COMMENTARIA IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM

Pars Posterior

Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences

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CONTENTS

DISTINCTIO 24 *On Free Will (*De libero arbitrio*)*

DISTINCTIO 25 *Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace (*De homine in gratia condito*)*

DISTINCTIO 26 *On the multiple senses of the word "grace" and the grace of Christ (*De multiplici acceptione vocabuli Gratiae et de Gratia Christi*)*

DISTINCTIO 27 *On the comparison of Christian virtue with philosophical habits, and the superiority of grace over free will (*De comparatione virtutis Christianae cum habitibus philosophicis et de praeponderantia gratiae supra liberum arbitrium*)*

DISTINCTIO 28 *On the efficacy of grace and free will (*De efficacia Gratiae et libero arbitrio*)*

DISTINCTIO 29 *That integral man stood in need of operating and co-operating grace (*Hominem integrum eguisse gratia operante et cooperante*)*

DISTINCTIO 30 *On Original Sin: its name, nature, transmission, and errors concerning it (*De peccato originali*)*

DISTINCTIO 31 *On the mode of transmission of original sin (*De modo propagationis peccati originalis*)*

DISTINCTIO 32 *On concupiscence in the baptized, and related questions (*De concupiscentia in renatis*)*

DISTINCTIO 33 *On Original Sin: Whether the Sins of Later Parents Are Transmitted to Their Descendants, and on Related Questions (*De peccato originali: utrum peccata posteriorum parentum ad posteros transeant, et de quaestionibus annexis*)*

DISTINCTIO 34 *On sin: its nature, definition, and extent (*De peccato: ejus natura, definitione, et extensione*)*

DISTINCTIO 35 *On sins as causes and penalties of sins, and on evil acts in relation to God (*De peccatis causis et poenis peccatorum, et de actibus malis in ordine ad Deum*)*

DISTINCTIO 36 *On the goodness and badness of the will (*De bonitate et malitia voluntatis*)*

DISTINCTIO 39 *On the twofold reason why a man is called simply good or evil by the act of the will (*De duplici ratione cur homo simpliciter bonus vel malus ab actu voluntatis denominetur*)*

DISTINCTIO 40 *Arguments that appear to prove all works of unbelievers to be sins (*Argumenta quae probare videntur omnia infidelium opera esse peccata*)*

DISTINCTIO 41 *On whether all the works of unbelievers are sins, and on the voluntary character of sin (*De operibus infidelium et de voluntario peccati*)*

DISTINCTIO 42 *On the gravity of sin and the addition of external acts to the malice of the will (*De gravitate peccati et accessione operis externi ad malitiam voluntatis*)*

DISTINCTIO 43 *On sin against the Holy Spirit, and whether the power of sinning is from God (*De peccato in Spiritum Sanctum et de potentia peccandi*)*

DISTINCTIO XXIV — ON FREE WILL (*DE LIBERO ARBITRIO*)

§ 1. — that God confers upon man dominion and power with respect to his own actions. For in Gen. 4, it is said to Cain: "Your appetite shall be under you, and you shall rule over it" — whether *appetite* or *sin* be understood.[1] And the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 7: "Having no necessity, but having power over his own will."[2] And in Tit. 3, ch. 3: "But let ours also learn to be leaders in good works."[3] For he presides over his own works who does them as one having dominion over them, so that he can do and not do: and this belongs to men, not to beasts.

§ 2. Another proof is drawn from the freedom of acting that existed in the first man before sin, which was plainly such as to exclude necessity of acting — as St. Basil[4] and St. Augustine[5] teach — and the same reasoning applies to the free will of the Angels. Nor is the formal character (*ratio*) of free will in the first man different from that in other men, nor is it different in human and angelic creatures.

Again, another proof from the following: because if the freedom of free will did not exclude necessity, man could not sin through free will. For as St. Augustine says:[6] "No fault can be found where there is necessity." Finally, the mode of freedom already explained is asserted in many passages of Sacred Scripture itself: as in Deut. 30: "I have set before you life and good, and on the other hand death and evil; choose life."[7] Likewise Sir. 15: "God left man in the hand of his own counsel."[8] And again: "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him."[9] And Sir. 15, v. 13: "He that could transgress, and hath not transgressed; and could do evil things, and hath not done them."[10] Is. 1: "If you be willing and hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land; but if you will not," etc.[11] Matt. 12: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree evil," etc.[12] 2 Kgs 4 [i.e., 2 Sam. 24]: "Three things are given thee to choose; choose one of them which thou wilt."[13] And innumerable other passages of this kind, which make mention either of choice, or of deliberation, or of power over either of two opposites in acting. For all these things clearly signify that the formal character of free will consists in this, that it can act and not act, inclined by no necessity toward one side rather than the other.

§ 3. Now this is the constant and certain judgment of the Fathers, and above all of St. Augustine,[14] that necessity is contrary to free will and cannot coexist with it. He likewise, in his work *On the Merits of Sins*,[15] locates the formal character of free will in the fact that it can be freely bent hither and thither, that is, toward diverse things. He uses the same expression also in *On Free Will*.[16] And — to omit others who, as they are most frequent in asserting free will, so everywhere attribute to it the aforesaid mode of freedom, such as St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and the rest — peculiarly and expressly this doctrine was delivered by St. Anselm[17] and St. Bernard.[18] To whom is added the doctrine of the Master[19] throughout nearly his whole treatment; likewise that of Hugh in the *Summa Sententiarum*;[20] and finally that of all the Scholastics.

§ 4. This matter will become still more perspicuous if the definitions of free will handed down both by the Fathers and by the Scholastics be considered; for it is certainly the function of a definition to explain the

proper formal character of the thing. Origen defines free will as the faculty of discerning good from evil and of choosing what it has approved.[21] Theophilus of Alexandria says that free will is the faculty of doing and of not doing what is good,[22] St. John Damascene says that free will is the faculty of choosing,[23] The Master, in this Distinction 24, defines free will as the faculty of reason and will, whereby good is chosen with grace assisting, or evil chosen with grace withholding,[24] And he adds that it is called *free* as regards the will, which can be bent toward either alternative. In nearly the same words it is defined by Hugh in the place already indicated.[20] Indeed, St. Bonaventure attributes that definition to St. Augustine — not without reason. For even though it is not found expressed word-for-word in St. Augustine, it is nevertheless drawn from his sayings, and above all from what he says in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 106: that free will of itself can choose evil, but cannot choose good except with the help of Grace.[25]

§ 5. St. Thomas says that free will is nothing other than the elective power (*vis electiva*).[26] This definition, as it is the briefest, is also the best; taken, namely, from the proper act of free will, which is to choose — that is, to prefer one thing over another, or to accept and not accept one and the same thing at one's own discretion. For election can take place in two ways. Either it is made by choosing among two or more things set before one — which is called the freedom of contrariety, or of specification — or one particular thing only is set before it, which it accepts or rejects, which is called the freedom of contradiction, or of exercise. That election is properly the act of free will is also taught by the same St. Thomas.[27]

§ 6. With the foregoing definitions agree the other definitions commonly found among the authors. But it must be carefully noted that it is not of the formal character (*ratio*) of free will that it have the freedom of contrariety — that is, freedom with respect to good and evil. For, as we shall show below, to be able to sin, that is, to be able to choose evil, is by no means of the formal character of free will. For in that case God and the Blessed would not have free will. But it is of the formal character of free will to have the freedom of contradiction — that is, to be able to act and not to act.

§ 7. Now, so that we may understand how firmly this doctrine must be held, which states that the proper formal character of free will requires that it be free from natural necessity, and that it does not suffice that it be free from coercion, it must be noted what is contained in the Council of Trent,[28] where it is said that man freely consents to the divine inspiration, inasmuch as he can also reject it. And in canon 4:[29] that free will can consent to or dissent from the divine movement and call. Wherefore St. Thomas[30] does not undeservedly affirm that it is a heresy — not only among theologians but even among philosophers — to say that for free election there is required only freedom from coercion, and not also freedom from necessity. It is also evident that propositions of the following kind have been condemned, and others similar to them: *(a)* "Only violence is repugnant to the natural freedom of man." "What is done voluntarily, even if done necessarily, is nevertheless done freely."[31]

§ 8. Reply to the objections: Some heretics of our time — namely those who, following Martin Luther, dare not openly deny free will (as Calvin and Bucer do), retaining the very word of free will on account of the authority of the holy Fathers — nevertheless take away its proper formal character as we have explained it, and consequently destroy the thing itself. For they teach that natural necessity is not repugnant to free will, but only the necessity of coercion. And for this reason they admit that man after sin has free will, because he acts not by compulsion but spontaneously and voluntarily.

§ 9. In support of their view they adduce certain passages from the Fathers. Of this kind is, first of all, that text of St. Augustine:[32] "If necessity be defined in the sense in which we say that it is necessary for something to be so or to be done in such a way, I do not see why we should fear that it deprives us of the freedom of our will. For neither do we put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we say that it is necessary for God always to live and to foreknow all things."

Second: The same author, in *The City of God*,[33] speaks thus of the Blessed: "Nor will they therefore be without free will, because sins will have no power to delight them. Nay, free will shall be the more truly free, in that it is set free from a delight in sinning so as to take an unfaltering delight in not sinning." And in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 105: "Man will be such that he will not be able to will evil, yet shall he not on that account be without free will."[34]

Third: The same St. Augustine, in the same *Enchiridion*, ch. [106], writes in this manner: "Nor is the will to be blamed, or is it not a will, or is it not to be called free, whereby we so will to be happy that we not only are unwilling to be miserable, but also are utterly unable to will it."[35]

Fourth: The same, in *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 46, says: "It would be quite absurd for us to say that the desire to be happy does not pertain to our will, because we cannot possibly not will it; nor do we dare to say that God has not will but only necessity of justice, because He cannot will" —

(a) These are the Baianian Theses, among those condemned, numbered 66 and 39; with which are consonant the Jansenian propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, the 41st of which reads in these express words: "That mode of freedom which is freedom from necessity is not found in the Scriptures; only the name of freedom from sin is found there"; and the 67th, which condemns in what is done necessarily as sinfully: all of these propositions also confirmed among the Jansenian ones.[^36]

§ 10. Fifth: Prosper, writing against the Collator,[36] defines free will as the spontaneous appetite for what pleases it; from which definition it appears that for the formal character of free will it suffices that the will desire something spontaneously and not under compulsion, whether it does so necessarily or not.

Sixth: St. Bernard, in Sermon 18 on the Canticles,[37] says that the will, having been changed for the worse by sin, makes necessity for itself; so that, since the necessity is voluntary, it cannot excuse the will, nor can the will, since it is enticed, exclude the necessity. For this necessity is in some manner voluntary. And, with a few words interposed, he says: "Thus the soul is held in a wondrous evil manner under this voluntary and evilly free necessity, both a servant and free — a servant by reason of necessity, free by reason of the will," etc.

Seventh: The Master,[38] in Dist. 25, §. A., says: free will is so called as regards the will, because it can be moved voluntarily and carried by spontaneous appetite toward those things it judges good or evil. And at §. E., having recited the words of St. Augustine from the *Enchiridion* and from his work *The City of God*, bk. 22, ch. 30,[39] he concludes: free will is called free because without coercion and necessity it can desire or choose what reason has decreed. What necessity he understands, he explains in §. I. with these words: "Free will is equally free from necessity both before sin and after. For just as men could not then be compelled, so neither can they now; and therefore the will is rightly judged before God, which is always free from necessity and can never be compelled." From these words it is clear that the Master makes the will free from necessity for no other reason than that it is free from coercion.

Eighth: Certain passages are also adduced from St. Thomas: for in the *Disputed Questions on Power*,[40] he says: "One must say that not every cause whatsoever excludes freedom, but only a compelling cause." And again,[41] he says that coercion alone is repugnant to the natural freedom of the will. And in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 2, ad 3,[42] he says that through sin free will has not been lost as regards natural freedom, which is that freedom which consists in freedom from natural necessity. Likewise in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 4, in the body of the article,[43] he says that man has free will insofar as he has, beyond other creatures, that he acts of himself, acting voluntarily.

Ninth: St. Bonaventure, in Dist. 25 on the text,[44] says that the essential freedom of free will is freedom from coercion, and he repeats similar things in the same Distinction, a. 2, q. 1. Then in q. 2 he says: "If we speak of free will according as it is free: thus I grant that it can be not only with respect to the contingent but also to the necessary; as is clear in God, in Christ, in Angels, and in the blessed among men. For since necessity is twofold — namely of coercion and of immutability — the necessity of coercion is repugnant to the freedom of free will, but not the necessity of immutability; because free will is called free not because it so wills this that it can will the opposite of it, but because everything it wills it desires at its own command; for it so wills something that it wills to will it, and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and has dominion over itself, and for this reason is called free, even though it be immutably ordered to that thing." And below: "The act of free will as free can be not only with respect to the necessary, but can also be necessary in itself." So far St. Bonaventure there, and certain other things to the same effect.

Tenth: Alfonso de Castro,[45] in the word *Libertas*, disputing about that freedom from which free will is named, says: "It is the freedom which is opposed to necessity, or — to speak more truly — to coercion."

§ 11. The whole difficulty of the arguments lies almost entirely in the fact that the Fathers did not distinguish clearly enough concerning what sort of necessity, freedom, coercion, and what acts of the will they were speaking of, and what they meant by *spontaneous*. These arguments must therefore be resolved by a careful distinction of these terms, as will be seen in each case individually.

And indeed, for the resolution of that which is first objected from St. Augustine, it must be noted that an absolute necessity belonging to something in certain matters or actions does not take away from it freedom in other things. Thus God, who necessarily exists and necessarily lives and necessarily knows and loves Himself, did not necessarily create the world but freely, so that He could have not created it. It must also be noted that the necessity of consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*), since it is not an absolute but only a conditional necessity with respect to us, does not, in my view, destroy freedom of will. Hence St. Augustine says in the same place: "It is necessary that when we will, we will with free will; yet we do not on that account subject free will itself to that necessity which takes away freedom." From which words it is plainly clear that St. Augustine, when he denies that necessity is repugnant to free will, is speaking of the necessity of consequence, which is necessity only from a hypothesis (*ex hypothesi*).

§ 12. But so that the sense of that passage may be made clearer, it must be observed that St. Augustine is there arguing against the Stoics, who, while asserting fate in primary causes, nevertheless denied necessity in human acts, lest they destroy freedom of will — as Aulus Gellius also writes about them.[46] St. Augustine replies to them that that necessity which is not in our power, such as natural necessity, is repugnant to free will. But that necessity according to which we say that it is necessary for something to be so or to be done in such a way — that is, which consists in a certain connection of causes and effects, and which, if considered in

itself, is certainly only a conditional necessity — this is not to be feared as depriving us of the freedom of our will. The example he brings concerning the foreknowledge of God also pertains to this. For its necessity is not absolute but from a hypothesis; namely, on the assumption that certain things will be future. For if nothing were to be future (which absolutely speaking could have been the case), there would be no foreknowledge in God, as was said above.[47]

Some similarly think about the life of God, which St. Augustine adduces as an example. For they say that St. Augustine takes *life* to mean the action of a living being, such as understanding and willing. Now it is established that God wills many things and also understands many things through His practical intellect, which He could have not willed and not understood. Hence the freedom of these acts of life is not taken away from God by the fact that He always and necessarily lives; just as freedom of existing in this place is not taken away from me by the fact that I am necessarily in some place.

§ 13. To the second passage of St. Augustine we reply that the sense is not that the Blessed will have free will with respect to not sinning — a phrasing that would signify that it is also free to sin, which is manifestly false. But by those words St. Augustine signifies that, through the necessity of not sinning, free will is not taken away from the Blessed but rather confirmed and made more free. For those who cannot sin are far freer in their choice of good — since they choose what they will without the possibility of sinning — than those who could sin. This is evident in God, who cannot sin, and yet has a most free will for choosing opposites. To signify this, St. Augustine adds in the *Enchiridion* these words: "Far more truly free will it be, which shall not at all be able to serve sin."

§ 14. To the third it is replied that St. Augustine is right to say that the will whereby we so will to be happy that we cannot even will misery ought not to be denied to be free: both because, even though in desiring beatitude it lacks the freedom of contrariety, in that it cannot will misery, it nevertheless has the freedom of contradiction in this life — for it can in act not will beatitude and can cease from the act — and also because the will even of the Blessed, who lack even the freedom of contradiction in desiring beatitude, is nevertheless free in many other things not having a necessary connection with beatitude; for with respect to these it can act and not act. But if you contend that St. Augustine is speaking not of the will as a faculty (*potentia*) but of the will as an act (*actu*), which is perhaps true: then, beyond what we have already said at the first point, one may reply that St. Augustine, in considering such an actual will, has in view a certain freedom of another kind, namely one opposed to violence or coercion; and yet it does not follow from this that in other acts of the will he does not acknowledge a different freedom which is proper to free will. For it was sufficient for him to show that a certain freedom belongs to the will even in willing that which it cannot not-will or even not-will at all.

§ 15. To the fourth, some reply that St. Augustine by those words signifies that he who wills beatitude, though constrained by necessity as regards specification — because he cannot will misery — is not on that account deprived of free will; because as regards exercise (*quoad exercitium*) he can will and not will beatitude. They say likewise that God, although He wills justice from a certain necessity as regards specification, because He cannot will injustice, is not on that account deprived of free will, because He can also as regards exercise do and not do certain just things, and as regards specification choose one just act from among many just acts in preference to another.

But this reply does not seem to explain the mind of St. Augustine. For he is not speaking of the operation of God by which He does the things that are just, but of God's very justice itself. I would rather say that what

Pelagius had said — that whatever is constrained by natural necessity is deprived of the exercise of will — is not so much reproved by St. Augustine as called into a certain doubt. For he says: "And here there is something of a question." He is not without reason in saying there is some question about this, because Pelagius did not distinguish between will and free will, as is clear from his words recited a little earlier in the same place. Thus according to Pelagius there was no will where there was natural necessity. But St. Augustine very aptly refutes this, while proving that there is sometimes will even in that which is necessarily had or desired, as justice is with respect to God and beatitude with respect to us. And that this is the mind of St. Augustine is made probable by the fact that, when Pelagius had named *free will*, St. Augustine himself, passing over this word in silence, named only *will*, concerning which he knew his words would carry no doubt; nor could Pelagius remove this objection of St. Augustine unless he distinguished will from free will.

§ 16. To the fifth: I reply that Prosper is calling *spontaneous* that which acts in such a way that it can also not act — as being neither under violence nor under necessity determining it to one side. Hence he also says a little further on, speaking of the first man, that sinning spontaneously (*sponte peccasse*) means that he was capable of not sinning. For in this way the Master also accepted *spontaneous* in the same manner as Prosper. This acceptance is not altogether foreign to common usage. For we commonly speak of men as being able to omit things they can do — to say we do something spontaneously (*sponte*) that is in our power to do or not do; rather than of beasts, in whose power it does not lie to act or not act. And the same Master does not seem to have distinguished coercion from natural necessity exactly, and therefore his words set down in §. I. need explanation and supplementation.[48]

§ 17. To the sixth: St. Bernard is speaking not of natural or absolute necessity but of a necessity of a certain kind, namely that by which someone is said to do necessarily what he is vehemently inclined toward; so that it is most difficult for him to draw away his affection and will from it. In this same manner even those who sin are said to sin of necessity, who are in long-established habits of sinning — and yet that necessity has more regard to sins in kind or in species than to the particular individual acts of sinning. As for there being another necessity about which Bernard speaks, this is sufficiently clear from the same sermon. For there it is clearly and expressly said that free will is and consequently that merit is greater in good than in evil, because men do good which is not free for them to omit. Therefore he proves this by the authority of Scripture, Sir. 31.[49]

§ 18. To the seventh: The Master takes *spontaneous* in the sense as Prosper did, as we have shown above. To the eighth: St. Thomas in the first passage seems to have put coercion for natural necessity, in the manner in which we said the Master was speaking. In the second passage he speaks more generally about the freedom of the will, saying that violence or coercion is opposed to it, not natural necessity. For he says that the will freely desires happiness (*felicitatem*), although God necessarily desires it; and that God loves Himself freely with His will, although He does so necessarily; and that the Holy Spirit freely proceeds from the Father, though He proceeds from necessity — yet he does not say these are acts of free will; for the will in general is called free insofar as it is spontaneous and not coerced. But free will properly is not called free except insofar as it can act toward either alternative. It must be known, however, that this mode of speaking about the free will is not to be found in those things which he wrote afterwards; and it is to be noted that he himself — above all in the *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 2 — disapproves of that expression, by which one says the Father generated the Son freely; and far more would he have disapproved of saying that He generated the Son with free will (*libera voluntate*). In the third passage, *to act through oneself* (*per se agere*) means to act through the election of one's own will. In the fourth passage, *per se agere* is to act through the election of one's own will.

§ 19. To the ninth: St. Bonaventure says (q. 2) that free will can be considered in two ways.[50] First, as regards the faculty (*potentia*) containing the formal character (*rationem*) of its origin — and he says this has God as its principal cause. Hence it rightly follows that God is more free. It can also be replied that the sufficiency of that faculty is in the supposit (*suppositum*). For that freedom is the perfection of man, but not of the intellect, which is not capable of it.

Second: The formal character (*ratio*) of judging is free not only from coercion but also from natural necessity, at least in contingent things: therefore it is formally free just as the will is. Reply: It is not properly called free from natural necessity, but indifferent in its nature — insofar as it can conceive various formal characters (*rationes*) of good regarding the same thing. From this indifference of the intellect there properly follows the freedom spoken of in the will.

Third: The will can choose nothing other than what reason has judged to be to be chosen, according to the ultimate practical proposition: therefore the will is truly and formally free in choosing only if reason is truly and formally free in judging.

§ 20. To this argument some reply that the will is truly free in choosing: not because it is not necessarily determined by the ultimate judgment of practical reason, but because that judgment itself is in the power of the will. For they hold that the freedom of the will is properly located in this, that when various non-necessary formal characters (*rationes*) are proposed, it can move itself from one and not from another, before any particular reason concludes its judgment. And they prove this from the Philosopher,[51] who says that elections are in our power because the judgments, or visions, by which elections are guided are in our power.

They also prove it from St. Thomas, who says that the cause of sin is that man operates without attending to the rule of the divine law; and the reason why this is is that not to attend to that rule is not to seek some other cause, since the very freedom of human will suffices for this.

But this reply contains many difficulties. First, because it destroys the ultimate proposition which those same authors themselves posit. For if it is in the power of the will to form the ultimate practical judgment, it cannot be said — according to the proposition put forward — that the will is necessarily determined to any free act whatever by the ultimate judgment of practical reason, since according to a free act of the will the judgment itself is determined. At this it cannot be said, for, according to that proposition, the will is necessarily determined to any free act whatsoever by the ultimate practical judgment; and this is not seeking some other cause, since the freedom of human will suffices for this.

§ 21. However, this reply contains many further difficulties. The first is that it destroys the ultimate proposition which those same authors themselves posit. If in the power of the will is the ultimate practical judgment, it cannot be said, in the terms of the proposition put forward, that the will is freely moved from one formal character of reason (*ratione*) and not from another, before any particular reason concludes its judgment — since that very judgment of reason depends upon an act of the will, and if it exists, the will necessarily follows it; if it does not exist, then by that judgment it is not the ultimate practical one in the power of the will, nor can the will be blamed or praised through it on account of it. For the will is rightly blamed or praised not for acts alone, but because of acts of free choice. Besides, if the freedom of the will is properly located in that, that it can move itself from one and not from another of the formal characters (*rationes*) proposed, one asks: in what does the freedom of the will consist in moving itself thus? For there will be other formal characters (*rationes*) to be sought, and thus the process will be infinite.

§ 22. Nor do the words of the Philosopher stand in favor of the said reply. For the Philosopher says nothing other than that virtues and vices are in our power, although everyone desires the good that appears to him; because each person is in some manner the cause for himself that this or that appears to him. Where it is manifest that he speaks of virtues and vices in general, not of individual actions. Then by saying *in a certain manner* (*quodammodo*), he signifies that not absolutely everyone is the cause for himself, but only in a way — namely through some antecedent free act by which this or that appears to him. Nor does what St. Thomas says do anything for that reply. For *not to attend to the rule*, which the same doctor calls elsewhere *inconsideration*, is a vice of the intellect; and if any act of the will is posited as the cause of this, that act of the will will already be a prior sin — namely the act of the will whose cause is the intellect not attending to the rule — and from which non-attention the first sin would be committed. Therefore *not attending to the rule* is not the ultimate practical judgment in the power of the will, nor can the will be blamed or praised through it. For the will is not rightly blamed or praised except on account of free acts. St. Thomas therefore says, so that reason does not attend, there suffices the freedom of the will in itself, or in its root. For just as the will by reason of its own freedom suffices for itself to choose evil, so the intellect by reason of its own indifference suffices for itself not to consider the rule and to judge badly.

§ 23. Since these things are so, it seems we must respond differently to the argument proposed: that the will is truly and formally free, even if the judgment of reason from which it depends and by which it is determined is not in the same way formally free. Because in order that freedom be properly in the will, it is required and it suffices that there be indifference of judgment in the intellect — or even the perfection of accidental things, pertaining to it at least in the least degree. The intellect has this indifference from God as its principal cause. Hence it rightly follows that God is more free. It can also be replied that the sufficiency of that faculty is in the supposit. For that freedom is the perfection of man, but not of the intellect, which is not capable of it.

§ III — Whether and in what measure the freedom of the will depends on the intellect (An & quatenus libertas voluntatis pendeat ab intellectu)

§ 24. To the fifth objection I reply: Prosper calls that "spontaneous" which so acts that it is able not to act — being constrained and determined to neither side by either violence or natural necessity. Hence, a little later he also says of the first man that he deprived himself of the good of his own accord, wishing by this to signify that he sinned in such a way that he could have not sinned. To the sixth: St. Bernard is speaking not of natural or absolute necessity, but of a certain necessity improperly so called, by which, namely, a person is said to do necessarily that toward which he is vehemently inclined, so that it is most difficult for him to withdraw his affection and will from it. In accordance with this same usage, those who are in a long habit of sinning are also said to sin by a certain necessity; and yet that necessity regards sin in genus or in species rather than particular and individual acts of sinning. Nor indeed is it clear that St. Bernard spoke of any other kind of necessity — as is sufficiently evident from the very same sermon. For in that same place he affirms free will and consequently merit both in good and in evil, by clear and express words, on the ground that men do good or evil which they are free not to do. And he proves this by the authority of Scripture, Sir. 31.[53]

§ 25. To the seventh: The Master takes "spontaneous" in a sense not altogether alien from common usage. For we are more accustomed to say of men who are able to omit what they do, that they do something

spontaneously, than of beasts, in whose power it is not to refrain from what they do. The same Master does not seem to have distinguished compulsion from necessity with exactness, and therefore the words he sets down in §. I. stand in need of explanation and supplementation. This may be done in the following way: free will is equally free from necessity both before sin and after it. For just as the will could not then be compelled or altogether necessitated, so neither can it now. Or one may certainly take "compulsion" as standing in place of "necessity." Nor is this surprising, since even God — who is less capable of violence than anything — is sometimes said to be compelled by His own goodness, mercy, and justice to do this or that. Hence that verse in the Hymn: "Let thy very piety compel thee, that thou mayest overcome our evils by pardoning." Hence He also says to Moses: "Let me alone, that my anger may be kindled" (Exod. 32),[54] as if He could be detained against His will. And concerning Christ it is said in Lk. 24: "And they constrained him" — where, however, there was in reality no violence at all.

§ 26. To the eighth: St. Thomas in the first passage seems to have put "compulsion" in place of natural necessity, in the way in which we have said the Master spoke. In the second passage he speaks more broadly of the freedom of the will, when he says that it is opposed to violence or compulsion, but not to natural necessity. For he says that the will, though it freely desires happiness, desires it necessarily; and that God freely loves Himself by His will, though He does this necessarily; and that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely from the Father, though He proceeds by necessity — yet he does not say that these are acts of free will. The will, therefore, is said to be free in a general sense insofar as it is spontaneous and uncompelled. But the free choice (*arbitrium*) of the will is not called free except insofar as it can tend to either side. It must be known, however, that this manner of speaking about the will as free is not found in the things he wrote afterward; and therefore it is not to be adopted by us without reflection, especially since he himself (in the *Summa*, I, q. 41, a. 2)[55] disapproves of the locution by which it is said that the Father begat the Son by will — still more would he disapprove were it said that He begat by free will. The third passage is to be understood in the same way as the first. In the fourth passage, "to act of oneself" (*per se agere*) means to act by the choice of one's own will.

§ 27. To the ninth: St. Bonaventure (q. 2)[56] teaches that free will can be considered in two ways — and indeed insofar as it is free, he says it can have reference to what is necessary, as is evident in God and the Blessed; because although in them it involves the necessity of immutability, it does not involve the necessity of compulsion. But insofar as it is deliberative, he says, it is only of what is contingent, because no one deliberates about what is necessary or impossible. From this distinction it is sufficiently apparent in what sense he said that free will, insofar as it is free, regards even necessary things and can have a necessary act. For "insofar as it is free" is nothing other than "insofar as it is voluntary and uncompelled." And so it amounts to the same as saying that the will, insofar as it is free from compulsion, is conversant with actions that are also necessary. But "insofar as it is deliberative" — that is, as he himself explains, insofar as it deliberates whether to choose this or that — is understood of the freedom that is proper to free will as such. Therefore St. Bonaventure does not differ from the others in the matter itself, but has spoken somewhat infelicitously and contrary to common usage. This is also what we reply concerning Alfonso de Castro.[57] For he himself otherwise declares sufficiently clearly in the same place that by "compulsion" he understands nothing other than the necessity that determines to one thing. For he says that man by freedom from compulsion can will and not will, do and not do, and so forth.

§ III — Whether and in what measure the freedom of the will depends on the intellect (An & quatenus libertas voluntatis pendeat ab intellectu)

§ 28. The Schoolmen dispute what order the will holds in relation to the intellect or reason with respect to the freedom already explained, and three principal opinions exist among them on this matter. One is that of Durandus, who, writing on this distinction (q. 3),[59] holds that both faculties — the intellect as well as the will — are formally free, and indeed that the intellect or reason is prior and more principally free than the will. He proves both of these claims with arguments not to be despised, which we shall adduce below. The second is the opinion of Henry of Ghent and Scotus, who, departing from the aforesaid position into the opposite extreme at the greatest possible distance, teach (as can be seen in Henry, *Quodlibet* I, q. 16,[60] and in Scotus writing on dist. 25 of this Book, single question),[61] that the will is so free that in its action it neither depends upon nor is determined by the practical judgment of reason. They even take away liberty from reason altogether, saying that it is not free — not formally, because, once ignorance is removed, reason always and necessarily judges that which is right; nor radically, because, as they say, reason is not the true cause of the liberty that is in the will, but only the occasion or condition without which there would be no liberty in the will, whereas the name "root" signifies a true cause. To this opinion there assent Gabriel, Adrianus, and certain others, among whom Abulensis (q. 6, on 3 Kgs. 12).[62]

§ 29. The third opinion is that of St. Thomas, who, proceeding by a middle way between the two foregoing positions, teaches that liberty is first in the intellect rather than in the will — yet not formally in the intellect, but only radically and causally. In the will, however, it is formally and completely. He sets forth this position in various places: q. 1 on the present Distinction; *De Veritate*, q. 24, aa. 1, 4, 6; *Summa* I, q. 83, aa. 1, 3, 4; I-II, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2; q. 13, a. 1 and 6; q. 17, a. 1, ad 2.[63] Agreeing with this doctrine are Aegidius Romanus (*Quodlibet* IV, q. 21),[64] Richard Capreolus (on this Distinction),[65] St. Bonaventure (on Dist. 25, a. 1, q. 6),[66] Cajetan (in the principal places of St. Thomas's *Summa* already cited),[67] as well as Medina, Bañez, and the other followers of St. Thomas, along with certain others.

§ 30. Now, in order to shed some light upon this whole doctrine, the following propositions are to be established.

First Proposition: The freedom of the will (*libertas arbitrii*) is radically in the intellect or reason as in its proper cause. This proposition can be proved in several ways.

First, because the will is free for the very reason that it is an intellectual or rational appetite (*appetitus intellectivus seu rationalis*), just as, on the contrary, the appetite in beasts is not free precisely because it is not rational. Hence it is evident that the cause of the liberty which is in the will is to be sought from the intellect or reason.

Second: We prove this a priori, that is, by explaining the very cause of freedom. The will is free because the intellect or reason is indifferent and undetermined in its judging. For reason can propose various means to the end to the will, and in each individual one can show the formal character (*ratio*) of good and the formal character of evil — speaking, of course, of contingent means, that is, those that do not have a necessary connection with the end. This, however, the sense-faculty cannot do, being naturally determined to one thing. The freedom of the will therefore flows from the indifference or indetermination of the intellect's judgment, as from its root and cause. St. Thomas sets out this matter learnedly and briefly in I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2:[68] "The

root of freedom," he says, "is the will as subject, but its cause is reason. For from this it is that the will can be freely borne toward diverse things, because reason can form diverse conceptions of the good; and hence the Philosophers define free will as 'free judgment from reason,' as if reason were the cause of liberty." Thus he.

Third: The will can never be borne toward what is unknown, as St. Augustine teaches (*De Trinitate* X, ch. 1),[69] and this is a position received by all. Therefore the action of the will always arises from the cognition of its object; and hence the free action of the will arises from a certain indifference of judgment which is in the intellect cognizing the object. This inference is proved both because otherwise the action of the will would not be free — being determined to an object determinately cognized — and because the nature of the appetitive faculty is to be assessed in accordance with the nature of the apprehensive faculty corresponding to it and upon which it depends in its operation, as St. Thomas teaches (I, q. 80, a. 2).[70]

Fourth: The will, according to the common doctrine of the Philosophers, flows from the essence of the rational soul by means of the intellect in the genus of efficient cause; therefore that which belongs to the essence of the will — namely, liberty — is in the intellect as in its cause and root.

Fifth: Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* III, chs. 2–3)[71] openly teaches that desire and choice arise from deliberation and the judgment of reason. And in *Metaphysics* IX, text 3,[72] he concludes that rational faculties (*potentiae rationales*), precisely because they are rational, have the capacity for opposites; therefore, according to the Philosopher, from the fact that reason is related to opposites — as from a cause — there follows the freedom of the will with respect to opposites.

Finally: This position is plainly consonant with the sayings of the ancient Doctors. For Clement, or whoever the author may be (in Epistle 2 to James),[73] and Origen (*Periarchon* III, ch. 2),[74] prove man's free will by this argument: that man is an animal acting from the judgment of reason; but reason is indifferent in its judging, being able to propose various things and to judge variously about the same things. St. Bernard, Sermon 81 on the Canticles,[75] says that liberty of will consists in the indifference of judgment and in the option of choosing — causally in the former, formally in the latter. Gennadius (*De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 20)[76] says that liberty of will is the rational will. And the Master (this Distinction, §. E.)[77] defines free will as the faculty of reason and will. Since, therefore, the liberty of free will is not in reason formally — as we shall presently teach — it must certainly be conceded that it is in reason as in its root and cause.

§ 31. Second Proposition: The freedom of the will is not formally in the intellect. Proof: First, because liberty is formally only in that faculty to which election belongs; but election is not an act of the intellect but of the will. Next, because it would follow that there are two liberties of free will in man — one of the intellect and one of the will — and consequently two elections and two sins, as often as anyone sinned by choosing evil. Third, because reason is the rule of human acts; but a rule as such must be fixed, determined, and immovable; therefore freedom to either side does not belong to it.

A fourth argument is as follows: Reason in itself has liberty neither from compulsion nor from natural necessity. Not from compulsion, because it can be compelled to believe something against the inclination of the subject — in a way that the will cannot be compelled. For the intellect of demons and of the damned is in many things compelled, whereas their will is capable of no compulsion whatsoever. Nor is reason free from natural necessity — whether with respect to the specification of the act or with respect to its exercise. As regards specification: reason, given necessary arguments, assents to a conclusion as necessary; given probable arguments, it assents with fear about the opposite; nor can it do otherwise, unless an inclination of the will in

a contrary direction intervenes — as happens in those things which we hold with certainty on account of Divine Authority, notwithstanding the probability of contrary arguments. As regards exercise: reason neither moves itself freely to consideration, nor freely ceases from such an act, but is moved by the will as rational appetite. For the Philosopher (*Nicomachean Ethics*, beginning)[78] and St. Thomas (I, q. 80, a. 1; I-II, q. 9, a. 2),[79] teach that every action proceeds from the appetite of some good.

§ 32. Third Proposition: Liberty of will is formally in the will alone. This follows from what has gone before. For if the formality were in any other faculty, it would be especially in the intellect — yet in the intellect we have already shown it not to be. Furthermore, the other faculties and their acts have liberty only by participation, by which liberty is communicated to them from the will, so that acts of this kind are free only insofar as they are subject to the command (*imperium*) of the will. Therefore liberty formally exists only in the will. Third: The liberty of free will consists principally in this, that one has dominion over one's own acts, as was stated at the beginning; but this is formally through the will alone. Fourth: That faculty alone is formally free to which sin and merit are primarily and principally attributed; but this is none other than the will. Hence St. Augustine (*De Duabus Animabus contra Manichaeos*, ch. 10)[80] says that "sin is committed only by the will." And (*Retractationum* I, ch. 9):[81] "It is the will," he says, "by which one sins and by which one lives well." And St. Bernard (Sermon 3 *De Paschate*):[82] "What does God hate or punish except the proper will? Let the proper will cease and there will be no hell," and so forth.

§ 33. Last Proposition: The will is free in such a way that in its election it nevertheless necessarily depends on the ultimate practical judgment of reason. The proof of this proposition — which is asserted against Henry, Scotus, and their followers — is manifest. For it is certain that the will cannot will or choose anything without a preceding judgment of reason, since it is a rational appetite and since its object is some good apprehended and judged to be fitting. Therefore, if the judgment of reason is undetermined, the will itself will likewise be undetermined and will not proceed to election. But if that judgment is determined, the will will also be determined to the same thing. For otherwise there would be election without judgment, and action without its proper object. Since, therefore, the ultimate judgment of practical reason is wholly determined — inasmuch as by it reason judges and pronounces that this is now absolutely to be done — it is necessarily required that the will choose this very thing which practical reason has thus judged to be chosen.

§ 34. A confirmation of this proof may be taken from an analogy. For the sense-appetite is determined to one thing precisely because the cognition upon which that appetite depends is determined to one thing. The human will itself is also determined to one thing with respect to the ultimate end — at least as regards specification — because the judgment of reason with respect to the same is determined, since it cannot represent the ultimate end except under the formal character of good. Moreover, the will of the Blessed with respect to the ultimate end is determined even as regards exercise, because the judgment of reason representing that end is always present, being perfectly applied to the minds of the Blessed. Therefore by parity of reasoning, whenever the ultimate and particular judgment is present whereby practical reason judges that this is now to be chosen, the will will also necessarily be determined to choosing it — both as regards exercise and as regards specification. The inference is evident. For such a practical judgment represents the thing only under the formal character of good.

§ 35. Now, because this judgment stands on the side of the intellect, I therefore hold that the Fathers of the Council of Trent wished to signify this by the name "illumination of the Holy Spirit," by which God

touches the heart of man — that is, the will — by efficaciously moving it; since the election of the will necessarily follows upon such an illumination. To this is added the following consideration: if the will in its election did not necessarily depend upon such a judgment of reason, but could choose contrary to what practical reason dictated, then it could come about that in the will there was sin without any error of the intellect. Although the adversaries indeed admit this, we have shown by many arguments (at Dist. 22)[83] that it is false and impossible — in the inquiry whether it is necessary that every sinner err. That whole disputation serves to confirm the truth of this our proposition.

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§ IV — Reply to the objections that seem to conflict with what has been said above (Ad ea quae supradictis adversari videntur responsio)

§ 36. Against the doctrine set forth above, arguments of no slight weight are raised; yet we shall teach in what way they can be refuted with probability. Against the first proposition established there, the following are brought forward.

First objection: The intellect or reason is only a certain condition and cause *sine qua non* — a cause without which the will cannot exercise a free act. For the office of reason is to represent and propose its object to the will; and unless this were present, the will could not act — just as one who applies fire to the kindling is not properly a physical cause of the combustion but only a cause *sine qua non*. Therefore the liberty of the will is not in the intellect as in a root and cause properly so called, but only as regards its use depends on the intellect as the proposer of its object.

It is answered: The office of reason toward the will is not fully explained by saying that it proposes its object to it. For reason does not merely propose but actually *makes* the object of the will, when it judges some thing to be good, fitting, and to be chosen. This judgment is truly the cause of the free election in the will, in accordance with the last proposition; for it brings it about that what was previously desirable in potency (*potentia*) becomes desirable in act (*actu*) — that is, that the will actually desires it.

§ 37. Second objection: In God there is truly and properly liberty of free will, yet in Him there is no indifference of judgment, because every judgment of the Divine Mind has been determined from eternity. Therefore the liberty of the will does not depend on the intellect as cause, insofar as that intellect is indifferent and undetermined in its judging about contingent means.

It is answered: Even in God an indifference of judgment must be acknowledged with respect to those things in regard to which He has liberty of free will. For example, God created this world freely because He judged this to be a fitting means to manifesting His goodness, while at the same time knowing that this means has no necessary connection with that end. Hence, just as He could from eternity not have chosen it, so He could from eternity not have judged it to be chosen. This judgment is therefore indifferent, because God did not from necessity but freely determine Himself to this, and does determine Himself — for in God properly speaking nothing is past, but only present. St. Thomas indicates this response (*De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3).[85]

§ 38. Third objection: If the liberty of the will radically depends on the indifference of the intellect's judgment, then when the intellect is already determined to judging one thing, the will will not be free to

choose it — the cause of liberty, namely the indifference of judgment, having ceased and been removed by its determination.

It is answered: Just as the intellect, at the very instant that it determines itself to judging one thing, could have determined itself to judging the other thing — so likewise the will, at the very instant that it chooses one thing, could have chosen the other. For just as the indifference of the intellect, by the very act of its determination, is not absolutely destroyed (since the same intellect that now judges thus, could at the same instant have judged otherwise) — so neither is the indifference of the will absolutely destroyed by its election. Thus the liberty of the will, even when it follows upon a determined judgment, is not liberty that is lacking to the will, but liberty that the will exercises precisely by that determined election — since it could, at that very instant, have elected otherwise.

§ 39. — and that this suffices for freedom to exist in the intellect radically and in the will formally. The fourth argument: The act of the intellect that precedes every free act of the will is not free, because it is neither an act of the will nor commanded by the will; therefore it is not indeterminate — for in the matter at hand the free and the indeterminate seem to be the same thing; therefore the will is not free on account of the intellect being indeterminate. For otherwise it would follow that the act of the intellect preceding the free act of the will is indeterminate. To this argument Cajetan responds well,[86] saying that an action is called free in two ways: in one way, because it is performed through the choice (*electio*) of the will — and this action is called free properly and formally. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place,[87] the proper action of free choice is election. In the other and less proper way, because it proceeds from a power which by its very nature is not determined to this or that operation. In this way the action of the intellect preceding every choice of the will can be called free — not formally, as we have said, but radically: because the appetite that follows upon such an indeterminate action derives from it the fact that it is not determined to one thing, but can choose either this or that.

§ 40. Against the second and third propositions the following arguments are raised. The first: The will is free on account of the indifference of the intellect; therefore, on account of that same indifference the intellect itself is, to a greater and stronger degree, free; and accordingly it is not free merely radically. The consequent is proved by this common axiom: "that on account of which something is such, is itself still more so." But it is answered that this axiom holds only in the case of a cause that is capable of the form which it produces in another. Now a cognitive power is not capable of freedom in the way that an appetitive power is. For to the latter belongs appetition, to the former cognition and judgment. Hence it suffices that freedom be in the intellect as in a root. But you will say: to be free is a perfection absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) — for it is most perfectly in God — therefore an effect cannot have that perfection unless the cause also has it formally; otherwise the effect, with respect to what it has from the cause, would surpass its cause, which is impossible. It must be said, it seems, that the will does not have that perfection from the intellect as from a power containing its original formal character (*ratio*); but it has it from God as principal cause. Hence it rightly follows that God is more free. It can also be replied that it suffices for that perfection to be in the supposit (*suppositum*). For that freedom is a perfection of the human being, but not of the intellect, which is not capable of it.

§ 41. The second argument: Reason in judging is free not only from coercion but also from natural necessity, at least in contingent matters; therefore it is formally free just as the will is. I reply: reason is not properly said to be free from natural necessity, but indifferent by its nature, inasmuch as it can conceive

diverse formal characters of good (*rationes boni*) with respect to the same thing. This indifference of the intellect is followed by what is properly called freedom in the will.

§ 42. The third argument: The will cannot choose anything other than what reason has judged to be chosen, according to the last proposition; therefore the will will not be truly and formally free in choosing unless reason has been truly and formally free in judging. To this argument some respond that the will in choosing is truly free — not because it is not necessarily determined by the last practical judgment of reason, but because that very judgment is within the power of the will. For they hold that the freedom of the will is properly located in this: that, when various non-necessary considerations (*rationes*) are proposed, it permits itself to be moved by one and not by another, before reason reaches its particular judgment. And they prove this from the Philosopher, who says[88] that choices are in our power because the judgments or "visions" to which choices are consequent are in our power. They also prove it from St. Thomas, who says[89] that the cause of sin is that a man acts without attending to the rule of the divine law; and that for the fact of not attending to that rule no further cause need be sought, since the freedom of the human will suffices for this.

§ 43. But this response contains many inconveniences. First, because it seems to destroy the last proposition, which those same authors nonetheless affirm. For if the ultimate practical judgment is within the power of the will, as they hold, this certainly cannot be the case except by reason of a free act of the will. But this cannot be said, since it is posited — according to that proposition — that the will is necessarily determined to its act by such a judgment of reason. Further, because that "permitting itself to be moved by one consideration and not another" either is an act of free choice or is not: if it is, then even it depends upon a practical judgment of the intellect and necessarily follows that judgment; if it is not, then through that act the ultimate practical judgment is not in the power of the will, nor through it can the will be blamed or praised. For the will is not rightly blamed or praised except on account of free acts. Moreover, if the freedom of the will is properly located in this — that, when various considerations are proposed, it permits itself to be moved by one and not another — the question arises in what the freedom of the will that so permits itself to be moved is located. For in order to account for this, further considerations will have to be sought, and thus there will be a regress to infinity.

§ 44. Nor do the words of the Philosopher support the said response. For the Philosopher says nothing other than that virtues and vices are in our power, even though all men pursue what seems good to them, because each person is in some manner the cause of it seeming thus or thus to himself.[88] Where it is manifest that he is speaking of virtues and vices, and not of individual actions. Moreover, by saying "in some manner" he signifies that no one is absolutely the cause of this to himself — namely, through some free act so that this or that seems good to him.

§ 45. Nor does St. Thomas avail anything for that response. For "not attending to the rule" — which the same doctor elsewhere calls *inconsideratio* — is a defect of the intellect; if some act of the will is posited as its cause, then prior to the first sin there would be something prior to it, namely that act of the will which is the cause of the intellect not attending to the rule — from which inattentiveness the commission of the first sin was held to follow. Therefore, when St. Thomas says that the freedom of the will suffices for reason not attending, one should understand this as the freedom of the will in itself or in its root (*radix*). For just as the will, by reason of its proper freedom, is sufficient of itself to choose badly, so the intellect, by reason of its own indifference, is sufficient of itself not to consider the rule and to judge badly. Since these things are so, it seems preferable for us to respond to the proposed argument: that the will is truly and formally free, even though the

judgment of reason upon which it depends and by which it is determined is not free in exactly the same way — because for freedom to be properly in the will, it is required that the indifference of the intellect's judgment be present in the intellect as the original and of itself efficacious cause (*ratio originalis*) of the freedom that is in the will. In accordance with this response, so far is it from following from the said argument that the will is not truly free, that rather the contrary follows — namely, that the will freely chooses this precisely because reason, out of several things toward which it was indifferent, has judged this to be chosen.

§ 46. But if it is asked what it is that determines reason itself to this judgment — for no action can proceed from a power that is indeterminate of itself unless it is first determined by something — I reply, following the mind of St. Thomas, that the intellect is sometimes determined solely by God's motion. For so St. Thomas teaches[90] — and Cajetan in the same place — as also in the same loci.[91] And Ferrariensis in the same places. But sometimes the intellect is determined to this judgment and not to another through discursion and counsel of reason having its origin from sense, when namely, from such discursion it is led to this judgment by some principle known to it, even though through another principle it could have been led to a different judgment. And in the former way the intellect is determined by another rather than by itself; but in the latter way it is also determined by itself.

§ 47. Against the last proposition these objections are raised. The first: Between natural and free powers there is this difference — that natural powers cannot but act when the object is present, whereas free powers can. But the will is the most free of powers, as the sole formally free one; therefore it will be able not to act when the object is presented to it through the practical judgment of reason. I reply that this difference between natural and free powers is true to this extent: because free powers, as powers concerned with means, are mostly engaged with contingent things in which various considerations can be taken into account by reason of which they may be inclined or not inclined toward those things. Whereas non-free powers always have some one thing as their object, which is proposed under one consideration only, and therefore cannot operate except in one way. However, when the object is presented to the will through the ultimate judgment of reason, it cannot then but operate given such a judgment: because at that point the object is proposed to it under one consideration only. And nonetheless the will retains freedom even in that act, because — as was shown above — its freedom depends upon the indifference of reason's judgment.

§ 48. From this response the second argument is also resolved, which is as follows: If the will cannot but follow the ultimate judgment of reason, then such an act will not be a choice (*electio*); for it is established that choice is among several things proposed, offered, or presented. It is answered, namely, that that act is truly and properly called a choice, because by it the will truly and properly chooses from among the many things toward which the intellect had indifference of judgment, for the reason that they did not have a necessary connection with the end. Moreover, those many things had been proposed and offered to the will not through the ultimate judgment of reason, but through the intellect considering in each of them some formal character of good (*ratio boni*) and of what is appetible and orderable to an end. For in that consideration lies the source of the freedom that belongs to the will.

§ 49. It can also be replied differently, if we say that the name "choice" does not precisely signify the act of the will that follows the ultimate judgment of reason, but in its full formal character simultaneously includes that judgment. This seems to have been the intention of St. Thomas[92] when he says that choice is indeed an act elicited by the will, yet it also imports an act of reason. Hence the Philosopher[93] also calls choice a "deliberative appetition" (*consultativa appetitio*). And in another place[94] he says it is "an intellectual appetite or an appetitive

intellect." Moreover, in yet another place,[95] he says that choice is like the conclusion of a practical syllogism, because that conclusion, together with the act of the will which necessarily follows it, seems to constitute the choice. And for this reason perhaps Gregory of Nyssa[96] wrote that choice is something composite of counsel and appetite. Since therefore from these considerations it appears that choice contains both elements — namely, the ultimate judgment of reason and the consequent movement of the will — it is easy to see how choice is among many things, and accordingly is rightly called a choice.

§ 50. Yet because it can still be objected that that very movement of the will, considered precisely, is truly called a choice, because through it the will formally chooses, it seems necessary to have recourse to the prior resolution of the argument. The third argument: If the will necessarily follows reason; it will never then be able to choose the lesser good while leaving the greater, when reason does not err. Likewise, if two equal goods are proposed, it will be able to choose neither one, since in that case reason gives preference to neither over the other. I reply that what is absolutely the lesser good can without error be judged here and now to be the greater good, and can thus be chosen. But as long as reason gives preference to neither over the other, choice cannot take place, because the ultimate practical judgment has not yet been reached; and the proper office of the ultimate practical judgment is to present one over the other as to be accepted, so that choice may follow.

§ 51. The fourth argument: St. Augustine says:[97] "If two persons equally disposed in mind and body and equally tempted see the beauty of one body, and upon seeing it one is moved to act impurely while the other perseveres with chaste will unmoved, nothing else appears to account for this difference in them except that the one willed, the other willed not, to fail from chastity." But the judgment of reason pertains to the disposition of the mind; therefore, with the same judgment posited on both sides, one may be able to will, the other to will not. Some respond that in these two the ultimate judgments of reason are diverse on account of the very diversity of their wills. For, as they say, the one, because he wills it, will judge that he ought to indulge in pleasure, and the other, because he wills it, will judge that he must resist. But this response falls into the same inconveniences that followed from a similar response adduced and refuted above. It is also briefly refuted thus: if he judges it because he wills it, and this willing is an act and choice of the will, then the act and choice of the will is prior to the judgment of reason, and accordingly this whole doctrine collapses — the doctrine according to which every choice of the will depends on reason in such a way that it necessarily follows reason's practical judgment. It seems preferable, therefore, to respond that St. Augustine includes under the will also the conclusion of the judgment of reason, to which the acceptance by the will is necessarily and inseparably joined. And those two persons are said to be equally disposed in mind with respect to everything that precedes that will, wherein they differ from one another.

§ 52. The last argument: God cannot err in judging, but judges each thing according to truth; yet God can do the lesser good while omitting the greater. For it is established among theologians that He could have made better things than those He has made. He could also have produced no creature at all, and thus not produce it; therefore the will does not necessarily follow the judgment of the intellect. For since free choice is of the same formal character (*ratio*) in God and in us, and it would pertain to its formal character as found in us to necessarily follow the judgment of the intellect, the same would follow in God. Some respond that when God does something, although He knows He could do something better, He nevertheless does that thing because He judges it to be then most expedient. But this response by no means escapes the difficulty. For just as God can do better things than He does, so also things more expedient than those He does. For if He cannot act except in ways most expedient, and these are the things He judges most expedient and accordingly does, an

absurd and condemned conclusion follows — that God cannot act otherwise than He does. God, for example, converts this sinner: He can of His own free will not convert him but leave him in sin; and the same reasoning applies to everything else He does ad extra. Nor, however, can it be said that the opposites are simultaneously most expedient. Therefore the judgment by which God judges something to be most expedient is not the rule of things to be done. Add the fact that God Himself makes some things to be intermediate, that is, expedient to an end. Therefore it ought not to be said that God does something because He judges it to be most expedient.

§ 53. Another response is that the formal character of God and of an intellectual creature is different: because perfect and most absolute freedom with respect to all things subject to His power belongs to God, by reason of which He can choose anything from among them; whereas the freedom of an intellectual creature is limited to the judgment of reason. But this response too does not hold. For however supreme God's freedom may be, it is nonetheless subordinated to the divine intellect, in such a way that just as He cannot will except what the intellect has cognized, so He cannot freely will or do anything unless the intellect has by its practical judgment decreed that it is to be done. The true response, then, unless I am mistaken, is that the free act of the Divine Will necessarily depends upon the practical judgment of His intellect — not the judgment whereby He judges this to be better, or this to be most expedient, but the judgment whereby He judges this as a means orderable to the end, and as contingent and indifferent, to be now actually ordered to the end, that is, to His own goodness. On this matter see Domingo Báñez in the same place.[98] For in God there is no judgment to the effect that something is better or more expedient among the things subject to His power, because among the things doable and subject to His power nothing is better or more expedient than another with a view to God being perfected or completed by some action or work; for He, most perfectly good in Himself, has no need of our goods. And this is the reason (*ratio*) for the supreme and wholly absolute freedom in God.

§ 54. To this may further be added arguments contending that the will can sin while the right practical judgment of reason stands. But these have already been resolved above,[99] where it was disputed whether everyone who sins errs.

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§ V — That the power to sin does not belong to the formal character of free choice (Potentiam peccandi non esse de ratione liberi arbitrii)

§ 55. That the power to sin does not pertain to the formal character (*ratio*) of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is sufficiently understood from what has been shown above; and above all from this, that we have demonstrated that for the formal character of free choice nothing else is required than that the will be determined by no necessity toward that which it is said to be free with respect to, but that it be able to will that thing in such a way that it can also not will it. In this requirement no power to sin is included. That doctrine is also evidently and easily proved by the following arguments.

§ 56. The first argument. Free choice will neither be taken away from a man, nor will it change its proper formal character, through that man's beatitude; but just as the man will remain one and the same according to substance, so also his free choice according to substance will remain unaltered; yet in the blessed man he will not at all be able to sin; therefore the power to sin does not belong to its proper formal character.

The second argument. The ability to fail does not belong to the proper formal character of any power; just as the ability to limp or to stumble does not belong to the formal character of the faculty of walking; and, what is closer to our present purpose, the ability to err does not belong to the formal character of the intellect. Yet to sin is to fail, far more so than to limp or to err; therefore the power to sin does not belong to the formal character of free choice. St. Thomas indicates this argument.[101]

The third argument. The formal character of free choice is the same, at least by analogy, in God, Angels, and men, just as the formal character of intellect is the same in them. For free choice is a certain property that follows per se

— it must be granted that God's will, as we said above, is free in the highest degree of all. This has indeed been shown more fully above.[102] But in God and in the Blessed Angels the power to sin does not pertain to the formal character of free choice; therefore neither does it in men.

The fourth argument. It does not belong to the formal character of free choice to be able to act well — as is evident in the case of demons and the damned, above all according to those who do not acknowledge even morally good acts in them — therefore much less does it belong to its formal character to be able to sin. For the good is in accord with nature, while evil is contrary to nature. Wherefore, if the one lies outside the formal character of free choice, the other will as well.

§ 57. The authority of the Fathers lends its support to these arguments. They attribute free choice not only to God, but also to the Angels, to the Blessed, and to men assumed or to be assumed into fellowship with the Angels. For St. Ambrose,[103] expounding that saying concerning the Holy Spirit in 1 Cor. 12, "distributing to each individually as he wills," explains it thus: "by free determination of will, not by the compliance of necessity."

And St. Augustine,[104] from the fact that God, who cannot sin, has free choice, draws the conclusion that there is nothing to prevent free choice from existing even in blessed men, although they can no longer sin. He teaches the same thing.[34] St. Bernard and St. Anselm hand down the same opinion in the plainest words, in those places which we cited above,[105] — in the treatment of this book where it was asked how the formal character of free choice remains intact in Angels already confirmed or hardened.

Indeed, so true and certain is this doctrine in St. Augustine's view that he says, in both places already cited, and likewise,[106] that free choice will then be far more free when it will be altogether unable to serve sin. This is also read from time to time in other authors. And rightly do they speak in this manner. For although the natural freedom of the will does not in itself admit of more and less, it does admit of more and less with respect to the exercise of its natural act — which act is to will well and to act well. Free choice exercises itself more perfectly in that act when it cannot sin, that is, cannot fail in acting, than when it is still able to sin. From which reasoning also St. Thomas

— cannot sin — than in us who can sin. Hence it is evident from this that freedom from sin is not foreign to the natural freedom of choice, but is its perfection in its own act; and therefore St. Augustine, when speaking of natural freedom, not ineptly or impertinently showed its perfection and increase through the addition of that freedom which is from sin.[107]

§ VI — Reply to the objections (Ad objectiones responsio)

§ 58. Against the doctrine set out above, the first objection is drawn from the definition of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) which the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] transmits in these words: "Free choice is a faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen with Grace assisting, or evil with Grace withdrawing." This definition was previously transmitted by Hugh (in the *Summa Sententiarum*, ch. 7).[109] It seems to be derived from the teaching of the ancients, who acknowledged that there must be recognized in man a choice (*arbitrium*) by which he can both choose good and choose evil. "Free choice," says St. Augustine (*De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 1), "we must confess that we have both toward evil and toward good."[110] Likewise, from the writings of those who, in declaring the freedom (*libertas*) of man, make mention of both: evil and good alike — Deut. 30, Sir. 15:17–18, Sir. 31.[111] From these it appears that it pertains to the formal character (*ratio*) of free choice that it can be bent toward both: good and evil.

§ 59. The second objection: Origen (bk. 1 of the *Peri Archon*, in the preface) says: "If we are possessed of free choice, then we are not compelled by necessity either to act rightly or to act badly."[112] And he places this among the things defined by ecclesiastical proclamation; therefore the necessity of acting well is not compatible with free choice, and hence it pertains to the formal character of free choice to be able to act both well and badly.

§ 60. The third objection: St. Hilary (in his exposition of a Psalm, at the final verse) writes as follows: "For confession of sins exists only in this present time of life, while a man is left to the use of his own will and the license of life grants the freedom of confession; as we fall from life, we simultaneously fall from the right of confession."[113] And immediately, speaking of the future age, he says: "That time, he shows, will have a will not free but necessary, saying: 'there is no willingness in me in those days.' For when the freedom of the will ceases, the will too — whatever there will be of it — ceases as well. For passage to Abraham's bosom was possible only for him who could have been in Abraham's boundaries through the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will is therefore shut off, since no confession is made among the dead," etc. By these words he openly removes freedom of choice from the future age, for the reason that there the faculty of both good and evil is lacking.

§ 61. The fourth objection: St. Jerome, in his letter to Pope Damasus concerning the Prodigal Son, says: "God alone is He upon whom sin does not fall; all other things, being possessed of free choice, can bend their will in either direction."[114] He means beyond doubt both directions: good and evil, as is clear from the very passage itself — most of all from his statement that God alone is He upon whom sin does not fall. The same Jerome (in his Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon) writes that man "would not have been created like to God, nor possessed of free choice, if he were so good that he could not receive evil.",[115] Again, the same (in his exposition of the Creed to Damasus) says that Jovinian had done away with the freedom of free choice, on the grounds that he asserted that man cannot sin. "But we say," he writes, "that man can always both sin and not sin, so that we may always confess ourselves to be possessed of free choice.",[116] These opinions assuredly require, for the formal character of free choice, the ability to sin.

§ 62. The fifth objection: the Master (dist. 7 of this book) teaches that in good Angels and bad alike free choice still exists to this extent: that even though neither the former can act badly nor the latter can act well, nevertheless the former act good and the latter act evil by spontaneous will and without any compelling necessity.[117] But it is established from what we said at the outset that spontaneity (*spontaneum*) does not suffice

for the proper formal character of free choice; therefore, according to the true state of things, free choice does not exist in good and bad Angels, seeing that neither can the former sin nor the latter act well.

§ 63. To these objections we reply as follows.

To the first: that definition of the Master, or of Hugh, and any other definitions of that kind, do not so much explain what the proper formal character of free choice is and what belongs to it essentially, as they make the thing known through that which perpetually befalls it and is conjoined with it during this present life. For in this way free choice is defined by reference to the election of evil, just as man is defined by reference to mortality (*mortalitas*) — not only by Porphyry but also by the Sacred Writers, by St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and others — even though it is most certain that mortality pertains in no way to the essence of man, nor even to his accidental perfection. For the rest, even though the Fathers and Sacred Scripture frequently ascribe to our choice the freedom of good and evil, they do not thereby teach that this is contained in its formal character.

§ 64. To the second: Origen manifestly speaks of the necessity of coercion (*necessitas coactionis*). "We are not compelled," he says, "by necessity either to act rightly or to act badly." For in the immediately preceding sentence he had also said that we are not subject to necessity such that we are compelled, in every case and even against our will, to do either bad or good things. Then even if he were speaking of natural necessity, his words would have to be understood in this sense: "If we are possessed of free choice, then we do not act each several good or evil thing by necessity." For in good things too there is choice, and in evil things as well. Although his words can also be expounded with reference to free choice according to the state of this present life. This reply must altogether be applied to the third objection as well. For it is manifest that Hilary is speaking of the will and its freedom with regard to that condition which belongs to it in this present life — namely, its flexibility (*flexibilitas*) toward good and evil; according to which the will is the source of good and bad merits. This sense is clear from the same Hilary's Commentary on Ps. 2, at the passage "Then he will speak to them in his wrath."[118] For the declaration of this matter it must be noted that the Fathers also sometimes speak similarly of virtue (*virtus*), saying that virtue has no place in the other life — viewing, that is, the formal character of merit (*ratio meriti*) in it. So St. Jerome in his Commentary (on Eccl. 9, at the words "neither have they any more a reward"[119]) denies that virtues have a place in the future age — to wit, insofar as they avail for acquiring merits, but not insofar as God is pleased by means of them.

§ 65. As to what is adduced in the fourth place from St. Jerome, we have said sufficiently what must be replied (at dist. 45 of bk. 1, and at dist. 7 of this book),[120] except for the passage which is in the Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon. To which therefore we now reply: those words of Jerome, even though they sound harshly, can nevertheless be charitably expounded in this way — if man were so good that he could not receive evil, he would no longer have been created like to God, but equal to Him; because God alone is by His nature impeccable. Likewise he would not be possessed of free choice according to the state of the present life.

§ 66. To the last objection it is replied: that the Master in that passage does not speak exactly, nor does he sufficiently explain the formal character of the free will (*libera voluntas*) in good and bad Angels. On which matter, let those things be consulted which we said (at the same dist. 7), where it was asked how the confirmation and hardening of the Angels is consistent with their free choice.[121]

§ VII — Whether the will always tends toward the good (Utrum voluntas semper appetat bonum)

§ 67. When it is asked whether the will always and necessarily tends toward the good, the question does not concern whether every act and choice of the will is good, upright, and without sin. For this is not in doubt. Rather, the question is whether the object of the will is nothing other than true or apparent good — that is, something apprehended under the formal character (*ratio*) of the good — or whether evil also falls under the object of the will. For Scotus teaches this latter position, writing at dist. 43 of this book,[123] where, having rejected the opinion that holds that the will can will nothing except under the formal character of true or apparent good, he affirms that the will can tend toward evil apprehended under the formal character of evil: because it can, he says, will the hatred of God before reason has been blinded. Yet the same Doctor, at dist. 49 of the fourth book,[124] acknowledges that it is a matter of doubt whether the object of the will is of itself the good. But William of Ockham flatly denies this, writing in the third book of the *Sentences*,[125] for he holds that the object of the will is being (*ens*), insofar as it includes both good and evil. From which it follows that evil under the formal character of evil can be sought by the will.

