understanding: namely, that although neither of these things was against the benevolent will (*voluntas beneplaciti*) of Christ, nor such as would come to pass against His will, yet these latter things, either in themselves or in their cause (that is, in the wickedness of the Jews), are deservedly contrary to His will of sign (*voluntas signi*), that is, of His commandment, and are such as do not have God as their author, nor simply displease Him. Hence Christ could not rejoice over these as He could over His own Passion, nor could He will them at all.

§ 21. Finally, it must be noted that the ancient writers sometimes speak of passions in the manner of the Stoics, who by the name of passion understood not just any motion of the sensual nature, but that which dominates reason and draws it along to itself — which perfect passion St. Thomas calls a *passio perfecta*.⁴³ It is in this sense, therefore, that St. Jerome, in his commentary on Matt. 26, says that passion (*passio*) was not in Christ, but only *propassio*; meaning by the name of passion a motion of the sensual nature that does not extend to moving or, if it has moved, to perverting reason. We add this because the same St. Jerome, in his commentary on Matt. 5, distinguishing between passion and *propassio*, says: "*Passio* is reckoned as a vice; *propassio*, though it bears some guilt of vice."⁴⁴ In this way, indeed, not even *propassio* had any place in Christ, in whom there was no fault.

§ I — Whether there was in Christ necessity of the aforesaid defects (Utrum in Christo necessitas fuerit supradictorum defectuum)

§ 22. Since it has now been shown that Christ truly assumed the defects of human nature both in the soul and in the body, the question must now be asked: whether in Him there was necessity of those same defects? For it appears so, first of all, from the fact that the necessity of suffering, dying, and undergoing other defects is itself also a certain defect. Since, therefore, Christ, according to the Apostle's sentence, was made like us in all things except sin, it is fitting that He should also have assumed this very necessity of defects, which is clearly not itself a sin.

§ 23. Likewise: Christ was mortal not merely as Adam before sin, so as to be able to die, but such as Adam after sin and all of us are through his sin — namely, with a mortality whereby we cannot not die, that is, whereby it is necessary for us at some point to die. Therefore in Christ too there was this mortality.

Moreover, defects of this sort were in Christ from nature, because He was born with them, having contracted them from His mother. But what exists from nature is not subject to the will but belongs to natural necessity. Hence St. Augustine says:⁴⁶ "The flesh of Christ drew its mortality from the mortality of His mother's body, because when He took it He found such a body," etc. To which is added the authority of the Ordinary Gloss on Heb. 9: "It is appointed unto men once to die,"⁴⁷ where it says: "Just as it is appointed unto men by the necessity and law of nature to die once, so was Christ in the same way once offered."

§ 24. Against this, however, it is testified by many passages of Scripture that the penal defects were in Christ not with the necessity of one suffering but with the voluntariness of one assuming: "He was offered because He Himself willed it" (Is. 53).⁴⁸ "He delivered Himself up for us" (Gal. 2 and Eph. 5).⁴⁹ "He troubled Himself" (Jn. 11).²⁵ More manifestly still He excluded the necessity of dying and established His free power and will in the words of Jn. 10: "I lay down my soul and I take it up again. No man taketh it away from me, but I lay it down of myself."⁵⁰

§ IV — Reply to what seems to oppose the things said (Responsio ad ea quae dictis adversari videntur)

§ 25. Now these things must be answered — both from reason and from the authority sought above — which seem contrary to the superior doctrine. These, broadly speaking, are as follows.

First: the soul of Christ, as was said above, was from the very first moment perfectly blessed by the most perfect vision of God, which therefore excludes all misery; hence it could not come about that either pain, or sadness, or any passion of a penal kind should have place therein.

Second: sadness is a passion concerning those evils which befall us against our will, as St. Augustine testifies in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 6.²⁷ But nothing befall Christ against His will, for His will in all things was in agreement with the divine will. Therefore there was no sadness in Him.

Third: fear is the evil of that which cannot be, or can only with difficulty be, avoided. Therefore since Christ could avoid all evils easily, there seems to have been no place for fear in Him.

Fourth: from Is. 42, the prediction concerning Christ is: "He shall not be sad nor turbulent," and it is said in general in Prov. 12: "No evil shall befall the just man in whatever shall happen to him."⁵²

To these are added certain passages of the Fathers — namely of St. Hilary, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine — which seem entirely to remove sadness, pain, and fear from Christ and from His soul. For St. Hilary throughout almost the whole of Book X (*De Trinitate*)⁵³ disputes at length against those who ascribe to Christ a fear of suffering, a penal grief, and sadness at death — whom he calls heretics — and refutes them copiously from the Scriptures. And among other things he says that, although any blow should strike Christ, or a wound should come down upon Him, or nails should be driven in, or He should be suspended on the cross — yet these would bring the impulse of passion upon Him, though they would not inflict the sensation of passion: as, for example, a weapon piercing Him, or water flowing through Him, or fire burning Him, or the air wounding Him. He says moreover that the virtue of the body of Christ, without the sense of punishment (*poena*), had received in itself the force of punishment; that it was with these same arguments that our adversaries, propounding them from the Gospels, endeavoured to dissolve. And there are other passages in which he speaks similarly. For writing in Ps. 68, he rebukes the fact that Hilary, because Christ wept, is argued to be infirm; and again on that passage, "I sought consolation and found it not": "He who consoles," he says, "does not seek *solace*, but seeks *faith*." And in ch. 31 of Matt., on that passage, "My soul is sad," he says that Christ spoke of sadness not concerning death, but of His having been sad over His disciples even to the point of death.⁵⁴

St. Jerome, however (*In Matt.* 26, on the words *to be sorrowful*)⁵⁵, acknowledges a *propassio* (first movement of passion) in Christ but denies passion. "For it is one thing," he says, "to be sorrowful (*contristari*), and another to be deeply sorrowful (*concupiscari*). He was troubled (*contristabatur*), not because He feared to suffer — for He came generated as a sufferer — but He rebuked the faintheartedness of Peter on account of the most wretched Judas and the scandal of the Apostles, and the abjection of the Jewish people, and the overturning of Jerusalem" — qualities which are also read in Hilary in Book X (*De Trinitate*)⁴² — "these things require a sound understanding, namely that this was neither against the benevolent will of Christ, nor contrary to that which was going to happen; but these latter things either in themselves or in their cause, that is, in the wicked will of the Jews, were rightly against the will of the sign, that is, of His precept, and were such things as were displeasing to God simply. Hence Christ could not rejoice on account of them, just as He could not with His passion, nor could He altogether will them."

Finally, it must be noted that the ancients sometimes speak of passions in the Stoic manner, since they understood by the name of passion not any motion of sensuality whatsoever, but only that which is dominated by reason and draws reason along with it. This perfect passion St. Thomas calls, in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 4,⁴³ and hence in this sense St. Jerome (*In Matt.* ch. 26)⁵⁶ says that passion was not in Christ, but propassion alone — with *propassio* understood as the motion of sensuality that does not extend to reason, nor moves it, nor perverts it. To this we add that the same St. Jerome (*In Matt.* ch. 5)⁵⁷ distinguishes between passion and propassion: "*Passio*," he says, "is counted as a vice; *propassio*, though it bears some guilt of vice." And as for what St. Hilary says — this is sufficiently clear from what we already said, namely that he intends to remove from Christ only the vitiated infirmity of man, disputing against the Arians, who argued impotence in Christ from these involuntary perturbations, and wished thereby to show that He was not one nature with God the Father, with whom He would not have been of equal power. Hence he says among other things: "For it is not fitting that what we wish to suffer should be suffered." That He willed to suffer is taught

from other passages of Scripture. And further below, explaining his meaning more fully, he says: "What is feared *must* be avoided when it is feared; and what is taken from infirmity causes terror, and whatever has an unchangeable nature of causing pain," and so forth. By which words he sufficiently shows in what sense he removes those passions from Christ — namely insofar as they are usually conjoined with impotence to avoid what causes fear, or terror, or pain.

§ 26. Now what is to be answered to the words of St. Jerome and St. Augustine: this is to be explained by the Master (*a Magistro in tertio* — that is, in Book III).⁵⁸

For the rest, for a greater declaration of those things which have been objected from the sayings of the Fathers, it must be known: first, that they speak of Christ not only, but also of Martyrs in this fashion, as though the torments did not in any way affect them — as in the case of Laurentius, in St. Ambrose's Sermon 71,⁵⁹ and St. Augustine's Tractatus 27 *In Ioannem*,³⁸ and Sermon 30 (*de Sanctis*).³⁹ And St. Bernard in Sermon 61 *In Cantica Canticorum*⁴⁰ speaks generally of Martyrs in similar words — not meaning to remove the sense of pain from them, but only to signify this much: that the torments did not work this effect on them — namely, that the pain thence perceived so affected them as to perturb their mental composure or draw them away from right reason; but they remained so steadfast, as though they felt the torments not at all, and so Laurentius manifestly explains this of himself. Since therefore the Fathers spoke in this way of Martyrs, in whom sensuality was not yet fully subject to reason (*ratio*), far more fittingly could they speak in this manner of Christ.

Second, it must be known that Christ, according to the passages of St. Augustine cited above and others, when He prayed that the cup of the passion might be taken away from Him, represented thereby the infirmity of His members and prayed on behalf of the person of the members — not because that prayer truly pertained to the person of Christ, as we shall show below (at Dist. 17);⁴¹ but because Christ voluntarily received what His weaker members suffer of necessity — namely sadness and fear at impending evils — and did so for the consolation of those who in their own passions were also going to suffer such things for Christ, though they would bear them unwillingly; for otherwise He would have been able, if He had wished, to be for His members, such as were Lawrence and Vincent and many others of both sexes, who accepted the passion laid upon them with alacrity and joy. Neither does St. Augustine wish anything else to be shown — as both his other passages and that which he writes in Ps. 93⁶⁰ prove — and what is cited back by the Master (*a Magistro*): "He took sadness in the way that He took flesh." For if He was truly sad, as the Gospel says, then if He was not sad, what the Gospel says is untrue; therefore He was sad, but voluntarily; therefore He took true sadness in the way that He voluntarily took true flesh. So he (i.e. Augustine).

§ 27. Third, what St. Jerome says — that Christ was not troubled by fear of suffering, but on account of the wickedness of Judas and the scandal of the Apostles, and the abjection of the Jewish people, and the overturning of Jerusalem — this is the same as what is read in Hilary in many passages of Book X (*De Trinitate*).⁴² A sound understanding requires that this — though it was neither against the benevolent will of Christ, nor contrary to that which was going to happen — these latter things, however, whether in themselves or in their cause, that is, in the wicked will of the Jews, were rightly against the sign's will, that is, of His precept, and were such as had no favour with God, but were simply displeasing to Him. Hence Christ could not rejoice at them, just as He could not rejoice at His passion, nor could He altogether will them.

§ 28. Lastly, it must be noted that the ancients sometimes speak of passions in the Stoic manner, since they understood under the name of passion not any motion of sensuality, but that which is dominated by reason and drags reason along with it. This perfect passion St. Thomas calls such in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 4.⁴³ And in this sense St. Jerome in Matt. ch. 26⁶¹ says that passion was not in Christ, but propassion alone. To what is replied from the Scriptures: neither may all sadness be excluded from Christ by any just reasoning (*ratio*), but only the disordered — namely that which precedes, or acts beside, or draws right reason toward itself; for in the just, passions are not given dominion. In Christ, however, there exist no such things as can anticipate reason or oppose it; without which it is impossible for others who are just to be in this life. That this is what the Prophet (*Propheta*) meant is argued from what is adjoined: "He shall not be turbulent (*Non erit turbulentus*)." For passions that are not subdued to the dominion of reason are perturbations and ailments of the soul that are rightly called diseases by the learned.⁶²

§ 29. To the words of Hilary the reply is broadly the same. For he does not wish to say that Christ neither suffered pain nor sensed altogether the punishments inflicted upon His body — which is what his very words seem on the surface to say — but rather that there was not in Him any passion of a penalty of such kind as in us, both because there was in Him no passion of the soul that was necessary and against the will, and because the rectitude of his mental reason (*mentis seu rationis rectitudo*) was in no way troubled or impeded by anything contrary to right and congruent operation. And that this is the meaning of Hilary's words is sufficiently understood from this, that his aim is to remove the vitiated infirmity of man from Christ, disputing against the Arians, who from such involuntary perturbations argued impotence in Christ, and wished to show thereby that He was not one nature with God the Father, with whom He would not have been of equal power. Hence he says among other things: "For it is not fitting that what we wish to suffer should be suffered." But that He willed to suffer is taught from other passages of Scripture. And further below, explaining his meaning more fully, he says: "What is feared *must* be avoided when it is feared; and what is drawn from infirmity causes terror, and whatever has an unchangeable nature of causing pain," and so forth. By which words he sufficiently shows in what sense he removes those passions from Christ — insofar, namely, as they are usually conjoined with impotence to avoid what causes fear, or terror, or inflicts pain.

§ 30. Now, to respond to the words of St. Jerome and St. Augustine: this is to be explained by the Master (in Book III).⁶³

For the rest, for a greater declaration of the things that have been objected from the sayings of the Fathers, it must be known: first, that they speak not so much of Christ, but of Martyrs in this fashion, as though torments in no way came through to their senses — as in the case of Laurentius, in St. Ambrose's Sermon 71⁶⁴ and in St. Augustine's Tractatus 27 *In Ioannem*³⁸ and Sermon 30 *de Sanctis*.³⁹ And St. Bernard generally in Sermon 61 *In Cantica Canticorum*⁴⁰ speaks of Martyrs in similar terms — not wishing to remove from them the sense of pain, but only to signify this much: that the torments did not produce this effect in them, namely that the pain perceived therefrom so affected them as to perturb their steady mental composure or draw them away from rightness; but they remained so constant, as though they sensed the torments not at all, as Laurentius himself so luculently explains. Since therefore the Fathers spoke of Martyrs in this way — in whom sensuality was not yet fully subject to reason — far more fittingly could they speak thus of Christ.

Second, it must be known that Christ, according to the Augustinian passages cited above, when He prayed that the cup of the passion might be taken from Him, was representing the infirmity of His members and praying in the person of the members, not because that prayer truly pertained to Christ's own person — as we

shall show at Dist. 17⁴¹ — but because Christ had voluntarily received what His weaker members suffer of necessity, namely sadness and fear at impending evils, for the consolation of those who in their own passions were also going to suffer such things for Christ, though they would suffer them unwillingly; for otherwise He could have been able, if He had wished, to represent to them, as He acceded to and received the passion with alacrity and joy, members such as Lawrence and Vincent and many others of both sexes. Nor does St. Augustine wish to show anything other, as both his other passages and that which he writes in Ps. 93⁶⁰ — which is cited back by the Master — prove: "He voluntarily took sadness in the way He took flesh." "For if He was truly sad, as the Gospel says; if He was not sad, then the Gospel's statement is untrue; therefore He was sad, but voluntarily; therefore He voluntarily took true sadness in the way that He voluntarily took true flesh." So he.

§ 31. Third, that which St. Jerome says — that Christ was not troubled by fear of suffering, but on account of the wickedness of Judas, the scandal of the Apostles, the abjection of the Jewish people, and the overturning of Jerusalem — a sound understanding of this requires the following: that though these things were neither against the benevolent will of Christ, nor contrary to what was going to come about, these latter things, however, either in themselves or in their cause — that is, in the wicked will of the Jews — were rightly against the will of the sign, that is, of His precept; and they were such as had no divine favour, but were simply displeasing to God. Hence Christ could not rejoice at them, just as He could not rejoice at His own passion, nor could He simply will them.

§ 32. Lastly, it must be noted that the ancients sometimes speak of passions in the Stoic manner, since by the name of passion they understood not just any motion of sensuality whatsoever, but only that which is dominated by reason and draws reason along with itself. This perfect passion St. Thomas calls such in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 4.⁴³ And in this sense St. Jerome (*In Matt.* ch. 26)⁵⁶ says that passion was not in Christ, but propassion alone.

§ 33. To the Scriptures it is answered: that neither is all sadness justly to be excluded from Christ, but only the disordered — that is, such as precedes, or passes beside, or draws reason contrary to itself; for in the just, passions are not given dominion. In Christ, however, there exist no such passions as can anticipate reason, or oppose it, without which it is impossible for others who are just to be in this life. That this is what the Prophet meant is argued by the adjunct clause: "He shall not be turbulent (*Non erit turbulentus*)."

For passions that are not submitted to the dominion of reason are perturbations and diseases of the soul, and are rightly called diseases by the learned.

§ 34. Now, in continuing the text of the Latin original — St. Hilary writes dispersedly throughout Book X (*De Trinitate*)⁵³, teaching that Christ took by His will what we suffer by necessity, and in Ps. 68 writing thus: "There was in the Only-begotten of God no natural infirmity, but an assumed one." And again: "He Himself suffers pain, placed indeed outside any necessity of fear and pain, yet accommodating Himself to those things which He assumed." And again: "All your infirmities which were in Him are not natural but assumed." The same (in the book *De Synodis*)⁶⁵ teaches that Christ was able to suffer, and yet was not passible — that is, removing from Christ that necessity of suffering which is in us. St. Augustine also in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 9,⁷ disputing about the passions of the soul which were in Christ, concludes thus: "But He, certainly, assumed those movements by a settled dispensation with His human soul, when He willed, just as He became man when He willed." And in Ps. 56: "Christ became man for this reason because He is merciful — not so that He might be born under the necessity of the condition, but so that He might free us from the

condition of necessity." Likewise in Ps. 87: "These affections of human infirmity, as the Lord Jesus assumed the very flesh of human infirmity and the death of human flesh — not by the necessity of the condition but by the will of compassion, He assumed."⁶⁶ And again in Ps. 93: "By will He took on true sadness, just as by will He took on true flesh." And in Ps. 96: "You die by condition; He dies by mercy." So also Leo in Sermon 8 *de Quadragesima*:⁶⁷ "Receiving the condition of servitude by the counsel of piety, and incurring no law of necessity: because by power He was made humble, by power passible," and so forth. Finally it was said generally by St. John Damascene in Book III, ch. 20:⁶⁸ "Nothing compelled is to be discerned in Christ, but all things voluntary." These and similar passages seem to remove the necessity of defects both of soul and of body from Christ. And this is also what reason convinces us from the omnipotence of the Word of God, taken in itself — for that omnipotence manifestly excludes the necessity of any defect whatsoever.

§ 35. This apparent contrariety of reasons and authorities we shall briefly dissolve if we say: there was indeed a necessity of defects in Christ, but that necessity was voluntary — that is, voluntarily assumed. For that necessity of dying and suffering which we contract through the corruption of a nature vitiated by sin, Christ assumed by the divine will whereby He assumed human nature. For, as St. John Damascene says in Book III, ch. 14,⁶⁹ by the good-pleasure of the divine will it was permitted to Christ's flesh to act and to suffer what was proper to it; and in the likeness of sinful flesh the deadly and corruptive quality which is the punishment of sin, Christ — who had come without sin — willed to spread through His own flesh. Hence it was rightly written by Hugh of St. Victor in Book II (*De Sacramentis*, ch. 7):⁷⁰ "To Christ as man from the beginning there was owed not only the immortality which the first man had before his transgression, but also that which the second man now has after the Resurrection — that is, so that, as by the fellowship of the Deity He was confirmed in spirit unto virtue, so that He could not sin, so also by the merit of virtue He might be confirmed in flesh unto incorruption, so that He could not die. But because sinful flesh could not be freed from punishment unless the flesh of Him who was without sin should suffer, He retained in the assumed flesh the infirmity of passibility and mortality — retained by power, sustained by will." So he. From which it is also understood that Christ, had He not been slain by violent death, would at length have failed and died through old age. "For since," says St. Augustine in *De Peccatorum meritis* II, ch. 29,⁷¹ "there was in Christ a likeness of sinful flesh, He willed to undergo the changes of ages, beginning from infancy itself: so that to death that flesh seems to have been able to come even by growing old, had He not been slain while young. Which death, however, in the flesh of sin, is rendered as the debt of disobedience. In the likeness of sinful flesh, however, it was assumed by the will of obedience," and so forth. From all these things therefore it is clear to what extent both are true: that Christ sustained the defects of human nature both by will and by necessity — because, namely, He had not only the defects themselves but also a certain necessity toward them in Himself. That necessity, however, He did not contract as we do from any debt of sin, nor did He sustain it unwillingly, but He assumed it by will, retained it by will, and laid it down by will.

§ 36. If you ask how necessity can consist with this will, it is answered: the necessity to be understood here is not that of compulsion (*coactio*), which is opposed to will and of which there was none in Christ —

1. Heb. 2 and 4 (the Apostle's statement that Christ took upon Himself all our defects except sin).

2. St. Leo the Great, *Epistola* 10 (to Flavian), and *Sermo* 2 *de Nativitate Domini*.

3. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 20.
4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, aa. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.
5. St. Augustine, commentary on Ps. 87 (on the words "My soul is filled with evils").
6. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* II, ch. 3.
7. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 9.
8. St. Jerome [attributed], *Explanatio fidei ad Damasum*.
9. Is. 53:3–4.
10. St. Ambrose, *loco memorato* (the passage cited above); and Commentary on Lk. 22.
11. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 24 de Passione Domini*.
12. Matt. 26:38.
13. Matt. 26:37.
14. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* II, ch. 2.
15. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 26.
16. St. Augustine, on Ps. 93.
17. Jn. 11:35.
18. Lk. 19:41.
19. Mk. 14:33.
20. Matt. 26:39.
21. Ps. 54:6.
22. Ps. 63:2.
23. Ps. 68:10; Jn. 2:17.
24. Mk. 3:5.
25. Jn. 11:33.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, aa. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 (as cited above).
27. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 6.
28. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, Book X (throughout).
29. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *Tractatus in Psalmum 68*.
30. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 26 (on the words "to begin to be sorrowful").
31. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 21* (Exposition of Ps. 21).
32. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 30* (Concio 1).
33. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 56*.
34. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 93*.
35. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 95*.
36. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* X (the passage in which he explains: "Everything that is feared must necessarily be avoided while it is feared," etc.).
37. St. Ambrose (attributed), *Sermo 71* (in Appendix of his works; see note (a) in the source: these sermons attributed to St. Ambrose were for the most part judged spurious by learned editors and placed in the Appendix to Volume V of the Benedictine edition; not all fifty-odd sermons formerly inscribed to Ambrose were retained; some appear among the Sermons of St. Maximus, some among those of St. Augustine; two, namely the Latin version of a Sermon of St. Basil on the words of the Rich Man in Lk. 12, "I

will destroy my barns," and the Sermon on Prov. 31 (ch. 31), are noted by the editors to be Sermon 37 in the newest edition, otherwise numbered 45, *De Diversis*; and among those formerly published under the Ambrosian name, excepting the four Orations *In funere Valentiniani*, *In funere Theodosii*, *De Basilicis non tradendis*, and *De Reliquiis SS. Gervasii et Protasii*, to which all scholars now agree in denying Ambrosian authorship, no one has been found who can with any probability of truth be attributed to St. Ambrose; Sermon 71, which the author here cites as Ambrose's, is numbered among the Sermons of St. Augustine CCVI by the same editors, and was formerly counted among the Augustinian Sermons 30 *de Sanctis*; the reader may also consult Bellarmine *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* on Ambrose).

38. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractatus 27.
39. St. Augustine, *Sermo 30 de Sanctis*.
40. St. Bernard, *In Cantica Canticorum*, Sermo 61.
41. Distinctio 17 (below in this work).
42. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, Book X.
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 4.
44. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 5, ch. 5 (distinguishing *passio* from *propassio*): "*Passio* is reckoned as a vice; *propassio*, though it bears some guilt of vice."
45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 14, aa. 2, 3.
46. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* V, ch. 9.
47. Heb. 9:27; Ordinary Gloss, *in loc.*
48. Is. 53:7.
49. Gal. 2:20; Eph. 5:2.
50. Jn. 10:17–18.
51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, aa. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 (cited as *S. Thom. ubi supra*).
52. Is. 42; Prov. 12.
53. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, Book X (passim).
54. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 21; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 30; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 56; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 93; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 95.
55. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 26, ad *contristari*.
56. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, ch. 26.
57. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, ch. 5.
58. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.* (Book III of the *Sentences*).
59. St. Ambrose (attributed), *Sermo* 71. (Note: as the editors observe, the Sermons attributed to St. Ambrose, apart from the four orations *In funere Valentiniani*, *In funere Theodosii*, *De Basilicis non tradendis*, and *De Reliquiis SS. Gervasii et Protasii*, to which all scholars now agree in denying Ambrosian authorship, none has been found that can with any probability of truth be attributed to St. Ambrose; *Sermo* 71, which the author here cites as Ambrose's, is numbered among the Sermons of St. Augustine as CCVI by the same editors, and was formerly counted among the Augustinian Sermons 30 *de Sanctis*; the reader may also consult Bellarmine *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* on Ambrose.)
60. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 93.
61. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, ch. 26, on *contristari*.
62. Cf. Is. 42; Prov. 12.
63. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.* (Book III).
64. St. Ambrose (attributed), *Sermo* 71; cf. footnote 12 above.
65. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Synodis*.

66. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 56; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 87.

67. Pope Leo the Great, *Sermo 8 de Quadragesima*.

68. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 20.

69. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 14.

70. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, ch. 7.

71. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 29.

DISTINCTIO XVI — ON THE VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF HUMAN CORRUPTION BY THE SON OF GOD (*DE VOLUNTARIA ASSUMPTIONE CORRUPTIONIS HUMANAЕ A FILIO DEI*)

§ 1. It was inevitable that a body composed of contraries should tend toward corruption and at length be corrupted. There is nothing to prevent such a necessity from having been voluntarily assumed. Now this is the necessity of a corrupted nature, not of an instituted one. For although the first man was, with respect to his body, composed of contraries, yet during the period of innocence that composition could not be followed by the corruption of the composite, nor indeed by any disposition toward corruption whatsoever; because there would have been no strife of contraries tending toward the corruption of the body, since whatever was lost through such strife would have been restored by nourishment — as we showed in the preceding book.¹ Voluntarily, therefore, did the Son of God assume the corruption of human nature, not with respect to guilt but only with respect to punishment (*poena*); and because He did not assume guilt, He is not properly to be said to have contracted punishment either. For, as St. Thomas says,² in the word *contracting* (*contrahere*) there is understood a relation of effect to cause, so that that is said to be contracted which is drawn along of necessity together with its cause. The cause, however, of the punitive conditions (*poenalitates*) in human nature — among which is the very necessity of suffering — is none other than guilt or sin. Hence St. Augustine³ says that Christ drew (*traxisse*) mortality from the mortality of the maternal body, but did not contract (*contraxisse*) it.

§ II — Whether Christ in His mortal life was a wayfarer or a comprehensor (Utrum Christus in mortali vita viator fuerit an comprehensor)

§ 2. On the occasion of the Master's teaching, by which he teaches that Christ received something from every state of man — namely, immunity from sin from the state of innocence; punishment from the state of fallen man; fullness of grace from the state of man constituted under grace; and the impossibility of sinning together with the perfect contemplation of God from the state of man raised to glory — it is customarily asked: whether Christ in this mortal life is to be called a wayfarer (*viator*), which pertains to the first three states, or a comprehensor (*comprehensor*), which pertains to the last state.

To this question it is briefly answered that Christ throughout the whole time of His mortality was at once both wayfarer and comprehensor, but in different respects (*diversa ratione*), which is declared as follows: a wayfarer (*viator*) is so called inasmuch as he tends toward beatitude (*beatitudo*); a comprehensor (*comprehensor*), inasmuch as he has already attained beatitude. Both of these the Apostle signified in these sentences: "So run that you may comprehend" (1 Cor. 9); and "But I follow on, if by any means I may

comprehend" (Phil. 3). Now since the perfect beatitude of man consists in soul and body, according to that which is proper and pre-eminent in the soul — that is, according to the mind — He was blessed from the beginning of His conception with the perfect vision (*visio*) of God, and hence was a comprehensor; but according to the body He was mortal and capable of suffering. Indeed, even according to the lower part of the soul He was subject to passions; and hence in this respect He was not yet a comprehensor but a wayfarer — inasmuch, namely, as through His passions, as one placed upon the road, He merited both for Himself and for us, as will be said more fully at dist. 18.⁵

§ III — That there were several wills in Christ (Plures in Christo fuisse voluntates)

§ 3. Concerning the will of Christ there formerly existed various errors, agreeing in this — that they attributed to Him a single will — yet resting upon different principles and foundations. For Apollinaris, by the very fact that he denied a mind or rational soul in Christ, also took away the human will, attributing to Him only the divine will. Eutyches, attaching a single composite nature to Christ, was consequently bound to attribute to Him a single will. Afterwards, however, certain Greeks, even though they acknowledged two distinct natures in Christ in accordance with the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, nevertheless attributed to Him a single will and a single operation, for this reason: they said that the human nature in Christ was never moved by its own proper motion, but only insofar as it was moved by the Divinity. These men, from the unity of will which they defended, were called Monothelites, and were condemned by the Sixth Ecumenical Synod under Pope Agatho, whose epistle written accurately against the said error was read and approved at that Synod (Act. 4).⁷

§ 4. This error, moreover, is refuted by a most certain argument drawn from the two natures of Christ. For since, besides the divine nature, there is in Christ a perfect human nature — as was proved in Distinction 2 — and since to the perfection of human nature there belong both will and intellect, which are the two faculties proper to the rational soul, it follows that in Christ there must be acknowledged a created will as well as a human intellect with its operations. There is, therefore, in Christ a twofold will, divine and human, just as there is also a twofold intellect, and according to each of these a twofold set of operations. Concerning this matter Pope Agatho, disputing in the aforesaid epistle, says: "When, concerning the Son of God and the mystery of His admirable dispensation according to the flesh, we make our confession, we assert all things to be twofold of the one and the same Lord our Saviour Jesus Christ according to the Evangelical tradition; that is, we proclaim His two natures, divine and human, and we confess that each of His natures possesses its natural property, and that the divine indeed has all things that are divine, but the human all things that are human, yet without sin, etc." Which doctrine the Fathers of that same Council diligently expounded, employing for its proof these Scriptural passages in particular: "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt" (Matt. 26); and "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Lk. 22); "Not my will, but Thine be done" (Lk. 22); "He entered into a house, and would have no man know it, and He could not be hid" (Mk. 7); "I seek not my own will, but the will of Him that sent me" (Jn. 5); and, in chapter 6: "I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him that sent me" (Jn. 6); and in chapter 7: "He would not walk in Judaea, because the Jews sought to kill Him" (Jn. 7); and that text from Ps. 53: "Voluntarily will I sacrifice to Thee."⁸ It must, however, be known that most of these passages are to be referred not to the rational will but to the sensitive

will, of which we shall treat a little below, although all of them sufficiently prove that there is some created will in Christ.

§ 5. The Synod, moreover, makes use further of testimonies of the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, for proving the same point, as may be seen in Action 4 of that Council;⁹ and beyond these the following passages may also be noted. St. Ambrose (in *De Fide ad Gratianum*, bk. 2, ch. 3) says:¹⁰ "As Christ took upon Himself my will, so He took upon Himself my sorrow." And in bk. 10 (on Luke, on the text "Not as I will"): "His will He referred to the man, the Father's to the Divinity. For the will of man is temporal; the will of the Divinity is eternal." Likewise St. Augustine (on Ps. 32, Sermon 1)¹¹ says: "Christ, bearing the man, showed the private will of man" — then, citing the text "Let this chalice pass from me," he says: "This was the human will, desiring something proper and as it were private, etc." And (on Ps. 93)¹² alleging the same Scripture he says that Christ showed by those words the will of man. Similar is the passage in bk. 3 (*Against Maximinus*, ch. 19).¹³ Bede also, in his book (*On Mark*), treating the same words of Christ, says — not so much in his own words as in those of St. Augustine — that the human will of Christ, which He assumed temporally from the Virgin, is signified there, as also elsewhere: "I came not to do my own will." In which place he likewise accommodates the text "But the flesh is weak" to the human will of Christ, as does also the *Glossa ordinaria* (on *Mk. 14*)¹⁴ — indeed, the Church herself in the Divine Office (on the Thursday of the Lord's Supper, Responsory 1).¹⁵

§ 6. But above all, St. John Damascene treated the argument solidly and expressly in bk. 3 of *De Fide Orthodoxa*, ch. 14; in bk. 1 *On Heresies*, on the heresy of the Monothelites; and again in a book composed particularly on this subject, whose title is *On the Two Wills and Actions of Christ*.¹⁶ In these places he assembles several arguments by which he proves the human will in Christ, of which these are the principal ones.

The first: Will follows upon nature, not upon person; for otherwise in God there would be three wills, just as there are three hypostases (*hypostases*). Since, then, there are two natures in Christ, there are also two wills.

The second: Man was made according to will in the image (*imago*) of God; but Christ assumed man insofar as he is the image of God; therefore He assumed the human will.

The third: Obedience belongs to a subject and inferior will; but Christ was obedient to the Father unto death; therefore He had a will lesser than the divine will, that is, a created will.

The fourth: Adam by sinning through his own will corrupted will both in himself and in his posterity. If therefore Christ did not assume the human will, then neither is our will healed in Him. For what is not assumed is not curable (*quod enim inassumptibile est incurabile est*).

The last: Christ merited both for Himself and for us; but merit exists only according to a created will; therefore there was in Him a created will.

§ 7. St. John Damascene also removes the objection of those who imagine a single composite will in Christ from the two wills — following the error of Eutyches, who attributed a composite nature to Christ. And that doctrine, which absurd consequences follow from —

1. Cf. Estius, *In III Sent.*, dist. 19, as cited above ("superiori libro, ad Distinct. 19").

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 14, a. 3.
3. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* [the passage cited above (*loco supracitato*)].
4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 15, a. 10.
5. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 18 (reference to follow).
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 18, a. 1.
7. Sixth Ecumenical Synod (Third Council of Constantinople, 680–681), under Pope Agatho; the Pope's epistle was read and approved at its fourth session (Act. 4).
8. Matt. 26; Lk. 22; Mk. 7; Jn. 5; Jn. 6; Jn. 7; Ps. 53.
9. Sixth Ecumenical Synod, Action 4.
10. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* II, ch. 3; and *In Lucam* X (on the text "Not as I will").
11. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32, Sermon 1.
12. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 93.
13. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, ch. 19.
14. Bede, *In Marcum*; *Glossa ordinaria* on Mk. 14.
15. The Roman Divine Office, Feria V (Thursday) of the Lord's Supper, Responsory 1.
16. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 14; *De Haeresibus* I (on the Monothelites); and *De Duabus Christi Voluntatibus et Actionibus*.

§ II — That a sensory will existed in Christ (Voluntatem sensualem in Christo fuisse)

§ 1. In Christ, according to His human nature, a twofold will must be acknowledged: one is the rational will, which is proper to man and corresponds to the intellect; the other is the sensory will, which is also called sensuality (*sensualitas*), is common to every animal, and corresponds to sense. And although only the rational appetite is properly called will (*voluntas*), nonetheless the name of will is sometimes attributed even to the sensory appetite. To this usage there seems to belong the fact that in Jn. 1 and Eph. 2 the "will of the flesh" is named.² And Prosper, in book 1 of *De Vocatione Gentium*, chapter 2,³ besides the rational will, also acknowledges the sensory will, writing as follows: "The sensory will, which we may also call the carnal will, is not raised above that movement which arises from the senses of the body. Such is the will in the souls of little children, who, although they make use of no judgment of reason, nevertheless show that they will something, when by feeling they both love those things in which they take delight and hate those things by which they are offended," etc. And the Philosopher in book 3 of the *Ethics*, chapter 2,⁴ teaches that the spontaneous or voluntary extends to more things than choice (*electio*). For it is, he says, common to us with children and the other animals.

§ 2. Now that this will — that is, sensuality — existed in Christ is again shown by an argument drawn from the perfection of human nature in Christ. For since human nature includes the nature of an animal, as a species includes a genus, and since sense and the appetite corresponding to sense pertain to the perfection of an animal, it must be conceded that just as sense, so also the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) existed in Christ. Nor is it any less absurd to remove sensuality from Christ than to remove from Him the faculty of sense itself.

§ 3. The same is shown sufficiently from Scripture. For, as we were saying in the preceding chapter, the many testimonies of Scripture by which a human will is proved in Christ seem to be taken not so much of the rational as of the sensory will. Moreover, those Scriptures which attribute to Christ pain, sadness, and fear — since these passions belong to the sensitive part — sufficiently establish that the sensory will existed in Christ. This teaching, following the Master in the text and Hugh of St. Victor in his little work *De voluntatibus Christi*,⁵ all the Scholastics consistently maintain and hand on.

§ III — That there was no contrariety of wills in Christ (Nullam fuisse in Christo voluntatum contrarietatem)

§ 4. Since, as we have now shown, the will (*voluntas*) in Christ is threefold — namely divine, rational, and sensory — it must be affirmed as a matter of Catholic faith that among these wills there was in Christ no contrariety or conflict. For with respect to the divine will and the rational will in Christ, not only was there no conflict between them, but the one was at all times and in all things conformed to the other, that is, the rational to the divine: so that Christ neither willed nor could will anything by rational will — that is, insofar as He was moved by the judgment and deliberation of reason — except what was absolutely pleasing to the divine will. With respect to the sensory will, however, it was not indeed conformed in the same way to the rational will, and hence not to the divine will either. For it was moved by its own proper and natural impulse, following those things which are agreeable to the senses and fleeing those which are burdensome to the senses, even when the divine and rational will was tending in a different direction and willing something altogether different. Yet for that reason these wills — the rational, I mean, and the sensory — were not contrary to one another in Christ: because each was borne by its own motion in such a way that sensuality did not in any manner impede or retard the movement of the rational will (as happens in other human beings, even in the just), nor, on the other hand, did the rational will impede or repress the movement of sensuality except insofar as it willed to do so by its own command. For Christ willed by divine and rational will that sensuality in Him should be moved according to the order of its own nature; and He likewise had perfect and complete dominion over that sensuality, so that it disturbed the movement of reason in no way whatsoever, nor was it itself moved except insofar as reason permitted. There was therefore in Christ no conflict between the lower and the higher appetite, of the kind that exists in us from our corrupted origin, whereby the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, so that we do not do whatsoever we will (Gal. 5). This is what makes a man contrary both to himself and to God, according to that word of Job: "Why hast thou set me against thee, and I am become burdensome to myself?"⁷

§ 5. Now what has been said of the sensory will holds equally of the natural will (*voluntas naturalis*), which differs from the rational will not in reality but conceptually (*ratione*), inasmuch as it is not moved in the manner of a nature — as when it naturally flees those things that are contrary to nature and evil in themselves, such as death, torments, and the like.

For the understanding of what has been said, one may employ the analogy of the first celestial sphere and the lower orbs: although these latter by their own motion tend in the opposite direction, they nevertheless do not impede or retard the motion of the first mover, but rather their own motions are moderated by that primary motion. The Philosopher makes use of this analogy for a similar purpose in Book III of the *De Anima*.⁸

§ 6. A more certain exposition of the same doctrine is drawn from Christ's own prayer which, as His passion was imminent, He addressed to the Father. For in that prayer both the multiplicity of Christ's wills is contained, and it is shown that no one of them was contrary to another. For when He says, "Let this chalice pass from me," and again, "Not as I will," He expressed a human will — not rational but sensory, or certainly natural. For each of these was fleeing death and passion as something evil in itself, contrary to nature, and to be feared. But by adding, "But as thou wilt," He manifests the divine will, which He possessed in common with the Father. In that whole sentence where He says: "Not as I will, but as thou wilt" (Matt. 26),⁹ or as another Evangelist has it (Lk. 22): "Nevertheless not my will, but thine be done,"¹⁰ is contained the rational will, consenting in all things to the divine will. Although therefore the sensory will was naturally moved toward the avoidance of passion and death, yet because in Him it was perfectly subject to reason, it is clear that there was in that prayer no contrariety. For reason itself, though it did not will what sensuality willed, nevertheless willed that sensuality should will this: just as a Lord, though He does not do what His servant does, and sometimes does the contrary, nevertheless wills that the servant do those things. When this is the case, contrariety of will between Lord and servant is excluded and agreement is established.

§ 7. Moreover, that this doctrine belongs to Catholic faith (as we were saying at the outset) is shown by these words of Pope Agatho in his letter to the Sixth Synod:¹¹ "We preach in Christ two wills not contrary to one another, as the impious heretics assert, but His human will following and not resisting His omnipotent will."

It must be noted that Agatho's entire letter was received by the said Synod at its eighth session.¹²

§ 8. Someone will ask how Luke can say that Christ was placed in agony and prayed more earnestly, if there was in Him no contention of wills. To this we can reply that there was in Christ an agony (*agonia*) only to this extent: that what reason willed, sensuality fled, and thus between the things willed — namely to die and not to die, to suffer and not to suffer — there was a repugnance, which nevertheless would not suffice for a contrariety of the wills themselves, as is clear from what has been said above. More correctly, however, it is answered that that agony — that is, that struggle — was not between the wills themselves, but between sensuality and death, which nature, as something evil and contrary to itself, flees in fear. A conflict of this kind is observed also in children and other animals that do not have a rational will, or at least do not have the use of it. Now this conflict is truly nothing other than the fear of an impending evil; as St. Thomas proves from St. John Damascene.¹³

§ IV — That every prayer of Christ was heard (Omnem Christi orationem exauditam esse)

§ 9. Christ, to whom it was fitting according to His human nature to pray, was heard in every prayer proceeding from His rational will — that is, in every prayer by which He asked for something absolutely — both because that will was in all things conformed to the divine will, and because He asked so piously, so holily, and so perseveringly that in all things He was worthy to be heard. Hence the Apostle (Heb. 5) says that He was heard for His reverence (*pro sua reverentia*), that is, for His dignity, by which it was fitting that such a Son, whenever asking anything of the Father, should never suffer rejection. That He was always heard by the Father is testified first by Martha (Jn. 11), saying to Him: "I know that whatsoever thou hast asked of God, God will give thee"; and then the Lord Himself confirms it in the same place, speaking to the Father thus: "But

I knew that thou hearest me always." And in the Psalm concerning Him (Ps. 20): "Thou hast given him his heart's desire, and hast not withheld from him the will of his lips" — where in the Hebrew there is subjoined SELA, that is, *always*, to which Christ perhaps looked back when saying to the Father: "Thou hearest me always." And although in another Psalm, namely Ps. 21, v. 3, He says to the Father, "I will cry and thou wilt not hear," nevertheless in the same Psalm at v. 15 He says with thanksgiving: "Because he hath not despised nor disdained the supplication of the poor man; neither hath he turned away his face from me; when I cried to him he heard me."¹⁵

§ 10. Hence it is given to be understood that that prayer of His was indeed not heard which expressed the sensual will or the natural desire (*naturale desiderium*) by which He shrank from death and the Passion; but that that prayer was heard which proceeded from the rational and deliberate will — the prayer which is properly and absolutely called prayer. And what this prayer was can be known from the words of the prayer made to the Father before the Passion. For when He said, "Let this cup pass from me," it was the voice of weak flesh, by which the desire of life and the horror of death were declared. But when He said, "Not my will but thine be done," He was praying simply and according to the judgment of reason that the eternal decree of the Father should be fulfilled in Himself. That this was fulfilled both in His Passion itself and in the glorification wrought through death and resurrection, it is clear that the rational will of Christ, and the prayer proceeding from it, were fulfilled. The Apostle testifies to this (Heb. 5) where, speaking of this very prayer: "Who," he says, "in the days of his flesh, offering up prayers and supplications to him who was able to save him from death, with a strong cry and tears, was heard" — was heard, I say, not so as to escape death by not suffering it, but so as to conquer death by rising again. For this was what the rational will prayed for in Christ, and to this the sensual will of His could not rise.¹⁶

§ 11. But that the words of Christ to the Father, "Thy will be done," signify not merely a spontaneous submission of the human will with respect to the divine will, but also contain a prayer petitioning that the Father's will should be fulfilled, is manifest from Matt. where it is read thus (c. 26, n. 42): "Again a second time he went and prayed, saying: My Father, if this cup cannot pass unless I drink it, thy will be done." In which words, since the Evangelist testifies that He prayed, yet no other prayer is found than that "thy will be done." Nor does the appended condition — "if this cup cannot, etc." — stand in the way. For since Christ knew that that condition, on account of the eternal decree of the Father, was firm and immutable, that condition could not render the will of the one praying suspended or non-absolute, as could the other condition when He said "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me" — which Luke expounds thus (22, n. 41): "If thou wilt, remove this chalice from me." This condition, since it did not hold (for the Father willed the Son to die for the salvation of the human race), brings it about that the absolute prayer of Christ was to the effect that the will of the Father should be done; but the non-absolute prayer — indeed not even properly a prayer, but only a signification of natural desire — was that the cup should pass from Him.¹⁷

§ 12. It must also be noted that the Evangelist records Christ as praying in this fashion only in the first place — that if it were possible the cup might be taken from Him — whereas in the second and third places He simply petitioned that the will of the Father should be fulfilled. Now from the prayer of Christ expounded in this manner, one will be able to understand in some measure what the Master raises in the text but does not fully resolve — namely, in what sense it was said by St. Ambrose, lib. 2 (*De Fide ad Gratianum*, cap. 3), that Christ in this prayer of His, when He said "if it be possible," doubted the power of the Father out of human feeling. For the Master wishes that it was said in this sense: not because He Himself doubted, but because He

bore the guise of one doubting, and seemed to men to be doubting. More correctly, however, we shall say that the doubt in St. Ambrose is not an uncertain judgment of reason concerning the truth of the matter, but a certain indifference of the sensitive part toward following either the inclination of nature or the command of reason. Doubt of this kind is posited in Christ without absurdity, as signified by those words "if it be possible." Hence we have said that by that part of the prayer a suspended and non-absolute will of the one praying is designated.¹⁸

§ 13. That which the Master puts forward in the last place from Hilary and leaves entirely unexplained — namely, in what sense it was said by him, lib. 10 (*De Trinitate*), that Christ prayed not for Himself but for His own — can be explained in this way: that Christ according to the form of the prayer prayed for Himself — that is, laid before the Father His natural desire — when He said, "Let this cup pass from me." But according to the intention of the one praying, He did not pray for Himself — because He did not will absolutely to obtain anything for Himself by those words — but prayed for us, that is, for our benefit, and that in a threefold way: first, in order to prove that He had taken on a true human nature with all its natural affections; second, in order thereby to show to man that it is sometimes permissible to will something according to natural affection which God does not will — in the way that it was said to Peter, "When thou art old, another shall lead thee whither thou wouldst not go" (Jn. 21), namely according to natural affection — by which words it was signified to him by what manner of death he would glorify God; third, in order to teach man that he ought always to subject sensual and personal affection to the divine will, as the example of Christ beautifully teaches, as St. Augustine shows (in Ps. 32, Con. 1).¹⁹

§ 14. There remains one objection concerning the prayer of Christ by which He asked the Father for His crucifiers, saying: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do." Yet it is not likely that all of them received pardon for their sin. To this objection St. Bonaventure, writing on this Distinction, replies that this prayer of Christ did not proceed from the rational will, but from that which he calls the will of piety (*voluntas pietatis*); which he says was not always conformed to the divine will in Christ, and that a petition of this kind was more ordered to our instruction than to obtaining the effect of the prayer. And of this same will he says that Christ desired the salvation of all the Jews. But more conformed to Sacred Scripture is the reply of St. Thomas (q. 21, art. 4, ad 2), saying that Christ did not pray for all His crucifiers, but only for those who were predestined. For Christ Himself speaks thus (Jn. 17): "I pray not for the world, but for them whom thou hast given me out of the world." That however some of the authors of the sin obtained pardon, is clear (Acts 2), where Scripture testifies that they were moved to repentance by the prayer of Peter and were baptized in remission of sins. Hence St. Augustine, Tract. 31 (*in Ioannem*), speaking of this prayer of Christ, says: "He saw some of them, among many strangers: for those He was now praying for pardon, from whom He was still receiving injury. But His own" — Augustine understands the predestined, according to that: "The Lord knoweth who are his" (2 Tim. 2) — "this He confirms": that Christ even while hanging on the cross wished to show the virtue of His crucifiers and those who mocked Him, not only in the present conversion of the thief to whom He promised Paradise, but also in the certain hope of the conversion of those who crucified and mocked Him, for whom Christ prayed.²⁰

§ I — When and in what manner Christ merited (*Christus quando et quomodo meruerit*)

§ 15. Christ, because He was not only a comprehensor (*comprehensor*) but also a wayfarer (*viator*) from the beginning of His conception up to death — as has been said at Distinction 16 — could therefore during that whole time both merit and be rewarded. For from the moment when in the Virgin's womb the Word was made flesh, His merit began; and it was consummated in His death, which the Master rightly teaches in the text, and with which all the Scholastics agree.

But in order to understand how and for what He merited, it must first be known: that just as in Christ there was a twofold will according to the doctrine of the preceding Distinction, so also there was a twofold operation, according to the definition of the Sixth Synod — namely divine and human; divine indeed, which is not diverse from the essence of God, and is uncreated; and human, truly created, proceeding from powers or habits that are likewise created and serve as instruments. Christ therefore merited not through the divine operation, according to which He was no more capable of meriting than the Father or the Holy Spirit, but through the human, inasmuch as He was still constituted as a wayfarer and exercised it. Yet because not only acts but also habits are pleasing to God and worthy of praise and reward — as we showed (at Distinct. 30, lib. 2) — it must be seen in what manner Christ merited from the beginning: whether only through habitual grace (*gratiam habituaalem*), of which He was full from the beginning, or indeed also through acts of free will (*actus liberi arbitrii*) proceeding from the habit of grace.²²

§ 16. Certainly the Master seems to attribute to Christ only habitual merit from the beginning of His conception, when he says that, from the moment He was made man, He merited through charity (*charitas*), justice, and the other virtues, in the fullness of which He was constituted according to His humanity. And repeating this he says that He merited from conception through the grace of the virtues, and through perfect obedience and will — being one who was perfectly obedient, and good and excellent according to His humanity from the moment He was man. On the contrary, that Christ merited from the very beginning also through the actual exercise of the will (*actuaalem voluntatis usum*) is the common doctrine of the Scholastics. And they prove it variously.

§ 17. First: because Christ from the beginning of His conception is called a man (*vir*), according to that of Jer. 31: "A woman shall compass a man." And the Fathers say He was a perfect man from the beginning — as St. Augustine, book 13 (*De Trinitate*, cap. 9, 10), and St. Gregory, lib. 9 (*Registrum*, cap. 61). Now He was a man and a perfect human being not by age or bodily strength, but by the vigor and perfection of His soul. The ultimate perfection of the soul, however, consists not in potency or habit, but in operation to which potency and habit are ordered. There was therefore in Christ from the beginning an operation of will and intellect in which the use of free will (*usus liberi arbitrii*) consists.²³

§ 18. Furthermore: the sanctification of Christ from the beginning was most perfect, as being the cause of the sanctification of all others. Since therefore sanctification according to act is more perfect than sanctification according to habit, it follows that Christ was sanctified in the instant of His conception according to act — namely according to the proper movement of free will.

Moreover: Christ from the instant of His conception was blessed according to His soul by the actual contemplation of the Divinity. Just as therefore from the beginning His soul had through glory a glorious act, so through grace it had a virtuous act, and consequently a meritorious one.

§ 19. It is therefore in accordance both with authority and with reason, as the Scholastics teach, that Christ merited from the beginning not only through habit — in which the dignity is attended to rather than the formal character (*ratio*) of merit unto reward, as has been shown elsewhere — but truly also through the act of free will, according to which properly speaking one is said to merit. Nor does the Master indeed deny this, even if he does not openly assert it. He seems however to have indicated it, when he says that Christ from His conception merited through obedience and perfect will. For by those words he seems to hint at some act of obedience, and one perfectly voluntary: of which kind was the very conception or Incarnation itself, which as present, and the Passion, which as future, pleased the will of Christ perfectly.

§ 20. Furthermore, since the soul of Christ had received from the beginning such a fullness of grace than which a greater could not be given to Him, and consequently neither charity nor any other virtue in Him could be increased, it follows that He could not advance in merit either. Hence that saying of St. Gregory (*Hom. 6. in Ezech.*): "Christ had nothing at all according to the merit of His soul by which He could advance." From which the Master rightly infers that Christ did not merit more through the gallows of the cross than He merited from conception through the grace of the virtues. For although He advanced as regards the number of merits, inasmuch as with the succession of time other works — and those indeed greater than others — were added, yet He did not advance as regards the virtue of merit. For the equality of grace reconciled equality of merit to all His works.²⁴

§ II — What Christ merited for Himself (Quid sibi meruerit Christus)

§ 21. There were, in the time of the Master [of the Sentences], as appears from the beginning of the Distinction, those who said that Christ merited nothing for Himself, but only for His members, that is, for us. Their error was revived in this age by Calvin, who says: "As often as Scripture makes mention of the death of Christ, it sets a reward for us, nor does it speak of anything other than what redounds to us."

§ 22. But against these men it must be held, on the authority of Scripture and the consenting doctrine of the Fathers, that Christ — although He was incarnate, suffered, and died principally for the cause of human salvation, and was indeed of such great dignity that every good would be owed to Him even without merit — nevertheless willed to merit for Himself also certain goods; and thus to make that which in one way was owed to Him also owed to Him in another way. Now those goods are not the ones that were conferred upon Him in the very Incarnation itself, such as the fullness of knowledge and grace and the contemplation of the Deity — for no merit had preceded these — but those goods which afterwards accrued to Him, both before His death and especially after His death. For even the honour and praise which many rendered to Him while He yet lived in a mortal body, He merited by His own virtue and His beneficent deeds. But greater are the things He received after death: namely, the impassibility of soul and body, likewise the immortality and glory of the body, the exaltation of His name, and the manifestation of His Divinity throughout the entire world, and other similar things — as these Scriptures attest:

Lk. 24: "Was it not necessary that Christ should suffer and so enter into His glory?" Phil. 2: "He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath exalted Him

and hath given Him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and every tongue should confess," etc. Heb. 2: "We see Jesus, on account of the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour." Rev. 5: "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and divinity," etc.

§ 23. The same is sounded by the oracles of the Prophets: as of David, Ps. 2: "Ask of me and I will give thee the nations for thine inheritance." And Ps. 109: "He shall drink of the torrent in the way; therefore shall He lift up His head." And Is. 49, where, after it had been said in the person of Christ, "I have laboured in vain; without cause and to no purpose have I spent my strength," there is the reply: "Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the farthest parts of the earth." And Is. 53: "If He shall lay down His life for sin, He shall see a long-lived seed," and again: "Because His soul hath laboured, He shall see and be filled."²⁶

§ 24. On this matter the expressed opinion of St. Augustine is as follows — speaking of the resurrection, he says: "As Christ was first humbled by the Passion, humility is the merit, and glory is the reward of humility."²⁷ A similar passage is found in the same author:²⁸ Likewise the Author of the Commentary on Paul ascribed to St. Ambrose, expounding Phil. 2, says that it is thereby shown how great is the merit of humility and how greatly it is rewarded.²⁹ And in *De Trinitate*, book 9: "On account of the merit of obedience it was said: 'He hath given Him the name,'" etc.³⁰

§ 25. One may also see the other commentators on the same passage, both Greek and Latin, who all with one voice understand it of the meritorious cause — that is, that on account of which something is repaid as a reward or recompense. So that Calvin's interpretation is plainly futile, by which he endeavours to elude the meaning of the Apostle, saying that the particle *propter quod* ("wherefore" / "on account of which") denotes not a cause but a consequence — signifying that something is given or received after something else.³¹

§ III — What goods Christ merited for us (Quae bona Christus nobis meruerit)

§ 26. Now, what Christ merited for us is plainly manifest from Scripture and from Catholic doctrine. For He merited for us all those goods which are bestowed upon us through His grace — namely, the first desire for good, or first grace (*prima gratia*), faith, penitence, the remission of sins, every genus of virtues and good works, together with perseverance in these, the blessed resurrection, and eternal life; and, in a word, all goods both of body and of soul that we await in the world to come. All those passages of Scripture which show that all saving goods come to us from Christ prove this merit. Of this matter enough has been said above in the superior book, when the grace of Christ was being treated.³³

§ 27. Now, in order that we may understand by what formal character (*ratione*) the merits of Christ benefit us, it must be noted that in Christ there was grace not merely as in a singular man, but as in the head of the Church, constituting together with His own members one mystical person. For, as St. Gregory says (at the beginning of his exposition of the sixth penitential psalm),³⁴ "Christ with His Church — whether that which still dwells on earth, or that which already reigns with Him in heaven — is one person." Just as in the human body the actions of the head communicate to the other members, so the merits of Christ the head extend to the rest as to members. Likewise, just as the sin of Adam was not only personal but was made common to all who are born of him by carnal propagation, so the good actions of Christ were not only personal but are

communicated by spiritual generation to all who are reborn of Him. This analogy the Apostle expounds in Rom. 5, saying: "As by the offence of one man condemnation came upon all men, so also by the justice of one man justification of life came upon all men," etc.³⁵ And after the Apostle, St. Augustine,³⁶ with the comparison transposed, speaks in the following manner: "Just as Christ, in whom all shall be made alive, besides the fact that He set Himself before those who imitate His example unto justice, also gives by His Spirit the most hidden grace to the faithful, which He pours secretly even into little ones — so also Adam, in whom all die, besides the fact that he is an example of imitation for those who transgress the commandment of the Lord by their own will, also, by a hidden contagion of carnal concupiscence, corrupts in himself all those who come from his stock." Hence the Apostle said for this reason and no other: "By one man," etc.

§ 28. It must also be noted that, just as by Adam's sin we are wholly changed for the worse — namely according to both body and soul, as is stated in canon 1 of the Second Council of Orange³⁷ — so by Christ's merit we are wholly reformed for the better, both in body and in soul. For just as the renewal of souls takes place through grace, so the resurrection of the body to glory must solidly be attributed to the merits of Christ. All goods, therefore, pertaining to eternal salvation come to us from merit — not our own merit, but Christ's. For as far as we are concerned, we are justified freely, and eternal life is the grace of God, as the Apostle teaches. But in order that these things might be given to us freely, Christ merited them before God by His Passion. He merited them, moreover, not as God, but as man. For to merit is not the property of divine operation, but of human operation, as we were saying at the outset. And yet this treasury of Christ's merits is immense and inexhaustible, on account of the condition of the person operating — that is, of the Son of God, whose dignity is infinite — so that the merits of Christ could suffice not only for saving all men whatsoever from the beginning of the world to its end, wherever and whenever they might live, but even if the worlds were infinite, or if the generations of men were to endure infinitely. But of this matter we shall treat more fully below when we deal with the satisfaction of Christ.³⁸

§ L — That Christ Fully Satisfied for the Sin of Man (Christum plene satisfecisse pro peccato hominis)

§ 29. What the Master says (toward the end of the preceding Distinction) — that Christ merited for us through the endurance of death and suffering what He had not merited by means of what preceded; namely, access to paradise and redemption from sin, etc. — is not to be understood as though Christ had acquired something of new merit in the course of time, since it was said above that Christ did not advance in merit; but rather that that first merit, taken separately and in itself, was not accepted by the Father for the redemption of the human race, just as neither was it offered by the Son to that end. The first merits of Christ regarding the Passion could indeed have sufficed for the reparation and redemption of man, had not God, according to the laws of His wisdom and justice, also exacted the fullest satisfaction and copious redemption — so that the death whose guilt man had incurred by sinning might be expiated by the death of the Son of God. For even though by the homage of virtues and the dignity of merits the debts of another can be equalled or even surpassed, as occurred in Christ, yet there is something that has the character of an indulgence in the fact that the plaintiff or creditor should be willing to consent to that commutation of a debt. Wherefore, with His prior merits, God also willed to add the punishment and bitterness of an ignominious death — justice so demanding — so that by this means the divine justice might be most fully satisfied.

§ 30. In order that this matter may be understood, it must be known that satisfaction is nothing other than the payment of a debt; although the name of satisfaction sometimes extends more broadly, so that he is also said to satisfy who by whatever means frees himself or another from debts before the creditor. Now sometimes the creditor exacts what is owed according to the rigour of justice; but sometimes he accepts what is sufficient according to mercy. In the former case, that satisfaction alone is perfect and satisfaction in the proper sense of the name; but the latter is reckoned among satisfactions not by reason of a just estimation of things, but by the indulgence of the creditor.

§ 31. Moreover, since debts are various, the debt spoken of here is the one that arises from a fault, that is, from the transgression of the divine law; and it is called an offence (*offensa*). Such is the debt which the first parent contracted by sinning and transmitted into all generations, and then whatever each person has added to himself by his own sinning. Since, therefore, man was made a debtor of eternal death by sin, the justice of God demanded either that man should perish eternally and satisfy for himself by enduring his own punishment; or that someone should suffer sufficiently, or that something equivalent should be paid by another on his behalf. For St. Augustine says⁴⁰ that it belongs to the natural order of justice that sins should either not be committed, or if committed, should not go unpunished; and in another place⁴¹ he denies that it can come to pass that there be in the universe a deformity of guilt without the honour of vengeance. But if man were to satisfy for himself, he could never be freed from eternal death. For he could not satisfy for himself otherwise than by enduring the very eternal death he had deserved. In order, therefore, that man might both be freed from eternal death and that satisfaction might be made to divine justice, it pleased the divine goodness that the human race should be freed from the debt of eternal death through the death of the only-begotten Son of God.

§ 32. In this matter the satisfaction for the sins of the human race is not merely sufficient, but superabundant. For Christ the Son of God, suffering death on the cross out of charity (*charitas*) and obedience, exhibited to God not merely an equal, but something far greater than what the recompense of the whole offence of the human race required: both on account of the greatness of the charity (*charitas*) from which He suffered, and on account of the dignity of His life which He placed in satisfaction, which was the life of the Son of God. Although, therefore, the bitterness of the punishment which Christ endured was not so great as the torments of all the damned, nor can the span of time in which Christ suffered be compared in any respect to the eternity of punishments, yet the dignity of the suffering Person abundantly supplied both of these deficiencies; for, as we said above, since that dignity was infinite, it conferred inestimable worth and value upon His passion.

§ 33. The sufficiency of Christ's satisfaction is indicated by these Scriptures: Ps. 60, "What I did not take away, I then paid back"; Is. 53, "The Lord placed upon Him the iniquity of us all"; 1 Pet. 2, "Who Himself bore our sins in His body upon the tree." The superabundance, however, is indicated by John in 1 Jn. 2, in these words: "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." And the Psalmist, calling Christ's redemption copious, in Ps. 129.⁴²

§ II — That the Redemption of Human Nature Through Christ Was Complete (Plenam fuisse redemptionem humanae naturae per Christum)

§ 34. The Passion of Christ has not only the formal character (*ratio*) of satisfaction, but also of redemption (*redemptio*); as Scripture frequently attests, as in 1 Tim. 2, "Who gave Himself a redemption for all"; Matt. 20, "The Son of man came to give His soul a redemption for many"; 1 Cor. 6, "You were bought with a great price"; and ch. 7, "He who was called free is the servant of Christ; you were bought with a price"; 2 Cor. 5, "Christ died for all, so that those who live should no longer live for themselves but for Him who died for them"; Gal. 3, "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us"; 1 Pet. 1, "You were not redeemed with corruptible gold or silver, but with the precious blood as of an unblemished and unspotted lamb, Christ." To this also pertain those texts in the Psalms: "He sent redemption to His people" (Ps. 110); and "With God there is plentiful redemption" (Ps. 129); and that of the Prophet Is.: "You were sold for nothing, and you shall be redeemed without money." Now to redeem someone is to free a captive or slave from the one who holds him in his power by means of a price; or to recover by price any thing whatsoever that has been alienated or seized.

§ 35. Furthermore, man sustained a threefold servitude: the first of sin, the second of the Devil, the third of death and misery. Of the first it is written, Rom. 6 (ch. 6), "When you were servants of sin, you were free from justice"; and Jn. 8, "Everyone who commits sin is a servant of sin." The Apostle Peter gives the reason for this in 2 Pet. 2: for, having called certain persons who promised liberty to be servants of corruption, that is, of sin, he adds: "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." By the same reasoning man was also brought into the power and servitude of the Devil, because, consenting by sinning to the Devil's suggestion, he was overcome by him. Hence in 2 Tim. 2, certain persons are said to be held captive by the Devil.⁴⁴ The third servitude which man endured was that of death and misery, to which he was subject by the just judgment of God on account of sin, according to that threat made to him: "In whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death" (Gen. 2). Under the name of death the remaining miseries are also comprehended. Understand that misery as both eternal and temporal. Hence the Apostle, Rom. 5, "By the offence of one, death reigned through one"; and ch. 6, "The wages of sin is death"; and ch. 8, he calls it the servitude of corruption, and says that on account of man's sin the whole creation is subject to it and groans together. And Heb. 2, concerning this servitude he says thus: "That through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is, the Devil; and might deliver them who through the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude."

§ 36. From this threefold servitude, therefore, Christ redeemed man by His Passion. For since that Passion was a sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the offence of the human race, as we showed above, it consequently also had the formal character (*ratio*) of a price by which man might be freed from the obligation under which he was held under the threefold kind of servitude. For the satisfaction of anyone, whether for himself or for another, is a certain price by which he redeems himself or another from him to whom he was bound by whatever title — to such a degree that even a man is said to redeem himself from sins by voluntary satisfaction for them, according to that of Dan. 4, "Redeem your sins with almsgiving."

§ 37. Now the price or *lytron* (λύτρον) paid by Christ is sometimes called His Passion — namely the very work of satisfaction by which man was redeemed. Hence St. Augustine, Epistle 171,⁴⁵ says: "The Passion of the Lord is the price of the whole world." Sometimes it is called the blood of Christ, as in 1 Pet. 1 — which is

also signified by the formula of the consecration of the chalice. Sometimes it is called the soul, that is, the life, of Christ, as in Matt. 20, Jn. 15, and 1 Jn. 3. Sometimes it is Christ Himself — as when either Christ is said to have given Himself, or the Father is said to have given the Son, for the redemption of the human race, as in 1 Tim. 2, Jn. 3, and Rom. 8. Yet all these amount to the same thing. For because Christ satisfied the Father through His death, hence also He gave both Himself and His soul — that is, His life — and His blood⁴⁶

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 18, a. 2.
 2. Jn. 1:13; Eph. 2:3.
 3. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 2.
 4. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 2.
 5. Hugh of St. Victor, *De voluntatibus Christi* [abbreviation as in source].
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 18, aa. 5 & 6.
 7. Job 7:20: "Quare me posuisti contrarium tibi, et factus sum mihi met ipsi gravis?"
 8. Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book III, ch. 2.
 9. Matt. 26:39.
 10. Lk. 22:42.
 11. Pope Agatho, Epistle to the Sixth Synod (Third Council of Constantinople), Act 6: "Praedicamus in Christo duas voluntates non contrarias, juxta quod impii asserunt haeretici, sed sequentem ejus humanam voluntatem, et non resistentem, seu potenti voluntati subjectam divinae ejus atque omnipotenti voluntati."
 12. Third Council of Constantinople (Sixth Ecumenical Synod), Act 8.
 13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 18, a. 6, ad 3; cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*.
 14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 21, aa. 2, 3, & 4.
 15. Jn. 11:22; Ps. 20 (Vulgate): "Desiderium animae ejus tribuisti ei, et voluntate labiorum ejus non fraudasti eum"; Ps. 21:3, 25 (Vulgate).
 16. Heb. 5:7: "Qui in diebus carnis suae preces supplicationesque ad eum qui possit illum salvum facere a morte, cum clamore valido et lacrymis offerens, exauditus est."
 17. Matt. 26:42; Lk. 22:41–42.
 18. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, lib. 2, cap. 3.
 19. Jn. 21 (on Peter); St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 32*, Concio 1.
 20. Lk. 23:34: "Ignosce illis quia nesciunt quid faciunt"; St. Bonaventure, *In I Dist.* [abbreviation as in source — Bonaventure's commentary on this Distinction]; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2; Jn. 17:9; Acts 2; 2 Tim. 2:19; St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tract. 31.
 21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 19.
 22. Reference to Distinct. 30, lib. 2 [i.e., Estius's own commentary, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30]; cf. the Sixth General Synod (Third Council of Constantinople) on the twofold operation in Christ.
 23. Jer. 31:22: "Mulier circumdabit virum"; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, cap. 9 & 10; St. Gregory the Great, *Registrum*, lib. 9, cap. 61.
 24. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Hom. 6.
 25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 19, a. 3; q. 49, a. 6.
 26. Lk. 24:26; Phil. 2:8–11; Heb. 2:9; Rev. 5:12; Ps. 2:8; Ps. 109 (110):7; Is. 49:4, 6; Is. 53:10, 11.

27. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem*, Tract. 104 (*in illud Ioan. 17, Pater clarifica Filium tuum*): "As Christ, inquit, was to be glorified by the resurrection, He was first humbled by the Passion; humility is the merit of clarity (*claritatis*), clarity is the reward of humility."
28. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, lib. 2, cap. 3 [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 2. Contra Maximinum cap. 5. & l. 3. cap. 2"].
29. Ambrosiaster, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Philippenses* (ascribed to St. Ambrose), on Phil. 2 [abbreviation as in source: "Auctor Commentarii in Paulum apud Ambrosium, enarrans Phil. 2"].
30. St. Augustine (or Hilary), *De Trinitate*, lib. 9 [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 9. De Trinit."]: "On account of the merit of obedience it was said: 'He hath given Him the name,'" etc.
31. Calvin's interpretation of *propter quod* (Phil. 2:9) as denoting sequence rather than meritorious causality is here refuted.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 19, a. 4; q. 48, a. 1.
33. Cf. above, Dist. 26 (of the prior book, treating the grace of Christ).
34. St. Gregory the Great, *Expositio in Psalmos poenitentiales*, at the opening of his exposition of Psalm 6 (*initio explanationis 6. Psalmi poenitentialis*): "Christ with His whole Church — whether that which still dwells on earth, or that which already reigns with Him in heaven — is one person."
35. Rom. 5:18.
36. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, lib. 1, cap. 9: "Just as Christ, in whom all shall be made alive, besides the fact that He set Himself before those who imitate His example unto justice, also gives by His Spirit the most hidden grace to the faithful, which He pours secretly even into little ones; so also Adam, in whom all die, besides the fact that he is an example of imitation for those who transgress the commandment of the Lord by their own will, also, by a hidden contagion of carnal concupiscence, corrupts in himself all those who come from his stock."
37. Council of Orange II (*Concilium Arausicanum II*), canon 1.
38. The fuller treatment of Christ's satisfaction is given below, Dist. 19.
39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, aa. 1–2.
40. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, lib. 26, cap. 3: "It belongs to the natural order of justice that sins should either not be committed, or if they are committed, should not go unpunished."
41. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, cap. 15: he denies that it can come to pass that there be in the universe a deformity of guilt without the honour of vengeance.
42. Ps. 60:1 (Vulgate: "Quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam"); Is. 53:6 ("Posuit Dominus in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum"); 1 Pet. 2:24 ("Qui peccata nostra ipse pertulit in corpore suo super lignum"); 1 Jn. 2:2 ("Ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non pro nostris autem tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi"); Ps. 129:7 (copious redemption).
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 4; q. 49, aa. 1–2.
44. 2 Tim. 2:26.
45. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 171: "Passio Domini pretium est orbis terrarum."
46. The text ends here at the page break; the argument continues in the following chunk: because Christ satisfied the Father through His death, He thereby gave Himself, His soul (i.e. His life), and His blood.

DISTINCTIO XIX — ON THE REDEMPTION OF THE HUMAN RACE BY THE BLOOD OF CHRIST (*DE REDEMPTIONE GENERIS HUMANI PER SANGUINEM CHRISTI*)

§ 1. — the blood shed by whose outpouring He died is said to have been given as the price of redemption. Someone will say that there was no need of any redemption: both because man, even by sinning, could never have been withdrawn from the power of God; and because the devil had seduced man by fraud, and therefore held him unjustly — from whom, accordingly, man was not to be redeemed by a price but to be snatched away by force. It is answered to this that man, by sinning, was not indeed withdrawn from the power of God, yet did incur a certain servitude, by which he ceased to be a servant of God with respect to the subjection of his will. From which servitude it was necessary that he be redeemed: so that, freed from sin and from the Devil, he might become a servant of justice and a servant of God. And although the Devil, for his own part, unjustly held man — who had, after all, been deceived by fraud — in servitude, it was nonetheless just that man, who had willingly consented to the Devil, should endure that servitude, God permitting it as regards the fault and ordaining it as regards the punishment, as St. Thomas says.¹ Hence also the price was to be paid not to the Devil — who in this cause is, as it were, the torturer — but to God as author and judge.²

§ III — Whether the Redemption of Christ extends to all men (An redemptio Christi ad omnes homines pertineat)

§ 2. Certain passages of Scripture appear to extend the redemption of Christ to absolutely all men: as 2 Cor. 5, "One died for all, Christ"; and 1 Tim. 2, "Who gave himself a redemption for all"; and, more plainly, 1 Jn. 2, "He himself is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world." Thus also St. Augustine (on Ps. 129): "The innocent blood shed has blotted out all the sins of the guilty; the price given has redeemed all captives."⁴ Other passages of Scripture, however, assert that Christ died not for all but for many, even with the exclusion of others: as Matt. 26 and Mk. 14 and the Canon of the Mass in the words of the consecration of the chalice attest that the blood of Christ was shed "for many."⁵ And Matt. 20, the Son of man is said to have come to give his life "as a redemption for many."⁶ And Heb. 9, "he was offered once to exhaust the sins of many."⁷ Likewise, Jn. 12, Jesus is said to be about to die so that "he might gather into one the dispersed children of God"; understanding by "children of God" the elect alone, who are also signified by the name of sheep, for whom Christ says he lays down his life.⁸ That he excludes others from the redemption is manifest from the fact that he excludes them from his prayer: for in Jn. 17 he says to the Father, "I pray for them; I do not pray for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me, because they are thine."⁹ Other passages of Scripture finally indicate both to us, as Is. 53 and Rom. 5, where now all, now very many, now many are named as those to be redeemed through Christ.¹⁰

§ 3. This apparent contradiction is removed by a brief distinction, by which it must be said that Christ redeemed all *sufficiently*, but not all *effectively* (*efficienter*). All, if you regard the value and magnitude of the price; not all, if you look to the effect of the redemption. Hence Prosper, replying to this point (in response to the first objection of Vincent), says: "Against the wound of original sin, the death of the Son of God is a true, powerful, and singular remedy. Therefore, as regards the greatness and power of the price, and as regards the one cause of the human race, the blood of Christ is the redemption of the whole world. But those who pass through this age without faith in Christ and without the Sacrament of regeneration are strangers to the redemption. Since, therefore, because of the one nature of all and the one cause of all truly taken up by our Lord, all are rightly said to be redeemed; and yet not all have been snatched from captivity; the property of redemption belongs without doubt to those from whom the prince of this world has been cast out; and who are now no longer vessels of the devil, but members of Christ." And a little further on: "For the cup of immortality, which has been made up of our weakness and of divine power, has indeed in itself the capacity to profit all; but if it is not drunk, it does not heal." These are his words; and he writes similar things in his replies to the capitula of the Gauls (Reply 9) and in Sentence 9.¹¹ Of the same import is that passage of St. John Chrysostom (Homily 16 on the Epistle to the Hebrews): "For all, he says, Christ died — namely, as much as in him lay. For his death was sufficient to heal the perdition of all mortals. Yet he did not take away the sins of all, because they were unwilling." So he.¹²

§ 4. This same text, however, is to be understood in a sound sense, lest anyone err.¹³

§ 5. [Here follows an extensive marginal note, marked (a), which the author was long compelled to omit but now sets out under the pressure of necessity, drawn up as concisely as possible.]¹⁴ The Predestinarian heresy, among its heretical chief articles — as is gathered from the recantation of Lucidus and from the Reginensian epistle addressed to that same Lucidus, guaranteed by the subscriptions of the Fathers assembled in the synod at Arles, the third in order — was this: that Christ our Saviour had not undertaken death for the salvation of all. Now, concerning the Predestinarian heresy, how it arose in the nature of things and at what time it began to spread, various opinions and diverse views exist among learned authors both of the present and of the preceding century, as we rightly noted in the third book (at Dist. 40).¹⁵ Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres, bishop, in book 8 (*De Haeresi Pelagiana*, final chapter), to whom concur Jacobus Usserius, Gilbertus Magainus (*in Prædestinariana Fabula Confutatione*), Vincentius Contensorius in book 8 (*Theolog. mentis et cordis*, appendix, one dissertation on the third), Joannes Cabassutius (*In Notitia Ecclesiastica*, fifth century, third dissertation *De Prædestinarianis post Concilium Arelatense tertium*), and not a few others, contend that the Predestinarian heresy nowhere and never existed and was never anything but a mere phantom and chimera, fabricated by the Semi-Pelagians in order to confound the calumny against St. Augustine's doctrine on predestination and grace, which they propagated with how great exertion of energy. They say that Sigebertus (at the year 415) was deceived into reporting that heresy from the ancient Semi-Pelagian writings in which Augustine's doctrine is translated as it were into Predestinarianism — chiefly from Gennadius's Hieronymian Index with the attached Catalogue *de Haereticis*, and they believe the error to have been drawn from the same sources by Hincmarus of Reims and the rest who wrote against Gothescalcus in the ninth century, so that by clear testimonies from Remigius, from the books of the Lugdunensian Church (*De Tribus Epistolis*, *De Veritate Scripturae Tenenda*), from Ratramnus the monk of Corbie, from Florus of Lyon, and from the Magister against John Scotus Erigenus — as Jacobus Sirmondus notes in his annotations on the third volume, drawn from the manuscript codices of the Councils of Gaul — they contend all this can be proved, and they assert that the subscriptions of the epistle of Faustus are false and fictitious, and that the

Councils of Arles and Lyon were not subscribed by the Fathers but convened in a private meeting by the Semi-Pelagian bishops infected with Pelagian errors; that the synods of Arles and Lyon, which Faustus alleges, were never held, they constantly assert.¹⁶ Cabassutius, at the place praised, at number 8, pressed by the authority of the gravest writers, judges that both those councils were truly convened, and that Lucidus the Presbyter, attributed to himself there, did truly, or at least falsely, abjure the dogma; and Jansenius, at the place cited, makes no mention of these councils and of the epistle of Faustus and the recantation of Lucidus. Again Jacobus Sirmondus, in his book (*de Haeresi Praedestinationiana*), contends that this heresy truly existed, and that around the year 424, among the monks of the Adrumentine monastery in Africa, this kind of sect emerged; and he adds that Prosper and Hilary, going against the same sect infecting the Gauls, sought Augustine's help. Baronius, at the year 492, writes of the Predestinarians: "After the death of St. Augustine there came forth certain men who from his writings, misunderstood, brought in errors, which they endeavoured to defend in the name and authority of St. Augustine; but Prosper, acting for the defence of St. Augustine himself, powerfully refuted them"; as Sigebertus noted, those supporters of the Predestinarians were called accordingly.

§ 6. The same opinion has been most vigorously defended by Ludovicus Cellorius (*in Historia Gothescalcana*), Dionysius Petavius (both elsewhere and in tom. 5, *Theolog. dogm.* lib. 3, *De Incarn.* cap. 6 and 7), Stephanus Dechamps, Philippus Labbe, Suarez (*Prolegom.* 6, *De Grat.* cap. 5, numer. 1), and others led chiefly by the authority of Prosper and by the other monuments above indicated.¹⁷ The same opinion appears to have been descending most clearly from Gerardus Joannes Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*, cap. 8, who (cap. 50), after much labour expended in assigning the epoch of the Councils of Arles and Lyon, concludes at last that those councils fall between the years 472 and 494; but the year in which it is difficult to state, he asserts: he thinks, however, that the year 491 or the nearest should be assigned to both councils. The middle way is taken by other very learned men, who assert the Predestinarian heresy indeed, but say it had few followers and had no beginning in the Adrumentine monastery, and did not emerge against it in the time of Celestine the first pontiff, and that Prosper or Hilary did not implore St. Augustine against it; and that the Predestinarian dogmas agree with the objections and calumnies by which the Massilians defamed the doctrine of St. Augustine and his disciples; and with the strongest arguments they prove and confirm this. The foremost of these are Henricus Cardinalis de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana* (lib. 2, cap. 15), Cardinal de Aguirre (tom. 4, numer. 47, disputing as far as sect. 9, §§ 7), and finally Sirmondus, who found and noted (tom. 8, *Concil.*) that he was condemned again and beaten with rods and thrown back into prison.¹⁸

§ 7. But Gothescalcus had, both in his own time and in these most recent times, his accusers and his defenders: for some, both at that time and even now, make him guilty of the Predestinarian heresy, while others on the contrary absolve him; nay, even in the very question of Grace and Predestination those who would not dare to proclaim the Catholic doctrine of St. Augustine and on Grace and Predestination overthrown do not hesitate to applaud loudly. Rhabanus of Mainz is counted among the first of the ninth century, as from his two-fold epistle — one addressed to Noringuus the bishop of Verona, published from the manuscript by father Sirmondus in the preceding century; another to Eberardus the count of the same region — and then from the epistle to Hincmarus, which is the synodical epistle of the Mainz Council held against Gothescalcus. Hincmarus, in his epistle to Rhabanus the bishop of Mainz, to Amolus or Amulon the bishop of Lyon, in the book (*De Praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio* addressed to King Charles the Bald), as Flodoardus says (lib. 3, *Hist. Rom.* cap. 15), whose book has only the preface to King Charles, described by Gerardus Joannes Vossius; and in the epistle to Pope Nicholas and in his other book *De Praedestinatione*,

which after the Synods of Langres and of Toul he edited and which has been published by that same Jacobus Sirmondus together with the rest of Hincmarus's works; Amolo the bishop of Lyon, predecessor of Remigius, in the epistle to Gothescalcus publicly produced by the same Sirmondus; John Scotus Erigenus, Amalarius, whom we do not detain, and finally the Fathers of the Synod of Quierzy in the aforesaid synod.¹⁹

§ 8. We count among the condemners of Gothescalcus in the following centuries Sigebertus, Aventinus, Trithemius, and the rest. And in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Baronius at the year 849, Didacus Alvarez (*De Origine Haeres. Pelag. cap. 30*), Severinus Binius in his notes on the Council of Quierzy the first, Du-Vallius in his notes on the book of the Church of Lyon against John Scotum, Jacobus Sirmondus, Ludovicus Cellotius, Philippus Labbe, Gravina, Cabassutius, Dionysius Petavius, Stephanus Dechamps, and several others; nor does Gerardus Joannes Vossius at the place praised (lib. 7, *Histor. Pelag. part 4*) seem to absolve him.²⁰ Among the defenders of Gothescalcus, however, accounted for in the ninth century, are chiefly Remigius of Lyon in the book entitled (*Absolutio Cujusdam Quaestionis*) and in the book (*De Tenenda immobiliter Scripturae Sanctae veritate*) under the name of the Church of Lyon, Rathramnus the monk of Corbie in the epistle sent to a friend confuting Hincmarus's libellus addressed to recluses, Prudentius bishop of Troyes in his epistle to Wenilon the bishop of Sens for the ordination of Aeneas, and in the book *De Praedestinatione* against John Scotus Erigenus edited in the preceding century, and in Tome XV of the *Bibliotheca PP.* p. 468, inserted — which Prudentius the Annals of the Franks from the most ancient codex of the monastery of St. Bertin at the year 861 designate as Galindo, surnamed Prudentius; Florus the Magister under the name of the Church of Lyon against John Scotus Erigenus; and, omitting the rest, the Fathers of the Synod of Valence in the year 855, and of the Synod of Langres and of Tull in the year 859, held.²¹ Lupus Servatus, a presbyter of Mainz, in some part defended Gothescalcus; the other Lupus, the abbot of Ferrières, in his epistle to King Charles the Bald. In our times not a few with every effort undertook to defend Gothescalcus, of whom you may easily name as the coryphaeos Jacobus Usserius, the archbishop of Armagh in Ireland, who professed a Calvinian position in his *Historia Gothescalci* and the Predestinarian controversy moved by him.²² Into the same opinion conceded Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres in lib. 8 (*De Haeresi Pelagiana cap. postremo*, p. 230, edition of Paris 1641, and p. 231), where nevertheless he does not hesitate to assert Gothescalcus as erring in some other matters; and lib. 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris cap. 21*, p. 163).²³ Moreover, Jansenius at the aforesaid place, lib. 8 (*De Haeresi Pelagiana*), pronounces in the Synod of Valence the third that it defined as Catholic faith what Hincmarus condemned in Gothescalcus as Predestinarian heresy. The most eager defender of Gothescalcus was Vincentius Contensorius at the place praised, lib. 8 (*Theolog. Mentis et Cordis*, appendix, one sect. 2), where he so extols Gothescalcus as to say he was not only free of Predestinarian heresy but a most vigorous defender of Augustinian Catholic doctrine, that he suffered persecution for Grace, and dying in the act of suffering, this author makes him into a glorious martyr. More mildly, however, in the doctrine of Gothescalcus, Christianus Lupus held (tom. 5, in *Scholiis ad Concilium primum Romanum S. Gregorii VII.*) where he has this about Gothescalcus: "he was pursuing a right cause, and truly was defending dogma — but this wretched monk was not doing so out of charity, therefore not with fire but in prison he proclaimed the truth." Innumerable others, drawn chiefly from those of Louvain and of Paris, can be recounted as followers of Gothescalcus; but we let them pass; we must come closer to our proper matter, and to the assertion of the Author concerning the Redemption of Christ as extending to all in what pertains to sufficiency, which is likewise the teaching of St. Thomas, as it is to be expounded.

§ 9. But that which is above all to be noted from the doctrine, as from the Epistle of Hincmarus of Reims to Egilon, is that the foremost, the second and the third heads of the Gothescalcian teaching were: in the first

of which he was saying "that God does not will that all men be saved, but only those who are saved; that all those who are saved can be saved, and that he himself wills to save them; and that therefore whoever are not saved are entirely not of his will that they be saved"; and in the other he said "that not for the salvation and redemption of all men has the Lord and Saviour our Jesus Christ been crucified and died, but only for those who are saved."²⁴ Contrary to these heads of Gothescalcian doctrine, the Synod of Quierzy (cap. 3) established: "God Almighty wills all men to be saved without exception, though not all are saved. That some are saved, however, is the gift of him who saves; that some perish, however, is the deserved punishment of those who perish." And cap. 4: "Christ Jesus, our Lord, as no man is, so no man will be, of whose nature taken up in him there was none and will be none; though not all are redeemed by the mystery of his passion."²⁵

§ 10. On the contrary side appear the Fathers of the third Council of Valence, who (cap. 4) seem to establish a contrary doctrine; and they define that Christ died for the faithful, not for all men, even those dying in their infidelity, in their statement of definition: they reject besides the fourteen other capitula of the four Councils of Quierzy as concluded most ineptly, by nineteen syllogisms as they themselves say, so the sophist in his pamphlet against Gothescalcus asserted. The capitula of Valence were confirmed and ratified in the Council of Langres and Tull of the year 859; but the words of that capitulum of the fourth Council of Quierzy were exploded in the aforesaid Council of Tull at Savonnières, where the capitula of the Council of Valence were read afresh and are read — but the nineteen syllogisms alone, most ineptly and most falsely concluded by a certain Scotus as has been rejected, are avoided as inept. The Synod of Valence was truly confirmed by Nicolas the first, the Supreme Pontiff, as the Annales Bertiniani attest; concerning which, authors for the most part not content with the sole testimony of the Annales Bertiniani — the same doctrine of the Council of Valence against the Synod of Quierzy the Church of Lyon also professes, whether by whoever wrote the book *De Tribus Epistolis*, and the book *De Scripturae Veritate Tenenda*, and the other authors mentioned above. The discordant ones, in regard to mode of speech, appear; inasmuch as moved by a certain disgust, the bishops of various provinces detected both these voices in the same mode alone, and not the sum of the matter in which they altogether agree is demonstrated most clearly by the arguments of the most praised Cardinal de Aguirre at the place praised (disp. 115, sect. 6 and disp. 226, sect. 3 and disp. 227), and most evidently and almost to the eye by Dionysius Petavius at the place praised, lib. 13 (*De Incarnat.* cap. 10, throughout and cap. 14), as to the concordance of the Synods of Valence and Quierzy.²⁶ And indeed, as Gerardus Joannes Vossius himself at the place praised (lib. 7, *Hist. Pelag.* part 4) observes in his Thesis, the Fathers of Quierzy pronounced such that the Fathers of Valence might drive them out: for they did not mean that Christ had given his redemption to the condemned before his death, as it were proposing it to them on the cross, so that hell might be exempted of those who were infidels and impenitent when they departed from life; they thought that Christ was from eternity destined as the price for the redemption of all, but only for those who would profit from it.²⁷

§ 11. It must above all be noted, as a point pertaining to this doctrine, that — as is evident from the Epistle of Hincmarus of Reims to Egilon — the foremost, second and third heads of the Gothescalcian doctrine were, in the first of which he asserted "that God does not will all men to be saved, but only as many as are saved; that all those who are saved, he himself willed to save; and that consequently whoever are not saved are entirely not of the will of him that they be saved"; and in the other "that not for the salvation and redemption of all men, and the redemption of the Lord, our Saviour Jesus Christ was crucified and died, but only for those who are saved."²⁸

§ III — Whether the Redemption of Christ extends to all men (An redemptio Christi ad omnes homines pertineat)

§ 12. Certain passages of Scripture appear to extend Christ's redemption to all men without exception, as 2 Cor. 5: "One died for all" (*Unus pro omnibus mortuus est Christus*); and 1 Tim. 2: "Who gave himself a ransom for all" (*Qui dedit semetipsum redemptionem pro omnibus*); and manifestly, 1 Jn. 2: "He himself is the propitiation for our sins, not for ours only but also for the whole world" (*Ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non pro nostris autem tantum, sed etiam pro totius mundi*). So also St. Augustine³⁰ writes: "The blood of the innocent washed away all harmful sins, the price given redeemed all captives." Other passages of Scripture, however, speak not for all but for many, even with the exclusion of some, as Christ died for them. Thus Matt. 26 and Mk. 14, and the Canon of the Mass in the words of the consecration of the chalice, attest that the blood of Christ was shed for many (*pro multis*). And Matt. 20: "The Son of man came to give his life as a ransom for many" (*animam suam in redemptionem pro multis*). And Heb. 9: "Once offered to exhaust the sins of many" (*semel oblatum est ad multorum exhaurienda peccata*). Likewise, Jn. 12 says that Jesus would die so that the children of God scattered abroad might be gathered into one; but "children of God" (*filios Dei*) is understood to mean the elect alone, who are also signified by the name "sheep," for which Christ says He would lay down His soul. That He excludes others from redemption is made plain by this, that He excludes them from His prayer, Jn. 17, saying to the Father: "I pray for them, I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me, because they are thine." Other passages of Scripture indicate to us both, that all and at the same time very many and a great multitude are named as redeemed by Christ.

§ 13. This apparent repugnancy is resolved by a brief distinction, by which it must be said that Christ redeemed all sufficiently (*sufficenter*), but not all efficaciously (*efficenter*). If one looks to the value and magnitude of the price, not all are contemplated with respect to the effect of redemption. Hence Prosper,³¹ responding to this article, writes: "That the Lord Jesus Christ was not crucified and died for the salvation and redemption of all men, but only for those who are saved — so he speaks against the wounds of original sin, potent and healing, and as a singular remedy for the entire human race. That therefore as to magnitude and potency it pertains to one cause of the entire human race's blood, Christ's redemption is of the whole world. But those who pass through this age without faith in Christ and without the sacrament of regeneration are strangers to redemption. Since therefore on account of the one nature of all and the one cause of all, redemption has been rightly taken up by our Lord in the truth, and yet not all are redeemed from captivity; the proprieties of redemption are hardly to be found with those of whom the prince of this world has been cast out; and now they are no longer members of Christ. And a little after: 'The cup of immortality, which is composed from our weakness and divine virtue, has in itself what is profitable to all; but if it is not drunk, it does not heal.' These things he writes in *the Capitula of the Gauls*, Reply 9, and in *Sentence* 9. Such is also that passage of St. John Chrysostom³² (*Homily* 16, in *Epistola ad Heb.*): 'For all,' he says, 'Christ died; sufficiently indeed His death was capable of washing away the perdition of all mortals. But not all men's sins are washed away.'" And the entire Epistle to the Hebrews treats of the sacrifice of Christ offered for sin, as many expound it, and so does virtually the whole letter to the Hebrews treat of Christ's sacrifice offered.

§ 14. Now this same doctrine, which the ancient Fathers held persuasively as the accepted view of Christ's Redemption understood in this manner, the Tridentine Fathers³³ pronounced in these words as the common Catholic opinion: "And if he, namely Christ, died for all, yet not all receive the benefit of his death, but only those to whom the merit of his passion is communicated." Likewise the Supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and

Alexander VII,³⁴ in the condemnation of the 5th proposition of Jansenius, in these words: "It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died for all men without exception, or shed his blood" — which proposition they declared false, rash, scandalous; and understood in the sense that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined alone, impious, blasphemous, contumelious, injurious to divine piety, and heretical; these same Supreme Pontiffs declared and condemned it. That this proposition was asserted and upheld by Jansenius himself, together with the most faithfully transcribed words, we have shown at length in the *Systema Janseniani* in the appendix to the third volume placed there, to which several of Quesnel's condemned propositions accord, particularly 30, 31, 32, 33, as we have also shown elsewhere.³⁵

§ 15. For the rest, as to what St. Thomas says concerning Christ's redemption as extending to all — insofar as it pertains to sufficiency — this is likewise the teaching of St. Thomas, which is to be explained. For it must be said above all that what is to be carefully noted from the doctrine of Gottschalk, as taken from the Epistle of Hincmarus of Reims to Egilon, is primarily what was said as the second and third of those chief chapters: in the first of which he declared "that God does not will that all those who are saved should be saved; but that all those who are not saved are in no way of His will that they should be saved"; and in the other chapter he said that "the Lord and our Saviour Jesus Christ was not crucified and did not die for the redemption of all men, that is, for the redemption of the whole world, but only for those who are saved." Contrary to this doctrine of Gottschalk, the Synod of Quierzy,³⁶ cap. 3, decreed: "God Almighty wills without exception that all men should be saved, though not all are saved. That some are saved is the gift of the Saviour; that some perish is the merit of those who perish." And cap. 4: "Christ Jesus our Lord, as no man is, was, or will be whose nature he did not assume, so there is no man, was, or will be, for whom he did not suffer — although not all are redeemed by the mystery of his passion."

§ 16. On the contrary, there appear to stand against these things the Fathers of the Valentinian Synod, who in cap. 4 seem to establish the contrary doctrine, and to define Christ as having died for the faithful, and not for all including infidels dying in their infidelity. They reject, besides, the four chapters of the Synod of Quierzy, and nine other chapters most deeply concluded: which had been the chapters asserted by John Scotus Eriugena in his foolish little work against Gottschalk. Indeed the same Synod's decrees were confirmed and established at the Synods of Langres and Toul celebrated in the year 859. There it was not the four chapters of the Synod of Valentina that were exploded, but only the nineteen syllogisms as they call them concluded by John Scotus, rejected and devoted to anathemas, that appear to have been condemned. That the Synod of Valentina was confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff Nicholas I is stated without doubt by most authors, on the testimony of the Bertinian Annals alone for one year. The same doctrine of the Valentinian Synod against the Synod of Quierzy is professed by the Church of Lyon, and by whoever is the author of the book *De Tribus Epistolis* and the book *De Scripturae Sanctae Veritate Tenenda*, and by the other authors cited above. Those who appear to differ in outward expression and mode of speaking, not as to the substance, as the most learned men of the Synod highly praised demonstrate, bishops of several provinces aroused by a certain rivalry, and stirred up on both sides — that it was only words and not the substance of the matter that differed — is shown most amply in arguments by Cardinal De Aguirre³⁷ in the place cited (disp. 115, sect. 6, and disp. 226, sect. 3, and disp. 127), and most copiously and evidently, and as it were face to face, by Dionysius Petavius³⁸ in the aforementioned place, lib. 13 (*De Incarnat.* from cap. 10 up to cap. 11, 14), especially *De Concordia Synodorum Valentinae et Carisiaci*, and as Gerardus Vossius himself³⁹ in the aforesaid place, lib. 7 (*Hist. Pelag.* part 4).

§ 17. That the Fathers of Quierzy did not so speak of the Redemption of Christ as to condemn him — that Christ had not given a price for the reprobate already before his death, in such a way that on the cross he proposed to himself that those who would depart from this life going to hell should be freed from hell — they established rather this: that the price had indeed been given for the redemption of all, but that it was profitable only to the elect. From this opinion, moreover, how little the Valentinian Fathers differ will easily be perceived by anyone who is willing to examine chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the same Valentinian Synod carefully and diligently. That this same dogma had been persuasively held as the ancient accepted view of the Redemption of Christ understood in this manner as the common Catholic opinion the Tridentine Fathers⁴⁰ pronounced in these words (*sess. 3, cap. 3*): "And if he, that is Christ, died for all, yet not all receive the benefit of his death, but only those to whom the merit of his passion is communicated." Likewise the Supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII in the condemnation of the 5th proposition of Jansenius in these terms: "It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died for all men without exception, or shed his blood" — which proposition they declared false, rash, scandalous; and understood in the sense that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined alone, impious, blasphemous, contumelious, injurious to divine piety, and heretical; and the same Supreme Pontiffs declared and condemned it. That this proposition had been asserted and upheld by Jansenius we have shown at great length in the *Systema Janseniani* in the appendix to the third volume, with the words most faithfully transcribed; to which several of Quesnel's condemned propositions accord, especially 30, 31, 32, 33, as we have also shown elsewhere.

§ 18. For the rest, as to what St. Thomas says of Christ's redemption as extending to all, insofar as it pertains to sufficiency — this is not to be understood as meaning that he willed that Christ should have offered a sufficient price only insofar as by reason of its infinite value it was sufficient for all and for however many are to be redeemed; but St. Thomas must be understood as speaking of the sufficiency of the Will of Christ (*sufficientia Voluntatis Christi*): insofar, namely, as Christ in what was in him, by his antecedent will (*voluntate antecedenti*), willed to redeem all men and offered for all the price of himself: although by his consequent will (*voluntate consequenti*) he willed only those to be made participants of his passion's merits, to whom the merits of his passion are applied. And by this same consequent will he must also be understood, the Holy Doctor, when⁴¹ (in *3. parte quaest. 22, art. 4, ad secundum*) from the prayer of Christ he says those are excluded who were not foreordained to life. Which sense of St. Thomas's teaching, both regarding the oblation of Christ in the universal and regarding the General and Antecedent Will of God to save all, is declared sufficiently abundantly from the places of the same Holy Doctor, transcribed most faithfully in the aforecited *Systema* with his own words. Indeed it would be absurdly said that Christ died sufficiently for all, if the sense were about the mere sufficiency of the price and not about the intention of the dying one offering the price for them — which is indeed the sense that Jansenius himself, who has established the contrary opinion,⁴² (*lib. 3, De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, cap. 21, pag. 163*) testifies.

§ IV — That our satisfactions do not derogate from the satisfaction and redemption of Christ (Satisfactioni, & redemptioni Christi non derogare nostras satisfactiones)

§ 19. Although the satisfaction (*satisfactio*) and redemption (*redemptio*) of Christ was most full, nevertheless nothing is thereby derogated by our works, by which — as Scripture testifies — we are both said to make satisfaction for our sins and to redeem our own sins. Nay rather, by these works that satisfaction is greatly illustrated. For Christ did not so suffer for us that we, idle and doing nothing, should obtain salvation through his passion; but rather that, by suffering with him and by ourselves making satisfaction to Christ for our own sins according to the measure of our own weakness (*modulum infirmitatis nostrae*), we might be made conformable to Christ, having thence the most certain pledge: "that if we suffer with him, we shall also be glorified with him" (Rom. 8).⁴⁴ Hence St. Leo,⁴⁵ Sermon 9 (*de Quadragesima*), says that among the holy Apostles in the days of Christ's passion — greater things were born, so that by common participation in the Cross of Christ, we also do something in that which he accomplished on our behalf, as the Apostle says: "If we suffer with him, we shall also be glorified; and adds: 'Certain and secure is the expectation of the promised beatitude, where there is participation in the Lord's passion.'" And St. Ambrose,⁴⁶ lib. 5 (*in Luc. 6*), says: "For what ought you to do for your salvation, when Christ keeps vigil in prayer for you?"

§ 20. Nor indeed is this our co-operation of such a kind as to furnish assistance to that work, as though his passion would not otherwise suffice for our complete redemption. For the Apostle in 1 Cor. 3 calls himself a co-operator of God (*Dei cooperatorem*) on account of the ministry of preaching, by which nonetheless he furnished no assistance to God as though to one who was infirm and insufficient. But this our co-operation is so joined to the operation of Christ, that the latter can indeed suffice of itself; but this depends necessarily on that one, and has no value except through it. Hence the Fathers of the Tridentine Council⁴⁷ (*sess. 14, cap. 8*) say: "Yet our satisfaction, which we discharge for our sins, is not so ours as not to be through Christ Jesus. For we who of ourselves, as of ourselves, can do nothing, by him co-operating who strengthens us, can do all things; so that man has nothing to glory in, but all our glorying is in Christ: in whom we live, in whom we merit, in whom we make satisfaction; bringing forth fruits worthy of penance, which from him have their virtue, are offered by him to the Father, and through him are accepted by the Father." Thus far there. Therefore under a twofold title the satisfaction of Christ is not obscured but rather illustrated by our satisfactions: because our works, both that they are good and pleasing to God, and that they have the force of making satisfaction, derive their value from no other source than from the merit of the passion and satisfaction of Christ. Which thing beyond doubt commends the glory of the passion of Christ, in that it has not only the power to blot out our sins, but also works in us those actions by which we ourselves are able to redeem our sins and make satisfaction for them.

§ 21. Finally, so far is the fullness of Christ's satisfaction from excluding our satisfaction, that St. Cyprian⁴⁸ did not hesitate to say, lib. 4 (*Ep. 4*): "If Christ labours and keeps vigil and prays for us and for our offences, how much more ought we to insist in prayers and to pray, and first to beseech him himself, and then through him to make satisfaction to God the Father." Thus he. But the fuller exposition of this matter belongs to the controversy concerning the Sacrament of Penance.

**§ V — That the passion of Christ has the formal character of a sacrifice
(*Christi passionem habere rationem sacrificii*)**

§ 22. Concerning the passion and death of Christ as a sacrifice whereby Christ offered Himself to God the Father for the reconciliation of the human race, the Scriptures of both the Old and the New Testament speak frequently and openly: as Is. 53, "He was offered because He Himself willed it"; Eph. 5, "He delivered Himself for us as an offering and a victim to God for an odour of sweetness"; and 2 Cor. 5, "Him who knew not sin He made sin for us" — that is, a sacrifice for sin, as many expositors explain it.⁵⁰ And almost the entire Epistle to the Hebrews treats of the sacrifice of Christ offered up.⁵¹

§ 23. Now sacrifice, taken in a general sense, is every work that is performed in order that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship — referred, that is, to that end of the good whereby we can truly be blessed. Such indeed is every work by which God is pleased and served, as St. Augustine teaches and explains.⁵² But in the proper and special sense it is the oblation of an external thing made in acknowledgement of the Divine Majesty and supreme dominion, according to a fixed rite, with the actual alteration of the thing itself. Although not only the act of the one offering, but also the thing itself which is offered in such a manner, is called a sacrifice. Since, therefore, Christ offered Himself to the Father upon the Cross in that manner, it is clear that the passion and death of Christ, inasmuch as He voluntarily endured it and at the same time wrought it for the honour of God, has the true and proper formal character (*rationem*) of a sacrifice; and that Christ Himself, inasmuch as He was thus offered, was a true sacrifice, and one most acceptable to God on account of the ineffable charity (*charitas*) with which He delivered Himself to death in order to reconcile the human race to the Father. Hence the Apostle, Rom. 2, says that we are reconciled to God through the death of His Son.⁵³ For so great a good was the voluntary passion of Christ that, on account of that good found in human nature, God was appeased regarding the offence of the human race.

§ 24. Moreover, of this sacrifice, as St. Augustine writes in the same work,⁵⁴ the manifold and various ancient sacrifices of the holy ones were signs; for this one was prefigured through many, just as one thing is expressed in many words, so that by multiplicity it might be commended without tedium. And since in every sacrifice four things are to be considered — as St. Augustine says⁵⁵ — namely, to whom, by whom, what, and for whom the offering is made, all of these are found in the one Christ. For Christ remains one with Him to whom He made the offering; He made one in Himself those for whom He made the offering, and what He offered. Therefore in this oblation not only is one and the same the priest and the sacrifice, but also one and the same is He to whom the oblation was made and He for whom it was made: because the head offered Himself for the members with whom He constitutes the body.

§ 25. Now from what has been said, the solution of the objection which a certain heretic, Peter Abailard, raised against St. Bernard concerning this mystery of human redemption can easily be gathered. He said that it was absurd to believe that God the Father was appeased and reconciled to the human race through the death of His Son: since by so great a malice and sacrilege, whereby the Son of God was slain, He ought rather to have been provoked to wrath, according to that of Sir. 34, "He who offers sacrifice from the goods of the poor is as one who slaughters a son before his father's eyes."

One must say (*Dicendum est*) that God the Father was appeased by the death of His Son, not inasmuch as it was unjustly inflicted upon Christ by the Jews — for on that account it doubtless gravely provoked the divine wrath — but inasmuch as it was voluntarily, obediently, and out of charity endured by Christ. Which

charity of the suffering Christ was greater, and pleased God far more, than the iniquity of those who slew Him displeased Him. And therefore the passion of Christ availed more to reconcile the whole human race to God than the crime of the Jews availed to provoke His wrath. In this sense St. Bernard responds at length and learnedly,⁵⁶ and likewise St. Thomas.⁵⁷

§ 26. More concerning sacrifice may be seen in St. Augustine.⁵⁸ But how the daily sacrifice of the Mass is rightly adjoined to this unique and singular sacrifice of the Cross of Christ — which St. Augustine calls singular, and which is by itself most sufficient for the reconciliation of man — that matter requires its own proper treatment, which is not the place for here. It will be addressed below.⁵⁹

§ VI — How Christ alone is our Redeemer and Mediator (*Christus quomodo solus redemptor & mediator noster*)

§ 27. The name of Redeemer the Master teaches to be proper to Christ; yet in a certain sense it is also attributed to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Hence in the Psalms the whole Trinity is sung to: "Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth" (Ps. 30). And in the Canticle of Zechariah: "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, because He hath visited and wrought the redemption of His people" (Ps. 129). "He shall redeem Israel from all his iniquities," etc. And Is. 63: "Thou, O Lord, art our Father, our Redeemer." But this, says the Master, is by reason of the use of power (*propter usum potestatis*), not by reason of the exhibition of humility and obedience — in which sense Christ alone is our Redeemer. For neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit, but Christ, by suffering paid the price of our redemption. For suffering is required in the one who redeems, inasmuch as this redemption is at the same time a penal satisfaction, because it is made for sin.

§ 28. Furthermore, the name of Mediator is attributed absolutely (*simpliciter*) to Christ alone, not to the Father, nor to the Holy Spirit. "For there is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus," says the Apostle (1 Tim. 2). A mediator is one who is appointed, as it were, as an arbiter standing in the middle, for the composing of peace — that is, for reconciling man to God — as St. Augustine explains, writing on Ps. 103.⁶¹ "For a mediator is not of one," as the Apostle says (Gal. 3), but is always understood as standing between two parties, as the very name (*nomen*) indicates. Because, therefore, Christ reconciled us to God by His own blood, that is, by His own power and merit (*propria virtute ac merito*) — something which neither any other person in the Trinity did, nor could any other man do — hence it must altogether be asserted that Christ alone is the primary Mediator of our salvation. For although the saints, interceding for us before God by their prayers and merits, are also rightly called mediators in some sense — as the Fathers sometimes call them, and as Moses (Deut. 5) says that he was a go-between and an intermediary between the Lord and the children of Israel — yet that name is attributed to them in a far different and inferior manner (*longe alia atque inferiori ratione*). For Christ pleases the Father through Himself, relying on no other mediator. But no one among the saints, whether in this age or in the future one, can please the Father except through Christ. And for Christ indeed no one intercedes; but Christ intercedes for all. Hence He alone is deservedly acknowledged as the full and perfect mediator between God and men (*plena et perfecta ratione mediator*).

§ 29. In this sense St. Augustine, in book 2 *Against the Epistle of Parmenianus*, ch. 8,⁶² rebukes Parmenianus for placing a bishop as mediator between the people and God. "Who," he says, "among good and faithful Christians would endure this?" For all Christians mutually commend one another with their prayers. For no one intercedes for himself; but He alone is the one true mediator, whose type was prefigured in the Old

Testament: for there it is found that no one prayed for the Priest. And a little afterwards: "Nor did Paul make himself a mediator between God and the people, but he asks that all the members of the body of Christ pray for one another, since they are mutually solicitous for one another." And again: "For if Paul were a mediator, then certainly the other Apostles were mediators also; and so there would be many mediators, contrary to what Paul himself established, saying: 'For there is one God, one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.'" The place is also found in Concio 2 on Ps. 36 and *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 15.⁶³

§ 30. St. Augustine, therefore, removes from bishops and all other men the proper office of that unique mediator — which is to mediate between God and the human race in such a way that through Himself, for the sins of the former, He pleases God and merits for the latter the observance of the law and justice. However, if one takes "mediator" in a general sense, for anyone who in any manner pleads the cause of someone before another, so as to reconcile him or obtain something from him by prayer or by merit — then nothing forbids that among men there should be many mediators and intercessors with God, not only in heaven but also on earth. For by this name the Fathers did not hesitate to call the saints who pray for us: the ancient writers, Gregory Nazianzen (in the *Apologeticus*⁶⁴), Jerome (in the Epistle to Simplicianum⁶⁵ and in 2 Macc.⁶⁶), St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 5, *On the Words of Isaiah*, and *De Sacerdotio*, book 6,⁶⁷ Cyril, book 12 (*Thesaurus*, ch. 10),⁶⁸ Pope Gregory I, Epist. 24,⁶⁹ and St. Bernard, last Sermon (*De Assumptione B. Mariae*).⁷⁰ St. Augustine himself (*De Cura pro mortuis*, chs. 4 and following⁷¹) calls the holy martyrs our patrons. And in Sermon 99 (*De Diversis*⁷²) he says that Stephen pleaded as advocate before God for his enemies.

§ 31. But the fuller treatment of this matter belongs elsewhere. Here it is asked whether the saints can be called mediators and redeemers in the same way — to which the answer is negative: first, because we do not read that the Fathers spoke in that way; and second, because there was no reason (*ratio*) so to speak. For although their sufferings, applied to us, can avail to mitigate or remove the temporal punishments due for our sins, they do not however avail to take away sins themselves, or to release from eternal punishment — both of which things are done solely through the death of Christ. And thus they do not redeem man absolutely (*simpliciter*), but, presupposing the redemption made through Christ, they free him from the remaining punishment — just as a man too is said to free and redeem himself, according to Scripture. Yet this manner is altogether insufficient for anyone to be called absolutely (*absolute*) his own or another's redeemer, because the temporal punishment for which the price is paid is something exceedingly small, and as it were nothing in comparison to the whole servitude to which man is subject and from which he is freed by the price of the blood of Christ.

§ 32. Hence St. Augustine, Tract. 84 *On John*, says: "Even if brothers die for brothers, nevertheless for the remission of fraternal sins no martyr's blood is shed in the manner in which He shed His for us. Nor in this should you understand what we should imitate, but rather what we should be grateful for. Anyone can imitate one who dies; no one could imitate Him who redeems."⁷³ And Pope St. Leo, Sermon 12 *On the Passion of the Lord*: "Although in the sight of the Lord the precious death of many saints may have been, yet the slaying of no innocent person was the propitiation of the world. The deaths were singular in each individual case, and no one paid by his death a debt belonging to another, since among the sons of men Christ alone existed in whom all were crucified," etc.⁷⁴ This same sentence he repeats word for word in Epist. 83, ch. 2,⁷⁵ except that in this latter place he changes the word "propitiation" to "redemption."

§ VII — According to which nature Christ is our Mediator (Christus secundum quam naturam sit mediator)

§ 33. Just as Christ is our Redeemer and Mediator according to His human nature and not according to His divine nature — as the Master rightly teaches in the text — so too this is understood from what we said in the preceding section. The reason is manifest: because Christ insofar as He is God is equal to the Father and therefore in this respect is not a mediator but one of the two extremes. For it was necessary that man be reconciled no less to God the Son than to God the Father, indeed to the whole Trinity. Christ is therefore a mediator between God and man according to the nature He assumed, in which He was indeed inferior to God insofar as He was man, but superior to man insofar as He was free from sin, and performed and suffered those things by which He could reconcile the human race, subject to sin, to God.

§ 34. Hence St. Augustine, in *De Peccato originali*, ch. 28,⁷⁷ says: "Through this Christ is profitable as mediator unto life: not through that whereby He is equal to the Father. For through that He is as far from us as the Father Himself is. And how will there be a middle point (*medietas*) where there is the same distance? Therefore the Apostle does not say: 'One mediator of God and men, Christ Jesus,' but 'the man Christ Jesus.' Therefore He is mediator through that by which He is man: nearer to the Father through that by which He is nearer to the Father; nearer to us through that by which He is nearer to us." Which is stated more clearly thus: "Inferior to the Father because in the form of a servant; superior to us because without the stain of sin." And in *Confessions*, book 10, ch. 41:⁷⁸ "The Mediator between God and men ought to have something similar to God, and something similar to men, lest being in both things similar to men He be far from God, or being in both things similar to God He be far from men."

§ 35. And in the adjacent chapter:⁷⁹ "That Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, appeared between mortal sinners and the immortal Just One: mortal with men, just with God." And below: "Insofar therefore as He is man, so far is He a mediator; but insofar as He is the Word, He is not in the middle, because He is equal to God." Similar passages are found in *De Civitate Dei*, book 9, ch. 15; *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, book 1, ch. 35; and in the exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians, ch. 3.⁸⁰ Now St. Augustine presses two scriptural passages: 1 Tim. 2 and Gal. 3. The former carefully attributes to Christ as man the being of a mediator; the latter, asserting that a mediator is not of one but that God is one, leaves it to be understood that Christ cannot be a mediator insofar as He is God, just as He could not be a mediator if He were a sinful man — since a mediator is sought between God and a sinful man.⁸¹

§ I — Whether the human race could have been freed otherwise than by the death of Christ (An aliter quam morte Christi liberari potuerit genus humanum)

§ 36. It is commonly asked whether the passion and death — or even the incarnation itself — of the Son of God was so necessary for freeing the human race from the captivity of sin and death that it could not have been freed in any other way. To which the absolute reply is that another mode of repairing human nature was also possible. The most certain reason (*ratio*) for this is that it belongs to the omnipotence of God, which,

since it is infinite, is not limited to this one mode of liberation but could have accomplished it by infinitely many other modes.

§ 37. On this matter St. Augustine, discussing it in *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 11,⁸³ says: "There are foolish people who say: 'Could not the wisdom of God have freed man without assuming a man, being born of a woman, and suffering such great things from sinners?' To whom we say: He could indeed do it entirely; but if He had done it otherwise, your foolishness would likewise be displeased." The same in *De Trinitate*, book 13, ch. 10:⁸⁴ "Those who say: 'Was there then no other way available to God to free men from the misery of this mortality, so that He willed His only-begotten Son to become man and, made mortal, to undergo death?' — it is too little to refute them merely by asserting that this mode is good and befitting the divine dignity; we must also show that no other possible mode was lacking to God, to whose power all things are equally subject." And he pursues this in chs. 13 and 14.⁸⁵

§ 38. In the same sense Pope St. Leo writes in Sermon 2 *On the Nativity of the Lord*,⁸⁶ saying: "That although for the repairing of the human race innumerable means lay at the mercy of God, He chose this counsel above all others: that for destroying the work of the Devil He should employ not the power of might but the reason (*ratio*) of justice." And in Sermon 14 *On the Passion of the Lord*:⁸⁷ "The omnipotence of the Son of God, which through the same essence is equal to the Father, could have snatched the human race from the power of the Devil by the sole command of His will." Also of clearly expressed judgment on this matter are St. Gregory, *Moralia*, book 20, ch. 26,⁸⁸ and St. Cyril, book 8 *Against Julian*, towards the end.⁸⁹ Finally, St. Bernard, answering the objections of Peter Abailard, says: "The reason for this deed was the will (*dignatio*) of the one who did it. For who denies that other and yet other modes of our redemption, justification, and liberation lay at hand for the Omnipotent? But this does not prejudice the efficacy of this one which He chose from among many."⁹⁰ These are his words.

§ 39. But as for what Scripture and the Fathers sometimes teach — that man cannot obtain salvation except through the death of Christ — this holds true on the presupposition of the eternal ordinance and decree of God, by which He established this one mode of salvation and liberation for the human race, namely through the death of His Son. Hence Peter says (in Acts) that there is no other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved.⁹¹ Thus St. Augustine, Tract. 37 *On John*:⁹² "If that blood had not been shed, the world would not have been redeemed." And St. Gregory, *Moralia*, book 3, ch. 1:⁹³ "If Christ had not taken upon Himself a death He did not owe, He would never have freed us from the death we owe." And on Ps. 4 Penitential: "No man would ascend to heaven, unless the Son of God had taken flesh for our salvation."⁹⁴ And the Gloss on Heb. 2: "Unless Christ had died, man would not have been redeemed."⁹⁵ Finally, one must so understand what St. Leo says in Sermon 8 *On Lent*:⁹⁶ "The wounds of original antiquity could not otherwise have been healed in human nature than by the Word of God assuming flesh to Himself from the womb of the Virgin, so that in one and the same Person both flesh was born and the Word was born." And in Sermon 14 *On the Passion of the Lord*:⁹⁷ "No one could be loosed from the snares of mortality, unless He in whom alone the nature of all was innocent had allowed Himself to be slain at the hands of the wicked."

§ II — Why God willed the human race to be restored through the death of Christ (*Quare per Christi mortem Deus voluerit reparari genus humanum*)

§ 40. The next question is this: since the human race could have been restored through the incarnation and death of the Son of God, and indeed by the mere nod of the divine will alone, why did God choose this particular mode of restoration above all others? To this it is answered: although the reasons of the divine works cannot be fully tracked down by us, nevertheless a manifold account of this divine counsel can be adduced from the Scriptures and the Fathers; so that it was rightly said by St. Augustine⁸⁴ that no other mode would have been more fitting for healing our misery.

First: in order that the faith of man might be confirmed by the fact that the Son of God Himself, in the flesh He assumed, announced the truth to us — He Himself saying in Jn. 18: "For this I was born, and for this I came into the world, that I should bear witness to the truth." Hence St. Augustine⁹⁸ says: "That man might walk more confidently toward the truth, Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed a man, established and founded Faith."

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 4.

2. The page image (p. 93) shows this passage concluding the prefatory matter of Distinctio XIX before the heading §. III. *An redemptio Christi ad omnes homines pertineat?* begins.

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 4 [as cited: *S. Thom. ubi sup.*].

4. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 129 [abbreviation as in source: *in Psal. 129*].

5. Matt. 26; Mk. 14; and the Canon of the Mass in the words of consecration of the chalice.

6. Matt. 20.

7. Heb. 9.

8. Jn. 12.

9. Jn. 17.

10. Is. 53; Rom. 5.

11. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsio ad primam Objectionem Vincentii* (Reply to the first objection of Vincent); also *Responsio ad capitula Gallorum*, Reply 9; and *Sententia* 9.

12. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, Hom. 16.

13. This sentence ("Quod ipsum tamen, sano sensu est accipiendum, ne quis erret") closes the main body of § III before the extended scholarly note begins.

14. This is footnote (a) in the printed text, a lengthy digression on the Predestinarian heresy and the Gothescalcian controversy, which Estius here inserts for the first time, having been compelled to suppress it in earlier sections by the constraints of time and the press.

15. Estius, *In tertium librum Sententiarum*, Dist. 40 [abbreviation as in source: *ad Di. stinct. 40*].

16. Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres, *De Haeresi Pelagiana*, lib. 8, cap. *postremo*; Jacobus Usserius; Gilbertus Magainus, *in Prædestiniana Fabula Confutatione*; Vincentius Contensorius, lib. 8, *Theolog. mentis et cordis*, appendix, one dissertation on the third; Joannes Cabassutius, *In Notitia Ecclesiastica*, fifth century, third dissertation *De Prædestinatis post Concilium Arelatense tertium*.

17. Ludovicus Cellorius, *Historia Gothescalcana*; Dionysius Petavius, *Theolog. dogm.* tom. 5, lib. 3, *De Incarn.* cap. 6 and 7; Stephanus Dechamps; Philippus Labbe; Suarez, *Prolegom.* 6, *De Grat.* cap. 5, numer. 1.