§ 68. The arguments for this opinion are as follows. The first is what we have already said Scotus adduces: the hatred of God, with reason not yet blinded. The second: certain sins are committed by men not through ignorance but through deliberate design and settled malice; in these cases, accordingly, evil appears to be chosen by the will as evil. The third: the intellect is of itself concerned with the true and the false; therefore likewise the will is of itself concerned with the good and the evil. The fourth: Scripture places good and evil within the object of the will and of free choice, saying at Sir. 15: "Before man are life and death, good and evil; whichsoever he shall choose, shall be given him."[9] A similar passage is at Deut. 30,[126] and to it the Sirach seems to have looked back. The fifth: St. Augustine in the second book of the *Confessions*[127] — recounting his theft — says that in it he loved nothing but sin itself, and the defect, and the malice. The sixth: St. Bernard in Sermon 35[128] says that the devil and certain men love evil because it is evil.

§ 69. Now the common and at the same time most true opinion is that the will and free choice tend of themselves toward nothing but the good — that is, toward something apprehended and set before them under the formal character of the good; for this is the proper object of the will. For evil as evil is not contained under the object of the will except by opposition to the will's proper act, which is to will. For just as we of ourselves will the good, so of ourselves we refuse and flee from the evil contrary to that good. For this teaching there are evident arguments.

The first: The will is an appetite (*appetitus*); therefore its object can be nothing but what is appetible; but according to the Philosopher,[129] the good is that which all things seek; therefore the object of the will of itself is nothing but the good.

The second: If the will could seek evil under the formal character of evil, its natural inclination would be evil; and consequently God, who is the Author of nature, would himself be the author of evil. That such an inclination would be natural is clear, because it would be an inclination toward the will's proper object.

The third: Evil as evil is the privation of the good and corruptive of nature; therefore if evil as evil pertained to the proper object of the will, it would follow that nature inclines toward its own corruption; which is absurd.

The fourth: The proper object of the intellect is being taken in the widest sense; therefore this is not the object of the will. For the faculties must be distinguished from one another by their proper objects.

The fifth: Each person wills by the will that which is more fitting to himself rather than that which is more excellent in its own nature — as, for example, a gold coin rather than a fly; therefore the proper object of the will is not being but the good, that is, what is fitting.

The last: The object of the sensitive appetite is nothing but the sensible fitting thing; for only this is sought by that appetite; therefore the object of the intellectual appetite, that is of the will, is nothing but the intelligible fitting thing; and that is the good.

§ 70. To these arguments is added the authority of the Doctors. Such is the opinion of (Pseudo-)Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*,[130] who teaches that evil is entirely outside the scope of the will, since the will looks only toward the good and does not look toward evil. Similarly teach Clement of Alexandria in the second book of the *Stromata*,[131] St. Augustine in the second book of the *Confessions*,[132] Boethius in the fourth book of *The Consolation of Philosophy*,[133] Aristotle at the place cited above,[134] and Seneca in the fourth book *On Benefits*.[135] But more brilliantly than the rest, St. Thomas sets forth this opinion[136] — whom most other authors rightly follow. It must also be noted what St. Bonaventure writes,[137] namely that free choice tends toward evil not insofar as it is free, but insofar as it is deficient (*deficiens*). Which would not be true if evil were contained under its proper object.

§ 71. But the arguments of the contrary opinion are easily dissolved.

To the first and second I reply that no one can hate God, nor sin from malice, unless some error of rational judgment has first been posited, as has been sufficiently explained in the foregoing, especially at dist. 22.[138]

To the third it is answered that the false as such is not the object of the intellect except by opposition to its proper act, which is to know. For the intellect, by dissenting, turns away from what is false. By which reasoning we have also said that evil is contained under the object of the will.

To the fourth, which was drawn from Sirach, it is answered that good and evil — that is, things which are such in reality — are contained under the object of the will materially, but insofar as they are apprehended under the formal character of good. Were this not so, men could not sin, because they could not choose evil. Hence also in that same place it is said: "whichsoever he shall choose" — that is, shall have seemed good to him. Although the statement of Sirach is not properly to be taken of moral good and evil, but of the rewards and punishments set before a man acting well or badly. For these are signified there by water and fire, life and death, and universally by good and evil. Nor indeed would Sirach say of the evil of fault: "it shall be given him" — namely by God.

To the fifth, the reply is clear from St. Augustine himself. For in the same book[139] he explains that he had loved the sin in that theft only to the extent that he had sought no utility from it for himself — for he had better things in abundance at home — but had looked in that deed only to the delight of deceiving and to liberty, and to the companionship or friendship of others who invited him to sin.

§ 72. To the last: the devil and many men love evil because it is evil — not absolutely, but as evil for others, upon whom they most ardently desire to inflict harm. Which harm, from envy or from some other depraved affection, they reckon as their own good.

§ VIII — Whether free choice regards only future things (Arbitrii libertas utrum sola futura respiciat?)

§ 73. It is held by some that free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is not referred to the present or the past, but only to future contingent things; for this reason, that past and present things are already determined, and therefore it is no longer in our power that they should be otherwise. The same is Hugh's opinion.[141] Among the Scholastics, William of Ockham transmits the same view.[142] Their arguments, beyond the one by which we have already said the Master is moved, are roughly these. The first: Everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be, as the Philosopher says;[143] therefore everything that acts, when it acts, necessarily acts; and consequently free choice does not stand freely with respect to a present act, but only with respect to a future act. This is also the Master's argument. The second: There is no freedom with respect to the past; therefore neither with respect to the present. This inference is proved by parity of the formal character (*ratio*), because each already has its determination. The third: We deliberate only about future things; but free choice belongs to those things about which we deliberate; therefore it belongs only to future things.

§ 74. But this opinion, insofar as it denies that free choice regards present things (for regarding past things it is most true), is rejected by nearly all as false and utterly improbable — and not without reason. For if free choice did not regard present actions but only future ones, many absurdities would follow.

First: It could never truly be said of anyone: "This man acts freely," for this is said of a present action, not of a future one. Second: It could never truly be said that a man sins at the very moment when he acts badly. For to sin (*peccare*) signifies a present action. Third: It would follow that God, when He created the world, did not create it freely; indeed, absolutely speaking, that God is not endowed with free choice, because nothing is future to God. Fourth: It would follow that Christ at the instant of His conception did not have, nor could have had, a free act, and consequently merited nothing at that instant, nor could have merited anything — which is contrary to the most universally received doctrine. Fifth: It would follow that the Angels at the instant of their creation did not have, nor could have had, a free act by which they merit — which is likewise contrary to the received position; although the Master and Hugh do concede this, chiefly on the basis of the opinion which we are now refuting. Sixth: This opinion absolutely abolishes merit and demerit. For we do not merit or demerit through future actions, but through present ones. Finally: If there is no freedom with respect to present things, then nothing is done freely; for there are no actions except present ones. And so by this opinion free choice itself is entirely destroyed.

§ 75. Wherefore, in order to escape these and like absurdities, we must necessarily acknowledge that free choice regards present things. Indeed, if one considers the matter carefully, he will understand that free choice properly speaking can be referred only to present things. For a man exercises the freedom of his choice when in the present he wills or chooses something that he could not will or not choose; not when he is still deliberating about what is to be chosen — except insofar as deliberation itself is also a certain act commanded by the free will.

§ 76. As for the objection of the Master — that what is in the present is determined, so that it is no longer in our power — this does not appear to be altogether true, if the discussion is about a determination previously made. For the present action is not previously determined; rather, it is being determined now. It is, however, determined by the free will, from which it proceeds in such a way that it could be omitted. But if the present action is said to be determined (which I do not think should be denied), let it be said to be determined

not by a past determination but by a present one — in the same way as air, at the very first moment of receiving light by which it is illumined, is truly said to be illumined. For in instantaneous things, being and coming-to-be are simultaneous.

§ 77. To the remaining arguments we reply as follows. To the first: the Philosopher's dictum is to be received as referring not to absolute but to hypothetical necessity, in accordance with which it is also true that everything that acts, while it acts, necessarily acts — consistently with the contingency of things. To the second, I reply that the formal character of the past and of the present with respect to the present will is not the same. For the past was already determined beforehand and is therefore no longer subject to the freedom of the will, in the sense that it might be done or not done. The present, however, is now being determined by the present freedom itself in choosing it, and thus is subject now in act. Therefore determination does not conflict with choice; rather, it is precisely what produces it; whereas past determination does conflict with present action — since, even when the past was present, it also proceeded from its own then-present choice, just as a future determination will also proceed from a future choice.

§ 78. To the third I say that free choice, if we consider its present act, is not of those things about which we deliberate, but rather of those things about which deliberation has been completed. For after deliberation there follows choice (*electio*), which is the proper act of free choice — by which it is again shown that free choice properly regards not future but present things. Since choice of a thing that is present follows deliberation about a thing that is future. Wherefore deliberation is not necessary for an act of free choice; for God, who is of the most free will, does not deliberate — as neither do the angels. Indeed, men too do many things by choice without prior deliberation.

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§ IX — That free choice is also present in fallen man, as taught by Scripture (In homine etiam lapso esse arbitrium docetur ex Scriptura)

§ 79. That the freedom of human choice has been attacked by many heretics is evident from the writings of the Fathers and from ecclesiastical histories. For they maintained absolutely that there is no free choice: partly by express denial; partly by asserting those dogmas from which this would manifestly follow — such as Manes, Bardesanes, Valentinus, Manichaeus, Priscillian, Peter Abelard, and John Wycliff. Furthermore, among the heretics of our own time, the matter stands thus: although they confess that in the first man before sin there was free choice, they nevertheless deny that it was left to fallen man. Although among them there is a certain difference in this doctrine. For some take away free choice from fallen man absolutely, so that even in civil and indifferent matters — and these are Luther and Calvin, and before them Lorenzo Valla in the book he wrote *On Free Choice* — Others, however, though they profess that in external and civil matters man after the fall is of free will, yet in those things that concern piety and the observance of divine law, and as they say in moral matters, they deny to free choice any power of doing anything at all. And this is the opinion of the Lutherans, who judge that sinful man is so enslaved to sin that he does not have the free faculty of choosing good; but after liberation, they say, he is so acted upon and impelled by the Grace of God working in him that he cannot choose evil.

§ 80. Therefore in this place it must be shown, both against these and against the earlier and more recent heretics, that in fallen man there remains the faculty by which he is able not only to incline himself arbitrarily

to diverse things — as is the case in the blessed and the wretched Angels — but also, having abandoned or even merely omitted evil, to do good; and vice versa.

§ 81. First then, that we may begin from Sacred Scripture, these words of God said to Cain most clearly establish this freedom: "Is it not so, that if thou dost well thou shalt receive reward, but if ill, shall not sin forthwith be present at the door? But the desire thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it" (Gen. 4). Which dominion is nothing other than what constitutes the proper formal character of free choice. The same freedom is confirmed by all those Scriptures which ascribe deliberation and counsel to man, and set before him a choice among many things — as in Deut. 30: "I have set before thee life and good, and on the other hand death and evil"; and below: "Choose therefore life, that thou and thy seed may live," etc.[126] Likewise Sir. 15: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel," and what follows.[145] That this Scripture pertains not only to the man before the fall, as the adversaries cavil, but also to men corrupted by sin, can be shown partly from the context of the very same passage, and is partly manifest from the passage in Deut. 30 to which Ecclesiasticus clearly refers in those words. Similar is the passage in Is. 1: "If you be willing and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land; but if you will not," etc.[146] Of the same kind is that of Zech. 11: "If it seem good to you, bring me my wages."[147] And Matt. 12: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good; or make the tree evil and its fruit evil."[148] We also read that David was given the option to choose whichever of three plagues he wished (2 Kgs, last ch.; 1 Chr. 21).[149] Moreover the deliberation and choice of Susanna when placed in straits, which is described in Dan. 13,[150] manifestly demonstrates this freedom of choice. To this pertains also 1 Cor. 7: "Having no necessity, but having power of his own will."[151] For by these words not only is coactive necessity excluded, as some hold, but also natural necessity — which is clear from what is commanded: "Let him do what he will," that is, let him choose either alternative.

§ 82. The same moreover is taught by those Scriptures which testify that something is done by man in such a way that he could omit that very thing and not do it, or the contrary. Which, besides the passages already cited, is most openly signified by Sir. 31: "He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed; and could have done evil things, and hath not done them."[152] This kind of freedom was also signified by Christ's approval of the words of Pilate in Jn. 19: "Knowest thou not," he says, "that I have power to crucify thee, and I have power to release thee?"[153]

§ 83. To these must be added those Scriptures which command the doing of good and the shunning of evil, as Ps. 36 and almost countless others.[154] Likewise those which contain promises and threats, which are also very numerous. For what place will there be for precepts, exhortations, promises, and threats, where there is no freedom of human actions to either side, but only a natural and inevitable necessity toward one part? Finally, those Scriptures also establish this freedom which teach that to each one reward will be rendered according to his works. For no room is left for good or bad merits, and consequently neither for rewards or punishments, where there is a necessity of operating. For as St. John Damascene says: "What is done of necessity is neither virtue nor vice."[155] Many other things could be brought in here from the Scriptures — whatever contains reproof, correction, rebuke, and the reproaching of evils. For these are applied entirely in vain and foolishly where there is no free choice, just as if these same things were applied to beasts. Likewise those things which contain the praises and rewards of good and holy men — for this clearly proves the point, as St. Augustine also testifies.[156] But of the Scriptures which have been cited, there is more than sufficient abundance.

§ 84. It must be noted, however, that from the passages and testimonies produced it is clear that not only in civil and external matters, but also in moral matters and those pertaining to the worship of God, men — whether sinners or just — have free choice, by which they can both do and not do either good or evil.

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§ X — The same doctrine proved from the Fathers (Eadem doctrina probatur ex Patribus)

§ 85. The consensus of all the Fathers of every age, both Greek and Latin, in the doctrine which holds that man even after the fall — whether he still lies in sin or has been raised up from the fall — has free choice both in moral and in civil actions, is so universal that it might seem superfluous to dwell on citing their testimonies or indicating passages. But since the adversaries who in this age assail free choice profess to rely chiefly on the authority of those who wrote against the Pelagians — as though those men had treated the question of free choice more accurately and candidly than others — it will therefore suffice for us to have produced some, out of many, of their testimonies, from which it may be most plainly established what their position regarding free choice also is.

§ 86. And let the first of these be St. Augustine, who is known to have defended the cause of the Catholic Faith against the Pelagians more keenly and abundantly than all other ecclesiastical writers.

He therefore writes thus, among other things, in *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 36: "Free choice has been given to the soul; those who endeavor to undermine it with frivolous reasonings are so blind that they do not even understand that they are saying these vain and sacrilegious things by their own will."[158] Likewise in *Soliloquia* I, ch. 1: "O God, by whose laws the soul's free choice is its own, and to the good rewards and to the evil penalties are distributed."[159] Likewise in *De Fide contra Manichaeos*, ch. 10: "Who would not cry out that it is foolish to give precepts to one who does not have it free to do what is commanded, and unjust to condemn one who had no power to fulfill what was commanded?"[160] Likewise in *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 11: "Sin is what a man's own will forbids and from which it is free to abstain."[161] And ch. 12: "To hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is the height of iniquity."[162] — and other things he writes in both these chapters.

§ 87. Likewise in *De Civitate Dei* V, ch. 10: "We are in no way compelled," he says, "either, in retaining God's foreknowledge, to take away the will's free choice, or, in retaining free choice, to deny — which is impious — that God foreknows future things; but we embrace both,"[163] "and confess both faithfully and truly." To these add his three books to which he gave the title *De Libero Arbitrio*; for in that work he acts expressly and deliberately, against the Manichaeans, to establish and defend free choice. Let there be seen above all what he writes in *De Libero Arbitrio* I, ch. 12; II, ch. 1; III, chs. 4 and 18.[164] Add also the following: *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14; *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 9; *De Actis cum Felice Manichaeo* II, chs. 3 and 4; *Tractatus* 4 *in Epistolam Joannis*; *Quaestio* 24 among the 83 Questions; and very many others.[165]

§ 88. But the adversaries say that these things were written by St. Augustine before the heresy of Pelagius arose, and therefore must be read with judgment and caution. I reply first: St. Augustine retracted none of these things afterward, although he expounded some of them — but not in such a way as to wish anything to be detracted from the truth of free choice in fallen man. This is a certain argument that his doctrine on this

point was firm, stable, and irretractable. Then — what is more — I say that this doctrine was afterward repeated by him and confirmed by the clearest testimonies in those books and treatises which he published against the Pelagians. Such are: *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 30: "Do we therefore make void free choice through grace? God forbid; but rather we establish free choice. For as the law through faith, so free choice through Grace is not made void but established."[166] *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 1: "God has revealed through His sacred Scriptures that there is in man free choice of the will."[167] And ch. 2: "The divine precepts would profit man nothing if he did not have free choice of the will, by which, in fulfilling them, he might attain the promised rewards."[156] And below: "How does God command, if there is no free choice?"[168] *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 2: "Who among us says that the sin of the first man destroyed free choice in the human race?" And a little after: "For free choice is so little destroyed in the sinner that through it he sins."[169] In Epistle 46[170] (a): "Believe the divine eloquences: free choice of man exists."[171] And Epistle 47[172] (b): "The Catholic Faith neither denies free choice, whether toward an evil life or toward a good one, nor attributes so much to it that without Grace it can avail anything."[173] And other things he writes in these two letters. Likewise Epistle 89[174] (c), qu. 2: "For free choice of the will is not therefore taken away because it is helped; rather it is helped precisely because it is not taken away."[175] And in *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 18: "The very reason powerfully distresses each one of us who reflects on it, lest in thus defending Grace we should seem to take away free choice; and again, lest in asserting free choice so freely we should be judged ungrateful for the Grace of God with proud impiety."[176] And lest you doubt that he is speaking properly of free choice, he teaches a little later that the free choice of the will is to be recognized as that which is bent freely this way and that, and which is among those natural goods even of which evil men make use.

§ 89. And that we may not pursue each individual point, it must be known that after the heresy of Pelagius arose, St. Augustine so little departed from the earlier opinion which he had held concerning the free choice of man that he even bore it gravely and with indignation that this was objected against him by the Pelagians — that by immoderate and incautious defense of Grace he was destroying free choice — and he assiduously refuted that calumny with his pen, as in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 3; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, chs. 2 and 9; and elsewhere.[177] Indeed even after the rise of Pelagius, no less than before, St. Augustine directed against the heresy of the Manichaeans that doctrine which would deny free choice — thereby showing most clearly that the two things are distinct: the Manichean error (to deny free choice altogether) and the defense of Grace against the Pelagians.

§ VIII — Evident proof of the same doctrine by arguments (Ejusdem doctrinæ per rationes evidens probatio)

§ 90. — from book IV (*Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 4)[179] and more fully from the opuscule (*De Hæresibus ad Quodvultdeum*).[180] Therefore from all these passages I conclude that St. Augustine, even in those writings which he composed against Pelagius, not only does not favour the opinion of those who today deny free will, but even judges that they are to be held as heretics. Let us now adduce the others who defended the grace of God against the Pelagians. That St. Jerome, in those things which he wrote before Pelagius had yet arisen, is exceedingly frequent in asserting free will, is plain to see. The passages are in Epistle 147 (to Damasus, on the prodigal son); in Epistle 150 (to Hedibia, questions 10 and 11); in book II *Contra Jovinianum*, ch. 2; in the Commentary on Is., ch. 1 and 50; on Jer., chs. 36 and 32; on Ezek., chs. 3 and 20; and in almost innumerable other places.[181] That he in no way declined from this doctrine when, already an old man, he

began to write against Pelagius, is most manifestly taught by these testimonies from what he wrote against that heresy. In the Epistle to Ctesiphon he thus addresses the Pelagian: "You blaspheme in vain and pour ignorance into ears — as if we condemned free will; let him be condemned who condemns it." And in the preface to the *Dialogues against the Pelagians*: "It is the way of the Manichæans to condemn human nature, to take away free will, and to remove the assistance of God." And in the third Dialogue: "This is what I said to you at the beginning: that it is in our power to sin or not to sin, so that free will may be preserved."[182]

§ 91. Pope Innocent I, in his Epistle to the Council of Carthage held against the Pelagians, says: "Free will (*liberum arbitrium*) we received at birth." And in his Epistle to the Council of Mileve likewise held against the Pelagians: "In all the Divine Pages we read that the free will must be joined to nothing other than the assistance of God, and that it can accomplish nothing when deprived of heavenly helps."[183] The author of the *Hypognosticon*, a work written against the Pelagian heresy, speaks thus in book III: "That free will exists in human beings we believe with certain faith and proclaim without doubt." And further below: "Whoever shall have denied free will is not a Catholic."[184] Celestine I, in his first Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 13, writes thus: "By the help and gift of God, free will is not taken away but liberated: so that from being dark it becomes bright, from being crooked it becomes straight, from being languishing it becomes sound, from being imprudent it becomes far-sighted.",[185]

§ 92. The same author briefly shows, in ch. 8, that neither grace nor sin takes away free will, in these words: "Nor, because he is moved by the Spirit of God, should a man therefore think that he does not have free will; which he did not even then lose when he gave himself over to the devil by his will — by whom the judgment of the will was depraved, not taken away. Therefore what was not destroyed by the one who inflicted the wound is not taken away by the one who heals it." The same author, in the Epistle to Rufinus on free will: "Most ineptly and most inconsiderately is it said by adversaries, that by this grace of God nothing is left to free will."[186] And in response to the sixth of the Capitula Gallorum: "He who says that free will in man is nothing, and that it is either toward good or toward evil by God's predestination operating in men, is not a Catholic. For the grace of God does not abolish man's free will but fosters it, and calls it back from error to the way and restores it; so that what by its own freedom was crooked, by the working of God's Spirit becomes straight." And in *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 11: "There is no danger to free will from the grace of God; nor is the will taken away when by it the will to do good is generated within it." See also the poem *De Ingratis*, chs. 26, 28, and the last chapter.[187]

§ 93. Pope Leo I, in Epistle 19 (to the Tribune Turribius, in the preface), teaches that from the fatal necessity which the Priscillianists posited it follows that neither virtues deserve rewards nor vices deserve punishments; and that all decrees not only of human laws but also of divine ordinances are dissolved — inasmuch as by that doctrine the free will of human beings is removed, without which none of these things can stand.[188] Fulgentius, in the book *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 20, holds the opinion that by the grace of God human free will is not taken away but healed.[189] St. Gregory the Great, in book XVI of the *Moralia*, ch. 22, writes thus: "From the breath of grace, the works of virtues are generated in the heart; so that from free will there also follows the action, to which after this life eternal retribution corresponds."[190] And in book 33 of the *Moralia*, ch. 25: "For this reason they in no wise receive the rewards of the heavenly fatherland — because now, while they were able to merit them from free will, they despised them."[191] The Venerable Bede, commenting in *Genesis* ch. 4 on the words of the Lord to Cain, writes thus: "*Its desire shall be subject to you, and you shall have dominion over it*" — that is, over sin — "as if He were plainly saying: it is under your

power whether you act well or ill."[192] And in the Commentary on Lk. 20, the Lord is said to depart from the vineyard and to leave the vinedressers free — "But God is always said to be in doubt, so that free will may be preserved to man." These same things are found in the Homily for the Friday after Reminiscere.'[193]

§ 94. St. Anselm, commenting on 2 Tim. 2, says: "Free will God gave us, so that by the judgment of our own will we might withdraw from iniquity or remain in iniquity."[194] There also exists by this same author a book *De Libero Arbitrio* and another *De Concordia Gratiæ cum Libero Arbitrio*. St. Bernard, in Sermon 81 on the Canticle, says thus: "The freedom of free will (*arbitrii libertas*) is plainly something divine, shining in the soul like a gem in gold. From this there arises in the soul the cognition and judgment between good and evil, life and death, light and darkness, and the power of choosing." And a little later: "Hence also it is called *liberum* — free — will (*arbitrium*); because it is permitted to dwell among these things according to the judgment of the will"; and the rest that follows.[195] There also exists a book of St. Bernard's *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, in which he shows that free will is not annulled by grace.

§ 95. And indeed all these Fathers whom I have mentioned not only lived after the Pelagian dogma had arisen, but also attacked the Pelagian heresy in their writings. But to all of these let the definition of two General Councils be finally added in the place of a conclusion: namely the Council of Constance, in which this article of John Wycliffe — number 27 — was condemned: "All things come about by absolute necessity" — by which he was doing away with free will.[196] And the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 5, issued directly against Luther and the followers of his doctrine, which reads thus: "If anyone shall have said that free will in man was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a thing of name only — nay, a title without a thing — and finally a fiction introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema."[197]

§ IX — Evident proof of the same doctrine by arguments (Ejusdem doctrinæ per rationes evidens probatio)

§ 96. Having easily shown from Scriptures and Fathers that free will exists in man even after the fall — and that not merely with respect to external civil actions, but also with respect to internal and moral actions, and those that pertain to true piety — let the first argument be this. Man through sin did not cease to be a rational animal, and freedom follows inseparably upon the nature of free will (*arbitrium*), as necessarily flowing from the intellect or reason as from its root. Therefore man has free will naturally, nor through sin ought he to lose it. This argument is illuminated by the second, which is as follows: the manner of appetition follows the manner of cognition; but in man, even after sin, there is cognition both of the end and of the means — not only of those things which are necessary for the end, but also of those which are not necessary but contingent. Therefore the appetite corresponding to that cognition — that is, the will (*voluntas*) of man — is moved of necessity toward the end and toward the means necessarily connected with the end, but contingently toward contingent means, that is, toward means not having a necessary connexion with the end. There is therefore in man's will a freedom of contingency (*libertas contingentiæ*); by which, namely, among several means not necessarily connected with the end, it can, as it shall have willed, embrace one and reject another. This moreover is the freedom of free will (*libertas arbitrii*). This argument is taken from St. Thomas.[70]

§ 97. Third argument: Man, even corrupted by sin, can deliberate, take counsel, and choose, as experience most broadly proves, and as the discourse of all peoples shows. For the actions signified by these terms are attributed everywhere among peoples to men, both bad and good without exception; but these actions are

either proper to free will — such as choosing — or cannot exist without it — such as deliberating and taking counsel; therefore free will is present in all human beings. Fourth: Man even after the fall does many things which he could omit, and contrariwise: for he can go to church, go to the market-place or not go, as he shall have willed. Such acts, however, manifestly argue free will, as being commanded by it. Fifth: To man even after the fall laws and precepts are given, rewards and punishments are proposed. Nor has there ever been any commonwealth, nor can one altogether exist, that lacks laws and does not punish their transgressors. Nor did God leave man without law after the fall; but beyond the eternal and immutable law, He also imposed mutable precepts, both in the Old and in the New Testament. He added also promises, exhortations, and threats; but all of these are in vain, if man does not have the freedom of acting or not acting.

§ 98. Sixth argument: If there is no free will in man, then man does not sin, since he does what he cannot avoid; therefore he does not sin. The consequent is manifestly false, even in the judgment of the adversaries themselves, whose dogma is that man sins in every work. The consequence, moreover, is no less manifest; because no one sins in that which he could not avoid, and from which he was not free to refrain, as St. Augustine teaches in the passages already cited, and specifically in the book *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14, and in the book *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 11[198] — for in these two places he affirms that it is as certain and manifest to all that no one sins in that which he does by necessity, that he says there is no race of men by which this is unknown. It must therefore be admitted that man after the fall has free will. Seventh: If there is no freedom of free will in human beings, then it follows that some are not good and others bad, but either all are good or all are bad — or rather, none are good or bad morally, to speak of moral goodness and badness. For a nature that lacks free will is not capable of such goodness or badness. Eighth: If there is no freedom of free will in man, then there is no reason why anyone should do penance for evil deeds, to which penance Scripture so often exhorts sinners. For who would accuse himself of that which he could not have not done? Ninth: If there is no free will in human beings, then God is cruel and unjust when He punishes the deeds of men contrary to His law, since they could not have not done them, being destitute of free will for not doing so. Tenth: If there is no free will in human beings, then everything whatsoever that is done wickedly and criminally by human beings must be referred back to God as Author; for if they do not perform those things freely, they perform them by natural necessity; but whatever is done in this way has God as its author.

§ 99. These arguments, although not all of them prove that in fallen man there is freedom for choosing moral good (for in demons, too, free will exists without freedom of this sort toward moral good), yet most of them prove even this; but all of them together demonstrate absolutely that free will exists in human beings even after the fall. And since these arguments — either all, or at least nearly all — are so clear and evident that they can be grasped by any man of mediocre talent and judgment, it follows also that this doctrine of the Church, which teaches that free will exists in us, is not only known through divine revelation but is also evident and manifest from reason and the natural light (*lumen naturale*). This is expressly taught by St. Thomas,[199] by Gregory of Rimini,[200] and by Gabriel.[201] Whose opinion is rightly followed by Ruardus, Domingo Bañez,[202] and other learned men, although certain obscure authors — such as Buridan[203] and Andreas de Castro[204] — have thought otherwise.

§ 100. Added to declaring this evidence is the fact that the pagan philosophers as well, endowed with the natural light alone, handed down this doctrine with common consent — so much so that even the Stoics, though they subjected all else to fate, yet exempted human wills from that law of fatal necessity, as St. Augustine attests.[205] Gregory of Nyssa affirms this same thing of both the Stoics and the Platonists.[206] St.

Augustine also relates that it was so well established for Cicero that human beings have free will, that when he could not reconcile free will with the divine foreknowledge of future things, he preferred — not without impiety — to deny foreknowledge of future things in God, rather than to take away the freedom of the will from human beings. This is read in Cicero himself, book II *De Divinatione*.[207] See also Eusebius, book VI of the *Præparatio Evangelica*, chs. 5, 6, and 7, where he confirms by both arguments and the testimonies of the pagans that free will exists in us.[208]

§ 101. But someone will object that passage of St. Augustine, from the book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 2: "God," he says, "has revealed to us through His Holy Scriptures that there is free will of the will in man. How He has revealed it, I shall call to your mind — not in human speech but in divine."[156] For these words seem to signify that it is known not by human reason but by divine revelation alone that there is free will of the will in man. For those things which are universally known to all by experience and human reason have no need of divine revelation; nor do we usually speak of them in such a way as to say that God has revealed them to us through Holy Scripture. For example: although Scripture testifies that the world exists, the heavens, the earth, water, the sun, the moon, the stars — yet no one would say that God has revealed these things to us in the Scriptures, not in human but in divine speech.

§ 102. It is answered: there is one thing about those things which are exposed to the senses, and another about those which we know with the help of reason — albeit through the mediation of sense. Exposed to the senses are the elements and the heavenly lights. Wherefore, in order that these things may be believed to exist in the nature of things, we do not customarily use an argument drawn from divine revelation; both because it is presupposed that all men of sound mind believe their own senses, and because it is not probable that one who from absurdity of talent or judgment denies what he perceives by sense will lend credence to the revelation of Holy Scripture. But those things which we come to know by reasoning through sense are not in like manner evident to the human intellect as the sensible things themselves. For they are not in themselves subject to the senses, nay, they are of themselves remote from the senses; and in this class belongs the truth that man is possessed of free will. Wherefore, on account of the weakness or corruption of the human mind, which does not sufficiently attain to what belongs to natural reason, the authority of God revealing these things to us in the Sacred Scriptures is rightly adduced to prove them. How, moreover, the same thing can belong to faith and yet be evident through natural reason — as happens both in this article and in certain others — we have shown elsewhere, namely at Dist. 3 of Book I and at Dist. 24 of Book III.[209]

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§ XII — That free choice is not merely passive, not even with respect to good (Liberum arbitrium non esse mere passivum, ne ad bonum quidem)

§ 103. Those who say in words only, but not in reality, that free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) was extinguished by the sin of the first parent, are those who affirm that it does absolutely nothing at all in the work of justification, or that it behaves as something wholly inanimate and merely passive (*mere passive*) — saying that God alone operates in us, while we do nothing, but only receive the operation of God; as it were after the manner of some inanimate instrument, which cannot rouse and move itself to the action of which it is the instrument. This error the Council of Trent condemned,[210] and these are the words of that canon: "If anyone shall say that free choice, moved and roused by God, in no way cooperates by assenting to God who rouses

and calls, so as to dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification; and that it cannot dissent if it wishes, but, like some inanimate thing, does nothing at all and behaves purely passively, let him be anathema."

§ 104. This position in truth destroys free choice; for it belongs to the formal character (*ratio*) of free choice not merely to be acted upon but to act, and not in any manner whatsoever, but in such a way that, from the prior cognition of the mind and from the deliberation of reason, it moves and inclines itself to freely choosing one thing over another, and commands the acts to be performed by the other faculties. And Luther himself sufficiently recognized this consequence: hence he said that free choice — with this activity removed, as he did indeed remove it — is a thing consisting in a title alone, or rather a title without the thing. Therefore, whatever arguments prove that free choice remains in fallen man, even with respect to the election of good, those same arguments also destroy this error. Beyond these, moreover, there are particular passages of Scripture by which the activity of free choice with respect to good works is clearly shown: such as, first of all, all those passages which testify that man can turn himself away from iniquity and convert himself to God. For he who turns and converts himself inclines and moves himself, and accordingly is not merely acted upon and moved. The same is proved by these and similar passages of Scripture: Josh. (last chapter), "Incline your hearts to the Lord"; Ps. 118 [119], "I have inclined my heart to perform your justifications"; Ezek. 18, "Make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit"; 1 Kgs [1 Sam.] 7, "Prepare your hearts to the Lord"; Matt. 12, "Make the tree good and its fruit good"; 1 Cor. 3, "We are God's helpers" — in Greek, *cooperantes* [co-workers]; and 1 Cor. 9, "So run that you may obtain"; and 1 Cor. 15, "I have laboured more abundantly than all of them — yet not I, but the grace of God with me"; 1 Tim. 4, "Exercise yourself unto godliness"; and 2 Tim. 4, "I have fought a good fight, I have finished the course"; 1 Pet. 1, "Purify your souls"; 1 Jn. 3, "Everyone who has this hope sanctifies himself." Expounding this last passage, St. Augustine[211] says: "See how he has not taken away free choice." He then goes on to teach that we join our will to God and that we do something by our will. Finally, in general, all passages of Scripture which attribute labour, operation, running, combat, and movement to man with respect to good actions tend to this same point. For none of these truly pertains to man unless his free choice actively conducts itself toward them.

§ 105. The same is proved from the fact that the grace of God is said to help man, as in Ps. 26 [27]. St. Augustine[212] says: "No one is helped unless he himself does something." He also uses this argument in his Tract 4 on the Epistle of John and in Sermon 13 on the Words of the Apostle, ch. 11.'[213] Again, it is proved from the fact that Scripture does not only say that God operates and makes our works good, but also testifies that God brings it about that we do them — that is, acts so that we may act: "I will cause," says the Lord in Ezek. 36, "that you walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments, and do them." Hence it follows that the operation of God by which He makes good works in us is so far from destroying the activity of our free choice that it rather establishes it. For the efficacious operation of God is directed toward producing the very operation of free choice itself. But more of this below.

§ 106. Nor indeed need we labour to confirm the activity of free choice by the testimonies of the Fathers, since, just as judgments in favour of free choice are everywhere to be found in their writings, so likewise are judgments in favour of its active and elective power. It will therefore suffice to have transcribed here the words of Leo,[214] which are in his Sermon 5 on the Lenten season: "Although," he says, "our building cannot stand without the work of its architect, nor can our structure remain sound unless the protection of its founder preside over it; yet because we are rational stones and living material, the hand of our Maker has so constructed us that he who is being repaired also works together with his craftsman. Let human obedience,

therefore, not withdraw itself from the grace of God, nor let it fall away from that good without which it cannot be good." So far Leo. In these words there is also contained a notable argument for the present doctrine — namely, that God operates in man according to the mode of his nature. Wherefore, since man is a rational animal endowed with free choice, which is by nature suited to move itself through reason and election to action, it must be acknowledged that God so operates in him that man himself also truly operates and moves himself to operation.

§ 107. Furthermore, with respect to this Catholic doctrine, it must be noted that the Scholastics have disputed variously whether free choice is an active or passive potency (*potentia activa an passiva*). For there were those who said that the will is simply and purely passive potency (*potentia simpliciter et pure passiva*), such that it receives its act from the object, or from the phantasm, or from the intellect itself apprehending and judging the object as a total efficient cause (*causa efficiens* totalis); or also, as some held, from some other acting will, whose function it would be to produce the act in the passive or passible will; so that according to these thinkers the will is moved efficiently not by itself but only by another. Others, holding the other extreme, said that the will is so purely active that, as regards its act, it depends in no way on the intellect, but can move itself toward an object even unknown. Still others said that the will is a potency partly active and partly passive, such that from the will and the intellect proposing the object there is constituted one complete and total cause in the genus of efficient cause with respect to the act of the will. So teach Gregory of Rimini,[215] and Gabriel [Biel],[216] and Paludanus.[217] Again, others said that the will moves itself as regards its exercise, but is moved by the intellect as regards its specification; and therefore is active in the former respect and passive in the latter. So Cajetan.[218] Finally, others hold that the will is absolutely active with respect to its act, so that it is moved efficiently neither by the object nor by the intellect proposing the object, but only in the genus of formal and final cause; while it alone moves itself efficiently. This appears to be the opinion of St. Thomas,[219] who in the last-cited place expressly says that the intellect does not incline the will toward the good that it desires — from which he seems to remove from the intellect altogether the formal character of efficient cause with respect to the will. Capreolus hands on this opinion in his commentary on this and the following distinction, and it is embraced by nearly all followers of St. Thomas.

§ 108. Of these opinions, the first is to be rejected entirely, as bearing a great affinity with the error condemned at the Council of Trent — namely that of those who say that free choice in good works behaves merely passively. The second is rejected by universal consensus, since it is impossible for appetite to tend toward what is unknown. The third and fourth, though they have more plausibility than the former, are nevertheless refuted by the same arguments by which we judge the fifth opinion to be the true one. First: because the will is the mistress (*domina*) of the other potencies; therefore the intellect is not a potency that moves it efficiently. Second: because God alone impresses on the will — as St. Thomas says in more than one place. Third: because the Fathers universally attribute activity absolutely to free choice — namely that it can will and not will, act and not act. Fourth: because it cannot be said that the will is moved effectively by the object or the thing willed, since that thing is often not sensed and does not even exist in the nature of things but only in apprehension. Fifth: because neither can it be said that the will is moved by the phantasm; both because separated souls, which have no less use of the will than souls joined to bodies, lack phantasms; and because the phantasm is a corporeal thing, which accordingly cannot act upon the will, that is, upon a spiritual and immaterial potency. And lastly, it cannot be said that the will is moved efficiently by the intellect proposing the object; because the intellect is a necessary cause (*causa necessaria*), and therefore it would follow that the act of the will too is necessary and not free, if it depended effectively on the act of the intellect. On

this whole question, let the reader consult the ample treatment of Domingo Bañez in his commentary on Pt. I, q. 80, a. 2.[220]

§ XIII — That the freedom of free choice is not impeded by the operation of grace (Libertatem arbitrii per operationem gratiae non impediri)

§ 109. Now that it has been sufficiently demonstrated that man is genuinely active (*active*) even in good works, we must proceed to the refutation of the arguments by which adversaries attack that entire doctrine — whether those arguments look to the abolishing of man's free choice absolutely, or only in works pertaining to piety and eternal salvation. For, as we recalled above, some among the adversaries concede that man is indeed of free will with respect to civil and morally indifferent acts, so that he can act and refrain from acting; but in works that pertain to piety, salvation, and eternal life they contend that he is driven by the force of divine grace in such a way that in those matters he has no freedom to refrain from acting — inasmuch as those works proceed from grace as God's efficacious operation working within them. For this is their chief argument for excluding the freedom of our free choice from good works.

§ 110. St. Augustine recognises the difficulty of this argument as well, writing in *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 47, [222] that the question in which free will and God's grace are disputed is so difficult to discern that when free will is defended, God's grace seems to be denied, and when God's grace is asserted, free will seems to be taken away. And in *Contra litteras Petiliani*, bk. 2, ch. 84,[223] he says that few are able to penetrate by understanding how God through grace draws men to Himself and yet at the same time releases them to their own free choice. Hence also, on the contrary side, the Pelagians attacked grace by an argument drawn from free will, by means of which they denied that the help of God's grace could be necessary for good works — and they tossed this argument back and forth, as St. Jerome reports in his epistle to Ctesiphon.'[224]

§ 111. For us, therefore, towards the resolution of this argument, it must first be shown, as far as the present place requires, how false is what the heretics conclude by this argument — namely, that free choice is destroyed in good works by God's grace. Then the solution to the argument must be applied, by which it may be taught how badly they draw such a conclusion.

§ 112. Although, however, from what has been said above on behalf of free will it is manifestly clear that even in good works, which cannot be done without God's grace, man is free, we shall now briefly confirm that same thing by certain particular arguments. Such are, first of all, the testimonies of Scripture, all of which signify that good works are thus to be done by man in such a way that he is able not to do them. For it was not without God's grace that he of whom Ecclesiasticus says in ch. 31, "He could have transgressed and did not transgress,"[225] was practising justice and abstaining from sins. Yet that would be false if grace so drives man toward the good that he cannot choose evil. Nor could those persist without God's grace to whom the Lord said: "Abide in my love" (Jn. 15).'[226] Yet this would have been said in vain if they were destined to persist not freely but of necessity. The same judgement applies to all other precepts, admonitions, and exhortations toward whatsoever works of virtue by which we are led to salvation — none of which can be performed by man without God's grace.

§ 113. More clearly, however, Scripture teaches this where it joins God's grace with our free will. This is what the Apostle does in all his epistles, when he at once exhorts and prescribes and invites by promises to every kind of good work, and yet everywhere carefully impresses upon us the necessity of divine grace for

performing those works — as in Phil. 2, where he says: "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling"; and immediately adds: "For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish."[227] To this also belong the sayings of the Fathers, in which they openly testify that even in good works man is so free that he is able not to do them. St. Augustine in Tract 81 on John,[228] affirms that man is so unable to live without grace — meaning, of course, the spiritual life — that even death, that is, sin, lies within the power of free choice. And in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11,[229] he says that the Elect are given through grace the ability to act well, but not that they are rendered unable to act ill. Prosper, in *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 1, ch. 8,[230] warns that "from the fact that man is moved by the Spirit of God, it must not be thought that he lacks free choice for good works." And in bk. 2, ch. 28,[231] he says that God so gives the very willing itself that He does not take away even from those who are to persevere that mutability by which they are able to refuse; and he there teaches at length that those who by God's grace believe in Christ can cease to believe, and those who persevere are able to fall away. St. Jerome, in bk. 4 *Super Hieremiam*, ch. 18,[232] maintains that notwithstanding the freedom of our will all our good must be referred to God's grace. St. John Chrysostom, in Hom. 22 on Genesis,[233] speaking of good works, says: "Since after God's grace the whole is left to our will, punishments are therefore appointed for sinners and rewards for those who work well." And there are very many other sayings of the Fathers to this same effect, in which they so commend God's grace to us that they wish nothing to be taken away from free will. Some of these we have adduced above in asserting the freedom of choice. Indeed, the Fathers, and especially St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Bernard,[234] have argued diligently about the agreement of grace and free will, and both by authority and by reason have shown that our good works proceed from both, even though they acknowledge that the manner in which this is so is difficult to understand and explain.

§ 114. Finally, St. Augustine lays down this general rule: that whenever good works are required of man or attributed to him, with God's grace being passed over in silence, it is not thereby to be understood that grace is excluded; and on the contrary, whenever our good works are attributed to grace, free choice is not thereby to be understood as excluded, but rather that both are understood as joined to each other in every good work. So he teaches in Epistle 46 to Valentinus, and in *Retractationes*, bk. 1, ch. 9 and 10.[235] For it must be known that just as the modern heretics by means of grace attack free will, so formerly the Pelagians by means of free will attacked God's grace. Wherefore, just as the Church withstood the Pelagians, teaching that nothing is taken away from the grace of Christ by free will, so likewise she rightly withstands the latter-day heretics, teaching that through grace neither is free will taken away nor is it injured.

§ 115. This doctrine is also confirmed by multiple reasons. First: grace does not destroy nature but restores and perfects it; therefore a good work done through God's grace is no less a work of free choice than if that very same work proceeded from the free will of man without the grace of Christ. Second: this is illustrated by other works of nature. For Sarah gave birth in no other way than Hagar, even though the one had received the capacity to bear through grace, that is through God's supernatural operation, while the other had received it through nature. Nor does one who was blind and was made to see by a miracle see in any different way than one who has sight from nature; and so in other cases. Therefore one who operates through grace, which is like a miracle, operates no less freely than one who does any work through nature without grace. Nor does it matter that in the examples just cited, only the faculty of operating — of giving birth and of seeing — was given through the miracle, while the actions that followed, such as giving birth and seeing, were not miraculous but natural, proceeding naturally from their own faculty. For even if the faculty of this kind had been preserved by miracle and the acts produced from it miraculously, those acts would nonetheless come about in no other way than if they proceeded from nature alone. Third: the first Angel and the first man fell in

such a way that they could have stood; but the good Angels stood in such a way that they could have fallen, as the adversaries themselves acknowledge who say that free choice was lost through sin. Therefore even now, after the fall of man, they act well or ill in such a way that they could refrain from so acting; and therefore they retain free choice, notwithstanding the fact that they do nothing well without God's grace — since neither the Angel nor the first man could persevere, or in general do any good thing whatever, without God's grace. Fourth: a good work does not proceed partly from grace and partly from free choice, but is simultaneously produced by both, and therefore wholly by each individually in an indivisible operation, as St. Bernard says in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*.[236] St. Thomas likewise teaches this in pt. I, q. 23, a. 5,[237] rejecting the opinion of those who distinguish between what comes from grace and what comes from free choice. So likewise St. Bonaventure.[238] This doctrine will be proved more fully by us below. Therefore the full formal character (*ratio*) of free choice remains intact in the perfecting of a good work, just as grace itself remains intact. Fifth: the cooperation of the First Cause in civil and external works does not destroy the freedom of choice; therefore neither does the grace of Christ in moral works. The consequence is proved: for the grace of Christ is in truth a divine cooperation of this kind in those things that pertain to piety — for by "grace" I mean the special assistance itself by which God moves man to a work of piety. And certainly, if God's cooperation were to conflict with the freedom of our action or choice, it would follow that no action of any intellectual creature whatever could be free; because it is impossible for the efficacious operation of God as First and Supreme Cause to be excluded from things.

§ 116. But on this argument more will be said in the next chapter. From all these considerations, the solution to the argument of the heretics — which they make against free choice on the basis of the efficacy of God's grace operating in us unto good works — can easily be gathered. For God through His grace does not merely bring it about that we perform good works, but also brings it about that we perform them in a manner befitting human nature, that is, that we perform them freely. And thus through God's grace free choice is not abolished but established, as St. Augustine says in *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 30, and elsewhere.[239] Hence St. Thomas, in the place cited a little above,[240] says: "What comes from free choice and what comes from predestination are not distinct, just as what comes from a secondary cause is not distinct from what comes from the First Cause. For divine Providence produces its effects through the operations of secondary causes; hence what comes to be through free choice also comes from predestination." And in the same question, a. 3, ad tertium, where the argument ran: "Nothing ought to be imputed to someone who cannot avoid it; but if God reprobates someone, he cannot avoid perishing" — and so on — he replies: "It must be said that the reprobation of God does not take away anything from the power of the reprobate" — namely, the contrary power by which he who has been reprobated is able not to sin and not to perish. These replies are plainly fitting to the present place, inasmuch as predestination's effect is grace, and reprobation's effect is the privation of grace; and therefore the same formal character applies to the reconciling of free choice with predestination or reprobation as to reconciling it with God's grace given or not given. For which reason one should also consult what we said at Dist. 40 of Bk. I,[241] in the place where we showed that Divine Predestination and Reprobation do not abolish the freedom of choice.

§ 117. The same St. Thomas, in I-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2,[242] explains this agreement of God's grace and our liberty in exactly the same manner, in words of this sort: "Since the grace of the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit infused into us, inclining us to act rightly, it makes us freely perform those things that are in keeping with grace, and avoid those things that are contrary to grace." And he adds that the new law is called the law of liberty because it causes us freely to fulfil the precepts and prohibitions of the law, inasmuch as we fulfil them

from the interior impulse of grace. Some things on this matter will also need to be said below, where the efficacious grace will be treated. Finally, this difficulty will be more fully untangled in the next chapter, for the formal character (*ratio*) of both arguments is the same.

§ XIV — That the freedom of our will is not removed by the fact that it is moved by God (Libertatem nostrae voluntatis non tolli per hoc, quod movetur a Deo)

§ 118. What has now been said in favour of the harmony of Grace and free will will be made clearer if we show that the freedom of the will is not taken away by the motion of God whereby He efficaciously moves and determines the will itself to act — not only in those things which cannot be done without the gift of Grace itself, but in every action whatsoever. For it was by this argument that Peter Abelard and John Wycliffe made use of the removal of free will entirely from the creature, and Calvin likewise uses it. And so this argument has wider scope than the preceding one, and indeed contains that one within itself. For every work that is done by our will through the operation of God's Grace is done with God efficaciously moving; but not conversely. For the solution of this argument, it must first be declared how the will or created free will is moved by God, and whether it must be admitted that our free will is determined by God; and then satisfaction must be given to the argument.

§ 119. First, therefore, it is not to be doubted that every created will is moved by God to its operations as by a First Cause (*Prima Causa*) and First Mover (*Primus Motor*). For from this order, whereby all created causes are subordinated to God as First Cause, so as to receive from Him their motion and all their action, the created will is in no way excepted, nor can it be excepted. To this, therefore, pertain those general texts of Scripture: Rom. 11, "For from Him and through Him and in Him are all things"; and 1 Cor. 12, "Who works all things in all." Commenting on this latter passage, St. Thomas says that God as First Cause creates all operations: "Yet," he says, "lest other causes seem superfluous, the Apostle accordingly adds, 'in all'; because the First Cause operates in secondary causes." And so that you may understand that St. Thomas wishes to include even free actions, in confirmation of his commentary he cites that text of Is. 26: "All our works Thou hast wrought for us, O Lord."[244]

§ 120. The following texts of Scripture likewise pertain here: Prov. 16, "The Lord has made all things for His own purpose"; Acts 17, "Since He Himself gives to all men life and breath and all things"; Wis. 8, "She reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly." And other similar texts, which testify that God is the author and efficacious cause of all things, actions, and motions — so that He Himself moves all other causes and applies them to their operations, and accordingly produces all the effects of secondary causes prior by nature, even if not prior in time. For that opinion of certain persons is not to be admitted, which holds that God operates not prior to, but simultaneously, both by nature and by time, with secondary causes, accompanying them in operating — namely in the way in which those things that are said among creatures to exist simultaneously by nature mutually accompany one another. This is indeed not only false, but utterly impossible, inasmuch as it is repugnant to the formal character (*ratio*) of the First Cause and the First Mover. For if God does not causally precede and move prior by nature to any created cause, He cannot with respect to them be truly and properly called the First Cause and First Mover. For He is so called, not because He is in Himself and through His own essence the being that is first of all, but because in causing and moving — or

what is the same thing — in the order of all causes and movers, He is the first: in the same way as even among secondary causes some are said to be prior to others, because they are prior in causing. Then it is proved also by this reason: because God uses all secondary causes as His instruments in producing effects, as St. Thomas often says.[245] But the principal cause and the instrument do not move simultaneously by nature, because the instrument as such does not move unless it is first moved by the principal cause; therefore God does not produce the effects of secondary causes simultaneously by nature with those secondary causes, but moves and applies them as His instruments to operating.

§ 121. Likewise: everything created is from God as cause; but that a secondary cause produces its own effect is something created; therefore it is from God; and accordingly God applies the secondary cause to operating prior by nature to the cause's operation. It must therefore be altogether admitted that every effect proceeds prior by nature from the First Cause than from the secondary — that is, the First Cause, in producing any effect of the secondary cause, is by nature prior in producing that effect. To prove this more fully from the doctrine of St. Thomas and other Doctors is not the place here. It will be sufficient for me now, for its confirmation, to have adduced what the Roman Catechism for Parish Priests has (in the explanation of the first article of faith, near the end): "Not only," it says, "does God preserve and administer by His Providence all things that exist, but also those things that are moved and do something, He so impels by an inward power to motion and action, that, while He does not hinder the efficiency of secondary causes, He nevertheless precedes them; since His most hidden power pertains to each individual thing, and just as" — reaches from end to end mightily, etc. These words manifestly signify that God applies secondary causes to action, and by this causally precedes their efficiency — which is nothing other than to cause their effects prior by nature. And since this doctrine is universal, it must necessarily be extended also to the free actions of the created will.

§ 122. And that this is so, St. Thomas teaches in many places. For writing in Dist. 37 of this book, q. 1, a. 2, at the end,[246] he says concerning free agents that although they act through themselves, because they determine their acts through their own nature and their own judgment, they nevertheless do not have from themselves the fact that they act, but from the First Agent, which confers on them both being and the power to act. And this he proves more fully in the same place, q. 2, a. 2.,[247] Likewise in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 8,[248] he writes thus: "Every inclination of any thing, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing other than a certain impression from the First Agent."

Again, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3,[249] he says: "It must be said that God moves man to acting not only as proposing a sensible appetible, or as changing the body, but also as moving the will itself; because every motion both of will and of nature proceeds from God as from the First Mover" — and what follows. And in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 104, a. 4:[250] "God," he says, "is the First Mover of all wills, just as He is the First Mover of all things that are moved naturally."

§ 123. Likewise, in *Contra Gentiles* bk. 3, ch. 67,[251] he teaches that every motion of the will is to be reduced to God as the first one willing; and in ch. 91,[252] that it is necessary for the motions of all wills and choices to be reduced to the Divine will. Those passages also pertain here in which he teaches that God alone can change the created will and impress upon it,[253] as in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4 and q. 111, a. 2, and I-II, q. 75, a. 3. There are also nearly countless other passages in the same Doctor where he teaches these same things, but we have cited a few out of many. Nor does St. Bonaventure speak less clearly about this motion of the will by God, writing in Dist. 25 of this book, a. 2, q. 1 and the following,[254] and in Dist. 37, q. 1.,[255] They prove this

doctrine from the following and similar texts of Scripture which speak especially of the will. Prov. 21: "The heart of the King is in the hand of the Lord; wherever He wills He will incline it." Job 12: "Who changes the heart of princes." Ezra 6: because He had turned the heart of the King of Assyria to them; and Ezra 7 and 15: "God turned the spirit of the King to clemency." Is. 26: "All our works Thou hast wrought for us, O Lord."

§ 124. Furthermore, from what has now been said it follows as a consequence that this too must be admitted: that our wills are determined by God to their actions, even to free ones. For if God efficaciously moves the will, it certainly follows as a consequence that He likewise determines it to every action to which He efficaciously moves it. Then, if the will determines itself, but every effect of a created cause must be reduced to God as First Cause, therefore God determines the will. Thirdly, God in His operations is not indeterminate, but works all things according to the counsel of His will, which counsel is certain and determinate, whence it is also called a decree; therefore He determines His will to every thing that He does, and consequently determines to the same thing all the intermediate causes He uses; among which, without doubt, is the created will. Fourthly, every principal agent determines its instrument to a work; but the created will is an instrument of God, just as every other created cause; therefore God determines it to every work. Fifthly, just as the will has dominion over its actions, but under God as supreme Lord, so the will determines itself to its actions, but under God as first determining. For the will has full dominion over its own act, yet God its creator has a fuller and more perfect dominion over that same act; inasmuch as His dominion over every creature is most perfect and absolutely unconditional. Hence St. Augustine says[256] that God has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own. Sixthly, God is no less properly and perfectly the cause of the actions of the will — producing them through the will as a secondary cause — than if He were to produce them, by an impossible supposition, without any secondary cause. For this is true of all effects produced through secondary causes. Hence St. Thomas says,[244] commenting on 1 Cor. 12, that God creates all operations; therefore, by engaging the created will to produce its actions, He determines those actions no less than if He alone were to produce them; and consequently determines the will to them, just as He determines the other secondary causes to their effects. Seventhly, God produces the determination of the will to an act; therefore He determines the will to the act. The antecedent is manifest, because God produces every effect; the consequent is also easy to prove, because a similar inference holds well: God produces the motion of a stone; therefore He moves the stone. Nor does the objection avail which says that the inference does not hold in all similar cases; for they say it does not follow: God produces walking, running, flying; therefore God walks, runs, flies. For it must be said that these are not similar cases. For the words "to walk," "to run," "to fly," and others of this kind signify an action together with a passion, that is, an action insofar as it is received in that which is said to act. For to walk is to produce walking in oneself, and so with the others. But "to determine" is not such a word, just as neither is "to move" and other words akin to these. For to determine is nothing other than to produce a determination, just as to move is nothing other than to produce a motion, whether in oneself or in another; hence, just as the inference is perfectly valid, God produces the motion of a stone; therefore He moves the stone — so also this inference: God produces the determination of our will; therefore He determines it.

§ 125. Finally, God operates in the will as in nature, as St. Thomas teaches in *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 8;[257] but God operates in nature in such a way as to determine it to action; therefore He also operates thus in the will. Hence in the same place St. Thomas adds that God as the first agent impresses more vehemently upon the will and can change its act far more into something other than the will itself can. This is consonant with what we cited from St. Augustine in the fifth argument.[258] Indeed, the same Doctor elsewhere says expressly that the created will is determined and pre-determined by God. For in *Contra Gentiles* bk. 3, ch. 90,[259] he says that the

words of St. John Damascene — who writes in *De Fide Orthodoxa* bk. 2, ch. 30[260] that God foreknows the things that are in us, that is, within our free will, but does not pre-determine them — are to be expounded in this manner: so that they are understood to mean that the things that are in us are not subject to the divine determination as though receiving necessity from it. In the same way he expounds and excuses Damascene in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1,[261] saying that Damascene denied a pre-determination of necessity, such as exists in natural things which are pre-determined to one outcome. And before St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales expounded the words of Damascene in precisely the same way. But no excuse would have been needed if it were simply and properly true that God does not pre-determine our actions. Therefore, in the mind of St. Thomas and of Alexander, it must be said simply that God pre-determines our actions — or what is the same thing — our will to actions.

§ 126. Again, St. Thomas, in *Quodlibet* 12, a. 5,[262] while discoursing on Fate, proves the opinion of those who reduce all things to the Providence of God, by which all things are pre-determined and ordained. Some respond that St. Thomas means nothing more than that all things are pre-determined from eternity in God's foreknowledge, but not in His causality. But St. Thomas is discoursing about causality when he treats of fate, because fate is spoken of not as foreknowledge but as pre-ordination. And it is manifest that when he replies to the objection from Damascene, he is treating of the priority of causality; for there could have been no doubt about time, since from eternity God would have ordained. There pertains further here the fact that the same Doctor teaches that God applies secondary causes to acting, as in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5,[263] where he says: "God moves things to operating, as it were by applying the forms and powers of things to operation." And let it not trouble one that he says "as it were by applying," as though he wished to say that God does not properly apply them. For that word "as it were" (*quasi*) is not one of attenuation but of declaration — in the same way as John says "we have seen His glory, as (*quasi*) of the Only-Begotten of the Father," and Paul says that He "was found in appearance (*habitu*) as (*ut*) a man." That St. Thomas does not add this in order to diminish the thing is clear, because elsewhere he speaks absolutely; as in *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 7,[264] where he says and repeatedly affirms that God applies the powers of agents to acting. Again, this same thing he clearly signifies as often as he says that God moves our will in such a way as not to determine it of necessity. For he adds that phrase "not of necessity" for no other reason than that he considers it simply true that God, in moving our will, determines it. But because that determination does not cause the motion of the will to be any less free and non-necessary — with the exception only of those things to which it is naturally moved — it is for this reason that he adds "not of necessity." He speaks and explains in this way in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 5, and *De Veritate*, q. 23, a. 14,[265] and scattered elsewhere.

§ 127. Other eminent theologians likewise teach and speak in the same manner. For Scotus, writing in Dist. 37 of this book, q. 2,[266] presupposes in his disputation as a thing confessed and undoubted that the created will is determined by the Divine Will, adding also what absurdities follow if this is denied. The same Scotus, writing in *In IV Sent.*, Dist. 49, q. 6, dubium 1,[267] rejects the opinion which says that the created will cannot be determined by God while preserving its freedom, and resolves the arguments of that opinion. See the same in *Quodlibet* 16.[268] John Bassolis, a disciple of Scotus, writing in Dist. 27 of this book,[269] disputing without naming him against the opinion of Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain) — which holds that God is the cause of the actions of secondary causes only because He endued secondary causes with the power of acting — calling that opinion dangerous, teaches how the same act of the will proceeds simultaneously from God and the will as from each determining cause, saving the freedom of the will; where also among other things he says that the freedom which belongs to a man's will is such as can befit a creature, which cannot be the first agent

nor the first determining principle in any action. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), in his commentary on *Contra Gentiles* bk. 3, ch. 89,[270] openly teaches that God determines all secondary causes, even free ones, to their effects, and this without prejudice to their freedom. Cajetan, commenting on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1,[86] teaches that free will in itself is indeed not determined to one outcome as natural agents are, yet it is determined both by God and by itself. John Driedo, in *De Captivitate et Redemptione generis humani*, tract. 5, ch. 3,[271] admits that human wills are determined by divine predestination to the works predestined. And in *De Concordia Gratiae et Liberi Arbitrii*, ch. 3,[272] he says first that God, with respect to all things that He does and will do, determined Himself by His will from eternity; then he adds that God by His predestination determines the wills of men and brings it about that men determine themselves. Ruardus, in his Explanation of the Article on Free Will,[273] says that our wills, both in civil and in moral matters, are moved and determined to action by Divine Providence. He adds further things to the same effect. The same Ruardus, in a certain disputation on Grace and Free Will, proposition 9,[274] says: "By nature prior, God determines and applies the will as a principal agent does its instrument; nor is there greater difficulty in the works of Grace than in the works of nature." Domingo de Soto (Bannes), in his commentary on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 10, d. 1,[275] teaches that it is not the First Cause that is determined to action by free will, but on the contrary, that free will is most certainly determined to its acts by Divine Providence and a certain definite pre-appointment of God; because, as he says, an uncreated agent is not determined by a created agent, but conversely. Then the same author proves this by a reductio ad absurdum: namely, it would follow that in a free act which proceeds simultaneously from God and from man, man would be the first to deliberate; and thus that act would not be pre-defined by God. It would also follow that man's providence with respect to this individual act would be more perfect than God's Providence. These and many other things that author adduces in that place to prove that the free acts of our will are deliberated and determined by God prior by nature to ourselves.

§ 128. Since, therefore, from what has been said it is clear that our will is efficaciously moved and determined to its actions by God as First Cause, First Mover, First Agent, First Deliberating Cause, and that it is accordingly preceded and pre-determined by Him, it remains to explain how, with that efficacious motion and determination — indeed pre-motion (*praemotio*) and pre-determination (*praedeterminatio*) — of the divine will, the freedom of our will is consistent. For that which is efficaciously moved and determined to one side by a prior cause does not appear to be left free with respect to either alternative. For the resolution of this difficulty, it must first be known that those err gravely who think that the name of free will includes this: that it designates a cause independent of any prior cause with respect to its free action. For it is established that this is proper to God, that is, to the First Cause. Hence St. Thomas, in Dist. 37 of this book, q. 2, a. 2,[247] says that those who deny that any action of the will is from God approximate to error. For it would follow that there are several first principles, and that God, who is the First Being, is not the universal cause of all things.

§ 129. Both of which are impossible and contrary to sound doctrine. Therefore, in accordance with what has been said above, we say that for the formal character (*ratio*) of free will it suffices that, from the prior judgment of the practical intellect, one chooses one of two opposites in such a way that, nonetheless, from a different judgment of that same intellect, one could choose the other. For, as we showed in that place, the root and foundation of freedom of will lies in the intellect, inasmuch as the intellect is able to consider diverse formal characters of the good with respect to opposites and to propose them to the will. Therefore, it is irrelevant to free will whether it holds that election impressed upon it from a prior cause or not. For it is the uncreated will alone whose election is not derived from something prior. Nor indeed is God able to make any creature that, whether in its being or in its operation, goes beyond the order of its Creator as First Cause, so as

not to depend upon Him as upon the first efficient, conserving, and operating cause, and also as upon the exemplary cause.

§ 130. Therefore, just as all created wisdom and all created justice is had by participation in uncreated Wisdom and Justice — so that God, who is uncreated Wisdom and Justice, is the first, proper, and intimate cause of all created wisdom and justice, and of every created action that is wise, just, and similarly of all other created goods of whatever kind — so also all created freedom of will is had from no other source than from participation in the supreme and uncreated Freedom which exists in the Divine Will; in such wise, namely, that the uncreated freedom of the divine will is the first, proper, and intimate cause of all created freedom, and of all free created actions. So far, therefore, is it from being the case that the efficacious operation of the most free divine will destroys the freedom of the actions of the created will, that the latter cannot subsist at all without the former, but necessarily depends upon it as a participated good depends upon the essential good.

§ 131. St. Thomas expounds and resolves the present difficulty in this same sense.[144] For when in the third place he had objected to himself the argument: "That which is free is its own cause; therefore the will of man, which is moved by another — namely by God — is not free," he replies: "It must be said that free will is the cause of its own movement, because by free will man moves himself to act." And concerning the necessity of freedom, that it should be the first cause of itself with respect to that which is free — just as it is not required, for something to be the cause of another, that it should be the first cause thereof — "God, therefore," he says, "is the First Cause moving both natural causes and voluntary causes. And just as by moving natural causes He does not take away the fact that their acts are natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not take away the fact that their actions are voluntary, but rather effects this very thing in them. For He works in each thing according to its proper nature." So he writes, and most learnedly indeed.

§ 132. See the same author in part I, question 19, article 8,[276] where he teaches that all contingency in things follows from the efficacy of the Divine Will, as being most efficacious not only with respect to effects but also with respect to their mode. And in book I of the *Contra Gentes*, chapter 68,[277] where he teaches at length how freedom of will is consistent with God's causality as giver of being and operation. The same author says in question 3 of *De Malo*, article 2, at the end:[278] "When something moves itself, it is not thereby excluded that it is moved by another, from which it has the very capacity to move itself; and thus it is not repugnant to freedom that God is the cause of the act of free will." And in question 6, article 1, ad 3:[279] "God," he says, "moves the will immutably, on account of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the will that is moved, which holds itself indifferently toward diverse things, no necessity is induced, but freedom remains. Just as also in all things Divine Providence operates infallibly, and yet contingent effects proceed from contingent causes, inasmuch as God moves all things proportionably, each one according to its own mode." So much in that place.

§ 133. Finally, in the *Compendium Theologiae* — which opusculum he wrote last of all — chapter 129, whose title is: *That God alone, and not any created thing, moves the will of man*, he writes in the following manner:[280] "But since the act of the will is a certain inclination proceeding from within toward what is exterior, it is compared to natural inclinations as natural inclinations are to natural things: for just as natural inclinations inhere in natural things only from the cause of their nature, so the act of will is from God alone, who alone is the cause of the rational nature that has a will. Hence it is clear that it is not contrary to freedom of will that God moves the will of man; just as it is not contrary to nature that God works in natural things" —

both are voluntary from God: both come about according to the condition of the thing. "For God so moves things as befits their nature." Such are the words of St. Thomas.

§ 134. Nor does St. Bonaventure hold a different view from him. For writing in Distinction 25 of this book, part 2, question 1,[281] he affirms that created free will is constituted immediately under God, and that it is the last principle of its own operations after God. "For it is observed," he says, "according to the rational creature's supreme principle, above which God alone is superior." And in question 4: "Free will has this dignity, that insofar as it is free, it is subject to God alone." Now that he speaks of that subjection by which it can be efficaciously changed by God, and not merely induced to its free actions, is clear from the immediately following question, in which he teaches this at length, with the express distinction drawn among these three: that the will is *induced*, that the will is *immutably changed*, and that the will is *compelled* — of which the first, he teaches, can be done even by a created agent, the second only by an uncreated agent, while the third can be done by no agent whatsoever, since it implies a contradiction.

§ 135. From all these things it is now understood how the freedom of the actions of our will does not conflict with, but is fully consistent with — indeed, necessarily coheres with — the efficacious motion of the Divine Will; both because created freedom, as much according to act (*actus*) as according to potency (*potentia*), necessarily depends upon uncreated freedom, and because God moves each thing according to the mode and condition of its nature. For although by His efficacious operation He reaches the end strongly, yet He disposes all things sweetly, not injuring the natures of things established by Himself, but conserving them, and moving them in a manner suitably befitting their constitution. Thus, therefore, the free will of God infuses freedom into the Angelic and human creature, not only by conferring upon it a free faculty — that is, the will — but also the free act itself;

which is a greater good and a greater perfection than the faculty alone. For powers exist for the sake of acts as their ends and perfections. Now that the determination of the First Cause likewise does not prejudice the created will so that it should be less free to determine itself toward whatever direction it wills — this is similarly manifest from what has been said. For since the created will is free under God, it is necessary that, just as it moves itself when moved by God, so also it determines itself when determined by God. For just as all the other effects of secondary causes proceed from the First Cause and the secondary cause, so nothing prevents — indeed it is necessary — that the determination of a certain effect of the secondary cause toward a certain effect should be made simultaneously by the First Cause and the second, simultaneously, I say, in time. For in the order of nature it is necessary that the First Cause be prior in every action.

§ 136. Nor ought one here to imagine two determinations of the same secondary cause toward its effect. For in truth the prior would exclude the posterior: because what has once been determined cannot be determined a second time, just as what has once been done cannot be done again. But one and the same determination is to be understood, which the First Cause makes prior by nature than the secondary cause does; just as it does every other effect of the secondary cause. Concerning this matter, see Scotus in *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, question 6,[282] and Ferrariensis in *Contra Gentes* III, chapter 89,[283] both of them dissolving the arguments which are brought against this kind of determination. What has been disputed at Distinction 38 of Book I,[284] concerning the contingency of things subject to Divine Providence, and at Distinction 39 of the same book,[285] concerning human acts subject to Divine Providence, and at Distinction 45,[286] where it was asked whether the will of God imposes necessity upon things, also contribute to a fuller understanding of the

whole present doctrine; as will also be what shall be disputed below at Distinction 37 of this book,[287] on the question whether evil acts are from God.[288]

§ XV — Other arguments from Scripture against free will are resolved (Solvuntur alia contra liberum argumenta ex scripturis)

§ 137. It remains now to reply to other arguments by which the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) of man — and of fallen man in particular — is attacked. These arguments are drawn from the Scriptures. The first: Scripture frequently testifies that man, with respect to his actions, stands toward God as clay in the hand of the potter — Is. 45, Jer. 18, Sir. 33, Rom. 9 — and that clay merely suffers and does not act; and likewise some things which God works in man are such that man only passively undergoes them. The second: the same Jeremiah says in chapter 10, "It is not in man's power to direct his way, nor in a man's power to walk and to direct his steps"; therefore man does not have his actions in his own power, which is precisely what free will consists in. Hence also the Gloss on the same passage, taken from St. Jerome's commentary, says: "Let them blush who say that each person is governed by his own free will." The third: What a person does well is not from him but from God, according to the testimony of the Apostle in Rom. 9, "So it depends not on the one who wills nor on the one who runs, but on God who has mercy"; therefore in good works there is no place for free will. The fourth: The Lord says in Matt. 10: "It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you"; therefore it is not the disciples of Christ who move themselves to speak, but they are merely moved by the Spirit of God. The fifth: Man is drawn by grace, according to that saying of Jn. 6: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him"; but being drawn implies a necessity contrary to freedom. For St. Jerome in book three against the Pelagians, adducing this saying of the Lord, warns that attention must be given to the fact that one who is drawn does not run of his own accord, but is brought along either reluctantly and sluggishly, or against his will. The sixth: Man before his restoration is a slave of sin, and after restoration a slave of justice, according to the Scriptures — Jn. 8: "Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin"; 2 Pet. 2: "Promising them freedom while they themselves are slaves of corruption; for by whatever a man is overcome, by that he is enslaved"; and Rom. 6: "Having been freed from sin, you have been made slaves of righteousness"; and again: "When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness" — but servitude is opposed to freedom, whether in good things or in evil. The seventh: The Apostle says of certain persons in 2 Tim. 2 that they are held captive by the devil according to his will. But captivity is contrary to freedom; therefore those whom the devil holds captive in sins — and such are all sinners — lack free will. Hence the author of the *Opus Imperfectum* says in Homily 37 on Matthew that a man who is bound to sin by his own will no longer does what he himself wills, but what the devil wills.

§ 138. There are also other objections which adversaries are accustomed to bring against free will from the Scriptures, but most of these are to be referred to other loci of theological doctrine — as concerning Providence and the Will of God, matters treated in the second book. There also, explicitly at Distinction 40, we produced and dissolved the objections which are brought against free will from divine predestination and reprobation. Let us now therefore reply to the arguments as proposed.

§ 139. To the first I reply: the similitude of clay in the hand of the potter is not adduced in order to signify that man does nothing while God works in him, but partly to signify that man can no more hinder God's will determining whatever He pleases concerning him — whether good or evil, whether prosperous or adverse —

than clay can hinder the operation of the potter so as to prevent him from making of it whatever vessel he shall have willed; and partly to signify that each man is chosen or reprobated by God not on account of any merits, but solely by God's will. According to the former sense Isaiah and Jeremiah speak; according to the latter, Ecclesiasticus and the Apostle. But nowhere does Scripture, in speaking of the internal act of the will, say that man is with respect to God as clay in the hand of the potter. And even if it were to say this, nothing else would be signified thereby than that God can so easily turn man's will in whatever direction He pleases — just as the potter can shape soft clay into whatever form he shall have willed; indeed far more easily, because God does this by the sole nod of His will, according to that saying of Prov. 21: "The heart of the king is in the hand of God; whithersoever He shall will, He will incline it." Yet because man is an animal endowed with intellect, his will is therefore moved by God in such a way that it also moves itself, and indeed freely — God, to be sure, moving it according to the mode of its nature. Now because this does not apply to clay, for that reason on this point the similitude need not be pressed.

§ 140. To the second: Jeremiah is speaking of external actions and of the success of our thoughts and plans. He denies that it lies within man's power to carry out whatever he wills and proposes, because he can be hindered in many ways on account of the various contingencies to which human life is subject, the knowledge and ordering of which do not fall under human prudence. This sense is clear from another parallel but clearer passage, Prov. 16: "The heart of man disposeth his way: but the Lord must direct his steps." St. Augustine indeed, in book one of *De Peccatorum Meritis*, chapter 17, refers the words of Jeremiah to internal actions, but understands them as meaning that it is not placed within man's power, without the aid of divine grace, to direct his ways — that is, to make his actions righteous and good.[290] St. Jerome also, from whom the Gloss is taken, speaks in the same sense: "Let them blush," he says, "the new preachers" (he means the Pelagians) "who assert that each person is governed by his own free will" — that is to say, with the exclusion of divine direction. Hence he also cites against them that passage of Ps. 36: "he shall direct his way." Finally, the following passage of Jer. 18 is to be set against this objection, where the Lord says: "Direct your ways and your practices." By this precept it is manifestly signified that it lies within man's free will to direct his actions.

§ 141. To the third: The Apostle is not speaking in that sentence of good actions, but of predestination, whose cause he says is not the will or the running — that is, the good work of man — but the mercy of God alone. And note that if the argument were valid, it would prevail not only against free will but absolutely against the will, because it is said: "Not of him who wills." Yet the adversaries do not hold that fallen man has no will. Nor indeed do they with us Catholics raise a dispute about the will, but about free will. But if at any point the Fathers refer the Apostle's sentence to good actions, they intend nothing other than that grace holds the primary place in a good work. For it is not our will that causes grace to operate, but grace that causes the will to do so.

§ 142. And this meaning attaches to what is objected in the fourth place. For it is to be understood in this way: "It is not you who speak from yourselves, but from the Holy Spirit speaking in you and through you" — that is, the Holy Spirit suggesting what is to be said and moving your tongue as His own instrument. This, however, is done with the condition that befits a rational instrument, which is man.

§ 143. To the fifth I reply: by the drawing whereby God the Father draws a man to come to Christ, neither violence nor necessity is signified, but the most powerful operation of God's grace, which makes even those who are unwilling and resisting into those who are willing and following — and this with the freedom of the will unimpaired. And this is precisely what the words of St. Jerome mean. For St. Jerome understands this

operation of God to be called a "drawing" because by it God the Father brings to Christ men who are resisting, unwilling, and sluggish, yet in such a way that by the very drawing they are made willing and running. This meaning St. Augustine expounded carefully both in his commentary on this passage[291] and elsewhere.

§ 144. To the sixth: man is called a slave of sin, or a slave of justice, not because he exercises sin or justice by necessity — [*the text breaks off here and continues in the next section*]

§ XVI — The arguments drawn from the Fathers are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta petita ex Patribus)

§ 145. It remains for us to refute also those arguments against free will (*liberum arbitrium*) which are brought forward from the Fathers, and especially from St. Augustine. Chief among these is the fact that St. Augustine says in several places that free will was lost by the sin of the first parent — as in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 30:[293] "Man," he says, "making bad use of free will, destroyed both himself and it." And again: "When sin was freely committed through the will, sin conquered and free will was lost." And in the letter to Vitalis:[294] "We have lost free will for loving God through the greatness of the first sin." And in the sermon on the Words of the Apostle, ch. 9:[295] "Man, when he was created, received great powers of free will, but lost them by sinning."

Second: the same St. Augustine frequently denies that man's will is free before it is liberated through grace. For he says in *Retractations* I, ch. 15,[296] that our will is free only insofar as it has been liberated. And in *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, ch. 3:[297] "Free will in good," he says, "is not possessed by one whom the Liberator has not freed." He repeats similar statements both in the same chapter and in book III, ch. 7.[298] The same author, in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 10,[299] says: "Through grace comes the healing of the soul by the abolition of sin from the vice of sin, and through the health of the soul comes the freedom of the will." And below: "Why do miserable men dare to boast about free will before they are freed, and do they not attend to the fact that in the very name 'free will' freedom is assuredly sounded?" And in the letter to Anastasius:[300] "Nor is the will to be called free so long as it is subjected to conquering lusts."

Moreover, both things together — that is, the loss of free will through the sin of the first parent, and its recovery through the grace of Christ — St. Augustine conjoins in *On the City of God* XIV, ch. 11,[301] saying thus: "The will is then truly free when it is not in servitude to vices and sins. Such was it as given by God, and such it is when lost through one's own fault, it cannot be restored except by Him by whom it could be given." These words Prosper also recorded among his *Sentences* gathered from St. Augustine (no. 152).[302]

Third: the same St. Augustine (in the place cited from *On the City of God*)[303] says that the will of our volition is to be called a slave (*servum*) rather than free (*liberum*). This appellation so pleased Luther that in his book which he wrote against free will, he gave it the title *On the Enslaved Will* (*De Servo Arbitrio*).

Fourth: the same St. Augustine teaches that from sin committed through free will men have fallen into the necessity of sinning. For he writes thus in *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 4:[304] "Through the freedom of the will it came about that man was with sin; but the penal corruption that followed from freedom has now made it a necessity." And presently: "For the will, conquered by the vice into which it fell, was deprived of liberty by nature." And shortly after: "Because the will sinned, there followed upon the sinner the necessity of having sin."

Fifth: St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 23, from various places in Matt.,[305] affirms that man after sin lost free will.

Sixth: the Council of Carthage, in the letter sent to Pope Innocent, which stands among the letters of St. Augustine as no. 190,[306] speaking of the grace of Christ: "By which," it says, "the very free will of our volition is made truly free, while it is freed from the domination of carnal lusts."

Seventh: the Council of Orange,[307] held by order of Pope Leo I, from whose prescription it established, among others, this canon 113: "The free will of the will (*arbitrium voluntatis*), weakened in the first man, cannot be repaired except through the grace of Baptism. What has been lost cannot be restored except by Him by whom it could be given."

§ 146. Almost all of these arguments are resolved by the distinction of freedom (*libertas*) in its manifold senses. For, as St. Bernard teaches in *On Free Will*,[308] freedom — with respect to the position that has been stated — is threefold: namely, freedom from guilt (*a culpa*), from misery (*a miseria*), and from necessity (*a necessitate*). Now through sin man indeed lost freedom from guilt and from misery; but freedom from necessity, since it necessarily follows upon the nature of man, he could not lose. By as many modes the opposed servitude can also be distinguished. For the servitude of sin and misery man incurred through sin. But that servitude which would exclude the natural freedom of the will — whereby both to act and not to act is free — such a servitude as befits brutes lacking reason, he neither incurred nor could incur, unless he were to cease being a rational animal. For by the very fact that he is endowed with reason and is able to deliberate about what is to be done, he must have free will.

Necessity also, with regard to the present state, is manifold: the first is the necessity of suffering concupiscences that resist the law of the mind; the second is the necessity of sinning from ignorance; the third is the necessity of sinning from weakness; the fourth is the necessity of sinning venially in general; the fifth is the necessity of sinning mortally at some time in one who has not yet been liberated through Christ; the sixth is the necessity of death and the penalties of this life; the seventh is the natural necessity with respect to voluntary actions. Among these necessities, only the last is simply (*simpliciter*) repugnant to free will. For, as we have shown in its proper place, free will is properly so called from that freedom whereby one can by the exercise of reason act and not act. This freedom has no place in brute nature, in which the will is by nature necessarily determined.

§ 147. These things being premised, we reply to the arguments adduced in the first place: St. Augustine, whenever he says that man has lost free will through sin, is speaking of the freedom that is from sin and misery (*a peccato et miseria*). He explains himself in nearly all those same passages. For in most of them he adds, for confirmation, the saying of Jn. 8: "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed" — or that of 2 Cor. 3: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" — or that other text, indicating that these passages are to be understood not of the natural freedom of our will, but of the freedom of grace. And this is also evident from the fact that in the letter to Vitalis[309] it is not said simply that we have lost free will through the sin of the first parent, but that we have lost it *for loving God* — because, namely, the will of fallen man, unless repaired through grace, cannot love God above all things.

But on this point it must be noted that in the sermon on the Words of the Apostle[310] it is not said that man lost free will itself, but the great powers (*magnas vires*) of free will, which he had received in his original creation. These powers consisted in original justice and the gratuitous gifts, and in the facility of acting well.

That St. Augustine does not mean that free will was simply extinguished by sin is clear from the fact that in the *Enchiridion*[293] he says that man, making bad use of free will, destroyed both himself and it. For he did not destroy himself so as not to exist, but so as to become worse; in the same way as certain men are said to be "lost," that is, depraved in life and morals. Thus likewise he "lost," that is, made worse and depraved, his own free will.

Finally, St. Augustine himself most openly expounds what freedom he means to have been lost through sin in such passages, in *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, ch. 2:[311] for when Julian the Pelagian objected to him precisely what the heretics now assert that he says — namely, that through the sin of the first man free will perished, and that no one any longer has the power to live well, but all are driven into the sin of the flesh by necessity — St. Augustine, replying to that calumny in those same words, writes: "Who among us says that through the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Freedom (*libertas*) indeed perished through sin — that freedom which was in paradise through such full immortal justice. On account of which, human nature stands in need of divine grace, as the Lord says: 'If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed' — free, that is, for living well and justly. For free will has so little perished in the sinner that through it they sin — above all, all those who sin with delight." And other things follow there.

§ 148. Hence also are resolved the testimonies of St. Augustine adduced in the second place. For our will always indeed retains its natural freedom whereby it can act and not act, but that freedom whereby it becomes free from the servitude of sin it does not obtain except through the grace of Christ. And that this is what St. Augustine intends is again manifest from those very passages. For in *On the Spirit and the Letter*[299] he confirms what he says by the Apostle saying: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" (2 Cor. 3). And in the others he nearly always adds: "If the Son shall make you free," etc. Which Prosper also did not omit in his *Sentences*.[312] Although this whole argument, even if it were to conclude as stated, would not make much for the teaching of the heretics — those who deny that there is free will in man not only in the state of sin but even after the grace of Christ has been received. But the present argument vindicates freedom of will for man at least after grace has been received.

§ 149. To the third it is answered: St. Augustine, disputing in that passage against a heretic who immoderately extolled free will, wished to indicate what it most profits us to consider in free will — namely, that by sinning it has fallen into servitude to sin and has in this way been made a slave. Yet this servitude is not repugnant to the natural freedom of the will.

To the fourth the reply is clear from what we have said about the manifold necessity. St. Augustine speaks chiefly of that necessity of sinning which, even if it does not stand in the way of justice altogether, yet stands in the way of perfect justice — such as is the necessity of sinning venially, since even the just cannot live without sins. Yet this necessity is not repugnant to free will: both because a man can avoid individual sins, though not all of them; and also because even the demons, since they sin in every act, yet choose one sin in such a way that, having omitted it, they could do another — and so they commit this particular sin freely.

§ 150. To the fifth I reply: that homily is not by St. John Chrysostom, but by a Latin author. Yet it truly and without doubt has this sense in what it says — because, as the author explains, man, once subjected to sin, cannot free himself therefrom without the grace of God; he therefore speaks of the freedom which is from sin.

The same is the reply to the sixth: for the Council manifestly speaks of freedom from the dominion of sin; of which it also immediately subjoins the evangelical testimony: "If the Son shall make you free," etc.

§ 151. To the seventh: one must note that we cannot say that free will is simultaneously both weakened (*infirmatum*) and lost (*amissum*), since these two things are affirmed by the canon of the Council. It has been lost, therefore, in the sense in which St. Augustine — from whose words those words were taken — speaks. Hence also there is added here: "If the Son shall make you free," etc. It has been weakened, however, because, as is said in canon 25 of the same Council,[313] and repeated in the Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 1:[314] "Through the sin of the first man, free will has been so inclined and weakened in its powers that afterwards no one can either love God as is fitting, or believe, or perform what is good, unless the grace and mercy of God shall have anticipated him." Where "inclined" and "weakened in its powers" is to be understood not in the sense that the very faculty of free will has been diminished in itself, but with respect to the powers of acting well — as the words that follow make clear.

§ XVII — How freedom toward good or evil stands in relation to freedom of choice (Libertas ad bonum vel malum quomodo se habeat ad libertatem arbitrii)

§ 152. Toward the elucidation of what has been said, there is a question which the Master raises[316] — namely, whether freedom toward evil is the same thing as freedom of choice (*libertas arbitrii*) — as also the question which he likewise raises immediately thereafter concerning freedom toward good. To both questions, however, there is one and the same answer: that freedom, whether toward evil or toward good, is the very same thing as freedom of choice, differing from it only in formal character (*ratio*). Hence it comes about that, as the Master says, from different causes they receive different names. For freedom of choice (*libertas arbitrii*) is so called insofar as through it the will is free to choose this or that, no determination to good or evil being added; the same is called freedom toward good insofar as through it the will is free to choose good; and freedom toward evil insofar as through it the will is free to choose evil.

§ 153. Nevertheless, it must be known that freedom both toward good and toward evil can be understood in two ways. In one way, by understanding it as that freedom whereby someone is simply able to do or choose good or evil, whether he be inclined toward and addicted to one or the other of these or not — such being the freedom toward evil that existed even in the first man and the Angel before the fall, and likewise the freedom toward good that exists in the fallen man not yet restored, although the former has only an inclination toward good, the latter only toward evil. And according to this sense, free choice is defined as the faculty of choosing good or evil, which pertains to free choice according to its state.[317]

§ 154. In the other way, freedom toward good is understood as that whereby someone is so disposed toward good that he is moved willingly and readily to choose it — such being the freedom toward good that existed in man in his integral state, and such also, though less perfectly, as exists in man after the fall who has been restored. Freedom toward evil, on the other hand, is that whereby someone is similarly disposed and ordered toward choosing evil — such as exists in the fallen man not yet redeemed. The name of freedom taken in this latter sense in either direction, that is, toward good and toward evil, occurs frequently in St. Augustine as he disputes against the Pelagians, as in *Enchiridion* ch. 30, in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* ch. 15, in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, chs. 2–3, and in other passages cited in the preceding chapter.[318] (For he understands freedom toward good as that whereby someone, free from sin, is a servant of justice; and freedom toward evil as that whereby someone, free from justice, is a servant of sin — according to the testimonies of

Scripture, Rom. 6, Jn. 8, and 2 Pet. 2.[319] And indeed, since the word *servitude* (*servitutis*), placed alone, is customarily understood in a bad sense, just as *freedom* is in a good sense, it follows that the freedom which is toward good and from sin constitutes a man free absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), but a servant only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*) — in the way we say that to serve God is to reign; whereas freedom from justice and toward evil constitutes one a servant absolutely speaking, and free only in a qualified sense.)

§ 155. Now what has been said — that freedom toward good and toward evil is in reality (*reipsa*) the same as freedom of choice — is rightly understood not only of the first sense of each kind of freedom, but also of the latter sense; so that freedom of choice is understood as freedom toward good insofar as it is devoted to good works, and as freedom toward evil insofar as it is devoted to sins. Although others who do not wish them to be the same differ from us in words rather than in sense. For by freedom toward good they understand the very Grace by which the will has been freed from sin, or at any rate the very inclination toward good; and by freedom toward evil, the proneness to sinning and a certain crookedness of the will contracted from sin, as the Master speaks. Freedom taken in this sense is without doubt distinct from freedom of choice.

§ 156. Not dissimilar is the question raised[320] whether freedom of choice is the same as the will insofar as the will is capable of being bent toward evil. The elucidation of that question will accordingly shed light upon this present passage as well.

§ XVIII — In what ways human nature is vitiated by sin (Quibus modis vitiata sit hominis natura per peccatum)

§ 157. That human nature has been corrupted or vitiated by the sin of our first parents is a Catholic doctrine handed down by the Fathers against the Pelagians and comprised in the first two canons of the Second Council of Orange.[322] In the former of these canons it is defined that by the offence of Adam's transgression the whole man — according to body and soul alike — was changed for the worse; and in the latter, that Adam's transgression harmed not himself alone but his posterity as well, both as regards the soul and as regards the body. This definition was repeated in the Council of Trent.[323] Nor is it surprising that corruption was brought into human nature by sin, seeing that sin itself — by which we say that corruption was introduced — is the primary and chief corruption of our nature. For it is called by this name in the Scriptures, as in 2 Pet. 2, where it is said: "promising them liberty, whilst they themselves are the servants of corruption" — that is, of sin. For it follows: "For by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." That this was said by Peter concerning sin is proved by the similar saying of his Master, in Jn. 8: "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin."

§ 158. Furthermore, pertaining to this same Catholic doctrine is that phrase so frequently used by the Fathers: *that man was wounded by sin in his natural goods, but stripped of his gratuitous goods.* For so St. Ambrose teaches (in the exposition of Lk. 10), expounding the parable of him who fell among robbers;[324] and so Bede commenting on the same passage;[325] and St. Augustine in his discussion of the same narrative.[326] And again the same St. Augustine says the same.[327] Following these authorities, the Master writes as follows:[328] "For by that sin the natural goods in man himself were corrupted, and the gratuitous goods were taken away. For he is that man who was wounded and stripped by robbers: wounded indeed in his natural goods, of which he was not deprived — otherwise no repair could be made — but stripped of his gratuitous goods, which through Grace had been added to his natural ones." Thus far the Master. Here, moreover, he gives these examples of

the natural goods of which he speaks: talent (*ingenium*), memory, intellect, freedom of choice — all of which pertain to the soul. To these add the natural goods of the body, and above all the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*).

§ 159. It is asked, however, in what sense man is said to be wounded in his natural goods. Some say that he was wounded and harmed in his natural goods precisely by the fact that he was stripped of his gratuitous goods. For, as they argue, by the loss of justice, faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and the other gifts, he is reckoned to be wounded in his natural goods — intellect, memory, and will — and in the inferior part of the soul, from which those perfections were taken away. Hence, speaking strictly, they hold that it must be denied that man was harmed in his natural goods, on the ground that, stripped and denuded of his gratuitous endowments, he possesses nothing less than he would have possessed had he been created in a state of pure nature. Thus Bartholomew Medina teaches.[329] And this is indeed a consistent position for those who hold that man as he is born of Adam differs from a man created in purely natural goods in no other way than a man stripped of his garments differs from a man who was naked and never clothed.

§ 160. But this opinion does not commend itself to others, and it cannot commend itself to us. For the Fathers, when they say that man was wounded by sin in his natural goods, did not have in view merely the stripping away of gratuitous goods; they were also looking to a certain corruption of the natural goods themselves within themselves, as the Master puts it — that is, a change for the worse. And indeed the very name of "wounding" altogether seems to require this. For who would say that one had received wounds in his body, when only his clothing and adornments had been removed while the body itself remained unharmed? Such a man we call stripped and naked, but by no means wounded. The Fathers, however, affirm that he was wounded — and wounded after the manner of that traveller in the Gospel, whom the robbers not only stripped but also beat with blows and wounds so as to leave him half-dead, not merely stripped. To this is added the fact that the wounds themselves upon human nature through sin seem to be alien to the state of man in his natural condition, even had he been created without gratuitous gifts. But of this matter more fully elsewhere.[330]

§ 161. What is proper to this place is to set forth what the wounds of nature are that have been inflicted upon man by sin. These St. Thomas enumerates and explains as four,[331] corresponding to the four principal goods of nature — that is, the four powers of the soul which, by the original institution of nature, were duly subject to the governance of reason, namely: intellect, will, the concupiscible appetite (*vis concupiscibilis*), and the irascible appetite (*irafcibilis*).

The first wound of nature, therefore, is in the intellect — namely, privative ignorance of things to be done, and beyond this, a positive ignorance together with a proneness to follow errors and to assent to falsehood, especially in those matters which concern the salvation of the soul. This wound the Philosopher too seems to have acknowledged, though he was ignorant of its cause, when in his work on the soul he says that error and deception are more proper to men than their contraries.[332] And Sacred Scripture touches upon this wound of corrupted nature most frequently, as in Jn. 3: "Men loved darkness more than the light." And in Ps. 4: "O ye sons of men, how long will ye be dull of heart? why do ye love vanity, and seek after lying?" and elsewhere.

The second wound is in the will, namely malice (*malitia*) — that is, a proneness to choosing and committing evil things, not only through ignorance of the intellect, but even knowingly and against the

dictate of reason. This fault the Lord seems to have touched upon when he said to his disciples, Matt. 7: "If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children."

The third wound is in the concupiscible appetite (*appetitus concupiscibilis*) — that vice whereby the appetite is moved against right reason and the law of God toward those things that are pleasing to the senses, and flees from those that are troublesome; and it is called by the special name of *concupiscence* (*concupiscentia*).

The fourth wound is in the irascible appetite (*appetitus irafcibilis*), whereby the appetite behaves inordinately in pursuing or fleeing or repelling difficult evils or goods; and this wound is called *infirmity* (*infirmitas*). In the meantime let Bellarmine and the Thomistic theology be consulted.[333]

§ 162. To these three last wounds, residing in the threefold appetite, Scripture points in Gen. 6, saying that God saw that the wickedness of men was great upon the earth, and that all the thought of the heart was bent upon evil at all times; and in Gen. 8, where the Lord says: "For the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" — or, as it is in the Hebrew, *from his boyhood*.

It must be noted, however, that by the four wounds already enumerated a fourfold order in man is subverted and corrupted. For, as St. Thomas says in the place cited above, insofar as the intellect or reason is destitute of its order toward the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is destitute of its order toward the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the concupiscible appetite is destitute of its order toward the pleasurable as moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence; and insofar as the irascible appetite is destitute of its order toward the difficult, there is the wound of infirmity.

Moreover, these wounds of nature are common to the entire human race, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place; yet they are present differently in the good and differently in the wicked. In the wicked they are raw and festering, and therefore deadly; in the good, according to the evangelical parable of Lk. 10, they are soothed and bound up by the infusion of oil and wine, so as not to bring death, and are indeed gradually healed, according to the word of Ps. 102: "Who healeth all thy infirmities."

§ 163. Although these wounds are four in number, corresponding to the division of the aforesaid powers, they are commonly comprised by the Fathers under a briefer enumeration, especially by St. Augustine, who sometimes gathers them under two headings, sometimes under three. For sometimes he names ignorance and difficulty (*ignorantia* and *difficultas*);[334] sometimes he names ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things (*ignorantia agendorum* and *concupiscentia noxiorum*); and sometimes he names ignorance, malice, and concupiscence (*ignorantia*, *malitia*, and *concupiscentia*). Therefore, according to St. Augustine, concupiscence must now be referred to two, now to the three last wounds of nature, whilst ignorance always resides in the intellect alone.

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§ XIX — Whether the good of nature is harmed by actual sins (Utrum peccatis actualibus laedatur bonum naturae)

§ 164. Not only has the nature of men been wounded by the sin of our first parents, but moreover, in each individual person already wounded from a vitiated origin, actual sins themselves further wound and more gravely injure the natural good of man; as St. Augustine[336] and Prosper[337] teach. For although by the first sin the gratuitous gifts perished, and beyond this nature itself was gravely wounded, nevertheless there remained

in it something of good over and above the powers themselves — something that is diminished by actual sins and more and more effaced in men steeped in wickedness. This is a certain general inclination toward virtue (*inclinatio ad virtutem*). For, as St. Thomas teaches,[338] in the reason of man there are naturally present certain naturally known principles, both of things to be known and of things to be done, which are certain seeds (*seminaria*) of intellectual and moral virtues; and in the will there is a certain natural appetite for good, which is that which accords with reason. These seeds of virtue others call *remnants* (*reliquiae*), others call them the *general precepts of the natural law* (*generalia praecepta legis naturae*), of which sort are: that what is honourable must be chosen; that what is dishonourable and base must be fled; that a benefactor must be loved; that good must be repaid for good; and the like. On these matters see St. Augustine,[339] St. Basil,[340] St. Cyril (on Jn. 1: "Who enlighteneth every man," etc.),[341] and St. John Damascene.[342]

§ 165. How this good of nature — which is the natural inclination toward virtue — is diminished by sin, St. Thomas teaches at length.[343] "For through human acts," he says, "a certain inclination is produced toward similar acts. But from the fact that something is inclined toward one of two contraries, its inclination toward the other must be diminished. Hence, since sin is contrary to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, the good of nature which is the inclination toward virtue is diminished." Thus he. And again, in the same place,[331] he teaches that the four wounds spoken of above also follow from actual sins, inasmuch as through sin reason is blunted especially in matters of action, and the will is hardened against good, and a greater difficulty in acting well accrues, and concupiscence is more inflamed.

§ 166. However, through wounds of this kind the whole good of nature is never entirely removed, still less nature itself. For there always remain in man, however depraved by sin, certain remnants (*reliquiae*) of the divine likeness — such as, that he wishes to be happy, that he is unwilling to be deceived, that he judges in general that virtue is to be embraced and vice to be fled, and the like; as St. Augustine attests,[344] where he calls such remnants "certain extreme lineaments of the virtues" (*extrema quaedam lineamenta virtutum*). And the reason for this is that sins cannot bring it about that the nature of man perishes — that is, the part by which he reasons, to which part a certain discernment of good and evil belongs. Hence this good of nature is not extinguished even in the damned, nor in the demons themselves. A sign of this is that there remains in them the worm or remorse of conscience (*remorsus conscientiae*), which is nothing other than pain over a good of nature that has been lost — and the very capacity for such pain pertains to the good of nature. So teaches St. Thomas.[345]

§ 167. But how it can come about that this good of nature is diminished by sins and yet never in the end entirely perishes, the same Doctor explains.[346] The sum of his view is that the reason for this is not — as some have said, employing the example of a finite magnitude which, when divided always according to proportion and never by equal parts, is always diminished yet never exhausted, since ever less is taken — that each successive diminution always takes less than the preceding one. For this does not apply in the present case: it is not always the case that a subsequent sin diminishes the good of nature less than the preceding one; sometimes it diminishes it more, if it is graver.

He says, accordingly, that the diminution of the good of nature can be understood in two ways: one way on the part of its root (*radix*), the other way on the part of its term (*terminus*). For that inclination is founded in rational nature as it were in its root, and tends toward the good of virtue as toward its term and end. In the first way, therefore, it is not diminished by sin, because sin cannot diminish nature itself — for then nature would at length be entirely consumed. But it is diminished in the second way — namely, insofar as an

impediment is placed in the way of reaching the term; and this is brought about by each and every mortal sin. Therefore the good of nature can indeed be diminished even to infinity, because impediments can be multiplied to infinity, inasmuch as a man can always add sin to sin. Yet even so that same good cannot in the end be entirely consumed, because it always remains in its root, which is intellectual nature — even if in certain persons, such as the damned, that inclination is never reduced to act, owing to the absence of Grace according to divine justice, as St. Thomas says in the same place,[345] comparing this inclination in the damned to the aptitude for sight in the blind man — namely, an aptitude founded in the very root of animal nature, which naturally possesses sight.

§ XX — Certain things to be noted concerning the order of temptation in man (Quaedam notanda circa ordinem tentationis in homine)

§ 168. In this Distinction the Master teaches that the order and progress of temptation in men is now the same as that which preceded in a certain typological signification in the first parents when they transgressed the commandment of God; and on this occasion he discourses at some length on the twofold *ratio* and on sensuality (*sensualitas*). He wishes the serpent to signify sensuality; the woman, the lower reason (*ratio inferior*), which attends to temporal things; the man, the higher reason (*ratio superior*), which contemplates eternal things. Just as therefore the serpent persuaded the woman to sin and the woman persuaded the man, so according to the Master sensuality suggests the conceived enticement of sin to the lower part of reason; which, if it consents, suggests the same to the higher reason; and, with that likewise consenting, sin is consummated. This is the doctrine of the Master (in the present section). In truth, however, it can far more aptly and more suitably for the purpose of explaining the order of temptation be understood that the woman signifies the lower reason, that is, the imperfect reason, not yet fully deliberating or attentive to the act. The man, however, signifies the higher reason, that is, the perfect, deliberate reason, attentive to the act. But in this comparison and in the order of temptation, certain things present themselves that must be noted.

§ 169. The first is that sensuality and the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) are the same power, yet differ by formal character (*ratione*). For sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite insofar as it anticipates the deliberation of reason, and insofar altogether as it has been vitiated and wounded by the first transgression. Hence in Christ the Lord, and in the first parents before the transgression, there was no sensuality. The formal character of this distinction is taken more from the usage of the Scholastics than of the ancients, among whom the name of sensuality is scarcely found. See St. Thomas[348] and his commentators Cajetan and Medina,[349] in the same place, and Durandus.,[350]

§ 170. The second is that, in order for the Master's doctrine to extend to every kind of sin, the name of sensuality must also be extended more broadly. For since there are many sins that are not committed with respect to sensible things, by sensuality one must understand not only the appetite of sense, but in general the vitiated and corrupted appetite of man. This the Master himself also thought must be noted (at the end of the Distinction). Hence the Apostle too, in Gal. 5, by the name of the flesh which lusts against the spirit, understands not only the vice by which man is tempted to those sins that are called carnal, but the entire oldness and corruption of man by which he is stirred up against the spirit and right reason. This is evident from the fact that immediately thereafter, in enumerating the works of the flesh, he also recalls many spiritual vices among them, such as contentions, sects, envies, and other such things. Therefore the desires of the flesh

in that same place must correspondingly be understood in that sentence: "Walk in the Spirit and you will not fulfil the desires of the flesh."[351]

§ 171. The third is that in sensuality alone, whether you take it in the special or the general sense, there is no sin. The Master indeed seems to teach something different here, when he says that it is a venial and very slight sin if the enticement of sin is held only in a movement of sensuality. This he repeats a second and a third time. But this cannot hold true, unless such a movement either arises from a prior fault, or is not immediately restrained and repelled once it has arisen. For in the former manner it is voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding fault from which it follows; in the latter manner it is so through the negligence of reason present at the time. Otherwise, that no sin is committed without the consent of the will, not even a venial one, we have demonstrated above.[352]

§ 172. The fourth is that the doctrine of the Master does not hold in every matter of sins, but only in grave or mortal matter, such as the matter of fornication, drunkenness, homicide, and other such things. For even deliberate consent to a sin that is venial by its genus is only venial, unless contempt be present; although we do not say that every sin committed with contempt is mortal. This Navarrus rightly teaches.

§ 173. The fifth is that deliberate consent to those sins which are by their nature apt to lead to the act of mortal sin consummated, provided they are not directed thereto by the intention of the agent or consenter, is not always mortal. This indeed, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Cajetan and certain others, we judge more consonant with the Apostle James, who says in ch. 1: "Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, generates death."[353] For from this it appears that the sin of which he says "it brings forth sin" does not generate death, though by its nature it leads to that of which it is said "when it is consummated."

§ 174. The sixth is that the multiple kinds of consent to sin must be distinguished. For one consent is express, another tacit or interpretive (*interpretativus*). And again, one is deliberate, which is also called full and perfect; another is surreptitious or imperfect. We call consent interpretive when someone, though he does not expressly consent, nevertheless does not impede what is in his power and what he is bound to impede; as happens with thoughts of illicit things, which thoughts affect the soul with delight and allure it to sin. For if such thoughts are not repelled immediately upon entering the mind, the will already consents to them interpretively. But if a thought of this kind is retained in the mind with delight for a long time, it produces morose delectation (*morosa delectatio*), so called from the duration of time; which, if it concerns mortal matter, is judged mortal. Not that duration of time in itself makes mortal a fault which would otherwise be venial, but because that lingering is wont to be a sign of full and perfect consent.[354] If, however, such consent is not in reality full, that is, neither actually nor virtually deliberate, but only surreptitious and imperfect, it does not bind a man to mortal sin.

§ 175. Finally it must be noted that it happens in two ways that someone takes delight in the thought of an evil thing. In one way, if he takes delight only in the thought and not in the thing thought of; a delight of this kind is not always evil — indeed it can be good and praiseworthy, as when the thought of an evil and illicit thing is taken up for some good end, such as for preaching, for teaching, for counselling, or for some other such purpose. In this manner one may even licitly and honestly take delight in the knowledge of vices and sins that are opposed to the virtues. For the knowledge of contraries is one and the same; and, as the Philosopher rightly said,[355] all knowledge is good. This without doubt pertains also to the knowledge of evils, whether in

nature or in morals. Hence we also attribute to God perfect knowledge not only of good things but also of evil things. In the other way, if he takes delight in the thing thought of: which thought is always vicious; but according to the quality of the consent, whether perfect or imperfect, and also according to the nature of the matter about which it is concerned, it is now mortal, now venial. But if no consent is present, there will be no sin.

§ 176. If you ask how it can be discerned whether the delight is in the thought or in the thing thought of — for this seems to some difficult to discern — I answer that it can be known by the following sign. If a thought with delight often forces itself upon someone, this is a sign that the delight is in the thing thought of, because that frequency of the thought, where there is neither necessity nor utility for it, arises from the depraved inclination of a corrupt affection toward the very thing that is thought of. But if such a thought is not importunate, but follows the judgment and governance of reason, and at reason's command easily withdraws, this is a sign that the delight is only in the thought itself, as taken up for some good end. Although the delight that one has in a thought can also be vicious, if it is taken up for an evil end; as happens with those who seek knowledge not to serve God and the Church, but to acquire wealth, honours, and glory among men.[356]

§ 177. Let us finally add that he is not immune from sin who at first indeed takes delight in the very thought which he has of an evil thing for a good end, but gradually admits into his soul delight in the thing thought of. For in corrupted man the step from delight in the thought to delight in the evil thing he is thinking of is easy, especially in carnal sins. But whoever wishes to read more on this whole topic should consult St. Thomas and his commentators.[357]

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§ XX [continued] — Whether the first man was created in Grace (An primus homo fuerit creatus in Gratia)

§ 178. Since grace (*gratia*) perfects nature, the order of reason suggests that we pass from free will (*liberum arbitrium*), which we have from nature, to grace. Moreover, the grace of man in his integral state must first be treated, then the grace of man fallen. And to the former belongs the question whether the first man was created in grace. For the Master, on this point — following the same author he had followed above concerning the Angels, namely Hugh of St. Victor, in whom this doctrine is found[359] — teaches at the beginning of Distinction 24, as he had taught concerning the Angels above,[360] that neither the one nor the other was created in the grace by which they could merit eternal life, though he professes that he does not wish to define anything rashly. The same was the opinion of Rupert.[361] A good number of the Scholastics followed the opinion of these men, such as Alexander of Hales,[362] St. Bonaventure,[363] who adds that this opinion is the more common one, Scotus and Richard (of St. Victor),[364] and certain others.

§ 179. But just as it has been shown above that the truer opinion is that of those who teach that the Angels were created in grace, as being more consonant with Scripture and the testimonies of the Fathers, indeed also more consonant with reason; so too must one think concerning the first man. Before we teach this, these few points must be premised by way of explanation.

§ 180. The first is that by the name of grace in this dispute (as we noted also in the question concerning the Angels) is to be understood a certain habitual and supernatural good (*bonum habituale et supernaturale*) inhering in the soul; one who is endowed with it is formally constituted pleasing to God (*Deo gratus*) unto eternal life, and through it he is also able to perform works meritorious of eternal life.

§ 181. The second is that it cannot be doubted in any way that Adam before the transgression had certain supernatural gifts (*dona supernaturalia*); such as true justice (*justitia*) and holiness (*sanctitas*), which certainly do not exist without grace, as well as the immortality of the body. This opinion is clearly proved, because according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers all these things the first man lost by sinning. This the Synod of Trent also attests[365] in these words in canon 1 of Session 5: "If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted, let him be anathema." And in canon 2 concerning that same first man: "If anyone asserts that the sanctity and justice received from God, which he lost, was lost for himself alone and not also for us, let him be anathema." To this pertains likewise what the same Synod affirms (Session 6, ch. 1): that all men have lost innocence in the transgression of Adam. And in ch. 7: that Catholics in baptism receive the first robe, that is, the true and Christian justice, bestowed upon them through Christ, in place of that which Adam lost for himself and for us by his disobedience. Now it is manifest that the justice and the other gifts which we receive in baptism are supernatural. Therefore, according to the definition of the Synod, it must be believed that such gifts existed in Adam before sin.

§ 182. The third is that the opinion which says that the first man was created in pure naturals (*in puris naturalibus*) in such a way that he was entirely lacking in every supernatural gift cannot be defended without rashness and danger. Proof: because there is no doubt that the immortality of the first man was a supernatural gift (as was noted above).[366] But it is certain from the Scriptures and the definition of the Fathers that the first man was from the beginning made immortal, namely in such a way that he was able not to die.

§ 183. The fourth is that there is nothing rash or dangerous in the opinion which holds that the first man was not created in grace, provided it is not denied that he had it (which we placed in the second point) at least before the fall. The reason is that this opinion pleased many learned and weighty men, whom we have just listed, and was at one time the more common opinion as St. Bonaventure testifies; nor is it against any express testimony of Scripture, nor do the Doctors who are of the opposite opinion reject this view as erroneous or rash, but rather depart from it with modesty as from something held by others with probability. Finally, there is no definition of the Church against it. For what the Council of Trent[367] defines in the words cited above (Session 5, can. 1) — that the first man by sin lost the sanctity and justice in which he had been constituted — did not thereby intend to define that he was created in sanctity and justice. For it is one thing to have been created in sanctity and justice, another to have been constituted in it. For he could have been constituted in it after creation. For the first man was constituted, that is, placed, in Paradise (Gen. 2), yet was not created in it.[368] Hence it is sufficiently clear that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, having spoken so circumspectly as to say "constituted" and not "created" or "formed," deliberately wished to abstain from defining the question disputed among Catholics whether man was created in grace. But those who read *created* in the canon instead of *constituted* have either examined the words of the canon with too little attention, or have used a faulty exemplar.

§ 184. These things having been premised, we establish as more probable that opinion which affirms that the first man was created in grace. To prove it, first of all those things are of service which were said in the

proper place concerning the Angels. For the formal character (*ratio*) of both natures, the angelic and the human, seems to be the same, as far as the present matter is concerned. For each is intellectual, created to this end, that by the perfect contemplation of God it should be made blessed. Moreover, concerning man himself there are proper testimonies of this matter, both in Sacred Scripture and most especially in the monuments of the Fathers.

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1. Gen. 4:7.
2. 1 Cor. 7:37.
3. Tit. 3:14 [Estius reads as "Tit. 3, cap. 3"].
4. St. Basil, *Homily 9* (*On the fact that God is not the author of evils*).
5. St. Augustine, *Retractations* I, ch. 23, and frequently elsewhere.
6. St. Augustine, *On Free Will* III, ch. 1: "No fault can be found where there is necessity."
7. Deut. 30:15, 19.
8. Sir. 15:14.
9. Sir. 15:17–18.
10. Sir. 15:22 [Latin enumeration, corresponding to Sir. 31:10 in some editions].
11. Is. 1:19–20.
12. Matt. 12:33.
13. 2 Sam. 24:12 [Vulgate: 2 Kgs. 24].
14. St. Augustine, *On Free Will* III, ch. 1; and *On the Merits of Sins* II, ch. 18; cf. also *On Free Will* III, ch. 1.
15. St. Augustine, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* II, ch. 18.
16. St. Augustine, *On Free Will* III, ch. 1.
17. St. Anselm, *On Free Will*.
18. St. Bernard, *On Grace and Free Will*; and *Sermon 18 on the Canticles*.
19. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In I Sent.*, dist. 34, §. E., and dist. 25, throughout nearly the whole.
20. Hugh (of St. Victor), *Summa Sententiarum*, tractate 3, ch. 4.
21. Origen, *Peri Archon* (On First Principles) III, ch. 1.
22. Theophilus of Alexandria, *Paschal Letter* II.
23. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, ch. 25 [bk. 2, ch. 25 in some editions].
24. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 24 [this distinction].
25. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 106.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 4.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 4; and III, q. 18, a. 4.
28. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7.
29. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 4.
30. St. Thomas, *Disputed Questions: On Evil*, q. 6, a. 1 [*De Malo*, q. 6, art. unico].
31. These are among the Baianian Theses condemned: nos. 66 and 39; and among the Jansenian propositions condemned by Popes Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Urban VIII, no. 41 (in these words: "That mode of freedom which is freedom from necessity is not

found in Scripture; only the name of freedom from sin is found there") and no. 67 (condemning what is done necessarily as sinfully done). These same propositions were also confirmed among those condemned as Jansenian.

32. St. Augustine, *The City of God* V, ch. 10.

33. St. Augustine, *The City of God* XXII, ch. 30 (last chapter).

34. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 105.

35. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 106 [as in source].

36. Prosper (of Aquitaine), *Against the Collator* (*Contra Collatorem*), ch. 19.

37. St. Bernard, *Sermon 18 on the Canticles* (*In Cantica Canticorum*, Sermo 18).

38. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, §. A. and §. E.

39. St. Augustine, *The City of God* XXII, ch. 30.

40. St. Thomas, *Disputed Questions: On Power* (*De Potentia*), q. 3, a. 7, ad 14.

41. St. Thomas, *Disputed Questions: On Power*, q. 10, a. 2, ad [reference as in source].

42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 2, ad 3.

43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 4, in the body of the article.

44. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, on the text; and dist. 25, a. 2, q. 1; and q. 2.

45. Alfonso de Castro, *On Heresies* (*De Haeresibus*), under the word *Libertas*.

46. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* VI, ch. 2.

47. Cf. Estius, commentary above, *In I Sent.*, dist. 38.

48. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, §. I.

49. Sir. 31 [as cited in the text; Estius refers to Sir. 31:10 in some Vulgate numberings].

50. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 2.

51. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 5 (*Ethic.* 3, cap. 5).

52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83; I-II, q. 8; q. 13; q. 17 [as cited in source].

53. Sir. 31 [as cited in source; the authority of Ecclesiasticus ch. 31 cited by St. Bernard to prove that men do good or evil freely].

54. Exod. 32 [Vulgate: "Dimitte me ut irascatur furor meus"].

55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 2.

56. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.* (or *In II Sent.*), dist. 25, q. 2 [as in source].

57. Alfonso de Castro, *De Haeresibus*, under the word *Libertas*.

58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83; I-II, q. 8; q. 13; q. 17 [as cited in source at section heading].

59. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In I Sent.*, this Distinction, q. 3.

60. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I, q. 16.

61. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, single question [as in source].

62. Abulensis (Alfonso Tostado), q. 6, on 3 Kgs. (1 Kgs.) ch. 12.

63. St. Thomas: q. 1 on the present Distinction (*In II Sent.*, dist. 24, q. 1); *De Veritate*, q. 24, aa. 1, 4, 6; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, aa. 1, 3, 4; I-II, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2; q. 13, a. 1 and 6; q. 17, a. 1, ad 2.

64. Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 21.

65. Richard Capreolus, on this Distinction [*In II Sent.*, dist. 24].

66. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, a. 1, q. 6.

67. Cajetan, commentary on the principal places of St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae* already cited.

68. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2.

69. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, ch. 1.

70. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 80, a. 2.

71. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, chs. 2–3.

72. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 3.

73. Clement (or whoever the author may be), Epistle 2 to James [ps.-Clementine].

74. Origen, *Periarchon* (= *De Principiis*) III, ch. 2.

75. St. Bernard, *In Cantica Canticorum*, Sermon 81.

76. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 20.

77. The Master (Peter Lombard), this Distinction (*In II Sent.*, dist. 24), §. E.

78. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, ch. 1 (beginning).

79. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 80, a. 1; I-II, q. 9, a. 2.

80. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus contra Manichaeos*, ch. 10.

81. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 9.

82. St. Bernard, Sermon 3 *De Paschate*.

83. Estius, commentary on *In II Sent.*, dist. 22 [as in source: "ad Distinct. 22"].

84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* at the same places cited above.

85. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3.

86. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1.

87. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 3 [source: "q. 83, art. s" = a. 3 in context; the printed text reads "eadem q. 83, art. s"].

88. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 5.

89. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 1, a. 3.

90. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 3; and Cajetan in the same place.

91. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 9, a. 4; and *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 89; and Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris) in the same place.

92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 13, a. 1.

93. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 3.

94. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, ch. 2.

95. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, ch. 3.

96. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Philosophia* (= *De Anima et Resurrectione* or the work cited as such), ch. 4.

97. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 6.

98. Domingo Báñez, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 9, a. [abbreviation as in source: "quest. 9. art."].

99. Estius, commentary on *In II Sent.*, dist. 22.

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 8.

101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3; and *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 88, a. 4, ad 1.

102. Estius, commentary *In I Sent.*, dist. 45.

103. St. Ambrose, *De Fide* II, ch. 3.

104. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, last chapter of the last book [i.e., Book XXII, final chapter].

105. Estius, commentary on dist. 7 of this book [*In II Sent.*, dist. 7], where it was asked how the formal character of free choice remains intact in Angels already confirmed or hardened.

106. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11.

107. St. Thomas [abbreviation as in source: continuation of argument referencing St. Thomas on the greater freedom of those who cannot sin].

108. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the place cited above [i.e., I, q. 62, a. 8].

109. Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, ch. 7.

110. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 1.

111. Deut. 30; Sir. 15:17–18; Sir. 31.

112. Origen, *Peri Archon* (= *De Principiis*), bk. 1, preface.

113. St. Hilary, Commentary on the Psalms, at the final verse [passage as cited in source].

114. St. Jerome, Epistle to Pope Damasus on the Prodigal Son.

115. St. Jerome, Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon.

116. St. Jerome, Exposition of the Creed to Damasus.

117. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, dist. 7.

118. St. Hilary, Commentary on Ps. 2, at the words "Tunc loquetur ad eos in ira sua."

119. St. Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, at ch. 9 ("neither have they any more a reward," Eccl. 9:5).

120. Estius, commentary *In I Sent.*, dist. 45; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 7.

121. Estius, commentary *In II Sent.*, dist. 7, where it was asked how the confirmation and hardening of the Angels is consistent with their free choice.

122. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 8, a. 1.

123. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 43, q. 2.

124. Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 4.

125. William of Ockham, *In III Sent.*, q. 13, dubium 3.

126. Deut. 30.

127. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II (chs. 4 and 9) [as cited in source].

128. St. Bernard, Sermon 35 (among the lesser sermons) [abbreviation as in source: *in parvis*].

129. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, ch. 1.

130. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* [book as in source].

131. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* I.

132. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, ch. 6.

133. Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* IV.

134. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, ch. 1 (place cited above).

135. Seneca, *De Beneficiis* IV, ch. 9.

136. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 20, a. 1; I-II, q. 8, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, chs. 16–17.

137. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, q. 1 super dist. sequentem [i.e., the distinction following dist. 24, as cited in source].

138. Estius, commentary *In III Sent.*, dist. 22.

139. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, chs. 6, 8, and 9.

140. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83.

141. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, ch. 22.

142. William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta* I, q. 16; *In II Sent.*, dist. 25 [abbreviation as in source: *in Dist. 38. in 2. Dist. 25*].

143. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* I, last chapter.

144. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1.

145. Sir. 15.

146. Is. 1.

147. Zech. 11.

148. Matt. 12.

149. 2 Kgs (last chapter); 1 Chr. 21.

150. Dan. 13.

151. 1 Cor. 7.

152. Sir. 31.

153. Jn. 19.

154. Ps. 36.

155. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 7.

156. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 2.

157. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1 (as above).

158. St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 36.

159. St. Augustine, *Soliloquia* I, ch. 1.

160. St. Augustine, *De Fide contra Manichaeos*, ch. 10.

161. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 11.

162. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 12.

163. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* V, ch. 10.

164. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* I, ch. 12; II, ch. 1; III, chs. 4 and 18.

165. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14; *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 9; *De Actis cum Felice Manichaeo* II, chs. 3–4; *Tractatus* 4 *in Epistolam Joannis*; *Quaestio* 24 among the *83 Quaestiones*.

166. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 30.

167. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 1.

168. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 2 (continued).

169. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 2.

170. Epistle 46 (a): In the edition of the Benedictine Fathers, this is Epistle 214, placed among the epistles of the third class; written, as those praised Fathers note in their preface to vol. 2 of the works of St. Augustine, at a minimum ten years before the condemned Pelagian heresy — i.e., at minimum before the year 417 or 418, contrary to what Baronius supposed, who assigned it to the year 418.

171. St. Augustine, Epistle 46 (= Benedictine Epistle 214).

172. Epistle 47 (b): In the same Benedictine edition, Epistle 213, written the same year after Easter, as those same Fathers note.

173. St. Augustine, Epistle 47 (= Benedictine Epistle 213).

174. Epistle 89 (c): In the same prefaced edition, Epistle 157; apparently written in the year 414, addressed to Hilarius of Syracuse, as those same Fathers note.

175. St. Augustine, Epistle 89 (= Benedictine Epistle 157), qu. 2.

176. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 18.

177. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 3; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, chs. 2 and 9.

178. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II [*ibidem*].

179. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4.

180. St. Augustine, *De Hæresibus ad Quodvultdeum*.

181. St. Jerome: Epistle 147 (to Damasus, on the prodigal son); Epistle 150 (to Hedibia, questions 10 and 11); *Contra Jovinianum* II, ch. 2; Commentary on Is., chs. 1 and 50; Commentary on Jer., chs. 36 and 32; Commentary on Ezek., chs. 3 and 20; and almost innumerable other passages.

182. St. Jerome: Epistle to Ctesiphon; Preface to the *Dialogues against the Pelagians*; *Dialogues against the Pelagians*, Book III.

183. Pope Innocent I: Epistle to the Council of Carthage (against the Pelagians); Epistle to the Council of Mileve (against the Pelagians).

184. [Pseudo-]Augustine, *Hypognosticon* III (a work written against the Pelagian heresy).

185. Pope Celestine I, first Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 13.

186. [Prosper of Aquitaine], Epistle to Rufinus, *De libero arbitrio* [attribution as in source].

187. [Prosper of Aquitaine]: Response to the sixth of the *Capitula Gallorum*; *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 11; *Carmen De Ingratis*, chs. 26, 28, and the last chapter.

188. Pope Leo I, Epistle 19, to Turribius, Tribune and Bishop, in the preface.

189. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 20.

190. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XVI, ch. 22.

191. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXIII, ch. 25.

192. Bede, Commentary on Gen. 4.

193. Bede, Commentary on Lk. 20; Homily for the Friday after Reminiscere.

194. St. Anselm, Commentary on 2 Tim. 2; also *De Libero Arbitrio* and *De Concordia Gratiæ cum Libero Arbitrio*.

195. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 81; also *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*.

196. Council of Constance: condemnation of article 27 of John Wycliffe.

197. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 5.

198. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14; *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 11.

199. St. Thomas, *Quæstiones Disputatæ De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1.

200. Gregory of Rimini, *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 1, ch. 1.

201. Gabriel [Biel], *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, a. 2, dubium 2.

202. Domingo Bañez [abbreviation "Dom. Bannes" as in source].

203. Buridan, q. 1 on *Nicomachean Ethics* III.

204. Andreas de Castro, *In Sent.*, dist. 45.

205. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 10.

206. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Fato*, chs. 1, 2, and 3.

207. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 9; Cicero, *De Divinatione* II.

208. Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica* VI, chs. 5, 6, and 7.

209. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 3; *In III Sent.*, dist. 24 [cross-references within the present commentary].

210. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 5 and canon 4.

211. St. Augustine, Tract 4 on the First Epistle of John.

212. St. Augustine, *De Perfecta Justitia*, ch. 19.

213. St. Augustine, Tract 4 on the Epistle of John; and Sermon 13 on the Words of the Apostle, ch. 11.

214. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 5 *De Quadragesima*.

215. Gregory of Rimini, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 1.

216. Gabriel [Biel], *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, dubium 3.

217. Paludanus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 3, a. 1.

218. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 80, a. 2; q. 82, aa. 4–5; and elsewhere.

219. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, ch. 72, argument 6; *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 22, aa. 9 and 11, ad 5.

220. Domingo Bañez, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 80, a. 2 [abbreviation "Dom. Bannes" as in source].

221. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 8; also I-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2; and q. 11.

222. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 47.

223. St. Augustine, *Contra litteras Petiliani*, bk. 2, ch. 84.

224. St. Jerome, Epistle to Ctesiphon [abbreviation "ad Ctesiphontem" as in source].

225. Sir. 31 (Vulgate).

226. Jn. 15.

227. Phil. 2.

228. St. Augustine, Tract 81 on John (*In Joannem*).

229. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11.

230. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 1, ch. 8.

231. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 2, ch. 28.

232. St. Jerome, *In Hieremiam*, bk. 4, ch. 18 (on Jer. 18).

233. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 22.

234. St. Augustine; St. Anselm, *De Libero Arbitrio*; St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, and *Sermo 18 in Cantica*.

235. St. Augustine, Epistle 46 to Valentinus; *Retractationes*, bk. 1, ch. 9 and 10.

236. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*.

237. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5.

238. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, reply to the penultimate argument.

239. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 30, and elsewhere.

240. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5 [the place cited just before].

241. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 40 [reference "ad Dist. 40. lib. 1." as in source].

242. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 108, a. 1, ad 2.

243. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4, ad 1 and ad 2; and many other places.

244. St. Thomas, commentary on 1 Cor. 12 [abbreviation "Super 1. Corinth. 12." as in source].

245. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4 [and many other places as cited].

246. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 2, at the end.

247. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2.

248. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 8.

249. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3.

250. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 104, a. 4.

251. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 67.

252. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 91.

253. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4; q. 111, a. 2; I-II, q. 75, a. 3.

254. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, a. 2, q. 1 and following.

255. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1.

256. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 14.

257. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 8.

258. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 14 [as cited in the fifth argument].

259. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 90.

260. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 30.

261. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1.

262. St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* 12, a. 5.

263. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5.

264. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

265. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 5; *De Veritate*, q. 23, a. 14.

266. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 2.

267. Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 6, dubium 1.

268. Scotus, *Quodlibet* 16.

269. John Bassolis, *In III Sent.*, dist. 27.

270. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), commentary on St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* III, ch. 89.

271. John Driedo, *De Captivitate et Redemptione generis humani*, tract. 5, ch. 3.

272. John Driedo, *De Concordia Gratiae et Liberi Arbitrii*, ch. 3.

273. Ruardus, *Explicatio Articuli De Libero Arbitrio* [abbreviation as in source].

274. Ruardus, disputation on Grace and Free Will, proposition 9.

275. Domingo Bannes, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 10, d. 1.

276. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8.

277. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, ch. 68.

278. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 2, at the end.

279. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3.

280. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae*, ch. 129.

281. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 25, part 2, q. 1; and q. 4.

282. Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 6.

283. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), *Commentary on Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 89.

284. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 38.

285. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 39.

286. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 45.

287. Estius, commentary on *In III Sent.*, dist. 37.

288. Footnote (a) in source: The doctrine delivered in this and the preceding section, which is that of St. Thomas and the Thomists, concerning the freedom of man from natural necessity — not only from coercion — is so constituted that neither the Jansenian nor the Quesnellian sentiments can agree with it, as those parties say that the sheep would have to be sought again. But we shall deal with these matters more at present; certain things have already been noted in the preceding book, certain others we shall note more fully at Distinctions 26 and 28 with God's assistance.

289. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1 [source citation as given at head of § XV].

290. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* I, ch. 17.

291. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis*, Tractate 26 (on Jn. 6).

292. St. Thomas, as cited above at the head of § XV [source citation as given].

293. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 30.

294. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 (in the Benedictine edition, Epistle 145) to Vitalis.

295. St. Augustine, Sermon 2 on the Words of the Apostle, ch. 9 (in the Benedictine edition, Sermon 131, among the sermons of the first class).

296. St. Augustine, *Retractations* I, ch. 15.

297. St. Augustine, *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, ch. 3.

298. St. Augustine, *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians* III, ch. 7.

299. St. Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 10.

300. St. Augustine, Epistle 144 (in the Benedictine edition, Epistle 145) to Anastasius.

301. St. Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, ch. 11.

302. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sentences gathered from St. Augustine*, no. 152.

303. St. Augustine, *On the City of God*, loc. cit.

304. St. Augustine, *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 4.

305. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 23, from various places in Matt.

306. Council of Carthage, letter sent to Pope Innocent, found among the letters of St. Augustine as no. 190 (in the Benedictine edition, no. 175).

307. Council of Orange (Concilium Arausiacanum secundum), held by order of Pope Leo I, canon 113. [Note: The source's footnote explains this is the second Council of Orange, held in the dedication of the Basilica of Liberius Patricius, constructed 5 Nones of July, in the year 529, under Felix IV, Pope, approved by Boniface, Lampadius and Orestes as consuls, as exhibited by Jacobus Sirmondus; the source's footnote apparatus discusses at length various details of the dating and identification of this council, noting confusion with the first Council of Orange, held in the Church at Justinianensis on the sixth Ides of November in the 17th year of Augustus and the 2nd year of Leo I as Pope, in the year of Christ 441 under Valentinian III, as exhibited by Sirmondus; see further Cardinal Henricus de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana* II, chs. 22–23; Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez, and Baronius.]

308. St. Bernard, *On Free Will* (*De Libero Arbitrio*).

309. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 (Benedictine: 145) to Vitalis.

310. St. Augustine, Sermon 2 on the Words of the Apostle (Benedictine: Sermon 131).

311. St. Augustine, *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians* I, ch. 2.

312. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sentences gathered from St. Augustine*.

313. Council of Orange (Arausiacanum secundum), canon 25.

314. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 1.

315. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85.

316. The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, dist. 25, § I (and the following § similarly).

317. The phrase "which pertains to free choice according to its state" (*convenire libero arbitrio secundum statum*) refers to the varying conditions of freedom across the different states of human nature (integral, fallen, redeemed, glorified).

318. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 30; *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 15; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, chs. 2–3. Cf. the citations assembled in the preceding section of this commentary.

319. Rom. 6; Jn. 8; 2 Pet. 2.

320. This further question is raised in the final part of the distinction (the last question of the distinction, not yet reached here), concerning whether free choice is identical with the will as capable of being bent toward evil.

321. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 3.

322. The Second Council of Orange (529 AD), canons 1 and 2.

323. Council of Trent, Session 5, canons 1 and 3.

324. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, on Lk. 10.

325. Bede, Commentary on Lk. 10.

326. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones Evangelicarum* II, q. 10.

327. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 3.

328. The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, dist. 25, § II.

329. Bartholomew Medina, on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3; and on q. 109, prooemium; and frequently elsewhere.