18. Henricus Cardinalis de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. 2, cap. 15; Cardinal de Aguirre, tom. 4, numer. 47, disp. sect. 9, §§. 7; Jacobus Sirmondus, tom. 8, *Concil.*
19. Remigius of Lyon, *Absolutio Cujusdam Quaestionis; De Tenenda immobiliter Scripturae Sanctae veritate*; Rathramnus of Corbie, epistle to a friend; Prudentius, bishop of Troyes, epistle to Wenilon of Sens; *De Praedestinatione* against John Scotus Erigenus; *Bibliotheca PP.* tom. XV, p. 468; Florus of Lyon; Fathers of the Synod of Valence 855; Synod of Langres and Tull 859; Hincmarus, *De Praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio* addressed to King Charles the Bald (referenced via Flodoardus, lib. 3, *Hist. Rom.* cap. 15); Amolo of Lyon; John Scotus Erigenus; Synod of Quierzy.
20. Sigebertus; Aventinus; Trithemius; Baronius at the year 849; Didacus Alvarez, *De Origine Haeres. Pelag.* cap. 30; Severinus Binius, notes on the Council of Quierzy; Du-Vallius, notes on the book of the Church of Lyon against John Scotum; Jacobus Sirmondus; Ludovicus Cellotius; Philippus Labbe; Gravina; Cabassutius; Dionysius Petavius; Stephanus Dechamps; Gerardus Joannes Vossius, lib. 7, *Histor. Pelag.* part 4.
21. Remigius of Lyon, *De Tribus Epistolis; De Tenenda immobiliter Scripturae Sanctae veritate*; Rathramnus of Corbie; Prudentius of Troyes; *Bibliotheca PP.* tom. XV, p. 468; Galindo surnamed Prudentius per the Annales Francorum from the Codex of St. Bertin at year 861; Florus the Magister; Fathers of the Valence Synod 855; Synod of Langres and Tull 859.
22. Jacobus Usserius, archbishop of Armagh, *Historia Gothescalci*; Predestinarian controversy.
23. Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres, *De Haeresi Pelagiana*, lib. 8, cap. *postremo*, p. 230, Paris edition 1641, and p. 231; lib. 3, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, cap. 21, p. 163.
24. Hincmarus of Reims, Epistle to Egilon, as cited in source.
25. Synod of Quierzy, cap. 3 and cap. 4.
26. Cardinal de Aguirre, disp. 115, sect. 6; disp. 226, sect. 3; disp. 227; Dionysius Petavius, *De Incarnat.* lib. 13, cap. 10 and cap. 14; Gerardus Joannes Vossius, *Hist. Pelag.* lib. 7, part 4.
27. Gerardus Joannes Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. 7, part 4.
28. Hincmarus of Reims, Epistle to Egilon [abbreviation as in source: *Epist. Hincmari Remensis ad Egilonem*].
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as above, and in *Supplement*, q. 12 and following.
30. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 129 [abbreviation as in source: *Aug. in Psal. 129*].
31. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Capitula Gallorum*, Reply 9 and Sentence 9 [abbreviation as in source: *Prosp. ad 1. Objecti. Vinc.*].
32. St. John Chrysostom, *Homily 16 in Epistolam ad Hebraeos* [abbreviation as in source: *Chrysost. Hom. 16. in Epist. ad Heb.*].
33. Council of Trent, Session 3, cap. 3 [abbreviation as in source: *Trid. Patres sess. 3. cap. 3.*].
34. Innocent X and Alexander VII, in the condemnation of the 5th proposition of Jansenius [abbreviation as in source: *Summi Pontifices Innocentius X. & Alexander VII. in Proscriptione 5. propositionis Jansenianae*].
35. Estius refers to his own *Systema Janseniani* in appendice ad tertium tomum; the condemned propositions of Quesnel, especially 30, 31, 32, 33.
36. Synod of Quierzy, cap. 3 and cap. 4 [abbreviation as in source: *Synodus Carisiacensis cap. 3. & cap. 4.*].
37. Cardinal De Aguirre, *disp. 115, sect. 6; disp. 226, sect. 3; disp. 127* [abbreviation as in source: *Cardinalis De Aguirre praeclaud. loco disp. 115. sect. 6. & disp. 226. sect. 3. nec non & disp. 127.*].
38. Dionysius Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 13, cap. 10 through cap. 14, especially *De Concordia Synodorum Valentinae et Carisiaci* [abbreviation as in source: *Dionys. Petav. praefato loco lib. 13. De Incarnat. a cap. 10. usque cap. 11. 14.*].
39. Gerardus Joannes Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. 7, part 4 [abbreviation as in source: *Gerardus Vossius praeclaudato loco lib. 7. Hist. Pelag. part. 4.*].
40. Council of Trent, Session 3, cap. 3 [abbreviation as in source: *Tridentini Patres sess. 3. cap. 3.*].
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 22, a. 4, ad secundum [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thomas 3. parte quaest. 22. art. 4. ad secundum*].
42. Cornelius Jansenius of Ypres, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 21, p. 163 [abbreviation as in source: *Jansen. lib. 3. De Gratia Christi Salvatoris cap. 21. pag. 163.*].

43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as above, and in *Supplement*, q. 12 and following [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. ubi supr. § in Supp. quaestion. 12. seq.*].
44. Rom. 8.
45. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 9 *de Quadragesima* [abbreviation as in source: *Leo Sermon. 9. de Quadragesima*].
46. St. Ambrose, lib. 5, *In Lucam*, cap. 6 [abbreviation as in source: *Ambrosius lib. 5. in Luc. 6.*].
47. Council of Trent, Session 14, cap. 8 [abbreviation as in source: *Tridentini Concilii Patres sess. 14. cap. 8.*].
48. St. Cyprian, lib. 4, *Epistola* 4 [abbreviation as in source: *Cyprianus lib. 4. Ep. 4.*].
49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 3.
50. Is. 53: "He was offered because He Himself willed it." Eph. 5: "He delivered Himself for us as an offering and a victim to God for an odour of sweetness." 2 Cor. 5: "Him who knew not sin He made sin for us" — that is, a sacrifice for sin (*hostiam pro peccato*), as many expositors explain.
51. The Epistle to the Hebrews throughout treats of the sacrifice of Christ offered up.
52. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 6.
53. Rom. 2 [more precisely Rom. 5:10, cited here as Rom. 2 in the source; abbreviation as in source: *Rom. 2.*].
54. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 20.
55. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 14.
56. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 190, written to Pope Innocent against the error of Peter Abailard [abbreviation as in source: *Scripta ad Innocentium Papam contra errorem Petri Abailard.*].
57. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 3, ad 3.
58. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, chs. 4, 5, 6, 19, 20; and *De Trinitate* IV, chs. 13, 14.
59. The matter is to be addressed at Dist. 12, lib. 4 [abbreviation as in source: *ad Distinct. 12. lib. 4.*].
60. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 5.
61. St. Augustine, writing on Ps. 103, Concio 4; and *In Iohannem*, Tract. 110.
62. St. Augustine, *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani* II, ch. 8.
63. St. Augustine, Concio 2 on Ps. 36; and *De Civitate Dei* ch. 15.
64. Gregory Nazianzen, *Apologeticus* [abbreviation as in source: *in Apologetico*].
65. St. Jerome, Epistle to Simplicianum [abbreviation as in source: *in Epistola ad Simplicianum*].
66. St. Jerome, on 2 Macc. [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. Mach.*].
67. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 5, *On the Words of Isaiab*; and *De Sacerdotio*, book 6.
68. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, book 12, ch. 10.
69. Pope St. Gregory I, *Epistolae* I, Epist. 24.
70. St. Bernard, last Sermon *De Assumptione Beatae Mariae*.
71. St. Augustine, *De Cura pro mortuis*, chs. 4 and following.
72. St. Augustine, Sermon. 99 *De Diversis* [the editors' note in the source indicates this sermon is numbered CCXIV among the Augustinian sermons in the Benedictine edition (Appendix, Tom. V), and was at one time judged spurious by Verulanus and Viudingo on account of the ineptitude of its author attributed to Augustine; much displeases in it which those who bear the name of M. S. Corbejensis are made to suffer].
73. St. Augustine, *In Iohannem*, Tract. 84.
74. Pope St. Leo the Great, Sermon 12 *De Passione Domini*.
75. Pope St. Leo the Great, *Epistola* 83, ch. 2.

76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 48, a. 5 [same reference as above].
77. St. Augustine, *De Peccato originali*, ch. 28.
78. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* X, ch. 41.
79. St. Augustine, *Confessiones*, the adjacent chapter [i.e., ch. 43, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 15 in context of the parallel passage].
80. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 15; *De Consensu Evangelistarum* I, ch. 35; and *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas*, ch. 3.
81. The footnote present in the source at this point reads: Although it is true that Christ is Mediator according to His human nature, as the author here most rightly asserts and proves, nevertheless the mediation is not to be attributed to the human nature in such a way as to exclude the dignity and value which derive from the Divine Person: for Christ, as God-Man, is truly and properly Mediator of God and men, since in His one Person the human and divine natures are united. Hence the proposition "Christ as man is the mediator of God and men" is most true; but if to the reduplication there be added the exclusive particle *only*, *solely*, *merely*, and the like, then the proposition is false according to Catholic Faith: for it is not possible to say "Christ is Mediator only insofar as He is man" — which was the heresy of Francesco Stancaro, who was a professor at the Royal Academy of Königsberg in Prussia in the sixteenth century, anno 1551. Nor likewise is the proposition true: "Christ only insofar as He is God is Mediator" — which Osiander tried to maintain. Therefore Christ is neither Mediator only as man, nor as God only; but as Catholic Faith teaches, as God-Man. Furthermore, in the Mediator Christ two things are to be distinguished in the soul: one is the substance itself of the Mediator; the other is the performance of the works and offices which are to be performed by the Mediator. The former, as the Fathers everywhere teach and explain, consists of two natures; the latter, if you look to the second aspect: again two things are to be distinguished — the action itself, or administration, of the external work performed, and its power, that is, its efficacy and dignity, whence merit and its price arise. Now what pertains to the former is of the human nature alone; what follows afterwards derives not from the measure of human nature but from the joined Divinity. These things having been thus cursorily sketched, the discussion will perchance return to this matter below, and we shall lay down rules for forming propositions about Christ, attending to either or both natures, whether stated absolutely or reduplicatively. In the meantime, among others, see Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, Tom. V, part 2, book 22, especially ch. 3.
82. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 46, a. 2.
83. St. Augustine, *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 11.
84. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 10.
85. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, chs. 13 and 14.
86. Pope St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 2 De Nativitate Domini*.
87. Pope St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 14 De Passione Domini*.
88. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XX, ch. 26.
89. St. Cyril, *Contra Iulianum* VIII, towards the end.
90. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 190, written to Pope Innocent against the error of Peter Abailard [abbreviation as in source: *scripta ad Innocentium Papam contra errorem Petri Abailardi*].
91. Acts 4: "Neither is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved."
92. St. Augustine, *In Iohannem*, Tract. 37.
93. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* III, ch. 1.
94. St. Gregory the Great, on Ps. 4 Penitential [abbreviation as in source: *in Psal. 4. pœnit.*].
95. Gloss on Heb. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *Glossa Heb. 2.*].
96. Pope St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 8 De Quadragesima*.
97. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 2, and q. 46, a. 3 and following.
98. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 2.

DISTINCTIO XX — ON THE REASONS FOR AND MANNER OF HUMAN REDEMPTION THROUGH THE DEATH OF CHRIST (*DE REDEMPTIONE HUMANI GENERIS PER MORTEM CHRISTI*)

§ 1. Secondly: that through this, the hope and confidence (*spes et fiducia*) of man might be raised up toward God. For, as the same St. Augustine says,¹ "What was so necessary for raising up our hope and freeing the minds of mortals from despair of immortality, as that it should be shown to us how highly God esteemed us, how greatly He loved us," and so forth. This confidence — that it should be fostered — is expressed by those words of the Apostle, Rom. 8: "He who did not spare His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how has He not also with Him given us all things?" Thirdly: that through that ineffable benefit of God's love toward man, the love of man toward God might in turn be enkindled. The following words of the Apostle show this: "Who shall separate us from the charity of God?" And further below: "But in all these things we overcome on account of Him who loved us" — that is, as the Ambrosian Commentary explains,² in so many evils we persevere with unbroken spirit through the love of Christ, who has bestowed upon us such great goods. Hence also 1 Jn. 4: "Let us love God, because God first loved us." And again: "If God so loved us, we also ought to love one another." St. Augustine employs this argument to excite charity,³ Fourthly: that in the man Christ there might be exhibited to man a visible form of life to be lived, according to that of 1 Pet. 2: "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow His footsteps." This argument is pressed by St. Augustine⁴ and by St. John Damascene.⁵

§ 2. Lastly — to omit other arguments which apply generally to the whole mystery of the Incarnation — this one is both unique and the chief argument (*ratio*) for why God willed to liberate the human race through the death of His Son: namely, that in this way satisfaction might be made to the justice of God, that is, that through a satisfaction, and that a perfect and full one, the offence of man against God might be repaired. Hence in this work of human redemption through the death of the Son, according to the Psalmist, the mercy and truth of God met together in wondrous fashion: mercy, indeed, because so far as man is concerned, he had nothing that he could offer for his own redemption. Hence, by this consideration, the liberation of man is wholly a matter of grace, as the Prophet attests: "You have been sold for nothing, and you shall be redeemed without money," Is. 52.⁶ And as the Apostle says: "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us," Tit. 3. Truth, however — that is, justice — because, lest the sin of man remain unpunished, God delivered His Son, made man, unto death, through which, as through a most complete satisfaction, He redeemed us and reconciled us to Himself. Concerning this matter St. Augustine treats learnedly,⁷ from which passage are taken the things which are read on this subject in the Master.⁸ Likewise St. Leo,⁹ St. John Damascene,⁵ and St. Bernard.¹⁰

§ III — Whether a mere man or an Angel could have redeemed the human race (An purus homo, vel Angelus potuerit redimere genus humanum)

§ 3. Although the human race could have been set free and restored in many ways, as has been proved above, it could not, however, have been *redeemed* — that is, set free by the payment of a just price or by a condign satisfaction — otherwise than through one who was not merely man but also God. And this is signified by those words of St. Augustine, in which he says:¹ "Although God did not lack another possible mode by which He might set us free, nevertheless there was not, nor needed there to be, another mode more fitting for healing our misery." The reason for this is: because it was more fitting that man should be set free from the power of the Devil by justice than by power, as we showed above from the same St. Augustine and from other sources.¹² Now justice demanded a determinate mode of liberation — that is, redemption — whereby, through the payment of a just price, one who was held captive under an alien power might be recovered. But neither a man nor an Angel, being merely a creature, could pay a just price for the redemption of the whole human race.

§ 4. For, as regards man: since through one man sin had entered into all by the law of propagation, and through sin death, and consequently all men were by nature servants of sin and children of wrath, it could not come about that any one from the human race would offer to God something of its own by which it might redeem even its own servitude — much less anything of such a kind as to make exact satisfaction to the justice of God for the redemption of the entire race. Furthermore, even if we were to suppose some mere man, free from sin and adorned with every kind of virtue, created by God and existing outside the mass of perdition: he still could not be of such great dignity before God that his suffering would become a just and condign price for making satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, as St. Thomas teaches,¹³ and after him very many others. And the same judgment holds with respect to an Angel.

§ 5. Therefore, although, if we wish to speak absolutely, God could through an Angel or a mere man have reconciled the human race to Himself, nevertheless the satisfaction offered by such an Angel or man would not have been condign — for condign satisfaction requires that what is returned to the one who has been wronged should be equal to, or greater than, the offence of the one who sinned. To this is added the fact that however great a price a mere man or an Angel could offer to God, that entire price would be received not from himself but from God, from whom comes every good of the creature. Hence such a redemption would rest not so much upon the justice of one making satisfaction as upon the liberality and mercy of one who gives that through which satisfaction could be made; and consequently it would not take place according to the strict rigour of justice.

§ 6. But Christ, since He was not merely man but also God, first possessed from Himself everything from which He could make satisfaction to God for the offence of the human race. Furthermore, He was able to offer a price of infinite value. For since His passion, death, and other actions were the actions of a Divine Person in human nature, they were of as great worth as the Person acting. Hence the same reality is understood when the price of the world is now called the passion of Christ, now His blood, now Christ Himself, who is the Son of God. And just as the Father holds nothing dearer than the Son, so He estimates nothing of greater worth than the price and redemption made through the blood of His Son. Hence it follows that Christ made exact satisfaction according to the strict rigour of justice, so that He had no need for this

purpose of any grace intervening on His behalf, as a man would need who can offer nothing that he does not have from God.

§ 7. Now although, by reason of this very dignity of the Person, even the least suffering whatsoever of the Son of God could have sufficed as a just price for the redemption of the world — for the Father was looking not so much at *what* or *how much* He suffered as at the charity with which He suffered — nevertheless Christ willed to exhibit to us a copious redemption through His passion and the death of the cross, so that, bound to Him by so great a benefit of love, we might in turn be re-enkindled to a greater love of Him. It was moreover necessary that He through whom redemption should be made should also be a man, or at least certainly a creature, because unless the Creator became a creature He could not undergo passion or punishment, which is necessary for a satisfaction that is made for a transgression.

§ 8. Nor indeed should the opinion of St. Bernard appear contrary to what we have said — the opinion in which he says that another mode of liberation, justification, and even redemption was possible for God.¹⁴ For either he is speaking of a redemption that is effected by a satisfaction not altogether full and exact, or he understands a mode of redemption different from that which was accomplished through the death of the Son of God. For, as we were just now saying, for a redemption that is even perfect, any suffering or punishment whatsoever of a Divine Person would have sufficed, even apart from death or blood. Concerning this entire argument of the redemption of mankind through the death of Christ — whether it was possible, and whether it could have been accomplished differently — let the studious reader consult St. Anselm.¹⁵

§ IV — Whether the handing over of Christ to death was good or evil (Traditio Christi in mortem, bona fuerit an mala?)

§ 9. Concerning the handing over of Christ to his passion and death — by whom and in what manner it was accomplished — Scripture speaks in more than one way. For, first, all four Gospels clearly show that he was betrayed and handed over to the Jews by Judas, his disciple, who for this reason was called by the distinctive name of "betrayer." He was also handed over by the Jews into the hands of the Gentiles, of Pilate, and of his ministers, in accordance with what he himself had foretold: "And shall deliver him to the Gentiles."¹⁷ Likewise, that he was handed over by Pilate to the will of the Jews is read in all four Evangelists. Nor was this all: the Father also handed over the Son, and the Son himself handed himself over, to death. For the Apostle speaks thus of the Father, in Rom. 8: "Who spared not even his own Son, but delivered him up for us all."¹⁸ That Christ also handed himself over is testified by Scripture in many places, as in Is. 53, Gal. 2, Eph. 5,¹⁹ and 1 Pet. 2.²⁰

§ 10. Since, therefore, this handing-over is attributed to such diverse and mutually contrary agents, it is rightly asked whether it was good or evil. For on the one hand, no evil work could proceed from the Father and the Son; yet on the other hand, it cannot be said that the action of Judas and of the Jews, and likewise of Pilate, by which they handed Christ over to death, was good. To this it must be answered that nothing prevents one and the same action from being judged in different ways in the formal character (*ratio*) of good and evil, insofar as it proceeds from a different root — just as St. Thomas, treating this question,²¹ learnedly explains, and likewise in the present distinction.²² For it is not novel that one and the same external act should proceed from diverse agents, and accordingly be done with diverse intention and will — as, for example,

almsgiving, or punishment, or something of this kind — while he who commands it has one thing in view, he who carries it out another, and he who suffers it yet another.

§ 11. It is said, therefore, that the Father handed over the Son: first, because from eternity he ordained and willed that the Son should suffer for the salvation of the human race, according to that passage in Acts 2, "Delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,"²³ and so forth; secondly, because he inspired in the Son the will to suffer; and thirdly, because he did not snatch him from the hands of those who crucified him, but exposed him to their cruelty and power, and permitted this — willing in this manner that the sin of the human race should be punished in his own Son. This is what is signified by the cry of Christ, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" — as St. Augustine interprets it²⁴ — as was also signified by those other words of the Apostle, where he says that the Father did not spare his own Son, etc. Moreover, Christ handed himself over: either insofar as he is God, by the same will and action as the Father — for the works of the Trinity are indivisible — or insofar as he is man, by a will and charity inspired by the Father, by which he also offered himself to those who persecuted him, and patiently endured his passion and death; which will, indeed, in respect of the eternal decree of the Father, also had the formal character of obedience. Hence it is said, "Made obedient to the Father even unto death."²⁵

§ 12. It is manifest, therefore, that both the Father handed over the Son, and the Son handed himself over, out of charity. Judas, on the other hand, handed him over out of greed; the Jews out of envy; Pilate out of fear of losing his prefecture — which was a worldly fear, and therefore a perverse one — and Christ was handed over by them; and in so handing him over they sinned. Treating this matter, St. Augustine, in his commentary on the Psalms,²⁶ says: "The spirit both of the one who hands over and of the one who does not hand over must be considered. This is what Judas did, and this is what God the Father did, of whom it is written that he spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all. This is what Judas did, and this is what the Lord Christ himself did, of whom it is written: 'Who gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour.' And again: 'Christ,' he says, 'loved his Church and gave himself up for her.' And yet we give thanks to God the Father, who spared not his only Son, but delivered him up for us all; we give thanks to the Son himself, who gave himself up for us and thereby fulfilled the will of the Father; we detest Judas, by whose deed God bestowed so great a benefit upon us. For he did not hand over Christ for our sake, but for the silver by which he sold him: even though the handing over of Christ is our redemption, and the selling of Christ is our redemption." So far Augustine, who adds, moreover, in order to illustrate the matter, an example drawn from martyrs and their persecutors. A similar passage is found in the same author, in Tractate 7 on the First Epistle of St. John:²⁷ "There was a handing over by the Father, there was a handing over by the Son, there was a handing over by Judas. One thing was done. What, then, distinguishes them from one another? Because the Father and the Son did this in charity, whereas Judas did this in betrayal." And he concludes: "A diverse intention, therefore, made diverse deeds. Since it is one thing, if we measure it by diverse intentions, we find one to be loved and the other to be condemned; one to be glorified and the other to be detested." So Augustine. See also another passage in his commentary on the Psalms,²⁸ and Leo, Sermon 1 on the Epiphany of the Lord.²⁹

§ 13. But if you ask whether the passion of Christ is to be called good or evil absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*): I answer that it is absolutely speaking good. The reason is that a passion is considered in itself more as it is received in the one who suffers it than as it proceeds from or is inflicted by the one who acts. Although, therefore, it was evil insofar as it was inflicted by the evil will of the Jews, it is nonetheless

established that it was good — indeed, most supremely good — insofar as it was received with a most supremely good will by Christ.

§ I — That neither the soul nor the flesh was separated from the Word in the death of Christ (In Christi morte nec animam nec carnem fuisse separatam a Verbo)

§ 14. Since death is the separation of the soul from the body, it is manifest that in the death of Christ the soul was separated from the flesh. Yet it must by no means be thought that either his soul or his flesh was separated from the Divinity or from the Word; rather, it must be confessed that both the flesh and the soul, having been separated from each other by the death of the Lord and lacking their own hypostasis (*hypostasis*), subsisted in the person (*persona*) of the Son of God no less than before death. For just as the human nature in Christ did not previously subsist of itself, but in the person of the Word, so after the separation of the parts of human nature they had no other hypostasis in which they might subsist than that same person of the Word. This is what the Symbol of our faith teaches us, by which we confess that the Son of God was buried and descended into hell — the former being said on account of the flesh, the latter on account of the soul. Since, therefore, those things which belong to human nature, or to its parts, are not predicated of the Son of God except by reason of the union, it follows that even in death the Word was joined to the parts that had been separated from one another.

§ 15. The Scholastics add to this the following argument: because what is granted through the grace (*gratia*) of God is never revoked without fault, according to that passage, Rom. 11, "The gifts of God and the calling are without repentance."³¹ Since, therefore, the grace of union is the greatest of all graces, and it would be impious to attribute any fault to Christ, the union of the Word with the flesh and soul of Christ ought never to have been dissolved once it had been effected.

§ 16. There exists on this matter the clear teaching of St. Augustine, in Tractate 47 on St. John,³² where he teaches that, from the moment that the Word was made flesh, although the body was indeed separated from the soul by the death of Christ as man, yet the soul and the flesh were never separated from the Word, but remained inseparably joined to him. The same point is confirmed from the same locus by the Glossa Ordinaria on John 10, "No man taketh it away from me."³³ To this also pertains the opinion of St. Augustine in the book *De Unitate Trinitatis ad Optatum*, chapter 14:³⁴ "In the tomb, Christ, by abiding in death with the flesh, did not desert it, just as, by co-nascence in the womb of the Virgin, he formed it." This appears also to be signified by those words of St. Ambrose, in the book *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, chapter 5,³⁵ where he says that Christ at death "emitted" the spirit — he did not "lose" it, that is, he did not dismiss it from himself — the union of the Word with the spirit evidently remaining. To these authorities is added that of St. John Damascene, who in Book 3, chapter 27,³⁶ speaks of Christ as follows: "Although," he says, "he died as man, and his holy soul was separated from his undefiled body, yet the Divinity was not separated from either the one or the other — I mean neither from the soul nor from the body; and not even thus was the one hypostasis divided into two hypostases. For both the body and the soul had their existence from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and when, in death, they were separated from one another, each of them retained the one hypostasis of the Word. So that the one hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis both of the

Word and of the soul and of the body. For never did either the soul or the body have its own hypostasis apart from that which is the hypostasis of the Word. For the hypostasis of the Word is one always and never two. Hence the hypostasis of Christ is always one. So that, even though the soul was locally separated from the body, it was nevertheless united hypostatically through the Word." So Damascene.

§ II — Reply to certain contrary arguments (Responsio ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta)

§ 17. Certain things that appear on the surface to be contrary to the foregoing doctrine must briefly be dissolved. Of this kind, in the first place, is what the Lord says in Jn. 10: "I lay down my soul, and again I take it up."³⁸ For he does not lay it down as God: by laying it down he ceased not to be man; he lays it down and again takes it up, therefore, as God.

§ 18. Likewise, there is that cry of the Lord upon the cross, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?"³⁹ which St. Ambrose, in Book 10 on St. Luke,⁴⁰ expounds by saying that these words contain an evident manifestation by God attesting to a withdrawal of the Divinity from the body; and then: "Man," he says, "dying separates the Divinity from himself. For since Divinity is free from death, death could not exist unless Life departed; for Life is the Divinity."

§ 19. There is also objected a certain Anathema of Athanasius, whom here as an author praising him the author cites as Augustine's, though the Benedictine Fathers, suspecting it, have placed it in the Appendix of the same volume and have assigned authorship of that book to Vigil of Thapsus — since he himself praises it in the Preface to his works against Varimadum, and it is also attributed to him in a certain very ancient manuscript.⁴¹

1. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 10.

2. The Ambrosian Commentary [*Ambrosiaster*], on Rom. 8.

3. St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, ch. 4.

4. St. Augustine, in a certain sermon *De Nativitate Domini*.

5. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 4.

6. Is. 52 [the OCR reads "Isa. 12," but the page image reads "Ifa. 52," corresponding to Is. 52:3].

7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, chs. 13–14.

8. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In* (the corresponding distinction of the *Sentences*).

9. St. Leo, *Sermons* 1 and 2 *De Nativitate Domini*, and in several sermons *De Passione Domini*.

10. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 190.

11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, as cited above (*ubi sup.*) [from the previous section's cross-reference; the marginal note reads "S. Thom. ubi sup."].

12. Reference to the preceding discussion in this distinction ("as shown above from the same St. Augustine"), i.e., the argument from fittingness (*convenientia*) over mere divine omnipotence.

13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 2, and q. 46, a. 1.

14. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 170.

15. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, Book I, ch. 22 and the following chapters.
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 47.
17. Matt. 20:19; cf. also Mk. 10:33, Lk. 18:32 (Vulgate: *Et tradens eum Gentibus*).
18. Rom. 8:32.
19. Is. 53; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 5:2 (the OCR reads "Eph. 6" but the page image and standard reference show Eph. 5:2, *qui dilexit nos et tradidit semetipsum pro nobis*; the marginal citation in the source reads *Eph. 5*).
20. 1 Pet. 2:21–24.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 47, a. 3.
22. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 47 [i.e. the commentary on this distinction, q. 5; the marginal note reads "in hanc Distinct. q. 5"].
23. Acts 2:23 (Vulgate: *Definito consilio et praescientia Dei traditum*, etc.).
24. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 120 (CXL in the newest edition of the Benedictines), ch. 9 and 10.
25. Phil. 2:8 (Vulgate: *Factus obediens Patri usque ad mortem*).
26. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* [reference cited as "in Ps." in the source; the extended quotation follows].
27. St. Augustine, *In Epistolam Iohannis ad Parthos*, Tractate 7.
28. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* [a further locus, cited as "in Ps." in the source].
29. Pope St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 1 de Epiphania Domini*.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50, aa. 2–3.
31. Rom. 11:29 (Vulgate: *Sine paenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio*).
32. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium*, Tractate 47.
33. Glossa Ordinaria on Jn. 10:18 (*Nemo tollit eam a me*).
34. St. Augustine [attrib.], *De Unitate Trinitatis ad Optatum*, ch. 14. [Note: The Benedictine editors, judging this book not to be Augustine's, placed it in the Appendix of their edition and assigned it to Vigil of Thapsus; the same author praises it in the Preface to his works against Varimadum, and it is attributed to him in a very ancient manuscript — as noted by Estius's editorial footnote marked (a) in the source.]
35. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento*, ch. 5.
36. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 27.
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50, aa. 2–3 (*ubi sup.*).
38. Jn. 10:17.
39. Matt. 27:46; Mk. 15:34 (Vulgate: *Deus meus quare me dereliquisti*).
40. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, Book 10.
41. The Anathema in question is attributed to Athanasius; the author here praising it cites it as Augustine's. However, the Benedictine Fathers, suspecting it, placed it in the Appendix of Volume 8 and restored authorship of that book to Vigil of Thapsus — since he himself praises it in the Preface to his own works against Varimadum, and it is also attributed to him in a certain very ancient manuscript (Codex M. S., as the source note indicates).

DISTINCTIO XXI — ON THE TRUE AND PROPER PREDICATION OF SUFFERING AND DEATH OF THE SON OF GOD (*DE VERE PROPRIEQUE DICENDO FILIUM DEI PASSUM ET MORTUUM*)

§ 1. — in the book *De Beatitudine Filii Dei ad Theophilum* — pronounces accursed the man who does not confess that the whole man whom the Son of God assumed rose again on the third day from the dead, having been taken up anew. Finally, since it was said (at the 2nd Distinction) that the Divinity was united to the flesh by means of the soul and spirit as an intermediary, it seems to follow that, once the separation of the soul from the flesh had taken place, the Divinity too was separated from the flesh, since, the middle term having been removed, the extremes must necessarily be dissolved.

The first of these objections is resolved by St. Augustine in Tract. 47 (*in Joan.*)¹, expounding the sentence that is objected. For he replies that Christ laid down his soul by reason of the part: because, namely, the flesh itself, which was a part of human nature, laid down the soul and again took it up — not indeed by its own power, which would belong to the flesh as its own, but by the power of the Word dwelling in the flesh.

To the second it must be replied that Christ was forsaken by God in his passion and death, not by the dissolution of the personal union. For otherwise it would be necessary that that dissolution had been effected before death. For Christ, still living, cries out that he has been forsaken; but this in the sense that he had been exposed by God to sufferings and the insults of enemies even unto death: so that to forsake means nothing other than not to protect from those who assault and persecute. In this sense the words of St. Ambrose are also rightly taken.²

St. Athanasius, disputing against those who denied Christ's resurrection and the glory of his body, does not teach that some new assumption of human nature is to be confessed, but only signifies that, by the renewed union of body and soul through the resurrection, the whole human nature which had been dissolved by death was restored in Christ.³

The resolution of the last argument must be sought from those things which were said near the end of the 2nd Distinction. For the soul is between the flesh and the Divinity a medium of congruence (*medium congruentiae*), not a medium of necessity (*medium necessitatis*), as they say. Therefore nothing prevents it that, with such a medium removed, the union of the extremes should remain.

§ 2. If you ask why, by reason of that union whereby the Divinity of Christ remained united separately both with the flesh and with the soul, it was not true that the soul is God and the flesh or body is God — since the communion of idioms (*idiomatum communio*) consequent upon the union seems to demand this — it is answered: just as on account of the union of the Word with the human nature, God is not said to be human nature, but man — that is, one possessing human nature — so on account of the union of the same Word

with the soul and body, which are the essential parts of human nature, God is not said to be soul and body, but one possessing soul and body, or, to speak in that manner, *animatus* and *corporatus* [ensouled and embodied]. Yet in such a way that these words do not signify one who is constituted of a soul or body, but one who is hypostatically united (*hypostatice unitus*) to a soul or to a body.

§ III — That the Son of God is truly and properly said to have suffered and died (*Vere recteque dici Filium Dei passum et mortuum*)

§ III — That the Son of God is truly and properly said to have suffered and died (*Vere recteque dici Filium Dei passum et mortuum*)

§ 3. If we call to mind what has been said (concerning Distinction 5, § 6) concerning the union of the two natures in Christ effected in the person of the Son of God, we shall not doubt that the Son of God is truly and properly said to be crucified, to have suffered, and to have died. For this is demanded by the communication of the idioms (*idiomatum communicatio*) of either nature. For since we believe that that man born of the Virgin underwent the cross, suffering, and death, we must consequently, by the law of the communication of idioms, believe and confess the same things of the Son of God, of the Word, of God — however absurd this may sound in the ears of unbelievers. For, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1), "The word of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to those who are being saved" — that is, to us — "it is the power of God." And again: "We preach Christ crucified, a stumbling-block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles."⁵

§ 4. And what follows these words is pertinent to the matter. This is contained above all in the Symbol of our faith, namely that the one Son of God suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, and died. The Apostle testifies (1 Cor. 2) concerning the princes of this age: "For had they known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory."⁶ Hence also that celebrated saying of (Pseudo-)Dionysius: "Either God by nature suffers, or the fabric of the world will be dissolved." Nor is a lengthy proof needed for this matter: since this is the common faith and confession of all the Fathers of the Church — indeed, of all the faithful — long since confirmed against Nestorius in the Council of Ephesus⁷ by these words of canon 12: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, let him be anathema." A fuller explanation of this doctrine is contained in canon 13.⁸ And in a certain sermon of that same Council it is said: "The death of Christ, inasmuch as it was made the death of God, destroyed death, because He who died was both God and man." Hence also the just punishment that overtook the Jews — not merely as murderers (*homicidas*), but as killers of God (*Deicidas*). For, as is said in that same sermon, they did not kill a mere man, but they laid rash and presumptuous hands upon God. It is clear, therefore, that it is not only true but also right — indeed most right — for every faithful person to confess and recall with a grateful heart that God, the Son of God, died for us. For as that beloved disciple says (1 Jn. 3): "In this we have known the charity (*caritatem*) of God, because He laid down His soul for us."⁹ Hence St. Bonaventure, treating this question, has written most excellently: "No word of greater dignity can resound in the ears of the human heart than this, that the Only-Begotten Son of God died for us, debtors of death." And therefore, he says, this is not only to be believed and affirmed, but also to be recalled most frequently.¹⁰

§ 5. Now, as for what the Master says in the text — that it can rightly be said that "God died," and "the Son of God suffered and was not impassible," and "the third Person suffered and was not impassible," and "the Word was crucified and was not uncrucified" — this is rejected by some as false and as containing a manifest contradiction, and is numbered among selected errors; although we on our part can interpret those negative attributes benignly, with an implied determination of the nature. For he himself adds: "but according to one nature He suffered, according to the other He was impassible." And indeed one must apply the same interpretation to the words of St. Ambrose cited by the Master, in which he says (in the book *De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento*, ch. 5): "Likewise, therefore, He suffered and did not suffer," etc.¹¹ For in such expressions the affirmation is understood absolutely and according to human nature, while the negation is taken not absolutely but only according to the divine nature.

§ 6. Now, as for what is cited by the Master from a certain sermon *On Right Faith*, which is among the sermons of St. Augustine *de Tempore*, no. 129:¹² "If anyone shall have said that the Son of God, that is God, suffered, and if anyone shall have said that in the suffering of the cross the Son of God, God, felt pain, let him be anathema" — although this can similarly be understood as said according to the divine nature, it is nevertheless probable in reply that this sermon is not by St. Augustine and perhaps not even by a Catholic writer. For even that which immediately precedes the former sentence: "If anyone shall have said that the man Jesus Christ was not assumed by the Son of God, let him be anathema" — approaches not a little to the sense of Nestorius.¹³

1. St. Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus* 47.

2. Footnote (a) in the source: Melchior Cano, writing at the same place (*De Locis Theologicis*, ch. 14), records that at the words of St. Ambrose there cited and similar ones, he wrote that Christ on the cross retained joy arising from the clear vision of God, in order thereby to exhibit arguments of Charity to men of greater worth. This opinion of Cano, however, condemned by sharp censure by Henry [Henriquez], Suarez, Vásquez, and Cardinal De Lugo, but defended by other eminent members of the Society of Jesus as immune from all censure and reproach, is [discussed] in the preface affixed to Cano's works in the most recent Paduan edition, ch. 8.

3. Footnote (b) in the source: The book *De Beatitudine Filii Dei* is judged by most scholars to be rightly attributed to Vigil of Thapsus rather than to Athanasius; Philippus Labbe (*in Dissertationibus Theologicis, & Historia De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, Tom. 1, in *Sibana*) is of this opinion.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 46, and following.

5. 1 Cor. 1:18, 23.

6. 1 Cor. 2:8.

7. That is, canon 12 of St. Cyril of Alexandria at the Council of Ephesus, confirmed together with the other eleven canons against Nestorius. A fuller explanation of this doctrine is contained in the letter of St. Cyril to Nestorius, commended in the same Council under the name of canon 13 of Ephesus, as the author here cites.

8. Council of Ephesus, canon 13 (in the sense of the *Epistola Cyrilli ad Nestorium* commended at the same Council).

9. 1 Jn. 3:16.

10. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 21, n. 3.

11. St. Ambrose, *De Incarnationis Dominicae sacramento*, ch. 5.

12. Footnote (b) in the source: Sermon 129 *de Tempore*, falsely attributed to St. Augustine in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers; in the Appendix to Volume V, rejected as no. 333 (*CCXXXIII*), and noted by those same eminent Fathers in the Louvain edition as doubtful, and judged by Verlinus and Vindingus to be spurious. They say, however, that, apart from the later anathematisms,

fourteen others who came from the Confession of Damasus to Paul of Antioch joined it there; and it is inscribed to the Roman Church: "A little book of Augustine: *De fide catholica contra omnes haereses*." And after a gap they further add: "Estius, in *In III Sent.*, dist. 21, n. 3, suspects it was published by a writer inclined to the Nestorians, of whose errors certain propositions — especially anathematism five — can be accommodated."

13. Cf. Philippus Labbe, *Dissertationes Theologicae et Historia De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, Tom. 1, under the entry *Sibana*, regarding the book *De Beatitudine Filii Dei*, which most scholars rightly attribute to Vigil of Thapsus rather than to Athanasius; and Hyacinthus Serri, *Vindicationes*, with Cano's works in the most recent Paduan edition, ch. 8.

DISTINCTIO XXII — THAT CHRIST DURING THE THREE DAYS OF DEATH WAS NOT A MAN, AND THAT HE DESCENDED ACCORDING TO HIS SOUL TO HELL (*CHRISTUM IN TRIDUO MORTIS NON FUISSE HOMINEM; ET DE DESCENSU ANIMAE CHRISTI AD INFEROS*)

§ I — That Christ During the Three Days of Death Was Not a Man (Christum in triduo mortis non fuisse hominem)

§ 1. The opinion of the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] in this distinction is that Christ during the three days of death was a man according to the propriety of speech; and Hugh of St. Victor held the same opinion, as is evident from his work.² The same was afterwards taught by John Wycliffe, as may be seen in Thomas Walden.³ Yet the Master and Hugh do not rest upon the same foundation in forming this opinion. For the Master holds that Christ truly remained a man in death because even then He possessed a human soul and a body; for he judges that, in order for something to be a man, it suffices if it has both essential parts of man, whether they are united to each other or not, provided they are united in some third thing. Hence the Master holds this view peculiarly about Christ, not about other men after death. Hugo's foundation, on the other hand, is Platonic: namely, that the rational soul is man in the proper sense of the word. Given this, it follows that not only Christ but all other men too are truly men after death, since souls do not die.

§ 2. But each rests upon a false foundation. The former, indeed, because in order for something to be a man it does not suffice that a human soul and a body be united to it as to a third thing by hypostatic union, unless both of these are also united to each other by the natural union constituting human nature. For even if a soul were to return to govern a body in the manner in which Angels govern assumed bodies, a man would not thereby be constituted, owing to the absence of that natural union. The latter, because even if by synecdoche the soul is sometimes called man from its more excellent part — in which manner the Apostle in 2 Cor. 4 distinguishes man into the one who is outward and the one who is inward, and in which manner it was also said by the Philosopher⁴ that each man is his own intellect — this cannot properly be said, since "man" signifies the composite of rational soul and body naturally united. Hence St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XIX commends the opinion of Varro,⁵ who said that man is not only a body, nor only a soul, but soul and body together.

§ 3. Rightly, therefore, are both the opinion of the Master and the opinion of Hugh rejected by the Schools as erroneous; so much so that St. Thomas⁶ says there is an error against faith in the words of this

opinion, even though the said authors did not hold the sense of the error in faith. The reason, however, is this: that it is an article of faith that Christ was truly dead; and therefore every assertion by which the truth of Christ's death is removed is contrary to faith. But that truth is removed by this assertion, which says that Christ, from the time He began to be a man, never ceased to be a man. For it pertains to the truth of the death of a man or of an animal that through death he ceases to be a man or an animal — by the separation, that is, of the soul, which completed the formal character (*ratio*) of man or of animal. For that reason one is no longer called simply a man, but a dead man, which is an alienating determination that destroys its own determinable. Another reason is: when the superior is removed, the inferior is removed; but to live and to feel are superior to man, and these did not belong to Christ during that triduum inasmuch as He was truly dead; therefore neither could being truly a man be attributed to Him. Still other reasons may be seen in the Master, who endeavours in vain to resolve them.

§ 4. As for the objection which the same Master raises from the book *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2,⁷ where these words are read: "In the sepulchre the same God made man lay, and from the lower regions the same God made man rose on the third day" — this aids his position not at all. For the author himself explains that this is not said properly but by synecdoche. For there follows: "but in the sepulchre according to flesh alone the same God lay, and into hell according to soul alone He descended." In this manner St. Augustine likewise at times expounds himself,⁸ as he declares the matter from an analogy in the former of those passages. For thus he says that Christ according to the assumed nature was both in the sepulchre and in hell during the three days of death; just as we say that Paul is now both in Rome and in heaven — the former according to body, the latter according to soul.

§ 5. As for what is finally objected concerning the perpetual Priesthood of Christ (from Ps. 109 and Heb. 7),⁹ from which it seems to follow that he who never ceased to be a Priest never ceased to be such according to human nature — it is answered: that the eternal Priesthood of Christ is eternal, both because nothing else succeeded to it, and because its act is sempiternal; and because the time of death is reckoned as nothing in this matter; or, as St. Thomas answers,¹⁰ because in the soul even when separated the character of orders remains.

§ II — That Christ Descended According to His Soul to Hell (Christum secundum animam descendisse ad inferos)

§ 6. It is the certain and perpetual faith of the Church that Christ after the separation of His soul from His body — His body having been committed to burial — descended according to His soul to hell. And regarding the former point we have no controversy from the four Gospels. Regarding the latter, however, certain heretics raised a question. For there were those who did not hesitate to remove entirely from the Creed that article, "He descended into hell," on the grounds that in the later Creeds — the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, and certain others — no mention is made of it. On this matter Rufinus, in his exposition of the Apostles' Creed (falsely ascribed to St. Cyprian), left it written as follows. "It must be known," he says, "that in the Roman Church's Creed this addition, 'He descended into hell,' is not found. Nor indeed is it found in this form in the Churches of the East." Yet the force of the words seems the same as in what is said of the burial. These words of Rufinus appear to have given occasion to Calvin, who in his first catechisms interpreted Christ's descent into hell as the laying of His body in the sepulchre. But when he saw that this

interpretation could be defended with no probability, on account of the manifest tautology by which the same thing would be most ineptly repeated in the very brief Creed in other and more obscure words — if the descent into hell signified nothing other than the sepulchre — he corrected that position in his *Institutes*, but with a worse interpretation, by which he teaches that the descent was accomplished on the very cross, in that Christ hanging on the cross was made subject to those pains which, as human malediction and the wrath of God, are suffered by the damned who have been placed in despair of salvation.

§ 7. A certain other more recent writer, wishing to avoid the absurdity of the interpretations already mentioned, interprets Christ's descent into hell as the manifestation of His death to evil spirits: so that the spirits, who had for so long heard Him promised to mortals, might now know Him as exhibited. Some, however, among whom is Durandus [of Saint-Pourçain], interpret Christ's descent into hell not as meaning that His soul exhibited its real presence to those in hell, but on account of the effect which the soul of Christ had upon those souls who were among the dead.

§ 8. Now although each of these opinions can easily be refuted by particular arguments, it will suffice in this place to overturn them all at once by a single assertion and the confirmation of Catholic faith: because we believe that Christ truly descended according to His soul to hell. For thus it is written in Ps. 15: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell." Lest anyone should twist this elsewhere, Peter in Acts 2 interprets it of Christ. And likewise the Apostle in 1 Pet. 3 testifies that Christ in the spirit, that is according to His soul, preached to those who were in prison — in that same spirit, namely, which dying He had commended into the hands of the Father. Paul also writes in Eph. 4 that Christ descended into the lower parts of the earth. To the same effect the Fathers refer the words of Zach. 9, spoken to Christ in this manner: "Thou also, in the blood of thy testament, hast sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water." And throughout his Psalms David in the person of Christ's soul confesses that it both descended into hell and was thence brought back. And at Ecclesiasticus [Sir.] 24.3 there is an illustrious passage where the Wisdom of God speaks thus: "I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth, and will visit all that sleep, and will enlighten all that hope in the Lord" — those, namely, of whom the Lord says in the Gospel: "Many prophets and just men have desired to see and to hear the things which you see and hear" (Matt. 13). For on account of these, as St. Irenaeus says (Against Heresies IV.39),¹² "Christ descended into the lower parts of the earth, as Jeremiah says: 'The Lord the holy one of Israel remembered His dead, which had slept in the land of the dust, and He descended to them to preach to them His salvation and to save them.'"

§ 9. That we may know the consent of the entire Church upon this article of faith, we shall cite some of the principal passages of the Fathers by which they confirm that faith. St. Ignatius, speaking of Christ in his Epistle to the Trallians,¹³ says: "He descended into hell alone, but ascended with a multitude." St. Irenaeus, besides the passage just cited, in book V, ch. 31: "For three days," he says, "He conversed where the dead were," etc. Likewise Origen, Homily 15 (*In Gen.* and *In Rom.* 5),¹⁴ whose words, like those of the others, we omit for the sake of brevity. Eusebius of Caesarea, book IV (*Evangelicae Demonstrationis*, ch. 12, and book X near the end).¹⁵ Athanasius (in the Creed, in the Sermon on the Passion and the Cross, and elsewhere repeatedly).¹⁶ St. Basil (on Ps. 44, 48, and 115).¹⁷ Gregory of Nyssa (Oration I on the Resurrection of the Lord).¹⁸ Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration 2 on Pascha).¹⁹ Epiphanius (Heresies 46, 69, and 77).²⁰ Cyril of Jerusalem (Mystagogical Catechesis 4, addressed to the baptized, and Catechesis 14).²¹ Cyril of Alexandria, book XII (*In Joannem*, ch. 36, and in the book *De Recta Fide ad Theodosium*, near the middle).²² St. John Damascene, book III (*De Fide*

Orthodoxa, ch. 29, and in the Oration on Suffrages of the Living for the Dead).²³ Theophylactus (on Matt. ch. 27).²⁴ And all these whom we have enumerated are Greek authors.

§ 10. Among the Latins, the number and authority of witnesses is no less. They are as follows: Tertullian, book *De Anima*, ch. 32.²⁵ Cyprian, book (*Contra Judaeos*, ch. 24).²⁶ And in the same author, the author of the Sermon (*De Unctione Chrismatis* and another *De Resurrectione Christi*), whom we, together with Jacob Pamelius, take to be Salvianus. Lactantius, book IV (*Divinarum Institutionum*, ch. 19, and the poem *De Resurrectione Domini*).²⁷ Hilarius, book IV (*De Trinitate*, at the end; likewise on Ps. 53, 54, and 118).²⁸ St. Ambrose, book IV (*De Fide ad Gratianum*, ch. 1).²⁹ Prudentius (in the *Apotheosis*, after the middle, and Hymn 6).³⁰ St. Jerome (on Hos. ch. 13; on Eph. ch. 4; on Dan. ch. 3; book II *Contra Jovinianum*).³¹ St. Augustine, book XVII (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 11, and book XX, ch. 15; likewise in the *Exposition of Psalm 85*; and Tracts 47, 78, and 112 *In Joannem*; and book III *De Symbolo*, ch. 7; and Epistle 57 to Dardanus).³² Copiously and as a formal inquiry he treats this matter in Epistle 99 to Evodius.³³ Besides these, the same is taught by Leo, Sermon 1 *De Resurrectione*, and in Epistle 79.³⁴ Gregory, book IV (*Moralia*, ch. 27; and book I, ch. 7; book VI *Epistolarum*, Epistle 15).³⁵ St. Bernard, Sermon 4 *De Omnibus Sanctis*.³⁶ And all ecclesiastical writers who came after have followed suit.

§ 11. To these is added the authority of Councils. For the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus confess that Christ rising on the third day despoiled hell. The Council of Toledo IV, canon 1, expounding the Creed's article "He descended into hell," testifies that the confession of this article pertains to Catholic faith. And the same St. Augustine clearly asserts this (Epistle 99) in these words: "Who, unless he be an unbeliever, will deny that Christ was in hell?" And a little after: "Let us hold most firmly what faith holds, confirmed by most well-grounded authority: that Christ was in hell," etc. So also Fulgentius, in the book *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2, places among the rules of faith: "that the Son of God descended according to His soul into hell." The same doctrine is found in his Epistle to Ferrando the Deacon, and in book III *Ad Thrasimundum Regem*, ch. 34.³⁷ Finally, St. Gregory (in Epistle 15, book VI): "True faith," he says, "teaches through the Catholic Church, that the Lord, descending into hell," etc.³⁸

§ 12. It must lastly be noted that the Fathers, nearly all of those enumerated so far, do not simply assert Christ's descent into hell, but assert that His soul descended thither. By their constant assertion the error is sufficiently refuted of those who interpret Christ's descent into hell only according to certain effects, whether of His divinity or of His soul.

§ 13. As for the objection raised from Rufinus: it is answered first, that Rufinus carries no great authority in the Church, as one who secretly followed the doctrines of Origen, and who troubled the Church by taking up pernicious quarrels against St. Jerome. Hence his writings are also rejected by Pope Gelasius along with the apocrypha.³⁹ Though Rufinus himself (in the same book) does not deny Christ's descent into hell, nor does he wish to call it in doubt, but seems to be speaking only of the sense of the article. For afterwards he says among other things: "That Christ descended into hell according to His soul has been clearly foretold in the Psalms," etc.

§ 14. As for the claim that this article is said not to be found in the Nicene Creed and certain others — for Rufinus is not speaking of the Apostolic Creed — this is an argument of no weight. For neither is mention of the burial of Christ in the Nicene Creed, just as it is not in the Creed of Athanasius. Yet for that reason we ought not to say that those Fathers removed this article also from the rule of faith. For it was not their purpose

to embrace all heads of faith in their Creeds, but only the principal ones, or those about which a controversy had at that time been stirred up by heretics.

§ 15. Furthermore, the opinion which explains Christ's descent into hell as the manifestation of His death to evil spirits is plainly futile and is easily refuted. For if in that sense Christ descended into hell, how then will He be said to have been brought back from hell, according to Ps. 29: "Thou hast brought up my soul from hell"? — since the knowledge of His death was not suddenly removed from evil spirits after that triduum, but has remained with them right up to the present day. Hence neither is it said in Ps. 15: "Thou wilt not leave *my knowledge* in hell," but "my soul." Furthermore, according to this interpretation, by the same reasoning — indeed by a much stronger one — one would have to confess that Christ, as soon as He expired, ascended to the spirits above, because His death was immediately made known with far greater certainty to the spirits above than to those below. But no one would grant this, even with the very Creed protesting against it; for in the Creed the ascension of Christ to heaven is not joined to His death but is placed after the resurrection, inasmuch as it took place on the fortieth day after the resurrection.

§ 16. From this article of Christ's ascension a yet more certain argument is drawn for the true understanding of the article concerning His descent into hell, since those two things are placed in the Creed in entirely the same manner. For if it must be believed without doubt that He ascended into heaven according to the assumed nature, and if another sense of that article would be imagined only with great absurdity, then likewise it must be believed that according to that same nature He descended into hell — with only this difference, that here the matter itself demands a synecdochical sense, since it is manifest and beyond contradiction that during the triduum of His death He did not have His soul joined to His body, and therefore that descent can be referred only to His soul, His body resting in the sepulchre.

§ III — What were the causes of Christ's descent into hell (Quae fuerint causae descensus Christi ad inferos)

§ 17. The soul of Christ descended into hell not in order to snatch the impious from thence — whether those liable to actual sins or those subject only to original guilt — but in order to lead the just out from thence. For as regards the wicked, it is the most certain dogma of the Church that in the hell of the damned there is no redemption; as is more fully explained toward the end of the Fourth Book of the *Sentences* against the Origenists. Hence St. Augustine⁴¹ numbers among the heresies the opinion of those who said that, upon Christ's descending into hell, the unbelievers there believed, and that all were thereupon freed. Now this is intimated also by those words of Wisdom found in Ecclesiasticus ch. 24: "I will look upon all that sleep, and I will illuminate all that hope in the Lord."⁴² And it was signified likewise by those words of Hos. ch. 13: "I will be thy sting, O hell" — that is, as the Gloss adds by way of interpretation, by leading out the elect and leaving the reprobate there. And St. Gregory, in book 12 of the *Moralia* (ch. 8),⁴³ treating that passage of Scripture, says: "Because he took away a part from hell and left a part, he did not kill it utterly, but bit hell." The same author (Homily 22 *On the Gospels*)⁴⁴ says: "For the Lord by his resurrection did not restore to pardon any of the unbelievers who had been handed over to eternal punishments for their crimes, but he snatched from the enclosures of hell those whom he recognized as his own in faith and works." Then, having cited the words of Hosea, he subjoins the same words as above.

§ 18. Furthermore, it is the teaching of all the Fathers that Christ descended to hell for this purpose: to lead out the souls of the just. For Tertullian writes²⁵ that Christ descended into the lower parts of the earth in order that there he might make the Patriarchs and Prophets partakers of himself. And Irenaeus, book 5 (*Against Heresies*, ch. 39),⁴⁵ says: "On account of the Prophets and the just, Christ descended into the lower parts of the earth." So Origen (*In Romans* 5)⁴⁶ says: "We understand that Christ descended into hell for this reason: that he might absolve those who were held there not so much by the guilt of transgression as by the condition of dying." The same is the teaching of Gregory Nazianzen in *Oration 2 On Easter*,⁴⁷ where he shows that Christ, descending into hell, did not save all without exception by his coming, but only those who believed. The same is the opinion of Epiphanius (*Heresies* 40 and 69)⁴⁸ and of the others whom we have cited above, among whom St. Augustine,⁴⁹ in book 10 of *The City of God* (ch. 15), says it is not absurdly believed that the ancient saints who held the faith of the Christ who was to come were, though in places far removed from the torments of the impious, nevertheless among those in hell, until the blood of Christ and his descent to those places should rescue them thence.

§ 19. Now what Christ bestowed upon the just by his descent, and from what evil he freed them, is discussed at length by St. Augustine (*Epistle 99*)⁵⁰ and by the Scholastics who dispute on this text, as well as by St. Thomas.⁵¹ For since, by reason of the debt of original sin, the souls of the just were still excluded (*exclusae*) from the vision of the glory of God, Christ, descending to them by the power (*virtute*) of his Passion, absolved them from that debt, so that they might be able to see God through his essence. Hence in *Sermon 2 On the Resurrection* found among the works of St. Augustine⁵² it is read that Christ, descending into hell, absolved all the just who were held bound by original sin. And St. Gregory, in book 4 of the *Moralia* (ch. 27),⁵³ says that those holy ones resting in the places of hell were prevented by the debt of the first guilt from entering the kingdom. And Rupert, book 1 (*On the Divine Offices*, ch. 15),⁵⁴ says that original sin was the middle wall standing in the way; and so on. Nor should one understand any other penalty or pain as that which Christ dissolved for them by his descent, according to that text of Acts ch. 1: "having loosed the sorrows of hell" (*solutis doloribus inferni*) — than the sorrow arising from the delay of the hoped-for glory, inasmuch as they had already arrived at the term of their life and therefore, unless that debt had stood in the way of the reward of justice, they ought to have received it. Now that penalty was dissolved when Christ, at the very moment of his coming, displayed to those holy souls not only the presence of his most holy soul, but also admitted them to the contemplation of the Divinity — although they were not admitted into heaven, which is properly the place of the Blessed, before Christ himself ascended thither.

§ IV — Whether all or some have been freed from Purgatory (*An ex Purgatorio omnes vel aliqui liberati*)

§ 20. Furthermore, some are of the opinion that Christ, in descending to those below, also freed those who were in purgatorial punishments — granting to them by His most auspicious coming the first and full indulgences, as it were certain first-fruits of the indulgences whose most generous use in the Church He was about to inaugurate. This is the view of Ambrosius Catharinus on that text of Eph. 4, "*He descended into the lower parts of the earth*," and of Dominicus Soto,⁵⁶ who also endeavours to confirm this from St. Augustine and St. John Damascene.⁵⁷ And this view is not implausibly held to be stated by those authorities: for that reason St. Augustine (in *Epistle 99*)⁵⁸ writes that purgatorial pains are remitted through the coming of Christ to those below — although St. Thomas holds a different opinion.⁵⁵

§ 21. It is confirmed: this opinion is also confirmed by the argument that the Fathers, speaking of the just being freed from the lower regions by Christ, nowhere except some of the pious, but only the impious, whose condition was truly hopeless; and sometimes they speak universally of the pious and the just. For Origen, Homily 15 (*In Genesim*),¹⁴ affirms that the words of Christ to the Thief — "Today thou shalt be with me in Paradise" — were spoken not to the thief alone but also to the holy men who had descended to the lower regions; and St. Augustine (on Ps. 85)⁵⁹ testifies that the Lord came down thither to rescue thence the souls of all the preceding saints. Similar universal statements are found in Athanasius (*Sermo de Passione et Cruce*)⁶⁰ and in Damascene (*in Tract. de Suffragiis vivorum pro mortuis*).⁶¹ Moreover, St. Augustine, in book 12 (*De Genesi ad litteram*),⁶² is seen to think this manifestly, saying as follows: "And Christ's soul is believed to have come even unto those places where sinners are tormented, in order to free by remission of punishment those whom His justice, concealed from us, judged were to be freed, and not without merit." Then, subjoining a proof from what is said in Acts 2, "*the pains of hell being loosed*,"⁶³ he adds: "For neither Abraham, nor that poor man in his bosom, that is, in the secret of his repose, was in pains; between whose repose and those infernal torments we read that a great chaos was fixed." Thus he, thinking that the pains of hell which Christ, in descending thither, loosed were not those of all the just, but of those who were still being tormented in the infernal regions on account of their sins. These can only be understood as those who were held fast by purgatorial punishments, their pains now loosed. Not dissimilar is the passage in St. Augustine, book 17 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 11),⁶⁴ where he says that Christ descended to the lower regions for the sake of loosing the bonds of sins of certain persons.⁶⁵

§ V — *Whether Christ as man is everywhere (An Christus homo sit ubique)*

§ 22. Just as, treating of the twelfth Distinction, we said that it was always the case that Christ, once man had been assumed, was and would always be man; so it must be acknowledged that He is everywhere. For the formal character (*ratio*) of each is the same, namely the unity of the Person (*Persona*) in two natures and the consequent communication of the properties (*idiomata*) of each nature. Therefore, not only must it be granted that Christ is everywhere; indeed also that Christ as man is everywhere — provided that this is not taken reduplicatively. For Christ as man is not everywhere according to His human nature, as Joannes Brentius in our age, together with certain others, ignorantly supposed; but according to His divine nature. For to the human nature its own determinate place belongs; wherefore it must not be said that the soul or the body of Christ is everywhere, but in a determinate place, after the manner of a creature. For the soul and the body are not predicated of the supposit (*suppositum*); since they are parts of the human nature. And therefore they do not participate in the properties (*idiomata*) of the whole supposit.

§ 23. Nor must it be granted that Christ *is* everywhere man; just as neither is it to be granted that Christ *always* was man. For such propositions signify the thing signified by the attribute — namely, that the human nature belongs to the subject according to the determination of the copula, that is, everywhere, and always — which is manifestly false. St. Augustine transmits this doctrine (in Epistle 57⁶⁷ to Dardanus, and *De Trinitate* I, ch. 13,⁶⁸ and book 3, *Contra Maximinum*, ch. 20).⁶⁹ Pertinent to the same point is also what the same author writes in the book *De Unitate Trinitatis ad Optatum*, ch. 14,⁷⁰ and *De Symbolo*, book 3, ch. 7:⁷¹ that Christ is and was everywhere whole (*totus*), everywhere perfect — wholly in heaven, wholly in the womb of the Virgin, wholly on the cross. For He is said to be wholly everywhere not on account of each nature, nor on

account of each part of either nature, but on account of the Hypostasis (*Hypostasis*). Therefore He is wholly everywhere, because the one perfect whole Person is everywhere. For the masculine gender refers to the person, but the neuter to the nature, as was stated in book 1, and as St. John Damascene attests in these words, book 3, ch. 7: "The whole Christ is perfect God, but not the whole is God."⁷² Adding the formal character of this he says: "For 'the whole' (*totum*) is representative of nature, but 'the wholly' (*totus*) is representative of hypostasis." Now, how it is possible for Christ to be in several places at once according to His human nature — as the Church teaches and professes that He is really present in several places in the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist — is a matter for treatment elsewhere.

§ I — What are called the theological virtues (Quae dicantur Virtutes Theologicae)

§ 24. Since there was in Christ a fulness of graces, of virtues, and of gifts (Dist. 13),⁷⁴ the Master here inquires concerning the theological virtues (*virtutes Theologicae*): whether it must be granted that they were in Christ. And from this he takes the occasion of treating at greater length of these virtues and of certain others, deferring the solution of the question proposed to Distinction 26. In order, therefore, that we may follow the Master's order, we must next treat of the theological virtues. Now those virtues are called theological which properly are concerned with God as the supernaturally beatific good (*bonum beatificum supernaturale*), and by which God as such a good is properly worshipped — namely these three: Faith, Hope, and Charity (*Fides, Spes, Caritas*). These are everywhere commended to us in the Scriptures of both Testaments. They are explicitly named and set down in their order by the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) and by Ecclesiasticus (Sir. 2).

§ 25. These virtues are, as it were, certain supernatural first principles by which man is directed and ordered toward attaining the beatitude (*beatitudo*) by which he is at last conjoined to God in perfect enjoyment (*fruitio*), which consists in the vision of Him — just as by natural principles each and every thing is ordered to its natural end. Hence Peter (2 Pet. 1) says that by these, as the greatest and most precious gifts of God, we are made partakers of the divine nature. Which, although it can be extended to every genus of virtue, pertains peculiarly, however, to those which have God according to the aforesaid consideration as their object: since between the object and the power tending toward it there exists a certain likeness and conformity, on account of which it was fittingly said by Peter that men, through the virtues by which they tend toward God, are made like God and partakers of divinity. Moreover, that the worship of God properly consists in these three virtues, St. Augustine teaches (*Enchiridion*, chs. 3 and 6),⁷⁵ where, to one asking in what manner God is to be worshipped, he says that the answer to be given briefly and in sum is: by faith, hope, and charity; and he approves the same in book 2 (*Retractationes*, ch. 63).⁷⁶

§ 26. If you ask why they are called theological or divine virtues, a manifold formal character (*ratio*) can be rendered. *First*, because, as has been said, they are concerned with God as their proper object. *Second*, because they transform man in some measure into God and render him divine. *Third*, because they are infused into us by God alone; whence they are also called infused virtues (*virtutes infusae*). This occurs both in the baptism of infants and in the justification of adults, as the Fathers of the Council of Trent teach (Session 6, ch. 7).⁷⁷ *Fourth*, because these virtues are handed down to us by divine revelation alone in Sacred Scripture, since they

are utterly unknown to the philosophers who dispute concerning morals. *Fifth*, because theological doctrine is chiefly concerned with them, and is almost wholly occupied in expounding their objects.

§ II — What faith is (Quid sit fides)

§ 27. Faith (*fides*), which is first in order of generation among the theological virtues, is defined by the Master as: "*the virtue by which those things are believed which are not seen*" — a definition taken from the *Enchiridion* of St. Augustine (ch. 9, and *Quaestiones in Evangelium* I, qu. 2, ch. 29, and other passages in the same author).

⁷⁹ St. Augustine admonishes, however, that only those things which pertain to religion belong to faith for the Christian to believe; for there are many things which a Christian may be ignorant of without any harm to faith — such as the causes of natural things, or the history of past events, and other things of this kind which do not at all touch upon religion. Wherefore the definition of faith given by the Master is not thereby incomplete. For the assent to such things, as we have said, is not an act of any virtue, or at least not of a theological virtue. For just as whatever is loved by theological virtue is loved by charity, so whatever is believed by theological virtue is believed by faith, and likewise of hope.

§ 28. Furthermore, St. Basil in the book *De vera fide*⁸⁰ defines faith thus: "Faith is an assent of the mind, with full approbation and without any hesitation, to those truths which have been proposed by divine gift." Others define faith as a certain cognition of present life, apt for directing the actions of piety according to the rule, in the contemplation of the rewards which make a man blessed. Others yet more plainly define it thus: "Faith is a virtue infused by God, by which the human mind, illuminated by His light, firmly assents to all things which God has revealed to men and proposed as to be believed by His Church, whether or not they are expressed in Sacred Scripture." This is rather a description than a definition of faith, yet it can stand. The understanding and fuller explanation of both this and the preceding definitions depends, however, upon those things which are to be said hereafter. This much is evident from the given definitions: that by faith, insofar as it is a theological virtue, is signified not the knowledge of salvation and of justice received or to be received through Christ, but the bare assent to those things which are divinely revealed.

§ III — How the definition of faith in the Apostle is to be understood (Fidei definitio apud Apostolum intelligenda)

§ 29. Another definition of faith is indicated by the Apostle (Heb. 11) in these words: "*Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.*" Although these words seem to the Apostle to have been written perhaps not so much to assign a definition of faith as to indicate some property of it, yet they are used by the Doctors as a definition. Now by this definition faith is first said to be *the substance* — in Greek *ὑπόστασις*, that is, substance or existence — of things hoped for, that is, of those things which are hoped for (for the Greek participle *ἐλπίζομένων* is in the present tense, just as what follows concerning those things which are not seen — in Greek *ἀβλεπομένων* — is likewise so); because the assent is so certain and firm, that it presents to us as present, and already subsisting in the nature of things, those things which are hoped for by us, even though they are still future and placed in expectation. For it makes us doubt no more about future

things and mysteries remote from sense than if they had either been seen with the eyes or comprehended by reason — indeed they are persuaded to us far more certainly than those things which are persuaded by sense or reason. Faith is therefore called the substance or hypostasis from its effect, because it begets and in some manner produces within us the hypostasis, that is, the subsistence, of things hoped for. Others hold that faith is called in this sense the certain substance of things hoped for, because it is a certain basis and foundation on which the hoped-for salvation so rests that without it it cannot be had — according to that saying of the same Apostle: "*Without faith it is impossible to please God.*" Yet the former exposition is more pleasing to the ancient Interpreters, especially the Greeks, and above all to St. John Chrysostom,⁸² and it seems more to be from the mind of the Apostle; both because of what is afterwards said in commendation of faith concerning Moses, "*he endured as seeing him who is invisible*"; and because the entire disputation of the Apostle up to the end of the chapter aims most especially at this sense, and above all at that which immediately follows: *the evidence of things not seen* — or, in Greek, *of those things which are not seen*. For faith is called the *evidence* (*argumentum*), or as it is very frequently read in St. Augustine and other ancient Latin writers, the *conviction* (*convictio*) — in Greek ἐλεγχος, that is, the showing and demonstration of things not appearing — because, although those things are not evident and not yet appearing, yet it represents them to the eyes of our mind so certainly as if they were either beheld with bodily eyes or demonstrated to us.

§ 30. Furthermore, since faith is not only of good things which are hoped for but also of evil things which are feared; and not only of future things but also of past things, and even of certain present things, that is, of those existing in the present; hence it is sufficiently clear that this notion of faith, as posited by the Apostle in its first part, does not comprehend every genus of those things which fall under faith, but only those which are the principal ones — namely the things to be hoped for and the things not seen.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III (supplement), q. 30, a. 4. [Note: the marginal citation reads "S. Th. 4. p. q. 30. a. 4," referring to the Supplement of the *Summa theologiae*, q. 30, a. 4.]

2. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, p. 1, ch. 11; and *Quaestiones super Epistolam ad Romanos* 1.

3. Thomas Walden (Thomas Netter), *De Sacramentis*, art. 3, ch. 44.

4. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, ch. 4.

5. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIX, ch. 3.

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50, a. 4.

7. [Pseudo-]Fulgentius (?), *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2.

8. St. Augustine, Epistle 57 (= Epistle CCLX to Dardanus, in the edition of PP. Benedictines) and Epistle 99; likewise Tracts 47 and 78 *In Joannem*.

9. Ps. 109 (Vulgate); Heb. 7.

10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50, a. 4 (response); the argument that the character of orders remains in the separated soul.

11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, qq. 51 and 52, a. 2 and following.

12. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* IV, ch. 39. The Scriptural passage cited is from Jer. 31 (as rendered by the Fathers; Estius notes in his annotation that Irenaeus cites this as from Jeremiah, though the name of Isaiah has crept into this locus — see the footnote in the printed text — and that Justin Martyr in his *Dialogue with Trypho* also alleges the same passage as from Jeremiah; moreover, that Jewish scribes had removed this and several other passages from the Sacred Scriptures, and that the text is not found in the LXX nor in the current Latin Vulgate).

13. St. Ignatius, *Epistola ad Trallianos*. Note: Dionysius Petavius (*Theologia Dogmatica*, tom. V, *De Incarnatione*, ch. XVIII, num. 1) says he had deliberately passed over the testimony of the Martyr Ignatius in this matter, since from the Epistle to the Trallians, as he himself states, he had found it noted by very many that those epistles had been interpolated in several places, and that the passage about the descent of Christ into hell was lacking in the edition which had recently appeared from the Florentine exemplar, the most correct of all in his age.
14. Origen, *In Genesim*, Homily 15; and *In Epistolam ad Romanos* 5.
15. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Evangelicae Demonstrationis* IV, ch. 12; and book X, near the end.
16. Athanasius, in the Creed [i.e., the Athanasian Creed]; in the Sermon on the Passion and the Cross; and elsewhere repeatedly. Note: Natalis Alexander (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, saec. 4, ch. 6, art. 8, num. 15) and Louis Ellies Dupin (*Bibliotheca Auctorum Ecclesiasticorum*, saec. 4, in *Athanasio*) and others deny the *Homilia* or *Sermo in Passionem et Crucem* to Athanasius, though very many ascribe it to him as genuinely his. As for the Creed, the dispute is ongoing whether it is or is not the Creed of Athanasius; many defending it as Athanasius's, and Bellarmine rightly observing (*Catalogus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*, in *Athanasio*) that since the Catholic Church bears witness to it by proposing it for recitation in the Divine Office under the name of Athanasius, one must acquiesce in its testimony.
17. St. Basil, *In Psalmum* 44, 48, and 115.
18. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio I de Resurrectione Domini*.
19. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio 2 in Pascha*.
20. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 46, 69, and 77.
21. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis Mystagogica* 4, addressed to the baptized; and *Catechesis* 14.
22. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem* XII, ch. 36; and *De Recta Fide ad Theodosium*, near the middle.
23. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 29; and in the *Oratio de Suffragiis Vivorum pro Mortuis*.
24. Theophylactus, on Matt., ch. 27.
25. Tertullian, *De Anima*, ch. 32.
26. Cyprian [or the author under his name], *Contra Judaeos*, ch. 24; and in the same author (or rather in the author of the Sermon *De Uncione Chrismatis* and another *De Resurrectione Christi*, whom Estius, together with Jacob Pamelius, takes to be Salvianus).
27. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* IV, ch. 19; and the poem *De Resurrectione Domini*. Note: some doubt whether the poem *De Resurrectione Domini*, cited here by the author under Lactantius's name, is genuinely his; Bellarmine testifies that there is no certain argument that it is not his.
28. Hilarius [St. Hilary of Poitiers], *De Trinitate* IV, at the end; likewise on Ps. 53, 54, and 118.
29. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum* IV, ch. 1.
30. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, after the middle; and Hymn 6.
31. St. Jerome, on Hos. ch. 13; on Eph. ch. 4; on Dan. ch. 3; book II *Contra Jovinianum*.
32. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVII, ch. 11; *De Civitate Dei* XX, ch. 15; *Expositio Psalmi* 85; Tracts 47, 78, and 112 *In Joannem*; *De Symbolo* III, ch. 7; Epistle 57 (= Epistle CCLX to Dardanus, in the Benedictine edition; or CLIV in the same edition, as noted in the source).
33. St. Augustine, Epistle 99 (= Epistle CCXXXVII in the Benedictine edition, or CLXV to Evodius).
34. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 *De Resurrectione*; and Epistle 79.
35. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 27; *Moralia* I, ch. 7; *Epistolarum* VI, Epistle 15.
36. St. Bernard, Sermon 4 *De Omnibus Sanctis*.
37. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2; *Epistola ad Ferrandum Diaconum*; *Ad Thrasimundum Regem* III, ch. 34.
38. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolarum* VI, Epistle 15.
39. Gelasius I, *Decretum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis*, in *Decretum Gratiani*, dist. 15, c. *Sancta Romana Ecclesia*.

40. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 52, aa. 5, 6, 7.
41. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 79.
42. Sir. 24 (Vulgate): "Inficiam omnes dormientes et illuminabo omnes sperantes in Domino."
43. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XII, ch. 8.
44. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 22.
45. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* V, ch. 39.
46. Origen, *In Epistolam ad Romanos* 5.
47. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 2 *In Pascha*.
48. Epiphanius, *Panarion (Adversus Haereses)*, heresies 40 and 69.
49. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 15.
50. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 99 (= Epistle CLXIV in the most recent edition).
51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 52, a. 5.
52. Sermo 2 *De Resurrectione*, cited here as among St. Augustine's works; in the ancient edition it is numbered CXXXVII *De Tempore*; in the Louvain edition it is placed in Appendix LI to the Benedictine edition and rejected as spurious, numbered CLX; it is also drawn from Gregory and Eusebius, that is from a Homily; the sentence which is cited from it here is found in the same edition. Benedictine edition, num. 1.
53. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 27.
54. Rupert of Deutz, *De Divinis Officiis* I, ch. 15.
55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 52, a. 8.
56. Ambrosius Catharinus, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios*, on Eph. 4 ("*Descendit in inferiores partes terrae*"); Domingo de Soto [*In IV Sent.* or relevant work — abbreviation as in source].
57. St. Augustine and St. John Damascene [specific works cited by Soto — abbreviation as in source].
58. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 99 (= Epistle CLXIV in the Benedictine edition).
59. St. Augustine, on Ps. 85.
60. Athanasius, *Sermo de Passione et Cruce* [authenticity disputed; see prior footnotes].
61. St. John Damascene, *Tractatus de Suffragiis vivorum pro mortuis* [authenticity disputed; see prior footnotes].
62. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII [ch. 33].
63. Acts 2 ("*solutis doloribus inferni*").
64. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVII, ch. 11.
65. For fuller treatment of Christ's descent to the lower regions, see above, the footnote on Bellarmino, *De Christi Animae ad Inferos Descensu (Controversiarum* vol. 1, *De Christo Capite totius Ecclesiae* lib. 4, from ch. 6 to the end of the book), and Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, vol. 5, pt. 2, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 13, ch. 15, to the last chapter, num. XIV, who expounds the same passage of 1 Pet. 3 concerning the spirits who were in prison, who at some time had been unbelieving in the days of Noah.
66. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 52, ad 3.
67. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 57 (= Epistle CCLX to Dardanus in the Benedictine edition; or CLXV in the most recent edition).
68. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 13.
69. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, ch. 20.
70. St. Augustine, *De Unitate Trinitatis ad Optatum*, ch. 14 [abbreviation as in source].
71. St. Augustine, *De Symbolo* III, ch. 7 [abbreviation as in source].
72. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 7.

73. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 62, a. 1 and following.
74. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, Dist. 13.
75. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 3 and 6.
76. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 63.
77. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7.
78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 4, a. 1.
79. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 9; *Quaestiones in Evangelium* I, qu. 2, ch. 29; and other passages in the same author.
80. St. Basil, *De vera fide* [abbreviation as in source].
81. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 4, a. 1 (*ubi supra*).
82. St. John Chrysostom [homily on Heb. 11 — abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO XXIII — ON WHAT, WHY, AND HOW ONE MUST BELIEVE, AND ON RELATED QUESTIONS CONCERNING FAITH (*DE QUID, PROPTER QUID, ET QUOMODO CREDENDUM, ALIISQUE AD FIDEM PERTINENTIBUS*)

§ 1. — and those things which have the formal character (*ratio*) of an end, namely future goods, that is, eternal beatitude. As to what the Master asks lastly, namely whether the description of faith applies to hope, according to the foregoing explanation, a negative answer must be given. For it is not the office of hope to make a man certain of future goods as though they already existed; but, that certainty being presupposed and received from faith, to expect with certainty that those same goods will be had by and from oneself — as will afterwards be declared in its proper place.

§ IV — What, why, and how one must believe (Quid, propter quid, et quomodo credendum)

§ 2. For a fuller understanding of the definitions set out above and of the very nature of faith (*fides*), three things must be diligently considered: *What, why, and how* one must believe.

What must be believed must be sought partly from Sacred Scripture, partly from Ecclesiastical tradition. Scripture we have comprised within a definite number of books and a fixed canon. Ecclesiastical tradition is made manifest to us either by the concordant teaching of the Fathers, or by the definition of the Church.

§ 3. *Why one must believe*, the Apostle teaches in 1 Thess. 2: "When you had received from us the word of the hearing of God," he says, "you received it not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God."² And by this consideration above all must the Christian mind fortify itself against every thought of the flesh, whether it suggests things contrary to faith or calls into doubt the truth of religion — by this consideration, I say, that whatsoever faith declares are the voices of God. And this is what the Scholastics teach when they say that the formal object (*objectum formale*) of faith is the first truth (*veritas prima*), or the divine truth (*veritas divina*) — by which words they wish to signify that the authority of God alone is the formal character (*ratio*) on account of which we believe.

§ 4. From this, moreover, must be sought the resolution of this question: whether, in believing, we ought to rest in the teaching and authority of Scripture and the Church, or whether we must pass on to a higher confirmation of truth? That is, whether we ought to believe because the Church so teaches and Scripture so holds, or because God so speaks. For the definition of Scripture and the Church is not here so separated from God as though the truth of Scripture or the Church derived its certainty and solidity from some source other

than God. For just as to believe something on account of the authority of a certain person and to believe it on account of that person's words are the same thing, so to believe something on account of the authority of God and to believe the same thing on account of the words of the Church or of Scripture, as the voices of God, must be held as equivalent; in accordance with that of Lk. 10: "He who hears you hears me."³ For in many and various ways God speaks to men: formerly indeed to the Fathers through the Prophets, to whom He made His will known by revelation, as it were by an interior locution — who therefore had no need of writings or definitions of the Church in order to believe. But afterwards to us through Sacred Scripture and the voices of the Church. It is to this, as to an exterior locution, that He wills us to have recourse in every question of religion, and He admonishes us to do so by all those utterances in which the authority of Scripture or of the Church is commended as divine.

§ 5. Now as to what pertains to the *manner of believing* (*modus credendi*), it must be known that faith belongs partly to the intellect (*intellectus*) and partly to the will (*voluntas*) — to the intellect indeed as to its subject and proper potency (*potentia*). For the very act of believing or of assenting (*assensus*) is an act of the cognitive part. On this account, therefore, faith, in the part that pertains to assenting, demands firmness, which excludes all hesitation whatsoever, as is clear from what has been said above. For if one must believe on account of the authority of God, who is the supreme, first, and immutable truth, no doubt, not even the least, ought to be left in those things which are received by faith, even though they may appear contrary to sense or to reason. Hence the faith of Abraham is commended (Rom. 4) in that "against hope he believed in hope," not hesitating in distrust, "not considering his body as dead," and so forth, "being fully persuaded" — that is, most certainly knowing — "that whatsoever God hath promised, He is able to do, and will indeed do."⁴

§ 6. Although, however, this firmness of assenting is necessary to faith, by which it is distinguished from opinion, conjecture, suspicion, and every fluctuating and unstable assent, it is not found in faith alone, and therefore it is not a certain and undoubted mark of Christian faith. For it can be found, and is found, in heresy and other errors, and even in assent to natural truth — as the pertinacity of heretics and the certainty of demonstration sufficiently proves.

§ 7. Furthermore, faith pertains to the will insofar as it depends upon the will as the commanding or consenting principle. For it is proper to the human mind by its natural constitution to deliberate and examine, and then to determine whether or not to assent to the things proposed; but those things which pertain to religion are for the most part such as do not admit of the examination of reason, being for the most part improbable to the judgment of human wisdom — as the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 1.⁵ Certainly, our intellect would never, or rarely, yield to matters of this kind, were it not drawn into assent by the command and inclination of the will — as the Apostle speaks in 2 Cor. 10, that "every intellect should be brought into captivity" into the service or obedience of Christ.⁶ Therefore, a kind and benevolent inclination of the will is necessary to the intellect in the act of believing, both in order that it may turn itself toward those reasons which, if present, nourish and sustain it, or at least show that what is believed is not absurd or alien to reason, and also so that it may prevent those considerations which might impede or delay assent. Hence it is said of Abraham that "he considered not his own body as dead," and so forth.⁷ Therefore the assent of faith is, consequentially, also an act of the will, indeed one commanded by the will — whether with respect to its beginning, or with respect to its continuation. And hence arises the merit of faith, since every merit must derive its origin from the will.

§ V — Whether there is faith in demons (*An in Daemonibus sit Fides*)

§ 8. To this question, which asks whether demons possess faith, the occasion for the inquiry is furnished by the words of the Master at the close of § III, where he says that faith joined with love (*dilectione*) belongs to the Christian, while that which exists without love is the faith of a demon. For, as James testifies, "the demons also believe and tremble."⁹ These words are drawn from St. Augustine,¹⁰ Sermon 1 (*De Vigilia Pentecostes, de Verbis Domini*, Sermon 61). At the same place similar sentiments are read in his work *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 7, Homily 17 among the fifty, and Tractates 6, 29, and 93 in *Joan*.¹¹ Nor rarely are similar things found among other Fathers.

§ 9. For the explanation of this question, the considerations which we set out in the preceding section are brought to bear, namely, why and in what manner belief is necessary. For to true, that is, Christian, faith a certain inclination of the will (*voluntatis propensio*) is necessary, by which the intellect may be led to assent to the words of one in whose authority the mind of the believer rests. For the act of faith has this as its own peculiar character: that from a certain humble reverence toward God the intellect believes in His authority, receives, and firmly and obediently holds those things which are spoken — as St. Basil teaches, commenting on Ps. 115, "I believed, wherefore have I spoken; but I was greatly humbled."¹² "Humility," he says, "is required for faith, by which, namely, a man modestly submits himself to the divine truth, so that he set not his own understanding as the measure of divine matters, and does not wish to measure by his own thought and wit all that he believes — so as to believe only as much as he can attain by his own reasoning." Thus he. If therefore anyone, whether by the mere natural acuteness of his wit, or by the weight of arguments and reasons, or by the evidence of senses alone or even of signs, being convinced and compelled, should assent to those things which have been divinely revealed, that assent will not pertain to Christian faith.

§ 10. Since, therefore, demons, by the subtlety of their nature and the perspicacity of their wit, see that the dogmas of our Religion do not contradict the truth known to them naturally, and see that the same are confirmed by miracles exceeding the power of nature well known to them; and since, moreover, they experience that by the virtue of Christian Teaching very many are snatched from their kingdom and power; and since, being led and convinced by these and similar arguments, they are compelled to confess that the teaching of the Christian Religion is most true — yet since there is in them no spontaneous submission and obedience of the will toward the divine truth, their assent concerning divine things cannot properly be called faith, but is a certain definite cognition extorted by experience and by the evidence of things or of signs. So teaches St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 21,¹³ where, treating of Mk. 1, "What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth?" he says that the Son of God became known to the demons not by the faith by which hearts are cleansed, but by certain temporal effects of His power and by signs of His most hidden presence, which could be perspicuous to the angelic senses even of malignant spirits rather than to the frailty of men.

§ 11. Although demons therefore share with us in the firmness of assent to many articles of Religion — which assent the Fathers, following the Apostle James, have often expressed under the general name of faith — yet, since that assent neither rests principally on the First Truth but on created reason, nor has a conjoined inclination of the will, but rather a rebellion, whereby they would wish to be false what they are compelled to confess as true: for these reasons it cannot be accounted by the name of Theological faith. To this must be added that even formless (*informis*) faith is a gift of God, as we shall show below — but in demons the gratuitous gifts of God have no use. For neither on their own account, whose salvation is beyond hope, nor on

account of men, with whom all intercourse with demons is forbidden, can faith be said to have been infused in them. Therefore in vain from the whole of its kind would this gift be bestowed on them.

§ VI — How "to believe God," "to believe a God," and "to believe into God" differ (*Quomodo differant Deo, Deum, et in Deum credere*)

§ 12. The Master, following St. Augustine, distinguishes among these three: *credere Deo*, *credere Deum*, and *credere in Deum* — namely, that *credere Deo* is to believe true the things God speaks; *credere Deum* is to believe that He Himself is God. Both of these are common even to the wicked. But *credere in Deum* is, by believing, to love God. And this he holds to belong to the good alone. For St. Augustine says in Tractate 29 in *Joan.*:¹⁵ "Not every one who believes God believes into God; for even the demons believed Him, and did not believe into Him. And of the Apostles themselves we can say: We believe Paul, but we do not believe into Paul." And he adds: "What is it to believe into God? By believing to love, by believing to go into Him and to be incorporated into His members." Then, explaining more fully the faith by which one believes *in* God, he says it is not just any kind of faith, but that which works through love (*dilectionem*). Similar things are found in St. Augustine in his *Exposition of Ps. 77* and Sermon 6 *de Verbis Domini* and on Ps. 139:¹⁶ "This is to believe in Christ: to love Christ." And below: "All therefore who believe thus are as living stones," etc.

§ 13. But this distinction of St. Augustine among these three seems to present some difficulty. For if *credere in Deum* is to love by believing, then the act of faith and of charity (*charitatis*) will be one and the same — which is absurd, since different habits have different acts. Furthermore, if only he believes into God who loves God and is incorporated into His members, then the profession of faith is false by which wicked Christians, reciting their Creed, say that they believe into God. Finally, this distinction seems to be manifestly overthrown by Scripture, Jn. 12, where it is said that many among the rulers believed into Him (*crediderunt in eum*), but because of the Pharisees they did not confess it, lest they should be cast out of the synagogue; "for they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God."¹⁷

§ 14. But it must be answered that St. Augustine was correct in distinguishing these three. This is indeed manifest with respect to the first two. And that *credere in Deum* is likewise different from both of them is clearly shown from our very Creed, in which we profess that we believe into (*in*) God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but into nothing else whatsoever — for there is added: "I believe the holy Catholic Church," etc. — not *in* the Church. It is necessary therefore that *credere in Deum* signifies something different from *credere Deum* and *credere Deo*. Now this has been declared by St. Augustine to consist in love (*dilectionem*), meaning that the will, commanding faith, moves the intellect toward God as toward its end — and this holds even in wicked Christians. For since true faith is in them, they have from a certain obedience and humility a will inclined toward those things which they believe; although concupiscence is stronger and they direct their actions contrary to what they believe. And this pious inclination toward those things which are believed St. Augustine has generally called love (*dilectionem*): because it is a certain beginning directed toward charity (*caritatem*), which makes the sons of God. Hence he adds in his comment on Ps. 130:¹⁸ not in the way that the demons believed — meaning that St. Augustine does not regard these as the selfsame act of faith and an act of love, but as two things, one conjoined with the other, in those who hold the Christian faith.

§ VII — That faith can subsist without charity (*Fidem consistere sine Charitate*)

§ 15. That faith does not necessarily have charity conjoined to it is presupposed in the text of the Master [of the Sentences], who indicates that distinction of faith which is most celebrated among the Scholastic Doctors: namely, into faith formed (*fides formata*) — that is, perfect and formed by charity — and faith unformed (*fides informis*) — that is, imperfect through lack of charity; yet both are true faith, and both are properly called faith. But because this doctrine is vehemently resisted by the sects of this age — some saying that faith and charity are the same thing, others asserting that faith cannot exist without charity any more than fire can exist without heat — it will here be worth the effort briefly to demonstrate the Catholic dogma from Scripture and the Fathers.

§ 16. It is first of all clear from faith's own case, that well-known text of Jn. 12: "Many even of the rulers believed in Him, but because of the Pharisees they did not confess it, lest they should be put out of the synagogue." And that you may know with certainty that they did not have charity, the evangelist continues: "For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God." No less clear is that text of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13: "And if I have all faith so as to move mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing." He says the same of others. Likewise Rom. 1, where he severely rebukes certain persons because "they hold back the truth of God in unrighteousness." Even though this may not seem to have been said of faith in the strict sense, yet the formal character (*ratio*) is the same for truth naturally known as for truth divinely revealed, provided that in either case both concern divine things, which the Apostle calls the "truth of God." Equally, either kind can be held back in unrighteousness. For he was surely speaking of the faithful — that same Apostle in 1 Cor. 6, when he was saying that neither adulterers, nor drunkards, nor the rapacious, and so forth, would possess the Kingdom of God.²⁰ Hence also elsewhere he commends not just any faith as sufficient unto salvation, but that faith "which works through charity" (Gal. 5),²¹ by which form of words he signifies that there is a certain faith which does not profit without charity. Most clearly indeed the Apostle James teaches this in ch. 2: "What will it profit, if someone says he has faith but has not works? Can faith save him?" — and what follows, to the end of the chapter;²² by which words it is shown that faith without charity, which is the mother of good works, can indeed exist, but is dead — that is, idle and useless. For he does not understand faith dead without works in such a way that it should not exist — just as we say a man is dead, who has ceased to be a man, but only this far dead, that it has neither motion nor operation — just as a dead body is said to be dead because it exists indeed but lacks life. For the Apostle himself employed that very comparison: "For just as a body without spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead." Therefore, just as that body is dead yet real, so also this faith is dead yet true.

§ 17. There are also other scriptural passages, and not a few, which beyond faith require works — that is, charity and the observance of the commandments of God — such as Matt. 7: "Not everyone who says to Me: Lord, Lord, etc."; Jn. 15: "You are My friends if you do what I command you"; Rom. 2: "Not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified."²³

§ 18. Furthermore, among the Fathers, St. Augustine treated this argument expressly in the book *De Fide et Operibus*, in which he teaches at length that no one ought so to flatter himself on account of faith as to despise salvation through it without works of charity.²⁴ Likewise he teaches the same (in *Quaestionibus a Dulcitio propositis*, quest. 1; again in Sermon 3 *de Verbis Domini*;²⁵ and in book 3 *Contra duas epistolas*

Pelagianorum, ch. 5; and frequently elsewhere), and repeats similar things; and in *De Haeresibus*, heresy 54, he counts among the heresies of the Eunomians this sentence — that evil works are of no hindrance, provided faith is retained.²⁶ Which is plainly what is taught today by the sectarians, who contend that charity is connected to faith even apart from the practice of good works. And not to recall more instances, this has always been the doctrine of the whole Church: that faith exists but cannot profit without charity.

§ 19. To prove this, beyond the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture, they also make use of two evangelical parables: the one concerning the ten virgins, of whom those who, having received their lamps, did not take oil with them are interpreted as the faithful lacking charity and good works — concerning which see St. Augustine, Sermon 23 *de verbis Domini*,²⁷ and St. Gregory, Homily 12 *in Evangelia*,²⁸ the other concerning the man who entered the banquet of the wedding but was not clothed in the wedding garment — which garment they interpret as nothing other than charity. Since, after all, that man could not have entered the banquet of the King, that is, the Church of Christ, without faith.

§ 20. Finally, this is the entire aim of all ecclesiastical discipline — through laws, threats, and exhortations directed toward the evil sons of the Church — namely, that those who believe rightly should also live rightly, and that those who already hold faith should also hold charity. Hence whatever things prove that within the Church not only the good but also the wicked are contained, those very same things show almost equally that faith can be held without charity. For they are nearly the same thing: the wicked man within the Church, and the believer void of charity.

§ 21. Now, so that the matter may also be set forth by reason: it is manifest that affection (*affectus*) does not follow upon intellect (*intellectus*) — that is, that what we have known to be good and to be loved, we do not thereby love in the manner and to the degree we ought. For just as in moral matters, so too in those things which pertain to eternal salvation, the poetic maxim often holds: "I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse." Which also the Apostle, disputing against a Jew in Rom. 2, expressed more fully with words not much different: "You who know the will of God and approve what is excellent, being instructed by the law, etc. — you therefore who teach another, do you not teach yourself? etc."²⁹ An example of this matter can be taken from the sick and from physicians themselves, who well know what is salutary but, being drawn away by vehement delight, not infrequently desire and take into food those things that are contrary to health. For faith is like a law and a knowledge (*scientia*), which shows what each person ought to do as good, yet does not thereby bring it about that the good once known is sought as it ought to be.

§ 22. Moreover, lest any room for doubting this dogma should be left, the Fathers of the Council of Trent have thus decreed in canon 28 of Session 6: "If anyone shall say that, together with the grace lost through sin, faith is also always lost; or that the faith which remains is not true faith, even though it be not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian — let him be anathema." Similar things are found in the doctrine of the same session, chapters 6, 7, and 15.³⁰

§ VIII — That the same faith is at one time unformed and at another time formed (Eadem fidem modo informem modo formatam esse)

§ 23. This question — whether the same faith that is numerically prior as unformed is afterwards formed by charity, or whether, with the unformed quality cast aside, a habit of formed faith succeeds it simultaneously with charity — the Master resolves briefly, saying that, whichever answer is given, it may be held without

danger; yet it seems to him that the prior quality remains and that, upon the arrival of charity, it becomes a virtue. The Scholastics follow the Master's resolution with one accord and confirm it with arguments. The arguments of this kind are roughly as follows.

§ 24. The first: Other gratuitous gifts of God, such as the gift of prophecy, of tongues, of miracles, are at one time conjoined with charity and at another time separated from it; therefore the same is true of faith. The second: In the habit of faith that precedes charity there is nothing that is repugnant to charity. For unformedness does not pertain to faith's formal character (*ratio*); nothing therefore prevents the same faith from persisting when charity arrives. The third: Charity does not expel the habits of acquired virtues but perfects them; much more, therefore, does it perfect pre-existing faith. The major — that it does not expel but perfects — is proved by the greater congruity of charity with faith as an infused virtue than with acquired virtues. The fourth: Mortal sin, even though it removes the form of faith, that is, charity, does not for that reason immediately remove faith itself; for otherwise it would always render a man an unbeliever. Therefore charity likewise, even though it removes the unformedness of faith, does not for that reason remove faith itself, but rather, finding it there, preserves, informs, and perfects it.

§ 25. Moreover, if charity upon its arrival necessarily excludes the prior faith in order to introduce another, then equally, upon its departure, it would carry that same faith away with it, and would thus leave the man an unbeliever. For what some have supposed — that God of His gratuitous goodness restores unformed faith to the sinner so that he may not perish utterly — is said absurdly. No gift of God is infused into a man on account of mortal sin, and indeed in the very act of sin and, as it were, by ordinary law. Nor is there any probability in what others have said: that when charity arrives, the habit of unformed faith is not indeed expelled, but formed faith is introduced; and that the prior habit coexists simultaneously with it, so that after mortal sin only that prior habit is left behind. For, apart from the absurdity of positing two habits of faith simultaneously in the same man, it is even more absurd that in a man who has charity there should be some otiose habit of faith which, in that same man once deprived of charity, is not otiose. This follows manifestly from the said opinion.

§ 26. Therefore it must altogether be said that the habit of formed and of unformed faith is one and the same. For the same faith, remaining uncorrupted in the intellect, is called formed when charity is present, and unformed when charity is absent. For charity is not called the form of faith as though it pertained to the essence of faith, nor because it properly informs the act of another habit; but only in this sense, that through charity the act of faith is perfected and formed so as to be meritorious and to advance toward eternal salvation — in the same way that charity is also called the form of all the other virtues.

§ 27. To this may be added a proof from the Scriptures. For James, in chapter 2, says that faith is consummated — that is, perfected — by works, not that a new faith is created;²² and on the text "Faith without works is dead," the interlinear Gloss notes that it revives through works — thereby signifying that the same faith remains. Furthermore, both the Church and Scripture exhort those Christians who have relapsed, not to the recovery of faith, but to charity and penitence for their sins. Moreover, the Fathers speak of faith in such a way as to imply sufficiently that, with charity absent and with charity present, it remains numerically the same. On this matter there is a passage worthy of note in St. Jerome, on that text in Matt. 21 (on the words "He who shall fall on this stone shall be broken"),³² and in St. Augustine.³³

§ 28. Furthermore, nearly all those arguments by which we showed above that faith can be separated from charity lend no small support to the same conclusion, and most especially what was adduced from the decrees of the Council of Trent. For in Session 6, chapter 15, it is manifestly asserted that faith is not lost by every mortal sin;³⁴ and in canon 28, those are condemned who affirm that, together with grace lost through sin, faith also is always lost.³⁵ From this definition of the Council it is evident that the present question is no longer, as the Master would have it, a problematic one, such that either side may be held without danger, but rather that one side is so certain that the contrary opinion does not lack the danger of error.

§ 29. As for what is said in chapter 7 of the same session — that a man in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, receives all these things simultaneously infused through Christ, among which faith, hope, and charity are enumerated³⁶ — this does not conflict with, but rather agrees with and confirms, the opinion we have approved, if we attend to the words immediately following. For, say the Fathers, "faith, unless hope and charity are joined to it, neither unites perfectly with Christ nor makes a man a living member of His body." These words, together with others that follow, sufficiently declare that the faith which precedes charity is not destroyed by its arrival, but is by that arrival so perfected as both to unite the man perfectly with Christ and to make him a living member of His body. For it is faith considered in its perfection that is said to be infused simultaneously with charity in justification itself.

§ IX — Whether unformed faith is a virtue (An fides informis sit virtus)

§ 30. The Master thinks that unformed faith is not a virtue, and that it becomes a virtue upon the arrival of charity. St. Thomas concurs with this opinion.³⁷ Others, such as St. Bonaventure and Durandus, think differently, simply granting that unformed faith is a virtue.³⁸

§ 31. For the explanation of this question it must be noted that the name "virtue" (*virtus*) is taken in two ways: generally and properly. In the general sense, virtue is called a habit of the soul consonant with right reason, and likewise inclining toward an act consonant with the divine law. This definition encompasses even imperfect virtues, that is, those not yet formed by charity. Among these is unformed faith, to which the full formal character of faith and hence of virtue taken in the general sense belongs. For it is a habit by which the intellect, taken captive by the command of the will in obedience to Christ, firmly believes those things which are divinely commanded to be believed. Concerning this kind of virtue, Prosper says (in the *Sentences of St. Augustine*, sentence 7) that all virtues diverse from charity can be common to the good and the wicked; that charity alone is the proper and special virtue of the godly and the holy.³⁹ He repeats this in epigram 7.⁴⁰ Hence it follows that the virtue of faith is found in the wicked, and that that virtue is manifestly unformed.

§ 32. Furthermore, the same point can be shown from the contrary. For every good habit that directly opposes a vice is a virtue; but unformed faith directly opposes heresy and unbelief, just as in moral matters; therefore it must be granted that it is a virtue. Moreover, it is the property of virtue to render the faculty of the soul prompt and ready for what is difficult. But faith does this even in its unformed state. If, therefore, to restrain oneself from revenge even by an act of the will is an act of virtue even before infused charity, no less will it be an act of virtue to obey God promptly and willingly in those things that surpass natural reason, even when charity is not present.

§ 33. Furthermore, virtue in the special and proper sense is said to be that which simply makes its possessor good and by which one lives rightly — as it is defined in book 2 of Aristotle.⁴¹ This acceptance of virtue encompasses only perfect virtues, that is, those conjoined with charity. According to this special acceptance, it must be granted that neither faith nor any morally good habit, with charity excluded, is a virtue. And in this way St. Augustine disputes concerning virtues, both elsewhere and in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 3;⁴² and Prosper, in chapters 27, 28, 29 *Against the Collationist*, and in book 1 *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, chapters 7 and 8.⁴³

§ X — That unformed faith is also a gift of God (Fidem etiam informem esse Dei donum)

§ 34. What the Master says — that unformed faith can be called a gift of God, since even in evil men there are certain gifts of God — is to be placed not among probable opinions but among those which are to be held with certain and firm faith. For it was defined long ago, against Pelagius, concerning Christian faith in general, that it is not had from the sole powers of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) but is infused by God and is a gift of God. The Fathers made use of the following scriptural testimonies in proof of this dogma: Jn. 6, "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent"; Rom. 2 [*recte* 1 Cor. 12], "To another is given faith in the same Spirit." Although this last text seems to be taken of some pre-eminence of faith, nevertheless the similarity of the formal character (*ratio*) compels that the same judgment be made concerning all faith, since the beginning of each virtue is from the same source from which its perfection is.⁴⁵ Likewise, 2 Cor. 4, "God, who commanded light to shine out of darkness, himself has shone in our hearts," and so on. Gal. 4, "Since you have known God, or rather have been known by God" — that is, have been anticipated by God's grace so that you might come to know him. Eph. 1, "Hearing of your faith, I cease not to give thanks to God for you." And chapter 2, "By grace you are saved through faith, and this not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Phil. 1, "It has been given to you on behalf of Christ, not only to believe in him," and so on. 2 Thess. 1, "We ought always to give thanks to God for you, because your faith grows exceedingly." To this pertains also what is said in Acts 16 concerning the purple-seller: "The Lord opened her heart to attend to the things which were spoken by Paul."⁴⁶ To these may be added the general testimonies of Scripture which refer every good and salutary work to the grace of God: as Jn. 15, "Without me you can do nothing"; and 1 Cor. 4, "What do you have that you did not receive?"; and Jas. 1, "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above."

§ 35. Concerning these matters, as discussed more fully in the treatise *On Grace*, St. Augustine above all others strenuously attacked the heresy of Pelagius, he who, as he himself recounts in *Retractations* book 1, chapter 23, and in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 3, had at one time fallen into that error of thinking that faith was in man from himself — and in those passages corrects himself and teaches by which scriptural testimonies he was recalled from that error.⁴⁷ He treats that argument throughout nearly the whole of *On the Predestination of the Saints*, teaching that faith and its beginning are a gift of God. Likewise in *Epistle 107* to Vitalis, and in almost innumerable other places. And Prosper, *Reply 8 to the Capitula of the Gauls*, and in *Replies to the Excerpts of the Men of Genoa* throughout, and scattered throughout *Against the Collationist*.⁴⁸ Likewise, Prosper in book 1, *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, chapter 23, gathers very many testimonies from the scripture of the New Testament to that purpose.⁴⁹ Now St. Augustine and Prosper use among other proofs this one as most efficacious: that the Church prays to God for unbelievers that they may

be converted to faith, and gives thanks to God for those same persons once converted to faith — both of which are most certain testimonies of grace.

§ 36. Another argument they draw from the first parent, who, having lost faith through sin (as we showed above at distinction 23, book 2), it follows that all his descendants lost the same in him, and therefore it cannot be recovered except through the gift of God. To the disputation of the Fathers there was added the authority of the Second Council of Orange, chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, by which it is defined against the Pelagians that just as the increase of faith, so also the beginning of faith and the very disposition of belief (*credulitatis affectus*) is a gift of God; and those are condemned who say either that the beginning of faith is naturally in us, or that by the power of our nature we can consent to the evangelical preaching without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit.⁵⁰ This same conclusion is explained more fully by the Fathers of that Council in the final chapter, asserting that we ought to believe that free will was so bent and enfeebled by the sin of the first man that thereafter no one could believe in God unless grace and divine mercy had preceded him; and they declare the same by various examples and testimonies of Scripture. Adhering to this doctrine, the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3, condemn with anathema anyone who shall say that without the preceding inspiration and assistance of the Holy Spirit a man can believe as he ought.⁵¹

§ 37. From these general judgments and definitions of the Fathers it is manifestly shown that all faith — both unformed and formed, both acquired and infused — provided it has the true formal character (*ratio*) of Christian faith, is to be counted among the special gifts of God. For although that division of faith by which it is divided by most authorities into acquired faith (which the Apostle testifies to be from hearing, Rom. 10) and infused faith (such as is evidently present in baptised infants) is not to be disapproved, nonetheless one must not so distinguish between the one and the other as if the former arose from the sole powers of nature and the latter from God's gift. For, as the foregoing abundantly proves, and as the Fathers of the Council of Trent expressly teach in Session 6, chapter 6, even that faith which is conceived from hearing is had by the exciting and assisting grace of God, yet in such a way that a movement of one's own will — as being itself an effect of that same grace — is also required for it; which is not the case in the faith that is infused into infants through baptism.⁵²

§ 38. Therefore what those same Fathers added in the canon — *as he ought* — was not appended in order to exclude unformed faith, but so that they might signify that their discussion was of Christian and properly so-called faith, and not of just any certain or probable assent to divine realities that does not rest upon First Truth but upon either experience or any created reason whatsoever — such as exists in demons, and formerly existed in the Philosophers, and in the Jews who beheld Christ suffering and dying before their eyes. For such persons, believing only so much, do not yet believe *as they ought*, because they do not receive the word of faith as the word of God but under some other formal character.

§ XI — In what respect faith is a gift of God (Fides qua parte donum Dei sit)

§ 39. Since it has been said above that faith belongs partly to the intellect and partly to the will, it is asked: in which respect is it a gift of God? To this the answer must be given plainly that both from the side of the intellect and from the side of the will it is to be referred to the benefaction of the grace of God.

For as regards the intellect: first indeed, the very things that are believed are for the most part such that, had they not been revealed by divine impulse, they could never have come into the mind of man — such as the

mystery of the Trinity, and those hidden counsels concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God, and concerning the Redemption and salvation of the human race through His death. Inasmuch, therefore, as God, either by Himself or through the external ministry of others (a function which the Prophets and Apostles formerly discharged, and which the Church discharges today), speaks to men the hidden mysteries of faith, faith itself is a gift of God. But in this respect there was no disagreement between Catholics and Pelagians. For even the Pelagians confessed faith to be a gift of God to the extent that a divine revelation made through some external ministry was necessary for coming to know the mysteries of faith — just as we cannot know future things either without divine revelation. This declaration, therefore, does not suffice.

§ 40. In a second manner, faith is a gift of God from the side of the intellect, because beyond the external ministry of one who announces the truth of faith, there is need of the grace of God illuminating the intellect, so that it may receive by faith what is preached. For unless the human mind were in this way imbued with a certain divine wisdom, it would count the word of gospel preaching as foolishness — and most especially those mysteries of our Religion which pertain to the redemption of the human race — as the Apostle testifies (1 Cor. 1).⁵⁴

§ 41. And as regards the will, faith is without doubt a gift of God in this respect as well. For in order that the human will may humbly and obediently submit itself to divine truth and may move the intellect by its command to assent, it does not have this of itself, but is prepared and moved by the Lord. In these two respects, therefore, the Pelagians differed from Catholics, attributing both the assent of the mind and the inclination of the will not to the illuminating and moving grace of God, but to the powers of nature alone. Against these St. Augustine disputes at length in the book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapters 5 and 6, and elsewhere;⁵⁵ though that error is sufficiently refuted by what has been said in the preceding chapter.

§ XII — That the faith of all believers is one (Unam esse omnium fidem)

§ 42. That the faith of all believers — both of those who preceded the coming of Christ and of those who followed Him — always has been and ever remains one and the same, Sacred Scripture teaches in more than one place. "One Lord," says the Apostle (Eph. 4), "one faith, one baptism." And in 2 Cor. 4: "Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I believed, therefore have I spoken; we also believe, therefore we speak." And St. Peter in Acts 15: "We believe that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved, even as they also." And in Acts 4: "For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved." Into the mystery of this truth, at the Transfiguration of Christ, two from the old law and three from the new were present, so that the one faith which is in Christ, belonging to all the righteous of both dispensations, might be signified. This was also signified by those who went before and those who followed after Christ, crying "Hosanna" — as St. Gregory expounds allegorically in Homily 17 on Ezekiel.⁵⁷ St. Augustine likewise has clear teaching on this matter in the book *On Original Sin*, chapter 27,⁵⁸ where, speaking of the righteous who preceded the coming of Christ, he says: "They too were cleansed by the same faith by which we are." And in Tractate 45 on John,⁵⁹ he says: "Before the coming of Christ, the righteous went before, believing in Him as about to come, just as we believe in Him who has come. The times have been varied, not the faith; for even the very words are varied according to the time, since they are differently inflected. The same faith, however, joins both — both those who believed He was to come and those who believed He has come — in different times indeed, but both entering, as we see, through one door of faith, that is, through Christ. We believe that our

Lord was born of a Virgin, that He came in the flesh, that He suffered, that He rose again, that He ascended into heaven. All of this, as you hear the words in the past tense, we believe to have been already fulfilled. In the fellowship of this faith with us are those Fathers who believed that He would be born of a Virgin, that He would suffer, that He would rise again, that He would ascend into heaven." Thus St. Augustine, in whom similar things are found in Letters 89, 155, and 157, and in Book 2 of *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, chapter 12, and in his commentary on Ps. 50 on the verse "Restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation," and in *The City of God* Book 18, chapter 47.⁶⁰

§ 43. The same is shown also by a reason drawn from analogy. For there is one hope of all who tend toward the same happiness, and one charity (*charitas*) by which they love all things for God's sake; therefore there is also one faith by which they assent to divine truth in holding the same things to be believed. Now, if you should ask how the faith of all believers can rightly be called one, when each individual has his own faith as distinct from another's as he himself is distinct from another and has a soul different from another's soul — St. Augustine answers in Book 13 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 2,⁶¹ that the faith by which the faithful are called faithful is common to all the faithful in the same way as a face is said to be common to several persons, even though each has his own. "For," he says, "faith is not one in number, but in kind; which, when it is in one person, is also in others — not the very same faith, but a like one. Yet on account of the likeness and the absence of any diversity, we more readily say it is one than many." And a little later: "But the faith of believers is said to be the same one faith in the same way as the will of those who will the same thing is said to be one will; though in those persons each has his own will." In these words, where he says that the faith in all believers is one not in number but in kind, this is not to be understood as though it were diverse even in species; rather, St. Augustine uses the name of genus to comprehend also the species.

§ 44. Moreover, the Scholastics explain this unity of faith roughly as follows: that faith is one by reason of its object (*ratione objecti*), because the formal object (*formale objecti*) of faith is the First Truth (*veritas prima*), as the formal character (*ratio*) for believing all things that are contained under faith, however great a diversity may otherwise be found among the articles of faith. And indeed, in this way it is rightly taught that faith is one in species in all believers, because habits receive their species from the formal character of their object. But according to this explanation, the faith of the ancients and our own would still be one even if those ancients were saved through faith in the creation of the world while we were saved through faith in the Incarnation of Christ; or if certain articles of faith were divinely proposed for belief to them, and certain other articles to us — provided only that the formal character (*ratio*) of believing, which is the First Truth, always remained the same. This, however, seems insufficiently consonant either with the sayings of the Fathers or with Sacred Scripture. Rather, the Scholastics ground the unity of faith in this: that all the faithful of all times and places believe the same things, as is easy to perceive from the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers cited above. Nor, when they wish the faith of diverse articles to be one, do they mean the faith considered as existing in diverse articles among themselves; but the faith which exists in different persons who nevertheless believe the same things. Therefore faith is one for all not only by reason of the formal object (*ratione formalis objecti*), but also by reason of the material object (*ratione materialis objecti*), because they do not merely believe for the same reason, but they all believe the same things — which will become more plain from Distinction 25.⁶²

§ XIII — *Whether one can hold faith in one article without faith in another*
(*An possit haberi fides unius articuli absque fide alterius*)

§ 45. It is customarily asked whether, in a person who believes some of the articles pertaining to faith and does not believe others — or even one particular article — there is properly so-called faith with respect to what he does believe. In this question one must carefully distinguish, first and foremost, between those who, retaining a general readiness to believe whatever the Catholic Church believes, nevertheless err through ignorance in certain dogmas of the faith, because the Church's belief in them has not yet been sufficiently declared to them — and those who, after the Church's teaching has been sufficiently made manifest, still choose to dissent from it, either by asserting the contrary or at least by doubting. The latter is the mark proper to heretics. For regarding the former class the answer is easy: they share the communion of true faith with the remaining Catholics in that part of Catholic doctrine concerning which they hold what is true. For these persons retain faith in the universal and in habit (*in universali atque in habitu*), as the phrase goes, entire and integral, so long as they sincerely profess themselves ready to receive whatever the Church hands on for belief. Among their number was Cyprian, who maintained that the baptism of heretics is invalid, and therefore that those who had been baptized by them and returned to the Church ought to be baptized again; and any among the Fathers who resembled Cyprian in certain other dogmas.

§ 46. But regarding the latter — that is, regarding heretics who retain some part of sound doctrine — the question is more difficult, and has been disputed by the Doctors on both sides with probability. That there is true faith in such persons with respect to the articles in which they do not err is urged, first, by experience: for many today who deny, for example, purgatory or the invocation of the saints, nonetheless firmly hold as divinely revealed that God is triune and one, that the Son of God was incarnate and suffered, and other such things. As in former times the Novatians, apart from their own distinctive dogma by which they repelled the lapsed from reconciliation, held nearly all else in common with Catholics — to such a degree that their party even ably assisted the cause against the Arians, as is recorded in Socrates.⁶⁴ Next, this is shown by the example of the Apostles, who at the time of Christ's Passion took scandal and lost their faith in Him; upon whom Christ reproached their own unbelief even after the Resurrection (Mk. 16), and called Thomas unbelieving on account of his denial of the Resurrection (Jn. 20). Hence St. Augustine (in the Preface to Ps. 96)⁶⁵ says that after Christ's Resurrection the faith of those who had fallen was recalled. But it must not be said that the Apostles at that time lost their faith in the Trinity, in the creation of the world, in eternal life, and in like articles.

§ 47. Furthermore, the Jews before the coming of Christ had faith in the one God, Creator of heaven and earth; who, even though they lost the true faith of the Messiah when they refused to receive Christ coming to them, are not therefore to be said to have lost also their faith in the one God, but held that article of faith with the same firmness as before. Add to this that both Jews and heretics, saying that they receive either the books of the Prophets or the four Gospels as the word of God, do not seem open to the charge of lying; since it appears sufficiently that they truly acknowledge in these writings a divine authority, even if they do not hold the true sense. Hence that word of Paul to Agrippa, after he had asked him whether he believed the Prophets: "I know that you believe" (Acts 26). They therefore retain faith regarding those Scriptures as divine. Lastly, it is manifest that many gifts of God are found even in the wicked, indeed even outside the Church. Therefore nothing prevents Jews and heretics, though they err in many things, from being nonetheless divinely illumined by faith in other matters, so that they believe rightly. This appears to be the teaching of St.

Augustine in the book *On the One Baptism against Petilianus*, chapter 3,⁶⁶ in these words: "Just as when a Jew comes to us to become a Christian, we do not destroy in him the good things of God, but only his evil things. For in that he believes that one God is to be worshipped, who made heaven and earth; that he detests all the idols and sacrileges of the Gentiles; that he expects the future judgment; that he hopes for eternal life; that he has no doubt about the resurrection of the flesh — we praise, approve, and acknowledge what he believed as things to be believed, just as we affirm what he held as things to be held. So also when a schismatic or heretic comes to us to become a Catholic: his schism and heresy we cut away by dissuading and destroying them; but the Christian sacraments, if we find the same in him, and whatever else of truth he holds — far be it from us to violate." Thus he writes, adding certain similar remarks in the following chapter concerning the idolater. But in the fifth chapter he again says to the Jew: "Hold the faith of the resurrection of the dead as you held it; but believe now that Christ has risen from the dead, which you did not believe" — and other things that follow.

§ 48. Not dissimilar is a passage in the same author in the book *On Patience*:⁶⁷ where, after saying in chapter 26 that the patience of a schismatic man who bears adversity for the faith of Christ is to be praised, he confirms in the following chapter that it too is a gift of God — namely, the patience whereby someone separated from the Church endures temporal sufferings not for the error that separated him, but for the truth of the sacrament or of the word which remained with him, lest he suffer eternal punishments. "For," he says, "this is not nothing good: that a man should believe he is to be punished with eternal torment if he denies Christ; and for that faith, of whatever kind it be, should endure and despise some human punishment" — and the words that follow to the end of the book; by which he shows that many gifts of God, and among them faith — not operating through charity, election, or fear — can be common even to those who are outside the Church. Some things pertaining to the same matter are read in Book 3 of *On Baptism against the Donatists*, in the final chapter, and in the commentary on Ps. 64.⁶⁸

§ 49. The contrary, however, seems to be urged by this argument. The formal object of faith is the First Truth (*veritas prima*), insofar as it is made manifest to a human being through the teaching of the Church as a divine and infallible rule; therefore whoever does not adhere to this rule, even if he assents to things that pertain to faith, does not embrace them by faith but by another kind of assent — in the same way as, if someone assents to a conclusion without knowing the middle term of the demonstration, he has not knowledge but only opinion of that conclusion. But that a heretic does not adhere to the said rule is manifest: for if he did adhere to it as divine and infallible, he would without exception receive all things that the Church teaches, and accordingly would not be a heretic. In this manner St. Thomas reasons in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 3.⁶⁹

§ 50. From St. Thomas Durandus, however, dissents,⁶⁹ holding that in a heretic true faith in the articles in which he does not err can be genuine. Others, such as Scotus and St. Bonaventure, do not definitively resolve the matter but choose a middle course.⁷⁰ For Scotus denies that infused faith (*fides infusa*) can be found in a heretic with respect to the articles he holds; because otherwise faith and heresy would co-exist simultaneously — although he admits that there can remain acquired faith (*fides acquisita*) regarding the other articles in which he does not err. But then, having said that heretics do not have the virtue of faith with respect to the articles they still retain, but believe them through the persuasion of human reason (*ex persuasione humanae rationis*), he afterwards adds: if however a faithful Catholic becomes a heretic and there remains in him cognition of some article, he does not have that cognition through acquisition; but yet it cannot be said that he possesses the virtue either, because in him the former illumination of truth is somehow mixed with the

error and with the corruption of error — and therefore he does not possess the habit befitting a virtue. Thus Scotus, acknowledging not only acquired faith — which is nevertheless itself also a gift of God — but also infused faith as in some part consistent with heretical error. Nor does it matter whether the illumination of truth that is mingled with the falsity of the error that is mixed in preceded it or followed it. For the reasoning is the same. To this position of the Scholastics there is added the authority of St. Augustine, who — finding it foreign to the custom of the faithful to say that heretics do not have grace — speaks as the Creed of Athanasius does, implying thereby that they still possess faith in some part. There is also another consideration: for if a heretic or a Jew holds certain things pertaining to faith, he holds them not by faith but in another mode — namely, merely by will and judgment; it would then follow that all that excellent cognition which is found in them concerning God and divine things is to be attributed not to the grace of God but to free will alone, which is against St. Augustine.

§ 51. To the argument urged from the opposing side, it is answered: it is irrelevant to faith by what intermediary one believes the First Truth — that is, what medium God uses in conferring the gift of faith on a human being; for although the ordinary medium is the testimony and teaching of the Church, it is nevertheless established that faith has been conferred by other ways or media on various occasions and even now is so conferred. For in former times many — such as Adam, Abraham, Melchisedech, Job — received it by a special revelation; the Apostles received it from the miracles and the preaching of Christ; others again received faith from the preaching and miracles of the Apostles; others believed in still other ways, before anything had yet been announced to them concerning the infallibility of the Church's teaching. To little children also, the gift of faith is infused through baptism without any other ministry. Thus it can come about that someone, not adhering to the teaching of the Church as an infallible rule, may yet receive certain things pertaining to faith as the word of God — either because they have now or in former times been confirmed by miracles, or because he plainly sees that the ancient Church so taught, or for any other reason by which he has been led — even while he refuses to believe certain other things.

§ 52. Nevertheless, it is not therefore to be conceded that heretics or Jews have faith, but only a part of faith (*fidei partem*). For "faith" signifies something integral and complete in all its parts — so that "faith" simply (*fides simpliciter*) and "Catholic faith" are the same: namely, what absolutely constitutes a man as a believer and a Catholic. Hence a heretic is simply an unbeliever, and is said to have lost the faith and — in the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 1) — to have made shipwreck of faith, even though he holds certain things with firmness of assent and readiness of will.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 4, a. 2.

2. 1 Thess. 2:13.

3. Lk. 10:16.

4. Rom. 4:18, 20–21.

5. 1 Cor. 1 (on the foolishness of the word of the cross to human wisdom).

6. 2 Cor. 10:5.

7. Rom. 4:19.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 2.

9. Jas. 2:19.

10. The footnote in the source reads: "Among the Sermons of St. Augustine on Ps. 140, *Emendabit me justus, contra Donatistas*, listed (in the Benedictine edition, vol. V, among Sermons of class 2) as no. CCLXVI; otherwise III among those edited from the Carthusian manuscript. At eo in sermone non habentur verba ab Auctore hic allata ex Magistro Sententiarum. Another Sermon is also counted among those same Vigils in the same edition and is no. XXIX, otherwise class 1, no. 3, *De Diversis*, to which this inscription is prefixed: (*De Versu Ps. 117.*) *Confitemini Domino quoniam bonum est*, which the editors themselves also prefix, as also another from the manuscript of Saint-Germain: *Habitus Carthagine in Basilica Restituta die Pentecostes in Vigiliis*. But neither in this Sermon are read the words cited here from the Master of the Sentences, which have the same meaning, though nearly the same words are found. At the same nearly words appear Sermon V in diebus Paschae, Seu CCCXXXIV inter Sermon. 2. Class. num. 3, in the Benedictine edition, alias *De Diversis* 86; nor are dissimilar things to be found in Sermon. CLVIII *de Verbis Apostoli* cap. 6, num. 6. Item Sermon. LIII, 11, among those edited by the Parisians." [abbreviation as in source]
11. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 7; Homily 17 among the fifty; *In Ioannem*, Tractates 6, 29, and 93.
12. St. Basil, commentary on Ps. 115 (*Credidi propter quod locutus sum, ego autem humiliatus sum nimis*).
13. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 21.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 2.
15. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractate 29.
16. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi* 77; Sermon 6 *de Verbis Domini*; and on Ps. 139. The source footnote reads: "(a) Seu Sermon. LXII inter Sermon. 1. Claff. in edit. PP. Bened." [abbreviation as in source]
17. Jn. 12:42–43.
18. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi* 130.
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 65, a. 4; and II-II, q. 4.
20. 1 Cor. 6.
21. Gal. 5.
22. Jas. 2.
23. Matt. 7; Jn. 15; Rom. 2.
24. St. Augustine, *De Fide et Operibus* [whole work].
25. Sermon 3 *De Verbis Domini*: identified in the Benedictine edition as Sermon. CCLXVIII in Appendice Tomi V, *inter Sermones 2. Classis*. The editors note that two manuscripts of better quality have the superscription from St. John Chrysostom, Hom. XI; furthermore, in the same edition, Sermon *De Verbis Domini* in the same class is Sermon. CCLXVIII. [abbreviation as in source]
26. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 54; *Quaestiones a Dulcitio propositae*, q. 1; Book 3 *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 5.
27. St. Augustine, Sermon 23 *De Verbis Domini* — identified as Sermon. CXLIV in the Benedictine edition, *inter Sermones 1. Classis*, cap. 1, num. 2. [abbreviation as in source]
28. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 12.
29. Rom. 2.
30. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 28; chapters 6, 7, and 15.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 4, a. 4.
32. St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 21 (on the words "He who shall fall on this stone shall be broken").
33. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 18.
34. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 15.
35. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 28.
36. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7.

37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 4, a. 5.
38. St. Bonaventure and Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].
39. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, sentence 7.
40. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epigrammata ex sententiis Augustini*, epigram 7.
41. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book 2 [the definition of virtue as "the habit by which one lives rightly"]; cf. also St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II, dist. 27 [abbreviation as in source].
42. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 3.
43. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 27, 28, 29; *De Vocatione Gentium* I, chs. 7 and 8.
44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 6, a. 2.
45. The scriptural sequence follows: Jn. 6:29; 1 Cor. 12:9 (cited in the source as "Rom. 2," which is an error corrected by context and the page image); 2 Cor. 4:6; Gal. 4:9; Eph. 1:16; Eph. 2:8; Phil. 1:29; 2 Thess. 1:3; Acts 16:14; Jn. 15:5; 1 Cor. 4:7; Jas. 1:17.
46. Acts 16:14.
47. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 23; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 3; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* (throughout); Epistle 107 (to Vitalis).
48. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum*, resp. 8; *Responsiones ad Excerpta Genuensium* (throughout); *Contra Collatorem* (scattered throughout).
49. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 23.
50. Second Council of Orange (529), chs. 5, 6, 7, 8, and the final chapter (*caput ultimum*).
51. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3.
52. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.
53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 6, a. 1.
54. 1 Cor. 1:19 (cited by the Apostle in testimony that the word of evangelical preaching would be accounted foolishness regarding the mysteries pertaining to the redemption of the human race).
55. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chs. 5 and 6.
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 4, a. 6.
57. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Hom. 17.
58. St. Augustine, *De Peccato originali*, ch. 27.
59. St. Augustine, *In Evangelium Johannis*, Tract. 45.
60. St. Augustine, *Epistolae* 89 (alias 155) and 157; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 12; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 50; *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, ch. 47. [The footnote in the source reads "(a) Seu CLVII. CVIII. & CXLII. in Edit." indicating variant numbering in different editions.]
61. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 2.
62. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, dist. 25.
63. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 3.
64. Socrates [Scholasticus], *Historia Ecclesiastica* [abbreviation as in source].
65. St. Augustine, *Praefatio in Psalmum* 96.
66. St. Augustine, *De Unico Baptismo contra Petilianum*, ch. 3.
67. St. Augustine, *De Patientia*, chs. 26–27. [The source footnote notes that the book *De Patientia*, as also the book *De Continentia*, has been contested as authentically Augustinian by Andreas and others of the school of Calvin and Luther, but is defended as genuine by Labbé and other scholars citing explicit testimonies of Augustine himself (Ep. CCXXXI alias 164, ad Darium, num. 7), Possidius in his *Indiculus*, and Bede.]

68. St. Augustine, *De Baptismo contra Donatistas* III, final chapter; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 64.
69. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In hanc distinctionem* [abbreviation as in source].
70. Scotus and St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO XXIV — ON THE OBJECT OF FAITH (*DE OBJECTO FIDEI*)

§ I — *What faith is concerned with (Fides circa quid versetur)*

§ 1. Just as in the other cognitive habits (*habitus cognitivi*), so also in faith, in order that we may rightly understand what faith is concerned with, a twofold object (*objectum*) of faith must be distinguished: the formal and the material. The material object of faith is the thing itself known through faith; the formal object, however, is the formal character (*ratio*) by which that thing is to be known — which they accordingly call the formal character of the object (*formalis ratio objecti*). Now that formal character is the first truth (*prima veritas*), or God insofar as He is truthful. For every assent of faith rests upon the divine truthfulness as its formal character (*ratio*); and for this reason whatever pertains to faith, whether written or not written, is called the word of God — because it is then, and only then, believed with the assent of faith when it is believed as the word of God, which the Apostle praises in 1 Thess. 2.² This formal character of the object was indicated by (Pseudo-)Dionysius when, in ch. 7 of *De Divinis Nominibus*, he said that faith is concerned with the simple and ever self-existing truth³ — which is none other than the first truth. The thing known through faith, however, which we said is its material object, is not God alone, but besides God many other things divinely revealed and believed on account of the divine truthfulness. These things, nevertheless, do not themselves fall under faith except insofar as they have some order to God — namely, inasmuch as through them, as through certain effects of the Divinity, man is assisted and ordered toward the things that belong to eternal beatitude (*aeterna beatitudo*). Of this kind are all the articles of faith and whatever is reduced to them.

§ 2. Here, if it is asked whether the object of faith is complex or non-complex, it is answered (*Respondendum est*) that, although simple things, insofar as something pertaining to religion is affirmed or denied about them, can in some fashion be called the material object of faith — such as God, beatitude (*beatitudo*), hell, the world, the Church, charity (*charitas*) — yet this is less properly said. For just as that which is seen is properly the object of sight, so that which is believed is the object of faith. But that which is believed is an enunciation (*enunciatio*) or something enunciable (*enunciabile*), not a thing as a simple term. For we believe, for example, that God is triune, that the world was founded by God, that the first man sinned, and the rest of the things that are signified not by a simple word but by an enunciation. Therefore the object of faith, properly speaking, is complex and enunciable (*complexum atque enunciabile*). The same will be evident to one who considers the genus of faith. For faith is a certain assent (*assensus*); but every assent regards not simple things but their combination as signified by some enunciation. Hence it is necessary that faith be concerned with complex matters, just as likewise the errors contrary to faith are complex: that God is the author of sin; that the Son is not equal to the Father; and so forth.⁴

§ II — *That theological faith is concerned only with things that are not seen* (*Fidem eorum tantum esse quae non videntur*)

§ 3. Theological faith is concerned solely with those things that are not seen: that is, with those things which are not of such a kind as to move our intellect or our sense by themselves toward cognition of themselves. Things of this sort — such as the first principles of the sciences and the objects of the senses — are said to be *seen*, that is, evidently cognized; and of these, accordingly, neither faith nor even opinion can exist. That faith, for its part, is not concerned with such things, the Apostle teaches in Heb. 11, saying that faith is "the evidence of things that appear not" — in Greek, of things that are not seen — and he demonstrates this with several examples of holy persons who, by faith, awaited as future what they did not see, such as Noe, Abraham, Moses, and others.⁶ The same Apostle signified the obscurity and non-evidence of those things that are believed, in 1 Cor. 13, by these words: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face."⁷ These words show that the things which belong to faith are indeed *seen* in some fashion. For even probable things are said among the Dialecticians to be *seen*, inasmuch as the intellect assents to them to some degree. But they are not seen in that mode which Scripture and the Fathers everywhere remove from faith. Among the Fathers, St. Augustine — in Tractates 27 and 40 on John, and frequently elsewhere — designates faith by this notion: "Faith is to believe what you do not see."⁸ And in Tractate 79 on John he says: "This is the praise of faith, if what is believed is not again seen." And likewise on that same passage, Jn. 14, "I go to prepare a place for you," he says: "He goes that a place may be prepared; He goes that it may be seen; He is believed, that it may be believed."⁹ The same doctrine of his is found in *Quaestiones Evangeliorum*, q. 39, and in *De Trinitate*, chapters 1 and 2.¹⁰ Similarly, St. Gregory, Homily 26 on the Gospels, and in *Dialogues* IV, ch. 5, says: "Apparent things do not have faith, but knowledge." And again: "This is truly said to be believed, which cannot be seen."¹¹

§ 4. Moreover, faith will undergo cessation or evacuation in the future, succeeded by vision — as the Apostle testifies in 1 Cor. 13. For this reason faith is said to be evacuated and not perfected as charity is: because faith involves a certain imperfection, namely obscurity and non-evidence in its formal character (*ratio*) — which will be taken away by the manifest declaration of truth in the age to come, when the cognition of God Himself and of all the things that were previously believed will be clear and evident. Therefore that imperfection, of which the Apostle speaks when he says that we see in a riddle and cognize in part, and prophesy in part, will itself be removed; and faith will be changed into vision — for no other reason than because that imperfection is included in the formal character of faith. But just as faith is not concerned with things that are seen, so also it is not concerned with things that are *known* — that is, demonstratively cognized. For when these things are demonstrated from self-evident principles, and hence from things that are seen, they are themselves also seen in some fashion, that is, in their principles from which they are with certainty and evidently gathered; therefore they must themselves in some fashion be seen. Hence faith cannot be concerned with them.

§ III — *Resolving the arguments to the contrary* (*Diluuntur argumenta in contrarium*)

§ 5. So that what has already been said may render more evident the replies we shall offer to the arguments by which it seems that even things that are seen or known can be held by faith, let us examine them in order. In

the first place there is that saying of the Lord to His disciples, Jn. 14: "I have told you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass you may believe." Since it is understood from the experience of the event, this seems to make faith a matter of things known through experience.

Then there is Jn. 20, where, when He had said to St. Thomas, who was now beginning to believe: "Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed." — whereas the praise of faith is "if what is believed is not seen." Thirdly: The other Apostles also, and the Blessed Virgin, and many other faithful, believed what they had seen — namely Christ, that is to say, a man, suffering, dead, buried, rising from the dead, and ascending into heaven, and many other things expressed in the articles of faith or committed to the Sacred Scriptures, which must be received by faith. Hence 1 Jn. 1 says: "That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of life, we announce to you."¹³

Fourthly: A philosopher who knows by demonstration that there is one God, the principle and cause of all things, can receive the faith of the same thing while his prior cognition remains — namely, if from being a pagan he becomes a Christian; for then such a philosopher will have to say "I believe in God." There will therefore be in the same person both knowledge and faith of the same thing.

Fifthly: The knowledge of faith is more certain than that of experience or demonstration; therefore one who knows some article of faith through experience or demonstration — for instance, that Christ is dead, or that God is eternal — ought still to add to that knowledge the one that belongs to faith and rests upon divine truth. For unless he adds this knowledge above the prior one, he will not know those articles as a Christian, but only as one following sense or natural reason.

Sixthly: St. Augustine (*in Ps.* 118, *Concert.* 13) says: "Some things are such that unless we understand them we do not believe them; others are such that unless we believe them we shall not understand them."¹⁴ There is therefore faith of certain things that are understood — that is, that are comprehended by reason.

§ 6. To these objections we reply as follows. To the first: faith in that passage is taken in a general sense, so as to extend even to things that are seen — as when someone is said to believe with his own eyes, which sense the Master draws from St. Augustine;¹⁵ or, at all events, the sense is this: "I have foretold many things to you that are future, so that when you see them done and fulfilled, you may believe that I am the Christ, the Son of God" — not, to be sure, with a new faith, but with an increased and firmer one. This latter sense is offered for the same passage by St. Augustine himself, and after him by St. Gregory, Homily 26 (*in Evangelia*),¹⁶ and it is confirmed by the other parallel passage in the immediately preceding verse, where it says: "I tell you before it come to pass, that when it is come to pass you may believe that I am he." From all of which it is entirely clear that this is the genuine sense of that locus.

§ 7. To the second objection, St. Augustine and St. Gregory reply in the same passages that St. Thomas had seen one thing and believed another: for he had seen the man and believed in God. Just as it is said elsewhere by St. Augustine concerning Christ: "He appeared among men, offering the man to those who saw, preserving God for those who believed" (*Serm.* 26 *de Tempore*).¹⁷

But against this reply there is the fact that the discussion there concerned not the article of the Divinity of Christ — except perhaps consequentially — but the article of His resurrection according to the flesh. Hence St. Thomas was also bidden to explore with his touch the truth of the body that had come back to life. And of the resurrection he had said: "Unless I see, I will not believe." And the Lord said to him: "Put in thy finger," and so forth. And note that he is called unbelieving — namely, in respect of the truth of the resurrection.

§ 8. Therefore, for the resolution of this argument and of the three following ones, it must be known that, although faith in its full formal character (*ratio*) includes obscurity and non-evidence of the thing cognized, as regards the mode of cognizing — yet insofar as only the certitude of cognition received from divine revelation is considered in faith, nothing prevents it from coexisting with experience and demonstration. This is correctly shown by the contrary arguments advanced concerning the Apostles and the philosopher converted to faith. For just as something can be known simultaneously by the same person through demonstration from a cause and through an effect; likewise through probable and through certain reasoning; and again through sensitive and through intellective cognition — so nothing prevents something from being known by someone through experience or demonstration, while the same thing is also cognized, and indeed more certainly, by the same person through divine revelation. Yet that thing is not said to be cognized by faith, in the full breadth of faith's signification, by one who has scientific knowledge or experience of it — because he does not have non-evident (*inevidentem*) cognition of it. For both sense and demonstration exclude non-evidence. And nevertheless such things are sometimes said to be believed in a general sense, as we said above.¹⁸ In this way is rightly understood the saying of St. Thomas the Apostle and the reply of Christ. For St. Augustine too speaks thus (*in Ps. 56*): "We not only believe," he says, "the glory of Christ upon earth, but we also see it."¹⁹ And well known is that maxim of the philosopher on the assent to principles: "The learner must believe," and among the Dialecticians any argument whatsoever is said to "make faith." Moreover, Theological Doctors commonly speak thus, so as to state that certain positions are of faith, and yet at the same time teach that these same positions are evidently known through demonstration — such as these: that the soul is immortal; that in man there is free will; that there is one God; that the Church which adheres to the Roman Pontiff is the Church gathered by the Apostles; that the world is governed by one God.

§ 9. As for what is objected in the last place from St. Augustine, it is not to be taken as if, among the things that pertain to the Christian faith, some are first comprehended by reason and then received by faith, while others are first received by faith and afterward comprehended by reason. Rather, St. Augustine's words are to be understood of one and the same proposition of faith, in this sense: in one and the same proposition that is proposed to be believed, there is something that we understand before we embrace the proposition by faith; and there is something else that we must believe before we attain to its understanding. For, as St. Augustine subjoins: "Since faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of God, how can one believe the one who preaches faith, if — to say nothing of other things — he does not understand the very language in which the preacher speaks?" St. Augustine therefore intends that for receiving the faith that comes from hearing, it is necessary that a grammatical understanding of at least the common words used by the preacher of faith should go before. For first the speech of the one preaching must be understood, then faith must be accommodated to his words. And lastly, as the reward of faith, the understanding of the very thing preached and believed is to be awaited — imperfect indeed in this world, perfect in the world to come — according to that of Is. 7 (according to the Septuagint): "Unless you believe, you shall not understand."²⁰

§ I — *That without faith in the Mediator no one could ever be saved (Absque fide mediatoris neminem potuisse unquam salvari)*

§ 10. After the fall of the first parent, faith in the Redeemer and Mediator was always necessary for all human beings for salvation. Nor must it be thought that the knowledge of the one God, creator and governor of all

things, could at any time have sufficed for anyone's salvation. The reason for this is that, since the salvation of eternal life can be obtained by no one without the justice of this life, and the justice of this life — whether from the side of the remission of sins, or from the side of good works — cannot be had without faith in the Mediator. For since by the sin of the first man the entire human race was so depraved that it could not raise itself by itself — that is, through those things which it has received in nature — to justice, it had need of some liberator through whom it might recover justice. This liberator, the same redeemer and mediator, was by the eternal decree of God to be the Son of God, who by taking on flesh and undergoing passion and death would prepare the return to justice for the human race. It was also established by the same decree of God that no one would be a participant in that redemption unless he believed in the redeemer himself, and by believing would acknowledge the benefit of redemption — either by his own assent, as adults, or by another's, as infants.

§ 11. This can also be shown by the following argument. Outside the Church there is no salvation; but the head of the whole Church is Christ; therefore no one is saved unless he becomes a member of Christ. But this cannot come about unless he believes in Christ. For no one is incorporated into Christ except through faith, by which he believes Him to be his own redeemer.

§ 12. Moreover, this doctrine is shown much more certainly from Sacred Scripture. For Peter testifies, Acts 4, that "there is no other name given to men under heaven in which we ought to be saved" than the name of Christ.²² Now that this is to be understood of faith in the name of Christ is manifest from Peter's very preaching itself, as the same Apostle declares plainly and distinctly, Acts 15: "By the grace," he says, "of our Lord Jesus Christ we believe to be saved, even as they" — namely, our Fathers — "believed themselves to be saved."²³

§ 13. This necessity of faith in Christ is frequently inculcated by Christ Himself in the Gospel, as Jn. 1, 3, 6, 8, and elsewhere. And on occasion by Paul in his Epistles, especially in Rom. and Gal. Hence that of Rom. 3: "The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in him."²⁴ And below: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood."²⁵ And that of Gal. 2: "Man is not justified by the works of the law but by the faith of Jesus Christ."²⁶ And ch. 3: "Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by the faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe."²⁷ Indeed, whatever arguments prove that no one is saved without Christ as Redeemer and Mediator, the very same are valid for proving the necessity of faith in Christ as Redeemer and Mediator. Since Sacred Scripture treats these two things — Christ and faith in Christ — as the same, as regards the necessity of salvation; because it presupposes that no one becomes a participant in the redemption of Christ without faith in Christ the Redeemer. Hence the Fathers also held those two things we have mentioned as equivalent, and disputed similarly about the necessity of each, as is evident from the letter of St. Augustine (*ad Optatum*), which is Ep. 157;²⁸ from *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 7; from *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, bk. 1, ch. 2 and ch. 12; and from Homily 17 of St. Gregory (*super Ezechielem*),²⁹ which passages are cited by the Master.³⁰

§ 14. Besides these there are also the following things worthy of note. St. Augustine in Ep. 89³¹ (treating those words of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2: "There is one mediator," and so forth) says: "Therefore, one Christ profits us for justification, as the Apostle records, so that we may know that even the ancient just, whoever they could be, were freed by none other than by that same faith of Christ by which we also are freed — the faith, namely, of the incarnation of Christ, which was

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, aa. 1–2.
2. 1 Thess. 2 — the Apostle there praises the Thessalonians for receiving the preached word not as the word of men but as the word of God.
3. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 7.
4. The footnote at the bottom of the page (marked *a*) reads: On this question one should altogether consult Aegidius Coninck, *De Fide, Spe et Charitate* (Disputation 4, Doubt 6, n. 105; Disputation 14; and Disputation 17, Doubt 3). In the meantime the following words of the Council of Trent must be weighed: Session 6, ch. 13 — that it is to be affirmed that not only is faith lost by any mortal sin, but that the habit of faith itself is also lost; accepted, the grace of justification is forfeited.
5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, aa. 4–5.
6. Heb. 11 — the Apostle defines faith as "the evidence of things that appear not" (*argumentum rerum non apparentium*), illustrating this by the examples of Noe, Abraham, Moses, and others who by faith awaited what they did not yet behold.
7. 1 Cor. 13:12.
8. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractates 27 and 40, and frequently elsewhere: *Fides est credere quod non vides*.
9. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 79, on Jn. 14:2: *Haec est laus fidei, si quod creditur non videtur*; and on the same passage: *Eat Dominus, ut paret locus; eat ut videatur; credatur, ut credatur*.
10. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones Evangeliorum*, q. 39; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, chapters 1 and 2.
11. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Homily 26; and *Dialogi* IV, ch. 5: *Apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem*; and: *Hoc veraciter dicitur credi, quod non valet videri*.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, aa. 4–5 (*ubi supra*).
13. 1 Jn. 1:1–3.
14. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 118, Concio 13.
15. The Master (Peter Lombard) draws this sense from St. Augustine; cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 3.
16. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Homily 26.
17. St. Augustine, *Sermo 26 de Tempore*. The Benedictine editors reject this sermon from among St. Augustine's genuine works and number it CXXVII, placing it also as CCCLXXI among the sermons of Class 7 — that is, among the doubtful ones that are not always coherent nor always uninterpolated — and they consider that this sermon was composed by someone other than him.
18. Cf. the resolution stated above in § II.
19. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 56.
20. Is. 7:9, according to the Septuagint (LXX) rendering.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7.
22. Acts 4:12.
23. Acts 15:11.
24. Rom. 3:22.
25. Rom. 3:25.
26. Gal. 2:16.
27. Gal. 3:22.
28. St. Augustine, *Epistola 157 (ad Optatum)*; also numbered Ep. CXC in the Novissima edition.
29. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Homily 17.
30. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In Sent.* [citing the passages indicated].

31. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 89; also numbered Ep. CLVII in the same edition, ch. 3, num. 14. At that locus the Auctor does not treat the words of the Apostle 1 Tim. 2:1, as he says, but those of the same Apostle (*ad Rom.* 5, v. 19): "As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one man many shall be made just." He does, however, allude to the locus of the Apostle 1 Tim. 2 [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO XXV — ON THE FAITH THAT WAS NECESSARY BEFORE THE COMING OF CHRIST (*DE FIDE QUAE ANTE CHRISTI ADVENTUM NECESSARIA ERAT*)

§ 1. those things were pre-announced to them, just as to us the accomplished facts are announced. For this reason the same Apostle calls Christ a man — even though He is also God — lest anyone should suppose that the ancient just could have been liberated through God alone in the manner of Christ, that is, through the Word who was in the beginning, and not also through faith in His incarnation, by reason of which that same one is called the man Christ. For this proposition, of which he speaks elsewhere in 1 Cor. 15, cannot be destroyed: "By one man death, and by one man the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive."¹ The same St. Augustine, in Letter 95,² says that the faith of Christ, which afterwards came into revelation, was hidden in the time of our Fathers; through that faith, however, those very persons were liberated by the grace of God, whosoever could be liberated throughout the ages of every kind. And in the book *On Original Sin*, chapter 24,³ he speaks thus: the truth of Christ does not doubt that without faith in the incarnation and death and resurrection of Christ, not even the ancient just could have been cleansed from sins so as to be just, and justified by the grace of God — whether among those just persons whom Sacred Scripture commemorates, or those whom it does not indeed commemorate but who are nevertheless to be believed to have existed: either before the flood, or thence up to the giving of the Law, or during the time of the Law itself, not only among the children of Israel, as were the prophets, but also outside that same people, as was Job. For the hearts even of those men were cleansed by the same faith of the Mediator, and charity was poured out in them through the Holy Spirit, who breathes where He wills, not following merits but also making those very merits. Thus far St. Augustine. With him there is a similar and brief pronouncement near the end of book 3 of the *Hypognosticon*: "Times," he says, "have changed, not faith. Justification therefore through faith in Jesus Christ has been given, is given, and will be given to believers."⁴

§ 2. Pope Leo I, on the same point, has left the following written in Sermon 3 *On the Nativity of the Lord*:⁵ "A sacrifice had to be offered for reconciliation, which would be a sharer in our nature yet alien to our defilement: so that this purpose of God, by which it pleased Him to blot out the sin of the world through the nativity and passion of Jesus Christ, might extend to the ages of all generations; and that the mysteries, varied according to the measure of the times, should not be thrown into disorder but rather confirmed — since the faith by which we live has not been different in any age." And a little after: "Let there cease, therefore, the complaints of those who, murmuring impiously against the divine dispensations, grumble at the lateness of the Lord's Nativity, as though what was accomplished in the last age of the world had not been bestowed upon the preceding times. The incarnation of the Word conferred these things as about to be done which, once done, and the sacrament of human salvation has never at any time in antiquity ceased. What the Apostles preached, this the Prophets announced. Nor is that thing late or novel which has always been believed." Thus far Leo.

§ 3. The Master therefore rightly concludes, regarding what has been said by the Apostle in Heb. 11: "He who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him"⁶ — that this is indeed necessary, as the Apostle testifies, but that it does not suffice, as the foregoing proofs demonstrate. Those things also contribute to the clarification of this teaching which were said at Dist. 1 of this book⁷ concerning the necessity and time of Christ's advent in the flesh, and likewise what was shown at Dist. 23⁸ — that the faith of all ages is one.

§ II — Of what articles an explicit faith is necessary for Christians (Quorum explicita fides sit Christianis necessaria)

§ 4. For the explanation of the questions of the present Distinction, it must be known that the faith of any article is in one respect explicit (*explicita*), and in another respect implicit (*implicita*), as the Scholastics call it. The Master calls the former "distinct" (*distinctam*) and the latter "veiled" (*velatam*); and again the former "in the open" (*in aperto*) and the latter "in mystery" (*in mysterio*). Explicit faith is that by which something is believed according to itself, in particular, and — as they say — in its proper form. Implicit faith, however, is that by which something is believed in another thing, as in a universal: as if someone from his heart professes that he believes whatever the Church believes and that whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture is true — such a person holds each of those two things which he expressly professes by explicit faith. He implicitly believes, however, for example, that there are seven Sacraments of the Church, that Abraham had two sons, and whatever else is contained in those general things explicitly believed, provided that in particular he does not pertinaciously hold anything contrary to any of those things which are contained in those general propositions.

§ 5. With this distinction of faith premised, it must be seen which things must be believed explicitly by Christians and which it suffices to believe implicitly. First, it is established among the Doctors that all Christians must believe all the articles of faith — that is, all the dogmas of faith — in some manner, whether explicitly or at least implicitly. It is equally certain that it does not suffice for any Christian who makes use of reason, if he believes implicitly all things that pertain to faith; rather, certain things must also be believed explicitly. And it is likewise consonant with truth that there is no Christian from whom an explicit or distinct cognition of all dogmas, as being necessary for his salvation, should be required. Hence it follows that just as it suffices to believe certain dogmas of faith implicitly, so also an explicit faith in certain others is necessary.

§ 6. It is asked, therefore, of which persons and concerning which dogmas an explicit — or at least implicit — faith is necessary after Christ. Concerning this question, on account of the variety of talents, places, and times, no one position can easily be pronounced upon and no single sentence put forward. The Master affirms in § 1 that in the time of Grace all things that are contained in the Symbol ought to be believed. But the same Master says in § 2 that in the Church there are some less capable persons, who are unable to distinguish and assign the articles of faith. Nevertheless all believe the things contained in the Symbol: "For they believe," he says, "those things which they are ignorant of, having veiled faith in mystery." These words of the Master do not fully resolve the proposed question.

§ 7. It seems indeed that one must say, first, that every Christian is bound to hold a distinct or explicit faith (*distinctam seu explicitam fidem*) of those articles whose distinct cognition is necessary for rightly ordering life. Next, those dogmas of faith which are publicly and sufficiently evident in Ecclesiastical teaching —

whether through the preaching of pastors, or through attendance at feasts and the use of ceremonies — must be held explicitly by all those who are not prevented by a just cause from publicly seeing, hearing, and understanding these things as proposed and taught in the Church; and the more so because the care of the Church is most greatly exercised around the teaching of such matters. Of this kind are, in general, those things which are customarily inculcated more diligently against rampant heresies — such as, in our own time, the dogmas concerning the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, concerning the invocation of the Saints, the purgatory of souls, indulgences, and the like. We except a just impediment; because there could be someone afflicted with so great a stupor of intellect, or so remote from Christian places where these things are taught — whether by captivity or by any other circumstance — that such persons might rightly be judged excused from explicitly believing these things.

§ 8. Moreover, those whose office it is to teach others — such as Bishops and Pastors — are bound, beyond the aforesaid, also to believe explicitly, and not only that, but also to know and understand to some extent, the things concerning Sacred Scripture, concerning the decrees of Councils and Pontiffs, concerning the doctrine of the Fathers and Ecclesiastical Traditions, insofar as the proper execution of their office demands. This matter cannot be prescribed exactly and in detail (*in individuo*), as they say, for each individual. St. Bonaventure disputes learnedly on this subject (in this Distinction, q. 3).¹⁰

§ III — On the extent to which certain ancients possessed a distinct faith in the mysteries (Quatenus distinctam mysteriorum fidem perfecte habuerint quidam antiqui)

§ 9. Concerning the faith of the ancients — that is, of those who preceded the coming of Christ — the Master, distinguishing at § 2, rightly distinguishes between the greater or more illustrious among them, such as the Patriarchs and Prophets, and the lesser or simpler, such as was the rest of the people: the former had received a distinct revelation of the mysteries of the Incarnation of Christ, while the latter had only a veiled knowledge of those same mysteries. Yet this is not to be taken as though the Prophets had possessed as great, as perfect, and as distinct a cognition of the mysteries of human redemption as the Apostles had, or those who learned them from the Apostles. For the truth in the Gospel protests against this, saying to the Apostles (Matt. 13): "Blessed are your eyes, because they see, and your ears, because they hear; for many Prophets and just men desired to see the things that you see, and did not see them, and to hear the things that you hear, and did not hear them." Hence St. Bernard, in Letter 77¹² (writing to Hugh of St. Victor and disputing against his opinion), citing the words just mentioned, says: "Why, then, did they wish to see and to hear? Namely, that they might perceive more clearly and more abundantly what they had barely and obscurely sensed beforehand. Otherwise, what was the point of seeing the flesh outwardly and hearing the discourses of the flesh, if they were already inwardly instructed in spirit concerning all things perfectly?" So he.

§ 10. What is said by the Master is therefore to be understood thus: those more illustrious ancients among the Jewish people did indeed possess a distinct knowledge of many mysteries of human redemption — such as the nativity of Christ, his passion, death, resurrection, and the like — but that knowledge was in many respects more imperfect and more obscure than what the Apostles had, or those who learned those things from the Apostles. For it is one thing to know something of future events prophetically and as if through a mist — since the law is a shadow of things to come — and another to see a thing while it is being

accomplished, or to receive it as already accomplished from eye-witnesses. In the same manner one must understand what is found in St. Augustine (in his *Commentary on Ps. 56*)¹³, where, speaking of David, he says: "This Prophet saw the Lord in spirit, humbled, struck, scourged, buffeted with blows, stripped of his garments, besmeared with spittle, crowned with thorns, suspended on the wood, and so forth." These things, I say, David perhaps saw individually and in particular in spirit; yet not so perfectly and so distinctly according to the complete order, manner, and time of the deed as they were seen and known by the Apostles. Hence the same St. Augustine (in the *Preface on Ps. 96*)¹⁴ says that although the Prophets had great joy when they saw in spirit things to be fulfilled concerning Christ, they nevertheless wished, if it were possible, to live with us in this present time, and to see accomplished what they were prophesying in spirit. "For although," he says, "they saw these things in spirit, those things were nonetheless presented to them as it were future, whereas to the Apostles they were rendered as already present," and so forth.

§ 11. As for what is said in the Gospel — that Abraham is said to have seen the day of the Lord — this is rightly referred to that knowledge by which, constituted in Limbo, he saw, that is, certainly knew, that Christ had already come in the flesh: by that mode of knowing, namely, which befits a separated soul concerning a thing already in existence; just as the just Simeon received it as a great benefit from the Lord that he should see Christ in the flesh with bodily eyes. Therefore, by each of these two examples it is likewise shown that a more perfect knowledge of the mysteries of Christ was granted to those who saw them fulfilled than to those who foresaw them as future.

§ 12. There is a luminous testimony to this matter in St. Gregory, *Homily 16 on Ezekiel*¹⁵, where, discussing what the ancients knew or did not know about God, he says among other things: "It must be known that through the increase of times the knowledge of the spiritual Fathers grew. For Moses knew more than Abraham; the Prophets more than Moses; the Apostles more than the Prophets in the knowledge of almighty God." And he proves this by these Scriptures: Dan. 12: "Many shall pass through, and knowledge shall be manifold"; Exod. 6: "I appeared to them in God Almighty, and my name Adonai I did not declare to them"; Ps. 118: "I have had understanding above all that teach me; I have understood above the ancients"; and lastly by that of Lk. 10: "Many kings and Prophets desired to see," and so forth. After which, concerning the Apostles, he thus concludes: "They therefore knew more of divine knowledge than the Prophets, because what those had seen by the spirit alone, they saw also in bodily form." And concerning the whole course of the Church he added: "Because the more the world is brought to its end, the more largely is the entrance of eternal knowledge opened to us." Entirely similar to this is what is read in the same author, *Moralia*, bk. 9, ch. 6⁶: "As the end of the world presses on, heavenly knowledge grows and increases more largely with time." And a little after: "Whatever lay hidden at the beginnings of holy Church, the end reveals day by day."

§ 13. Although from this opinion of St. Gregory, St. Thomas seems to dissent, attributing a fuller knowledge of the mysteries to those who were nearer to Christ, whether before or after — as to John the Baptist as the last of the Prophets, and to the Apostles as the first heralds of the Gospel.¹⁷

§ IV — What faith in the Mediator was necessary before the coming of Christ (Quae fides mediatoris fuerit ante Christi adventum necessaria)

§ 14. When it is asked among the Scholastics how far a distinct and explicit (*explicita*) cognition of the Mediator was necessary for the ancients who preceded Christ's coming, the question turns principally on this:

whether all were bound to believe distinctly that they were to be liberated through the death of one who was both God and man, or whether it sufficed for the simple and more unlearned to believe that God would in some manner known to Himself liberate the human race, even if they were ignorant of the mode of that liberation and of the condition of the person through whom the liberation was to be accomplished.

Some have been of the opinion that a distinct faith in those four mysteries — namely the Incarnation, the Death, the Resurrection, and the Coming to Judgment — was necessary for all the ancients unto salvation. This is a position which the Master sets out in §. 3 in such a way as to appear not to disapprove of it, and this on account of the authority of St. Augustine, from whom those four mysteries are enumerated¹⁸ as having been believed by the ancients in common with us. For this purpose certain other passages of St. Augustine can also be brought forward,¹⁹ of which the most explicit words are read in chapter 24 of that last-named book: "Christian truth does not doubt that not even the ancient just could have been cleansed from their sins so as to be just, nor been justified by the grace of God, without faith in the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Christ." And what follows. Not dissimilar is the passage in bk. 3 of the *Hypognosticon*, near the end.²⁰

This opinion also receives much probability from the Gospel, in which it seems to be repeatedly hinted that the Jewish people in general were persuaded that the Messiah whom they awaited would be God or the Son of God. They consider this to be indicated by the confession of Martha in Jn. 11: "I have believed that thou art Christ the Son of God"; and by that first address of Nathanael to Christ in Jn. 1: "Thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel." Hence also in the Council of the Priests and Elders the Lord was questioned in Matt. 26 as to whether He were the Christ the Son of God — one question embracing both points at once. And the centurion and the other soldiers, on seeing the miracles wrought at the death of Christ, said: "This indeed was the Son of God." Add to this that John the Baptist, announcing Christ to the promiscuous multitude and a little later pointing to Him as present, says in Jn. 1: "I saw, and I gave testimony that this is the Son of God."

§ 15. The other opinion, however, is that none of these things had to be explicitly believed of necessity by all; but that for the simple who possessed neither fuller instruction nor revelation, it sufficed if, having recognized the corruption of nature through sin, they believed in a general way that the human race would thence be liberated by some mode divinely decreed, even if that mode were unknown to themselves. So thinks St. Bernard in his Letter 77 (to Hugh of St. Victor),¹² who, in words already cited, says: "If then the Prophets and those who seemed more illustrious in that people could not all equally and clearly know all things, but some more and some less — how much more could the simpler among the just fail to know the time, the mode, and the order of salvation, without detriment to their salvation? — who nevertheless held most firmly with certain hope and faith what had been promised." And below: "Many therefore before the coming of the Saviour, holding God Almighty and loving Him as the gracious promiser of their salvation, believing in the promise faithfully, hoping for the most certain Redeemer, were saved in this faith and expectation — though they knew not when, how, or in what order the promised salvation was to come." So St. Bernard. With him on this point in no way dissents Hugh of St. Victor (in his book *De Sacramentis*),²¹ writing thus: "These are the things in which faith could be placed from the beginning: namely, to believe that there is one God, creator of all and ruler of all things; that He indeed is not the author of evil, but that He would be the future Redeemer of those who in their miseries should seek and await His mercy. This we believe sufficed for the faith of the simple from the beginning. And yet we say that they most truly had faith in His nativity, passion, resurrection, and ascension in this way, because those who believed and knew these things cleaved to them with faithful

devotion." And again: "Before the Law God the creator was believed, and from Him salvation and redemption were awaited. But by whom, and in what manner, the same salvation was to be accomplished and perfected, was not known by the rest of the faithful — excepting the few to whom it was given as a singular gift to know this." So he. These words are sufficiently in agreement with what is read in St. Gregory, Homily 16 on Ezekiel.¹⁵

The same is the teaching of the most approved Scholastics, such as St. Bonaventure (on this Distinction)²² and St. Thomas,²³ who, having said in the body of the article that the lesser sort, before Christ's coming, by believing under the veil of the sacrifices that these were divinely ordained concerning the Christ who was to come, possessed in some manner a veiled cognition — more fully resolves the question in the reply to the third objection, saying: "If any, however, were saved who had not had revelation made to them, they were not saved without faith in the Mediator; because, even if they did not have explicit faith, they nevertheless had implicit faith in divine providence, believing that God is the liberator of men according to the modes pleasing to Him, in accordance with what the Spirit had revealed to those who had knowledge of the truth."

It must further be noted that, in the same article — drawing upon the aforementioned Homily of St. Gregory — St. Thomas adds that those ancients knew the things pertaining to the mysteries of Christ so much the more difficultly, that is, obscurely, the further removed they were from Christ; and so much the more easily, that is, clearly, the nearer they were to Christ — inasmuch, of course, as revelation grew with time. And as revelation grew, the obligation to a more explicit faith also grew.

§ 16. This, then, being an altogether probable opinion, it will not be difficult to dissolve the arguments of the opposing side. For St. Augustine makes no mention of explicit faith, and consequently his words can be taken in the sense that they signify that some faith — whether open or veiled — in those mysteries he recalls was necessary for all the ancients; for St. Augustine's disputation undertaken against the Pelagians requires no more than this, and it sufficed him to name those things which are the chief mysteries of our redemption.

To the objections drawn from Scripture, we reply: first, that from these it by no means follows that explicit faith in the Divinity of the Messiah, in the Resurrection, and the like, was necessary for all the ancients. Second, it could seem to the common run of Jews that to be the Son of God was one thing, and to be God another — since the name "Son of God" is attributed not infrequently by Scripture, both old and new, also to others. And indeed it is credible that Nathanael had a somewhat lesser sense of Christ when he at once confessed Him to be the Son of God at the very beginning, than Peter had — who on account of a verbally similar confession was made Prince of the Apostles and Pastor of the Church. Finally, although some at that time from among the simpler sort were so illumined as to recognise Christ as God, it was not for that reason generally known or necessary to be known that this was so, until fuller instruction and clearer revelation came through doctrine and miracles.

We add lastly that not even an express faith in the Trinity was at all times necessary unto salvation for all, just as St. Gregory expressly teaches and proves in the Homily cited above.²⁴ With him St. Thomas does not disagree,²⁵ saying: "In the same way as the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ before Christ was believed explicitly by the greater, and implicitly and as if in shadow by the lesser, so also the mystery of the Trinity — although all are bound to believe both explicitly after the time of grace having been promulgated." The same is sufficiently signified by the words of Hugh already cited above by us; although the Master (in the text) seems to hold a different view — unless one prefers to interpret the whole of §. 3 as referring to the more advanced,

as St. Bonaventure interprets it, in whose commentary it bears this inscription: *Concerning the more advanced before the coming of Christ, whether it was necessary for them to believe all the things that are now believed.*²⁶

§ V — What was the faith of Cornelius before he heard the Gospel (Quae fuerit fides Cornelii ante auditum Evangelium)

§ 17. The Master asks whether Cornelius the Centurion had faith in the Incarnation of Christ when he was addressed by the Angel (Acts 10): "Your prayers and your almsgiving have ascended as a memorial in the sight of God." For that he then had faith in the one God is sufficiently apparent from Scripture, which calls him devout and fearing God, since he could not even have prayed to God without faith, the Apostle saying (Rom. 10): "How shall they call upon him in whom they have not believed?" But the sole question is concerning faith in the Incarnation of Christ.

§ 18. To this question the reply seems to be that Cornelius, since he was a Gentile, had received the faith which he possessed from the Jews among whom he lived; and that accordingly he had explicit faith in God as the author and ruler of all things, just as also in that same God as the bestower of all goods and the repeller of evils. For his earnest prayers to God argue this sufficiently. Nor is it implausibly said that he also believed in general concerning the coming of the Messiah what was believed by the Jews — namely, that He would come at some time into the world as the leader, redeemer, and saviour of His people. But because the time of the revealed Gospel was already at hand, it was necessary that he, like all the Jews, should be instructed explicitly in faith in Christ the mediator: that is, that they should distinctly believe concerning the time and the person — namely, that the Messiah had already come, and that this Jesus who had been crucified was that Messiah, the Son of God and the Redeemer of the world, and other such things which in the time of revealed Grace are to be expressly believed by the faithful. In agreement with this reply the Master adduces (in the text) concordant statements, and St. Thomas concurs,²⁷ saying that Cornelius had implicit faith, the truth of the Gospel not yet having been manifested, and that therefore Peter was sent to him, that he might be more fully instructed in the faith. For it must not be supposed that St. Thomas is there speaking of implicit faith in the one God — both because such faith never sufficed anyone for salvation, and because from the words of Scripture, as we have noted above, it is sufficiently established that Cornelius had explicit faith in the one God. Indeed, St. Thomas in the third book of the *Sentences*²⁸ affirms that Cornelius had explicit faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, although implicit faith in this would have sufficed him for salvation. "But he did not have distinct faith concerning the time of the Incarnation; and therefore, because this was already beginning to be necessary for salvation, Peter was sent to instruct him." So says he.

§ 19. Now, a view different from these may appear to be that of St. Augustine and St. Gregory. St. Augustine indeed, in the book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7,²⁹ attributes faith in the one God to Cornelius in such a way as nevertheless to remove from him faith in Christ, saying that his almsgiving had been accepted and his prayers heard before he believed in Christ, and hence subjoining these words: "But if without faith in Christ he could be saved, the Apostle Peter as master-builder would not have been sent to him for his edification"; and concluding at last thus: "Whatever therefore Cornelius did well, both before he believed in Christ and after he had believed, is all to be attributed to God," etc. And St. Gregory, in Homily 19 on *Ezekiel*,³⁰ discoursing about Cornelius, says among other things: "He knew therefore God the creator of all things, but that His omnipotent Son had become incarnate, he did not know." And again: "But by good

action he merited to know God perfectly and to believe the mystery of His Incarnation, so as to attain to the sacrament of baptism. By faith therefore he came to works, but by works he was confirmed in faith." And indeed in Homily 9 *on the same Prophet*³¹ he says that Cornelius, before he became a believer, merited by his good works that faith should be announced to him; because, namely, he was doing good works for the purpose of receiving faith.

§ 20. But the words of both St. Augustine and St. Gregory are rightly understood in such a way that they do not remove from Cornelius all faith in the Mediator, but only the distinct and explicit faith — namely, concerning Christ already born and having suffered for the salvation of the world — which was also then lacking to other Jews still holding implicit faith in the Mediator, and indeed even in some respects explicit faith, yet not however as regards the time and the person. This was what was then beginning to be announced by the Apostles. And indeed something of this sort St. Gregory seems to suggest concerning Cornelius when he says that he did not yet know that the Son of God had become incarnate — as if to say: in the mystery he indeed believed in the coming of the Messiah, but that He had already become incarnate, had suffered, and had died, he did not yet know.

§ I — How hope is defined and what it regards (Spes quomodo definiatur et quid respiciat)

§ 21. Hope, insofar as it is a natural affection of the soul by which goods that are difficult of attainment are desired, is not a virtue (*virtus*); but insofar as it is a certain habit (*habitus*) perfecting the rational appetite (*appetitus*), that is, the will, and determining it toward spiritual and eternal goods which surpass nature, goods to be expected from God, it is ranked second among the theological virtues (*virtutes Theologicae*). Two definitions of it are handed down straightway by the Master at the beginning of this distinction. The first is this: "Hope is the virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for." The second, attributed to Haymo, is this: "Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude (*beatitudo*) coming from the grace (*gratia*) of God and from preceding merits." By others it is defined in this manner: "Hope is a virtue divinely infused, by which the goods of our salvation and of eternal life are expected with assured confidence." The sense of these definitions is one and the same, and will be more fully grasped from what is to be said below.

§ 22. Hope taken in this manner is rightly counted among the virtues, because it makes the act of man good. For just as faith (*fides*) causes the soul to assent to the First Truth, so hope causes the soul to confide in and lean upon the supreme and immeasurable bounty — that is, to expect in the fitting manner those goods which the divine bounty has promised, goods set beyond all human estimation. Although these goods be many, yet since the principal object (*obiectum*) of hope is God Himself, insofar as by the enjoyment (*fruitio*) of Him man is made blessed, it is clear that hope is rightly numbered among the theological virtues. For the formal character (*ratio*) of a theological virtue consists in this: that it has God as its object, as has been said elsewhere.³³ Although, therefore, other goods also — both in this life and in the life to come — are rightly expected from God, such as justice, the remission of sins, and immortality, yet all of these are hoped for in the order toward God as the ultimate end (*finis ultimus*), in which at last all our desire (*desiderium*) may find rest.

§ 23. For the fuller declaration of this matter, it must be noted (*notandum est*) that hope regards two things: namely, the good which a person expects by hoping, and the help (*auxilium*) by which he hopes to obtain such a good; of which the former — namely, the good that is hoped for — has the formal character of

an end (*ratio finis*), and the latter — namely, the help in which one trusts — has the formal character of an efficient cause (*ratio causae efficientis*). Now since one end is ultimate and another is not ultimate, and one efficient cause is principal and another is secondary, this distinction may be observed both in the good which hope regards and in the help on which hope leans. For hope regards eternal beatitude itself, which is God, as the ultimate end (*finis ultimus*); the remaining goods, whether of this life or of the other, it views as secondary ends, or as certain means fitted for attaining the ultimate end, that is, eternal beatitude. Again, hope leans upon the help of God Himself as the first and principal cause who promotes and finally bestows beatitude; whereas it leans upon the assistance and support of creatures — whether angelic or human, whether still acting in this life or reigning in the future — as upon a secondary and subordinate cause that promotes the same felicity. Hence, just as it is not permitted to man to hope for some good from God as an ultimate end that is diverse from God, so neither is it permitted to him to expect from any source other than God, as from the primary and principal cause, the help for obtaining beatitude. But just as we rightly expect certain goods that differ from God as secondary ends, by the ordering of God Himself, so too we are not forbidden to seek from others besides God, as from secondary and subordinate helpers, assistance toward obtaining beatitude. Hence it is clear that neither the intercessions of the saints nor merits — whether one's own or another's — conflict with the proper object of Christian hope.

§ II — Whether hope can subsist without charity (Spes an sine charitate consistat)

§ 24. What we said above concerning faith — that charity (*caritas*) is not necessarily conjoined to it — is customarily asked similarly concerning hope: whether hope can exist without charity. For that hope cannot exist without charity, the definition already set forth seems to prove: since hope was said to be the expectation of future beatitude proceeding from preceding merits. But merits cannot be had without charity. Hence the Master also affirms in the text that charity precedes our hope. This seems to be taken from St. Ambrose, who, in Book 8 on Luke, on the words "If you had faith like a grain of mustard seed" (Lk. 17:6), says: "From faith is charity, from charity hope."³⁵ The Master, expounding the given definition, then subjoins: "Without merits it is possible to hope for something, but it cannot properly be called hope — it is presumption."

§ 25. Moreover, St. Augustine at one time makes hope posterior to charity, and at another denies it to come from good merits. For in Book 1 of *On Christian Doctrine*, chapter 37, he says that by love (*dilectio*) and good works a man hopes for a reward.³⁶ And in chapter 40 he says: "That man despairs of arriving at that which he believes and loves — as though toward the eternal — in whom an unworthy scruple of knowledge lurks."³⁷ And in Sermon 16 on the Words of the Apostle he says: "What is hope, unless it arise from some prevailing goodness of conscience?"³⁸ Similar is the passage in Psalm 31.³⁹ And in Sermon 31 on the Words of the Lord he says that hope belongs only to the sons.⁴⁰

§ 26. Nor are there lacking testimonies of Scripture by which this part of the question seems to be established. For the Wise Man says, Prov. 24: "The wicked have no hope of future things."⁴¹ Sentences of this kind are repeated also elsewhere, as Wis. 5 and 16, and Sir. 34.⁴² Paul likewise says, Rom. 5:3–5: "Tribulation works patience, and patience probation, and probation hope; but hope does not confound, because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts."⁴³ By these words the Apostle seems to make hope posterior not only to patience and probation but also to charity. And John in his first Epistle, chapter 3, speaking of the

hope of eternal life, says: "Every one who has this hope sanctifies himself, as He is holy."⁴⁴ And in the same chapter: "If our heart does not rebuke us, we have confidence toward God."⁴⁵ Finally, throughout the Psalms and elsewhere, Scripture declares blessed those who hope and trust in the Lord — which cannot be without charity.⁴⁶

§ 27. To these authorities reason also seems to lend support. For just as nothing is hoped for unless it is known — whence it is necessary that faith precede hope — so nothing is hoped for unless it is loved, as St. Augustine himself testifies (*Enchiridion*, ch. 8).⁴⁷ From which it seems similarly to follow that love precedes hope; and indeed such a love by which God is preferred above all others. For just as hope is not without love, so the hope of the highest good (*summum bonum*) does not seem to be without the love of the highest good — which is charity.

§ 28. Notwithstanding all these arguments, it must be held without doubt that charity can be separated from Christian hope; and that just as faith, so also hope is rightly distinguished into formed and unformed (*formata* and *informis*), living and dead. Although this matter could be sufficiently clear from what has been said concerning faith, we shall here add certain things for greater confirmation.

§ 29. General is the sentence of Prosper (which is in the book of the Sentences of St. Augustine, number 7):⁴⁸

1. 1 Cor. 15:21–22.

2. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 95 (also cited as Epistle CLXXVII in some editions), ad loc.

3. St. Augustine, *De Peccato originali*, ch. 24.

4. St. Augustine (attributed), *Hypognosticon*, lib. 3, sub finem.

5. Pope Leo I (Leo the Great), *Sermo* 3 de Nativitate Domini.

6. Heb. 11:6.

7. Estius, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 1 [i.e. the corresponding discussion earlier in this book].

8. Estius, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 23.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5 and following.

10. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 25, q. 3. — The footnote appended to this passage in the source (marked *a*) reads: "Rightly indeed, but less completely and somewhat too briefly the matter is treated by the Author. Many things therefore ought here to be noted about the necessity of means and of precept, as they say, and the twofold necessity, or both as being explicitly credenda for the sake of novices and of usefulness, since they occur widely among the Doctors, to be explained. But we judge it best to commend in the first place the most celebrated and admirable writer Ægidius Conink in his most celebrated work *On Morality, Nature, and the Effects of Supernatural Acts* (disp. 14, dub. 8, usque, and throughout dub. 11), who elucidates these things clearly, learnedly, dogmatically, and as much scholastically as is fitting. Moreover in this question, there are several propositions to be had before the eyes from the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII and Innocent XI, where they are proscribed; namely among those condemned by Alexander VII, the first, which reads thus: 'A man is at no time of his life bound to elicit an act of Faith, Hope, and Charity from the precept of the divine commandments.' And among those proscribed by Innocent XI, 65, 64, 23, 22, 17, 7, 6: of which the first, namely 6, reads thus: 'It is probable that not a single act of Charity towards God is rigorously required of the faithful during the whole of their life.' The Seventh: 'Then only does one oblige...' [the footnote continues but is partially obscured; abbreviation as in source].

11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 7.

12. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 77 (to Hugh of St. Victor).

13. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 56.
14. St. Augustine, *Praefatio in Psalmum* 96.
15. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 16.
16. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 9, ch. 6.
17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 7, ad 4.
18. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, bk. 2, ch. 12.
19. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 89 (or 95); *De Peccatorum meritis*, bk. 2, ch. 29; *De Peccato originali*, ch. 24, 25, 26.
20. St. Augustine (attributed), *Hypognosticon*, bk. 3, near the end.
21. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*.
22. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 25 [on this Distinction].
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7, in the body of the article and ad 3.
24. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 16 (cited above).
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 8.
26. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 3, with the title: *De Provectoribus ante adventum Christi, utrum necesse fuerit eos credere omnia quae modo creduntur*.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4.
28. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, ad Textum.
29. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7.
30. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 19.
31. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 9.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 17, aa. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6.
33. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 17, a. 6.
34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 65, a. 4; II-II, q. 17, a. 8.
35. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, Book 8, on Lk. 17:6.
36. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 37.
37. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 40.
38. St. Augustine, Sermon 16 *de Verbis Apostoli* (in the Novissima Editio: Sermon CLVIII among the first class of sermons).
39. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 31.
40. St. Augustine, Sermon 31 *de Verbis Domini* (in the Novissima Editio: Sermon CX).
41. Prov. 24:20 (Vulgate).
42. Wis. 5; Wis. 16; Sir. 34.
43. Rom. 5:3–5.
44. 1 Jn. 3:3.
45. 1 Jn. 3:21.
46. Ps. 31 and passim in the Psalms.
47. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 8.
48. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, no. 7.

DISTINCTIO XXVI — ON THE NATURE OF HOPE AS SEPARABLE FROM CHARITY, ITS CERTAINTY, AND RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE SPE INFORMI, CERTITUDINE SPEI, ET QUAESTIONES ANNEXAE*)

§ 1. [7.] that the love of God and of neighbour is a proper and special virtue of the pious and the holy, since the other virtues can be common to both the good and the bad. Therefore, according to Prosper and St. Augustine, hope can both exist in the wicked and be separated from charity. This was expressed more explicitly by St. Augustine himself in Tractate 83 on John: ¹ "In vain indeed, but yet he can hope for pardon who does not love." By these words St. Augustine wished to indicate an unformed and dead hope, by which pardon and eternal life are hoped for in vain, insofar as concerns the present good effect or present merits. The same thing was indicated to us from the contrary by Peter in his First Epistle, chapter 1, when he says that we have been regenerated through the mercy of God unto a living hope (*in spem vivam*).² For in naming hope "living," he implied that there is a certain dead hope, by which those hope for a reward who lack the pursuit of good works. Consonant with these is that which the Interlinear Gloss has on Matt. 1:³ "Faith begets hope, but hope begets charity."

§ 2. The argument also in support of this view is manifest. For just as, by way of example, someone lacking money can hope for a house or a field or something similar, because he hopes to receive money with which to buy that thing: so nothing prevents a sinner, destitute of good merits, from hoping for eternal life — inasmuch as he hopes to receive through God's grace those very good merits by which he may obtain eternal life for himself. This hope, indeed, is to be attributed not to presumption but to virtue, and is to be ascribed to the gift of God. There are also other arguments that demonstrate the same thing.

First: because a sinner can hope for eternal life from merits acquired before sin. These, even if they have been mortified by subsequent sin, can nevertheless be revived again through grace.

Next: because, as we said above, hope regards not only eternal life but also the means by which one arrives at it, of which kind are above all the very merits of good works. Therefore, one who does not yet have merits can hope for them, just as for all other goods leading to salvation — excepting faith and hope, which do not simply fall under hope. Although we can and ought to hope for the increase of these virtues as well. For whatever is asked for in prayer is likewise expected through hope.

§ 3. Finally, with regard to no sinner in this life ought one to despair of himself; but he ought, by desiring, to hope and to expect from the mercy of God both eternal life and those goods without which one does not arrive at it.

Now, although there is not so explicit a definition in the Council of Trent concerning hope as there is concerning faith separable from charity, nevertheless those things are said there from which this teaching is

gathered sufficiently clearly. For (in ch. 6 of Session 6)⁴ it is said of sinners that, turning themselves toward a consideration of the mercy of God, they are raised to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them on account of Christ. And in canon 3,⁵ the Fathers profess that a man can hope as is fitting, so that the grace of justification may be infused into him, though not without the prevenient inspiration and assistance of the Holy Spirit. This passage not only establishes that there is some unformed hope, but also that it is a gift of God.

§ 4. In order therefore to reply to the objections, first — as regards the definition of hope which requires preceding merits — some are of the opinion that it applies only to formed hope; and it appears that the Master [of the Sentences] held this view.⁶ Others think that the words of the definition can without absurdity be accommodated also to unformed hope; for that hope too arises, as regards its act, from preceding merits — not merits preceding hope itself, but the thing hoped for, that is, eternal life. For those merits the sinful man, even if he does not have them, nevertheless, as we have said, hopes to receive through the grace of God. This same thing is expressed by others in other words: that a sinner expects eternal life from merits which he has not in reality but in intention.

§ 5. For the resolution of what was objected from Scripture and the Fathers, it must be noted that both love and hope are to be considered in two ways: namely, either according to a certain beginning or according to their perfection. For there is a certain inchoate and imperfect love of God, by which God is indeed loved inasmuch as He is proposed by the intellect as our supreme and beatifying good, yet not so perfectly loved that the will by its affection sets all other things after Him. And there is also a perfect love of God, by which one sets God before all other things not by estimation alone but also by the affection and operation of the will; which love is charity (*caritas*). Similarly, one hope is imperfect, while he who hopes does not yet have in himself that which would enable him to apprehend the thing hoped for. Another is perfect, when he who hopes already has that in himself.

§ 6. One must say, therefore, that even imperfect, unformed, and inchoate hope is not without some love — at least an imperfect one — of the thing hoped for: as the right argument adduced on the opposite side and the authority of St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*⁷ showed; yet it is consistent without perfect love, that is, without charity. Perfect hope, however, is not consistent without perfect love, that is, without charity — which is what has been indicated by many other testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers. For charity and the works of charity, and the good conscience that follows from them, not only cause a man's hope to become formed from unformed; but also confirm and intensify hope when it is weak and slack: so that with far greater confidence one may expect the promised goods, now that the pledge of the inheritance has been received, than when he was still an enemy of God through sin.

§ III — In what sense hope is called a certain expectation (Spes quomodo certa Exspectatio dicatur)

§ 7. Sacred Scripture very frequently attributes certainty to hope — as in Rom. 5: "Hope does not confound." In 2 Tim. 1: "I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to keep my deposit."⁹ In Heb. 6: "By two immovable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we have the strongest consolation, we who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and firm."¹⁰ And in Sir. 2: "No one has hoped in the Lord and been confounded. For who has continued in his

commandment and been forsaken?" And in Ps. 21: "They hoped in thee and were not confounded."¹¹ And throughout Scripture those are proclaimed blessed who hope and trust in the Lord — Ps. 33 and Ps. 83, Prov. 16, Jer. 17, and elsewhere.¹² However, in what sense that certainty is to be understood, and whence hope derives it, is not altogether agreed among the Doctors. We shall set forth what seems the more probable view.

§ 8. It must be noted, therefore, that there is a threefold kind of certainty. For there is a certain certainty that is *conditional* — whereby we say that something is certain not absolutely, but because, given something else, it infallibly follows from it. In this way we commonly say that a son is the certain heir of his father: provided, namely, that he survives his father and commits nothing worthy of disinheritance. Another certainty is that by which something is said to be certain because it comes about steadily and, as it were, perpetually in one way, either by the impulse of nature or by the habitual disposition and determination of the mind. In this way it is said to be certain that the just man will act justly, the sober man soberly. For virtue is similar to nature. And just as nature has a fixed mode of acting — as fire perpetually burns and water moistens while matter is present — so virtue determines the mind of him who possesses it to a certain act, albeit with a not altogether equal certainty. The third and most perfect kind of certainty is that by which something is said to be certain which excludes all hesitation and all fear of the opposite, and this absolutely, with no condition added or understood. In this way the principles of the sciences are certain, and whatever is known either by demonstration or by faith. Thus we say that the future resurrection of the dead is certain, and that all the blessed will reign eternally with God. It must also be noted that whatever is comprehended under any mode of certainty and said to be certain — the hope, or more generally the expectation, of those same things may also rightly be called certain.

§ 9. These matters having been thus clarified, it must now be explained under which kind of certainty hope is called a certain expectation (*certa expectatio*). And indeed there is no room for doubt that the first and second kind of certainty belong to hope. As regards the first kind, it is manifest that Christian hope is most certain. For every man who hopes for eternal life is plainly certain, with all doubt excluded, that he will attain to it, if he has done those things for which eternal life is promised — that is, if he has persevered in justice unto the end of his life. This conditional certainty is established above all by all those promises by which God has promised salvation to those who live justly and keep his commandments, such as the following: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. 19); "If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee" (Sir. 15); "He who shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved" (Matt. 24).¹³ This certainty is further shown by particular passages of Scripture, which attribute the certainty of hope precisely on account of this condition of justice observed. For the Apostle says that hope does not confound, because "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts."¹⁴ And Sir. 2, having said that no one who hopes in the Lord has been confounded, assigns as the reason the perseverance of justice, saying: "For who has continued in his commandments and been forsaken?" And in Ps. 83, from the fact that God does not deprive of good things those who walk in innocence, it is concluded: "Blessed is the man who hopes in the Lord."¹⁵ Hence St. Augustine (*writing on Ps. 99*) says: "You ought to be as certain of rest, of happiness, of eternity, of immortality, if you do the precepts of God, as you ought to be certain of destruction, of the burning of eternal fire, of damnation with the devil, if you despise his precepts."¹⁶ And in the *Preface on Ps. 123* he says: "Our hope is so certain as though the thing were already accomplished. For we do not fear the one who promises, since Truth cannot be deceived nor deceive; it is good that we should cling to him. He liberates us, but if we abide in his word."¹⁷ Moreover, this certainty of hope rests, as can be gathered from what has been said, upon the Omnipotence and the Truth of God: because God is omnipotent, so that his will cannot be impeded; and

because he is truthful, so that he does not will to act otherwise than he has promised — it follows that we have a certain expectation of the goods he has promised, the condition being observed according to which he promised.

§ 10. That hope is also certain in the *second* way is taught both from the analogy of other habits and especially from the likeness of the other virtues. For just as, to take an example, the virtue of temperance so affects the mind of the temperate man that it is not tossed about by the waves of desires but is borne promptly, steadily, and with certainty toward sober and chaste actions: so the virtue of hope does not allow the mind of him who hopes to fluctuate either with disordered fear or with harmful presumption; but it raises and directs him by a determinate and certain movement toward the eternal happiness to be expected from the Grace of God and from merits.

§ 11. The certainty of the *third* kind, however, hope has joined to it not perfectly but only in part. Inasmuch as it rests upon the power, the truth, the goodness of God, and his charity toward the human race: in that respect it has that absolute certainty. For Christian faith does not allow us to doubt concerning those things. Hence the Apostle says absolutely: "I am certain that he is able to keep my deposit."⁹ And elsewhere he compares the firmness of hope to an anchor, because "it is impossible for God to lie."¹⁸ But inasmuch as hope has regard either to our justice and perseverance as a necessary means to the end, or to our very salvation itself as the end and the thing hoped for: in that respect it is deprived of that absolute certainty, because a man is also able through free will to fall away from justice and from the capacity to apprehend it, and consequently can fall away from the salvation hoped for.

§ 12. It must also be noted, with respect to this threefold certainty of hope, that hope derives the first and the third certainty from faith, and is said to be certain by it not essentially but only participatively. The second, however, it possesses as a certain habit, proper and internal to itself. From all of this, furthermore, the difference between Christian hope and human hope as regards certainty becomes manifest. For since every man is both powerless and a liar, it follows that hope, whereby someone expects from a man what he has promised, cannot be certain either on the part of his power or on the part of his truthfulness, even if he fulfils the condition of the promise. For the man who promised can be prevented from rendering the promise both through powerlessness, and also can by the mutability of his will deflect from the promise and break his word. Neither of these, as we showed above, has any place in God. This difference Scripture insinuates in various places, warning us not to hope or trust in man, nor in princes, but in God alone — as in Jer. 17, Ps. 117, Is. 31.

¹⁹ St. John Chrysostom beautifully expounded this same point in Homily 9 (*on the Epistle to the Romans, on the passage of chapter 5, "Hope does not confound"*): "The future goods," he says, "placed in hope, we hold in hope indeed, but not a human hope: which forthwith also fails and brings shame upon him who hopes — either because he who ought to render what was hoped for dies, or even if he has lived, changes his mind, or through powerlessness falls short, so that he cannot assist or render what he has promised. But our hope is not of such a kind, but endures firm and immovable."²⁰ And St. Augustine in Exposition 2 (*on Ps. 36*), teaching which hope brings confusion, says among other things: "You are confounded, because the hope placed in falsehood has deceived you. For every man is a liar. But if you place your hope in your God you shall not be confounded: because he in whom you have placed your hope cannot deceive or be deceived." So he.²¹

§ IV — That Christian hope does not possess certainty of salvation (Quod spes Christiana non habet securitatem salutis)

§ 13. Since our hope is certain and infallible according to the Scriptures in the manner we have described, it is evident how far those stray from the truth who wish every condition to be excluded from this certainty. For if God's promise by which He pledges eternal life to each one of us were simple and absolute, having no condition annexed on our part, then the same certainty that obtains regarding the power and truth of God would belong to us regarding the outcome of our hope — that is, regarding our salvation. But since God does not promise eternal life to all absolutely, but to those who watch, who labor, and who strive lawfully until the end of life — concerning which conditions and means no individual among us is certain — it follows that neither can we be simply certain and secure regarding the attainment of the thing hoped for. And this is what all the Scriptures teach, which bid us fear lest we fall away either from justice or from salvation: as in Ps. 2, "Serve the Lord in fear"; Eccl. 9, "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred, but all things are kept uncertain for the time to come"; Wis. 4, "He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding"; Rom. 11, "Thou standest by faith; be not high-minded, but fear. For if God hath not spared the natural branches, perhaps he will not spare thee either"; 1 Cor. 10, "He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall"; 2 Cor. 11, "I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtlety, so your minds should be corrupted," and so forth; Phil. 2, "With fear and trembling work out your salvation"; Heb. 4, "Let us fear therefore lest, the promise being left of entering into his rest, any of you should be found to want"; Rev. 3, "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." And there are almost innumerable other passages besides. Indeed the Apostle himself, as though by no means secure about his own salvation, chastises his body lest, having preached to others, he himself should become a castaway (1 Cor. 9). And the same Apostle, after so many labors endured for Christ, says, not yet secure: "If by any means I may attain to the resurrection that is from the dead" (Phil. 3).²³ In this sense St. John Chrysostom interprets that passage.²⁴ Nor was David secure when he prayed to the Lord: "Cast me not away from thy face; and take not thy Holy Spirit from me" (Ps. 50).

§ 14. Now there is the clearest teaching of the Fathers on this matter, from whom we shall note only a few passages. St. Augustine, in the book *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 8, says: "God has judged it better to mingle among His elect some who will not persevere, so that those for whom security in the temptation of this life is not expedient cannot be secure. For many are restrained from pernicious pride by what the Apostle says: 'He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.'" He repeats similar things in ch. 13 of the same work.²⁵ Also in the book *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 13, he says: "Who from the multitude of the faithful, as long as he lives in this mortality, presumes that he is numbered among the predestined? Because this must be kept hidden in this place, where pride must be so carefully avoided that even so great an Apostle was buffeted by an angel of Satan lest he be exalted," and so on.²⁶ And in *De Civitate Dei*, book 11, ch. 12, speaking of the just: "Who, although they are certain of the reward of their perseverance, are nevertheless found uncertain of their perseverance itself. For what man knoweth whether he will persevere in the practice and progress of justice even unto the end, unless he be made certain by some revelation from Him who, by a just and hidden judgment, instructs not all men in this matter but deceives no one."²⁷ A similar passage is found in St. Jerome, book 2 *Against Pelagius*, and in a Sermon 7 *On the Passion of the Lord* attributed to Leo:²⁸ where he says that Christ's disciples were troubled not on account of guilt of conscience, but on account of the uncertainty of human mutability, namely when they heard: "One of you shall betray me."

§ 15. Now a manifold reason can be given for this teaching. The first: because as long as one lives here, the will of man is capable of turning toward evil. The second: because the powers of man are assailable. The third: because one lives here in warfare and combat, and while the combat endures the victory is uncertain. The fourth: because according to the Prophet the heart of man is unsearchable (Jer. 17), so that one is not certain even of his present state of justice, much less of his future and persevering state. The fifth: because "In many things we all offend" (Jas. 3), and "Who understandeth sins?" (Ps. 18:13).²⁹ Hence if we do not with certainty distinguish mortal sins from venial ones in our daily life, much less can we know with certainty in what state we shall depart hence. The sixth: because "it is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2:13),³⁰ who distributes His gifts according to the counsel of His will, hidden from us — by which argument the Apostle is moved (Phil. 2) when he urges that we work out our salvation with fear and trembling.

§ 16. The final and ultimate reason is the preservation of humility and the flight from presumption and pride. This reason, as is evident from the things said above, St. Augustine presses repeatedly. To these considerations is added the example of the angels and of the first man before his fall: who, though they had hope of eternal beatitude, nevertheless did not attain to it — either absolutely, as the angel, or not in the manner that was hoped for, that is, without an intermediate fall and death, as man. Hence it is manifest that, regarding the attainment of the beatitude for which they hoped, they were not simply secure; since in that uncorrupted state all error ought to have been absent. Much less, therefore, does our hope, who dwell in a place of temptation amid so many snares and dangers, possess certainty.

§ 17. Finally, lest certain passages of the Fathers, placed obscurely or stated somewhat incautiously, trouble anyone, the Fathers of the Council of Trent wished this doctrine to be clearly defined (Session 6, ch. 12 and 13, canons 15 and 16).³¹ Pertaining here also are the things that were disputed concerning the Uncertainty of predestination at Dist. 40 of Book I of the *Sentences*.³²

§ V — How hope is said to be from grace and at the same time from merits (Quomodo spes ex Gratia simul & meritis esse dicatur)

§ 18. In the statement that hope is from the grace of God and from preceding merits, it must first be observed that this is not said in the sense that the virtue of hope is given to a man from the grace of God and from his own merits — although that is simply true as regards the grace of God, and in some manner also true as regards merits, insofar as merits augment and confirm hope, in the way that the testing of hope is said to produce hope³⁴ — but rather in this sense: that through hope eternal goods are awaited, goods to be bestowed or received from the grace of God and from the merits of man. Now how these two do not conflict — so that eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*) may be said to be awaited at once from grace (*Gratia*) and from merits — must now be set forth, provided we have first briefly proved each point separately.

§ 19. That eternal life is to be hoped for from the grace of God is plainly attested by Peter in Acts 15: "Through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ we believe that we shall be saved."³⁵ And by Paul in Rom. 6: "The grace of God is eternal life."³⁶ And in Rom. 11: "The remnant are saved through the election of grace."³⁷ And in Eph. 2: "By grace you are saved."³⁸ And elsewhere throughout, the Apostolic Letters insist upon gratuitous salvation. And so the whole benefit of the Incarnation of Christ is certainly the argument of the divine charity toward us and of that gratuitous goodness by which He willed to bring us forward to salvation and eternal life.

§ 20. That the same eternal life is to be hoped for from merits is taught first and foremost by all those places of Scripture which testify that God will render to each one according to his works. Taught also are those passages which call the Kingdom of heaven the reward of justice and of good works: as Matt. 5: "Your reward is great in heaven;"³⁹ and Matt. 10: "He shall receive the reward of the just,"⁴⁰ and "He shall receive the reward of a prophet,"⁴¹ and "He shall not lose his reward;"⁴² 2 Jn.: "That you lose not the things you have wrought, but that you may receive a full reward;"⁴³ and Rev. 11: "To render reward to thy servants the prophets,"⁴⁴ and Rev. 22: "My reward is with me."⁴⁵ Likewise, whatever passages acknowledge a recompense or retribution of eternal life — for these signify that eternal life is a prize, and, as the Apostle calls it, a crown of justice and of the holy labours of this life.⁴⁶ All of which cannot stand without the formal character (*ratio*) of merit, since they include a relation with respect to merit.

§ 21. Now, that we may understand how those two things do not conflict, it must be known that the entire origin of our merit is from the grace of God through Christ. For since we lost our good merits in Adam, we must confess them to be restored in Christ and through Christ, as the Apostle says in Eph. 2: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them."⁴⁷ Hence it is easy to remove the apparent conflict between grace and merits. For our merits, on the basis of and in return for which we are bidden to hope for eternal life, are not posited as our own — that is, as acquired by our own powers — but as bestowed upon us from the grace of God through Christ. Wherefore, while we ascribe our every merit to the grace of God, we consequently acknowledge that what we await on account of merits we do not await apart from the grace of God, which is the source of all merit. Hence, eternal life is at once both grace and reward: grace to the sinner and son of Adam, such as all of us are who in this age are reborn in Christ and made effective through His grace; reward to those who work well —

§ 22. — as we are in Christ. On this matter St. Augustine says (in Epistle 105):⁴⁸ "Eternal life itself, which of course will be possessed at the end and without end, and is therefore rendered to preceding merits — nevertheless, because those very merits to which it is rendered were not prepared by us through our own sufficiency, but were wrought in us through grace, even it is called grace: for no other reason than that it is given freely. Not because it is not given to merits, but because those very merits to which it is given were themselves also given." And further on in the same letter: "When the Apostle had said 'The wages of sin is death,' who would not have judged it most fitting and consistent to add: 'And the wages of justice is eternal life'? And it is true; for just as death is rendered as a wage to the merit of sin, so eternal life is rendered as a wage to the merit of justice. But the blessed Apostle, fighting most vigilantly against pride, says: 'The wages of sin is death' — then, lest justice should exalt itself on account of human merit, just as human evil merit is undoubtedly sin, he did not state the contrary, saying 'The wages of justice is eternal life,' but says: 'The grace of God is eternal life.'" And a little after: "O man, if you are to receive eternal life, it is indeed the wage of justice — yet let it be grace to you, to whom justice itself is also grace. For it would be rendered to you as something owed, if your justice were from yourself, to whom it would be owed."⁴⁹ Likewise in the book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapter 8:⁵⁰ "If eternal life is rendered to good works, as Scripture most openly says — 'For God will render to each one according to his works' — how is eternal life grace? since grace is not rendered for works but is given freely." And immediately he adds: "This question seems to me in no way capable of being resolved unless we understand that our own good works too, for which eternal life is rendered, pertain to the grace of God." Again, in the book *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter 13:²⁶ "Because eternal life itself, which is certain to be rendered as owed to good works, is called by so great an Apostle the grace of God — since grace is not rendered for works — it must without any doubt be confessed that eternal

life is called grace for this reason: that it is rendered to those many things which grace bestowed upon man." Thus St. Augustine. In him also other similar passages are frequently read: as in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chapters 6 and 7,⁵¹ where he shows that all good merits are gifts of God; likewise book 9 of the *Confessions*, chapter 13;⁵² *Enchiridion*, chapter 107;⁵³ *On Psalm 98* and *On Psalm 118*, Discourse 2 and 19;⁵⁴ *On Psalm 144*.⁵⁵

§ 23. Finally, that the matter may be concluded with still greater authority, the second Council of Orange — of which the Roman Pontiff was not so much the confirmer as the author — has in canon 17: "A reward is owed to good works if they are done; but grace, which is not owed, precedes in order that they may be done."⁵⁶ And before Leo, Celestine — in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 1 — says:⁵⁷ "So great is the goodness of God toward all men that He wills those things to be our merits which are His own gifts, and for those things which He has lavishly bestowed He will bestow eternal things." The former words of this sentence were repeated by the Fathers of the Council of Trent (Session 6, chapter 16),⁵⁸ in which place both the formal character of merit has been carefully explained and the manner in which eternal life is truly called at once grace and reward has been set forth.

§ VI — Whether hope or fear ought to be greater in us (Utrum spes, an timor in nobis major esse debeat)

§ 24. Since in this warfare of the Christian life hope and fear ought to run together in equal measure — so that hope does not exclude fear, nor fear destroy hope — inasmuch as those are proclaimed blessed who hope in the Lord, and likewise blessed are those who fear the Lord, and according to the wise man it is said in Prov. 27: "Blessed is the man who is always fearful," and the Apostle admonishes us to work out our salvation with fear and trembling (Phil. 2:12): hence that saying of Cyprian (in his *Sermon on the Lapsed*): "God, as He is always indulgent and good with the tenderness of a father, is equally to be feared in the majesty of a judge" — from this, a question is customarily raised: which affection ought to be greater in us than the other?

In reply to this question, although in certain persons and at certain times the fear of damnation is deservedly greater than the hope of salvation, ordinarily, however, hope ought to be greater in us. And the former point is shown first as follows: because sinners, while they remain in the disposition of sin, ought to consider the wrath of God more than His mercy, according to that saying of Sir. 5: "Upon sinners His wrath looks" — especially when they are of such a character that they are to be drawn away from sin more by fear of punishments than by hope of rewards.

§ 25. Moreover, certain persons are found in so dangerous a state of life that their damnation is, absolutely speaking, more to be feared than their salvation is to be hoped for. Wherefore they themselves also, recognizing the peril of their state and yet persisting in it, are deservedly bound to fear more than to hope. And what each person sometimes rightly fears more than he hopes concerning another person, certainly, when the same cause presents itself concerning himself, it is fitting for him too to fear more than to hope.

The latter point, however, is proved as follows: because fear arises from consideration of our own weakness; but hope rests upon the mercy of the Omnipotent God, which is ready both to remove wickedness from us and to raise up our weakness: "For the Lord is able," says the Apostle (Eph. 3:20), "to do above what we ask or understand."⁶⁰ And He Himself in the abundance of His piety deservedly surpasses the prayers and the vows of suppliants. And it is His own proper attribute always to have mercy and to spare, as it is sung in

the Collects of the Church. Moreover, the Sacred Scriptures exhort us to hope far more frequently and more powerfully than to fear. Hence St. Augustine (in *Fragment* 7) says that God is to be feared, but also to be loved.⁶¹ And the same thing is clearly taught by St. Jerome (*In Is.* 28) and St. Bernard, *Sermon* 5 (*On the Nativity of the Lord*).⁶²

§ 26. Yet this is to be understood, as we have said, as holding ordinarily — and especially in those who, having laid aside the disposition of sin, now have in themselves some cause for hoping from a good will divinely inspired; who therefore rightly trust that "He who has begun a good work in them will bring it to completion until the day of Jesus Christ," as the Apostle says in Phil. 1:6.⁶³ For beyond that certainty of faith — by which hope was shown above to be called certain from the standpoint of consideration — there is also a certainty of confidence (*certitudo fiducia*): namely, when, with that prior certainty presupposed, a person applies to himself through confidence that which he held in universal terms through faith; because he discerns in himself with probability those means by which eternal life has been promised. For he believes that every person who perseveres in justice and good works will have eternal life; and yet he recognizes in himself with probability a perseverance in justice and good works — the Apostle saying, "He who has begun will bring to completion." It follows, therefore, that he rightly trusts that he will have eternal life. And this is what the Apostle Peter admonishes: that through good works we make our calling certain (2 Pet. 1:10).

§ 27. Moreover, this certainty of confidence (*fiduciae certitudo*), which a good conscience engenders, is increased and confirmed in us in proportion as a person recognizes with probability that he is making progress in justice and in a good manner of life. And to prove this point, those things serve which were adduced above to show that there is a certain hope which cannot subsist without charity and good merits — namely, the perfect and formed hope. To these we add that saying of 1 Jn. 4:17: "We have confidence in the day of judgment, because as He is, so also are we in this world" — that is, we therefore hope and trust that we shall not be confounded in the day of judgment, because we love our enemies as Christ does.⁶⁴

Such confidence was displayed by Hilarion when already near death, as St. Jerome recounts in his *Life of Hilarion*.⁶⁵ Such confidence was displayed also by very many other saints, who on account of the good conscience of their past life departed hence as if secure concerning their own salvation. The better the conscience, therefore, the greater and more certain is the trust of hope, and the less is the fear of hell: so that a man of perfect charity may boldly dare to pray for the coming of Christ, because, as St. John testifies (1 Jn. 4:18), "Perfect charity casteth out fear" — namely that fear which either a bad conscience or a charity still imperfect harbours.⁶⁶ On this matter one may consult St. Augustine, *Tractate* 9 on the First Epistle of St. John.⁶⁷

§ VII — Whether hope is only concerning one's own goods (*An spes sit tantum de bonis propriis*)

§ 28. Concerning the distinction between faith and hope which the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] assigns in the text on the basis of St. Augustine,⁶⁹ saying that faith is of good and evil things, and likewise of things both past, present, and future, and again of one's own things and of another's, whereas hope is only of good things, and not unless future ones, and of things pertaining to oneself — there is customarily a doubt raised about the last part of this distinction (for the prior parts are without question true), namely how St. Augustine and the Master can say that hope is only of those things which pertain to the one who hopes; since one person also

hopes for spiritual goods on behalf of another, both of this life and of the life to come, as the Apostle says: "Our hope is firm for you, knowing that as you are partakers of the sufferings, so also shall you be of the consolation" (2 Cor. 1).⁷⁰ And again: "I am confident of this very thing in you, that He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus" (Phil. 1).⁶³ And (1 Thess. 4): "Be not sorrowful concerning them that are asleep, as others who have no hope."⁷¹ And (Heb. 6): "But we are confident of better things of you, and nearer to salvation."⁷² Indeed, even good men rightly hope on behalf of the wicked, according to that saying of Lk. (last chapter): "But we hoped that it was He that should have redeemed Israel."⁷³ The same also seems to be shown from prayer. For the hope of all those things which they strive to obtain from God by prayer is included among these, among which are undoubtedly to be reckoned penance, justice, and the salvation of another.

§ 29. Finally, since hope and despair are concerned with the same object, and we are forbidden in this life to despair of another's salvation, the same holds good that we ought to hope for the same thing. It is true, however, that St. Thomas⁶⁸ rightly dissolves this difficulty (q. 17, art. 3), so as to say that the reason given by St. Augustine — that hope is only of one's own goods — is because hope imports a certain movement or inclination of the appetite toward some arduous good. Now a movement is ordered to acquiring for him who is moved toward a terminus, not for another. And therefore hope is said to look directly to one's own good, not to another's.

§ 30. But if he who hopes also has love toward another, so as to become in some manner one with that other, what belongs to love is proper to that other, and he holds him as equal to himself. With this presupposition, one may already hope for another and desire the same goods for another as for himself; inasmuch as through love he is made in some manner one with that other. Indeed, he can even hope for goods on behalf of another which he cannot hope for himself; as, for instance — since no one simply hopes for faith itself — it is clear that hope absolutely speaking is of goods that belong properly to him who hopes, not only to him who is said to hope, but also to others, insofar as one is by love joined to others. Therefore those things which were rightly objected in the contrary sense are to be conceded, and they are nevertheless to be reconciled with the opinion of St. Augustine and the Master in the manner we have described.

§ VIII — Whether faith and hope were in Christ (An fides et spes fuerint in Christo)

§ 31. To the question proposed at the beginning of Distinction 23⁷⁵ by the Master and here at length continued — whether faith and hope were in Christ — it must be answered with the Master and the Scholastic Doctors: that although there was in Christ an eminent charity, by which He both loved God for His own sake and the human race for God's sake, of which He Himself says in Jn. 15: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends"⁷⁶ — the virtues of faith and hope, nevertheless, were never in Him. The certain proof of this is: because it is contained in the formal character (*ratio*) of faith that it should be of those things which are not seen, as has been shown in its proper place at Distinction 24;⁷⁷ and it is of the formal character of hope that there should be in it a stretching forth of the will toward those things which are not yet possessed. For "hope that is seen is not hope. For what doth a man hope for that which he seeth? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience" — as the Apostle says (Rom. 8).⁷⁸

— signifying that hope is not of a thing already obtained, but of a thing to be obtained, and that the very thing which was hoped for, once it is already at hand, is no longer hoped for.

§ 32. Now Christ from the first instant of His conception perfectly saw God through His essence, being according to His soul a perfect comprehensor (*comprehensor*). Therefore, since the principal object of both faith and hope is God — of faith, inasmuch as He is known obscurely and as in a riddle; of hope, inasmuch as He is not yet possessed but is still awaited — it is perspicuous that neither could have had a place in Christ. And from this foundation it is also not difficult to resolve what can be objected in the contrary sense, namely that there was in Christ a fullness of all grace. For this is to be understood of those gifts and virtues which are not repugnant to His state. But faith and hope include a certain imperfection, which we have shown to be opposed to the perfection which Christ had from the very beginning. And it would surely be absurd to attribute to Christ, in whom were hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2),⁷⁹ those things which the Apostle attributes to us in this life as wayfarers still remote from the vision of God (1 Cor. 13):⁸⁰ namely, to know in part, to see through a mirror and in a riddle, to taste and to think as a little child. Nor indeed ought it to seem strange that we remove the virtue of faith and hope from Christ; since neither ought the virtue of penance, on account of the evil attached to it, be attributed to Christ. For in place of these virtues Christ possessed certain things far more perfect: in place of faith, the clear vision; in place of hope, the full comprehension — just as also in place of penance, the perfect detestation of all sin.

§ 33. But if you object passages of Scripture which attribute hope to Christ, as frequently in the Psalms — which was even reproached to Him by the impious, who said: "He trusted in the Lord, let Him deliver him" (Ps. 21)⁸¹ — likewise (Heb. 2)⁸² where this is openly attributed to Christ: "I will be confident in Him" — which is taken either from Ps. 16 (where we read: "I will hope in Him")⁸³ or rather from Is. 12,⁸⁴ where we have according to the Hebrew version: "I will act confidently in Him" — the Apostle, however, cites the words as they stand in the Seventy Interpreters. Another passage is (Heb.)⁸⁵ where Christ is said to have endured the Cross with the joy set before Him, that is, with the hope of the joy and future recompense. To this finally all the prayer of Christ seems to belong: which must proceed from hope, and likewise the certain expectation of goods which He had not yet obtained — such as the immortality of the body, the glory of His name, and the perfect impassibility of His very soul.

§ 34. We answer first that many things are said in the Psalms from the Person of Christ, not inasmuch as He is the Head, but inasmuch as He speaks in His members, with whom He constitutes one body; as St. Augustine notes in nearly countless places in his writings on the Psalms.⁸⁶ As an example of this, (in Ps. 68)⁸⁷ — in which Christ suffering manifestly speaks — He attributes to Himself both foolishness and sins. Next, it is not to be denied that there was hope in Christ with respect to those things which He had not yet obtained, such as the resurrection and the glorification of His name and the like. But that hope, because it did not regard God Himself as its principal object but certain other goods — though true goods — was indeed true hope, yet not the theological virtue (*virtus Theologica*) which is treated of here. Faith, on the other hand, could by no means be in Him; because it entirely excluded the full cognition of all things which He possessed completely.

§ VIII — In whom, after this life, faith and hope remain (In quibus post hanc vitam fides & spes supersit)

§ 35. From what has been said above, it is sufficiently understood in whom faith and hope must be said to remain even after this life. For first of all, as the Master rightly teaches in the Text, the ancient Fathers who were held in the lower regions until Christ's descent into those places possessed the virtue of faith and hope: because they both believed what had not yet appeared, and hoped for what they had not yet apprehended — namely the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) of God. Hence Bede, commenting on Lk. 2, "After eight days were completed," says: "The ancients, consoled with blessed rest in the bosom of Abraham after death, awaited with happy hope the entrance into the light from on high."⁸⁹ This is proved moreover from Scripture. For in Wis. 3, concerning the just who have been taken from this life, it is said: "Their hope is full of immortality." But the Wise Man speaks of the just of his own time, when their souls still descended to the lower regions. The same judgment moreover holds concerning souls existing in Purgatory. For since they have not yet arrived at the vision they await, it follows that they still retain faith and hope. Nor does it present an obstacle that all these have passed beyond the state of the way (*status viae*); because insofar as they have not yet obtained their reward, in this respect they are to be said to be not yet in the homeland but still on the way — though by another consideration, namely with respect to the capacity of meriting, they are in truth at the term. Nor does it present an obstacle that they are secure concerning their beatitude: for that does not empty the formal character (*ratio*) of hope, since that security comes to them not from the presence of the thing hoped for, but from the confirmation of free will or from a revelation of God.

§ 36. In the blessed, however, hope cannot exist, any more than faith can; and this for the same reason that was given above concerning Christ. For since they see God through His essence, neither the formal character of faith nor the formal character of hope can be preserved in them: because they know God not in an enigmatic manner but face to face, and they do not await beatitude as future, but possess it as present — though it must be admitted that there is still in them a certain hope by which they await the redemption and glorification of their own body. But that hope, as we said above, does not have the formal character of the theological virtue (*virtus Theologica*). Finally, in the damned there is neither faith nor hope — this is entirely most certain: both because all the gifts of God are taken from them, according to that saying in Matt. 25, "Take from him the talent,"⁹⁰ and because they have so turned away their will from God that they cannot bring their intellect into captivity to faith as is required; and certainly, since they will never attain beatitude, that certainty is repugnant to the formal character of hope. To this also pertains what we set forth above concerning the faith of the demons.⁹¹

§ I — How love, dilectio, and charity differ (Quomodo differant amor, dilectio & caritas)

§ 37. The third among the theological virtues (*virtutes Theologicae*), and the most excellent, is charity (*caritas*), concerning which the Apostle, in 1 Cor. 12, when urging the pursuit of the better gifts, says: "And I show unto you yet a more excellent way." And in the very next chapter, concluding a splendid commendation of charity above all the other gifts, he thus concludes: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity."

§ 38. Of charity, therefore, we shall henceforth treat; and we shall begin our discourse from an explanation of the distinction in meaning among these three cognate expressions: *amor* (love), *dilectio* (affection), and *caritas* (charity). These are indeed distinguished partly according to the usage of Scripture and the Fathers, and partly according to the practice of the Scholastics, in such a way that love (*amor*) extends more broadly than *dilectio* and *dilectio* more broadly than *caritas*. Love pertains both to the sensitive and to the rational part, and embraces both carnal and vicious as well as spiritual affection toward any thing whatsoever, as is easy to show by examples from Scripture. *Dilectio*, however, whether understood according to the act or according to the habit, is received almost entirely in a good sense, and pertains to the rational appetite; yet in such a way that even in it there can be a *dilectio* both of God and of neighbour in one who has not yet obtained the grace of justification nor been transferred into the adoption of sons. Charity (*caritas*), moreover, is found only in the sons of God, that is, in the regenerate or in the reconciled just, and is recognized by this as the love proper to God's friends. This must be understood of charity that is infused, perfect, and sincere — which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, and which is the fullness of the law.

§ 39. For a fuller understanding of this matter, it must first be known that this distinction between *dilectio* and *caritas* has been derived not so much from Sacred Scripture as it has been prudently employed by the Scholastic Doctors for the purpose of teaching — so that by means of distinct terms they might more conveniently distinguish among the gifts of God. For in Scripture, *caritas* and *dilectio* are used almost interchangeably, because in Greek there is a single word ἀγάπη which the translator renders now as *caritas* and now as *dilectio*. Hence St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei* XIV (ch. 7),⁹³ disputing about these three expressions — *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas* — says that when they are taken in a good sense they signify the same thing in Sacred Scripture. Hence it comes about that among the Fathers that distinction is not infrequently confused which we said is customary and approved in the usage of the Scholastics; and *caritas* is also called that *dilectio* which precedes the remission of sins, in the man who is truly penitent. For St. Augustine in the same place wishes *caritas* and *bona voluntas* (good will) to be one and the same thing, and writes similar things in *De Gratia Christi* ch. 21.⁹⁴ The same author, in Sermon 14 among those published by the Parisians for the feast of All Saints (ch. 11),⁹⁵ says that charity is nothing other than *dilectio*. And writing in Ps. 9,⁹⁶ he says: "Love, if it is depraved, is called cupidity (*cupiditas*); if upright, charity (*caritas*)." A similar passage occurs in the tract *De Substantia Dilectionis*, ch. 1.⁹⁷ So also St. Ambrose speaks (in *Apologia David*, ch. 9):⁹⁸ "Charity," he says, "remits even sins themselves, as it is written of the woman who poured ointment over the Lord: her sins, which are many, are forgiven her, because she loved much." St. Bernard likewise (in Epistle 77, to Hugh of Saint-Victor),⁹⁹ speaking of one who refuses baptism out of pride: "If, however," he says, "before his death he shall have come to his senses, and shall have been willing and shall have asked to be baptized, but, forestalled by the moment of death, has perhaps been unable to obtain it; since right faith, holy hope, and sincere charity are not lacking, God be merciful to me — for this man, solely on account of the water, if it be lacking, I cannot in any way whatsoever despair of his salvation, nor believe his faith empty, nor confound his hope, nor hold his charity to be lost, provided only that it is not contempt of water, but, as I said, sheer impossibility that prevented him." The later Thomas Waldensis also speaks in this fashion on all these points in his work *De Sacramentis contra Wideff*, ch. 97,¹⁰⁰ saying: "A good catechumen, burning with divine charity, a just man of proven righteousness, before he is joined to the Church of Christ, is, as regards the power of his present state, still unfit for receiving the Kingdom of God." St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledges this more general acceptance of charity in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 26, a. 3, and III, q. 84, a. 5, ad 2.¹⁰¹ These and similar

sayings of the Fathers sufficiently show that that *dilectio* of God and of neighbour which in a man already penitent precedes the remission of sins is designated under the name of charity.

§ II — That some love of God precedes the remission of sins (*Quod aliqua Dei dilectio remissionem peccatorum antecedit*)

§ 40. In order to refute the modern heresies all the more effectively by means of the distinction between *dilectio* and *caritas* now indicated, it must be proved a little more fully that there is and that it is praiseworthy — a certain *dilectio* of God which precedes the remission of sins, either in the catechumen or in the penitent; and that there is likewise a certain *dilectio* of God proper to the just, which is called charity. First, then, the former point is proved, beyond the testimony of the Fathers already cited above.

§ II — That some love of God precedes the remission of sins (*Quod aliqua Dei dilectio remissionem peccatorum antecedit*)

§ 41. In order that the distinction indicated above between love (*dilectio*) and charity (*caritas*) may shine forth more clearly against the modern heresies, it must be proved more fully both that there exists a certain praiseworthy love of God which precedes, whether in the catechumen or in the penitent, the remission of sins, and again that there exists a certain love of God that is proper to the just and to the sons of God, which is called charity. The former point, therefore, is shown — in addition to what was said in the preceding chapter — by the following arguments as well.

§ 42. The Lord says of the sinful woman: "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much" (Lk. 7). Although this saying can be drawn in various senses, the ancients for the most part interpret it in this sense: that the preceding love, confirmed by works, is understood to have obtained the subsequent remission of sins. Thus St. Ambrose understood it in the place cited above,¹⁰³ and in *De Paenitentia* I, ch. 16,¹⁰⁴ and in Book VI *In Lucam*,¹⁰⁵ where, treating this passage of Scripture, after other things he says: "And do thou love much, that much may be forgiven thee." So too St. Augustine (*Homily 23, among the 58*)¹⁰⁶ says: "That woman came to the Lord unclean, that she might return clean; she came sick, that she might return whole," and so on, and a little after: "For why did she do all those things, if not that her sins might be forgiven her?" And in *Tractatus 7 (In Joannem)*¹⁰⁷ he says: "She merited the medicine rightly, because there was no guile in her." And in Book II (*De Consensu Evangelistarum*, ch. 79)¹⁰⁸ he says: "Mary, approaching the Lord with that humility and those tears, merited the remission of sins." Similarly St. Jerome speaks in *Epistle 10, which is addressed to Furia*,¹⁰⁹ and St. Gregory (*Homily 15 In Evangelia*)¹¹⁰ says: "The sinful woman, by loving the truth, washed away with tears the stains of her crime, and the word of truth was fulfilled, which says: 'Her sins, many as they are, are forgiven, for she loved much.'" In this passage the stains of her crime cannot be understood in respect of her aversion from God — for she had already been converted; because she could not have been loving, weeping, loving much, unless she had been sincerely converted — therefore they are understood in respect of the debt of penalty due to sins, which is customarily called *culpa*. And St. John Chrysostom likewise agrees (*Homily 2 In Psalmum 50*;¹¹¹ *Homily 22 Ad Populum Antiochenum*)¹¹².

§ 43. With these agree the more ancient Tertullian and Origen, of whom the former, in Book IV (*Contra Marcionem*)¹¹³ says: "The penitence of the sinful woman merited pardon according to the Creator." The latter, in Book II (*In Leviticum*)¹¹⁴ enumerating certain causes of the remission of sins, says: "There is also a sixth remission, through the abundance of charity, as the Lord Himself says: 'Her sins, many as they are, are forgiven, for she loved much.' And the Apostle says: 'Because charity covereth a multitude of sins.'" Now by the name of charity he understands that love which we have said to exist in the penitent before reconciliation. To these is added Euthymius, writing (*In caput 7 Lucae*)¹¹⁵: "She who was liable for many sins loved me vehemently, that much might be forgiven her. Therefore it is also fitting for me to forgive much to her as one who loves vehemently." The opinion of Peter Chrysologus is likewise explicit; he, in *Sermon 94*,¹¹⁶ treating the Gospel narrative of the sinful woman, says among other things: "Dost thou wish to be absolved? Love. Charity shall cover a multitude of sins." And again: "Love blots out and washes away all sins." And below: "Brethren, if we acknowledge ourselves to be sinners and wish not to be sinners, let us give tears to the feet of Christ and scatter our hair, let us press kisses upon them, let us pour forth the oil of devotion with all devotion, that it may be said to us: 'Her sins, many as they are, are forgiven, for she loved much.'" So he. Hugh of Saint-Victor writes to the same purpose concerning the sinful woman in Book II (*De Sacramentis*, Part 14, Chapter 6).¹¹⁷

§ 44. And thus far concerning the words of the Lord in Luke. There is another passage (Jn. 14) where the Lord sets forth this order: "If anyone love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him." Here the first is love of God, and the last is the dwelling or indwelling of the Trinity in man, which comes about through the grace of justification and of the remission of sins — as St. Augustine too understood it (*Epistle to Dardanus*, Ep. 57).¹¹⁸

§ 45. Furthermore, the Apostle says (1 Cor., last chapter): "If anyone does not love our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema." Now it is impious to say "anathema" to a catechumen or to a penitent aspiring to the grace of the remission of sins, even if he has not yet obtained it. Such persons, therefore, are not without love or love of God. And — to pass over other Scriptures from which the same thing could probably be taught — we shall note certain passages of the Fathers by which we prove that they hold this view. St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 76)¹¹⁹ teaches that everyone makes alms from that love which is prescribed by the second commandment, while he prepares himself

1. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractate 83.

2. 1 Pet. 1.

3. Glossa interlinearis on Matt. 1.

4. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.

5. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3.

6. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].

7. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 18, a. 4.

9. 2 Tim. 1:12.

10. Heb. 6:18–19.

11. Ps. 21:6 (Vulgate).
12. Ps. 33; Ps. 83; Prov. 16; Jer. 17.
13. Matt. 19:17; Sir. 15:15; Matt. 24:13.
14. Rom. 5:5.
15. Sir. 2:11–12; Ps. 83:13.
16. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 99* [abbreviation as in source: *scribens in Psal. 99*].
17. St. Augustine, *Praefatio in Psalmum 123* [abbreviation as in source: *praefatione in Psal. 123*].
18. Heb. 6:18.
19. Jer. 17:5; Ps. 117:8–9; Is. 31:1.
20. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Hom. 9, on Rom. 5:5.
21. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 36*, Expositio 2 [abbreviation as in source: *Conc. 2. in Psal. 36*].
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 18, a. 4; and I-II, qq. 109 and 114.
23. The citation of Phil. 3:11 ("*Si quo modo occurram ad resurrectionem, quae est ex mortuis*") is given by Estius as Phil. 2 in the OCR, but the image confirms Phil. 3 (Phil. 3:11 in the Vulgate). Estius notes that St. John Chrysostom interprets this passage in the same sense.
24. St. John Chrysostom, homily on this passage [abbreviation as in source: *Chrysostomus in hunc locum*; the text of Estius specifies Chrysostom's interpretation of Phil. 3:11].
25. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 8 and ch. 13.
26. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 13.
27. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 12.
28. St. Jerome, *Adversus Pelagianos*, book 2; and Sermon 7 *On the Passion of the Lord* [attributed to Leo in the source: *apud Lesnem Sermone 7. de Passione Domini*].
29. Jas. 3:2; Ps. 18:13 (Vulgate).
30. Phil. 2:13.
31. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 12 and 13; canons 15 and 16.
32. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, dist. 40, on the uncertainty of predestination.
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 5; q. 114, aa. 1, 2, and following.
34. Cf. Rom. 5:4, where the testing (*probatio*) is said to work hope.
35. Acts 15:11.
36. Rom. 6:23.
37. Rom. 11:5: "The remnant are saved through the election of grace" (*Reliquiae per electionem Gratiae salvae factae sunt*).
38. Eph. 2:5 (cf. also Eph. 2:8): "By grace you are saved" (*Gratia estis salvati*).
39. Matt. 5:12.
40. Matt. 10:41: "He shall receive the reward of the just" (*Mercedem iusti accipiet*).
41. Matt. 10:41: "He shall receive the reward of a prophet" (*Mercedem Prophetarum accipiet*).
42. Matt. 10:42: "He shall not lose his reward" (*Non perdet mercedem suam*).
43. 2 Jn. 8: "That you lose not the things you have wrought, but that you may receive a full reward" (*Ne perdatis quae operati estis, sed ut mercedem plenam accipiat*).
44. Rev. 11:18: "To render reward to thy servants the prophets" (*Reddere mercedem servis tuis Prophetis*).

45. Rev. 22:12: "My reward is with me" (*Merces mea mecum est*).
46. Cf. 2 Tim. 4:8, where the Apostle speaks of "the crown of justice" (*corona justitiae*).
47. Eph. 2:10: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them" (*Ipsius enim sumus factura, creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus*).
48. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 105 (in the most recent edition, Epistle CXCIV): the passage cited begins "Ipsa, inquit, vita aeterna..."
49. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 105 (CXCIV), continued.
50. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 8.
51. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chs. 6–7.
52. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* IX, ch. 13.
53. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 107.
54. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*: on Ps. 98; on Ps. 118, Discourses 2 and 19.
55. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*: on Ps. 144.
56. Council of Orange II (529), canon 17: "A reward is owed to good works if they are done; but grace, which is not owed, precedes in order that they may be done" (*Debetur merces bonis operibus si fiant; sed Gratia quae non debetur, praecedit ut fiant*). Estius notes that the Roman Pontiff was not so much the confirmer as the author of this Council. The marginal note reads: "Rectius ante Felicem IV. seu Bonifacii" [abbreviation as in source, referring to the pontificate under which the council was held].
57. Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae* [before Leo; Estius notes this preceded Leo], ch. 1: "So great is the goodness of God toward all men that He wills those things to be our merits which are His own gifts, and for those things which He has lavishly bestowed He will bestow eternal things" (*Tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas Dei; ut nostra velit esse merita quae sunt ipsius dona, et pro his quae largitus est, aeterna sit donaturus*).
58. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 16.
59. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 22.
60. Eph. 3:20.
61. St. Augustine, *Fragmentum* 7.
62. St. Jerome, *In Isaiam*, ch. 28; St. Bernard, *Sermo 5 de Nativitate Domini*.
63. Phil. 1:6.
64. 1 Jn. 4:17.
65. St. Jerome, *Vita Hilarionis*.
66. 1 Jn. 4:18.
67. St. Augustine, *In Epistolam I Joannis*, Tractate 9.
68. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 17, a. 3.
69. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 9; cited by the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] in the text.
70. 2 Cor. 1.
71. 1 Thess. 4.
72. Heb. 6.
73. Lk. 24 (last chapter).
74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 3; and a. 4.
75. The question was proposed at the beginning of Distinction 23 by the Master and continued here.
76. Jn. 15:13.
77. See above, at Distinction 24.

78. Rom. 8:24–25.
79. Col. 2:3.
80. 1 Cor. 13:9, 12.
81. Ps. 21 (Vulgate).
82. Heb. 2.
83. Ps. 16 (Vulgate).
84. Is. 12.
85. Heb. 12:2.
86. St. Augustine, commenting on the Psalms in numerous places.
87. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 68.
88. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 67, aa. 3, 4, 5; II-II, q. 18, aa. 2–3.
89. Bede, *In Lucam*, on Lk. 2 ("After eight days were completed").
90. Matt. 25.
91. See above, on the faith of demons (treated in an earlier section of this Distinction).
92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 26, a. 3.
93. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 7.
94. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 21.
95. St. Augustine (or attributed), Sermon 14 among those published by the Parisians for the feast of All Saints, ch. 11 [= Sermon LIII in the first class in the Benedictine edition, ch. 10, n. 11; the editors note that this sermon is attributed to Hugh of St. Victor by many manuscripts, and the Benedictine editors relegate it to their Appendix VI as spurious].
96. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 9 [*Enarrationes in Psalmos*].
97. *De Substantia Dilectionis et Amoris* [attributed variously; among the works of St. Augustine, Tom. IV in the older editions; commended by the Louvain editors as a pious opusculum, but noted by the learned Benedictine Fathers as differing widely in style and diction from the genuine works of St. Augustine, and accordingly relegated by them to Appendix VI of their edition as spurious; the work usually bears the name of Hugh of St. Victor], ch. 1.
98. St. Ambrose, *Apologia David*, ch. 9 [the author here notes textual and editorial difficulties: the words cited from "Ambrose" in *Apologia David* ch. 9 appear in the Roman edition published by order of Gregory XIII, and in the Parisian editions; however, in the ancient Parisian Benedictine edition of 1545, the *Enarratio in Psalmum* L is appended to the same *Apologia*, suggesting it may be the same opusculum rather than a different work; Estius accordingly follows the ancient Parisian edition in citing it from the *Enarratio in Psalmum* L rather than from the *Enarratio in Psalmum* 50. Moreover, the most accurate student of Augustine, comparing *Contra Julianum* I (ch. 3; I, a. 5) and *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* ch. 11, praises that *Apologia* as Ambrose's; a later *Apologia David* is suspected of being spuriously attributed to Ambrose by Bellarmine, Possevinus, Nicolaus Faber, and several others, whose arguments, though subtle, Theophilus Raynaudus endeavours to refute in his *Tractatus De librorum Confixione*. The Benedictine Fathers, although they do not move the said book from its place in their edition, nevertheless note in all the MSS they have seen the name of Ambrose prefixed; and the arguments alleged by certain critics do not appear sufficiently firm; Estius acknowledges that doubt about this work has existed and continues to have force. Natal. Alexander (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, T. 4, sec. 5, art. 27, § 1, n. 14), Ludov. Elias Dupinus (*Bibliotheca Auctorum Ecclesiasticorum*, T. 2, Sec. 4 in Ambrosio), and several writers of the present age follow this opinion; Philippus Labbe (*in Dissertationibus Philologicis et Historia De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*) likewise withholds his judgment. Furthermore, the author of the *Sentences* omits one word from Ambrose at the cited place — and perhaps not one to be omitted — namely: "Multa quoque Charitas remittit etiam ipsa peccata; sicut Scriptum est de ipsa muliere, quae super Dominum sudit unguentum: Remissa sunt peccata ejus multa, quoniam dilexit multum," Lk. 7].
99. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 77, to Hugh of Saint-Victor.

100. Thomas Waldensis, *De Sacramentis contra Wideff*, ch. 97 [= *De Sacramentis*, Tom. 2; the work is appended among his works under the title *Institutiones Catholicae in Decalogum*; also numbered among the works of Hugh of St. Victor by Trithemius; Ludov. Elias Dupinus considers it, from its two extant brief Tractates found among the works of Hugo, to be a separate work].
101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 26, a. 3; III, q. 84, a. 5, ad 2.
102. This section heading (*Quod aliqua Dei dilectio remissionem peccatorum antecedit*) begins Distinction XXVII, § II as printed.
103. The passage "supra citato" refers to the citation from St. Ambrose's *Apologia David* (ch. 9) mentioned in the preceding section.
104. St. Ambrose, *De Paenitentia* I, ch. 16.
105. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* VI (commentary on the passage on the sinful woman).
106. St. Augustine, *Homily 23* among the 58 homilies (*inter 58*), i.e., among the *Sermones ad Fratres in Eremito* or the series numbered thus in older editions.
107. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractatus 7.
108. St. Augustine, *De Consensu Evangelistarum* II, ch. 79.
109. St. Jerome, *Epistola 10*, addressed to Furia.
110. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 15.
111. St. John Chrysostom, *In Psalmum 50*, Homily 2.
112. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Populum Antiochenum*, Homily 22.
113. Tertullian, *Contra Marcionem* IV.
114. Origen, *In Leviticum* II.
115. Euthymius Zigabenus, commentary on Luke, ch. 7.
116. Peter Chrysologus, *Sermo 94*.
117. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De Sacramentis* II, Part 14, ch. 6.
118. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Dardanum*, Ep. 57.
119. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 76.

DISTINCTIO XXVII — ON THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS THROUGH CHARITY AND THE COUNCILS (*DE VENIA PECCATORUM PER CARITATEM ET DE CONCILIIS*)

§ 1. The same author, in his book *De Fide et Operibus*, chapter 10,¹ refutes those who held that from those about to be baptized only the love of God was to be required, but from those already baptized also the love of neighbour — teaching that both are required from those about to be baptized, and that neither can subsist without the other. And in Tract 74 *on John*,² he says that the Apostles, if they said "Lord Jesus," did so not falsely but truly and from the heart, and therefore without doubt they loved Him. Leo, in Sermon 2 *On Collections*,³ says that this remedy has been divinely given to human weakness: that if any sins are contracted in this earthly dwelling, they may be blotted out by almsgiving. "For almsgiving," he says, "are works of charity, and we know that charity covers a multitude of sins." Prosper likewise, in Book 3 *On the Contemplative Life*, chapters 13, 14, and 15,⁴ similarly requires that love which he himself calls charity in those doing penance. Fulgentius, in *Epistle 7 to Venantius*,⁵ and St. Ambrose in Book 7 *on Luke*, chapter 19,⁶ agree with these.

§ 2. Finally, this is also shown by the authority of Councils. For the Council of Orange, in its final chapter,⁷ has this: "God, with no preceding merits, first inspires both faith and love of Himself, so that we may faithfully seek the sacrament of baptism." The Council of Milevis has something similar in chapter 4.⁸ But more manifest is what is read in the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6,⁹ namely that sinners doing penance, before they are justified, begin to love God as the source of all justice. And in canon 3,¹⁰ anathema is pronounced upon one who says that a man can love God as is required — so that the grace of justification be conferred upon him — without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This passage likewise sufficiently shows that God is loved as He ought to be loved by the penitent before the grace of justification, and it condemns the one who says that this can be done without the grace of God.

§ III — That there is a certain love proper to the sons of God (Esse quamdam dilectionem Filiis Dei propriam)

§ 3. Let us now come to the other point that was set forth to be proved, namely that there is a certain love of God proper to the justified alone, or the regenerate, or the reconciled — a love which accordingly never precedes the remission of sins, but perpetually brings that remission along with it, inasmuch as it constitutes a man both gratifying to God and a son of God, and therefore an heir of the heavenly Kingdom.

§ 4. The following and similar Scriptures prove this. Rom. 5: "The charity (*caritas*) of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us"¹² — therefore it exists only in him who has the Holy

Spirit dwelling in him. But the Holy Spirit dwells only in the sons of God, according to that word of the same epistle, chapter 8: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God."¹³ And: "You have received the spirit of the adoption of sons of God, in whom we cry Abba, Father."¹⁴ And again: "But if sons, heirs also."¹⁵ And that text, Gal. 4: "Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father. Therefore now he is not a servant but a son. And if a son, an heir also through God."¹⁶ Another Scripture is 1 Tim. 1: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith."¹⁷ For before the remission of sins the heart of man is not pure, nor is conscience good. Another again is 1 Jn. 3: "Behold what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called and should be the sons of God."¹⁸ And chapter 4: "Everyone who loves is born of God"¹⁹ — that is, is a son of God. And again: "If we love one another, God abides in us, and his charity is perfected in us."²⁰ And below: "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him."²¹ And a little later: "Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casts out fear."²² To this also pertains what the Apostle (Rom. 13) calls love the fullness or complement of the law.²³

§ 5. These Scriptures therefore, and others of the same kind, sufficiently prove in their respective places that there is a certain love (which we properly call charity, *charitas*) which belongs only to the just and to the sons of God, and through this so great a gift of God the whole Trinity dwells in them. Hence the celebrated praise of charity — that it alone distinguishes between the sons of God and the sons of the Devil, between the sons of wrath and the sons of grace, between the sons of the Kingdom and the sons of Gehenna. So speaks St. Augustine:²⁴ treating in that place of the charity which John commends in his Epistle, he says: "This alone is the gift which divides the sons of the eternal Kingdom from the sons of eternal perdition." And:²⁵ "This gift of the Holy Spirit is proper to the saints, from which no outsider has any share." And in the *Tractatus on John*:²⁶ "Love alone (*dilectio sola*) discerns between the sons of God and the sons of the Devil." And again: "The sons of God are not distinguished from the sons of the Devil, save by charity. Those who have charity are born of God; those who do not have it are not born."

§ 6. Sermon 53 (on a time)²⁷ attributes a similar encomium to faith operating through charity, saying that we are said to be reborn in baptism and to obtain eternal salvation. Again, in Epistle 106,²⁸ he says: "This faith we wish catechumens to have, by which they may obtain charity, which alone works rightly, and through it salvation." Another passage is Sermon 75,²⁹ where, speaking of the evangelical pearl, he addresses Catholics thus: "This is the charity which will be poured out in your hearts by the Holy Spirit who will be given to you" (namely in baptism) "and after: the Lord first grants that through his grace those who are regenerate may have it written by the Holy Spirit in your hearts; so that what you believe, you may love, and through love it may work in you, and you may please the Lord, not servile-mindedly, fearing punishment, but liberally, by loving." A similar passage is in the book *De Fide et Symbolo*, chapter 2,³⁰ where he says we are reconciled to God in no way except by the love whereby we are called sons of God. And a little later: we are reconciled and recalled into friendship through charity. And again (*Commentary on Psalm 118*)³¹ he testifies that through the Holy Spirit the totality of sins is blotted out, and the charity of things done rightly is inspired. Similar passages are in the book *De Doctrina Christiana*, chapter 6,³² where he says that the servants of God come toward baptism and thence ascend, bearing the fruit of twofold charity. And *Tractatus 9 (in Joan.)*³³ that he who has begun to have charity has the Holy Spirit; and (*Tractatus 32*)³⁴ that we have the Holy Spirit if we love the Church; and that we love the Church if we remain in her communion and charity. In that place he also subjoins this sentence concerning charity: "Hold it, and you shall have all things" (namely, whatever things are necessary for salvation, among which beyond all doubt is the remission of sins).

§ 7. This teaching is further confirmed by that sentence of Prosper taken from St. Augustine:³⁵ "The love of God and of neighbour is the proper and special virtue of the pious and the saints." And again, sentence 327: "How great is charity! Without which whatever else is held, it is held in vain; but if it be present, all things are held."

§ 8. Finally, passing over other ancient and scholastic writers, it is manifest that the Fathers of the Council of Trent speak of charity in this manner:³⁶ for in Session 6, chapter 7, they say that in justification itself the charity of God is poured out through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who are justified, and perfectly unites them with Christ and makes them a living member of his body; and again in Session 14, chapter 4, where they say that contrition, if it be perfect with charity (*charitas*), reconciles man to God.

§ 9. Toward the proof of this there also contribute certain definitions of charity that are read in the sacred writers, which we now subjoin.³⁷

§ IV — The modes in which charity is defined (Charitas quibus modis definiatur)

§ 10. Many definitions of charity (*charitas*) are found among the sacred writers. The Master in his text defines it as the love by which God is loved for His own sake and the neighbour for God or in God.³⁹ St. Augustine in various places defines it most briefly, calling it now a good will (*voluntas bona*), now a desire of the good (*cupiditas boni*), now a right love (*amor rectus*).⁴⁰ The relevant passages are: *De Civitate Dei* XII, chapter 7; the book *De Gratia*, chapter 27; *In Expositione Psalmi 9*, Concio 1; *In Psalmum 3*.⁴¹ Prosper, following him, *De Vita Contemplativa* III, chapter 83, likewise says: "Charity (*charitas*), as it seems to me, is a right will turned wholly away from all earthly and present things" — and what follows, in which he enumerates many properties and effects of charity.⁴² Again, St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* IV, chapter 9: "By charity I mean the motion of the soul toward enjoying God for His own sake, and oneself and one's neighbour for God's sake."⁴³ Others, from the same St. Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, chapter 11, define charity as the most right affection (*rectissima affectio*) of our soul joining us to God — though in that place St. Augustine attributes that notion not to charity specifically but to virtue in general.⁴⁴ The author of the book *De Spiritu et Anima* among the works of St. Augustine describes charity as the life by which the lover is united with the beloved.⁴⁵ Moreover the words of the Apostle in 1 Tim. 1 have the form of a definition, in which he says that the end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith.¹⁷ For St. Augustine too (*Epistle 29*, which is to St. Jerome,⁴⁶ and *Tractatus 87 in Joan.*)⁴⁷ uses those words as a definition of charity.

§ 11. Furthermore, St. Thomas, II-II,⁴⁸ says that charity is the friendship of man with God, which adds to love a mutual return (*mutua redamatio*) together with a certain mutual communication; and II-II,⁴⁹ he defines charity as a certain friendship of man toward God, founded upon the communication of eternal beatitude. With this doctrine of St. Thomas agree those who define charity as the virtue by which, trusting in pious hope that we are adopted as sons of God, we love, embrace, and invoke Him, calling Him our Father and saying Abba, Father. And that this is that holy friendship with God which no one can have except through the indwelling Holy Spirit.

§ 12. Now if it be asked what the difference is between these definitions, we answer briefly that, although a manifold distinction between them can be established, yet the principal one, most fitting for this place, can be assigned as follows: the last four definitions belong to charity properly so called (*charitas proprie dicta*), which establishes men as sons of God and heirs of the Kingdom; whereas the earlier ones, whether definitions or descriptions, appear to apply also to that love which we have said exists in penitents before the received pardon of sins (*venia peccatorum*). And furthermore, the two definitions of St. Augustine by which he calls charity now a motion (*motus*), now an affection (*affectio*), are accommodated not to the habit but to the act of charity properly speaking. Although from a well-known act it is not difficult to arrive at knowledge of the habit itself.

**§ V — Whether there is one charity by which God and neighbour are loved
(*Una fit charitas qua diligantur Deus & proximus?*)**

§ 13. Since there are two precepts of charity — one by which we are commanded to love God, the other by which we are commanded to love our neighbour — it can appear that the charity by which God is loved and the charity by which the neighbour is loved are not one and the same, but twin. For this reason also the Fathers sometimes call Christian charity by a dual name.⁵¹ And this seems to be confirmed by the distinctness of the acts. For the disposition of the soul by which one is moved in love towards God is one thing, and that by which one is moved towards the neighbour is another. For one loves God above all things, but loves the neighbour as oneself. Hence it will also seem fitting that the habits themselves similarly differ from one another. To this is added the observation that the one can appear to be separable from the other. For some love God but not their neighbour; others, on the contrary, love their neighbour but not God. Hence St. Gregory (in *Homily 23 on the Gospels*)⁵² says that the two disciples going to Emmaus, not yet loving Christ as God, loved Him as a stranger. And this is confirmed: for those to whom it is said, on account of their unbelief, "O foolish ones and slow of heart to believe," did not love God — and yet St. Gregory attributes to them charity towards their neighbours, saying that they could not be strangers to charity, since Truth walked with them. To this is added the example of the Samaritan (Lk. 10) who loved his neighbour — as the parable itself teaches — yet not God, because he was a Samaritan by sect. To whom the Lord says (Jn. 4): "You adore that which you do not know."