330. The note in the source refers to a work on the grace of the first man, ch. 5, as the place where opportune annotations will be found ("Quo loco quae opportuna sunt adnotabimus verf. lib. unito de Gratia primi hominis cap. 5").

331. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3.

332. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, ch. 3.

333. Bellarmine, *Controversiarum*, tom. 3, lib. 6, *De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*; and the Thomistic theology, tract. 6, disputation [as cited in source].

334. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 67; *Retractationum* I, ch. 9.

335. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, aa. 1–2.

336. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* III, ch. 13.

337. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Ad quinque objectiones Vincenti*, and *Sententiarum* 382 (drawn from the aforesaid passage of St. Augustine).

338. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1 (as cited by Estius; the content described corresponds to I-II, q. 63, a. 1 on seeds of virtue).

339. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in monte* I, on Matt. 7 ("Whatsoever you would that men should do to you," etc.); *De Libero Arbitrio* II, ch. 10; *Sermone* 28 *de verbis Domini*.

340. St. Basil, *Regulae*, second and third.

341. St. Cyril, Commentary on Jn. 1 (on "Who enlighteneth every man," etc.).

342. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, ch. 14.

343. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 1.

344. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27.

345. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3.

346. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 2, in the body of the article.

347. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, aa. 3 and 8; II-II, q. 165, etc.

348. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3.

349. Cajetan and Medina, commentaries on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3.

350. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In III Sent.*, dist. 12.

351. Gal. 5:16.

352. Above, at Distinction 21.

353. Jas. 1:15.

354. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 6, ad 3 [as cited by Estius in the marginal note at this point: morose delectation is called such from adherence, not merely from duration of time; if the will deliberately and with advertence of reason consents, even if for the briefest space of time, it is already morose].

355. Aristotle, *De Anima* I [as cited in source].

356. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 31, a. 5; q. 74, a. 6, ad 3; q. 88, a. 5, ad 2; II-II, q. 154, a. 4; q. 162, a. 3, ad 1; q. 180, a. 7.

357. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 8 (throughout); and the commentators cited above on the same.

358. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1; II-II, q. 5, a. 1 [as cited in source: "1. p. qu. 85. art. 1. Item 2. 2. qu. F. art. 1." — the "qu. F." appears to be an OCR corruption of "q. 5"].

359. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, part 6, ch. 17.

360. The Master, *In I Sent.*, Distinction 3 [i.e., the earlier discussion of the Angels].

361. Rupert, *In Matthaeum* XIII.

362. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, part 2, q. 96, member 1.

363. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 29, a. 2.

364. Scotus and Richard (of St. Victor), *In II Sent.*, dist. 29.

365. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 1; Session 6, chs. 1 and 7.

366. Above, Distinction 19 [as cited in source].

367. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 1.

368. Gen. 2 [the first man was placed/constituted in Paradise, not created therein].

DISTINCTIO XXV — WHETHER THE FIRST MAN WAS CREATED IN GRACE (*DE HOMINE IN GRATIA CONDITO*)

§ 1. The Scriptural passages which we find used by both older and more recent authors for proving this matter are the following. Gen. 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Eccl. 7: "This I have found, that God made man upright." Sir. 17: "God created man of the earth, and after his own image he clothed him with strength." These texts, taken by themselves, do not altogether prove that man was created in such rectitude as to be able to merit eternal life; yet, with the consent of nearly all the Fathers lending its weight, they are not without reason received in the sense we have stated, particularly if one also considers that Scripture acknowledges no rectitude of man other than that by which he is ordered toward eternal life. That no certain argument for this opinion can be drawn from those Scriptural passages, however, is readily apparent. For in the passage Gen. 1, many quite plausibly understand "likeness" to be the same as "image" — a matter we have discussed above.[1] The second passage is general in character, and is in no way of itself confined to supernatural rectitude. Cajetan, moreover, interprets it not of Adam alone, but of other human beings as well. In the third passage, "strength" (*virtus*) is not understood as the virtue (*virtus*) opposed to vice (although even so it would not be a certain proof) but as that which is opposed to infirmity; for the Greek word signifies strength — on which see Jansenius.[2]

§ 2. Others bring forward that saying of the Apostle, Eph. 4: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth." And the same Apostle's words, Col. 3: "Stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of him who created him." But from these Scriptural texts, too, the proof is neither evident nor certain. For the Apostle, when he speaks of the new man created in justice and holiness, does not mean Adam, but the man who is renewed from his old state — that is, the fallen man restored through Christ; and this man is said to be renewed in the spirit of his mind because he is brought back to that newness of mind which he once possessed in the first parent. But the Apostle does not say that the first parent himself was created in such newness. The more illustrious proof of this doctrine, however, comes from the Fathers, who all ascribe justice and holiness to the first man before the fall; and most of them assert this even from the very beginning of his creation.

§ 3. It is not explicitly asserted by others, and so neither is it denied. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 3, part 3,[3] says that God made us in the first parent participants in the divine likeness and divine estate (*divinus status*), which he interprets as referring to every kind of virtue. Irenaeus, bk. 3, *Contra haereses*, ch. 20,[4] says that in Jesus Christ we recover what we lost in Adam. And at ch. 37, he makes Adam himself say: "because the robe of sanctification which I had from the Holy Spirit I lost through disobedience." Cyprian, in Epistle 74 (which is addressed to Pompeius),[5] expounds those words of Scripture, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," as referring to the grace of the Holy Spirit infused by God into the soul of the first man. And in Sermon 3 (which is on patience),[6] he affirms that Adam lost the grace

divinely received by the transgression of the divine commandment. Methodius the martyr, cited by Epiphanius (in the Heresy of Origen),[7] similarly understands by "the breath of life" which God breathed into the face of man, the Holy Spirit. This interpretation is also found in some other writers, as we noted above,[8] and specifically in St. Basil (in the exposition of Psalm 48, at the verse: "Man when he was in honour," etc.).[9] And this same Basil, in the homily *That God is not the author of evils*,[10] speaks of Adam thus: "What was his pre-eminent good? The approach to God and union with Him through love," etc. And in *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 15,[11] he says: "Through the Holy Spirit comes restoration to Paradise, return to adoption as sons," etc. See also the same work, ch. 9.[12]

§ 4. St. Ambrose followed the opinion of St. Basil. For in bk. 6, *Hexaemeron*, ch. 7,[13] having interpreted the image of God as referring to the varied adornment and grace of the virtues, he added these words: "According to this image, Adam was before sin; but when he fell, he laid aside the image of the heavenly, and took on the form of the earthly." The same Ambrose, in his Commentary on Luke, expounding at ch. 10 the parable of the man who fell among thieves,[14] testifies that in Adam we were despoiled and stripped of the garments of spiritual Grace. See also his writing in the commentary on Luke ch. 4,[15] where he treats the verse of Ps. 113: "Jordan was turned back." And in the book *De Dignitate hominis*, ch. 3.[16] Hilary likewise, in a certain homily on holy Job,[17] says that in Adam's offence we lost the nobility of that first and blessed creation. This homily is no longer extant, but the words are read in St. Augustine, bk. 2, *Contra Julianum*, ch. 8.[18]

§ 5. Gregory of Nazianzus — his words are cited below in what follows. John Damascene, bk. 2, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, ch. 12,[19] and St. Jerome in the book *Contra Jovinianum*,[20] while treating that saying of the Sage, "one of a thousand I have found," do not dissent from the same doctrine. St. John Chrysostom, moreover, in Hom. 16 on Genesis,[21] extols the dignity of man in almost the very same words as Gregory of Nazianzus, calling him an earthly angel and endowed with the Grace of God. St. Augustine follows, whose testimony on this matter is most open. For in bk. 11, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 31,[22] he writes of the first parents: "As soon as they had transgressed the commandment, divine Grace deserting them they turned their eyes, now wholly stripped of it, upon their own members." This he repeats in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 13,[23] and in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11:[24] "Adam therefore had God's grace, and indeed great grace, but different from ours." And he does not wish Adam himself to be without His grace, which He left in his free will. He teaches the same thing in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 1 and ch. 19,[25] where he says that the Christian faith proclaims that the first human beings were so constituted that, had they not sinned, by the merit of their obedience they would have lived for ever. See also ch. 24 of the same book, and besides it, bk. 14, ch. 10, 11, and 17, and *De Spiritu et littera*, ch. 27, and bk. 1, *De Libero arbitrio*, ch. 11,[26] where he introduces Evodius as saying that he believes and holds with the firmest faith that man was created by God so perfectly and placed in the happy life that he fell thence into the miseries of this mortal life by his own will; and St. Augustine designates that perfection by the name of wisdom.

§ 6. Prosper follows St. Augustine (in *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 18–19, and bk. 2, *De Vita contemplativa*, ch. 18).[27] Leo the Great, in Sermon 1 on the December fast.[28] Peter the Deacon, bk. 1, *De Incarnatione Christi*, ch. 6.[29] Fulgentius, bk. 2 of the same work, ch. 12,[30] and likewise in *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 15.[31] Gregory the Great, bk. 5, Ep. 115, and bk. 6, Ep. 195.[32] St. Cyril diligently inculcates this opinion throughout the commentary on John, ch. 15, bk. 2, ch. 3, bk. 11–12, ch. 36, and bk. 12, ch. 55.[33] Likewise in bk. 6 of the *Dialogues*, and in *De Adoratione et Spiritu*, before the middle of that work.[34]

§ 7. To these one may add Prudentius, who in bk. 2, *Contra Symmachum*,[35] sings in the person of God:

"I had fashioned man perfect, endowed with a heavenly gift, and had commanded him, his every sense turned wholly toward me, to stand erect," etc.

And in the *Apotheosis*, in the chapter on the nature of the soul,[36] speaking of the soul as it was created in the beginning, he says:

"For it was formed by the mouth of God, such as it had not been before; but formed in most beautiful array, painted as it were with things divine, full of its Creator, and like to Him."

And in the same place further on he writes certain things similar to these. Now here too are to be referred the testimonies of all those Fathers who interpret the divine likeness, to the image of which man was created, according to the virtues of justice, piety, wisdom, and the rest. The relevant passages have been enumerated above.[37] Item, those who interpret the parable of the man despoiled by robbers as referring to the despoilment, that is, the removal of gratuitous gifts, wrought by the transgression of the first parent. These we cited above at the preceding distinction.[38]

§ 8. Moreover, in confirmation of this opinion there contributes also what is asserted very frequently by the Fathers, that man was created for the seeing and contemplating of God. So teach St. Augustine, bk. 1, *Confessiones*, ch. 1;[39] Leo the Great, Sermon 4 on the Nativity of the Lord;[40] Gregory the Great, bk. 4, *Moralia*, ch. 30, and bk. 3, ch. 14;[41] and others.

§ 9. Finally, the declaration of the Second Council of Orange is plain.[42] Its canon 19 reads as follows: "Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created, could in no way have preserved itself without the help of its Creator. Hence, since without the grace of God it cannot guard the salvation which it received, how shall it be able without the grace of God to repair what it has lost?" These words are taken from Epistle 106 of St. Augustine.[43] They signify, moreover, that man by sinning lost what he had before sinned. Although that Council was held on the authority of Pope Leo — though not Leo the First but Boniface the Second, who approved it by a letter to Caesarius of Arles, as we have noted once and again[44] — it must not therefore be supposed that it was defined in the Church that man was created in Grace. For the intention of the Council was not to define the whole of what is contained in the words of the canon, but only that about which the question was then being disputed on account of the Pelagians: namely, that neither can salvation, that is justice, be guarded without the grace of God, nor can it be repaired without it. It is true, nevertheless, that from this canon great weight of probability accrues to this opinion, as does also so great a mass of patristic testimonies. For this reason it is also the more received opinion among the Scholastics.

§ 10. For St. Thomas, although in his *Scriptum super Magistrum*, bk. 2, dist. 20, q. 1, a. 3,[45] he does not fully explain what he himself thinks, yet afterwards, at dist. 19, q. 1, a. 2,[46] he prefers the affirmative opinion, which he then defends without ambiguity in the *Summa*, I, q. 65, a. 1.[47] And in II-II, q. 5, a. 1,[48] he confirms again for Angels what he had said of human beings. Albert the Great holds the same opinion, writing at dist. 24 of this book and in his *Summa Theologica*.[49] Likewise Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, at dist. 4 of this book, q. 5, and at dist. 29, q. 1;[50] Gregory of Rimini, at dist. 24;[51] and the others of whom mention was made above at dist. 4.[52] For, as we have already said, the formal character (*ratio*) of the question is the same for Angels and for human beings; and therefore all those who have said that the Angel was created in Grace have thought the same must be said of man.

§ 11. Furthermore, in favour of the same opinion the following arguments are adduced. The first is St. Thomas's, which he presents in the place just cited from Part I,[53] drawn from the rectitude of man's original

state. For that rectitude consisted in this: that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul; and the first subjection was the cause of the second and of the third. For as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to it. But that subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin. It is therefore manifest that even that first subjection, by which reason was subject to God, was not merely according to nature but according to the supernatural gift of Grace; since it cannot be that the effect is greater than its cause. If therefore man was created with that rectitude, it follows that he was created with the supernatural gift of Grace. This argument of St. Thomas has some difficulty, of which mention will be made below in its proper place.

§ 12. The second argument: Man was created by God for a supernatural end; therefore he was created with the Grace and virtues by which he could attain and merit that end. The inference holds, because God so instituted the nature of things that to whatever beings He has appointed some end, to those same beings He has from the outset, together with their nature, instilled the power and faculty of attaining that end. This is evident from the example of all other things, to which God has implanted seed and powers according to each in its own kind, whereby they might attain their ends. But the seed and power of attaining the supernatural end, that is, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God, is Grace and charity (*caritas*).

§ 13. The third argument: The children who were to be born from Adam preserving his innocence would have been born in justice and Grace, as we showed above at dist. 20;[54] but their parent did not have lesser gifts at his own creation than they were to have at their generation; therefore he was created in justice and Grace.

§ 14. Finally, converging here also are the arguments by which, above at dist. 3,[55] we were led to teach that Angels were created in Grace.

§ II — Reply to the Arguments of the Contrary Opinion (Ad argumenta diversæ opinionis respondetur)

§ 15. Those who hold that man was created without grace bring forward first of all, in confirmation of their opinion, what the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15: "The last Adam was made into a quickening spirit. But that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterwards that which is spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthly; the second man was heavenly." The first part of the Apostle's words seems to signify that the first man, when he was created, did not have the Holy Spirit, but only a living soul. The second, that he was not spiritual from the beginning, but natural (*animalis*). Moreover, as the same Apostle testifies at 1 Cor. 2: "The natural man (*animalis homo*) perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God." The third, that he was earthly, not heavenly — that is, devoted to earthly and sensible things, not to heavenly ones. Hence it follows: "Such as is the earthy, such also are they that are earthy; and such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly. Therefore as we have borne the image of the earthy, let us also bear the image of the heavenly."

§ 16. This argument is confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, from the book *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 123,[57] where, after reciting the Apostle's words, he subjoins: "What is so plain as that Adam did not have the Holy Spirit?" And he adds that Adam had sensory knowledge of nothing but sensible and earthly things; and that therefore those are in error who say that we recover in Christ the adoption of the sons of God which was lost in Adam.

§ 17. It is answered: the sense of the Apostle's words is altogether different, as we showed above at dist. 19.[58] For the Apostle, discoursing on the resurrection of bodies, teaches by these words what the distinction is in the body of man — not only as it is after sin, but also as it was created in the beginning — and between the glorious body arising from the resurrection, such as is now the body of Christ, and such as we await. The distinction is this: that the first Adam, like us and all other living beings, required food and drink, motion and sense and self-preservation for his body. But Christ, who is the second Adam, at the resurrection received an immortal body for which the soul alone suffices for life, as a quickening spirit. This exposition is given in St. Augustine, bk. 6, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 1, and bk. 12, ch. 7;[59] likewise in Epistle 46;[60] and in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, chs. 2 and 23.[61] Similar things are read in *Enchiridion*, ch. 91.[62]

§ 18. The same is the exposition of St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, the author of the Ambrosiaster, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and others in their commentaries on this passage.[63] Indeed the Master himself, although he does not think that man was created in grace, nevertheless at Distinction 29[64] transmits that same interpretation of the Apostolic passage which we have set forth. Furthermore, nothing prevents the first man from having had an animal body in the sense explained, and yet having had a spiritual soul through Grace; since even in us this occurs, who have bodies already dead on account of sin, as the Apostle says (Rom. 8). That the first man was thus made into a living soul, yet that this same soul was already from the beginning quickened by the Holy Spirit, the same St. Augustine affirms in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 23.[65] And he adds for this reason that, although the presence of souls is the life of bodies, rational souls without the Spirit are nevertheless to be counted as dead. Note also that the Apostle does not say that the first man was made a natural (*animalis*) man, but that his body was natural (*animale*); hence the objection concerning the natural man ceases; while he calls him earthly by reason of his body, as has now been explained.

§ 19. The appended confirmation from St. Augustine has no weight at all; for it is established among all learned men that the work *Quaestiones utriusque Testamenti* is neither Augustine's nor can altogether be attributed to any author.[66]

§ 20. But again they object from certain genuine passages of St. Augustine: for instance, bk. 3, *De Libero arbitrio*, ch. 24,[67] where, having proposed to himself the question of what kind the first man was made — foolish or wise — he pushes the dispute to each side of a dilemma, and in the end seems to lead his discussion to the conclusion that he was made neither wise nor foolish, but in a state intermediate between the two. Likewise bk. 2, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, ch. 8,[68] where he writes that Adam was made natural (*animalis*) as we are, and thereafter, on receiving God's command, was made spiritual, but by sin fell back again into being natural. Likewise bk. 11, *De Genesi ad litteram*, the last chapter,[69] where again he so disputes as though he were of the opinion that Adam was not spiritual from the beginning, and that Eve was not even at the time when she was tempted by the serpent.

§ 21. It is answered: the sense of the Apostle's words is far other, as we showed above at dist. 19.[58] For the Apostle, treating of the resurrection of bodies, teaches by those words what the distinction is between the body of man not only as it is after sin but also as it was created in the beginning, and between the glorious body from the resurrection, such as is now the body of Christ, and such as we await. The distinction is this: that the first Adam, as we and all other living beings, required food and drink, motion and sense and the preservation of his body. But Christ, who is the second Adam, received at the resurrection an immortal body for which the soul alone suffices for life as a quickening spirit. This exposition is found in St. Augustine, bk. 6,

De Genesi ad litteram, ch. 1, and bk. 12, ch. 7; likewise in Epistle 46; and in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, chs. 2 and 23. Similar things are read at *Enchiridion*, ch. 91.[70]

§ 22. It is the same exposition of St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, the author of the Ambrosiaster, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and others in their commentaries on this passage. Indeed the Master himself, although he does not think that man was created in grace, nevertheless at Distinction 29 transmits that same understanding of the Apostolic passage which we have stated. Furthermore, nothing prevents the first man from having had an animal body in the way explained, and yet having had a spiritual soul through Grace; since this very thing occurs even in us, who have bodies already dead on account of sin, as the Apostle says (Rom. 8). Moreover that the first man was thus made into a living soul and yet that the same soul was from the very beginning quickened by the Holy Spirit, the same St. Augustine affirms in bk. 13, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 23. And he adds this reason: because, although the presence of souls is the life of bodies, rational souls without the Spirit are nonetheless to be counted as dead. Note also that the Apostle does not say that the first man was made a natural (*animalis*) man, but that his body was natural (*animale*); thus the objection concerning the natural man ceases; while he calls him earthly by reason of his body, as has now been explained.

§ 23. The appended confirmation from St. Augustine has no weight; for it is established among all the learned that the work *Quaestiones utriusque Testamenti* is neither Augustine's nor can be at all attributed to any certain author.[71]

§ 24. But they object again from certain genuine passages of St. Augustine: for instance, bk. 3, *De Libero arbitrio*, ch. 24,[67] where, having proposed to himself the question of what kind the first man was made — foolish or wise — and driving the disputation toward both sides of the dilemma, he finally seems to lead the discussion to the conclusion that he was made neither wise, but in a state between the two. Likewise bk. 2, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, ch. 8,[68] where he writes that Adam was made natural (*animalis*) as we are, and then, on receiving God's precept, was made spiritual, but by sin fell back again into being natural. Likewise bk. 11, *De Genesi ad litteram*, the last chapter,[69] where he again so disputes as though he were of the opinion that Adam was not spiritual from the beginning, and that Eve was not so even at the time when she was tempted by the serpent.

§ II — Whether grace was natural to the first man (An gratia fuerit primo homini naturalis)

§ 25. This question, which is agitated by some, must not be passed over here: whether the grace (*gratia*) in which we have shown the first man to have been created was natural (*naturalis*) to him or supernatural (*supernaturalis*). For each side has its own arguments, drawn both from the Fathers and from reason.

For the prior part — that grace was natural — the following testimonies are adduced.

First: Leo, in a sermon on the fast of the tenth month,[73] openly declares that it belongs to the natural dignity of our race that, as if in a certain mirror, the form of divine goodness might shine back to us; and he says: "The grace of the Saviour daily restores us, inasmuch as what fell in Adam is raised up in the second Adam."

Second: The same Leo, in a sermon on the Passion of the Lord,[74] calls the innocence of the first man natural, in these words: "We lost, therefore, the integrity of natural innocence through the transgression of our

first parents; what the saints before us received, they received by no merits of their own preceding it." Again, the same Leo, in Sermon 24,[75] says that through Christ the natural freedom of man is restored.

§ 26. Third: St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, book 12, chapter 1,[76] writes thus of the angels: "When the vice of an angelic creature is said to consist in its not adhering to God, it is thereby most plainly declared that it belongs to the nature of that creature to adhere to God." Now the same formal character (*ratio*) applies to man. But neither angel nor man can adhere to God except through grace. Similar is the passage in book 11, chapter 17:[77] "It would not be a vice to depart from God, unless the nature in which that vice exists were more fittingly made to be with God."

Fourth: It is the opinion of the same St. Augustine[78] that all the vices of souls are privations of natural goods; but to be without the grace of God is a vice of the soul; therefore it is a privation of a natural good, and consequently grace itself is a natural good.

Fifth: Again, St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei*, book 12, last chapter,[79] says that a soul deprived of the Spirit of God is dead, because the Spirit of God is its life; therefore it is natural to the soul to be vivified by the Spirit of God, which comes about through grace. For it could not rightly be called dead merely because it lacked a supernatural gift.

Sixth: Prosper, in book 1 of *De Vita contemplativa*, chapter 18,[80] says that man, corrupted by sin of the flesh, has lost the benefits of God that he had received in the condition of his nature.

Seventh: The same Prosper, writing against the Collator, chapter 18,[81] says: "It is not lawful to doubt that the first man received such a free will (*liberum arbitrium*) that, if he did not abandon the Lord as his helper, he could have persevered in the goods which he had received naturally."

Eighth: Cassiodorus, in *De Anima*, chapter 17,[82] calls the beatitude of the first man — that is, the blessed state in which he was created — natural.

Ninth: The author of the *Quaestiones Novi Testamenti*, found among St. Augustine's works, part 2, question 41,[83] affirms that man, through faith in Christ, returns to the natural justice (*justitia naturalis*).

Tenth: Pope Celestine, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul, chapter 4,[84] defines that in the transgression of Adam all men lost their natural capacity and innocence.

Eleventh: The Second Council of Orange[85] declares that the ancient saints had that excellent faith which the Apostle Paul praises to their credit — not through the good of nature which had first been given in Adam, but through the grace of God. By these words it is intimated that the faith which existed in the first man belonged to the natural good of his nature.

Twelfth: The testimony is that of the Apostle Paul himself, who in Rom. 2, speaking of the faithful from among the uncircumcised, says: "For when the Gentiles who have not the law do by nature the things that are of the law," etc. Now this is not said as if they fulfil the law without grace — which is contrary to the Apostle's most manifest teaching; therefore it seems to be said for this reason, that grace itself and true justice, to which the faithful are reformed through Christ, is natural to man. Hence St. Augustine, in *De Spiritu et Littera*, chapter 27,[86] says: "Let it not trouble us that he says 'by nature the things of the law.' For this is the work of the Spirit of grace: that the image of God, in which we are naturally made, may be restored in us." From this also the Fathers sometimes say that it is natural to us to believe in God, to love God, and to adhere to Him — as Fulgentius, in *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, chapter 23,[87] says: "Man is able, by God's gift, to believe in

God naturally; for it is against the nature of man not to believe in God." He repeats the same thing in chapters 24 and 25.[88] Likewise St. Basil, in the *Regulae fusius disputatae*, chapters 2 and 5,[89] says that love of God and neighbour is natural to us and flows from nature. So also St. John Damascene speaks in *De Fide*, book 3, chapter 14.[90] See also St. Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 6,[91] and St. Ambrose on Luke, as cited by St. Augustine, book 1 *Contra Julianum*, chapters 3 and 2, and also book 5.[92]

§ 27. To these testimonies of the Fathers, reason also seems to lend support — first and foremost the following: The natural end (*finis naturalis*) of an intellectual creature is eternal beatitude (*beatitudo aeterna*), in which God is seen as He is. For so St. Thomas teaches:[93] and so also the ancients, such as St. Basil in Epistle 141 to the Caesareans,[94] where he makes even the contemplation of God as it will be in the future so natural to us, as sight naturally discerns colours. To this belongs also the saying of St. Augustine in *Confessions*, book 1, chapter 1:[95] "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O God, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee." For the heart would not be restless unless it had a natural appetite for that end, which is to rest in God. But if this is so, then also the grace by which one tends toward that end, and through which one arrives at it naturally, is: for God has ordained natural means for natural ends, as is observed in other creatures, all of which attain their natural ends by natural powers and means.

Another reason: No nature is in good condition (*bene se habet*) unless it either already possesses its end or tends toward its end in a fitting manner. For the goodness of each thing is estimated from its end; but an intellectual creature cannot obtain its end, nor tend toward it, except through grace; therefore, without grace, it cannot be in good condition according to its nature, and consequently grace is a natural good to it.

Third reason: The heavenly beatitude which we merit through grace, and to which grace is directly ordered, is called everywhere by the Fathers "our homeland" (*patria nostra*) — as by St. Augustine in the last tractate on John,[96] and by others. But the homeland is the native soil in which we received what is naturally ours; therefore man was so created that both beatitude and grace would be natural to him.

Fourth: Man through transgression is said not only to have been stripped (*spoliatus*) but also to have been wounded (*vulneratus*) — namely, on account of the loss of goods which he had received in creation, as the Fathers whom we cited at the preceding Distinction teach;[97] therefore, just as bodily health and integrity of members, which is taken away by the infliction of a wound, belongs to nature and is a natural good, so also grace, by the loss of which man's nature is said to have been wounded, belonged to his natural goods.

Fifth: Those things are natural to a given species which are present in all its individuals. For from this we recognise that something is natural to a species — if it is found in all its singular members. It is by this argument that St. Thomas in *De Veritate* teaches[98] that grace is not given to all, because it would follow that grace is a natural gift; but if man had not sinned, all men would always have had grace — indeed they would have been born with grace; therefore in that state grace was natural.

§ 28. Now, on the other side — for the opinion which asserts that grace is a supernatural good (*bonum supernaturale*), both for the angel and for man — the following testimonies of the Fathers stand.

First: (Pseudo-)Dionysius, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, book, chapter 4, part 4,[99] speaking of the demons, says among other things: "Nor have the angelic gifts bestowed on them ever been changed, but they remain whole and altogether evident." From these words of (Pseudo-)Dionysius has been taken that common axiom: "Naturals remained intact in the demons after their fall" — whence it is a consequence that grace does not belong to natural goods but is above nature.

Second: St. Athanasius, in Oration against the Arians,[100] says: "The gifts of divine grace placed in us are certainly great and above man — such as the pattern of heavenly citizenship, power against demons, adoption and right of sonship," etc.

Third: St. Basil, in *De Spiritu Sancto*, chapter 16,[101] says thus: "Sanctification is not without the Spirit. For the heavenly Powers are not holy by nature; rather, according to the proportion of their eminence among themselves, they have their measure of sanctification from the Holy Spirit."

Fourth: St. Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 9,[102] says that the creature ascends above its own nature by the glorifying grace of God who crowns it with various honours and goods. And a little later he adds these words: "For truly the Lord is merciful, who by His goodness makes a creature small and lowly by nature great and admirable."

Fifth: The same St. Cyril, in chapter 13 of the same book,[103] treating of the text "He gave them power to become children of God," says: "Let us ascend to supernatural dignity (*dignitas supernaturalis*) through Christ." And again: "The creature, since it is a servant, is called to supernatural things by the nod and will of the Father alone." And shortly after, in chapter 14: "Those who are called by faith in Christ to the adoption of sons have laid aside the lowliness of their nature; and, clothed as if in shining purple by the grace of the glorifying Christ, they ascend to supernatural dignity."

Sixth: The same author, book 10 of the same work, chapter 23,[104] expounding the text "You are my friends," says: "What is greater, what more glorious, than to be and to be called a friend of Christ? This dignity certainly exceeds the bounds of human nature." And again: "The Lord leads those who keep His commandments to supernatural glory, calling them not servants but friends." He repeats similar things in book 12, chapter 51.[105]

Seventh: Again the same author, in the book *Quod Spiritus sit Deus*, near the beginning,[106] writes thus: "Since to be able to make and to grant to creatures a dignity that exceeds the creature is more than the nature of creatures can bear, if the Spirit deifies, how would he be a creature and not rather God, inasmuch as He deifies?" See also the book *De Adoratione in Spiritu*, before the middle.[107]

Eighth: St. Bernard, in Sermon 1 *On the Annunciation of the Lord*,[108] says that Adam by sinning lost the likeness (*similitudo*) of God but not the image (*imago*); because, he says, the image was not stitched on from without but innate — whereas the likeness of God, which he expounds of grace and the adornments of the virtues, was not innate and impressed upon nature but added from without and therefore supernatural.

§ 29. To these testimonies add the Scriptures — especially those of which St. Cyril makes almost constant use in the places mentioned above — such as Jn. 1: "He gave them power to become children of God, who are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." And chapter 15: "You are my friends, if you do," etc. Rom. 11: "If thou, being a wild olive, wert cut off and, contrary to nature, wert grafted into the good olive tree," etc. 2 Pet. 1: "He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature (*Divina Natura*)."

§ 30. Now also the reasons which make for this doctrine are to be set forth.

First: A quality is said to be natural which arises from the principles of nature; but no one will say that the justice of Adam — which was of such excellence as to make him a partaker of the divine nature, to constitute him a son of God and heir of the heavenly Kingdom — arose naturally from his soul and body as from an

efficient cause; therefore it is not to be called natural to him as something arising from the powers of nature, but rather supernatural, conferred by divine gift above nature.

Second: Sin is not of such a nature as to take away some natural principle or natural gift, but only to cause the loss of the gift of supernatural grace and to produce a certain proneness to similar sins, and at the same time to diminish the inclination toward the virtue contrary to that sin — as is evident in the sins committed by men after the fall of Adam. Therefore it is not to be supposed that the sin of Adam — which was an actual sin, and of the same genus as the rest — was of such power as to take away some natural principle or natural gift. But it did take away grace; therefore grace in the first man was not a natural gift but a supernatural one.

Third: Man, on account of the loss of grace, is not said to have been wounded (*vulneratus*) but stripped (*spoliatus*); indeed grace itself is called a garment (*indumentum*). For St. Ambrose says in *De Isaac et Anima*, chapter 5:[109] "Nor was Adam naked when innocence clothed him." And in *De Elia et jejunio*, chapter 4:[110] "Adam was covered with the veil of the virtues before he transgressed; but as if stripped by transgression he saw that he was naked, because he had lost the garment which he had." And St. Augustine, in book 4 *Contra Julianum*,[111] says that Adam, so long as he had grace, had in his body nothing to be ashamed of; stripped of grace, he felt what he ought to cover. But a garment is outside and beyond the nature of the body to which it belongs; and therefore, if it is taken away, it leaves no wound in the body; so neither does grace pertain to the nature of man, nor, when taken away, does it leave a wound — although on account of its removal man is, as it were on account of his nakedness, the more exposed to wounding.

§ 31. This seems to be signified by St. Ambrose, writing on Luke, chapter 10,[112] while expounding the story of the man who fell among robbers: "Who are these robbers," he says, "but the Angels of the night of darkness? These are accustomed first to strip away the garments of Spiritual Grace which we had received, and then to inflict wounds." The fourth argument can be drawn from the very name of Grace, which the Fathers distinguish from nature in the first man and in the Angels. For concerning these there is the well-known saying of St. Augustine, in book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 9:[113] "Simultaneously fashioning their nature in them, and bestowing Grace upon them." Where one may also observe the word "bestowing" (*largiendi*); for since this word signifies pure liberality in those things which are natural — and therefore in some sense due — it does not appear to have a place there. Other passages, both of St. Augustine and of other Fathers, in which they call the first man's justice Grace, are to be seen above, where we taught that the first man was created in Grace.[114]

§ 32. The fifth argument: God was able to create man without grace, for indeed many are of the opinion that this was in fact done — those we enumerated above. Others, however, although they deny that it was in fact so, do not doubt that it could have been, and St. Augustine in particular teaches this in book 3 of *On Free Will*, chapters 20, 22, and 24.[115] Nor does he appear to have retracted this in book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 9,[116] but rather to have confirmed it, especially since even in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapters 11 and 12,[117] he concedes that God could have created man without that felicity into which He did create him. But if Grace were natural to man, God would have seemed to want to create nothing other than a certain animal imperfect by nature — as if He were to create man without feet or hands — which is not fitting to divine wisdom. The sixth argument: Every creature of God is a servant, according to that of Ps. 118 (*Omnia serviunt tibi*[118]), "All things serve Thee," and elsewhere: "Thou art Lord of all"; therefore the fact that any creature is assumed into the adoption of the children of God, and into His friendship, and into the fellowship of the Divine Nature (*consortium Divinae Naturae*) — which indeed comes about through Grace

— surpasses the condition of created nature, and is altogether supernatural. St. Cyril makes use of this argument more than once. The seventh argument: Man was created outside Paradise and afterwards placed in it, so that he might understand that it was not natural to him, nor given to him by nature, that he was created in Grace, but that he might acknowledge therein a supernatural benefit.

§ 33. To all these considerations there is added the common opinion of the Scholastics on this point, for which see Soto, book 1 of *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 13,[119] and Bartholomew Medina on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 3 and following.[120] There is added finally the condemnation of certain articles made by the authority of the Apostolic See, among which were those asserting: that the elevation and exaltation of human nature into fellowship with the Divine Nature was owed to the integrity of the first condition, and was therefore to be called natural, not supernatural. Likewise: that the integrity of the first condition was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition. Likewise: that those think absurdly who say that man was from the beginning elevated above the condition of his nature by some supernatural and gratuitous gift, so that he might worship God supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity. Likewise: that the opinion of the Doctors is false, that the first man could have been created and established by God without justice.'[121]

§ IV — A distinct reply to the question, with the resolution of objections (Distincta ad quaestionem responsio cum solutione objectionum)

§ 34. For the determination of the proposed question, those things must be recalled to mind which were said (at Distinction 19)[123] concerning the question whether bodily immortality was natural to the first man. For there we showed that what is called *natural* can be taken in various senses, and by distinguishing those senses we were explaining the question; and the same must be done here. For if *natural* is said of that which God implanted or conferred upon any thing when He established its nature, then in this sense those who teach that man was created in grace will not doubt that grace was natural to him — just as we also said in the place cited that bodily immortality was natural to him. Again, if *natural* is said of that which is consonant with nature and which adorns and perfects it, then even in this sense it is certain that grace was natural not only to the first man but to us as well — as are all the other virtues, and indeed eternal life itself. But if *natural* is called that which is present in each thing from birth, whether it be a good and perfective thing for its nature, or on the contrary something evil and harmful: then in this sense justice and grace were natural to the first man, whereas sin and the privation of grace are natural to us, according to that word of the Apostle, Eph. 2: "We were by nature children of wrath."

§ 35. But beyond these senses, that is said most properly to be *natural* which is either nature itself, or a part of nature, or which flows from the principles of nature, or which has a sufficient cause in nature. In this sense body and soul, the senses, the intellect, and the other faculties of the soul together with their operations are called natural; in this sense also the arts, the sciences, and the other habits which can be acquired by the powers of nature alone are rightly called natural. But in this sense grace cannot be said to have been natural to the first man. For it is established that it was neither nature itself nor a part of his nature, nor of such a kind that it would be possible to acquire it by the powers of nature alone — neither by natural potency (*potentia naturalis*) nor by habitual acquisition.

§ 36. Now among the four modes just enumerated in which something is customarily called natural, only the last is properly opposed to what is usually called supernatural. For that which in the first or third sense is called natural is opposed to that which comes upon a thing already established or generated — whether it come naturally or otherwise, and whether it be good or evil. But to that which in the second sense is called natural, that which is contrary to nature is opposed. Therefore, when the question is asked whether grace was natural or supernatural to man, it is necessary that you understand by *supernatural* what theologians commonly understand, and take *natural* in the question in the last sense just explained. Hence the simple and absolute reply to the question will be: grace was not natural to the first man, but supernatural (*supernaturalis*).

§ 37. That this may be more fully understood, it must be more carefully considered in what manner human nature could be created without defect, and what its innocence necessarily required. Certainly this much is evident: that the integrity of a certain simple innocence did not require so great an honour and glory that man should be taken up into the fellowship of the divine nature, into the adoption of the sons of God, and into the hope and participation of heavenly glory which consists in the clear vision (*clara visio*) of God — as if, forsooth, man could not have existed unless he had been endowed in his creation with such dignity, or could not have been upright and free from all defect unless he had been adorned with such illustrious gifts of the soul and had approached God his Creator by the excellence of so great a likeness and fellowship. For this reason it is rather to be judged that into the first man, above that knowledge which he was able to have and attain naturally, as a creature endowed with mind and reason, concerning God the author and governor of all things, and likewise above that affection of love by which from the powers of nature alone he was able to rise up toward God as his benefactor, there was infused the light of a higher and more divine wisdom: by which light, when his mind was illumined, he might be joined to his Creator as to a father and friend, and as one spirit with Him, by the most intimate bond of a certain fellowship — not only by a more sublime knowledge, but also by a more excellent love.

§ 38. Moreover, it is altogether incredible that he could have tended and attained to that ultimate end which consists in the clear vision of God — than which nothing greater or more desirable could befall man — through merits derived from the powers of nature alone, that is, from powers not assisted by any supernatural gift; since reason rather teaches that for the attainment of such an end man stands in need of the great condescension and bountiful kindness of God, which far surpasses those who are altogether deficient. For neither can it be denied that God could have made man in a servile condition, who would expect from God no other reward for his obsequies. For although man could not have been deprived of some beatitude (*beatitudo*) of his own kind — for beatitude is the end of an intellectual creature and is therefore necessarily desired by it — God could nonetheless have implanted in man, as in the angel, a desire for a far lesser beatitude, with which alone, being content according to his nature, he would lack without distress that more sublime felicity. Therefore, the fact that man was created and constituted by God in such great honour — so that he should be not merely a servant but also a son, and that the beatitude attributed to him as his end is that beatitude than which none more excellent can be attributed to a creature — although it can in a certain sense be called natural to him, according to what has been said, nonetheless it cannot be denied that it is most rightly and most properly called supernatural. For both grace (*Gratia*) and glory (*Gloria*) are goods exceeding the capacity of human nature and of every creature. For even if it be perhaps true that man naturally desires that end which is to see God through His essence — concerning which matter the Scholastic Doctors dispute variously,

whose opinions Soto weighs[124] — yet the constant teaching of all is that neither man nor angel could ever have attained to that end without supernatural means, of which the chief is what we call grace.

§ 39. This our reply and position on the present question is sufficiently confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers adduced above in the latter place, as well as by the arguments subjoined to them, even though we do not deny that some of those arguments do not altogether compel. It remains, therefore, that we reply to the arguments of the opposing side. This will not be difficult if we attend to the various senses of what is called natural. For whatever Fathers said that grace, justice, happiness, and the dignity in which the first man was created were natural to him — they understood that to be natural to man which God conferred upon him at the time when He established his nature, whether it had its origin from the principles of nature or could have had such, or not. In this sense, then, the testimonies drawn from Leo, Prosper, Cassiodorus, Celestine, and the Council of Orange[125] are to be received.

§ 40. That saying of St. Augustine holds true of man and angel as they were made, not as they could have been made. For from the moment they were created in grace, it is defective in them and in their nature so constituted that they should not have grace — both because the grace given in creation was in a certain manner natural, and because it is not lost without sin. Hence it is evident that the privation of grace cannot but be defective in man and angel. By this the response seems also to have been given to the fifth testimony produced from the same St. Augustine.[126] For the soul that lacks the Spirit of God is therefore called dead, because it was so created in the first man that it should have the Spirit of God, of which it would never have been destitute had it not sinned.

§ 41. To the fourth, which is from the same St. Augustine,[127] it can be replied that all vices of the soul are called privations of natural goods, because they are privations of that natural rectitude which would have existed in the first man, if he had been established in natural goods alone. For that blameless rectitude would be destroyed by every sin and every depraved habit. Yet in a man so created, to lack the gift of grace would not have been a defect; whereas now it is a defect, for the reasons stated a little before.

§ 42. To the testimony adduced from the Apostle Paul it is answered that it was not said by him that the Gentiles, not having the law, do naturally the things of the law, because grace is natural to man. For by this reasoning he ought to have named not so much the Gentiles who did not have the law as the Jews who had received the law. For just as certain ones among the Gentiles, so also certain ones among the Jews did the things of the law. But the sense is that the Gentiles converted to the faith did, naturally — that is, with nature as guide, and the law of nature pointing the way — those things which are of the law, even though they did not have the written law, yet not without the grace of Christ. Moreover, those Fathers who said that it is natural to us to believe in God and other things of the kind, had regard to nature as it was established in the first man together with grace; and they call *natural* the whole of that which man received in his condition, even if it be of such a kind that it surpasses the capacity of nature itself. And perhaps certain of them understand as natural that which is very fitting for and perfective of nature. For what is more fitting for nature than to believe in God?

§ 43. Now let us also briefly reply to the arguments. To the first it is answered that there is controversy whether the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) which consists in the clear vision (*clara visio*) of God is a natural or supernatural end of man; yet even if it be conceded to be natural, it does not follow that it can be attained through natural means. For it is conceded to be natural with respect to appetite (*appetitus*), not with respect

to attainment. Just as the soul separated from the body naturally seeks to be reunited to the body — which nonetheless cannot follow without a miracle and a supernatural act (*ratio supernaturalis*). And indeed this seems fitting for the dignity of man: that his ultimate end should be of such excellence that, although he desires it naturally, he is nonetheless unable to reach it by the powers of nature alone, but stands in need of the supernatural operation of that very God who is the end — who supplies the means for attaining Himself and joins Himself to the one whose end He is.

§ 44. To the second argument it can be replied, beyond the answer already given, that if the natural end of the created mind is the contemplation of God in creatures, it does not follow that it can attain to that end without the grace of which we are speaking. For if its end is nothing other than what has been said, it suffices for the attainment of that end, even if it lacks that end toward which it does not tend, and even if the means to that end are such as it will at some time have.

§ 45. To the third: heavenly beatitude (*beatitudo caelestis*) is called our homeland (*patria*) by the Fathers because we were created in the first parents destined to attain it, and we are called to it on account of the transgression of the first parents, by which it came about that we lost the means of attaining it. To the fourth it is answered that nature has been despoiled of grace and wounded — wounded, however, on account of certain natural goods that were lost, as will be discussed below.[128] Others answer that nature was wounded by the loss of grace, and this through the sin by which grace was lost. For, as was said above, every sin is a certain privation of natural rectitude, inasmuch as it destroys that rectitude — and would have destroyed it even if we had been created in natural rectitude alone. Hence it is that St. Thomas teaches that by every sin the good of nature is injured and diminished.[129] Concerning this matter we spoke at the preceding distinction.

§ 46. To the last argument it is answered that the argumentation of St. Thomas proceeds correctly in the state of fallen nature (*status naturae lapsae*). For the grace which man had in the state of integrity was given to him after the manner of nature (*per modum naturae*), that is, in such fashion that together with nature it would be communicated to all his posterity — just as grace was also given to the angels after the manner of nature, a manner which we explained at Distinction 3 of this book.[130] But after man by sinning of his own will lost grace, God willed to show how great the difference is between nature and grace. Therefore after the fall, grace is not given to all as nature is, but only to a few, and that according to the good pleasure (*beneplacitum*) of the divine will.

§ 47. [131] The doctrine condemned in so many Baianist theses, particularly propositions 21, 26, 23, and 79, which held that the merits of the man in integrity were the substance of his first creation and therefore are not rightly called grace — with the result that the gifts conceded to intact man are said to be grace only because they are understood as gifts given through Jesus Christ, and are neither merits nor wages rendered to him — is an invention of the foolishness of the philosophers. The condemned articles [noted in the marginal annotation *a* of the source] are those Baianist articles condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs; which Cornelius Jansenius undertook to renew in three full books and to thrust again upon the Catholic schools, asserting that the creation of man with original justice included is owed to man considered according to his nature. Certainly Jansenius, in order to give a specious appearance of defense for his weak position, devised a similar evasion: that that thesis in particular was condemned merely because its novelty was unheard of and scandalous among Catholics, rather than because of its falsity — as he had contrived that same evasion in his work on the state of fallen nature.[132] In those places he contends that certain Baianist propositions were condemned merely because, when their authors attacked the opinions of others, they were hurled among

Catholics as scandal-givers and as those who had introduced novelty; and that accordingly they were condemned only as scandalous, not as false — a thing which he does not hesitate to assert. But this resolution or reply is altogether to be rejected and repudiated, as any person of sound mind would agree; since by this method a way is opened up to defend all the propositions of Michael Baius and of Jansenius himself, and of any heretics condemned by the anathema of the Church. For it is a common practice of heretics to brand the sentences handed down against their authors by the Church with various marks of reproach — to claim they were condemned not because they contain false doctrine but because they gave scandal. Cardinal Joseph de Aguirre follows this reasoning.[133]

Vincentius Contenson, approaching by a middle path in his *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*,[134] holds the position that in the state of pure nature (*status naturae purae*) it is possible — although not convenient, and therefore not possible by ordinary power — for sanctifying grace to be excluded, and for God to create man thus without original justice, and that this is true not merely by the absolute and extraordinary power but by the ordinary power of God — a new dogma as it were. But this is altogether undeserved, as anyone who reads attentively the places cited by that author will see, particularly from chapter 52 of book 2 of the *Contra Gentes*.[135] Contenson strives to demonstrate that his position is different from that of Jansenius, and does not hesitate to attack those authors who would charge it with Jansenism, and he refutes them as those who have not read Jansenius himself in the source. This is an unfortunate practice: ought not a man of Contenson's learning so easily draw the most learned authors before the bar of literary judgment? His adversaries will say that they have rather cursorily run through Jansenius than thoroughly read him. What will you say to this? Namely, Jansenius himself, in order to make a smoke-screen, returns to the same Divine Wisdom and the same congruence with which you press upon him, in order to establish the absolute impossibility of the state of pure nature — inasmuch as his argument, derived from the nature of grace as such and from every right founded upon the creature, admits no other solution besides that drawn from Divine Wisdom, and from a certain congruence, or connaturality of man, and from equity. For he says it is repugnant to grace most properly so-called that it should be owed — whether owed by right or by work of the creature — while he does not deny the debts from connaturality, the decencies, congruences, and equities which arise from other chapters; for which reason he concludes that God, though He may not act against the right of justice which would be incurred in the creature, would nonetheless act against His own Wisdom, no less than against justice, if He were to pass over grace. Jansenius himself in his book on the state of fallen nature,[136] teaches that human nature is of itself ordered to the vision and enjoyment of God as to a connatural end, and that nothing more connatural is found in human nature — which things are certainly owed in right founded in the very nature of man, or they suppose and presuppose such right; and therefore he concluded that the state of pure nature excluding original justice is absolutely impossible, even by the absolute power of God. Let Contenson consider whether on the same arguments he does not find himself pressed as much as Jansenius. Indeed in this part I judge that Contenson ought to be read with caution; for the arguments by which he strives to prove his position lead to the conclusion that the state of pure nature is either impossible by the absolute power of God, or that it is not at all repugnant even by the ordinary power — which is our judgment, arrived at by attentive reading and examination of Contenson's arguments, and we are glad to have found it already made by the aforesaid Cardinal de Aguirre.[137]

Now indeed how the position, or thesis, of Contenson can be sustained I do not see sufficiently. For in the judgment of the Catholic Church, grace, and the supernatural state (*status supernaturalis*), and likewise the supreme beatitude (*suprema beatitudo*) which consists in the clear vision of God — these are called

supernatural for this reason: that they are above the nature of man, and nature has no sufficient foundation in itself, that is, has no proportion with them; this is what is called supernatural, namely that which so exceeds the powers of nature, so that nature, altogether perfect in its kind, is without it; so that there is such great congruence and fittingness that God is, as it were, compelled by the laws of His own Providence to attribute it to human nature, so that He cannot deny it by ordinary power? The comparable statement of Contenson runs thus: grace, as also the right to glory (*ius ad Gloriam*), surpasses the capacity of nature and exceeds it, and is not owed to it; and yet it is so connaturally fitting to man that God acts against His wisdom and sweet Providence if by ordinary power He creates man and denies him that gift. We would be going beyond the boundaries of our office if we attempted to argue out these matters. Yet we consider that position to be demolished by the one reply: that it in no way befits Divine Wisdom to give something to man whose own nature cannot sustain it. The rest of the things concerning enjoyment (*fruitio*) and natural appetite have force only on that ground if man is posited as liberally elevated and raised up by God to a supernatural state; for then that appetite for enjoying God is to be posited as existing in man. But that — that certain things which Contenson writes are not altogether consonant with Catholic piety — I deeply regret: inasmuch as certain writings of his render the Apostolic Bull of the Supreme Pontiffs concerning the Baianist propositions entirely vain. For Contenson writes in that place that proposition 79 of Baius was reprobated by the Supreme Pontiffs under that name alone, either because they judged those propositions to contain the censure of severity, or because they admitted a perverse interpretation, or because they were delivered with a certain censorial haughtiness by the author. But if once we admit this evasion, all the Baianist propositions can henceforth be taught from any chair whatsoever without danger of censure. But I shudder to write these things and cannot wonder enough at Contenson writing — a thing which deserves most diligent attention — that several of the Baianist propositions are true and catholic and certain; yet that they are to be reprobated for the reasons just recounted — namely, the severity of the censure, the author's haughtiness, and a perverse interpretation. This I find in no way pleasing to the Catholic mind.

§ IV — The distinct resolution of the question with a solution of the objections (Distincta ad quaestionem responsio cum solutione objectionum)

§ 48. For the determination of the proposed question, the matters must be called to mind which were set forth (above at Dist. 19)[139] concerning this question: namely, whether the immortality of the body was natural to the first man. For there we showed what is called *natural* and, by a distinction of its varieties, explained the question; and the same must be done here.

For if *natural* is said of that which God instilled or conferred upon any thing when He established its nature, it is not doubted by those who teach that man was created in grace, that grace was natural to him in this way — just as we likewise said that the immortality of the body was natural to him in the place mentioned. Again, if *natural* is said of that which is concomitant with nature and which adorns and perfects it, it is likewise certain in this way that grace was natural not only to the first man, but even to all other men, and likewise to life eternal itself. Moreover, if *natural* is called that which is inborn to each thing from birth — whether it be a good (*bonum*) and perfection of nature, or on the contrary an evil (*malum*) and defect — in this way grace was natural to the first man, whereas for us it is natural to be deprived of grace, according to that word of the Apostle, Eph. 2: "We were by nature children of wrath."

§ 49. But beyond these, what is most properly called *natural* is that which is, or is a part of nature itself, or which flows from the principles of nature; or that which has in nature a sufficient cause for it. In this way the body and soul, the senses, the intellect, and the other faculties of the soul, together with their natural operations — as also the arts, the sciences, and the other habits which can be acquired by the forces of nature alone — are rightly called natural. In this way, however, grace cannot be said to have been natural to the first man. For it is established that grace itself is not nature itself, nor any part of his nature, nor flows from natural principles: since it is not at all within the power (*potentia*) of natural faculties, nor can it be acquired by habit.

§ 50. Now among the four modes already enumerated by which anything is customarily called natural, only the last is properly opposed to that which is customarily called supernatural. For that which in the first, or in the third mode is called natural, is opposed to what is instituted or generated afterwards and then comes about — whether it come about naturally or otherwise, and whether it be a good or an evil. But that which in the second mode is called natural is opposed to what is against nature (*contra naturam*). Therefore, when it is asked whether grace was natural or supernatural to the first man, it is necessary that, if you understand *supernatural*, you understand what theologians commonly understand by *natural* — that is, as the question has just been explained, in the final mode. Hence the simple and direct reply to the question will be: that grace was, not natural, but supernatural to the first man.

§ 51. So that this may be more fully understood, one must carefully consider what human nature could have been created without fault, and what the integrity of its innocence necessarily required. Certainly this much is plain: that neither the mere integrity of some simple innocence was required in order that man might be assumed into the fellowship of the Divine Nature (*Natura*), the adoption of the sons of God, and the hope and participation of celestial glory — which consists in the clear vision (*visione*) of God — nor could he have been man unless in his creation he was possessed of such dignity; nor could he have been upright and free from all fault unless he had been endowed with so splendid gifts of soul, and with so great a likeness, and so great an excellence of society, as to be closely joined to God his Creator. Hence it is rather to be thought that the first man was given from the beginning the cognition which he was naturally able to have as a rational creature endowed with intellect, and the affection of love towards God as his benefactor by natural powers; and that, beyond this, a light of higher and more divine wisdom was infused into him, illuminated not only by a loftier cognition of God but also by a more excellent love, so that he might be joined to his Creator as to a Father and a friend, and as a single spirit by the closest bond of a certain fellowship.

§ 52. Moreover, it is not in the least credible that the final end — which consists in the clear vision (*visione*) of God, than which nothing more excellent or more desirable could befall man, and towards which and to which he could have tended and attained by merits which he might have had from the forces of nature alone — should be such that it were quite impossible; when rather reason teaches that for the attainment of such an end there was needed on man's part great condescension of God and liberal benevolence.[140] The other things which Contenson heaps up broadly in connection with God's beneficence are only valid in this respect: that, when man is freely elevated by the benefit of God to a supernatural state, the Author of that supernatural state and the clear contemplation of Him are to be set up in man. This I greatly regret: that Contenson advances certain things that are partly contrary to Catholic piety; since indeed (in the place cited above, *speculatio* 1, at the passage beginning *Nec ob*) he writes that Holy Pius V declared several of the propositions of Baius, and even several other Supreme Pontiffs, to contain nothing but what Augustine had

said word for word, and that they are to be reproved only for the following reasons: the harshness of the censure, the arrogance of the author, and the perverse interpretation.[141]

§ 53. For if this evasion were once admitted, all the propositions of Baius could be preached from the pulpit, from the chair, without any danger of note, since any judicious person would not take it ill that Contenson should write (which he wishes to observe most carefully) that Holy Pius V declared several propositions from Baius to be true and Catholic and taken word for word from Augustine — to be reproved, that is, only for the harshness of the censure, the author's arrogance, and a perverse interpretation. I shudder as I write these things and cannot but greatly marvel.[142]

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§ V — Original justice: what it is and what are its parts (Justitia originalis, quae sit, quaeque ejus partes)

§ 54. The question is not the same as whether man was created with grace and whether he was created with original justice (*justitia originali*). Indeed all Catholic doctors acknowledge that he was created with the justice which they call original (*originalis*): "For God made man upright" (Eccl. 7). But concerning grace many have been in doubt, as we showed above. Therefore it remains to be explained here what original justice is, and in what it consists; and in what way it differs from grace; and whether it was a supernatural gift (*donum supernaturale*). As regards the first point, then, the very name "original justice" explains itself. For it is called *justice*, because justice — which is the principal among the cardinal virtues — consists in rendering to each one what is his own; but as the name of justice also signifies rectitude and the order of something, it embraces the whole disposition of all of its powers, both with respect to God and with respect to their own acts. Moreover, it is called *original*, because man had it in the origin of his own nature; and had he not lost it, he would have transmitted it to his posterity — not indeed by the power of seed, but by means of God's cooperation in the generation of individuals, just as God also creates the souls themselves: namely, insofar as it is a supernatural gift. Now the nature of angels is simple, and not consisting in different powers — for there are no powers of angels, some intellectual and others sensitive — all are of the prior kind; nor is there in angels any propagation of their kind, as there is in men. As a result of this nature it is that we do not ordinarily ascribe original justice to angels. For which reason —

§ 55. — we are truly among those who have found in them (*i.e.* the angels and the holy ones among the first men) that they were created in God with true justice and holiness in their very origin, perfectly subjected to God, and in them there was nothing disordered.[143]

§ 56. Furthermore, what the original justice is in which we say the first man was created, what kind of thing it is — whether a single habit (*habitus unus*) or several, or something else — the opinions of the doctors vary. Some hold that there was some one habit, or some one gift of God, which rendered the whole man upright and perfect according to all his powers, and that this is original justice. Of these, some judge that such a habit was in reality identical with Grace and distinct only by formal character (*ratione*), as Domingo de Soto[144] and Medina;[145] others hold it to be really distinct from Grace, or from a supernatural gift (*dono supernaturali*), as Henry of Ghent,[146] Durandus,[147] Scotus,[148] Gabriel Biel,[149] Cajetan,[150] and Bañez ibid., and several others, who derive their opinion from St. Thomas,[151] where Grace is called the root of original justice,

and he therefore seems to understand them to be different things — since a root is distinct from that which is born from the root.

§ 57. But insofar as original justice is by all these thinkers posited as some one habit — whether that habit be identical with Grace or different from it — their opinion seems to be refuted by arguments of no small weight. First, because since certain powers (*potentiae*) of the soul are immaterial — such as intellect and will — and certain are material — such as all the sensitive powers — it cannot be seen how one numerically single habit can order and perfect so many powers differing in their whole genus (*toto genere*), especially since habits are distinguished by acts and acts by objects. Second, because it cannot easily be said in which power that one habit of original justice was seated. For it could not be in the intellect, because then it would not perfect the will; nor in the will, because then it would not perfect the intellect. And again, not in either, because then it could not perfect the sensitive appetite. The opinion of others, therefore, is that original justice was something aggregated from several things, and they define it as a certain absolute complex, or comprehension, of all the habits by which man according to all his powers and faculties was rendered upright and perfect.

§ 58. According to the opinion of these latter, the integral parts (*partes integrales*) of original justice were several habits existing in several and diverse powers: in the speculative intellect, all the speculative sciences of all things that, as they say, can naturally be known by man; in the practical intellect, prudence together with the practical sciences; in the will, the habit of religion towards God and of justice towards the neighbour; in the sensitive appetite, temperance and fortitude. Yet even if it be not to be doubted that original justice had these goods — either all, or most of them — conjoined in the first man (which would also be the case for his posterity born from him, the state of innocence enduring), nevertheless by the name "justice" it does not seem that such an aggregate or complex is properly signified, but rather a certain rectitude which arose in the whole man from the order and best disposition of his parts and powers. Hence original justice seems to have been related to all such habits, dispositions, and perfections of the powers, as a certain relation to the formal characters (*rationes*) founding it; so that it is not necessary for us to seek either one single habit or several which properly are, or constitute, original justice, but it suffices to understand that man according to his parts and powers was so ordered as to be called absolutely upright and just, inasmuch as he had in himself nothing disordered, crooked, or corrupt.

§ 59. This rectitude and integrity of the first man consisted chiefly in three things. First, in this: that the part of the soul — the mind through a perfect knowledge of God and of His law, and the will through full obedience — was subjected to God and cleaved to Him, so that man could truly say that word of Ps. 72: "But for me it is good to cling to God." In this part, original justice comprehended Grace, whose proper effect and office it is to join and subject the mind and will of man to God through knowledge and love. Second, it consisted in this: that the lower parts of the soul — that is, the sensitive appetite, both the concupiscible and the irascible — were subject to the higher, without any conflict and rebellion. Third, in this: that all the members of the body served at a nod the will, or the command of reason — so that, just as no movement arose in the lower part of the soul against reason, so neither in any member of the body.

§ 60. From these three quasi-parts of original justice one may gather several notable effects of the same justice in man. The first effect was that all and each of the faculties of man were able to perform all their actions readily and perfectly, for each had in itself the best disposition. The second effect was that the lower powers of the soul were so subjected to the higher that their actions neither impeded nor retarded them, but rather assisted them — inasmuch as all their movements and actions were so in the power of the ruling reason

that they never perverted its judgment nor resisted its command, but depended on the nod of reason both as regards their beginning and their progress, their increase, decrease, and cessation. As for what Scotus disputes (writing on Dist. 29 of this book)[152] and leaves under doubt — whether in that state the sensitive was so subject to reason that it would never rise against its prescription, namely neither by anticipating its judgment nor by resisting its command — certainly this seems not to be in doubt, as we shall presently show from the Scriptures. The third effect was the full subjection of the body and its members under the command of reason, as we said a little before. Fourth, it followed from that original rectitude that there was in man a great desire (*cupiditas*), yet an ordered one, of knowing the truth; and of all things, at least those which

§ 61. Fifth, there followed a vehement inclination of the will towards every good and an aversion from every evil. Last of all they add this: that original justice constituted man in natural felicity (*felicitate naturali*), that is, such as can naturally be desired and obtained by man. This they hold to consist in what St. Augustine says,[153] that no good would be absent from man which a right will could desire, and nothing would be present which could offend the condition of a man living happily either in body or in soul.

§ 62. But now let us confirm by the testimonies of Sacred Scripture those things through which we have said original justice is constituted. And so as not to repeat what we adduced above to prove that man was created in Grace — which was the principal and most excellent part of original justice — let it suffice here to establish original justice in general by what Ecclesiastes said: "This alone I have found: that God made man upright, and he has entangled himself in infinite questions" (Eccl. 7:29). For this rectitude, which the Sage affirms was given to man by God, is no longer found in the human race. Rather it is said of it in Gen. 6: "Every thought of the heart was intent upon evil at all times." And by the Prophet Jeremiah, ch. 17: "The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable." And in the person of all men by David: "For I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins," etc. (Ps. 50). Therefore in man's first state there was a certain rectitude and integrity, which he lost by sinning, and which is lost in all his posterity. This rectitude the Christian schools call *original*, and from this understanding the Fathers interpreted the passage in Ecclesiastes, St. Augustine in several places[154] and the other Fathers. And since that rectitude cannot even be understood without the subjection by which the part of the soul is subjected to God and cleaves to Him as to its own greatest good through love — this first element, in which we said original justice consists, is sufficiently confirmed from these testimonies of Scripture.

§ 63. But the second and third are proved from those Scriptures which, in reference to the sin of the first man and the corruption of our nature consequent upon sin, report the rebellion of flesh against spirit, and the disobedience of members against the command of reason. Rom. 7: "For the good that I will, I do not; but the evil that I will not, that I do." And again: "For I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man; but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" And Gal. 5: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary one to another: so that you do not the things that you would."

§ 64. To the same purpose seems that word of Wis. 9: "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things." This proceeds from the corruption of the flesh which we have contracted from Adam; so that in the first place the superior part of the soul is, as it were, dragged down by a heavy weight by the lower part — which is corporeal and organic — towards sensible and earthly things, and cannot freely and without hindrance attend to spiritual things. Hence

also holy Job, ch. 7, sighs to God saying: "Why hast thou set me opposite to thee, and I am become burdensome to myself?" (Job 7:20). Concerning the rebellion of the members, beyond what we have adduced from Rom. 7, Scripture speaks most openly. For in Genesis, when it had said of the first human beings as they were before sin: "And they were both naked, and were not ashamed" — of the same persons after sin it is at once said that "they knew that they were naked, and they made themselves garments," and that "because of this they hid themselves from the face of God." For Adam confesses the cause of this hiding, saying: "I heard thy voice, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself."

§ 65. Now that in this rebellion — that is, of the lower part of the soul against the higher, or of the members against the command of the will — there is a certain injustice or iniquity contrary to the rectitude in which man was originally created, is easily taught both from the same Scriptures and from others. For the Apostle in Rom. 7 calls the law that is in the members the "law of sin," and says it fights against the law of the mind, which he had also called the "law of God." The same, several times in chs. 6 and 7, calls that rebellion by the name of *concupiscence*, and calls it *sin*. The same in Gal. 5 says the flesh fights against the spirit — which spirit St. Augustine interprets as the Holy Spirit.[155] Likewise holy Job on account of this rebellion of the flesh says that he is contrary to God. Hence the Fathers also recognise in this rebellion of the flesh against the spirit a certain iniquity. St. Augustine says, *Contra Julianum* bk. 4, ch. 5: "that the flesh lusts against the spirit"; and bk. 5, ch. 3, addressing Julian: "If you were here prudent, you would assuredly see the iniquity by which the lower part of man fights against the higher and better part"; and bk. 6, ch. 8: "For it is no small iniquity, when in one man either the higher parts shamefully serve the lower, or the lower parts stubbornly resist the higher — even if they are not permitted to conquer."[156] By the same reasoning it was said by St. Ambrose,[157] that in the reborn and holy there remains an iniquity against which they must continually fight.

§ 66. All these things were not said by the Fathers because they believed that concupiscence in the reborn was a sin in the proper sense of the name — as the heretics wish, to whom a reply will be given at Dist. 32 — but because concupiscence itself is of itself a certain evil (*malum*), not just any evil, but evil in the respect in which that is called evil which fights against and is contrary to the spirit and to the divine law, as the Apostle speaks — even though it does not drag the will to consent, and therefore cannot properly be called sin. Moreover, unless that too were iniquitous — that some part of the body resists the command of the will — the shameful and pudenda would not be what they are, which move in man more by their own law than by the command of the will. "For we are ashamed in them of nothing else than that our flesh does not serve our command," as St. Augustine says.[158]

§ 67. It is therefore sufficiently evident from what has been said that the first man lost through sin that rectitude by which his lower parts were subjected to the higher without any conflict and trouble. The Apostle also signifies this when he exclaims in these words: "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" For in saying "from the body of this death," he wishes it to be understood that in the body as it was before this mortality — which we have incurred from the sin of the first parent — that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit (of which he had spoken at length with many words) was not present, but rather its contrary: rectitude and justice. Hence St. Augustine (ch. 23 of the book mentioned)[159] says: "The first justice of the first men was to obey God, and not to have in their members this law of concupiscence contrary to the law of their mind."