§ 14. But since in all things which we love with charity there is one formal character (*ratio*) of loving — namely, God inasmuch as He is the supreme good, who is loved above all things as such a good, and to whom, considered under the same formal character, all other things that we love with charity are referred — it must altogether be admitted that there is, according to habit, one and the same charity by which God and the neighbour and whatsoever other thing (towards which charity can exist) is loved. This is because the unity and distinction of habits ought to be taken from the formal character of the object, just as was declared above concerning faith and hope.⁵³ On account of this unity — by which all things that we love are referred and in a certain manner gathered into one supreme and beatific good — charity itself is rightly called by the Apostle (Eph. 4 and Col. 3) "the bond of peace and perfection." And rightly it is also said (in Acts 4) that the heart and soul of all the believers was one. Indeed, the whole Church, besides other causes, is called one in the Creed also for this reason, which is drawn from charity.

§ 15. Nor does the contrary prove this, or even the distinction of the acts or acts of charity. For from that it does indeed rightly follow that the proximate and material objects of charity are diverse — namely the things that are loved, God and the neighbour. But of these, one alone is the principal object and contains in itself the formal character (*ratio*) of the object — namely, God as He is supreme goodness. Since this formal character is the same in the love of the neighbour (for the neighbour is to be loved on account of God), it is manifest that the habit of charity is one according to species and not several. Hence St. Augustine (in *De Trinitate*, Book VIII, ch. 8)⁵⁴ — after having said many things concerning the two precepts of charity and their necessary mutual connection — at last concludes thus: "From one and the same charity, therefore, we love God and neighbour; but God on account of God, ourselves however and our neighbour on account of God." And in a certain Sermon (on the Ascension of the Lord, which is the 6th among the Parisian sermons, ch. 8),⁵⁵ after saying that the Holy Spirit had been given twice in order to commend the precepts of charity, he adds: "For there are two precepts and there is one charity." And below: "One charity, two precepts. One Spirit and two gifts. For one was not given first and another given afterwards; because no other charity loves the neighbour than that which loves God. Therefore it is not another charity. By the same charity by which we love the neighbour, by that same charity we love God. But because God is one thing and the neighbour another, they are loved by one charity; yet those who are loved are not one." Thus far he. To whom St. Gregory (in *Homily 26 on the Gospels*)⁵⁶ accords, both in words and sense, saying: "As therefore there is one charity and two precepts, so there is one spirit and two gifts."

§ 16. From which it also manifestly follows that the charity of God cannot be separated from the charity of the neighbour. For one and the same thing cannot be separated from itself. To what, therefore, was objected from the other passage of St. Gregory, I reply thus. Either those two disciples had true and Christian charity — and thus they also loved God, although they did not love the man walking with them as God, because they did not know who He was, thinking Him a stranger — or they did not have it, and by this they were not loving the neighbour either with Christian charity, but only with a certain affection of humanity. Which is perhaps more probable. For if they had lost their faith (for they are rebuked on that account) they could not have had true charity towards God. Concerning the Samaritan, a similar answer can be given: that it was not true charity but a human affection of love by which he loved the wounded man. For the Lord in that parable intended only to show who is our neighbour — that was what had been asked. It can also be answered that he was a Samaritan by nation only, and not also by religion.

§ 17. Moreover, what the Master adduces as the foundation of the present doctrine — that the charity by which God and neighbour are loved is the Holy Spirit — proceeds from that error of his whereby he taught (in Book I, Distinction 17)⁵⁷ that there is no created charity in us but only the uncreated charity which is God. From which foundation it would follow that the charity of all the just is the same not only in species but also in number. But we have refuted that opinion of the Master as gravely erroneous in its proper place.

§ VI — That God has commanded nothing impossible to man (*Deum homini nihil praecepisse impossibile*)

§ 18. It is asked in this place whether the precepts of charity — by one of which we are commanded to love God with our whole heart, etc., and by the other to love our neighbour as ourselves — are fulfilled in this life.

This question is to be treated the more diligently in proportion as error is committed about it today by the sectaries, who teach that no one can fulfil the law of God in this state of corruption, and that no one is just before God by the performance of virtuous acts; but that what God has commanded is impossible for us, living here, to observe. First, therefore, it must be shown that nothing impossible has been commanded to us by God. Then it must be proved that the precepts of charity are fulfilled in this life by the justified.

§ 19. For the proof of the former point, we shall set forth three arguments. The first is: A precept and an impossibility are mutually repugnant. For if something is commanded, it is to be done — since a precept is nothing other than the rule of things to be done. But what is impossible is not to be done. For this division belongs only to possibles: that of them some are to be done and others not to be done. The second: Every law is given to the will, for no other reason than because the will can move itself towards what is commanded. With this reason removed, the character of law ceases; therefore a law exists only of what is possible. The third: Among men, he who should command another to do something impossible, or should exact some such thing from him, would rightly be judged to be doing something absurd and alien from reason. Much more, therefore, must that absurd manner of commanding be removed from God. To these arguments there is also added the legal maxim that of impossibilities there is no obligation.

§ 20. But far more certainly does Sacred Scripture teach us the same. For (Deut. 30) Moses speaks thus to the Israelites: "This commandment which I command you this day is not above you, nor far off, etc., but the word is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do it." And afterwards, declaring the same possibility and expounding wherein it consists, he adds: "Choose therefore life, that both you and your seed may live, and that you may love the Lord your God and obey His voice, etc." And those earlier words of Moses were repeated by the Apostle (Rom. 10) where he was disputing concerning the justice which is of faith, lest anyone should suspect that Moses spoke only of an external work. Hence we also say that the observance of the law is possible not only to the pious and spiritual, but also to carnal and earthly men, such as those were to whom Moses was speaking — namely, in so far as, aided by God's grace, they can freely turn themselves to loving God.

§ 21. Other Scriptures, moreover, admonish that the observance of the divine law is not only possible but also easy, as (Matt. 11) where the Lord says: "My yoke is easy and my burden light." Which the Fathers understand of the commandment of charity. And 1 Jn. 5: "This," he says, "is the charity of God, that we keep His commandments; and His commandments are not burdensome." Nor would David have said that the commandments of God are more desirable than gold and precious stones and sweeter than honey and the honeycomb (Ps. 18), nor that he had delighted in them as in all riches (Ps. 118), if he had judged them impossible to observe.

§ 22. We say, however, that a thing is impossible not in the sense that a man cannot do it by the proper forces of nature — in which sense the precepts of God are without doubt impossible to man, as we showed (at Distinction 28 of Book II)⁵⁹ — but in the sense that it cannot be done according to the mode of grace which God communicates in this life to the justified. Such an impossibility of the precepts of God the Catholic teaching defends against the heretics of this time. Against whom, after Scripture, the authority of St. Augustine chiefly in many places refutes it. For in Book II (*Retractations*, ch. 30),⁶⁰ setting forth from Book I (*Against the Manichaeans*, ch. 3)⁶¹ certain words in which he had said that all men, if they wished, could fulfil the precepts of God, he confirms this as altogether true. "But," he says, "the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so greatly increased by the gift of charity that they are able." And in the book *On Grace and Free Will* (ch. 15),

⁶² he says that through grace it comes about that the good will is increased and becomes great enough to fulfil the divine commandments. And in the following chapter he approves what the Pelagians were objecting to Catholics: "God would not command what He knew could not be done by man." And in the book *On Nature and Grace* (ch. 43),⁶³ he says thus: "God does not command impossibilities, but in commanding He admonishes you to do what you can and to pray for what you cannot." And (can. 69):⁶⁴ "From this it is most firmly believed that God, being just and good, could not have commanded impossibilities; we are admonished in easy things what to do, and in difficult things what to ask for." In which passage he also cites as testimony the Scriptures already cited above by us. The same (in Ps. 56)⁶⁵ — speaking of the precept of charity by which we are commanded to lay down our lives for our brethren — says: "God would not exact this, as if it were to be accounted an impossibility that it should be done by man." And in Book II (*On the Merits of Sinners*, ch. 6):⁶⁶ "I doubt not," he says, "that God has commanded nothing impossible to man." Likewise Sermon 3 (*On the Words of the Lord*):⁶⁷ "God," he says, "would not condemn a slothful servant if those things which are in no way able to be done were commanded — note: *in no way*; for without grace it cannot be done." Similar things are read in him (Sermons 50 and 61, *On the Season*),⁶⁸ even though those sermons may not appear to have St. Augustine as their author.⁶⁹ But it is manifest from all these passages that St. Augustine is speaking of man according to his present state.

§ 23. In the same manner St. Jerome speaks, expounding that of Matt. 5, "Love your enemies": "Many," he says, "not measuring the precepts of God by the strength of the saints but by their own weakness, think that those things are impossible which are commanded."⁷⁰ And immediately: "It must be known, therefore, that Christ commands not impossibilities but perfections." So also Bede (Book I, *On the Song of Songs*, ch. 6),⁷¹ replying to an objection of Julian, says: "He who says that the Lord has not commanded anything impossible, because He is just, speaks the truth indeed. And he looks to His help; but if he trusts in the forces of his own soul, true understanding refutes him which says: 'Without me you can do nothing.'" For this reason, moreover, that proposition — which says that something impossible has been commanded to man by God — the Pelagians invidiously imputed to Catholics, and Catholics studiously repelled it from themselves; because that proposition pertained to the heresy of the Manicheans, who held that man, on account of the evil nature of which he was composed, could not avoid sin. But Catholics condemn this in such a way that they deny it to be simply impossible for man to fulfil God's law not only from an evil principle (of which sort there truly is none), but also from the corruption of nature brought about through Adam. For what makes something possible to nature and to the law — indeed, what brings it about and accomplishes it — is, as will be shown in the following chapter, the grace of God through Christ.

§ 24. The definition and clear explanation of this dogma may be seen in the Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 11 and canon 18).⁷² In which passages the Fathers restrict their definition to the justified man for this reason: that in a certain true sense the observance of the precepts of God is impossible to man destitute of God's grace — just as the Fathers' testimonies set out above testify; and the things we said on this argument (at Distinction 28 of Book II)⁵⁹ sufficiently prove.

§ VII — Whether the Precepts of Charity Are Fulfilled in This Life (An Præcepta Charitatis impleantur in hac vita)

§ 25. What we have said concerning the possibility of God's precepts will be more certainly established if we now demonstrate what was proposed in the second place: namely, that the precepts of charity are fulfilled by the justified in this life. For from act there necessarily follows power or possibility (*potentia seu possibilitas*). At the same time, satisfaction will be given to that question also which asks whether the manner of loving expressed in the first and greatest commandment — namely, with one's whole heart, with one's whole soul, and so forth — is possible in this life and is indeed fulfilled. For we assume, as manifest from the words of the commandment, that this manner too is contained in the precept, so that it must be granted that every person is bound by divine and natural law, even in this life, to love God with one's whole heart, and so forth. That this is fulfilled by the justified must now be proved.

§ 26. Proof is drawn first and foremost from various passages of Scripture, some of which testify that certain persons were just — not imputatively, as the adversaries would have it, but properly; namely in that justice (*justitia*) which consists in the performance of virtuous acts, of which 1 Jn. 3 says: "He who doeth justice is just." In this manner Abel, Noah, Abraham, and the other Patriarchs and Prophets are said to have been just before God. For just as that is called right in general which corresponds to its rule, so among men that man is just whose actions correspond to the law as to a human rule. Hence it follows that he is just before God whose life is conformed to the law of God — which is nothing other than that God's precepts are fulfilled by him.

§ 27. Other passages testify that certain persons walked in such a manner that — as Luke writes concerning the parents of the Baptist (Lk. 1) — "they were both just before God, walking in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless," which in Greek is *irreprehensibiles* (that is, without reproach). Of this kind also is the testimony of holy Job concerning himself (Job 23): "I have kept his way and have not declined from it. From the commandments of his lips I have not departed." And David sings similar things of himself in Pss. 17, 18, and 118.⁷⁴

§ 28. Other passages attribute charity (*caritas*) toward both God and neighbour to human beings, as Rom. 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts," and 1 Jn. 3: "We have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." And indeed charity fulfils the law, according to that of Rom. 13: "The fulness of the law is charity." And Gal. 3: "All the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."⁷⁵ It follows consequently that those who have charity fulfil the law, as the Lord says (Jn. 14) of the charity of God: "If any one love me, he will keep my word," and as the Apostle says (Rom. 13) of the charity of one's neighbour: "He who loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law."

§ 29. Yet other passages of Scripture testify of certain persons that they sought God with their whole heart, that they loved Him, that they followed Him, that they walked before God, that they searched His commandments — as of David, Josaphat, Ezechias, and Josias, kings of Judah. And indeed concerning Josias the most explicit words of Scripture are those of 4 Kgs. 23: "He turned to the Lord with all his heart and with all his soul and with all his strength, according to all the law of Moses."⁷⁶ Also manifestly pertaining to the promise of the New Testament is that of Deut. 30: "The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart and the heart of thy seed, that thou mayest love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul." And that of Jer. 24: "They shall return to me with their whole heart."⁷⁷

§ 30. There are also other passages which attribute to a person in this life the perfection of justice (*justitia*) and of charity (*caritas*). Thus of Noah it is written (Gen. 6 and Sir. 44) that he was a just and perfect man.⁷⁸ And the Apostle acknowledges certain persons to be perfect in this life when he writes (1 Cor. 2): "We speak wisdom among the perfect," and (Phil. 3): "Whosoever therefore are perfect, let us be thus minded."⁷⁹ Nor would Christ say "If thou wilt be perfect, sell," etc., unless that perfection could be attained in this life. John also (1 Jn. 2 and 4) acknowledges charity as perfected in this life in these sentences: "He who keepeth the word of God, in this truly the charity of God is perfect," and "If we love one another, God abideth in us, and his charity is perfected in us."⁸⁰

§ 31. Finally, those passages which testify that a person in this life fulfils and perfects the law of God plainly confirm the matter at hand: the Apostle's statement (Rom. 8) that the justification (*justificatio*) of the law is fulfilled in those who walk not according to the flesh but according to the spirit; and what we cited above from the same, that he who loveth hath fulfilled the law. And that of Phil. 2: "It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish."⁸¹ And James 2 signifies that he who loveth his neighbour as himself fulfils the law.⁸² Thus also of Caleb and Josue the Lord says (Num. 32): "These have fulfilled my will."⁸³

§ 32. Although this proof from the Scriptures ought to suffice, yet, for the sake of a more certain proof, we shall add certain words of St. Augustine by which this is clearly established. Writing in his commentary on Ps. 40, he says: "Great is the Christian law — but who fulfils it? It is fulfilled in the name of our Saviour." And below: "Let those who doubt come to faith. Let them not say, Who fulfils this? If they presume on their own powers, they will not fulfil it. All the faithful live in the name of Christ, each one according to his own degree fulfilling the precepts of Christ — whether married persons or celibates, or virgins." And again: "Say not to me, Who fulfils it? He fulfils it in me, who came, the rich one, to the poor."⁸⁴ Likewise in Epistle 89: "The charity of God," he says, "is poured forth in the heart, whence the fulness of the law is made; not through the powers of free will which is in us, but through the Holy Spirit who is given to us."⁸⁵ And in Epistle 120: "The charity which fulfils the precept is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit."⁸⁶ Similar passages are found in the book *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 19, in *Quaestio* 107 and 166 on Exodus, and in the *Expositio quarundam propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos*, proposition 41.⁸⁷ But also elsewhere it is frequent in him that not fear but love, not cupidity but charity, fulfils the law. And as for the manner in which God is to be loved, although that is sufficiently contained in the statement that the law is fulfilled, there are nevertheless other passages on this point in the same author, in the book *De Vera Religione*, ch. 46, and in Tract. 17 on John.⁸⁸

§ 33. To these there is added the authority of the Council of Milevis, in which it is defined (ch. 5) that the divine commandments are fulfilled by us only through the grace of Christ.⁸⁹ And lastly, of the Council of Trent, in which it is defined in Session 6 (ch. 11) that the observance of God's commandments is so possible for the justified that they do in truth observe them.⁹⁰ Moreover, lest the word "fulfilling," which we here use according to Scripture, cause scruple to anyone: he is said to fulfil the law, as St. Augustine testifies,⁹¹ who does those things which the law commands.

§ VIII — Reply to certain arguments of the adversaries (Responsio ad quaedam adversariorum argumenta)

§ 34. Against the doctrine set forth above, many objections are customarily brought by the adversaries, but three chiefly; by which they strive to show that God is not loved in this life, nay, cannot be loved by anyone in the manner that the law prescribes, namely from the whole heart, and so forth. The first: because there is no one who so directs every power of the soul toward the love of God as to love Him as much as He is lovable from Himself; for otherwise there would be no room for advance in the act of loving God. Now they suppose that this most perfect mode of loving is signified by those words, *from the whole heart*, etc. The second: because no one lives here without daily sins; but this, they say, conflicts with the mode of loving prescribed by the law. The third: because, as long as we live here, the concupiscence of the flesh remains in us, always striving against the spirit (Gal. 5:17), which accordingly brings it about that man does not love God with all the powers of the soul.

§ 35. Furthermore, in confirmation of their error, they make use of certain sentences of St. Augustine. For he writes in book one of *De Doctrina Christiana*, chapter 22,⁹³ as follows: "This rule of love has been divinely established: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, but God from the whole heart and from the whole soul and from the whole mind; so that thou mayest direct all thy understanding toward Him, from whom thou hast the things thou conferrest. But when He says: with the whole heart, the whole soul, the whole mind; He leaves no part of our life which ought to be empty and, as it were, make room for wishing to enjoy something else; but whatever comes into the soul that is to be loved, is swept thither whither the whole impulse of love runs." And in the book *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, chapter 8:⁹⁴ "The question is not whether it has been commanded, but whether that which is agreed to have been commanded can be fulfilled in this body of death, where the flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc." And after much he speaks, treating of the life to come, on the fullness of charity in which that precept shall be fulfilled: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart and from thy whole soul and from thy whole mind. For while there is yet some carnal concupiscence, which is either restrained by continence, he doth not in every way from the whole soul desire God, etc." And again: "Why then should this perfection not be enjoined upon man, although no one in this life attains it? For the course is not rightly run if it is not known whither one must run; and how could it be known and yet pointed out by no precepts?" Likewise, in the book *De Spiritu et Litera*, last chapter,⁹⁵ commemorating the precept of the love of God and of neighbour, he says: "This we shall fulfil in that life, when we shall see face to face. But it has been prescribed to us even now for this reason, that we might be admonished what we ought by faith to seek, whither to send hope before us, and forgetting those things which are behind, we ought to reach forth unto those things which are before." And a little after, he says that the words "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from the whole," etc., pertain to immortal life; but to this present life: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey the desires thereof," and "Thou shalt not covet"; and to this life: "Go not after thy desires," etc.⁹⁶ Likewise St. Bernard in Sermon 50 *On the Canticles*⁹⁷ holds similar positions to St. Augustine.

§ 36. To reply briefly to these objections, it must be noted that the totality prescribed by the law when it is said *from the whole heart* can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that it signifies that a man ought to apply and direct all the powers of his soul to the love of God in such a manner that he can do no more, that is, that he should love Him as much as He is lovable from Himself. In another way, so that something is said to be done with the whole heart when a man places his chief study and thought therein; in which sense we say

that someone is wholly given to learning. One must say, therefore, that the totality included in the precept of love is to be understood not in the former but in the latter way. This can be shown from the innumerable passages of Scripture in which certain persons are said to have sought God, or to have done certain good things, from their whole heart, as we showed in the preceding section. God is therefore loved from the whole heart, etc., when in love nothing is preferred to Him, but He Himself is loved above all things, and the tendency is toward perfect love of Him; even if we are not yet free from depraved concupiscences, from light and venial faults — since these are not of such a kind as to be able to exclude from us the charity of God.

§ 37. Moreover, what certain people say — that the word of totality placed in the law signifies nothing other than that God is to be loved sincerely and purely — does not seem sufficient to explain the force of the precept. For one's neighbour too is to be loved sincerely and purely and from love of us, yet we are nowhere commanded to love him from the whole heart and from the whole soul, etc., but only as ourselves.

§ 38. To St. Augustine we reply that, in the cited passages, he indeed understood the totality in the first mode; and in this sense he asserts that the mandate of love cannot be fulfilled in this life. But he teaches that the mandate so understood is not a precept given to infirm man under penalty of sin, but is set down only as a goal and end, toward which he ought to strive and aspire, and someday arrive — that is, to that perfection of justice which is hoped for in the age to come. Which he is seen to have considered similarly in the precept "Thou shalt not covet," as is apparent also from elsewhere. And that this was St. Augustine's intention can easily be grasped from the words set forth above, and is evidently shown from the others which occur in the same place in *De Spiritu et Litera*: "For neither," he says, "if such love of God as is owed to the full and perfect knowledge of Him cannot yet be attained, is this to be accounted a fault. It is one thing not yet to have attained the whole of charity, another to follow no concupiscence." In the same sense St. Bernard writes in Sermon 5 *On the Canticles*.⁹⁸ But the fuller treatment of this argument belongs to the controversy concerning justification.

§ I — What things are to be loved by charity (Quaenam charitate diligenda sint)

§ 39. The formal object (*objectum formale*) of charity (*charitas*), as we showed above, is God alone; because He alone is the supreme goodness which is loved for His own sake, to which all other things that fall under love are to be referred. The material object (*obiectum materiale*) of charity, however, is called that which is loved by charity. Now it is established that this is not God alone, but also certain other things. What those things truly are, St. Augustine expounds in book one of *De Doctrina Christiana*, chapters 23 and 26,¹⁰⁰ when he teaches that there are four things to be loved: one which is above us, that is God; another which we ourselves are; a third which is next to us, that is our neighbour; and a fourth which is below us, that is our body. And indeed, concerning loving God and our neighbour, two explicit mandates of love have been given. Concerning ourselves and our body, St. Augustine says in the same place that no precepts needed to be given: "For however much," he says, "man has fallen away from charity, there remains in him love of himself and love of his body; and therefore he cannot do otherwise than love both himself and his own body."¹⁰¹ And in chapter 25: "That man wishes to benefit himself and loves even his own body, and wishes it to be safe and whole, is equally manifest."¹⁰² And in chapter 26: "Since no precept was needed that every man should love

himself and his own body, that is, what we are and what is below us, yet it pertains to us: we love them by the inborn law of nature, which is also promulgated among the beasts — for beasts also love themselves and their bodies — it remained that we should also take precepts concerning what is above us and concerning what is next to us.”¹⁰³

§ 40. By these words St. Augustine does not say that the love of oneself and of one's body has not been commanded, but he denies that a precept for it was needed. For that the love of all those things which ought to be loved falls under the precept of charity, when it is rightly understood, is shown by the following words of the same author: "If thou understandest thyself wholly, that is thy soul and thy body, and thy neighbour wholly, that is his soul and his body; no kind of things to be loved has been passed over in these two precepts. For since there stands first the love of God with the prescribed mode of loving, so that the rest flow into it, concerning thy love nothing seems to have been said; yet what is said — thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself — at the same time the love of thyself has not been omitted."¹⁰⁴ Thus St. Augustine.

§ 41. Furthermore, what is said in the words of St. Augustine cited above — that love of oneself and love of one's body always remain in man, so much so that he cannot fail to love both himself and his body — is to be understood of that love by which one loves rightly, in an ordered way, and for God's sake. For it is thus manifest that many do not love either themselves or their bodies, but rather hate them — according to that word of Ps. 10:¹⁰⁵ "He who loveth iniquity hateth his own soul" — as St. Augustine teaches in the same place. But concerning the natural love by which each one wishes well to himself and to his body, according to that word of the Apostle, Eph. 5:¹⁰⁶ "No man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it" — which natural love of self he testifies is common even to beasts, as the above-cited words of St. Augustine attest: therefore, a precept is not needed for man to love himself and his own body, that is, to wish good to himself and to his body; but, he says in the same place, the mode of loving (*modus diligendi*) must be prescribed for man — that is, how he is to love himself so as to profit himself, and likewise how he is to love his body so as to consult for it in an orderly and prudent manner. Now that mode is contained in the various precepts of God, of which one general one is that found in Sir. 30 and Deut. 6:¹⁰⁷ "Have mercy on thy soul by pleasing God," and "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart," etc. Likewise: "Do all things to the glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31).¹⁰⁸

§ 42. Now, in order briefly to explain the formal character (*ratio*) of charity in the case of those four things which we said are to be loved: God is to be loved as the principle (*principium*) of our beatitude (*beatitudo*); we ourselves, as those who are to attain beatitude; our neighbour, as one who is to share the same beatitude with us; and our body, as that to which beatitude is derived by a certain overflow (*redundantia*). And from this it is manifest that our soul is contained under the second member; because it is the very thing which in us enjoys (*fruitur*) God, while the body of our neighbour is loved by us by reason of a certain association (*associatio*) in beatitude.

§ 43. Charity itself is not numbered among those aforementioned things; because it is loved neither as the supreme goodness, in the manner in which God is loved, nor as that to which we wish the supreme goodness to be communicated, in the manner in which we said that we, our neighbour, and our body are loved; but only for this reason, that it is cherished as a certain good which we wish to be communicated to those whom we love by charity, and as a good of such a kind that it of itself leads to the supreme and beatifying good (*summum et beatificum bonum*). And the same judgment holds concerning the other virtues and their acts, and beatitude itself, as St. Thomas rightly teaches.¹⁰⁹ And in this sense is to be understood what St. Augustine

says in book 8 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 8:⁵⁴ "He who loveth his neighbour, it follows that he also loveth love itself."

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1. St. Augustine, *De Fide et Operibus*, ch. 10.
 2. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 74.
 3. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 2 De Collectis*.
 4. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita Contemplativa*, lib. 3, cc. 13, 14, 15.
 5. Fulgentius, *Epistola 7 ad Venantium*.
 6. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, lib. 7, ch. 19.
 7. Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*), final chapter.
 8. Council of Milevis (*Concilium Milevitanum*), ch. 4.
 9. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.
 10. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3.
 11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 1.
 12. Rom. 5:5.
 13. Rom. 8:14.
 14. Rom. 8:15.
 15. Rom. 8:17.
 16. Gal. 4:6–7.
 17. 1 Tim. 1:5.
 18. 1 Jn. 3:1.
 19. 1 Jn. 4:7.
 20. 1 Jn. 4:12.
 21. 1 Jn. 4:16.
 22. 1 Jn. 4:18.
 23. Rom. 13:10.
 24. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 18.
 25. St. Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 23.
 26. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 5 (in *Epist. Joan.* 1).
 27. *Sermo LIII De Tempore* (= *Sermo CVIII* in the Benedictine edition, placed in the Appendix to Vol. V as spurious).
 28. Epistle 106 (= *CLXXXVI* in the Benedictine edition).
 29. *Sermo 75 (de diversis)* = *Sermo CCXII* among the Sermons, second class, in the Benedictine edition.
 30. St. Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 2 [abbreviation as in source: "De Fide & Symbolo cap. 2"].
 31. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 118* (Commentary on Ps. 118) [abbreviation as in source: "Conc. 25. in Psal. 118"].
 32. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, ch. 6.
 33. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 9.
 34. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 32.

35. Prosper of Aquitaine (from St. Augustine), Sentence 7 and Sentence 327.
36. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7; Session 14, ch. 4.
37. The marginal note here signals that footnote (a) contains the editors' discussion: Sermo LIII *De Tempore* — PP. Benedictini place it in the Appendix to Vol. V as spurious, numbering it CVIII; (b) = CLXXXVI in the same Benedictine edition; (c) = Sermo CCXII, among Sermons of the second class in the same edition. The extended footnote (a) on p. 154 records Estius's judgment that the author of the *Distinctio 17* (Book 1 and Book 4) obscurely expressed himself and that his opinion — that an act of contrition of whatever intensity can co-exist with the guilt (*reatus*) of eternal and temporal punishment and precede the remission of sins, though he be truly contrite — is disproved most clearly above at Dist. 17, and that the author strayed exceedingly from the universal opinion of theologians.
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 62, a. 5; II-II, q. 23, a. 1; q. 24, a. 2.
39. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, Dist. 27.
40. St. Augustine, various places.
41. St. Augustine: *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 7; *De Gratia*, ch. 27; *In Expositione Psalmi 9*, Concio 1; *In Psalmum 3*.
42. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita Contemplativa* III, ch. 83.
43. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* IV, ch. 9.
44. St. Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, ch. 11.
45. Pseudo-Augustine, *De Spiritu et Anima* (among the works of St. Augustine).
46. St. Augustine, *Epistola 29* (= Ep. CLXVII in the Benedictine edition), to St. Jerome.
47. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 87.
48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 65, a. 5.
49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 1; q. 34 [abbreviation as in source: "2. 2. q. 23. a. 1. & 24. a. 2"].
50. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 5.
51. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 6 [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 2. De Doctrina Christiana cap. 6"].
52. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Hom. 23.
53. See above, at the treatment of faith and hope earlier in this distinction.
54. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 8.
55. St. Augustine (or Pseudo-Augustine), Sermon on the Ascension of the Lord, the 6th among the Parisian sermons, ch. 8. [Note: The Benedictine editors place this among the sermons attributed to Augustine in the Appendix to Vol. V, numbering it CCLXVIII; in the best manuscripts it is attributed to St. Augustine, while in those of Corbie it is attributed to another author.]
56. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Hom. 26.
57. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In I Sent.*, Dist. 17.
58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 10; II-II, q. 44.
59. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 28.
60. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 30.
61. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 3.
62. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 15.
63. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 43.
64. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, canon 69 [abbreviation as in source: "can. 69"].
65. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 56* (Enarratio in Psalmum).
66. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 6.

67. Pseudo-Augustine, Sermon 3 *De Verbis Domini*. [Note: the Benedictine editors of Augustine place this sermon, as Estius elsewhere noted, in the Appendix to Vol. V, numbering it CCLXVIII; in the best manuscripts (*M.S.*) it is attributed to St. Augustine, while in those of Corbie it is attributed to St. John Chrysostom.]
68. Pseudo-Augustine, Sermons 50 and 61 *De Tempore* [abbreviation as in source: "serm. 50 & 61. de Tempore"]. [Note: these sermons are regarded as spuriously attributed to Augustine; the Benedictine editors place them as supposititious in the Appendix to Vol. V, numbering them CCLXXII, since in the same Benedictine edition they are considered spurious.]
69. Note (a): Sermon 3 *De Verbis Domini*, as Estius noted elsewhere, the Benedictine editors of Augustine place among the sermons attributed to Augustine in the Appendix to Vol. V, numbering it CCLXVIII; in the best manuscripts (*M.S.*) it is attributed to St. Augustine, while in the Corbie manuscripts it is attributed to another author.
70. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 5 ("Diligite inimicos vestros").
71. Bede, *Super Cantica* I, ch. 6.
72. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11 and canon 18.
73. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 44, aa. 6 and 8.
74. The references to Pss. 17, 18, and 118 correspond to the Vulgate numbering (i.e., Ps. 17 = Ps. 18 MT; Ps. 18 = Ps. 19 MT; Ps. 118 = Ps. 119 MT).
75. Gal. 3:13 (Vulgate: *Omnis lex in uno sermone impletur: Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum*) — in the modern critical text this is Gal. 5:14.
76. 4 Kgs. 23:25 (Vulgate numbering; = 2 Kgs. 23:25 in the Hebrew canon).
77. Deut. 30:6; Jer. 24:7.
78. Gen. 6:9; Sir. 44:17.
79. 1 Cor. 2:6; Phil. 3:15.
80. 1 Jn. 2:5; 1 Jn. 4:12.
81. Phil. 2:13.
82. Jas. 2:8.
83. Num. 32:12.
84. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 40 [abbreviation as in source: *in Psalm. 40*].
85. St. Augustine, Epistle 89 (= Epistle CLVII in the Benedictine edition). [Footnote in source: "(a) Seu CLVII. in Edit. Benedict."]
86. St. Augustine, Epistle 120 (= Epistle CXL in the Benedictine edition). [Footnote in source: "(b) Seu CXL. in eadem Editio."]
87. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 19; *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, qq. 107 and 166 on Exodus; *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, proposition 41.
88. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 46; St. Augustine, Tractate 17 *In Joannem*.
89. Council of Milevis (Milevitanum), ch. 5.
90. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11.
91. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, lib. 17, ch. ult. [last chapter].
92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 44, aa. 6 and 8 [as cited above].
93. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 22.
94. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, ch. 8.
95. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, last chapter.
96. The references are to Rom. 6:12 ("Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body"); Rom. 7:7 / Ex. 20:17 ("Thou shalt not covet"); and Sir. 18:30 ("Go not after thy desires").
97. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 50.

- 98. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 5.
- 99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 1.
- 100. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, chs. 23 and 26.
- 101. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 24 [as quoted in the text].
- 102. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 25.
- 103. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 26.
- 104. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 26 (continuing the same passage).
- 105. Ps. 10:6 (Vulgate; = Ps. 11:5 MT).
- 106. Eph. 5:29.
- 107. Sir. 30:24; Deut. 6:5.
- 108. 1 Cor. 10:31.
- 109. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 2.

DISTINCTIO XXVIII — ON THOSE WHO ARE COMPREHENDED UNDER THE NAME OF NEIGHBOURS (*DE HIS QUI PROXIMORUM NOMINE COMPREHENDUNTUR*)

§ 1. — love (*dilectionem*), not that it itself may be blessed, but that through it a man may be blessed. Concerning irrational creatures also, something very similar must be said. For they are loved, not as beings to whom we would wish to communicate the beatitude (*beatitudinem*) of which they are not capable, but as certain goods which we desire, out of charity (*charitate*), either for ourselves or for other men whom we love; even though these are not such goods as lead of themselves to the supreme good.

§ II — Those who are comprehended under the name of neighbours (Proximorum nomine qui comprehendantur)

§ 2. What is signified by the name of neighbour (*proximi*) in the second precept of love, and how broadly that name extends, the Lord wished to show in the Gospel (Lk. 10),² where, when asked by a lawyer, "Who is my neighbour?", He set forth the parable of the man going down from Jerusalem and in turn asked: "Which of these three seems to you to have been neighbour to him who fell among thieves?" And when the lawyer answered that he who showed mercy to that man seemed to be the neighbour, the Lord, as if confirming his verdict, added: "Go and do thou likewise." But from this reply it could appear that it was not the priest, nor the Levite, who was neighbour to him who fell among thieves, but only the Samaritan — as the one who alone showed mercy toward him. If that is so, then neither was the wounded man the neighbour of those two; for "neighbour" is said by relation to a neighbour. Hence the consequence will be that neither did those two sin against the precept of love of neighbour, nor is anyone bound to love save him from whom he has received a benefit — both of which conclusions are false and contrary to Scripture. Therefore one must say that the sense of the Lord's question is this: "Which of these three seems to you to have performed the office of neighbour toward him who fell among thieves?" In accordance with this sense, the lawyer rightly answered that he who showed mercy was the neighbour, that is to say, showed himself to be in reality a neighbour to the wounded man. And that every human being, with no one in this life excepted, is comprehended under the name of neighbour, the Lord wished to make clear by the example of the Samaritan and the wounded man. For if the Samaritan, different and alien from the Jews in race and manner of life, showed mercy to the wounded Jew as a neighbour, then assuredly no man is to be excepted from the name and duty of neighbour. This conclusion is indicated by that epiphonema of the Lord: "Go and do thou likewise" — that is, whatever man you find in need of your help, regard him as your neighbour and yourself as his; and therefore he is to be aided by you with the offices of mercy. Hence St. Augustine,³ both from this parable and from the Apostle (Rom. 13)⁴ saying that every commandment is recapitulated in this word, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," proves that from the law of love of neighbour no man is to be excepted: since none is excepted to

whom, if he is in need, the office of mercy ought to be denied, seeing that it extends even to the loving of enemies, by the Lord's command.

§ 3. Now with regard to the question which the Master raised — whether, under the precept of love of neighbour, the love of the Angels also is included — St. Augustine in the same place answers thus: "Indeed, if he to whom the office of mercy is to be shown, or from whom it is to be shown to us, is rightly called a neighbour, it is manifest that by this precept by which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even the holy Angels are contained, by whom such great offices of mercy are bestowed upon us." So St. Augustine. It is therefore manifest that under the name of our neighbour every intellectual creature is contained that can be a sharer with us in eternal beatitude (*aeternae beatitudinis*). Of this kind are first of all all the blessed, both Angels and the souls of holy men; then, all human beings who still live in this age, whether good or evil, even the reprobate — not indeed as such, but in so far as they can be saved and ought to be advanced toward salvation by those who do not know them to be reprobate. Demons, however, and the souls of the damned are not contained within this general scope of neighbour; and accordingly we are not commanded to love them with charity (*charitate*): nay, it is not even permitted; because that good of eternal beatitude which charity looks to, we ought not to will for those whom we already know to be damned. For that would be repugnant to the charity of God by which we approve His justice and truth. With what we have said about the meaning of "neighbour," St. Augustine agrees,⁵ as does Prosper.⁶

§ III — How the wicked are to be loved by us (Mali quatenus a nobis diligendi)

§ 4. Since wicked men living in this life are also comprehended under the name of neighbours, as has now been shown, it follows that they too are to be loved by us with charity, and this by the example of Christ, who in that act most commended His love toward us: "because when we were yet sinners He died for us" (Rom. 5).

⁸

For the declaration of this doctrine it must be noted that, when we say a wicked man or a sinner, two things are signified: the one, that he is a man; the other, that he is a sinner — of which the former signifies his nature, the latter his vice. Since, therefore, wicked men, in so far as they are men, that is, by reason of their nature, are capable of eternal beatitude (*aeternae beatitudinis*), by this consideration they are to be loved by us — because charity is founded upon the communication of eternal beatitude. But because that vice by which they are wicked is an impediment to them for the attainment of eternal beatitude, by this consideration they are not to be loved but to be hated. And this very thing is also the office of charity: to have hated sin in him whom we will to arrive at eternal beatitude; for the reason that sin impedes him from arriving at that end. And it is of the same formal character (*rationis*) in general to hate someone's evil and equally to love his good. Hence by that very fact by which one hates a man in so far as he is wicked, he is convinced to love that same man simply speaking as a man.

§ 5. In this sense St. Augustine writes, both elsewhere and in *De Doctrina Christiana*,⁹ in these words: "Every sinner, in so far as he is a sinner, is not to be loved; and every man, in so far as he is a man, is to be loved for God's sake." And this has been recorded among the sentences of Prosper as among the sentences of St. Augustine (*Sententia* 267, whose title is *De homine peccatore*).¹⁰ Similar is what St. Gregory warns in *Homily 32 on the Gospels*:¹¹ "That in one and the same man we may love the good that has been wrought, and pursue

away the evil that he has done." And what he says elsewhere: that even if we owe indignation to his vices, we nonetheless owe compassion to his nature.

§ 6. From this declaration it is easy to reconcile the Scriptures that appear to be in conflict with one another: of which some teach that all men — even the wicked and enemies — are to be loved, that good is to be done to them and prayer is to be made for them; while others signify that they are rightly held in hatred. For the former consider in sinners their nature, the latter their wickedness. Hence he who had said, "I have hated the unjust" (Ps. 118),¹² so that we might understand in what sense this was said, added: "and I have loved Thy law" — signifying that he hated the unjust in so far as they are unjust, that is, in so far as they are opposed to the divine law; and the same person set this forth more plainly in another verse of the same Psalm, saying: "I have hated iniquity and abominated it, but I have loved Thy law." Indeed, John also in the Catholic Epistle — which is entirely an exhortation to the faithful toward love — wishes only sin and the incentive of sin (*peccati fomitem*) to be excepted from love, when he says: "Do not love the world, nor the things that are in the world." And he adds the reason for this precept: "because, if anyone loves the world, the charity of the Father is not in him." And then, expounding what the world is and what the things that are in the world are, he subjoins: "Because everything that is in the world is either the lust of the flesh," etc. As for what is read against the wicked in the way of imprecation (*imprecatory* passages), these are to be understood differently — but the OCR of the closing lines is defective and a further portion of the argument is introduced which Estius treats in what follows below.¹³

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, aa. 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11.

2. Lk. 10:29–37.

3. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 30.

4. Rom. 13:9.

5. St. Augustine, *Tractatus (De Disciplina Christiana)*, ch. 3–4) and *Sermo* on the 13th Sunday after Pentecost; and Prosper, *De Vita contemplativa* III, ch. 15. [Footnote (a) in the source notes that the *Tractatus de Disciplina Christiana* is found in Tom. IX of the old edition of St. Augustine's works, and that the Benedictines placed it among the genuine works of St. Augustine in their Tom. VI; Ludovicus Dupin questioned whether it is Augustine's on grounds of style, but Estius holds that on the authority of so many learned men one ought not to depart from their judgment.]

6. Prosper, *Sententia* 267, with the title *De homine peccatore*.

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 6.

8. Rom. 5:8.

9. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 27.

10. Prosper, *Sententiae ex Augustino*, *Sententia* 267.

11. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Hom. 32. [Footnote (b) in the source: or *Sermo* I in Dominica XIII post Festum Sanctae Trinitatis, vel CCXXI de Tempore. The Benedictines place this sermon in Tom. V of the works of the same holy Doctor, noting that it is an excerpt from the second *Enarratio* on Ps. 25 (Tom. IV in their edition, Tom. VIII in the old edition); and that it is in truth drawn from that *Enarratio* — indeed it is the very preface thereof, but somewhat altered, diminished, and interpolated. Moreover, similar things on the signification of "neighbour" St. Augustine has in *Serm. XCI de Diversis* (in the old edition, number CCCLIX; in the prefatory edition of the Benedictines, *Serm. IV*, Class. num. IX).]

12. Ps. 118 (119):113, 163.

13. The closing lines of the Latin source are fragmentary at this point due to the page-break and OCR damage; the argument concerning imprecatory passages against the wicked is resumed in the continuation of this section.

DISTINCTIO XXIX — ON THE ORDER OF CHARITY: THAT GOD IS TO BE PREFERRED TO ALL OTHERS (DE ORDINE DILECTIONIS: DEUM OMNIBUS ALIIS ESSE PRAEFERENDUM)

§ I — That God is to be preferred to all others in the order of charity (Ordine dilectionis Deum omnibus aliis esse praeferendum)

§ 1. Prayers of this kind in Sacred Scripture, together with the love that belongs to them, can be understood in three ways, as St. Thomas teaches.² In one way, so that they have an enunciative sense; in a second way, so that they are optative, but in such a manner that the desire of the one who wishes does not in itself refer to the punishment of the man, but to the justice of the one who punishes. In a third way, so that the same desire refers to the destruction of the man who is a sinner — not as a man, but as a sinner. But how far it is necessary to pursue evil men, and especially enemies, with the duties of charity (*dilectionis officii*), will be said in connection with Distinction 30.

§ 2. That there is some order of loving (*aliquem diligendi ordinem*), by which one thing is to be loved more and another less, is shown by that text of Song 2: "He hath ordered charity in me." Explaining this, St. Augustine in Sermon 7 on the Words of the Lord³ says: "Make gradations, and restore to each what is owed. Do not place prior things after posterior ones." And in *The City of God*, book 15, chapter 22,⁴ having cited this same testimony of Scripture, he teaches that virtue is nothing other than the order of love (*ordinem amoris*). The same author, in book 1 of *On Christian Doctrine*, chapter 27,⁵ discoursing on this matter expressly, says: "He lives justly and holily who is an unimpaired estimator of things. Now he is such a one who has ordered charity (*ordinatam dilectionem*): so that he neither loves what is not to be loved, nor fails to love what is to be loved, nor loves more what is to be loved less," and so forth. In these words of St. Augustine the formal character (*ratio*) of this order is indicated — namely, the right and unimpaired estimation of things. For since among goods one is the highest, and others stand in a certain order in relation to that highest good as to their principle, and since charity (*charitas*) is a kind of friendship consisting in the communication of that highest Good, it is necessary that in those things which are loved by charity, that same order be observed. In this order, beyond all doubt, God as the highest good is to be placed before all other goods — not only those that are other than ourselves, but even ourselves.

§ 3. For we are commanded to love our neighbour indeed as ourselves, but God not as ourselves, but with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and so forth — which is not commanded either regarding our neighbour or regarding ourselves. And it is said (Lk. 14): "If any man does not hate" — that is, does not prefer me before by the affection of love — "his father and his mother," and so forth, "and moreover his own soul,"

that is, himself, "he cannot be my disciple." The same sense is confirmed by the similar statement in Matt. 10: "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me."⁶ Hence St. Augustine in book 1 of *On Christian Doctrine*, chapter 22,⁷ says, among other things: "If you ought not to love even yourself for your own sake, but for the sake of Him in whom your love finds its most rightful end, let no other man be angry if you love even him for the sake of God. For this rule of love has been divinely established: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' but God with thy whole heart," and so forth. And in chapter 27, he says: "God is to be loved for His own sake: and since God is to be loved more than every man, each person ought to love God more than himself."⁵ The same author, in book 8 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 8,⁸ says that we ought to bestow incomparably more charity upon God than upon ourselves.

§ 4. The formal character, moreover, is manifest from what has been said: because God is the highest good (*summum bonum*) and the ultimate end (*ultimus finis*); wherefore, as the highest good He is to be loved above all things, and as the ultimate end He is to be loved for His own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. All other things, however, are to be loved both below God and for the sake of God. Hence it is also established that it is evident from natural reason that God is to be loved above all things, and that the law of nature teaches this — although the law which teaches and dictates this was so obliterated from the minds of men that not even any of the Philosophers is found to have handed it down; indeed the contrary is rather found. See Pererius on the Epistle to the Romans, disputation 11, number 76,⁹ who cites Aristotle, Cicero, and Aulus Gellius.

§ II — That each person ought to love himself more than his neighbour (Quod quisque se magis quam proximum diligere debeat)

§ 5. Just as what is above us and above all things is to be loved in the first place — that is, God — so in the second place what we ourselves are is to be loved; in the third place what is next to us, that is, the neighbour; and in the third and fourth place what is below us, that is, our own body.

§ 6. The Master collects this order of those to be loved with probability from St. Augustine, even though St. Augustine in the third book of *De Doctrina Christiana* does not there hand down the number of those things that are to be loved, nor does he expressly set out the order between the second and the third — that is, between ourselves and the neighbour.¹¹

§ 7. Proof: This order is nonetheless proved both by authority and by reason. By authority: because when it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," it is signified that the love of a man toward himself is, as it were, the exemplar and rule of love toward another, and not the reverse. For just as it is not likewise said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," so also it is read, "Thou shalt love thyself as thy neighbour." St. Augustine calls this the rule — in *De Civitate Dei*, book 1, chapter 20¹² — when he says that a man has received the rule of loving his neighbour from himself; and in *De Vera Religione*, chapter 46.¹³ Since, therefore, the exemplar and the rule is more excellent than that to which it is accommodated, the consequence is that each person ought to love himself more than his neighbour.

The same order is confirmed by a lesser argument drawn from Ecclesiasticus 14: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" — as if to say, first let each one wish good to himself before to others. Something of this sort is also indicated by that passage: "Lest perhaps there be not enough for us and for you, but go

rather to them that sell." And what we read that Elijah said to the widow woman (3 Kgs 17): "Make me thereof a little cake first, and bring it to me, and after make for thee and for thy son."¹⁴

The same is also proved from the fact that no one is obliged to give alms to another except from what is not necessary for himself, or not equally necessary. Hence it is said: "He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none," and likewise, "he that hath two tunics, let him give one to him that hath not; and he that hath food, let him do likewise" (Lk 3). And St. Augustine and other Fathers teach everywhere that alms are to be given from one's surplus, using that Scripture passage (Lk 7): "She began to wash his feet with her tears" — that is, the poor woman refreshed the Lord's feet with her surplus. From this it is understood that the order of charity requires that one provide first for one's own necessity, and then, from what is also necessary, provide for the necessity of another — not out of one's own necessities, but out of those.

§ 8. To these are added the explicit judgements of the Fathers. For St. Augustine, in book 2 of the *Retractationes*, chapter 8,¹⁵ retracting what he had said in *De Quantitate Animae*, chapter 28,¹⁶ where he had said that he owed himself most of all, says: "This indeed I referred to men. For I owe more to myself than to other men; though to God more than to myself." And in the Tractate *De Doctrina Christiana*, chapter 6:¹⁷ "Love thy neighbour as thyself; but first, as it is fitting, love thyself." And in Homily 47 among the fifty:¹⁸ "First," he says, "love God, then thyself, and thereafter love thy neighbour as thyself." Again, in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 76:¹⁹ "He who wishes to give alms in an ordered manner ought to begin from himself, and give it to himself first, according to that word: 'Have mercy on thy soul, pleasing God.'" He says moreover that the Pharisees had perverted this order of mercy. And it is read among his works in the book *De diligendo Deo*, chapter 1, tom. 9²⁰ — a book which we are told ought to be called not from Augustine but from the frequency of barbarous words, whose many sentences of this book were culled from Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard, and St. Anselm, as the learned demonstrate both from the discrepancy of style and from words unusual in Augustine, and it was therefore rejected as a supposititious book — that "nothing is to be denied to a friend: all things are to be borne for him, and one's bodily life is to be laid down for a friend, as divine authority has commanded." Prosper also, who in book 3, *De Vita Contemplativa*, chapter 25,²¹ says that we ought to love all our neighbours in second place from ourselves, that is, in the second rank from us.

§ 9. By reason also the said order is proved. For a man loves himself by charity insofar as he is capable of the highest good; whereas he loves his neighbour by reason of a fellowship toward that good. Just as therefore unity is more excellent than union, so the reason (*ratio*) why the man himself is capable of the divine good is more excellent as a motive for loving than the reason why another is joined to him in participating in that good. Another reason: because by nature each thing more desires perfection in itself than in something like it — after the manner of a weight, which draws more strongly the body in which it is than another conjoined to it. A third: because it is manifest that not all neighbours are to be loved equally, but some more and some less, as will be said below; if therefore no neighbour is to be loved less than ourselves, it will follow that not all are equally to be loved with us, but some are to be loved more than we love ourselves. This argument has particular force against those who hold an equality of love of self and neighbour, on account of that phrase "as thyself." To these considerations St. Thomas adds this further sign:¹⁰ because no one ought to undergo the evil of sin in order to free his neighbour from sin — which would surely be permissible if the obligation of a man to love himself and his neighbour were wholly equal; permissible, I say, in that case where it is necessary that either the one or the other perish or sin. For with an equal obligation posited, it would be arbitrary to choose either one's own or another's salvation or good.

§ III — Reply to the objections urged against the foregoing (Ad ea quae contra obijciuntur responsio)

§ 10. Against this order of love of self and neighbour, these are roughly the objections that are customarily advanced.

It is objected first: the very precept of love, by which each is commanded to love his neighbour as himself. By this words an equality of love seems to be signified, just as an equality of honour is signified by those words: "that all may honour the Son even as they honour the Father" (Jn 5). But if only a likeness is signified, one could likewise say: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour, or thyself, as God."

Secondly, those Scriptures are adduced in which some persons are read to have laudably set aside their own salvation for another's: as Moses (Exod. 32), praying thus to the Lord for the Israelites: "Either forgive them this trespass, or if thou do not, strike me out of the book that thou hast written." And Paul (Rom. 9) wishes to be anathema from Christ for his brethren. And the same person (1 Cor. 10), "not seeking that which is profitable to himself, but to many"; and (2 Cor. 13) when he says: "We pray that you may do what is good, but we as reprobates." From these it appears that it is right for one person to love his neighbour more than himself.

Thirdly, they urge those Scripture passages which censure love of self, as 1 Cor. 10: "Let no one seek his own, but that which is another's." 1 Cor. 13: "Charity seeketh not her own." Phil. 2: "All seek the things that are their own," and 2 Tim. 3: "lovers of themselves." These seem to be spoken of the love by which one loves himself more than his neighbour.

Fourthly: the neighbour is not to be loved for our sake but for his own sake; so that the offices of charity shown to him are to be referred to his own good, according to that word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 3): "All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos," etc.; and (2 Cor. 4): "All things for your sake"; and (2 Tim.): "I endure all things for the sake of the elect." Hence the same Apostle (Phil. 2) says that he is constrained between two things, so that he does not know what to choose: "having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, as being by far the better thing for himself; but to remain in the flesh as more necessary for others." Yet in his soul the good of others seems to have predominated, since he adds: "And this I know with confidence, that I shall remain and abide with you all for your progress."

Fifthly, from the authority of the Fathers: St. Augustine in book 8 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 8,⁸ says that although we owe incomparably more to God than to men, we nevertheless owe to a brother as much as to ourselves. And in book 2 of *De Doctrina Christiana*, chapter 7,²³ he uses the following argument: "The just man who rightly esteems truth neither prefers himself to his neighbour nor ranks himself equal to his neighbour, because neither does he rank equal him whom he loves as himself." Which argument will be of no force unless the just man loves his neighbour equally with himself or more than himself. And the Author of the book *De Amicitia* among the works of St. Augustine, chapter 1, tom. 4,²⁴ says: "Nothing is to be denied to a friend: all things are to be endured for him, and one's bodily life is to be laid down for a friend, as divine authority has commanded." St. John Chrysostom indeed interprets the Apostle (Rom. 9) so as to understand him to have desired to fall into hell and to be deprived of the heavenly kingdom rather than that his brethren the Jews should perish. The relevant passages are in his Commentary on the Epistle (to the Romans, book 3), *De Providentia*, book 3, *De Sacerdotio*, and in a certain sermon on the nothingness of the kingdom, tom. 5.²⁵

Theophylact in his Commentary expressly follows him, saying that Paul loved others more than himself. And he says the same of Paul and Moses (in Matt. 5, c.):²⁶

Finally, certain arguments are advanced. First: the better someone is and hence the nearer to God, the more lovable he is. For the object of love is the good as such; and therefore God is supremely lovable because He is the highest good; therefore each person ought to love at least a better neighbour more than himself. And indeed it seems absurd to say that a sinful and vile man is obliged to love himself more than St. Peter or the Blessed Virgin Mary; and yet we ought to love every neighbour. For both men and Angels are our neighbours. Second: we are more obliged to love the greater glory of God; but that is greater from the salvation of many than of one; therefore we are more obliged to love the salvation of others, at least of many, than our own salvation. Third: in a well-constituted body, one member exposes itself to danger for the safety of another, especially of one that is more excellent and more necessary — as the arm for the head; therefore in the mystical body also the same ought to be done. And indeed this is the greater argument of love of self: for that which we are the more eager to preserve, we love the more. Fourth and last: it is the mark of charity to make our will conformed to the divine will, especially when it is known; but we know that many are better than us; God therefore loves them more; wherefore we also ought to love them before ourselves.

§ 11. To these we respond in order as follows.

To the first: although the word *sicut* or *tamquam* sometimes designates equality, those words are nevertheless — and indeed more often — a note merely of likeness or of some kind of agreement. For thus Moses says of Christ (Deut. 18): "The Lord thy God will raise up to thee a prophet from the midst of thy brethren like unto me" — which he then expounds as "like me." And it is found (Acts 3 and 7), and yet no Christian ignores that there is the widest possible difference of dignity between Moses and Christ; and this is learnedly explained by the Apostle (Heb. 3). Likewise it is said (Matt. 5): "Be ye perfect as also your Father," etc. And innumerable other instances of this kind. It must therefore be said that the second commandment of love prescribes that we love our neighbour in the manner in which we love ourselves. Which manner consists in this: that we sincerely wish him well, do him good, inflict no injury upon him, and rather show him kindness and help, and be altogether of assistance to him toward living blessedly; and all this not for our own utility and good but for his — so that in this precept there are most briefly contained those two things by which a man is ordered toward his neighbour: one affirmative (Matt. 7): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them"; the other negative, as (Tob. 4): "That which thou hatest to have done to thee by another, see thou do not to another at any time." Therefore it could not simply be said, "Thou shalt love thyself or thy neighbour as God," because God is not to be loved in the manner in which a man is rightly loved — as is clear from the foregoing analysis — but in a manner far more excellent. The sense we have assigned is confirmed by St. Augustine in book 1 of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 20,¹² *De Vera Religione*, chapter 46,¹³ and Tractate 16 on John.²⁷

§ 12. To the second it must be said that Moses, in order wholly to obtain what he desired, disjunctively added to his petition that which he knew God would neither do nor could do, since He is immutable. Or at any rate he used hyperbolic speech in order to signify the greatness of his love toward the people. In the same sense also the Apostle's words (Rom. 9) are not badly taken; although it can be said that the Apostle did not say *I wish* but *I was wishing*, or as it can also be rendered from the Greek, *I could have wished* — so that one understands: "if it were lawful," or something of that sort. To the Commentary of St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact, however, the reply is that by "hell" or by "separation from Christ" they do not understand the

privation of God's friendship, but only the lack of the glory of the elect. For they themselves manifestly so explain it, and Theophylact moreover adds that phrase: "if only it could be so." Furthermore, what the same Apostle says, "but we as reprobates," has this sense: "While you are acting rightly, I do not claim the authority by which I could punish you; indeed I do not refuse to be held as a reprobate" — that is, as one held in contempt and devoid of authority.

§ 13. The Scriptures proposed in the third place neither condemn love of self absolutely, nor the love by which one loves himself more than his neighbour; but the love by which a man in his actions and human duties has private and temporal advantages chiefly before his eyes, and sets these before the public good, or the salvation of neighbours, or even the honour of God. This sense is shown by what is added in Phil. 2: "not the things that are Jesus Christ's."

§ 14. To the fourth we reply that the neighbour is properly to be loved neither for our sake, but for God's sake. Nevertheless, because the neighbour is loved by way of fellowship in the Highest Good, as was said above, hence from that good which one wills to the neighbour, he who loves does not exclude himself. And the Scriptures adduced do not signify anything other than that the ministry of preaching was entrusted to the Apostles not for their own sake but for others' — in whose execution of that office, however, they also consulted their own salvation.

§ 15. To the authority of St. Augustine from book 8 of *De Trinitate*,⁸ the reply can be made along with the Master that the words *tantum* and *quantum* are not to be referred to the magnitude of love, but either to those goods which we ought to wish both to our neighbour and to ourselves by loving them; or — which comes to the same thing — to the common manner of love, of which we spoke in the resolution of the first argument. As for the argument from Augustine's second book of *De Doctrina Christiana* that is urged in objection,²³ it proceeds from a parity of reason. For with respect to truth, the man himself and his neighbour stand in the same relation. And what is next urged from the book *De Amicitia*²⁸ is to be understood according to the laws of friendship concerning things that are lawful and honourable. Among which is the laying of one's temporal life in danger for the eternal salvation of one's neighbour; or even for the temporal life of one who is more necessary to the State. Yet even in this matter, he still loves himself more with respect to his ultimate end.

To St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact, reply has already been given.

§ 16. To the first argument St. Thomas replies that love has its quantity not only from the part of the object, which is God, but also from the part of the one loving.¹⁰ And accordingly, although a better neighbour may be nearer to God, yet because he is not so near to the one who loves him as the one who loves is to himself, it does not follow that he ought to love his neighbour more than himself. St. Bonaventure, however, replies that each person ought indeed to love the neighbour whom he knows to be better than himself to a greater final end, yet not with a greater act of love.²⁹

§ 17. To the second, the same St. Bonaventure replies that charity does not separate the glory of God from our own spiritual good.³⁰ It can also be replied that the love of many neighbours, because of their number, is indeed more extensive, but it ought not therefore to be more intensive than the love of self.

To the third it must be said that a member that exposes itself to danger for the safety of another does not so much do this with the intention of saving the other member as of saving the whole body — on whose safety it depends more from such a member than from itself. For without the head the body cannot be saved,

but it can without the arm. Therefore a part exposes itself for the whole: because the good of the part depends on the whole, and thus that act proceeds from love of self. Then, to speak properly, it is not so much to be said that a member exposes itself to danger for the safety of another member, or even of the whole, as that the whole exposes another member to danger for the safety of itself or of a more excellent member; since the acts are acts of the whole supposit (*suppositi*). In the civil or mystical body, however, properly and in an ordered manner one person sometimes spends his temporal life for another, yet nevertheless keeps a greater love of self; by which, namely, he wishes to himself more than to another the highest good — toward which as toward a universal good one must always look, and according to whose will as a law all our love is to be regulated. For the created common good must yield to the uncreated universal good.

§ 18. The last argument does indeed convince that it ought to please us that God loves my neighbour more than me; and accordingly that my neighbour, being better than us, should participate more in the highest good — since we know God to will this. It does not, however, require that I love him more, that is, that I set him before myself in the offices of love.

§ IV — That those near to us are to be loved in preference to others, and in what order (Propinquos prae aliis esse diligendos et quo ordine)

§ 19. Since the love of neighbours ought not to be disordered, those among our neighbours are to be loved more who are closer to us according to the origin of the flesh. This is sufficiently proved by the particular precept of the Decalogue concerning the honouring of parents: where the word "honouring" signifies, in the Hebrew idiom, not only reverence and obedience, but above all the rendering of assistance and benefits. It is indeed by these things chiefly that love towards another is manifested. It is also proved by that text of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 5: "If anyone has no care for his own, and especially for those of his household, he has denied the faith," and so on.³² Here by "those of his household" the Apostle understands those close to one — such as a mother, a kinswoman, and so forth — as is plain from the context. See our Commentary on that passage.³³ The same is shown also by the contrary case: for in Lev. 20, a peculiar punishment of death is appointed for one who has cursed his father or his mother. He therefore who acts against the love of parents sins more gravely than one who acts against the love of others, and accordingly is more strictly bound to the love of parents.

§ 20. This order of loving is affirmed by St. Jerome, writing on chapter 46 of Ezekiel,³⁴ upon the words "You shall not enter in upon a dead person, save upon a father or a mother," and so on. "The affection of nature," he says, "is approved: so that in the order of charity, after God the parent of all things, the father also of the flesh is to be loved, and the mother, the son and the daughter, the brother and the sister." And the *Glossa Ordinaria* attributed to St. Ambrose, on those words of Song 2: "He ordered charity in me,"³⁵ says that God is to be loved first, parents second, children third, and then the other members of the household.

§ 21. The reason of this doctrine is as follows: since after God a man ought to love himself most, as was shown above, the more closely any other person is joined to him, the more he is bound to show him the offices of love. This St. Augustine also testifies in the book *De Vera Religione*, chapter 47,³⁶ saying that a man is unjust unless he prefers to benefit those more closely connected with him. Now although connections are various — as those of blood-relatives, fellow-citizens, fellow-soldiers, fellow-students, and so forth — yet among them that connection which is according to natural origin, that is, the bond of kinship or

consanguinity, is absolutely prior and stronger and more enduring; because it is according to that which pertains to substance, and is therefore immovable. For the other connections are accessory and can be dissolved. Therefore those who are bound to us by this bond of kinship are to be loved more by us. St. Thomas expounds this reason at greater length in the *Summa theologiae* II-II.³⁷

§ 22. Now if the question is asked concerning the order of love among kinsmen themselves, a distinction must be employed. For the degree of love can be considered from two standpoints, as was indicated in the preceding section: namely, either from the side of the object, or from the side of the one loving. From the side of the object, that which has a greater formal character (*ratio*) of good with respect to us is to be loved by us more — as father and mother more than wife or children or brothers, because parents are loved as the principle of our substance. This formal character of love is stated in Sir. 7, where it is said: "Remember that you would not have been born save through them."³⁸ They are to be loved likewise as those from whom children have received many and very great benefits. This formal character is regarded in the words that follow in the same place: "And repay them as they also have repaid you."³⁸ From the side of the one loving, however, that is to be loved more which is more closely joined to the one loving. In this manner a wife and children are loved more than parents. For a wife is joined to her husband as one flesh (Matt. 19).³⁹ Hence the Apostle, Eph. 5: "Husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his own wife loves himself."⁴⁰ And below: "Let each one love his wife as himself."⁴¹ Children, moreover, are joined to parents as something that belongs to those very parents. For what is begotten is as it were a part of the one begetting, but not conversely. Hence it comes about that by this latter consideration children also are to be loved more than parents.

§ 23. But if it is asked to whom assistance is to be given preferentially in an equal emergency of necessity, all else being equal, I answer briefly: it is consonant with Scripture, with reason, and with the judgements of the Doctors that this order is to be held — that assistance be given first to the father, then to the mother, then to children, then to a spouse, and afterwards to others according to the degrees of kinship. [On this argument one may consult St. Thomas, in the article mentioned above.]⁴²

§ V — Resolution of what seems contrary to the foregoing doctrine (Solutio eorum quae superiori doctrinae videntur contraria)

§ 24. Against this order of love (*dilectionis ordo*) which we have set forth — namely, that those close to us are to be loved — many objections can be raised.

First, St. Augustine seems to hold that all human beings are to be loved equally. For in book one of *Doctrina Christiana*, chapter 28, he says: "All human beings are equally to be loved. But since you cannot be of benefit to all, those are chiefly to be looked after who, being bound to you as if by a certain lot, are joined to you by the opportunity of place and time, or of any other circumstances." And in *Tractatus* 30 on John he says: "Who is there who does not judge according to persons? He who loves equally — equal love causes persons not to be preferred. For when we honour human beings in different ways according to their respective ranks, we must then fear lest we be accepting persons." Likewise in book 19 of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 16, he says that according to temporal goods the holy Patriarchs distinguished the condition of their children's lot from that of servants; but for the worship of God, in whom eternal goods are to be hoped for, they gave equal counsel of love to all the members of their household. And in his *Exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians*, on

chapter 6, "Let us do good to all," etc., he says: "Eternal life is to be desired for all with equal love, but the same offices of love are not to be rendered to all." And in *De Vera Religione*, chapter 47, speaking of the valiant man, he says: "If he addresses some member of his household more readily than any other person, it is not that he loves him more, but that he has greater confidence in him." And he adds immediately after: "When, therefore, he cannot benefit all whom he loves equally, unless he prefers to benefit those more closely joined to him, he is unjust." Similar to this is that saying of St. Bernard cited by St. Thomas: "Love knows no rank, considers no dignity."⁴⁴

§ 25. Secondly, there are objected those passages of Scripture which seem to reject and condemn the love of kinsfolk solely because they are kinsfolk, as carnal; as when (Matt. 12) it was announced to Christ that his mother and brothers were standing outside seeking to speak to him, he replied: "Who is my mother?" etc., and then, teaching that kinship is to be measured by obedience to the commandments of God, pointing to the disciples he said: "Whoever shall do the will of my Father, he is my brother and sister and mother." On which passage St. Jerome, writing in that place, says: "He preferred the Apostles to his kindred, so that we too should prefer the spirit to the flesh in the comparison of love."⁴⁵ And Bede on the same passage, as cited by the Master: "He does not injuriously neglect his mother, nor does the mother deny him; but the bonds of minds are shown to be more excellent than those of bodies."⁴⁶ Another Scripture text is Gal. 6: "Let us do good to all, but especially to those of the household of faith." Since the proof of love is the display of works, it will follow — as St. Gregory says (*Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 30) — that those are especially to be loved who are more closely joined to us by faith and charity.⁴⁷ Moreover, elsewhere Scripture seems to call us back from more intense love of kinsfolk, as in Deut. 33, where Moses, in commendation of the tribe of Levi, says that they regarded their parents, brothers, and children as strangers, and adds: "They kept your word and observed your covenant."⁴⁸ And in the Psalm (Ps. 44), the bride of Christ is urged to forget her own people and her father's house, so that the king might desire her beauty.⁴⁹ Similar is that passage of Lk. 14: "If any man does not hate father and mother and wife," etc. From which it follows at least that a stranger who is better is to be loved more than a kinsman who is wicked, or less good.

§ 26. Thirdly, to this same matter there are adduced passages from St. Augustine and other Fathers. For St. Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, chapter 46, asserts that these bonds of carnal kinship are from sin, and that no one is fit for the kingdom of God who does not hate them.¹³ And afterwards he says: "Therefore human nature itself, without the condition of carnality, is to be loved. All are begotten under one God the Father; those who love him fulfil his will." And in *Epistola* 38, he says that Christ taught that kinships and temporal bonds of intimacy are to be despised.⁵⁰ Similar to this is the passage in book 1 of *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, chapter 25, and in *Homilia* 38 among the fifty.⁵¹ Moreover, St. Ambrose in book 1 of *De Officiis*, chapter 7, speaks to his people in this fashion: "For I love you no less, whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had received you through marriage. For nature is not more vehement for loving than Grace. We ought certainly to love more those whom we think will be with us forever than those who are with us only in this present age"; and what follows.⁵² But most plainly of all, Prosper in book 3 of *De Vita Contemplativa*, chapter 15, seems to disapprove of the aforesaid order, for among other things he says: "For no one loves a neighbour as himself merely because that neighbour is his brother or sister, father or son, mother or daughter, grandchild or granddaughter. He who loves in such a fashion loves carnally." And immediately after: "For if we love our kinsfolk, however disorderly, ugly, and of evil conduct, more than any saints whom we call neighbours not by blood but by faith, we not only love them carnally but we gravely sin in such love of them."⁵³ Not dissimilar is the passage in St. Basil, *Sermon* 1, *De corripiendis Monachis*.⁵⁴

To these seems also to be added the Master (in the text, § F), who holds that the good who are not joined to us in flesh are to be loved more than the wicked who are joined to us in flesh. For he says: "The bond of minds is holier than that of bodies." And St. Bernard in *De Modo Bene Vivendi*, chapter 5, number 13, using almost the same words as the Master.⁵⁵

§ 27. Finally, arguments too are not lacking by which this opinion is made probable. First, because since the object of love is the good, better things ought to be loved more. Hence St. Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, chapter 48, holds that perfect justice consists in our loving greater things more and lesser things less.⁵⁶ Secondly, because God loves the better more, and it is fitting that we conform our will to his, if we wish to love rightly. Hence the same St. Augustine in his commentary on Ps. 93 says that those are upright of heart who will what God wills, since the will of God is the rule of our will.⁵⁷ Thirdly, because in the state of beatitude (*beatitudo*), with no account taken of carnal kinship, each person will be loved more by every other in proportion as he is better and more united to God.

§ 28. That we may reply briefly to these objections: concerning what was urged in the first place, it must be known that it was the opinion of certain persons — which the Master recites in the text — that all neighbours are to be loved with an equal disposition (*affectus*) of charity (*caritas*), even if they are not to be served with an equal effect (*effectus*) of charity, that is, an equal display of works. Which opinion the Master rightly rejects, and St. Thomas refutes in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 6,⁵⁸ because just as in natural things, so also in spiritual things the inclination of a thing ought to be proportionate to its fitting act. Therefore, just as earth has greater weight than water because its nature seeks a lower place, so the disposition (*affectus*) of charity ought to be greater toward those to whom we owe the greater external works of beneficence. It must be said, therefore, that St. Augustine, in the words cited from *De Doctrina Christiana* and *De Vera Religione*, is not speaking of equality of disposition or act of love as regards its intensity, but of parity in the good to which all are to be loved — that is, God himself, or eternal beatitude in general. For the meaning is that all are to be loved toward the one good which is God, but those who are more closely joined to us are to be advanced toward that good more by works of beneficence. Moreover, in the *Tractatus on John* he requires no other equality than that which excludes the acceptance of persons (*personarum acceptio*). He therefore understands equality of proportion, not of quantity. And in *De Civitate Dei* he wishes nothing other than that counsel should be given to all members of the household without exception for the obtaining of eternal goods, just as eternal life is to be desired for absolutely all human beings without exception — as the other passage in the *Epistle to the Galatians* signified. St. Bernard, however, seems to understand by ranks and dignities those of this present age, the consideration of which introduces the acceptance of persons, as the Apostle James teaches in chapter 2 of his Epistle.⁵⁹

§ 29. To the second it is answered: the order of love (*ordo dilectionis*) certainly places spiritual kinship before carnal kinship, but not spiritual kinsfolk before carnal kinsfolk — except insofar as we ought to will for the former, as being better, a greater good which they possess or which they deserve. Hence St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 10 on John, says: "What the Lord magnified in the Blessed Virgin was that she did the will of the Father, not that flesh bore flesh."⁶⁰ The words of St. Jerome and Bede are therefore absolutely true: because the spiritual bond is more excellent than carnal kinship, and those who are better are always to be esteemed more highly by right judgement than those who are worse or less good — yet they are not always to be loved more intensely. Furthermore, the Apostle in the *Epistle to the Galatians* is making a comparison only between the faithful and the unfaithful with whom they were then mingled; and therefore it was necessary to know to

which of the two beneficence was rather to be shown. The other passages of Scripture show that carnal kinship is to be disregarded to the extent that it can be an impediment to us in the worship and love of God.

§ 30. The words of St. Augustine adduced in third place from *De Vera Religione* were retracted by the author himself in *Retractationes* I, chapter 13,⁶¹ where he teaches that sentences of this kind tend toward making it believed that the first married couple would not have begotten descendants had they not sinned — an opinion which he refuted as erroneous more openly in other later writings, as we showed in the commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*. Similarly, he also retracted the other passage from book 1 of *De Sermone Domini in Monte* in *Retractationes* I, chapter 19.⁶² This correction by the author is to be extended to whatever similar passages are found in him. St. Thomas interprets St. Ambrose as speaking of love insofar as it regards spiritual benefits, such as a pastor is specially bound by reason of his office to bestow upon his spiritual flock, even though the more intense disposition of love absolutely speaking may be directed toward certain others.⁶³ Prosper, however, seems to hold nothing other than that love is to be measured not by kinship alone, but in general by the common fellowship of human nature, so that no one may be excluded from our love. For that something additional is to be rendered to those more closely joined to us he indicates later when he says: "Yet so that toward those whom intimacy makes more closely joined to us, if their reputation does not condemn them and their life commends them, we bestow more." The reason he added the qualification about reputation and life is that those who are notorious and of evil life, even if they are kinsfolk, are to be avoided in their exterior conduct. Moreover, the Master in the text makes no definitive pronouncement, saying that this is a thorny question (*latebrosa quaestio*) not to be fully resolved by him. And what is cited from St. Bernard is not Bernard's but belongs to an author of uncertain identity — though both the Master's words and those cited under Bernard's name readily admit a convenient interpretation: namely, that the better are to be loved more in the estimation of the thing loved, not in the intensity of love — which we express differently, as we noted above: that the better are to be loved more as regards what comes from the connection with the one who loves. And this same resolution is to be applied to the first argument.

§ 31. To the second it must be said: the love (*dilectio*) of God, since it is his substance, admits neither intensity nor remission. God is, however, said to love some more or less by reason of the good he confers upon them; and hence in a twofold way — either according to present good or according to predestined good. In the first mode he loves more those who are actually better, even if perhaps they are reprobates, or predestined to less glory than others. In the second mode he loves more those to whom he has predestined a greater final grace (*gratia*) and glory (*gloria*), even if perhaps they are now still impious, or less good than others. We ought to conform our love to each of these divine loves as known and manifested to us — to the extent of willing for the just and the predestined those goods which God gives or has determined to give them. We are not, however, commanded to do this with a greater disposition of love, as we said above; nor are we therefore bound to come to their temporal aid first or preferentially.

§ 32. To the last it is answered from St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 13,⁶⁴ that the condition of the future life and of the present life is different. For there, with the cause ceasing whereby it is necessary that each one provide more for one who is more closely joined to him, according to whatever necessity, than for a stranger — which is necessary in this life — the entire order of love (*ordo dilectionis*) will be received from the sole connection with God, who will be all in all.

§ I — That love of enemies is a precept for all (Dilectionem inimicorum omnibus esse in praecepto)

§ 33. That not only the perfect but absolutely all are bound to love their enemies is shown most clearly from the very precept of love itself, in which it was said: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." For if every human being is comprehended under the name of neighbour, as we showed (at *Distinctio* 28), and this precept of love is without doubt to be understood of every neighbour, it is manifestly clear that human beings who are enemies are to be loved by us — and not in any manner whatsoever, but as ourselves. Therefore that gloss attributed to St. Ambrose which the Master cites — according to which it is said that no one is obliged to love enemies as himself, but that it suffices to love them and not hate them — is to be rejected as spurious (since it exists in no approved author, let alone in St. Ambrose).⁶⁶

§ 34. Moreover, there are many express precepts of the love of enemies in Sacred Scripture. As Matt. 5: "But I say to you, love your enemies, do good to those who hate you," etc. That these words have the force of a precept the following words teach: "that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven." And again: "For if you love those who love you, what reward will you have?" The same things are repeated in Lk. 6, where we are also commanded to pray for those who calumniate us, and this general rationale of the precept is subjoined: "As you wish that men should do to you, do likewise to them." Moreover, the Scripture of the Old Testament prescribed this same love of enemies in more than one place: in Exod. 23, concerning leading back and assisting the strayed ox and ass of an enemy; and Prov. 25: "If your enemy is hungry, give him food," etc. This sentence the Apostle repeats in Rom. 12.⁶⁷ There concurs also that passage of Peter, 1 Ep. 3: "Not rendering evil for evil, nor curse for curse; but on the contrary, blessing."⁶⁸ Moreover, Christ himself, Stephen, and other saints demonstrated by example that one should pray for one's killers. Nor is the proof from the Lord's Prayer less strong, in which we so petition God to forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. For the Lord says in Matt. 6: "If you forgive men their sins, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your offences. But if you do not forgive men, neither will your Father forgive you."⁶⁹ The same is required in Matt. 18 and Mk. 11.⁷⁰ And there is in Sacred Scripture a similar passage from the Old Testament, namely Sir. 28: "Forgive your neighbour the harm he has done you, and then when you pray, your sins will be forgiven."⁷¹

§ 35. From these passages it is also clear that the text of Matt. 5 — "You have heard that it was said, you shall hate your enemy" — is not to be understood as if it had ever been a precept or even been lawful to hate an enemy simply speaking; but rather because it was permitted to the carnal people, or because this dictum was of ancient standing, in accordance with the perverted understanding of the Pharisees, who took occasion from what was read in Lev. 19: "You shall love your neighbour," and hence by an argument from the contrary concluded that an enemy was to be hated, or at least that love of him was not commanded. Or finally, because that ancient people was for certain reasons prohibited from temporally benefiting some of its enemies. For in Deut. 23 it is commanded concerning the Ammonites: "You shall not seek their good all your days."⁷²

§ 36. Finally, lest we be in doubt about the opinion of the Fathers: Hilarius and St. Jerome (on Lk. 6), St. Ambrose and Bede (on Rom. 12), St. John Chrysostom and Theophylactus in their Commentaries, and other Doctors have understood these passages in like fashion.⁷³ On this matter St. Augustine is frequently to be adduced, as in *Homilia* 24 among the fifty, where having recited the pact of the Lord's Prayer he says: "That we may be able to say this truthfully, we must also love our enemies."⁷⁴ And in his commentary on Ps. 53, he inculcates the same thing at greater length, now calling it a prescribed rule, now a precept, that we should love

even our enemies.⁷⁵ Other passages are in *Sermon 4 de Sanctis*; book 1 of *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, chapter 46; *Sermon 74 de Diversis*, last chapter.⁷⁶ St. Gregory also teaches the same thing openly in *Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 27.⁷⁷

§ II — Resolution of a certain difficulty concerning the foregoing (Dubitationis cujusdam circa praedicta solutio)

§ 37. That we may understand how and to what extent an enemy is to be loved, the difficulty which arises concerning the foregoing doctrine from the words of St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, 73) must be explained. There, after having said that it is a great thing if one is benevolent or even beneficent toward someone who has done no harm to him, he continues: "that it is a much greater and of the most magnificent goodness, that you love your very enemy, and always will good to him who wishes you ill and does it if he can, and do it when you are able." And he added: "but since these are the things of the perfect, of sons of God, to which every believer ought to strive — yet since this great good is not for the multitude of those whom we believe to be heard when in the Lord's Prayer it is said, 'Forgive us our debts as we forgive,' — without doubt the words of this pledge are fulfilled if a man who does not yet love his enemy, yet when asked by the man who has sinned against him to forgive, forgives from the heart; and also, himself wishing to be forgiven when he prays and says, 'as we also,' that is, so forgive us our debts as we also forgive our debtors who ask us."⁷⁹ From these words it appears that it is not absolutely necessary for a Christian's salvation that he love his enemy; since the one who does not love his enemy and has not yet remitted the debt to one by whom he is not asked is heard in the Lord's Prayer, in which he petitions that his own sins be forgiven him. A similar passage of the same author is in *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, chapter 8: "Rightly do we say in prayer, 'forgive us,' etc., 'as we also,' etc., if, however, we do what we say, or at least even enemies themselves are loved: or if anyone still as a little one in Christ does not yet do this, let him nonetheless from the depths of his heart forgive the penitent, and the one asking pardon for what he has sinned against him, if he wants his prayer to be heard by the heavenly Father."⁸⁰ In this sense he also speaks elsewhere — as in book 2 *Contra duas Epistolas*, chapter 5; *Homilia* 40 among the fifty; *Sermo* 74 *de Diversis*; *Sermo* 11 *in Novissimis*.⁸¹

§ 38. Indeed, Scripture itself seems to require no more of us. For the Lord says in Lk. 17: "If your brother sins, rebuke him. And if he repents, forgive him. And if he sins against you seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turns back to you saying, 'I repent,' forgive him."⁸² There seems to be nothing else in the precept, therefore, than that we forgive an enemy who is penitent and asks pardon; not that we forgive one who persists in the will and act of doing harm. Moreover, that loving enemies belongs not to all but only to the perfect, Theophylactus expressly affirms on that passage of Matt. 5, "Be therefore perfect": "To love some and to hate others is imperfect; to love all is the mark of the perfect."⁸³

§ 39. For the resolution of this difficulty a twofold distinction is needed: one of what it is to love an enemy (*diligere inimicum*), and one of what it is to forgive (*alter[um] dimittere debita*).

Love of enemies can be considered either in common (*in communi*) or in particular (*in particulari*). In common, insofar as one who in general loves a neighbour does not wish to exclude his own enemy from that generality, even if he is not actually moved by a particular affection of love toward him. In particular, insofar as someone is moved by a special motion of love toward an enemy, or by wishing him well. Likewise, forgiving is said to happen in another's case either in act, or in an interior preparation (*animi praeparatio*); in act, when

one actually comes to pray or expresses in the very prayer the thought of forgiving an offence; in a preparation of soul (*animi praeparatione*), if one does not bear a hostile soul toward him, nor expects vengeance, but is so disposed in affection as to freely forgive a penitent who asks pardon.

§ 40. These things being established, it must be replied that every Christian is bound to provide toward an enemy not yet penitent but still exercising enmity that love which he is bound to show to every neighbour — namely, not to exclude his own enemy from the general disposition (*affectus*) of love and from prayer and similar things. He is not bound, however, in his particular prayer or intention of affection to direct these toward the enemy; for he is not bound to do for enemies what he is not bound to do for all non-enemies. He is equally bound to forgive the debt in a preparation of soul, and he is not bound thus to forgive it in act — even if the thought of the enemy occurs to him — because if he omits this, he is heard in the prayer which says "Forgive us," etc., as St. Augustine openly teaches in *Homilia* 40.⁸⁴ But if the enemy is penitent, the one who has been offended is bound to display to him even the particular disposition and effect (*effectum*) of love, and above all that effect which consists in forgiving the sin from the heart without delay; and such a person is not to be heard in prayer petitioning that his own sins be forgiven.

§ 41. Therefore what St. Augustine says — that loving an enemy is the mark of the perfect, sons of God, and that many are heard in the Lord's Prayer who do not yet love their enemy — is to be understood of that love by which

§ I — That the love of enemies is commanded of all (Dilectionem inimicorum omnibus esse in praecepto)

§ 42. The love of enemies (*dilectio inimicorum*) can be considered either in general or in particular. In general, indeed, in so far as someone, loving his neighbour generically, does not wish his enemy to be excluded from that universality, even though he is not moved toward him by an actual affective love (*actuali amoris affectu*) or by a love directed to him in a special way. In particular, however, in so far as someone is moved by a particular impulse of love toward his enemy — either by wishing him well, or by actually doing good to him. In like manner, the remission of a debt owed to another is said to be either in act (*actu*) or in disposition of soul (*animi praeparatione*): in act, indeed, if, before he approaches prayer, or at least in the very act of prayer, he remits the offence to his neighbour by an explicit act of thought; but in disposition of soul, if he does not bear a hostile mind toward him, nor expects revenge, but is so disposed that he would readily pardon him if he sought forgiveness and repented.

§ 43. These distinctions having been established, it must be replied that every Christian is bound toward an enemy who has not yet repented but is still carrying on his enmity to render that love which he is bound to render to every neighbour: namely, that he should not exclude his enemy from the general affective love (*dilectionis affectu*) of prayer and similar acts. But he is not bound to direct the intention of his prayer or affection to his enemy in particular; for neither is he bound to do so toward all neighbours who are not enemies. He is likewise bound to remit the debt to him in disposition of soul. But he is not so bound to remit it in act, even if thought of his enemy occurs to him, such that, if he omit to do so, he would not be heard in his prayer in which he says "Forgive us," and so on — as St. Augustine openly teaches.⁸⁴ But if the enemy, led by repentance, asks forgiveness of the one he has offended, that person is bound also to show in particular the affection and effect of love (*dilectionis affectum et effectum*) toward one who, by now repenting, has ceased to

be an enemy; and to show that effect principally by forgiving the sin from his heart without delay, since otherwise he will not be heard in his prayer, in which he asks that his own sins be forgiven.

§ 44. Therefore, what St. Augustine says — that it belongs to the perfect sons of God to love an enemy, and that many are heard in the Lord's Prayer who do not yet love their enemy — must be understood as referring to that love whereby someone is moved toward an enemy who is still acting as an enemy, and does good to him in particular.⁸⁴ St. Augustine says: "If you wish him well who wishes you evil, and, if you can, always do him good and whatever good you can do." Now this is indeed not necessary, so that one may obtain the forgiveness of his sins. Yet the same St. Augustine seems to signify, when he says that every faithful person ought to exert himself toward that perfection — not, of course, with respect to the necessity of salvation, but only by precept — that at the proper place and time a man should wish well and do good even to an enemy who is still persisting in his enmity; and that the person who attains this perfection does not, through failing to do so in act, thereby frustrate the prayer of the Lord's Prayer or be excluded from the grace of God. But in a case of urgent necessity (*in articulo necessitatis*), one is so bound to show to an enemy who still bears a hostile mind the necessary benefit — that, if he refuses to do so, he can neither pray with effect nor obtain it from God, nor arrive at salvation — since in such a case every man is absolutely required, if he would be or remain a son of God, to succour an enemy in need. Concerning which case, it is agreed by all — as St. Thomas interprets — that saying from Prov. 25: "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat."⁸⁵ And indeed it is manifest even from this, that if an evident occasion be offered, a benefit dictated by benevolence (*ex praescripto benevolentiae*) must be shown to an enemy, especially since the law (Exod. 23) in prescribing what of beneficence must be shown to an enemy has set forth the example of what is necessary.⁸⁶ Hence by the old law that is commanded which is commanded under the article of necessity; so that praying for those who persecute and calumniate us is also something commanded, of such a kind that, unless it be done, one falls away from the grace of God — as is clear in those cases in which a man sins formally.⁸⁷ Therefore, nothing generally prevents one from being less heard by God in his prayer if he sins against this commandment in any matter.

§ 45. Now with respect to the debtor who has not yet repented, one who does not remit the debt but is prepared to remit it to the one who repents and asks forgiveness — even if perhaps such a one sins venially by not yet remitting — it must be said that he does not therefore fail to be heard. For there is compatible with this disposition that love of an enemy (*inimici dilectio*) whereby one wishes him both repentance and eternal life, even in particular. [Note (a):] The author is to be understood as speaking of the external remission which we are said to owe enemies absolutely when they ask; but we are not bound absolutely to show them signs of goodwill when they do not ask. Furthermore, each person is bound in his heart to remit the injury received even from one who does not ask. This, speaking of the internal remission, is to be understood prior to the other's asking, or even when he has not yet ceased to do harm; for one is bound to put aside hatred, or to lay down hatred already entertained — which all teachers unanimously confess. (See de Coninck, Doubt 6, n. 82.) Hence those propositions X and XI among those condemned by Innocent XI are rightly and deservedly proscribed, which say that to satisfy the precept of loving one's neighbour it suffices to love him externally and formally.⁸⁸

§ II — The resolution of a certain difficulty concerning the foregoing (Dubitationis cujusdam circa praedicta solutio)

§ 46. Moreover, the passage from Lk. 17 does not signify that a brother's sin committed against us must not be forgiven before he is led by repentance to ask pardon; but that the remission already made in the heart must then also be declared by word and by other signs of goodwill and reconciliation — something which it is not always expedient to do before his repentance.⁸²

§ 47. To Theophylactus we reply that "the imperfect" are understood in two ways: either those who are indeed just but of a lower degree than those whom Scripture recognises as perfect according to the mode of this life — and so the imperfect are said to hate enemies, because they do not immediately remit injuries received from them, which the perfect do, but only when they are asked; or those who, while they are indeed Christians, do not yet do what faith prescribes, while the perfect do so. And that saying "Be ye therefore perfect," etc., must be taken of the latter. In which sense it was also said by St. Jerome on that passage, that Christ commanded those things which are perfect — namely, those which are perfect in the sense of being necessary to salvation for all.⁹⁰

§ 48. But if finally you object that God does not remit a debt except to one who asks; and that therefore neither is a man bound by precept to do anything more than this — first I reply: one must not think of what God does as being identical to what is prescribed for a man to do. Then, God, before He is asked, confers upon an enemy a far greater benefit than can be conferred by a man — namely, by so changing his will that out of an enemy he becomes a friend, which man cannot do for man.⁸⁹

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, aa. 1, 2, 3.

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 6.

3. St. Augustine, Sermon 7 on the Words of the Lord (or Sermon C. among the Sermons, First Class, in the most recent edition).

4. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XV, ch. 22.

5. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 27.

6. Matt. 10:37.

7. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 22.

8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 8.

9. Pererius [Benedictus Pererius], *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, disputation 11, n. 76, citing Aristotle, Cicero, and Aulus Gellius.

10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 4.

11. The Master collects this order from St. Augustine, even though St. Augustine in book 1 of *De Doctrina Christiana* does not there number those things that are to be loved, nor expressly set out the order between the second and third — that is, between ourselves and the neighbour.

12. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 20.

13. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 46.

14. 3 Kgs (1 Kgs) 17:13.

15. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 8.

16. St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 28.

17. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* (Tractate), ch. 6. [The reference as in source: "Tractat. de Discip. Christiana cap. 6."]
18. St. Augustine, Homily 47 among the fifty (*inter 50*), Homil. 47 (also identified in the source as Sermon. CCCLXVIII in the most recent edition).
19. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 76.
20. The book *De diligendo Deo*, ch. 1, tom. 9, found among the works of St. Augustine but whose authorship is disputed; as the author notes, it is of uncertain attribution, with many of its sentences culled from Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bernard, and St. Anselm, and rejected by the learned as supposititious.
21. Prosper, *De Vita Contemplativa* III, ch. 25.
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as above (*ubi supra*).
23. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 7.
24. The Author of the book *De Amicitia* among the Works of St. Augustine, ch. 1, tom. 4 (Seu in Appendice Tomo VI in Edit. Benedicti).
25. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, book 3; *De Providentia*, book 3; *De Sacerdotio*; and a certain sermon on the nothingness of the kingdom, tom. 5.
26. Theophylact, *Commentary* (on Rom. 9); and on Matt. 5, c.
27. St. Augustine, Tractate 16 on John (*Tract. 16 in Joan.*).
28. The book *De Amicitia* among the works of St. Augustine.
29. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source: "S. Bonav." — precise locus not specified in text].
30. St. Bonaventure, as above.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, aa. 7, 8, 9, 11, 13.
32. 1 Tim. 5:8.
33. Estius refers to his own commentary on 1 Tim. 5.
34. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Ezekiel*, on ch. 46.
35. *Glossa Ordinaria* attributed to St. Ambrose, on Song 2:4.
36. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 47.
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, aa. 7–8.
38. Sir. 7:28.
39. Matt. 19:5–6.
40. Eph. 5:28–29.
41. Eph. 5:33.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, aa. 9 and 11.
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 6 (cited at head of section as *ubi supra*).
44. St. Bernard, *De Modo Bene Vivendi*, ch. 5, n. 13 [as attributed by the Master and St. Thomas; Estius later notes this is not authentically Bernard's].
45. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matt. 12* [abbreviation as in source].
46. Bede, *Commentary on Matt. 12*.
47. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 30.
48. Deut. 33 (commendation of the tribe of Levi).
49. Ps. 44.
50. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 38 (= Ep. CCXLIII in Benedictine edition).

51. St. Augustine, *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte* I, ch. 25; *Homilia* 38 among the fifty (= Sermon. CCCLXXXV inter Sermon. V. Classis seu dubios in Editione Benedictina).
52. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* I, ch. 7.
53. Prosper, *De Vita Contemplativa* III, ch. 15.
54. St. Basil, *Sermo* 1, *De corripendis Monachis*.
55. St. Bernard [uncertain author], *De Modo Bene Vivendi*, ch. 5, n. 13.
56. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 48.
57. St. Augustine, Commentary on Ps. 93.
58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 6.
59. Jas. 2.
60. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem*, Tract. 10.
61. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 13.
62. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 19.
63. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26 [*ubi supra*].
64. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 13.
65. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 8.
66. *Glossa Ordinaria* attributed to St. Ambrose [cited by the Master in Distinctio 30].
67. Exod. 23; Prov. 25; Rom. 12.
68. 1 Pet. 3.
69. Matt. 6.
70. Matt. 18; Mk. 11.
71. Sir. 28.
72. Lev. 19; Deut. 23.
73. Hilarius on Matt. 5 and 18; St. Jerome on Lk. 6; St. Ambrose and Bede on Rom. 12; St. John Chrysostom and Theophylactus in their respective Commentaries [abbreviations as in source].
74. St. Augustine, *Homilia* 24 among the fifty (= Sermon. CCCLXXXIII; also identified as Sermon. V. Classis seu dubios in Editione Benedictina).
75. St. Augustine, Commentary on Ps. 53.
76. St. Augustine, *Sermo 4 de Sanctis*; *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte* I, ch. 46; *Sermo 74 de Diversis*, last chapter.
77. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 27.
78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 9.
79. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 73.
80. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, ch. 8.
81. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 5; *Homilia* 40 among the fifty (= Sermon. CCX inter Sermon. II. Classis in eadem Editione); *Sermo 74 de Diversis*; *Sermo 11 in Novissimis* (= Sermon. I. Classis, Sermon. LXVI inter cap. XII. num. 16).
82. Lk. 17.
83. Theophylactus, Commentary on Matt. 5.
84. St. Augustine, *Homilia* 40 among the fifty (= Sermon. CCX inter Sermon. II. Classis in eadem Editione).
85. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 8; Prov. 25.

86. Exod. 23.

87. Matt. 5; Lk. 6.

88. De Coninck, Doubt 6, n. 82; the condemned propositions X and XI of Innocent XI.

89. This note continues the reply to the objection from the divine mode of remission.

90. St. Jerome, Commentary on Lk. 6; Matt. 5.

DISTINCTIO XXX — WHETHER IT IS OF GREATER MERIT TO LOVE A FRIEND OR AN ENEMY (*UTRUM SIT MAJORIS MERITI AMICUM AN INIMICUM DILIGERE*)

§ 1. From an enemy let him become a friend; from a wicked man let him become good. That which a man ought at least hitherto to imitate is this: that toward an enemy who is still raging he should not wish for vengeance, but should seek repentance and grace for him from the Lord.

§ III — Whether it is of greater merit to love a friend or an enemy (Utrum sit majoris meriti amicum an inimicum diligere)

§ 2. It is asked whether it is of greater merit to love a friend or an enemy. Neither is to be so separated from the other as to be placed in isolation. For he who loves his friend while not loving his enemy has no reward (Matt. 5),² and if someone were to love his enemy while not loving his friend, he would be equally alien from reward, since he does not have charity (*charitas*) — the source of all merit — who excludes either the one or the other from love. The sense of the question, therefore, is: in a man who rightly and in an ordered manner loves both his friend and his enemy simultaneously, is the act by which he loves his friend, or the act by which he loves his enemy, of greater merit? Where, first of all, it must be established that, by the right order of charity (*charitas*), a friend is to be loved more than an enemy, inasmuch as he who loves is more closely united to a friend than to an enemy. This is left manifest from those things which were said above concerning the order of love. That being established, it can nevertheless appear that the love of an enemy is of greater merit.

§ 3. First, because the Lord (Matt. 5) did not place perfection in the love of friends, when, after the precept of the love of enemies, He subjoins: "Be ye therefore perfect," etc.

Second, because the Apostle (Rom. 5) shows that the singular charity of God toward us is commended in this: that while we were yet enemies, He died for us; whereas otherwise scarcely would anyone die for a just man.³

Third, because St. Augustine says (*Enchiridion*, ch. 73) that it is of much greater goodness if someone loves an enemy than if he loves a friend; and he holds it to be of the perfect to love enemies, of the imperfect to love friends. And writing on Ps. 108, he says that to render good for good is of the mediocre, but to render good for evil is of the good.⁴

§ 4. Consonant with these are these words of St. Gregory, *Moralia* IX, ch. 13: "That prayer is supremely commended to the ears of the Creator which intercedes even for enemies."⁵

And likewise these words of Lactantius, *Divinarum institutionum* VI, ch. 12: "He who does good only to a kinsman, or to a neighbor, or to a friend, earns no praise, or certainly no great praise" — the reason being that the love of a friend is for the most part less pure, since it has conjoined to it a carnal affection and regard for temporal advantage; whereas, on the contrary, the sole motive (*ratio*) of loving an enemy is nothing other than God; whence the love of an enemy is more absolute, and therefore more pleasing to God.⁶

Fifth, because it is more difficult to love an enemy than a friend. Wherefore, since the difficulty of a work arising on the part of the object augments the formal character (*ratio*) of virtue and of merit, one will merit more by loving an enemy than a friend.

§ 5. Nevertheless, these arguments notwithstanding, it must be said that, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) and other things being equal, the love of a friend is of greater merit than that of an enemy — as, after the Master, most of the Scholastics hold, although Durandus dissents, together with certain others.⁷

The principal reason has already been indicated above: because the object in the love of friends is both in itself better, and more closely united to the one loving; and accordingly it more greatly participates in the formal character (*ratio*) of the object of charity — whether that be estimated from propinquity to the Highest Good (*Summum Bonum*) as the primary object of charity, or from union with the one loving himself. Wherefore also the act which is exercised about that object ought absolutely (*simpliciter*) and from its own genus to be the better act; and therefore also of greater merit before God. Just as it is of the greatest merit to love God, for the very reason that God is in Himself and supremely lovable.

§ 6. The same is shown from the opposite. It is worse to hate a friend than an enemy; therefore it is better to love a friend. For this same conclusion can be drawn similarly from the love of God with respect to the love of one's neighbor, by way of the opposite hatred. Likewise it is worse to hate one's parents than strangers; therefore it is better to love them. Again, this is taught from the fact that by ordered love we love a friend more intensely than an enemy, as being more closely united to us. Now a more intense love from charity is of greater merit with respect to the essential reward (*praemium essentiale*) than a more remiss one. Finally, it can also be shown from this: that if we imagine one man loving only a friend and another loving only an enemy, we would without doubt prefer the former, and judge as either better or less evil the one who loves only a friend over the one who loves only an enemy.

§ 7. In order, therefore, that we may reply to the arguments of the opposing party: it must be said that Christ requires this perfection in all the faithful, that their love should not stop at friends but should extend even to enemies, just as the love of the Heavenly Father extends. And just as it does not follow from this that the love of God the Father, by which He loves enemies — that is, the wicked — is better than that by which He loves His Only-Begotten Son; so neither does it follow in the case of human beings. Nay, rather, from the comparison of divine charity the contrary can be gathered.

To the second, the reply is similar. For greater is the love which extends even to enemies than that which reaches only to friends; just as the heat of fire is greater in proportion as it warms things more remote. But just as the action of fire upon things nearer to it is greater and more excellent, so there the love toward those who are united — that is, toward friends — is better.

To the authorities of the Fathers: it is answered that they compare the love by which only friends are loved with that which, beyond friends, also embraces enemies; as is manifest from their very words.

To the fourth we reply that other things are not equal when the love of a friend is rendered impure by the admixture of some carnal affection. In which case nothing prevents the love of an enemy from being of greater merit, provided the enemy be loved purely for God's sake.

To the fifth it must be said that the formal character (*ratio*) of what is unowed does not of itself augment the formal character of merit. For the love of God is both supremely owed and supremely meritorious. To the last: the reply from St. Thomas⁸ is that for the formal character of merit goodness counts more than difficulty, nor does difficulty augment merit except where it follows upon the formal character of the good. But in the present case the difficulty does not arise on the part of the object insofar as it is good, but insofar as it falls short of the good — that is, of the lovable; in other words, not from the excellence of the object but from its defect. For an enemy is less lovable than a friend, and hence the love of him has its difficulty — just as in cognizable things it happens that some of them are with difficulty known by us, not on account of the excellence of their nature, but on account of their imperfection; the cognition of which accordingly is not more excellent than the cognition of those things which are easily known.

— *Distinctio XXXI — That charity once had can be lost (Charitatem semel habitam amitti posse) (continued from previous chunk) —*

§ I — That charity once had can be lost (Charitatem semel habitam amitti posse)

§ 8. The question which the Master treats in the first place under this Distinction is to be placed not among problematic questions but among questions of faith. For it is to be held with certain faith that charity (*caritas*), or grace (*gratia*), or justice (*justitia*) — for these three are either the same or inseparably connected — once had in this life, can be lost. This indeed happens as often as anyone, by committing a mortal sin, abandons justice. But a man, however just he may be, can do this so long as, placed in the mutability of this life, he has not yet arrived at the end.

§ 9. Now the proof of this doctrine is manifold and copious: both from Sacred Scripture, and from the authority of the Fathers and the Councils, and from reason, and from the very experience of the matter itself.

The Scriptures which prove this are many. For some testify that certain persons have fallen away from justice once received by sinning — as the fallen angels, the first parents, Saul, David, Solomon, Peter and other Apostles, and certain of the believers of the primitive Church, whom the Epistle (Heb. 6 and 10) notes.¹⁰ Hence also it is said to someone (Rev. 2): "Thou hast left thy first charity; be mindful therefore whence thou art fallen." And when the Lord had said (Lk. 10) that the names of the seventy were written in heaven, yet afterwards some of them went back (Jn. 6).¹¹ And St. John himself in his Epistle teaches that charity is extinguished by the omission of a good work, when he says: "He who shall see his brother having need and shall shut up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?" (1 Jn. 3).¹²

§ 10. Other Scriptures show the same thing under a parable: as (Lk. 15) under the parable of the straying sheep, the lost drachma, and the prodigal son — to whom the first robe which he had left behind is restored, by which charity is signified.¹³ And (Matt. 12) under the parable of the unclean spirit who returns to his house from which he had been cast out.¹⁴ And under the parable of the seed that fell on rocky ground (Matt. 13).¹⁵

Others teach that a man once justified can fall away from justice; as all those Scriptures which exhort to perseverance, which forbid a man to be without fear, which admonish us to watch and pray lest we enter into temptation, which teach that prior works of justice come into oblivion before God through a subsequent transgression, and finally all those which, by whatever means, deter the just children of God who have the charity of God and neighbor from graver sins. The passages of Scripture by which each of these points is proved are everywhere obvious. To these we add that Scripture (Wis. 4) which testifies that a certain one was caught up lest wickedness should change his understanding.¹⁶ To this point finally pertain all the Scriptures which invite those who have relapsed to penance — evidently presupposing that it is possible for someone to lose by sinning the first grace of justification. Wherefore also all those writings of the Fathers in which they teach against the Novatians that those who have lapsed after baptism are to be received back into grace through the sacrament of penance manifestly prove this very thing: such as those of St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and others.¹⁷ Although elsewhere as well the things which we have just said are found everywhere obvious in the Scriptures, and are frequently and extensively inculcated by the Fathers, so that it would be superfluous to dwell on the recounting of their opinions.

§ 11. We add only one or two passages of St. Augustine where he transmits this matter most openly. The first is in the book *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 8 and 9,¹⁸ where he says that God gave to certain persons faith, hope, and love, to whom He did not give perseverance. The latter is in *Tract. 45 In Joannem*,¹⁹ where, expounding the text "But the sheep did not hear them," he says that there are many in the Church who are chaste, sober, standing firm and praising God, who will at some time blaspheme, fornicate, grow drunk, and fall and be damned; because they are not sheep according to present justice. Similar is the passage in St. Gregory, *Moralia* XIV, ch. 26,²⁰ where he shows how there were members of the Church who were able to lose justice.

§ 12. And indeed it is worth noting, for the certainty of this doctrine, that the heretic Jovinian was long ago condemned by so great a consensus of the Fathers because — among other things (as St. Augustine reports, *De Haeresibus*, n. 82)²¹ — he said that a man after receiving the washing of regeneration could not sin so as to lose by sin the grace of regeneration.

§ 13. To these has been added the doctrine and definition of the Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 13),²² where the matter of those who lapse and of their restoration is treated (ch. 15),²³ where it is taught that by any mortal sin the grace of justification — though not faith — is lost. The same is declared by several canons of the same session: canons 15, 16, 17, 23, 27, and 28, but especially canon 17,²⁴ by which those are condemned who say that the grace of justification falls to the predestined to life alone, and that the reprobate are indeed called, but do not receive grace; and canon 23,²⁵ by which anathema is said to him who shall say that a man once justified can sin no further and cannot lose grace, and that therefore he who lapses and sins was never truly justified.

§ 14. Furthermore, one manifest and sufficient reason is this: because since in this life God, who is the Highest Good, is not yet seen through His essence, and consequently it is possible for some good to seem to the human mind which is in reality not good but is opposed to charity, it will be possible for that apparent good to be chosen by the free will. By which act of the will, charity is lost not only as a meritorious cause is removed, but also effectively, as it is expelled by its contrary — as St. Thomas teaches.²⁶ And therefore the truth holds in charity, however great and perfect it may be according to the manner of this life. But what reason shows to be possible, daily and indeed frequent experience also teaches actually occurs: both in the case

of those who, when they come to a more advanced age, lose by sinning the innocence of baptism; and of adults who, after the grace of reconciliation, relapse subsequently into the same or other crimes.

§ II — Resolution of the objections raised against the foregoing (Solutio eorum quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 15. Now we must briefly reply to certain arguments brought forward on the contrary side. For the following Scripture texts are first objected: "Many waters could not extinguish charity" (Song 8).²⁸ "Whom He justified, those He also glorified." And further on: "Who shall separate us from the charity of Christ?" And again: "Charity never faileth" (1 Cor. 13).²⁹ "If they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us" (1 Jn. 2).³⁰ "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not, and cannot sin" (1 Jn. 3).³¹

To these may be added that text from Prov. 17: "He that is a friend loveth at all times." Citing this Scripture, the author of the book *On Friendship*, ch. 2, tom. 4, writing in the person of St. Augustine,³² says that a friendship which has failed was never a true friendship. St. Jerome affirms the same thing (*Epist.* 41, *ad Rufinum*, at the end), saying that a friendship which can cease was never a true one.³³ Consonant with this opinion is that saying which the Master cites from St. Augustine: charity which can be abandoned was never a true charity.³⁴ The same conclusion seems to be supported also by those testimonies of the Fathers cited by the Master — of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Ambrose, and Bede. Not dissimilar is a passage found in St. Augustine (*lib.* 4, *Contra Julianum*, ch. 3),³⁵ where he says that God brings none of the reprobate to wholesome and spiritual repentance. And in *Tract.* 14 (*in Joan.*),³⁶ that no one of the reprobate receives the testimony of Christ. Similar is that saying of St. Gregory (*Moralia*, lib. 34, ch. 8),³⁷ that he who loses sanctity never truly had sanctity before the eyes of God. This Prosper also confirms when he says that charity is not subject to any instability (*De Vita contemplativa*, lib. 3, ch. 13).³⁸ All these texts seem to prove that true sanctity, or charity, cannot be lost — that is, that justice cannot be lost.

§ 16. But to these we reply: the text of Canticles does not speak of charity in general, but of that charity by which the bridegroom Christ and the bride, the Church, are mutually united. The texts objected from the Epistle to the Romans speak only of the predestined. For the Apostle preceded those words — "Whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed," and so on — with "Who shall accuse the elect of God?" And straightway from that place: "Who therefore shall separate us?" — he takes upon himself the person of the elect, and in that character says what follows to the end of the chapter.³⁹ Now it is true indeed that the charity of the predestined cannot be finally extinguished; in the composite sense this is true and is certain.

§ 17. What, moreover, the sense of this proposition is — "Charity never faileth" — we shall discuss later in its proper place, when we treat of this same Distinction.⁴⁰ What is adduced from the first Epistle of John in the first passage is similarly said in the person of the elect. For all the elect persevere unto the end. Nor do the preceding words stand in the way of this interpretation: "They went out from us, but they were not of us." For the reprobate, mingled in the Church with the elect, when they separate themselves from the Church, go out from the midst of the elect; but they were not of the number of the elect. For had they been so, they would assuredly not have deserted the fellowship of the elect.³⁰

§ 18. The later passage signifies nothing other than that he who is born of God, while that filiation endures, cannot sin with that sin by which charity is violated. But St. John does not mean thereby that charity, once possessed, cannot be lost; this is clear from the same Epistle. For (ch. 2) he says: "My little children, these

things I write unto you, that you sin not" — therefore he considered it possible that those who were in charity might sin and might sometimes sin. And (ch. 3): "He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need and shall shut up his bowels from him — how doth the charity of God abide in him?"¹²

§ 19. The sentence adduced from Proverbs shows that a true friend bears such an affection toward a friend that he is unwilling to desert him even in adversity. This is similarly and truly said of charity as well — namely, that God is loved by a man in such a way that the lover is unwilling to be separated from the Beloved; but just as in human friendship, so in divine charity it comes about that, even though the love be genuine and sincere on both sides, yet it can be extinguished, and is sometimes extinguished, on account of the mutability of the human will turning away from good. In the same manner, other sentences of the same kind can be understood. For the matter is that the book *On Friendship* has no certain author.⁴¹ And the opinion of St. Jerome writing to Rufinus is shown by the very event itself to have been untrue — namely, that the friendship between them was dissolved.⁴²

§ 20. That, moreover, which the Master cites in the first place from St. Augustine is not found in St. Augustine,⁴³ although it does appear in Gratian, *De Poenitentia*.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, one may reply on the Master's behalf that a thing is sometimes said to be true — that is, constant and stable and lasting without doubt, and capable of bringing its possessor

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 7.

2. Matt. 5:46–47.

3. Rom. 5:7–8.

4. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 73; and *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 108.

5. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* IX, ch. 13.

6. Lactantius, *Divinarum institutionum* VI, ch. 12.

7. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source]; cf. the Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, dist. 30.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 7, ad fin.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 11.

10. Heb. 6:4–6; Heb. 10:26–27.

11. Lk. 10:20; Jn. 6:67.

12. 1 Jn. 3:17.

13. Lk. 15:4–32.

14. Matt. 12:43–45.

15. Matt. 13:20–21 (the parable of the sower, seed on rocky ground).

16. Wis. 4:11.

17. St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and others, *passim*, in their writings against the Novatians.

18. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 8–9.

19. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 45.

20. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XIV, ch. 26.

21. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, n. 82.

22. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 13.
23. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 15.
24. Council of Trent, Session 6, canons 15, 16, 17, 23, 27, and 28, but especially canon 17.
25. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 10.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 10 (cited as *S. Thom. ubi supra*).
28. Song 8:7.
29. Rom. 8:30, 35; 1 Cor. 13:8.
30. 1 Jn. 2:19.
31. 1 Jn. 3:9.
32. The author of the book *De Amicitia*, ch. 2, tom. 4, writing in the person of St. Augustine — Estius notes this is Pseudo-Augustine (now identified as appearing in the Benedictine appendix, tom. VI, in the Benedictine edition). The edition here cited is: *De Amicitia*, ch. 2, writing as if by St. Augustine, tom. 4.
33. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 41, *ad Rufinum*, at the end.
34. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, dist. 30, citing St. Augustine; the saying "charity which can be abandoned was never true charity."
35. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, lib. 4, ch. 3.
36. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Joannem*, Tract. 14.
37. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXXIV, ch. 8.
38. Prosper of Aquitaine (or Pseudo-Prosper), *De Vita contemplativa*, lib. 3, ch. 13.
39. Rom. 8:29–35.
40. Estius refers the reader forward to the later discussion of this same Distinction XXX on the meaning of 1 Cor. 13:8 ("Charity never faileth").
41. Estius notes that the book *De Amicitia* (cited above) has no certain author; it appears in the Benedictine Appendix to Augustine's works, tom. VI (note *a* in source: *Seu in Appendice Tomo VI. in Edit. Benedictin.*).
42. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 41, *ad Rufinum*, at the end; the subsequent rupture of friendship between Jerome and Rufinus itself refutes the claim.
43. The saying "charity which can be abandoned was never true" does not appear in St. Augustine's authentic works.
44. Gratian, *Decretum*, Pars II, *Causa* XXXIII, Quaest. 3, *Distinctio* 2, *De Poenitentia* (note *b* in source).

DISTINCTIO XXXI — ON THE RECOVERY OF LOST CHARITY AT ANY DEGREE (*DE CHARITATE AMISSA QUOCUMQUE GRADU RECUPERARI POSSE*)

§ 1. — leads to the legitimate end. Hence, just as Scripture denies that he possesses God's gift of charity (*charitas*) who does not use what he has as he ought, so we can say that he does not possess charity who, though he both can and ought through it to attain beatitude (*beatitudo*), does not reach it. This is the proper use (*usus*) of charity. And this same reply can be accommodated to whatever similar passages there may be. For St. Augustine also, writing against Julian,¹ calls penance not just any kind but a salutary one — that is, one leading to salvation. For that which does not bring this about, since it has been in vain, is reckoned as though it had been false. And writing on John,² he denies that the testimony of Christ is to be persistently received by the reprobate — as he himself likewise expounds it. Likewise, according to St. Gregory, he who lost his holiness never truly had it before the eyes of God: because holiness that has been lost receives no recompense from God, the rewarder of all good things, as though it had been nothing. Therefore the sense is: before the eyes of the Judge and Rewarder.

§ 2. To the last objection we reply that the defect of mutability is rightly removed from charity by Prosper.³ For it is not the defect of charity but of the man himself that, forsaking the good, he inclines toward evil.

§ 3. But as for what the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] and Gratian — who agrees with him (in *De Poenitentia*, dist. 2)⁴ — judge: namely, that the opinions of the Fathers of this kind are to be understood of perfect charity, if they are speaking of the charity of this life (as it clearly appears they are speaking), this is not to be accepted. For, as we have shown above, charity however great and perfect, which has not yet reached its term, can be lost by a contrary movement of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). If, however, they understand by perfect charity that charity by which the capacity of each person is filled — such as it is in the world to come — it is indeed true that such charity cannot be lost; but the Fathers in those passages that were raised as objections were not looking specifically to that charity. The more exact treatment of this argument, moreover, belongs to the controversy concerning justification.

§ III — That charity once lost can be recovered to whatever degree (*Charitatem amissam quocumque gradu recuperari posse*)

§ 4. Just as the charity (*charitas*) of this life, however great, can be lost, so that which has been lost can be recovered to whatever degree as well — whether equal, or greater, or lesser — yet never numerically the same (though, by the opinion of the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], who acknowledges no charity other than that which is created, this would have to be said), but only specifically the same. That charity can be recovered is proved, first and foremost, by all those arguments which serve to establish the Sacrament of Penance and,

indeed, to prove the reconciliation of those who have fallen. For just as those who fall away lose charity, so those who are reconciled receive it again. Hence (Rev. 2) he who had forsaken his first charity is admonished to do penance and to do his first works. The same is proved by the examples of our first parents, whom Wisdom (*Sapientia*) led away from their sin (Wis. 11); of David who, after the crime of adultery and homicide, sought and obtained that the Holy Spirit be restored and renewed within him; of Peter and the other Apostles, who after their denial, scandal, and unbelief were filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit. The parables likewise prove it: of the sheep brought back after going astray, of the lost coin found, of the son who had squandered his father's substance and was received back into favor, and upon whom the first robe was again bestowed.⁶

§ 5. The argument is to be sought principally, however, from the goodness and mercy of God, who even after the gift of charity once received has been lost gives pardon to those who have relapsed through Christ, so that they might recover charity and the other ornaments of the soul that had been lost; and He has willed that this mercy is not confined to any fixed number of sins. Most rightly, therefore, the Fathers of the Council of Trent⁷ — both against the ancient Novatians and against certain more recent heretics — teach and define that those who have fallen from the grace of justification through sin can, by God's prompting through the Sacrament of Penance by the merit of Christ, recover the grace that had been lost and be justified anew.⁸

§ 6. Moreover, there is no doubt at all that charity can be recovered to whatever degree: for just as God has set before Himself no fixed number of acts of propitiation, beyond which a sinner can no longer be received back into grace, so He has prescribed no degree of charity beyond which He would deny to the penitent, returning to the grace of God, the hope of advancing further. Furthermore, it pertains not only to charity itself but also to the penance which commands charity. Therefore, in accordance with the manner of charity which the Divine Goodness has decreed to restore, it likewise inspires the manner and measure of penance, so as to bestow, in proportion to that measure, charity now equal, now greater, now lesser — as the Fathers of the Council of Trent teach⁹ in these words: "Each one, as he receives justification in us, receives it according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each severally as He wills, and according to each person's own disposition and cooperation." In which words, although the subject is justification by baptism, the same principle applies, as far as the present matter is concerned, to the justification of those who have relapsed.

§ 7. Nevertheless, the justice or charity restored by penance can afterwards grow to a greater perfection. This is shown by the examples of penitents — of Peter, of David, and of others — who after their fall and reconciliation cleaved to God with a far more perfect love than before. The same is taught by the authority of St. Gregory in Book 7 of the *Registrum Epistolarum* (Epistle 53), which is addressed to Secundinus; and in Homily 34 (*In Evangelia*), where, treating the text of Lk. 15, "There is joy in heaven over one sinner," etc., he says that certain penitents, because they reflect that they have strayed from God, compensate for their preceding losses by the gains that follow.¹⁰ And then he adds: "Therefore there is greater joy in heaven over a converted sinner than over a righteous man who has stood firm, because a general in battle loves more that soldier who, after fleeing, returns and presses hard upon the enemy, than one who never turned his back and never performed any brave deed."

§ 8. St. John Chrysostom likewise attests, in Homily 87 (*In Joannem*), that after his penance Peter, with a greater confidence toward the Lord than he had conceived before, questioned Him concerning John — John who at the Last Supper had not dared to question the Lord on his own behalf — and that to this same one, who loved Him more than the rest, the charge over Christ's sheep was committed.¹¹

§ 9. Confirmation: This teaching is confirmed by the Interlinear Gloss (*Glossa interlinealis*) on Leviticus 7, at the beginning, in these words: "The virtue of the righteous and the worthy penitence of sinners are equally pleasing to God; penitence restored David and Peter to their former degree."¹² And on that text of Malachi 1:14, "The sacrifice of Judah will be pleasing to the Lord, as the days of old," the Gloss says: "Just as they were pleasing to God in the beginning, so after sin they will begin to please Him through penance, once purged of every defilement of sins." From these testimonies it is clear (*patet*) that the penitent can rise both to an equal and to a greater degree of charity. That he can rise to a lesser degree is even less open to doubt.

§ IV — Whether faith, hope, and charity abide in the world to come (An fides, spes, charitas maneat in futuro saeculo)

§ 10. To the question whether the theological virtues (*virtutes Theologicae*) abide in the world to come, we have the Apostle's plain answer: he, in 1 Cor. 13, commending charity (*caritas*) and proclaiming its excellence above all other gifts, says, "Charity never falleth away, whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed. For we know in part and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." And immediately after: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." And in Rom. 7: "Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? But if we hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience." By these words of the Apostle it is manifest that charity indeed does not fall away but abides in the world to come, whereas knowledge, faith, and hope fall away and do not abide. This teaching of the Apostle, so far as it concerns faith and hope, admits of no great doubt. For since faith, as has been said in its proper place, includes in its formal character (*ratio*) that it concerns things not seen or not apparent (Heb. 11), and hope likewise concerns things future and absent — things, that is, which are still placed in expectation — it is sufficiently clear that neither faith nor hope abides in the future state of beatitude, where, with the obscurity of cognition and the state of expectation taken away, God will be seen just as He is, all things being exchanged for the blessed possession — as St. Augustine likewise teaches.¹⁴

§ 11. But concerning charity a doubt can arise: why should it not also be said to be done away? For in this age, just as we know in part and prophesy in part, so also we love in part. Now if you respond, with the Master, that charity itself is also done away insofar as it is in part — because, to be sure, its imperfection will be removed and perfection added to it — why could not the same be said of faith, or at least of knowledge? namely, that it is not to be destroyed simply (which the Apostle nevertheless affirms), though we know in part; but only in this respect: because that which is in part shall be done away, its imperfection being removed and perfection added — especially since St. Jerome, in the Epistle to Paulinus which is prefixed to the Scriptures, speaks thus of our knowledge: "Let us learn on earth those things whose knowledge shall persevere for us in heaven."¹⁵

§ 12. To this it must be answered that we love in part in one way, and know in part in another way. For we love in part only through defect of quantity (*defectus quantitatis*), because in this age we do not have as great a charity as we shall have in the world to come — yet both are of the same formal character (*ratio*). But we know in part because the very mode of knowing (*modus cognoscendi*) that is suited to this life is imperfect in its own genus, even if it were to extend itself to all knowable things and were very greatly perfected in intensity. Now this is the mode by which things are known not in themselves but in intelligible species abstracted from the

phantasm. When this mode is removed, another mode — which is perfect in its own genus, by which, namely, God will be seen through His essence and all things will be known in themselves or in the Word — will be substituted in the world to come. Hence, even if the knowledge of this age were perfect with that perfection of which it is capable, it would still have to be changed; because the mode of knowing suited to this life is not suited to the future life. Charity, however, if it were perfect in this age, would in every respect remain the same in the world to come. For the mode of loving will not be changed as the mode of knowing is changed. St. Jerome, then, holds that knowledge abides with respect to the things known, or also with respect to the habit itself, but not with respect to the mode of knowing. In nearly the same way St. Augustine explains this question.¹⁶

§ V — What was the order of charity in Christ as man (Quis fuerit ordo charitatis in Christo Homine)

§ 13. The same (*Non idem*) was not the order of charity in Christ as man as in other men who love rightly according to the mode of this life. For Christ, according to His soul, was from the beginning of His conception a perfect comprehensor, as we have shown (at Distinction 14),¹⁸ and therefore that order of love which befits the blessed, not that which befits wayfarers, must be attributed to Him. Now in the blessed the entire order of love is taken from the sole conjunction with God, as we noted (at Distinction 29, at the end).¹⁹ Therefore it must be acknowledged that such an order of love existed in Christ from the beginning — an order by which He would love each man and Angel more or less according as that man or Angel was more or less conjoined to God through righteousness (*justitia*) — especially since in that soul of Christ there existed from the beginning a knowledge of all things, as we showed (at Distinction 16),²⁰ and accordingly all the merits of each and every person were known to Christ exactly.

§ 14. Moreover, since that conjunction of men with God can be understood in two ways — either according to present righteousness or according to final and perpetually abiding righteousness — a twofold order of Christ's love toward men must likewise be attended to: the one by which He loves them more or less inasmuch as they possess present righteousness in greater or lesser degree; the other by which He loves them in accordance with and toward that which they will perpetually be through His grace. Therefore, according to the former order, Christ loves — or formerly, while acting on earth, loved — not only the elect but also many of the reprobate, namely those who are or were for a time just; and indeed it must not be denied that certain of the reprobate were loved by Christ, by that reckoning, more than certain of the elect, since some of the reprobate are for a time better than some of the elect. But according to the latter order, Christ loves only the elect, and these more or less according as they will be more or less conjoined to God in eternal beatitude through righteousness and glory. And this order properly belongs to charity, by which the neighbour is loved not toward any sort of good, even a spiritual one (such as temporal righteousness is), but toward the attainment of the Highest Good — that is, toward eternal beatitude.

§ 15. Hence it must be said absolutely, with the Master, that Christ — whose human will was always conformed to the divine will — never loved the reprobate by a habit of charity; but He loved only those whom He Himself, as God, had from eternity predestined to salvation, that is, the elect. For this reason He prayed to the Father not for the world — that is, for the reprobate — but for those alone whom the Father had given to Him from the world (Jn. 17),²¹ as has been shown more fully (at Distinction 17).²²

§ 16. From these things it follows, furthermore, that the charity of Christ, as regards the number of those who are to be loved, extends less broadly than our charity does. For we, who in this life cannot distinguish the elect from the reprobate, have received the precept to love men indiscriminately, and accordingly we love many reprobates, wishing them eternal life and, as far as lies in us, working toward it. Now this is not peculiar to Christ, but is common to all the blessed — for it happens that the saints reigning with Christ seek the aforesaid vindication against those for whom, while they were here on earth, they had prayed — not against all of those, but against certain reprobates whom they did not then know as reprobates (Rev. 6).²³

§ 17. That at that time they did not love all the reprobate did not come about through any diminution of charity but through the withdrawal of the things to be loved, consequent upon the perfection of knowledge. For the state of wayfarers, on account of ignorance of the divine counsel, befits their loving all persons without exception. But the state of the blessed, on account of the manifestation of that same divine counsel, befits their loving only those whom they know to be predestined by God to the attainment of the Highest Good. Now since Christ knew this from the beginning, even as man, it is evident that He always observed this order of love in Himself.²⁴

§ 18. But if you object that Christ loved John more than Peter — as is apparent from the fact that John is called "the disciple whom Jesus loved" (Jn. 13 etc.), whereas Peter loved Christ more than the other disciples did (Jn. 21),²⁵ and was raised to a greater dignity both in this life and — as is believed — to a greater glory in the future life — Reply: by the name of love, Sacred Scripture sometimes designates only the exterior act of love, or a manifest and visibly conspicuous sign of love. Hence in Mk. 10, of a certain man who affirmed that he had observed all the commandments of the Decalogue from his youth, it is said that "Jesus, looking upon him, loved him" — that is, showed by a kindly and gentle gaze that He loved him. In this way it must be understood that Christ is said to have loved John in a special manner: not because He did not love the other disciples, or loved them less, but because for the sake of a certain kind of token of affection He declared His love toward John more through outward signs and familiar intercourse than toward the others. On this matter, see St. Augustine (*Tractatus ultimus in Ioannem*).²⁶

§ I — In what way and to what degree God loves every creature (Quatenus et quo gradu omnem creaturam diligit)

§ 19. The Master treats (in this Distinction) of God's love toward the creature. Concerning this question it is sufficient here to say a few things in an articulate manner.

It is said first: the love by which God loves us is not the same as that by which we love God, as the Master supposes, persisting in what he had said in Book I (Distinction 17),²⁸ but is different. For the former is the very essence of God, eternal and immutable; the latter, however, is a quality of the soul, created in time and subject to change. Concerning this matter enough has been said at the Distinction cited above.

It is said second: God loves all things that exist, without exception. For all things are from God, and insofar as they are from God they are good; and insofar as they are good, they are lovable in the ordering toward eternal salvation, and consequently — as they say — we are urged by those observations we noted above (at Distinction 19, § 3),²⁹ where we also treated at length of the Saviour's offering made for all.³⁰

1. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* [abbreviation as in source: "contra Julianam"].
2. St. Augustine, *In Joannem* [abbreviation as in source: "Et in Joannem scribens"].
3. Prosper of Aquitaine [abbreviation as in source: "a Prospero"].
4. Gratianus, *De Poenitentia*, dist. 2.
5. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 89, aa. 2–3.
6. These parables are found in Lk. 15.
7. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 14, and canon 29.
8. A footnote in the printed source (marked with an asterisk) reads: "To whom this inscription 'Augustine to Julian the Count' is prefixed. The Correctors of Gregory note, however, that in the older editions of the Letters of Bl. Augustine this work was entitled *Of Salutary Documents, to a certain Count*, ch. 7. Furthermore, this book *On Salutary Documents* was rejected in the Edition of the Benedictine Fathers in Appendix Tom. 6 as spuriously attributed to Augustine, and restored to Paul, or Paulinus, Bishop of Forojulium, by those same Benedictine Fathers."
9. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7.
10. St. Gregory the Great, *Registrum Epistolarum* VII, Epistle 53 (to Secundinus); and *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 34, on Lk. 15.
11. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, Homily 87.
12. Glossa Interlinealis on Leviticus 7, sub initio; and on Malachi 1:14 [cited as Malach. 14 in source].
13. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 67, aa. 4, 5, and 6.
14. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, ch. 2.
15. St. Jerome, Epistle to Paulinus (prefixed to the Scriptures) [abbreviation as in source].
16. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 24; and *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 29.
17. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 20; and *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 13; q. 26.
18. Estius refers to his commentary at Distinction 14 of this Book.
19. Estius refers to his commentary at Distinction 29, at the end, of this Book.
20. Estius refers to his commentary at Distinction 16 of this Book.
21. Jn. 17.
22. Estius refers to his commentary at Distinction 17 of this Book.
23. Rev. 6.
24. The footnote in the printed source at this point (marked *(a)*) reads: Concerning the efficacious love of Christ ordered toward eternal salvation, and the consequent love — as they say — the author is sufficiently reminded by what we noted above (at Dist. 19, § 3), where we also treated at length of the prayer and of the death of Christ the Saviour offered for all. Moreover, what the author says absolutely — that Christ loved the reprobate with a habit of charity — seems too harsh. For, as he himself taught a little earlier, Christ pursued the reprobate who were for a time better with a greater love, and it is a foremost act of charity; so that it must be said that He loved them with a habit of charity. His statement about love in the ordering toward eternal salvation must therefore be understood thus: that Christ did not so love them as to will for them Glory by an efficacious and consequent will. Indeed, it can be said that Christ did not fail to love those with a habit of charity for whom, on account of overly great charity, He gave even Himself and the price — by the antecedent will.
25. Jn. 13; Jn. 21 (the last chapter).
26. St. Augustine, *Tractatus ultimus in Joannem* [i.e., *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tractatus 124].
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 20, aa. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

28. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, Distinction 17.
29. Estius refers to his commentary at Distinction 19, § 3, of this Book.
30. The text of the Latin source breaks off at this point in the chunk.

DISTINCTIO XXXII — ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES, THEIR OFFICES, AND THEIR PRESENCE IN CHRIST AND THE BLESSED (*DE VIRTUTIBUS CARDINALIBUS, EARUM OFFICIIS, ET AN IN CHRISTO AC BEATIS MANSERINT*)

§ 1. — are lovable, and most of all to Him by whom they were made. Hence that word of Gen. 1: "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good." And Wis. 11: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. For Thou didst not appoint or make anything while hating it."

Third: God loves all things from eternity. For the will of God by which He loves things is immutable — whether He loves them simply that they may exist, or that He may communicate certain goods to them beyond their nature. For God is not said to love only by conferring benefits, but also by proposing and willing to confer benefits. Now it is established that this proposal is eternal. Hence Scripture teaches that certain persons were loved by God before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1), and Jacob is said to have been beloved before he was born (Rom. 9).¹ Hence St. Augustine says:² "Far be it that God should love temporally at any time, as if with a new love which was not in Him before — in whom neither have past things passed away, nor are future things not yet done." Sometimes, however, on account of a temporal effect of divine love, certain persons are said to begin to be loved by God and to become friends of God: so that to love temporally is to do good, just as to love from eternity is to will good. Hence St. Augustine subjoins in the same place: "But when men are converted and find Him, then they are said to begin to be loved by Him: so that it may be said in the manner in which it can be grasped by human affection, the thing that is said." For whatever change is signified in such cases is not in God's will, but in the things subject to God's will — as has been said more fully above in Book I, Distinction 8.³

Fourth: God does not love all things equally. For although the love of God is one and the same, being His very essence, the effects of that love are neither one single thing nor all equal to one another in goodness, but some are better than others. Therefore God loves more those things which are simply better, and loves less those things which are simply less good; or — which comes to the same thing — He loves more those things which are nearer to Himself, that is, to the Supreme Good, and less those things which are more remote from it. Hence St. Augustine says:⁴ "Who can worthily express how much God loves the members of His Only-Begotten Son, and how much more He loves the Only-Begotten Son Himself?" Nor does it conflict with what is said of God in Wis. 6: "He made the small and the great, and He has care for all alike." For in place of "alike" the Greek has *similiter* ("similarly"). And nothing else is signified thereby than that God's providence is universal and extends to all things, with none excepted.

Fifth: although God loves all things insofar as they exist and are good, He nevertheless does not love sin, nor indeed the sinner as such. The reason for this is manifest: because sin is neither good, nor the work of God, nor in any way a being possessed of some reality, and consequently is not lovable. The sinner also, as such, is not made by God. Hence Scripture says (Wis. 14): "Alike hateful to God are the ungodly man and his ungodliness." And in Ps. 5: "Thou hatest all who work iniquity." And Wis. 7: "God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."⁵

Sixth: although God, on account of present righteousness, loves all the just — and that not in any casual manner but as His friends — and on account of present iniquity hates all sinners as His enemies, He nevertheless loves all the elect from eternity by a special formal character (*ratio*), and hates all the reprobate, according to that word: "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated" (Rom. 9).⁶ And the reason is that from eternity He wills to the elect the greatest good of man, destined to remain forever — namely, eternal happiness; whereas from eternity He wills to the reprobate the greatest evil of man, destined to endure forever — namely, eternal misery.

Seventh, and lastly, regarding the question whether God loves more the predestined sinner or the just reprobate: one must answer that, if love is understood according to present benefit, the just reprobate is loved more by God; but if it is understood according to the eternal proposal of doing good, in this sense the predestined sinner is loved more. For the good which has been foreordained from eternity by God's will for the latter is simply greater than that ordained for the former. And correspondingly one must answer the question, which of the two God hates more: for if God's hatred has regard to the present condition of men, He hates the predestined sinner more; but if it has regard to the condition that is to endure forever, in this sense He hates the just reprobate more — as one for whom, on account of his foreseen and never-to-be-remitted sin, He has decreed from eternity a punishment that shall never end.

§ II — What the Cardinal Virtues Are and Their Offices (Quae sint virtutes Cardinales et earum officia)

§ 2. Since some virtues are intellectual and others are moral — the former perfecting the intellect, the latter the appetitive faculty — yet in such a way that from the former no one is said to be simply good, whereas from the latter one is so said: certain virtues among them are called, in relation to the rest, principal or cardinal, and sometimes also general virtues — namely, Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude. Among these, Prudence alone is an intellectual virtue, while the rest are moral. Although Prudence is also in some sense moral: because, even though according to its essence it resides in the intellect, yet in respect of the subject-matter with which it is concerned it agrees with the moral virtues, since it is right reason applied to things to be done (*recta ratio agendorum*) and presupposes rectitude of appetite.

These four virtues are called principal or cardinal: either because they are four genera of virtues, to which the remaining virtues are subordinated as species. For in this sense both Philosophers and Ecclesiastical Doctors have sometimes spoken of them; or — more properly — because each one of them is concerned with what is most important in its own particular subject-matter of virtue. On this account the other virtues will not relate to these as species to genera, but as less principal virtues; and as what are called their potential parts, they are to be reduced to their respective wholes. We explain this as follows. The good consisting in the

consideration of reason is found principally in the very command of reason itself: which pertains to Prudence. The good, however, which consists in operations according to the due measure of reason, is found principally in exchanges and distributions directed toward another with equality; which pertains to Justice. Likewise, the good of restraining the passions is found principally in the domain of the pleasures of touch; which is attributed to Temperance. But the good whereby one stands firm in what reason has dictated against the onset of the passions is found pre-eminently in dangers of death; which Fortitude supplies. From this explanation it is also clear what distinguishes these virtues from one another according to their formal character (*ratio*) — whether that formal character be general or special. Hence the proper offices of each individual virtue are easy to know. For Prudence by right reason dictates and commands what is to be done; Justice renders to each his own; Temperance restrains pleasures; Fortitude gives steadiness against adversities and dangers. They are also distinguished by their subjects. For Prudence is in the intellect, Justice in the will, Temperance in the concupiscible appetite, Fortitude in the irascible — as St. Thomas maintains;⁸ whereas according to others the latter two are both in the will, just as Justice is. Now this quaternary number of virtues is most celebrated among writers. For besides pagan authors — Aristotle, Cicero, and others — Sacred Scripture itself (Wis. 8) enumerates them.⁹ And mention of them is very frequent among the sacred writers St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and others, whose passages it is unnecessary to note here. St. Thomas treats of them learnedly and methodically.¹⁰

§ II — Whether the said virtues were present in Christ and will endure in the blessed (Ad dictæ virtutes in Christo fuerint, & in beatis mansuræ sint)

§ 3. Concerning the moral virtues, and most especially the cardinal virtues, it is customary to inquire in this place whether it must be said that they existed in Christ, and that they will persist in the blessed. For there are not a few arguments that appear to urge the negative, and these in particular.

First: A habit whose act does not exist is useless (*frustra*); but the acts of these virtues will be entirely absent in heaven. For there no one will lack what is his own, which justice might render back; nor will there be any evil which prudence might guard against; nor any concupiscence which temperance might restrain; nor any affliction which fortitude might endure — and altogether the works of the active life, to the perfecting of which the moral virtues of men are ordered, will cease after this life, as St. Gregory testifies,¹² and St. Augustine.¹³ Hence also the Apostle (Tit. 2), saying that the grace of Christ instructs us to live "soberly, justly, and piously," added "in this age" — as if in the age to come there will be no place for the acts of these virtues. Therefore virtues of this kind —

1. Cf. Eph. 1 and Rom. 9.

2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, last chapter (*lib. 5, cap. ult.*).

3. Estius, *In I Sent.*, Distinction 8.

4. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem*, tract. 110 (*Tractat. 110. in Joan.*).

5. Wis. 14; Ps. 5; Wis. 7.

6. Rom. 9 (citing Mal. 1:2–3).

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 56, a. 4, and q. 61, aa. 1–4.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II [as cited in the source in the context of the division of subjects].
9. Wis. 8.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 61 (1. 2. qu. 61) [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. 1. 2. qu. 6.*; the page image reads *1. 2. (qu. 61)*].
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 1.
12. St. Gregory, *Moralia* VI, ch. 28.
13. St. Augustine, *Sermones* 16 (*inter additos a Parisiensibus*); also known as *Sermo* CCCXXXVII, among the *Sermones* III of the classified edition of Bened.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII — ON THE MORAL VIRTUES IN THE STATE OF BEATITUDE (*DE VIRTUTIBUS MORALIBUS IN STATU BEATITUDINIS*)

§ 1. Second: Fortitude and Temperance reside in the irascible and concupiscible parts, as was said above.¹ Since these faculties are extinguished by the death of man together with sense — inasmuch as they are organic — they cannot exist in separated souls, and far less are they to be attributed to Angels. Therefore at least these virtues do not persist after this life. Third: By the Apostle, charity alone is commended in such a way that it is said never to fall away; therefore all the remaining virtues do fall away. Fourth: The moral virtues are means for the attainment of beatitude (*beatitudinis*) as the ultimate end (*ultimi finis*), as St. Augustine affirms expressly of the cardinal virtues.² But means ought to cease once the end has been attained. Fifth: St. Augustine³ says that in the future age there will be a single virtue, which is both virtue and the reward of virtue (*virtutis praemium*). And likewise, in his *De Patientia*, last chapter, treating verse 19 of Ps. 9, he says: "The patience of the poor shall not perish for ever" (*Pauperum patientia non peribit in aeternum*) — "not because patience will be there where there will be nothing to endure; but it shall not perish, because it shall not be fruitless; rather it shall have an eternal fruit, and therefore shall not perish for ever." And he teaches the same by analogy, because one who has arrived at the promised reward of his labour, rejoicing, says: "I have not lost my labour." Hence, according to St. Augustine, patience remains in no other way than labour remains, namely in respect of its fruit. And in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 9, he says: "For patience itself will not be eternal, which is an accessory virtue only where evils are to be endured; but what is attained through patience will be eternal."⁴ And on Ps. 91 he says: "No one is patient in good things." And in the same St. Augustine, in the *Liber LXXXIII Quaestionum*, such definitions are assigned to these virtues as cannot be consistent with the state of the blessed.⁵ Finally: In favour of this opinion the words of Lactantius seem expressly to speak, where he says that there is no virtue if an adversary is absent.⁶ And in other places he denies that patience can retain its force and its name if there is nothing which we are compelled to endure, and that where there are no vices, there is no place for virtues either — just as there is no victory where there is no adversary.⁷

§ 2. That the aforesaid virtues, or at least some of them, were not present in Christ either, seems to be shown by virtually the same arguments, especially the first and the fourth. For since in Christ there was no disordered movement toward pleasure, temperance does not seem to have had a place in Him; and since from the first moment of His conception He was blessed according to His soul, He does not seem to have had need of means leading to beatitude.

§ 3. Moreover, the other part of the question is established both by reason and by authority. By reason: because since the moral virtues are ornaments of the soul (*animae ornamenta*), and do not necessarily carry with them any imperfection — as was said above concerning faith and hope⁸ — and furthermore since acts of these virtues that are otherwise fitting to the state of the blessed can be assigned, it is altogether consonant

with reason that we acknowledge them as remaining after this life. That there will be some use of them in that state through acts befitting that state, authority teaches. For St. Augustine, having proposed this question to himself and having had the opinion of Cicero from the *Hortensius* dialogue set against him, replies: "If it is justice to be subject to God who rules, then justice is altogether immortal, nor will it cease in that beatitude."⁹ And then he adds: "Perhaps also the other three virtues — prudence without any danger now of error, fortitude without the trouble of enduring evils, temperance without conflict with lusts — will exist in that happiness: so that prudence's act will be to set no good before God or equal to God; fortitude's, to cleave to Him most firmly; temperance's, to delight in no harmful defect. But what justice does now in relieving the wretched, what prudence in guarding against snares, what fortitude in enduring troubles, what temperance in curbing depraved pleasures — these will not be there, where there will be nothing evil at all. And therefore these works of the virtues that are necessary for this mortal life, like faith to which things past are referred, will be reckoned among past things." Thus St. Augustine. By these words he has expressed to some degree the use of all four cardinal virtues (*quatuor virtutum cardinalium*) in the future life. These words are repeated almost verbatim in the *Glossa ordinaria* under the title of Bede on that text of Exod. 16: *Quod appendes ante quatuor columnas* ("What you shall hang before the four pillars").¹⁰ What St. Augustine says — that justice is altogether immortal — is taken from Wis. 1.¹¹ Yet that passage seems to be understood of justice in the general sense, which embraces all the virtues and signifies the rectitude of man toward the law of God, rather than of justice in the special sense, which is one of the cardinal virtues.

§ 4. And rightly does St. Thomas, treating the same question, distinguish in virtues of this kind what is material from what is formal, and teaches that they do not remain in the future life as regards what is material in them — because pleasures of food and of sexual matters have no place there, nor fears of dangers, nor distributions and exchanges of things pertaining to the necessities of life — but that they remain only as regards what is formal in them; insofar, that is, as the formal character (*ratio*) of each one will be most upright with respect to the things pertaining to that state, and the appetitive power (*vis appetitiva*) will be moved perfectly according to the ordering of reason (*secundum ordinem rationis*). By this explanation the acts of these virtues are not excluded simply from the blessed life, but only those acts which have to do with their proper matter as present. Hence the reply to the first objection is clear.¹²

§ 5. To the second, St. Thomas replies that just as in the separated soul the irrational faculties (*potentiae irrationales*) are not actually present but only radically in its essence, so too the virtues of those faculties are not actually in it, but nonetheless remain in reason and will as in their root. But after the resurrection, when the organic faculties have been restored together with the body, there will be nothing absurd if fortitude is placed in the irascible and temperance in the concupiscible, insofar as this faculty will be perfectly disposed to obey reason. In keeping with this reply of St. Thomas, it would have to be admitted that just as the organic faculties will be restored not numerically the same but specifically the same only, so too the virtues inhering in them will be specifically — but not numerically — the same as those that were possessed here. Hence others prefer to locate fortitude and temperance in the rational appetite, that is, in the will — insofar as the will can be divided in such a manner — as do St. Bonaventure and Scotus.¹³ Durandus, however, leaves this question as doubtful.¹⁴

§ 6. Whether there are also moral virtues in Angels — which is denied by most, doubted by Scotus, but affirmed in the *Glossa* cited just above — is irrelevant to the question, since the nature of men and the nature of Angels are different.

§ 7. To the third: Although the Apostle in that passage is treating not of the moral virtues but of the theological virtues (*Theologicis*) and of certain other gifts, it can nonetheless also be replied that the moral virtues fall away not as to their habit (*habitus*) but as to the acts proper to this life, as has now been shown. Those acts are in themselves more imperfect than those which we have said will exist in the blessed — just as was noted above concerning knowledge and its act¹⁵ — while charity as a virtue does not ever fall away, not even as regards the mode of its act which it has in this life.

§ 8. To the fourth it is answered: The cardinal virtues are not only means for the attainment of beatitude but also for the retaining of it — just as a temperate diet is such in respect of health. For by the very fact that they order the whole man rightly toward himself and toward his neighbour, they consequently dispose him well for enjoying (*fruendum*) God.

§ 9. What is objected in the fifth place from St. Augustine — that in the future age there will be a single virtue — is said of charity (*caritas*), by which one adheres to God, but in such a way that in it he comprehends the four cardinal virtues. "Let it be called," he says, "prudence (*prudentia*), because it will most perfectly adhere to the good that cannot be lost; and fortitude (*fortitudo*), because it will most firmly cling to the good from which it cannot be torn away; and temperance (*temperantia*), because it will most chastely adhere to the good where it can no longer be corrupted; and justice (*iustitia*), because it will most rightly adhere to the good to which it is deservedly subject." And he adds: "Although even in this life virtue is nothing other than to love what ought to be loved, etc."¹⁶ The other objections drawn from the same St. Augustine and also from Lactantius are to be understood not of the habit of the virtues but of the act of the kind they have here. For there is no doubt that even in this life the habit of virtue can remain, even when the matter of exercising virtue does not always present itself. That the name of virtue is sometimes attributed to the act among writers, and the reason why this is done, was said above.¹⁷

1. The reference is to an earlier discussion of the organic character of the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 14.

3. St. Augustine, *Epistula* 52 (or 155, in the same edition).

4. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 9.

5. St. Augustine, *Liber LXXXIII Quaestionum*, qq. 31 and 61.

6. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* III, ch. 28.

7. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* V, ch. 7 and 22; also VI, ch. 15.

8. Above, at Distinction 26.

9. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, ch. 9; and the objection from Cicero's *Hortensius* dialogue.

10. *Glossa ordinaria*, under the title of Bede, on Exod. 16 (*Quod appendes ante quatuor columnas*).

11. Wis. 1.

12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 1.

13. St. Bonaventure and Scotus, *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].

14. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), [abbreviation as in source].

15. Above, at Distinction 31.

16. St. Augustine, [the passage on the single virtue of charity comprehending all four cardinal virtues; abbreviation as in source].

17. Above, at Distinction 27, Book II.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV — ON THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, THEIR DISTINCTION FROM THE VIRTUES, AND THE VARIOUS KINDS OF FEAR (*DE SEPTEM DONIS SPIRITUS SANCTI, EORUMQUE A VIRTUTIBUS DISTINCTIONE, ET DE MULTIPLICI TIMORE*)

§ 1. To the argument that is drawn from the definitions of the individual virtues, the reply from St. Augustine is already clear from what has been said above. For those definitions have been taken from acts known to us and suited to the present life, to which other, more perfect and more excellent acts will succeed. From what has been said it is, finally, sufficiently manifest that if the moral virtues are to remain in the blessed after this life, far more must it be said that they were present in Christ during this life, even though He was already blessed according to His soul. For He was engaged most perfectly in the operations of the life both active and contemplative. Hence also certain acts of all the cardinal virtues, even according to the condition of this life, were in Him: such as justice, in rendering what is due; prudence, in avoiding the snares of temptations; fortitude, in enduring the most bitter passion; and temperance, in the use of food and drink.

§ I — That there are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (Septem esse dona Spiritus Sancti)

§ 2. Isaiah enumerates (ch. 11) seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (which he predicts will be in Christ) in the following order: wisdom and understanding, counsel and fortitude, knowledge, piety, and the fear of the Lord. From this passage arose the teaching of both the ancient Doctors and the Scholastics concerning the sevenfold number of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. With regard to this number, although by subtle consideration the rationale for it is rendered in diverse ways by diverse authors, and although St. Bonaventure assigns eight modes according to which this number of gifts can be understood, yet there is scarcely any mode that satisfies the curious enquirer, as St. Bonaventure himself acknowledges.²

§ 3. Hence, setting aside that subtlety, let it suffice to say that this sevenfold number is posited for the sake of the universality of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which the inner man is perfected and sanctified. The use of that number is wont to be most frequent in Sacred Scripture. For even in the passage of 1 Kgs 2 — "until the barren hath borne many" — in the Hebrew the reading is: "hath borne seven." And these very gifts of the Holy Spirit are signified by the same number as future in Christ (Zach. 3), when it is said: "upon one stone there are seven eyes." And by the same number they are signified in Christ in Rev. 5, where John sees "the

Lamb having seven horns, which are the seven Spirits sent into all the earth." Therefore there is no need to force the gifts of the Holy Spirit into the sevenfold number; rather, under these seven enumerated by Isaiah and attributed to Christ, the remaining gifts may also be comprehended: especially since the Prophet in what follows also adds other virtues, such as justice, equity, and faith.

§ 4. Now, that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated by Isaiah at the beginning of chapter 11, that they are signified by the name of sevenfold grace, and that from them the Spirit Himself is accustomed to be called sevenfold — this is manifestly taught by St. Jerome in his commentary on that passage of Isaiah;³ by Origen, *On the Holy Spirit*, bk. 1, ch. 10;⁴ and by St. Augustine, bk. 1, *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*, ch. 4, where he accommodates them to the beatitudes proposed by Christ;⁵ and in bk. 2, *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 7, where he explains the same grades ascending from the last to the first;⁶ and in Sermon 17 (a) *On the Saints*, where he calls them the seven most well-known gifts, and in turn compares them with the beatitudes.⁷ But also in Sermon 209 (b) *On the Season*, he calls the grace of the Holy Spirit sevenfold. Although this sermon is not St. Augustine's, it is learned and venerable. St. Gregory likewise in *Moralia* bk. 1, ch. 29, interprets the seven daughters of Job as the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit mystically.⁸ And he mentions them again in bk. 35 (cap. 7) and in *Homily 19 on Ezekiel*.⁹ St. Bernard, in a particular sermon *On the Gifts of the Holy Spirit* (a), adds to the others, among others, Origen, *Homily 6 on Numbers*, and in *Isaiah*.¹⁰

§ 5. But against this number Calvin objects that in Hebrew only six distinct names are found. For where we read: "the spirit of piety and of the fear of the Lord," in the Hebrew text the same word is repeated; at the last position, namely the penultimate and the ultimate place, signifying fear. Therefore he ascribes this sevenfold number of gifts to the error and ignorance of the Doctors. To him we reply that indeed only six words are found in Hebrew; but since that last word was repeated a second time not rashly by the Prophet — the Prophet saying: "and he shall fill him with the spirit of the fear of the Lord" — the Seventy interpreters rightly rendered one word placed twice by two diverse expressions: the former indeed by *εὐσέβεια* [piety], the latter by *φόβος* [fear of the Lord]; inasmuch as they understood that by the same word placed twice there were signified not the same thing again, but two diverse meanings. Especially since the fear of the Lord in sacred scripture does not have a single signification — as it is easy to demonstrate by examples, and as will be clear below when the treatment of fear comes. Therefore the rendering of the Seventy is rational; which the Fathers who followed that interpretation used among themselves, so that the seven gifts enumerated by the Prophet in that passage might be understood. Thereafter St. Jerome himself followed this interpretation in his version, so that he rendered not fear in both places, but piety in the former and the fear of the Lord in the latter. That he translated it thus no one need doubt, as is plain from his own Commentary.³

§ 6. Now these things which we have said are worth noting for the purpose of showing that there are not more than seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and that they are those enumerated by Isaiah at the beginning of chapter 11 as seven; and that by the number by which universality is wont to be signified, the rest are easily comprehended.

§ II — Whether the gifts differ from the virtues (Utrum dona differant a virtutibus)

§ 7. Concerning the distinction of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit from the virtues, the Doctors hold varying opinions. For some teach that they are diverse from the virtues; others deny this. Those who distinguish them in turn disagree. For some distinguish them in such a way that the virtues perfect man in a human mode, and the gifts in a mode exceeding the human. Others hold that the virtues perfect the will, and the gifts the intellect. Others, that the virtues are ordained to acting well, and the gifts to resisting temptations. Again others, that the virtues are ordained to acting, but the gifts to suffering. St. Bonaventure seems to distinguish them thus: that the virtues cause one to act rightly, and the gifts, readily. St. Thomas distinguishes them thus: that by the virtues man is disposed to his actions inasmuch as he is moved internally by reason, whereas by the gifts he is disposed inasmuch as he is moved by God.¹²

§ 8. However, it seems that none of these distinctions can stand solidly, as is shown by the following arguments. First: because charity is the most excellent gift of God, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) and St. Augustine, bk. 10, *On the Trinity*, ch. 19;¹³ and therefore it pertains no less than any other gift whatsoever to perfecting man in a mode exceeding the human; and yet it is established that charity is a virtue. Second: because it belongs to the same virtue to act rightly, more rightly, and most rightly with regard to its own object, as is clear both from the formal character (*ratio*) of virtue, which admits of intensity and perfection, and from the virtues of the perfect, who through them operate perfectly. Third: because the virtues in the blessed will be most perfect; by which therefore the gifts would seem to be vainly distinguished from the virtues in respect of similar acts and objects. [Fourth is omitted in the enumeration here by Estius but the sequence continues.] Fifth: because the gift of fear St. Augustine places among beginners, in bk. 2, *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*, ch. 4;¹⁴ in bk. 2, *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 7;⁶ and in Sermon 17 *On the Saints*.¹⁵ Therefore man does not operate by that gift in some perfect mode surpassing the virtues. Fifth [sic, recte Sixth]: because it is manifest that certain virtues perfect the intellect, such as faith and prudence; just as also certain gifts perfect the will, such as fortitude, piety, and fear. Sixth [recte Seventh]: because it is no less manifest that the other two distinctions also are confused, inasmuch as the virtues too are ordained to suffering and to resisting temptations, and the gifts to acting and operating well. Seventh [recte Eighth]: because it belongs to the same habit to act rightly and readily. Eighth [recte Ninth]: because in the work of virtue man is moved by both — by reason and by God — speaking of Christian virtue as defined by the Master. Therefore this diversity of moving or impelling principles does not seem able to introduce a real distinction between virtues and gifts, but only one of reason.

§ 9. There are also other arguments, by which it seems to be shown that they are not really distinguished. First: because the virtues are gifts of God, as St. Augustine and Prosper and other ancient writers teach against the Pelagians regarding Christian virtues.¹⁶ Second: because the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit enumerated by Isaiah are often called virtues by the Fathers, as by St. Jerome in his commentary on that passage of the Prophet,³ and by St. Gregory, bk. 1, *Moralia*, ch. 12 (alias 28),¹⁷ and by St. Augustine, bk. 1, *Questions on the Gospels*, q. 8.¹⁸ Third: because the definition of virtue applies to the gifts, just as the definition of gift applies to the virtues. For the gifts too are qualities of the mind by which one lives well, etc.; and the virtues are certain benefits divinely conferred upon man. Fourth: because certain things are commonly numbered among both the virtues and the gifts; such as wisdom, knowledge, understanding, fortitude. Fifth: because since the virtues sufficiently perfect man with regard to every object by which he can be perfected on the way, as is clear

through the three theological and the four cardinal virtues, the gifts would seem to be posited vainly as really distinct from the virtues. Last: because since various distinctions are put forward — as we have shown in part above — yet there is none in which the mind can sufficiently rest, as St. Bonaventure himself noted. From all of which it is probable, as the Master teaches in the Text and Scotus following him in this Distinction, that the seven gifts are truly virtues.¹⁹ We likewise judge that the same must be said of the eight — or, according to others, seven — beatitudes enumerated by Matthew, and of the fruits of the Spirit reviewed by the Apostle (Gal. 5). Although the rational distinction signified by those very words among those four things must be altogether acknowledged. For insofar as they perfect man to act well, they are called virtues; insofar as they are given divinely, gifts; insofar as they lead to beatitude, beatitudes; insofar finally as they produce the fruit of eternal life in the one who works, they are called fruits.

§ III — To which virtues the individual gifts belong (Singula dona ad quas virtutes pertineant)

§ 10. To which virtues the individual gifts are to be referred can be briefly explained as follows. Wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, of which the Master treats in the next distinction. Fortitude is a moral virtue, and one of the cardinal virtues. Counsel pertains to prudence. Scotus understands piety as mercy (*misericordiam*) and joins it to justice; but according to the requirement of the Hebrew and Greek word, more correctly that virtue is understood by the name of piety by which we are well disposed toward God and His worship; and nonetheless it can be referred to justice, according to that word: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Matt. 22:21). The fear of the Lord St. Augustine, in the passages mentioned above, understands as humility, which is certainly established to be a virtue, and which among the Scholastics is placed under temperance: because it holds the mean with respect to honours as certain delectable things. Although not fully known, the philosophers called it modesty. Others, however, prefer to distinguish between piety and the fear of the Lord — which above we said were expressed by the same word among the Hebrews — in such a way that piety signifies the worship of God insofar as it arises from consideration of the mercy and goodness of God; whereas the fear of the Lord signifies that same worship of God insofar as it arises or is aroused in us from consideration of the just and severe judgment of God against sinners.²¹

§ IV — That the Seven Gifts were in Christ and will remain in the blessed (Septem Dona in Christo fuisse, & in beatis esse mansura)

§ 11. Whether the gifts be distinguished from the virtues really or only in formal character (*ratio*), there is no doubt that they were in Christ, to whom they are explicitly attributed by the Prophet, and concerning whom Scripture elsewhere testifies that He was full of grace and received the Spirit not by measure, and that from His fullness we have all received (Jn. 1), and that in Him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2).²³ But concerning other human beings, to whom those gifts are communicated from the fullness of the head, Christ, as to members, it is asked whether they will remain in them after this life.

§ 12. Yet the answer to this question also is not in doubt. For if the gifts are in reality virtues, then — since it has been shown above that charity and the moral virtues will remain in the Fatherland, and the same must be held concerning the intellectual virtues that do not include imperfection — consequently the same must be said of the seven gifts, inasmuch as we have already shown which gifts pertain to which virtues. But if they are distinct from the virtues, not even so is there any room for doubt that they remain; since that distinction (if it is to be acknowledged in the gifts) constitutes a certain perfection that is not present in the virtues. Therefore, if the virtues remain, much more must the gifts remain, being, as they are, certain more perfect and more divine habits. St. Ambrose testifies to this,²⁴ saying that the heavenly city is satisfied with the full flowing of the seven spiritual virtues. Therefore, what has been said above concerning the virtues — that they will be in the blessed, though not according to acts befitting this life but proper to the state of beatitude — the same is likewise to be understood of the gifts, whether they be the same as the virtues or distinct from them.

§ 13. Moreover, St. Gregory seems to have wished to indicate this²⁵ when, enumerating and expounding the seven gifts, he assigns to each something transitory and something permanent. For he says that wisdom refreshes the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things: of these, hope passes away, but certainty remains. Concerning understanding (*intellectus*) he says that it serves to penetrate what is heard and to illuminate the mind: the former of these is transitory, the latter permanent. Counsel, he says, prevents one from being hasty — which belongs to this life alone — and fills the mind with reason (*ratione*), which is what we chiefly await in the life to come. And so likewise of the rest. Finally, since it has been said of the fear of the Lord — which holds the last place, and according to St. Augustine the lowest place among the gifts — (Ps. 18) that it shall endure for ever and ever,²⁶ much more must this be affirmed of all the others. But more will be said concerning fear in what follows.

§ V — On the necessity of distinguishing the manifold kinds of fear (*Distinguendum esse multiplicem timorem*)

§ 14. In order that it may be understood what kind of fear is to be attributed to Christ and to the blessed, and what kind is to be removed from them, the Master rightly distinguishes a manifold fear. Now fear is in general of three kinds: namely, natural, worldly, and the fear of God. This last is again subdivided into three: namely, servile, initial, and filial — so that in the aggregate five kinds of fear are reckoned. Natural fear resides not in the rational part but in the irascible appetite (*appetitu irascibili*); it is that passion (*passio*), namely, whereby an animal naturally flees an impending evil. This fear is in itself neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, though in a human being it can be such by accident (*per accidens*), insofar as it can be commanded by the will. The remaining kinds of fear reside in the rational appetite.

Worldly fear — which St. Augustine, Cassiodorus, and the Scholastics also call "human" fear — is that by which either any temporal evil, or the loss of any temporal good, is so greatly dreaded that on account of it justice is abandoned, either by committing what is unlawful or by omitting what is due. This fear is always and in its entire genus (*ex toto genere*) vicious, and it is frequently censured in Sacred Scripture, as at Matt. 10: "Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul."²⁸ And at 1 Pet. 3: "And do not fear their fear, and be not troubled."²⁹ Hence also John (Rev. 21) says that the fearful — that is, those imbued with worldly fear — shall have their part in the burning lake.³⁰ Concerning this fear also does (Sir. 7) speak, when it warns that no one should seek the office of judging unless he be able to withstand iniquities — lest, it says, you be overawed

by the face of the powerful, that is, lest through fear of his power you show partiality in his regard and subvert judgment.³¹ For the same reason those also are censured in Scripture who please men (Ps. 52 and Gal. 1)³² — that is, those who, lest they lose favor among men, give offense to God.

A similar fear is that whereby someone refrains from evil works not out of love of justice but solely from dread of hell or even of temporal punishment, and does what the law requires. By this fear the children of Israel were seized when the Lord, about to give the law, descended to them terribly upon Mount Sinai (Exod. 20).³³ Concerning which the Apostle says, Rom. 8: "For you have not received again the spirit of servitude in fear."³⁴ And 2 Tim. 1: "For God has not given us the spirit of fear."³⁵ And Heb. 2: "That he might deliver those who through fear of death were all their life subject to bondage."³⁶ Now this fear also is vicious, not indeed of itself — that is, insofar as it is fear of punishment — but insofar as it is servile, that is, insofar as it always has an evil joined to it: namely, a desire of sinning lurking in the soul. Which evil is signified by the very fact that it is called servile. For it is servile to refrain from evil solely from fear of punishment, and not to do the evil one would wish only because of the fear of punishment.

Furthermore, initial fear is intermediate between servile and filial. Filial fear — which is also called by other names holy, chaste, free-born (*ingenuus*), amicable, and reverential — is that by which someone fears God and fears being separated from Him through offense, that is, through fault; or certainly reveres God as the supreme Lord of all and the most just avenger of sins. This fear is praiseworthy and is enjoined upon all, according to that of Ps. 33: "Fear the Lord, all ye his saints,"³⁷ and Ps. 111: "Blessed is the man who fears the Lord."³⁸ Hence those who lack it are rebuked, as in Ps. 13: "There is no fear of the Lord before their eyes."³⁹ Hence through Malachi the Lord says, Mal. 1: "If I am the Lord, where is my fear?"⁴⁰ Likewise Jer. 10 and Apoc. 15: "Who shall not fear thee, O King of the nations?"⁴¹

Initial fear, therefore, since it is intermediate between servile and filial, is rightly understood to be that which draws back from evil and impels toward good, partly through fear of punishment, partly through love of justice — so that it regards simultaneously both punishment and offense; the one of these it has in common with servile fear, the other with filial fear.

It must be noted (*Notandum est autem*) that in this manifold acceptance of fear, only the third, fourth, and fifth are called the fear of the Lord, and that it is by means of these that one draws near to God either absolutely or at least in some manner, and withdraws from sin. For by the second one draws back from God and draws near to sin. The first, however, is indifferent in itself, as has been said.

§ VI — The distinction of initial fear from servile and filial fear is explained (Explicatur distinctio timoris initialis a servili et filiali)

§ 15. Various authors distinguish initial fear from servile and filial fear in various ways. Among these, those appear to hold the best opinion who teach that initial fear differs in species (*specie*) from servile fear, but that it is distinguished from filial fear only as the imperfect from the perfect. In order that this may become clearer, it must be known that servile fear is distinguished from filial fear according to species (*secundum speciem*). For since both acts and habits are distinguished according to their objects, and the object of servile fear is the evil of punishment (*malum poenae*), while the object of filial fear is the evil of fault (*malum culpa*), it follows that

these two fears differ essentially. This St. Augustine also sufficiently declares in Tract. 9 on the Epistle of John, and in Ps. 127,⁴³ where he distinguishes servile and chaste fear by these very objects.

Now servile fear, although insofar as it is servile it does not remain with charity, and consequently is not present in one who has been made a son of God through charity, nevertheless, according to the very substance (*substantiam*) of that fear — that is, insofar as it regards punishment — nothing prevents it from remaining with charity set aside in the meantime, just as formless faith (*fides informis*), which precedes charity, remains with charity, but with its formlessness removed. It is one and the same fear by which someone fears hell both before and after the reception of charity; although after the reception of the gift of charity and of sonship it ceases to be servile.

But initial fear, since it signifies no disposition toward servile fear, but rather toward filial, is not to be classed together with servile fear as belonging to the same species with it, but rather with filial fear. For it is called "initial" insofar as it befits the state of beginners who are taking up the spiritual life, in whom the fear is indeed begun through the beginning of charity. Which fear is established to be filial. Thus, therefore, initial fear is related to filial fear as imperfect charity is to perfect charity. Wherefore, just as between perfect and imperfect charity there is no essential distinction but only an accidental one according to more and less, so also between filial and initial fear. Hence it is further understood that the object of initial fear is the same as that with which filial fear is concerned, namely, offense and separation from God.

But if you object concerning the fear of punishment that remains in the sons of God, and consequently ceases to be servile — which, since it is not filial fear but is of the kind that perfect charity casts out (because it has punishment as its object), appears to be the residual that should be called initial — it is answered (*Respondemus*) that one need not labor greatly over the name, and that perhaps nothing prevents that fear also from being called initial, or at any rate from being comprehended under the broader acceptance of initial fear: provided that, just as in object so also in species, that remaining fear of punishment in the son is distinguished from the fear which we said has the formal character (*rationem*) of the imperfect with respect to filial fear.

§ VII — Whether servile fear is good and useful for justice (An timor servilis bonus sit et utilis ad justitiam)

§ 16. In servile fear two things are to be considered: the fear itself, and the servility. Of these, the one is good, the other evil. For it is good to fear punishment, but evil to fear servilely — that is, to fear the evil of punishment in such a way that one does not yet love the good of justice — so that St. Thomas rightly said⁴⁴ that servile fear, insofar as it is servile, is contrary to charity. Yet since that servility does not pertain to the substance of the fear which is called servile — just as infirmity (*infirmetas*) does not pertain to the substance of the faith which is called unformed (*informis*) — it follows that servile fear according to its own substance is good, even though the servility joined to it is evil. Indeed, it must be admitted that this fear of punishment is so truly good that the Apostle attests it to be a gift of the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8),³⁴ for in saying "You have not received again the spirit of servitude in fear," he sufficiently indicates both that this fear proceeds from the Holy Spirit and that it was at some time given by Him to certain persons — namely, to the People of the Old Testament at the very reception of the Law. He signified the same in 2 Tim. 1,³⁵ when he said: "For God has not given us the spirit of fear" — meaning, that is, the spirit which had once been given to the Israelite People.

§ 17. And this fear is so commended in the Scriptures that, according to the exposition of certain interpreters, it is said to be the beginning of Wisdom (Prov. 1).⁴⁵ For Bede expounds that passage explicitly in this sense, just as St. Augustine also understood it before him.⁴⁶ And St. Basil likewise.⁴⁷ Of it also the following was said by Ecclesiasticus, according to the declaration of the Fathers of the Council of Trent: "The fear of the Lord drives out sin, and he who is without fear cannot be justified."⁴⁸ To the same effect belongs that passage of Is. 26: "From thy fear, O Lord, we have conceived and brought forth the spirit of salvation."⁴⁹ Finally, there pertain to this matter all those passages of Scripture which by the dread of Gehenna and the severity of the divine judgment deter men from sinning and rouse them to justice — as in Matt. 1, Lk. 12, Mk. 9, and elsewhere.⁵⁰

§ 18. The teaching of this matter is frequent among the Fathers, and most especially among St. Augustine in various places. For in book 2 *Against the Letter of Petilianus*, ch. 73, he says: "The fear of punishments, although it does not yet possess the delight of justice, at least restrains evil desire within the enclosure of thought."⁵¹ And on Ps. 5: "Fear is a great support for those who are advancing (the Master says: *progressing*) toward salvation. But when anyone has arrived, perfect charity casts out fear."⁵² And in Epistle 120 to Honoratus: "Fear, sent ahead, drives from our heart the habit of evil works, and keeps a place for charity."⁵³ And again on Ps. 127, among the other things he discusses about the twofold fear, he speaks thus of servile fear: "Some fear, but do not love justice. Yet when through fear they restrain themselves from sin, the habit of justice is formed, what was hard begins to be loved, God begins to be sweet, and the man begins to live justly."⁵⁴ In the same passage he also affirms that this fear is good and useful, and on the penultimate Psalm he says: "Unless, O man, you begin by fear to worship God, you will not arrive at love."⁵⁵ In the same author, Tract. 9 on the Epistle of John, the place is prepared for charity: "Fear enters in order that it may introduce charity; and if there is no fear, there is no door by which charity may enter."⁵⁶ Splendid also is that saying of his, Sermon 13 on the Words of the Apostle: "Do it at least out of fear of punishment, if you cannot yet do it out of love of justice."⁵⁷ Similar to this is that of Tract. 42 on John: "If you cannot yet love justice, fear at least the punishment; so that you may arrive at loving justice."⁵⁸ Hence also in the book *On Catechizing the Unlearned*, ch. 17, he praises those who come to baptism out of fear of eternal punishment.⁵⁹ And in Epistle 59 to Boniface he teaches that even Paul, whose conversion was so wondrous, was led by fear. "He," he says, "whom a greater fear compelled to charity — his perfect charity afterwards cast out fear" — looking, no doubt, to that passage in Acts 9 where it is said of him that, trembling and astonished, he said: "What wilt thou have me do?"⁶⁰ By this example it becomes probable that no adult is justified without some prior fear of this kind. And certain earlier passages of St. Augustine sufficiently intimate as much, and he states it more explicitly in the book *On Catechizing the Unlearned*, ch. 5, asserting that it is exceedingly rare — indeed, never — that anyone wishes to become a Christian who has not been struck by some fear of God.⁶¹ This fear or terror, arising from consideration of the severity of God and leading toward the building up of charity, he does not hesitate in that same chapter to call most salutary.

§ 19. Rightly therefore does St. Basil teach that fear is necessary by which those who relish earthly things are educated. "For fear," he says, writing on Ps. 32, "is a certain introductory element necessarily employed for the learning of piety. But charity, receiving those who have been exercised by instructive fear, is wont to bring them to perfection."⁴⁷ And elsewhere, as on Is. 1, he calls fear a pedagogue for the exercise of piety.

§ 20. From all these things it is evident how consonant with Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers is what is read in the Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6:⁶² that sinners, shaken to good effect by fear of

divine justice, raise themselves toward hope by turning to consider the mercy of God. And what canon 8 of that same session contains: "If anyone shall say that the fear of Gehenna, by which, fleeing to the mercy of God and grieving for sins, we take refuge, or from which we abstain from sinning, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema."⁶³ Hence also the decree of Session 14, ch. 4 (which concerns contrition), where it is said: "For by this fear the Ninevites, usefully shaken, did penance at the preaching of Jonah, full of terrors."⁶⁴

§ 21. It must, however, be carefully noted concerning the foregoing that Scripture and the Fathers commend servile fear of punishment — not insofar as it is servile (hence it is nowhere commended by the Fathers under that name) — but insofar as it is a certain fear by which, upon the threat of punishment being set before him, a person is drawn back from the act of sin, knowing that punishment to have been decreed.

§ VIII — Whether one who abstains from sins by fear alone commits sin (An peccet qui solo timore a peccatis abstinet)

§ 22. It is customarily asked whether one who, by fear of eternal punishment alone, or even of temporal punishment, either performs the works of the law or abstains from sin, commits sin; which question is put in other words thus: whether every work proceeding from fear of punishment alone is a sin? The negative part seems to be openly asserted by these words of Moses to the people, Exod. 20: "For God is come to prove you, and that his fear may be in you, and you sin not." Which passage ought without doubt to be understood of servile fear. Likewise, from the Apostle it was shown above that servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and indeed such a gift through which a man is prepared and led to justice; therefore an act proceeding from that fear alone, if it be not vitiated by any other circumstance, is not a sin. For it seems absurd that what is contrary to justice — which is the character (*ratio*) of every sin — should be capable of preparing a man for justice; since a contrary cannot be a disposition towards its own contrary, but is rather a withdrawal and a removal from it.

§ 23. To this is added the authority of St. Augustine, who in the two passages cited above exhorts the faithful that, if not from love of justice, they should at least do good from fear of punishment. Who also, in the book *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, ch. 17, pronounces him to be a true Christian who worships Christ so as not to go into eternal fire, even if he not yet loves the Lord more than Gehenna.⁵⁹ And similar things are found in the same author in *Tractatus 6 in Epistolam Joannis*, in *De Verbis Apostoli*, in *Epistola* 105, and in the commentary on Ps. 117,⁶⁶ beyond the others cited above by which the usefulness of the fear was shown.

§ 24. A reason likewise accrues: just as the Kingdom of Heaven is the supreme good, so Gehenna is the supreme evil; wherefore, just as a man does not sin by doing a good work in hope of the Kingdom of Heaven, neither does he sin if, fearing Gehenna as a supreme evil, he abstains from sin through that fear even while he does not yet love justice.

§ 25. This opinion seems to be favoured by canon 8 of Session 6 of the Council of Trent,⁶³ by which anathema is pronounced upon the one who shall have said that fear of Gehenna is a sin or makes sinners. Which likewise appears to be understood of the act proceeding from such fear; and what follows from this appears to be that, if an act of this kind were a sin, it would make the man himself worse, since sin is of the nature of sin, so as to increase in him who sins both guilt and malice.

§ 26. On the other hand, the contrary position holds: that what is done from fear of punishment alone is not done from love of justice, which love is nevertheless required as a necessary circumstance of a good work. For indeed even the works of the Gentiles, in whom there was no love of justice, seem to have been capable of the reproach of sin. Although those of them who did not know the true God, yet there were some who perceived the good of justice and from that love did certain praiseworthy good works. But where this love is absent, as it is absent in the man who only looks to escape punishment, and who would otherwise either do what is forbidden or not do what is commanded, the human work done does not seem able to be other than sinful.

§ 27. Into this same opinion not a few passages can be brought from St. Augustine. For in *Sermo 15 de Verbis Apostoli*⁶⁷ he says: "He who does not covet because of fear of punishment, covets, because he does covet." And in *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 32,⁶⁸ he testifies that the man who from fear alone does what is commanded, though he does a good thing, nevertheless does not do it well. And in *Epistola 144*⁶⁹ he teaches that the man who only fears is an enemy of justice. His general judgement is expressed in *Confessiones* I, ch. 12:⁷⁰ "No one does good unwillingly, even if what he does is good." But that he who acts from fear alone acts unwillingly is manifest; because he does not love justice, though he performs the work of justice in outward appearance. Another passage of the same author is in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 4,⁷¹ where concerning the man who keeps the commandments from fear alone, he says among other things: "He who keeps the commandments in this manner performs them without any doubt unwillingly, and therefore in his mind does not perform them. For he would altogether prefer not to do them; and according to what he desires and fears, he would be allowed to act without punishment with impunity. And therefore he is inwardly guilty in his very will, in the place where God himself, who gives the command, looks." So much for him. And the following passages may also be noted: *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 8 and ch. 14; *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 57; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 9; *In Psalmum 67*, on the verse "Si dormiatis inter medios"; *In Psalmum 17*, on the verse "Et in lege ejus noluerunt ambulare"; *In Psalmum 102*, *Concio 2*; *In Psalmum 118*, *Concio 11*; *In Evangelium Joannis*, *Tractatus 85*; and *De Peccatorum Meritis*, II, ch. 18.⁷²

§ 28. In agreement is Prosper, who from various passages of St. Augustine wove this Sentence (no. 117):⁷³ "God approves that innocence by which a man is innocent not from fear of punishment but from love of justice. For he who does not sin from fear, although he does not harm one whom he wishes to harm, nevertheless harms himself greatly; and, abstaining from the iniquitous deed, he is nonetheless guilty in his will." A similar saying is found in *Sententia 222* and *257*.

§ 29. From all these things, therefore, it seems at least to follow as a consequence that every man who abstains from sin by fear alone commits sin. Whatever may be the case with the external act, and whether it ought to be called a sin on account of the defect of due circumstance, or whether it can in some way be excused from sin — concerning which one may consult St. Bonaventure (q. 2 in the latter part of this Distinction)⁷⁴ and Durandus (in the same Distinction, q. 4)⁷⁵ — certainly it must altogether be admitted, as the Fathers affirm, that the man who fears in a servile manner and from that fear does or omits something, is inwardly guilty in his very will and mind; since he would prefer to omit what he now fears, or to do what is forbidden, if

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 4.
2. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* [abbreviation as in source; context suggests *In III Sent.*, dist. 34].
3. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Isaiah*, ch. 11.
4. Origen (attributed), *De Spiritu Sancto*, bk. 1, ch. 10.
5. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in monte* I, ch. 4.
6. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 7.
7. St. Augustine, Sermon 17 *De Sanctis* (= Sermon CCCXLVII inter Sermon IV. Class. in the Benedictine edition).
8. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* I, ch. 29.
9. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXV, ch. 7; and *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 19.
10. St. Bernard, Sermon *De Donis Spiritus Sancti* (formerly attributed to St. Bernard; the sermon *De Septem Gratiis seu Donis Spiritus Sancti* was once attributed to St. Bernard, as Joannes Merlou Hortius in Vol. V of the Works of St. Bernard placed it there as doubtful; Mabillon rejected it in his edition, p. 237, with the epigraph: *a N. n est S. Bernardi*); Origen, *Homily 6 on Numbers*; and *On Isaiah*.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1; and q. 69, a. 1.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1.
13. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, ch. 19.
14. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in monte* II, ch. 4.
15. St. Augustine, Sermon 17 *De Sanctis*.
16. St. Augustine and Prosper of Aquitaine, various works against the Pelagians.
17. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* I, ch. 12 (alias ch. 28).
18. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* I, q. 8.
19. The Master (of the Sentences), *In III Sent.*, dist. 34 (Text); Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 34.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 67; and II-II, q. 52, a. 2, etc.
21. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in monte* II, ch. 4; *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 7; Sermon 17 *De Sanctis*.
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 6.
23. Jn. 1:16; Col. 2:3.
24. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* I, ch. 20.
25. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* II, ch. 36.
26. Ps. 18 (19):10.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, aa. 1, 2, and 3.
28. Matt. 10:28.
29. 1 Pet. 3:14.
30. Rev. 21:8.
31. Sir. 7:6.
32. Ps. 52 (53); Gal. 1:10.
33. Exod. 20.
34. Rom. 8:15.

35. 2 Tim. 1:7.
36. Heb. 2:15.
37. Ps. 33 (34):10.
38. Ps. 111 (112):1.
39. Ps. 13 (14):3.
40. Mal. 1:6.
41. Jer. 10:7; Rev. (Apoc.) 15:4.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6, and 8.
43. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 9 in Epistolam Joannis*; and on Ps. 127.
44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 4.
45. Prov. 1:7.
46. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 9 in Epistolam Joannis* and *Fragmentum 12*.
47. St. Basil, *In Psalmum 32*.
48. Sir. 1:27–28; cf. the declaration of the Fathers of the Council of Trent.
49. Is. 26:18.
50. Matt. 1; Lk. 12; Mk. 9.
51. St. Augustine, *Contra epistolam Petiliani* II, ch. 73.
52. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 5*.
53. St. Augustine, *Epistola 120* (= Ep. CXL in the Benedictine edition) ad Honoratum.
54. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 127*.
55. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 148* (the penultimate Psalm).
56. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 9 in Epistolam Joannis*.
57. St. Augustine, *Sermo 13 de Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermo CLVI inter Sermones classis 1 in the Benedictine edition).
58. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 42 in Joannem*.
59. St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, ch. 17.
60. St. Augustine, *Epistola 59* (= Ep. CLXXXV in the Benedictine edition) ad Bonifacium; cf. Acts 9:6.
61. St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, ch. 5.
62. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.
63. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 8.
64. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 4.
65. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 4 (as above, *ubi supra*).
66. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 6 in Epistolam Joannis*; *Sermo 15 de Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermo CLVI, inter Sermones classis 1 in the Benedictine edition); *Epistola 105* (= Ep. CXCIV in the Benedictine edition); *Enarratio in Psalmum 117*.
67. St. Augustine, *Sermo 15 de Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermo CLXIX in the Benedictine edition, inter Sermones de Scripturis Veteris et Novi Testamenti).
68. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 32.
69. St. Augustine, *Epistola 144* (= Ep. CXLV in the Benedictine edition).
70. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* I, ch. 12.

71. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 4.

72. St. Augustine: *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 8 and ch. 14; *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 57; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 9; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 67 (on "Si dormiatis inter medios"); *Enarratio in Psalmum* 17 (on "Et in lege ejus noluerunt ambulare"); *Enarratio in Psalmum* 102, *Concio* 2; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 118, *Concio* 11; *In Evangelium Joannis*, *Tractatus* 85; *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* II, ch. 18.

73. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, no. 117; cf. also nos. 222 and 257.

74. St. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 34, q. 2, posterior part.

75. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 34, q. 4.

DISTINCTIO XXXV — HOW WISDOM, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING DIFFER (*QUOMODO DIFFERANT SAPIENTIA, SCIENTIA, ET INTELLECTUS*)

§ I — How wisdom, knowledge, and understanding differ (Quomodo differant sapientia, scientia, et intellectus)

§ 1. Since it has been said above that wisdom (*sapientia*), knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding (*intellectus*) are to be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and that they are intellectual virtues (*virtutes intellectuales*), we must now see how these three differ among themselves. For that wisdom and knowledge differ from one another is plainly taught by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12: "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, but to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit."² These same divisions of graces he there names. That understanding, moreover, differs from both of them, sufficiently clear passages declare — Is. 11, Prov. 1, Eccl. 1, 4, and 15, Dan. 1, and Col. 1:³ — in which wisdom (*sapientia*) in part and understanding (*intellectus*) in part are reckoned as distinct gifts of God.

§ 2. Wisdom, according to the Philosophers, as St. Augustine testifies,⁴ is defined as the knowledge (*notitiam*) of things divine and human. But this acceptance is general, comprehending also knowledge and understanding, and indeed the whole genus of intellectual virtues — just as general justice comprehends all the Moral virtues. In the stricter acceptance, wisdom signifies the cognition (*cognitionem*) of eternal or divine things, as the same St. Augustine testifies in the same place. For the Philosopher likewise in Book 6 of the *Ethics*, chapter 7, defines wisdom as the knowledge (*notitiam*) of the highest causes.

§ 3. Furthermore, since the cognition of divine things is sometimes combined with a devout affection (*pia affectione*) for them, and is sometimes separated from it — as among those who have such cognition it may be found either in the good or, separated from it, in the wicked — the question can be raised, in which of these two modes wisdom is to be taken when it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Certainly in the former mode, wisdom is taken in the Sacred Scriptures as the true and pre-eminent cultivation (*cultum*) of God — as is manifest when it is said, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," and since Job 28 says "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom." And in Ps. 70 (or 71 according to some readings), "piety (*pietas*) is itself wisdom." Treating this sentence, St. Augustine in the passage cited above testifies that wisdom is the true and pre-eminent cult of God. Nevertheless wisdom is also taken in another mode — namely so as to signify that devout affection (*piam illam affectionem*) towards God which does not exclude divine knowledge. For the Apostle, writing to the Romans in the first chapter, when he rebukes those who called themselves wise, does not deny that they were truly wise in so far as they had great cognition of God, but reproaches them because they attributed to their own industry, and not to God who manifestly conferred it, that illustrious knowledge. And in 1 Cor. 1,⁵ he plainly distinguishes wisdom from knowledge, not as anything other than

certain gifts given gratis for the edification of others, which he intends to enumerate. To this is added the fact that, as we have said, wisdom, knowledge, and understanding are intellectual virtues, which do not necessarily have rectitude of affection (*rectitudinem affectus*) conjoined to them. Hence, although many count wisdom among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they prefer to take it precisely as the right cognition (*cognitionem recti*) conjoined with an affection for the good (*affectione boni*); and Scotus, writing on this Distinction, holds that wisdom is an appetitive habit (*habitus appetitivum*), numbering it in the same category as charity — though this can be taught neither with certainty nor with much probability, especially since St. Augustine and we ourselves have stated that wisdom, as distinguished generally from knowledge, is defined as the cognition of divine things purely and simply. To which must be added the fact that neither knowledge (*scientia*) nor understanding (*intellectus*) include in their formal character (*ratione*) an affection for the things known conjoined to them. Therefore the same may not improbably be said of wisdom as well, when it is numbered among the other gifts of God.

§ 4. The name of knowledge (*scientiae*) is by itself general and can be taken in various ways. But as it is numbered by St. Augustine — where he defines it above — alongside human things, and by the Apostle between the gifts of the Spirit, it is rightly defined, as St. Augustine defines it in the same place, as the cognition of human things (*cognitio rerum humanarum*). Where by "human things" understand all created things, so as to understand that those things which are learned with a view to divine knowledge and which lead a man, as if guided by the hand, to things divine, are to be comprehended under this term. "For truly," says St. Augustine, "whatever can be known by man among human things, where what is for the most part superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity is to be found, this is to be attributed to knowledge: but that thing by which that most wholesome faith is nourished, defended, and strengthened, which leads to true beatitude — this the Apostle seems to call by the name of knowledge properly speaking." So he.⁶

§ 5. Finally, understanding (*intellectus*) can probably be distinguished from wisdom and knowledge in this way: that it belongs to understanding properly to understand those dogmas of corrupted reason which attack the religion of our faith, by which, when they are brought forward in the guise of arguments, they do not overthrow it. Of this sort are those arguments which are advanced against the Most Holy Trinity, the Eucharist, the Incarnation of the Word, the Resurrection of the dead, and similar more difficult heads of our Religion — which are customarily objected by heretics and by the wise of this world.

— *Distinctio XXXVI — Whether all the virtues are mutually connected (Utrum virtutes omnes sint inter se connexae) (continued from previous chunk)* —

§ I — Whether all the virtues are mutually connected (Utrum virtutes omnes sint inter se connexae)

§ 6. The question concerning the connection of the virtues (*connexione virtutum*), agitated as much among the Philosophers as among the Theologians, is properly to be investigated with respect to the moral virtues. For it is not doubted that the purely intellectual virtues (*virtutes mere intellectuales*) can be separated from one another and from the moral virtues — just as we have shown above that faith and hope can subsist without

charity. The question is, therefore: whether the moral virtues have among themselves such a connection that, where one is, the rest are necessarily present as well.

§ 7. The first clear statement is St. Jerome's sentence in Is. 56,⁸ to the effect that all the virtues so adhere to one another that whoever lacks one lacks all, and whoever has had one has had all. And in the Epistle to Pammachius (*ad Pammachium*) he approves this Stoic opinion.⁹ And in the Epistle to Fabiola (*ad Fabiolam*) on mansion 38 he says: "Virtues cleave to one another and are so bound together that whoever lacks one lacks all."¹⁰ Which sentence, writing to St. Jerome, St. Augustine in Epistle 29¹¹ so confirms that he confesses it to have pleased all the Philosophers, and himself endeavours to establish the same by reason and example. Likewise in Book 3, *De Trinitate*, chapter 4:¹² "Virtues," he says, "which are in the human mind, however individually and in some other way they are understood one by one, are by no means separated from one another." The same is St. Ambrose's opinion in Book 5, *In Lucam*, on that text of chapter 6 "Blessed are the poor" (*Beati pauperes*):¹³ "Connected to one another and linked together are the virtues, so that whoever has one

§ IX — Whether the gift of fear was in Christ and remains in the blessed (Utrum timoris donum fuerit in Christo et maneat in beatis)

§ 8. Regarding what the Master (*Magister*) asks as the principal subject of this Distinction — whether the gift of fear was in Christ, and whether after this life it will remain in the blessed — following the distinction of the multiple kinds of fear set out above, we respond distinctly, point by point and in order.

First: natural fear (*timor naturalis*) was in Christ, as we have shown clearly.¹⁵ In the blessed, however, who are now freed and secure from every evil and from every expectation of evil, it neither is nor can be.

Second: worldly fear (*timor mundanus*) was never in Christ, nor can it be. In the blessed likewise, so long as they are blessed, it cannot be. The reason is manifest: because this fear is vicious and carnal. Although both of the kinds of fear just mentioned have it in common that they ought to be called neither the fear of the Lord nor the gift of fear, yet worldly fear is of such a nature that it even draws one away from the fear of the Lord and is contrary to it — which is not the case with natural fear, inasmuch as that is indifferent.

Third: servile fear (*timor servilis*), even though according to its substance it is a gift of God (as was said above), was nevertheless not in Christ, nor could it be, just as neither can it be in the blessed. The reason is taken both from the side of servility and from the side of fear. From the side of servility, indeed: because Christ most perfectly loved justice and hated iniquity (Ps. 44), and the blessed too are perfect in the love of justice. Hence the servility by which someone performs a work of justice in some way under compulsion can have no place in them. From the side of fear, moreover: because in Christ there always was, and in the blessed there is and will always be, a certain assured security (*certa securitas*) of not sinning, and consequently of not incurring the punishments which the justice of God threatens against sinners.

Fourth: initial fear (*timor initialis*) ought to be acknowledged neither in Christ nor in the blessed. The reason is that, inasmuch as it is initial, it includes something imperfect and has the fear of punishment joined to it — which we have already shown to be foreign to Christ and the blessed. Furthermore, what is written in 1 Jn. 4 must be understood of both servile and initial fear: "Fear is not in charity, but perfect charity casts out fear, because fear has punishment. Now he that feareth is not perfected in charity." For it is common to both

kinds of fear to have punishment, even though this belongs more principally to servile fear, which as such has only the fear of punishment annexed to it. And indeed servile fear, inasmuch as it is servile, simply perishes when charity arrives; but inasmuch as it is fear, it remains, yet in such a way that as charity increases, so much does it diminish — as St. Augustine teaches in Tract 9 on the canonical Epistle of John.¹⁶ The same is likewise to be understood of initial fear inasmuch as it is initial, that is, inasmuch as by reason of its imperfection it has punishment, even though we acknowledge that it grows according to its own substance as charity grows.

Fifth and last: filial fear (*timor filialis*) was in Christ, and remains in the blessed — not indeed according to that act by which the offence of God or separation from God is dreaded (for all the blessed are assured that they will never sin, nor be separated from God for eternity), but according to a certain act of reverence toward God arising from the consideration of His justice and severity toward the wicked. The permanence of this filial fear is proved by Ps. 18: "The fear of the Lord is holy," or as the Septuagint has it, "chaste, remaining for ever and ever."¹⁷ This text was so understood by St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, book 14, chapter 24; in *Epistola* 120 *ad Honoratum*; in Sermon 214 *De Tempore*; and in *Enarratio in Psalmum* 18.¹⁸ Although in *De Civitate Dei*, book 14, chapter 9,¹⁹ he does not venture to assert altogether whether chaste fear remains according to its substance, or only according to its effect in the manner in which it is said: "The patience of the poor shall not perish for ever." For in this way only, and even that hesitantly, does he consider the fear of God to be destined to remain. Prosper, following St. Augustine, in book 3 *De Vita contemplativa*, chapter 32,²⁰ affirms that chaste fear remains for ever. St. Gregory confirms that chaste fear remains for ever in book 34 *Moralium*, chapter 17.²¹ Now what Bede says in the first chapter of Proverbs — that not only servile but also filial fear will cease in the next life — is to be understood of the prior act of filial fear, by which, namely, the father's offence is dreaded, and not of the latter act by which a son reveres his father. According to this sense the Master too interprets Bede as having spoken.²²

§ I — How wisdom, knowledge, and understanding differ (Quomodo differant sapientia, scientia, et intellectus)

§ 9. Since it has been said above that wisdom (*sapientia*), knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding (*intellectus*), inasmuch as they are numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, are intellectual virtues (*virtutes intellectuales*), we must now see how these three differ from one another. For that wisdom and knowledge differ from one another is clearly shown by that text of the Apostle at 1 Cor. 12: "To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit" — which he there also calls "divisions of graces." That understanding, however, differs from both, is sufficiently declared by those passages²⁴ in which understanding is enumerated partly alongside wisdom and partly alongside knowledge as a certain distinct gift of God.

The Philosophers, as St. Augustine witnesses,²⁵ define wisdom as the knowledge (*notitia*) of things divine and human. But this acceptance of wisdom is general, comprehending also knowledge and understanding and altogether the whole genus of intellectual virtues — just as general justice comprehends all the moral virtues. In a stricter acceptance, wisdom (*sapientia*) signifies the cognition (*cognitio*) of eternal or divine things, as St. Augustine attests in the same place. For the Philosopher too, in book 6 of the *Ethics*, chapter 7,²⁶ defines wisdom as the knowledge of the highest causes. Now since the knowledge of divine things is sometimes joined

to a pious affection toward them, and sometimes separated from it — as in evil men who possess such knowledge — it may be asked in which mode wisdom is taken when it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

For it is manifest that wisdom is very frequently taken in the former mode in the Sacred Scriptures — as when it is said, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," and when the Wise Man denies that wisdom enters into a malicious soul or dwells in a body subject to sins (Wis. 1); likewise when Job 28 says, "Behold, the fear of the Lord" (or as the Septuagint has it, "piety") "is itself wisdom." Treating this sentence, St. Augustine in the place cited above attests that wisdom is the true and chief worship (*cultus*) of God. Wisdom is taken, nonetheless, also at times in the other mode, so that it does not include that pious affection toward God and divine things. For the Apostle, in Romans 1, does not deny that those who said they were wise were truly wise, by reason of the great things they had come to know about God; rather, he reproves them for this: that they attributed that eminent knowledge to themselves and to their own industry, rather than to God who had revealed it. And in 1 Cor. 12,² where he manifestly distinguishes wisdom from knowledge, he intends to enumerate nothing other than certain freely-given gifts (*dona gratis data*) for the edification of others. To these considerations is added the fact that we have said wisdom, like knowledge and understanding, is an intellectual virtue — virtues which do not necessarily have uprightness of affection (*rectitudo affectus*) conjoined with them.

Hence, although most people prefer to take wisdom, as it is enumerated among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, in so specific a sense that it signifies the cognition of right joined with the affection of good, and Scotus, writing on this Distinction, thinks that wisdom is an appetitive habit (*habitus appetitivus*), one in number with charity — nevertheless this is taught neither with certainty nor with great probability; especially since St. Augustine also, as we have said, when distinguishing wisdom from knowledge, defines it in general and simple terms as the cognition of divine things. To which add the fact that neither knowledge nor understanding in its own formal character (*ratio*) includes this, namely that they have the affection of good toward the things known, conjoined with them. Therefore the same can not improbably be said of wisdom as it is enumerated among the other gifts of God.

§ 10. The name of knowledge (*scientia*) is by itself general, and, as enumerated by the Apostle among the gifts of the Spirit, it is rightly defined by St. Augustine in the place cited above as the cognition of human things.²⁵ By "human things" understand all created things, insofar as they lead man by the hand, as it were, to the cognition of divine and uncreated things. "Nor indeed," says St. Augustine, "is whatever can be known by man in the realm of human things — where there is very much superfluous vanity and harmful curiosity — to be attributed to this knowledge; but only that by which the most wholesome faith, which leads to true beatitude (*beatitudo*), is engendered, nourished, defended, and strengthened. With which knowledge many of the faithful are not endowed, though they are very greatly endowed with faith itself. For it is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to attain the blessed life (*vita beata*): but it is another to know how this same thing both assists the pious and is defended against the impious. It is this latter that the Apostle seems to call by the particular name of knowledge." So he says.

§ 11. Lastly, understanding (*intellectus*) can probably be distinguished from wisdom and knowledge in the following manner: that it properly belongs to understanding to grasp that the arguments of corrupted reason do not overthrow the doctrines of our religion, however much in appearance they seem to oppose them. Of this sort are those objections which are accustomed to be urged by heretics and the wise of this world against

the Most Holy Trinity, the Eucharist, the Incarnation of the Word, the Resurrection of the dead, and the like more difficult heads of Religion.

§ I — *Whether all the virtues are mutually connected (Utrum virtutes omnes sint inter se connexae)*

§ 12. The question concerning the connection of virtues, much disputed among Philosophers as well as Theologians, is properly to be understood of the moral virtues (*virtutes morales*). For there is no doubt that purely intellectual virtues can be separated both from one another and from the moral virtues; just as we also showed above that faith and hope can subsist without charity. The question is therefore: whether the moral virtues have among themselves such a connection that where one is present, all the rest must necessarily be present as well. This question has no little difficulty on account of the various arguments that can be brought forward on either side.

For first, the mutual connection of all virtues in charity is proved by the Scriptures, which constitute in charity the fulfillment of the law — as Rom. 13, Gal. 5, Jas. 2 — whence also at 1 Cor. 13 every kind of virtue is attributed to charity in these words: "Charity is patient, is kind," and so on. Hence St. Augustine, in Tract 87 on John,²⁷ says: "With good reason does the good Master so often commend love as the sole thing to be enjoined, without which the other goods cannot profit, and which cannot be possessed without the other goods by which a man is made good." And in Tract 83:²⁸ "Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking? Where it is not, what is there that can profit?" But although these texts sufficiently prove that charity cannot exist without the other virtues, they do not, however, show that the rest do not exist without charity; still less do they establish their all-round mutual connection. A proof thereof must therefore be sought from elsewhere. It is taken above all from the authority of the holy Fathers of the Church as well as from the Philosophers, and from the reason by which they seem to have been persuaded to hold this view.

First, the opinion of St. Jerome is clear, in Is. 56:²⁹ that all virtues so cleave to one another that whoever has lacked one lacks all, and whoever has had one has all. And in the *Epistle to Pammachius*³⁰ he approves this as the opinion of the Stoics. And in the *Epistle to Fabiola*, on the mansions, mansion 38:³¹ "Virtues," he says, "cleave to one another, and are so closely linked together that whoever has lacked one lacks all." This opinion, writing to St. Jerome, St. Augustine so confirms³² that he confesses it to have pleased all the Philosophers, and himself endeavours to establish the same by reason and example. Likewise in Book 3, *De Trinitate*, chapter 4:¹² "Virtues," he says, "which are in the human mind, however individually and in some other way they are understood one by one, are by no means separated from one another." The same is St. Ambrose's opinion in Book 5, *In Lucam*, on that text of chapter 6 "Blessed are the poor" (*Beati pauperes*):³² "Connected to one another and linked together are the virtues, so that whoever has one

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 4; and II-II, q. 8, 9, and 44.

2. 1 Cor. 12.

3. Is. 11; Prov. 1; Eccl. 1, 4, 15; Dan. 1; Col. 1.

4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 14, cap. 1.

5. 1 Cor. 1.
6. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 14, cap. 1 [abbreviation as in source: "libr. 14. (D. Trinit. cap. 1.)"].
7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 65, a. 1.
8. St. Jerome, *In Isaia*, ch. 56.
9. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Pammachium* [Epistle 83 in the Editio Benedictin., or CLXVII in the Editio Novissima — abbreviation as in source].
10. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Fabiolam*, de mansione 38.
11. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 29 (*ad Hieronymum*).
12. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, cap. 4.
13. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* V, on ch. 6 (*Beati pauperes*).
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 11.
15. Cf. above, Dist. 15 of this book.
16. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 9 in Epistolam Ioannis ad Parthos* (on the canonical Epistle of John).
17. Ps. 18.
18. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, cap. 24; *Epistola* 120 *ad Honoratum*; *Sermo* 214 *De Tempore* (Seu *Sermo* CCCXLVIII, inter *Serm.* 1, *Classis*, in Editio Benedictina); and *Enarratio in Psalmum* 18.
19. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, cap. 9.
20. Prosper (of Aquitaine), *De Vita contemplativa* III, cap. 32.
21. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXXIV, cap. 17.
22. Bede, *In primum caput Proverbiorum*; cf. the Master (Peter Lombard), *In I Sent.*, dist. 35 [abbreviation as in source].
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 4; and II-II, qq. 8, 9, and 44.
24. Is. 11; Prov. 1; Eccl. 1, 4, and 15; Dan. 1; Col. 1.
25. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, cap. 1.
26. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, cap. 7.
27. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 87 *in Ioannem*.
28. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 83 *in Ioannem*.
29. St. Jerome, *In Isaia*, cap. 56.
30. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Pammachium* (Seu *Epistola* CLXVII in Editio Novissima).
31. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Fabiolam*, de mansionibus, mansio 38.
32. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* V, on Lk. 6 (*Beati pauperes*).

DISTINCTIO XXXVI — ON THE CONNECTION AND EQUALITY OF THE VIRTUES (*DE CONNEXIONE ET AEQUALITATE VIRTUTUM*)

§ 1. St. Gregory likewise shows in very many places that this opinion was pleasing to him. For in Book 22 of the *Moralia*, chapter 1, he says: "It must be known that whoever is believed to excel in some virtue truly excels in it only when he does not in some part lie subject to vices." And a little further on, after a few intervening words: "And it is certain that neither is chastity true in the heart of him to whom humility is lacking, nor is humility true to which mercy is not joined, nor is mercy true which stands apart from the rectitude of justice," and so forth.¹ Similar passages are found in Book 1 of the *Moralia*, chapter 24, and Book 2, chapter 3,² as well as in that same author — or whoever the author may be — in the third penitential Psalm, at the words: "There is no peace in my bones."³ Moreover, Prosper, in his work *Against the Collator*, chapter 37, teaches that virtues cannot dwell together with vices;⁴ and in Book 3, *On the Contemplative Life*, chapter 3, asserting that virtue does not dwell in a vicious soul, he appears to hold the same view as those above regarding the connection of the virtues.⁵ And St. Bernard, in Book 1 *On Consideration*, addressed to Eugenius, chapter 8, calls this connection "a most sweet harmony and embrace of the virtues," by which it comes about that one depends upon another;⁶ and the same Bernard, in Sermon 1 *On the Annunciation*, says that virtues cannot even exist if they are separated from one another.⁷

§ 2. As for what concerns the Philosophers — to say nothing of Aristotle and Cicero, the former of whom in Books 3 and 6 of the *Ethics*, and the latter in Books 2 and 3 of the *Tusculan Disputations*, advance the same opinion⁸ — we have just now shown, from St. Augustine's letter to St. Jerome, that this opinion was pleasing to all philosophers.⁹ The argument by which St. Augustine proves it, both elsewhere and in the letter just mentioned, he sets forth thus: because prudence can be neither slothful, nor unjust, nor intemperate. For if it were any of these things, it would not be prudence. Wherefore prudence draws the others along with it. So too fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust. And similarly for the rest. This same proof is already to be seen in St. Gregory, Book 2 of the *Moralia*, chapters 3, 5, and Book 22, chapter 1.¹⁰ St. Augustine further adds an example by which to illustrate this, drawn from the Roman Catiline. Although Catiline was most patient of all hardships, he was nevertheless not endowed with true fortitude. For he did not choose rightly on behalf of good ends; nor was he temperate, because he was defiled by the most foul corruptions; nor was he just, for he had conspired against his fatherland. "And therefore," Augustine says, "there was no fortitude, but a hardness which imposed upon itself the name of fortitude in order to deceive the foolish. For if it were fortitude, it would be not a vice but a virtue. But if it were a virtue, it would never be abandoned by the other virtues as by inseparable companions." So St. Augustine.

§ 3. The Scholastics, however, employ an argument of this kind. If someone is supposed to possess temperance without fortitude, and is placed in a moment of necessity such that he must either die or commit

adultery, then lacking fortitude through fear of death he will choose adultery, and consequently it follows that he does not possess temperance either. This same point can be demonstrated in a similar manner regarding the other virtues. Therefore the virtues are necessarily connected among themselves.

§ 4. Now, the arguments which dissolve the connection of the virtues appear neither fewer in number nor less effective. First, the Apostle, at 1 Cor. 7, when speaking of continence, says that each one has his own gift from God, one in this manner and another in that.¹¹ Second, at Rev. 2, the virtue of patience is attributed to the Angel of Ephesus, who had nevertheless abandoned his first charity.¹² And at 1 Cor. 13, mercy and liberality towards the poor are acknowledged as separated from charity.¹³ Therefore if some moral virtue can be possessed without charity, it will also be possible to possess it without another moral virtue. The authority of the Fathers also supports this opinion.

§ 5. St. Jerome, in *Dialogue 1 Against the Pelagians*, chapter 7, denies that all the virtues can be present in any one man while we live in this mortal body.¹⁴ The contrary opinion, that is, the one which connects the virtues, he says is the opinion of the philosophers, not of the Apostles, and declares that he does not care what Aristotle teaches but what Paul teaches. And in chapter 8 he says that it is either no bishop at all, or a rare one, who possesses all the virtues which the Apostle requires of him. "Yet," he says, "if one or two are lacking, he will not be deprived of the title of the just. For to possess all things is the virtue of him who did not commit sin, and in whose mouth no deceit was found."¹⁵

§ 6. The same Jerome, above in chapter 1 of the commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, at the end, says: "God is present by parts in individual persons: in one, justice; in another, chastity; in another, temperance; in another, wisdom; in another, fortitude; and it is difficult even among holy and perfect men for all the virtues together to be present. But when in the end all things shall be filled up, all in all, so that what God is, complete in all virtues, may be fulfilled in the universal whole — all having all the things which individually the particular persons possessed."¹⁶ And Augustine, writing to Jerome in Letter 29, after what we cited above in favour of the connection of the virtues, attacks that same position from the opposite side of the debate: "For it is not a divine sentence, that opinion which says that whoever has had one virtue has them all, and that in none is any one lacking to whom any one is lacking; this seemed good to men," etc. And a little further on: "Hence the conjugal chastity of women and of consecrated women is, beyond all doubt, a virtue, yet it does not carry with itself all the virtues. For if all of these things were present, there would be no vice; if no vice, absolutely no sin. And many intervening words later: But if, as I think to be truer and more consonant with Sacred Scripture, the intentions of the soul are like the members of the body — so that, just as each one is illumined by an act of devout charity more in one act, less in another, and in another not at all — so can one be said to have one virtue, and not to have another, to have one virtue more and another less." And what follows, in which he asserts that someone may not have continence who nevertheless possesses patience and mercy.¹⁷

§ 7. The same St. Augustine, in the book *On Patience*, chapter 26, recognises in a schismatic dying for the faith of Christ a praiseworthy patience, which, however, he at once confirms in the same place to be separated from charity in such a man.¹⁸ And in Book 2 *On the Merits of Sinners*, chapter 19, he says that all the just are left exposed by the guardianship of humility to certain vices;¹⁹ and again in the book *On Holy Virginity*, chapters 45 and 47, he shows that there are other virtues in different persons.²⁰ From this passage Bede, in Book 1 of his commentary *On the Song of Songs, Against Julian, concerning Grace*, chapter 6, teaches that all the goods of virtues are not present in all the Saints, and that these are the more humbled on account of the

virtues they do not have than on account of those which they do have.²¹ St. Gregory likewise, in Homily 13 on the Gospels, acknowledges that some are outstanding in chastity who do not exercise themselves in good works, though he denies that they are pleasing to God.²² This too is the opinion of Prosper, number seven among the Saints: "With the sole exception of charity, all virtues are common to both the good and the wicked."²³ And Lactantius, in Book 5 of the *Divine Institutes*, chapter 14, teaches that the remaining virtues — such as faith, temperance, probity — can be separated from justice.²⁴

§ 8. Furthermore, this same point seems to be shown both by experience and by reason: by experience, indeed, because many people observe chastity while being drunkards in the meantime. Many also cultivate the virtue of justice, defrauding no one but rendering to each his own; who nevertheless do not practise liberality towards the needy. Moreover, it is well established that many are endowed with conjugal continence who do not possess virginal continence. Indeed, virginal, conjugal, and widowed chastity are mutually opposed. And by reason: because virtues are undoubtedly habits, and habits, just as they are all acquired through their proper operations, so too are they lost through contrary operations. Since, therefore, one can exercise oneself in the operations of one habit and not of another, and likewise perform operations contrary to one habit and not to another — for no one teaches that the operations are themselves connected to one another — one will therefore be able to acquire one moral habit without another, just as one will be able to lose it. Furthermore, it seems plainly absurd and alien to the true nature of habits that at the very same moment at which, after frequent acts, some habit is acquired, many other habits should simultaneously spring up whose acts have been preceded by none whatsoever — just as it is equally absurd that at the moment one habit perishes, all the rest should perish with it. There is also another argument. Since one virtue is not the entire perfection of a man but only a partial one — just as one sense is in the body of an animal — nothing seems to prevent a man from being well disposed around the object of one virtue and not around the object of another: for instance, around those things which pertain to virginity, but not around those which pertain to other matters. Just as one sense can be present without another, so too can one virtue.

§ II — Determination of the question together with the resolution of the arguments (Quaestionis determinatio cum solutione argumentorum)

§ 9. For the explanation of the question (in which Scotus dissents from St. Thomas, absolutely denying the connection of the virtues) one must distinguish between perfect virtue and imperfect virtue. This distinction is not taken according to habit and disposition, nor according to intensity and remission, but according to a certain other mode of perfection and imperfection. For although every virtue, as such, is a certain perfection of the soul, not every virtue is therefore to be called a perfect virtue. Now a virtue is perfect — as it is also imperfect — in two ways. In the first way, we call that virtue perfect which disposes the soul of its possessor well around its proper object universally and generally, that is, against whatever impulses proceeding from whatever passion. Imperfect, on the other hand, is that virtue which disposes the soul well around its proper object not universally, but only against the impulses of those passions which it properly moderates. For example, temperance is a perfect virtue when it disposes and strengthens the soul around pleasurable things not only against the impulse of disordered pleasure, but also against those impulses which can arise from avarice or fear of death. For otherwise it will be an imperfect virtue only, as in the case of a man or woman who

admits fornication or adultery not out of desire for pleasure, but for gain or for fear of death or torture. In the second way, we call that virtue perfect which is formed by charity, and imperfect that which lacks that form.

§ 10. These things having been established, it is answered: virtues that are perfect in the first way are connected in prudence, while imperfect ones are not necessarily connected. Likewise, those perfect in the second way are connected in charity, while imperfect ones are not. Proof of the first: because prudence is the formal character (*ratio*) of all things to be done universally, and not only of those things which are of a certain genus; and therefore, just as each virtue draws prudence along with it, so prudence draws the rest along with itself. Proof of the second: because charity rectifies the will absolutely and not merely with respect to a certain genus of actions to be done. This is confirmed by those who teach that charity alone suffices for salvation — for no other reason than that charity itself without the other goods necessary for salvation cannot exist.

§ 11. Moreover, this distinction of perfect and imperfect virtue for solving the present question was not first devised by the Scholastics, but was manifestly indicated by St. Gregory. For in Book 22 of the *Moralia*, chapter 1, showing that virtues are in a certain sense connected and in a certain sense not connected, he says: "For each virtue is by so much the less, the more the others are lacking." And below: "Thus one virtue without the others is either altogether nothing or imperfect. For — to speak of the four primary virtues: prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice — the individual virtues are so much the more perfect, the more they are mutually conjoined to one another. But separated, they can in no way be perfect, because neither is prudence true which is not just, temperate, and brave; nor is temperance perfect which is not brave, just, and prudent," and so forth.¹ And the same Gregory speaks similarly in Book 21, chapter 4, and in the commentary on the third penitential Psalm.²⁶

§ 12. These things having been established, it is not difficult to reconcile the opinions of both parties and to resolve the arguments. For some things must be understood of perfect virtues, others of imperfect virtues. For this reason too, Augustine, writing to Jerome, was willing to argue on both sides rather than to set forth anything definitive. As for the fact that the Fathers sometimes deny that all the virtues are present in any single man, even a holy one — although this can be taken with respect to the excellence of the virtues (for different persons have excelled in different virtues), and St. Jerome explains the matter in this way in Book 1 *Against the Pelagians*, chapter 7, where, responding to Critobulus asking: "And how do we read that whoever has had one virtue seems to have all?" Atticus answers: "By participation, not by proprietary possession. For it is necessary that individual persons excel in certain ones" — so he speaks;¹⁴ it can nevertheless also be understood of the virtues insofar as they are certain habits by which we operate readily and with delight. For in this manner not all virtues are present in those who have charity, but at least according to the preparation of the will for the very works of the virtues to be performed in the proper place and time, so that in charity as in a root all of them may be said to exist. This is in accordance with the words of St. Gregory, Homily 27 on the Gospels: "For just as many branches of a tree proceed from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity."²⁷ That this suffices for the formal character of Christian virtue — which, existing radically in charity, has a connection with the others — we showed at Distinction 27 of Book 2.²⁸ And in this sense there is nothing absurd in saying that whoever receives charity is said to receive all virtues simultaneously; and conversely, that whoever loses charity loses all simultaneously. For from charity as form all simultaneously receive their perfection; when it withdraws, all simultaneously lose it — even if it should happen that the operative habits, which at that point retain only the formal character of imperfect virtue, remain.

§ 13. To the objection raised about virginal chastity, the reply must be that in one who does not have virginal chastity but only conjugal chastity, the virtue of temperance can exist as even perfect in both modes of perfection; and consequently the moral virtues are connected in him — not indeed according to individual species, which is not required in those things which are not necessary for salvation (such as virginal chastity), but according to their genera, which are the four cardinal virtues.

§ III — *Whether all the virtues in the same person are equal (An virtutes omnes in eodem sint aequales)*

§ 14. That virtues are not equal in different persons — whether they be of the same genus or of different genera — is self-evident. For since neither prudence nor charity is equally great in all good persons, it is no wonder that other virtues are also found to be unequal in them: for instance, fortitude compared with fortitude, or fortitude compared with temperance. But whether in the same person all virtues are equal is a matter of question.

§ 15. The side that denies this is supported by no small force of both reason and experience. By reason indeed: because virtue, just as it is acquired, so too is it increased and intensified by the frequency of acts. Now it very frequently happens that the acts of one virtue are practised by someone more than those of another. Therefore it is consistent that one virtue should be more intensified and increased than another. By experience: because we see that very many people exercise the act of one virtue more readily and with greater delight than that of another. This is an argument for a more intense habit. Scripture too and the Histories commend different persons for certain virtues above others: Abraham and Peter for faith, Joseph and John for chastity, Job and Tobias for patience, Moses and David for meekness. Thus among the Martyrs fortitude excelled, among Virgins purity, and in others other virtues were outstanding — so that the Church even justly sings of any Confessor: "There was none found like him who kept the law of the Most High" — evidently, as St. Thomas says, on account of the prerogative of some more excellent virtue which each one possessed above another. Hence Augustine, in Letter 29 to Jerome,³⁰ thinks it truer and more consonant with Sacred Scripture that, just as each one is affected by the illumination of devout charity more in one act and less in another, so he has one virtue more and another less — for instance, greater chastity than patience.

§ 16. Yet the same Augustine appears to hold a different opinion. For in the book *On the Trinity*, chapter 4, he joins equality to the connection of the virtues, so that whoever are equal, for instance, in fortitude, are equal also in prudence, temperance, and justice. "For if," he says, "you say that these men are equal in fortitude but that one surpasses in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of this man is less prudent, and for this reason they are not even equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of that man is more prudent." And similarly for the other virtues.³¹

§ 17. This opinion is confirmed also by these words of St. Gregory, in the last Homily on Ezekiel, on the verse "And he measured the atrium": "Faith, hope, charity, and action — so long as we live in this life — we find to be equal to one another in ourselves. For as much as we believe in him, so much do we love; and as much as we love, so much do we presume from hope." And a little further on: "When, therefore, virtue, the opportunity of time and place for acting are at hand, one acts so much as he has known God." And below: "Each person who is engaged in this exercise of life believes as much as he hopes and loves; and acts as much as

he believes, loves, and hopes." And in the subsequent words the same Gregory asserts the same thing of the four principal virtues, which are so set in a fourfold arrangement that one does not exceed another. Concerning these, after much more he thus concludes: "Let therefore the more perfect life of the faithful be measured by the square, and let each side of the spiritual atrium be as great as each individual side, because each person is as much prudent as he is temperate, and as much just as he has been prudent, temperate, and brave." So he.³²

§ 18. Since these things have been said so variously by the Fathers, here again a distinction of perfect and imperfect virtue is needed. For perfect virtues, just as they are connected in the root of prudence or charity, so also are they found to be equal in the same person. For the other philosophical virtues are as great as prudence; and the other Christian virtues are as great as charity; and as much as either one grows, so much do the rest grow. Not because one virtue according to its species and the formal character of its proper object is not more worthy and pre-eminent than another; but because in the root of prudence or charity all are proportionally equal to one another, in that by a certain proportion they are simultaneously increased along with the increase of prudence or charity — just as we say that the fingers of the same hand are in quantity unequal but in proportion equal, and grow equally. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Good of Marriage*, chapter 21, did not hesitate to compare the holy Patriarchs even with respect to those virtues which they did not possess in act but only in habit, with those who exercised them in act.³³

§ 19. The arguments produced on the contrary side prove that the virtues are unequal in the same person, not with respect to what is formal in them — that is, with respect to the formal character of prudence or charity — but with respect to what is considered material in them: that is, with respect to the inclination which a person has towards the act of virtue. For it is established that men are inclined by nature, or by habit, or by some infused gift of Grace, more towards the act of one virtue than of another.

§ IV — That vices are neither mutually connected nor equal (Quod vitia nec connexa sint inter se, nec paria)

§ 20. The formal character (*ratio*) of virtues and of vices is not the same — neither as regards their connection nor as regards their equality. For, to speak first of connection: in vices a contrariety is found such as exists in no wise among virtues. Hence it is not possible to posit any one thing in which all vices are mutually connected with one another, as all virtues are connected in some one thing. For although all vices and sins agree in this, that through them there is a departure from the rule of right reason and the mind is turned away from love of the Highest Good, yet through them there is no approach and conversion to any one created good, but rather to diverse goods having no connection among themselves — indeed, sometimes even to goods that are mutually contrary. St. Augustine, therefore, having granted the connection of virtues, rightly denies that it follows that vices are likewise mutually connected, saying thus in Epistle 29 (to St. Jerome):³⁵ "Therefore, when inquiry is made also concerning vices, whether they too are all present wherever one is present, or are none of them present where one is absent — it is laborious to show this, because two vices are wont to be opposed to a single virtue: one that is its open contrary, and one that is veiled under the appearance of resemblance." And a little later: "Yet because some are rash who are not fearful, and again some are fearful in whom boldness is absent — since both are vices — we are compelled to admit that vices are more numerous than virtues. Hence at times one vice is displaced by another vice, as love of praise displaces love of money; at

times one gives way so that several may succeed: as one who has been a drunkard, if he drinks but little, may have learned miserliness and ambition. Vices, therefore, can also yield to succeeding vices, not to virtues, and for this reason they are more numerous. But virtue, wherever one has entered — since it leads the others with it — will assuredly drive out all the vices that were present. For not all were present; but sometimes the same number, sometimes more succeeded fewer, or fewer succeeded more." Thus St. Augustine. He also pronounces plainly in Book 4 (*Against the Donatists*, ch. 20):³⁶ "For not all the other vices follow upon any single vice."

§ 21. Now as regards equality: neither on this point is the same judgment to be made about virtues and vices alike. For the equality of vices can be understood in two ways: either such that all vices, in whomsoever they may be found, are judged to be of equal gravity and demerit — which was once the Stoic opinion, expressed by Cicero (*Paradoxes* 3)³⁷ — or such that in the same individual all vices found therein are of equal demerit and malice. In the former sense, we have already said above that not even virtues are equal among themselves. By the same token, however, the same does not follow concerning vices; because, as St. Augustine says in the epistle already cited,³⁸ "where there is no virtue, nothing is straightway right. Yet it does not follow that one crooked thing is therefore more crooked than another, or one distorted thing more distorted." For departure from what is right can be greater or less, just as in lines, so also in actions.

Hence the Stoic opinion concerning the equality of sins was long ago, in the case of Jovinianus, condemned as heretical by Catholics, as is evident from St. Jerome's book written against him,³⁹ and likewise from St. Augustine, both in the Epistle to St. Jerome and elsewhere, and in the book *On Heresies*, and in *Against Lying*, ch. 15.⁴⁰ The Stoics, indeed, also maintained the equality of virtues, as is evident from the *Paradoxes* of Cicero and from St. Augustine's letter to St. Jerome; but that opinion, inasmuch as in part it is true — namely, as regards virtues which are in the same thing — we do not read to have been combated by the Fathers in the same way.

§ 22. In this latter mode, therefore, virtues are equal; but it does not follow that vices must likewise be equal. For the equality of virtues arises from their connection, as has been shown in the preceding section. Since this connection has no place in vices, as has now been shown, it is evident that no such parity is to be acknowledged in them either. The inequality of vices and sins — whether in the same person or in different persons — is variously estimated: for instance from the object, from a greater or lesser propensity, from the cause, from the person, from the place, from the time, from the manner, and from other circumstances.

§ I — That all things are contained in the two precepts of charity (In duobus praeceptis charitatis cetera omnia contineri)

§ 23. After Christ (Matt. 22) had proposed the two chief commandments of the law — the one concerning God, the other concerning love of neighbour — he added: "On these two commandments the whole Law and the Prophets depend." Expounding this, St. Augustine in the book *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 5,⁴² says: "Many are the divine precepts in the Holy Scriptures, to enumerate all of which would be exceedingly laborious. But the Lord, who made a word short and abridged upon the earth, said in two commandments that the Law and the Prophets depend, so that we might understand that whatever else has been divinely commanded has its end in these two and is to be referred to them. Whatever, therefore, we are forbidden by

God's law, whatever we are commanded to do — we are forbidden and commanded to that end, that we may fulfil these two." And in the *Enchiridion*, ch. penultimate:⁴³ "All divine precepts are referred to charity, of which the Apostle says: 'The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith' (1 Tim. 1:5). Every end of a precept, therefore, is charity — that is, every precept is referred to charity. But when this is done out of fear of punishment or out of some carnal intention, so that it is not referred to that charity which the Holy Spirit pours forth in our hearts — it is not done as it ought to be done, however much it may seem to be done. For this charity is charity toward God and toward neighbour. And surely on these two commandments the whole Law depends, and the Prophets. Add the Gospel, add the Apostles." Then he concludes: "Whatever, therefore, God commands and whatever, without being commanded, is counselled by spiritual advice — these are rightly done when they are directed toward loving God and neighbour in the present life and in the future."⁴⁴

§ 24. The places of St. Augustine in which he expounds that saying of the Lord in nearly the same manner may be seen: in *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 35 and 36, Book 1;⁴⁵ in Epistle 52;⁴⁶ in Book 1 of the *Questions on the Gospels*, question 33;⁴⁷ in Book 19 of *The City of God*, ch. 14;⁴⁸ and in the treatise *On the Praises of Charity*,⁴⁹ the words of which passage are found in the Master at the end of the preceding Distinction. Furthermore, St. Cyprian, looking to the same doctrine in the Sermon *On the Lord's Prayer*,⁵⁰ says thus: "For when our Lord Jesus Christ came to all, gathering the learned and unlearned alike, and gave to every sex and age the precepts of salvation, he made a great summary of his commandments, so that in heavenly discipline the memory of those learning might not be burdened, but that what was necessary for simple faith might be swiftly learned," and so forth.

§ 25. From these considerations, therefore, it is understood in a twofold formal character (*ratio*) that all other things depend on the precepts of charity. In one way, because through charity all things are fulfilled, according to that saying of the Apostle in Rom. 13: "The fullness of the law is love" (*plenitudo legis dilectio*); and *ibid.*: "He who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law." In another way, because all things are in some fashion contained in these two, so that according to this latter mode — which the Lord himself seems properly to have had in view — the sense of the statement is this: All divine precepts, whether they pertain to morals and judgments, or even to ceremonies, and all doctrine of the Prophets and the history of the sacred Books, yea and the evangelical counsels and apostolic precepts, and whatever else is rightly established by men, are contained in these two commandments of love in such a way that they either depend upon them and are elicited from them, or are referred to observance of them — so much so that according to the rule of this twofold love all other things are to be estimated as to their necessity, or greater or lesser usefulness, with the result that sometimes, in accordance with the exigency of that same rule, they ought even to be omitted, changed, abrogated, or dispensed.

§ 26. It must be noted (*Notandum est*), moreover, that what the Lord says in Matt. 22 concerning the two commandments can be understood either of them taken together — since in the former commandment are comprehended all things toward God, and in the latter all things toward neighbour and consequently toward ourselves — or of either of them taken separately, because the observance of the one precept cannot exist without the other. For no one loves God as he ought unless he obeys his commandments, one of which is that the neighbour be loved. Nor can anyone love his neighbour as he ought to be loved — that is, for God's sake — unless he loves God as the end to which the love of one's neighbour is referred. Which mutual connection of the twin charity is indicated in some measure by St. John (1 Jn. 4).⁵¹

§ 27. That not only in the former but also in the latter commandment of love all other things depend, is clear from the authority of Scripture. For Christ (Matt. 7), having said: "All things whatsoever you wish that men should do to you," etc. — words by which the commandment of love of neighbour is explained — added: "For this is the Law and the Prophets." And Paul (Rom. 13) says that all the commandments are restored, recapitulated, and summarily comprehended in this word: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" — and he testifies that this same love of neighbour is the fullness of the law, that is, its completion. He repeats the same (Gal. 5).⁵²

§ 28. Note also, from St. Jerome in his *Catalogue (De Viris Illustribus)*, the saying of the Apostle John:⁵³ who, since in his old age he could not deliver long discourses to the brethren, kept inculcating repeatedly that one thing: "Little children, love one another." But when he was asked why he said only this in the assembly, he gave the answer worthy of an Apostle: "Because if this alone be done, it is enough." Which is nothing other than that all other precepts are contained in it. Furthermore, St. Augustine, writing on ch. 5 of the Epistle to the Galatians,⁵⁴ gives the reason why the Apostle, both in the Epistle to the Romans and to the Galatians, placed the consummation of the law in love of neighbour, passing over in silence the love of God — even though both precepts are such that neither can be kept without the other. The reason is this: because, he says, "in love of God men can lie, since rarer temptations test it. But in love of neighbour they are more easily convicted of not having it, when they deal unjustly with men." A similar passage is found in Epistle 52.⁵⁵

§ II — That the entire law of nature is contained in the Decalogue (Totam legem naturae decalogo contineri)

§ 29. When the law of nature (*lex naturae*) had been almost entirely blotted out from the minds of men by sin and by the habit of sin, God willed to give to the people whom He had chosen for Himself as peculiar among all nations a written law, by which they might be more surely instructed concerning those things which they ought either to do or to omit. Hence to the Jewish people is attributed in a special manner the knowledge of the law and of the divine will, even of that part of it which coincides with the natural law (Ps. 147 and Rom. 2).⁵⁷ For it is manifest that the Apostle is speaking of the natural law, because he says that the Jew knows from the law that one must not steal, must not commit adultery, must not commit sacrilege — which are indeed precepts of the law of nature. And he affirms (Rom. 7) that sin is not known except through the law, and that without the law sin is dead — although a man is never without the natural law.⁵⁸ It was therefore necessary that the entire law of nature be contained in the Decalogue, which was given for this purpose: that the law of nature, all but erased from the minds of men, might be reformed and, as it were, re-engraved there; and that in it, as in a brief compendium, whatever precept pertaining to the natural law had been commanded or was to be commanded elsewhere might be comprehended.

§ 30. Hence St. Augustine (in *Quaest. 148 in Exod.*)⁵⁹ says: "When God had spoken so many things, only two stone tablets are given to Moses; evidently all the other things which God commanded are understood to depend on those ten precepts written on the two tablets, if they are diligently sought out and rightly understood — just as these same ten precepts in turn depend on those two, namely the love of God and of neighbour, on which the whole Law and the Prophets hang." The same author, at the beginning of his *Enarratio on Ps. 57*,⁶⁰ speaks thus: "The hand of our Maker wrote truth in our very hearts: *What you do not*

wish to be done to you, do not do to another. This is something that even before the law was given no one was permitted to be ignorant of, so that there might be a basis on which even those to whom the law had not been given might be judged; but lest men complain that something had been lacking for them, it was also written on the tablets what they were not reading in their hearts. For they did not lack it in written form, but they were unwilling to read it. Set before their eyes was what they were compelled to see in their conscience, and as if by the voice of God applied from without they were recalled to their inward selves." And he continues: "For the thought of the impious man shall be interrogated" (Wis. 1).⁶¹ "Where there is interrogation, there is law. But because men, craving the things that are outside, had become exiles even from themselves, the law was also given in written form — not because it had not been written in their hearts, but because you were a fugitive from your own heart." St. Ambrose likewise (Epist. 71, to Irenaeus)⁶² says: "Because by disobedience the prerogative of the natural law was corrupted and forbidden, therefore a written law was deemed necessary"; and what follows.

§ 31. That the law of nature was obscured by sin and all but erased from the hearts of men, so that for this reason a written law was necessary, is shown by the Scriptures, which attribute folly and ignorance of what is to be done to the human race (Ps. 13, Rom. 3, Tit. 3).⁶³ The Fathers also teach this in very many places, of which it suffices here to have noted certain ones: St. Augustine, book 14 (*De Trinitate*, ch. 15; *Enchiridion*, chs. 26–27; *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27; and book 1 of the *Confessions*, ch. 18);⁶⁴ St. Jerome, book 2 (*Adversus Jovinianum*);⁶⁵ Prosper, *Contra Collatorem* (ch. 21 and *Resp. 6 ad cap. Gall.*);⁶⁶ St. Cyril, book 2 (*In Jo.*, ch. 45, on the text: "Everyone who does evil hates the light").⁶⁷ To these add the passage of St. Ambrose just cited and certain things said by us (at Dist. 23 and 24, book 2).⁶⁸

§ III — That Christians are bound by the Decalogue under Christ as lawgiver (Christianos teneri decalogo sub legislatore Christo)

§ 32. Although Christians are not bound by the Mosaic law insofar as it is such — that is, insofar as it was enacted through Moses — because the legislation of Moses pertained only to the Israelite people, and that only until the coming of Christ and the preaching of the Gospel, in which the entire Mosaic constitution received its end; they are nevertheless bound absolutely by the law of the Decalogue, for a twofold reason. First, because the Decalogue is nothing other than an explication of the law of nature (*lex naturae*), as we have already shown. And for this reason not Christians alone, but all men are bound by the law of the Decalogue. For the law of nature is common to the whole human race, nor does it require, in order to oblige anyone, an external promulgation, but it suffices that it be inscribed in the hearts of individual persons. Second, because the law of the Deca-

1. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXII, ch. 1.

2. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* I, ch. 24; II, ch. 3.

3. The reference is to the commentary attributed to the same author (or a closely related author) on the third penitential Psalm, at Ps. 37 [38]: "There is no peace in my bones."

4. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 37.

5. Prosper of Aquitaine [or Julian Pomerius], *De vita contemplativa* III, ch. 3.

6. St. Bernard, *De consideratione* I, ch. 8.
7. St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *On the Annunciation*.
8. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III and VI; Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* II and III.
9. St. Augustine, Epistle to Jerome (Ep. 167 in the Benedictine edition).
10. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* II, chs. 3, 5; XXII, ch. 1.
11. 1 Cor. 7.
12. Rev. 2.
13. 1 Cor. 13.
14. St. Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* I, ch. 7.
15. St. Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos* I, ch. 8.
16. St. Jerome, Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, Book 1, ch. 1 (end).
17. St. Augustine, Epistle 29 [= Ep. 167, Benedictine edition] to St. Jerome.
18. St. Augustine, *De patientia*, ch. 26.
19. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 19.
20. St. Augustine, *De sancta virginitate*, chs. 45 and 47.
21. Bede, *In Cantica Canticorum de Gratia contra Julianum* I, ch. 6.
22. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia* homily 13.
23. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae*, no. 7 among the Saints.
24. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* V, ch. 14.
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as cited above (*ubi supra*).
26. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXI, ch. 4; commentary on the third penitential Psalm.
27. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia* homily 27.
28. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 27.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 66, a. 2.
30. St. Augustine, Epistle 29 (= Ep. 167, Benedictine edition) to St. Jerome.
31. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ch. 4.
32. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, last homily (*Super Ezech., ad illud: "Et mensus est atrium"*).
33. St. Augustine, *De bono coniugali*, ch. 21.
34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 73, aa. 1–2.
35. St. Augustine, Epistle 29 (= Ep. 167, Benedictine edition), to St. Jerome.
36. St. Augustine, *Contra Donatistas* (here cited as Book 4, ch. 20) [abbreviation as in source: "libro 4. Contra Donatistas capite 20"].
37. Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, Paradox 3.
38. St. Augustine, Epistle 29 (= Ep. 167, Benedictine edition), to St. Jerome, as cited above.
39. St. Jerome, book written against Jovinianus (*Adversus Jovinianum*).
40. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, ch. 15.
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 99, a. 1; q. 100, a. 3, ad 1; II-II, q. 44.
42. St. Augustine, *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, ch. 5.

43. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. penultimate (ch. 121).
44. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, concluding passage, *ibid.*
45. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, chs. 35–36.
46. St. Augustine, Epistle 52 (= Ep. CLV or CLXVII, Benedictine edition) [abbreviation as in source].
47. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* I, q. 33.
48. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIX, ch. 14.
49. St. Augustine (attrib.), *De laudibus caritatis* (a sermon placed among the *Sermones de Diversis*, Order CCCL, in the Benedictine edition, Vol. V; found also in excerpts of Eugippius under the title *De laude Caritatis*; reprobated by Erasmus's censure and placed in Vol. X among the *Sermones de Tempore* XXXIX by the Benedictines among the genuine sermons, Vol. IV). [Estius's footnote (b) identifies this as a composite/interpolated text.]
50. St. Cyprian, *De Oratione Dominica* (sermon on the Lord's Prayer).
51. St. John, 1 Jn. 4.
52. St. Paul, Gal. 5.
53. St. Jerome, *De Viris Illustribus (Catalogus)*, on the Apostle John.
54. St. Augustine, Commentary on ch. 5 of the Epistle to the Galatians (*In Epistolam ad Galatas*, ch. 5).
55. St. Augustine, Epistle 52 (Benedictine numbering: Ep. CLXVII).
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 11.
57. Ps. 147 and Rom. 2.
58. Rom. 7.
59. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Exodum*, q. 148.
60. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 57 (opening).
61. Wis. 1.
62. St. Ambrose, Epistula 71 (to Irenaeus).
63. Ps. 13; Rom. 3; Tit. 3.
64. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, ch. 15; *Enchiridion*, chs. 26–27; *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27; *Confessiones* I, ch. 18.
65. St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum*, book 2.
66. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 21; and *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 6.
67. St. Cyril, *In Joannem* II, ch. 45 (on the words "Everyone who does evil hates the light").
68. Estius, commentary on Dist. 23 and 24, book 2.
69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100 and q. 108, a. 5; *Summa theologiae* III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII — ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE, THEIR OBLIGATION, AND THEIR FULFILMENT THROUGH LOVE (*DE PRAECEPTIS DECALOGI, EORUM OBLIGATIONE, ET IMPLETIONE PER DILECTIONEM*)

§ 1. Christ confirmed the Decalogue in the Gospel and taught that obedience to it is necessary for the attainment of life, and moreover willed it to be His own law; so that Christ is rightly to be called a Legislator as well, and not merely our Redeemer and Mediator. Hence the Fathers of the Council of Trent pronounce anathema upon those who say that Christ was given by God to men as a Redeemer in whom they should trust, but not also as a Legislator whom they should obey.¹ For this reason, however, the Decalogue does not bind absolutely all human beings, but only those to whom the knowledge of Christ's law has come.

§ 2. Moreover, the passages of Scripture that attribute legislative power to Christ are very numerous in both Testaments, but the following are the most important. Is. 2 and Mic. 4: "From Sion the law shall go forth"; Is. 42: "The islands shall await His law"; Ps. 83 [84]: "The Lawgiver shall give blessing." Likewise Christ (Matt. 5) speaks as a Legislator and repeatedly says: "But I say to you," and so forth. And at the close of the whole sermon on the mount, the Evangelist adds that "He was teaching as one having authority, and not as the scribes and Pharisees."² Elsewhere too Christ inculcates His commandment, as when He says (Jn. 15): "This I command you. This is my commandment. If you do what I command you," and similar words. And that saying (Matt. 28): "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." To these add the fact that God the Father commands obedience to Christ as Legislator, saying: "This is my beloved Son; hear Him." And Moses (Deut. 18) says: "The Lord your God will raise up for you a Prophet from your brethren like unto me; Him you shall hear; but whosoever will not hear His words, I will be the avenger, saith the Lord."³ Peter repeats this (Acts 3) and Stephen (Acts 7).⁴ Hence it is clear that Christ is no less properly a Legislator than Moses, inasmuch as the transgression of His precepts merits punishment not only as contrary to the law of nature, but also as opposed to the precepts of Christ, just as is said of the law of Moses (Heb. 2 and 10), in the promulgation of which Moses was God's minister. Hence the Apostle did not hesitate to call what Christ delivered to be done "the law of Christ" (1 Cor. 9; Gal. 6) and "the commandments of the Lord" (1 Cor. 7 and 14).⁵

§ 3. This is further confirmed by what is found scattered throughout Scripture: Christ is called not only Lord, Physician, and Redeemer, but also King, Prince, Lord, Teacher, Master, and our Father. To all of these there belongs the power of commanding under penalty of disobedience. And indeed it would be absurd to remove legislative power, or its exercise, from Christ, since it manifestly belongs to His body the Church, of which He Himself is the head — as He Himself said: "If he will not hear the Church" (Matt. 18). This power

of commanding He conjoined with the power of judging, and both are attributed to Christ by St. Gregory⁶ treating the text "Let him who judges write the book himself," saying thus: "The Lord, coming for the redemption of men, gave us a new testament, but also, examining us on the same testament, at times comes even as judge; and thus He Himself writes the book, who also judges. For Truth itself, which is itself, says: 'The Father judges no one, but has given all judgment to the Son.' He will therefore then be the ruler of the city who now is the author of the book; so that He may exact more strictly what He now mercifully commands," etc.

It is therefore clear that Christians have one and the same Lord as their Legislator whom they are to obey, as their Redeemer and Helper in whom they are to trust, and as their Judge from whom they are to expect rewards or punishments according to their merits. That the same Lord Christ also requires of His own the observance of the Decalogue is manifest from His reply to one who asked: "What good shall I do that I may have eternal life?" He answered: "If you will enter into life, keep the commandments," and thereupon recounted several commandments of the Decalogue (Matt. 19). And at the beginning of His preaching (Matt. 5), He bears witness saying: "Do not think that I have come to destroy the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to destroy but to fulfil." He fulfils it moreover not only by furnishing the Spirit of grace through whom the law is fulfilled by us, but also by supplying certain things that were less expressly set forth in the old law, as is plain from the same passage.⁷

§ 4. Paul likewise (Rom. 13) and James (ch. 2) require from their hearers the observance of the whole Decalogue, by no means content with faith alone without works. And, to pass over other innumerable passages, there is that celebrated sentence of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7): "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the observance of the commandments of God." Hence it has been said, rightly, by St. Augustine or rather by the Church⁸ that "the precepts of the Decalogue, except for the Sabbath, we do not doubt are to be observed in the New Testament." He excepts the Sabbath because it was ceremonial. Yet that precept is in part moral, and even now binds us and is observed by the Church in the substitution of the Lord's Day. Finally, the Church at all times, by proposing to the faithful the precepts of the Decalogue and requiring their observance as necessary for salvation, gives by its very practice a most weighty testimony to this effect. To this testimony, moreover, the authority of the Council of Trent has been added⁹ (Session 6, canon 9), where those are condemned who teach that in the Gospel nothing is commanded except faith, that the rest are matters of indifference, neither precepts nor prohibitions but free; and likewise those who teach that the precepts are of no concern to Christians. And (canon 20, in conformity with ch. 11), those are condemned who say that a justified man, however perfect, is not bound to observe the commandments of God and of the Church, as though the Gospel were a bare and absolute promise of eternal life, without the condition of observing the commandments.¹⁰ A similar error was condemned at the Council of Vienne.¹¹

(a) The Council of Vienne, held under Clement V in the year 1311, condemned the errors of the Beguards and Beguines, who were spreading their madness widely in the Kingdom of Almania [Germany]; its decree is reported in the Clementine constitution Ad Nostrum, On Heretics. These errors were customarily attributed by writers to various names: the Beguards, or Brothers of the Poor Life, and the Bizocos, and the Apostles, or the Fraticelli of the opinion, and finally the Dulcinites. Wondrous but altogether horrible are the depraved dogmas of this sect, which are reduced to eight headings in the aforesaid Clementine. Of these, the second was as follows: "That a man who has attained this degree of perfection can freely concede to his body whatsoever it pleases

— of men as well as of women who are in the said degree of perfection; nor is he obligated to any precepts of the Church." The third error of the Beguards, infused with an abominable spirit, was: "That those who are in the spirit of liberty are not subject to human obedience, nor are they obligated to the precepts of the Church." The remaining headings of this shameful teaching, which do not pertain to the matter the Author is discussing, we pass over, and will transcribe them elsewhere at a suitable opportunity. Very similar errors were renewed by certain sectarians who were called *Illuminati* (*Illuminati*) in the time of Urban VIII in the year 1623, whose sect was very frequent in certain towns of the Kingdom of Spain. Andreas Bacecus, at that time supreme Inquisitor of the Kingdom of Seville, condemned some sixty-six of them; their assertions were nearly innumerable. Among them: first, that mental prayer is so obligatory that by means of it all things are fulfilled. Third, that one ought not to obey any Prelate insofar as mental prayer would be impeded. Seventh, that at the elevation of the Most Blessed Sacrament one who is at prayer ought to keep the eyes closed, gathering the presence of God to oneself, so as not to allow discursion or meditation, or even the humanity of Christ. Twelfth, that one who is occupied in mental prayer can abstain from hearing Mass even on feast days. Thirteenth, that one who is at prayer or in church ought to forget the affairs of his household. The remaining dogmas of this most pernicious sect are reported at length by Malvasia in the Catalogue of Heresies, Century XVI, and by Father Galasso of the Society of Jesus in the Examination of Curious Doctrine. In that very recent seventeenth century, under the guise of piety, Michael Molinos likewise strove to put forward the same doctrine, under the pretext of leading souls to the highest Contemplation, to rest, and to union with God, and to continue them therein, and finally to impel them towards every impurity of the flesh under the pretence of a wicked annihilation of self. The Most Holy Lord Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff, in the General Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition held before him on the 8th of August, 1687, condemned, proscribed, and struck with anathema as "heretical, suspect, offensive to pious ears, rash, scandalous, blasphemous, injurious to the Church, subversive of the discipline of the Christian life, respectively seditious" sixty-eight propositions of the same Michael, acknowledged by him as his own. Of these propositions the greater part and almost all agree with the assertions of the Beguards. The first is: "A man must annihilate his own powers." The second: "To will to act actively is to offend God, who alone wishes to act in us." The fourth: "afterwards to remain as a lifeless body." The fifth: "Natural activity is the enemy of Grace, and impedes the operations of God and true perfection." Ninth: "By doing nothing the soul annihilates itself and returns to its principle, which is the essence of God, and God then remains in Himself alone; and in this way God lives and is, in an operative manner." These propositions are of the same theft as those of Michael Molinos noted in the aforesaid Diploma, and many more would need to be noted on this matter, but it is sufficient for our purpose to have indicated these.