§ 68. It is furthermore evident from what we have said that grace (*Gratia*) and original justice (*justitia originalis*) are not the same thing —

§ VI — Whether original justice was supernatural to man (Utrum originalis justitia fuerit homini supernaturalis)

§ 69. It is now asked whether that rectitude, or original justice, with which we have shown the first man was created, was natural or supernatural to him? This question has no room for doubt according to those who do not distinguish original justice from grace. For when —

§ 70. — and to be in some manner a part of it. This also can be gathered from what has been said, that there is a question usually raised concerning the subject of original justice, about which learned men indeed dispute in various ways. But if justice properly and in itself signifies rectitude — that is, a certain relation, as we have said — it follows that the subject of original justice is the parts or powers coordinated among themselves. For rectitude, whether it be understood in corporeal or in spiritual things, exists in parts having a certain order among themselves, from which the whole constituted of those parts is said to be right (*rectum*).

But if you ask whether original justice could have existed without grace (*sine Gratia*), I answer that it could have, in a certain sense. For man could have been established from the beginning with a certain natural justice, which would accordingly subsist without grace. And this appears to have been the opinion of those who held that the first man was created without grace. For they could not deny that man was created just and right, since Scripture manifestly attests this. But they appear to have attributed to him only a natural justice.

Finally, someone will ask whether original justice also embraces the immortality and impassibility of the body. For certain persons are found to hold this opinion, inasmuch as they enumerate bodily immortality among those things in which they say the gift of that justice consists. But the reply is in the negative, and its proof is evident: because in Christ the Lord nothing was lacking for the most perfect justice of man, and yet He bore mortal and passible flesh. Nor does that text of Wis. 9 offer an obstacle: "The body which is corrupted weigheth down the soul," and so forth. For, as we indicated above, the Wise Man speaks there not so much of the corruptibility — that is, the mortality — of the body, as of that corruption whereby it comes about that even the soul, joined to the body, is ill-disposed and impeded in its operations.[161]

§ VI — Whether original justice was supernatural for man (Utrum originalis justitia fuerit homini supernaturalis)

§ 71. It is now to be asked whether that rectitude (*rectitudo*) or justice with which we have shown the first man to have been created was natural or supernatural for him. This question indeed has no room for doubt among those who do not distinguish original justice from grace. For since

§ VI — Whether original justice was supernatural for man (Utrum originalis justitia fuerit homini supernaturalis)

§ 72. It is now to be asked whether that rectitude (*rectitudo*) or justice with which we have shown the first man to have been created was natural or supernatural for him. This question indeed has no room for doubt among those who do not distinguish original justice from grace. For since it is a consequence for them that

they say the very same thing about original justice — if, however (which is the opinion of others that has seemed more probable to us), original justice is not entirely the same as grace, it can rightly be doubted whether it is supernatural: not indeed on that side by which it comprehends grace, through which the higher part of the soul was perfectly subjected to God (for concerning grace, as we have already said, there is no doubt), but insofar as it consisted in the perfect subjection of the soul to God, and of the lower parts under the higher part, and of the members of the body under the command of the will. That the rectitude of these parts was not from nature but from a supernatural gift seems to be taught by the following arguments.

§ 73. First: Man is naturally composed of flesh and spirit, and therefore by nature he shares partly with the beasts and partly with the angels. Naturally, therefore, by reason of his flesh — in which he shares with the beasts — he has a propensity toward bodily and sensible good, toward which he is carried by sense and sensual appetite; but by reason of his spirit — in which he participates with the angels — he has a propensity toward spiritual and intelligible good, toward which he is carried by intellect and intellectual or rational appetite. Wherefore it is natural for man to have propensities that are contrary and mutually conflicting; and consequently the conflict of flesh against spirit — that is, the rebellion of the lower appetite against the higher — belongs to man naturally. It follows therefore that the gift whereby such conflict and rebellion was removed — namely, by which it was brought about that the lower part was perfectly subjected to the higher — was a supernatural gift, not a natural condition.

§ 74. Second: If the perfect subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason had been natural to man, it would have remained in him after sin; for natural properties remain intact after sin even in the demons, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius attests.[164] But it did not remain; therefore it was not natural to man but supernatural. Nor does it avail to say that the first sin of Adam was therefore able to corrupt nature by removing something natural, because he sinned as the head of the whole of human nature. For the formal character (*ratio*) of headship required nothing other than that, with him preserving justice, all should be born just, and with him sinning, all should be born sinners — which could come about without any violation of a natural good.

§ 75. Third: The rebellion of the lower powers against the higher arose through the removal of a supernatural gift, that is, through the withdrawal of grace. For St. Augustine says that through the desertion of God's grace the evil of lust and the rebellion of the members arose in man.[165] The same point is proved thus: God is not the author of that rebellion. For "concupiscence is not of the Father," as John says in his first Epistle (1 Jn. 2). But neither is the Devil the author of it, since he only counselled the sin and did not also impose the punishment; nor was man himself the author of it by his sinning, except only as a meritorious cause; still less is it to be referred to the forbidden fruit as its cause — for thus it would be referred to God. It remains therefore that it be referred to the condition of matter as to its efficient cause, but to God and divine justice only as to the cause that removed the obstacle: insofar, namely, as God justly stripped the transgressor of that gift by which the conflict and rebellion arising naturally from the condition of matter and consequently about to arise naturally in man was held back. This gift was therefore supernatural.

§ 76. Fourth: God can recall a dead man to life without bestowing upon him original justice, and indeed He does so. For He has bestowed that justice upon none of those whom He recalled from death to this mortal life. In those who were thus resuscitated, therefore, there was conflict of flesh against spirit; hence He could also create man thus. For the formal character of creating and of re-creating or restoring what had been extinguished is the same. Indeed, if God could reunite just souls — such as were nearly all those whom He

resuscitated — to a body not only mortal and passible but also subject to concupiscence, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, how much more was He able at the beginning to join to such a body a soul neither just nor unjust? But such a man would have been constituted in a state of pure nature; therefore concupiscence is something natural, while the rectitude that removes it is something supernatural.

§ 77. Fifth: The rectitude by which the lower powers were held in obedience to the higher did not arise from any natural causes, nor was it at all capable of arising from such causes; therefore it was not natural but supernatural.

§ 78. Sixth: St. John Chrysostom, in speaking of the first humans who, although they were naked, were not ashamed, says that they were clothed in the glory that had come from above.[166] Therefore their not being ashamed was had by them, according to St. John Chrysostom, from a gift from above — that is, from a heavenly and supernatural gift. He also compares that gift to a garment for the very reason that it was not of man's nature but was added over and above his nature, just as a garment is added over the body. St. Ambrose likewise speaks in similar fashion in several places, comparing that innocence, which was free from shame, to a garment.'[167] So too St. Augustine: "What is it," he says, "that when the forbidden fruit was eaten the nakedness was made known, if not that sin stripped bare what grace was covering? For great was the grace of God there, where the earthly and animal body did not have bestial lust. Therefore he who, clothed in grace, had in his naked body nothing of which to be ashamed — stripped of grace, felt what he ought to cover."'[168]

§ 79. Seventh: The same St. Augustine calls the first humans blessed before sin, for the reason that they lacked shameful lust and were able to generate and conceive without it, and he says that this was granted to them by the goodness of God.[169] But they would not be called blessed on account of what is purely natural; and a gracious concession also implies something given above nature.

§ 80. Eighth: The same St. Augustine in the *Retractations* speaks as follows: "Even if ignorance and difficulty had been the natural beginnings of man, God would not on that account be to be blamed but to be praised."[170] God was therefore able to create man in such a way that ignorance of truth and difficulty in doing good — which results from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit — would be in him as if certain natural properties; and his nature would not on that account be changed. Therefore these are truly even now natural to him; and consequently the gift that prohibited them was supernatural.

§ 81. Finally, there is added the authority of the Scholastics. For St. Thomas, writing of the rectitude with which Adam was created, says: "It is manifest that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons the natural endowments remained after sin."[171] Thereupon, from the statement of St. Augustine that the first humans, immediately after the transgression, with God's grace deserting them, were troubled about the nakedness of their bodies, he reasons thus: "If, with grace deserting, the obedience of the flesh to the soul was dissolved, therefore through the grace existing in the soul the lower powers were subjected to it." The same Doctor writes: "God had bestowed upon human nature at its beginning, above the condition of its own principles, a certain original rectitude in reason, which it was able to impress upon the lower powers without any resistance. And because this had been conferred gratuitously, it was therefore taken away through the ingratitude of disobedience; hence it came about that when the first man sinned, human nature, which was in him, was left to itself, so as to subsist according to the condition of its own principles."'[172] Again, the same Doctor teaches that from original sin there follows, not directly but indirectly, an inclination toward an

inordinate act — namely, through the removal of that which was obstructing, that is, of original justice, which was prohibiting inordinate movements.'[173] He also writes similar things elsewhere.'[174] Durandus likewise transmits the same opinion.'[175] Scotus also concurs.'[176] In agreement with these are Capreolus and Gabriel,'[177] Ferrariensis,'[178] Cajetan,'[179] Soto,'[180] and afterwards Bartholomew Medina,'[181] in which places this author explains that opinion at length and affirms that it is common to theologians. The Roman Catechism for Parish Priests also appears to have transmitted it; for in the explanation of the Lord's Prayer on the words "Thy will be done," it says that the human race in the first man lost the goods of original justice, by which it had been increased and adorned by God above the capacity of its own nature. And below it speaks thus: "For as soon as the first man lost original justice, by which as by a certain bridle the passions were governed," and so on. Finally there is here cited by some the pontifical condemnation of a certain article which reads as follows: "The integrity of man's first condition was not an elevation of human nature unowed to it but its natural condition.",[182]

§ 82. Yet neither does the contrary position lack its own many and weighty arguments, of the following kind. First: No vice is natural to man; but if original justice, insofar as it concerns the subjection of body to soul and of the lower powers to reason, were supernatural, many vices would be natural to man — such as concupiscence or the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit and whatever follows from it — which are vices not so much of the body as of the soul. Concerning them St. Augustine affirms generally that all vices of souls are privations of natural goods.[78] From which it follows as a consequence that the goods themselves opposed to the vices are natural.

§ 83. Second: The Apostle John in his first Epistle (1 Jn. 2) says that concupiscence is not of the Father but of the world, and places it in the same order as the pride of life; but in a state of pure nature nothing would be of the world — everything would be of God — nor would there be the pride of life there if sin were excluded; therefore concupiscence would not exist in that state. Hence it follows as a consequence that the rectitude opposed to concupiscence belongs to that state.

§ 84. Third: The concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit is in itself evil — not as death and diseases and other natural defects, but as something which by its own nature inclines and impels toward sin. For the proper movements of this concupiscence are evil desires, as the Apostle teaches in Rom. 6 and 7; for which reason also it is called sin by the Apostle; therefore it cannot be natural.

§ 85. Fourth: Even granting that God is able to create man subject to the said concupiscence, it does not therefore follow that man in a state of pure nature would be such. For God can create a man blind, one-eyed, lame, or deprived of some other natural member or faculty; nor does any of these things on that account belong to man as we posit him in pure nature.

§ 86. Fifth: Evil concupiscence and ignorance of what is to be done and the rebellion of flesh against spirit are wounds of nature, and therefore the Fathers teach that the nature of man was wounded. For their teaching is that the nature of man was not merely stripped but also wounded — stripped, namely, of gratuitous gifts, wounded in its natural endowments, as we have shown elsewhere;[183] therefore the perfections opposed to the said vices are natural to man. For what is not to be said — as pleases some — is that man was wounded in his natural endowments by the very fact that he was stripped of gratuitous gifts; rather, that he was stripped in one respect and wounded in another is plainly indicated by these words of St. Ambrose: "These robbers" — that is, the demons — "were accustomed first to despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace which we had

received, and then to inflict wounds;"[184] and accordingly from these words it appears that man was first despoiled of the garment of grace and afterwards wounded by the violation of natural integrity — for no other reason than that besides grace he also lost certain goods of nature.

§ 87. Sixth: Christ was able to assume human nature in pure nature; but He was not able to assume concupiscence, the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, the proneness to sinning, the difficulty of good will. For it would follow that He was able to sin, since proneness to sinning presupposes the ability to sin.

§ 88. Seventh: God so constituted the nature of each creature that it could attain its natural end through natural means — as is evident in the beasts and all other creatures differing from man. This is also proved by reason, because a means ought not to be more excellent and of a higher order than the end toward which it is ordered; but man created in pure nature would not have been able through natural means to attain his natural end if original rectitude were not natural to him, because he would have been impeded from his end by the continuous rebellion of the flesh against the spirit and the other vices mentioned above. Therefore it is not to be denied that that rectitude would have been natural to him. Otherwise it would follow that man according to his nature would be the most miserable of all animals — inasmuch as through those things alone which he had received by nature he would be unable to attain his natural end. For even the angel through natural endowments alone could have attained his natural end, had he been created in those alone; and the measure of man and of the angel is the same (Rev. 21). And indeed each was created for the same end, both natural and supernatural — namely, the contemplation of God. Therefore if for the angel natural goods sufficed for the natural end, why not also for man?

§ 89. Eighth: It is the opinion of many theologians that original justice, insofar as it does not include grace, was ordained in respect of man not toward a supernatural but only toward a natural end; and this is gathered plainly from St. Thomas, where he teaches that for man in the state of integral nature there was no need of a gift of grace, over and above the said natural goods, in order to love God above all things with a natural love and to fulfill the precepts of the law as to their substance — that is, to love God and to fulfill His precepts out of charity.[185] The inference is valid, because, as has already been said, a means of a higher order ought not to be assumed for a lower end.

§ 90. Ninth: Carnal lust, although it is natural to the beasts inasmuch as they lack reason, is nevertheless in man — who is a rational animal — intrinsically base and foul on account of the struggle of the flesh against the command of reason, as we shall show at greater length elsewhere.[186] But purity of nature has nothing base and foul; therefore carnal lust was not going to exist in the state of pure nature for man.

§ 91. Tenth: In pure nature nothing is shameful or causes blushes, because the whole of nature is the work of God; and whoever is ashamed of His work does injury to God, as St. Augustine teaches and argues.[187] But men are justly ashamed of lust and the rebellion of the members; hence they are accustomed to cover such members as shameful, as the first parents did after sin; and whoever did not do so would be held most shameless and disgraceful. Therefore in pure nature there would have been nothing of this sort.

§ 92. Eleventh: From the shame which man suffers on account of the movement of lust and the rebellion of the members, the Doctors draw an argument for original sin — as St. Bonaventure writing in this book[188] and others do. Which argument would be entirely invalid if man created in pure nature had equally experienced movements and rebellion of this kind.

§ 93. Twelfth: If the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is natural to man considered according to pure nature, then no man in pure nature could have attained salvation or escaped hell; rather, all adults at least would have been destined to eternal damnation. For no one, without supernatural aid, can long persist in innocence and abstain from mortal sin. For from that rebellion there is in man a headlong inclination toward vices, as even those admit who posit it in pure nature. They reply to this argument that God so constituted the nature of man even according to pure nature that he could not arrive at beatitude even natural beatitude without supernatural aid — just as the separated soul naturally desires to be reunited to the body, which nevertheless it cannot achieve without supernatural power. But this reply seems insufficiently solid. For from it it would follow that, although the remission of sins is a supernatural gift, it would nevertheless have been so owed to man in pure nature as is the resurrection of bodies — lest there follow the absurdity that the whole human race was created for eternal damnation; just as, unless the resurrection of bodies be posited there, that absurdity would follow, namely that souls once separated from their bodies (which was necessarily going to happen through death as something natural) would have remained perpetually without them. But then it would further follow from this that the remission of sins, and consequently true penance after a fall, would be included in the institution of man according to pure nature, just as the future resurrection of bodies after death is included; and thus these two things — namely, true penance after a fall and the remission of sins — would not be special benefits of God through Christ. And why could it not be said by the same reasoning that the same supernatural benefit is owed to lapsed nature through the transgression of the first man? Since lapsed nature, according to the opinion of these men, differs from nature as it would have been created in pure nature only as a stripped woman from a naked one. Certainly it follows from the said reply that the remission of sins belongs to the state of nature, just as does the resurrection of the dead, and just as the infusion of souls — though supernatural — belongs to the same state of nature. Others reply that God was able to lead man through natural means to an end proportioned to his nature — that is, to a natural end, which is to investigate truth by reasoning and not to raise him higher — and they explain this by the example of the bat. But this reply does not dissolve the argument about the eternal damnation of all, since both adults and infants would have been destined to it, or they would have fallen from even that natural end through the vice of concupiscence laying waste the whole human race.

§ 94. Thirteenth: Through the concupiscence contracted from the sin of the first man, the nature of man was vitiated and changed for the worse. Hence St. Augustine says that the sin of Adam was so great that through it a great change for the worse was wrought in nature.[189] He compares this change in the same place to the change of an olive tree into a wild olive, and says that Adam by sinning was converted from an olive tree into a wild olive and made the whole race a wild olive. He writes similar things elsewhere,[190] and in other places calls concupiscence a languor of nature and a morbid quality. All of which things seem to signify that the integrity which excluded these vices was a natural good — inasmuch as when it was removed, nature was changed for the worse.

§ 95. — the nature itself was wounded, depraved, and corrupted. The fourteenth argument: the same St. Augustine (in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, book I, final chapter, and throughout his books *Contra Julianum*)[191] objects against the Pelagians that they defend concupiscence as a natural good. Nor do those seem to answer this argument sufficiently who say that concupiscence is natural, not as a good of nature, but as a natural defect arising, as they put it, from the condition of matter. For St. Augustine nowhere speaks in this way; on the contrary, he simply removes concupiscence from nature altogether and everywhere calls it an evil — not in the way in which we call death and other purely penal afflictions, which Christ Himself also

assumed, evil; but because it wars against the law of God and incites to sin, and is something of which men are ashamed. Hence he says in book II of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, chapter 2:[192] "It more rightly receives the name of evil than of good, because both evil persons and good persons are ashamed of it." Therefore neither should it be conceded that God is the author of that evil, as was proved from the Apostle by the second argument — since otherwise Scripture is wont to refer even natural defects, such as death and the other evils of punishment, to God as their author.

§ 96. The fifteenth argument: among those wounds of nature which the human race contracted from the sin of the first parent, malice in the will (*malitia in voluntate*) is customarily reckoned second in order. This is called by Bartholomew Medina, commenting on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 3,[193] hatred of spiritual things — and indeed in agreement with St. Thomas in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 3.[194] But in the man whom God would have created in pure natural endowments, there would have been no malice of will, nor hatred of divine things; therefore there would have been naturally in him the rectitude opposed to these vices.

§ 97. The sixteenth argument: concupiscence is not only not the work of God, but is also so evil that it displeases God. Hence we too are commanded to combat it and to hold it in hatred, as will be shown more fully below (at dist. 30)[195] from Scripture and the Fathers, especially St. Augustine; therefore concupiscence would have had no place in a man endowed with natural endowments only. For in such a man nothing would have displeased God, and consequently such a man, existing only as he would have been made by God, would have been obliged to hate nothing in himself.

§ 98. The seventeenth argument: if in the state of pure nature there had been rebellion of the members and the filthiness of lust, then in that state right reason would have counselled perpetual continence and would have dissuaded from contracting marriage; but marriage itself would have stood in need of excuse, just as it does now after sin. Therefore, in the state of pure nature, right reason would have dissuaded from the act that is most natural, and would have incited toward that which is contrary to the propagation of nature. And so right reason, with no corruption of nature yet intervening from sin, would in a certain fashion have warred against nature and its conservation — which seems most absurd. Add that by the same reasoning it would follow that marriage, from its first institution in nature and setting aside the supernatural, would be not only for the generation of children but also as a remedy for incontinence — a purpose of marriage, however, which the Doctors are not accustomed to acknowledge except by reason of the occasion of sin.

§ 99. Finally, in support of this opinion, see what Henry of Ghent disputes (*Quodlibet* 6, q. 11).[196] Among his arguments is that which we have already mentioned: that man through sin was not merely stripped of gratuitous gifts, but was also wounded in his natural endowments. Another argument likewise is that otherwise in reality there would be no difference between an infant born in pure natural endowments and one born from Adam the sinner; because as regards the thing itself, and setting aside relationships, there is no difference between a naked man who has never been clothed and a man stripped of his garment. Hence they would be alike, or would be equally to be freed from punishment. See also what Gregory of Rimini disputes to the same conclusion (*Super II Sententiarum*).[197] Although few other Scholastics agree with the opinion of these authors.

§ 100. Thus far the arguments on both sides. Which side ought rather to be assented to is difficult to judge, since the common opinion of the Scholastics — and indeed of St. Thomas himself — with its not contemptible reasons stands on the side of the former position. Yet the latter position seems to be supported

by arguments that are more numerous and not inferior in conclusive force — although not all such that they could not be solved by the more acute. Much also commends this opinion the authority of St. Augustine, concerning whom Bartholomew Medina, writing on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 2,[198] when he was rejecting the opinion of those who distinguish a man established in natural endowments alone from a fallen man, says: "Which opinion, however, without doubt appears to be that of St. Augustine."

§ 101. To this is added the fact that St. Thomas, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, art. 3, ad 1,[199] teaches that to concupisce is natural to man insofar as it is in accordance with the order of reason; and that the same is contrary to nature for man insofar as it transcends the limits of reason. And what he teaches in q. 85, arts. 1 and 2,[200] that through sin man is not only deprived of supernatural gifts, but that the good of nature is also diminished. And although those who think otherwise apply their own interpretations to these passages of St. Thomas — interpretations which we do not condemn — it nevertheless appears altogether that this Doctor acknowledged that the rectitude opposed to depraved concupiscence and its depraved inclinations is in some manner natural to the integral man, according to the mode in which it was said by St. Augustine that the things which are called vices of natural endowments are privations of goods; especially since, according to the doctrine of the same St. Thomas, that rectitude of itself will perfect man only in the order toward his natural end, as was proved above.

§ 102. It also seems possible to resolve the argument drawn from the composition of man from diverse and as it were warring natures. For that composition, insofar as it was made and established by God, seems sufficient to remove such a conflict and depraved inclination by which man would be moved against God. For it does not seem to belong to human nature according to its purity and natural integrity — which it has from God — that the senses should draw man away from God, the supreme good, and from divine things, and should incline him to sin, that is, should move him against God. For to make this natural to man, if it is not utterly impossible, seems at least to be unbecoming to the Divine Goodness, whose property it is, according to (Pseudo-)Dionysius, to draw all things to itself.[201] Moreover, not even in beasts and other creatures is there observed such a repugnance of the powers of nature against their own natural end; rather, in all things there appears a natural inclination toward the end. Therefore, if there were naturally in man a conflict of the lower powers against right reason, and consequently against the law of God, by this there would naturally be in him an inclination against his own natural end, and man would by this reasoning be worse according to his natural endowments than all other creatures.

§ 103. Furthermore, this opinion is not impeded by the condemnation of the article which asserted that the integrity of the first condition is the natural condition of human nature.[202] For that article speaks of the first integrity, which comprehends Grace — indeed, insofar as it consists chiefly in Grace; concerning which we have already shown above that it was not natural to the first man, but supernatural. The sense of the article is made manifest from the teaching of its Author in that chapter whose title or summary prefixed by the Author is the same as the article. For he treats there chiefly of Grace, which assuredly constitutes man absolutely just and right. The same is evident from articles 21, 23, and 24 preceding, which are of the same argument as this one and speak only of the gift of Grace by which God adopts man as a son of God. Finally, this is established from the declaration of the Faculty of Theology of Louvain in the writing issued concerning the said articles.[203]

§ VII — What kind of assistance was necessary for the first man (Quale adjutorium fuerit primo Homini necessarium)

§ 104. Besides the justice or grace in which the first man was created by God — which he could not have retained unless He who had given it preserved it — it is asked whether some other assistance was necessary for him, such that without it he could neither perform good works nor merit eternal life, nor persevere in the justice he had received; and if such a thing was necessary, what and of what kind it might be.

§ 105. It is answered affirmatively to the prior question. For that a certain assistance distinct from the grace of creation was necessary for the first man is the clear doctrine of St. Augustine in several passages: namely, in the *Enchiridion*, chs. 104 and the several following; in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 10, 11, and 12; in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 27; in *De Natura et Gratia*, chs. 20 and 26; in *De Genesi ad Litteram* VIII, ch. 12; in Sermon 11 on the Words of the Apostle;[205] and in Letter 106.[206] The same is also the doctrine of Prosper in *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 18.[81] But what or of what kind this assistance was, whether according to the mind of St. Augustine himself or according to the truth of the matter, is disputed and variously discussed among the Doctors.

§ 106. One interpretation answers these questions in the following words: "That assistance was the freedom of the will immune from all taint of corruption, together with the rectitude of the will and the integrity and vitality of all the natural powers of the soul." So he says, but this is contrary to St. Augustine's opinion. For it is clear from St. Augustine in the passages already cited that that assistance, as he posits it, is distinct both from the grace of creation and from the uncorrupted powers and that integrity of nature whose parts the Master enumerates. By this same argument the opinion of those is also refuted who hold that assistance to consist in the preservation of the grace once given. For grace given and grace preserved is one and the same gift.

§ 107. Others, therefore, besides the grace and the rectitude in which man was made, say that from the beginning there was present to him another gift, either habitual or similar to a habit, by which he would be assisted in performing good works and in persevering; and that this is what St. Augustine calls an "assistance." These hold that that assistance was, as it were, a continuous influx of God into man, by which both a kindling of light was supplied to his intellect and a kindling of good affection to his will, without which his justice would have gradually failed, just as a lamp is gradually extinguished when the oil runs out. Moreover, they hold that such was this assistance, by which man could, if he wished, persevere in the justice he had received. For, they say, if at the moment of his creation he had lacked it, he would have fallen through his own fault: since his nature was such that, with this assistance, it could persevere if it wished; but as for actually willing to persevere when possessed of it, they say this was left to his free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). They prove this opinion of theirs from St. Augustine himself, who in the passages cited above, and especially in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11, and in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 106, speaks in the manner just described about this assistance and its necessity; and who elsewhere declares the same necessity by similar expressions introduced in addition. For in *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 26,[207] he teaches that this assistance was as necessary for man in his integral state as light for seeing is necessary for an eye however sound and healthy. Elsewhere, as in the *Enchiridion*, he uses the comparison of nourishment and sustenance, without which — supplied externally — the nature of an animal or of fire cannot be preserved.

§ 108. Those who hold this opinion therefore say that the grace or right will of the first man was like a nature, while the assistance was like nourishment or sustenance that must necessarily be applied for the preservation of the nature of a living thing, whether healthy or sick. By means of things externally applied in this way, something is properly said to be sustained, that it may remain and not fail. They confirm and declare this comparison further from what St. Augustine writes in *De Genesi ad Litteram* VIII, chs. 8, 9, and 10,[208] where he teaches that God has established and governs things in different ways. Some things he has established so that they persist by God's conservation alone, with nothing else externally applied to preserve them; such is the rational soul, such are the Angels and the heavens. Others he has established so that beyond general conservation they need the resource of some other thing; such are animals, which however sound and robust still need food and other external sustaining things in order to be preserved and to remain in a good state. Therefore, they say, beyond the general conservation of grace as the life of one living, there was need for man to have, in order to conserve that same grace, a certain peculiar assistance, which would be as the nourishment and sustaining of justice and of the good will, and which could be provided by none other than God.

§ 109. If it is further asked from the same authors how the first man received that divine influx which they call an assistance, or how he would have received it if he had remained in innocence, they reply that it is probable he was to receive it by a continuous contemplation of the works of God — that is, of creatures, among which also his own works and the most excellent things among bodily creatures. By the beauty of all these he would, wondrously delighted, have been rapt into the love of God, and thus would have grown more and more in the perfection of justice: inasmuch as he would have done no work in which he was not actually contemplating God. On this matter see St. Augustine in *Confessions* X, ch. 6,[209] and Prosper in *De Vocatione Gentium* II, ch. 1.[210]

§ 110. There is besides the opinion of others, who interpret the assistance of which St. Augustine speaks as the cooperation of God with man through a special assistance (*auxilium speciale*). They place the necessity of this even in the first man from the fact that secondary causes can accomplish nothing except with the cooperation of the First Cause; and they hold this to have been signified by St. Augustine, both elsewhere and especially in Letter 106,[211] where he says: "Human nature, even if it were to remain in that integrity in which it was constituted, could in no way preserve itself without its Creator's assistance." These words were indeed transcribed by the Roman Pontiff into Canon 19 of the Council of Orange.'[212]

§ 111. They add, moreover, that there was no need for any motion of God by means of an exciting assistance (*auxilium excitans*) to make the first man use the prior gifts — namely the grace and the assistance just described — as is needed by us in the state of fallen nature. They assign the reason for this difference: because the gift of grace in the first man not only subjected the mind to God, but also the flesh to the spirit; and therefore in man there was nothing that would impede or retard him from a good work or that would incite him to sin. In us, however, that gift indeed subjects the mind to God, but not the flesh to the spirit; and therefore, to overcome the allurements of the flesh, we need the assistance of exciting grace (*gratia excitans*). They prove by the testimonies of St. Augustine that the first man did not need this assistance. For in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11, speaking of Adam, he says: "He had no need of that assistance for which those men plead when they say: 'I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind.' In them, says he, the flesh lusts against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh; and, striving and endangered in such a conflict, they beg to be given the power to fight and to conquer through the grace of Christ. But he, tried and troubled by no such strife within himself, enjoyed in that place of blessedness his peace with himself." And

after many things about the assistance of the first man he adds these words: "For such was that assistance, which could be forsaken when one wished, and in which one could remain if one wished — yet not such as to make one wish it. This is the first grace given to the first Adam. But this is more powerful in the second Adam. For the first is this: that a man may have justice if he wishes. The second therefore has more power: by it a man is also made to wish it." And the other things that follow in the same sense, and especially that which he says — that it was left to the free choice of the first man whether he wished. By which it seems manifestly indicated that the first man had an assistance by which he could act well if he wished, but not such as would make him will and act.

§ 112. To the same end they adduce what the same St. Augustine says in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7,[213] when speaking of perseverance in good and of overcoming temptations: "This is not in the powers of free choice as they now are; it had been in man before he fell." Likewise the fact that the author of the *Hypognosticon*, at the beginning of Book III, wrote these words: "We reply that no one can of himself, that is, by free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), suffice to accomplish what he wishes. We rightly say this, except only for the first-formed man (*protoplastum*), since the will of his free choice was sound in him before guilt." And in ch. 2, speaking of this same soundness of free choice: "That itself," he says, "is the first grace by which the first man could have stood, had he wished to keep the commandments." By these passages they think it is signified that in the powers of the free choice of integral man lay the very act of willing well; that acting well and persevering in the good was not something he could do without grace, but because even that grace itself, without which he could do none of these things, was in the power of his free choice — not only, I say, the habitual grace which he had in himself and which he could use when he wished, but also the divine cooperation, which they understand by the name of an assistance. For they say that this cooperation was most ready for man and always assisting him in the first act (*in actu primo*), but not in the second act (*in actu secundo*), except when it would have been lawful for man to do something.

§ 113. Concerning these last two opinions, which we have expounded at greater length for the sake of explanation, it is to be said that what we said above concerning the assistance given to the Angels for perseverance (at Dist. 5)[214] applies here. For there we showed that the opinion of those is more true who, beyond the grace of the first creation, require no further habitual assistance in the Angels for perseverance; since in the genus of habitual gift, the first grace preserved would suffice for that purpose. We think the same must be said entirely of the first man. For concerning this matter St. Augustine in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11, and in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7, and elsewhere, wishes the same to be thought of Angels and of the first man.[215] Therefore, beyond the first grace, there is no need to posit that continuous influx of God into man, as a kind of nourishment or external sustaining of grace and of good will applied from without — the kind posited by those of the prior opinion. Not because God did not truly continue to flow into man in justice and good will for as long as he remained in God's obedience, but because the first grace itself — whether it be called justice or good will — could only be retained and preserved by a continuous influx of God. Hence such a continuous influx was nothing other in man than grace preserved and continued.

§ 114. The assistance posited by the second opinion is by no means sufficient, understood, that is, in the manner in which it is explained by its own authors. For they say that assistance was the cooperation of God with man through a special assistance. They understand this cooperation as that by which —

§ 115. God cooperates with man if he wills; but not in such a way that He brings it about that the man wills. Accordingly, they make this cooperation and special assistance of God depend upon the condition of man's will, and in consequence do not subject the will itself — that is, man's act of willing — to God as to an operating cause, but rather subject God's cooperation to the will of man. But the truth holds that neither the Angel nor the first and integral man could will rightly, act rightly, accomplish the good, and persevere in the good, except by God working these things in them and with them. And therefore this assistance of divine operation, or cooperation, over and above the habitual grace given at the beginning, was necessary both to the Angels and to the first man for all those things which we have already stated. This opinion, although it can easily —

— be established by those arguments by which, in the place mentioned,[216] we proved it of the Angels; and more fully by those arguments by which (at Dist. 41 of Book I),[217] we showed that the election of the Angels was not derived from foreseen merit. For the arguments are nearly common to both, applying as well to man as to the Angel; yet for the sake of a more certain doctrine we shall set forth here also some arguments. Of these the first and foremost is the following: To God as author, first cause, and prime mover is to be referred every action, motion, form, quality, nature, and in fine every being and everything that has been created — not as to a moral cause, but as to a physical one, and that one operating and moving most properly and intimately. Therefore for the first man in the state of integrity it was not sufficient to have the assistance or cooperation of God by which he could act rightly if he willed; but it was also necessary to have the assistance by which he would will and would persevere, inasmuch as he could not will and persevere except by God working these things in him. And to this purpose belong those Scriptures which declare God to be the author of all things and of all goods: Rom. 11: "For from Him and through Him and in Him are all things." Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect boon is from above," and so forth.[218]

§ 116. The second argument: The first man was obliged to pray to God for perseverance; therefore perseverance itself even in the first man would have been a special gift of God. For those who think that in the first state of man there was no need of prayer are gravely mistaken, since even Christ — whose innocence and rectitude according to the whole of human nature was most excellent — is read to have prayed to God the Father frequently. The third: If the first man had persevered to the end, he would have been bound to render to God particular thanks for that good; therefore perseverance itself would have been given to him by God. For the act of thanksgiving is the acknowledgment of a benefit received. The fourth: If the first men had overcome the temptation of the devil, they would have been bound to give thanks to God for that victory; therefore that good also they would have had from no other source than from God. The fifth: Integral men would have been bound to glory in their perseverance and in the victory gained over the devil — not in themselves but in God; just as the holy Angels always praise God in all things and glory in God alone. To this purpose belong the Scriptures: "Let him that glories, glory in the Lord" (1 Cor. 1:31). "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory" (Ps. 113:9). "Cursed is the man that trusts in man," and so forth (Jer. 17:5).[219]

§ 117. Now that this opinion — concerning the assistance necessary to the first man — is St. Thomas's is sufficiently manifest, not only from very many passages where he teaches and diligently inculcates what was assumed in the first argument, namely that God is the cause most properly so called of all things, actions, and motions; but also from what he disputes concerning the assistance which was necessary for the first man either to avoid sin, or for meriting and persevering. For writing in Dist. 24 of this book,[220] he says: "One must say that

God operates in the will and in nature as the first cause in second causes. And therefore without His assistance not even a stone would be preserved in being, nor would it tend downward. Similarly also human nature without Him can neither subsist nor have a right movement of the will." By these words he plainly signifies that man had need of the assistance and cooperation of God in order to have a right movement of will, in just the same way as he had need of God's operation in order to persist in being, and just as without God's assistance not even a stone is preserved in being or tends downward. In these latter cases, moreover, the operation of God is not suspended upon the condition of some other concurrent cause; rather the first cause itself makes the second causes operate and, as St. Thomas elsewhere says, applies them to acting.[221] Therefore God by His cooperation assisted man in good actions in such a way that this cooperation did not depend upon the condition "if man should will," but rather itself brought this very thing about.

§ 118. The same Doctor writes in I-II:[222] "It is manifest that all motions, both bodily and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover absolutely, which is God; and therefore, however perfect any bodily or spiritual nature be supposed, it cannot proceed into its act unless it be moved by God." And much more follows. Likewise (art. 2),[223] he clearly asserts that in both states — both of integral nature and of corrupted nature — man stands in need of divine assistance for doing or willing any good whatsoever, as by the prime mover, so namely as to be moved by Him toward acting rightly. And (in the reply to the first objection),[224] he shows by the general argument of the prime mover and prime deliberator that the mind of man even when sound does not possess dominion over its own act in such a way that it does not need to be moved by God. Note here incidentally that man is lord of his own act, but under God as mover. He repeats similar things in arts. 3, 4, 6, and 8.[225] Then (art. 9),[226] he teaches that man established in grace does not indeed need another assistance of grace as though another infused habit, but he does need the assistance of grace in another mode — namely, that he be moved by God to acting rightly — and this for two reasons: First, the general reason, because no created thing can proceed into any act whatsoever except by the power of divine motion. Second, a special reason, on account of the corruption of human nature. Note here the former reason: because it is general, it has a place also in the state of integral man. Hence in the same place he says (in the reply to the first objection) that even in the state of Glory, when grace will be wholly perfect, man will need divine assistance. Finally (art. 10),[227] treating of the assistance of grace for the purpose of persevering, he writes thus: "For having perseverance, man established in grace needs no other habitual grace indeed, but he needs the divine assistance directing him and protecting him against the impulses of temptations; and therefore after a man has been justified by grace, he necessarily must ask from God the aforesaid gift of perseverance; namely, that he be guarded from evil until the end of life. For to many grace is given to whom it is not given to persevere in grace." And in the reply to the third objection, citing St. Augustine, he says: "Man in the first state received the gift by which he could persevere, but he did not receive it so as to persevere. Now, however, through the grace of Christ, many receive the gift of grace by which they can persevere; and it is given to them further that they do persevere."[228] By these words it is certainly signified that for the first man in his actual perseverance the gift by which he could persevere did not suffice, but that over and above it was necessary that the actual persevering itself be given to him — just as now for Christ's elect faithful the gift of grace by which they can persevere does not suffice, but it is given to them further that they do persevere, as without this gift they would never have persevered. From all these passages it is established that, according to St. Thomas's doctrine, for the first man in order to persevere, and altogether for every good action, there was necessary, besides the grace given at the beginning, an assistance of God by which he would be moved more efficaciously to all those things.

§ 119. Now this same opinion of St. Augustine is first gathered from the fact that in Book XII of *De Civitate Dei* (ch. 9)[229] he writes of the Angels — namely, that those who persevered in the grace of divine love, while others fell by an evil will, were assisted more than the others and attained to the fullness of beatitude. Now this assistance, which he says some had over others, cannot be understood as anything other than that which caused them to persist in the love of God; for otherwise nothing would have prevented an equal assistance from being given to both. Therefore concerning the first man also the same must be thought according to St. Augustine's judgment: namely, that such assistance as was given to the good Angels to persevere was also necessary to him for persevering. This is clearly sounded by the words of the same Doctor in the Tractate *De Cantico Novo* (ch. 8):[230] "What free will can do when not assisted is shown in Adam himself: for evil it suffices by itself; for good it does not, unless it be assisted by God." Note here what he says: *not assisted* — for by this he plainly signifies that some assistance was lacking to the first man which was necessary to him for the good of perseverance.

§ 120. There is added the fact that the same St. Augustine in Book II of the *Confessions* (ch. 7)[231] teaches that the man who has not sinned is more bound to love God than the man who, after sins, has been brought back to repentance — for the reason that the former has received a greater benefit from God, namely from God preserving him so that he did not fall, than the other to whom this was not given. Hence in the same place he thus addresses God: "I attribute to Thy grace whatever evil things I have not done," and so forth. Therefore Adam, if he had not sinned, would have had to credit this very thing to the grace of God guarding him from sin, just as the holy Angels do credit it. To this also pertains what St. Thomas teaches in II-II,[232] where, to the question whether an innocent person is more bound than a penitent to render thanks to God, he responds that, from the quantity of what is given, the innocent person is more bound, because a greater good is given to him by God and more continuously continued, all other things being equal and speaking absolutely. In these words note that the continuation of the benefit is given to the innocent person by God over the other — that is, this very thing is given, namely that the innocent person remains such and does not decline toward sin; which certainly was not given to the other, who is supposed to have sinned. Therefore the fact that Adam was for some time preserved in innocence was a singular benefit of God preserving him; and if he had remained in innocence, he would on that account have had a greater benefit from God than one who did not remain, and for that benefit he would have been bound to render particular thanks to God.

§ 121. Again, to this purpose admirably serves what the same St. Augustine writes in Book XII of *De Civitate* (ch. 9) and in Book II *De Peccatorum Meritis* (ch. 18):[233] from the fact that the Angel and man are said to have from themselves — that is, from free will — the very act of willing, but from God alone the power to will, he says it follows that they have something better from themselves than from God, because without doubt it is better in good things to will than to be able. It must therefore be admitted, according to this most solid reasoning of St. Augustine, that the first man also received from God not merely the power to will if he willed, but also the very act of willing as long as he willed, and that this assistance — by which it was brought about that he willed — was necessary to him for persevering.

§ 122. Another passage in St. Augustine is very clear, in Book VIII of *De Genesi ad Litteram* (ch. 12),[234] where he wishes those sentences of Scripture to obtain a place also in the first man: "God it is who works in us to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2:13); "We are His workmanship, created in good works which God has prepared that we should walk in them" (Eph. 2:10); "By grace you are saved, not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should glory" (Eph. 2:8–9); and other similar ones. Now it is established

from those things which St. Augustine disputes against the Pelagians that the Scriptures just mentioned signify to St. Augustine that God gives to man not merely the power if he will, but also the very act of willing. Therefore from his judgment, not even the very act of willing could the first man have unless God gave it. The same author, in Book XI of the same work (ch. 8),[235] writes thus, both of men and of Angels: "Let him that glories, glory only in the Lord, when he knows that it is not his own, but the Lord's — not only that he exists, but also that his good condition comes from none other than from Him from whom he has his existence."

§ 123. The same opinion is confirmed by the authority of St. Bernard, who in the book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (about the middle),[236] compares the fallen man with the standing man in these words: "And what wonder if one lying down cannot rise by himself, when one standing could advance into anything better by no effort of his own?" He understands by the man "standing" the man in that dignity in which the first man stood — that is, assisted by freedom from sin and from misery — as the immediately following words clearly attest. And such a man he denies to have been able — by his own effort — to advance of himself into anything better. Accordingly, it was not sufficient for man to have the freedom by which he could easily act rightly (for such was the freedom of the first man from sin), unless God also supplied him the effort — that is, the very act of willing. The same St. Bernard, in the same book a little below, says: "To the higher spirits it was given to endure without sin and without misery; to Adam, to be without these, but not also to remain in that state."[237] These words manifestly show that the assistance necessary for perseverance even in the integral state is that by which the actual persevering is given.

§ 124. Finally, Canon 19 of the Council of Orange,[238] taken from St. Augustine's Letter 106 to Paulinus,[239] greatly favors this opinion. Its words are these: "Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no wise preserve itself without the assistance of its Creator. Hence since without the grace of God it cannot keep the salvation it received, how without the grace of God shall it be able to repair what it has lost?" Here again, from the comparison of the standing man with the fallen man as regards the necessary assistance of grace, it is sufficiently understood that integral man could not have remained in his integrity without the assistance of God by which the actual remaining would be given to him — just as fallen man cannot recover lost salvation without the assistance of God granting all things which are required from man for the recovery of salvation. In this sense St. Thomas certainly accepted the words of the Council, writing in Dist. 24 of this book,[240] and after him more expressly Petrus a Soto in a certain disputation addressed to Ruard.[241]

§ 125. Now what can be replied to those things which from St. Augustine are adduced on the contrary side — and this according to the judgment of St. Thomas — we have stated accurately enough at Dist. 41 of Book I,[242] so that there is no need for us to repeat the same things here. In that same place also, following St. Thomas's doctrine, we presented the distinction between the state of the Angel and the integral man on the one hand and the state of fallen man on the other, with respect to the divine assistance necessary in each case. The sum of this doctrine is that, over and above the assistance common to both states — by which they needed God as the operation of the prime mover and first cause for doing or willing any good whatsoever — man in the state of corrupted nature needs also the assistance of healing, elevating, repairing, and strengthening grace against the impulses and enticements of temptations which he suffers from the flesh, and against all the evil inclinations which he has contracted from the corruption of nature through sin. For such assistance the first man did not need, because his nature was still sound and integral. "For they that are well

have no need of a physician, but they that are sick" (Lk. 5:31). And it is manifest that very many of the words of St. Augustine which were objected are to be understood of this kind of assistance.

§ 126. Nevertheless it does not follow from this that the first man had no need of the assistance of exciting grace (*gratia excitantis*), as some would have it. For although he had no need of grace by which he would be roused from sluggishness of mind — from which he certainly did not suffer, since sluggishness signifies a defect — yet, just as he was bound to rouse himself to divine praises, to acts of thanksgiving, and to meditation on heavenly things (I say "rouse," not from sluggishness, but from cessation or from a more remiss act), so also he needed exciting grace for these same things. For he could do none of these things unless roused to do them by God. Hence St. Augustine also attributes exciting grace to the Angels when he says in Book XII of *De Civitate* (ch. 9)[229] that the will of the Angels, however good, would have been impoverished and remained in the mere desire for good, had not He who had made their good nature from nothing capable of Himself made it better from Himself by filling it, first making it more eager by exciting it. Much less, then, does the soundness and integrity of human nature in the first state lead to the conclusion that man at that time had no need of the assistance of grace that would make him use the prior gifts — as holds the opinion which we have refuted. Rather, from the distinction already given of the assistance necessary in each state, it follows that both in the state of integral man and in the state of fallen man, without that assistance which would make man use either the gifts he had received or those offered to him, absolutely nothing good could be done by him.

§ 127. At the end, note this: although from what has been said above it is sufficiently manifest that this assistance of which we have now treated — just like that gift given to man at creation by which he merits eternal life — is rightly called grace, which has imprudently been denied by some; nevertheless it is so called in Canon 19 of the Second Council of Orange,[238] which we said was taken from St. Augustine's Letter 106. But also elsewhere throughout in St. Augustine it is called grace or the assistance of grace.[243]

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§ 128. Cornelius Jansenius[244] strives, in innumerable places — in volume 2, chapters 14 and 15, and indeed in six hundred other places — to foist upon us, as it were with puffed cheeks at high noon, this fabricated distinction of the *auxilium quo* and the *auxilium sine quo non*, which we discussed in Book I,[245] as though it were the key to all of St. Augustine's writings on the grace of innocent nature and the auxiliary grace belonging to that state. Jansenius asserts that this distinction consists in the following: that the grace of the state of innocent nature so acted upon the will as to cooperate with it if the will itself should wish to act, whereas now grace causes the will to will. That is to say, the difference lies in the indifference of the will flexibly poised in either direction, and in grace both flowing into and willing in the will. It came about as a result of Jansenius's deliberate arrangement that he borrowed his principal doctrinal tenets so frequently from the heterodox, who had previously taught the same dogma — particularly from Calvin, in the third book of his *Institutions*, chapter 3, number 10, and in the fifth book *De Gratia*, whom he loads with innumerable insults and assaults with every manner of reproach.

§ 129. Calvin, moreover, attempts to prove this same distinction between the auxiliary graces of intact nature and of fallen nature in his *Antidote* and in the book against Castellio, second edition, Geneva.[246] Calvin in that work, following the distinction of two delectations — the earthly and the heavenly — so greatly commended by Jansenius, holds that the heavenly delectation overcomes the earthly one. And indeed Calvin

entitles the very same chapter 6 thus: *The name of the medicinal grace of Christ*; by which manner of speaking he prepares the way for his teaching, since he clearly does not acknowledge any grace save the victorious delectation (*delectatio victrix*).

§ 130. It accords with his own principles that Jansenius, defining in that same book 4, chapter 11, page 185, column 1, the delectation of which he has hitherto been treating — which delectation St. Augustine requires to be brought to bear for every good work — declares it to be nothing other than a certain undeliberate act infused from heaven into the will, by which a good is sweetly pleasing (which act he then calls a simple will, or complacency, or love of the will, corresponding to the passion of the sensitive love); or even a good presented to be desired and pursued. Again, in the same chapter, page 186, column 2, he defines the delectation that precedes and follows suggestion as nothing other than a certain love — undeliberate and indeliberate — by which the mind, even while resisting, pants after sin, or at least is moved by some illicit desire, undeliberate, as a first movement of concupiscence even in one who is unwilling, prompting to sin, even though consent does not follow. Good God, how numerous and how great are these portentous and horrible monsters! Does not Jansenius here lay himself plainly open, declaring a cruel war against liberty? But of these things elsewhere. It now suffices to proceed with the other objections against Jansenius.

§ 131. For once the dogma of the twofold auxiliary is firmly established, Jansenius joins to it those auxiliaries which belong, as it were by right, to original justice, and asserts that man, fallen from that state, stands in need of such auxiliaries as not merely surpass but actually destroy the forces of human freedom. But how greatly Jansenius is deceived may be gathered from the fact that those who omit — namely, those who contend for a physically efficacious grace acting from within, as well as the disciples of Molina, who defend a versatile or merely morally attractive grace — have him as an adversary alike on both sides; as the learned and highly praised Cardinal de Aguirre[247] demonstrates eruditely and at length, especially in section 6 of the cited disputation. Those authors whom we have enumerated above,[248] hold in my judgement a not inferior place; and the said Cardinal de Aguirre, in the passage already cited, reckons the Jansenist dogma among the errors of Luther, Calvin, and the other heterodox, and in that passage,[249] commends our Author by name, as a most serious and learned writer.

§ 132. The passages of St. Augustine that are plainly contrary to Jansenius are read everywhere among those authors, and their most important ones are cited both above, at the praised Distinction 41 of Book I,[250] and here; but it is not the business of this present place, nor within our competence, to add anything further after so many and such outstanding writers. Nevertheless, I cannot in good conscience endure the fact that Jansenius, so impudently and brazenly, in that chapter 7 of his book *De Gratia*,[251] dares to assert that this distinction of the twofold auxiliary is the true key to St. Augustine's writings, and that without it one who tries to enter those writings gropes about like a blind man at noon. Proh nefas! — to what readers did Jansenius suppose he was writing, and into whose hands did he think he was thrusting these paradoxes?

§ 133. That this paradox may be seen for what it is, it must be noted: Jansenius begins to insinuate that the said distinction is located in that celebrated passage from the book *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter 11,[24] because in our mortal condition we experience a perpetual conflict between harmful and beneficial impulses, whereas when the sweetness from heaven shall have come, it overcomes its adversary. And Jansenius gives this as the reason for what he had said on the same page 175, column 1: namely, that we must act according to whatever shall have most pleased us. Hence the name of the victorious delectation, derived from thence and imposed upon grace, gradually pours out its venom and demonstrates, for the confirmation of his own

dogmas, that he posits for the state of fallen nature another grace of Christ — namely the delectation by which those affected operate in such a way that they operate necessarily. Defining delectation once more in the same book 4, chapter 11, page 185, column 1, he holds: the delectation which is required for every good work, as St. Augustine has it, is nothing other than a certain undeliberate act infused from heaven into the will, by which something good is sweetly pleasing (which act he then calls a simple will, or complacency, or the love of the will corresponding to the passion of sensitive love), or even a good presented as something to be desired. Again in the same chapter, page 186, column 2, he defines the delectation that precedes and follows suggestion as nothing other than something by which the mind even while resisting pants after sin, or at least is moved by an undeliberate desire, as a first movement of concupiscence which even in an unwilling person prompts to sin, although consent does not follow.

§ 134. Now it is clear from all that has been said that St. Thomas is the most faithful interpreter of St. Augustine, and that he stands at the greatest possible remove from this dogma, as the testimonies adduced in the places already cited abundantly demonstrate. But the mind of the Angelic Doctor on this matter is shown most clearly by his testimony from article 2 of question 109[223] — which we earnestly request the reader to revisit. Furthermore, it must be noted that from the Jansenist principle of the twofold auxiliary there flow those monsters of propositions condemned by the gravest censure of the Catholic Church: from that same principle of the twofold auxiliary flows the impossibility of observing any of God's commandments even for just men in the state of fallen nature without a freedom derived from necessity; from it flows the denial that fallen man can ever resist exterior grace; from it flows the contrary claim being stigmatised as Semi-Pelagian; from it flows the assertion that Christ either was not dead for all men, or was dead only for the predestined. Manifestly, all these errors are bound up with the aforesaid distinction of the twofold auxiliary. Of this matter one should consult the said Cardinal de Aguirre in the cited disputation,[252] as well as the disputation on the nature of fallen man, disputation 117, section 7.[253]

§ 135. Nor is it within our competence, nor would it seem superfluous after so many and such distinguished writers, to add anything in refutation of Jansenius — especially after the most lauded Cardinal de Aguirre has enumerated the Jansenist dogma among the errors of Luther and Calvin and the other heterodox, and commends our Author in that passage from volume 1[249] by the designation of a most grave and learned writer. Indeed, the authors whom we have recalled above[254] hold in my judgement a not inferior place; and the passages of St. Augustine that openly contradict Jansenius are to be read in the places cited. But the mind of the Angelic Doctor is shown most clearly, as regards this matter, by the testimony drawn from article 2 of question 109,[223] — a text we earnestly entreat the reader to revisit. And one must note from that same distinction of the twofold auxiliary from which those monsters of propositions condemned by the gravest censure of the Catholic assembly of Catholics emanate: for from that principle flows the impossibility that God's commandments can be kept even by just men in the state of fallen nature without a freedom from necessity; from it flows the merit and demerit in that state from a defect of grace; from it flows the denial that man in that same state was ever in danger of Pelagianism being noted against him; from it, finally, flows the assertion that Christ either was not dead for all men whatsoever, or was dead only for the predestined. Manifestly all these errors are wholly bound up with the aforesaid distinction of the twofold auxiliary. Of this matter one should consult the said Cardinal de Aguirre in the cited location, and in the tract on fallen human nature, disputation 117, section ultimate.[255] And it does not seem to be within our task, nor would it be an idle exercise, after so many outstanding writers, to add something. But I cannot bear with equanimity the fact that Jansenius, so impudently and shamelessly in the aforesaid chapter 7 of the book *De Gratia*,[251] asserts that

this distinction of the twofold auxiliary is the true key to Augustine's writings, and that without it one who tries to enter into those writings gropes about like a blind man at noon. To what sort of readers, pray, did Jansenius suppose he was writing, and to whom did he think he was insinuating these paradoxes? Let it be manifest how great this paradox is: it must be noted that Jansenius begins to hint that the distinction of the twofold auxiliary is located in that blessed passage, because in mortal life we experience a perpetual conflict between harmful and beneficial things, whereas when sweetness comes from heaven it overcomes its adversary.

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1. Estius refers back to his treatment at Dist. 16 of Book II, where he discussed the distinction between image and likeness.
2. Jansenius of Ghent; the reference is to his commentary on this passage of Sir. 17, where he notes that the Greek word signifies *fortitudo*, strength.
3. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 3, part 3.
4. St. Irenaeus, *Contra haereses*, bk. 3, ch. 20; ch. 37.
5. St. Cyprian, Epistle 74 (to Pompeius).
6. St. Cyprian, Sermon 3, *De patientia*.
7. Methodius the martyr, cited by Epiphanius in the section on the heresy of Origen.
8. Estius refers back to his discussion at Dist. 17 of Book II.
9. St. Basil, exposition of Ps. 48, at the verse "Man when he was in honour," etc.
10. St. Basil, Homily *Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*.
11. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 15.
12. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 9.
13. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, bk. 6, ch. 7.
14. St. Ambrose, Commentary *Super Lucam*, ch. 10, on the man who fell among thieves.
15. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, bk. 4, treating Ps. 113, "Jordan was turned back."
16. St. Ambrose (attributed), *De Dignitate hominis*, ch. 3.
17. Hilary, Homily on holy Job (no longer extant).
18. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 2, ch. 8.
19. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 2, ch. 12.
20. St. Jerome, *Contra Jovinianum*, treating the saying of the Sage (Eccl. 7) "one of a thousand I have found."
21. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 16.
22. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, ch. 31.
23. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 13.
24. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11.
25. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 1 and ch. 19.
26. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 24; bk. 14, chs. 10, 11, 17; *De Spiritu et littera*, ch. 27; *De Libero arbitrio*, bk. 1, ch. 11.
27. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 18–19; Pomerius (attributed to Prosper), *De Vita contemplativa*, bk. 2, ch. 18.
28. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 on the December fast (Sermon on the Nativity, Sermon 4 in some series).
29. Peter the Deacon, *De Incarnatione Christi*, bk. 1, ch. 6.
30. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione Christi*, bk. 2, ch. 12.

31. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 15.

32. Gregory the Great, bk. 5, Ep. 115; bk. 6, Ep. 195.

33. St. Cyril, Commentary on John, ch. 15; bk. 2, ch. 3; bk. 11–12, ch. 36; bk. 12, ch. 55.

34. St. Cyril, *Dialogorum* bk. 6; *De Adoratione et Spiritu*, before the middle of that work.

35. Prudentius, *Contra Symmachum*, bk. 2.

36. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, chapter on the nature of the soul.

37. Estius refers back to his enumeration at Dist. 16 of Book II.

38. Estius refers back to the preceding Distinction (Dist. 24).

39. St. Augustine, *Confessiones*, bk. 1, ch. 1.

40. Leo the Great, Sermon 4 on the Nativity of the Lord.

41. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 4, ch. 30; bk. 3, ch. 14.

42. Council of Orange II, canon 19.

43. St. Augustine, Epistle 106 (Seu CLXXXVI in the Benedictine edition, written about the year 417, to Paulinus, from Alypius and Augustine; the words adopted by the Council are from this Epistle).

44. Estius's footnote: "We have noted once and again that the Second Council of Orange was approved not by Leo I but by Boniface II, by a letter to Caesarius of Arles; as Jacobus Sirmondus notes, *Concilia Antiqua Galliae*, tom. 1, from a Fossatensis codex, where a brief notation is prefixed to that Epistle stating the Apostolic See's pre-eminence, and the notation reads: 'In this place is contained what Pope Bonifacius confirmed; and therefore whoever believes otherwise concerning Grace, free will, and what was decreed in that Synod, let him know himself to be contrary to the authority of the Apostolic See and of the Universal Church.'"

45. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 1, a. 3.

46. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 2.

47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 65, a. 1.

48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 1.

49. Albert the Great, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24; and in his *Summa Theologica*.

50. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, dist. 4, q. 5; dist. 29, q. 1.

51. Gregory of Rimini, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24.

52. Estius refers back to his discussion at Dist. 4 of Book II.

53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 65, a. 1 (already cited).

54. Estius refers back to his discussion at Dist. 20 of Book II.

55. Estius refers back to his discussion at Dist. 3 of Book II.

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the place already cited above.

57. [Pseudo-]Augustine, *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 123.

58. Estius refers back to his discussion at Dist. 19 of Book II.

59. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 6, ch. 1; bk. 12, ch. 7.

60. St. Augustine, Epistle 46 (Seu CCV in the Benedictine edition, to Consentius, written around the year 420, among the letters of the third class).

61. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, chs. 2 and 23.

62. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 91.

63. St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, the Ambrosiaster author, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and others, in their commentaries on 1 Cor. 15; see *Retractationum* bk. 1, ch. 12.

64. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, Distinction 29.

65. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 23.

66. Estius's footnote: "The author of this book (*Quaestiones utriusque Testamenti*) has been held to be Hilarius Sardensis, a follower of the Luciferian sect, as we noted above when we were speaking of the author of the Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul among the works of St. Ambrose."

67. St. Augustine, *De Libero arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 24.

68. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, bk. 2, ch. 8.

69. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, last chapter.

70. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 6, ch. 1; bk. 12, ch. 7; Epistle 46; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, chs. 2 and 23; *Enchiridion*, ch. 91.

71. See fn. 66 above.

72. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95.

73. Pope St. Leo the Great, Sermon on the Fast of the Tenth Month [*Sermo de jejunio decimi mensis*].

74. Pope St. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 on the Passion of the Lord [*Sermo I de Passione Domini*].

75. Pope St. Leo the Great, Sermon 24.

76. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 12, ch. 1.

77. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 11, ch. 17.

78. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 11.

79. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 12, last chapter.

80. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa*, bk. 1, ch. 18.

81. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 18.

82. Cassiodorus, *De Anima*, ch. 17.

83. Author of *Quaestiones Novi Testamenti* (found among St. Augustine's works), part 2, q. 41.

84. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 4.

85. Second Council of Orange [*Concilium Arausanum II*].

86. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27.

87. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 23.

88. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, chs. 24 and 25.

89. St. Basil, *Regulae fusius disputatae*, chs. 2 and 5.

90. St. John Damascene, *De Fide orthodoxa*, bk. 3, ch. 14.

91. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 1, ch. 6.

92. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, as cited by St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 1, chs. 2 and 3, and bk. 2, ch. 5.

93. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1.

94. St. Basil, Epistle 141 to the Caesareans (*ad Caesarienses*).

95. St. Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 1, ch. 1.

96. St. Augustine, Tractatus ultimus *in Joannem*.

97. Estius refers to the Fathers cited at the preceding Distinction.

98. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, last article.

99. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.

100. St. Athanasius, Oration against the Arians.

101. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 16.

102. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 1, ch. 9.

103. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 1, ch. 13.

104. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 10, ch. 23.

105. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 12, ch. 51.

106. St. Cyril, *Quod Spiritus sit Deus*, near the beginning.

107. St. Cyril, *De Adoratione in Spiritu*, before the middle.

108. St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *On the Annunciation of the Lord* (*De Annunciatione dominica*).

109. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et Anima*, ch. 5.

110. St. Ambrose, *De Elia et jejunio*, ch. 4.

111. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4.

112. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, bk. 7 (commenting on Lk. 10, on the man who fell among robbers), ch. 47 [abbreviation as in source: *in Lucam cap. 10*].

113. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 12, ch. 9.

114. Estius refers back to the discussion in the preceding sections of this distinction where the first man's creation in Grace was demonstrated.

115. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, chs. 20, 22, and 24.

116. St. Augustine, *Retractationum*, bk. 1, ch. 9.

117. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, chs. 11 and 12.

118. Ps. 118:91 (Vulgate).

119. Soto (Domingo de), *De Natura et Gratia*, bk. 1, ch. 13.

120. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 3 and following.

121. The condemned articles referred to are among the Baianist propositions condemned by the Apostolic See; specifically propositions 7, 9, and 14 [as noted in the marginal annotation *a* of the source: *Qui sunt articuli Bajani a Summis Pontificibus damnati*], which read to the effect that the gifts of the first man were not gratuitous but owed to nature, that integrity of the first condition was not an undue exaltation but the natural condition of human nature, that those err who speak of a supernatural elevation of the first man, and that it is false that the first man could have been created without justice.

122. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the same place [*ibidem*]; see the reference for this distinction.

123. Estius refers to the discussion in Distinction 19 of this Book (Book II) concerning whether bodily immortality was natural to the first man.

124. Soto (Domingo de), *In IV Sententiarum*, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1 and 2.

125. The testimonies referred to are those drawn from Pope Leo (the Great), Prosper (of Aquitaine), Cassiodorus, Pope Celestine, and the Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*), adduced in the preceding sections of this distinction.

126. St. Augustine, fifth testimony cited previously in this distinction [abbreviation as in source].

127. St. Augustine, fourth testimony cited previously in this distinction [abbreviation as in source].

128. The discussion of the wounding of nature in the subsequent distinction is referenced here.

129. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* [*ibidem*, at the preceding distinction; abbreviation as in source].

130. Estius refers back to Distinction 3 of this Book (Book II), where the manner in which grace was given to the angels *per modum naturae* was explained.

131. The long note that follows, partly given in the source as a running marginal or footnote annotation marked *(a)*, concerns the condemnation of the Baianist articles by the Supreme Pontiffs (Gregory XIII and Urban VIII) and the controversy with Cornelius Jansenius and Vincentius Contenson. The condemned propositions referred to include Baianist articles 21, 23, 26, and 79, as condemned in the decrees of the Apostolic See.

132. Cornelius Jansenius, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, bk. 4, chs. 26 and 27 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 4. de Statu naturæ lapsæ cap. 26. pag. 281. col. 2. cap. 27. per totum a pag. 283.*].

133. Cardinal Joseph de Aguirre, *Theologia Sancti Anselmi*, tract. 5, *De Natura hominis pura*, disp. 105, sect. 2, num. 16 [abbreviation as in source].

134. Vincentius Contenson, *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*, bk. 8, differ. 1, cap. 1, speculatio 2 [abbreviation as in source].

135. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 2, ch. 52 [abbreviation as in source: *ex cap. 52. libri 2. contra Gentes*].

136. Cornelius Jansenius, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, bk. 1, ch. 2 and following [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 1. de Statu naturæ lapsæ cap. 2. & sequentibus*].

137. Cardinal Joseph de Aguirre, *op. cit.*, sect. 1, num. 11 [abbreviation as in source: *præallegato loco sect. 1. num. 11.*].

138. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1.

139. Estius refers to his treatment above at Dist. 19 of this same book (*In II Sent.*, dist. 19) concerning the naturalness of bodily immortality to the first man.

140. The immediately preceding text (continuing from the prior chunk) dealt with the position of Vincentius Contenson, *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*, bk. 8, differ. 1, cap. 1, *speculatio* 2, who sought a middle path holding that original sanctifying grace was possible from the absolute power of God yet not convenient, and not even possible from ordinary power; and St. Thomas was wrongly claimed as his patron; this judgment, drawn from the attentive reading and weighing of the arguments, had already been found by Cardinal Joseph de Aguirre, *Theologia Sancti Anselmi*, tract. 5, disp. 105, sect. 1, num. 11.