§ 5. Those who assert that the precepts of God are proposed to those living under Grace as a greater means of showing all to be guilty of eternal death, rather than to be observed by them, are gravely in error.¹²

§ IV — The precepts of the law are fulfilled through love of God and of justice (Praecepta legis dilectione Dei, atque Justitiae, impleri)

§ 6. That we are not to obey the divine law through servile fear of punishment alone, but through love of justice (*amor iustitiae*), is shown partly by what has been said concerning servile fear (at Distinction 34), where it was asked whether he sins who abstains from sins through servile fear of punishment alone; and partly by what has been said at this Distinction, showing how in the precepts of charity the rest are contained. From these things it is clear that the law is fulfilled through love, Scripture saying: "The fullness of the law is love" (Rom. 13). Indeed, without some love of justice, or love of right duty, no precept of the law can be fulfilled; because it has been most truly said by St. Augustine¹⁴ that "No one does good unwillingly, even if what he does is good." Hence the same St. Augustine, speaking of the fulfilment of the commandment¹⁵ says: "The commandment of God, if it be done through fear of punishment, not through love of justice, is done servilely, not freely, and therefore is not done. For a fruit is not good which does not spring from the root of charity." And in his work *Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians*¹⁶ ch. 4: "Those who, through love of gaining earthly things and through fear of losing them, keep the precepts of God, do not keep them but seem to keep them for themselves. For in them faith does not work through love, but earthly cupidity and fleshly fear; and he who does the precepts in such a manner is doubtless doing them unwillingly, and therefore does not do them in his soul. For he prefers altogether not to do them," etc. And in *On the Grace of Christ*¹⁷ ch. 26: "What good should we do if we did not love? For even if the precepts of God are done, yet they are done not willingly but by those who fear; nonetheless they are not love — and without any love no good work is exercised, nor is it rightly called a good work."

§ 7. Many passages bear on this point (in *On the Spirit and the Letter* ch. 26; *Conc. 1* on Ps. 32; *Sermon 19* on the words of the Apostle; and *Tract 9* on the Epistle of John).¹⁸ Nor is it only through love of justice, but also through love of God and with the intention of pleasing God, that the works of the law ought to be done — not indeed so that whenever they are not done in this manner a sin is committed, but every Christian ought to tend and strive to refer all his works to God, according to those general precepts: "Do all things to the glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31), and: "Do all things in the name of Christ" (Col. 3:17). Hence he is not properly considered to fulfil a commandment who does not perform it with this intention, the Lord saying: "He that does not love me does not keep my words" (Jn. 14:24). The Lord seems to prescribe this manner of fulfilling the law (Deut. 6), where He wills the law of love of God with the whole heart, etc., to be set before us in every action and to be meditated upon. Writing of this matter, St. Augustine¹⁹ says that the word "You shall love God from your whole heart" etc. was so spoken, "that man should direct all his thoughts, his whole life, and his whole understanding towards Him from whom he has even these things which he directs"; and then adds: "But when He says, 'With your whole heart, your whole soul, your whole mind,' He has left no part of our life free to be vacant, as it were, and to afford room for wanting to enjoy some other thing; but whatever else may occur to love should be drawn to that end to which the whole impetus of love runs. Whoever, then, loves God aright ought so to act that God too may love Himself with his whole heart, whole soul, whole mind; so that, loving himself as himself, he refers the whole love of himself and of God to that love of God which suffers no stream of itself to flow outside of itself, the diversion of which might diminish it."²⁰

§ 8. St. Augustine speaks similarly in his *Enchiridion* ch. 121. Pertinent also are his discussions in *On the City of God* ch. 25 and *Against Julian* bk. 4, ch. 10.²¹ But it must be noted here that the precept is not to be so understood as if every man, or at least he who has already received God, were required to act in such a manner

that in all things and always he must carry with him an express thought of God. For although he is bound by the precept of love never to be free from that love even for a moment, nonetheless he is not bound by a precept to be always expressly thinking of it — so that by some wondrous mode he does not fail to think of God even when he is not actually thinking of Him, provided he does not turn away from actual love. For according to right reason, a man ought sometimes to sleep, to cease from actual thought, and thus rightly does nothing wrong in so doing. In this way too Martha loves God with all her powers, when she employs the powers of her lower nature and directs her life toward God, so that in this way she does not lose God — so that by this reasoning the admonition of the Apostle (Rom. 14) is fulfilled, and he not only lives but also in his works and deeds, and in his rest, and in whatever, whether good or evil, can be done or omitted by man, he refers it all to God's will, either actually or habitually. This the Apostle intends by that general exhortation (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or drink or do anything else, do all to the glory of God."

§ V — How the ten precepts are distributed between the two tables (Quomodo decem praecepta duabus tabulis digesta sint)

§ 9. Among writers there is agreement on the number of the precepts of the Decalogue and their order from Scripture itself. For in Ex. 34 and Deut. 4 and 10 they are called "ten words," from which the name of the Decalogue is taken. And those same passages, Ex. 20 and Deut. 5, enumerate them in the same order. It is not however equally clear how those ten words were distributed between the two tablets, since Scripture does not explain this either, and different writers have held different opinions on this point.

§ 10. Philo the Jew (in his explanation of the Decalogue) and Josephus (bk. 3, *Antiquities*, ch. 4), and after them Clement of Alexandria (bk. 6, *Stromata*) and Origen (Homily 1 on Exodus)²³ and Procopius of Gaza (on ch. 20 of Exodus)²⁴ assign five precepts to each tablet, in such a manner that they make the first precept of the first tablet to be: "You shall not have strange gods," the second: "You shall not make for yourself a graven image," the third concerning swearing, the fourth concerning the Sabbath, the fifth concerning the honouring of parents. The remaining precepts they assign in their order to the other tablet, so that they establish a single precept concerning covetousness; yet Clement departs not a little from the others on this point, as may be seen in him. Some, such as St. Jerome (on ch. 10 of Hosea) and Hesychius (on Lev. 26);²⁵ place three precepts in the first tablet — but so that the first is: "I am the Lord your God"; the second: "You shall not have strange gods"; the third: "You shall not make for yourself a graven image" — and thus relegate all the remaining to the second tablet, excluding the Sabbath precept as not pertaining to Christians. Others assign four precepts to the first tablet and seven to the second, as the Greeks generally do, following thus far the opinion of Clement and Origen and of the Jews Philo and Josephus, in that they make two distinct precepts: one concerning strange gods, another concerning the graven image. Of this opinion also is the Author of the *Opus Imperfectum* (on Matthew, in the Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 47);²⁶ and the author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament*, q. 7, among the works of St. Augustine.²⁷

§ 11. But by far the most probable is that distinction which St. Augustine transmitted in many places, and nearly all who wrote after him; namely that inscribed on the first tablet were three precepts pertaining to God, the first of which also embraces the prohibition of graven images, while the other tablet contained seven pertaining to the neighbour, so that the precept concerning covetousness is held to be two distinct precepts.²⁸ St. Augustine holds this distinction in his work *On the Seventy-one Questions on Exodus*, and in Ps. 32, Tract

1(a), and in the Letter to Januarius bk. 15, *Against Faustum* ch. 4 (b), and in Sermon 95 *On the Season* (c).²⁹ And St. Thomas likewise holds it.³⁰

§ 12. The reason and fittingness of this distribution can be gathered from the following: the three precepts of the first tablet signify to us the divine Trinity. For in God the Father there appears first that unity which is commended by the first precept, when the multitude of gods is rejected. The Son is the truth, which the second precept signifies to us, prohibiting the swearing of false oaths. The Holy Spirit is sanctification and rational rest of creatures, which the third precept commands. This is what St. Augustine says approximately in his Letter to Januarius (bk. 15 in *quaest. 27 super Exod.*) and St. Thomas also³¹ (I-II, q. 100, a. 4).

§ 13. The first precept of the Decalogue has two parts: the prior — "You shall not have strange gods before me" — and the posterior — "You shall not make for yourself a graven image or likeness, etc.; you shall not adore them, neither shall you worship them. For what is premised: 'I am the Lord your God,'" is not at all one of the ten precepts but rather a preamble and as it were a commendation of the whole law from the author thereof. For when it is said: "I am the Lord your God," man is reminded of His worship and love, which he owes to one true God alone; so that he may believe in Him, hope in Him, love Him, and obey Him as the supreme and sovereign Lord of the whole universe. But this precept, which in Deuteronomy is most frequently inculcated, is explained partly in the passage where the command is often given to the man to love God and to serve Him; partly in the precept of love of God which is conveyed in Deut. 6 and repeated in the Gospel as the greatest and first commandment of the law. It is therefore the general precept, the ground and cause of all ten things that are individually transmitted in the Decalogue. For after this general precept "I am the Lord your God," is first repeated immediately in Ex. 20 and Deut. 5, as the proximate reason; and in Lev. ch. 20, 21, and 22 almost to each individual precept is added this or a similar formula: "I am the Lord."

§ 14. Against this first general commandment sin in the first place all unbelievers, whether they be atheists who say in their heart, "There is no God," under which are comprehended those who deny the providence of God over human affairs; or whether they be apostates — that is, deserters of the Christian Religion once embraced — or Jews who neither receive Christ nor acknowledge the Trinity; or Turks who think similarly to the Jews; or heretics who follow Christ but in a corrupt and erroneous manner.³²

§ V — Explanation of that opening formula, "I am the Lord thy God" (Explicatio illius exordii: Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus)

§ 15. That there are two distinct precepts concerning concupiscence — St. Augustine transmits this distinction in numerous places.³⁴

The fitness and appropriateness of this distinction may be gathered from the fact that the three precepts of the first table intimate to us the divine Trinity. For in God the Father there appears first that unity which is commended by the first precept, inasmuch as a multitude of gods is rejected. The Son, however, is truth, which is commended to us by the second precept, which forbids the falsehood of an oath. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is sanctification and the repose (*requies*) of the rational creature (*creatura rationalis*), which the third precept enjoins. This is largely what St. Augustine says in the aforesaid Epistle and in his questions on Exodus.³⁵ Likewise St. Thomas.³⁰

§ 16. The first precept of the Decalogue has two parts: the prior part is "Thou shalt not have strange gods before me"; the posterior part is "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing, etc.; thou shalt not adore them, neither shalt thou serve them." For what is premised — "I am the Lord thy God, etc." — is neither one precept among those of the Decalogue, nor the preamble (*exordium*) to the whole Decalogue as some have thought; but it is the exordium to the whole Decalogue, by which is intimated to us the great commandment of the law, which embraces all the rest. For when it is said "I am the Lord thy God," man is admonished of that worship and love which he owes to the one true God: namely, that he should believe in Him, hope in Him, love Him, and obey Him as his supreme Lord and the Lord of the entire universe. And indeed this precept is most especially inculcated in Deuteronomy, partly in that man is there frequently told to love God and to serve Him, and partly in that commandment of the love of God which is given in Deut. 6, and is repeated in the Gospel and declared by the Lord to be the greatest and first commandment of the law.³⁶ Moreover, this general precept is the formal character (*ratio*) and cause of all ten which are handed down severally in the Decalogue. For immediately after the first precept it is repeated in Exod. 20 and Deut. 5 as the proximate formal character. And in Lev. ch. 20, 21, and 22, to virtually every precept this or a similar clause is appended as its formal character: "I am the Lord."

§ 17. Now those who sin against this general precept — first of all — are all unbelievers, whether they be atheists, who say in their hearts "There is no God," under which are comprehended those who, by denying the divine Providence, deprive things human of their Gods; or whether they be apostates, deserters of the Christian Religion once received; or Jews, who neither receive Christ nor acknowledge the Trinity; or Turks, who hold views similar to those of the Jews; or heretics, who do not believe Christ speaking through the Catholic Church, but pertinaciously adhere to false or condemned dogmas, or pertinaciously choose to doubt the true ones. To these must also be numbered those who either believe heretics, or on account of their persuasive discourses and arguments waver in a dogma of faith, even if without pertinacity.

§ 18. Secondly, since the fear of God is enjoined by this general precept — the Lord saying in Mal. 1: "If I be a Lord, where is my fear?" — those sin against it who, either because sentence is not at once pronounced against the wicked (Eccl. 8), or for whatever other cause, commit evils with no fear at all, and, persisting in their crimes with noxious security, trust that they will obtain mercy; or who certainly defer the amendment of their life from day to day in such a manner as if they were certain and secure of one day receiving the gift of repentance. Against such men Ecclesiasticus ch. 5 and the Apostle in Rom. 2 speak.

§ 19. Thirdly, since we are commanded by this general precept to hope in God — to which belongs the expectation of eternal life through God's grace and our merits — those sin against it who, terrified by the magnitude or the multitude of their sins, despair of pardon and salvation, after the example of the fratricide Cain and of the traitor Judas, as though any man's iniquity, however great, were greater than God's immeasurable goodness. And likewise those who, considering the weakness of their own powers and the violence of evil desire, distrust that they will overcome it through God's grace — of whom it is spoken in Jer. 8 and Eph. 4.³⁷ Likewise all who do not trust in God but in the flesh — that is, in any carnal or temporal thing, such as riches, friends, strength, or health. And most especially those who lean so much upon their own free will (*liberum arbitrium*) and its powers as to think that by those powers alone they can fulfil the law of God, or do anything good that pertains to salvation; or those who indeed acknowledge God's grace (*Gratia*) but suppose that their good works preceded it, or subject it to their own free will, not acknowledging its efficacy.

§ 20. Fourthly, since this general commandment demands above all the love (*dilectio*) of God from us, those sin against it generally who are transgressors of the divine law in any respect; but more particularly those who by an elicited act of the will love created things equally with God or more than God, whereas we are commanded to love Him above all things and to prefer Him to all. Of such Christ says in Matt. 10: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me."³⁸ Most grievously, however, do they offend against this precept who hate God, who is the highest, and therefore most lovable, good. Into this horrible vice fall those who, plunged wholly into sin and obstinate in it, go so far that — because they perceive that the sins which they themselves love are displeasing to God and punished by God — they wish either that God did not exist at all, or that He were unjust and of one mind with them, so as to approve sins or allow them to go unpunished. Against whom is said in Ps. 49: "Thou thoughtest unjustly that I should be like to thee." Against persons of this kind St. Augustine exclaims in Tract. 90 on John:³⁹ "Miserable men, who, since they wish to be evil, wish that truth — by which the evil are condemned — should not exist. For they wish it not to be what it is; whereas they themselves ought in no wise to be what they are, so that, with truth remaining, they may be changed, lest, with truth judging, they be condemned."

§ 21. Lastly, since the intimation of lordship demands obedience from servants, those are opposed to this precept who are unwilling to be subject to God — whether contemning the one who commands, or contemning His commandment, according to that of Prov. 18: "The wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth." Concerning this sin Samuel thus pronounces in 1 Kgs 15:⁴⁰ "For it is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." An example of this is depicted for us in the Israelite people in Is. 30 and Jer. 44 and elsewhere.

§ VII — On the declaration of the prior part of the first precept (De declaratione prioris partis primi precepti)

§ 22. The prior part of the first precept — "Thou shalt not have strange gods before me" — forbids that gravest injury to God whereby anyone other than God Himself is held to be God, or is worshipped as God. This is not said as though there actually were some other god, but because the perversity of the human mind has fashioned this for itself. "Strange," therefore, means the same as "other." For the Hebrew and Greek word signifies not "alien" in the proper sense, but "another." It is also to be noted here that the Septuagint translates the first commandment differently from our version, so that one should not think that only the plurality of gods is here forbidden. As for what follows — "before me" — in Hebrew it is "upon my faces"; the Seventy rendered it in Exodus as "besides me," and in Deuteronomy as "before my face." The Hebrew word also signifies "against" as well as "besides." In the former sense, which our version expresses, that addition carries special emphasis. For it is a far graver matter — inasmuch as it pertains to contumelious insult — if someone detracts from another's honour openly and before his very eyes and transfers it to another, than if he does so secretly. But whoever does this before God does so before God, since all things are present to God. In the latter sense the whole sentence is rendered fuller and more absolute. For every other god is both besides and contrary to the true God.

§ 23. In order that we may understand how far this prohibition extends: first, those sin against it who offer sacrifice to anyone other than the true God, who build temples, erect altars, appoint priests, or present games, spectacles, or anything of that kind in the manner of a sacrifice; or who by open profession of voice or of any

gesture — such as was the kissing of the hand — praise or venerate another as God. In these ways the blind Gentiles of old venerated their gods.

Second: those who practise the art of divination, or who consult those who practise it. For in this matter that is manifestly attributed to a creature which is proper to God — namely, the ability to know those things that are future and those things that have no certain cause in nature, but depend on human free will or on some other uncertain and mutable cause. Hence the Lord says through Is. 41: "Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." This kind of superstition is expressly forbidden by the Lord in Lev. 19, Deut. 18, and elsewhere.⁴²

Third: those who from the inspection of the stars attempt to foretell particular events and the deeds of men — called *genethliaei* by the Greeks, and commonly mathematicians — and those who consult such foretellers. Against this superstition God instructs His people through Jeremiah: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven," and so on. The ancient writers as well most frequently inveigh against this kind of superstition, as is more fully to be shown elsewhere, and as we have partly shown above.⁴³ These passages also can be noted from the Fathers: the First Council of Braga, ch. 9; the Fourth Council of Carthage, canon 89; St. Ambrose, *De Helia et Jejunio*, bk. 4, ch. 4; St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Thessalonicenses*, hom. 3; St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 5, ch. 1; *De Genesi ad Litteram*, bk. 2, ch. 17; *Confessiones*, bk. 4, ch. 3; Epistle 119 *ad Januarium*, ch. 7; and on Ps. 32 at the words "I will confess against myself," etc.; and St. Gregory, *In Evangelia*, hom. 10.⁴⁴

Fourth: those who consult demons concerning any matter whatsoever, whether by themselves or through others. For although demons know many things — whether through experience or through the keenness of their nature — whatever inquiry of that kind is made of them is a superstitious cult, because it cannot take place without some compact with the devil. But the devil admits no fellowship with man except to the end that he may draw him away from the true worship of God and at length cause divine honour to be transferred to himself. Hence every such communication with the devil is at the very least the beginning of a certain apostasy from God; for which cause the Apostle rightly and simply forbids it, saying in 1 Cor. 10: "I would not that you should be made partakers with devils." Something has been said by us on this matter above.⁴⁵

Lastly: whatever other superstitions, by whatever name they may be called — such as those that prescribe ligatures, numbers, characters, and all signs that are neither divinely instituted nor naturally efficacious, for the attainment of some effect; and likewise the collecting and preserving of herbs on a certain day or hour, or by some rite and ceremony, and their use for whatever effects that neither nature produces nor the blessing of the Church obtains; and all the other innumerable forms of such observances, devised for the most part by vain and superstitious men at the instigation of the devil — all these are condemned by this same prohibition. Concerning all these matters see St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, bk. 2, ch. 20 and following; and the decree at *Causa 26, quaestio 5*, ch. *Non liceat Christianis*;⁴⁶ where, among other things, the following is said: "In the gathering of herbs that are medicinal, no observances or incantations are permitted to be attended to, but only the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, so that God alone, the Creator and Lord of all things, may be honoured."

**§ VIII — That the cult of the saints is not at odds with the said prohibition
(*Sanctorum cultum non pugnare cum dicta prohibitione*)**

§ 24. Just as the honour of parents which the law prescribes is not contrary to the said prohibition, so neither is that honour or cult whereby, besides God, we also honour, venerate, and invoke the saints reigning with God opposed to it. For the Church does not attribute to them, nor permit to be attributed to them by the faithful, any divine cult — that is, any honour proper to God or owed to God alone — but only that which she knows to be owed to those most closely joined to God as His friends, privy to His secrets, and most devoted to our salvation: which, for the sake of distinction, she calls *dulia*, whereas the former is properly called *latria*. Nor is such a cult to be thought in any part to diminish or obscure the glory of God; rather it augments and illustrates it — both because by this means God is acknowledged as wonderful and glorious not only in Himself but also in His saints, and also because this is itself the will of God: that just as kings, princes, priests, parents, and all who are eminent by reason of power or holiness in this life are to be honoured by us according to His law — as possessing by a kind of participation something divine, namely power or holiness — so also, and much more, ought we to honour those who have already become sharers of the heavenly Kingdom together with Him; because, being more perfect in charity (*caritas*) and more sublime in dignity, they possess with God that excellence of honour which they can never lose by any change. That God wills that they be thus honoured by us as those already honoured first by God, the Sacred Scriptures attest: as in 1 Kgs 2: "Whosoever shall honour me, I will glorify him." Ps. 138: "Thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honourable." Prov. 14 [reading from the image: "He shall be honoured whom the King willeth to be honoured"]. Jn. 12: "If any man minister to me, him will my Father honour." Rev. 2: "To him that shall overcome, I will give power, as I also have received of my Father." And Rev. 3: "To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with me in my throne, as I also have overcome and am set down with my Father in his throne." And other passages of the like kind.

§ 25. Moreover, so ancient is the cult and veneration of the saints reigning with Christ in the Church of Christ — and especially of the martyrs — that what the heretics today calumniate, the pagan persecutors of Christians thought the same long ago: namely, that divine honours were paid by Christians to the martyrs after death. To prevent this, they cast the bodies of the slain into the sea, or by whatever means they could withdrew them from Christians, saying: "Lest they become gods of the Christians, and those who refuse to worship gods begin to adore our servants" — as is found in Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 4, ch. 15, and bk. 8, ch. 6.⁴⁸ But the Church has always easily repelled this calumny, carefully distinguishing both in teaching and in practice between the honour proper to God and that which is attributed to holy men who are the friends of God. Hence St. Augustine, replying to the Manichaeon Faustus, who similarly calumniated Catholics for having converted the idols of the Gentiles into the martyrs, says among other things in *Contra Faustum*, bk. 20, ch. 21, that the Christian people offer sacrifice to none of the martyrs but to God alone, the God of the martyrs. And then he adds: "We honour the martyrs, therefore, with that cult of love and fellowship wherewith holy men of God are honoured even in this life. But them more devoutly, because more securely, after their contests are overcome. But with that cult which in Greek is called *latria*, we neither worship nor teach that any but one God is to be worshipped," and what follows.⁴⁹

§ 26. In this same sense are to be taken the things which the same Doctor transmits elsewhere, though in somewhat different words, as in *De Vera Religione*, ch. ult.: "Let there be for us," he says, "no religion in the cult of men who have died. They are to be honoured for the sake of imitation, not adored for the sake of

religion. We honour them with love, not with servitude" — understanding by "religion" and "servitude" the cult of *latría*, concerning which it has been said, "Thou shalt adore the Lord thy God" — and he says that no dead person is worshipped by Catholic Christians in this sense. And then, explaining this, he adds: "Nothing, in fine, is to be adored as a divine power which is made and created, but only God who made and created all things."⁵⁰

There is also in the same author a passage worthy of note in *Sermon 101 De Diversis*, ch. 3 — or, according to the Benedictine edition, Sermon 17 — where he relates that St. Eulogius the Deacon, when asked "Dost thou also worship Fructuosus?", replied: "I do not worship Fructuosus, but I worship together with him the one whom Fructuosus also worships." And St. Augustine adds: "How he admonished us to honour the martyrs and to worship God together with the martyrs," etc. — clearly understanding by "cult" that which is owed to God alone. For concerning the veneration of the martyrs, following (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, he speaks thus in the same sermon: "The holy martyrs have an honourable place. In the recitation at the altar of Christ, they are recited in a better place, yet they are not adored in place of Christ," etc. And he concludes with these words: "Therefore, dearest brethren, venerate the martyrs, praise them, love them, proclaim them, honour them; worship God of the martyrs."⁵¹ A similar passage is found in *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 8, ch. 27.⁵²

§ 27. The same careful distinction of cult was transmitted also by other Fathers: as by St. Epiphanius in *Haeresis 79* — which is that of the Collyridians, who by error offered sacrifice to the Virgin Mother of God — and by St. Cyril, bk. 6, *Contra Iulianum*, where he refutes certain calumnies of Julian similar to the above.⁵³ Furthermore, the fruit which the faithful derive from the veneration of the saints, St. Augustine shows in these words in the passage already cited against Faustus: "The Christian people celebrate the memories of the martyrs with religious solemnity both to excite their own imitation and that they may be made associates in their merits and aided by their prayers." So he. As for the intercession and invocation of the saints, and the manner in which they know our prayers, we shall say nothing in this place, since a more opportune occasion for treating that matter presents itself below.⁵⁴

§ IX — That ecclesiastical ceremonies are free from superstition (Ecclesiasticas caeremonias superstitione carere)

§ 28. Briefly now one must show that those ceremonies which the Church uses, whether in the Sacraments or outside them, are far removed from the superstition which we have said is forbidden by the first precept. It is shown in this manner. If some effect is expected from God in a due and fitting manner, even if it could not be obtained by natural power, there is no superstition. But so does the Church act, when in the Sacraments instituted for a spiritual effect she expects from them precisely that for which they were instituted; indeed also in the blessings of various things — as of salt, water, candles, branches, and fruits — even though she does not have for these any peculiar institution and divine promise, she does nothing other than exercise the power granted to her by Christ. This power the Lord did in truth concede when He gave His disciples the power over unclean spirits to cast them out and to heal every sickness and every infirmity (Mk. 10), and when He said to them: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy, and nothing shall hurt you" (Lk. 10). Nor was this power merely temporary, destined to die with the

disciples of Christ to whom He then spoke; but, just as the devil never ceases to assail Christians, so that power never wholly fails the Church. And just as the devil frequently uses against men corporeal things, in which he received a certain power over us on account of sin, so to repel his harms the Church hallows and blesses corporeal things with certain fixed and pious prayers. For what the Apostle says of every kind of food in 1 Tim. 4 — "It is sanctified by the word of God and prayer" — is with equal propriety most rightly referred to every creature that comes into the use of men.

§ 29. It is confirmed: the use of such ceremonies is confirmed by examples both from the Old and the New Testament. For Moses sweetened bitter waters by casting wood into them; Elisha healed the sterile soil by sprinkling salt upon it (2 Kgs 2). Tobias put to flight the demon by means of the liver of the fish burnt, and by anointing his father's eyes with its gall he restored his sight (Tob. 6, 8, and 11). Christ Himself willed to make use of corporeal things in the performing of miracles. For He gave sight to one blind from birth, first by clay, then by water (Jn. 9); He healed one who was deaf and mute by applying spittle to his tongue and inserting His fingers into his ears (Mk. 7); we read that a woman with an issue of blood was healed by touching the hem of His garment, as also were many other sick persons (Matt. 9, ch. 14). In the same manner He cured diseases and expelled demons by means of handkerchiefs and aprons carried from His Apostle's body and laid upon the sick. Lastly, just as the power of exorcising demons, handed down by Christ to the Apostles, has remained in the Church up to the present day — and is conferred by a certain fixed ordination, for the order of Exorcists is the second among the minor orders, of which we speak in Bk. 4, dist. 4 — so also there is no doubt that the power whereby, through the word of God and prayer, not only foods but also other creatures are blessed, was handed down and received by succession from those same Apostles.

§ 30. Among these, holy water — that is, blessed water — holds the first place. Its use Alexander I commends and enjoins at length in his Epistle to all the Orthodox, in such a way that he appears to wish not so much to institute it himself for the first time as to pass on and communicate to others the custom of the Roman Church as already received. The blessings of other things too — as of the Paschal candle, concerning which a learned and lengthy Hymn is found in Prudentius; of ashes, of branches, of flowers, of fruits; likewise of churches, altars, vestments, and sacred vessels — it is not difficult to establish from ancient authors. It must be noted in this context that the Church does not customarily apply blessings to just any things indiscriminately, but only to those which are more distinguished either by their use or by their signification — such as those we have now enumerated. Accordingly, in such blessings she does not permit new and private forms to be devised (for that would not be without danger of superstition), but retains by constant use the fixed form of blessing which was long ago received by a certain consent and tradition of the Fathers for the purpose of mitigating or removing the harassment of demons and diseases and the inclemency of the weather.

§ 31. Furthermore, it must also be noted that superstition can be committed through the abuse of things rightly and lawfully consecrated by ecclesiastical prayers: for instance, if either power is attributed to the things themselves — rather than to God, in whose name they have been invoked over them — which they do not possess by nature; or, what is far worse, if someone uses them for incantations and practises magic by means of them.

§ X — Declaration of the posterior part of the first precept (Declaratio posterioris partis primi praecepti)

§ 32. What follows in the first precept — "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything," etc., down to "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them" — is a certain explanation of what preceded. For "what was said," says St. Augustine, in *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 71 *super Exodum*, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," is more perfectly explained when the worship of images is forbidden. For whoever makes a graven thing, or any kind of idol, in order to adore it, does in truth set up another god for himself besides the true God — although not conversely."⁵⁷

First, concerning this part of the precept, it must be noted that between a "graven thing" (*sculptile*) and a "likeness" or "image" (*simulacrum*) there is the distinction that exists between a species and a genus. For after naming one, the more common species, the Lord wished to conclude the generality of the precept with a general term, when He forbade making any likeness whatsoever. Wherefore the distinction which Origen transmits in *In Exodum*, hom. 8, between "idol" and "likeness" — and from Origen, the Master in his text — although it may perhaps be legitimate and may have a place in accordance with the interpretation of the Seventy, who rendered the graven thing as "idol," nevertheless has no place in our version, nor in the Hebrew truth; nor indeed does either Scripture or Christian usage acknowledge that distinction. For Scripture, without distinction, calls all the idols of the Gentiles by the name "idols" (Ps. 113; 1 Cor. 8; and others), just as in Christian usage likenesses of any kind set up for adoration are generally called idols.

§ 33. Next, it must be carefully noted that the prohibition here is not that we should make any likeness or image whatsoever of anything existing in the natural order or conceived by imagination alone. For the art of sculpture, or founding, or painting does not displease God, nor did it ever displease Him. For He Himself commanded (Num. 21) that a brazen serpent in metal be made — which was afterward preserved by pious leaders and kings down to the time of Hezekiah (2 Kgs 18). He likewise commanded that Cherubim be made in the Tabernacle and in the Holy of Holies (Exod. 25), and images of lions, oxen, palms, and pomegranates to be made in the Temple (1 Kgs 6 and 7; 1 Chron. 28; 2 Chron. 3 and 4). And He testifies that the art itself, by which these things are wrought, is a gift of His Spirit (Exod. 26 [reading: Exod. 31]). From all these things it is clear that not even to the Jews was it simply forbidden to make or to possess images of anything whatsoever. Indeed, an image was found among the gifts of David, that most holy worshipper of God (1 Kgs 16 [reading: 1 Sam. 16, or as source has it]). Nor is Josephus to be heeded in this matter, who in *Antiquitates*, bk. 1, ch. 8, says that it was imputed as a fault to Solomon that he ordered images of animals to be made and placed in the Temple of God — since Solomon received the entire design of that building from his father David, and David received it from God, just as Moses once received the form of the Tabernacle. "All things," David says, "came written by the hand of the Lord to me, that I should understand all the works of the pattern" (1 Chron. 28).

§ 34. The Lord therefore forbade images to be made, possessed, and set up — not any whatsoever, but those made for the worship of the divine. For this is what that final clause of the precept means: "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them" — as if to say, thou shalt not make them for thyself in order that thou mayest adore or serve them. This is also signified by St. Augustine in the above-cited *Quaestio 71 super Exodum*, when he says that by this part of the precept the worship of images is forbidden. The same is signified by Moses in Deut. 4, when he says to the people: "Take heed lest thou make thee a graven likeness of those things which the Lord hath forbidden to be made." Now one sins against this prohibition in three ways: either if the idol

itself is held to be a god, or if the creature represented by it is worshipped as God, or if an image is held in such a way as if the divinity itself were portrayed by it. In the first way sinned the blind Gentility, holding its idols to be gods and adoring them as gods. Concerning these Moses says in Deut. 28 [reading: Deut. 28 per the image]: "Thou shalt serve gods, which are the work of men's hands, wood and stone, that see not, nor hear, nor eat, nor smell."

§ VII — On the sin of idolatry and its kinds (De peccato idololatriae ejusque generibus) (continued)

§ 35. And Jer. 2 says: "They say to a piece of wood, Thou art my father, and to a stone, Thou hast begotten me."⁵⁸ Isaiah (ch. 44) paints and exposes with broad strokes and graphic vividness this most foolish kind of idolatry, and after him Jeremiah does the same in the Epistle written to the Jews dwelling in Babylon.⁵⁹ Writing on this kind of idolatry, St. Augustine (on Ps. 113, Sermon 2) says: "Images avail more to bend the unhappy soul in that they have a mouth, they have eyes, they have ears, etc., than to correct it in that they will not speak, they will not see, etc." — where he also refutes the excuses of certain persons who, fancying themselves wiser than the common people, tried to interpret the significance of images in a more elevated sense, something the common people could not do. And (on Ps. 65), speaking in the person of a man converted from paganism, he says: "Once I cried out to a stone, I cried out to a deaf piece of wood." And a little later: "I who said to a piece of wood, Thou art my father, now say: Our Father who art in heaven."⁶⁰ And the same (Book 7 of the *History*, ch. 18): although mention of this error, crude as it is, is so frequent and open, both in Sacred Scripture and in the writings of the Fathers, that it is superfluous to adduce more by way of proof.⁶¹

§ 36. Therefore, Oecolampadius, Calvin, and others do grave injury to the authority of both Scripture and the Fathers when, in order to detract from the veneration of sacred images, they deny that the Gentiles were ever so blinded as to think that the very images themselves were gods, and say only this was reprehended in them: that they worshipped their gods in and through images. The vanity of this invention is easily refuted from what has been said, as certain Catholics have also learnedly refuted it.

§ 37. Moreover, that foolish conviction of the Gentiles was attempted to be excused by a certain Hermes Trismegistus, as St. Augustine reports (in *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 23),⁶² with a subterfuge of this sort: he invented that certain spirits, invited by the prayers of men, dwelt in or were present beneath the images as if in bodies of gods — spirits capable of doing something either to harm or to fulfil the desires of those by whom divine honour and the offices of worship were paid to them. But the plain evidence of the matter is what Scripture cries out: "The idols of the nations are silver and gold, and there is no breath in their mouths" (Ps. 134). And in truth, those spirits which are feigned to be present in images are none other than demons, seeking by whatever means to obtain the honour of divinity; of whom the same Psalmist says: "All the gods of the nations are demons."

§ 38. In the second mode, those sinned who, withdrawing somewhat from the absurdity of those just mentioned, attributed nothing divine to the images themselves, but nevertheless worshipped as gods the creatures represented by those images — whether men, either long dead or still living, or any other animals whatsoever, or the sun and moon, fire and water, or something similar. And indeed, concerning the cult of dead men through images, by what occasion it arose and by what reasoning it prevailed, we have a clear

description in Wis. 14.⁶³ That divine honours were also paid to living persons through images, the examples of pagan Emperors and Kings make plain, who everywhere placed their own images in temples among the gods, before which they wished incense to be burned and sacrifices offered. Following this example, the image of Tiberius was placed by Pilate in the Temple of Jerusalem, and afterward the equestrian statue of Hadrian was set up in the very place of the Holy of Holies; as St. Jerome relates (on Matt. 24).⁶⁴ That other animals too, and other creatures, were held as gods and were honoured with divine worship either in themselves or in their images, is most well known from histories both sacred and profane.

§ 39. Nor indeed were those free from this impiety who tried to excuse and diminish the error of the common people by certain physical interpretations; as St. Augustine recounts of Varro (in *De Civitate Dei* VII, ch. 5 and following).⁶⁵ For when Varro saw the common people worshipping the very images, or infamous men represented in images — such as Jupiter, Mars, and Venus — lest he should condemn that worship altogether, he transferred the signification of the images further, to the world and its parts, so that, for example, under the name and image of Jupiter, the air was worshipped; under the name and image of Neptune, the sea; and so with the others. But since all these things are in reality nothing other than creatures, he did not thereby extricate himself from culpable worship, nor did he lead others whom he had instructed in this manner from error to truth; rather he led them into a somewhat different error. For whether they take as gods the images, or men, or the parts of the world, they have still not departed from what the Apostle says in Rom. 1: "And they served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever."⁶⁶ St. Augustine argues against such interpretations of images (on Ps. 113), and again in a certain Sermon on the Kalends of January, fragment 5 (ch. 2 and 6),⁶⁷ where, treating the aforesaid words of the Apostle, he says: "And lest any one of them should say, I do not worship images but what images signify, he immediately subjoins: And they served the creature, etc. For either they worship an image or a creature" — and what follows.

§ 40. In the last mode, those sin who think that God or the Divinity can be expressed by some image: for those who think this make God corporeal, and therefore far inferior to an Angel, and even to man himself, who in the nobler part of himself, that is, according to his soul, is incorporeal. Hence the worship consequent upon this error concerning the nature of God is false and joined with great injury to God. Hence Is. 40 says: "To whom have you made God like? or what image will you set up for Him? To whom have you likened me, and made me equal? says the Holy One." And Paul, taking his argument from man himself who is the image of God, says in Acts 17: "Being therefore the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the divine is like gold, silver, or an artistic sculpture or the conception of man" — understanding by "the divine" the very nature of God.⁶⁸ For this reason moreover, when God was giving the law, He was unwilling to appear in any form: "Lest perhaps," says Moses to the People of Israel in Deut. 4, "being deceived, you make to yourselves a graven likeness or image of male or female," etc.⁶⁹ Hence the error of the Anthropomorphites was condemned long ago in the Church of Christ by the tacit consent of the Fathers, who, as St. Augustine says (in *De Haeresibus*, haer. 50), "fashioned God for themselves by carnal thought in the likeness of the image of corruptible man."⁷⁰ "For God the Father is not to be thought of as bounded by a human form," says the same St. Augustine (*De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 7),⁷¹ as if, to those thinking about Him, right and left — And the Seventh Council (Session 6) declares: "The divine Nature is above all circumscription, even though the human nature, in which we confess that Christ ascended into heaven, is circumscribed and defined."⁷² Hence, according to that nature in which Christ appeared on earth, Christians depict His image — not according to that nature in which He is invisible with the Father. On this matter St. John Damascene (*De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 17) says: "It is foolishness and extreme impiety to figure the Divinity" — and much that follows.⁷³

§ 41. Nor does it seem to those who carefully consider it that any other intention lies behind canon 36 of the Council of Elvira, which states: "It has pleased the Council that there should be no pictures in churches, lest what is worshipped and adored be painted on walls." For the words "worshipped" and "adored" sufficiently indicate that the canon is speaking of a picture or image of God, and this according to His divinity — although others prefer to interpret that canon differently, in a sense also orthodox.⁷⁴ As to the extent to which certain pictures representing the Most Holy Trinity, or one of the three Persons, or a particular operation of theirs, are approved or tolerated in the Church, it belongs to another place to examine this exactly. We add only, from the decree of the Council of Trent (Session 25) on sacred images, that no images of false doctrine and such as may furnish the ignorant occasion of dangerous error are to be set up; and that if it should ever happen that stories and narratives of Sacred Scripture are expressed or figured when this is profitable to the unlearned people, the people are to be taught that on this account the Divinity is not thereby figured, as though it could be perceived by bodily eyes, or expressed in colours or figures.⁷⁵

§ VIII — That the use of images among Christians is not opposed to the first commandment (Primo praecepto non adversari usum imaginum apud Christianos)

§ 42. Of the cult or veneration of the sacred images of Christ and the Saints we have spoken above (at Distinctio 9 of this book).⁷⁷ Now it must be briefly shown that the received use of images among Christians does not conflict with the commandment of the Decalogue by which the worshipping of images is forbidden. The demonstration of this is not difficult, from the decree of the Council of Trent (Session 25), which we have just cited. In that decree these words occur: "Moreover, the images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and of the other Saints are to be had and retained especially in churches, and due honour and veneration is to be paid to them — not that any divinity or power is believed to be in them on account of which they are to be worshipped, or that anything is to be sought from them, or that trust is to be placed in images as was formerly done by the Gentiles who placed their hope in idols; but because the honour which is shown to them is referred to the prototypes which those images represent, so that through the images which we kiss and before which we uncover our heads and kneel, we venerate Christ and the Saints whose likeness they bear. This is what has been established by the decrees of the Councils, especially the Second Council of Nicaea, against the opponents of images."⁷⁸ Thus far the words of the decree, in which is contained the perspicuous solution of the argument that could be drawn from the precept of the Decalogue. For since, as we declared above, the law forbids nothing other than that either an image or something represented by an image, which is not God, be worshipped as God; and since nothing of this sort is done by Christians when they venerate the sacred images of Christ and of the Saints — it is manifest that their use and veneration, so long as it is kept within the legitimate bounds prescribed by the Sacred Councils, is in no way opposed to that precept.

§ 43. Even if this be granted to adversaries — what, following Josephus, Jews today opine, to whose opinion the modern sectaries readily accede — namely, that it was simply forbidden by the law to make any image, even if it were not set up for adoration, this will nevertheless not prevail against the images of Christians. Given that concession, we shall reply that that prohibition pertained in a particular manner to the Israelite People (inasmuch as it was most prone to idolatry) and to those times in which idolatry flourished exceedingly throughout all nations; and that therefore by such a precept the Lord willed to remove from that

People chosen for His worship every occasion of false worship. And yet the things above adduced by us, and especially the example of the bronze serpent (Num. 21), by looking upon which those who had been struck were healed — from which they might seem most especially to have been given occasion for idolatrous worship — sufficiently show that images were not absolutely forbidden to them.⁷⁹ As for Christians, however, the case is altogether different: for they, better and more fully instructed, with the light of the Gospel now shining brilliantly and suffused with the more abundant grace of the Holy Spirit, are so very far removed from the danger of so gross an error as to think that something divine resides in images. Hence the error of the Iconoclasts was deservedly condemned long ago — both because they acknowledged no distinction between the images of the gods of the Gentiles and the images of Christ and the Saints, and because they had no regard for the time at which God, for the sake of our salvation, put on human, corporeal, and therefore depictable nature, and in that nature presented Himself visibly to us; and finally because they made no distinction between the state and people of the Old and New Testaments.⁸⁰

§ XII — Exposition of the third precept (Explicatio tertii praecepti)

§ 44. Setting aside the second precept, concerning which we shall treat together with the Master at the penultimate Distinction, we must now speak of the third precept, by which the sanctification of the Sabbath is commanded. Here it must first be noted that this precept, as it is expressed in the Decalogue, belongs partly to the law of nature and partly to positive law: according to its substance, indeed, it belongs to the law of nature, but according to its determination it belongs to positive law. For the law of nature commands that we devote some portion of time to divine worship and service, just as the same law requires that times be set aside for other activities, such as labour, refreshment, and sleep. Those matters which are not determined by nature require determination through positive law. Therefore the Law of Moses assigned the exercise of divine worship to the seventh day and prohibited servile works on that same day; and this was ordained in memory of the benefit of creation — a benefit common and manifest to all — namely, the creation of all things: for "in six days," says Moses in his exposition of this precept, "the Lord made heaven and earth and all things that are in them, and he rested on the seventh day and sanctified it" (Ex. 20).⁸²

§ 45. It must further be noted regarding the name *sabbath* that by this word there is signified, not — as some have supposed — the seventh day (even though the Hebrew words are close to one another), but rest. Therefore, if we attend to the primary signification of the word, sabbath will denote not only the seventh day but every feast day; on it one must be free for divine worship and rest from servile work, so that by this reasoning our Christian Lord's Day is also rightly comprehended under the name of the Sabbath. But by the customary usage of Scripture the name Sabbath was almost entirely appropriated to the seventh day, for the reason just stated. And that the Sabbath is to be understood in this way in the words of the Decalogue is clear from the declaration of the law annexed thereto. Now what the sanctification which the law requires is, and wherein it consists, is shown by the following words annexed: "Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy works; but on the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: thou shalt do no work therein, thou, nor thy son," etc. (Ex. 20).⁸³ Here rest is commanded from every servile work — that is, from that bodily work to which we are accustomed specially to appoint slaves and beasts of burden.

§ 46. But since God is not in itself delighted by man's idleness, He did not simply command him to cease from work, but rather that by that cessation and rest he should outwardly declare his giving of thanks to God,

who had created both man himself and all other things for man's sake in six days, and had rested on the seventh day: so that man, from the works of the six days — that is, from the entire fabric of the world — might be led to rest in God his sanctifier. The sanctification of the Sabbath therefore requires these two things: that one abstain from servile work, and that one devote oneself to divine worship both interior and exterior. Hence, Jews who merely ceased from servile work but did nothing that pertained to the worship of God were in truth not sanctifying the Sabbath, and accordingly were not observing it either, even though they sinned less than those who violated the Sabbath also by exterior work. But worse than both were those who abused the leisure of the Sabbath in pursuit of their own desires. Against these Isaiah speaks (ch. 58), and St. Augustine likewise.⁸⁴

§ 47. The reason is that the former were only violating the precept concerning the observance of the Sabbath, whereas the latter, in addition to this, were also transgressing another precept. Moreover, if someone rested on the Sabbath so as to call to mind the benefits of God, and by reflecting upon them aroused himself to give thanks to God and to celebrate His works, he would not be judged to have violated this precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath.⁸⁵

§ 48. And these things are similarly to be received and applied to us Christians. For just as the Jews under the Law rested on the Sabbath and on other days prescribed by law, so also we are bound to rest on those days which Christ has determined for this purpose through His Church. Hence, just as formerly to the Jews not only servile works — even as far as the cooking of food — but also certain other things were prohibited, such as travelling, buying, and selling, as is evident (Ex. 16; 2 Esd.; Neh. ult.),⁸⁶ so also now, beyond servile works, certain other things as well that withdraw a man from the worship of God are forbidden, such as trading, taking of oaths, pronouncing of sentences, the clamour of lawsuits, litigation, and the like — concerning which see the relevant chapters of the Decretals.⁸⁷

§ 49. In all these matters, however, since the Church, which regards interior worship more than exterior and does not impose this rest as rigidly as the Law of Moses did of old, the custom of the Christian people — that is, of the devout faithful — is especially to be attended to as the best interpreter of the Church's laws. From this interpretation we understand that certain things are now lawful which were formerly prohibited to the Jews, such as cooking, making a journey, and the like.⁸⁸

§ 50. St. Thomas, in the passage cited in the note,⁸⁵ explains very perspicuously the sanctification which the law requires of the Sabbath, noting that the words of the law — "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day of the Lord thy God; thou shalt do no work therein" — comprise a threefold kind of servitude: that by which man is subject to sin, that by which man serves another man, and a third kind. He says that the first servitude is what the precept primarily forbids; the second and third are the reason why works done on those days are called "servile" — because they impede the application of man to divine things. Hence he who does a sinful deed acts more against this precept than he who does a lawful work. Thus St. Augustine says (in Sermon 97, or in the book *De Decem Chordis*, ch. 3, no. —):⁸⁹ it is better to do something useful on the Sabbath than to be seditious in the theatre; and he who spends the whole day in idle revelry sins more against this precept than he who travels or cooks on the Sabbath for a lawful reason. Thus far St. Thomas.

§ 51. From St. Thomas's teaching it is clear that one who rests on the Sabbath in order to call to mind the benefits of God is not therefore to be judged as having violated this precept concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath — though he be a Jew, as St. Thomas asserts, the same is plain by parity of reasoning for a

Christian. We do not conceal, however, that not undistinguished authors have maintained that the end of a precept does not fall under the precept itself and that a transgression of the end does not transfer the act into a different species of sin; from which they deduce the opinion — which is indeed an opinion held among the more probable — that it is not a violation of the Sabbath precept to use the Sabbath leisure for one's own desires. Nevertheless the sentence of St. Thomas, as being both truer and more weighty, is to be preferred.

§ VIII — On the institution of the Lord's Day and other feasts (De institutione diei Dominici et aliorum festorum)

§ 52. With the abrogation of the ceremonial law by Christ, the Sabbath likewise was abolished at the same time. Yet since the law of nature nonetheless demanded that some certain time be set apart for divine worship, that determination of nature was changed by another positive law — namely, the Apostolic and Ecclesiastical law — by which the rest of the seventh day was transferred to the eighth, which is at the same time the first: that is, the Lord's Day, so called because it is peculiarly dedicated to Christ the Lord, in memory of His resurrection, by which He also bestowed on us the secure hope of resurrection, as the firstfruits of those who sleep. For just as on one day of the year — that which is called Pascha — the Church solemnly commemorates that benefit to us, so that no unthankful oblivion of it might ever steal upon us through the passage of time, so on each individual Lord's Day she celebrates the ever-renewed memory of our resurrection in Christ and through Christ, and of the rest prefigured in Christ. Hence St. Augustine, at the end of *The City of God*, says: "That Sabbath shall be our rest, whose end shall be no evening, but the Lord's Day, as it were an eighth day eternal, consecrated by the resurrection of Christ, prefiguring not only the eternal rest of the spirit but also of the body."⁹¹ Moreover, we read that this day was called by this name by the Apostle John (Rev. 1), where he says that he was in the Spirit on the Lord's Day. Indeed, we also learn from Paul that from the very beginning it was the custom to come together on the first day of the Sabbath — that is, the Lord's Day — for the hearing of the word of God and for receiving the Body of the Lord; and likewise that on the same day of the week they were accustomed to contribute publicly their alms for the poor through the hands of the ministers of the Church at the altar of God. For Luke says in Acts 20: "On the first day of the Sabbath, when we had come together to break bread" — that is, to communicate — "Paul disputed with them." And Paul in the last chapter of 1 Cor.: "Concerning the collections that are made for the saints, as I have ordained for the churches of Galatia, so do ye also. On the first day of the Sabbath, let every one of you lay by him in store, reserving what shall be well pleasing to him."⁹² More about the institution, signification, and observance of the Lord's Day may be seen in St. Augustine,⁹³ in Innocent I,⁹⁴ in Leo,⁹⁵ and in the Sixth Council of Constantinople.⁹⁶

§ 53. Now, just as the Jews had, besides the Sabbath, other days as well that were feast days and solemn by the Law of Moses or by the legitimate institution of their ancestors — as is plain from Lev. 23 and from the books of Esther, Judith, and Maccabees — so in the Church of Christ, besides the Lord's Day, other days also are celebrated by institution of that same Church. Concerning which St. Augustine says generally in *The City of God*, book 10: "We call to mind and consecrate the memory of the benefits of God with solemn feasts and appointed days, lest ungrateful oblivion creep upon us through the passing of time."⁹⁷ What those benefits are, however, which are set forth for our commemoration on each of the individual solemnities, it is not the purpose of this work to explain in detail.

§ 54. It must be known, however, that not only those feasts are to be reckoned which are said to belong to God or to Christ the Lord — such as the Nativity of Christ, Pascha, Ascension, Pentecost, and the Eucharist — but also the feasts of the Saints are properly dedicated not to the Saints but to God and to Christ, the Saviour of all the Saints. For all these have been instituted to this end: that God may be glorified in His Saints, and the greatness of His benefits may be acknowledged even in the Saints — as the Ecclesiastical Office clearly demonstrates.

§ 55. The reasons (*rationes*), therefore, or causes, on account of which the Church celebrates the memories of the Saints on certain solemnities, are gathered both from what has been said and from St. Augustine in *Against Faustus*, book 2, and *The City of God*, book 8, final chapter,⁹⁸ and also from other sources. The first is, that by this Commemoration of the Saints we may be stirred to imitation of them. The second, that we may become sharers and participants in their merits. The third, that we may be helped by the prayers of those whose feasts we celebrate. The fourth, that through this kind of celebration we may be roused to praise God, who has been pleased to work such great and wonderful things for His Saints, and that we may renew in ourselves the memory of those benefits of God which He has bestowed upon His Church through His Saints. From all of which it is plain that all the honour which we show to Saints on their feast days is referred to God. Hence St. Augustine, in *The City of God*, book 22, chapter 8, recalling the great joy with which the people exulted at the miracles of St. Stephen, says: "What was in the hearts of those who exulted, except the faith of Christ, for which Stephen's blood was shed?"⁹⁹

§ 56. Moreover, how ancient is the custom of keeping such feasts — and most especially those which are called the *natalitia* of the Martyrs — both as regards institution and observance, is most clearly understood from ancient authors, both historians and those who wrote homilies to the people. Their passages we here omit for the sake of brevity. It will suffice to have cited one passage from Eusebius, who in book 4 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, chapter 15, quotes from the letter of the Smyrnaeans, who had lived with Polycarp the disciple of John: after they had described the martyrdom of Polycarp, they wrote thus: "In this place even now, with the Lord granting it, we hold solemn and joyful assemblies — above all indeed on the day of his passion, but also when we celebrate the memories of those who suffered before him — so that the souls of those who come after may be kindled by the illustrious examples of their predecessors." Thus far Eusebius.¹⁰⁰

§ XIV — What the faithful are bound to on feast days (Ad quid teneantur fideles diebus festis)

§ 57. Since the end of the precept concerning the rest of feast days is that one may more freely devote oneself to divine worship and to the commemoration of the benefits of God — for this is that "delightful Sabbath" (in Is. 58), that is, the Sabbath pleasing to the Lord — the faithful certainly ought not to be ignorant of what they are bound to on those days. First, therefore, just as the Jews observed the Sabbath in memory of the creation of the world (Ex. 20), and Pascha in memory of the liberation from Egypt (Ex. 13), and just as on the feast of Pentecost they were obliged to profess before the priest that they had received the promised land from God (Deut. 26), and so with the others; so likewise Christians ought to rest on feast days, and to do so above all in memory of the benefit of Redemption — yet in such a way that, according to the variety of the feasts, they recollect the various articles of faith and the mysteries relating to this benefit. For to this end the Church has instituted the various solemnities: that through them, as through certain reminders, the articles of faith might

be more easily commended to the memory of men. Hence it comes about that all the articles which are publicly proclaimed in the Church through the solemnity of feasts, all the faithful — even the rude and simple — are bound to hold and believe explicitly.

§ 58. But in order that the faithful might be yet further aided in commemorating these benefits of God, the Church prescribes that on feast days each one should hear Mass — that is, should present himself as present and devout before the awesome Sacrifice. For this Sacrifice has been instituted above all in memory of the Passion and death of the Lord, by which we were redeemed by Christ. Now, just as the precept concerning the keeping of the Lord's Day and the feasts of Christ is grounded more in the perpetual custom of the people of God than in any specific canon of the Fathers, so likewise this precept concerning the hearing of Mass — inasmuch as its origin after the Apostles is not found in writing — may rightly be regarded as a custom received in those early times as law, and handed down to us. For although there are Councils, both ancient and more recent, that make some provision about hearing Mass, these prescribe rather the manner or the place of hearing than simply command that Mass be heard on feast days. Among these is the Council of Agde, held nearly twelve hundred years ago, which so decreed concerning the hearing of the whole Mass (can. 31): "We prescribe by special order that secular persons attend entire Masses on the Lord's Day before the blessing of the priest, and that the people presume not to depart before the dismissal; but if they do so, they shall be publicly rebuked by the bishop."¹⁰² Concerning the place, the same Council decrees (can. 14). Similar provisions are made in the Sixth Council of Constantinople (can. 8), and in the Council of Orléans, canons 1 and 2.¹⁰³

§ 59. As regards the sacred sermon, although the Church has not expressly commanded the faithful to be present at it — perhaps because in former times only bishops were accustomed to preach the word of God, and it was impossible for the whole multitude of the faithful to be present at the sermon of any one of them — she has nonetheless sufficiently indicated even in former times what she desires to be done by the faithful in this matter. For in the Fourth Council of Carthage (chap. 24) it is decreed: "If, while the priest is speaking in the church, anyone departs from the hearing, let him be excommunicated."¹⁰⁴ And in the Council of Vaison (can. 4) we read: "This has seemed good to us for the edification of all the churches and for the benefit of the whole people: that not only in the cities but also in all parishes we should give to presbyters the power of preaching; so that if a presbyter is prevented by some infirmity and cannot preach in person, the homilies of the Holy Fathers shall be recited by a deacon."¹⁰⁵ Whatever may be the case, however, as regards the precept of the Church, by the law of nature and of faith Christians are certainly bound to learn those things which are necessary for their salvation. Since these are almost never taught except in the sacred sermons, the Christian people will assuredly be bound by the same law to attend them, and the pastor will be bound by the same law not to omit them.

§ XV — Explanation of the Fourth Precept (Explicatio quarti praecepti)

§ 60. Among the precepts of the second tablet, the first place is held by the precept concerning the honouring of parents, and this for three principal reasons. The first reason is that a man receives everything that he is from his parents, namely his body and all the members of his body, life, health, upbringing, the very use of

reason, and in a word the entire fact of being a man. Hence the Sage admonishes in Sir. 7: "Remember that thou wouldst not have been born but for them, and make return to them as they have made return to thee."¹⁰⁷

The second reason is on account of the anxious labours, sorrows, and dangers undertaken for the sake of children. Concerning this the Sage admonishes in the same place: "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." And Tobias in Tob. 4: "Thou shalt honour thy mother all the days of her life; for thou must be mindful of the great peril she underwent for thee in her womb." And yet, to be sure, a father's solicitude and labours on behalf of his children are no less great — indeed they are often greater. But Scripture makes special mention of the mother's labours for this reason, that they are more perceptibly apparent in the carrying, the birth, and the early upbringing of children; whereas the remaining period of children's lives belongs more properly to the care and solicitude of the father.

The third reason is on account of the honourable, pious, and Christian formation of children in character and the correction of their morals. By reason of this it comes about that children owe to their parents not only what they are as human beings, but also what they are as Christians. Since, therefore, honour is the testimony of excellence, it is sufficiently clear from these considerations how great is the honour owed to parents by their children, who are (and this is a mark of great excellence) the authors of so many goods. It must be noted, however, that this testimony of excellence — that is, honour — is rendered in many ways: either by the heart alone, when one honours someone before God; or by an external sign, such as the voice, a bow, a genuflection, and the like, when we wish to honour someone in bodily presence; or by some deed, which brings with it a further utility as well, such as obedience, compliance, sustenance, the offering of gifts, and the like. Since, therefore, the law commands that parents be honoured, it prescribes not only that reverence which consists in words and external bodily gesture, but also — and far more especially — that children should think honourably of their parents, obey them, and guard their life, honour, and dignity with every resource; and similarly assist them in poverty, old age, infirmity, danger, and every adversity with liberal supply of necessities — and this both while they are alive and after their death.

§ 61. That the word "honour" in Sacred Scripture is extended even to the supplying of the means of life is clear from the following. For the Apostle says in 1 Tim. 5: "Honour widows who are truly widows," and again: "Elders who rule well are worthy of double honour."¹⁰⁸ So likewise Tobias was honoured by the king by being granted a money subsidy (Tob. 1), and a physician is commanded to be honoured because of his necessity (Sir. 38). Similarly Scripture speaks (in Num. 22 and 24). Hence St. Jerome (on Matt. 15),¹⁰⁹ commenting on the words "But you say, Whosoever shall say to father or mother," and so forth, writes: "Honour in the Scriptures is understood not merely in terms of salutations and services rendered, but also in terms of almsgiving and the offering of gifts. And a little further on: The Lord had commanded that, having regard to the weakness or the age or the poverty of parents, children should honour them, even to the point of ministering to them in necessary things."

And then, showing the wickedness of those whom Christ reproaches, St. Jerome adds: "This most provident law the Scribes and Pharisees were willing to subvert, so as to lead the worst of sons into impiety under the name of piety; that if anyone wished to vow to God the things that were to be offered to his parents, the true oblation of God should be set before the duties owed to parents; or at any rate the parents themselves, seeing that things consecrated to God were being withheld, and declining to incur the charge of sacrilege, were left in destitution. And so it came about that the offerings of children, under pretext of the Temple and of God, went to the profit of the priests." Thus St. Jerome. From these words it is understood that parents

cannot, even under a pretext of religion, be abandoned by their children in time of need without violation of this precept.

§ 62. On this matter, in conformity with the evangelical doctrine of Christ and the exposition of St. Jerome, the Synod of Gangra, held around the year 324, decreed in chapter 16 as follows:¹¹⁰ "If any children desert their parents, especially faithful parents, alleging that they are doing so for the sake of the worship of God, and do not rather render the debt of honour owed to their parents — so as to venerate in them the fact that they are the faithful — let them be anathema."

For this reason, if a son has a needy parent whose necessity he, being established in a monastery, cannot relieve, he ought either to defer or to omit his entry into religion until he has provided for that necessity. But if after entry into the religious life a parent has subsequently fallen into want, so as to stand in need of the son's assistance, the son may indeed defer or omit those things which pertain to the essence of his rule of life in order to come to the aid of his parent — for the obligation imposed on him to observe those things is not absolute; but whatever he can preserve with the integrity of his profession, whether as a monk or otherwise, he is bound to preserve as far as he is able, and to that end he should have recourse to his Superior; so that in no wise should he be altogether withdrawn from that necessary assistance. And the same is likewise to be understood of another who is about to marry, with his parent placed in a similar situation.

§ XVI — On the promise attached to this commandment (De promissione huic præcepto adjuncta)

§ 63. Attached to this commandment in Exod. 20 is the promise: "upon the land which the Lord thy God shall give thee." What is read in Deut. 5 runs: "that thou mayest live long, and that it may be well with thee in the land which the Lord thy God shall give thee." The Seventy, in the former passage, rendered it "land"; and Sirach (ch. 3) echoes the same: "He that honoureth his father shall have length of life." The Apostle, Eph. 6, says: "Honour thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with a promise, that it may be well with thee," etc.¹¹² These words St. Augustine understands, in the work *De Decem Chordis* (ch. 6),¹¹³ as meaning that this is, so to speak, the distinctive commandment — that is, the first in the whole Decalogue which is set down in the second table and likewise has a promise attached to it. But more correctly, the Latins and the Greeks in their commentaries understand it thus: that this is the first commandment to which an express promise is attached. For although in the subsequent commandments longevity is promised to those who keep them, it is nonetheless specifically promised to those who honour their parents.

§ 64. This promise has a great fitness (*congruentia*) from reason. For men are accustomed to seek fruit and advantage from their works, but this they cannot hope to obtain from parents who are already declining with age and about to die. If therefore a son has been grateful and attentive regarding the benefit received from them, it is just that he be preserved long in life. For he who is grateful for a benefit received is judged worthy to enjoy that benefit as long as possible; just as on the contrary we deem the ungrateful man worthy to be stripped of the benefit he received as quickly as possible. But in the matter before us, the benefit is life itself, which a son has already received from his parents. Therefore, if in honouring his parents he has shown himself grateful, it is just that he be preserved long in life. But if he has done otherwise, he is worthy to lose his life as swiftly as possible.

§ 65. For Scripture in other places similarly attends to this fitness of reason, as when it is said: "Whosoever shall shed man's blood, his blood shall be shed" (Gen. 9); "All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. 26); "Men of blood and deceit shall not live out half their days" (Ps. 54).¹¹⁴ For it is just that those who unjustly take life from others should themselves quickly lose their own life. Furthermore, just as in other places of Scripture "days" or "length of days" comprehends all the remaining felicity of life, and this by a peculiar phrase of Scripture — whence in Deuteronomy and in the Apostle there is added: "that it may be well with thee" — so also elsewhere, to those who honour their parents, divine glory, prosperity, and every blessing are promised (Prov. 1 and Sir. 3).¹¹⁵ On the contrary, upon those who are impious towards their parents, not death alone but also misfortune, ignominy, and every curse are threatened by the same Scripture (Exod. 21; Prov. 19, 20, and 30; and Ezek. 22),¹¹⁶ insomuch that this curse is even transmitted to a long posterity, as the example of Ham, son of Noah, teaches (Gen. 9).¹¹⁷ Concerning which see St. Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, ch. 30.¹¹⁸

§ 66. But how the truth of this promise is consistent admits of some question. For we must believe that many who were obedient to their parents have died early, while those who were impious towards their parents have lived to extreme old age. For, as Ecclesiastes says (ch. 9): "All things happen alike to the just and to the unjust, to the good and to the evil," etc. It has pleased divine providence, says St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 8,¹¹⁹ "to prepare present goods for the just — which the unjust also may possess — and present evils for the impious — which the good also often undergo — so that neither may goods be sought too eagerly, since the wicked also are seen to possess them, nor may evils be basely avoided, since the good are for the most part also afflicted by them." To these considerations we may add the examples of innumerable Martyrs, and of the Lord's own Martyrs and of His most holy Forerunner, who all, having honoured their parents, died young and seem, from the effect, to be strangers to the fulfilment of this promise.

§ 67. Reply: In all promises of earthly felicity that are read as made to the Israelite people — a people old and carnal — the promise of heavenly and eternal felicity must consequently be understood as well. For "godliness (*pietas*) is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come" (1 Tim. 4),¹²⁰ yet in such a way that the goods of the life to come are understood as promised absolutely (*simpliciter*). The goods of the present life, however, are promised only insofar as that either befits the order of divine governance or is expedient for the salvation of those to whom the promise was made. For some good men are snatched away by premature death, "lest wickedness should alter their understanding" (Wis. 4);¹²¹ others are snatched away lest they see the evils of their people (4 Kgs. 22 and Is. 57);¹²² for Martyrs, moreover, both on their own account and for the public good of the Church, it is far better to meet a glorious death for Christ than to survive long in this life. Yet we must not think that those of whom we have spoken are entirely defrauded of this promise; for it is most abundantly compensated to them in the other life for what in this life they were worthy to receive. Just as we do not say that a man is deceived to whom silver was promised but gold is given in return; nor does he escape the threat to whom for a time forbearance is shown only that at the last he may be punished more grievously. And after this fashion St. Jerome understood that evangelical promise: "Every one that hath forsaken houses," etc., "shall receive a hundredfold" (Matt. 19).¹²³ The sense of this, he says, is: he who has relinquished carnal things for the Saviour's sake shall receive spiritual things, which in comparison and by worth shall be such as if a small number were compared to a hundred.¹²⁴

§ XVII — What things are to be referred back to this commandment (*Ad hoc praeceptum quae sint revocanda*)

§ 68. To this fourth commandment is reduced in the first place the reciprocal duty of parents towards their children. For just as parents are owed honour by their children, so in turn parents ought to be mindful of their duty towards their children — they to whom we owe the piety (*pietas*) by which we approach nearest to God, as St. Ambrose says (*Epist.* 43).¹²⁶ Now this parental duty is itself also manifold.

§ 69. First: the diligent and solicitous nursing and rearing of children up to a robust age. Mothers do not satisfy this duty in the least who, without just necessity, hand over their children to other women to be suckled and reared — contrary to the example of those most holy women Sarah, Anna, Samuelis (the mother of Samuel), the mother of the Maccabees, and most especially the Mother of the Lord, indeed contrary to the example of cattle and wild beasts. This corrupt custom is gravely reprov'd by St. Gregory, in his replies to the questions of Augustine, Bishop of the English (ch. 10),¹²⁷ and by St. Basil (*Hom. 9 of the Hexaemeron*).¹²⁸

§ 70. Second: the provision for life in future years. For parents ought to lay up treasure for their children, as the Apostle testifies (2 Cor. 12).¹²⁹ But they fulfil this not so much if they leave their children treasures of money, or annual revenues, or great estates, as if they instruct them in honourable arts — as St. Basil the same likewise admonishes, writing on Ps. 7.¹³⁰

§ 71. Third: an honourable, pious, and Christian upbringing. Moses admonishes the Israelites of this duty in Deut. 11: "Teach," he says, "your children my words, that they may meditate upon them, when thou sittest in thy house," etc.¹³¹ Concerning this more is read in Sir. 30.¹³² And Abraham executed this duty diligently, as the Lord bears testimony of him (Gen. 18).¹³³ Likewise Tobias, whose most holy admonitions to his son are on record (Tob. 4);¹³⁴ and the parents of Solomon — his father indeed (1 Paralip. 22 and 3 Kgs. 1)¹³⁵ and his mother (Prov. 4 and the last chapter).¹³⁶ But parents ought to discharge this duty either in person, or, if they are less able to do so themselves, through capable teachers — as the Synod of Mainz of the year 813, celebrated in the year 45,¹³⁷ mandates this be done — although parents themselves are bound to this at least to some degree, inasmuch as they themselves ought to hold the rudiments of Christian doctrine and to give their children an example of honourable conduct. Hence St. Jerome, writing to Laeta, says: "Remember that parents teach their children more by example than by word."¹³⁸

§ 72. Fourth: the correction of children. In this matter prudence and moderation must be employed, so that the parent be neither unduly severe nor unduly indulgent towards the child. For excessive severity leads to hatred and despair. Hence the Apostle admonishes the Ephesians in chapter six: "And ye, fathers, provoke not your children to wrath, but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."¹³⁹ And Col. 3: "Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged."¹⁴⁰ Indulgence, however, engenders contempt for discipline and neglect of all probity, as was once made manifest by the example of the sons of Eli (1 Kgs. 2).¹⁴¹ And because parents, out of the carnal love of children by which they are for the most part afflicted, are more accustomed to sin in this direction, hence more frequent admonitions of parents to exercise discipline appear in Scripture (as Prov. 22, 23; Sir. 7, 30).¹⁴²

§ 73. To this commandment are further referred other matters to be briefly reviewed by us. First: the mutual debts and duties of all who are joined by blood, or affinity, or native land, or dwelling. Hence also the order of charity (*ordo caritatis*) in these requires a greater affection and effect of love, and on account of the

honour owed to those joined by blood, marriage is forbidden in certain degrees of consanguinity. Second: the mutual offices of charity and honour between spouses. For the husband ought to love his wife as his own self, and as Christ loved the Church; and the woman in turn is bound to show her husband love, subjection, and obedience, as Scripture teaches (Eph. 5; Col. 3; 1 Pet. 3).¹⁴³ Third: those duties which servants owe to masters and masters in turn to servants. For that masters were accustomed to be called fathers by their servants is shown by the example of Naaman the Syrian (4 Kgs. 5).¹⁴⁴ Concerning both there are frequent Apostolic precepts (Eph. 6; Col. 3; Tit. 2; 1 Pet. 2; and Sir. 7 and 33).¹⁴⁵ Servants, moreover, are commanded to obey their masters — not only those who are good and gentle, but also the refractory — yet only in the Lord, that is, only in those things which are according to God, that is, which are not opposed to God's precept. The same is to be understood of all obedience.

§ 74. Fourth: to this place pertain the duties of subjects towards the Prince and the Magistrate, and of these in turn towards their subjects. Concerning what they owe one another, there are throughout all Scripture very many and most salutary precepts, and expressly in the Apostolic epistles (as Rom. 13; 1 Tim. 2; Tit. 3; 1 Pet. 2).¹⁴⁶ Fifth: the duty of the Christian people towards ecclesiastical superiors, and vice versa. That the superiors of the Church have the power of commanding and of making law, to which the faithful are bound to obey, is to be argued at greater length elsewhere against heretics. For the present it suffices to have noted these passages of Scripture (Deut. 17; Matt. 16, 18; Lk. 10; 1 Cor. 15; and Heb. 13).¹⁴⁷ And the same judgment holds regarding the duty of Religious towards their superiors and vice versa. Lastly, to this place must be referred what disciples owe to their teachers, and in turn teachers to their disciples; and again, what juniors owe to seniors and vice versa. For as the former owe honour, love, and reverence to the latter, so the latter in turn — teachers indeed being bound to apply every care and solicitude to the sound formation of their disciples, both in morals and piety and in doctrine — and seniors are bound to go before their juniors in all propriety, gravity, and examples of the virtues, and to illuminate the way for them.

§ XVIII — What is prohibited by the fifth precept (Quinto praecepto quae prohibeantur)

§ 75. In order to explain the sense of this precept, by which it is said "Thou shalt not kill," one must note first of all what St. Augustine warns against the superstitious dogma of the Manichees:¹⁴⁹ that this saying is not spoken of shrubs, because there is no sense in them, nor of irrational living creatures, because they are joined to us by no bond of reason. Hence, he says, "by the most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our uses." It therefore remains that the saying was spoken of man alone. And indeed concerning beasts and every kind of plant, that they may lawfully be turned to the food of men (which cannot come about unless they are killed), Moses clearly shows.¹⁵⁰

§ 76. Moreover, concerning the non-killing of man: this was given first as a precept to the human race after the flood,¹¹⁷ and it was the first among the precepts of the Decalogue to be expounded by Christ,¹⁵¹ and the first after the fall of man to be violated by Cain, and most grievously avenged by God.¹⁵² The Scripture adds the reason for the precept:¹¹⁷ "because man was made to the image of God." This reason is indeed twofold; for it signifies that the gravest injury is committed both against man, whose excellence is such that he alone among all corporeal natures bears the image of God within himself, and against God, whose image shines forth in

man. To these considerations add the fact that whoever kills a man overthrows, so far as in him lies, the entire work of God, since he removes man, for whose sake all other things were made by God.

§ 77. Nor are those to be heeded here who place this precept after the precept "Thou shalt not commit adultery," whether in order or in the gravity of transgression — as do Philo the Jew in one place and another,¹⁵³ and Clement of Alexandria.¹⁵⁴ For although Paul¹⁵⁵ and James¹⁵⁶ placed adultery before homicide, for whatever reason they did so, it is nevertheless certain that Moses in Exodus and Deuteronomy preserved the order which we have mentioned, which order both the Seventy and the other Interpreters follow; and with them Josephus also agrees.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, when Christ was asked what the commandments are,¹⁵⁸ he begins his enumeration from homicide.

§ 78. Now, before we say what is forbidden by this precept, we must first state what killing of a man is not forbidden, through which the sense of the precept will at the same time become apparent. St. Augustine, writing on this matter,¹⁵⁹ says: "Certain exceptions the Divine Authority itself has made, so that it is lawful to kill a man — namely, one whom God commands to be killed, whether by a law given to that effect, or by an express command to that person at the time. Now in that case it is not man who kills, but he who owes the service of an instrument, as a sword is to the one using it. Therefore they in no way acted against this precept who waged wars at God's command, or who, bearing the person of a public authority established by His laws, that is, by the most just rule of reason, put the wicked to death. And Abraham was not only not charged with the crime of cruelty, but was even praised under the name of piety, in that he made ready to slay his son — not as a crime, but as an act of dutiful obedience. And a few sentences later he concludes: With these exceptions, therefore — those whom either a just law commands generally, or God Himself the fountain of justice commands specially, to be put to death — whoever kills a man, whether another or himself, falls under the guilt of homicide." Thus far Augustine.

§ 79. From these words it is clear that the sense of this precept is: "Thou shalt not kill a man by human rashness" — or, which comes to the same thing, "by human authority." Although this, even when it occurs, is done by private authority in most cases, it may nevertheless at times happen also by public power, if anyone uses that power not rightly. The right use of public power the Apostle describes:¹⁵⁵ "Princes are not a terror to good works, but to evil. And again: He is a minister of God to thee for good; but if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is a minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Wherefore, as Innocent I says,¹⁶⁰ "Who will reproach what they see has been conceded by God's authority?" — as is cited in the Decree of Gratian.¹⁶¹

Hence the Lord says to judges generally and without exception through Moses:¹⁶² "Thou shalt not slay the innocent and the just, because I will not justify the wicked." Therefore the opinion is objectionable¹⁶³ and little consonant with the Scriptures of those who think that a judge can condemn the innocent on the basis of what has been alleged and proved; an opinion which St. Thomas refutes, as is evident to one who considers the matter.¹⁶⁴ For whatever arguments might be adduced for it, none of them is consonant with the Scriptures, as the author asserts.

§ 80. Moreover, every malefactor may not lawfully be killed by a judge in just any manner whatsoever; only one who is rightly and publicly convicted as a malefactor worthy of death may be so treated. Hence the rule laid down in Deuteronomy:¹⁶⁵ "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he perish who is to die. No one shall be put to death on the testimony of one witness alone. A single witness shall not stand against

anyone, whatever the sin or crime may be; but in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand." Now among those who are justly punished are without doubt also false witnesses and informers, who according to Deuteronomy are to be numbered among the capital offenders.¹⁶⁶ But it is not our purpose to pursue this subject further.

§ 81. It must now briefly be added: what things ought to be brought back under the prohibition of the killing of a man under this precept. First, indeed, those acts by which a man is harmed or ill-treated in body: such as striking, wounding, mutilating, subjecting to torture or bodily torment, imprisoning, and similar injuries. Second, acts preparatory to slaughter and the aforesaid injuries: conspiracy, the bearing of arms, provocation. Third, verbal injuries, in their manifold kinds, of which mention is made in Matt. 5 and Ps. 2:¹⁶⁷ insult, threats, detraction, malediction and the like, insofar as they have any bearing upon corporal harm. Otherwise they are referred to the eighth precept. Fourth, interior acts, by which the mind is moved to harm someone in body:¹⁵¹ among these are anger, hatred, dissensions, suspicions, jealousies, desire for the death or adversity of a neighbour, and other things similar to these.

§ 82. Fifth, those acts by which one cooperates in homicide or the other aforesaid injuries to one's neighbour: such as command, counsel, petition, consent, silence, and things of this kind by which such acts are brought to completion; to which add also rejoicing over the death of a neighbour. Finally, omissions of those acts by which the aforesaid sins could and ought to be impeded. In this last respect princes and judges frequently sin, when they do not deal with murderers, robbers, extortioners, and assailants of men as they ought, nor scrutinize them as they should.¹⁶⁸

§ 83. Among the transgressors of this precept are to be reckoned, first and foremost, not only those who destroy already-ensouled foetuses in the womb by means of drugs or any other method, or who procure their abortion, and those who beat pregnant women or terrify them in such a way that the foetus dies therefrom — for these are simply homicides — but also those who procure sterility, or in any way whatsoever impede the foetus from being ensouled, or prevent conception. For even if these are not simply homicides, since they do not kill a man, they nevertheless place an obstacle to human life, and therefore share in the lot of homicides. On this matter we have Scripture's testimony in Exod. 21 according to the Septuagint.¹⁶⁹

§ 84. The canons also most severely punish sins of this kind, as is evident in the fifth book of the *Decretals*, title on Homicide, chapter *Si aliquis*, from the Council of Worms; likewise in the Sixth Synod,¹⁷⁰ chapter 91, and in the Council of Ilerdense;¹⁷¹ chapter 5.

§ XIX — That it is lawful for no one to kill himself (*Quod nemini liceat seipsum interficere*)

§ 85. The violators of the fifth commandment are those above all who kill themselves. For, as St. Augustine says in book one of *The City of God*, chapter 17: "If it is not lawful by private authority for anyone to kill a man, not even one who is guilty, when no law grants the licence of killing him, then certainly also he who kills himself is a homicide; and he is so much the more guilty in having killed himself, the more innocent he was in that case in which he thought he ought to kill himself"; and in chapter 20: "Not without reason can it nowhere be found in the holy and canonical books that we are divinely commanded or permitted to inflict

death upon ourselves, either for the sake of attaining immortality, or for the sake of avoiding or warding off any evil. For we must understand that we are forbidden to do so when the law says: *Thou shalt not kill*, especially because it does not add 'thy neighbour,' as when it forbade false witness it said: *Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour*. Nor yet, if anyone has borne false witness against himself, should he on that account think himself free from this crime; because the rule of loving one's neighbour is taken by the lover from himself, since it is written: *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*." And what follows.¹⁷³ And St. Augustine confirms this teaching yet further through several succeeding chapters, showing that it is lawful for no one to kill himself: neither to escape temporal troubles, nor to avoid sins of another, nor to avenge his own past sins, nor for the hope of a better life after death, nor finally to forestall a sin which he might commit. The perspicuous reason for this is that, as the Apostle says, *evil must not be done that good may come of it*, nor is a certain sin to be committed in order to escape an uncertain one. Nor is there any sin whatsoever into which it is necessary for a man to fall.¹⁷⁴

§ 86. There are also other passages in St. Augustine, by which he shows principally against the Donatists the enormity of this crime, as in book one, *Against Gaudentius*, chapters 30 and 31; book two, *Against the Letters of Petilianus*, chapter 46; and Tractate 51 on *John*; where he proves the point by two testimonies of Scripture; in the book *On Patience*, chapter 12; and in the *Letter to Dulcitius*, 61.¹⁷⁵ Likewise clear is the opinion of St. Jerome, writing on chapter 1 of *Jonah*: "It is not for us," he says, "to seize death, but to receive willingly that inflicted by others. Hence also in persecutions it is not lawful to perish by one's own hand."¹⁷⁶

§ 87. Moreover, even pagan writers understood how contrary this is to the natural law. For Aristotle, in book three of the *Ethics*, chapter 8, says: "To rush upon death in order to flee poverty, or captivity, or any distress whatsoever, is not the act of a brave man, but of a coward. For to flee from hardships, and to do so not because it is honourable but in order not to suffer evil, is cowardice."¹⁷⁷ Plato likewise, as reported by Cicero in the book *On Old Age*, denied that one ought to depart from one's post without the command of the Commander — that is, that one ought to depart from life before God calls one.¹⁷⁸

§ 88. Moreover, what has been said concerning killing is to be understood similarly concerning mutilation. For just as a man is not master of his own life and therefore ought not to kill himself, so neither is he master of his own members; and consequently neither he himself, nor another at his command or with his consent, can remove a member from him, unless perchance this be judged necessary for the preservation of the whole body. For the sake of the soul's salvation, to avoid sin, this is never lawful. For it is not the intactness of members that is ever the cause of sin, but the will alone. Hence Origen was deservedly rebuked by the Fathers because, for the sake of avoiding incontinence, he castrated himself, wrongly understanding the Scripture (Matt. 19) which does not praise the bodily cutting off of members, but the resolve of perpetual continence confirmed by vow.¹⁷⁹

§ 89. Furthermore, in this matter there are to be considered the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, which read as follows: XXXIV. "It is lawful to procure abortion before the animation of the foetus, lest a girl discovered pregnant be killed or defamed." XXXV. "It seems probable that every foetus, as long as it is in the womb, lacks a rational soul and first begins to have one when it is born; and consequently it must be said that in no abortion is homicide committed."¹⁸⁰ And with this the decree which is extant in the Council of Nicaea, and in the Council of Arles, and in the decretal letter of Pope Innocent to Felix of Nuceria, chapter 1, as referred to by Gratian, Distinction 55, canon *qui partem*, agrees.¹⁸¹

§ 90. As to what must be answered concerning those holy virgins who, in the time of persecution, plunged themselves into a river — as is said — to escape the lust of their persecutors, this may be seen in St. Augustine (*On the City of God*, chapter 16), where he puts forward the conjecture that this was done by divine command or instigation, just as concerning Samson, who, inspired secretly by the Spirit of God, brought down the building upon himself and his enemies together, which he affirms in the same book.¹⁸² How Razias (2 Macc. 14) is to be judged — who, rather than be harshly treated by unbelievers, attempted to bring about his own end by killing himself — the same St. Augustine teaches in book two, *Against Gaudentius*, chapter 23, and in the *Letter to Dulcitius*, declaring that his example is neither to be praised nor condemned, but that it is one which provides just cause for censure.¹⁸³

§ XX — *That wars may lawfully be waged by Christian princes (Bella licite geri a Christianis Principibus)*

§ 91. Wars, whether defensive or offensive, are not opposed to the precept of charity, nor are they absolutely forbidden to Christians, provided that the three conditions required for a just war are present: a just cause, public authority, and right intention. For defensive wars are lawful because it is permitted to repel force by force, especially if he who does so has the primary authority to act; but offensive wars — which serve also the purpose of vindication — are lawful because a perfect commonwealth necessarily possesses retributive power not only against those within, whether domestic criminals or internal disturbers, but also against external enemies. If this power were lacking, it would not be a perfect commonwealth and could not sustain itself. This consideration, therefore, drawn from the perfection of the commonwealth, constitutes the ruler judge of all those who disturb it, so that he may proceed against them by way of cause, as justice demands, in the manner of a vindicator of the commonwealth. Wars of both kinds are recorded in the Scriptures of the Old Testament as having been waged — even at God's command — by Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Saul, David, and other leaders and kings of the people of Israel.¹⁸⁵

§ 92. As for the causes on account of which wars that are called vindictive may justly be waged, St. Augustine teaches this most fully, in these words from his *Questions on Joshua*, Quest. 10: "Those wars are customarily defined as just which avenge injuries: if some nation or city which is to be attacked by war has neglected either to punish what was wickedly done by its own members, or to restore what was unjustly carried off."¹⁸⁶

§ 93. Concerning the authority required for waging war, he writes in the same work:¹⁸⁷ "It matters by whose authority men undertake to wage wars; for the natural order of mortals, accommodated to peace, demands this: that the authority and deliberation for undertaking war should rest with the prince, while soldiers should owe the ministry of carrying it out to peace and common welfare." And a little further on he speaks again of the soldier in this way: "A just man, if he happens to serve under a king who is even sacrilegious, can rightly wage war at his command, keeping the order of civic peace — since what is commanded is either certainly not contrary to God's precept, or it is not certain whether it is contrary, so that perhaps the iniquity of commanding makes the king guilty, while the order of serving shows the soldier innocent."¹⁸⁸ Yet these words of St. Augustine, since they speak only of that soldier who both loves justice and is bound to obey his prince, are by no means to be extended to those who either have regard only for pay when

the question is whether the cause for which war is undertaken is just or unjust; or who, when the cause is doubtful, offer themselves to military service beyond the necessity of obedience.

§ 94. As for what things render a war unjust, or at least illicit, above all through the defect of right intention, St. Augustine shows this in chapter 74 of the same work, in these words: "The desire to harm, cruelty in taking vengeance, an implacable and unappeasable spirit, savagery in rebelling, lust to dominate, and the like — these are what are rightly censured in wars. Often it is even right that such wars should be waged by the good against the violence of those who resist — whether God or some legitimate authority — when they find themselves constrained by the very order of justice to command something of this kind, or to obey in such matters." So says St. Augustine. From these words it is evident in how many ways the intention may be depraved in the undertaking of wars.

§ 95. Now in order to prove that wars may lawfully be waged and undertaken, St. Augustine makes use, in the same place and elsewhere, besides the Scriptures of the Old Testament, of the following New Testament passages. From Lk. 3: when soldiers came to John and asked what they should do, John did not command them to abandon military service, but only that they should not molest anyone and that they should be content with their pay.¹⁸⁹ From Matt. 22: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's." From Rom. 13: "There is no authority except from God. Rulers are not a terror to good conduct but to evil. But if you do evil, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword without reason; for he is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil." From Matt. 8: the centurion who had soldiers under him is praised.¹⁹⁰ Concerning this centurion, St. Augustine writes in the same place: "The Lord deservedly praised the faith of that centurion; he did not command him to abandon his military service." And the same could be said of the centurion Cornelius (Acts 10): when Peter was about to baptize him, he required faith from him but did not command him to lay down his military belt. The same man is called by Luke devout and fearing God, and it is said that he had a soldier who feared the Lord. More may be seen in confirmation of this teaching in St. Augustine,¹⁹¹ as well as in St. Ambrose.¹⁹² There are also several chapters in Gratian's *Decretum* on this matter.¹⁹³

§ 96. These testimonies show clearly enough how incorrectly those have thought who in our time have taught that for Christians to wage war under Christian princes is contrary to evangelical meekness. For even Moses, who was the meekest man upon the earth (Num. 12), and David, whose singular meekness is also celebrated (Ps. 131), waged wars. And indeed, quite injurious to Christian princes is the assertion of a certain man, that war is nothing other than the common murder and robbery of many men, and that soldiers are nothing other than hired men and armed robbers in the pay of the commonwealth. Although something of that sort may rightly have been said by St. Augustine — in *De Civitate Dei* IV, ch. 6 — of unjust wars undertaken from the sole lust of domination, in these words: "To wage wars against neighboring peoples and then proceed from there against others, crushing and subjecting peoples that give no offense, out of the sole desire to reign — what else is this to be called but great robbery?" For he says also (in the same book, ch. 4, on kingdoms): "Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves but little kingdoms?" And then he goes on to cite what a certain pirate replied to Alexander the Great.¹⁹⁴

§ XXI — Whether it is lawful for any private person to kill an aggressor in self-defense (*An cuiquam privato liceat invasorem occidere pro sui defensione*)

§ 97. A more difficult question is whether one who, in defending himself and his property against an aggressor with the moderation of a blameless defense — as the jurists call it — kills him, thereby transgresses the precept of the Decalogue, or is in any way to be said to have sinned. For St. Ambrose and St. Augustine seem to teach this. The former, in *De Officiis* III, speaks as follows: "Someone asks whether a wise man, placed in a shipwreck together with a foolish fellow-shipwrecked person, ought to seize from the fool a plank which could support only one. Although it may seem more advantageous to the common good that a wise man escape from the shipwreck rather than a fool, yet it does not seem right that a Christian man, just and wise, should seek life at the cost of another man's death; as one who, even if he fall upon an armed robber, cannot strike back at the one striking him, lest in defending his safety he defile his piety. Concerning this there is in the books of the Gospel an open and evident judgment: 'Sheathe thy sword; for all who take the sword shall perish by the sword,' etc."¹⁹⁶ The same author, on the words of Lk. 22, "All who take the sword, etc.," says it was permissible to strike back up to the time of the Gospel.

§ 98. St. Augustine truly says, concerning the killing of men: "I do not think it permissible to give counsel that someone be killed, unless perhaps one who holds public office, and who does this not for his own sake but for others and for the city, where even he himself, having received legitimate authority, proceeds against the person."¹⁹⁷ And in *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 5: "The law is not unjust which gives the power to a traveler to kill a robber lest he himself be killed, or to any man or woman to slay a violator who rushes upon them violently, before the injury is inflicted, if possible. And afterwards: for the sake of the law, I do not find fault, since it permits such people to be slain; but how I am to defend those who do this, I do not find. And again: for how can they be free from sin before God, on whose account things which ought to be despised — namely human safety — are prized?"¹⁹⁸ And in *Contra Faustum* XXII, ch. 70, discoursing on Moses, he says: "According to the eternal law he should not have killed a man over whom he had no rightly ordered authority to punish, even if he was harmful and offensive."¹⁹⁹ Something similar he has in his questions on Exodus, where treating of the same Moses and asking whether it was altogether lawful, he says: "This was not lawful, because he did not yet bear any legitimate authority received either by divine or human ordinance."²⁰⁰ There follows to the same effect the decree of Pope Nicholas, found in Gratian: "Concerning those clerics who, defending themselves, killed a man — if they afterwards, amended by penance, can return to their former state or ascend to a higher one — know that we give no permission, nor grant any license, that any man kill in this manner."²⁰¹ St. Bernard seems to be of the same mind, saying in *De Praecepto et Dispensatione* that one who kills another out of the necessity of defending himself is in fault, though less so than if he had attacked first.²⁰²

§ 99. To this same side pertain further the words of Matt. 5: "I say to you, do not resist evil." Rom. 12: "Not avenging yourselves." And: "All who have taken the sword," which Scripture Ambrose uses. And lastly the precept of the Decalogue: "Thou shalt not kill." All of which seem to forbid a private person to do this, even for the sole defense of himself and his own.

§ 100. But the contrary opinion is rendered the more probable by the law of nature, reason, and authority. For the law of nature, which Cicero himself beautifully explains in the *Oratio pro Milone*, dictates that force may justly be repelled by force, especially if this is done with the moderation of a blameless defense. This law is

confirmed not only by civil law but also by canon law,²⁰³ indeed also by divine law (Exod. 22), where he who strikes a nocturnal thief is absolved as innocent.

§ 101. Reason also seems plainly evident: because one who in this way kills an aggressor does so not by private but by public authority — when both the law of nature and positive law, which stands on the side of the one attacked or his companion when he cannot otherwise escape, make him the instrument of public justice; not indeed to execute vengeance (for vengeance can be deferred to another time) but to defend himself and his own against the injury of the attacker. Since this matter admits of no delay when there is danger, it cannot be put off. This is roughly the common opinion of the Doctors, and especially of the more recent ones. The *Catechism for Parish Priests* also concedes to this view, in these words: "If anyone, in defending his safety, using every precaution, kills another, it is sufficiently clear that he is not bound by the law 'Thou shalt not kill.'" ²⁰⁴

§ 102. Nor indeed are the ancient authors found to be averse to this opinion. For St. Cyril, in *In Ioannem* I, ch. 35, says: "Whence did Peter have a sword? Then he answers: Because according to the law it was lawful to defend oneself with the sword, therefore it was also lawful to carry a sword." And earlier: "For if Christ were being dragged unwillingly to death by any multitude, perhaps his disciples would in every way have had to defend him." And again: "But Peter's intention, who took the sword against the men, was not alien from the legal commandment."²⁰⁵ And St. Ambrose, in *De Officiis* I, ch. 36: "The law of virtue lies not in inflicting injury but in repelling it. For he who does not repel an injury from a companion, when he can, is as much at fault as he who does it. And holy Moses took from this his first beginnings of military courage. For when he saw a Hebrew receiving an injury from an Egyptian, he defended him, so that he even slew the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. Also Solomon says: 'Rescue him who is led to death, etc.' Now there is no doubt that if it is lawful to defend a companion in this way, it is also lawful to defend oneself."²⁰⁶

§ 103. Those who hold this opinion also think that the words of St. Augustine in the *Epistola ad Publicolam* favor it — the words immediately following those cited above on the other side: "But those who are repelled by some terror — even for them something is perhaps provided. Hence it was said: 'Do not resist evil, nor let us delight in vengeance, which feeds the mind on another's misfortune, so that we do not neglect the correction of men.' Hence neither is he guilty of another's death who has built a wall around his own property, if someone, struck by its ruins, should perish. Nor is a Christian guilty if his ox kills someone by goring, or his horse kills someone by kicking. Nor is Paul guilty because he took sufficient care that the plot prepared against him by certain wicked men should be made known to the tribune; and because he therefore received armed escorts, if those wicked men had fallen upon those arms, Paul would be acknowledging his own guilt in the shedding of their blood — far be it. Let what we do for a good and lawful purpose, or have authorization to do, not be imputed to us if any harm comes thereby to someone contrary to our will," and what follows.²⁰⁷ But in that place St. Augustine is speaking only of those defensive instruments which defend even a man who is quiet. Whether he wishes the same judgment to apply to those instruments by which a man himself actively defends himself — such as a sword or any weapon by which death can also be inflicted — is not sufficiently clear, especially since the nature of the question he is treating absolutely required his expressing himself on that point.

§ 104. According to this more probable opinion, therefore, it is lawful to defend oneself and one's own, even using for this purpose instruments of such a kind that the death of the aggressor may follow — provided that the defender aims at nothing other than defense, and that a moderate defense, in no way intending to kill

the aggressor if he could by any other means retain himself and his own in safety. For if the defense is either immoderate, or has joined to it the desire for vengeance, he will not be immune from the sin of homicide if the death of the aggressor follows. And because those two things are almost always joined to the defense undertaken against an aggressor, it comes about that the Fathers sometimes speak as if such defense were simply illicit, evidently judging it most difficult for a man, while engaged in defending himself against a violent enemy, to restrain his hand from an immoderate act of defense, and his spirit from all desire of revenge.

§ 105. As for the Scripture passages which were brought forward on behalf of the same opinion, they forbid not defense but vengeance executed by any private authority; just as the words of St. Augustine cited above also expound the passage (Matt. 5) and as the passage (Rom. 13) plainly shows — where, in place of what we read as *Defendentes* ("those who defend"), the word is one which signifies *vindicantes* ("those who avenge"). For it further follows, he says, that it is written: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord."²⁰⁸

§ XXII — Propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII and Innocent XI (*Propositiones a Summis Pontificibus Alexandro VII. et Innocentio XI. damnatae*)

§ 106. Here are to be noted certain propositions ordered into exile from the schools and from Catholic practice by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII and Innocent XI, which we judge it worthwhile to set out here for the benefit of beginners. The following theses, therefore, were condemned by Alexander VII, being among the propositions fixed upon by him as erroneous. The second is as follows: "A knight (*vir equestris*) who has been challenged to a duel may accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of cowardice." The second — or seventeenth — proposition is: "It is lawful for a Religious or a Cleric to kill a calumniator who threatens to spread grave crimes against him or against his Religion, when no other mode of defense is available, as it does not seem to be available, and when the calumniator is prepared to allege those things publicly before grave men against the Religious or his Religion, unless he be slain." The third — or eighteenth — proposition is: "It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even the judge, from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, when there is no other way to avoid it." The fourth — or nineteenth — proposition is: "A husband does not sin by killing on his own authority his wife caught in adultery." By Innocent XI, however, these theses were likewise driven from the company of the faithful and banished; among them the following: "It is lawful for a man of honor to kill (*Fas est Viro honorato occidere*) —"²¹⁰

§ XXII — Declaration of the Sixth Commandment, and what falls under it (*Sexti praecepti declaratio, et quæ pertineant*)

§ 107. The commandment "Thou shalt not commit adultery" prohibits not adultery alone under that name, but also every other graver sin and every sin of lesser unchastity (*impudicitia*). Hence St. Augustine says (Quest. 71 on Exodus): "Just as under the name of theft every illicit appropriation of another's property is rightly understood, so under the name of adultery every unlawful congress and every illegitimate use of those members ought to be understood as prohibited."²¹² Now adultery is of three kinds: of a married man with an unmarried woman, of an unmarried man with a married woman, or of a married man with a married woman.

These are so ordered among themselves that adultery is a grave sin, vehemently condemned in the Sacred Scriptures (Job 31; Prov. 6; Sir. 23).²¹³ Yet of these three kinds the last is graver than the second, and the second than the first in gravity. If we compare this commandment with the one immediately following, we shall find that adultery, like homicide, is forbidden by the latter as well, as we showed above; yet it is prohibited more lightly there, just as the parallel passage clearly shows and reason itself declares. For just as the injury done to a man is graver when inflicted upon his own person than when inflicted upon a person joined and associated to him, so likewise an injury done to a man is graver than one done to the external things which he possesses.

§ 108. Furthermore, as we have said, it is to adultery that the remaining species of lust (*luxuria*) or incontinence are referred; and all of these are held to be forbidden by this same commandment. It must likewise be said that if anyone impiously flees the blow of a fist or a stroke, avoiding it by theft, the same applies. The second species concerns the preservation of one gold coin. The third species concerns those things which we actually possess; the fourth, or thirtieth, those which we hope to possess. The thirty-first: an obstacle to one who would otherwise enter upon an inheritance or right to a benefice. Note here that there is the following proposition: "Sexual union with a woman who consents at the confession of her husband's agreement suffices to say in confession —" See Cajetan.²¹⁴

§ 109. First, then, simple fornication (*fornicatio simplex*) falls here, which is the congress of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman — such a mingling as excludes those circumstances which constitute peculiar and graver species of unchastity. That this is to be referred hither St. Augustine teaches (Quest. 71 on Exodus).²¹⁵ Of the gravity of this sin we shall speak in the next chapter. We add here that, even if the commandment prohibits this alone insofar as it is expressly named, fornication committed with those women who publicly prostitute their bodies is judged graver, on account of the greater injury thereby done to the offspring likely to be born. Likewise, concubinage (which is a certain species of simple fornication) is graver than simple fornication, because to the sin of fornication it adds continuance and permanence in sin — that is, a continuous and quasi-conjugal habitual intimacy with a fornicating woman.

§ 110. Second, seduction (*stuprum*) falls here — namely, the deflowering and corrupting of a virgin outside of marriage. On account of this violation of bodily integrity, this sin is graver than simple fornication and is punished more severely by the laws.

Third, rape (*raptus*) — namely, when any woman whatsoever is forced against her will and while resisting into carnal intercourse, or is carried off by complete violence, even if she afterwards consents to the intercourse, or finally when she herself, though consenting, is taken away against the will of her father, husband, or guardian of her person. This sin is by its genus graver than seduction.

§ 111. Fourth, incest (*incestus*), which is committed when one mingles carnally with a woman joined to him by blood or affinity within the prohibited degree, without a legitimate dispensation without which marriage cannot subsist. Laws concerning this are extant (Lev. 18).²¹⁶ The principal reason why such congress is intrinsically unlawful is this: because by nature everyone owes honor to his parents and consequently to other close relatives. To this honor the turpitude that accompanies the mingling of the sexes is supremely contrary. Hence St. Augustine says (lib. 15, *De Civitate Dei*, cap. 16): "I know not how there inheres in human modesty something natural and praiseworthy, whereby, toward one to whom we owe respectful honor by reason of kinship, we refrain from that lust which, though generative, is one of which we see even conjugal

chastity itself to be ashamed." And in lib. 2 (cap. 4): "Human shame has a regard toward parents which not even depravity itself can take away."²¹⁷ This sin is so much the graver and the more abominable, the more closely related is the person with whom it is committed. Nor is there any doubt that it is by its genus graver than the sins mentioned above and than simple adultery itself.

§ 112. Fifth, sacrilege (*sacrilegium*), which is committed whenever either a sacred person sins against the vow of chastity, or a place consecrated to God is defiled. By reason of the circumstance it is by its genus graver than the foregoing.

Sixth, those acts which are committed against nature (*contra naturam*): as self-abuse (*mollities*), sodomy (*Sodomia*), bestiality (*bestialitas*), and whatever is similar. These are without doubt, by their genus, graver than all the foregoing and more abominable. They are said to be committed against nature because natural use and order are abandoned, as the Apostle says (Rom. 1) — because they are done contrary to that use by which the human race can subsist through procreation, as St. Augustine explains (lib. *Contra Julianum*, cap. 20).²¹⁸

§ 113. Beyond these species of lust already enumerated (to which adultery, if added, would itself be included among the more grievous sins of unchastity), all things that dispose toward the completion of the act of licensed lust, or in any way lead or tend to lead thereto, must likewise be referred hither — such as touches, kisses (*oscula*), immodest gestures, ribaldry, obscene speech (under this heading both hearing and reading obscenities and much more writing them must be understood as included), immodest movements, dances, spectacles, lascivious songs, wanton movements of the body, and other things of this kind. Each of these must individually be referred to the species to which the complementary act itself belongs.

§ 114. Finally it must be known that, although generally every use of lust (*libido*) outside of marriage is prohibited by the law of God, one must not on the other hand suppose that, if it is contained within the boundaries of marriage, it is always free from sin. For both mortal and venial sin can occur in the conjugal act, as is taught more fully where the subject of marriage is treated (Dist. 31, lib. 4).²¹⁹

§ XXII [continued] — That simple fornication is a mortal sin (Simplicem fornicationem esse grave peccatum mortale)

§ 115. From the gravity of any sin whatsoever of unchastity it will be possible to judge, if we show that simple fornication, which is the least among all species of lust, is by its genus altogether a mortal sin — both against the pagans, among whom fornication was never reckoned a crime, as is sufficiently indicated (Acts 25),²²¹ and against the erroneous persuasion of certain Hebrews who, from the fact that only adultery is expressly named in the Decalogue, concluded that simple fornication is not forbidden by the law of God. To the opinion of these men certain persons, not very Christian in their manner, did not fear to give a measure of assent, when they dared to assert that fornication is not a mortal sin, or at least that it is doubtful, and they wish to make the question a disputed one. But Scripture, the Fathers, and reason itself make clear to us something far different.

§ 116. For Scripture calls fornication a crime and teaches that it excludes men from the kingdom of God. Thus the Book of Tobit says in chapter 4: "Beware, my son, of all fornication, and besides your wife never permit yourself to know sin" — whereby all use of the sex organs outside of marriage is not obscurely

signified. More manifestly still we have this in the Scriptures of the New Testament: in Rom. 1, fornication is numbered among those sins of which it is said that "they who do such things are worthy of death"; in 1 Cor. 6: "Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate shall possess the kingdom." And shortly after, in exaggeration of this sin, the Apostle speaks thus: "Know you not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot? God forbid. Flee fornication. Every sin that a man doth is without the body; but he that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? For you are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body."²²² These words of the Apostle make clear that fornication is a great sin against God and that it already, in one who commits it in his own body, even drives God from his body — inasmuch as it defiles the temple of the Holy Ghost, that is, God's own temple, with whatever uncleanness — and how great a crime this is, the words of the Apostle indicate from the same Epistle: "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy" (1 Cor. 3). There are also: Eph. 4: "All fornication and uncleanness, let it not so much as be named among you"; Eph. 5: "For know you this and understand, that no fornicator, or unclean person, hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God"; Heb. 13: "For fornicators and adulterers God will judge"; Rev. 21: "Their part shall be in the pool burning with fire and sulphur."²²³ There are other passages from which it is established that these are mortal sins, excluding from the kingdom, as Matt. 15; Mk. 7; 1 Cor. 5; 2 Cor. 12; Gal. 5; Col. 3.²²⁴

§ 117. Nor did the old law leave this crime altogether untouched. For it is said (Deut. 22): "If the tokens of virginity be not found in the young woman, they shall bring her out to the door of her father's house, and the men of that city shall stone her to death; because she hath done a wicked thing in Israel, to play the harlot in her father's house."²²⁵

The teaching of the Fathers is in harmony with all these Scriptures, as may be seen in their Commentaries on the above-cited Scripture passages. Manifest and definite is the sentence of St. John Chrysostom (Hom. 22 on 2 Cor. 10): "As often as you have committed fornication, so often have you condemned yourself."²²⁶ And Theodoret, in his commentary on 1 Cor. 6, greatly exaggerates the gravity of this sin. Hence also in the Decree of Gratian, Quest. 1 (cap. *Praedicandum*), fornication is listed among the mortal sins for which the canons formerly required the more serious satisfaction — in these words: "They must know that such penance ought to be imposed as for perjury — such penance as for adultery and fornication and for wilful homicide and for other criminal vices."²²⁷

§ 118. If finally we consult reason, nothing different from what has already been said will appear. Fornication of itself and by its genus tends toward a notable harm to the offspring likely to be born of that congress, because it hinders the offspring's proper upbringing. For this upbringing requires: certainty of paternity, cohabitation of both parents and a mutual obligation to cohabit, a mutual love of both parents for each other and for the offspring begotten of them, and further a care and provision for the offspring concerning its proper education and instruction. All of these are lacking, either entirely or to a very great extent, in the upbringing of offspring conceived outside of marriage. This reasoning, learnedly expounded together with the solution of six arguments that can be urged to the contrary, may be seen in St. Thomas (2 Thom. *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 2, and *De Malo*, q. 15, a. 2),²²⁸ where he teaches in general that every inordinate act and every consummated appetite of lust is a mortal sin, resolving eighteen arguments to the

contrary. The same St. Thomas (2 Thom. *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 20, a. 2) says that this proposition — "fornication is a mortal sin" — is self-evident (*per se notum*).²²⁹

§ 119. It must however be known that in Sacred Scripture that reasoning is more strongly pressed which is drawn from the turpitude of the act itself and from the injury that follows upon it — to one's own body, and thereby to God himself — as the passages Rom. 1 and 1 Cor. 6 show.²³⁰ For the reasoning already given, although it seems good and solid, would still find some application even if no foulness of lust were joined to the act of fornication — whereas it is precisely this foulness which the Scriptures most particularly attend to and detest in sins of this kind.²³¹

§ XXIV — Under which part of the Decalogue drunkenness is prohibited, and how grave a sin it is (*Ebrietas qua decalogi parte prohibita, et quam grave sit peccatum*)

§ 120. Among those things which are forbidden by this sixth commandment, drunkenness (*ebrietas*) can also be brought, as well as in general the sin of gluttony (*gula*), for a twofold reason: first, because taste (*gustus*), around which gluttony revolves, is according to natural philosophers a certain kind of touch — but this sixth commandment prohibits those sins that consist in the pleasure of touch; and secondly, because the sins of gluttony provoke lust (*libidinem*). For as the Wise Man says (Prov. 20): "Wine is a lustful thing." And the Apostle says (Eph. 5): "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is lust." And likewise (Jer. 5 and Ezek. 16), surfeit is remembered as the cause of adultery and of the Sodomitic sin.²³³ Hence St. Jerome says in lib. 2 (*Contra Jovinianum*): "Eating of meat and drinking of wine, and the fullness of the belly, is the seedbed of lust." And in lib. 1 (cap. on the Epistle to Titus): "Wherever there are surfeit and drunkenness, there lust holds sway," etc.

²³⁴

§ 121. The vice of gluttony can moreover be referred to the fifth commandment, and likewise for a twofold reason: first, because gluttons and drunkards through intemperance for the most part harm their own health, shorten their lives, and are in a certain manner destroyers of themselves — as is shown at length (Prov. 23; Sir. 19, 31, and 37). In which place there is this memorable sentence: "Many have died through excessive eating and drinking, but he that is temperate shall prolong life."²³⁵ Of this matter also see St. Ambrose (lib. *De Helia et jejuni*) and St. Jerome (lib. 2, *Contra Jovinianum*).²³⁶ And secondly, because drunkenness frequently stirs up quarrels, contentions, and brawls, from which wounds and slayings ensue, as is indicated in those passages of Scripture and sufficiently proved by experience.

§ 122. Now in order that we may understand how grave a sin drunkenness is, it must be known that by the word "drunkenness" there is not here signified the mere defect of the use of reason, which, considered in itself, is only a misfortune and not a fault, but rather the excessive and immoderate drinking from which that defect follows. This sin, then, according to the common opinion of theologians, is by its genus mortal, even when committed only once. However, it can happen that one who is made drunk through ignorance of the drink is thereby excused. The reason for this is that drunkenness, even a single episode of it, brings a notable harm to a man: for it destroys the use of reason and consequently so disrupts the life of a man that it exposes him to grave dangers of body and soul, as is clear from what has been said above. St. Ambrose declares this at length in lib. 1 (*De Abraham*, cap. 6): "Lot," he says, "being drunk with wine, knew not what he was doing.

From this indeed we learn that drunkenness is to be avoided, through which we cannot guard against crimes. What we sober men avoid, we commit through drunkenness in ignorance. It is little that it inflames lust, kindles the concupiscences of the body; it also undermines the mind itself and takes captive the soul," and what follows.²³⁷

§ 123. This teaching is fully in accord with Sacred Scripture. For everywhere the Apostle numbers drunkenness among those sins which exclude a man from the kingdom of God (Rom. 13; 1 Cor. 5 and 6; Gal. 5).²³⁸ And the Prophets detest drunkenness as a very grave sin (Is. 5 and 28; Ezek. 23; Hos. 4).²³⁹ From that also which Anna, the mother of Samuel, is read to have replied to the priest Eli who supposed her to be drunk (1 Kgs 1): "Do not think of thy handmaid as one of the daughters of Belial," it is sufficiently apparent in what repute the sin of drunkenness was already held.

§ 124. The same is evident from the practice and teaching of those who after the Apostles guided the Church of God. Hence from the Apostolic Canons (canon 42), those clerics who drink to excess or are habitually given to drink are partly condemned to deposition and partly deprived of communion.²⁴⁰ What St. Ambrose and St. Jerome think of this vice is clear from what has been said above. What St. Augustine thinks (from one of his letters, ep. 64) is abundantly clear from the fact that he bewails this sin as pervasive and grave, and as one numbered by the Apostle among those things for which men would be excommunicated and excluded from the kingdom of God — to such a degree that it had become common in Africa as scarcely to be reckoned a sin at all.²⁴¹ St. John Chrysostom in Hom. 22 (*In 2 Corinthians*, 10) reckons it with rapine and signifies that it is worthy of eternal condemnation.²⁴² And in Hom. 7 (*Ad Populum Antiochenum*) he so affirms the drunkard to be demoniacal, on account of his brutishness and lasciviousness. Finally, the open sentence of St. Peter Chrysologus is extant (Serm. 26), that drunkenness is in other men a crime, and in priests a sacrilege.²⁴³ To this adds the Council of Mainz (*Moguntinum Concilium*), held in the year 813, whose canon has it: "The great evil of drunkenness, from which all vices spring — we command all men to beware of it; and he who shall be unwilling to beware of it, we decree that he is to be excommunicated until he has come to amendment."²⁴⁴

§ XXV — *What the seventh commandment prohibits and how far it extends* (*Septimum praeceptum quid prohibeat, et ad quæ se extendat*)

§ 125. By the seventh commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," there is prohibited in general every injury that is unjustly inflicted upon a man in the external goods which he possesses. Among such injuries, theft holds first place — that most well-known species of this sin, which may be defined as the secret removal, or secret detention, or any kind of usurpation whatsoever, of another's property against the will of its owner. For theft can be committed in many ways: by taking, by detaining, by alienating, by consuming, by damaging, by defrauding, and by purchasing or occupying goods that have been carried off by theft. Hence those also who retain found objects whose owners are still living and who have not yet been regarded as abandoned, and who take no care to restore them to their true owners, are implicated in theft. That things of this kind must absolutely be restored, Scripture admonishes (Deut. 22). That one who fails to do so becomes guilty of theft, St. Augustine teaches²⁴⁶ — indeed, he even teaches that those who claim for themselves goods belonging to another that are found in the possession of a thief or robber, and those who seize and do not restore goods lost

in a shipwreck and cast upon the shore, are held guilty of this crime, under whatever pretext of justice they may act. Concerning shipwrecks, Pope Alexander III teaches this²⁴⁷ in the third Lateran Council, chapter 24, related in the Decretals under the title *De Raptoribus*, chapter *Ex vi communicationis*. The fourth chapter of the Bull *In Cæna Domini*, customarily read aloud, is consonant with this.

§ 126. Now theft is a sin. For in Hos. 4 it is numbered alongside certain other crimes; and in Jer. 3, the Lord threatens thieves with a curse and condemnation. And the Apostle, in 1 Cor. 6, denies that thieves shall possess the Kingdom of God. The reason for this is that theft, considered in its full nature, inflicts a notable injury upon one's neighbour. For otherwise, if what is taken away is so trifling that the injury suffered is reckoned as nothing or at least as not notable, such a theft will not be mortal. Nor indeed does the Wise Man teach anything different (Prov. 6) when he says: "No great fault when a man hath stolen." For he denies that theft is a grave fault in comparison with adultery, since adultery is far graver than theft. He then wishes the circumstance which he subjoins — "for he stealeth to fill his hungry soul" — to carry much weight toward the extenuating of that sin. From these considerations one can further estimate the gravity of other sins of this kind, which are generally graver than theft, and which are all held to be prohibited by this same commandment, as St. Augustine teaches.²⁴⁸

§ 127. First, therefore, comprehended here are those things that add something beyond the general formal character (*ratio*) of theft, pertaining to the aggravation of the crime — such as *peculatus* (embezzlement of public funds), which occurs when public property is taken away or converted to private use. *Plagium* (man-stealing), when a person, whether free or slave, is stolen away and removed for any use whatsoever. *Sacrilegium* (sacrilege), which according to the Master²⁴⁹ is committed in three ways: namely, when a sacred thing is taken from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place. To these may be added other modes: one, when someone converts sacred things to profane uses, as King Belshazzar did (Dan. 5); another, when someone who has professed poverty usurps something beyond his vow, or secretly detains some portion of common goods as his own — as was the case with Judas (Jn. 12); a third, when someone subjects a thing spiritual in character, or something spiritually annexed, which cannot at all be valued at a price, to a price — which vice is called simony from Simon Magus, and is treated below.²⁵⁰

§ 128. Moreover, *rapina* (robbery) is comprehended in this commandment, and indeed manifestly so. "For he who forbade theft did not permit robbery," says St. Augustine in the question just cited.²⁴⁸ Robbery is when a thing belonging to someone is taken away by force and violence, whether by a private person or even by a public authority acting without lawful order. And although this sin is generally punished somewhat less publicly than theft, it is in truth all the more grave: for that which is taken from an unwilling person who is aware of it is taken more forcibly than that which is secretly taken from one who does not know of it. Now participants in this crime are, first, those who withhold and defraud labourers of their wages — a sin so grave that it is said to cry out to heaven (Jas. 5); secondly, those who in any way subtract or fail to pay in full their tithes, tribute, and taxes; those who sell justice for a price; those who defraud their creditors; those who devise stratagems for raising the prices of grain and other commodities; and whatever crimes are akin to these. Such is usury in particular, of which we treat in the next section.

§ 129. Furthermore, there are *emptio et venditio* (buying and selling), when a thing is bought for less than its worth or sold for more. And in general, every fraud, deceit, and injustice that is wont to be committed in contracts of buying and selling and in other mutual obligations involving money, goods, labours, and services.

§ 130. Moreover, for the obtaining of remission of those sins which shall have been committed against this seventh commandment, restitution of what one has unjustly taken away is altogether and above all necessary — whether in actual fact or by certain resolve to make it — concerning which St. Augustine has left the following words written²⁵¹ in his Letter to Macedonius: "If another's property, on account of which the sin was committed, is not restored when it can be restored, no penance is done, but it is feigned. But if penance is truly done, the sin will not be remitted unless what has been taken away is restored — but, as I said, when it can be restored." So he.

§ XXVI — *That usury is illicit and prohibited by every law (Usuram illicitam, et omni lege prohibitam esse)*

§ 131. Whatever is received from a loan beyond the principal sum given is called usury (*usura*), or the very act of such receiving is so called — derived from "use," because, as St. Ambrose says,²⁵³ "By usury estates are split asunder. The Greeks call it *Tokos*, that is, offspring." St. Basil explains the reason for this name.²⁵⁴ The Hebrews, however, call it "a bite." Hence where our version (Deut. 22) has "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother," the Hebrew reads: "Thou shalt not bite thy brother with a bite." The reason for this term is that he who gives at usury, receiving more than he gave, as it were bites into another's flesh and takes a part thereof.

§ 132. Now usury is a crime graver than theft, inasmuch as it pertains to robbery, as we noted above, and is prohibited both by natural law and by divine law. In order first to understand that usury is contrary to the law of nature, and therefore illicit of itself, one must know, as St. Thomas teaches,²⁵⁵ that there are certain things whose use is their very consumption — such as wine, grain, and oil — in which accordingly the use of the thing cannot be valued separately from the thing itself; and to whomsoever the use of such a thing is granted, the thing itself is equally reckoned to be granted, so that in such things, when the use of the thing is conceded, the ownership of the thing is simultaneously transferred — which kind of concession is called a *mutuum* (loan for consumption). Hence if someone wished to sell, separately, for example, wine, and separately the use of the wine, which consists in drinking, he would be selling the same thing twice — or certainly would be selling what does not exist — and would therefore be committing manifest injustice. In this manner, therefore, he commits injustice who, when making a loan, say, of wine or wheat, beyond the compensation of a like or equal thing exacts in addition a price for the use of the thing conceded. This price is called usury or superabundance.

§ 133. Now there are other things whose use is not their own consumption — such as a house, a book, a horse. And in these, the ownership of the thing can be conceded separately and the use separately, as the examples just given readily show; therefore it is not illicit to accept a price for the use of such things, as is clear in the letting out of things: where, namely, the ownership being retained, only the use is conceded to another. This kind of concession is called not a *mutuum* but a *commodatum* (loan for use). Now in which of these two categories money is to be reckoned is not difficult to see. For since it was principally invented for making exchanges, and thus its principal use is its own consumption or disbursement, which must necessarily be effected by means of exchanges, it is evident that money belongs to the former category of things. Just as it is therefore manifestly iniquitous to receive a measure of wheat for a measure of wheat and in addition to exact

an eighth or a sixteenth part of the same measure for its use, so it is equally plain that it is iniquitous to receive back the same number of coins and in addition to exact one or more coins for the use of that money. For in both cases there is a manifest inequality of exchange. And this is what the Philosopher has written,²⁵⁶ that it is against reason for money to breed money.

§ 134. To this natural law, obliterated from the minds of many, there was added the divine law expressed in Sacred Scripture frequently and very clearly — as in Exod. 22, Lev. 25, Deut. 15 and 22, Ps. 14 and 54, and Ezek. 18 and 22. These last two passages, as also Ps. 14, show the gravity of this sin: that he who has given his money at usury can neither rest upon the mountain of God nor escape eternal death. Nor, however, is usury committed in money alone, but in the loan of any things whatsoever that are consumed in use — as is clear from what has been said above and from the very definition of usury, and as both passages of Ezekiel sufficiently indicate, where superabundance is condemned in general terms, as St. Jerome writing on Ezekiel rightly noted.²⁵⁷ One may also see a similar annotation of his on Matt. 21, at the words "He overturned the tables of the money-changers." In the New Testament, moreover, the Lord prohibits usury (Lk. 6) when He says: "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby" — although interpreters vary in the interpretation of this sentence. The natural and divine law are further explained by human laws, especially ecclesiastical ones, very many of which are found in the Decretals under the title *De usuris*, where among other things Innocent III²⁵⁸ (chapter *Super eo*, taken from the Lateran Council) teaches that usury is not to be practised even for the ransoming of captives, and declares that, just as in the case of lying, so in the case of usury, dispensation cannot be given.