141. The censure referred to involves article 79 of Baius, along with several other articles condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs, namely by St. Pius V and Urban VIII. Contenson at the cited place (*praelaudato loco specul.* 1, at the passage *Nec ob*) writes that Sanctus Pius V declared several propositions from Baius to be true, Catholic, and taken word for word from Augustine, reproving them only for the harshness of the censure, the author's arrogance, and perverse interpretation. The controversy over the punctuation in the Bull of Pius V — whether the comma fell after *sustineri posse* or after *Assertoribus intento* — was resolved by Urban VIII in his diploma of 1644 (*In eminenti*), which entirely overthrew the Baianist and Jansenist reading of the punctuation. Alexander VIII also fixed it in the condemnation of the last of the theses condemned by him, and propositions 34 and 35 among the Quesnellian theses condemned by Clement XI are rivulets from the same Baianist and Jansenist spring: "The grace of Adam does not follow from the act of creation and was not due to his intact nature" [abbreviation as in source].

142. Estius here expresses his distress at Contenson's writing that Jansenius taught the same doctrine as Contenson himself; see Cornelius Jansenius, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, bk. 1, ch. 2 and following [abbreviation as in source].

143. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1.

144. Domingo de Soto, *De Natura et Gratia*, bk. 1, q. [5], ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 1. q. De Natura & Gratia cap. 5.*].

145. Medina, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 83, art. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *in 1.2. q. 83. art. 2.*].

146. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, Quodlibet 6, q. 11 [abbreviation as in source: *Quodlib. 6. q. 11.*].

147. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 5, art. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. Distin. 20. q. 5. art. 1.*].

148. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 29, ad 4 [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. Distin. 29. ad 4.*].

149. Gabriel Biel, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 2, art. 3, dubium 2 [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. Distin. 30. qu. 2. art. 3. dubio 2.*].

150. Cajetan, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *in 1. q. 95. artic. 1.*].

151. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 100, art. 1, ad 2 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thoma in 1. q. 100. art. 1. ad 2.*].

152. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 29 [abbreviation as in source: *in Distinct. 29. hujus libri*].

153. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 14, ch. 10 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 14. De Civit. cap. 10.*].

154. St. Augustine, cited in multiple places in the commentary on this question; see, among others, his treatment *Contra Julianum* and *De Civitate Dei*.

155. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 5; bk. 5, ch. 3; bk. 6, ch. 8 [abbreviation as in source: *Contra Julianum cap. 5. lib. 5. cap. 3. lib. 6. cap. 8.*].

156. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 5; bk. 5, ch. 3; bk. 6, ch. 8 [as cited in the body].

157. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et Anima*, ch. 8 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Isaac & Anima cap. 8.*].

158. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 2, ch. 22 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. De Peccatorum meritis cap. 22.*].

159. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 2 (the book mentioned), ch. 23 [abbreviation as in source: *cap. 23. libri memorati*]. The quotation runs: "The first justice of the first men was to obey God, and not to have in their members this law of concupiscence contrary to the law of their mind" (*Primorum hominum prima justitia fuit, oboedire Deo, hanc in membris adversus legem mentis suae, legem concupiscientiae non habere*).

160. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1; also II-II, q. 109, art. 2, 3, 4.

161. The reference to Wis. 9 ("*Corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam*") is discussed earlier in the distinction; the explanation offered here — that the Wise Man speaks not of mortality but of moral corruption rendering the soul ill-disposed — is noted as having been indicated above (*supra indicavimus*) in the commentary.

162. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1; also *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 109, arts. 2, 3; q. 109, art. 4 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. 1. p. qu. 95. art. 1. Item 2. 2. q. 85. art. 3. q. 109. art. 2. 3. & 4.*].

163. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1; also *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 85, art. 3; q. 109, arts. 2, 3, and 4.

164. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, pt. 4 [the reference to demons retaining their natural endowments after sin, cited as "Dionysio teste" in the source].

165. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 31; *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 13; *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 13.

166. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 15.

167. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et Anima* I, ch. 5; *De Iacob et beata vita* II, ch. 5; *De Elia et ieiunio*, ch. 4.

168. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* IV, final chapter.

169. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, ch. 14.

170. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 9.

171. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, art. 1; and St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 13, as cited therein.

172. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, art. 1.

173. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, art. 1, ad 3.

174. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 87, art. 7; II-II, q. 164, art. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, ch. 52; *De Malo*, q. 4, art. 1.

175. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In III Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 5; dist. 30, q. 1.

176. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 29.

177. Capreolus and Gabriel, *In III Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 1.

178. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), *In I Contra Gentes*, ch. 52.

179. Cajetan, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 3, doubt 2; and q. 109, art. 2.

180. Soto (Domingo de), *De Natura et Gratia* I, ch. 13.

181. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 85, arts. 3, 5, 6; q. 109, in the proem, and again arts. 2, 3, 4.

182. The pontifical condemnation referred to is that of an article stating: "The integrity of the first condition was not an elevation of human nature unowed to it, but its natural condition." The condemned article is cited here by Estius as cited by certain authors.

183. The reference is to an earlier discussion in the commentary (noted as "alibi ostendimus" — as we have shown elsewhere).

184. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* VII, ch. 10 (on Lk. 10:47).

185. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, arts. 3 and 4.

186. The further demonstration is promised at *In IV Sent.*, dist. 31.

187. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, ch. 9.

188. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 30.

189. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia* I, ch. 32.

190. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, chs. 9 and 34.

191. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, final chapter; and throughout the books *Contra Julianum*.

192. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 2.

193. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 3.

194. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 3.

195. The further demonstration is promised at *In III Sent.*, dist. 30.

196. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 6, q. 11.

197. Gregory of Rimini, *Super II Sententiarum*.

198. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 2.

199. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, art. 3, ad 1.

200. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, arts. 1 and 2.

201. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* [the attribution is Estius's; the property referred to is God's drawing all things to Himself].

202. The condemned article asserted that the integrity of the first condition was the natural condition of human nature; see the discussion above.

203. The declaration of the Faculty of Theology of Louvain, issued in the writing concerning the said articles [abbreviation as in source: "Facultatis Theologicae Lovaniensis in scripto quodam super dictis articulis edito"].

204. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, arts. 1, 2, 3, 4 and following; also II-II, q. 109, art. 2.

205. St. Augustine, Sermon 11 on the Words of the Apostle (= Sermon 26 among the Sermons of the First Class in the Benedictine edition).

206. St. Augustine, Letter 106 (= Letter 186 in the Benedictine edition, written to Paulinus around the year 417, as the same editors note in their annotation on that letter).

207. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 26.

208. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* VIII, chs. 8, 9, and 10.

209. St. Augustine, *Confessions* X, ch. 6.

210. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* II, ch. 1.

211. St. Augustine, Letter 106 (= Letter 186, Benedictine edition).

212. Council of Orange, Canon 19.

213. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

214. Above, at Dist. 5 [of the present *In II Sent.*].

215. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

216. Above, in the place cited [at Dist. 5 of the present *In II Sent.*].

217. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 41.

218. Rom. 11:36; Jas. 1:17.

219. 1 Cor. 1:31; Ps. 113:9 (Vulgate); Jer. 17:5.

220. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 24, q. 1, a. 4, reply to obj. 1.

221. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5.

222. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1.

223. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

224. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, reply to obj. 1.

225. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, arts. 3, 4, 6, and 8.

226. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9.

227. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10.

228. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10, reply to obj. 3, citing St. Augustine.

229. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9.

230. St. Augustine, Tractate *De Cantico Novo*, ch. 8.

231. St. Augustine, *Confessions* II, ch. 7.

232. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 106, a. 2.

233. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9; *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 18.

234. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* VIII, ch. 12.

235. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, ch. 8.

236. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, approximately at the middle.

237. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, a little below the middle.

238. Council of Orange (Second), Canon 19.

239. St. Augustine, Letter 106 (= Letter 186, Benedictine edition), to Paulinus. [These words were transcribed by a Roman Pontiff into Canon 19 of the Council of Orange, as noted in the source text.]

240. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, Dist. 24, q. 1, a. 4.

241. Petrus a Soto, in a certain disputation addressed to Ruard.

242. Above, at Dist. 41 of Book I [of the present commentary].

243. St. Augustine, passim; for instance, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7; *Epistola* 106 (Benedictine: 186).

244. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, vol. 2, chs. 14–15, and in innumerable other places.

245. Estius, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 41 [of the present commentary], where the distinction of *auxilium quo* and *auxilium sine quo non* was discussed.

246. Calvin, *Institutiones Christianae Religionis*, Book III, ch. 3, no. 10, and Book V *De Gratia*; also Calvin, *Antidote* and the book against Castellio, 2nd edition, Geneva.

247. Cardinal Joseph de Aguirre, *Theologia Sancti Anselmi*, tract. 5, *De Natura Hominis Pura*, disp. 131, especially sect. 6.

248. Above, at Dist. 41 of Book I [of the present commentary], §. 14.

249. Cardinal de Aguirre, in the cited location, from vol. 1 [abbreviation as in source].

250. Estius, *In I Sent.*, Dist. 41, §. 14.

251. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Book *De Gratia*, ch. 7.

252. Cardinal de Aguirre, in the cited disputation [abbreviation as in source], tract. on fallen human nature, disp. 131.

253. Disputation on the nature of fallen man, disp. 117, sect. 7 [abbreviation as in source].

254. Above, at Dist. 41 of Book I, §. 14.

255. Cardinal de Aguirre, tract. on fallen human nature [abbreviation as in source], disp. 117, sect. ult.

DISTINCTIO XXVI — ON THE MULTIPLE SENSES OF THE WORD "GRACE" AND THE GRACE OF CHRIST (*DE MULTIPLICI ACCEPTIONE VOCABULI GRATIAE ET DE GRATIA CHRISTI*)

§ I — The multiple senses of the word "grace" (Vocabvli gratiae multiplex acceptio)

§ 1. Because the grace given to our first parent at his creation was lost and forfeited through his sin — and lost not for him alone but for the entire human race, and because no powers of nature sufficed to recover it — it was necessary that man, thus ruined, should be restored to justice by a certain higher and, so to speak, new counsel of God. He is restored through the grace of Christ the Redeemer, concerning which grace we are henceforth to treat; and first let us see what is to be understood by the name of the grace of Christ. In order that this may be understood, the multiple sense of this word — that is, of "grace" — insofar as it pertains to the theologian, must be explained.

§ 2. Here it must be noted first of all that "grace" can be understood either on the part of God or on our part. On the part of God it signifies the gratuitous favour, mercy, and liberality of God, and universally any gratuitous and beneficent operation of God. In this sense the words of the Archangel to the Blessed Virgin are most commonly taken: "Thou hast found grace with God."[2] The same phrase recurs frequently elsewhere in the Scriptures: as in Gen. 6, "But Noah found grace before the Lord"; and in Exod. 33, the Lord speaking to Moses: "Thou hast found grace before me," and so forth.[3]

§ 3. Grace is also taken in this sense when the Apostle says in Rom. 4, that faith is reckoned unto justice "according to the purpose of the grace of God"; and again when he says, "that the promise might be firm according to grace"; and in ch. 11: "The remnant are saved according to the election of grace."[4] Elsewhere in Scripture this grace is called mercy, goodness, the good-pleasure of God, and good will, or simply the will of God: as in Ps. 93 [Vulg.], "Thy mercy, O Lord, was my help"; Sir. 1, "The mercy of God is upon all flesh"; Ps. 149 [Vulg.], "The Lord is well pleased with his people"; Ps. 50 [Vulg.], "Deal favourably, O Lord, in thy good will with Sion"; Phil. 2, "For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will"; Ps. 29 [Vulg.], "Wrath is in his indignation, and life in his will."[5]

§ 4. St. Augustine speaks of grace in this manner in Epistle 106 (to Paulinus, and elsewhere),[6] when he says that grace precedes the will of man, because the will of God whereby He wills man well is prior to the will of man as it receives the benefit of God, according to that saying of Ps. 58 [Vulg.]: "The mercy of God shall prevent me." In a similar sense he says in the book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6,[7] that grace is sometimes withdrawn — meaning that God sometimes withdraws his gratuitous operation. Thus also in the Second

Council of Orange, canon 5, it is said that the grace of God causes God to be invoked by us — that is, that God by his gratuitous action brings it about that we invoke him.[8] And a great many other things are said of grace according to this sense.

§ 5. Grace taken in this way is not in reality something distinct from God and the divine Essence. This sense of grace is moreover frequent among the Scholastics, as when they say that the grace of God produces this or that good in us. Concerning it, St. Thomas in the *Disputed Questions* (*De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 14)[9] says that although those who speak in the common manner use the name of grace for the habitual gift that justifies, grace can nevertheless be understood more generally as the mercy of God by which he inwardly produces the motion of the mind and outwardly orders things to the salvation of man, and that by reason of this no man can do any good without the grace of God. Of the same grace he writes in the *Summa* (*Summa theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 2):[10] "The grace of God causes goodness in the man who is pleasing to God, because the good will of God — which is understood by the name of grace — is the cause of all created good." So far he.

§ 6. Furthermore, on our part, by the name of the grace of God there are generally understood all the gratuitous benefits of God — that is, all that is graciously granted to us by God, whether it be natural or exceed the limits of nature; of which kind, to speak absolutely, all benefits of God are. For there is none of them that is not gratuitous and unowed, if it be traced back to its origin. In this general sense of grace, the image of God (*imago Dei*) to which man was made, and which after sin remained in him, is sometimes called grace by the Fathers — expressly by Epiphanius, once and again in the Letter he wrote to John, Bishop of Jerusalem.[11] In the same way St. Thomas uses the name of grace in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 21, a. 4,[12] when he teaches that in every work of God, both natural and supernatural, the formal character (*ratio*) of grace and likewise of a certain justice is simultaneously found, so that what is written is always true: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." For although, given God's antecedent will to establish creatures, there is a certain formal character of justice and of what is owed in his making them according to the conditions and properties proper to each nature, yet it is a benefit of gratuitous kindness — and therefore of the mercy of God (as the name of mercy is frequently taken in the Scriptures) — that he produces creatures from nothing. In a similar manner many Greek writers and the Sixth Ecumenical Council itself (in its eleventh action) used the name of grace when they taught that the angels are immortal by grace — concerning which matter we have spoken in the commentary on Dist. 8 of this book.[13]

§ 7. Under this general signification of grace, Pelagius, the enemy of the grace of Christ, attempted to conceal his heresy and to mock the Catholics. For he said that he did not deny but affirmed the grace of God — inasmuch as he acknowledged it in nature, in mind, and in free will, as in gratuitous benefits conferred upon man. And indeed these things could truly be comprehended under the name of the grace of God, for we owe thanks to God because he himself made us and we did not make ourselves. Nor does St. Augustine disapprove of this signification of grace; rather he approves it, as may be seen in his Epistle 95 and in his *Exposition of Psalm* 143 on the verse "The memory of abundance," etc.[14] But what was condemned in Pelagius was that by recalling this general grace he wished to obscure — indeed to abolish — that grace by which we are Christians, and which the Catholic Doctors, following Sacred Scripture, distinguish from nature. Hence St. Augustine's book *De Natura et Gratia*.[15] For as regards that general sense, Sacred Scripture scarcely anywhere uses the word "grace" in such a way as to include nature or natural goods under it.

§ 8. Furthermore, in a special sense — and most frequently in the Scriptures, especially of the New Testament — by the name of grace is signified a supernatural gift or benefit ordained to salvation, which is

through Christ and unto eternal life, whether it consist in habit or in act, and whether it be internal or external. Grace taken in this way is further divided in two, according as the benefits of God belonging to this genus are of two kinds, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 1.[16]

§ 9. For some are of such a kind that they do not of themselves conduce to the salvation and justice of the person in whom they are, yet through them one person co-operates with another for the purpose of leading him back to God. These are called by theologians *gratia gratis data* (grace freely given). Of this kind are health of the body, knowledge of languages, the gift of prophecy, the discernment of spirits, and similar things, concerning which the Apostle Paul says in 1 Cor. 12: "There are divisions of graces"; and further below: "To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the benefit" — namely of others — "of which to one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom," etc.[17] And Peter says in his First Epistle, ch. 4: "Every one as he hath received grace, ministering the same one to another," etc.[18]

§ 10. The other kind consists of those gifts by which man is mercifully restored by God to justice and to the attainment of salvation — all of which assuredly belong to that Grace which theologians call *gratia gratum faciens* (grace that makes one pleasing), because, beyond the fact that it is freely given — which is indeed common to every grace as such — it also makes one pleasing and a friend of God; and, as the Apostle says in Eph. 1, in it or through it God "hath graced us" (*gratificavit*), that is, holds us as pleasing and acceptable to himself.[19] For although not all the benefits of God that are to be referred to this second division are of such a kind as to establish man immediately in the friendship of God, yet all of them are ordered by their very nature towards reconciling man to God and at last leading him to perfect and eternal friendship with God — including even that perfect friendship itself comprehended among them, together with all the goods of eternal life — as Medina rightly teaches on the article cited above.[20]

§ 11. In this genus are faith, hope, good will, indeed any first beginnings whatsoever of faith, hope, and good will; repentance, the remission of sins, charity (*caritas*), justice, good works, the virtues and their increases, perseverance, and finally Eternal Life — unto which, as to a consummated grace, all the foregoing benefits of God are destined, as is written in Rom. 6: "The grace of God is life eternal."[21] Whatever benefits of God therefore belong to this latter genus are contained under the name of the grace of Christ, or — as the Apostle Paul elsewhere phrases it — the grace of God through Jesus Christ, or — as in Eph. 1 — that grace "whereby he hath graced us in the Beloved," that is, the grace about which the Catholic Fathers were principally in contention against Pelagius.[22]

§ 12. For the Fathers understood by that name not only habitual and justifying grace, but also faith and the other things conducive to justice. The Second Council of Trent speaks of the grace of Christ in this way; so also St. Augustine, St. Jerome, Prosper, and the Pontiffs Innocent I, Zosimus, Celestine, and others.[23] Furthermore, the benefits that are of the former genus — because they are not given of themselves for the purpose of rendering those to whom they are given pleasing to God — are certainly, as such, not to be counted among the benefits of the grace of Christ; but only insofar as they are efficaciously ordered toward salvation, or toward some beginning of the salvation of others. For the grace of Christ is not without at least some beginning of true justice and salvation.

§ 13. From these things it is therefore evident that the knowledge, however great, of the divine law and of its mysteries does not belong to the grace of Christ as such — since it can be entirely separated from a good will. Hence neither did Pelagius, when in the course of time he assigned something more to grace, constituting

the grace of God in the law and in doctrine, attain to a true recognition of the grace of Christ; nor could he by that concession of grace satisfy the Fathers in any way. Nor is the possibility of observing the commandments of God a part of the grace of Christ: whether that possibility be understood as the one which is present in all men even unbelievers, insofar as they are still on the way and can be led to true faith and justice; or as the one by which a person is said to be more able than others on account of certain special aids of nature or even of *gratia gratis data*, such as teaching and knowledge of the law, or universally love of perceiving the truth; or, finally, if you understand by that possibility the kind whereby a person is said to be able on account of certain internal excitations, by which it has not yet been wrought in the man that he wills or begins to will.

§ 14. The reason is manifest: because every such possibility, since it can be separated from act (*actus*), subsists without the beginning of good will and of justice — without which beginning, however, that which is properly called the grace of Christ does not subsist, as St. Augustine teaches in the book *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 42.[24] For the grace of Christ (which is to be more fully demonstrated in what follows) is not common to the good and the wicked, but distinguishes the good from the wicked — as St. Augustine teaches in very many places, comprehending under the name of goodness even the first beginnings of good will.[25]

§ 15. Finally, neither is servile fear included under the grace of the New Testament, and rightly so; for that fear, though it outwardly restrains a man from the commission of sin by the hand of coercion, corrects the will in no respect. For it is the characteristic of fear of this kind — as the voice of the Lord declared — that, with brow raised and in a spirit of hesitancy, it is a fear belonging to the old covenant and pertaining to the Old Testament; for the people of Israel feared when the law of God was promulgated to them with great fear, and yet through such fear, which was merely servile, they were not made partakers of the grace of Christ, but only received a certain preparatory benefit of God through the law.[26]

§ 16. [At this point the printed text contains a marginal apparatus of considerable length dealing with Jansenist propositions, their condemnation, and related polemical matters. Consulting the page image, the passage reads as follows:] Not a few of the statements here made by our Author are of Jansenist tendency. For these words are indeed Jansenist: "The grace of Christ is given unto act"; "The grace of Christ is that which distinguishes the good from the wicked and moves the will"; and that second proposition of Jansenius — concerning the grace of fallen nature which is never resisted — which he sets out clearly in his book [*Augustinus*] (lib. 2, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 1, p. 33, col. 2, and in other places indicated above). This proposition has been proscribed. The Semi-Pelagians admitted preventing grace even unto the beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics. They taught a grace to which the human will could resist or comply. The Catholics asserted it, both as a grace sufficient and as an efficacious one that moves the will, so that we are able both to know what we ought to do and to love doing it — not being content with mere illumination of the mind; as is clearly evident to one who consults the passages of St. Augustine and the Councils cited above. See Cardinal de Aguirre, *Theologia Sacramentalis*, vol. 3, disp. 112, especially sect. 4;[27] and Dionysius Petavius on the history of the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian dogmas, especially ch. 4 and ch. 8;[28] and where he treats of the Semi-Pelagian error and the Catholic position in chs. 9 and 10; Cardinal Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vol. 5, dissert. 4;[29] and likewise Henry de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. 2, chs. 5 and following,[30] where he reviews the Semi-Pelagian and Catholic doctrines at length. What then do the Jansenians differ from the Catholics? The Catholics affirm grace given unto act and efficacious in such wise that they do not destroy sufficient grace; they hold that the first movement of the will, by which it rises to the works of salvation, proceeds to act by the will in such manner that the human will, set free by the efficacy of grace, is wholly good; and they firmly

maintain that, insofar as it thus begins to will good, the human will is thereby able to advance further if it co-operates with grace. But the Jansenists, as will be said below, construct a grace of such a kind as to destroy liberty absolutely. It must also be noted, lest the Jansenist error be thought to have no place here, as we noted above (lib. 1, ad Distinct. 11, § 6, p. 142) and shall warn again below — for the present it is enough to admonish the Reader that this is the doctrine which St. Augustine maintained against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, upholding it in many places, especially in the books *De Gratia Christi* and *De Praedestination Sanctorum*, and in the books *De Perseverantia*, from which some clearer passages will be given below — and which the Councils of Mileve, the second of Orange (can. 4, 5, 6), and the Council of Trent confirm; and the canons of the Church of Rome concerning grace and free will, whether collected by Celestine I or by someone else, and subjoined to his letter to the Bishops of Gaul, or annexed thereto, and especially ch. 7, set it out in plain and robust terms. Pelagius, long after, admitted a grace that excites, which he included under the name of doctrine and preaching, though he taught it as conducing to an easier performance of good works, not as necessary therefor. The Semi-Pelagians, on the other hand, assigned interior grace to the exercise of works of piety, not to the beginning of faith — as they most cunningly pretended; yet they asserted that this grace did not move the will in any way, nor did it reach the will itself so as to prepare it. But from the Jansenists there arises the necessity of interior exciting grace — as the Pelagians required it only for easier operation, and as the Semi-Pelagians denied it to be required for the beginning of faith; both parties asserted grace as only an illuminator of the mind and not a mover of the will. The Catholics on the other hand asserted it as both illuminating the mind and stirring the will, so that we may not only know but also love and perform what we have known to be done, not being content with mere illumination of the mind — as is clearly evident from the passages of St. Augustine and the Councils cited above. Of this the Quesnellian propositions, especially nos. 20 and 21, condemned by our Lord Clement XI, are also to be noted.[31] But there is no occasion here for Jansenist error, as we have warned above and shall warn again below.'[32]

§ 17. [Returning to the main expository text:] The things said above make clear what is to be understood by the *gratia gratis data* among benefits of grace. As the Fathers interpret it, the source signified in Scripture (cf. Is. 55, "a well of water springing up into eternal life," as St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, and St. Ambrose expound it)[33] is either the Holy Spirit or his grace; as may be seen in their Commentaries, and moreover in St. Basil (*Expositio in Psalm.* 45)[34] and St. Ambrose (*De Spiritu Sancto*, lib. 1, ch. 19),[35] and St. Jerome (writing on Is. 55).'[36] Nor does it matter whether the Holy Spirit or his grace be understood, since it is established that the Holy Spirit dwells in man only through some created gift, although the passage more strongly demands that it be understood of created grace. For it is said: "It shall become in him a fount of water"; but "become" (*fieri*) can properly be said only of a created thing. By "fount" moreover something permanent must be understood, from which streams perpetually flow and issue forth. Therefore the Lord signifies by "a fount of water springing up into eternal life" a grace residing and remaining in man, from which flow the waters of good actions by which he merits eternal life.

§ 18. Likewise there is another Scripture passage, 2 Pet. 1, where the Apostle testifies that God has given us "most great and precious promises, that by these" we may become partakers of the divine nature.[37] [The remainder of this passage continues into the following section.]

§ [continuation] — That both actual and habitual grace must be acknowledged (Non solum actualem sed et habitualem gratiam agnosci oportere)

§ 19. — that we might be made partakers of the divine nature (*Divinæ consortes Naturæ*). From which it is gathered that through the gifts of the grace of God there is conferred upon us a certain divine being (*esse divinum*). Now this cannot be constituted in a transient act (*actus transiens*); therefore it consists in that which is after the manner of a permanent habit (*habitus*) or nature. Furthermore, pertinent to this point are those Scriptures which compare the grace of God to created and permanent things, or even to things that inhere; as to an anointing or ointment, a seal, a pledge, a seed. The passages are: 1 Jn. 2: "The anointing which you have received from Him, let it abide in you," where in Greek it is *λεῖσμα*, that is, ointment, and *μένουσα*, that is, it abides — so as to signify that grace, like an ointment poured upon us, remains and resides in us. And ch. 3: "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him." And 2 Cor. 1: "Now He who hath anointed us is God, and who hath sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts."

§ 20. Now let us prove the same doctrine from the Fathers. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, part 1, says that by the most sacred and ineffable operation a divine state (*status*) is wrought in us; now *status* signifies permanence. Nor does (Pseudo-)Dionysius mean anything different by those words from what he says elsewhere: that men through baptism receive a certain new and divine being (*esse*), namely, fellowship of the nature (*Naturæ consortium*).[39] St. Irenaeus, in *Contra Hæreses*, bk. 5, ch. 6, says, and repeatedly repeats, that the perfect man, that is, the just man, consists of three things: body, soul, and the Spirit of God, that is, the grace of the Holy Spirit. By this opinion it is certainly signified that grace is in the just man like a permanent thing, just as the parts are in a whole. He says in the same place that the Holy Spirit is poured into the soul and mingled with it — which cannot be understood except of a gift permanently inhering.[40]

§ 21. St. Basil, in *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 26, says: "Just as the power of seeing is in the sound eye, so is the operation of the Spirit in the purified soul; and as a skill (*ars*) is in him who has acquired it, so is the grace of the Spirit in him who has received it — always indeed present, but not at all times actively operating."[41] By these words nothing could have been said more plainly. See the same author in ch. 9 of the same work, and in the *Homilia de Spiritu Sancto*. St. Ambrose, in *Hexameron*, bk. 6, ch. 8, compares the grace of God to a painting, by which man is painted in the soul by the painter and artisan, God; now a painting is a permanent thing.[42] St. Jerome, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon*, expounding that closing passage of the epistle, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit," says: "When grace has been in the spirit, it makes the whole man spiritual, so that the flesh also may serve the spirit, the soul may not be overcome by the flesh, and, both being reduced together into a spiritual substance, they may cleave to the Lord — for he that cleaveth to the Lord is one spirit." These words of Jerome cannot be plainly understood except of habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*).[43]

§ 22. St. John Chrysostom, in the *Homilia ad Neophytos* — which St. Augustine also cites in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 1 — says that to infants through baptism there is conferred holiness and justice.[44] But of what kind, I ask, if not habitual? — since the age of infancy is not yet capable of the acts of holiness and justice. The same author, in Hom. 40 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, attributes to baptism not only the cleansing

of the polluted mind but also the making of it purer than the rays of the sun.'[45] St. Augustine, in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 9, speaking of Christ: "In Christ shall all be made alive. He," Augustine says, "besides offering Himself as an example of righteousness to those who imitate Him, also gives to His own the most hidden grace of His Spirit, which He infuses secretly even into little ones."[46] Here it is manifest that St. Augustine is speaking of habitual grace.

§ 23. In expounding the verse "That He might make the face shine with oil" (Ps. 103), he calls the grace of God in us a certain divine brightness (*nitor*), and says that Christ, in whom grace was most excellent, anointed with grace His whole body, that is, the Church.[47] Now all these things indicate a permanent quality. St. Cyril, in his *Commentary on Isaiah*, bk. 4, Oration 2, expounding ch. 44, "I have formed thee, my servant," writes as follows: "Each person is formed into a son of God, being intelligibly shaped by the knowledge of the divine laws, into that excellent form and likeness which assuredly inheres and is imprinted as an ornament in the souls of men. This beauty may be understood as spiritual. He is also formed, as it were, in Christ, through the participation of the Holy Spirit, into His likeness. For the divine Paul writes to the Galatians: 'My little children, of whom I am in labor again until Christ be formed in you.' Now Christ is formed in us, the Holy Spirit imparting to us a certain divine form through sanctification and justice. For thus, thus does the character of the substance of God the Father shine forth in our souls, the Holy Spirit reforming us, as I have said, through sanctification into Him."[48] These words of St. Cyril most plainly establish for us that divine form (*forma divina*) implanted in the souls of men by the Holy Spirit and inhering and residing in them, which we call habitual grace. See the same author in bk. 11, ch. 2; bk. 12, ch. 56; bk. 7 of the *Dialogues*, in many passages, where he also makes use of the comparison of fire proceeding from fire, and at the beginning of the work *Quod Spiritus Sanctus est Deus*.[49]

§ 24. Pope St. Leo, in Sermon 1 *De Jejunio Decimi Mensis*, says: "Loving us, God restores us to His image, so that in us He may find the form of His goodness. He gives us that, from which we too may perform what He performs: kindling, namely, the lamps of our minds and inflaming us with the fire of His charity, so that we may love not only Him but whatever He loves."[50] These words are to be well noted. For although he names neither grace nor habit, yet he says those things which fit no other purpose more aptly than the gift of habitual grace. There is likewise a remarkable passage on this matter in Caesarius of Arles in Homily 7 (*De Corpore Domini*), where he speaks splendidly of grace as a certain form residing in the soul of man and adorning it in a wonderful manner.[51] Although indeed similar opinions are to be found scattered throughout other Fathers as well.

§ 25. Now the arguments by which this doctrine is confirmed are of the following kind. The first: God provides for created things as to their natural endowments in such a way that He not only moves them to their natural acts but also bestows upon them certain forms and powers (*virtutes*) which are the principles of those acts — by which, namely, they are inclined toward such acts — so that the movements by which things are moved by God may be, to those very things, connatural and easy, in accordance with what is written of God in Wis. 8: "Who disposeth all things sweetly." For it pertains to the sweet disposition of God by which He governs creatures, that no thing should be moved to its own and natural action except through a natural form permanently in it. What is done therefore in natural things, the same — and indeed with much greater reason — it is fitting should be done in supernatural things; namely, that those whom God moves to attain a supernatural good, He infuses into them certain supernatural forms or qualities, in accordance with which they may be sweetly and promptly moved by Him toward the attainment of that good — and thus the divine

movement toward such a good may become in a certain manner connatural to those who are so moved. Now a form or quality of this supernatural kind we call grace; it follows therefore that grace is a permanent quality, and — as St. Thomas says — one that rests in man after the manner of a habit (*habitus*). This argument belongs to St. Thomas,[52] and it is drawn from (Pseudo-)Dionysius, who in the passage cited above says that man cannot perform divine operations unless he shall have previously received a certain divine being (*esse divinum*).[53]

§ 26. The second argument: Man is pleasing (*gratus*) to God not through the bare and naked external favour of God alone — which has been condemned in the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 11 — but through grace (*gratia*) inhering in him; and yet man is pleasing to God not only when he is actually operating according to God, but also when he rests from all such operation, as when he sleeps. Therefore he has even then a grace inhering in him. Hence it must needs be something permanent after the manner of a habit.[54]

§ 27. The third argument: Grace is increased in man through good works; hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 32, defines that we merit an increase of grace by our good works.[55] Therefore grace is something permanent. For a transient form cannot be increased in itself, although there might succeed it in its passing another more perfect form of the same kind.

§ 28. The fourth argument: Through baptism infants are justified — infants in whom there can be no actual movement toward God — yet they are justified through the grace of justification. Therefore that grace consists not in act but in a certain habit. And indeed that certain gifts of grace are infused into all who are justified has been defined in the Council of Trent. And in particular concerning infants, that they receive habitual grace in baptism, is taught expressly below.[56]

§ 29. The fifth argument: All who are born of Adam contract an injustice adhering to and permanently residing in the soul after the manner of a habit, until it is taken away by baptism. Therefore all who are reborn of Christ acquire justice or grace similarly inhering and permanent. This argument is confirmed from the Apostle at Rom. 5: "For as," he says, "by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just."[57] Finally: even the very nature of regeneration demands that the grace which is possessed through it should be something permanent. For just as generation gives natural being (*esse naturale*), so regeneration must give a certain spiritual and supernatural being (*esse spirituale et supernaturale*). Now natural being is not something actual; rather it is presupposed before all act or operation. Therefore supernatural being likewise is not an act; rather it has the character of something permanent.

§ 30. Contributing moreover to the corroboration of this doctrine are the points made concerning habitual charity in what was said above,[58] and again those which will be brought forward in the next distinction, to prove that the virtues are habits — if, however, we shall have conceded that grace is not something really distinct from charity, and is therefore to be numbered among the virtues. Concerning which question we shall have to treat a little further on.

§ [new section] — That both actual and habitual grace must be acknowledged (Non solum actualem sed et habitualem gratiam agnosci oportere)

§ 31. Certain authors have so fastened upon the commendation of actual grace — that is, of that which we have said consists in act — that they have altogether refused to acknowledge habitual grace, and have indeed excluded it as superfluous. Thus, besides John Calvin and other heretics of our age who are pleased only with imputed justice (*justitia imputativa*), Albert Pighius also held this view, as is clear from his fifth book *De Libero Arbitrio*, where he deems what is customarily taught in the schools concerning habitual grace to be fictitious and foreign to the Scriptures.[59] But this opinion of that author — especially as set forth in words which seem to express contempt for the common doctrine of the Schools — cannot escape the just mark of a certain conspicuous rashness: both on account of the common and constant opinion of theologians to the contrary, which the author professes he is not ignorant of; and on account of the decree of the General Council of Vienne, which perhaps was unknown to that man who was otherwise well versed in the decrees of Councils.

§ 32. The scholastic theologians teach with one accord that in justification there is infused into man a certain supernatural habit (*habitus supernaturalis*) by which the soul is rendered just and pleasing to God; as may be seen at length in their commentaries on *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, and on dist. 26 and 27 of bk. 2.[60] Nor does the Master himself entirely dissent. For although in dist. 17 of bk. 1 he refuses to allow charity to be a certain habit, holding it instead to be the Holy Spirit Himself — on which opinion of his I will state my judgment elsewhere — nevertheless, he does speak of grace in the present distinction and the immediately following one as if it were a certain habit. For he says that grace is a virtue infused into us by God; and a virtue he defines as a good quality of the soul (*bona animi qualitas*).

§ 33. Furthermore, the Council of Vienne decreed, in the midst of the various opinions of Doctors that were being put forward concerning the effect of baptism in infants, that the opinion which says that both to infants and to adults there is conferred in baptism and infused as to habit (*quoad habitum*) the grace that informs and the virtues — that this opinion, as the more probable and as more consonant with the sayings of the holy ones and of the modern Doctors of Theology, as it says, is to be chosen; as is had in the *Clementina unica, De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*.[61] Now that this decree of the Council contains an absolute definition, Guido the Carmelite rightly shows in his *De Hæresibus*.[62] Hence it is also sufficiently apparent that what Domingo de Soto says is untrue — namely, that up to the Council of Vienne no mention had been made among Doctors of the infusion of a quality — for the Council manifestly makes mention of the opinions of the preceding time and affirms that its own judgment is more consonant with the sayings of the holy Fathers. And certainly, if before that time no mention of the infusion of a quality had been made, the Council would not have proceeded to define that matter.'[63]

§ 34. But even if that decree were not to have the force of an absolute definition, as some hold, on account of its saying there that the said opinion is to be chosen as the more probable: nonetheless, after the Council of Trent it will not be permissible to hold the opinion of Pighius, who wrote before that Council. For although the Fathers of the Council of Trent seem to have been unwilling to define whether sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is a habit properly so called or not, they nevertheless seem to have defined quite plainly enough that it is a permanent quality adhering to the soul after the manner of a certain habit — when in Session 6, ch. 7 *De Gratia*, they decreed that justification is not only the remission of sins, but also

sanctification and renewal of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts.[64] And again when, a little afterward in the same chapter, they say that in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, there are simultaneously infused Faith, Hope, and Charity — where it is pronounced that Charity itself inheres in the hearts of those in whom it is poured forth.

§ 35. Likewise, when in canon 3 of the same session [the Council pronounces anathema on those who say that without the movements of faith, hope, love, and penance a man can be justified];[65] and finally when in canon 11 they join grace together with charity, which is poured forth and inheres in the hearts of those to be justified — and condemn with anathema those who say that the grace by which we are justified is the favour of God,[54] To these add the fact that in the same session certain persons are said to lose, to recover, and to preserve the grace of justification received. This cannot be understood of the bare favour of God — namely, the anathema of the Council standing in the way — nor of an actual movement of the soul. For such a movement, being a transient form (*forma transiens*), is not properly said to be lost, and much less to be recovered or preserved. Hence it remains that all of this is to be understood of a permanent quality, as it were a habit.

§ 36. Now that this doctrine rightly and deservedly pleased both Councils, we shall briefly show its truth from Scripture, the Fathers, and reason. From Scripture and the Fathers: for although neither Scripture nor the ancient Fathers expressly name grace a habit (*habitus*), they nevertheless speak of it in such a way as of a form or certain quality existing in and permanently residing in man even while the action to which it inclines ceases. Now this is to be present after the manner of a habit (*per modum habitus*). Such are the Scriptures which signify that grace is infused into us, as Rom. 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us;" and Tit. 3: "He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom He poured out upon us abundantly."[66] To which accords that text from the prayer of the Church: "Pour, O Lord, Thy grace into our minds." Now by the infusion, the pouring forth, the diffusion of grace or charity into our hearts, there is properly signified the bestowal of some gift that will remain; just as the liquid that is poured into a vessel is retained and stays there. Hence those locutions are to be taken not of actions, which do not remain, but of habitual gifts. For of actions, on the contrary, it is customarily said that they are poured forth and go out from hearts — as the Lord speaks of thoughts and other actions at Matt. 15.[67] Nor does that text of the ecclesiastical Hymn seem to be an obstacle: "Pour love into our hearts" — for there too it is not an act of love but a habit that can be signified, just as the habitual light [is signified] in the preceding verse: "Kindle light in the senses."

§ 37. Another Scripture is Jn. 4: "Whosoever shall drink of the water that I shall give him, it shall become in him a well of water springing up into eternal life."[68] This text, together with the permanent presence of grace which is therein indicated, was the subject of the remarks of the Fathers cited at the end of the preceding section.

§ 38. Furthermore, the Scriptures which compare grace to things created and permanent also belong here — as to anointing or ointment, a seal, a pledge, a seed. The passages are: 1 Jn. 2: "The anointing which you have received from Him, let it abide in you," where in Greek it is *λεῖσμα*, that is, ointment, and *μένουσα*, that is, it abides: to signify that grace, like an ointment poured upon us, remains and resides in us. And 1 Jn. 3: "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him." And 2 Cor. 1: "Now He who hath anointed us is God, and who hath sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts."

§ 39. From the Fathers the same doctrine has been proved above. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, part 1, says that by the most sacred and ineffable operation a divine state is wrought in us; and *status* signifies permanence. Nor does (Pseudo-)Dionysius mean anything different by those words from what he elsewhere says: that men through baptism receive a certain new and divine being (*esse*), namely fellowship of the nature. St. Irenaeus, in *Contra Hæreses*, bk. 5, ch. 6, says and repeatedly repeats that the perfect man, that is, the just man, consists of three components: body, soul, and the Spirit of God, that is, the grace of the Holy Spirit. By this opinion it is certainly signified that grace is in the just man like a permanent thing, just as parts are in a whole. He says in the same place that the Holy Spirit is poured into the soul and mingled with it — which cannot be understood except of a gift permanently inhering. St. Basil, in *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 26: "Just as," he says, "the power of seeing is in the sound eye, so is the operation of the Spirit in the purified soul; and as a skill (*ars*) is in him who has acquired it, so is the grace of the Spirit in him who has received it — always indeed present, but not at all times actively operating." By these words nothing could have been said more plainly. See the same author in ch. 9 of the same work, and in the *Homilia de Spiritu Sancto*. St. Ambrose, in *Hexameron*, bk. 6, ch. 8, compares the grace of God to a painting by which man is painted in the soul by the painter and artisan, God; now a painting is a permanent thing. St. Jerome, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon*, expounding the closing text of the epistle, "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit," says: "When grace shall have been in the spirit, it makes the whole man spiritual, so that the flesh also may serve the spirit, the soul may not be overcome by the flesh, and, both being reduced together into a spiritual substance, they may cleave to the Lord — for he that cleaveth to the Lord is one spirit." These words of Jerome cannot be plainly understood except of habitual grace. St. John Chrysostom, in the *Homilia ad Neophytos*, which St. Augustine also cites in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 1, says that to infants through baptism there is conferred holiness and justice — but of what kind, if not habitual? since the age of infancy is not yet capable of the acts of holiness and justice. The same author, in Hom. 40 on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, attributes to baptism not only the cleansing of the polluted mind but also the making of it purer than the rays of the sun.

§ 40. St. Augustine, in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 9, speaking of Christ: "In Christ shall all be made alive. He," Augustine says, "besides offering Himself as an example of righteousness to those who imitate Him, also gives to His own the most hidden grace of His Spirit, which He infuses secretly even into little ones." Here it is manifest that St. Augustine speaks of habitual grace. In expounding the verse "That He might make the face shine with oil," he calls the grace of God in us a certain divine brightness (*nitor*), and says that Christ, in whom grace was most excellent, anointed with grace His whole body, that is, the Church. Now all these things indicate a permanent quality. St. Cyril, in his *Commentary on Isaiah*, bk. 4, Oration 2, expounding ch. 44, "I have formed thee, my servant," writes as follows: "Each person is formed into a son of God, being intelligibly shaped by the knowledge of the divine laws into that excellent form and likeness which assuredly inheres and is imprinted as an ornament in the souls of men. This beauty may be understood as spiritual. He is also formed, as it were, in Christ, through the participation of the Holy Spirit, into His likeness. For the divine Paul writes to the Galatians: 'My little children, of whom I am in labor again until Christ be formed in you.' Now Christ is formed in us, the Holy Spirit imparting to us a certain divine form through sanctification and justice. For thus, thus does the character of the substance of God the Father shine forth in our souls, the Holy Spirit reforming us, as I have said, through sanctification into Him." These words of St. Cyril most plainly establish for us that divine form implanted in the souls of men by the Holy Spirit and inhering and residing in them, which we call habitual grace. See the same author in bk. 11, ch. 2; bk. 12, ch. 56; bk. 7 of the

Dialogues, through many passages, where he also makes use of the comparison of fire proceeding from fire, and at the beginning of the work *Quod Spiritus Sanctus est Deus*. Pope St. Leo, in Sermon 1 *De Jejunio Decimi Mensis*: "Loving us, God restores us to His image, so that in us He may find the form of His goodness; He gives us that from which we ourselves may likewise perform what He performs — kindling, namely, the lamps of our minds and inflaming us with the fire of His charity, so that we may love not only Him but whatever He loves."[50] These words are to be well noted. For although he names neither grace nor habit, yet he says those things which fit no other purpose more aptly than the gift of habitual grace. There is likewise a notable passage on this matter in Caesarius of Arles, in Homily 7 (*De Corpore Domini*), where he speaks splendidly of grace as a certain form residing in the soul of man and adorning it in a wonderful manner. Although indeed similar opinions are found scattered throughout other Fathers as well.

§ 41. The arguments by which this doctrine is confirmed are of the following kinds. The first: God provides for created things as to their natural endowments in such a way that He not only moves them to their natural acts but also bestows upon them certain forms and powers (*virtutes*) which are the principles of those acts — by which, namely, they are inclined toward such acts — so that the movements by which things are moved by God may be connatural and easy to those things, in accordance with what is written of God in Wis. 8: "Who disposeth all things sweetly." For it pertains to the sweet disposition of God by which He governs creatures, that no thing should be moved to its own and natural action except through a natural form permanently residing in it. What is done therefore in natural things, the same — and indeed much more fittingly — is it fitting should be done in supernatural things: namely, that those whom God moves to attain a supernatural good, He infuses into them certain supernatural forms or qualities, in accordance with which they may be sweetly and readily moved by Him toward the attainment of that good; and thus the divine movement toward such a good may become in some manner connatural to those who are so moved. Now a supernatural form or quality of this kind we call grace; it follows therefore that grace is a permanent quality, and — as St. Thomas says — one that rests in man after the manner of a habit. This argument is St. Thomas's, [69] and it is drawn from (Pseudo-)Dionysius, who in the passage cited above says that man cannot perform divine operations unless he shall have previously received a certain divine being (*esse divinum*).

§ 42. The second argument: Man is pleasing to God not through the bare and naked external favour (*favor*) of God alone — which has been condemned in the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 11 — but through grace inhering in him; and yet man is pleasing to God not only when he is actually operating according to God, but also when he rests from all such operation, as when he sleeps. Therefore he has even then a grace inhering in him. Hence it must needs be something permanent after the manner of a habit.

§ 43. The third argument: Grace is increased in man through good works; hence the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 32, defines that we merit an increase of grace by our good works. Therefore grace is something permanent. For a transient form cannot be increased in itself, although there might succeed it in its passing another more perfect form of the same kind.

§ 44. The fourth argument: Through baptism infants are justified — infants in whom there can be no actual movement toward God — yet they are justified through the grace of justification. Therefore that grace consists not in act but in a certain habit. And indeed that certain gifts of grace are infused into all who are justified has been defined in the Council of Trent. And in particular, concerning infants, that they receive habitual grace in baptism, is taught expressly in what follows.[70]

§ 45. The fifth argument: All who are born of Adam contract an injustice adhering to and permanently residing in the soul after the manner of a habit, until it is taken away through baptism. Therefore all who are reborn of Christ acquire justice or grace similarly inhering and permanent. This argument is confirmed from the Apostle at Rom. 5: "For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just." Finally: even the very nature of regeneration demands that the grace possessed through it should be something permanent. For just as generation gives natural being, so regeneration must give a certain spiritual and supernatural being. Now natural being is not something actual; it is presupposed before all act or operation. Therefore supernatural being likewise is not an act; rather it has the character of something permanent.

§ 46. Contributing furthermore to the corroboration of this doctrine are the points that were made concerning habitual charity in what was said on dist. 17 of bk. 1, and again those which will be brought forward in the next distinction, to prove that the virtues are habits — if, however, we shall have conceded that grace is not something really distinct from charity, and is therefore to be numbered among the virtues. Concerning which question we shall have to treat a little further on. On this question see St. Thomas,[71] and there his commentators.

§ V — Reply to the arguments of various opinions (Respondetur ad argumenta diversæ opinionis)

§ 47. Since grace (*gratia*) is distinguished from charity by those who contend that it differs from charity, the arguments by which this is contended must now be resolved in order. The first is from reason (*ex ratione*): the operative act (*operatio*) and operative power (*virtus operativa*) of any thing presupposes the being (*esse*) of that thing; and if the operation and power be natural or naturally acquired, it presupposes a natural being; therefore similarly a supernatural operation and supernatural power presupposes that something is in some sense supernatural. Now charity is a supernatural power; therefore it presupposes grace as bestowing upon man something supernatural. Hence it must necessarily be that these two are distinguished from each other in reality — just as nature is distinguished from a natural power, nature being presupposed.

§ 48. The second: In natural things, besides the acquired virtues there is the natural light of reason, from which those virtues are derived; therefore similarly in supernatural things, besides the infused virtues one must acknowledge the light of Grace, from which virtues of the same order proceed. These two arguments are those of St. Thomas.[73]

§ 49. The third: The formal effects of Grace and of charity are diverse, and indeed they can even be separated from each other in one and the same person; for the formal effect (*effectus formalis*) of grace is to make man acceptable and beloved; of charity, to make him loving and to be loved in return — for it can happen that someone is loved and does not love; and conversely, that someone loves but is not loved in return; above all through grace a man is made acceptable to God, that is, ordered to eternal life. Therefore the formal causes (*causæ formales*) of grace and charity ought to be diverse. Bartholomaeus Medina thinks this argument efficacious for demonstration.[74]

§ 50. The fourth is from Scripture: For 1 Jn. 4 says: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us"; therefore the grace by which we are beloved and lovable to God is prior to charity by which we love God, and it is therefore really distinguished from it. The fifth: According to Scripture it is first that the Holy Spirit is given to us — as the Apostle says, Rom. 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us"; and Gal. 5: "The fruit of the Spirit," he says, "is charity, joy, peace, patience," etc. Now the Spirit is given at the very moment at which grace is given; therefore grace is prior to charity, which means it cannot be the same thing, unless we distinguish them.

§ 51. Sixth, from (Pseudo-)Dionysius, who in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, part 1, says that man cannot perform divine operations unless he shall first have received a divine being (*esse divinum*); just as man cannot perform human operations who shall not first have possessed human being. Therefore, as in human things a human being must first exist before one can operate or even possess an operative virtue; so in divine things, that is, supernatural ones, the case is the same: that supernatural being is not otherwise possessed except through grace. Seventh, from St. Augustine, who in *De Dono Perseverantiæ*, ch. 14, manifestly distinguishes grace from charity; for he says that grace precedes charity (*gratia præveniet caritatem*). St. Thomas also uses this argument.[75]

§ 52. Eighth, from the Council of Vienne, which defined that in baptism there is conferred upon both infants and adults grace that informs (*informans gratia*) and the virtues. From which definition it is sufficiently apparent that the Council wished to distinguish between habitual grace, which it calls the grace that informs, and the virtues.

§ 53. The last, from the Council of Trent, which in Session 6, ch. 7, transmits that justification is the renewal of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts; and in canon 11 pronounces anathema on those who teach that man is justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace and charity. By which passages this Council likewise, expressly naming both grace and gifts, and again grace and charity, seems to wish to distinguish it from the gifts, that is, from the infused virtues, and thus to wish to distinguish it even simply from charity itself.

§ 54. To these arguments it is answered as follows. To the first: every operation and operative virtue presupposes the being of the thing; it is true, however, that if a supernatural operation or virtue is supposed, it is not necessary that its very presupposed being should itself be supernatural. For it is not one and the same thing for the being to be natural, that is, the substance of the thing, as it suffices that there be supposed in it something from which that supernatural virtue or operation proceeds — namely, the habit of that virtue, or some other supernatural quality permanently placed in it — without however requiring that the very substance of the soul, or its natural being, be something supernatural. For when it is said that the presupposed must belong to the same order as that which is presupposed, this is not absolutely true; it suffices that the presupposed be a sufficient foundation for that which rests upon it.

§ 55. To the second: in natural things besides acquired virtues there is the natural light of reason; but that light is not some third thing really distinct from the intellective soul — it is the soul itself, or a natural property of it. Now the soul is the principle from which the acquired virtues derive and flow. Similarly therefore in supernatural things, over and above the infused virtues, one must acknowledge a certain supernatural light of grace; but that light need not be a third thing really distinct from the virtues themselves

and from charity. For it can be charity itself, insofar as it is the most excellent of the infused virtues and as such the root and fountainhead of the others — and this is in fact the more common and probable opinion.

§ 56. To the third: the formal effects (*effectus formales*) of grace and charity are diverse: of grace, to make man acceptable and beloved; of charity, to make him loving. But from the diversity of formal effects it does not follow that grace and charity are really distinct from each other as things (*res*), since the same real thing (*res*) can have more than one formal effect (*effectus formalis*). For example, the soul is both the principle of life and the form giving natural being to the body; and yet the soul is not really distinct from itself as life-principle and as natural form. This argument therefore proves only that the formal character (*ratio*) of grace and the formal character of charity are distinct in their concept, not that they are two really distinct things.

§ 57. To the fourth and fifth: these arguments prove that grace in some sense of the word precedes charity — not in time, but in the formal character (*ratio*) and concept of the thing. For grace denominates the soul as accepted by God and ordered to the divine friendship and eternal life; charity denominates it as the principle of the act of loving God. Now there is no impediment to these two being one and the same real quality, distinguished only in formal character (*formaliter*). And indeed, that in Scripture the Holy Spirit is said to be given before charity and to infuse charity, this signifies only that the Holy Spirit, as first agent, produces in the soul of man the habit of charity together with the other infused virtues, and that charity is the gift of the Holy Spirit — not that it is some thing really distinct from the gift first conferred.

§ 58. To the sixth, from (Pseudo-)Dionysius: what (Pseudo-)Dionysius says is that man cannot perform divine operations unless he shall have first received a divine being. But this divine being (*esse divinum*) is nothing other than the participation of the divine nature (*Divinæ Naturæ participatio*) which we called above the fellowship of the divine nature (*Naturæ divinæ consortium*) — and this is precisely habitual grace itself, or charity, taken as that by which the soul is elevated to a supernatural order, not as that from which there proceeds an act of love in the proper sense. For the same thing is both the divine being and the habit of charity; only the formal characters (*rationes*) are distinct.

§ 59. To the seventh, from St. Augustine: that Augustine distinguishes grace from charity by saying that grace precedes charity does not require a real distinction (*distinctio realis*) between the two, since a logical priority of formal character (*ratio*) in the same real thing suffices for this manner of speaking. To the eighth, from the Council of Vienne: the Council says that the grace that informs and the virtues are infused together; it distinguishes these two, calling the one the grace that informs, the other the virtues. But from this it follows only that there is a formal or conceptual distinction (*distinctio formalis seu conceptualis*) between grace insofar as it constitutes man just and acceptable (*gratum faciens*) and the virtues insofar as they are the principles of particular operations — not that grace is a thing really distinct from charity or from the virtues. To the last, from the Council of Trent: for the same reason, what the Council of Trent says — that justification is the renewal of man through the reception of grace and gifts — proves only that grace and the virtues have different formal characters, not that they are really two numerically distinct qualities inhering in the soul.

§ III — Whether habitual grace is to be posited according to the Faith (Utrum secundum fidem ponenda sit gratia habitualis)

§ 60. There is a question among some theologians whether it belongs to the Faith that the grace by which we are justified and are pleasing to God is a habit infused into us and inhering in us. Some hold that it is indeed very rash to deny this, on account of the authorities and arguments adduced above, yet that it is not certain according to the teaching of the Faith, for the reason that it is neither expressly stated in Sacred Scripture, nor clear from ecclesiastical tradition, nor defined in the Councils. For, as they say, the Council of Trent refrained from the name of habit and only defined that man is justified by a justice which is infused into and inheres in our hearts, and not merely by an external and imputed justice, as the heretics maintain.[76] Furthermore, the Council of Vienne, although in the words premised to its decree it makes mention of the opinion of those who assert that virtues and the grace that gives form (*gratia informans*) are infused into children in Baptism as to habit (*quoad habitum*), nevertheless in the decree itself omitted that phrase — *quoad habitum* — and this, as is apparent, deliberately, lest it should seem to have defined that the informing grace of which it speaks is a habit.[61] Moreover, even if *quoad habitum* had been added to the decree, they deny that the consequence would follow that the matter had been defined in that Council, since there it is only defined that the opinion of the Doctors is the more probable one, inasmuch as it is more conformable and agreeable to the sayings of the holy Fathers and of the Scholastics.

§ 61. Domingo de Soto, who was present at the Council of Trent, seems to hold this view.[77] But Bartholomaeus Medina teaches it more openly,[78] For he judges that the Tridentine Fathers wished to define only this against the heretics who had lately arisen: that when God justifies sinners, He does not merely remit their sins by not imputing them as punishment, as the heretics taught, but also inwardly renews them according to the soul, so that from wicked and unjust men they become upright and just. But whether God brings about this interior renewal through some quality permanently inhering, or rather through the sole actual motion of the divine assistance — this, he denies, was defined by the Council, because, as he says, that question did not pertain to what had been proposed for definition in the Council.

§ 62. On the other hand, Andreas Vega, writing on chapter 7 of Session 6 of the Council of Trent, holds the contrary opinion.[79] For he affirms that it is a defined dogma in that place of the Council that grace and the virtues are infused habits. Our own view is that the opinion of Medina cannot be sustained, on account of the decrees both of the Council of Vienne and of the Council of Trent. For although in those decrees it is not expressly defined that the grace and virtues which are infused in Baptism or in the justification of man are habits, it is nevertheless manifest from them that the interior renewal of man does not take place through the sole actual and transitory motion of the divine assistance, but after the manner of habits, whether they be called by that name or not.

§ 63. First, because the Council of Vienne speaks of the grace which infants receive in Baptism, while the Council of Trent deals generally with justification in such a way as to comprehend also the justification of infants and of the insane. But in these cases the actual motion in question cannot be operative; therefore in the said Councils there must be understood a quality remaining after the manner of a habit. Second, because the Council of Vienne in express words approves the opinion of those whom it had described as asserting that the informing grace is infused *quoad habitum*, even if not *quoad actum*. Third, from the very name of virtue, which by universal consent consists not in acts but in habits, even though the Fathers of the Council of Trent

preferred to speak of gifts rather than habits. Fourth, because neither can the other things decreed in the Council of Trent be reconciled with the opinion of a solely actual and transitory motion, but altogether require qualities permanently residing in the soul, as will be evident to anyone who considers the matter more deeply. To which is added that in chapter 7 of Session 6 the following is said of catechumens and the newly baptised: "Thus, receiving true and Christian justice, they are bidden to preserve it, as their first garment, white and unspotted, in place of that which Adam by his disobedience lost for himself and for us, so that they may bear it before the tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ and have life eternal."[76] Fifth, because the mind of the Council of Trent is interpreted in this sense by the Roman Catechism for Parish Priests.[80] For it sets forth these words regarding grace: "Grace, as the Tridentine Synod has decreed under penalty of anathema and commanded to be believed by all, is not only that by which sins are forgiven, but also a divine quality inhering in the soul, a certain splendour and light that blots out all the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves more beautiful and more splendid." By the divine quality inhering in the soul, the author of the Catechism understands a habit, as he himself afterwards explains when he says that through it we become capable of good and honest actions, and that from it upright and honourable deeds proceed. He therefore judges it to be defined in the Council that grace is something inhering in and permanent in the soul after the manner of a habit — which is also our view.

§ 64. Nevertheless we do not on that account hold it to be true that it has been defined that the grace and virtues conferred in justification are infused habits, as Vega thinks. For it was not without reason that both the Viennese Fathers and the Tridentines refrained in their defining from the name of habit. This was done by them deliberately and carefully; because, while the fact that grace is a quality permanent after the manner of a habit (which the Fathers judged it sufficient to define) stands firm, there remains a doubt whether grace is truly and properly a habit, or rather a permanent quality of some other condition and nature than those qualities which we are accustomed to call habits: especially since it does not sufficiently appear that children, after they have grown up, are inclined by the grace and virtues infused in them to acts of piety — which, however, the nature of habits properly so called seems to require. There was also the consideration that from the light of nature philosophy has handed down to us no habits properly so called other than those which are acquired by a single act or by acts. Therefore there was no need, nor was it even expedient, to introduce the name of habit into the said decrees.

§ 65. As for the objection that the Council of Vienne embraces only as the more probable the opinion which posits grace and the infused virtues in children — the reply to this has already been given in the preceding chapter from the judgment of Guido.[81] For the Council established and decreed that the said opinion, which at that time was the more probable one, was simply to be adopted — that is to say, so that it should be held not as merely more probable, but as certain and as defined by the Council.

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§ IV — Whether grace is a quality distinct from charity (Utrum Gratia sit qualitas a Charitate diversa)

§ 66. This is a question disputed among theologians and not yet defined: whether the habit of grace is the same as charity, or distinct from it. For some hold that they are entirely the same both really and formally (*re et ratione*), as Durandus.[83] Others distinguish them by formal character (*ratio*) alone. They say that one and the

same habit is what Scripture and the Fathers call now grace, now charity — grace insofar as it adorns man and renders him pleasing and lovable, so to speak gracious, to God; and charity insofar as it renders man prompt and capable of loving God above all things. So think Alexander of Hales in his *Summa Theologica*,[84] Henry of Ghent,[85] Richard (of St. Victor),[86] Scotus,[87] Marsilius,[88] and likewise Maironius, Gabriel, John Major, and certain others writing on this distinction.[89] Andreas Vega also agrees with them.[90] Those who say that grace and charity differ not really but only formally (*formaliter*) differ from this position almost in words alone. For so speaks Albert the Great[91] and likewise Alexander of Hales,[92] although the latter Doctor in the place previously cited acknowledges only a distinction of formal character (*ratio*). From which it is gathered that for these authors it is the same thing to differ by formal character alone and to differ only formally.

§ 67. The third opinion is that of those who make grace and charity habits really distinct (*re distinctos*). For they say that grace is something divine and supernatural which is given to the soul as a quasi-divine being; and accordingly they place it in the very essence of the soul as its proximate subject; while charity, they say, is an infused virtue by which man is made prompt to love God above all things, and which is seated in a power of the soul, namely in the will. So teaches St. Thomas in his commentary on this distinction,[93] and likewise in *De Veritate*,[94] and in the *Summa*.[95] Capreolus,[96] Cajetan, and Medina,[97] Ferrariensis,[98] and Domingo de Soto[77] and the other Thomists subscribe to the same opinion. St. Bonaventure is also cited in favour of this opinion, but incorrectly. For he, writing on this distinction,[99] although he acknowledges that the common opinion holds that grace first respects the substance of the soul and the virtues first respect the powers of the soul, nevertheless departs from that opinion when understood according to the strict sense of the words, and teaches that the proximate subject of grace is not the substance of the soul but the will. And in *In III Sent.*, dist. 27, art. 1, q. 3,[100] when disputing the question now under discussion — whether the habit of grace and of charity is really the same — he settles neither alternative, but resolves the arguments of both sides, saying that either can be held with probability. Navarre likewise leaves the matter undecided.[101]

§ 68. Now the first of the opinions stated, which is that of Durandus, is easily refuted. For that there is some distinction of formal character between grace and charity is manifestly shown by the usage of these terms, both in the Scriptures and among the Fathers and in the mouths of the faithful. For when someone is said to be in the grace of God or to have grace, everyone understands by grace that by which a person is pleasing, acceptable, and beloved of God. But when someone is said to be in charity or to have charity, by that name they understand the quality by which a person loves God. These formal characters, however, are clearly diverse — indeed in a certain sense opposed according to the relation (one being a relation of being loved, the other of loving).

§ 69. The remaining two opinions, however, rest on great probability on account of the arguments, drawn both from reason and from authority, which are customarily brought forward on either side. We, inclining toward the side that distinguishes grace and charity by formal character alone as the truer position, will now set forth certain principal arguments; and then we will resolve those which seem to favour real distinction.

§ 70. The reasons that show grace to be distinguished from charity by formal character alone are principally the following.

First reason. If grace were a quality really distinct from charity, this would be chiefly on account of what they say is proper to grace: namely, to give the soul a certain divine and supernatural being (*esse quoddam divinum et supernaturale*). But it is certain that man cannot participate in the divine being except according to

accident. Now there is no accident by which man participates more in the divine being than charity, as will be shown below from the Apostle (1 Cor. 13). Indeed, if grace and charity were habits really distinct, as is posited by the authors of the contrary opinion, charity would bring about that divine participation more than grace. For grace would only confer a supernatural accidental being, whereas charity, beyond that being, would additionally unite the soul to God in the most perfect union that can be had in the present life — this life's union with God being through love, by which one loves God.

Second reason. If grace is distinguished from charity in the manner in which the soul is distinguished from its powers, as St. Thomas teaches — wishing grace to be, as it were, the essence of the supernatural life, presupposed and underlying the supernatural virtues — it will follow that without grace no infused virtue can exist in man, just as without essence there can be no power of that essence, nor any habit of the powers. But it is certain that when grace is lost, faith and hope do not immediately perish but frequently remain together with the loss of grace, so that through them grace is even recovered. Therefore the said comparison of grace and charity with the soul and its powers seems to have little solidity. For however much anyone may deny that the faith which remains after grace is lost is a virtue, it is nevertheless established that it is a supernatural quality, and that its operation is likewise supernatural. It is also established among the most learned theologians that the same faith is at one time formed (*formata*) and at another time unformed (*informis*). And similarly with hope. Therefore grace cannot be compared to the whole genus of supernatural habits and operations as a certain essence to the powers or operations, since powers and operations necessarily presuppose their essence.

Third reason. Grace is that by which we are properly pleasing and beloved of God; but this above all is charity. For in charity consists the highest likeness to God that we can attain in this life. Now God holds as pleasing and loves those who are like to Himself, and the more so the more like to Him they are. For likeness is the cause of love. Hence the Wise Man says: "Every animal loves its like" (Sir. 13).[102] In the present matter, however, what is attended to is not likeness of nature but of perfection according to the virtues, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1). This perfection is had above all through charity, as the most excellent of all virtues; therefore grace ought not to be posited as something really distinct from charity.

Fourth reason. The essence of a thing does not admit of more and less; if therefore grace is distinguished from charity in such a way that it stands in the mode of an essence from which charity and the other supernatural gifts flow, it would follow that it could not be increased — which is known to be false.