§ 135. Indeed, to such a degree has it ever been certainly persuaded from the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Fathers to the Catholic Church that usuries are unjust and that they can in no way be licitly practised, that Clement V at the Council of Vienne (found under the title *De usuris* in Book 5 of the Clementines, after the Sixth Book of the Decretals) did not hesitate to issue the grave decree that if anyone should fall into that error as to presume pertinaciously to affirm that the practice of usury is not a sin, he is to be adjudged and punished as a heretic. From all these considerations one may understand with what rashness it was written by some sectarians of this age — such as John Calvin, Molinaeus, and others — that usuries are neither contrary to charity nor prohibited by divine law, provided only that they do not bear too heavily upon those from whom they are exacted. This is as much as to say that theft is not a sin, if he who has something taken from him by theft receives a not notable injury.²⁵⁹

§ XXVII — What is prohibited by the eighth commandment of the Decalogue (*Quid octavo decalogi praecepto prohibeatur*)

§ 136. By the eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," there is expressly prohibited not every false testimony and not everything of that sort, but only that which is brought forward against one's neighbour, and is brought forward in such a way that not so much one's own judgment is perverted, as injury is inflicted upon one's neighbour by means of falsehood. Yet in general many sins can be referred hither.

§ 137. First, all those things by which public judgment is liable to be perverted: such as false sentence, the acceptance of bribes, partiality toward one side, or the acceptance of persons, and the disturbance of legal procedure that clouds the order of law — and whatever other proper sins of judges there may be; and

whatever things are committed toward impeding in any way the truth of a rightful judgment by any other persons assisting at the tribunal: by the plaintiff, the accuser, the defendant, witnesses, the advocate, the procurator, the notary, the secretary.

§ 138. Second, more generally referred hither is every utterance of falsehood, even outside of a court of law, and whether or not it injures one's neighbour. Hence pertaining here first and foremost is every kind of lying, and then those things which by their circumstance constitute a particular species of falsehood — such as calumny, perjury, or any kind of violation of promises and agreements. Indeed, even the crime of perjury, according to the Master,²⁶¹ is prohibited by this commandment, although it more properly conflicts with the second commandment — as will be said below in the next Distinction.²⁶²

§ 139. Third and finally, it will be permissible to refer hither all sins of the tongue, whether contrary to truth or not. For it is evident that even by speaking truth, and even by enunciating neither truth nor falsehood, many sins are committed through the tongue. Such are detraction, flattery, whispering (*susurratio*), insult, mockery, cursing, blasphemy, scurrility, foul speech, garrulity, murmuring, and whatever is similar to these — although most of these can also conveniently be reduced to other commandments, as has been shown in their proper places.

§ 140. Furthermore, from the phrase added in the commandment, "against thy neighbour," one must by no means suppose that he is free from guilt who, in order to preserve the life of his neighbour or even of an innocent person, has spoken false testimony. For this phrase is added in the commandment because false testimonies are for the most part wont to be given against a person in judgment, even if it sometimes happens that the contrary occurs. And although it may be doubtful whether he sins mortally who bears false testimony in a court in order to save the life of an innocent person, yet there is no doubt that he who does this same thing in order to snatch from danger a guilty person who has been justly accused, sins mortally — since he subverts the rectitude of judgment by false testimony.²⁶³

§ XXII — On usury and the prohibition of exacting more than the principal (De usura et prohibitionem ultra sortem exigendi) (continued)

§ 141. Furthermore, these propositions have been proscribed by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII and Innocent XI: namely, proposition 41 among those condemned by Alexander VII — that it is not usury to exact something beyond the principal, if one binds oneself not to seek repayment for a certain time — and propositions 40, 41, and 42 among those proscribed by Innocent XI, including that the *contractus mohatra* is licit even with respect to the same transaction entered into beforehand with the intention of gain.²⁶⁴ For money is to be counted as nothing, and there is no one who does not set greater store by money; and thus to exact anything beyond the principal from the borrower, and under that title to

§ II — That lying is of multiple kinds (Mendacium generali quadam partitione in tria genera dividitur)

§ 142. Lying is divided by a certain general classification into three kinds, as St. Augustine teaches in his commentary on Ps. 5, at the verse "Thou shalt destroy all those who speak a lie"²⁶⁶ — namely, the officious lie (*mendacium officiosum*), the jocose lie (*mendacium jocosum*), and the pernicious lie (*mendacium perniciosum*).

A lie is called officious (*officiosum*) when it is told without injury to another, for the safety or benefit of someone. It is called jocose (*jocosum*) when it is uttered solely with the wish to please or to amuse. For what the same St. Augustine says — in his *Quaestiones in Genesim*, question 145 — namely, that things said in jest are not reckoned as lying, and in his book *De mendacio*, chapter 1, that jests have never been counted as lies — must be understood as referring not to lying according to its essence (*secundum essentiam*), which consists in the will to signify what is false, but according to its perfection or proper end. For the proper end (*proprius finis*) of lying is to deceive. But, as St. Augustine says in his commentary on Ps. 5, he who lies in jest does not deceive; for the one to whom the jest is addressed knows that it was said in fun.²⁶⁷ The pernicious lie (*perniciosum*) is so called because it inflicts notable harm. Of this kind are the lies of detractors, and those lies which are committed in contracts, agreements, judicial proceedings, and in teaching — especially that which pertains to religion. Among these three kinds, the last is established to be mortal, while the remaining two are indeed venial, yet by no means trivial. Hence St. Augustine, in the passage already cited, excludes them from the perfect, from whom, however, not all venial sins can be entirely removed.

§ 143. A fuller and more detailed division of lying is given by the same St. Augustine in his *De mendacio*, chapter 14, where he enumerates eight kinds of lies.²⁶⁸ The first is that which is told in the teaching of religion; the second is that which benefits some and harms another; the third is that which benefits one person while harming another; the fourth is that which is told from the sheer desire to lie and to deceive; the fifth is that which is told from the desire to please by smooth speaking; the sixth is that which harms no one and benefits someone in some external matter; the seventh is that which harms no one and benefits someone outside of a judicial context in the matter of their bodily life; the eighth is that which harms no one and is of benefit in this respect, that it protects someone from bodily defilement. What order of gravity these eight kinds hold among themselves, he teaches in the final chapter of the same book, saying: "Among these eight kinds, the less anyone sins in lying, the more he rises toward the eighth; and the more he sins, the more he sinks toward the first."²⁶⁹

§ III — That every lie is a sin (Omne mendacium esse peccatum)

§ 144. It is an ancient and celebrated question whether every lie is a sin — or, what comes to the same thing, whether it is ever permissible in any case to lie. On this matter the majority of pagan writers did not hesitate, judging that a good man must sometimes lie for the sake of duty. Among these, Plato taught that magistrates, as physicians of the commonwealth, sometimes have need of falsehood; and in his *Dialogues* he introduced Socrates speaking to that effect.²⁷¹ Among ecclesiastical writers the same view appears to have been held by Abdias in his *Life of Matthew* (or whoever the author may be); by Clement of Alexandria²⁷²; by Origen²⁷³, as St. Jerome cites him in the epistle to be mentioned below; by St. John Chrysostom in his book *On the Priesthood* and in his commentary on chapters 12 and 37 of *Genesis*²⁷⁴; by Theodoret in his *Life of Jacob*, in his *Prolychronius*, and also in book 4 of his *Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 20.²⁷⁵ Among the Latins: Lactantius in book 6 of the *Divine Institutes*, ch. 18²⁷⁶; and St. Jerome in his commentary on the second chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians.²⁷⁷ Defending this commentary — which deals with Peter's being rebuked in pretence by Paul — in a certain letter to St. Augustine, he cites seven authors in support of his opinion.²⁷⁸ Again, in book 1 of his *Apology against Rufinus*, after the middle.²⁷⁹ John Cassian held and taught the same view in *Conferences*, 18²⁸⁰; likewise Rupert in his commentary on the second chapter of *Joshua*.²⁸¹ In favour of these positions appears to be the text found in Gratian, Cause 22, question 2, chapter *Utilem*, which passage is drawn from St. Jerome's commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians.²⁸²

§ 145. Moreover, those who defend the officious lie adduce many examples from the Saints, and especially from Sacred Scripture. For, setting aside the case of Abraham calling Sara his wife his sister — since, as he himself clears the matter (Gen. 20), she was truly his sister, daughter of his father though not of his mother — there are many other instances that do not seem to admit of any plausible excuse. Such as: that the same Abraham (Gen. 22), when he was going to sacrifice his son, said he would return with the boy.²⁸³ That Isaac (Gen. 26), having been reproached for a lie, excuses himself in such a way as nevertheless to acknowledge the lie.²⁸⁴ That Jacob (Gen. 27), in order to snatch the blessing from his brother, said to his father, "I am Esau thy first-born"; and again: "Behold, I have done as thou didst command me"; and a third time: "Eat of my venison."²⁸⁵ That Joseph (Gen. 42) calls his brothers spies, and (ch. 44) declares that the cup from which he was accustomed to divine had been stolen from him.²⁸⁶ That (Exod. 1) the Egyptian midwives are praised who by lying saved the children of the Hebrews.²⁸⁷ And (Josh. 2) that the harlot Rahab is praised for having delivered the spies from danger by lying.²⁸⁸ That (1 Kgs. 20) David asks Jonathan to tell his father that he had gone to Bethlehem²⁸⁹; and (ch. 21) says to the priest Ahimelech that he has been sent by the king.²⁹⁰ That (4 Kgs. 6) the prophet Elisha says to the soldiers sent to capture him: "This is not the way, and this is not the city you seek."²⁹¹ That (Tob. 5) the Angel declares himself to be Azarias, the son of Ananias.²⁹² That Judith (ch. 10–11) deceived Holofernes with a fictitious narrative.²⁹³ That the prophet Amos (ch. 7) denies that he is a prophet²⁹⁴; and that Micah (ch. 2) wishes he could speak a lie.²⁹⁵ Finally, that in the New Testament the Apostle Paul (Acts 23) says he did not know that the person he was cursing was the high priest, and that he exclaims there that he is a Pharisee.²⁹⁶

§ 146. And if there are any other words or deeds of the Saints that can be invoked in defence of lying — such as the Apostle's calling himself (Eph. 3) the least of all the saints²⁹⁷, and (1 Cor. 15) denying that he is worthy to be called an Apostle²⁹⁸; and the saying of the wise man (Prov. 30) about himself: "I am the most foolish of men, and the wisdom of men is not with me",²⁹⁹ — all such things as these, which are read as spoken by pious persons more humbly than truthfully, may be understood in the manner indicated by St. Gregory in his reply to the question of Augustine of the English, where he also acknowledges in some manner their own faults where there is no fault. This is cited by Gratian, Distinction 5, chapter *Ad ejus*.³⁰⁰

§ 147. The arguments by which nearly all the defenders of this opinion endeavour to uphold it are drawn for the most part from effect and purpose: namely, because by lying either the salvation of the soul or that of the body is defended and preserved, or chastity is protected, or provision is made for the peace and welfare of the commonwealth, or some similar good is procured, or a contrary evil is averted. They confirm their view by another argument as well: for slaying and the taking of another's property can, as God has commanded them, so also in a particular case rightly be done by a human being, as the examples of Scripture demonstrate; therefore a lie too can be commanded by God and committed by a man without fault.

§ 148. They offer yet another argument: Error is not always a sin; therefore to produce error in another's mind, which is what lying does, will not always be a sin.

§ 149. And another still: A lie does not appear to be a sin for any other reason than insofar as it is deceptive of one's neighbour; yet not every lie appears to be such — for, as we showed above from St. Augustine, he who lies in jest does not deceive, nor does he intend to deceive.

§ 150. Finally: What a lie is in words, that dissimulation is in deeds; yet it is sometimes permissible to dissimulate, as the examples show of Joshua commanding the children of Israel to simulate flight (Josh. 8)³⁰¹,

of David simulating madness (1 Kgs. 21)²⁹⁰, of Jehu simulating that he was a worshipper of Baal (4 Kgs. 10)³⁰², and of the Lord Himself pretending to go further (Lk., last chapter)³⁰³; therefore it will also sometimes be permissible to lie. So widely did this opinion find favour with many in former times that St. Augustine himself confesses that it had been very common, writing thus in *Questions on Leviticus*, question 68: "It seems good to all that where no one is harmed, one ought to lie for the sake of salvation."³⁰⁴

§ 151. But it must be known that this very teaching concerning lying was vigorously attacked by the same St. Augustine in very many places, and especially and systematically in two books, of which he entitled the one *On Lying* and the other *Against Lying* — because, as he himself testifies in book 1 of his *Retractations*, in the final chapter, the greater part of the former book was occupied with the controversy of inquiry.³⁰⁵

1. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 21.

2. Matt. 5 and 7 (close of the Sermon on the Mount); cf. Matt. 7:29.

3. Deut. 18:15, 18–19.

4. Acts 3:22; Acts 7:37.

5. 1 Cor. 9:21; Gal. 6:2; 1 Cor. 7:19; 1 Cor. 14:37.

6. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* bk. 24, ch. 13, on Job 13 ("Let him who judges write the book himself").

7. Matt. 5:17.

8. St. Augustine (or the Church's tradition derived from him), on Ex.: "The precepts of the Decalogue, except for the Sabbath, we do not doubt are to be observed in the New Testament."

9. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 9.

10. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 20; cf. ch. 11.

11. Council of Vienne (1311) under Clement V; the decree against the Beguards and Beguines is contained in the Clementine constitution *Ad Nostrum*, On Heretics.

12. This refers to the Jansenist position; cf. the marginal note referencing Cardinal De Aguirre, *Theologia S. Anselmi*, tom. 3, Disputations CXXX–CXXXI.

13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, aa. 9–10.

14. St. Augustine, *Confessions* bk. 1, ch. 22.

15. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* ch. 14.

16. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* bk. 3, ch. 4.

17. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi* ch. 26.

18. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* ch. 26; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32, Conc. 1; Sermon 19 on the words of the Apostle; Tract 9 on the Epistle of John.

19. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* bk. 1, ch. 22.

20. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* bk. 1, ch. 22 (continuation of the same passage).

21. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* ch. 121; *De Civitate Dei* ch. 25; *Contra Julianum* bk. 4, ch. 10.

22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100 [as cited in source: *S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 107*; the q. 107 reference appears in the source heading for this section].

23. Philo Judaeus, *De Decalogo*; Josephus, *Antiquities* bk. 3, ch. 4; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* bk. 6; Origen, *Homilies on Exodus*, Hom. 1.

24. Procopius of Gaza, Commentary on Ex. ch. 20.
25. St. Jerome, on Hosea ch. 10; Hesychius, on Lev. 26.
26. Author of the *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum*, in the Homilies attributed to St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 47.
27. Author of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 7, among the works of St. Augustine.
28. St. Augustine transmits this distribution in numerous places.
29. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 71 *super Exodum*; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32, Tract 1; Epistle to Januarius (Ep. 55 [116 Benedict.]), bk. 15, q. 27 *super Exod.*; (a) Tractatus *De Decem Chordis* inter Opera Augustini, antiquae editionis Tom. IX, colloc. & Tom. X inter Serm. De Tempore XCVI, numeratus, in Editione Benedictina Tom. V, appositus, inter Serm. 1. Classif IX, recensetur, & a Possidio in Indic. cap. 8 notatus, atque ab Eugipio & Floro citatus dicitur. (b) Seu LV in Edit. Benedicti. (c) Sermonem alias XCV De Tempore PP. Benedictini in prae laudata eorum Editione Operum S. Augustini, in Appendicem Tom. V inter suppositios S. Doctoris Sermones rejecerunt, & XXI numerant cum hac Epigraphe *De decem plagis & decem praeceptis*; *Contra Faustum* ch. 4; Sermon 95 *De Tempore*.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 4.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 4; and I-II, q. 122.
32. This paragraph continues from the discussion of those who sin against the first precept of the Decalogue.
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 4; II-II, q. 122.
34. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 71 *super Exodum*; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32, Tract. 1; Tractatus *De Decem Chordis*, ch. 5–6; Epistle 116 (Ep. *ad Januarium*), ch. 11; *Contra Faustum*, bk. 15, ch. 4 [and] Fragment 2, ch. 11; Sermon 95 *De Tempore*.
35. St. Augustine, Epistle *ad Januarium* (Ep. 116); *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 27 *super Exodum*.
36. Deut. 6; Matt. 22.
37. Jer. 8; Eph. 4.
38. Matt. 10:37.
39. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tract. 90.
40. 1 Kgs (1 Sam.) 15:23.
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, aa. 5–6; II-II, q. 122, a. 2.
42. Lev. 19; Deut. 18. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 6; *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 29 and following; and the First Council of Toledo, at the end of the profession of faith there subjoined.
43. Jer. 10: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven," etc. Cf. above, at Distinctio 14, Bk. [I].
44. First Council of Braga, ch. 9; Fourth Council of Carthage, canon 89; St. Ambrose, *De Helia et Jejunio*, bk. 4, ch. 4; St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam I ad Thessalonicenses*, hom. 3; St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* V, ch. 1; *De Genesi ad Litteram* II, ch. 17; *Confessiones* IV, ch. 3; Epistle 119 *ad Januarium*, ch. 7; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32; St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, hom. 10.
45. 1 Cor. 10. Cf. above, at Distinctiones 16 and 22.
46. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 20 and following; Decretum Gratiani, *Causa* 26, q. 5, ch. *Non liceat Christianis*.
47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 84, a. 1; q. 103; III, q. 25.
48. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica* IV, ch. 15; VIII, ch. 6.
49. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XX, ch. 21.
50. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. ult. (final chapter).
51. St. Augustine, Sermon 101 *De Diversis*, ch. 3 (or, in the Benedictine edition, Sermon 17; in the Benedictine edition of the Opera this is Sermon CCLXXXIII among Sermons *De Sanctis*). Reference to (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2.
52. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 27.

53. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion (Adversus Haereses)*, Haeresis 79 (Collyridians); St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Iulianum* VI.
54. Cf. below, Distinctio 45, Bk. IV.
55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 90, a. 3; q. 96, a. 1 and following; III, q. 87, a. 3; q. 71, aa. 2–4.
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 4; II-II, q. 94; III, q. 25, a. 3.
57. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, q. 71 *super Exodum*.
58. Jer. 2:27.
59. Is. 44; the Epistle of Jeremiah (= Bar. 6).
60. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 113, Sermo 2; Ps. 65.
61. St. Augustine, *Historia* [abbreviation as in source], Book 7, ch. 18. (The precise work is uncertain from the abbreviation; likely *De Civitate Dei*.)
62. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 23.
63. Wis. 14.
64. St. Jerome, Commentary on Matt. 24.
65. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VII, ch. 5 and following.
66. Rom. 1:25.
67. St. Augustine, Sermon on the Kalends of January, fragment 5, ch. 2 and 6 [abbreviation as in source].
68. Acts 17:29.
69. Deut. 4:16.
70. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, haeresis 50.
71. St. Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, ch. 7.
72. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Council), Session 6 (Act 6).
73. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* IV, ch. 17.
74. Canon 36 of the Council of Elvira.
75. Council of Trent, Session 25, Decree on Sacred Images. Cf. footnote (a) in the source: meanwhile one must recall the Proposition condemned by Pope Alexander VIII (Proposition XXV): "*It is sinful for Christians to place in a temple the image of God the Father sitting.*"
76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25.
77. Above, at Distinctio 9 of this Book IV.
78. Council of Trent, Session 25, Decree on Sacred Images.
79. Num. 21.
80. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 25.
81. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100; II-II, q. 122, a. 4.
82. Ex. 20:11.
83. Ex. 20:9–10.
84. St. Augustine, *Tractatus de Decem Chordis*, ch. 3; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 32, Concio 3.
85. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 122, a. 4, ad 1.
86. Ex. 16; 2 Esd. (Nehemiah); the final chapter of the same.
87. *Decretales*, lib. 2, tit. *de Feriis*, cap. *Omnes*, cap. *Licet*, and others.
88. Reference to the custom and common practice of the Christian faithful as interpreter of ecclesiastical law.

89. St. Augustine, Sermon 97 (= *De Decem Chordis*, ch. 3), in *Opera*, vol. 9 [abbreviation as in source].
90. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, a. 3; I-II, q. 100, a. 5, ad 2; q. 102, a. 4, ad 10; q. 103, a. 3, ad 4; II-II, q. 122, a. 4.
91. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXII, final chapter (ch. 30).
92. Acts 20:7; 1 Cor. 16:1–2.
93. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 119 (= *Epistola I ad Januarium*, ch. 13).
94. Innocent I, *Epistola* I, *Decretal*, ch. 4.
95. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 4 de *Quadragesima*.
96. Sixth Council of Constantinople (Quinisext / Trullan Synod), can. 8. — Estius here appends an extended note on the historical status of this synod, which we summarise: the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople (held in the Imperial Basilica called *in Trullo*, as Christianus Lupus establishes in his *Dissertatio de Sexta Synodo*, ch. 6) enacted no canons; the canons commonly attributed to it under the name of the Sixth Synod belong rather to a different assembly, also held in the same royal city and in the same place — in the *Trullum* or vaulted hall of the Palace — whose date is discussed by authors: Baronius places it in the eighth year of Justinian II, the fifth of Pope Sergius, the tenth after the Sixth Synod, i.e. A.D. 692; Christianus Lupus in his *Dissertatio de Synodo Trullana* and Dupinus in *Bibliotheca saeculi VII* agree with Natalis Alexander (tom. 5, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, saec. 7, diss. 3, n. 5) in placing it c. A.D. 688, five years before. Whether Callinicus or Paul presided as Patriarch of Constantinople is disputed; Lupus argues Callinicus's name was erased as that of an infamous person blinded and exiled by Justinian II, and Paul's name substituted, while Tharasius in the Seventh Synod, Session IV, shows Callinicus subscribed. Pope Sergius received the canons sent to him by Justinian II, but neither approved all nor rejected all; subsequent popes — up to John VII and to Tharasius — accepted only those consonant with the Apostolic See. Sixtus V, *Constitutio* 87, appears to cite the Trullan synod. The canons of the Trullans not approved are Canons II, XIII, LV, LXV, and LXXXII. What the Author here says, that Canon VIII of the so-called Sixth Synod establishes something about the institution, signification, or observance of the Lord's Day, is wide of the truth; that canon treats of the convening of synods. In none of the canons of this collection, except nos. 80 and 90, is the Lord's Day mentioned; and what is said in canons 80 and 90 about the Lord's Day does not appear to pertain to the matter of which the Author treats.
97. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* X, ch. 4.
98. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, lib. 2; *De civitate Dei*, lib. 8, final chapter.
99. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 8.
100. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* IV, ch. 15.
101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 102; q. 103; II-II, q. 122, a. 4.
102. Council of Agde (*Concilium Agathense*), can. 31.
103. Sixth Council of Constantinople (Quinisext), can. 8; Council of Orléans (*Concilium Aurelianense*), can. 1 and 2.
104. Fourth Council of Carthage, ch. 24.
105. Council of Vaison (*Concilium Vasense*), can. 4.
106. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100; II-II, q. 101; q. 122.
107. Sir. 7.
108. 1 Tim. 5.
109. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew*, on Matt. 15.
110. Council of Gangra, ch. 16 (held c. 324).
111. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 7; II-II, q. 122, a. 5.
112. Eph. 6:2–3.
113. St. Augustine, *Tractatus De Decem Chordis*, ch. 6 [= Sermon 9 in the Benedictine edition; also numbered among the Sermons *De Tempore*].
114. Ps. 54 (Vulgate numbering).

115. Prov. 1; Sir. 3.
116. Exod. 21; Prov. 19, 20, 30; Ezek. 22.
117. Gen. 9.
118. St. Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, ch. 30.
119. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 8.
120. 1 Tim. 4:8.
121. Wis. 4.
122. 4 Kgs. 22; Is. 57.
123. Matt. 19:29.
124. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew*, on Matt. 19.
125. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 101; q. 102; q. 103; q. 104; q. 122, a. 5.
126. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 43.
127. St. Gregory the Great, *Responses to the Questions of Augustine, Bishop of the English*, ch. 10.
128. St. Basil, *Homiliae in Hexaemeron*, hom. 9.
129. 2 Cor. 12:14.
130. St. Basil, *Commentary on Ps. 7*.
131. Deut. 11:19.
132. Sir. 30.
133. Gen. 18:19.
134. Tob. 4.
135. 1 Paralip. (1 Chr.) 22; 3 Kgs. (1 Kgs.) 1.
136. Prov. 4 and ch. 31 (the last chapter).
137. Synod of Mainz, year 813, celebrated [under canon] 45.
138. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Laetam* [Epist. 107].
139. Eph. 6:4.
140. Col. 3:21.
141. 1 Kgs. (1 Sam.) 2.
142. Prov. 22; Prov. 23; Sir. 7; Sir. 30.
143. Eph. 5; Col. 3; 1 Pet. 3.
144. 4 Kgs. (2 Kgs.) 5.
145. Eph. 6; Col. 3; Tit. 2; 1 Pet. 2; Sir. 7; Sir. 33.
146. Rom. 13; 1 Tim. 2; Tit. 3; 1 Pet. 2.
147. Deut. 17; Matt. 16, 18; Lk. 10; 1 Cor. 15; Heb. 13.
148. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 122, a. 6 and following; q. 64, a. 6 and following.
149. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 20.
150. Gen. 1 and 9.
151. Matt. 5.
152. Gen. 4.

153. Philo Judaeus, in one place and another [abbreviation as in source].
154. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* VI.
155. Rom. 13.
156. Jas. 2 [the OCR reads "Jacob. 6"; the page image confirms James (Jacobus), here reading as Jas. 2].
157. Josephus, *Antiquities* III, ch. 9.
158. Matt. 19; Lk. 18.
159. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 21.
160. Innocent I, *Epistola Decretalis* to Exuperius, Bishop of Toulouse, ch. 3.
161. Cited in the *Decree* of Gratian, causa 23, q. 4, canon *Quaesitum*.
162. Exod. 23.
163. Note: here the text contains a footnote (marked *a*) concerning the opinion that a judge may condemn on the basis of allegations and proofs alone, which Estius and St. Thomas reject; Estius refers to St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 6, ad 3.
164. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 6, ad 3: "To the third objection, it is said that if a judge knows that someone, who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent, he must examine the witnesses more diligently, as Daniel did. But if he cannot do this, or if there is no other way, he does not sin according to himself, since he does not kill the innocent man but the authority by which he acts; nor is his authority, which is held to be probable, at fault. But he ought to leave the matter to the superior for judgment, alleging an occasion for freeing the innocent, since the sentence passed against him would contain an intolerable error. The minister of the judge, however, if the sentence manifestly contains injustice, ought not to obey; otherwise the executioners who killed the Martyrs would be excused."
165. Deut. 17 and 19.
166. Deut. 13 and 17.
167. Matt. 5; Ps. 2.
168. Zach. 13.
169. Exod. 21 (according to the Septuagint). Note: a footnote in the source refers to the Constitution beginning *Effrenatam* (of Sixtus V), and to the Sixth Synod (Trullan Council), canon 91, concerning those who give abortifacient medicines and those who receive them, both being subject to the penalties of homicide. The canons of the Trullan Council not approved are Canons II, LXVII, and LXXXII. The canon there cited (canon 8 of the Sixth or Quinisext Synod) is, as explained by the author, in some respects alien from the truth in its institution or signification; for in that canon the matter at hand is not that subject, but the convening of synods. Moreover, in none of its canons, beyond canons 80 and 90, is mention made of the Lord's Day; nor do the afore-praised canons 80 and 90 seem to pertain to the matter of which the author treats. Having examined these canons in several Conciliar editions, once and again and a third time, we could not find anything of this kind.
170. The Sixth (Trullan/Quinisext) Synod, canon 91.
171. Council of Ilerdense (Lérida), ch. 5.
172. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 5.
173. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 17 and ch. 20.
174. St. Paul, Rom. 3 (*non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona*).
175. St. Augustine, *Contra Gaudentium* I, ch. 30 and 31; *Contra litteras Petilianii* II, ch. 46; *Tractatus in Ioannem* 51; *De patientia*, ch. 12; *Epistola ad Dulcitium* 61 (in the Benedictine edition, Ep. CCIV).
176. St. Jerome, *In primum caput Ionae*.
177. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, ch. 8.
178. Plato, as reported by Cicero, *De Senectute*.
179. Matt. 19.

180. Propositions XXXIV and XXXV condemned by Innocent XI. Note: Sixtus V, in his constitution *Effrenatam* published in 1588, had bound with the penalty of excommunication incurred *ipso facto* all who procure abortion, whether the foetus be formed or unformed, animate or inanimate, and those who give sterility-potions, or assist in any way.
181. Council of Nicaea (first); Council of Arles (canon 6); Pope Innocent I, *Epistola decretal* I, to Felix of Nuceria, ch. 1; Gratian, *Decretum*, Distinction 55, canon *qui partem*.
182. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 16.
183. St. Augustine, *Contra Gaudentium* II, ch. 23; *Epistola ad Dulcitium* (Ep. CCIV in Benedictine edition).
184. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 40.
185. Gen. (Abraham); and the books of Exodus, Joshua, Judges (Gideon), 1 Kgs. (Saul and David).
186. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, Quaest. 10 *super Iosue*.
187. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXII, ch. 75.
188. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXII, ch. 75 (continued).
189. Lk. 3.
190. Matt. 8; Matt. 22; Rom. 13.
191. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 205 (in the Benedictine edition, Ep. CXXXVIII and CLXXXIX); *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 21; IV, ch. 15; XIX, ch. 7 and 15; XXII, ch. 6.
192. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* I, chs. 35, 40, 41; and the *Sermo* 7 (attributed by others to Maximus).
193. Gratian, *Decretum*, Causa 23, q. 1 and following.
194. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IV, ch. 6 and ch. 4.
195. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 7.
196. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* III, ch. 4 (on the shipwreck passage); and on Lk. 22.
197. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Publicolam* (Ep. 47 in some editions; Ep. LV in the Benedictine edition) — the passage on public versus private killing.
198. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 5.
199. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXII, ch. 70.
200. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, on Exodus.
201. Pope Nicholas I, Decree in Gratian, *Decretum*, Dist. 50 [abbreviation as in source: Dist. 90].
202. St. Bernard, *De Praecepto et Dispensatione*.
203. Gratian, *Decretum*, Dist. 1, ch. *ius naturale*.
204. *Catechismus ad Parochos* (Roman Catechism), on the commandment "Thou shalt not kill."
205. St. Cyril, *In Ioannem* I, ch. 35.
206. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* I, ch. 36; Prov. (Solomon: "Eripe eum qui ducitur ad mortem").
207. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Publicolam* (Ep. CLXXXIX Benedictine).
208. Rom. 13 (*vindicantes*); Rom. 12 (*Mibi vindicta, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus*). Note: appended here is a footnote found in the printed source concerning certain propositions condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI (Propositions II, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII), which it was judged worth exhibiting for the benefit of readers, since they concern the schools and Catholic practice. Among the condemned propositions the following are pertinent: Prop. II: "A knight (*vir equestris*) may accept a duel, lest he incur the mark of cowardice." Prop. XVII: "It is lawful for a Religious or a Cleric to kill a calumniator who threatens to spread grave crimes against him or his religion, when there is no other mode of defense available and the calumniator is prepared, or himself before grave men is ready to allege the said things, unless he is slain." Prop. XVIII: "It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even the judge, if the innocent man cannot otherwise avoid condemnation." Prop. XIX: "A husband

- does not sin by killing his wife caught in adultery by his own authority." These are among the theses condemned by Innocent XI, which among other bad dogmatic positions were proscribed; and among them also: Prop. XXX, XXXI, XXXII.
209. Cf. the footnote appended in the printed source concerning propositions condemned by Alexander VII and Innocent XI. The condemned propositions pertinent here are: Prop. II, Prop. XVII, Prop. XVIII, and Prop. XIX (condemned by Alexander VII), and Prop. XXX, XXXI, XXXII (condemned by Innocent XI), all of which concern homicide, dueling, and related matters of moral theology.
210. The text of Innocent XI's condemned proposition (Prop. XXX) begins here but is cut off in the source at this point; the continuation appears at the opening of the following section. The full proposition reads: "It is lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who strives to bring calumny upon him, if the said ignominy cannot otherwise be avoided" (*Fas est Viro honorato occidere invasorem, qui nititur calumniam inferre, si aliter haec ignominia vitari nequit*).
211. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 11; *Summa theologiae* II-II, qq. 121, art. 6; q. 153.
212. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Exodum*, q. 71 [abbreviation as in source].
213. Job 31; Prov. 6; Sir. 23 (citing the Vulgate *Ecclesiasticus*).
214. The marginal note concerns a proposition: "Sexual union (*copula*) with a woman who consents with the confession of her husband's consent does not constitute adultery, so that it would suffice in confession to say one has committed fornication." See Cajetan (*De Lugo, De iustitia et iure*, Disput. 8, sect. [abbreviation as in source]). The condemned propositions pertaining here (among those condemned by Alexander VII, Prop. L, and Innocent XI) are noted in footnote (a) of the printed source: Prop. L (condemned by Innocent XI) reads: "Sexual union with a married woman who consents with the admission of her husband is not adultery; so that it would suffice to say in confession that one has committed fornication."
215. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Exodum*, q. 71; cf. also St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 2; q. 1 [abbreviation as in source].
216. Lev. 18.
217. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XV, cap. 16; *De Civitate Dei* II, cap. 4.
218. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, cap. 20 [abbreviation as in source].
219. Dist. 31, lib. 4 of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.
220. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 15, a. 2; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 20, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source].
221. Acts 25.
222. 1 Cor. 6:15–20 (Vulgate).
223. Eph. 4; Eph. 5:5; Heb. 13:4; Rev. 21:8.
224. Matt. 15; Mk. 7; 1 Cor. 5; 2 Cor. 12; Gal. 5; Col. 3.
225. Deut. 22:20–21.
226. St. John Chrysostom, *In II Epistolam ad Corinthios*, Hom. 22, n. 10 [abbreviation as in source]; Theodoret, *In I Epistolam ad Corinthios*, cap. 6 [abbreviation as in source].
227. Decretum Gratiani, Causa 22, Quaest. 1, cap. *Predicandum* [abbreviation as in source].
228. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 15, a. 2.
229. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 20, a. 2.
230. Rom. 1; 1 Cor. 6.
231. Footnote (a) of the printed source: Rightfully, therefore, the following proposition was reduced to order and banished from the practice and teaching of Catholics by Innocent XI, as one among others condemned by him under the forty-eighth number, being of this sort: "It seems that fornication of itself involves no malice and is only evil because it is forbidden; so that if it were not forbidden by God, it would be entirely free of guilt."
232. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 150.
233. Prov. 20:1; Eph. 5:18; Jer. 5; Ezek. 16.

234. St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* lib. 2 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Titum*, cap. 1 [abbreviation as in source].
235. Prov. 23 (cited in the printed source as *Prov. 32* — likely OCR misreading or Vulgate numbering variant); Sir. 19, 31, and 37. The sentence cited: *Propter crapulam multi obierunt, qui autem abstinens est, adjiciet vitam* (Sir. 37:34, Vulgate).
236. St. Ambrose, *De Helia et jejuniis* [abbreviation as in source]; St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* lib. 2.
237. St. Ambrose, *De Abraham* lib. 1, cap. 6 [abbreviation as in source].
238. Rom. 13; 1 Cor. 5 and 6; Gal. 5.
239. Is. 5 and 28; Ezek. 23; Hos. 4.
240. Canones Apostolorum, canon 42 [abbreviation as in source]. Note: The authority of the Apostolic Canons is a matter of dispute among scholars as to whether all eighty-five or only the first thirty-five are to be accepted, and what their origin is. The Benedictine editors and others discuss these questions at length in the printed source's footnote (a).
241. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 64 (or Ep. 22 in some editions) [abbreviation as in source].
242. St. John Chrysostom, *In II Epistolam ad Corinthios*, Hom. 22, n. 10 [abbreviation as in source].
243. St. Peter Chrysologus, *Sermo* 26 [abbreviation as in source].
244. Council of Mainz (*Concilium Moguntinum*), held in the year 813, canon 1 (*cap. 37*) [abbreviation as in source]; cf. also Council of Agde (*Concilium Agathense*), a. 505, can. 41 (cited in the printed source's footnote at this point): "To all clerics drunkenness is forbidden — drunkenness, which is the fuel and nurse of all vices. And therefore him whom you see drunk —" [text continues in source].
245. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 66; q. 122, aa. 4, 6.
246. St. Augustine, *Sermones de Verbis Apostoli*, Sermo 24 (= Sermo CLXXVIII in the Benedictine edition), and *Homiliae quinquaginta*, Hom. 9.
247. Pope Alexander III, in the third Lateran Council, cap. 24, *De Raptoribus*, cap. *Ex vi communicationis*, in the Decretals. Note: The printed source's footnote (a) corrects the body text, noting that this chapter is attributed not to Innocent III but to Alexander III, from a decretal letter of Alexander III addressed to the Archbishop of Palermo, in the first collection under the title *De Usuris*, cap. 3 (part 16, c. 1), and was not promulgated at the Lateran Council itself but derived from that decretal letter.
248. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Exodum*, q. 71.
249. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In IV Sent.*, dist. [as in source, referring to the threefold mode of sacrilege].
250. Below, Dist. 15 of Book IV [as in source].
251. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 54 (*ad Macedonium*) [= Ep. 153 in the Benedictine edition].
252. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 78.
253. St. Ambrose, *De Tobia*, cap. 13.
254. St. Basil, *Homilia 2 in Psalmum* 14.
255. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 78, a. 1.
256. Aristotle, *Politica* lib. 1, cap. 3: that it is against reason for money to breed money.
257. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Ezechielem* [on Ezek. 18 and 22; as in source].
258. Note: The printed source's footnote (a) corrects this attribution, noting that this chapter (*Super eo*) is assigned not to Innocent III but to Alexander III, in the first collection under the same title *De Usuris*, cap. 3 (part 16, c. 1), and that it was neither promulgated at the Lateran Council nor derived therefrom, but is from a decretal letter of the same Alexander III, addressed to the Archbishop of Palermo, as appears clearly from the title (*Epigraphe*) of that chapter in the places cited.
259. Cf. also the propositions condemned by Innocent XI among the lax probabilist theses, nos. 36, 37, 38, 39, as noted in the source's footnote: Prop. 36 (that it is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave need); Prop. 37 (that servants may secretly steal from their masters to compensate for labour beyond their wages); Prop. 38 (that one is not bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken by several small thefts, however great the total sum); Prop. 39 (that he who induces or advises another to inflict grave damage on a third party does not sin mortally).

260. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 9 [as in source]; II-II, q. 122, a. 6; q. 69 [as in source].
261. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In IV Sent.* [as in source, treating perjury under the eighth commandment].
262. Below, the next Distinction [Dist. 38 of Book IV, as in source].
263. Cf. the propositions condemned by Innocent XI noted in the source's footnote (a) at this point, among which are: Prop. 34 (that it is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity); and others concerning false testimony and legal proceedings as listed in the printed source's footnote to this section.
264. These propositions are among those proscribed by Alexander VII and Innocent XI: prop. 41 of Alexander VII (that it is not usury to exact something beyond the principal if one binds oneself not to seek repayment for a time); and props. 40, 41, and 42 of Innocent XI (including that the *contractus mohatra* is licit even with respect to the same transaction entered into beforehand with the intention of gain), as indicated in the source at this point.
265. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 110 [abbreviation as in source: "S. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 100" — likely referring to the treatment of lying].
266. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 5, on the verse "Thou shalt destroy all those who speak a lie" (Ps. 5:7).
267. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, q. 145; St. Augustine, *De mendacio*, ch. 1.
268. St. Augustine, *De mendacio*, ch. 14.
269. St. Augustine, *De mendacio*, final chapter.
270. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 3; q. 111.
271. Plato, *Republic* and related Dialogues, via the scholastic tradition.
272. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, bk. 7 [abbreviation as in source: "Strom. lib. 7."].
273. Origen, *Stromata*, bk. 10 [abbreviation as in source: "Strom. lib. 10."].
274. St. John Chrysostom, *De Sacerdotio*; *In Genesim*, on ch. 12 and ch. 37.
275. Theodoret, *Vita Jacobi*; *Prolychronius*; *Historia Ecclesiastica* IV, ch. 20.
276. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* VI, ch. 18.
277. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Galatas*, on ch. 2.
278. St. Jerome, Epistle to St. Augustine [abbreviation as in source: "Epistola ad Augustinum"], citing seven authors for his opinion.
279. St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Rufinum* I, after the middle.
280. John Cassian, *Collationes* 18.
281. Rupert, *In Josuam*, on ch. 2.
282. Gratian, *Decretum*, Causa 22, q. 2, c. *Utilem*; drawn from St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Galatas*.
283. Gen. 22.
284. Gen. 26.
285. Gen. 27.
286. Gen. 42; Gen. 44.
287. Exod. 1.
288. Josh. 2.
289. 1 Kgs. 20.
290. 1 Kgs. 21.
291. 4 Kgs. 6 [the OCR reads "Helizaeus"; the reference is to Elisha, 2 Kgs. 6 in modern numbering; Vulgate 4 Kgs. 6].
292. Tob. 5.
293. Jdt. 10–11.

294. Amos 7.

295. Mic. 2.

296. Acts 23.

297. Eph. 3.

298. 1 Cor. 15.

299. Prov. 30.

300. St. Gregory the Great, reply to Augustine of Canterbury; cited in Gratian, *Decretum*, Distinctio 5, c. *Ad ejus*.

301. Josh. 8.

302. 4 Kgs. 10.

303. Lk. 24 (the last chapter).

304. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Leviticum*, q. 68.

305. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, final chapter; *De mendacio*; *Contra mendacium*.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII — ON THE SECOND COMMANDMENT, LYING, AND THE NATURE OF OATHS (*DE SECUNDO PRAECEPTO, MENDACIO, ET JURAMENTO*)

§ 1. Other passages on this matter are found in him¹ — and again² — together with those we cited above.³ The same doctrine and opinion as St. Augustine's is taught and held by Prosper,⁴ St. Gregory,⁵ and virtually all the Latin writers who followed in the wake of St. Augustine. For as regards those who preceded Augustine — namely St. Ambrose and St. Cyprian — Augustine himself sets them against St. Jerome.⁶ Finally, together with the Master [of the Sentences], the entire school of later Doctors agrees with Augustine, among whom St. Thomas⁷ concludes that lying can by no consideration be rendered good or licit. St. Bonaventure, for his part, writing on this Distinction,⁸ proposes this question and replies: "It must be said that without any doubt every lie is a sin, and this is so essential to it that it can in no way, for no end, by no dispensation — neither human nor divine — be made good." This is indeed in conformity with the teaching of Pope Innocent III,⁹ who in the Lateran Council states that Sacred Scripture forbids lying for the preservation of another's life, and indicates that no dispensation is possible in this matter — just as there is none in usury. Innocent appears to have his eye on that passage: "For thy soul be not ashamed to say the truth" (Sir. 4). Other passages of Scripture are: Sir. 7, "Be not willing to make any manner of lie"; Lev. 19, "You shall not lie, neither shall any man deceive his neighbour"; Ps. 118, "Take not thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth"; Eph. 4, "Putting away lying, speak ye the truth." And many other passages of Scripture occur here and there in which both lies and the authors of lies are reproved. Indeed, in Jn. 8, the Devil is called not only a liar but also the father of lying, who "when he speaketh a lie, speaketh of his own"; so that we may understand that just as God is the fountain of all truth, and whatever truth is spoken by anyone is from God, so the Devil is the author of every lie, and whatever lie is uttered by anyone is from the Devil — according to that word in Matt. 5: "Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no; and that which is over and above these is of evil," that is, of the Devil. Hence also in the canon of Arausio (*Arausicanus*)¹⁰ lying is a sin. "But if anyone possesses truth and justice, it is from that fountain," etc. For the Devil is the author of our corruption.

§ 2. The reason why lying can be licit in no case is offered by St. Thomas:⁷ because lying is evil in itself and by its genus, being an act falling upon an undue matter (*actus cadens super indebitam materiam*). For since words are by nature signs of the thoughts of the mind, it is unnatural and undue that anyone should signify by word what he does not hold in his mind. This reason St. Augustine expressed in these words:¹¹ "Every lie must therefore be said to be a sin, because a man ought to say what he holds in his mind — not only when he himself knows what is true, but also when he errs and is deceived as a man — whether that thing is true, or is thought true but is not so. But everyone who lies speaks against what he senses in his mind, with a will to deceive. And assuredly words were instituted for this reason — not that men should by them deceive one another, but that each one should by them convey his thoughts to the knowledge of another. Therefore to use words for deception, and not for the purpose for which they were instituted, is a sin." Thus St. Augustine.

§ 3. In order, therefore, to reply summarily to the arguments of the contrary opinion: in the first place it must be known that not everything which we read as done by holy men, whether in Sacred Scripture or elsewhere, is thereby licit and to be imitated — since it is established that they were not of such a kind as to have lived without sin. And yet certain things which are attributed to them as though they were lies will, if examined more carefully, be found not alien from truth. On this matter the Commentaries on Sacred Scripture are to be consulted; yet these do not agree in one way about the deeds of Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, David, and Judith — some judging that they lied officiously (*officiose*), others on the contrary excusing them from any lie. What St. Augustine argues especially in the case of Jacob¹² — though what he says, that his deed is to be referred to a mystery, truly does not resolve the question — because the mystical sense, just as it does not remove the historical sense, so neither does it excuse the deed. Nor is the case similar with metaphors, parables, and other figurative modes of speech; because a tropological discourse is to be understood only according to its trope, and parables have none but a parabolic sense; whereas a narrative, even if it contains a mystery, will not be true unless what is narrated was done exactly as it is said. Such is the account of the two sons of Abraham, one born of a free woman and one of a bondwoman, and many others of the same kind.

§ 4. What is to be answered regarding the Hebrew midwives and Rahab the harlot is indicated by St. Augustine:¹³ "For they received recompense from God not for their lie, but for their mercy and fear of God." For so it is written in Exod. 1: "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." How the angel Raphael, Amos, the prophet Micaiah, and Paul in Acts are shown to be free from lying is to be sought in the proper passages of Scripture, just as also that other matter: how holy men spoke very humbly of themselves rightly and without lying, since, as St. Augustine says,¹⁴ humility is to be placed on the side of truth, not of falsehood.

§ 5. To the arguments drawn from the end of an action, we reply with blessed Job 15: "Doth God need our lie?" And with the Apostle Paul, Rom. 3: "Evil is not to be done that good may come of it." For that which is evil in itself cannot be made good by an end, as we showed above.¹⁵ St. Augustine also replies in these words:¹¹ "Nor is any lie therefore to be thought not to be a sin, because we can sometimes benefit someone by lying. For we can also benefit someone by stealing; we can also benefit someone by committing adultery; and yet no one would say that such theft or such adultery is not a sin." Similar passages are found in him in the book *Contra mendacium*.¹⁶

§ 6. To the next argument it is answered that God dispenses with no precept of the Decalogue, and therefore can command neither theft, nor adultery, nor homicide in the sense intended by the Decalogue's prohibition — and consequently neither lying. Therefore, just as God is so truthful that He can neither lie Himself nor deny Himself (2 Tim. 2), so it cannot come about that He either prescribe lying as something to be done by anyone, or approve it once done.

§ 7. The solution of the third argument is indicated by St. Augustine,¹⁷ where he says that every error is to be avoided not only in major matters but also in minor ones. This he also pursues in the following chapters.¹⁸ From which it is understood that voluntary error is never without sin, and much less can he be free from fault who, knowingly, by lying words introduces error into another's mind — however harmless that error may be.

§ 8. To the fourth argument, St. Thomas replies that a jocose lie (*mendacium jocosum*), even though from the intention of the speaker it is not put forward to deceive, nor does it in fact deceive by its manner of speaking, yet by the genus of the act it has the formal character (*ratio*) of deceiving.

§ 9. What is finally objected — that simulation in deeds stands in the same relation as lying in words — is entirely true; and accordingly just as every lie, so every simulation properly so called must be confessed to be a sin, as St. Thomas rightly holds.¹⁹ For simulation is nothing other than lying (*mendacium*) consisting in the signs of outward deeds. Although, however, it is not necessary to excuse what David and Jehu are read to have done from the sin of simulation, yet Joshua did not properly simulate anything, but by laying an ambush concealed his plan from the enemy. This can be done without sin just as much as concealing the truth at the right time and place.

§ 10. Christ also, in feigning that He would go farther, properly simulated nothing. For He composed the gesture and movement of His body as those who are about to go farther are wont to do — yet He did not do this in order that the disciples might think He wished to go farther, although He knew they would think so; but in order to arouse, by this means, their love toward Him and their disposition of hospitality. Others, not less probably, reply that there was therefore no simulation in this deed of Christ; for He was indeed going to go farther if He had not been invited to remain by the disciples.

§ IV — That not every lie is a mortal sin (Non omne mendacium esse peccatum mortale)

§ 11. Although every lie is a sin, one must not go so far as to ascribe mortal guilt to every lie. For not every lie is of such a kind as to injure the honour of God and religion, or to inflict notable harm upon a neighbour. Hence, as we said above, among the three kinds of lies, only the pernicious lie (*mendacium perniciosum*) is mortal by its genus. The jocose lie (*mendacium jocosum*), which harms no one, and the officious lie (*mendacium officiosum*), which even benefits someone, are only venial sins.

§ 12. There are those who assign officious lies to just men without detriment to justice, examples of which were recalled above.

§ 13. Moreover, St. Augustine clearly teaches this in his exposition of Ps. 5, commenting on the words "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," saying:²¹ "There are two kinds of lies altogether in which the guilt is not great, yet they are not without guilt: when we either jest, or lie to benefit our neighbours." In the same passage he also teaches that those who lie only in this last way, as though of necessity, deserve thereby that they may sometime be freed from every lie. And in his commentary on Lev. 68 (dealing with the lie of the midwives), he says that on account of their mercy that sin was venial.²² Likewise, concluding a discussion of the officious lie in *Enchiridion* 22, he says:¹¹ "It is therefore a sin, but a venial one, which benevolence excuses." Similar passages are found in the same work²³ and in *De mendacio*.²⁴ In the same vein St. Gregory writes:²⁵ "Every lie must be most carefully avoided; although sometimes there is a kind of lie of lighter guilt, if anyone lies in order to preserve a life." And again: "Yet this kind of lie also the perfect man takes the utmost pains to flee, lest they defend anyone's life through their deceit, and harm their own souls while striving to preserve the life of another's flesh. Though we most easily believe this kind of sin to be remitted, etc." Here it is to be noted that although the officious lie is counted among light sins, it is nonetheless signified to be no small sin — inasmuch as it is one to be shunned with all diligence by those who are perfect. This St. Augustine also teaches writing on Ps. 5. The opinions of St. Augustine and St. Gregory on the venial lie are joined by all the scholastic Doctors after the Master.

§ V — Reply to what is objected against this (Responsio ad ea quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 14. Certain passages of Scripture seem to oppose not a little the above distinction of lying into mortal and venial, for they ascribe death and destruction to every lie without distinction, as: Ps. 5, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie"; Wis. 1, "The mouth that believeth killeth the soul"; Rev. 21, "The lot of all liars shall be in the pool of fire"; and Rev. 22, where among those who are outside, that is, aliens from the Kingdom, liars (*mendaces*) are numbered — all of whom love and practise lying. Add to this that St. Augustine²⁷ extends Ps. 5 to condemn every lie without exception, which he also does in his commentary on the same Psalm, saying that a man ought not to lie even for his temporal life, nor kill his soul for the sake of another's body. Likewise, in the sixth chapter of *Contra mendacium* he indicates that one who lies in order to convert a heretic sins mortally; and again, writing on Ps. 5, he asserts that one who lies so that he may live dies in his soul. And in the treatise *De conflictu virtutum et vitiorum*, ch. 19, he says: "By no artful device, no ambiguous word, ought one to deceive anyone; by whatever art of skill he lies, he who lies kills the soul. And for all liars their lot shall be in the pool of fire." St. Gregory likewise, in the place cited above, says that the Egyptian midwives lost eternal life by their lying, and that it was exchanged for a temporal recompense.

§ 15. But to these objections we reply that Scripture in those places does not speak of every kind of lie, but of that which conflicts with piety and religion. For just as truth is found above all in the teaching of religion, so by antonomasia what is called a lie is that which is contrary to the truth of religion and the Word of God. Such was the very first word of the ancient serpent: "You shall not surely die" (Gen. 3). Hence Peter also calls heresiarchs "lying teachers" (2 Pet. 2 [recte 3]). And John, speaking of the heretics of his time, says (1 Jn. 2): "Who is a liar, but he who denieth that Jesus is the Christ?" Of such a lie it is also written in 2 Thess. 2: "God shall send them the operation of error, that they should believe lying." Similar is the passage in Ezek. 23, v. 9. Although what appears in Wis. 1, as is clear from the Greek word, is to be understood not of lying simply speaking, but of that which is brought forth against someone — that is, to the injury or harm of another.

§ 16. Furthermore, St. Augustine extends the death of the soul even to venial sin, understanding by it in a general sense whatever spiritual harm there is to a man — just as Gregory explains in his own words, saying that even light lies harm the soul. It must however be noted that what is adduced from the treatise *De conflictu virtutum et vitiorum* carries little weight, since that treatise is not of certain authorship.²⁸

§ 17. What is objected from the sixth chapter of *Contra mendacium* is not said of just any lie, but of that lie by which, for the purpose of laying bare the secrets of heretics, the heresy itself is simulated and verbally approved — which is clear from the passage itself.

§ 18. To that last objection from Gregory it can be replied that the midwives lost not the eternal recompense which they merited, but that which they could have merited, had there not been mingled in their benevolence a self-love (*amor proprius*), that is, a disordered one. For Gregory adds: "For if it be carefully weighed, they were moved by love of life rather than by intention of reward. In preserving the lives of the infants, they were endeavouring by lying to preserve their own." This, however, belongs to a question dealt with elsewhere, concerning Exod. 1.

— *Distinctio XXXIX — On the Second Commandment, Its Wide Scope, and the Nature of Oaths (De sensus secundi praecepti latitudine ac juramenti natura)* (continued from previous chunk) —

§ I — What is the sense of the second commandment, and how broadly it extends (Quis sensus secundi praecepti; et quam late pateat)

§ 19. The second commandment (the declaration of which we have deferred to this point together with the Master) is expressed in the Decalogue in these words: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" — that is, thou shalt not swear falsely by the name of God. For thus the Lord Himself (Matt. 5) expounds the commandment as given to the ancients. What is understood in this commandment, therefore, is not any and every assumption or usurpation (*assumptio* seu *usurpatio*) of the Divine Name, but that which is done in swearing. For the Divine Name is taken in vain when it is invoked for the confirmation of something false. For "false" is properly called "vain," and we are accustomed to speak of lying men as vain. Moreover the Hebrew word (*vox Hebraea*) signifies lying. Since, therefore, God knows all things and can neither be deceived nor deceive, whenever we are destitute of human testimony, He is not unworthily called upon to serve as witness for the confirmation of what we say, whereby human controversies may be settled: "for the end of all human controversy as regards confirmation is an oath," says the Apostle (Heb. 6). This law of swearing therefore requires, as it commands (*mandat*), that no one assume His holy name in order to confirm a falsehood. They sin, therefore, against this commandment directly and properly — all perjurers, that is, those who confirm with an oath what they know or think to be false; whether this be done with the express name of God, or by means of creatures, insofar as the truth of God shines forth in them. How Christ (Matt. 5 and 23) declares that this commandment is to be understood, against the false interpretation of the Pharisees, he makes plain.

§ 20. Furthermore, what is brought under the prohibition of this commandment, and therefore is to be counted as generally forbidden by the second precept of the Decalogue, is manifold.

First, those sin against this commandment who swear by false gods — whether what they wish to confirm by such an oath be true or false. Under these also are comprehended those who swear by any creature simply in itself, and not insofar as the divine truth shines forth in it as so regarded.

Second, those sin against this commandment who swear that they will do something evil, whether they intend to do it or not, and whether they afterwards fulfil it or do not fulfil it simply. Such is David's oath (1 Kgs. 25) which merits reproof, and much more the oath of Joram king of Israel (4 Kgs. 6).

Third, whoever swears either irreverently and foolishly, or without just necessity or utility, sins. Those among them offend more gravely who scatter oaths promiscuously throughout ordinary speech, and in this way expose themselves to the danger of perjury and irreverence toward the Divine Majesty. This (Eccl. 23) seriously prohibits, and many sermons against this wicked custom are extant in St. John Chrysostom and St. Augustine.

Fourth, those who exact an oath from those whom they know or think will perjure themselves. Concerning these something will be said below.

Fifth, to this heading is also reduced every violation of a vow; indeed also every sin which is committed by vowing something evil or imprudently. For Scripture frequently comprises a vow under the name of an oath,

as in Num. 30 and Ps. 131. Thus St. Augustine speaks, writing on Ps. 62 at the verse "All shall be praised that swear by Him": "Who swears by Him? He who pledges his life to Him. He who makes a vow to Him renders it." A similar passage is found on Ps. 121 at the words: "As the Lord hath sworn, and vowed a vow to God, etc."

§ 21. Finally, to this heading are referred also other sins of the lips by which any irreverence whatsoever toward God is committed, such as blasphemy, denial of the faith, teaching contrary to religion or piety, or even fabulous, vain, or scandalous speech concerning divine things, the tempting of God, and other matters of this kind. Although we already noted above, in its proper place, that all of these, insofar as they are sins of the tongue, can be reduced to the eighth commandment.

§ II — On the various kinds of oath and perjury (De variis juramenti et perjurii modis)

§ 22. An oath (*juramentum*) is divided into species and kinds, as is perjury. Now to swear is nothing other than to call upon as witness or to invoke a witness. For as we said above, the oath is ordained to the confirmation of those things in which human proofs are lacking. Hence it has been as it were introduced by law that what is said with the invocation of divine testimony should be held as proven. From this law of swearing the very vocabulary of swearing seems to be derived — as St. Thomas also has noted.³¹

§ 23. An oath, therefore, is of one kind assertory (*assertorium*), by which something present or past is asserted to be so. Under this is comprehended that by which someone simply denies something. Of another kind it is promissory (*promissorium*), by which something future on our part is confirmed. Under this is also contained the comminatory (*comminatorium*). This genus is called by one name "obligatory" (*obligatorium*) by others.

§ 24. Again, one oath is simple (*simplex*), another execratory (*exsecratorium*). Simple indeed, which contains the bare attestation of God. This however is variously uttered; as St. Augustine teaches:³² "We call upon God as witness when we say: 'God knows, God is witness, I invoke God as a witness, I speak before God, I swear by God, or per Deum ita est' — or simply, *juro*. Ex secratorio vero, qui seipsum vel aliquid ad se pertinens obligat ad poenam, nisi verum sit quod jurat." Of this kind that formula frequent in Sacred Scripture is: "May God do this to me and add to it, if someone says such a thing; Per animam meam, Per salutem meam, Per caput meum, Per filios meos — vel hoc modo, Deum invocare testem super animam meam." Of these St. Augustine writes:³³ "Whoever says, 'Per filios meos,' pledges his children's safety to God. When he says, 'Per filios meos,' he mortgages his sons to God, so that if it be true, it be true; if false, false. Of the same genus are these formulas: ita mihi propitius sit Deus; ita me Deus amet — and other such formulas in common use among men."

§ 25. Another division of oaths distinguishes between that which has an expressed assumption of the divine name, and that which has such an assumption only tacitly. And this latter is in turn twofold — for there is no means by which an oath is expressly uttered, such that someone merely swears this or that thing; or one swears by creatures, or by the saints (*per sanctos*) of God and the holy Angels, or by heaven or earth, by the sun or moon. Such is also that word of Paul (1 Cor. 15): "I die daily by your glory, brethren."

§ 26. Now in oaths, as in perjuries, variety is found. For perjury (*perjurium*) is nothing other than a false oath, or, as the Master defines it, a lie confirmed by oath. Properly, therefore, perjurers are: *first*, whoever in an oath assert what they know or believe to be false — whether what is false is in reality true or not. *Second*, those who do not intend to fulfil what they promise by oath. *Third*, those who do intend to fulfil what they promise by oath, but afterwards do not fulfil it, nor furnish what was sworn, the legitimate cause for not fulfilling it ceasing, without their having habituated themselves to not fulfilling the dispensation. Those who swear a falsehood which turns out to be true are called perjurers by St. Augustine³⁴ even materially (*materialiter*), because what is false is what they swear. But as St. Thomas says,³⁵ in any individual case it is rather that which is formal (*formale*) than that which is material that makes one a perjurer — that is, one who is not thus a perjurer is not so much the one who swears what is false, believing it to be true, as the one who swears what is true but believes it to be false. For St. Augustine says in the same place: "It matters how the word proceeds from the mind, since the tongue makes no man guilty except in his own conscience." In this way the perjurer is rightly joined to him who, while swearing that he will do something, will not be able to fulfil it without sin. For even quomodo, what cannot rightly be done is judged impossible in morals.

§ III — How far an oath is licit for a Christian (Juramentum quatenus licitum sit christianis)

§ 27. It is shown that an oath is licit in itself, from its origin, and from its end. From its origin indeed, because an oath was introduced from faith (*fide*), which persuaded men that God is the infallible truth of all things and the knowledge and providence of all affairs. Hence among all peoples whatever it has been customary to use oaths, and among them consequently at least an implicit persuasion (*implicita persuasio*) of this sort regarding God must be granted. From its end, because the oath is properly ordained to confirming truth between men and settling controversies, as the Apostle testifies (Heb. 6).

§ 28. Now that which is by its nature licit and good can turn for someone into evil if not rightly used — as in natural things: fire, wine, medicines; and in spiritual things, the Body of the Lord, which he who receives unworthily brings judgment upon himself (1 Cor. 11). So therefore also regarding the oath it is to be judged. For even if it be good in itself, it turns to evil for the one who misuses it — if, that is, he uses it without just necessity or evident utility, or without due caution. For in the former mode he sins against God by irreverence, bringing Him in as a witness on easy grounds and from light cause: which indeed men of authority among the Gentiles take care not to do with respect to those in whose power they live. Posteriorly (*posteriori*), however, by temerity, he falls into the danger of perjury, which is nevertheless of great relevance to divine irreverence. Since in words the lapse comes easily, and since by pretending belief (*opinionem se fallens*), there is a danger of bringing as witness, incautiously, God, the guarantor of falsehood (*testem Dei falsitatis*), who swears inconsiderately comes to this.

§ 29. This readiness and temerity in oaths — that is, the evil use of a good thing — Scripture condemns in Sir. 23, saying: "Swearing shall not depart from his mouth: and he shall not be named." And further: "A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity: and the plague shall not depart from his house." And ch. 27: "He that sweareth much, his iniquity shall be upon him; and the house of him that offereth many oaths shall be filled with iniquity, and the irreverence due to himself shall shut his ears."

§ 30. That it is not simply unlawful to swear, as though it were something evil in itself, is proved most manifestly from Scripture. For Moses says, Deut. 6: "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by His name" — which is repeated in Deut. 10. Likewise, Ps. 14 says that one who does not deceive his neighbour, and who will dwell in the tabernacle of the Lord, and Ps. 25: "All shall be praised that swear in Him." Indeed throughout Scripture we read the saints of the Old Testament either openly invoking the name of God, or tacitly interposing these or similar formulas: *Vivit Dominus* — *Vivit anima tua* — *Per salutem Regis*. Jeremiah even expressed conditions necessary to be observed in every oath, saying cap. 4: "Et jurabis, Vivit Dominus, et in veritate, et in iudicio, et in iustitia." About these St. Jerome remarks in his Commentaries that "what should accompany swearing are truth (*veritas*), judgment (*iudicium*), and justice (*iustitia*). If these are lacking, it will not be an oath but perjury" — perjury in its general name comprehending every illicit oath. One who swears in truth is the one who confirms nothing false by oath. One who swears in judgment is the one who uses oath only on grave cause. One who swears in justice is the one who promises nothing by oath that is not licit, and keeps that which he has so sworn inviolably.

§ 31. Furthermore, that in the time of the New Testament too it is licit to swear is shown from the same testimony of Jeremiah. For it pertains to a prophetic sentence about the people of the New Testament, as it is declared by what follows immediately: "And the nations shall bless themselves in Him" — Gen.³⁷

§ II — On the various kinds of oath and perjury (De variis juramenti, & perjurii modis)

§ 32. An oath (*juramentum*) is divided into species and modes, just as perjury likewise is. Now to swear is nothing other than to call upon or invoke God as a witness. For, as we said above, an oath is ordained to the confirmation of those matters in which human proofs are lacking. Hence it was introduced, as it were, in place of law (*pro jure*), so that what is said with the invocation of divine testimony should be held as true. From this law of swearing (*jus jurandi*) the very word *juramentum* seems to be derived — as St. Thomas also noted.³¹

§ 33. An oath, therefore, is either *assertory* (*assertorium*), by which something present or past is asserted to be so. Under this must also be included that by which we similarly deny something. Or it is *promissory* (*promissorium*), by which something to be performed by us in the future is confirmed. Under this the *minatory* (*comminatorium*) is also contained. This genus others designate by the single name *obligatory* (*obligatorium*).

§ 34. Again, one oath is *simple* (*simplex*), another *execratory* (*exsecratorium*). The simple oath is that which contains the bare invocation of God as witness. This is uttered in various ways, as St. Augustine teaches³⁸ — for example, when we say: "I speak before God," "I swear by God," "By God, it is so," or simply. The execratory oath, however, is that by which someone binds himself, or something belonging to himself, to a penalty, unless what he says be true. Such is that which is frequently read in the Sacred Scriptures: "May God do this to me, and may He add this, if not," and so forth. Such also is the case when someone says, "By my soul," "By my salvation," "By my head," "By my children" — or in this manner: "I call God as witness upon my soul." Concerning these, St. Augustine³³ wrote thus: "When anyone says 'By my salvation,' he pledges his salvation to God. When he says 'By my children,' he pledges his children to God, so that this may come upon their head — what proceeds from his mouth — true if true, false if false." Of the same genus are also these formulas: "So may God be propitious to me," "So may God love me," and others common in the usage of men.

§ 35. By another division again, an oath is distinguished into that which has the express assumption of the divine name, and that which has only the tacit assumption of it. And this is done in two ways: either there is no thing by which the swearing is expressed, so that someone merely says he swears this or that; or else swearing is done by creatures, by the holy men of God, or by angels, by heaven, or earth, by the sun, or the moon. Such also is that of Paul in 1 Cor. 15: "I die daily, by your glory, brethren."

§ 36. Now furthermore, what variety is found in oaths, the same variety is found in perjuries. For perjury is nothing other than a false oath, or — as the Master defines it — a lie confirmed by oath (*mendacium juramento firmatum*). Properly speaking, therefore, the following are perjurers: First, whosoever affirm under oath what they know or believe to be false, whether it be in fact false or in fact true. Second, those who do not intend to fulfil what they promise under oath. Third, those who do indeed intend to fulfil what they promise under oath, but nevertheless afterwards do not fulfil it; and they do not render what they swore to render, there being no legitimate cause for not rendering it, nor a dispensation duly obtained for not rendering it.

§ 37. Those, however, who swear what is false but believe to be true are indeed called perjurers by St. Augustine³⁹ as well, because they materially swear what is false. But because — as St. Thomas says³¹ — in each thing what is formal is of greater importance than what is material, he who swears what is false but believes to be true is not a perjurer in the same way as he who swears what is true but believes to be false. For St. Augustine says in the same place: "It matters how the word proceeds from the mind, because the tongue is not guilty unless the mind is guilty."

§ 38. To these modes of perjury another is deservedly added: when someone swears that he will do something which he cannot fulfil without sin. For although such a person ought not to fulfil what he has sworn, lest he heap sin upon sin, nevertheless he is on that account held guilty of perjury, because he swore he would do something which does not fall, nor can fall, under a promissory oath — namely, something impossible. For in practical matters, that is judged impossible which cannot rightly be done.

§ III — How far an oath is lawful for Christians (Juramentum quatenus licitum sit christianis)

§ 39. That an oath is lawful in itself and by its genus is shown both from its origin and from its end. From its origin indeed, because an oath was introduced from faith, by which men are persuaded that infallible truth and knowledge and providence of all things reside with God. Hence wherever among any peoples there is the use of oath, among those same peoples there must consequently be at least an implicit persuasion of this kind regarding God. From its end, moreover, because an oath is properly ordained to confirming truth among men and settling controversies, as the Apostle testifies (Heb. 6).

§ 40. But what is by its own nature lawful and good can turn to evil for someone if it is not used rightly — as in natural things, fire, wine, and medicine, and in spiritual things, the Body of the Lord, which whoever receives unworthily "eats judgment to himself" (1 Cor. 11). Thus also must we think of the oath. For although it is in itself good, it turns to sin for one who uses it badly — namely, if he avails himself of it without just necessity or evident utility, or without due caution. For in the former way he sins against God by irreverence, inasmuch as he thus readily and from a trivial cause calls Him as witness — something which even men

possessed of authority would not easily endure from those subject to them. In the latter way he sins by that rashness (*temeritas*) by which he casts himself into the danger of perjury, which is nonetheless also a great irreverence toward the divine name. For since in words there is easy lapse, and we are often deceived in our opinion, there is danger lest he who proceeds inconsiderately to swearing should adduce God as a witness to a falsehood.

§ 41. This facility and rashness in swearing — that is, the evil use of a good thing — Scripture therefore condemns, as in Sir. 23, with these words: "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls." And again: "A man who swears much shall be filled with iniquity, and the scourge shall not depart from his house." And Sir. 27: "A man who swears much makes the hair of the head stand on end, and his irreverence stops the ears."

§ 42. That it is not simply unlawful to swear, as if it were something evil in itself, is most manifestly proved from Scripture. For Moses says (Deut. 6): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by his name" — which is repeated at Deut. 10. Likewise Ps. 14: "He that sweareth to his neighbour, and deceiveth not," is said to be destined to dwell in the tabernacle of the Lord; and Ps. 23: "He who sweareth not deceitfully to his neighbour shall receive a blessing from the Lord." And Ps. 62: "All they shall be praised who swear by him." Indeed throughout we read that the Saints of the Old Testament in grave matters openly or tacitly invoked the name of God with this or a similar formula: "The Lord liveth," "As thy soul liveth," "By the health of the king." Jeremiah moreover expressed the conditions necessary to be observed in every oath when he says (Jer. 4): "And thou shalt swear: The Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice." Concerning which St. Jerome writes in his Commentaries:⁴⁰ "It must be noted," he says, "that an oath has these companions: truth, judgment, and justice. If these are lacking, it will by no means be an oath, but perjury" — comprehending under the name of perjury every illicit oath in general. Now one swears *in truth* who confirms by oath only what is true. One swears *in judgment* who uses an oath only on grave occasion. One swears *in justice* who promises under oath only what is lawful, and observes this inviolably.

§ 43. Furthermore, that an oath is lawful even in the time of the New Testament is shown from the same testimony of Jeremiah. For that prophetic sentence pertains to the people of the New Testament, as is declared by what immediately follows it: "And the nations shall bless him" (*Gen.* —)⁴¹

1. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 18, ch. 22; *Epistola* 8 and 9 (to St. Jerome) — in the Benedictine edition, Ep. XXVIII.

2. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 19 (to the same) — in the Benedictine edition, Ep. LXXXII; and those passages cited above.

3. References are to St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 5, ad illud "Perdes omnes qui..."; *Quaestiones* 68 in *Leviticum*.

4. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 9.

5. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XVIII, ch. 2 and 3.

6. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 19, ch. 3 (Benedictine Ep. LXXXII).

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 3.

8. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* (here *In III Sent.*), on this Distinction.

9. Pope Innocent III, in the Lateran Council (*Concilium Lateranense*); contained *Extra de Usuris*, cap. *Super eo*. Note: as Estius himself remarks, this chapter has been attributed not to Innocent III but to Alexander II, writing to the Archbishop of Panormus.

10. Canon of the Council of Arausio (*Arausicanus*).

11. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 22.
12. St. Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, ch. 10; *De civitate Dei* XVI, ch. 37.
13. St. Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, ch. 13; *Quaestiones 68 in Leviticum*.
14. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 34.
15. Reference to the commentary on Dist. 30, Book II.
16. St. Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, ch. 7 and following.
17. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 17.
18. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 20 and 21.
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 111, a. 1.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 4.
21. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi* 5, ad illud "Perdes omnes qui..."
22. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones 68 in Leviticum*.
23. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 18.
24. St. Augustine, *De mendacio*, ch. 14; *Contra mendacium*, ch. 8 (the last portion of the work).
25. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XVIII, ch. 4.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II (reference as above).
27. St. Augustine, *De mendacio*, ch. 6 and ch. 1; *Contra mendacium* (Ps. 5); *De conflictu virtutum et vitiorum*, ch. 19.
28. Footnote in source: The treatise *De conflictu virtutum et vitiorum* was first attributed to St. Augustine in all editions of his works, then to St. Leo the Great and St. Ambrose, then to St. Isidore of Seville in some editions. The Benedictine Fathers in their edition of St. Augustine's works rejected it as spurious and assigned it to Ambrose Autpert, Abbot of the Monastery of S. Vincenzo al Volturno in Benevento. Indeed mention of this booklet as composed by Ambrose Autpert is made in his *Life*, Part II, Century III by the Benedictines; and it has no small affinity with a certain work of the same Ambrose on the *Apocalypse*.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100; II-II, q. 122, a. 3; and q. 89.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89 and q. 98.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 1.
32. St. Augustine, *Sermones de verbis Apostoli*, lib. 1 (*Sermo de sermone Domini in monte*, ch. 30); *Epistola* 89 — in the Benedictine edition, *Serm.* CLXX among *Sermones Primae Classis*; *Ep.* CLVII in the same edition.
33. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 28 *de verbis Apostoli* — in the Benedictine edition, *Serm.* CCCVII among *Sermones Classis* III.
34. St. Augustine, *Sermones de verbis Apostoli*, *Serm.* 10 — in the Benedictine edition, *Serm.* CCCVII (*Classis* III).
35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 98, a. 1.
36. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 2.
37. The text breaks off mid-citation at the page end; it refers to Jer. 4 and the continuation of the prophecy cited just above.
38. St. Augustine, *Sermones de verbis Apostoli*, *Serm.* 28 (*lib.* 1 *De sermone Domini in monte*, ch. 30; and *Epistola* 89) — in the Benedictine edition, *Serm.* CLXX among *Sermones Primae Classis*; *Ep.* CLXXXII in the same edition.
39. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 28 *de verbis Apostoli*; and *Sermo* 10 *de verbis Apostoli* — in the Benedictine edition, *Serm.* CCCVII (*Classis* III).
40. St. Jerome, *Commentarii in Jeremiam*, on Jer. 4.
41. The sentence breaks off at the page-end with *Et benedicent eum Gen-*, referring to Jer. 4 and the continuation "Et benedicent eum Gentes" — the text continues in the following chunk.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX — ON THE LAWFULNESS OF OATHS (*DE JURAMENTO LICITO*)

§ 1. And the nations themselves shall praise Him. Yet more manifestly pertinent is that passage of Is. 65: "And he who swears upon the earth shall swear by God Amen."¹ These matters are further proved by the examples of the saints of the New Testament, and especially of the Apostle Paul, who is established to have sworn repeatedly in his Epistles: as in Rom. 1, "God is my witness";² in 1 Cor. 15, "By your glory" — or, as it is in the Greek, "By our boasting";³ in 2 Cor. 1, "I call God as witness upon my soul";⁴ and in Gal. 1, "Behold, before God, that I lie not";⁵ and again in Phil. 3 and 1 Thess. 2, he calls God to witness.⁶ Finally, in Heb. 6, when he says: "Men swear by one greater than themselves, and every controversy among them is settled for confirmation by an oath" — by this he sufficiently shows that that universal custom of all nations of confirming doubtful matters by divine testimony is lawful, approved, and consonant with right reason.⁷

§ 2. Nor is the proof of this doctrine from the Fathers any less certain. First, the teaching of St. Augustine is plain, in his Sermon 28 on the Words of the Apostle,⁸ where, having adduced examples from both Testaments and further alleged his own example as well, he shows that an oath is lawful when it is employed circumspectly and only as a remedy for human necessity. Other passages of the same author are: *De Mendacio*, ch. 15; Epistle 89 (that is, Epistles CLVII and XLVI in the Benedictine edition) and 154; *De Sermone Domini in Monte*; and Book 1, ch. 17, in the *Exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians*, on that passage of the chapter: "Behold, before God, that I lie not"; and in a certain Sermon on the Beheading of John the Baptist, which is among the Parisian sermons, no. 10.⁹

§ 3. That St. John Chrysostom likewise held nothing different can be proved from his commentaries on the Pauline Epistles, at every place where we have shown above that the Apostle swore; and likewise on that apostolic adjuration of 1 Tim. 6, "I charge thee before God," etc.;¹⁰ and in Homily 9 on the Acts of the Apostles.¹¹ Moreover, how St. Jerome teaches that one may lawfully swear has been stated a little above, from his Commentary on Jeremiah.¹² To these we add St. Bernard, who, in Sermon 65 on the Canticle,¹³ inveighs against certain heretics who teach that it is unlawful for Christians to swear. More testimonies to this effect may be seen in Gratian, 22, q. 1.¹⁴

§ 4. To these the authority of Councils has also been added. For the Fathers of Ephesus demanded an oath of a recantation of his dogmas from Nestorius; and in the Council of Constance this article of Wyclif, no. 43, is read as condemned: "Oaths are unlawful which are made to strengthen human contracts and civil commerce." In that same Council, moreover, an oath was taken by all the Fathers for the confirmation of the compact entered into by the Princes for the purpose of overturning the schism by which the Church was then afflicted.¹⁵

§ IV — Resolution of the objections raised on the contrary side (Solutio eorum quae in contrarium objiciuntur)

§ 5. Now we must reply briefly to those arguments which appear to show that an oath is altogether and in every manner unlawful, at least for a Christian man. Chief among these is what the Lord commands (Matt. 5), saying: "You have heard that it was said to them of old: *Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.* But I say to you, not to swear at all, neither by heaven," etc.; and He finally concludes: "But whatsoever is more than these is of evil." And likewise Jas. 3: "But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath. But let your speech be yea, yea; no, no: lest you fall under judgment." To these they add the passage of Eccl. 9, according to the Septuagint: "All things happen alike to him that sweareth and to him that feareth to swear." And Zech. 5: "Every one that sweareth from henceforth shall be judged in like manner," that is, condemned. Now these and similar passages appear to have been understood by the holy Doctors as if an oath were altogether forbidden and admissible under no circumstances among Christians. On this point St. John Chrysostom is particularly insistent and exceedingly frequent. For beyond his commentary on the passage of Matt. 5, he also repeats the same point elsewhere from time to time; as in Hom. 15 on Gen.:¹⁷ "Let a Christian," he says, "flee oaths by every means, hearing the sentence of Christ," etc. "Let no one therefore say, I swear in a just cause. For it is not permitted to swear either in a just or in an unjust cause." And in Hom. 9 on Acts¹⁸ he pronounces those impious and worthy of excommunication who, in contracts and other forensic actions, either swear or exact an oath. In other places, moreover — as in the Homily on Ps. 5,¹⁹ in the third book *Against the Detractors of the Monastic Life*,²⁰ in *De Compunctione cordis*,²¹ and in Homilies 8, 19, 25, 27, and 28 to the People of Antioch,²² — he calls an oath now a crime, now a diabolical thing. The Greek interpreters agree with Chrysostom in almost everything, as Theophylact and Euthymius²³ (on Matt. 5), and Oecumenius²⁴ (on Jas. 5). Similarly Origen (Hom. 35 on Matt.),²⁵ Epiphanius (Book 1, *De Haeresibus*, in the heresy of the Ossaeans),²⁶ Athanasius (*In the sermon on the Passion and Cross of the Lord*),²⁷ and Basil (*In Ps. 14*)²⁸ appear to have understood the taking of oaths to be simply forbidden to Christians. Among the Latins there are similar opinions, as in Cyprian (*Tractate on Mortality*),²⁹ Lactantius (ch. 4 of the *Epitome*),³⁰ St. Jerome (*on Matt. 5, Jer. 4, Zech. 8*),³¹ Hilary (*Canticle 4 on Matt.*),³² and St. Ambrose (*on that verse of Ps. 118: "I have sworn and am determined to keep," etc.*).³³ There is also read in Eusebius, Book 6 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 5,³⁴ that one Basilides, a certain martyr, when an oath was demanded of him in some controversy, replied that it was wholly unlawful for him to swear, on the ground that he was a Christian.

§ 6. To these objections we reply as follows. The prohibition of the Lord, repeated by James — *not to swear at all* — is expounded by some in such a way that they say "to swear" is used in place of "to forswear oneself," just as indeed this word is sometimes so taken elsewhere in the Sacred Scriptures. If you object against them that, on this exposition, nothing is added by the Lord beyond what had been said to the men of old, "Thou shalt not forswear thyself," they respond that the Lord forbids all perjury, even perjury by creatures, of which He immediately subjoins: "neither by heaven," etc. And this on the ground that the Jews had been persuaded by Pharisaic doctrine that a man is not bound by an oath who has sworn by creatures (with certain exceptions), as is evident from Matt. 23.³⁵ Their response does not seem sufficient, both because the Lord concludes absolutely: "Let your speech be yea, yea; no, no" — and because He deliberately changes the word "perjury" to "oath," signifying beyond any doubt that He understands "oath" as distinguished from "perjury." Otherwise He would have had to say: "But I say to you, not to forswear yourselves at all."

§ 7. Others answer that it is a counsel, not a precept, that we should not swear, as St. Bernard seems to hold.¹³ But in truth it is altogether plain that the words of the Lord carry the force of a precept, because He wished to forbid something as unlawful which the Scribes and Pharisees taught to be lawful — just as may be observed in the other precepts of the same chapter. It would also be absurd if we were to concede that the Apostle Paul, who is established to have sworn several times in his Epistles, did not follow the counsel of Christ. More correctly, therefore, does St. Augustine, who, treating this passage of Matthew as well (Book 1, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, ch. 17;³⁶ Book 1, *De Mendacio*, ch. 15³⁷), teach that the Lord prescribed *not to swear at all* in this sense: lest anyone seek an oath as though it were something good, and through habitual swearing gradually slide into perjury by force of custom. "Wherefore," he says, "he who understands that an oath is to be reckoned not among good things but among necessities, should restrain himself as much as he can, so as not to make use of it except out of necessity: when he sees men too sluggish to believe what it profits them to believe, unless it be confirmed by an oath." So he. The sense, therefore, of the dominical precept is: that one should on no account swear, so far as lies in us — that is, unless some just necessity (under which we comprehend evident utility also) compels us to swear. Moreover, the threefold reason for this general prohibition is: first, to avoid the danger of perjury; second, out of reverence for the divine name; third, on account of the mutual trust among Christians, which ought in all justice to be so great that each person would believe his neighbour even without an oath. It was for this reason, moreover, that the Lord added: "neither by heaven, neither by" — lest anyone should suppose that at least by creatures it was permitted to him with impunity to swear either falsely or rashly; Jews (who otherwise abstained quite religiously from naming God directly) appear to have persuaded themselves that oaths of that kind were not binding upon them.

§ 8. Since, therefore, this prohibition is a general one — which nevertheless admits of an exception — it is no wonder that the ancient writers everywhere speak as though they hold that an oath is simply and absolutely forbidden. For this is to be taken in the same sense in which we have said the words of Christ are to be taken. For in pronouncements of this kind they had regard chiefly to the very bad custom of the common people, who used to interpose an oath either altogether rashly or on account of matters of no great importance, whether in contracts or in any other business whatsoever. That St. John Chrysostom had this in mind in his Homilies to the People is perfectly certain. For even though he inveighs against those who swear more vehemently than others, he nowhere denies that swearing is lawful in matters of great importance. And he calls an oath a diabolical thing because the Lord says: "Whatsoever is more than this is of evil" — that is, of the Devil. Since the Devil is the first author of sin, and it is owing to sin that men do not trust one another unless an oath is employed (for in the state of innocence there would never have been any need of an oath), it is correctly said that the Devil is the cause of swearing — namely, the occasion of it.

§ 9. To the passage of Ecclesiastes and Zechariah the response is easy: "to swear" is there used in place of "to forswear," in which sense St. Augustine testifies that this word is sometimes taken in the Sacred Scriptures.³⁸ For so our translation has it at Ecclesiastes: "As is the perjurer, so is he who swears truly." And in Zechariah, a little after, it is subjoined: "And to the house of him that sweareth in my name mendaciously." These things sufficiently indicate who it is that the Prophet a little before understood by "the one who swears."

§ V — That an oath is not to be demanded of one who will swear falsely (A pejeraturo non esse exigendum juramentum)

§ 10. Just as it is lawful in some circumstances to swear, and to demand an oath — namely on account of the uncertain and not sufficiently established trustworthiness of one whose assertion or promise in a matter of great moment we require — so St. Augustine holds⁴⁰ that, on the other hand, if we know or probably suppose that someone will swear falsely, then out of reverence for the divine name we ought not to press him to swear. Hence St. Augustine⁴¹ speaks thus: "He who demands an oath from someone — it makes a great difference whether he does not know that the other will swear falsely, or whether he does know it. For if he does not know it and therefore says, 'Swear to me, so that I may have confidence in you,' I dare not say it is without sin, yet it is a human temptation. But if he knows that the other has done it and compels him to swear, he is a murderer. For the latter destroys himself by his own perjury, but the former both drew out and pressed down the hand of the one who intervened." And in another sermon⁴² he says: "He who provokes a man to swearing and knows that he will swear falsely surpasses a murderer, because the murderer is about to kill the body, but that man kills the soul — indeed two souls: the soul of him whom he provoked to swear, and his own," and so on; where he also appends the example of a certain man warned by God through a vision and severely punished because he had demanded an oath from one who was about to swear falsely.

§ 11. Although, however, one who is prepared to commit perjury has already destroyed himself, nevertheless, without just necessity it is not lawful to permit the name of God to be defiled by the external act of perjury itself. Since therefore there is here neither any necessity nor any utility — as when, for example, a creditor allows his debtor, who is denying the debt, to swear falsely (for he will be defrauded of his property none the less) — therefore, for the honor and reverence of God, he ought rather to prevent than to admit such an oath. For a different consideration applies to a public official, such as a judge, whose office it pertains to follow the order of law. Such a person, whatever disposition he may know the one swearing to have, is not bound to prevent him from swearing.

§ VI — A note on swearing by false gods (De juramento per falsos Deos adnotatio)

§ 12. Concerning the oath that is made by false gods, or by any creature whatsoever as though it were God, three things are to be noted in summary.

The first is that such an oath is unlawful — indeed, impious — and prohibited by God. Exod. 23: "By the name of foreign gods you shall not swear, neither shall it be heard from your mouth." And Deut. 6: "By his name you shall swear" — which is a negative precept forbidding one to swear by anything whatsoever except by the name of the Lord. The reason is that an oath is an act of religion (*actus Religionis*) whereby one professes that he by whom one swears possesses knowledge of all things and infallible truth, which belongs to God alone. Hence Christians who usurp the oaths of the Gentiles — whether through affectation or through some depraved custom — are gravely to be rebuked. "Far be it," says St. Jerome in his Epistle to Damasus concerning the prodigal son, "that from the mouth of a Christian there should sound: 'Jupiter Almighty,' and 'by Hercules,' 'by Castor,' and the rest — which are monsters rather than divinities."⁴⁴

The second point is that one who swears falsely by false gods is a perjurer. For although such an oath is impious, yet if it is made, it must be true; and if it is promissory, it must be kept. One reason is the common one: that it is not lawful either to lie or to deceive; and another is a special one: because he who swears calls as his witness one whom he believes to be truthful in all things and to have knowledge of all things; wherefore if he swears falsely, he makes God, so far as it lies in him, either a liar or one ignorant. But if indeed he does not believe that he by whom he swears is God, even so he sins most gravely, because against his own conscience he displays the worship of religion toward one whom he knows not to be God; and he is nonetheless a perjurer, and will be punished as a perjurer — as the Wise Man plainly teaches (Sir. 14, at the end),⁴⁵ showing that even those who swear falsely by idols — whether they worship and hold them as divinities or not — will be severely punished by God. And the opinion of St. Augustine is clear (*Serm. 28 de Verbis Apostoli*): "He who swears falsely by a stone is a perjurer. For many," he says, "are also deceived in this and think that, because there is nothing by which they swear, they are not held guilty of the crime of perjury. You are an utter perjurer, because by that which you consider holy you swear falsely. But I do not consider it holy; he to whom you swear considers it holy." And a little after: "The stone does not hear you speaking, but God punishes you deceiving."⁴⁶ Likewise, *Epistola* 154: "If anyone has sworn by false gods and has not kept faith, he has sinned twice: both because he swore by those by whom he ought not to have sworn, and because he acted contrary to the pledged faith, which he ought not to have done."⁴⁰ Gratian repeats these and similar points, *Causa* 22, *qu.* 3.⁴⁷

The third point is that it is not unlawful to accept the oath of one who swears by false gods, when just necessity demands it and false gods are worshipped by the one from whom the oath is exacted. On this matter St. Augustine, writing in the same Epistle, speaks thus: "He who makes use of the faith of one who is known to have sworn by false gods, and makes use of it not for an evil purpose but for a lawful and good one, does not make himself a partner in his sin — the sin by which he swore by demons — but in his good covenant, by which he kept faith."⁴⁰ And after a few words he also acknowledges that it can be proved by examples from Scripture that he does not sin who causes another to swear to him by false gods, when the one who swears to him worships false gods. Those examples are those of Isaac and Jacob, who made a covenant with the idolaters Abimelech and Laban, with an oath interposed on both sides. To these can be added the example of Judas Maccabaeus, who struck a similar covenant with the Romans.⁴⁸

But if you object that it is not lawful to demand an oath from one whom we know will commit perjury — as was proved above — and therefore not from one whom we know is about to swear by an idol or a demon, which is likewise contrary to the divine honour: to this it is answered first, from St. Augustine (in the said Epistle), that without any doubt it is a lesser evil to swear by a false god truthfully than by the true God falsely — for the holier that by which one swears, the more grievous is the punishment of perjury. Furthermore, he who makes use of the oath of one whom he knows will swear by an idol, on account of some just necessity or utility, permits this evil; but he who demands an oath from one who is about to commit perjury reaps no utility from it by which that evil might be compensated, as was shown above.⁴⁰

§ VII — On oath by creatures, and how far it is lawful (*Juramentum per creaturas quatenus licitum sit*)

§ 13. It happens in three ways that an oath is sworn by a creature. In one way, inasmuch as the creature itself is called as witness, as having infallible truth. To swear by a creature in this way is unlawful and pertains to idolatry; for by so swearing, something divine is attributed to the creature, just as the Gentiles attributed it to the gods by whom they swore.

§ 14. In a second way, inasmuch as the divine truth is manifested in the creature itself. This truth can indeed be manifested to us in every creature, but more excellently in one than in another. Hence it has become both received and praiseworthy to swear by the Gospels — because the divine truth shines forth most eminently in them — and by the Saints and the relics of the Saints, because they both held the truth of God by believing rightly and expressed it by living holily. This manner of swearing, therefore, is not unlawful. For he who swears by a creature in this way calls upon none other than the Creator of that creature as his witness, as the Master (*F. Et*) explains, and Gratian likewise.⁵⁰ Indeed, this very interpretation of the oath by creatures is handed down by Christ (Matt. 23), where He says: "Whosoever shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it and by him that dwelleth therein; and he that sweareth by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God and by him that sitteth thereon." In this way did men lawfully swear by holy persons, saying to them: "As thy soul liveth" (2 Kgs. 2 and elsewhere).⁵¹ This is attested by St. Jerome.⁵² St. Thomas illustrates this matter by the analogy of faith (*fides*). For faith principally regards God, who is the first truth (*prima veritas*), and secondarily regards creatures, in whom the truth of God shines forth. So too an oath is principally referred to God, whose testimony is invoked, and secondarily to creatures, inasmuch as they contain within themselves the vestiges (*vestigia*) of the divine truth.

§ 15. In a third way, when one who is swearing names a creature so that the divine judgment may be exercised upon it; as occurs in the execratory oath (*juramentum execratoriun*), of which we spoke above — as when someone swears by his own soul, by his own head, by his son. That this manner of swearing is lawful is shown by the examples of the Saints, and in particular of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 1).⁵³ As for what we read of Joseph, that he swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gen. 42), this can be understood in either the second or the third manner. For either he called upon God as witness, whose judgment was administered on earth through the ministry of Pharaoh, and accordingly the truth of that judgment shone forth in the person of Pharaoh — which is how Gratian and the Master understood it⁵⁴ — or he used "by the health of Pharaoh" in the same way that men are accustomed to say "by my own health," because the health of Pharaoh was to him a thing dear and precious, as those who follow this interpretation maintain. Indeed, it seems that the phrase "by the health of Pharaoh" was said in the same way that men habitually say "by my own health."

§ 16. From what we have said, the solution to the objections that could be raised on the contrary side must now be sought. Of this kind are certain chapters found in Gratian (C. 22, q. 1),⁵⁵ of which one states that a cleric who swears by a creature is to be most sharply rebuked, and that if he persist in the vice, it has been decreed that he is to be excommunicated. A second states that if anyone shall have sworn by a hair of God or by His head, or shall have used blasphemy against God in any other manner: if he be in holy orders, let him be deposed; if a layman, let him be anathematized. A third states: "Consider that the Saviour did not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven, and by the earth, and by Jerusalem, and by thy head." These words are taken from St. Jerome's Commentary (on Matt. 5),⁵⁶ where other passages to the same effect are also read.

The first and the third of these must be understood of the case in which the oath was principally referred to the creature — that is, in such a way that something divine was acknowledged in it — in which manner we have shown that it is impious to swear by creatures. And that St. Jerome was of this mind is made clear by the words immediately preceding that passage of his: "The Jews always had this most wicked custom of swearing by the elements, as the prophetic discourse frequently rebukes them; he who swears either venerates or loves him by whom he swears. In the Law it was commanded that we should not swear except by the Lord our God. The Jews, swearing by Angels, and by the city of Jerusalem, and by the temple, and by the elements, venerated creatures and carnal things with the honour and obsequy of God." So he.

§ 17. Similarly, reply must be made to that which can be objected from the *Glossa ordinaria* on Matt. 5 ("neither by heaven"), with the words of which the Lord declares that it is superstition to have laid these things aside; and the same reply holds for certain passages of St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, and other Fathers.⁵⁷ For they understood the oath by creatures as it was frequently practised among the Gentiles.

The second chapter, which is taken from the decrees of Pope Pius I, certain interpreters think must be understood in the same way. But St. Bonaventure more correctly teaches that that canon was enacted against those who attributed to God, according to His divinity, a head, and hair, and other bodily members; for by thinking and speaking thus they were making use of blasphemy against God.⁵⁸ Although those persons certainly deserved to be restrained by the censures of the canons who, in their daily oaths, irreverently named the members of Christ — and as St. Bonaventure says, divide Christ quasi limb by limb by a certain refined manner of swearing, a custom which is detestable among many people. Hence St. Louis by law decreed that anyone who had sworn by the wounds of Christ should be cauterized with an iron on the lips.⁵⁹

§ VIII — To what extent oaths are to be kept (*Juramenta quatenus servanda sint*)

§ 18. Concerning the obligation of an oath, the question is raised not about the assertory oath, but about the promissory oath, or, speaking generally, about every oath — and that oath alone — which concerns some future thing to be done or omitted by the one who swears. Here, in the first place, it must be noted that, with respect to the force of binding, the formal character (*ratio*) of an oath made expressly by God and that made by a creature is equal; since the latter also, as was said above, is principally referred to God. Hence the Lord (Matt. 23) rebuked the error of the Scribes and Pharisees, who taught that oaths made by creatures, and by the temple, and the altar, and heaven, did not bind — refuting them with these words: "He that sweareth by the altar, sweareth by it and by all things that are upon it; and he that sweareth by the temple, sweareth by it and by him that dwelleth therein. And he that sweareth by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God and by him that sitteth thereon."⁶¹ Meanwhile those men excepted certain creatures that served their avarice — as the gold of the temple, and the gifts offered and laid upon the altars — just as the Lord reproaches them in that same place, and St. Jerome explains more fully in his commentary on that passage.⁶² Moreover, they could have learned from the Law and the Prophets that a man is held by an oath made by creatures just as much as by one made with the express name of God. For (Gen. 31) Jacob swore to Laban by the fear of his father Isaac,⁶³ and Moses (Deut. 30) calls heaven and earth as witnesses.⁶⁴ And (Josh. 2) the spies, when asked by Rahab the harlot for an oath, said: "Our life for yours unto death."⁶⁵ And yet these men who swore thus had no doubt that they were bound. Furthermore, that the same error of the Pharisees was covertly reproved by the Lord

(Matt. 5) where it says, "Neither by heaven nor by earth," etc., is taught by St. Augustine,⁶⁶ who subjoins in the end these words: "Therefore the Lord teaches that nothing is so slight even among the creatures of God, that anyone should think he may swear falsely by it; since from the highest to the lowest all things are governed by divine providence" — beginning from the throne of God down to a white or black hair. And the Author of the *Opus Imperfectum* (*In Matthæum*, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 44)⁶⁷ likewise holds that he who swears by God and he who swears by the Gospel are equally bound.

§ 19. These things having been premised, it must be known that there are approximately four ways in which a promissory oath does not bind.

First, when the person to whom the oath is sworn remits the obligation. For such an oath thereupon ceases to bind, from the moment the remission is made. Nor does the oath thereby become false, any more than a bare promise becomes false; because both are understood only insofar as they are accepted by the person to whom they are made — for the formal character of a promise either does not subsist, or it expires.

Second, if it be made concerning an impossible thing, whether it be impossible at the time when it is sworn, or becomes and remains impossible thereafter. The reason is that no one is held to what is impossible. In oaths of this kind, however, sin is most often committed: as when the person swears knowing, or ought to have known, that the thing is impossible; or when through his own fault it becomes impossible, that which was previously possible — as, for example, if he swore to pay a sum of money within a certain term, which he afterwards cannot pay because he did not apply the diligent effort he ought. Hence even such a person does not escape the guilt of perjury; for he begins to be a perjurer from the moment the matter becomes impossible through his own fault.

Third, if it be made concerning an illicit thing. The evident reason for this is that nothing can bind a man to sin. Of this we have an example in David (1 Kgs. 25)⁶⁸ who, having rashly sworn to slay Nabal with his entire family, was afterwards warned of his rashness and refrained from what he could not carry out without sin, as he himself acknowledges in these words: "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel who hath kept his servant from evil." The contrary example, on the other hand, is that of Herod, who fulfilled what he had wickedly sworn, by killing John the Baptist (Mk. 6),⁶⁹ even though a correct interpretation of his oath did not extend it to the murder of the Prophet. Both examples are treated by St. Augustine⁷⁰ and by Bede (Hom. 43)⁷¹ on the same feast. Bede in his handling of this sort of oath says: "If it should happen that anyone has incautiously sworn what he intended to observe, but which we know will turn to a worse end, let him freely change it by the better counsel; and it is more necessary for us to be perjurers under such pressing necessity, than to fall into another, graver crime in order to avoid perjury." And concerning David, whose example he introduces, he adds: "Nor did he incur any fault of sin by such perjury." Bede, moreover, calls an oath *reserved* (*perjurium reservatum*) because truth is lacking to that oath, insofar as its execution is concerned — which truth, however, ought not to be present, since it cannot be fulfilled without sin. To this point there pertain also certain other testimonies of the Fathers, which are cited by the Master in the same section⁷² — among which the celebrated saying of Isidore is celebrated: "In evil promises, break your word." To which are added St. Ambrose,⁷³ the Council of Toledo VIII,⁷⁴ and Pope Soter in his Letter to the Bishops of Italy.⁷⁵

§ 20. Fourth, if what has been sworn is not indeed evil in itself, but is nevertheless an impediment to some good — of which kind are negative oaths concerning certain goods: for example, if someone swears that he will never enter a religious order, or never receive holy orders, or the care of souls, or a prelacy, or anything of

this sort. For although the things sworn — such as not entering a religious order, not receiving holy orders, etc. — are themselves licit, yet oaths made to that effect are illicit; because the one who swears thus removes from himself, as far as in him lies, the greater possibility of good, and, as St. Thomas says,⁷⁶ places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit — unless perhaps it were established that such goods, by reason of some cause, are not expedient for the one who swears, but would rather turn into a snare and a detriment to his salvation. For in that case it would not be illicit to bind oneself by such an oath. That oaths of this kind do not bind is shown by the words set down above, namely, that things observed in this way turn to a worse end, inasmuch as by them a greater good is excluded. The same is likewise proved by the two capitula in Gratian: *Si aliquid* and *Inter cetera* (C. 22, q. 4).⁷⁷

§ 21. As to the case where it is doubtful in any respect whether the oath itself, or what has been sworn, is licit or illicit; expedient or harmful; and this either absolutely speaking or in a given case — there the proper recourse is the declaration, dispensation, commutation, or even absolute relaxation of a superior. Of this we have some example (Num. 30) where by the contradiction of a father and of a husband the oath of a daughter and wife is dissolved.⁷⁸ In this way Gregory VII, by apostolic authority, absolved from their oath those who were bound by fidelity to excommunicated persons (C. 15, q. 6).⁷⁹ And the Lateran Council under Innocent III decreed something similar, as is contained in the Decretals (*Extra De Hæreticis*, cap. *Excommunicamus*).⁸⁰ Evagrius also reports (in his *Historia*, bk. 6, ch. 12)⁸¹ that Gregory, Patriarch of Antioch, granted a dispensation to soldiers who in a tumult had defected from their commander, regarding the oath by which they had sworn never to serve under him again.

§ 22. Lastly, as regards an oath extorted by force or fraud: force or fraud alone does not suffice to dissolve its obligation, when it can otherwise be licitly fulfilled and does not tend to a worse outcome — so much so that even to a thief, faith confirmed by oath must be kept. For although an obligation arising from a mere promise made to a man is removed by compulsion — inasmuch as he who applied force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept — yet that obligation by which a person is bound to God to perform what he has promised in God's name is not removed, even though he who suffered violence or was subject to deceit may seek restitution of the thing so extorted by judicial process, or denounce the deed to a judge, before he fulfils what he has sworn. For that ceases to be the matter of an oath which, by a legitimate superior, is subtracted from the power of the one who swore. A person could also be absolved from the obligation of an oath by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff — especially if he had been compelled by a fear capable of falling upon a steadfast man — as is evident from the Decretals (*Extra De Jure Jurando*, cap. *Verum*).⁸²

It must be noted in this matter certain propositions condemned by Pope Innocent XI, which are among those proscribed by him, and which read as follows: XXIV. "To call God to witness a lie of slight importance is not such great irreverence as to give one reason, or render one able, to condemn a man on this account, nor is the manner of swearing, whether the matter be light or grave, of any moment." XXV. "When a just cause is present for swearing, it is lawful to swear without an intention to swear, whether alone, or in the presence of others, whether interrogated, whether of one's own accord, whether for recreation's sake, or for any other purpose — if one has not done something which one in fact did, understanding inwardly another way than that in which one did it, or anything else added as true, so that one does not lie, nor is one a perjurer." XXVII. "A just cause for using these amphibologies is whenever it is necessary, or useful for the preservation of bodily health, honour, or family goods; and the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and studious." XXVIII. "Whoever has been promoted through commendation and through a public office to a magistracy or

an office, may make a mental oath, as is customarily required by mandate of the King from such persons, without regard to the intention of the one requiring it, since he is bound to confess no hidden crime."⁸³

§ I — Why the two final precepts were added to the preceding ones (Duo ultima praecepta cur superioribus addita)

§ 23. When the Lord had prohibited adultery and theft by the preceding precepts, lest anyone should take this to mean that only the external acts had been forbidden by those precepts, while the desire to commit adultery and to steal remained permitted — and lest anyone should think himself to sin only once he had consummated his desire by the deed — He therefore wished, by particular and explicit precepts, to prohibit also the desire itself for those things. Furthermore, regarding all the other sins that are opposed to the remaining precepts of the Decalogue as well, a similar judgment must be held: their concupiscence too is to be understood as prohibited. But the reason why the concupiscence of adultery and theft is named before the rest is that almost all men are accustomed to be afflicted by desires of both these kinds, and that desires of these kinds seem especially natural to human beings and are almost common to them with the brute animals — whence it comes about that by most men they are not even thought to be sins. Hence it is said in Rom. 7: "Sin I knew not, but by the law. For I had not known concupiscence, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not covet." And although this extends generally to every illicit desire, it holds true in a particular way with respect to the two kinds already mentioned.

§ II — In what ways sin is committed against these two precepts (Contra haec duo praecepta quibus modis peccetur)

§ 24. The general prohibition of not coveting embraces many things. First, it forbids that we consent to the external act of sin, whatever precept may prohibit that act. Hence, whoever sins by the very deed against any part of the Decalogue thereby also offends against this prohibition, because no external act can have the nature (*rationem*) of sin without the internal consent of the will. Second, it forbids that we take delight in this vicious concupiscence, even if we do not wish to carry it through to the deed. For concupiscence, as soon as it has conceived, brings forth sin (Jas. 1), even before it is consummated either by the will or by the act. Third, it enjoins that we also hate this concupiscence within ourselves, and by hating it, attack it; by attacking it, weaken and diminish it; and that we do all this altogether, so that it may at length be extinguished within us. Hence, when Sirach (Sir. 18) had said "Go not after thy concupiscences," in order to show that they are also to be held in hatred, he added: "And turn away from thy own will." The reason for this is that the Christian man is obliged to tend continually toward the perfection of charity (*caritas*) and justice. He cannot attain this, unless concupiscence has first been extinguished and rooted out. For "so long as there is still something of carnal concupiscence in a man which must be restrained by continence, God is not in every way loved with the whole soul," as St. Augustine says.⁸⁵ But we have spoken more fully on this matter above.⁸⁶

§ 25. Fourth, it must be known that those also sin against this precept who desire that the things forbidden by divine law should be permitted. They sin, for example, who desire that drunkenness, or fornication, should not be a mortal sin, or should not be a sin at all; and in general, whoever desires that carnal

affection — that is, sensuality (*sensualitas*) — should be the rule of conduct, that is, that everything that pleases should be permitted. For such a will is at variance with the divine law, and is therefore crooked and vicious.

§ 26. Fifth, this precept holds guilty also all those who, for whatever end, consent to any other sin, whether present, past, or future, whether their own or another's, or who take pleasure in it.

§ 27. Finally, all those sin who desire another's property in a disordered manner — for instance, if it is desired contrary to justice, contrary to the will of the possessor, or out of avarice, lust, gluttony, or ambition. For Ahab sinned grievously in coveting the vineyard of Naboth, even though a just price was offered, because he persisted in that desire even against the possessor's will, which was known to him⁸⁷ — and the children of Israel sinned grievously in desiring the flesh-pots, when other necessary foods were not lacking to them.⁸⁸ To this point pertains what St. Augustine says,⁸⁹ when treating of the prohibition of coveting another's property, even if you seek there a just inheritance, stating among other things: "Thou praisest as lawful possessors; God condemns one who covets unjustly." If, however, someone desires in an orderly way what belongs to another — as, for instance, if he is prepared to buy at a just price a thing that is for sale and will be useful to him — he does not sin against the law, just as neither does one who desires to join to himself in honest and lawful matrimony an unmarried woman. Nor indeed does one sin who desires to have as a wife, after her husband's death, a married woman whose husband is suffering from a mortal illness.

§ 28. Finally, as regards the tinder of concupiscence (*fomes concupiscentiæ*), this commandment is not to be taken as though it enjoined upon us that in this life we should be entirely free of all vicious concupiscence, so that neither the habitual vice itself should be in us, nor any movement of it against the spirit should arise in us. For since this is not within our power, it does not fall under a precept, as we have shown above.⁹⁰ From which it further follows that evil desires which arise in us against our will and with our complete non-consent are not sins, nor are they forbidden by the law "Thou shalt not covet" — which we have demonstrated at length against the heresies of our time.⁹¹

§ III — The distinction between these two final precepts (Distincta inter se esse duo ultima præcepta)

§ 29. Concerning the distinction of the precepts of the Decalogue, and what is more probably to be held on the authority of St. Augustine and the Latin Fathers, we have spoken above.⁹³ What therefore is to be said here in that place concerning these two distinct precepts — "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife" and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods" — we now prove more fully. It is established first that the concupiscence of another's wife and the concupiscence of another's possessions are not of the same formal character (*rationem*). For the former pertains to lust or impurity, and the latter to avarice; and St. John calls one the concupiscence of the flesh and the other the concupiscence of the eyes (1 Jn. 2). Therefore, just as the precepts "Thou shalt not commit adultery" and "Thou shalt not steal" are distinct, corresponding as they do to distinct acts, so it is consistent and fitting that the concupiscences corresponding to those acts be prohibited by distinct precepts.

§ 30. Moreover, Scripture itself (Deut. 5) sufficiently indicated this distinction to us; and this is especially clear if we have recourse to the Hebrew source, where it reads: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife,

§ III — That the two final precepts are distinct from one another (*Distincta inter se esse duo ultima praecepta*)

§ 31. Concerning the distinction of the precepts of the Decalogue, what is more probably to be held, on the authority of St. Augustine and the opinion of the Latins, we have said above.⁹³ What, therefore, was stated in that place — namely, that there are two distinct precepts, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife" and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods" — let us now prove more fully. First, it is established that the concupiscence of another's wife and the concupiscence of another's possession are not of the same formal character (*ratio*); for the former pertains to lust or unchastity, the latter to avarice; and John calls the one the concupiscence of the flesh and the other the concupiscence of the eyes (1 Jn. 2). Therefore, just as the precepts concerning acts are distinct — "Thou shalt not commit adultery" and "Thou shalt not steal" — so it is consistent and fitting that the concupiscences corresponding to those acts be prohibited by distinct precepts likewise. Moreover, Scripture itself (Deut. 5) has sufficiently indicated this distinction to us; and this is especially clear if we have recourse to the Hebrew source, where it reads: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife,

1. Is. 65:16.

2. Rom. 1:9.

3. 1 Cor. 15:31.

4. 2 Cor. 1:23.

5. Gal. 1:20.

6. Phil. 1:8 and 1 Thess. 2:5, 10.

7. Heb. 6:16.

8. St. Augustine, *Sermo 28 de Verbis Apostoli*.

9. St. Augustine, *De Mendacio*, ch. 15; *Epistola* 89 (= Ep. CLVII and XLVI in the Benedictine edition) and *Epistola* 154; *De Sermone Domini in Monte*; *In Epistolam ad Galatas Expositio*, Book 1, ch. 17; *Sermo de decollationem Johannis Baptistae*, inter Parisienses no. 10 (= *Sermo CCCVI inter Sermones III. Classis* in the Benedictine edition).

10. 1 Tim. 6:13.

11. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentarii in Epistolas Paulinas* (at the passages where Paul swears, as shown above); and *In Acta Apostolorum*, Hom. 9.

12. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Ieremiam*.

13. St. Bernard, *Sermones in Cantica*, Sermon. 65.

14. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 1.

15. Council of Ephesus (oath demanded of Nestorius); Council of Constance, Wyclif's article no. 43 (condemned).

16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, *ubi supra* [i.e., as cited above].

17. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Hom. 15.

18. St. John Chrysostom, *In Acta Apostolorum*, Hom. 9.

19. St. John Chrysostom, *In Psalmum* 5, Hom. 1.

20. St. John Chrysostom, *Adversus vituperatores Vitae Monasticae*, Book 1.

21. St. John Chrysostom, *De Compunctione cordis*.
22. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Populum Antiochenum*, Homilies 8, 19, 25, 27, and 28.
23. Theophylact and Euthymius, *In Matthaeum* 5.
24. Oecumenius, *In Jacobum* 5.
25. Origen, *In Matthaeum*, Hom. 35.
26. Epiphanius, *De Haeresibus* (= *Panarion*), Book 1, in the heresy of the Ossaeans.
27. Athanasius, *Sermo de Passione et Cruce Domini*.
28. St. Basil, *In Psalmum* 14.
29. Cyprian, *Tractatus de Mortalitate*.
30. Lactantius, *Epitome*, ch. 4.
31. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum* 5; *Commentarius in Ieremiam* 4; *Commentarius in Zachariam* 8.
32. Hilary, *In Matthaeum*, Canticle (canon) 4.
33. St. Ambrose, *In Psalmum* 118, on the verse "I have sworn and am determined to keep."
34. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, Book 6, ch. 5.
35. Matt. 23.
36. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, Book 1, ch. 17.
37. St. Augustine, *De Mendacio*, Book 1, ch. 15.
38. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Leviticum* (*Quaest. 1 Levit.*) [abbreviation as in source: *Quaest. 1. Levit.*].
39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 98.
40. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 154.
41. St. Augustine, *Sermo 28 de Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermon. CCCVIII inter Sermones III, Classis in Edit. Bened.).
42. St. Augustine, *Sermo inter Parisienses* (= Sermon. CCCVIII inter Sermones III, Classis in Edit. Bened.) [abbreviation as in source: *Ser. inter Parisienses*].
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 78, a. 4; q. 98, a. 4, ad quartum.
44. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Damasum de filio prodigo* [abbreviation as in source].
45. Wis. 14 (end of chapter).
46. St. Augustine, *Sermo 28 de Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermon. CCCVIII inter Sermones III, Classis in Editione Benedictina).
47. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 3.
48. Cf. Gen. 26 (Isaac and Abimelech); Gen. 31 (Jacob and Laban); 1 Macc. 8 (Judas Maccabaeus and the Romans).
49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 9.
50. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 1 [abbreviation as in source]. The "Master" refers to Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*.
51. 2 Kgs. 2 (Vulgate; i.e., 2 Samuel 2 in other enumerations), and parallel passages.
52. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Galatas*, at the end.
53. 1 Cor. 15; 2 Cor. 1.
54. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 1; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*.
55. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 1 (several capitula).
56. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Evangelium Matthaei*, on Matt. 5.
57. *Glossa ordinaria* on Matt. 5 (*neque per caelum*, etc.); cf. St. Augustine and St. John Chrysostom, various passages.

58. St. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* [abbreviation as in source]; the decree of Pope Pius I cited in Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 1.
59. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.* The law of St. Louis (King Louis IX of France) against swearing by the wounds of Christ.
60. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89 and q. 98.
61. Matt. 23:20–22.
62. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Evangelium Matthæi*, on Matt. 23.
63. Gen. 31:53.
64. Deut. 30:19.
65. Josh. 2:14.
66. St. Augustine, *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte*, bk. I, ch. 77.
67. *Opus Imperfectum in Matthæum* (among the works of St. John Chrysostom), Hom. 44.
68. 1 Kgs. (i.e., 1 Samuel) 25.
69. Mk. 6.
70. St. Augustine, *Sermo 2 de Joannis Decollationem*, which is no. 11 among the Parisian sermons.
71. Bede, Hom. 43, on the same feast (the Beheading of St. John the Baptist).
72. The Master (Peter Lombard), *Sententiae*, bk. IV, the present section (§ H).
73. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis*, bk. III, ch. 12.
74. Council of Toledo VIII, ch. 2.
75. Pope Soter, *Epistola ad Episcopos Italiae*. Note: on the Decretal Letters of Soter and other Pontiffs before Siricius, the judgment to be made is noted in Vol. 2, *Distinctio IX*, §. 1, n. 10, p. 88. See the authors praised there.
76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89 [abbreviation as in source].
77. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 22, q. 4, cap. *Si aliquid* and cap. *Inter cetera*.
78. Num. 30.
79. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 15, q. 6, c. 15.
80. Council of the Lateran (IV, under Innocent III), *Extra De Hæreticis*, cap. *Excommunicamus*.
81. Evagrius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, ch. 12.
82. *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, *Decretales Extra De Jure Jurando*, cap. *Verum*.
83. These are among the propositions condemned by Pope Innocent XI (*Denz.* 2124–2128; propositions XXIV, XXV, XXVII, XXVIII of the condemned list).
84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 5; II-II, q. 122, a. 6.
85. St. Augustine, *De perfectione justitiæ*, ch. 8.
86. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, Dist. 30, lib. 2, § 16.
87. 1 Kgs. (i.e., 1 Kings) 21.
88. Num. 13.
89. St. Augustine, *Fragmentum* 2, epist. 10 [abbreviation as in source], where he says that God prohibits the coveting of another's property even if you seek a just inheritance there, saying among other things: "Thou praisest as lawful possessors; God condemns one who covets unjustly."
90. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, Dist. 27 of this book.
91. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 32.
92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 4; II-II, q. 122, a. 6.

93. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, Dist. 37.

DISTINCTIO XL — ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE, AND ESPECIALLY THE TWO PRECEPTS CONCERNING CONCUPISCENCE

§ 1. — "nor his field, nor his servant," etc.¹ In these words two things are to be noted. The first is that the verb occurs in both places, although in our version it was omitted in the second place. The second is that the Hebrew verb placed in the first position and that placed in the second position are not the same, nor of altogether the same signification. For the word that occurs in the first place signifies a more vehement impulse of the soul, and is therefore more fittingly accommodated to designating venereal concupiscence. The word that occurs in the second place, however, is more usually referred to the lusts of avaricious men. Add to this that the Seventy Interpreters, both in Exodus and in Deuteronomy, even though they always render the verb of desiring by a single word, nevertheless seem by the very repetition of the word to have indicated not obscurely that there are not one but two prohibitions concerning not coveting. For in both places it has been said by them clearly and distinctly: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife"; "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, nor his field," etc.²

§ 2. Rightly, therefore, did St. Augustine and nearly all others after him distribute the Decalogue in such a way that the two final precepts thereof forbid a twofold concupiscence — the one of another's wife, the other of another's goods. To this distinction the Fathers of the Council of Trent give their assent when, in Session 14, ch. 5, they teach that in confession all mortal sins must be enumerated, even if they be most secret and committed only against the two final precepts of the Decalogue; which they repeat also under anathema in the same Session, canon 7.³ Where it is beyond doubt that the Fathers understand two precepts prohibiting internal concupiscence, and accordingly in their judgment these two precepts are distinct from one another.

§ 3. But against these conclusions those who hold that there is a single precept concerning not coveting object as follows: that the Apostle so understood it when, in Rom. 7, he cites it as though it were one single precept and as it were in one word: "Thou shalt not covet"; and again when, in Rom. 13, recounting several precepts of the law and summing up the entire precept of prohibiting concupiscence into one, he says: "For: thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet, and if there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbour," etc.⁴ Furthermore, they adduce in their favour the text of Scripture in Exodus 20, where in the first place the coveting of the neighbour's house is forbidden, then of his wife, then of his servant, maidservant, ox, ass, and whatever else there may be — and since no other prohibition is interposed between these, they therefore conclude that there is not two but a single precept of not coveting.

§ 4. It is answered to these objections: that the Apostle, in Rom. 7, took from the Decalogue that which best served his own purpose — that is, that which among the negative precepts was the most universal; and therefore, since he wished to show as broadly as possible what he intended to demonstrate was prohibited by

the law, he joined together the mention of neither wife nor another's property separately, just as, on the contrary, among the affirmative precepts the precept of loving extends most broadly. Thus, therefore, it was said "Thou shalt not covet," just as one would say "Thou shalt love." From which, just as it would not follow that there is a single precept of loving God and one's neighbour, so neither ought it to follow that there is a single prohibition of coveting another's wife. In the other passage, however, since the Apostle wished only summarily to enumerate certain precepts of the Decalogue, for the sake of brevity he comprised the ninth and tenth in a single sentence. Hence he also did not preserve the order of the precepts as they are written in the Decalogue, placing adultery before homicide.⁵

§ 5. To the passage from Exodus, certain ones reply that the wife is numbered among the things that are possessed; for the reason that in that place it is not the coveting of another's wife in relation to carnal intercourse that is prohibited, as in the other prohibition, but the coveting of those things which are by way of possession. But since with this reasoning it would have to be admitted that in Exodus the penultimate precept of the Decalogue has been omitted — namely, that concerning not coveting another's wife with respect to carnal intercourse — we think it must more correctly be replied that what in Exodus was stated confusedly, in Deuteronomy, as a law repeated and reviewed, has been set forth more distinctly; especially since also the Seventy Interpreters, as we have said, have in both places set out these precepts in the same order, placing the wife before other things. Moreover, according to the Hebrew text, in Exodus the word of coveting is repeated in the second place, where the wife is named, so that from this too one may gather that these two precepts ought to be distinguished.⁶

§ IV — What is the difference between the old law and the new (Quod sit discrimen inter legem veterem et novam)

§ 6. When we distinguish the old law from the new, by the old law we understand not only the Decalogue given to the people of old, but the entire legal administration of that people through Moses, including also those things that pertained to ceremonies, inasmuch as these were handed down to the old people through the ministry of Moses; just as we also understand the new law to be the entire complex of God's precepts insofar as it is administered through Christ to the new people. Therefore the difference between the two laws is manifold.

First, they differ in their legislators or primary ministers: the Law was given through Moses, but grace and truth were made through Jesus Christ (Jn. 1),⁸ Scripture opposing Moses to Christ and showing the former to be the minister of the Old Testament, the latter of the New — as is clear from Heb. 3.⁹

§ 7. Then they differ in effect, and that in a manifold way. For the old law showed what ought to be done, but did not supply the grace by which it might be fulfilled. It likewise made sin manifest, but did not heal it. Hence the Apostle says in Rom. 3: "by the law is the knowledge of sin,"¹⁰ and in Rom. 7: "I did not know sin except through the law."¹¹ And in chapter 2 of the same Epistle, he attributes to the Jew who is instructed by the law an excellent knowledge of the will of God.¹² From that knowledge of the law, fear was born of the punishment which the law threatened. Hence it was called the law of fear, just as the new law is called the law of love. This effect is indicated by the Apostle in Rom. 8, when he says: "For you have not received again a spirit of bondage unto fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption of sons."¹³ And in 2 Tim. 1: "God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power and of love."¹⁴ And in Heb. 2: that he might "deliver those who

through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage."¹⁵ For fear is here understood with the exclusion of love — the fear which we call servile. To this point is what the Apostle says: "the law worketh wrath" (Rom. 4).¹⁶ And to Moses (2 Cor. 3) he attributes the ministry of death and of condemnation, while by contrast he attributes to Christ the ministry of the spirit and of justice.¹⁷ For a law destitute of grace — such as the old law is understood to be — can indeed show what is right, but cannot bring it about that what is commanded is done; and accordingly it makes a man guilty of death and damnation. But the law of grace, endowed with grace — such as the new law is understood to be — not only delivers all things, but also supplies the spirit and the power by which what is commanded may be fulfilled. And this is what the Apostle says in the same chapter: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."¹⁸ Therefore, just as Scripture attributes these effects to the old law — oldness, fear, bondage, wrath, death, damnation — so to the new law it attributes their contraries: newness, love, freedom, grace, life, salvation. Each of these it is not difficult to illustrate with its own examples. This distinction is set forth most clearly by Jeremiah (ch. 31)¹⁹ and by the Apostle (Heb. 8).²⁰ St. Augustine expounds it in many places: in *De Spiritu et Littera*, chs. 25–26; in the *Quaestiones super Exodum*, question 166; and the *Quaestiones super Deuteronomium*, questions 11 and 15; in *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 25; and XVI, ch. 26; likewise in *Contra duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* III, ch. 4 and the following chapters — which passage is more apt and more extensive than the others.²¹ He expounds that particular Scripture "the letter killeth, the spirit giveth life" with special attention in *De Spiritu et Littera*, chs. 4, 5, and 14; in *De Doctrina Christiana* III, ch. 5; in *Contra Faustum* XIV, ch. 18; in *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, ch. 8; in the *Sermon on the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 3; and in *De Tempore*, Sermon 81.²²

§ 8. Another difference between the two laws is taken from their promises and threats. For the old law promises and threatens temporal things, as is clear from Lev. 26 and Deut. 27 and 28.²³ But the new law promises and threatens eternal things, as is evident from the writings of the Evangelists and the Apostles. The Apostle weighs this distinction in Heb. 8,²⁴ saying of Christ: "But now he hath obtained a better ministry, by how much also he is the mediator of a better testament, which is established upon better promises." Nevertheless this distinction is not so absolute as to mean that the law of Moses does not at times also promise and threaten eternal things, though more rarely and obscurely — as St. Augustine proves in *De Vera Religione*, chs. 27–28; in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 11; and in *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 30, and elsewhere.²⁵ Hilary also teaches this in his commentary on Ps. 68, on the words "They shall be blotted out of the book of the living."²⁶ And Christ sufficiently intimated this when, to one who asked what he must do to obtain eternal life, he referred him to the law, saying: "Do this, and thou shalt live" (Lk. 10).²⁷ And again, when addressing the Pharisees concerning the Scriptures of the Old Testament, he said: "Search the Scriptures, for you think that in them you have eternal life" (Jn. 5).²⁸ Conversely, the new law likewise at times, though more rarely, sets forth temporal promises and threats, for it is "profitable to all things," as the Apostle says in 1 Tim. 4, "having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come."²⁹ And the Lord himself (Mk. 10) testifies to the one who has left all things that he shall receive a hundredfold even in this present time.³⁰ The reason, however, why those who belong to the Old Testament were to be aroused by temporal things — temporal things being set aside — and those who belong to the New Testament by eternal ones, is treated at greater length elsewhere.³¹

§ 9. The last difference is taken from the diversity of the Sacraments, Sacrifices, Ceremonies, and Rites universally. For it was necessary that each people should have its own proper and fitting external signs, by

which it should worship God, prescribed to it. But this distinction will become more fully known in the next book, in which the Sacraments are to be treated.³²

APPENDIX TO DISTINCTION THIRTY-FOUR

§ VIII — In which the system of Jansenius and his followers concerning the nature of servile fear is set forth, and whatever in that system is dissonant from sound and Catholic doctrine is shown by a brief and clear method to be rejected, and demonstrated by authority and reason to be repudiated; and how much Jansenius differs from his own dogmas — above all on this point — from the teaching of St. Thomas, is demonstrated (In qua Systema Jansenii, et Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, et quidquid eo in systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum, sit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, et auctoritate ac ratione probatur, demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

ADMONITIO

§ 10. Some will think this discussion superfluous and proceeding from nothing but a fondness for writing; nor would that judgment be altogether improbable, seeing that the Author has discoursed so rightly, so clearly, so distinctly, and so exactly in accordance with the standard of Catholic Faith on the nature of servile fear (*timor servilis*) in this work, that whatever is added here might be said to be superfluous and utterly idle. But indeed, whoever shall have had a clear view of the present state of the Church, and shall have considered with mature and serious reflection of mind how great and how many controversies Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, has stirred up — both in other matters touching grace, and also in this matter concerning fear — and with how much effort and striving his followers are at present fostering and have fostered them, such a one will take our modest labour in good part as being useful, and perhaps necessary, for those who are beginners in theology, lest in a matter so rough, and especially in this tempest, at the occasion of these controversies, with things so obscured, they either stumble or rush headlong into a precipice; and lest, in place of the Catholic dogmas attested by the Fathers, they embrace opinions that are corrupt and perverted by a prejudice-laden bias. We confess indeed that we enter upon this task with a reluctant and unwilling mind: conscious of our limited powers and measuring the proper weakness of our own talent, we recognise that we are unequal to bearing this burden. But since it has come to pass by the guidance of divine grace that, acquiescing in the definitions of the Holy Apostolic See, we judge there is nothing further to be inquired as to what they have declared — the rock stable and firm upon which the Church, supported by it, can be shaken, struck, battered, or overthrown never and nowhere, as we believe with our whole heart and confess with our lips, having our faith confirmed either by our own blood or by the blood of saints — we are mindful of the words of Jesus Christ our Saviour and Lord, by which constancy and firmness to the Apostolic See of Peter, and perseverance to the end of the world, has been promised. Scorning therefore the voice of Peter, that is, the

sentence of his Roman Pontiff's successors, whatever heterodox persons may clamour, or (if it is permitted to speak so) whatever pain-laden concessions may be made, or whatever certain men seduced by partisan zeal, or even some Orthodox men who have written or may write, following their own private judgment rather than adhering to the first judgments of the Holy See — we judge these rightly to be condemned with a solemn oath. For truly, though we have been driven to this task somewhat against our will, having taken upon ourselves something of no small difficulty, we have undertaken it so that, as in the Appendix to the first volume we set out the whole Jansenian system *De Gratia*, so in this third book we may adduce those things which seemed most apposite to place in the Appendix to it; and in order that, as we show in the Appendix to the prior volume the whole Jansenian system on grace, so here also in this, which we attach to this Third Book, the reader may recognise at a single glance, from a single point of view as it were, both the foundation from which Jansenius set out, the *ratio* by which and the principle from which he was led, and at the same time where sound doctrine diverges from his.³³

§ VIII — Appendix to Distinction Thirty-Four: In which the System of Jansenius and his Followers Concerning the Nature of Servile Fear is Set Forth, and whatever in that System is Dissonant from Sound and Catholic Doctrine is here Expounded and Refuted by Authority and Reason, and it is Demonstrated how far Jansenius's Dogmas Diverge both in other Matters and above all in this Subject from what our Author held (In qua Systema Jansenii, & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, & quidquid eo in Systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum, fit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, & auctoritate ac ratione probatur, demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

ADMONITIO

§ 11. Someone will perhaps think it superfluous, and not unbecoming to mere self-indulgence in writing, to have added this Dissertation to the present work on the nature of servile fear — and indeed it would have been not so improbable a judgment, were it not that whoever has accurately surveyed the present state of the Church, with maturity and earnest reflection of mind, will perceive how many controversies there are, both in other matters touching Grace, and likewise in this question concerning Fear which Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, has stirred up, and with what effort and force his followers have sustained and fostered the errors of their master. That man of good counsel, however, will judge our labour here to be useful, indeed necessary, in a matter so precarious, and especially in this tempestuous age, on occasion of these controversies — lest, while no small number of corrupted minds and those depraved by prejudice embrace such opinions, and while for the Catholics the dogmas of the Fathers are put forward, though corrupted and distorted by a preoccupied judgment — we ourselves, supine and remiss, remain idle. We confess, indeed, that it is with a reluctant spirit and a repugnant mind that we have undertaken this Province; for our powers are utterly insufficient, and, measuring our own mediocre capacity and the lack of acuity of our own talent, we know ourselves to be unequal to so heavy a burden. It has come about, however, that, supported by Divine Grace and acquiescing in the definitions of the Holy Apostolic See, we judge that nothing further is to be inquired

— no matter what those Authors have said or thought. This is that firm and stable rock, on which the Church, leaning, can only be agitated, shaken, and assailed, but can never and nowhere fall: we believe this with our whole heart, as we also confess it with our mouth, being prepared, if need be, to confirm our faith even with blood. For we are mindful, surely, of the divine words of Jesus Christ our Saviour, by which He promised to the Chair of the Apostle Peter constancy, firmness, and perseverance even to the end of the age. Contented therefore with the voice of Peter — that is, the sentence of his Successor the Roman Pontiff — whatever the heterodox may bark, or (let it be permitted to say so, conceding something to grief) however many deluded, or certainly seduced, or carried away by party spirit, certain orthodox men may have written or even now write, we judge it right to adhere rather to the judgment of the primary See than to follow them. For in truth, since we have taken upon ourselves this burden — compelled to some degree, though not without reason — of giving counsel, with such mediocrity as we possess, to young Theologians who have read our Author's Commentaries for learning true and genuine Theology, we have held it a matter of duty to point out to these same readers certain Jansenian reefs, against which, if the ship draws too near, it will be shattered.³⁴

§ 12. This, therefore, is our single aim and purpose: to show to novices and Candidates of Theology the snares and sophistries of the Jansenians, so that, just as in the Appendix to the first volume we expounded the entire Jansenian system *De Gratia*, so likewise in this appendix — which we attach to this Third Book, and for this reason, namely that Jansenius treats what he regards as one of the principal corollaries of his Dogma — we may make known to the reader, with a single glance as it were, on what foundation, by what method, and from what principle Jansenius's system is derived, so that the reader may at once perceive and reject it. We shall therefore first exhibit what Jansenius thought concerning Fear, his own words faithfully transcribed and the passages noted; then we shall set forth what has been condemned and marked with censure by the Holy See: so that even the newest reader may know how to choose the good and reject the evil. And in order that we may perform this worthily, we humbly and earnestly implore with all the effort and fervour of our soul the mercy and goodness of God, who makes the tongues of the speechless eloquent.

§ 13. We noted already in the Appendix to the first volume (at number 2) that the solemn and principal dogma of Jansenius — which Michael Baius had also taught before him — and the foundation of his entire position, was that proposition by which he asserted that only two principles of human actions are to be acknowledged, namely concupiscence and love of God.³⁵ With this foundation laid — which he endeavoured to establish and confirm in many places, as we there recorded, indicating several passages — it was easy for him to deduce other corollaries therefrom which might more and more elucidate his position and confirm it at least in appearance. The corollary that follows most immediately, so to speak, upon the aforesaid Dogma is what he expounds, asserts, and strives to demonstrate throughout the whole of Book V *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, that is, *De Effectibus Gratiae Christi*:³⁶ namely, that the Grace of Jesus Christ properly so called — that which is mercifully given by God in view of His merits — is necessary only for works of love (*dilectionis*); which is the same, according to the principles of Jansenius, as to say that only works of love of God are good works entirely free from every stain of sin, and that the Grace of Jesus Christ is given only for these; since Jansenius holds all other works of virtue to be virtuous and good only insofar as they are either commanded or elicited by love of God. The first chapter of that book, therefore, Jansenius entitles: *Grace of Christ is necessary only for loving God in the fulfilment of whatever precept*. In the course of that chapter he clearly defines, according to the principles of St. Augustine as he himself boasts, that medicinal Grace of Christ is solely that by which it comes about that we love God. "Whoever," he says at the passage cited³⁷ — "gathers from what precedes that the sole sweetness of love which Christ the Physician imparted to ailing humanity is the

medicinal grace of Christ, gathers correctly from the mind of St. Augustine." He takes note, however, that to more recent Doctors, as he himself says, this will seem very surprising, inasmuch as by it the works of all other virtues are destroyed or referred back to the powers of nature; but he does not hesitate to say that it is beyond doubt in the mind of St. Augustine. Jansenius thus establishes that Grace is nothing other than the inspiration of love of God; and this assertion he endeavoured to confirm with almost innumerable testimonies of St. Augustine.

§ 14. With what unfortunate success Jansenius undertook this enterprise is not our purpose to demonstrate here; there are very many authors who, fighting against Jansenius, have vindicated St. Augustine, and, opening his true meaning, have so explained the testimonies of that holy Doctor cited by Jansenius — adducing other passages of the same St. Augustine — that they have perspicuously shown him to have been far removed from the opinion of Jansenius: they taught, namely, that it never entered St. Augustine's mind — what Jansenius fabricated — that the Grace of Jesus Christ is given only for acts of love of God, and not for other supernatural and virtuous works by which the way is prepared and made ready for love and charity of God and for solid and Christian piety. Our Author, in many places, adduces the clearest testimonies of St. Augustine, by which it is manifestly proved that what St. Augustine called the Grace of Jesus Christ is that which prepares and disposes a man for the works of salvation, and hence for love of God loved for His own sake.

§ 15. Furthermore, we cannot pass over what Jansenius adds at the end of that chapter as a crowning touch, so as to render his position impregnable: namely, that it is proved by a clear canon of the Council of Carthage, and perspicuously defined thereby. Here are his words, faithfully transcribed from the passage cited:³⁸ "This doctrine of St. Augustine is so celebrated and certain both in his writings and indeed in the sense of the Catholic Church, that the Council of Carthage confirmed it with an express canon and defined it under anathema against the Pelagians." The words of the Canon, which is the fourth or fifth — as not a few manuscripts have it — among those which are commonly called the canons of Milevis, are these: "If anyone shall have said that the Grace of God through Jesus Christ helps us to avoid sin for this reason only, that through it the understanding of the commandments is opened to us, so that we know what to seek and what to avoid, but that through it we are also given the desire to do and the power to perform what we have come to know must be done, let him be anathema."³⁹ After recounting these words from the aforesaid Canon, Jansenius appends this interpretation: "Behold," he says, "the Grace of Christ is defined as necessary so that we may love to do what we have come to know must be done." And shortly after: "Since, as St. Augustine teaches everywhere, that inspiration of love is charity which is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, so in this very same passage the holy Bishop employs the same argument and almost the same words of Augustine, to prove that it is grace so that we may love to do what we have come to know must be done."⁴⁰

§ 16. After setting out this inference, Jansenius immediately subjoins the remaining words of the same Canon — which we consider it worth our while to transcribe here, so that it may at last become clear whether Jansenius derives from this Canon what he maintains in that chapter. "For since," the Council continues thus: "The Apostle says, 'Knowledge puffs up,' it is very impious that we should believe we have the Grace of Christ for that which puffs up, and that we do not have it for that which builds up — since both are a gift of God, both the knowing what we ought to do and the loving so that we may do it, so that, with charity building up, knowledge cannot puff up. For just as it is written of God 'who teaches man knowledge,' so likewise it is

written, 'Charity is from God'.⁴¹ Thus far the Council. We beg the reader to weigh these words of the Council and to consider carefully in his mind whether the opinion of Jansenius is deduced from them, or rather the contrary. The Council says that both are a gift of God: knowledge which enlightens, and charity which builds up — and indeed such a gift as comes from the Grace of Christ, for it is of this that the Council speaks, since it acts against the Pelagians, with whom the dispute was about the Grace of Christ. Jansenius says that charity alone that builds up is from the Grace of Christ, and that the Grace of Christ is necessary for it alone. Are these two propositions consonant, or dissonant and opposed? We do not deny that by the Council that knowledge is attributed to the Grace of Christ which, together with the moving of the will by the aid of Divine grace, simultaneously moves it to will a good work and to prepare itself for the obtaining of integral justice: since, as we noted elsewhere on the second Book (Distinction 26),⁴² the principal point of contention between the Catholics and the Pelagians was whether the Grace of Christ only enlightened the mind, or also moved the will — so that we may also love and be able to do what we have come to know must be done, as the Catholics maintained and the Councils defined, whereas the Pelagians denied this — and this with regard to the beginning of Faith as well. Jansenius, therefore, can derive nothing in favour of his own position from this Council. But it is customary for this Author to congratulate himself triumphantly even when his case has collapsed.

§ 17. We must not linger further on these matters; we must press on to others that touch more directly on the Jansenian system concerning servile fear, so that we may accomplish the task which has been assigned to us by reason of our office. Jansenius proceeds, therefore (in the same Book, chapter 2), and expounds the root of his position: namely, he explains what is to be understood when he says that the Grace of Jesus Christ is necessary only for works that proceed from love of God. What that explanation is, hear in the words of Jansenius himself:⁴³ "But if you ask of me, how the sole inspiration of charity — or the sole grace by which, as Augustine himself says, charity is infused — is that grace which is necessary against the Pelagians for willing and working, for turning away from evil and doing good, for living justly and uprightly, and consequently for all good works and for the avoidance of all evils and the fulfilment of the whole law; it is not difficult to explain from what has been said before. For in Augustine there is no good, as long as it is done from fear of punishment and not from love of justice. Justice itself, which shines forth in the precept of living well — whether affirmative or negative — must be sincerely loved if the work is to be a good one." He adds that more is said about this when treating of the good works of unbelievers, and especially when treating of Pure Nature, namely in Book 3 (*De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, ch. 16; p. 217; Book 4, chs. 1–2, pp. 228, 230–231; ch. 8, p. 246; ch. 17, p. 265; and Book 1, *De Statu Naturae Purae*, chs. 4, 5, and following)⁴⁴ — as we also noted in the Appendix to the first volume. "For this doctrine," he says, "is so certain, fixed, and immovable in Augustine (if you please) that nothing more insistently and famously inculcated against the Pelagians can be found in him. Now this justice, which he teaches must be loved in all good works whatsoever, is not any habit or act of the soul, but is that eternal and immutable justice which presides above the minds of men as mutable" — and which determines what is good or evil. "Which we have also asserted at length with very many most lucid testimonies of St. Augustine," he says, "namely in Book 1 (*De Statu Naturae Purae*, ch. 8), so that whoever shall have loved it, loves nothing other than the true God." Thus Jansenius at the place just cited.

§ 18. Let us not be reluctant to hear him speaking further in that chapter 8 which he indicated in Book 1 *De Statu Naturae Purae*; for from what he has there his doctrine emerges more clearly. To that chapter he inscribes this title:⁴⁵ *That justice is God, just as truth, goodness, and the eternal law*. At the beginning of the chapter, having proposed for his own inquiry what that justice is which is exposed to all for contemplation,

without love of which it is impossible for an act of will to be just or good, and the love of which is poured forth in our hearts as charity through the Holy Spirit; he answers: it is nothing other than the truth, justice, and rectitude of the eternal law — or, what is the same, the eternal law itself prescribing with its everlasting truth, justice, and rectitude to rational creation whatever is true, just, and right in matters to be done. This law of justice is nothing other than God, nor is God other than truth, justice, and eternal rectitude: "that which," he says, "in this life we perceive dimly from its effects" — and concerning what Jansenius means by these words "we perceive dimly from its effects," a certain very keen apologist of Jansenius professes not to understand him, in a pamphlet published in French with the title *Règle du bon sens*, article 14⁴⁶ — "not only by Faith but by the intuition of rational mind; whence we most confidently pronounce: this ought to be done, that ought not; this is true, this is just, this is right, that is perverse and distorted. For that justice which we contemplate in saying this, and by whose light shining upon us we thus discern concerning individual acts, is immutable and eternal, and therefore presides above our minds as mutable."⁴⁷ Thus Jansenius there.

§ 19. But hold — whither do you rush headlong, Jansenius? You slay yourself with your own sword. For if to every being endowed with reason that first and eternal truth, which is God Himself, shines forth, and whoever knows that some good is to be done or some evil is to be avoided contemplates it; then assuredly, if he avoids evil or pursues and chooses the good which he knows in this light, because it is good to adhere to and acquiesce in the illuminating truth, that man beyond doubt loves this truth, loves this rectitude — inasmuch as he chooses it by no other motive than for this reason, because it is right. Since, then, this truth is God, what prevents us from saying that he loves God with that love which is altogether of grace and rests in God alone? But then again — even the Gentiles were able to do many good things for this reason alone, because they were good, the light of the first truth displaying this to them, by which light a man perceives the goodness and malice of an act. What then — can a man rise, without faith, to so great a work as to love God with that love by which he pursues God Himself, which — according to the principles of Jansenius — is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us? These things Jansenius does not say, but they follow from what he does say. And if Jansenius should say that one destitute of faith does not know that the truth which he contemplates, and in which he perceives the goodness of an action, is God, and therefore does not yet perceive that that work is to be referred to Him as to the ultimate end — which surely, with faith possessed, which works through love, both we know and we do — it is easy to reply that this is said gratuitously and without any foundation: for it is imperceptible that some object should be present to the intellect, that the intellect should look upon it, think about it, and yet not know it; for things become present to the mind by cognition, by thought, by perception. How, therefore, can it be that this first truth is represented to the intellect, that the intellect gazes upon it, thinks about it, and yet does not perceive it?

§ 20. Furthermore, whoever, having perceived the goodness of an action, performs it because he has come to know that it is good, therefore performs it because it is good, because it is right; therefore he loves goodness, he pursues goodness, he is borne toward goodness — or justice, rectitude, or truth. But God Himself is truth, is rectitude, is justice, which man contemplates and on account of which he acts; therefore it seems to follow that this agent, though not reflexively, is at least directly borne toward God Himself, loves Him, wills Him. Moreover, he who acts not only because he sees that the work is good, but because he knows that an eternal punishment has been threatened to those who omit such a work — which he has imbibed through the teaching of faith; to such a one God is certainly known through that same illuminating faith. If, therefore, this man, driven by fear of punishment in order to avoid it, pursues a good work, we ask: does that man act from love of God? By no means, Jansenius will reply. But why not? Since that man chooses the goodness of the

action in order to avoid eternal punishments — and to flee evil is good, just as it is also to consult one's own salvation, and this in an orderly fashion, as Jansenius himself acknowledges — he must therefore perceive in that eternal rectitude the goodness or rectitude of this flight from evil; and thus, in choosing the flight from evil because it is good, he chooses goodness, and hence loves it. But this rectitude, which dictates that it is good to consult one's own self, is God Himself; for it is the immutable and eternal rectitude which is always true. Therefore, in choosing the flight from evil and the pursuit of good, he pursues God Himself, he chooses God Himself. These matters ought to be pursued at greater length; but the time and occasion does not demand this spectacle: let what has been said suffice for the present, chiefly because from these considerations the incoherence of Jansenian doctrine becomes sufficiently and more than sufficiently clear.

§ 21. Let us now pursue the remaining corollaries of Jansenius. After having set forth that root of his position (in the aforesaid chapter 2), he immediately in chapter 3 strives to prove that virtue is nothing other than love of God; and in chapter 4 he teaches that the four virtues which Theologians call the Cardinal Virtues are a fourfold love of God — which he also proves of the other moral virtues, and specifically of the virtue of Religion (chapter 5). In chapters 6 and 7 he is wholly occupied with proving that Faith is nothing other than love of God — Christian Faith, that is, by which man submits and subjects himself to God revealing — and that it proceeds from love; and that that love from which Faith arises is an imperfect charity, namely that by which God is not yet loved above all things, but yet freely and because it is good to adhere to God. This he establishes expressly in chapter 7; and he pursues the same at very great length concerning Hope (chapters 8, 9, 10). But in chapter 11 he begins to explain in what sense it is to be understood when the Second Council of Orange, the Council of Trent, and St. Augustine say that a work is done as it ought to be (*sicut oportet*). In order to explain this, he recounts several opinions of the Scholastics which, after either wholly rejecting them or demonstrating in his own judgment that they are not sufficiently consistent with the principles of St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and the Councils of the Church, he immediately pronounces as from the tripod:⁴⁸ "I say, therefore, that in the doctrine of St. Augustine for a good work to be done as it ought to be is nothing other than for it to be performed as it must be performed, so that the work be truly right and good. But this very thing is nothing other than for the work to be performed"

§ VIII — On the system of Jansenius and his followers concerning the nature of servile fear, and whatever in that system is at variance with sound and Catholic doctrine (In qua Systema Jansenii, & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, & quidquid eo in systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum, sit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, & auctoritate ac ratione probatur, demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

§ 22. — not from love of penalty but from love of justice; that is to say, in such a manner that justice itself, as the thing to be done according to the law, is loved, in the sense in which we have explained that love of justice from his own words. For such love of justice is nothing other than the love by which God is freely loved — He who is not to be placed and loved in the heart after the manner of an idol, but as justice itself and equity and truth and wisdom. Then, at page 228, col. 1, near the end of that same chapter 11 of Book V, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, after having heaped together very many sentences of St. Augustine, he finally draws this

conclusion:⁴⁹ "From all of which it is sufficiently clearly gathered that a good work, done as it ought to be done, is nothing other than a work done in the manner in which it ought to be done, both as regards the duty and as regards the end, so as to be a good work, not a bad one. For this it is necessary not only that the duty which we perform be good, but also the end for which we perform it. That end, moreover, is none other than justice, or the true God, to be loved freely with true charity out of faith."

§ 23. And at chapter 12, on the same page 228, col. 1, in which he boasts of showing that the Scholastic Doctors greatly err concerning works which are done, or not done, as they ought to be done,⁵⁰ he treats the sayings of the ancient Scholastics with contempt and thrusts upon them, as it were, a new theology unknown to the earlier theologians — yet one which he glories in having drawn chiefly from the writings of the Fathers, and above all of St. Augustine; as though Jansenius alone had been so perspicacious as to discern in the books of the Fathers and in the definitions of the Councils what the other theologians, groping in blindness, could not perceive. Therefore he begins the aforesaid chapter thus: "Hence it can now easily appear how fabricated is what certain persons wish to impose upon St. Augustine — namely, that a good work is not done as it ought to be done because it is not supernatural; whereas, on the contrary, it ought to be supernatural so that it may be done as it ought. The reason, indeed, why a work of grace surpasses nature is that it is impossible that the legitimate end of a good work (that is, God and justice, without which it cannot even be morally good) should be reached unless by true love; and it is likewise impossible that this love should be possessed without the aid of grace. For concerning this condition of the work — that it be required to be supernatural, as though there were some works that were good in a non-supernatural manner — there is no mention in the entirety of Augustine's writings, or those of the earlier writers; but it has been introduced by the Scholastics, because it served for promoting their opinions under the name of Augustine."

§ 24. Is it now sufficiently clear that for Jansenius a good work and a supernatural work are one and the same thing? Jansenius, to be sure, is in harmony with his master Michael Baius, and, though condemned by the supreme Pontiffs, peddles the same condemned theses of Baius as Catholic axioms. Does he not adhere to Baius, who holds that glory corresponds to a good work, or that a good work merits eternal life, for the reason that by its own nature it is meritorious of eternal life?⁵¹ And likewise who asserts that those who live justly and righteously in this mortal life until the end, so as to attain eternal life, should attribute that not properly to the grace of God but to the natural ordinance immediately established at creation by God's just judgment; and that in this retribution of goods no reference is had to the merit of Christ, but only to the first institution of the human race, in which by natural law it was established, by God's just judgment, that eternal life be rendered to obedience to the commandments? Or who asserts that the good works done by the children of adoption do not receive the formal character (*ratio*) of merit from the fact that they are done through the Spirit of adoption dwelling in the hearts of the children of God, but only from the fact that they are conformed to the law and that the obedience rendered through them is obedience to the law? Or who affirms that the formal character of merit does not consist in the fact that he who works well has grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit, but solely in the fact that he obeys the divine law? Or who considers fabricated and deserving to be rejected the distinction of the Doctors that the precepts of the divine law can be fulfilled in two ways — one way as to the mere substance of the works commanded, and another as to a certain particular mode, namely that mode according to which they are able to lead the worker to the Eternal Kingdom (that is, the meritorious mode)? Or finally who says that the distinction must be rejected by which a work is said to be good in a twofold way — either because it is right and good in regard to its object and all its circumstances (which they are accustomed to call morally good), or because it is meritorious of the eternal Kingdom,

inasmuch as it is performed by a living member of Christ through the Spirit of charity? Without doubt, since the aforesaid propositions are theses II, XI, XV, XIII, LXI, and LXII among the Baian ones struck with anathema by the supreme Pontiffs.⁵²

§ 25. But whoever acknowledges no good work except a supernatural one, and asserts it to be supernatural for this reason — because it is a good work, and therefore that the grace of Jesus Christ is required, because man fallen from his integrity cannot rise to any good work whatever without the grace of Jesus Christ — attributes the merit to the work itself, and not to the principle from which the work proceeds; that is, he ascribes the merit not to grace, nor to the work done from grace, but to the work itself because it is good; although he does say that a good work cannot exist in the present state of fallen nature without the aid of divine grace, and for this reason, namely, that human free choice, weakened by the fall of the first man, cannot love God — though in his view, if it had not lost its integrity, it could have loved God naturally with charity properly so called. That these are the principles of Jansenian doctrine is sufficiently and more than sufficiently clear, both from the things we have reported and from others which Jansenius has elsewhere, chiefly in the books *De Statu Puræ Naturæ*, as we noted in the Appendix to the first volume.⁵³ It is evident, therefore, that Jansenius yields to the Baian doctrine in the condemned theses enumerated above.

§ 26. Now we frankly confess that we do not sufficiently understand what Jansenius means when in the aforesaid passages he demands charity (*caritas*) towards God as a prerequisite for any act whatever of virtue; since at one time he says that this charity is that love (*dilectio*) which is inspired in us and poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit; at another time he says that by the name of that charity is to be understood the beginning of a good will loving justice, in which it takes delight; at another time he says it is the will of acting for the sake of justice, which the will exclusively has in view in acting, as is apparent from the words of his which we transcribed above. More fully do those things show this which he has in the same Book V, chapter 2, page 210, col. 2,⁵⁴ where, speaking of this charity and love, he says: "Now it is clear of itself in what manner God works in us, through that grace of love by which charity is poured forth, or by which we love God, both to will and to perfect, or to will and to work. For He works through it the willing, when by infusing sweetness He causes justice to begin to please us, so that we begin to will it. For this very first desire, or will of the good, is nothing other than the first justice and the inchoate love, however slender; and this is nothing other than inchoate charity."

§ 27. But so that you may see how obscure and nearly imperceptible this doctrine of Jansenius is, do not be reluctant to read the words which he has in the same Book V, chapter 3, page 212, col. 2;⁵⁵ where, after having declared and established as a principle of St. Augustine that for exercising the duty of inchoate, advanced, and perfect virtue it is necessary to apply the mind to immutable rules, in which it sees what is to be pursued and done, and to love and follow them, he immediately adds: "These rules, however, and as it were lights of the virtues, immutable and sempiternal, are none other than the eternal law which shines in the eternal truth of God itself; in loving which one loves nothing other than God himself, or his immutable truth and justice, from which it flows, and in whose refulgence of light there shines whatever we approve or do as just and right."

§ 28. We should be excessively tedious and would fatigue our readers overmuch if we were to review or transcribe the rest of what Jansenius has (both in the aforesaid Book V and elsewhere) on this subject. From what we have reported up to this point, however, no one of sound mind fails to see that Jansenius is stuck in deep water and entangled in such a manner that he is utterly unable to extricate himself from it. Therefore, we

must recall what we said above when we refuted that same doctrine of Jansenius as incoherent. Nevertheless it is our intention to add certain things from which the reason of our argument may emerge more clearly. What these things are, receive in a few words.

§ 29. If it is established for Jansenius that the mind tending toward incorruptible rules, which show it the formal character of the right, and following them, being touched by delight in them, and therefore pursuing, loving, undertaking, and executing a work which, in the refulgence of that supreme light, it recognizes as right — is virtuous, a lover of God, and therefore ablaze with charity towards God; since from the same Jansenius both in this book and elsewhere such a light shines upon all — what reason is there why we should not say that any pagan, or heathen, or idolater, while he does some good work because he knows it to be good, is touched by love of God and loves God? For while he attends to truth — which truth is God himself — and works from truth, he certainly loves it; for he could not work from truth without loving truth: therefore he loves God, and indeed explicitly (*explicite*), not merely implicitly (*implicite*) as theologians commonly say — and as we ourselves have explained sufficiently from St. Thomas in the Appendix to the first volume.⁵⁶ Now who would not shudder at this paradox? These conclusions certainly press hard upon Jansenius; indeed even some of his adherents rightly recognize this, and therefore they abandon him on this point; namely, they say that the truth which the impious attain is not the primary truth, that is, God himself, but a particular and created truth, which exists in the intellect itself and which the intellect knows by participation in uncreated light. But of these things enough.

§ 30. The root of his doctrine Jansenius himself expounds at the end of chapter 2 of that same Book V, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, pages 210–211, col. 2 and 1, in these words:⁵⁷ "But if anyone wishes to know the first root of these heads of doctrine, namely why the grace alone by which love of God is breathed into us, or by which charity is poured forth in our hearts, is that grace of willing and working which was asserted by the Scriptures against the Pelagians by St. Augustine and the Councils, let him recall those principles concerning original punishments and free choice which we have set down as immovable from St. Augustine in our treatises on those subjects. For since the rational creature is necessarily inclined by its will as by a weight toward something, it is necessary that one of two things be that in which the voluntary motion comes to rest: either the Creator, or the creature; either the World, or God. For under the World is comprehended everything that is created and distinct from God. This principle is in itself manifest and of certain truth. And of no less undoubted certainty is that other principle, that if the will comes to rest in a creature to be loved, the love is vicious, reprehensible, and therefore culpable — the fountain, tinder, and root of all sins. For that is the vicious cupidity (*cupiditas*) which is mastered in all sins; to which charity alone towards God is contrary. Absolutely no middle ground between these two is given, or can be given."

§ 31. That this doctrine was transmitted elsewhere by Jansenius we noted in the Appendix to the first volume at the passages cited;⁵⁸ and we there indicated that it was refuted and proscribed by the supreme Pontiffs: the Holy Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Alexander VIII.⁵⁹ We have reviewed it again here so that what we are about to say presently from the same Jansenius concerning fear may emerge more clearly — namely, so that it may become plain on what foundation rests what Jansenius holds concerning fear of Gehenna, or servile fear.

§ 32. Moreover, it must not be passed over in silence that Jansenius obliterates and destroys all virtues by one and the same sponge, both as regards their habits and as regards their proper acts elicited from them (as they say), and that no virtue other than charity alone is recognized by him as a virtue. Hear his own words

from chapter 4 of the same Book V, page 216, col. 1:⁶⁰ "Hence, indeed, the more intelligent reader will perceive how constant and settled in St. Augustine is that doctrine" (namely the doctrine by which every virtue besides charity is dismissed, which he imputes to St. Augustine himself) — "which he asserts with such great insistence against the Manichees. From this too it is not obscurely evident that it is entirely in vain to seek, with the Scholastics, other moral virtues besides charity, by which charity is aided in the offices of temperance and fortitude and similar virtues. For, as we have seen from St. Augustine and as daily experience evidently proves, by the very fact that someone loves something strongly, it necessarily comes about that he not only spurns and endures both flatteries and pains, but also despises them with the magnanimity of his very love." And a little later: "The love of God alone, therefore, is that which restrains the mind from the desires and lusts that oppose the love of God, the love that bears pains bravely. And if from the very passions there arises from their restraint a readiness and facility of restraining them again, this is no virtue at all, but merely good habit, which cannot attain to the height of virtue, can be absent in the presence of virtue, and can remain when virtue is destroyed."

§ 33. Good God! What sort of monstrosity is this! How could Jansenius have written these things and not have stood in awe of the schools of the philosophers and theologians — not even of St. Thomas himself, whom he invokes so often in his work? He does adduce certain passages of St. Augustine in that place, which our design and the brevity of time in no way allow us to examine here; but we can certainly testify that, having recalled them to examination once, twice, and three times with close attention, we could not perceive that anything of the sort is there asserted by St. Augustine. St. Augustine's single intention is that love, as the principal affection of the soul, so pervades all the other affections that, under its governance, the soul now experiences one affection, now another, and accordingly, depending on the various movements of love, is now inclined toward the works of these virtues, now toward those of others. If anyone wishes to recognize the falsity of the Jansenian position, let him have recourse to St. Thomas — both in the *Quaestiones Disputatae De Virtutibus in Communi*, the unique question, and above all in the *Summa Theologica* from question 58 through question 67 of the first part of the second part, and especially question 65, and in the second part of the second part, question 23, article 7.⁶¹

§ 34. But as to where Jansenius places faith and hope, and whether he expunges them also from the register of the virtues — from the portions of his Book V (chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X) it seems he would wish to say that faith and hope are nothing other than charity; because if what he has in the chapters just cited is compared with what he has in the five preceding chapters, it will be not obscurely apparent that Jansenius reduces the moral virtues — and likewise the theological virtues, faith and hope — to the single virtue of charity. Lest you think we are falsely proclaiming this and wish to fasten so great a calumny upon Jansenius, we exhibit to you even the slightest specimen, faithfully transcribed in his own words. These are from chapter VI of the same book, page 217, col. 2:⁶² "A fifth most certain principle in St. Augustine is that no precept can be fulfilled by a man unless justice is loved, as we have now shown this many times and from many passages of St. Augustine. Therefore neither can the precept of believing God and hoping in God be fulfilled without the love of justice. For justice and equity and sempiternal rectitude are proposed no less in the precept of believing and hoping than in any other precept whatever. But justice cannot be loved without true and properly so called charity, as we have also shown many times already; therefore the precept of faith and hope cannot be kept without that same charity. Hence come those general pronouncements of St. Augustine about the observance of any law whatever, whether of faith, or of hope, or of temperance, or of justice, or of fortitude." And at chapter 7, where he expressly teaches that this love from which faith is born is imperfect

charity, at page 218, col. 2, after having discoursed on the manifold senses in which charity can be taken, and having explained that it is sometimes taken for the love by which God is truly, sincerely, and freely loved from the soul for his own sake, with regard to no creature but himself alone — though it does not attain to that perfection by which God is loved above all created things, but rests in a lower and simpler affection; and sometimes for that same love which reaches the perfection by which God is loved above all things — speaking of that love of friendship not distorted by any perversion of concupiscence reflected back upon oneself, he pronounces thus:⁶³ "Such love of God, therefore, unless it bends the will of man to believing, will not be Christian faith, but either that of the demons from fear of punishment, or carnal faith from love of the world; neither is that faith from which we are called the faithful. For that faith arises indeed from a certain imperfect charity" — so that the human intellect is humbly submitted to the authority of God and is made captive in obedience to Christ." Whether these assertions of Jansenius tend to the conclusion that faith and hope are nothing other than the charity of God submitting the intellect to the words revealed by Him (which would be the office of faith) and filling the soul so that it may be borne toward God and may desire and seek Him (which would be the office of hope) — this we leave to others to judge. Certainly Jansenius says not dissimilar things about the moral virtues, from which he concludes: "It is entirely in vain to seek, with the Scholastics, other moral virtues besides charity."

§ 35. At this point it would be the moment to treat of the chief foundation of this doctrine — indeed of Jansenius's entire system — namely, of that celebrated pronouncement or Jansenian axiom, repeated six hundred times in his work, chiefly in Book 4, *De Gratia Christi*, in many places, by which he asserts or endeavors to assert that we necessarily act according to what pleases us more (*secundum id quod amplius nos delectat*); an axiom which he also attributes to St. Augustine without any distinction, in such a way as to signify that the holy Doctor by the name of *delectatio* understood not love or desire or choice, but a certain pleasure and sweetness which, filling the soul, makes it necessarily embrace this or that in proportion as it gives delight. But since there are numberless authors who discuss this matter and who reject the Jansenian pronouncement from the testimonies of St. Augustine, and since our discourse would be prolonged too greatly, we restrain our hand and proceed to what Jansenius teaches concerning servile fear.

§ 36. We have already indicated to some extent in the Appendix to the first volume, at number 3, what Jansenius thinks concerning servile fear; and this can sufficiently appear from his dogmas reviewed above — namely, that Jansenius sends servile fear far away from the virtues. For since he recognizes no other virtue than charity, nor any other virtuous act than one elicited under the impulse of love of God, it is most certain that according to his principles servile fear does not put on the person of a virtue; and therefore it is not to be ascribed to the grace of Christ, nor is it supernatural. For Jansenius, as we have already stated, most explicitly acknowledges and proves that the grace of Jesus Christ is given and is necessary only for works done from love. But Jansenius himself also expressly draws out these consequences in the same Book V, from chapter XIII, where he treats of fear of Gehenna.⁶⁴

§ VIII (continued) — On the system of Jansenius and his followers concerning the nature of servile fear (In qua Systema Jansenii, & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur)

§ 37. [Continuing from the Appendix to the first volume, and having erred likewise in the remaining chapters there cited touching this question of Fear — owing, that is, to a defect of the codex we were using, for we did not at that time attend to the sequence of the chapters] — Jansenius sets forth, explicates, and considers himself to have proved and demonstrated his teaching right through to the very last chapter of that book. In chapter XIII, indeed, he proves that fear of Gehenna, considered in itself, is lawful, good, and right, adducing testimonies from the Council of Trent and from St. Augustine.⁶⁵ In chapter XIV he argues that fear of punishment is an external beginning of wisdom (*initium sapientiae*), which is excluded by wisdom itself, that is, by charity (*charitas*). Hence, at page 231, col. 2, he asserts that those who think the fear of punishment, with which God threatens sinners, is by no means excluded by charity, depart from the mind of St. Augustine — and in the margin Bellarmine is cited.⁶⁶

§ 38. Here we must pause for a moment and examine of what charity Jansenius speaks when he says that fear is excluded by charity. The passages of St. Augustine which he cites in that place seem to prove only this: namely, that from perfect charity — that is, from an intense and ardent charity by which a man is so borne toward God that he seems nearly forgetful of himself — the act of fear is excluded. For when the just burn with love of God, the force of that love so sweeps them toward God that at times they explicitly and so firmly resolve never to displease God, that they even propose to themselves that, even were no punishment to exist, they would in no way transgress His commandments, since those commandments are His. Jansenius, however, speaks so generally that he seems to say that fear of punishments is excluded by any charity whatsoever, whether perfect or imperfect — that is, whether it is a charity that loves God above all things, or one that is, as he himself says, of a simpler and lower degree of affection — whether intense or remiss. For since, in Jansenius's view, every love of justice is charity, if fear of punishments is, according to his mind, excluded by charity, it follows consistently with his own principles that any love of justice whatsoever, by which justice is loved for its own sake, expels fear — and indeed, as regards the habit (*habitus*), not merely as regards the act (*actus*).

§ 39. Now this assertion appears to coincide with the first of the propositions condemned by Innocent XII from the book published in the French tongue by François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai — a proposition condemned by Innocent in the following terms: "There is a habitual state of love of God which is pure charity and without any admixture of a motive of self-interest. Fear of punishments and desire of rewards have no further part in it. God is loved no more for the sake of merit, nor for the sake of perfection, nor for the sake of the happiness to be found in loving Him" — to which accords the second among those same condemned propositions, which runs thus: "In the state of contemplative or unitive life, every interested motive of fear and of hope is lost."⁶⁷

§ 40. Whether Jansenius admits initial fear (*timor initialis*) — that is, the fear by which punishment is feared and God is loved; or, as St. Thomas says, by which the evil of punishment and the evil of fault are feared — we confess ourselves unable to determine: for he speaks with such intricacy that we have been unable to extract anything certain from what he says on the matter.⁶⁸ Yet since he says that fear of punishments — under which name he includes also Gehenna — is excluded by charity, it seems to follow that he does not

acknowledge initial fear; for in this, both fault and punishment are feared, as St. Thomas states. Let us, however, hear St. Thomas himself speaking on this question in the already-cited article.⁶⁹

§ 41. To that article St. Thomas prefixes this title: "Whether servile fear remains together with charity." In the *Sed contra* of the argument he writes thus: "But on the contrary, servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as has been said above. But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not removed by the advent of charity, through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Therefore, with the advent of charity, servile fear is not removed." He then replies to the question as proposed, saying: "that servile fear arises from self-love (*amor sui*), because it is fear of punishment, which is a deprivation of one's own good. Hence in this manner fear of punishment can coexist with charity, just as self-love can. For it belongs to the same formal character (*ratio*) that a man should desire his own good and that he should fear to be deprived of it. Now self-love can stand in three relationships to charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, according as someone places his end in love of his own good. In another way it is included within charity, according as a man loves himself for God's sake and in God. In a third way it is indeed distinct from charity, but not contrary to it: as when someone loves himself according to the formal character of his own good, yet does not place his end therein. Just as also towards one's neighbour there can be some special affection on account of the love of charity, which is founded on God, while the neighbour is loved by reason of utility, consanguinity, or some other human condition, which nevertheless is referable to charity (*referibilis ad charitatem* — note: referable to charity, says St. Thomas, not actually referred to charity). So therefore also fear of punishment is included in one manner within charity. For to be separated from God is a certain punishment which charity most especially flees. Hence this pertains to chaste fear (*timor castus*). But in another manner it is contrary to charity, according as someone flees a punishment contrary to his natural good as the principal evil contrary to the good which is loved as an end; and thus fear of punishment does not coexist with charity. In yet another manner, fear of punishment is indeed distinct as to substance from chaste fear, because the man fears the penal evil not by reason of separation from God, but inasmuch as it is harmful to his own good, and yet his end is not placed in that good, nor accordingly is that evil dreaded as the principal evil. And such fear of punishment can coexist with charity. But this fear of punishment is not said to be servile except when punishment is dreaded as the principal evil. And therefore fear, insofar as it is servile, does not remain with charity. But the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, just as self-love can remain with charity."⁷⁰ These are the words of St. Thomas.

§ 42. I ask: are these things which St. Thomas teaches in the aforesaid article conformable to those which we have set forth from Jansenius? By no means: they are as far apart as heaven from earth. And yet Jansenius, more than once in that Book V, appeals to St. Thomas, to whom he even wishes to attribute his own opinion, as we shall see below.

§ 43. But let us now engage Jansenius directly at close quarters. Tell me, Jansenius — can that act which is in accordance with reason, both honourable and referable to God, coexist with charity? No one could deny this without rashness and indeed error. You yourself, Jansenius, in the same Book V, chapter XIII, when you begin to treat of Fear, assert as known by the natural light and beyond all doubt that a man who is just can desire what is honourably good, provided, however, that it be referred to the ultimate end. Yet you also assert that the fear of punishment, by which a man consulting for his own salvation flees it and shrinks back, is referable to God. How then do you afterwards say that fear of punishments is excluded by charity? Cannot this fear be referred by one who possesses charity to the glory of God? Cannot it be taken up as an efficacious means for curbing concupiscence, lest it exert its forces and hurl the soul headlong into vices, and be expressed

in the words of the Prophet: "Pierce my flesh with thy fear" (Ps. 118:120)? Why therefore do you so absolutely, so roundly, and with no qualification attached, say that fear of punishments is excluded even by true wisdom — that is, by charity? Certainly, when we examine more carefully what you have written about fear of punishments being excluded by charity, not a single word of any such qualification occurs. You perhaps supposed that from what you had said in chapter XIII this qualification could easily be deduced by any reader. But where the matter demanded it, and the integrity of the doctrine required it, this inference ought to have been noted, or at least hinted at.

§ 44. Indeed, you frequently heap up many things, and although they have been repeated and introduced very many times, you do not scruple to repeat and introduce them again and again. But to repeat that qualification was not much conducive to the doctrine you were then establishing; you were tending toward something quite different, and therefore you judged that no mention of this matter was to be made. But whither do we stray? Back from the digression to the main road.

§ 45. Furthermore, since Jansenius says that fear of punishment is excluded by wisdom, the logic of his own position demanded that he should banish such fear to the supernatural order and reduce it to the order of natural affections, excluding it from the effects of the Grace of Jesus Christ. Hence in chapter XV he says that fear arises from a certain general grace (*gratia generalis*), not from that which is properly called the Grace of Christ. Jansenius indeed admits that fear of punishment is infused by God; that it is the same spirit of fear by which the Jews served God as their Lord, and the spirit of love by which sons cry out to God as their Father; and although he says that the former belongs to the Old Testament and the latter to the New, he does not hesitate to declare that both are given and received from God, and he supports that assertion with many testimonies from St. Augustine. But when he explains that general grace from which he had said fear of punishment arises, he represents it in such a way as to make it nothing more than a certain external, or even internal, providence, operation, gifts, and grace, and in the end reduces it recklessly to the natural order. We refrain from transcribing Jansenius's words at length. Let it suffice, then, to set down only what he has at the very end of that chapter XV, page 237, col. 1, in which the sum of the entire chapter is contained. "Hence it also comes about," he says, "that according to Augustine, whoever fulfils the precepts of justice out of fear of the threatening Divine law does so not from the Grace of God, but is judged to fulfil them from his own powers — namely, because, although both the law and the threatening of punishments are from God, yet they assist in no other way than by providing knowledge; and when that knowledge has been received, if someone is struck with fear, he does whatever he does by the forces of his own will."⁷¹

§ 46. Then in chapter XVI he reduces even the fear of Gehenna to this same natural order, as is sufficiently clear from the very title of the chapter, which he prefixes thus: "An objection is met; it is shown that the same formal character (*ratio*) holds concerning any fear of punishments and of Gehenna: it arises from love of the creature and of self." He declares this still more fully in chapter XVII, namely on the ground that fear of punishment produces the justice arising from the law, and our justice not from God; and indeed in chapter XXVI he shows more amply, as he himself says from St. Augustine, that fear of punishment and a work done from that very fear are not from the Grace of Christ but from the powers of nature, given faith. Wherefore in chapter XIX he strives to prove that from pure fear of punishment one cannot so flee sin as to incur no sin from any other source; which he also expressly teaches in chapter XX concerning the fear of Gehenna. But in chapters XXI, XXII, and XXIII he puts forward three roots of this teaching. The first: because he who flees sin from bare fear of punishment flees it unwillingly and with a resisting spirit, and accordingly flees not sin

but something else entirely. The second: because fear of punishment cannot change an evil will. The third: because fear of punishment, divorced from love of justice, arises from self-love insofar as it rests ultimately in the creature. This justice arising from fear of punishment he then endeavours in chapter XXIV to show is the justice of the law and our own, which the Apostle counted as loss and dung (Phil. 3:7–8). Finally, in chapters XXV and XXVI, he does not hesitate to assert that it greatly contradicts St. Augustine to teach that sorrow for sin out of fear of Gehenna — that is, attrition — as the Scholastics of a certain school define it, can exclude every will to sin and contain the proposal of a good life or of observing the whole law of God, and likewise that it is a sufficient disposition for justification together with the Sacrament — and that this teaching manifestly contradicts the Council of Trent in many places.

§ 47. Now from these chapters of Jansenian doctrine reviewed above, three things are gathered. First, that there is a distinction between the New and the Old Testament, and a very great difference — namely, that the Old Testament was entirely under fear, and accordingly excluded from the Grace of Christ, which according to Jansenius is given only for the inspiring of love. Second, that fear of Gehenna is not supernatural, is not inspired by the Grace of Christ, and is not pure from every stain of sin. Third, that flight from sin, the fulfilment of a precept, and indeed also penitence arising from fear of Gehenna, are not free from sin and are vitiated, not merely non-supernatural. Now as regards the first point, we would have much to say in order to show that the difference which Jansenius posits between the Jewish and the Christian covenant, and which Pasquier Quesnel endeavoured to renew in his theses condemned by Our Lord Clement XI — which, among the other propositions of that author, are the 6th, 7th, 8th, 63rd, 64th, and 65th, which we transcribed in the annotation to Distinction XXXIX, § IV — is entirely fictitious, approved by none of the ancients, especially not by St. Augustine and by St. Thomas.⁷² But we are too much constrained and pressed by such straitness of time that it is in no way possible for us to treat this matter as it deserves. Let studious readers have recourse to those authors who have written against Pasquier Quesnel, especially Father Gregory Selleri, Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace and our teacher, in his work against the Quesnellian theses, vol. 1, on propositions VI and VII, where he adduces in the greatest abundance the clearest passages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, which utterly refute this fiction;⁷³ and Father De la Fontaine of the Society of Jesus in his work entitled *Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Clementis Papae XI Constitutio Unigenitus Theologice propugnata*.⁷⁴

§ 48. As regards the second head, whereby it is asserted that the fear of Gehenna, though presupposing Faith, is not supernatural, and insofar as it is elicited by a man destitute of charity is vitiated and defiled — first of all, the condemnation of two theses, among others condemned by Alexander VIII, must be kept before our eyes — namely these: "Fear of Gehenna is not supernatural"; and "Attrition which is conceived from fear of Gehenna and of punishments, without a love of benevolence towards God for His own sake, is not a good motion and not supernatural" — which are the very assertions of Jansenius, as is plain to any attentive reader.⁷⁵

§ 49. Thereafter we cannot sufficiently marvel by what thought this opinion could have entered the mind of Jansenius after such clear definitions of the Council of Trent and the innumerable testimonies of the ancient Fathers, who say expressly that fear of punishments, of Gehenna, and of the Divine judgment is infused by God, is a gift of His grace, that it is to be attributed to His grace that a sinner dreads the extreme day of judgment and is restrained by fear of Gehenna — and other things of this kind. Testimonies of this sort from Scripture and the Fathers are exhibited in great abundance by polemical writers; or at the single author Bellarmine, in his work *De Paenitentia*, Book II, chapter XVII, so many and such clear ones are extant that for anyone it might suffice merely to have read him.⁷⁶

§ 50. Certainly St. Thomas, in the passages cited in the Appendix to the first volume, manifestly teaches that fear is from the Holy Spirit, that it disposes and prepares a man for wisdom and charity, and itself removes him from sin; and those things which St. Thomas attributes to the impulse and motion of the Holy Spirit must, according to the principles of his doctrine, be said to be from the Grace of Christ and supernatural. For St. Thomas denies that servile fear is to be numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit — that is, among those gifts which are listed in Is. 11 — yet he acknowledges both there and in article 4 of the same question and elsewhere that that fear is from the Holy Spirit.⁷⁷ Now in the doctrine of St. Thomas it is unheard of that something donated by the Holy Spirit should not be of the supernatural order.

§ 51. Moreover, there are not wanting eminent Doctors who reckon this fear among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as Alexander of Hales in the third part of his *Summa Theologiae*,⁷⁸ and St. Bonaventure in the third book of the *Sentences*.⁷⁹ That this same opinion also pleased St. Augustine and was handed down by him in several places, especially in Tract 9 on the First Epistle of John and in Book I of the *Sermon on the Mount*, chapter 9; and likewise by St. Gregory in Homily 19 on Ezekiel — Cardinal Bellarmine affirms in the aforesaid work.⁸⁰

§ 52. But setting aside this question — whether or not the fear of Gehenna is to be reckoned among those seven gifts of the Holy Spirit — it must not in the least be doubted by all Catholics, by the Fathers, and by the Scholastic Doctors, as expressly taught by Scripture and handed down, that fear is from the Holy Spirit, is excited in us by the impulse of the Holy Spirit, is donated by God, and accordingly is to be attributed to the Grace of Jesus Christ our Saviour, and is supernatural. From the innumerable testimonies of the Ancients which could here be adduced, we shall set forth the definitions of two only of the Councils confirmed by the Apostolic See and received by the universal consent of the Church. The first is the Second Council of Orange, canons 4, 5, 6, and 7.⁸¹ By these canons the Council defines that in order that we may be purged from sin our will must be prepared by God; that the beginning of Faith is not from us but from the Grace of God; that it is the effect of God's grace that we believe, will, desire, endeavour, labour, watch, study, pray, seek the mercy of God; that in order that we may be able to do all these things as we ought, the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit are required; that by the powers of Nature we cannot so much as think or choose anything good that pertains to salvation without Grace. Canon 4 says: "If anyone maintains that, in order that we may be purged from sin, our will awaits the cooperation of God, but does not also confess that the will to be purged is wrought in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Spirit himself, who through Solomon says" (Prov. 19:8 according to the Septuagint) "'the will is prepared by the Lord,' and the Apostle who preacheth to our profit: 'It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish according to His good will' (Phil. 2:13)." And canon 7: "If anyone says that by the force of Nature he can think any good thing that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient, or choose it, or consent to salutary — that is, Evangelical — preaching, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is deceived by the heretical spirit." The Council of Orange plainly speaks in these canons of the Grace of Jesus Christ proper — no one can doubt it; yet the Council expressly teaches that Grace and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit are required so that a man may prepare himself and dispose himself for any work of salvation whatsoever, or even think it as is expedient — namely, think it so as to be led to detestation of sin.

§ VIII — On the System of Jansenius and His Followers Concerning the Nature of Servile Fear (In qua Systema Jansenii, & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, & quidquid eo in systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum sit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, & auctoritate ac ratione probatur, demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

§ 53. — and that its operation comes about in order that we may be purged from sin by the Holy Spirit, and that the things which dispose toward penance and justification are gifts of the grace of Jesus Christ as intended by the Council — while the fear of Gehenna is so efficacious as to draw a man back from sin, Jansenius himself confesses it to be a preparation for penance, and the holy Fathers hand it down with unanimous consent, and it is clearly defined by the Council of Trent, as we shall say below. Therefore, in the mind of the Second Council of Orange,⁸² the fear of Gehenna is to be reckoned supernatural and to be counted among the gifts of the grace of Jesus Christ — as is most clearly established. And if you attend to the Scriptures, you will see this same thing confirmed by the testimony of God. For the Apostle says, "Without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11),⁸³ which is likewise said of fear in Sir. 1: "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Furthermore, we say together with the Fathers and the Council that faith disposes toward justification because it is the beginning of righteousness and of salvation; while of fear the Prophet says it is the beginning of wisdom (*Psal.* 110)⁸⁴ and Solomon likewise (*Prov.* 1).⁸⁵ On the interpretation of this passage one must consult St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, Book I, ch. 9,⁸⁶ where he understands that fear which is the beginning of wisdom to be servile fear (*timor servilis*); with whom nearly all the Fathers concur: St. Basil (in the *Oration on the Beginning of Proverbs*),⁸⁷ St. Gregory the Great (*Hom.* 19 in *Ezech.*),⁸⁸ Bede (in his *Commentary on the first chapter of Proverbs*),⁸⁹ St. Bernard (*Serm.* 23 in *Cant.*),⁹⁰ and not a few others. Moreover, faith disposes toward justification because through it we seek God and draw near to him; and that the same effect is wrought by fear is written in *Ps.* 82: "When he slew them, they sought him and returned, and came to him early in the morning," as the Prophet says there. Likewise (*Ps.* 82): "Fill their faces with shame, and they shall seek thy name, O Lord." And in *Jonah* 3, moved to fear by Jonas, the King and people of Nineveh returned to God.⁹¹ There is the further consideration that faith disposes and prepares for justification because through it Christ is formed in us, as is said (*Gal.* 4); but of fear Isaiah writes (*ch.* 26), according to the Septuagint version: "From thy fear, O Lord, we have conceived and have brought forth the spirit of salvation." Again, faith prepares for justification because the just man lives by faith (*Hab.* 2); but of fear it is written (*Prov.* 14): "The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life." Finally, faith is the beginning of righteousness because it purges sins, as the Apostle testifies (*Acts* 23; *Rom.* 3; *Gal.* 3, and elsewhere);⁹² but the Scriptures likewise expressly teach the same of fear. For indeed, does not Jansenius himself confess that the heart of a man is so shaken by fear of punishments that, through desire of righteousness, it flees to the Lord in order to be purged from its sins? Since, following St. Augustine, he asserts that a man shaken by fear, when he sees himself powerless to extricate himself from his sins, ought to flee to the Lord and pray to him — the man therefore conceives from fear of Gehenna, through faith instilled in him, at least the desire to purge himself from sins. But according to the Council of Orange (*can.* 4), as we just reported, it is by the infusion of the Holy Spirit that a man is moved to will to be purged from sins.⁹³ It is therefore clear that the fear of Gehenna, inasmuch as it moves the will to desire liberation from sin, is a supernatural motion and an effect of the Holy

Spirit, presupposing not only the grace by which the mind is illumined through faith, but also the assistance by which the will is moved to the act of willing and to the desire for purification from sin. These considerations, unless our own opinion deceives us, utterly overthrow Jansenius. But what more is needed?

§ 54. The Council of Trent removes all doubt, however much Jansenius may resist and deny it: for (sess. 6, ch. 6) it expressly teaches that fear of divine justice is the second disposition toward justification, saying: "They are disposed toward that righteousness itself when, being excited and aided by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised, and above all that the ungodly man is justified by God through his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, converting themselves to a consideration of the mercy of God, from the fear of divine justice by which they are profitably shaken, they are raised up to hope."⁹⁴ We do not fail to notice that Jansenius uses this very passage to prove that the Council of Trent teaches that love of God is the proximate disposition toward justification even in the Sacrament; for the Council is there treating of the righteousness to be obtained through Baptism, whose ultimate preparation it declares to be that love by which sinners begin to love God as the fount of all righteousness, and are therefore moved against sins. But at the moment our question is not whether attrition from fear of Gehenna is a sufficient disposition together with the Sacrament of Penance for righteousness; for on this we shall perhaps note what seems opportune below (in the fourth book). Our contention against Jansenius is only this: that fear of punishment is supernatural, inasmuch as it is at least a remote disposition toward righteousness — which the testimony of Trent adduced above irrefutably proves.

§ 55. The same Council intimates the same in canon 8 of the same session, saying: "If anyone shall say that the fear of Gehenna, by which, grieving for our sins, we flee to the mercy of God, or by which we abstain from sin, makes sin or sinners worse, let him be anathema."⁹⁵ Do you not see from this canon of the Council the very thing we were saying confirmed: namely, that from the shaking of the heart wrought by fear a man readily flees to the mercy of God and abstains from sin? But that motion impelling a man to flee to the mercy of God — indeed even to grieve and to abstain from sin — how a man who is Catholic and deeply versed in the writings of Augustine, such as Jansenius must be reckoned, could have believed it not to be from the Holy Spirit supernaturally moving, we simply cannot comprehend. And this especially, because Jansenius himself (in the last chapter of his Book V), where he treats of the fruits of fear, acknowledges this fruit of fear and expressly asserts it: namely, that sinners, "while they vehemently fear the punishments which God threatens to transgressors of the law, pressed and constrained by fear, flee as suppliants to the mercy of God, so that, with heavenly assistance sent to them for fulfilling the law, they may be freed from the threatened punishment." Behold, then, Jansenius himself confessing that the sinner, terrified by the threat of punishment, has recourse to God's assistance in order to fulfill the law and to be freed from punishment — why, then, is not that fear supernatural by which a man, driven to avoid punishment, prays to God to obtain his assistance? Certainly that which, in Jansenius's own hypothesis, impels, solicits, and moves this man to pray to God is the desire for immunity from punishment; therefore this desire is from God through the Holy Spirit moving him, not indeed dwelling in him, but merely moving him. For who does not here see that fear — the fear of faith — moves the man toward God his liberator so that God, sending heavenly assistance, may free him from punishment? And who will deny that the motion of faith is supernatural? And — to increase the wonder — Jansenius cites in the same place the testimony of St. Augustine, whose words it is worth transcribing here, so that it may also appear thereby that the very testimonies of St. Augustine which he adduces to defend his position actually refute his own opinion. The passage is from *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 10 (num. 16), in the

Benedictine edition, tom. 10:⁹⁶ "Let them," he says, "as the pile of the prohibition and the accumulation of transgression has begun to grow, flee through faith that justifies and through the gift of the Spirit, delighting in the sweetness of righteousness, so as to escape the punishment that the letter threatens." What could be clearer?

§ 56. But the Council of Trent furnishes us with an argument still clearer (sess. 14, ch. 4),⁹⁷ where expounding the doctrine of contrition and speaking of imperfect contrition, which theologians commonly call attrition (*attritio*), it says: "That imperfect contrition which is called attrition (*attritio*), since it is commonly conceived either from the consideration of the foulness of sin or from the fear of Gehenna and of punishments — if it excludes the will to sin along with hope of pardon — the holy Synod declares not only does it not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but that it is even a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling in the soul, but only moving it, by whose aid the penitent prepares himself to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of Penance." Say, if you please: does the Council of Trent, by the name of a gift and impulse of the Holy Spirit, understand some grace of the natural order, or some special providence, whether internal or external, not exceeding the order of Nature — or rather a supernatural grace? Who so raves as to think that in this passage the Council of Trent spoke of Natural Grace and not of supernatural grace given through Jesus Christ? But the Council of Trent speaks of fear arising from fear of Gehenna, and declares it, provided only that it attains to excluding the will to sin and encompasses hope of pardon, to be a gift of the Holy Spirit. Why, then, does Jansenius resist? The same Council defines its doctrine (sess. 6, can. 5) and proposes it to be embraced by all the faithful, and strikes those who refuse with anathema: "If anyone shall say that the contrition which is prepared by examination and detestation of sins — whereby one reflects upon one's years in the bitterness of one's soul, pondering the gravity, the multitude, the foulness of one's sins, the loss of eternal beatitude and the incurring of eternal damnation — together with a purpose of amendment of life, is not a true and useful sorrow, nor one that prepares for grace, but makes a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner; and finally that it is a forced and not a free and voluntary sorrow — let him be anathema."⁹⁸

§ 57. By these definitions of Trent the matter seems settled. But what will not a mind pre-occupied by prejudice dare? Jansenius uses this same doctrine of Trent to prove his own position — namely, that the contrition of which the Council speaks is that which is formed by charity (*charitate formata*), or arises from charity; and he does not doubt that this is supernatural and leads to justification. For the Council of Trent, says Jansenius, speaks of that contrition which contains "a vehement hatred and detestation of past sin"; for it had premised that this contrition has been necessary at all times for the obtaining of the pardon of sins; and after setting forth its other properties, immediately adds that this contrition is sometimes perfect through charity, and reconciles a man to God before the actual reception of the Sacrament. By these words, says Jansenius, the Council of Trent indicates that contrition is often not perfect through charity before the Sacrament — and this, he continues, for no other reason than that there is a certain contrition in the true sense of the name and formal character (*rationis, & essentiae*) which nonetheless suffices for acquiring justification only together with the Sacrament. That is to say, in the Jansenian sense, there is a certain contrition that is formed by charity but does not proceed from perfect charity; and so, if we believe Jansenius, the phrase "perfect through charity" (*charitate perfectam*) is understood by the Council of Trent to mean an intense charity, a vehement charity, a perfect charity. But in the system of Jansenius, that charity is perfect which loves God above all things. Therefore when the Council of Trent in the following words speaks of imperfect contrition, it must be understood to speak of that contrition which comes from a charity that does

not love God above all things; and this contrition, by Jansenius's own concession, is declared by the Council of Trent to be a sufficient disposition toward justification together with the Sacrament. Jansenius is therefore driven to admit that a man can be justified with the Sacrament even though he does not yet love God above all things. This certainly follows from Jansenius's own explanation — but Jansenius does not admit it; nor do those Doctors who require an incipient love of God as a prerequisite for justification even when obtained with the Sacrament. But let us set these matters aside.

§ 58. Who revealed to Jansenius this sense of Trent, that by the phrase "perfect through charity" (*charitate perfecta*) is to be understood an intense and vehement charity? For if the Council of Trent had wished to convey this, it would not have said contrition *perfect through charity* (*contritio charitate perfecta*), but contrition *perfected from charity* (*contritio ex charitate perfecta*); but when it says *contrition perfect through charity*, it joins the word "perfect" with the word "contrition" — and the sense is that contrition is perfect when it proceeds from charity, or when it is perfected by charity, to use the language of the theologians, that is, when it is formed by charity (*charitate formatur*). Namely, when charity is added to contrition, then contrition is formed and perfect; but when it is destitute of charity, then it is, as it were, formless and imperfect — just as faith without charity is formless faith (*fides informis*), and faith having charity joined to it is formed faith (*fides formata*); as St. Thomas speaks also of the other virtues.⁹⁹

§ 59. But let us now examine the doctrine of Jansenius more closely. Jansenius says (ch. 26 of Book V, p. 249–250, col. 2 and 1)¹⁰⁰ that when the Council of Trent uses the name of that imperfect contrition which it also calls attrition, it understands a contrition in the true and proper sense and formal character (*veri nominis, & rationis*); for he says the Council premised this, namely that there is a certain contrition perfect through charity which suffices for justification even before the Sacrament, in order thereafter to explain what that imperfect contrition was which it also calls attrition, and which together with the Sacrament leads to justification. And what is this attrition, or imperfect contrition, according to the Council of Trent as interpreted by Cornelius Jansenius? "Behold," he says, immediately subjoining: "That imperfect contrition, which is called attrition, etc." — and although without the Sacrament of penance it cannot of itself lead to justification, yet it disposes the man to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of penance. Trent therefore signifies, says Jansenius, that this attrition is a contrition of the true name and formal character, but, as it names it, imperfect — that is to say, a contrition proceeding from charity, and not a contrition conceived from fear of Gehenna.

§ 60. Good God! Where in the world are we? Was Jansenius writing for the illiterate, for those unable to read? The Council of Trent in that passage proposes the distinction between attrition and contrition, that is, between perfect and imperfect contrition, which is called attrition; it therefore speaks of that imperfect contrition which the theologians understood by the name of attrition. But at that time, and even now, theologians commonly understand by the name of attrition that sorrow which is conceived indeed from a supernatural motive, but from a motive other than that of charity; indeed most commonly and in ordinary parlance, the sorrow conceived from fear of Gehenna and of punishments. Therefore it is of this that the Council of Trent speaks. But what need do we have of witnesses? Trent itself says in the most express words, and signifies that it speaks of contrition arising from fear of Gehenna or from the foulness of sin; and of the motive of the love of God it says not a word: "That imperfect contrition which is called attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the foulness of sin or from fear of Gehenna and of punishments, if it excludes the will to sin, etc., declares it to be a gift of God, etc." Here the Council of Trent

speaks of attrition conceived from fear of Gehenna and defines it to be a gift of God. Why, then, does Jansenius have recourse to these subtleties and circumlocutions? They are sophisms and hair-splittings. Trent proposes a doctrine of faith to be understood and embraced by all. And who, attending to the words of the Council of Trent, does not conceive that opinion — that the Council speaks of attrition from fear of Gehenna, and not of attrition or contrition from the motive of charity? For the Council of Trent opposes this imperfect contrition to that perfect contrition of which it had spoken before. Certainly this interpretation which Jansenius employs is not anywhere reported as having been proposed by even a single word among the Fathers of the Council, as the most eminent author of the history of Trent, Cardinal Pallavicino, attests. For he says (lib. 12, ch. 10)¹⁰¹ that that decree was changed into the form in which it now reads, but for this reason: that Johannes Aemilianus of Todi had held the extreme of the opposing position, namely that perfect contrition was required; and he adds that the chapter was composed in other words in the assembly of the Fathers; but that thereafter, when the aforesaid Bishop pointed out that it was falsely stated that such sorrow could scarcely ever be conceived without love (for certain words had been placed in the prior form of the decree expressing this sense, as the same historian reports), and that the question whether this attrition suffices for the constitution of the Sacrament varies among authors, the decree was reformed into the form in which it now stands. So far, therefore, is the Council of Trent from understanding by the name of imperfect contrition a contrition proceeding from charity, that it rather reformed the prior decree precisely in order that it might be more clearly understood to speak of attrition destitute of charity. Whether indeed this attrition suffices together with the Sacrament for justification is another question, to be treated elsewhere. The arguments which Jansenius adds for confirming his interpretation, we shall weigh below when we presently treat of the third chapter of his doctrines.

§ 61. To the third chapter, therefore, which is the last of those previously enumerated — wherein it is asserted that flight from sin, the fulfillment of a precept, and even penance itself, if conceived from the fear of Gehenna alone, are vitiated — correspond the Quesnellian theses among those condemned by our Most Holy Lord Clement XI,¹⁰² namely theses 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, and 67, of which the first reads as follows: "If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more violent it is, the more it leads to despair." The second: "Fear does nothing but restrain the hand; but the heart is for so long addicted to sin as it is not led by the love of righteousness." The third: "He who refrains from evil only from fear of punishment commits it in his heart and is already guilty before God." The fourth: "The baptized person is still under the law like a Jew, if he does not fulfil the law, or fulfils it only from fear." The fifth: "Under the curse of the law there is never a good done, because to sin is one and the same whether evil is done or avoided only from fear." The sixth: "Moses, the Prophets, the Priests, and the Doctors of the law have died without having given any son to God, since they produced nothing but slaves through fear." The seventh: "He who desires to draw near to God ought not to come to him with brutal passions, nor to be led by natural instinct, nor by fear, as a beast, but by faith and by love, as sons." The eighth: "Servile fear does not represent God to itself except as a harsh, imperious, unjust, intractable lord."

§ 62. Furthermore, Jansenius pursues this opinion of his at length in the aforesaid Book V (from ch. 19), to which he prefixes this title: "From pure fear of punishment sin cannot be so fled that no other sin is incurred from another source" — through and throughout chapter 24. If we wished to set forth here, even in summary, all that Jansenius heaps up in these chapters to prove his position, we would, besides the tedium and weariness we would bring upon our readers, assuredly bring them no profit at all. It is therefore sufficient to review the principal headings, or, to speak more accurately, to recall them, since we have already indicated

them above. The first he develops in ch. 21, where, explaining the first root of his doctrine, he maintains that he who flees sin from bare fear of punishment flees it unwillingly and with his mind in resistance, and therefore does not flee sin but something else. Luther had proposed the same argument (in his *Sermon on Penance*, in the *Assertion of the Sixth Article*)¹⁰³ in order to prove that fear and dread even of Gehenna are pernicious and vitiated, and make a man a hypocrite — Luther being guided, of course, by this principle: that he who acts from fear still adheres to what he fears. However that may be, this is for Jansenius the prow and stern, the alpha and omega, of his argument for defending his assertion; and to give it firmness, after citing several holy Fathers and philosophers, he enlists St. Thomas as his ally, praising a passage from *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 7, ad 2,¹⁰⁴ where the holy Doctor concludes his reply as follows: "But the fearful man acts against what, even now, he wills in itself." For he had said at the beginning of the reply that in the man who acts from fear there remains a repugnance of the will toward what is done, considered in itself. From this assertion of St. Thomas, Jansenius principally constructs his argument for his own position: because, if the fearful man still retains a repugnance toward what he does from fear of punishment, as St. Thomas says, then it is universally true that whoever acts from fear acts unwillingly, and accordingly is still inclined toward the opposite of what he does, and is affected toward that opposite as toward his own good — from which it clearly follows that the man who flees sin or grieves over it

§ VIII — In which the System of Jansenius and his Followers concerning the Nature of Servile Fear is set forth, and whatever in that system is at variance with sound and Catholic doctrine is rejected by a brief and clear method, and is proved by authority and reason; and how far Jansenius's dogmas differ from others, and most especially from the Author himself, is demonstrated (In qua Systema Jansenii, & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, & quidquid eo in systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum, sit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, & auctoritate ac ratione probatur, & demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

§ 63. — not to hate sin out of fear of punishments, to cling to sin and still preserve the will to sin, and, while choosing the work enjoined by the precept only in order to avoid punishment, to conduct oneself in a disordered manner — for he uses the end as though it were a means — and therefore to sin in the very fulfilment of the precept. Jansenius, moreover, supposes that he has spoken elegantly and is in complete agreement with St. Thomas, whom he commends most highly in the aforementioned place.¹⁰⁵ But the boundaries of the Mysians and the Phrygians are distinct: Jansenius and St. Thomas are separated by the whole breadth of heaven. We do not, indeed, deny that St. Thomas, together with the Philosopher, maintained that actions performed through fear are mixed, consisting of the voluntary and the involuntary: for this is what St. Thomas (in the praised passage, article 6, in the body of the question), where he treats expressly whether fear causes the involuntary absolutely speaking, says — that what is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary, but becomes voluntary in the particular case, namely for the purpose of avoiding the evil that is feared.¹⁰⁶ But the words which the holy Doctor immediately subjoins in that same article 6 must be carefully noted: "But if anyone," he says, "rightly considers, actions of this kind are more

voluntary than involuntary. For they are voluntary absolutely speaking, yet involuntary in a qualified sense; for a thing is said to be simply what it is in act, and what is done through fear is in act not according to the involuntary, but according to the voluntary; and after a few words: Thus what is done through fear is voluntary in this respect, namely here and now, insofar as in this case it is a hindrance to the greater evil that was feared; just as the throwing of cargo into the sea is voluntary at the moment of the storm, on account of fear of the peril."¹⁰⁶ From these words of St. Thomas one can sufficiently gather that it is possible for someone driven by fear of punishment to choose voluntarily some work which he judges necessary to avoid the evil he fears. St. Thomas does not, however, deny that it can happen — and frequently does happen — that someone may be so disposed toward some object that is the cause of his evil as utterly to abominate it, especially if he sees the necessary connection between his evil, which he fears, and that deed from which the evil threatens. Such is the case of the sinner who fears Gehenna and, out of fear of Gehenna, shuns sin: for he knows, by divine revelation, that punishment — and indeed eternal punishment — will of necessity be joined to his sin unless he repents from the heart, and accordingly he regards sin as the cause of so great an evil to himself and therefore utterly detests and abhors it, indeed hates it as the cause of his evil. For when a man abstains from sin because he knows that the punishment of eternal torments has been imposed upon it, he does not on that account have a will or even an ineffectual volition to commit sin if the punishment were not feared. For what prevents a man from so hating the punishment of Hell that, out of fear of it, he recoils entirely from sin?

§ 64. We say nothing new. What? Is it something new in the teaching of the Fathers and the Theologians that the servility of fear can be separated from fear itself, so that a man fears punishment and, out of that fear of punishment, begins to perform the works of the law, and yet is not so disposed that, if there were no punishment, he would sin — but is so deterred by the punishment as to abominate sin, without any further reflection, as the cause of so great an evil? St. Augustine indeed says that a man must be questioned, when he says he fears Gehenna, whether he keeps this secret will in his heart, that he would wish to sin if God did not see: for the holy Doctor presupposes that the fear of punishment can rightly be coupled with no will to sin whatsoever, or with a nolition of sin. And he likewise supposes that it is possible for these two things to be conjoined: that someone is terrified by fear of punishment and at the same time has a will to sin if punishment were absent. Behold the words of St. Augustine (from Sermon 161, otherwise numbered 18, *On the Words of the Apostle*, ch. 8, num. 8):¹⁰⁷ "When the Lord has struck fear, and struck it vehemently, and by repeating the word has doubled the threat, shall I say to you: Do you fear amiss? These words I shall not say. Fear plainly — you fear nothing better; there is nothing you ought to fear more. But I ask you: if God did not see when you act, and no one would convict you at His judgment — would you then do it? Look at yourself. For you cannot answer to all my words; look into yourself. Would you do it? If you would, then you fear punishment; you do not yet love chastity; you do not yet have charity. You fear servilely; the dread is of evil, not yet the love of good. But nevertheless fear, so that this fear may guard you, so that it may lead you to love. For that fear by which you fear Gehenna, and on account of it do not do evil, restrains you; and so it does not allow the inner mind that wills to sin, etc." Do you not see from St. Augustine that someone can fear, and out of fear of punishment be unwilling to sin — or that someone can be so disposed that even in the absence of punishment he would not sin?

§ 65. Now moreover, if that fear of punishments, because it includes the will to sin, is evil and vicious — that is to say, if the act of fear itself is vicious (for Jansenius admits that fear is not vicious, but that the one who fears sins, or preserves the will to sin, which is the same as saying that the act of fear itself as elicited by the sinner, by reason of that circumstance, is vicious) — why does St. Augustine so frequently exhort men to the

fear of Gehenna? "Fear plainly," he says, "you fear nothing better"; and to him who fears servilely he does not hesitate to say: "But nevertheless fear, so that this fear may guard you, so that it may lead you to love." Was St. Augustine exhorting men to fear in the abstract, or to the act of fear to be elicited by the sinner whom he exhorts to fear? Certainly he was exhorting them to the eliciting of the act of fear. Was he therefore exhorting men to sin, urging them to guilt, preaching vice? Jansenius indeed says that even from sin one may licitly take occasion to work what is good, or even to repent; but will he say that one can exhort men to sin so that thence they may take occasion for repentance? By no means — for that person is not free from fault who so exhorts them. How then does St. Augustine exhort sinners to it? Away then with Jansenius, and let him at last cease to peddle his opinions as the doctrine of St. Augustine.

§ 66. Furthermore, St. Thomas is so far from believing that he who fears cannot cast away the will to sin and withdraw from sin, that he rather, concerning the Fear which is from God, expressly asserts the contrary in several places, which we have cited in the Appendix to the first volume.¹⁰⁸ Let us here adduce one, from *Summa theologiae* II-II, question 19, article 7,¹⁰⁹ where he inquires whether fear is the beginning of wisdom; to which question, replying, he says the following, speaking of the effect as beginning of wisdom: "but as regards the effect, it is the beginning of wisdom, whence wisdom begins to operate: and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom — servile fear, however, in one way, and filial fear in another. For servile fear is as a principle disposing from outside toward wisdom, inasmuch as someone through fear of punishment withdraws from sin" — (note: he says "withdraws from sin," not "does not commit sin"; but to withdraw from sin names an act of the will, whose flight from sin is called a withdrawal from sin) — "and is thereby made capable of the effect of wisdom: according to that of Sir. 1: 'The fear of the Lord driveth away sin.'" And in question 45, article 6, reply to the third objection, he says:¹¹⁰ "One must say that, as has already been stated, it belongs to wisdom as a gift not only to contemplate divine things, but also to regulate human actions. In this directing, the first thing that presents itself is the removal of evils that are contrary to wisdom. Hence fear is said to be the beginning of wisdom, inasmuch as it causes one to recede from evils." These things are clearer than that they could be denied.

§ 67. But the words of the Council of Trent, transcribed above (from Session 14, ch. 4),⁹⁷ must also be recalled here, where it says that that imperfect contrition which is called attrition, and which is commonly conceived out of fear of Gehenna and of punishments, if it excludes the will to sin together with hope of pardon, not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit. The Council of Trent therefore judges that exclusion of the will to sin can be conjoined with fear of punishment. You say that this argument is quite manifest? But Jansenius ridicules it: for he says (in the praised chapter 26)¹⁰⁵ that from the fact that the Council of Trent says that attrition, in order to exclude the will to sin — so as to be called a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit — it is clearly gathered from that passage that the Council of Trent is speaking of contrition from charity. But what would you do with a Belgian man of hardened mind, clinging so firmly to his own judgment that he can by no argument be moved from it? Surely it would be necessary to prove to Jansenius that the will to sin cannot be excluded except through contrition proceeding from charity, so that thence he might prove that the Council of Trent was speaking of that contrition. But he himself proceeds from the opposite direction and begs the question. For this is the question under debate: whether fear of punishment can exclude all will to sin; we, who defend the affirmative position, demonstrate clearly that this is judged by the Council. But Jansenius, because he thinks that the will to sin cannot be excluded by fear of punishment, wishes that the Council of

Trent was speaking of contrition from charity, because it speaks of that contrition which excludes the will to sin. Is not this a begging of the question? But we have already said too much.

§ 68. Concerning the second root which Jansenius adduces (ch. 22) in confirmation of his opinion — namely that fear of punishment cannot change an evil will, but only love of justice — a few things present themselves to be said. For that root coincides with the argument which Luther formerly objected in order to banish all fear from penance, to which objection Cardinal Bellarmine gives a satisfactory reply in the praised book 2, *De Paenitentia*, ch. 18,¹¹¹ to whom it suffices to refer the reader. The substance of the reply is this: that grief over sins on account of fear of punishment is not the perfect hatred of sins which follows from love of God and of justice; and that therefore grief or hatred conceived from fear of punishment is called not contrition but attrition by Catholics: yet it must be noted that something can be perfectly hated whose contrary was not previously loved, if we speak of those things which are hated for the sake of something else and not for their own sake — as is evident in the case of someone who detests a pleasant food, not because he loves its opposite, the unpleasant, but because he loves health, which the pleasant food is believed to harm. Hence it follows that a sinner can pursue sins with the most genuine and most vehement hatred, even if he by no means loves the virtues contrary to them, because he loves the happiness from which sin withdraws him.

§ 69. Jansenius says (ch. 24 of his Book V) that the third root of his dogma is that fear of punishment, separated from love of justice, is born from love of self insofar as one ultimately rests in the creature — namely, Jansenius thinks that the fear of punishment which is born from love of self, by which a man loves himself and rests in himself, but not as in an ultimate end, is vicious and evil, because, according to his principles, it does not flow from the source of all good things (namely charity) but from concupiscence, the root of all evils. How greatly Jansenius errs in this his doctrine — above all in what he says, that no work is good unless it be referred to God, actually or virtually, and indeed explicitly — we have shown abundantly enough in the Appendix to the first volume, adducing several passages of St. Thomas.¹¹² But here it must be noted that it is not universally true — as Jansenius pronounces — that every act proceeding from love of self is infected by the stain of vice, which it draws from concupiscence as from a source; since St. Thomas, in the passage cited above from *Summa theologiae* II-II, question 29, article 6,¹¹³ clearly asserts that someone can love himself according to the formal character (*ratio*) of his own proper good and yet not sin in this; indeed he clearly indicates that someone can so love his own proper good as nevertheless not to establish his ultimate end in it: just as also there can be toward one's neighbor some special love besides the love of charity which is founded in God, when the neighbor is loved on account of advantage, or on account of the bond of kinship, or of some other condition of human life — which love, however, is referable to charity. This doctrine St. Thomas applies in the same place to fear of punishment, which he says is distinguished according to substance from chaste fear: because, namely, a man fears the evil of punishment not by reason of separation from God, but insofar as it is harmful to his own proper good; nor yet is his end established in that good.

§ 70. It is evident therefore, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, that nothing prevents anyone from fearing, out of love of his own proper good, the evil contrary to that good, and yet not sinning in that act: since, according to the principles of St. Thomas, as is sufficiently clear from his words transcribed above, someone can love himself in such a way as to exclude positively the referral of his love to God; and again he can love himself as prescinding from that referral, even though he does not actually refer that love to God, yet does not positively exclude that referral. And in this manner loves himself he who grieves over sins out of fear of punishment — for he does not so fear his evil and desire his good that he would desire it against God's

precept, if the fear of punishment were absent. But in order that the doctrine of St. Thomas on love of self, insofar as it can be the cause of sin, may appear more clearly, behold his words from *Summa theologiae* I-II, question 77, article 4,¹¹⁴ where he inquires whether love of self is the principle of every sin, and replies to this question thus: "One must say that, as was said above (question 75, article 1), on the side of the turning toward a changeable good, from which side every act of sin proceeds from some disordered appetite for some temporal good — the fact that someone desires in a disordered way some temporal good proceeds from this: that he loves himself inordinately. For to love someone is to will good to him. Hence it is manifest that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin." But what St. Thomas understands by the name of inordinate love he explains in the replies to the objections: "To the first, one must say that natural love of self — which is due, namely such that it wills to itself the good that is fitting — is distinguished from inordinate love of self. But inordinate love of self, which leads to contempt of God, is posited as the cause of sin according to St. Augustine, Book 15 of *The City of God*, final chapter."¹¹⁵

§ 71. Indeed, more things, drawn from higher principles, would have to be set forth here in order for us to complete the task we have undertaken. But what we have said can suffice for beginners, for whom alone we write: indeed, from the passages of St. Thomas which we have cited, clear as they are, those who are attentive will easily be able to gather that the opinion of Jansenius is to be rejected. We have labored to the best of our ability — which we have perhaps also achieved — to show how flimsy are those props with which Jansenius defends his opinions. However this may be, we have written out of the devotion and reverence which we owe to the Holy Apostolic See, and out of the charity by which we are affected toward our neighbors — namely, toward Novices and Readers not yet refined by the study of theology — so that we might consult their interests; whom we earnestly pray once more to receive this our labor, such as it is, with fairness and goodwill.

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§ VIII — In which the system of Jansenius and his followers concerning the nature of servile fear is set forth, and whatever in that system is at variance with sound and Catholic doctrine is refuted by a brief and clear method, and is shown by authority and by reason how far Jansenius's dogmas differ both in general and most especially in this matter from the teaching of our Author (In qua Systema Jansenii & Sequacium De Natura Timoris Servilis proponitur, & quidquid eo in systemate utpote Sanae ac Catholicae Doctrinae dissonum, sit rejiciendum paucis ac clara Methodo edisseritur, & auctoritate ac ratione probatur, & demonstraturque proinde quantum ab Jansenii dogmatis tum in ceteris, tum potissimum hac in re distet Auctor)

§ 72. That this dissertation, prosecuted from Scripture alone, will seem to some superfluous, and indeed not unlikely to be so judged, is not improbable; for since the nature of servile fear has been so rightly, so lucidly, so distinctly, and so fully set forth by our Author in conformity with the Catholic Faith, whatever is added in this work is superfluous to say, and altogether vain to say. For indeed those who have a thorough view of the present state of the Church, and who contemplate it with a mature and serious reflection of mind, know full well how great controversies arise — in those matters touching Grace as much as in this matter of Fear — whenever Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, stirs them up, and how greatly he endeavoured, and by what effort, to establish and foster them, and to foster their promoters in his printing-house; he is indeed one who would counsel any good man to find such a labour, however modest, useful — if not necessary — in a matter so treacherous, especially in these times, on the occasion of these controversies, lest no few things be obscured

or confounded, and lest, for Catholics and the doctrines held by the Fathers, corrupted opinions, not corrupted by any preoccupied piety of mind, be embraced. We confess indeed that we have approached this province with a reluctant and unwilling spirit: for our powers are plainly insufficient, and, measuring our own ingenuousness and incapacity, we know ourselves to be unequal to so great a burden. It has come about that, thus comparably aided by Divine Grace, and acquiescing in the definitions of the Holy Apostolic See, we judge nothing further need be inquired into, whatever they have said — senseful Authors: that this is the firm and stable rock on which, leaning, the Church can be agitated, shaken, and shattered — never; for we believe with the whole heart, as we also confess with the mouth, that our faith was confirmed by blood or by the blood of the martyrs. Mindful as we are of the words of Jesus Christ our Saviour and Lord, by which he promised to the Apostle Peter's Chair constancy, firmness, and perseverance to the end of the age, we esteem it worthy to hold in contempt the voice of Peter, that is, of his Successors, and the sentence of his Roman Pontiffs — whatever the Heterodox bark, or (let it be said thus: something must be conceded to grief) however much certain men seduced, or at least drawn aside by partisan zeal, have written while clinging rather to their own judgement than to the First See of the Pontiffs; this we think justly to be set aside. For truly, since this burden is — though compelled by no small force — not without some reluctance borne by us, we have taken it up, in order to be useful to younger theologians who have read these Commentaries of our Author in a more genuine and true sense, and by what mediocrity of ours we can to counsel them; we have judged it proper to point out to them certain sights of Jansenians — which certainly, if they appeal more closely to the ship, they will elude her — and so we collimate, that we may show to novices and candidates of theology the arts and sophistries of the Jansenians, and just as we have shown in the Appendix to the first volume the entire Jansenian system *De Gratia*, so also in this Appendix to the Third Book we have added what we have adduced as hitherto one of the chief props of his Dogma — in order that Jansenius may be recognised, and at one glance, where sound doctrine agrees or disagrees.¹¹⁷

§ 73. *Admonitio* [Prefatory Notice]: That this work will seem to some superfluous, and not to be prosecuted except from Scripture alone — indeed not improbably, if one's judgement has been so formed — when, as regards the nature of servile fear, our Author has so rightly, so lucidly, so distinctly, and so amply set it forth in conformity with Catholic Faith, whatever is here added is superfluous to say. For those who have thoroughly perceived the present state of the Church, and contemplate it with a mature and serious reflection of mind, know how great controversies — as well in other matters touching Grace as also in this matter of Fear — Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, stirred up, and by how great effort he endeavoured to establish and foster them, and to foster their promoters: he is indeed such that he would counsel any good man to count that labour useful, and, if necessary, not weak in a matter so treacherous, and especially in these times, on the occasion of these controversies, lest not a few things, not obscured or confounded, be occupied; and, for Catholics and the doctrines of the Fathers, opinions not corrupted by preoccupied piety of mind be embraced.

§ 74. We confess indeed that we have approached this province with a reluctant and unwilling spirit: for our powers are plainly insufficient, and measuring our own ingenuousness and incapacity, we know ourselves unequal to so great a burden. It has come about that, thus comparably aided by Divine Grace, and acquiescing in the definitions of the Holy Apostolic See, we judge nothing further need be inquired, whatever the Authors have said: that this is the firm and stable rock on which, leaning, the Church can be agitated, shaken, shattered — never; for we believe with the whole heart, as we also confess with the mouth, that our faith is confirmed by the blood of martyrs. Mindful as we are of the words of Jesus Christ our Saviour and the words of the Divine

Lord, by which the constancy, firmness, and perseverance to the end of the age of the Apostle Peter's Chair are promised, we think it rightly worthy to hold in contempt — whatever the Heterodox bark, or however much certain men seduced, or at least drawn aside by partisan zeal, have written while clinging to their own judgement rather than to the First Pontifical See — to set this aside as justly deserving. For truly, since this burden is taken up though compelled by no small force, and not without some reluctance, we have taken it up in order to counsel younger theologians who have read these Commentaries of our Author in a more genuine sense, by such mediocrity as we can; we have judged it fitting to point out to them certain sophisms and arts of the Jansenians, which, if they appeal more closely, they will elude — and, having done so, we collimate, so as to show to novices and candidates of theology the techniques and sophistries of the Jansenians, and just as in the Appendix to the first volume we have shown the entire Jansenian system *De Gratia*, so also in this Appendix to the Third Book we have added what pertains to one of the chief props of his Dogma — so that Jansenius may be recognised at one glance where sound doctrine agrees or disagrees, is good or evil.¹¹⁸

§ 75. That this is so we assert with the most luminous testimonies of St. Augustine, — namely from Book I (*De Statu Naturae Purae*, ch. 8), "he who loves her [justice], loves nothing else but God himself." This Jansenius has just related. And lest it weary us to speak at length of what we indicated above in ch. 8 of Book I (*De Statu Purae Naturae*): from those things that are there more clearly apparent, the title which he inscribes there (*tom. 2, of his work, namely of St. Augustine, pag. 305*) evinces itself: "Justice, that is, as truth, goodness, and eternal law." At the opening of the chapter, when he had proposed that question: what that justice is which is set out as a contemplation of all things, without the love of which it is impossible for a voluntary act to be just or good, and whose love is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit by charity: he replies that it is nothing other than the truth of the eternal law, and the rectitude, the eternal law itself ever true with its justice, and the rectitude describing the rational creature, whatever is true, just, and right: "For this law of justice is nothing other than God, nor is God anything other than truth, and justice, and eternal rectitude; that very one which in this life we barely discern from obscure works" (what Jansenius wishes by these words — "we barely discern from obscure works" — a very keen defender of Jansenius confesses in a French Apology published under the title *Regulae boni sensus*, art. 14): "not only from Faith, but from the intuition of rational mind; ex qua funditus pronuntiamus, hoc debet fieri, illud non debet, hoc verum, hoc justum, hoc rectum est, illud perversum atque distortum. That justice, I say, which we grasp from this, and from whose light we so discern the individual works as commutable, and which is eternal, and therefore presides over our minds as immutable." So Jansenius.

§ 76. But where do you, Jansenius, hasten headlong? By your own sword you cut your own throat. For if to any one, endowed with the aforesaid first and eternal reason which God himself is, the knowledge of some good thing to be done, or some evil thing to be fled, can reach — provided that the good, which he discerns in this light, he follows, and, since it is the illumination of truth, he elects to adhere to and acquiesce in the truth — beyond all doubt he loves this truth, this rectitude; as one who does not act from another motive, unless because it is right action, and because it is the right good that he elects; since, therefore, this truth is God himself, what prevents us from saying that the Lord governs her by this love — the love which is altogether from grace, and rests in God alone? But the Gentiles also could do more things by good reason, because good things were, God showing in this light of the first truth the goodness which a man perceives and the malice of operations. What then? By this good faith alone can a man arise to so great a work as to love God with that love by which God himself, in Jansenius's principles, is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit? That, Jansenius does not say; but these follow from what he says. For if Jansenius said that one destitute of Faith

does not know that truth, and in what he perceives the goodness of the action — to be God — and therefore does not yet perceive God referred to in the ultimate end as that work — which certainly, given Faith, we both know and acknowledge, and which operates dilection — it is easily said, and to repose this gratis is easy indeed and without any foundation; for it is imperceptible that something is present to the intellect in its own object; to think about it, and for the mind to perceive it — for present things come to mind by cognition, by perception; who therefore can be brought about that that first truth be represented to the intellect, that the intellect intuit it, and that it think about it, and yet not perceive it? Then, whoever, perceiving the goodness of an action, operates it, because he recognises it to be good, operates it, because it is good, because it is right; therefore he loves the goodness, the goodness is sought, he is carried towards justice or rectitude, or truth — but God himself is truth, is rectitude, is justice, which he intuit, and for which and for the sake of which he operates: therefore it seems to result that this operator, albeit not reflexively, at least directly, is carried to God himself, loves God, wishes God.¹¹⁹

§ 77. But he now who operates — not because he sees the good to be the work, but because he knows that God has threatened eternal punishment to those omitting it; for this, evidently, faith shows him, and the same faith illustrates: if, therefore, this one, moved by fear of punishment, follows the good work, we ask whether this one operates from love of God? Jansenius will not at all concede this: but why not? When this one elects the goodness of the action, in order to avoid eternal punishments, which he knows — as being shown by faith — to be the same; if he, moved by fear of punishment, follows the good and elects it, we ask whether this one operates from love of God? Jansenius will not readily concede this. But why not? When he elects the goodness of the act so as to avoid the punishments — which are eternal — which are threatened, he already elects something of good; and so it does not constitute the end in this property of good. Just as also a neighbor can be a special object of charity (*dilectio*) founded in God, while the neighbor is loved on account of a commodious relation, of consanguinity, or of some other condition of the human condition, which nevertheless is referable to charity (*adscendo referibilis, ait Sanctus Thomas, non relata ad charitatem*); and so also the fear of punishment is included in one mode in charity (*charitas*). For to be separated from God is the punishment which charity most greatly flees. Hence this pertains to chaste fear. In another mode it is contrasted with charity, according as someone flees a punishment contrary to his good by nature, as the principal evil contrary to a good which he loves as an end; and so the fear of punishment is not with charity. In yet another mode the fear of punishment is distinguished, to be sure, from chaste fear, according to substance, because the man fears the penal evil, not by reason of separation from God, but inasmuch as it is harmful to his proper good; nor yet is the end of that good constituted in it, hence neither is that evil formulated as the principal evil. And such fear of punishment can be with charity. But that fear of punishment is not called servile, unless when punishment is feared as the principal evil. And therefore the fear, inasmuch as servile, cannot be with charity. But the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, just as the *amor sui* can remain with charity. These are St. Thomas's own words.¹²⁰

§ 78. These things, then, are those which St. Thomas hands down in the aforesaid article: are they in conformity with the things which, out of Jansenius, we set forth? Far from it — they are as far removed as the whole heaven. And yet Jansenius not once in Book V of St. Thomas appeals to him, and wishes to attribute to him the opinion, as we shall see below.

§ 79. Now let us deal more closely with Jansenius. We ask: is that act of his honest according to reason, and can it be said to consist with charity when he refers it to God? No, unless someone rashly and erroneously

should deny it. Even Jansenius himself (*in the same book V, cap. 13*) — where he proceeds to argue from the topic of impious beginners, acting as if by natural light, and that a good honest thing can be sought: provided, however, that it be referred to the ultimate end — even you yourself add: the fear of punishment, by which each one flees the eternal punishment and flees it, as if known from natural light, every honest good can be sought: provided, however, that it be referred to the ultimate end. And this you also add: the fear of punishment, by which each one flees for the sake of his own salvation and dreads it.¹²¹

INDEX OF THE DISTINCTIONS OF THE THIRD BOOK (*INDEX DISTINCTIONUM*)

§ 80. The following is the full Index of Distinctions of the Third Book of the Sentences, with the sections (*paragraphi*) pertaining to each:

IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI. § I. Whether there was in Christ a necessity of the aforesaid defects. § II. Whether Christ in mortal life was a wayfarer (*viator*) or a comprehensor (*comprehensor*).

IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII. § I. That there were several wills in Christ. § II. That the sensual will was in Christ. § III. That there was no contrariety of will in Christ. § IV. That every prayer of Christ was heard.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII. § I. When and how Christ merited. § II. What Christ merited for himself. § III. What goods Christ merited for us.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX. § I. That Christ fully satisfied for the sin of man. § II. That there was a full redemption of human nature through Christ. § III. Whether the redemption of Christ pertains to all men. § IV. That our satisfactions derogate from the satisfaction and redemption of Christ. § V. That the passion of Christ has the character (*ratio*) of a sacrifice. § VI. How Christ alone is our redeemer and mediator. § VII. According to which nature Christ is mediator.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XX. § I. Whether the human race could have been freed otherwise than by the death of Christ. § II. Why God willed the human race to be restored through the death of Christ. § III. Whether a pure man or an angel could have redeemed the human race. § IV. Whether the handing-over of Christ to death was good or evil.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI. § I. That in the death of Christ neither the soul nor the flesh was separated from the Word. § II. Reply to certain arguments to the contrary. § III. That it is truly and rightly said that the Son of God suffered and died.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII. § I. That Christ during the triduum of death was not a man. § II. That Christ according to his soul descended into hell. § III. What were the causes of Christ's descent into hell. § IV. Whether all or some were freed from purgatory. § V. Whether Christ as man is everywhere.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIII. § I. What are called the theological virtues. § II. What faith is. § III. How the definition of faith in the Apostle is to be understood. § IV. What, for what reason, and how we believe. § V. Whether there is faith in the demons. § VI. How believing God, believing in God, and believing of God differ. § VII. That faith can subsist without charity. § VIII. That the same faith is at one time formless (*informis*), at another time formed (*formata*). § IX. Whether formless faith is a virtue. § X. That even formless faith is a gift of God. § XI. By which part of the gifts of God faith belongs. § XII. That all have one and the same faith. § XIII. Whether faith in one article can be had without faith in another.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIV. § I. With what faith is concerned. § II. That faith belongs only to those things which are not seen. § III. Arguments to the contrary are dissolved.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXV. § I. That without the faith of the mediator no one could ever be saved. § II. Whose explicit faith is necessary for Christians. § III. To what extent certain ancients possessed a distinct faith in the mysteries. § IV. What faith in the mediator was necessary before the coming of Christ. § V. What was the faith of Cornelius before he heard the Gospel.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVI. § I. How hope is defined and what it regards. § II. Whether hope can subsist without charity. § III. How hope is called a certain expectation. § IV. That the hope of Christ does not have the security of salvation. § V. How hope is said to be from grace and at the same time from merits. § VI. Whether fear or hope ought to be greater in us. § VII. Whether hope is only of one's own goods. § VIII. Whether faith and hope were in Christ. § IX. In which, after this life, faith and hope survive.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVII. § I. How love (*amor*), affection (*dilectio*), and charity (*charitas*) differ. § II. That some love of God precedes the remission of sins. § III. That there is a certain love proper to the sons of God. § IV. By what modes charity is defined. § V. Whether there is one charity by which we love God and neighbour. § VI. That God has commanded man nothing impossible. § VII. Whether the precepts of charity are fulfilled in this life. § VIII. Reply to certain arguments of adversaries.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXVIII. § I. What things are to be loved with charity. § II. Who are comprehended under the name of neighbours. § III. To what extent evil men are to be loved by us.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX. § I. That in the order of love God is to be preferred to all other things. § II. That each one ought to love himself more than his neighbour. § III. Reply to what is objected in opposition. § IV. That relatives are to be loved before others, and in what order. § V. Solution of what seems to be contrary to the above teaching.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX. § I. That the love of enemies is in every case a matter of precept. § II. Solution of a certain doubt concerning the above. § III. Whether it is of greater merit to love a friend or an enemy.

§ I. [Beginning of the next numbered sequence within Distinctio XL]

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXI.¹²² § I. That charity once possessed can be lost. § II. Solution of what is objected against this. § III. That charity once lost can be recovered at any degree. § IV. Whether faith, hope, and charity remain in the world to come. § V. What was the order of charity in Christ as man.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXII.¹²³ § I. To what extent and in what degree God loves every creature.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIII.¹²⁴ § I. What the cardinal virtues are and their offices. § II. Whether the said virtues were in Christ, and whether they will remain in the blessed.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV.¹²⁵ § I. That the gifts of the Holy Spirit are seven. § II. Whether the gifts differ from the virtues. § III. To which virtues the individual gifts pertain. § IV. That the seven gifts were in Christ, and will remain in the blessed. § V. That a multiple fear is to be distinguished. § VI. Explanation of the distinction of initial fear from servile and filial. § VII. Whether servile fear is good and useful for justification. § VIII. Whether one who abstains from sin from fear alone sins. § IX. Whether the gift of fear was in Christ and remains in the blessed.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.¹²⁶ § I. How wisdom, knowledge, and understanding differ. § I. Whether all the virtues are connected with one another. § II. Determination of the question with solution of

arguments. § III. Whether all the virtues in the same person are equal. § IV. That vices are neither connected with one another nor equal.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.¹²⁷ § I. That all other things are contained in the two precepts of charity. § II. That the entire law of nature is contained in the Decalogue. § IV. That the precepts of the law of love of God and of justice are fulfilled. § V. How the ten precepts were distributed in two tablets. § VI. Explanation of that preamble: "I am the Lord your God." § VII. Declaration of the first part of the first precept. § IX. That the ceremonies of the Church are free from superstition. § X. Declaration of the latter part of the first precept. § XI. That the use of images among Christians does not conflict with the first precept. § XII. Explanation of the third precept. § XIII. On the institution of the Lord's Day and other feasts. § XIV. To what the faithful are bound on feast days. § XVI. On the promise annexed to this precept. § XVII. What things are to be recalled to this precept. § XVIII. What is forbidden by the fifth precept. § XIX. That it is lawful for no one to kill himself. § XX. That wars may be waged by Christian princes. § XXI. Whether any private person may kill an aggressor in his own defence. § XXII. Explanation of the sixth precept and what pertains thereto. § XXIII. That fornication together is a mortal sin. § XXIV. By which part of the Decalogue drunkenness is prohibited, and how grave a sin it is. § XXV. What the seventh precept prohibits and how far it extends. § XXVI. That usury is illicit and prohibited by every law.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII.¹²⁸ § I. What the eighth precept of the Decalogue prohibits. § II. That lying is of many kinds. § III. That every lie is a sin. § IV. That not every lie is a mortal sin. § V. Reply to what is objected in opposition.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVIII.¹²⁹ § I. What is the sense of the second precept and how widely it extends. § II. On various modes of oath and perjury. § III. To what extent an oath is lawful for a Christian. § IV. Solution of what is objected in opposition. § V. That an oath is to be exacted from one about to commit perjury. § VI. A note on swearing by false gods. § VII. To what extent swearing by creatures is lawful. § VIII. To what extent oaths are to be kept.

IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIX.¹³⁰ § I. Why the two last precepts were added to the preceding ones. § II. In what ways sins are committed against these two precepts. § III. That the two last precepts are distinct from one another. § IV. What is the difference between the old and the new law.

1. The passage cited is Deut. 5:21 (and Exod. 20:17), the Decalogue precepts concerning coveting; the opening words "nor his field, nor his servant" continue a quotation begun at the end of the preceding chunk.

2. The Septuagint rendering of Exod. 20:17 and Deut. 5:21; cf. also the Vulgate versions of the same.

3. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 5; and Session 14, canon 7.

4. Rom. 7:7 ("*Non concupisces*"); Rom. 13:9 ("*Nam non adulterabis, non occides, non furaberis, non falsum testimonium dices, non concupisces, et si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc verbo instauratur: Diliges proximum tuum*").

5. The argument draws on Rom. 7:7 and Rom. 13:9; Estius's point is that Paul's conflation of the two precepts into one phrase serves his rhetorical and doctrinal purpose rather than legislating on the precise enumeration of Decalogue precepts.

6. Exod. 20:17 and Deut. 5:21; reference also to the Septuagint rendering (*οἱ ἑβδομήκοντα ἑρμηνευταί*) of both passages.

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, qq. 106–107.

8. Jn. 1:17: "The law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ."

9. Heb. 3:3–8, where Moses is compared to Christ as servant to Son.
10. Rom. 3:20: "by the law is the knowledge of sin."
11. Rom. 7:7: "I did not know sin except through the law."
12. Rom. 2:18: the Jew instructed by the law "knowest his will, and approvest the more excellent things."
13. Rom. 8:15: "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons."
14. 2 Tim. 1:7: "For God hath not given us the spirit of fear: but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."
15. Heb. 2:15: "that he might deliver them, who through the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude."
16. Rom. 4:15: "For the law worketh wrath."
17. 2 Cor. 3:6–9, where Moses is called the minister of the letter that killeth, and of condemnation, while Christ's ministry is of the spirit and of justice.
18. 2 Cor. 3:6: "for the letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth."
19. Jer. 31:31–34, the prophecy of the new covenant.
20. Heb. 8:6–13, citing Jer. 31 and expounding the better testament.
21. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, chs. 25–26; *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, Quaestiones super Exodum, q. 166; *Quaestiones super Deuteronomium*, qq. 11 and 15; *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 25; *De Civitate Dei* XVI, ch. 26; *Contra duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* III, ch. 4 and following.
22. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, chs. 4, 5, 14; *De Doctrina Christiana* III, ch. 5; *Contra Faustum* XIV, ch. 18; *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, ch. 8; *Sermons on the Words of the Apostle*, Sermon 3; *Sermons De Tempore*, Sermon 81 (= Sermon CLXIII among the Sermons of St. Augustine in the Benedictine edition, which the Benedictines number among the spurious; it is Sermon 92 *De Tempore* in the old edition, and is drawn from Origen's homilies on Exodus, with certain words excepted, in the appendix to vol. V of the Works).
23. Lev. 26 (blessings and curses); Deut. 27–28 (blessings and curses of the covenant).
24. Heb. 8:6: "But now he hath obtained a better ministry, by how much also he is the mediator of a better testament, which is established upon better promises."
25. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, chs. 27–28; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 11; *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 30.
26. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Psalmum* 68, on the verse "They shall be blotted out of the book of the living."
27. Lk. 10:28: "Do this, and thou shalt live."
28. Jn. 5:39: "Search the Scriptures, for you think that in them you have eternal life."
29. 1 Tim. 4:8: "for bodily exercise is profitable to little: but godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come."
30. Mk. 10:29–30: the one who has left all things shall receive a hundredfold even now in this time.
31. This note in the source (*b*) refers the reader to propositions VI, VII, VIII, LXIII, LXIV, and LXV condemned from Jansenius's work, which the editors append to this third book, warning that these are to be held as proscribed theses and anathematised propositions.
32. The treatment of Sacraments is reserved to the next (fourth) book of the *Sentences*.
33. This paragraph serves as the Admonitio (prefatory notice) to the Appendix to Distinction 34, §VIII, concerning the Jansenian system on servile fear, with the condemned propositions VI, VII, VIII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV of Jansenius listed as anathematised theses; condemned also by Alexander VIII and other supreme pontiffs as noted in the Appendix to the first volume.
34. The Admonitio (prefatory notice) to the Appendix to Distinction 34, § VIII. The editors identify the work of Cornelius Jansenius (1585–1638), Bishop of Ypres, whose posthumous *Augustinus* (Louvain, 1640) is the subject of this entire appendix. The propositions condemned from Jansenius's work — including propositions VI, VII, VIII, LXIII, LXIV, and LXV — are those censured by Pope Innocent X (*Cum occasione*, 1653) and Pope Alexander VIII, as noted in the Appendix to the first volume.

35. Cf. the Appendix to Volume 1, number 2, where Estius (or his editors) had treated the foundational Jansenian-Baianist thesis of the two principles of human actions — concupiscence and love of God.
36. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V: *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, De Effectibus Gratiae Christi*. Paris edition of 1641.
37. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V, ch. 1, p. 203, col. 1, Paris edition of 1641.
38. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V, ch. 1 [end], p. 208, col. 2, Paris edition of 1641.
39. Council of Carthage (also cited as Council of Milevis), Canon IV (or V): "Quisquis dixerit Gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere, aut quid vitare debeamus, et quod faciendum cognovimus, etiam facere diligamus, atque valeamus, anathema sit."
40. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V, ch. 1, p. 208, col. 2.
41. The continuation of the Carthaginian/Milevitan Canon, as quoted by Jansenius; cf. 1 Cor. 8:1 ("knowledge puffs up"); Rom. 5:5 ("Charity is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit"); Ps. 93:10 ("who teaches man knowledge").
42. Reference to Estius's own commentary, In II Sent., Distinction 26, where the Catholic-Pelagian dispute over grace is treated.
43. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V, ch. 2, p. 205, col. 1, Paris edition of 1641.
44. Jansenius, *Augustinus*: Book 3, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, ch. 16, p. 217; Book 4, chs. 1–2, pp. 228, 230–231; ch. 8, p. 246; ch. 17, p. 265; Book 1, *De Statu Naturae Purae*, chs. 4, 5, and following. Paris edition of 1641.
45. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. II (*Augustini* text), p. 305: ch. 8 of Book 1, *De Statu Naturae Purae*, entitled *Justitia illa, Deus est, sicut veritas, bonitas, & lex aeterna*.
46. Reference to an anonymous French pamphlet published in defence of Jansenius, entitled *Règle du bon sens*, article 14; the author is described as a very keen apologist of Jansenius ("acerrimus Apologista Jansenii").
47. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. II, p. 305, col. 1–2 (Book 1, *De Statu Naturae Purae*, ch. 8).
48. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V, ch. 11, p. 226, col. 1. The phrase "as from the tripod" (*tamquam ex tripode*) refers to pronouncing with oracular authority, as the Delphic Pythia from her tripod.
49. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 11, p. 228, col. 1 (Paris edition of 1641).
50. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 12, p. 228, col. 1.
51. The condemned theses of Michael Baius (Michel de Bay) are here at issue. The propositions enumerated correspond to Baian theses II, XI, XV, XIII, LXI, and LXII, condemned by Pope St. Pius V in the bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567) and subsequently reaffirmed.
52. The condemned Baian propositions (theses II, XI, XV, XIII, LXI, and LXII) as anathematized by the supreme Pontiffs. See the bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* of Pius V, and subsequent condemnations by Gregory XIII and Alexander VIII.
53. Estius's own Appendix to Book I (the first volume), where the Jansenian doctrine concerning the state of pure nature is examined; cf. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. II (*De Statu Naturae Purae*), chs. 4–5 and following, and Vol. III (*De Statu Naturae Lapsae*), Book 3, ch. 16, and Book 4, chs. 1–2, 8, 17.
54. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 2, p. 210, col. 2.
55. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 3, p. 212, col. 2.
56. Estius's own Appendix to the first volume, where the question of explicit and implicit love of God in the act of the virtues is discussed with reference to St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II.
57. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 2 (final section), pp. 210–211, col. 2 and col. 1.
58. Estius, Appendix to the first volume, at the passages there cited.
59. The doctrine was condemned: by Pope St. Pius V, in the bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567); by Gregory XIII, confirming the same; and by Alexander VIII, in the decree *Cum occasione* or related documents. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, was also condemned by Urban VIII and Innocent X.
60. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 4, p. 216, col. 1.

61. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Virtutibus in Communi*, q. unica; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, qq. 58–67 (especially q. 65); *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 7.
62. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 6, p. 217, col. 2.
63. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 7, p. 218, col. 2.
64. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 13 and following, on fear of Gehenna.
65. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 13; Council of Trent cited therein; St. Augustine cited therein.
66. St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Paenitentia*, Book II, ch. 17 (cited in Jansenius's margin).
67. Innocent XII, condemnation of the propositions of François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai, propositions 1 and 2, from the work published in French. Confirmed by papal authority.
68. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 2.
69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 6.
70. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 6, *corpus articuli* and *Sed contra*.
71. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Vol. III, Book V (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 15, p. 237, col. 1.
72. The propositions of Pasquier Quesnel condemned by Clement XI are the 6th, 7th, 8th, 63rd, 64th, and 65th; transcribed in Estius's annotation to Distinction XXXIX, § IV.
73. Father Gregory Selleri, O.P., Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace, *Opus contra theses Quesnellianas*, vol. 1, on propositions VI and VII.
74. Father De la Fontaine, S.J., *Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Clementis Papae XI Constitutio Unigenitus Theologice propugnata*.
75. Alexander VIII, condemned propositions: "Fear of Gehenna is not supernatural" (*Timor gehennae non est supernaturalis*); "Attrition which is conceived from fear of Gehenna and of punishments without a love of benevolence towards God for His own sake is not a good motion and not supernatural" (*Attritio quae gehennae poenarumque metu concipitur sine dilectione benevolentiae Dei propter se non est bonus motus ac supernaturalis*).
76. St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Paenitentia*, Book II, ch. 17.
77. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 9; q. 19, a. 4; and the passages cited in the Appendix to the first volume.
78. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologiae*, Part III, q. 76, member 2.
79. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 34, part 2, a. 1, q. 1.
80. St. Augustine, *Tractatus IX in Epistolam Primam Ioannis*; St. Augustine, *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte*, Book I, ch. 9; St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Hom. 19; Cardinal Bellarmine, *De Paenitentia*, Book II, ch. 7.
81. Second Council of Orange (529), canons 4, 5, 6, and 7; confirmed by the Apostolic See and received by the common consent of the Church. Canon 4 citing Prov. 19:8 (LXX) and Phil. 2:13; Canon 7 on the necessity of illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit for any salutary act.
82. Second Council of Orange, canons 4, 5, 6, and 7; confirmed by the Apostolic See and received by the common consent of the Church.
83. Heb. 11:6.
84. Ps. 110 (111):10.
85. Prov. 1:7.
86. St. Augustine, *De Sermonibus Domini in Monte*, Book I, ch. 9.
87. St. Basil, *Oration on the Beginning of Proverbs*.
88. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Hom. 19.
89. Bede, *Commentary on the first chapter of Proverbs*.
90. St. Bernard, *In Canticum Canticorum*, Sermon 23.

91. Jon. 3.
92. Acts 23; Rom. 3; Gal. 3.
93. Second Council of Orange, can. 4 (citing Prov. 19 LXX and Phil. 2:13).
94. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.
95. Council of Trent, Session 6, can. 8.
96. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 10, num. 16; in the Benedictine edition, tom. 10.
97. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 4.
98. Council of Trent, Session 6, can. 5.
99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 8.
100. Cornelius Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book V, ch. 26, p. 249–250, col. 2 and 1.
101. Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, *Historia Concilii Tridentini*, lib. 12, ch. 10.
102. Pope Clement XI, *Unigenitus* (1713); condemned Quesnellian theses 60–67.
103. Luther, *Sermo de Paenitentia; Assertio Articuli Sexti*.
104. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 7, ad 2.
105. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book V, ch. 26.
106. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 6, in corpore.
107. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 161 (otherwise numbered 18), *De Verbis Apostoli*, ch. 8, num. 8.
108. Estius, Appendix to the first volume, various passages from St. Thomas there cited.
109. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 7.
110. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 45, a. 6, ad 3.
111. Cardinal Bellarmine, *De Paenitentia*, Book II, ch. 18.
112. Estius, Appendix to the first volume, with various passages of St. Thomas there adduced.
113. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 29, a. 6.
114. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 4.
115. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XV, final chapter.
116. This is the title of § VIII of the Appendix to Distinction XXXIV of the Third Book, as printed in the source. The Appendix treats the system of Cornelius Jansenius (1585–1638), Bishop of Ypres, on the nature of servile fear, refuting it from St. Thomas, Scripture, the Council of Trent, and the Fathers.
117. Reference to Estius's own Appendix to the first volume of this Commentary, where the Jansenian system *De Gratia* is examined at length.
118. Cf. Estius, Appendix to the first volume, various passages.
119. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book I (*De Statu Naturae Purae*), ch. 8; and Book V, tom. 2 of his work on St. Augustine, pag. 305.
120. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 2. The extended citation and discussion of the three modes in which the fear of punishment relates to charity follows St. Thomas's *praelaudata quaestio* (the aforementioned question, which Estius here cites directly, the article being entitled "Utrum timor servilis remaneat cum charitate").
121. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book V, cap. 13.
122. The sequence of Distinctions XXXI–XL in the Index continues as printed; the section numbers given follow the printed table of contents exactly.
123. Distinctio XXXII: *De dilectione Dei erga creaturam*.

- 124. Distinctio XXXIII: *De virtutibus cardinalibus.*
- 125. Distinctio XXXIV: *De donis Spiritus Sancti et de timore.* The Appendix to this Distinction (§ VIII) occupies the bulk of this chunk.
- 126. Distinctio XXXV: *De connexione virtutum.*
- 127. Distinctio XXXVI: *De praeceptis Decalogi.*
- 128. Distinctio XXXVII: *De octavo praecepto Decalogi et mendacio.*
- 129. Distinctio XXXVIII: *De iuramento.*
- 130. Distinctio XXXIX and XL: *De duobus ultimis praeceptis et de discrimine legis veteris et novae.*