Fifth reason. Habitual forms (*formae habituales*) are not to be multiplied without necessity; but no necessity compels the positing of a habit of grace really distinct from the habit of charity. For whatever a habit of grace achieves or can achieve, the habit of charity achieves the same — such as making us partakers of the divine nature, making our works meritorious of eternal life, and so on for the rest. Therefore beyond the habit of charity there is no need to posit a habit of grace really distinct, since with the latter removed, man has no less through the habit of charity. And moreover, as Durandus argues, the habit of grace would be an idle quality — especially since those who distinguish it really from charity do not posit it as an operative habit, but hold that it is presupposed by the operative habits.[103] Finally, this too is to the point: that the Greeks call grace *χάριν* (*charin*) and graces *χάριτος* (*charitos*) — terms very similar to the Latin *charitas*.

§ 71. Now from the Scriptures such an argument can also be constructed. Whatever is attributed to grace by the authors of the contrary opinion is found attributed in Scripture to charity; therefore not a real, nor even a merely formal, but only a distinction of formal character can be established between grace and charity.

Proof of the antecedent: according to Scripture, charity gives man the divine being (*esse divinum*) through which he is constituted a son of God. For John says in his First Epistle, chapter 3: "Behold what manner of charity the Father has bestowed upon us, that we should be called and be the sons of God" (1 Jn. 3:1). And in chapter 4: "Everyone who loves is born of God" (1 Jn. 4:7). And Christ Himself says in Matt. 5: "Love your enemies, that you may be the sons of your Father who is in heaven" (Matt. 5:44). Likewise, charity is the life of the soul: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. He who does not love remains in death" (1 Jn. 3:14). Charity makes man beloved of God: "I love those who love me" (Prov. 8:17); "If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father" (Jn. 14:21). Charity joins man to God: "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him" (1 Jn. 4:16). Charity is that through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Charity is the fountain and root of all virtues: "It is patient, it is kind, etc." (1 Cor. 13:4); and "The fullness of the law is love" (Rom. 13:10). In short, whatever else is commonly attributed to grace, we can show to have been attributed also to charity in Sacred Scripture, or at least by the Fathers — which seems to be a certain argument of real identity.

§ 72. To this let there now be added the chief and principal argument: that according to Scripture, charity holds the first and supreme place among all the gifts of God bestowed on men. This the Apostle teaches most plainly in 1 Cor. 13, where he places charity incomparably ahead of all other things, going so far as to assert that without charity all other things are nothing. And concerning charity he says also in Col. 3: "Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection" (Col. 3:14). Hence St. Augustine says: "There is no gift more excellent than this."[104] And in a sermon on the words of the Lord: "What a good thing is charity! What is more precious? What more luminous? What more firm? What more useful? What more secure?",[105] St. Bernard speaks similarly.[106] If therefore grace is something distinct from charity, it must necessarily be less than charity. But this is both false and contrary to the mind of those who posit a real distinction between them. Nor is it of any avail to say that Paul, writing to the Corinthians, is not comparing charity with grace, but only with the other infused virtues, namely faith and hope. For it is manifest (from the end of chapter 12 and the whole of chapter 13) that charity is compared by the Apostle with all other charisms whatsoever, with none excepted. Therefore, if it is not compared with grace — which we concede — the plain consequence is that grace is not a charisma distinct from charity.

§ 73. Moreover, from the Fathers, no other proof needs to be adduced in favour of this opinion than the fact that they are not found to have ever distinguished grace from charity except, it may be, according to formal character (*ratio*). Indeed, whatever is customarily or can be attributed to grace, the same is found attributed to charity in their writings, just as we have already said of Scripture. And the chief point — that they constitute the justice which makes us pleasing and acceptable to God, and which therefore is habitual grace, in a virtue and specifically in charity — is attested by a passage in St. Augustine on Ps. 118, sermon 26, where he teaches that the justice by which we are justified is a virtue.[107] And in *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter 42, where he pronounces charity to be the truest, most complete, and most perfect justice.[24] And in the same book, chapter 70, where he says: "Charity begun is justice begun; charity advanced is justice advanced; charity great is justice great; charity perfect is justice perfect."[108] So Augustine. The same is signified by the words of

Leo in Sermon 1 *On the Fast of the Tenth Month*, where he speaks of the image of God to which we are restored, and of the form of the divine goodness impressed upon us.[50]

§ 74. — that is, grace — inflames us more powerfully with its fire. The words cited above, in § 2, were adduced in favour of habitual grace. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] is also customarily alleged here, as one who in this distinction and in the one immediately following affirms that grace is a virtue, and indeed is charity itself. For after much discussion he writes (in the final § of the following distinction): "Charity is a movement of the soul, that is, grace, by which the soul is moved to love." But as regards the habit of virtue or of charity, it is sufficiently clear from both distinctions, and most of all from the conclusion of the said §, that the Master is speaking not by way of assertion but by way of disputation. Nor, assuredly, can it be consistent with that opinion of the Master whereby he teaches[109] that charity is the Holy Spirit himself, and not any habit inhering in the soul, that habitual grace should be identical with charity. For against him it would follow that, besides the Holy Spirit, some habitual charity would have to be acknowledged. And so if, according to the Master, grace is a habit but charity is not a habit but the Holy Spirit, then the contrary would rather follow from him: namely, that grace is not charity. But to this it must also be said that the matter is doubtful even for the Master himself, whether the virtues are habits or acts. Wherefore, even if he says that grace is a virtue, he will not straightway admit that it is a habit. But since, if according to the Master grace is a virtue, and no other than charity (for St. Thomas himself acknowledges,[110] that the Master held something of this kind), while to that same Master charity is not a habit but the Holy Spirit himself — the consequence for him is that grace likewise is not a habit, but the Holy Spirit. Which the Master would perhaps not unwillingly have conceded.

§ 75. But in favour of the identity of habitual grace and charity, there is this more efficacious consideration: that the Fathers of Trent, unless they wished to define nothing at all on this matter, yet appear not obscurely to have indicated on which side they were more inclined. For in Session 6, chapter 7,[76] when they were treating in a formal way of the formal cause (*causa formalis*) of our justification, they teach that it is one alone — namely, the justice of God by which He makes us just. This they then designate as the charity (*caritas*) of God poured forth in our hearts, making no mention of grace, but only of faith and hope, which they say are infused into a man at the same time as charity when he is justified. If therefore — as all agree — justification comes about through the infusion of grace together with charity in the mind of the Council, then either — which is not to be believed — the teaching of the Council concerning the formal cause of justification will be imperfect, and accordingly false in that part where it maintains that there is one sole formal cause of our justification, namely justice, which it identifies with charity.

§ V — Reply to the arguments of the opposing opinion (Respondetur ad argumenta diversae opinionis)

§ 76. Those who distinguish grace from charity as really distinct things rely upon approximately the following arguments, which must be resolved by us in order. The first is from reason: the operation and operative power (*virtus operativa*) of any thing presupposes the being (*esse*) of that thing; and if the operation and power are natural or naturally acquired, they presuppose natural being; therefore, similarly, a supernatural operation and power presuppose some supernatural being. But charity is a supernatural virtue; therefore it presupposes grace as that which confers upon man a supernatural being. Hence it is necessary that the one be really distinguished from the other, in the way that nature is distinguished from the natural virtue that presupposes nature.

§ 77. The second argument: In natural things, besides the acquired virtues, there is the natural light of reason, from which those virtues are derived; therefore also in supernatural things, besides the infused virtues, one must acknowledge a light of grace, from which virtues of the same order proceed. These two arguments belong to St. Thomas.[110]

§ 78. The third argument: The formal effects (*effectus formales*) of grace and of charity are diverse, so much so that they can even be separated from each other. For the formal effect of grace is to be accepted and beloved (*esse gratum ac dilectum*); that of charity, to be loving (*esse diligentem*). And it can come about that someone is loved and does not love, and conversely that someone loves and yet is not loved — especially with respect to that good to which man is made acceptable to God through grace, that is, to eternal life. Therefore the formal causes (*causae formales*) themselves — grace and charity — must also be diverse. Bartholomaeus Medina considers this argument to be an efficacious demonstration.

§ 79. The fourth argument, from Scripture: For St. John says in his first Epistle, chapter 4, "Not as though we had loved God, but because He himself loved us"[112] — that is, before we loved Him; therefore the grace by which we are beloved and lovable to God is prior to the charity by which we love God, and consequently is really distinguished from it.

§ 80. The fifth argument: According to Scripture, it is prior to us that the Holy Spirit be given to us than that charity and the other virtues be given to us. For the Apostle says at Rom. 5, that charity is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us;[113] and at Gal. 5 he says, "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience,",[114] and so forth. But the Spirit is given at the very moment at which grace is given; therefore it is prior that grace be given to us than that charity be given, which could not occur unless they were really distinguished.

§ 81. The sixth argument, from (Pseudo-)Dionysius, who in his book *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, chapter 2, part 1, says that man cannot perform divine works unless he has first obtained divine being (*esse divinum*), just as he cannot perform human works who has not first obtained human being.[39] Therefore, in the judgment of (Pseudo-)Dionysius, just as in human and natural things being comes before operating, or even before having the virtue of operating, so it is also in divine things, that is, in supernatural things. But supernatural being is not had except through grace.

§ 82. The seventh argument, from St. Augustine, who in his book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14, manifestly distinguishes grace from charity, saying that grace goes before (*praevenire*) charity.[115] St. Thomas also makes use of this argument.

§ 83. The eighth argument, from the Council of Vienne, which defined that in baptism there is conferred upon both children and adults informing grace (*gratia informans*) and the virtues.[116] From this definition it appears sufficiently that the Council wished to distinguish between habitual grace, which it calls "informing," and the virtues.

§ 84. The last argument, from the Council of Trent, which in Session 6, chapter 7 teaches that justification is a renewal of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts (*gratia et donorum*).[76] And in canon 11 it pronounces anathema upon those who teach that man is justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of grace and charity.[54] By which passages this same Council, in like manner distinctly naming grace and gifts, and again

grace and charity, appears to have wished simply to distinguish it from gifts, that is, from the infused virtues, and therefore from charity itself.

§ 85. To these arguments we reply as follows. To the first: every operation and operative power does indeed presuppose the being of the thing; yet if the operation or virtue is supernatural, it is not necessary that the very being which is presupposed be supernatural. For one and the same being, which is natural being, or the being of a substance (*esse rei substantia*), suffices to underlie supernatural as well as natural things of that same thing. For although supernatural virtues and actions do not flow from nature, and therefore nature is not to be called their principle in the genus of efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), nature nonetheless has towards them what is called obediential potency (*potentia obedientialis*): because God can adorn and elevate nature with such endowments beyond its natural condition. Hence it is not necessary here to seek some supernatural being distinct from the supernatural virtue itself. For just as whiteness gives the being of white, which is a certain accidental being (*esse accidentarium*), so the divine supernatural virtues give a divine and supernatural being, which likewise is nothing other than a certain accidental being.

§ 86. To the second it is answered: if grace is like a supernatural light, then it is not like an essence, because the light of reason is superadded to nature. One must say therefore that, corresponding to the natural light of reason from which acquired virtues are derived, there is, in supernatural things during this present life, the light of faith (*lumen Fidei*). For from it hope and charity are in their own manner derived, and by its direction the moral virtues are ordered to the supernatural end. But in the future life the light of glory (*lumen Gloriae*) corresponds to it. Nor is grace aptly placed as a supernatural light. For the word "grace" does not connote a light or cognitive principle, but rather acceptance and passive love (*dilectionem passivam*). This is a matter very remote from the signification of light.

§ 87. The third argument proves only a diversity of formal character (*ratio*) between grace and charity. For these effects — being beloved (*esse dilectum*) and being loving (*esse diligentem*) — can arise from one and the same quality or form considered in different ways. For one and the same charity, insofar as it is an operative virtue, renders man fit for an act, namely of love, and therefore formally makes him loving in habit (*diligentem in habitu*); but insofar as it is a certain most beautiful form inhering in the soul, it formally renders the soul beautiful and for that reason beloved and accepted by God — so that it is not necessary on this account to posit some quality really distinct from charity, by which man is formally made acceptable to God.

§ 88. To the confirmation as well it is answered: it can indeed come about that someone is loved and does not love — in the way in which God loved those not yet loving Him from eternity, so that they might at some time love Him. But with that love by which He holds us beloved and acceptable to eternal life, He loves none except those who love — because the foundation of that love by which He so loves is our love by which we love Him, that is, the charity poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

§ 89. Hence also the reply to the fourth is clear: God loved us first, indeed from eternity, to the end that we might love Him in time. But that love of God, prior to this effect of our love, placed nothing in us, just as neither did eternal election and predestination. Therefore it in no way follows from this that grace inhering in us is prior to or distinct from the charity by which we love God. For it would follow that grace was in us from eternity.

§ 90. To the fifth I reply: when it is said that charity is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, and when the same charity is called the fruit of the Holy Spirit, this does not signify that

some gift of the Holy Spirit is given to us, from which charity then proceeds in us — an interpretation which is without doubt false. Rather, it signifies that the Holy Spirit Himself is given to us, who is the uncreated gift (*donum increatum*), whose primary and principal effect in us is charity. Hence no order of gifts inhering in us is here posited; rather, at the very moment at which the Holy Spirit is given to us, charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts. For both past tenses — "has been poured forth" (*diffusa est*) and "has been given" (*datus est*) — are to be referred to the same instant of time and of nature. For although the Holy Spirit is prior to His gifts, He is not however given prior to them.

§ 91. To the sixth it is answered that (Pseudo-)Dionysius by "divine being" does not understand some being presupposed to the supernatural virtues, but rather to supernatural operations, as is manifest from his words. And so that divine being, without which man cannot perform divine works — since it is not substantial being but only accidental being — is to be thought of as nothing other than what is had formally through charity and the other supernatural virtues. For through them man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature (*Divinae consors Naturae*), so as, in the manner of (Pseudo-)Dionysius, to perform divine and supernatural works.

§ 92. To the seventh the reply is easy. For the grace which, according to St. Augustine, goes before charity is not habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*), but that which according to the same author goes before all our good works, namely the benevolence of God (*benevolentia Dei*): which is nothing other than God Himself insofar as He bestows all these things upon us gratuitously, as we showed at the beginning of this Distinction. In this manner, therefore, grace — that is, the benevolence of God — goes before the grace inhering in us; namely, as a cause its effect. In the same sense charity goes before charity: that is, the charity by which God loves us goes before the charity by which we in turn love Him.

§ 93. To the eighth I reply: from the Council of Vienne nothing can be gathered except some distinction of reason (*distinctio rationis*) between grace and the virtues. And the same reply applies to the last argument from the Council of Trent. For the Fathers of that Council deliberately so tempered their words as not to appear to have defined a question controverted among Catholics and probable on both sides in favour of either party — being content, namely, to define only what was denied by heretics against the consensus of the whole Church; although, as we demonstrated above, the same Fathers appear to have been inclined toward the very position which distinguishes grace from charity by reason alone. This is also apparent to one who considers the words of canon 11 more attentively. For when the Fathers had named grace and charity, lest anyone for that reason suppose that the mind of the Council was that grace and charity are two distinct gifts, they prudently subjoined one and another word in the singular number — evidently to intimate that it is fitting, or at least possible, that the two foregoing terms should be understood of one and the same gift. For what follows is: "which may be poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit and may inhere in them" — using singular verbs (*diffundatur atque inhaereat*); whereas otherwise, if they had wished distinct gifts to be understood, they would rather have used the plural: "may be poured forth and may inhere" (*diffundantur atque inhaereant*).[117]

§ VI — That the subject of habitual grace is the will (Habitualis Gratiae subiectum esse voluntatem)

§ 94. From the foregoing doctrine it is easy to see what the subject of habitual grace (*habitualis Gratia*) is. For if grace is the same as charity (*caritas*), no other subject can be assigned to it than that which belongs to charity itself. Now this is without doubt the will (*voluntas*); for charity is the habit by which we love God, and love (*dilectio*) or love (*amor*) is the act proper to the will. And indeed all who hold grace to be identical with charity think in this way. St. Thomas himself acknowledges and teaches that this follows as a consequence from that opinion,[118] saying: "If grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in a power of the soul (*potentia animae*); for a power of the soul is the proper subject of virtue." So we say: if grace is not just any virtue, but charity, it must necessarily be in the will as in its subject. For the will is the proper subject of charity. If this is so, then grace cannot be located in the essence of the soul (*essentia animae*) as its proper subject, as is the view of those who really distinguish (*realiter distinguunt*) grace from charity — unless they say that the powers of the soul are not really distinct from the very essence of the soul itself, as Henry of Ghent holds;[119] who accordingly says that grace, insofar as it is grace, has its subject in the essence of the soul, but insofar as it is charity, inheres in the will.

§ 95. But, granted the more common opinion, which holds that the powers of the soul are really (*secundum rem*) distinct from it, both points are further proved — namely, that grace has its subject not in the essence but in a power of the soul, that is, in the will — by the following arguments.

The first: Operative habits (*habitus operativi*) reside in the powers, not in the essence of the soul, as even the Thomists admit; and this is clear from the argument that the powers are intermediaries between the essence and operation. But grace is an operative habit, for from it, as from an operative principle, good operations proceed. Hence even habitual grace itself is said both to operate and to co-operate with our will. And by the author of the *Hypognosticon*[120] it is compared to free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) as a rider to a horse. For this reason also the Master[121] teaches that grace is not idle; therefore it must be placed in the power, not in the essence of the soul. This entire argument is confirmed by the consideration that the essence does not appear capable of any habit properly so called, except through the mediation of a power; since a habit presupposes a power, just as operation does.

The second: Those things that are immediately in the essence do not admit of more and less, as is evident in the powers of the soul — in the intellect and the will. But grace without controversy admits of increase; therefore it is not immediately in the essence.

The third: Through grace a man is formally (*formaliter*) justified; but Christian justice is placed by theologians in the will, not in the essence of the soul; therefore grace too must be placed in that same subject.

The fourth: Opposites bear upon the same subject; but the fault (*culpa*) which is opposed to grace is in the will, not in the essence of the soul; therefore grace itself is also there.

Further arguments to this effect, and dissolutions of the arguments of the contrary opinion, may be seen in Bouby.[122]

§ VII — The division of grace into operating and cooperating grace is explained (Explicatur divisio Gratiae in operantem et cooperantem)

§ 96. Among the things that were once decreed concerning the grace of Christ against the Pelagians, and among the other matters which Catholic Doctors hand on concerning that same grace of Christ, certain further divisions of it — beyond the two brought forward and explained at the outset (of which the one divides grace into uncreated and created, the other into habitual and actual) — must still be set forth and explained, as being not a little conducive to the understanding of this whole doctrine. First and foremost, then, the celebrated division of grace into operating (*operantem*) and cooperating (*cooperantem*) — or, as Prosper says in his Letter to St. Augustine,[124] into pre-operating (*preoperantem*) and cooperating (*cooperantem*) — is to be considered. And in this sense grace is rightly divided, whether you understand uncreated grace or created grace. For God, who is uncreated grace, both by operating brings it about that we will, and by cooperating brings it about that what we already will we carry out. Furthermore, created grace is understood as either habitual or actual; and habitual grace can indeed be called at one time operating, at another time cooperating, by the same rationale by which we have said that uncreated grace is distinguished by these names: for God operates and cooperates with our free will (*libero nostro arbitrio*) through the habitual and infused gift of grace in those alone to whom that gift has already been conferred — that is, in the justified. But actual grace, which is our movement or action, cannot properly in the same way be divided into operating and cooperating, inasmuch as this division belongs not to our actions but to the principles of our actions. Wherefore it will be more correctly divided into prior and posterior: so that the prior is that by which, through God's operating grace, we will what is good; and the posterior is that by which, through the cooperating grace of the same God, we accomplish the good which we were willing — and, to speak briefly, the prior grace is the willing (*velle*), the posterior is the doing (*facere*). Now from the explanation of the division of grace into operating and cooperating that has just been given, it is sufficiently understood that in reality operating and cooperating grace are the same grace, differing only in the formal character (*ratione*), whether we speak of uncreated or of created grace — as both the Master holds[125] and St. Thomas teaches more explicitly.[126]

§ 97. That actual grace is multiplied is certain, inasmuch as the actions themselves — to which this name of grace is attributed — are multiplied. This division of grace is taken from various places in St. Augustine's disputations, and from his book *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 17,[127] where St. Augustine not only hands down this division but also proves it from Sacred Scripture: "God by cooperating," he says, "perfects what He begins. For He who initiates by operating so that we will, cooperates with those who are willing by bringing to completion: on account of which the Apostle says, 'I am confident that He who has begun a good work in you will bring it to completion until the day of Christ Jesus'" (Phil. 1). "So that we may will, He operates without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, He cooperates with us. Yet without Him either operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing for works of holy piety. Of His operating so that we may will, it was said: 'For it is God who works in you both to will.' Of His cooperating when we now will and by willing do: 'We know that for those who love God all things cooperate for good.'" So St. Augustine there. From which it is also evident that, according to St. Augustine, the said division most especially belongs to uncreated grace. Nor do I think there is a passage in St. Augustine where he assigns it to created grace. For the rest, what manner of cooperation this is by which God is said to cooperate with our free will is to be explained more fully in its proper place below.

§ 98. It must be noted here that the grace which, following St. Augustine, we have called cooperating is sometimes also called, by a simple term, operating — as by the Apostle in Phil. 2: "It is God who works (*operatur*) in us both to will and to accomplish." And elsewhere: "Who works all things in all" (1 Cor. 12). And in Is. 26: "All our works Thou hast wrought for us, O Lord." And in the prayer of the Church: "Grant that what we have known, through Thy inspiration, ought to be done, we may, through Thy operation, fulfil." But likewise, conversely, the grace which in the sense of this division is called operating can be called cooperating — namely, on account of the cooperation of free will, whose act is the very act of willing, with respect to which act grace is called operating. For if free will cooperates with grace by producing within itself the act of willing, it follows equally that grace cooperates with free will in that same act — because "cooperating" is said relatively in relation to the one cooperating.

§ 99. Now, that the division of grace into operating and cooperating should be a good division, it is necessary that its members be distinguished; and it will be false that operating grace can also be called cooperating, and vice versa. Rather, operating grace, as distinct from cooperating grace, must be called that which operates in us and in our will whilst the will does nothing. For if the will also does something there, what reason will there be that that grace should properly be called operating, and not cooperating? And indeed the words of St. Augustine cited a little earlier seem altogether to establish this interpretation of operating grace, in which he says: "So that we may will, God operates without us; but when we will, and so will as to do, He cooperates with us." To this purpose also belongs the passage in the same book, ch. 5,[128] where he treats that text of 1 Cor. 15: "But not I, but the grace of God with me." For after he had said that it was neither the grace of God alone, nor Paul alone, but the grace of God together with him that had laboured, he added: "But that he should be called from heaven and be converted by so great and most efficacious a calling — that was the grace of God alone." Similar is what he says in the Letter to Sixtus,[129] — that faith is made in a person, not by a person. And something similar is found in the book addressed to Simplicianus, q. 2.,[130] To the same purpose is adduced Canon 20 of the Second Council of Orange[131] (taken from St. Augustine's book 2 *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, ch. 6), which reads thus: "Many good things are done in man which man does not do; but man does no good things which God does not bring it about that man does."

§ 100. There is added to this the teaching of St. Thomas who, in explaining the division of grace into operating and cooperating,[123] writes thus: "In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved and is not moving — while God alone is the mover — the operation is attributed to God, and accordingly it is called operating grace. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul, and accordingly grace is called cooperating." Then, for purposes of explanation, he distinguishes in us a twofold act: the first, according to which the will bears itself as moved and God as moving — especially when the will begins to will the good; and he calls this notion of God operating grace. But another act is exterior and commanded by the will, which accordingly is referred to the will as moving, yet not without God cooperating — whence cooperating grace is to be established.

§ 101. From this teaching taken together with the cited sentences of St. Augustine, certain thinkers have supposed that in the effect of operating grace our will does nothing, and does not move itself at all, but is only moved. But this sense is false and erroneous, and it is easy to prove. First: because the interior act which operating grace produces in us — for example, loving God, hating sin — is an act of the will, not only as subject but also and especially as effective principle; therefore the will, with respect to it, is a mover, and not

merely moved. Second: because the act by which the will begins to will the good is a free act; therefore the will with respect to it is a moving principle — and not just any sort of moving principle, but a free one. Third: because acts of this kind fall under precept: for a man is commanded to believe, to convert himself to God, to depart from sin; therefore they proceed from the will moving itself freely.

§ 102. Wherefore, repudiating this false understanding, one must say that the aforesaid Doctors meant nothing other than that God works the first act, or the good movement of the will, through His grace in us, without any prior movement in us of the will by which we strive toward or aspire after that first movement, or by which the will commands it to itself — inasmuch as a good affection of the will is sometimes inspired even in one very greatly resisting, as happened in Paul. And indeed the conversion of Paul, insofar as it concerns that change from evil to good wrought through God's operating grace, is the form and exemplar of the conversion of all sinners. For all are converted from those who have turned away, and are rendered willing from unwilling, through the operating and efficacious grace of God — which is to be shown more at length hereafter.

§ 103. According to this understanding, therefore, the distinction between operating and cooperating grace consists in this: what St. Thomas says — that in the first effect of grace our mind is moved and not moving — understand thus: that our mind does not move itself toward that effect by some other and prior movement, as it were commanding this movement. This sense is sufficiently gathered from what he afterwards says, that the exterior act — which is the effect of cooperating grace — is commanded by the will. He signifies, therefore, that the interior act, which is the first effect of grace, is not from the will as moving in the manner of commanding, though it is from it as from an active principle. Moreover, the very phrase by which the will is said to move itself to some act seems to require that there be within it some movement prior to such an act. For to move oneself is to produce a movement in oneself; and therefore whenever the will moves itself to some act, it is necessary that it produce in itself a movement prior in time or in nature to such an act. Hence St. Thomas spoke quite properly when he said that in the first effect of grace our mind is moved and not moving — although otherwise, to a reader who is not sufficiently attentive, his words cause no little difficulty, which Medina[132] rehearses at length in his commentary on that passage, yet does not satisfactorily explain.

§ 104. Furthermore, the sense we have offered St. Augustine himself also indicates not obscurely, when he employs these words: "so that we may will," "so that he should be called," "so that he should be converted" — for speech of this kind sounds the order of the posterior in relation to something prior. Wherefore his sense is: that God works in man that he may will, and that he may begin to be converted, the man himself having first worked nothing toward this his act. And indeed St. Augustine meant nothing else by that manner of speaking than what he himself says elsewhere and expressly, in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 32:[133] "The grace of God anticipates (*praevenum*) the unwilling that he may will." This, then, is what it means for Augustine that God operates in us without us so that we may will: namely, that the grace of God anticipates us when we are unwilling, so that we may will — or, as the Council of Trent says,[134] that God calls us with no merits of ours existing.

§ 105. For the rest, the Arausicanian canon[135] is to be understood not of the first effect of grace in us, but rather of certain consequent gifts which habitually and permanently remain in us. For it appears that the sentence was written by St. Augustine — from whom it is taken — in this sense. But that St. Augustine does not hold the view that the first motion of the will toward good in us is brought about by God while we do nothing, is perspicuous from other passages, in which he teaches that from the beginning to the end of a good work God helps us, and that we cooperate with God; as in book 2 *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, chs. 8,

9, 10,[136] and in Sermon 5 *On the Words of the Apostle*, ch. 8.[137] For if in the first desire of good it belongs, according to Scripture, to open the mouth and to prepare the heart, God helping us; and conversion, by which a person turns from having been turned away, comes about through the help of God, as St. Augustine teaches in the places already cited — then in movements of this sort we ourselves also do something. For, as St. Augustine himself says in the book *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 9:[138] "No one is helped unless he himself also does something." Likewise, if we cooperate with God even at the very beginning of the good will, then God does not bring about that beginning while we do nothing. This again is evident from what he says in ch. 11 of Sermon 15 *On the Words of the Apostle*:[139] that without our will — that is, without our striving and consent (for thus he himself explains it) — the justice of God is not in us; and also from this sentence subjoined there: "He who made you without you does not justify you without you. Therefore," he says, "He made you without your knowing; He justifies you willing." Now St. Augustine includes, after his manner, the beginning of the good will also under justification. A similar passage occurs in Tractate 72 on John,[140] where, expounding those words of Christ "and greater things than these shall he do," he says openly that a man justifies himself when he is impious — namely by reason of the fact that he himself, through his own will, produces in himself that movement by which the impious man is converted to God, and so in the work of his own conversion cooperates with God.

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§ VIII — How grace called operating operates in us (Quomodo gratia sine operans nobis dicatur operari)

§ 106. If the division of grace into operating and cooperating is a good one, it is necessary that its members be distinguished, and it will be false that operating grace can also be called cooperating, and vice versa; and rather, operating grace as distinct from cooperating is to be called that which operates in us and in our will whilst the will does nothing. For if the will also does something there, what reason will there be that that grace should properly be called operating, and not cooperating? [The preceding argument was already articulated above and here Estius continues the systematic exposition.] It is confirmed by the doctrine of St. Thomas who, in that same article, distinguishing a twofold act in us — the first being interior, with respect to which the will bears itself as moved, God as moving, particularly when the will begins to will the good, calling this notion of God operating grace; the other being exterior and commanded by the will, and therefore referred to the will as moving, though not without God cooperating, whence cooperating grace is established — teaches plainly how the distinction consists. What therefore St. Thomas says, that in the first effect of grace our mind is moved and not moving, understand — as we explained — that our mind does not move itself toward that effect by some other and prior movement as if commanding it. And the phrase itself by which the will is said to move itself to some act requires, as it seems, that there be within it some movement prior to such an act. For to move oneself is to produce a movement in oneself; and therefore whenever the will moves itself to some act, it is necessary that it produce in itself a movement prior by time or by nature to such an act. Hence St. Thomas spoke quite properly when he said that in the first effect of grace our mind is moved and not moving — though otherwise, to a reader insufficiently attentive, his words present no small difficulty, which Medina rehearses at length in his commentary on that passage,[142] yet does not satisfactorily explain.

§ 107. Furthermore, the sense we have offered St. Augustine himself also indicates not obscurely when he uses these words: "that we may will," "that he should be called," "that he should be converted" — for speech of

this kind implies the order of the posterior in relation to something prior. Wherefore his sense is that God works in man that he may will and that he may begin to be converted, the man having previously worked nothing toward this his act. Nor did St. Augustine mean anything else by that manner of speaking than what he says elsewhere and expressly in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 32:[133] "The grace of God anticipates the unwilling that he may will." This, then, is what it is for Augustine that God operates in us without us so that we may will: namely, that the grace of God anticipates us when unwilling so that we may will — or, as the Council of Trent says,[134] that God calls us with no merits of ours existing.

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§ IX — The division of grace into prevenient and subsequent is explained (Explicatur divisio Gratiae in praevenientem et subsequentem)

§ 108. By another division, grace is divided into prevenient (*praevenientem*) and subsequent (*subsequentem*) — the names taken from Scripture: Ps. 58 [Vulg.]: "His mercy shall come before me (*misericordia ejus praeveniet me*)"; and Ps. 22: "His mercy shall follow me (*misericordia subsequetur me*)." This division, deriving equally from Scripture and from the usage of the holy Fathers, is most aptly understood of uncreated grace — that is, of God. For He anticipates man through His grace and mercy: either in the order of time, whilst the man is still turned away and impious, or even from birth He prepares for him certain benefits by which it will one day come about that he is converted; or by the sole order of causality, inasmuch as He is the cause enabling the man to will rightly by producing a good will in him. St. Augustine seems to have kept both modes in view in book 13 of *The City of God*, ch. 1,[144] when speaking of how the will of God precedes the will of man. Although the latter mode — and by much the more common — is generally signified by the name of prevenient grace (*gratia praevenientis*); so that grace is properly called prevenient which works the beginning of good in man, either absolutely or in respect of his justification, or in any good work whatsoever — that is, grace which gives man to will the good which he did not previously will, either absolutely or with respect to a given work.

§ 109. Hence the Fathers of the Council of Trent,[134] expounding the teaching: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted," confess that we are called by the grace of God. Hence in the same place, describing prevenient grace from which the beginning of justification must be taken, they designate the calling of God by which, with no merits of ours existing, He calls us — and an effective and efficacious calling, which actually produces conversion, is intended. Similarly, subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*) is that which grants to man to do or carry out the good which he was already willing. Concerning both, St. Augustine speaks thus in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 32:[133] "The grace of God," he says, "anticipates the unwilling that he may will; and follows the willing lest he will in vain." And a little later: "Pray for our enemies, that the mercy of God may anticipate them, as it has also anticipated us; and may follow us, that it may follow them." And St. Gregory, Homily 19 *On Ezekiel*,[145] says: "God by inspiring anticipates us that we may will, who by helping follows us so that we may not will in vain." And in the same passage: "God gave to the saints by anticipating (*praeveniendo*) the good willing that they did not have; and by following (*subsequendo*) granted the power to accomplish the good that they willed." In which two passages note in passing that *posse* — put in place of "to do" and "to carry out," which St. Thomas in art. 3 calls "to work efficaciously" — is so used by St. Gregory; and this is a customary way of speaking among the ancients, to be more fully explained by us elsewhere.

§ 110. Again, both these graces are expressed in the prayers of the Church, as in that prayer which asks that "God may by inspiring anticipate our actions and by helping further them"; and likewise that which prays: "Our vows which Thou dost by inspiring anticipate, do Thou also by helping further." See also what St. Augustine writes in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 5,[146] and in book 1 of the *Retractations*, ch. 9.[147]

§ 111. It must be noted, moreover, that in a more general sense all grace can be called prevenient with respect to a later grace, and similarly all later grace can be called subsequent with respect to an earlier, as St. Thomas rightly teaches.[143] And in this way St. Augustine speaks of prevenient and subsequent grace in the book *On Nature and Grace*, ch. 32:[148] "It anticipates that we may be healed; and follows that, being healed, we may be strengthened. It anticipates that we may be called; it follows that we may be glorified. It anticipates that we may live piously; and follows so that we may live with Him forever."

§ 112. It must also be noted that it is sufficiently evident from what has now been said that subsequent grace is not to be understood as if in some good work, or in some part of it, the grace of God were posterior to our free will. This sense was condemned in the Council of Orange, canons 6 and the last.[149] Rather, it is to be called subsequent in the sense already explained, or certainly in the general manner, insofar as God augments and perfects the prior benefits of His grace bestowed on us, and accumulates them with other and subsequent benefits, ever adding new ones upon old.

§ 113. Third, it must be noted that the aforesaid division, even if less apt, can also be accommodated to created grace, insofar as, namely, among the effects of divine grace some are prior to others, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article.[148] Fourth, one must know that in a certain sense on the part of God all grace can be called prevenient, insofar as God efficaciously works in us all good and everything in every respect, from the beginning of the good will to the consummation of the good work, causing us to do what we do — for this is most truly to anticipate, namely in the order of causality. On account of which it has been said by St. Augustine, in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 34,[150] and in Tractate 86 on John,[151] that in all things the mercy — that is, the grace — of God anticipates us. Which is nothing other than what has been said by the Prophet: "All our works Thou hast wrought for us" (Is. 26); and by the Apostle: "What do you have that you have not received?" (1 Cor. 4).

§ 114. Finally, it is asked how this division differs from the former. One must say, it seems, that both divisions, if properly taken according to the explanation given above, coincide. For all operating grace is also prevenient, and conversely. Similarly, all cooperating grace is also subsequent, and conversely. They differ, however, in formal character (*ratione*). For "prevenient" and "subsequent" signify an order of prior and posterior which "operating" and "cooperating" do not signify by their very names. But that order can be taken in two ways: either with respect to the human will, or mutually. In the former way, grace is called prevenient because it anticipates the will by causing in it the beginning of the movement toward the good; and subsequent because it follows upon and furthers and applies to execution the good movement already begun in the will through prevenient grace. This order St. Augustine manifestly signifies when he says: "The grace of God anticipates the unwilling; follows the willing." The other things cited above for this division also signify this. In the latter way, prevenient grace is called that which precedes the subsequent grace; as also subsequent grace is that which follows the preceding grace. This order St. Augustine seems to have had in view in the words cited before from the book *On Nature and Grace*.[148]

§ 115. Finally, it must be observed that, speaking generally, every operating grace (*gratia operans*) is also prevenient (*præveniens*), and conversely; but not every cooperating grace (*gratia cooperans*) can be said to be subsequent (*subsequens*), even though every subsequent grace is cooperating.[152]

§ X — What is called the leading grace and what the accompanying grace (Quæ dicatur Gratia ducens & quæ comitans)

§ 116. There is a further partition of grace, which has a certain appearance of a distinct division, in that some of the Fathers occasionally call grace the *leader* (*dux*) and the *companion* (*comes*) of the will, since grace both leads the will and accompanies it. Hence Prosper, in his fifth epigram, sums up the office of grace in this distich: "Who thus fulfils His gifts in all those called, / That where He is their guide, He is Himself their companion."[153] Both aspects the Church likewise signifies to us in the Secret Prayer for those who are setting out on a journey, when she beseeches God both to direct their way by His preceding grace and to deign to accompany them with His subsequent grace. St. Augustine speaks of grace in like fashion,[154] and Fulgentius as well distinguishes prevenient, accompanying (*comitantem*), and subsequent grace.[155] There is also found in Blessed Bernard a certain division of grace into prevenient, accompanying, and cooperating.[156] Furthermore, the same Bernard, in his book *On Grace and Free Will*, makes mention of a leading and an accompanying grace.[157]

§ 117. In this division it must be noted that the Fathers intended nothing other than that grace is both the cause of the will's acting and at the same time cooperates with the will as it acts; so that in the former respect grace is called the guide or *leading* grace, and in the latter the companion or *accompanying* grace. For a companion in this sense (*comes* taken as a fellow-traveller, that is, one who accompanies another on the way) does not stand in relation to a guide or one who goes before as if they were two distinct realities: rather, one and the same grace is both leading and accompanying, just as *brother* and *fellow-brother*, *companion* and *fellow-companion*, signify the same thing. From this explanation it is gathered that this division of grace into leading and accompanying is the same as the two divisions discussed above; and the Church's prayer cited above makes this sufficiently clear.

§ 118. Yet Fulgentius does distinguish the accompanying from the subsequent: understanding the accompanying as the grace that advances good works in their progress, and the subsequent as that which accompanies them in the recompense of beatitude. Bernard, however, distinguishes the accompanying from the cooperating; interpreting prevenient grace as that by which we will the good, accompanying grace (*comitans*) as that by which we begin the same, and cooperating grace as that by which we bring it to completion. Which distinction, belonging to each of the two authors, seems forced.

§ 119. From this whole explanation it is gathered that this division contributes nothing in support of the false opinion of those who would have the will be the leader of grace in a good work or in some part of it — as though grace depended upon the drawing and leading and consent of the will, rather than grace itself efficaciously producing this consent in the will. Against that opinion there will be more to say in its proper place.

§ 120. Now, that the will in a good work ought not to be called the leader of grace is expressly attested by St. Augustine, who says, in a letter to Paulinus, that the will accompanies grace, does not lead it, and is its follower, not its forerunner.[158] These words were likewise transcribed by the Venerable Bede in his

commentary on Rom. 9.,[159] And to the same point belongs that apostolic sentence, Rom. 9: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy" — which sentence St. Augustine, citing in his *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, explains thus: "Because he both willed and ran, but therefore willed and ran, because God showed mercy. For the will of man is prepared by God" (Prov. 8, according to the Seventy). Hence he shows that although a good work of man is produced neither by grace alone nor by the will alone but by both together, yet conversely it cannot be said: "It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills and runs." This exposition St. Augustine pursues at length,[160] and briefly indicates it also in his book *On the Perfection of Justice*.[161]

§ 121. To these add what Prosper, in his letter to St. Augustine and in his book *On the Calling of the Nations*, so affirms grace as leader of the will as to deny that it is its companion — in the sense already disapproved by us.[162] But fuller confirmation of all these matters must be sought from the doctrine established more than sufficiently in the preceding book, namely that our predestination does not proceed from merits. For if the will is the leader of grace and in some manner takes the prior part in the transaction of good works, then, contrary to the definition of the Fathers, grace will be given according to merits, and predestination will proceed from some merit of the will.

§ XI — The division of grace into exciting and helping is explained (Explicatur divisio Gratiæ in excitantem & adjuvantem)

§ 122. There is moreover a certain division of grace into *exciting* (*excitans*) and *helping* (*adjuvans*). St. Augustine points to this division of grace in his work *On the Merits of Sinners*, when he says: "That we are converted to God, we cannot accomplish unless He Himself excites and helps us."[164] And Bernard says in his book *On Grace and Free Will*: "Our efforts are vain if they are not helped, and are nothing at all if they are not excited."[157] Both these graces the Church acknowledges, praying at one time that God may excite the wills and hearts of the faithful, and at another time that He may follow up by helping the actions of the faithful which He has anticipated by inspiring them. Finally, the Council of Trent makes luminous mention of both graces,[165] saying that those who had been turned away by sins are disposed to conversion and to their own justification by His exciting and helping grace. In these very words the Council seems plainly to have had in view the aforesaid sentence of St. Augustine. And in chapter 6 the Council says that they are disposed to justice when, excited and helped by divine grace, and conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, etc. The Council also mentions, in canon 4, the excitation by which free will is excited by God; and this excitation is nothing other than exciting grace.

§ 123. It is asked, however, which grace is called exciting and which helping. Some constitute exciting grace in certain divine illuminations and inspirations by which God knocks at the heart of man, to rouse him from the sleep of sin or of negligence in good works; and they hold helping grace to be the divine cooperation, direction, and protection by which man is assisted both to choose the good to which he had been excited and actually to do it. According to these, therefore, exciting grace is that by which someone is excited to good, though he does not yet will it; while helping grace is that by which he is assisted to will it and thereafter to do it. In support of this they adduce Scripture, Rev. 3: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him," etc.

§ 124. But this Scripture is in truth poorly suited to establishing what they wish to show. For knocking (*pulsare*) and exciting (*excitare*) are not the same thing. Knocking is applied to many — both through the external ministry of preaching, exhortation, and reproof, and through internal illuminations and inspirations — who nevertheless are not excited or awakened from the sleep of sin or negligence, but remain stupefied; and therefore cannot yet be said to be excited, nor to possess exciting grace in themselves, just as happens with those held by bodily sleep, who do not straightway awaken when knocking is applied. Accordingly, on the view just expounded and the scriptural testimony adduced in its support, that grace ought to be called not so much *exciting* as *knocking* (*pulsans*). Yet no ecclesiastical writer has judged that it should be called by this term.

§ 125. For this reason, others proceed much more correctly who interpret exciting grace as that by which a thought, a desire, a volition of a good work is sent into the sinful man or the man ceasing from good work, as though oppressed by a kind of sleep, so that he can now truly be said to be roused from the sleep of sin or of negligence in good works. And they interpret helping grace as that by which the person already excited is helped to will perfectly what he has begun to will, and to accomplish what he has already willed. For grace excites so that we will; it helps so that we act. The effect of exciting grace is therefore to will; the effect of helping grace is to act and to bring to completion.

§ 126. Yet it should not be denied — in light of what was said above concerning operating and cooperating grace — that helping grace may also be called that by which the first movement of a good will is produced in man: which movement, since it proceeds from the free will, grace nonetheless cooperates in producing it, and thus helps. That exciting grace is to be interpreted in the way we have stated can easily be shown, apart from the argument drawn from the very word *excitare* ("to rouse"), from those testimonies which we adduced at the outset for establishing this division of grace into exciting and helping. For St. Augustine attributes to exciting and helping grace the conversion of man; to exciting grace, in order that the beginning of conversion may be distinguished, with respect to the starting point of conversion; to helping grace, with respect to its progress and completion. But if exciting grace were merely knocking grace, it would often subsist without the conversion of the will, and indeed would never produce it except with the addition of a new and efficacious grace to convert the will.

§ 127. Bernard attributes to exciting grace the effect that there be an effort of the will, and to helping grace the effect that the same effort not be vain but advance to the work. The Church refers excitation to the wills and hearts of the faithful, not to bare illuminations and inspirations which belong only to the intellect. It is necessary, therefore, that exciting grace work something in the hearts or wills themselves. The Council of Trent, just as St. Augustine, ascribes to exciting and helping grace the conversion of man and the free movement of the will toward God; and yet more than this, in canon 4, it so conjoins the movement of free will by God with that same excitation as to name the movement in the first place: "If anyone shall say," the canon reads, "that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, contributes nothing, by assenting to God who excites and calls," etc., let him be anathema. Hence it is manifest from the mind of the Council of Trent that exciting grace does not subsist without some movement of free will toward good; and yet illuminations and inspirations can subsist without such movement. Therefore exciting grace cannot, according to the mind of the said Council, be constituted in illuminations and inspirations alone.

§ 128. Furthermore, if exciting grace, as such, does not move the will but only admonishes and addresses it by means of certain illuminations, nothing will prevent even outward preaching, admonition, and address — provided it is at least understood by those to whom it is applied — from being said to belong to exciting grace.

And finally, if the office of exciting grace is only to illuminate, admonish, persuade, or in some other manner knock at the mind, yet in such a way that with all these the mind can remain unmoved as regards the affection of the will: it will follow that exciting grace — just as the mere knowledge of Christ's grace, at least in so far as no movement of the will follows from it, which indeed is only through efficacious grace — does not pertain to Christ's grace. From all of which it can also be understood that this division of grace with which we are now dealing is the same as, or nearly the same as, the three preceding divisions. This perhaps is the reason why St. Thomas, after explaining the other two divisions, did not think it necessary to treat this one separately in that place; and he does mention this division, yet clearly would not have passed it over entirely had he supposed exciting grace to be different from operating and prevenient grace — especially since the same Doctor is nowhere found to acknowledge any grace of Christ consisting in bare illumination of the intellective part alone.[166]

§ XII — A note on certain other divisions of grace (De aliis quibusdam Gratiæ divisionibus adnotatio)

§ 129. There are also certain other divisions of grace not unlike those treated above, which it is easy to gather both from the Scriptures and from the Fathers and from the prayers (*Orationes*) of the Church, and to understand from what has been said above. For grace can be divided into *aspirant* or *inspirant* grace and *consequent* (*prosequens*) grace. This division is indicated for us by the prayer of the Church, which asks that God would anticipate our actions by breathing upon them (*aspirando*) and further them by assisting us (*adjuvando prosequatur*). And by that other prayer which is offered on the day of Easter: "All our acts which thou dost anticipate by breathing upon them, further also by assisting them." Words of this kind are found also in St. Gregory.[168] From these it is understood that *aspirant* grace is the same as *prevenient* grace, and *consequent* grace the same as *subsequent* and *assisting* grace. Therefore aspirant grace is not to be located solely in the internal suggestion of good with respect to the intellect, even if the will is in no way moved or affected through consent, complacency, or desire of good; rather, it signifies that breathing-upon (*aspiratio*) or inspiration (*inspiratio*) which efficaciously affects the will by working in it at least some desire and beginning of good.

§ 130. In this manner the Council of Orange speaks of inspirant grace, when in canon 5 it teaches that through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, our will is corrected from unbelief to faith and from impiety to piety.[169] And in canon 6, that through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit it comes about in us that we believe, will, and are able to attempt or choose anything good pertaining to salvation, and that no one can consent to the preaching of the Gospel without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.,[170] And in the final canon, that He inspires into us both faith and love of Himself.,[171] All of which sufficiently shows that inspirant grace is to be understood with respect to the will as efficaciously moved. Hence the same Council, in canon 4, calls it the operation of the Holy Spirit, which in what follows it names *inspiration*, so that from this too it may be understood that inspirant grace is the same as operative grace (*Gratia operante*).

§ 131. Again, grace can be divided into *inchoate* (*inchoans*) grace and *perfecting* (*perficiens*), or *completing and consummating* (*finiens atque consummans*) grace. This division is signified by that part of the prayer of the Church: "That all our prayer and action may always begin from Thee and through Thee, once begun, be brought to its end." But this division too coincides with the preceding ones. For inchoate grace is the same as

operative and prevenient grace; perfecting grace is for the most part the same as co-operative and subsequent grace — with this sole distinction, that the latter conveys the consummation of the work all the way to its end, whereas those others convey only its continuation.

§ 132. Moreover, one may observe elsewhere still other differences of grace, which are however easily reduced to the members of the divisions treated above. Indeed, to operative and prevenient grace belong: *converting* grace (Jer. 31; Lam. 5, and elsewhere); *calling* grace, speaking of efficacious vocation, as Paul uses the term (Rom. 8, and often elsewhere);[172] *drawing* grace, which Christ commends in Jn. 6;[173] and *compelling* grace, which the Church acknowledges when she prays God to compel even our rebellious wills toward Himself. To co-operative and subsequent grace belong: *directing* and *governing* grace, *strengthening* and *confirming* grace, *preserving* and *guarding* grace, *protecting*, *fortifying*, and *defending* grace. Furthermore, certain other differences — such as *liberating*, *reconciling*, *purifying*, *sanctifying*, *vivifying*, *justifying*, *saving*, and *glorifying* grace — belong partly to the grace of the remission of sins, partly to habitual grace (*gratiam habitualem*), and partly to the grace of heavenly glory. Finally, as many salvific goods as there are in us, so many gifts of God's grace can be enumerated, since every good that is ours is a gift of God. There is also handed down by some authors a certain division of grace into *sufficient* (*sufficientem*) and *efficacious* (*efficacem*), and likewise into *sufficient* and *superabundant* — of which it will be our task to treat in what follows.[174]

§ XIII — Whether the first effect of prevenient grace is faith together with love (Primus effectus Gratiae praevenientis an sit fides cum dilectione)

§ 133. It is asked, concerning the foregoing, what the first effect of prevenient grace (*Gratiae praevenientis*) in us is. And this is the same question as that concerning the first effect of operating grace, exciting grace, and so on. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] replies that prevenient and preparing grace — that is, the first effect of grace — is faith together with love (*fides cum dilectione*). Here, however, by the name of love one must understand not the charity (*caritas*) which constitutes the sons of God, but a good and salutary movement of the will toward God. For it is certain that many effects of grace are prior to that charity which is proper to the sons of God. The Master's reply is confirmed by those words of the Council of Orange, canon 25: "God inspires in us, without any preceding merits on our part, both faith and love of Himself."[176]

§ 134. From this reply of the Master, however, a doubt arises: whether faith, not yet having joined to itself that love which he understands, is the prior effect of prevenient grace. Some say that faith, existing alone and separated from this kind of love, is indeed a gift of God, and consequently the effect of some grace, but not of that grace which we call restoring grace (*gratiam reparantem*) and which is properly called the grace of Christ — just as the bare and solitary knowledge of the law, if it is nothing more than that, does not pertain to the grace of Christ. They offer this reason: because just as by the bare knowledge of the law, so also by faith empty of love, a man is brought no nearer to salvation — as the words of the Apostle at 1 Cor. 13 sufficiently show, where he teaches that all faith and all knowledge without charity profit nothing. And so these same authors hold that St. Augustine, wherever he locates the first grace in faith, understands faith conjoined with some love. Hence is that saying of his in Epistle 107 (to Vitalis)[3]: that the beginning of a good will is there where the beginning of faith is.

§ 135. Next they prove this reply of theirs from the opposite side, namely from what happens in the case of a just man who is tempted toward sin by his own concupiscence. For the movements of evil concupiscence rising up in him do not, so long as he in no way consents to them, cause a defection from justice. Therefore, in a similar manner, whatever knowledge of God and of His commandments and of the mysteries of the Christian religion, unless a good movement of the will toward God be added, advances nothing at all toward justice and salvation; and consequently does not pertain to restoring grace, that is, to the grace of Christ. And what they say of faith can, by equal reasoning, also be said of hope separated from love.

§ 136. But against this reply there are objections of no small weight.

First: for it was already said at the outset that faith and hope ought to be referred to that kind of grace which is called sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*). But this is restoring grace and the grace of Christ; therefore faith and hope, even if they do not yet have love joined to them, are effects of restoring grace.

Second: Among other benefits, Christ merited faith and hope for us; therefore faith and hope, even unformed (*informis*) and wholly severed from love, is a gift of God through Christ, and consequently pertains to the grace of Christ. The antecedent is taught below.[178]

Third: That both unformed and formed faith is a gift of God through Christ is expressly handed down, against the erroneous opinion of certain persons, below.[179]

Fourth: But neither does it seem that faith can exist without some good will. For by faith a man voluntarily brings his intellect into captivity to the obedience of Christ, as the Apostle says at 2 Cor. 10. Hence faith, although it resides in the intellect as in its subject, is nevertheless an act of the will as commanding it, and also in some manner as its subject — as is more fully taught below.[180] Therefore it is absolutely true that the first effect of prevenient grace is faith, and what St. Augustine said must be understood absolutely: that the beginning of a good will is there where the beginning of faith is. For these words are pointlessly restricted to faith accompanied by love, if faith altogether without love — that is, without a good will — cannot exist.

Fifth: If faith and hope could exist without any good disposition of the will, there would be no reason why, as has been said, they should be placed in the class of sanctifying grace rather than prophecy and knowledge and the other graces freely given (*gratiae gratis datae*). Nor would there be any reason why the knowledge of the law and the knowledge of sin should not also be placed in the same order. Yet these are placed by the Apostle as effects of the law, not of the grace of Christ.

Finally: The Council of Orange (canon 5) places in the first rank among the effects of restoring grace the beginning of faith, and says that this is brought about in us by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from unbelief to faith.[181] And canon 6 says that through that inspiration it comes about that we believe,[170] And canon 7 says that without it no one can consent to the evangelical preaching,[182] But the Council speaks of faith in general, since it opposes it to unbelief. And in the final canon it distinguishes faith from love.[171]

§ 137. On account of these arguments, it might perhaps seem to someone that a distinction ought to be drawn concerning faith in such a way that, insofar as there is seen in it the bare supernatural knowledge of mysteries, it does not pertain to restoring grace, nor should it be placed as an effect of prevenient grace — just as neither does knowledge of divine things considered in itself; but that it must be said otherwise when faith is considered according to its full formal character (*rationem*), which also contains the obedience of a will

submitting the intellect to divine truth — since this obedience does not seem to be understood without some good will.

§ 138. But in truth this distinction does not seem to resolve the difficulty. For if faith, considered according to its full formal character (*rationem*), always and necessarily has joined to it something of a good will, that is, of love, then no faith could be given that profits nothing — that is, that does nothing toward piety and advances nothing toward salvation. And yet Paul acknowledges such faith (1 Cor. 13) and James in his Epistle, chapter 2 — who so far depresses that faith which is without works that, with respect to the business of piety, he compares it to the faith of demons, which is certainly established to be wholly separate from every good will. He also calls it dead faith, that is, faith having nothing at all of life, nothing of salutary action or thought.

§ 139. Therefore, in order to reply to the proposed difficulty, we say first that faith consists not only without charity — which is agreed among all Catholics — but also without love in the sense understood by the Master, that is, without a good will or the beginning of one. This is evident from the testimonies of Paul and James, who acknowledge a faith that is useless, dead, and idle. The same is manifest from the teaching of St. Augustine and others, who teach that faith without works does not commend us to God. The Master himself also holds this view in the present passage, since he does not call faith simply, but faith together with love, prevenient grace. Moreover, this is proved by the following argument: for faith and hope can remain, and do sometimes remain, in a Christian man retaining no good disposition of the will — as in one who sins through malice, who with deliberate will blasphemes God, and so on.

§ 140. We say second that faith which, according to the mind of the Master, exists without love, is not in a man the effect of prevenient and restoring grace; because through it no beginning of restoration as yet takes place in the man. For faith of this kind does not make the man better in any other respect, or nearer to salvation, as is evident from what has already been said.

§ 141. We say third that such faith pertains to the benefit of restoring grace through Christ, insofar as it happens that through it a man is led to love and repentance and true piety. For this reason also external aids by which a man is converted to God — such as the preaching of the Gospel, exhortation, reproof, and the reading of Sacred Scripture — are numbered among the benefits of the grace of Christ, as will be declared more fully a little further on.

§ 142. From all this it can be understood to what extent the objections adduced — which contend that faith and hope, even without love, pertain to prevenient and restoring grace — proceed and conclude. For they pertain to it not as placing some beginning of restoration in the man, but because they are certain means that are in themselves and properly ordered toward the restoration and renewal of the one in whom they are, even though they precede it in time. I add "of the one in whom they are" in order to remove the objection both concerning external means which are not within a person, and concerning the graces freely given, which are bestowed for the benefit of others as such.

§ 143. For the rest, to the canons of the Council of Orange it can also be replied otherwise, namely that they speak not of any faith whatsoever, but of saving faith (*fide salutari*), that is, of faith that advances a man's salvation. That this is probable is shown by the fact that in canon 7 it is said that no one can consent to the *saving* preaching (*salutari praedicationi*) without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. As also by the fact that in

canons 6 and 7 these qualifications are added: "as is fitting" (*sicut oportet*) and "as is expedient" (*sicut expedit*) — for one who does not have love does not believe in such a manner.

§ 144. To what proves that a good will is included in the full formal character of faith, the reply appears to be this: that faith is always accompanied by some good will, insofar as the will submitting itself to divine authority commands the intellect to believe; and this act of the will is by its kind good. But in the particular case, the will does not always perform this from a pious disposition toward God, which disposition we in this place, and together with the Master, call love (*dilectionem*).

§ XIV — The objection concerning the will and the thought that precede faith is resolved (Solvitur objectio de voluntate et cogitatione fidem praecedente)

§ 145. Against what has been said — namely, that faith is the first effect of restoring grace (*gratia reparantis*), whether it be understood as conjoined with love (*dilectione*) or as separated from it — another doubt is commonly raised: namely, concerning the good will and the good thought which appear to precede faith. The Master disputes this matter at length in paragraphs F, G, H; but first the question about the will must be examined. For since faith is a matter of the will, as the same Master rightly shows from St. Augustine,[184] Tract. 26 on Jn., and from the interlinear gloss on that passage of Gen. 24, "Let us call the girl and inquire of her will" — the fuller proof of which belongs to the treatment of dist. 23 of this book,[185] — it seems that the will by which a person wishes to believe precedes faith itself by which he already believes, just as the will to perform a good work precedes the good work itself; especially since faith itself is reckoned among good works, the Lord having said in Jn. 6: "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent." If this is so, then faith together with love is not the first effect of grace in a person, but rather that antecedent will to believe. For that this will is an effect of restoring grace the general testimonies of Scripture demonstrate, which ascribe a good will to the divine gift, as Prov. 8 according to the Septuagint: "The will is prepared by the Lord"; and Phil. 2: "God is he who works in you both to will," etc. On this matter see also canons 4 and 6 of the Council of Orange.[186]

§ 146. But to this part of the doubt one replies easily, together with the Master, that faith is a matter of the will — not in the sense that the act of believing is an act not of the intellect alone but also of the will, but because the will commands the intellect to believe. Hence, just as the matter stands with other internal acts of the will, so it must be determined with regard to faith as well. Therefore, just as the will to love does not precede love in time, nor the will to hope precede hope, but is either the same as that act or precedes it only by an order of nature — or rather of our understanding — so too the will to believe stands in the same relation to faith. For just as whoever wills to love loves, and whoever wills to hope hopes, so too whoever wills to believe believes. Nor can the will to believe be separated from the act of faith any more than the will to love and the will to hope can be separated from the act of love and hope; although these acts of will do precede in order of time many other good works, both interior and exterior, from which they can indeed be separated. Therefore one must not for this reason deny that faith is the first effect of grace, merely because the will to believe is said in some sense to precede it.

§ 147. The greater difficulty, however, concerns the good thought that precedes faith. For that this is an effect of prevenient grace (*gratiae praevenientis*), the Apostle seems to teach in 2 Cor. 3, saying: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." And that it

precedes faith, St. Augustine seems to teach in his book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 2,[187] where, treating those words of the Apostle, he says: "Who does not see that thinking comes first before believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought it credible." From this, therefore, it appears that some good thought which also promotes salvation — namely, the thought by which one thinks that something ought to be believed — precedes faith itself. To this the Master replies in such a way as to say that such a prior good thought is not of the kind by which one lives rightly, and therefore does not yet pertain to restoring grace. But certainly the Apostle speaks of a saving thought (*cogitatione salutari*), one in which there is at least some beginning of right living. And St. Augustine undoubtedly intends the same thing, when he cites the Apostle's authority.

§ 148. Therefore a different and better reply can be given: namely, that the Apostle and St. Augustine speak of a thought that precedes faith not in time but only in nature, or by a certain order of imperfection, insofar as it is a kind of beginning (*initium*) of faith itself. For this is gathered from the very words of St. Augustine, since such a thought, according to him, embraces faith itself according to some aspect of its beginning. And again from what he adds after the words cited above: "Indeed even believing itself is nothing other than thinking with the assent of the mind." This sort of thought, therefore, which, according to St. Augustine, precedes faith, appears to be nothing other than a certain imperfect and initial will to believe, preceding a more perfect and more deliberate faith; or certainly a thought that in some manner affects the will toward that which is thought. Now that the word "thought" (*cogitatio*) is sometimes taken for an imperfect will, sometimes even for a perfect will, is manifest. For a person is said to think evil in his heart when he has an imperfect will to do evil; and the Lord says to the Prophet: "Behold, I think thoughts of peace and not of affliction" — which without doubt must be understood of a perfect will, because an imperfect will does not fall in God.

§ 149. Now as regards those thoughts which precede faith and the beginning of faith in time, and appear to prepare a way for salvation — such as the thought and will of an unbelieving man who, desirous of his own salvation and happiness, wishes to hear and examine what is announced concerning Christ, and is ready to give credence if he finds it consonant with right reason; as is written of Sergius the proconsul in Acts 13, that having summoned Paul and Barnabas he desired to hear the word of God — concerning these, I say, it seems to have to be said that, although such dispositions of the soul proceed from the beneficence of God's gracious gift, they are nevertheless not effects of restoring grace (*gratiae reparantis*), because they do not yet render any beginning of righteousness or salvation, just as we said above concerning faith without love and concerning knowledge of the commandments of God, and as we shall say a little more fully below concerning that same knowledge. Concerning this kind of thought, see St. Augustine, Sermon 8 on Ps. 118.[188] From which passage too it must be noted that what happens in the case of those who are converted to faith also occurs in practice in the case of those who, though they are Christians, return from grave sins to the life of righteousness.

§ XV — What good a man cannot do without the grace of Christ (Quid bonum non possit homo sine Gratia Christi)

§ 150. In order that the disputation concerning the necessity of the grace of Christ, building on the greater foundation of what has now been said, may become plainer and clearer, it must now be shown in general what

good should be understood as that which a man cannot have or do without the grace of Christ, and concerning which the Lord said in Jn. 15: "Without me you can do nothing." For since the goodness of human works is manifold, there is not sufficient agreement among all the theologians as to which class of works the necessity of grace — which is given through Christ — is precisely to be restricted to. For some include under this necessity whatever is morally good. Some think that only works meritorious of eternal life pertain to it. Others hold a view different from both and follow a middle path — and this more correctly. Therefore, in order that the truth may become apparent, the following propositions are set forth.

§ 151. First proposition: No work, of whatever degree of goodness, can be performed by a man without the aid and co-operation of God, which is at least a general co-operation necessarily required for all the actions and effects of secondary causes. This proposition is most certain, and its ground is evident: because God is the universal cause who works all things in all. Nor can there be any good in a creature that does not flow from the first source of goodness, that is, from God. And this is further proved by the necessity of rendering thanks to God for whatever good we possess, without exception. And of works that are merely morally good this is affirmed by St. Augustine[190] and Prosper.[191] It is likewise the general sentence of the Council of Orange, canon 22, that no one has of himself anything except lying and sin.[192] This canon accords with St. Augustine.[193] Likewise St. Thomas teaches this in innumerable places, and whenever he concedes that something good can be done without grace, he always adds: "not, however, without the aid of the divine motion by which He works in all things" — or something similar. See his commentary on dist. 28 of Book II,[194] throughout all its articles, and in the *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, through nearly all its articles.[195]

§ 152. Second proposition: It is certain that works which are merely natural or civil, insofar as they are such, can be performed by man without the grace of Christ. Such are: to eat, to drink, to walk, to beget children, to serve in the military, to till fields, to build houses, and other things of this kind. So says also the author of the *Hypognosticon*[196] and somewhere St. Augustine himself and Prosper. To this also pertains the love of neighbours that arises from the natural affection of kinship and the flesh alone. On this, St. Gregory.[197] Truly, however, whether this proposition is disputed among theologians admits of question. But it has been stated with the qualification "insofar as they are such" (*quatenus talia sunt*); because those same works can be considered also as morally good or bad, or even as referred to God by a Christian person — at which point they pertain to the following propositions.

§ 153. Third proposition: Works that are merely morally good can be performed by fallen man (*homine etiam lapso*) without the grace of Christ. That this proposition is not conceded by all is sufficiently clearly proved by the morally good works of unbelievers (*Infidelium*), who are still altogether estranged from the merits of Christ. On these works more will be said below in dist. 41 of this book.[198] Moreover, the truth of the proposition will emerge more clearly from what follows.

§ 154. Fourth proposition: Not only works that are meritorious of eternal life are such that they cannot be performed by fallen man without the grace of Christ. This proposition is directed against those who habitually interpret the testimonies of Scripture declaring the necessity of the grace of Christ — and specifically that text, "Without me you can do nothing" — as well as the Fathers and Councils wherever they make mention of the necessity of Christ for good works, to refer exclusively to works meritorious of eternal life. That this interpretation is imperfect and insufficient will be apparent from the proof of the following proposition, through which this fourth is confirmed.

§ 155. Last proposition: The good which a fallen man can neither possess nor do without the grace of Christ is all and only that which conduces to eternal salvation, and

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§ 156. Concerning this kind of good is to be understood that saying: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15).[199] Of the same the Lord speaks when He says in chapter 14: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life: no one comes to the Father except through me." And in chapter 11: "I am the Resurrection and the Life." This good is sometimes called the *salutary good* (*bonum salutare*), sometimes the good pertaining to piety, sometimes the *beatific good* (*bonum beatificum*), as in St. Augustine, sometimes the good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, as in the Council of Orange, and it is called by various other names in various places, as will presently be evident from the testimonies of the Fathers. To this category belong not only actions, but also the habits of the Christian virtues, of which we shall speak in the immediately following distinction.[200] And therefore in the proposition set forth above it was said: either to *have* or to *do*. For virtues are gifts which are *had*, just as works are goods which are *done*. And we read this distinction expressly stated in the definition of the Council of Africa of 214 bishops, cited by Prosper, as you will see below.[201]

§ 157. Proof: This truth is proved first from Sacred Scripture. For the Apostle Peter, in his Second Epistle, chapter 1, expounds the goods which we receive through Christ in the aforesaid manner, saying: "How all things of his divine power, which pertain to life and piety, have been given to us through the knowledge of him who has called us," etc.[202] The same thing was signified by Paul when, in Heb. 9, he called Christ the High Priest of things to come,[203] that is, given to us by the Father for this purpose, that through him we might receive whatever would be conducive to the attaining of the possession of future goods. Wherefore, if something does not conduce to those goods, it does not pertain to the grace of Christ's intercession and priesthood. To this head are likewise to be referred those Scriptures which ascribe to the grace of God through Christ not only the works of the just, but also those of catechumens and penitents not yet justified — such as faith, hope, trust, love, repentance, invocation, almsgiving, and the like. For from this it is plainly evident that not only those works which merit eternal life, such as the works of the justified, but also those which, although not yet possessing the dignity of merit, nevertheless in some manner conduce and advance toward eternal salvation, are to be reckoned to the grace of Christ.

§ 158. Then it is proved from the Fathers, and first from St. Augustine. For he, in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 3,[204] having discussed at length many goods of the faithful to which Julian attributed goodness, and at last concluding the disputation, content to have removed from those works that goodness which the grace of Christ imparts to our virtues and works, declares plainly what that good is which is not had without the grace of Christ, in these words: "Or certainly, since you at least grant that the works of unbelievers, which seem to you to be good, do not nevertheless lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom; know that we say that that good — that good will, that good work — cannot be conferred on any man without the grace of God, which is given through the one Mediator of God and men, through which alone man can be led to the eternal gift of God and the kingdom." Thus he. From which words it is established that St. Augustine, in this passage, does not number among those goods which are not had without the grace of Christ those works which are only morally good and do not conduce to eternal life — such as we here suppose can be performed by unbelievers. The same author, a little later in the same chapter, writes as follows concerning the love of God by which we attain to God through Christ: "But the love of God by which one comes to God exists only from God through Christ." And again: "This love, therefore," he says, "is needed that there may be a beatific good."

And the same author, in chapter 8, teaches that grace must precede in order that the beatific good may be sought from God.[205] The same author, in the book *Against Lying*, chapter 5,[206] says that Rahab the harlot, although she did certain good things, was afterwards transplanted into the people of God, so that she might be able to attain to eternal rewards. And in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapter 28:[207] "Just as light sins do not hinder the just man from eternal life, so certain good actions do not profit the unbeliever unto eternal life," etc. And in the *Exposition of Psalm 142*, on the words "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," he asks: "What good works of mine are counted without thy assistance, whereby I might entreat and be worthy to be led by thy Spirit into the right land?" Which passage not only proves what we wish, but also intimates that the good works which cannot be done without the grace of Christ are of a twofold kind: namely, some by which a man entreats justice and eternal life, as are those which he does before the remission of sins; others by which he is worthy and merits eternal life, as are the works which he does when already justified.

§ 159. There is also an open passage in the book *On the Grace of Christ*, chapter 26,[208] where, speaking of the grace which is through Christ, he says: "Let him be in absolutely no doubt that without it nothing good pertaining to true piety and true justice can be done." And in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 13:[209] "As regards the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."

§ 160. That St. Augustine, beyond these salutary goods, acknowledges certain goods that are only morally good, even in unbelievers — goods which accordingly, according to his sentence, can be done without the grace of Christ, though not without the benefit of God — is gathered not only from the aforesaid sentences (for why else would he have needed to restrict his doctrine to good works that conduce to eternal salvation, if he acknowledged no good works different from these?), but can also be proved from elsewhere: as from the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, chapters 25, 26, and 27,[210] and from book 2 *On Free Choice*, chapter 10,[211] and from the Epistle 130 (or, as it is numbered in some editions, Epistle 69, written to the people of Cirta around the year 412).[212] On this matter more will be said at distinction 41 of this book.[213]

§ 161. Moreover, Prosper of Aquitaine holds the same opinion as St. Augustine. For he also acknowledges certain honest and good works of unbelievers which fittingly adorn the present life but do not have the reward of eternal beatitude, as may be seen in book 1 *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, chapters 4 and 7;[214] yet he ascribes to the grace of Christ alone those works which advance toward eternal beatitude. This he indicates somewhat obscurely in chapter 8 of the same book, when he says: "We most wholesomely believe that all goods, and especially those which advance toward eternal life, are guarded by his gift." Here, by saying "and especially those," etc., he intimates that those things which advance toward eternal life are had and guarded by that singular gift of God which is given through Christ. But in plain and clear words he teaches this in the book *Against the Collationist*, chapter 10, and in the *Response to the Eighth Chapter of the Gauls*,[215] and this from a certain African Council of 214 bishops,[216] in which it was defined that we are so assisted by grace

[here the footnote (b) in the source is inserted, which we treat separately]

that we can think, say, or do nothing of true and holy piety without it — where this is the sentence not so much of Prosper as of the Council cited by him. To this is added the authority of another council, namely that of Orange II, assembled at the direction of the Roman Pontiff,[217] with capitula transmitted from him, in which it was defined that no one can by the strength of nature, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and

without his illumination, think or choose anything that pertains to salvation unto eternal life — this established by the testimony from the words of Christ: "Without me you can do nothing," and from the Apostle: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as from ourselves." From this it is also perspicuous, from the mind of this Council and the Supreme Pontiff, what good things ought to be understood by those two scriptural testimonies, namely those that pertain to salvation unto eternal life. To these subscribes Petrus Diaconus in his book *On the Incarnation and Grace*, chapter 6,[218] where he says that by the grace of Christ a man cannot think, or desire, or complete the things that pertain to eternal life, and that human beings cannot desire divine things; though they can think and desire human things. And the same author, in chapter 7 of the same work, restricts that good which we cannot by nature will to the good pertaining to eternal life. And Fulgentius repeats the very same sentence in as many words in chapter 21 of the same title.'[219] Maxentius agrees in his book of faith, writing in this manner: "But for those goods that pertain to eternal life, we believe that free choice can neither will, nor think, nor desire, nor accomplish them, except through the infusion and inward operation of the Holy Spirit."'[220] Likewise Richard of St. Victor, in book 2 *On the Formation of the Interior Man*, chapter 21,[221] says that the just ascribe to the Lord all that they do usefully — "usefully," namely, in respect of goods pertaining to the salvation of eternal life. Finally, the Church itself sufficiently signifies this very thing when in her prayer she asks of God that by his assistance we may always be directed toward salutary things, and this through Christ our Lord — by "salutary" (*salutaria*) plainly understanding those things that pertain to the salvation of eternal life, just as the Council of Orange speaks.

§ 162. Hence the opinion of Baronius collapses, asserting that the aforesaid council fathers were heretics.[222] The business of our thesis seems however to be troubled by those who contend that faith and hope also, even apart from charity, pertain to the prevenient and repairing grace of Christ. For they do not, so to speak, posit some beginning of reparation in man, but because they are means in themselves properly ordained for the reparation and renewal of man in which they inhere, even though they precede it in time. I add, to remove the objection concerning the external means which are not inherent — such as graces gratis given, which of themselves are for the utility of others.

§ 163. For the rest, one may also respond to the canons of the Council of Orange differently, namely that they speak not of faith of any kind whatsoever, but of saving faith, that is, of faith that advances the salvation of man. That this is probable is evident from the fact that canon 7 says that no one can consent to salutary preaching without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (*absque inspiratione Spiritus Sancti*); so that to consent to salutary preaching

It is said first: that faith of this kind consists not only without charity, which is conceded by all Catholics, but also without that love (*dilectio*) which the Master understands, that is, without good will or its beginning. This is evident from the testimonies of Paul in 1 Cor. 13[223] and of James in his Epistle, chapter 2,'[224] who compare it, as regards the business of piety, with the faith of the demons, which is plainly shown to be altogether separate from all good will.

It is said second: that faith of the kind which, according to the mind of the Master, consists in *dilection*, is not in man the effect of prevenient and repairing grace; because through it no beginning of reparation is yet initiated in man. For such faith does not make a man better in any respect, or nearer to salvation, as is perspicuous from what has been said.

It is said third: that faith of this kind pertains to the benefit of the repairing grace of Christ through Christ, insofar as it happens that through it a man is led to love and true piety. For this reason also the external aids by which a man is converted to God — such as the preaching of the Gospel, reproof, correction, reading of Sacred Scripture — are numbered among the benefits of the grace of Christ, as will be more amply declared shortly after.

§ 164. From these things it can be understood to what extent the objections adduced proceed and conclude — those objections which contend that faith and hope, even without charity, pertain to the prevenient and repairing grace. For they do not, properly speaking, posit some beginning of reparation in man, but because they are means that are in themselves properly ordained for the reparation and renewal of man in which they inhere, even though they precede it in time. I add, to remove the objection also concerning the external means which are not inherent — such as graces gratis given, which of themselves are for the utility of others.

§ 165. Concerning this matter let St. Thomas be consulted in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 2,[225] where he teaches what good a man can will and do without the grace of Christ. And in *On Truth*, q. 24, art. 14,[226] where he interprets the good which a man cannot do without the grace of Christ as whatever conduces to the salvation of man, even if it is not meritorious — not, however, every moral good. The commentators on St. Thomas on the aforementioned article of I-II should also be consulted.[227]

§ XVI — Objections are resolved (Diluuntur objectiones)

§ 166. Against the doctrine set forth above — namely, that only that good which, inasmuch as it conduces to eternal salvation, is to be ascribed to the grace of God given through Christ — there can first be urged certain general statements of St. Augustine, by which he denies in universal terms that any good can be done by us without the grace of Christ. Such is the passage in the book *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 2,[229] where, discussing the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, he says: "Without which, men perform no good whatsoever, whether in thinking, or in willing and loving, or in acting." And in book 2 *Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians*, ch. 9:[230] "that man performs no good deeds which God does not bring it about that man performs." This statement was taken up into the Council of Orange, canon 20.[231]

§ 167. The second objection is that Pope Leo, in a sermon *On the Passion of the Lord* (Sermon 8),[232] says equally generally that the Cross of Christ is the fount of all blessings and the cause of all graces. Now, blessings are commemorated in the Scriptures — not only spiritual and heavenly ones, but also temporal and earthly ones: such as the blessing which Esau obtained from his father on behalf of his posterity, and such as those which the Old Law promises (Lev. 26 and Deut. 28, and elsewhere passim). There are also certain graces which do not promote the salvation of man, such as those called *graces freely given* (*gratiae gratis datae*); therefore the fount of these blessings and graces too must be the merit of the Cross of Christ.

§ 168. The third objection: The Council of Orange, commending to us throughout nearly all its canons the necessity of the grace of Christ, speaks in canon 22 in these general terms: "No one has anything of his own but falsehood and sin."[233] Therefore not even any moral good can man perform without the grace of Christ.

§ 169. The fourth objection: To the benefit of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ there belonged the miracles which Christ wrought; yet these were directly destined for the health and healing of bodies, not of souls. For not all who were healed bodily were also healed spiritually, as is evident in the case of the nine lepers who were ungrateful for God's benefit.

§ 170. The fifth objection: The Apostles worked cures and performed other miracles by invoking the name of Christ. Similarly, other Saints did the same. Indeed, even certain persons who were not saints, who are destined to say on that day: "Lord, did we not prophesy in Thy name, and cast out demons in Thy name, and perform many mighty works in Thy name?" (Matt. 7). Now these benefits are bodily ones. Moreover, the very gift of prophecy is a grace freely given, not grace that makes one pleasing to God (*gratum faciens*).

§ 171. The sixth objection: The sign of the Cross works only by the merit of the Crucified; and yet that through this sign very many benefits of a purely bodily character are conferred is well known from the histories. For even beasts are healed by the sign of the Cross, and are freed from evil spells.

§ 172. The seventh objection: The sacraments of the new law have no efficacy except by the merit of Christ; yet through them a man sometimes obtains benefits that are purely bodily, such as liberation from disease or some other bodily evil — as the histories relate happened to Constantine and certain others through baptism. Indeed, even to the sacrament of extreme unction the Fathers and Councils, following the Apostle James, ascribe the effect of bodily healing.[234]

§ 173. Finally: Christ, who commands us to ask in His name for whatever is to be asked, taught us to ask for our daily bread. Hence the whole Church in her public prayers asks God not only for spiritual goods but also for temporal ones: for peace, fair weather, rain, the sufficiency of the fruits of the earth, health of bodies, the repelling of diseases, liberation from famine, plague, and war — and not only for human beings but also for brute animals she asks for benefits of this bodily kind, which are of course entirely incapable of spiritual benefits. And all these things she seeks and strives to obtain through Christ our Lord, with which phrase she concludes all her prayers.

§ 174. There could also be objected here whether one can overcome any temptation without the grace of Christ; and yet such victory does not always advance the salvation of the person, as in the case of unbelievers. But concerning this question there will be a special disputation below.[235] Setting it aside therefore at this point, let us resolve in order what has been said.

§ 175. Reply to the first: I answer that the general statements of St. Augustine are to be understood of the good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life; in which sense the Council of Orange interprets the general statements of Christ and of Paul, as was explained above; and in which sense St. Augustine himself also expounded that which we cannot do without the grace of Christ, in the passages cited above. When, however, he says "nothing whatsoever," this is to be referred to the generality of the grace of Christ toward the good — as if he were saying: from the generality of the grace of Christ toward the good, no thoughts are excepted, nor acts of will, nor actions.

§ 176. Reply to the second: I answer that Leo in the same place indicates that he is speaking of the kind of spiritual blessings and graces. For it follows in the same context from that same Cross: "through which, for believers, power is drawn from weakness, glory from shame, life from death." He speaks, in conformity with the Apostle who says in Eph. 1: "Blessed be God who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ."[236]

§ 177. Reply to the third: It is answered that the Council of Orange is not only concerned in its canons to teach for what goods the grace of God through Christ is necessary for us, but also in general to show how nothing can man do without the help of God considered universally. This is clear from canon 19,[237] where it is said that human nature, even in its integral state, could in no way preserve itself — that is, keep safe the health it had received — unless aided by its Creator, that is, without the grace of God, as is explained in the same place. It is established, however, that for man in the integral state the grace of God through Christ was not necessary. When, therefore, another canon says "no one has anything of his own," understand this generally: that what man is said to have "of his own" is what belongs to him in such a way that he has not received it from God. Hence the title of the canon also reads: *Concerning those things that are proper to human beings*. In this sense it is most truly the case that man has nothing of his own save falsehood and sin. In this manner also certain statements of St. Augustine — from which the canons of Orange are largely derived — must be understood. These statements moreover serve to confirm the first proposition established in the preceding chapter.[238]

§ 178. Reply to the fourth: I answer that the miracles pertained to the benefit of Christ's grace inasmuch as they promoted the salvation of mankind in general — partly as external means through which, with God working inwardly, men who saw or heard those things were efficaciously aroused to faith and love of God; and partly in particular, inasmuch as those upon whom bodily benefits were miraculously conferred were through them moved to faith, piety, and gratitude.

Hence, although certain miracles did not profit to salvation those in whose regard they were wrought, they nevertheless profited others, and even now profit us, who through them — as recorded by the Evangelists — are strengthened in faith and piety. Indeed, to the end of promoting the salvation of souls they were directly destined, even if not immediately.

§ 179. The same is the reply to the fifth. And as for the objection concerning the gift of prophecy, one must say that this gift, considered in itself, does not indeed pertain to the grace of Christ; for a prophet as such is not more pleasing to God than one who lacks that gift. Yet prophetic predictions, insofar as they advance men toward the benefit of Christ, are to be referred to saving grace, just as miracles are. And to this end such gifts were granted to the Church, according to that word of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12: "To each one the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the benefit" — namely, of others, and a spiritual benefit at that.[239] As often, therefore, as they serve this end, they are to be ascribed to the grace of Christ, inasmuch as through that grace they are applied to such an end.

§ 180. By these considerations the reply to the sixth and seventh is now clear. For whatever miracles are wrought through the sign of the Cross promote in some way the glory of God and the salvation of men. And the same judgment holds for the bodily benefits conferred through the sacraments of Christ. Certainly, as regards extreme unction, it is manifest from the teaching of the Church that the effect of bodily healing is not attributed to it except insofar as it is expedient for the salvation of the soul; as the Council speaks.[240] And the clear statement of St. Augustine confirms this reply concerning the sacraments (*Enchiridion*, ch. 66),[241] where he says: "All that is healthfully transacted in the sacraments pertains more to the hope of future goods than to the retention of present ones." He says "more," because if any temporal good befalls a man through the sacraments of the Church, this ought to be subservient to the spiritual good; nor will it be reckoned among the goods given through Christ under any other account, unless it assists the spiritual good.

§ 181. To the last objection the reply is similar: that the Church does indeed ask temporal goods from God through Christ, but only insofar as they are referred to spiritual goods. For she asks for them inasmuch as they are certain necessary or fitting and conducive means for promoting the eternal salvation of mankind, and in this respect they are given only through Christ. But if for certain persons they profit nothing toward salvation or piety, they are given to these by God, yet not through Christ — in the same way as they were once given to carnal Jews, and are given to unbelievers. Moreover, that the Church asks for temporal things only in their ordering to spiritual things is manifest from her own prayers: by way of example, she asks for peace — not just any peace, but that which the world cannot give, that is, saving peace: namely, that with temporal tranquillity granted, our hearts may be devoted to the commandments of God, and, with adversities destroyed, we may serve God in secure freedom. She asks for rain, so that, sufficiently aided by present blessings, we may more eagerly seek after everlasting ones. She prays for the sick, so that, with health restored to them, they may render to God thanks. And so in all the rest. For although the intention of the spiritual good is not always expressed in the prayer, it must always be understood. And this is what is commonly said: that in every prayer by which some temporal good is asked from God, this condition must be understood implicitly: *if it is expedient to the salvation of the soul*.

§ 182. Certainly Scripture itself expressly teaches us to what extent we are to ask temporal goods from God — such as peace, the defeat of enemies — namely, so that, "delivered from the hand of our enemies, we might serve Him in holiness and righteousness all the days of our life," as it is in the canticle of Zacharias (Lk. 1). Moreover the Apostle in his letter to Timothy instructs the whole Church to make public prayers for kings and all those in high places, "that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life in all piety and chastity" (1 Tim. 2). Therefore, as often as temporal goods serve and are applied to this end, in that way and no otherwise do they pertain to the benefits of the grace of God through Christ.[242]

§ XVII — How far the knowledge of the law pertains to the grace of Christ (Quatenus scientia legis ad Christi gratiam pertineat)

§ 183. The question coheres with the preceding one: whether, and how far, the knowledge of the divine law is to be reckoned among the benefits of the grace of Christ. For the Scriptures and the Fathers sometimes speak in such a way as to seem to attribute the knowledge of the commandments of God to the benefit of Christ. For there is a promise of the New Testament, and therefore pertaining to the grace of Christ, namely that which is found in Is. 54, and alleged by Christ in Jn. 6: "They shall all be taught by the Lord." Likewise that passage of Jer. 31, commemorated by the Apostle in Heb. 8: "No one shall teach his neighbour or his brother, saying: Know the Lord; for all shall know me," etc. For that this pertains also to the doctrine of the law and to knowledge, the superior words there make plain: "I will give my laws into their mind, and in their heart also will I write them." To this effect also is that of Ps. 93: "Blessed is the man whom thou shalt instruct, O Lord, and shalt teach him out of thy law." And what the same Psalmist prays to God in Ps. 118, saying: "Open thou my eyes, and I will consider the wondrous things of thy law." And again: "Give me understanding, that I may know thy testimonies." Nor is there any doubt that the Psalmist sought these things through Christ.[244]

§ 184. More expressly, however, the Apostle teaches this in 1 Cor. 1, saying: "I give thanks to God always for you, for the grace of God which is given you in Christ Jesus: that in all things you are made rich in him, in all utterance and in all knowledge." Further, in ch. 12 and 13, he places knowledge among the charisms of the

Holy Spirit. Hence the same Apostle thus addresses Timothy: "Understand what I say; for the Lord will give thee understanding in all things."[245]

§ 185. The prayers of the Church are also added, as for instance that which asks that the Paraclete may illumine our minds and lead us into all truth; likewise that which asks that the faithful may see what things are to be done; and other such prayers, all of which the Church concludes through Christ our Lord.

§ 186. There is also the definition of the Council of Milevis, ch. 4, in these words: "Both are a gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love that we may do it." The Council proves the prior part through that of Ps. 63: "Who teacheth man knowledge." Moreover, the Council of Orange II, can. 22, ascribes both benefits to God: truth, that is, knowledge opposed to lying, and justice opposed to sin.[246]

§ 187. There is likewise on this matter the illustrious sentence of St. Jerome writing on Mal. 3: "If anyone," he says, "learned and instructed in the law of God is able to instruct others, he ought not to assign to his own prudence and genius what he possesses; but let him give thanks first to God, who bestows all things, then to his priests and teachers, by whom he has been instructed. For if he shall not give thanks but shall claim the knowledge for himself, he shall be cursed in poverty." Thus he.[247] He is certainly to be understood as admonishing the learned to give thanks no otherwise than as the Apostle gave thanks for the Corinthians, namely through Jesus Christ. For the rest, other passages of Scripture concerning the knowledge of the law and the cognition of the commandments of God speak in such a way as to indicate not only that this knowledge is not given through Christ, but even to appear to oppose it to the grace of Christ, namely as an effect of the law and not of grace, as is plain in Rom. 1, where the Apostle calls the Jew established under the law, and still an alien from the grace of Christ, on account of the knowledge of the law, "a guide of the blind, a light to those who are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of infants, having the form of knowledge and of truth in the law." The same, in ch. 3 of the same Epistle, says: "By the law is the knowledge of sin." And in ch. 7: "I did not know sin, but through the law." Where you see the effect of the law declared to be the knowledge of sin, and therefore the knowledge of what is to be done. And the opposition of the knowledge of the law to grace is more manifestly indicated by these sentences of the same Apostle: "Knowledge puffeth up, charity edifieth" (1 Cor. 8); "The letter killeth, the spirit quickeneth" (2 Cor. 3). Hence also the sentence of Pelagius, who made the grace of Christ consist in law and doctrine, was deservedly condemned.'[248]

§ 188. Add that moral knowledge, since it does not exceed the powers of nature, can be had through nature, and therefore would be sought in vain from grace — just as Christ would have died in vain if justice were through the law, as the Apostle argues in Gal. 2.[249] The reply is confirmed from St. Augustine, who says in his work *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 12, that the divine laws are thoroughly implanted in our nature by the mind within us.[250]

§ 189. This question can be not with difficulty resolved from what has been said above concerning faith, as the first effect of prevenient grace, and in general concerning the good which we cannot achieve without the grace of Christ — and this by means of two propositions.

First proposition: The knowledge of the divine law, of whatever kind it be, and in whomsoever it exists, and however it is possessed, is a gift of God and pertains to the grace of God, if we speak generally of grace so as to comprehend every gift and gratuitous benefit. The truth of this proposition is beyond doubt and manifest. For all goods are to be referred to God as their author and bestower, according to that of Jas. 1:

"Every best gift," etc.[251] And in particular God is called "the Lord of sciences" in 1 Kgs 2, and it is said of him: "Who teacheth man knowledge" (Ps. 63) — namely for this reason, that all knowledge and wisdom is from God (Sir. 1).'[252] Wherefore St. James in ch. 1 teaches that it is to be sought from no other source than God; and St. Jerome most rightly admonishes that thanks are to be given to God for it, since he bestows all things.

§ 190. Second proposition: The knowledge of the divine law does not pertain to the benefits of the grace of Christ, except insofar as it promotes piety and conduces to eternal salvation. This also is sufficiently manifest from what has been said above. For if all and only salutary goods are to be attributed to the grace of Christ, then the knowledge of the law too will deservedly be attributed to the grace of Christ by no other formal character (*ratio*) than insofar as it is salutary for man. Now it begins to be salutary when it begins to be conjoined with a good will to fulfil the law. And the same judgement holds concerning the desire for knowledge of the commandments of God and of divine things.

§ 191. For some desire to know the things that ought to be known in order that through such knowledge they may acquire for themselves wealth, glory, and the honours of this world. Others wish to know only in order that they may delight in knowledge with a certain curiosity. There are others who assiduously apply themselves to the divine law and moral discipline to this end, that having come to know they may act accordingly; but with this persuasion, that once knowledge has been obtained they will be able by their own powers to fulfil the law. Such were the Jews; such also were the philosophers, especially the Stoics and Peripatetics, who excelled among the Gentiles in moral knowledge — and such a man the Apostle Paul also indicates himself to have been before his conversion (Phil. 3).[253] Others again desire to know, that what they have come to know as to be done they may do and fulfil with the help of the grace of Christ; or also that through that knowledge they may instruct many in piety and justice; and altogether that they may make good use of the knowledge acquired, both for their own and for others' salvation. In this way alone, therefore, do we say that knowledge and the desire for it pertain to those goods which are proper to the grace of Christ: because only in this way is knowledge possessed as it ought to be possessed. As for the others, as those who possess and use it badly and not as they ought, they are subject to that word of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 8: "If any man think that he knoweth any thing, he hath not yet known as he ought to know." And such is the knowledge that not only puffs up the one who has it, but also ruins the neighbour, as the same Apostle there rightly says: "And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died." Likewise those who think that the knowledge of the law suffices them to fulfil the law have those words of the same Apostle against them: "The power of sin is the law," that is, the knowledge of the law (1 Cor. 15); "The letter killeth" (2 Cor. 3); "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence," etc. (Rom. 7); and in the same place the law is called the law of death.'[254]

§ 192. Now from this declaration and distinction it is easy to see how the passages of Scripture and the Fathers, drawn now from one side and now from the other, do not contradict one another. That knowledge of God and of his commandments pertains to the promise of the New Testament, which is not bare knowledge but conjoined with a good disposition and will to fulfil the law. For this is what the Apostle cites from Jer.: "I will give my laws into their mind and in their heart will I write them." And this knowledge, such as it is, is called — or is the law of God written in hearts. Of this same knowledge the Psalmist speaks piously when he prays: "Teach me to do thy will" (Ps. 143); and: "Teach me" (Ps. 118). And the Apostle in 1 Thess. 4, saying: "you have learned of God to love one another" — for it follows: "And indeed you do it towards all the brethren." Where the Apostle sufficiently indicates that those who know and do not act have not learned from

God, that is, have not been taught by the Lord in that manner which is indicated by the prophetic promise of the New Testament as the manner in which they would be taught by the Lord.[255]

§ 193. As for the fact that the Scriptures and the Fathers sometimes declare even that knowledge which men use badly and perversely to be a gift — this is most truly said, but it is not to be understood as meaning that it is given per Christum in the proper sense in which that phrase is used. The Fathers, when discoursing on grace, frequently commend those goods as great goods on occasion of such knowledge — goods which, because they do not yet sufficiently promote piety, cannot yet be numbered among the goods of the grace of Christ, except insofar as the Council of Orange already cited above establishes.[256] But concerning the aforesaid matters — both the knowledge of the divine law in moral goods and the other temporal goods and benefits — something more must still be added, which the subsequent treatment will provide to the attentive reader.

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§ XVIII — That grace is given for individual acts, defined against Pelagius by the Fathers (Gratiam dari ad singulos actus contra Pelagium a Patribus definitum)

§ 194. Setting aside those matters that seemed pertinent to knowing the truth of the grace of Christ and its effect, we now turn to those things which the grace of Christ, as against its enemies, has long since been transmitted and defined by the Church from the Scriptures. Of such a kind, in the first place, is this: that grace is given for individual acts (*singulos actus*). For Pelagius, finding the grace of God most manifestly commended in the Scriptures, yet undertaking to attack it with his own perverse understanding, taught that grace consisted in free will (*liberum arbitrium*), as a gift divinely granted to us. Then, in order to appear to attribute something more to the grace of God, he located it in the law and in doctrine; to which he finally added the example of Christ, as St. Augustine attests.[258] He also constituted it in other respects in the remission of sins, as is evident from canon 3 of the Council of Milevis.'[259] He reproved Catholics as ignorant persons who said that grace was necessary to man for individual actions. For since free will had once been given by God together with nature, and the law and doctrine — especially the evangelical doctrine which Christ brought to us and confirmed by His example — had thereafter been added by the same God, and since there was no need for these to be given again daily and for individual works, he thought that these aids of God, once granted, sufficed for man to live well and to attain salvation. Moreover, under the heading of doctrine he also comprehended exhortations, persuasions, reproofs, promises, threats, and similar external supports and incentives to living well, whether customarily applied by God, by angels, or by men, as parts of doctrine. Against this impious heresy of his, the Fathers taught and defined that the grace of God is given for individual acts — meaning thereby to indicate that grace does not consist in free will, nor in the law and doctrine, nor in the examples of Christ and the saints, but in the aid by which the very obedience to the divine law is efficaciously rendered to us. This definition also holds against what the same Pelagius afterwards said, when pressed more urgently by Catholics and appearing to correct his opinion and to attribute something more to grace, namely that through grace the possibility and facility of good work is given. For neither possibility nor facility need be given for individual acts, since, once given, either can suffice for all or at least for many acts.

§ 195. This took place in the Synod of Palestine, which St. Jerome in his letter calls the Diospoline Synod — that is, the one held at Lydda.[260] Concerning this city St. Jerome writes in the *Epitaphium Paulae*: "She saw

Lydda," he says, "transformed into Diospolis, made renowned by the resurrection and healing of Dorcas and Aeneas." At that Synod Pelagius himself was summoned and was present. Although this synod does not survive today, the words of it containing the definition of the aforesaid doctrine are to be found in St. Augustine's letter to Paulinus,[261] where he recounts the twelve articles which Pelagius was compelled to condemn and retract lest he himself be condemned. Among these the seventh is as follows: *that the grace of God and His aid are not given for individual acts, but consist in free will, or in the law and doctrine.* This definition, together with the condemnation of its adversaries, was afterwards repeated in the Council of one hundred and fourteen bishops and set down in these words: "We establish that the sentence pronounced by the venerable Bishop Innocent from the blessed Apostolic See of Peter against Pelagius and Caelestius shall remain in force, until with the most open confession they acknowledge that we are aided by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, not only for knowing but also for doing justice, at individual acts, so that without it we are able to have, to think, to say, to do nothing that truly belongs to holy piety." These words are quoted in full by Prosper,[262] and are cited again by the same author in his reply to the objections of the Gauls.'[263] This Council was held in Africa and approved by the Apostolic See and received by the whole world, as the same Prosper writes in his chronicle and in that eighth reply.'[264] St. Augustine also mentions this Council.'[265] Indeed, this doctrine — that grace is given for individual acts — was so certain and undoubted among the Fathers that St. Augustine affirms that the Catholic Church has always held it thus.'[266] And in another letter he places it among the twelve propositions which he says he most firmly knows to pertain to right and Catholic faith.'[267]

§ 196. Writing in his work against profane novelties,[268] he says: "Who before Pelagius presumed such power of free will as not to think the grace of God necessary for being aided in good things at individual acts?" Hence also Ferrandus the Deacon, in his book on the duty of the Christian soldier, demands this as the first of all the rules he prescribes to a soldier: that he believe that grace is given for individual acts.'[269]

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§ XIX — In what sense it was defined that grace is given for individual acts (Quo sensu definitum sit gratiam ad singulos actus dari)

§ 197. In order that this sentence defined by the Fathers may be rightly understood, it must be briefly explained concerning which acts and concerning which grace it ought to be understood. As regards the acts, the first point is manifest of itself: by acts are understood human, rational, and free acts; such as belong only to those who use reason, and not to infants or the insane. Therefore St. Augustine expressed the proposition in these words: "We know that grace is given to the greater for individual acts" — thereby evidently indicating that the lesser — whom in the preceding sentence he had called little ones (*parvulos*) — do not yet exercise acts for which grace is given.[267] Furthermore, there is no doubt that good acts are understood. For for evil acts no grace, no aid is given by God. This point was also noted by St. Augustine when he says: "When I tell you, do nothing without the aid of God, I mean: do nothing good. For to do evil you have free will without the aid of God." For this reason the Lérins writer thought it necessary to add the phrase *in good things* (*in bonis rebus*). Now good acts are understood not in any manner whatsoever, but in that mode of goodness which was explained above when we showed that man cannot be good without the grace of Christ — namely, acts are called good which pertain to the salvation of eternal life, as the Second Council of Orange speaks.[270] This meaning is moreover evident from the words of the Synod of two hundred and fourteen bishops cited above

from Prosper, in which it is said that we are aided by God's grace in individual acts *for doing justice* (that justice, namely, which is commended in the Scriptures). And to remove all doubt, it is more expressly added: "so that without it we are able to do nothing that truly belongs to holy piety." Therefore, morally and officially good works of the kind that can also be performed by unbelievers are not comprehended under this proposition. Furthermore, by the grace of God is understood that which is given through Christ — a point clearly expressed by the words of that same Council. It is asked, however, whether habitual or actual grace (*actualis Gratia*) is meant. For some interpret the proposition concerning habitual grace, which they say is given for individual acts —

§ 198. — namely because it is so given to each one that individual good acts proceed from it and cannot be such without it. But this exposition plainly contradicts the mind of the holy Fathers. For the Fathers, in order to exclude the sense of Pelagius, who located grace in free will or in the law and doctrine, defined that grace is given for individual acts — meaning to show that neither free will nor the law or doctrine is given for individual acts, but that these, once given, suffice for all or many acts. But the sense of Pelagius will not be excluded if the Fathers' proposition may be explained in the way that these interpreters explain it concerning habitual grace. For in the same way it could be said that free will is given for individual acts — because it is so given to each one that individual good acts proceed from it and without it they cannot be such. And the same could be said of the law and doctrine. For unless each person has first received the knowledge of what is to be done, which is had through the law and doctrine, he cannot perform any good act. Moreover, that interpretation is utterly forced. For the custom of speech does not allow us to say that something is given for individual acts when it is given once, even though afterwards it is necessary for individual acts. For it would be absurdly said that the faculty of walking is given to a man for individual walks, or the faculty of seeing for individual acts of vision; or, to use examples closer to the matter at hand, that the habit (*habitus*) of charity or justice is given for individual pious and just acts, even though acts of this kind cannot be performed without those faculties or habits. Hence Pelagius himself was not so absurd as to say that free will, or even the law and doctrine, are given to men for individual acts; rather, since in these he said grace was located, he denied that it was given for individual acts — for it was conceded by all that neither free will nor the law and doctrine are given for individual acts. Therefore, it cannot, except most absurdly and against the mind of the definition of the holy Fathers, be said that habitual grace is given for individual acts. By the same reasoning are refuted those who interpret grace as given for individual acts in the sense that it is given for these kinds (*genera*) of acts, which are: to think, to will, to work — as though by the word *singulos* only kinds of individual acts are signified, with a verification made concerning individual meritorious acts. For habitual grace is not —

§ XVII — The superior teaching is more fully proved from Scripture and the Fathers (Superior doctrina latius probatur ex Scriptura et Patribus)

§ 199. Therefore, neither will it be possible to say that grace is given for individual acts according to the kinds (*genera*) of acts, unless in that sense which applies equally to free will, to the law, and to doctrine — a sense which we have now sufficiently excluded. But if we speak of actual grace, as though it were given not for each singular act individually but only for acts of certain kinds (*genera*), that interpretation is refuted. First, from the very signification of the word used by the Fathers. For the word *singuli* by the property of its own signification comprehends not merely the kinds of individuals but absolutely the individual members of each kind. Second, it is most openly refuted by the very words of the Council of 214 bishops, which explains its

sentence expressly. For having said that we are aided by God's grace through individual acts (*actus singulos*), it added: "so that without it we are able to have, think, say, or do nothing that truly and holily belongs to piety." With which explanation it is in no way consistent that a man should be able to have, say, or do anything of true and holy piety without the grace of God. For this is a manifest contradiction. Third, it is most clearly refuted by the Scriptures on which the said definition of the Fathers rests, such as: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15); "What do you have that you have not received?" (1 Cor. 4); and others to be produced shortly hereafter, which no sane person would say are to be taken only of individual kinds. Fourth, it is refuted no less openly from nearly all the canons of the Second Council of Orange,[272] which leave us no particular good pertaining to piety for which the working of the grace of God is not necessary. Fifth, it is refuted from St. Augustine and the other Fathers, who are never read to have interpreted the said definition of the Church otherwise than of individual acts severally. Indeed, they sometimes openly reject a different interpretation, as, by name, Prosper in his book *Against John Cassian*,[273] one of whose errors, among others, was to say that men can perform certain good things by the vigour of free will, but others only through the working of the grace of God. Sixth, it is refuted by the strong arguments which we shall adduce below as proof of the sentence defined by the Fathers. For all those arguments conclude concerning individual acts severally.

§ 200. Finally it is refuted, because that interpretation involves the Pelagian sense — namely, in so far as it denies that grace is given for certain acts of true piety. Nor does it altogether excuse this interpretation that they say no acts of this kind can be performed by us without habitual grace, but that actual grace is not needed for each one individually in particular. For it has been shown more than sufficiently that the Fathers speak not of habitual but of actual grace, and not of kinds of acts but of individual acts numerically and in particular. Wherefore, since that sentence was defined against Pelagius, whoever interprets it either of habitual grace alone, or not of individual acts in particular, aids the sense of Pelagius. Furthermore, it is in itself absurd and unreasonable to say that certain good acts are performed from habitual grace alone without any special co-operation of God, while others are also performed in this manner — since the formal character (*ratio*) of all the acts of which there is here question is, according to the Scriptures especially, one and the same. And besides, those acts would be more worthy which proceed from God actually working in us than those which proceed only from the habit of grace, even if performed with greater effort of the will. But other absurdities would also follow, which Prosper recalls in the book cited.[274]

§ 201. Now since it is established from what has been said that the sentence must be understood of actual grace, it is still asked whether it ought to be understood of created or of uncreated grace. For it seems that it cannot conveniently be expounded of either. Not of created grace: for the very good acts are a certain created grace, that is, benefits which God mercifully bestows upon men and works in them. But it is an awkward locution to say that acts are given for individual acts, that is, for themselves. Nor of uncreated grace either: for this is God himself, and it seems absurd to say that God is given for individual acts. But notwithstanding this objection, I answer that grace is to be understood as uncreated — that is, the divine operation (which is in reality nothing other than God operating), gratuitously producing in us salvific effects. Now this grace is given for individual acts in the sense in which the Scriptures frequently say that the Holy Spirit, who is certainly God, is given to men for these or those works, namely when He works those works in them; and in the sense in which it is said, "Send help from the sanctuary" (Ps. 20),[275] and "God sent his mercy" (Ps. 57),[276] and yet that help and that mercy are, according to the real order of things, nothing other than God himself. The sense of the sentence is therefore clear and easy: God, freely and through Christ, works in us every single good act pertaining to piety. This exposition of grace is proved, because the Fathers call this grace — which is given for

individual acts — by another name: *adjutorium*, "help," as St. Augustine in Epistle 105 to Paulinus,[277] when he says that Pelagius asserted that the grace and help of God (*Gratiam Dei atque adjutorium*) are not given for individual acts. Likewise Innocent I in Epistle 91[278] among St. Augustine's letters, when he calls this grace the "continual help" (*assiduum adjutorium*). Now this name does not belong to created grace. For created grace is the effect of divine help, not the help itself, which always inheres in the one who helps, whereas the effect of it is in the one who is helped.

§ 202. And this understanding is confirmed by the fact that in the Council of 214 bishops, in the place of what had previously been defined — that grace is given for individual acts — it is said that the grace of God aids us (*nos adjuvari*) through individual acts. From which it is clear that the grace which is given for individual acts is aiding grace (*gratia adjuvans*). Now we taught some time ago that this appellation of grace can be understood only of uncreated grace. By these considerations there is also excluded the exposition of those who interpret the sentence as being about a certain exciting grace (*gratia excitans*), understood as distinct from aiding grace, to whose office it belongs to knock at the door of our heart through certain inspirations. For the Council expressly expounds the sentence as being about aiding grace. Now aiding grace is distinct from exciting grace, especially according to those who expound exciting grace in the manner we have described. Thus also St. Jerome in his Epistle to Ctesiphon,[279] and the other Fathers, interpreted that sentence in exactly the sense we have stated, as will be clear from the passages to be cited below.

§ 203. Furthermore, similarly, St. Thomas in the *Quaestiones de Veritate* (q. 24, art. 14)[280] interprets this grace — necessary for individual acts — when he says that taking grace as God's mercy, by which He inwardly works the movement of the mind, a man can in this sense do no good without the grace of God. But God's mercy is nothing other than God himself bestowing mercy. See the same Doctor in *Summa theologiae* I-II (q. 109, art. 9),[281] where, beyond habitual grace, he teaches that the help of God is necessary, by which the will of man is moved to individual good actions. Which help is certainly nothing other than the grace which is given for individual acts. Indeed, whenever theologians — both ancient and scholastic — teach that without divine working or co-operation no act of true piety can be exercised by us, they say in different words what was defined by the Fathers: that grace is given for individual acts; and hence they interpret this grace as uncreated. This the Council of Trent also does,[282] in these words: "We, who can do nothing of ourselves as of ourselves, can do all things with the co-operation of Him who strengthens us." For what it says — "with his co-operation" — is equivalent to saying "with his grace co-operating": not that co-operating grace is distinguished from operating grace, but that it comprehends it; because through that co-operating grace we can do all things, as the Council says.

§ XVIII — The superior teaching is more broadly proved from Scripture and the Fathers (Superior doctrina latius probatur ex Scriptura et Patribus)

§ 204. It now remains that we establish more fully and more certainly, from Scripture, from the Fathers, and from arguments grounded in Scripture and in ecclesiastical tradition, the sentence defined by the Fathers — that grace is given for individual acts — according to the sense explained in the preceding paragraph. First, in Sacred Scripture the commendation of that daily grace, necessary for individual acts, is most frequent. The Lord Christ says in Jn. 15: "Without me you can do nothing." The Apostle says in 1 Cor. 4: "For who singles you out? What do you have that you have not received?" And in 1 Cor. 12: "God works all things in all." And

in 2 Cor. 3: "We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." And Eph. 2: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them." And Phil. 2: "It is God who works in you both the willing and the accomplishing." Isaiah says in ch. 26: "Lord, you have worked all our works in us." In Ezekiel, ch. 36, the Lord says: "I will make you walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments and do them."[284]

§ 205. By these and other divine testimonies instructed, the Church rightly established and defined under anathema the oft-mentioned sentence, understood in no other sense than that which we have stated. This is shown, first, from Innocent I, in whose time the Synod of Palestine was held, which was the author of the said condemnation. For he, in his Epistle to the Synod of Carthage (which is numbered 91 among the letters of St. Augustine, and is cited both by St. Augustine himself in Epistles 47 and 106,[285] and by Pope Celestine in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chs. 5 and 6),[286] calls the grace of Christ "continual help" (*assiduum adjutorium*) and says that we obtain it daily. This cannot manifestly be understood of habitual grace. He said "daily," however, for what is usually said "as often as ever," that is, for each individual. This sense was expressed more clearly by the successor of Innocent, Pope Zosimus, in the Epistle which he wrote to all the bishops of the world: "All things," he says, "must be referred to their Author, from whom they are born." And again: "What period of time is there in which we do not need God's help? In all acts, causes, thoughts, and movements, he must be entreated as helper and protector. For it is arrogant for human nature to presume anything for itself." Writing back to this pontiff, the African bishops in turn also declare their own doctrine concerning the grace of God among other things in these words: "The will is prepared by the Lord, that they may do some good, and he himself by fatherly inspirations touches the hearts of his faithful. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God — so that we neither feel our free will to be absent, nor in each and every individual movement of the human will toward good things do we doubt that his help is the more powerful."[287]

§ 206. All these things are repeated and approved by Pope Celestine[288] (in the aforesaid Epistle, chs. 8 and 9). This same pontiff, moreover (ibid. ch. 9), has these words: "That God so works in the hearts of men and in free will itself, that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of good will are from God; because through him we can do some good, without whom we can do nothing." He finally concludes (ch. 12) that God must be professed the author of all good affections and works and of all endeavours and all virtues, so that nothing whatsoever is to be subtracted from the work and gracious dignity of divine grace. After him, Leo I — cited in the Arausican Council, can. 9,[289] — speaks thus: "As often as we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work." In which words, for teaching in what sense grace is given for individual acts, nothing could have been said more briefly or more explicitly. These words simultaneously show that the word "daily" (*quotidie*) in the Epistle of Innocent is most correctly expounded as we expounded it. Likewise, can. 20: "A man does no good which God does not bring it about that a man should do."[290] This is taken from St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, penultimate chapter.[291]

§ 207. Moreover, at that very same time when the Synod of Palestine was held, St. Jerome — who was in that same region, and from whom therefore the sentence of the Synod could not be hidden — in his Epistle to Ctesiphon,[292] written concerning both Pelagius, who was condemned at that Synod, and his followers, and the Catholics, explains the mind of both parties more fully, in exactly the sense we have stated. For (in ch. 8 of that Epistle) having said that the Pelagians so posit God's grace that we do not rely upon and are not directed by its help in individual works, but that they refer it to free will and to the precepts of the law, he himself teaches, by

contrast, what Catholics say and hold, in sentences of this sort: that we do not receive God's help daily, nor does what was once received suffice; that we do nothing good without God's help; but that in individual works all the good we do is of God, and that God always helps us; that we are nothing unless God preserves in us what he has bestowed. Likewise: "Willing and running are mine, but that very mine will not be mine without God's continual help." And again: "God is always the giver and always the bestower; what he once gave does not suffice me unless he gives always. I ask that I may receive; when I have received, I ask again. I am greedy in receiving the benefits of God; he does not fail in giving, nor am I sated in receiving." He uses for these proofs, besides the Scriptures cited by us above, also these: Rom. 9: "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy"; Jn. 5 [*sic*]; Ps. 42: "My eyes are ever toward the Lord"; Ps. 34: "The steps of a man are directed by the Lord."[293]

§ 208. Similar things may be read in the same St. Jerome, bk. 1 of the *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, chs. 1 and 2,[294] where he also explains more diligently that phrase — "in individual works" and "in individual things which we do, we need the help of God" — referring it even to minor good actions, provided they be good. Again the same author, bk. 5 *on Jeremiah*, at ch. 25,[295] writes that we so always need God's help that what was once given can never suffice, but must be renewed daily — that is, a new gift must be given for individual acts — and calls those who think otherwise heretics. St. Augustine teaches the same thing in very many passages, which we shall produce elsewhere more opportunely. In the meantime let his Epistles 206 and 107,[296] be read, which recall the condemnation of the Pelagian sentence and oppose to it the Catholic sentence. And his Sermon 3 *On the Words of the Apostle*, chs. 10, 11, and 12,[297] where, having cited the Apostle's testimony of Rom. 8 — "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God" — and the verse of Ps. 26 — "Be my helper, do not forsake me" — he teaches that we are always and continuously in good actions moved, directed, and aided by God. This sense he excludes as Pelagian, whereby someone says: "If God's co-operation and God's help have been withdrawn, my spirit does this — though with labour, though with some difficulty, it can nevertheless be accomplished." "Thus," he says, "is not the help, thus is not the help of Christ, thus is not the help of the Holy Spirit. If it be lacking, you will be able to do nothing good. He indeed acts without the free will that helps, but badly." So much and more there from St. Augustine. And it is manifest that he is speaking of actual help, because he names the co-operation of God and says God acts and helps. His words are also well to be noted against those who, in order somehow to evade the teaching of the Fathers concerning help necessary for individual acts and the canons of the Arausican Council pertaining to the same matter, have recourse to a certain general concurrence of God without which acts can be performed — for St. Augustine says that he speaks of the help without which a man can act but only badly. He makes this clear in the following words: "Without God's help," he says, "I say nothing — for to act badly, free will does not need the help of God.",[298]

§ 209. Let there also be consulted Petrus Diaconus in the book where he expounds the faith of the universal Eastern Church concerning the Incarnation and grace of Christ.[299] There, in ch. 8, to show that God through his grace works in us every good thought, will, and action, he adduces testimonies of the Son from the Liturgy frequented throughout the whole East (as he says), and in addition the testimonies of Innocent I and the African Council which we cited above. And thus much from the Fathers at present. For the truth of this teaching will be established still more certainly by the sentences of the Fathers proving the efficacious character of divine grace, which will be produced more abundantly below.

§ XXI — The same doctrine confirmed by arguments drawn from Holy Scripture and the practice of the Church (Rationibus eadem Doctrina confirmatur)

§ 210. Among the arguments founded in Holy Scripture and in the usage and practice of the faithful, that argument is both the first and the most firm which is drawn from the prayers of the faithful. For the faithful are commanded not only to prepare themselves and to dispose themselves to receive God, and to receive habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*), and the habits (*habitus*) of the virtues, and to be made ready and prompt for doing good; but also actually to perform good works. This, indeed, they have been taught and instructed by Christ, since we pray to the heavenly Father when we say: "Thy will be done" — that is, make us to do Thy will. Which prayer alone can suffice to demonstrate that each and every act requires the assistance of God. St. Augustine testifies to this in his book *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 7:[301] "If," he says, "there were no other documents, the Lord's Prayer alone would suffice to make out the case for Grace, which we defend; because it would be entirely vain and foolish — indeed derisory — to petition for that which we either already possess, or which is placed within our own power, so that we need not expect it to be given or done by others." Thus St. Augustine teaches and reasons in *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 28, in Epistle 105 to Sixtus, and in Epistle 107 to Vitalis.[302] In the last-mentioned place, among other things, he says: "We do not pray at all — indeed, we cannot even pretend to pray — if we believe that it is we ourselves, and not God, who accomplish what we pray for." St. Augustine employs this argument further in Epistle 252,[303] where he also adds another argument of the same kind, drawn from the blessings which Bishops bestow upon the people. Similarly, Pope Innocent I, in his Epistle to the Council of Milevis (which is found among the letters of St. Augustine, no. 93).[304]

§ 211. Pertinent to this is the fact that the Psalmist, already made a partaker of divine Grace, nevertheless times without number and through nearly all the Psalms implores the help of God and prays that he be not abandoned by Him: "Be Thou my helper, forsake me not"; "O God, come to my assistance"; and many other such expressions — clearly understanding that it was by no means sufficient for him to have received, once for all, the assistance of some habitual grace, but that beyond this he stood in need of fresh and actual (*actuali*) assistance from God for each individual work. And that David's example is one that all the faithful — however far advanced in the Grace of God — must imitate, admits of no doubt. Hence the Council of Orange, can. 10:[305] "The help of God must be implored even by the reborn and the holy, so that they may be able to arrive at a good end or to persevere in good works." To the same effect are the prayers of the Church, which signify as much: those namely by which we petition that all our actions and prayers may ever begin from God and, once begun through Him, be brought to completion; that our words, thoughts, and deeds may ever proceed toward the doing of God's justice and be directed aright; that God may deign to direct, sanctify, govern, and rule our bodies, senses, speech, and acts in His law. And there are other similar prayers, by which the Church, as it were with public voice, professes her belief that grace is so given for each individual act, that each individual good work of men proceeds, not merely according to some habitual principle divinely received, but properly and in itself from the operative Grace of God — that is to say, that these works are of such a kind that God, for each one of them individually, is operative in man.

§ 212. For if habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*), without any further assistance, were sufficient for a man to perform any good work, there would be no need for the faithful already established in grace to implore fresh assistance for each individual act; it would be sufficient to give thanks for the gift of grace once conferred, and

to labour for its increase and preservation — unless perhaps they were to seek fresh assistance only to the end that what they could accomplish without it, though with difficulty, they might accomplish more easily through it. Which reply, as Pelagian, we have already rejected above on the authority of St. Augustine. Nor would the truth of the proposition — that grace is given for each individual act — be at all consistent with that reply. Moreover, there is the celebrated teaching of St. Augustine on this matter in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, penultimate chapter,[291] where he concludes with a general statement that nothing in the Holy Scriptures is commanded to man by God for the purpose of testing free will which is not found either to be given by His goodness, or to be petitioned for, in order to show the assistance of Grace. The same thing he teaches at greater length in a certain sermon against the Pelagians, a good portion of which is found in Eugippius (or Eugypius), the abbot, vol. 2, ch. 288,[306] and which you will find in vol. 10 of the works of St. Augustine in the newer edition.[307] There, after confirming the matter with examples drawn from Scripture, he concludes again with a general statement: "Whatever is commanded to us must be prayed for, that it may be fulfilled."

§ 213. Finally, Pope Celestine I likewise,[308] in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chs. 10 and 11, employing this same argument drawn from the prayers of the Church and the blessings of Bishops — as if it were an invincible argument — teaches that we must acknowledge the necessity of divine assistance for each individual action; so that, as he puts it, the law of praying (*lex supplicandi*) establishes the law of believing (*lex credendi*) — that is, from the prayers and supplications of the Church we learn what, concerning the necessity of Grace for good works, we are bound according to the Catholic faith to believe.

§ 214. The second reason, connected with the foregoing and confirmed by it, is that drawn from the act of thanksgiving (*gratiarum actio*) which the faithful render to God for good works, whether performed by themselves or by others. For in this thanksgiving they confess that everything for which they give thanks to God is a gift of the divine bounty. For one who gave thanks to God for something which he supposed to be his own and not God's would more rightly be judged to be mocking God than to be giving Him thanks. Now it is the custom among the faithful not only to give thanks to God in a general way for the possibility of doing good — even the proximate possibility, which is had through habitual grace — or for ease of action; but also to give singular and particular thanks to God for the works themselves, each one individually, and accordingly to exclude from the matter of thanksgiving absolutely no good whatsoever that is in man or is performed by man. This is evident even from the fact that it is customary among pious and religious persons, upon receiving any good whatsoever, or upon hearing of it in others, to have immediately on their lips that exclamation, *Deo gratias* — "Thanks be to God" — and this from the most ancient usage, which St. Augustine also mentions.

§ 215. This custom has, moreover, a most certain foundation in Holy Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament. We read in 1 Par. 29[309] that King David, greatly rejoicing over the devotion of the people who were offering liberally for the building of the Temple, said to God with an act of thanksgiving: "Thine are all things, and of Thy own hand have we given Thee." This Scripture, as being general and comprehensive of all goods, even spiritual goods — above all the works of piety by which God is worshipped — is cited here by St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 17, ch. 4,[310] and following St. Augustine by the Council of Orange, can. 11,[311] and by Prosper, Sentence 54.[312] The priest Esdras blesses God who put it into the heart of the king to make a decree for the restoration of the divine worship and sacrifices in the Temple at Jerusalem (Ezra 7).[313] The Apostle James and the other elders of the Church of Jerusalem glorified God when, upon hearing Paul's account, they learned of the faith and conversion of the Gentiles wrought through his ministry, and professed

that God had done all those things (Acts 21).[314] Likewise, the faithful glorified God in Paul — that is, on account of Paul's conversion and his zeal in preaching the Gospel (Gal. 1).[315] Indeed Paul himself, as a pre-eminent herald of the Grace of Christ, scarcely began any epistle without such an act of thanksgiving, which he rendered to God for the faith, the holiness, and the progress in virtue of those to whom he wrote. And not content with this, he also commanded us to do the same, saying: "In all things give thanks" (1 Thess. 5).[316] Therefore this custom of the faithful, whereby they give thanks to God for absolutely all good things, has in Holy Scripture and in apostolic teaching not only its foundation but also its precept. St. Augustine employs this argument frequently, as in Epistle 107,[317] and elsewhere; and in *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 68,[318] he carefully admonishes the faithful that as often as, and as soon as, they have done anything good, they should immediately give thanks to God for the good work. The same saint, in the above-cited sermon against the Pelagians,[319] when he wished to show that the preaching of Grace does not destroy free will, and had accordingly said that "we too ought to do something, we ought to strive, we ought to make the effort" — lest by these words he should seem to have attributed something proper to free will — he cautiously added, "and in doing so to give thanks," and so forth: manifestly signifying thereby that even for the very striving and effort of our will toward good, thanks must be rendered to God by us. Pope Celestine likewise employs this argument in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11,[320] where, speaking of the good things that have been received and are now possessed, which were already petitioned from God, he writes thus: "So entirely is all this felt to be the work of God, that thanksgiving and the confession of praise are always offered to God as the one who effects it, for the enlightenment of such persons, or for their correction." See also for this argument St. Bernard, Sermon 4 *in Cantica*,[321] where, against certain ungrateful persons who reserved something of their own will in good works and did not ascribe everything to divine Grace, he most beautifully treats that passage of Job 31: "If I have kissed my hand with my mouth" — and this following St. Gregory's exposition of the same passage in *Moralia*, bk. 22, ch. 6, toward the end.[322]

§ 216. The third reason, plainly of the same order and weight as the foregoing ones, is that which is drawn from glorying (*gloriatione*). For both Holy Scripture everywhere teaches, and it is the custom of pious persons, to ascribe the praise and glory of all and each of their good works to God, and to glory in no one other than God. Hence those maxims of the Apostle Paul: "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Gal. 6);[323] "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord" (1 Cor. 1);[324] and (2 Cor. 10):[325] "Not of works, lest any man should boast" (Eph. 2);[326] "To God alone be honour and glory" (1 Tim. 1);[327] and other similar sayings, both in the same Apostle and elsewhere. Hence also in the Canon of the Mass all honour and glory is attributed to God the Father through Christ; and it is a custom of the most ancient observance that in the ecclesiastical office, at the close of each Psalm, that verse is sung: "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit",[328] — namely, so that, admonished by the frequent repetition of this versicle, we may know that the glory of all our individual actions is owed to God. This same thing is proclaimed most clearly by that sentence of Blessed Cyprian, more than once cited by St. Augustine against the Pelagians and greatly praised by him: "In nothing are we to glory, since nothing is our own." It is found in bk. 3 of the *Testimonia ad Quirinum*, ch. 4,[329] and is quoted by St. Augustine in *Contra 2. Epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 4, ch. 9; in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chs. 3 and 4; and in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, chs. 14, 17, and 19.[330] See also for this argument St. Bernard, Sermon 13 *in Cantica*,[331] where he so treats and expounds that angelic canticle "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men," as to teach that it should suffice for us that we have peace with God, while the glory of all our good is to be left entirely and solidly to God Himself.

§ 217. Now it is easy to perceive the force of this argument. For if we are to glory in none of our good works except in God, it follows most certainly that God is, through His Grace, the author and bestower of all and each of our works. For otherwise the praise would be feigned and not true, by which someone ascribed the entire glory of good works to God. And the Apostle sufficiently plainly indicates this consequence when he says at Rom. 11: "For from Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things: to Him be glory for ever";[332] and 1 Cor. 4: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?",[333]

§ 218. The fourth reason can be drawn from the falls of the saints (*lapsu sanctorum*). For whenever it happens that certain persons who with great alacrity and facility were running along the way of God's commandments fall from that happy state into some grave sin, the thing itself makes it sufficiently manifest that it was not in their power to remain, without the continuous assistance and cooperation of God, in the exercise of good works. This St. Augustine teaches in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6, and *De Correctione et Gratia*, ch. 9.[334] And we have an illustrious example of this in David, who, after so great a grace received from God, fell so shamefully as to heap the crime of homicide upon adultery; and who, afterward, restored by the Grace of God and confirmed by the princely spirit, fell again into the sin of pride. Hence he says of himself in Ps. 29: "I said in my prosperity: I shall not be moved for ever. Thou didst turn away Thy face from me, and I became troubled";[335] and in Ps. 118: "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart";[336] and again: "Lead me in the path of Thy commandments" — as if he were saying: unless Thou lead me and continually enlarge my heart, I cannot walk and run along the path of Thy commandments. Pertinent to this is what St. Augustine teaches in *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 2, chs. 17 and 19:[337] that God sometimes permits the saints to fall into sins, or to be affected with a certain weariness in the way of the Lord, so that they may acknowledge that their walking well was a gift of divine bounty. Hence also St. Gregory, *Cura Pastoralis*, pt. 3, Admonition 34:[338] "Those," he says, "who are vainly puffed up and attribute the keeping of their small measure of good to their own powers, are justly abandoned, overwhelmed by greater faults, and by falling they learn that what they stood firm in was not their own." But concerning this argument there will be more to say when we treat of the gift of perseverance.

§ 219. To the reasons already adduced, let there be added a fifth reason, which is drawn from the fact that God is the first and supreme and universal cause (*causa*) of all things, of all actions and motions, and therefore also of all acts of free will. For from this it manifestly follows that all individual good acts are caused by God not merely according to some habitual principle, but properly and individually (*sigillatim*) — just as by Him are caused all other actions and motions, even those that are purely natural. This argument, although it be general, is nevertheless most efficacious for demonstrating the proposition at hand, and is most solidly founded in Holy Scripture. Nor indeed is the general concurrence (*concursus generalis*), as they call it, necessary for every action of any creature whatsoever. For God's operation extending to those things which exceed the powers of nature is reckoned under the designation of special assistance (*auxilium speciale*); if they are such things as God performs not merely with respect to nature in general but in regard to men with an eye to Christ's face — as is declared in its proper place. Moreover, both this last reason and those that precede it will be explained more fully when we come to set forth the efficacy of divine grace, along with certain other questions.[339]

§ XXII — Reply to those who contradict the foregoing doctrine (Respondetur iis qui superiori Doctrinæ contradicunt)

§ 220. Certain persons do not attend sufficiently to what was once defined by the Church against Pelagius — that grace is necessary for individual acts — and so, while their understanding of this matter is one that we have shown clearly from the very churches and councils by which Pelagianism was condemned, they nonetheless bring forward certain arguments and authorities against that doctrine, intending to show that the habit of grace, once received, can thereafter suffice for individual acts of a justified man without any special assistance and operation of God — at least so that he does not stand in need of a singular and new co-operation of grace for each and every act, and that he can perform some easier and more relaxed acts with only habitual grace concurring, as they say, together with God's general concourse — especially if the habit of grace has been increased and confirmed. They concede, nonetheless, that for a just man to persevere long in justice, to perform excellent and great works of piety, and to stand firm against the powerful waves of temptations, a special assistance of God is required over and above justifying grace. Now these opponents think that when the Fathers simply say that grace is given for individual acts, they mean this in a less than proper sense; that is, they interpret the Fathers as speaking of habitual grace, or at most conceding grace with respect to acts — yet not so precisely and universally as we require. These, then, are their arguments.

§ 221. The first argument: Habits of habitual grace and the virtues are given for this purpose — that man may operate well and avoid evil — therefore, having received them, he will be able to do these things through them; otherwise such habits would have been given in vain, or would be imperfect in their own order.

The second argument: Man can, by his natural powers alone together with God's general assistance and concourse, perform certain morally good works — especially if he has already acquired a moral habit. For this is what even unbelievers can do, those who are strangers to God's grace, as is the common opinion of the Doctors. Why, then, cannot Christians do the same thing at least by the powers of nature alone? And yet grace, charity, and the other virtues proper to Christians are no less powerful with respect to their own proper acts — which are works of piety — than purely moral virtues are with respect to theirs. For it is common to all operative habits that they render the powers apt for action; therefore, similarly, a man furnished with habitual grace and the other Christian virtues will be able, with God's general assistance alone, to exercise acts of these virtues. And briefly: if a pagan can give alms without God's special assistance, and do so in a morally good way, why cannot a Christian do the same thing without special assistance, and do it in a Christianly good way? — seeing that the substance of the act is the same in both cases, and that each party has an equal readiness for action through habit.

The third argument: The habits of grace and the other virtues are in certain just men very intense, firm, and deeply rooted; therefore habits of this kind will at least be able to issue in their acts without the supply of a new and additional assistance. For the stronger a person is, the less he stands in need of external help.

The fourth argument: Christ, through the medicine of His grace, restored to us the power of acting well which we lost in the first man. But the first man, as long as he remained in the state of rectitude, stood in no need of a new and special assistance for individual acts; it sufficed him to have the grace of his first creation together with the support which was always at his disposal. Therefore the restored man likewise has no need of a new and special assistance for individual acts.

The fifth argument: What bodily health is, that is grace to the soul — according to that text of Ps. 102 [Vulgate], "Who healeth all thy infirmities,"[341] namely through grace. Therefore, just as for the operations of the body the preservation of health together with the bodily powers and habits suffices, so that no further particular assistance is needed, so likewise for performing the works of piety that pertain to the salvation of the soul, the preservation of grace together with the powers and habits of the soul suffices, without any special assistance.

§ 222. The sixth argument: The Lord says in Jn. 4: "The water that I shall give him shall become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life;"[68] and in ch. 6: "He that eateth of this bread shall live forever."[,342] By these words the power of divine grace is signified; therefore grace, once given, provided only it be preserved, suffices to bring man through to eternal life.

The seventh argument: In Mk. 4, the kingdom of God is compared to a seed which, once cast into the earth, of itself germinates and bears fruit, even while the man who sowed it sleeps and knows it not.[343] Therefore grace, which is called a seed in 1 Jn. 3,[,344] and in which the kingdom of God principally consists, once infused and sown into the heart of man, thereafter of itself germinates and produces the fruits of good works — God who gave it being, as it were, asleep and unknowing, that is, supplying no further assistance specially for individual acts.

The eighth argument: When Christ supernaturally and miraculously restored sight or the power of walking to someone, that person could thereafter naturally see and walk, nor had he need of supernatural assistance for each individual act of seeing or walking. Similarly, therefore, once grace — which was lost in Adam — has been restored to man, he has no need of another supernatural assistance for individual acts; but through that grace he will be able to exercise naturally the acts that flow from it as from their principle. The inference is proved because the external and bodily miracles which Christ performed on earth were certain signs of what He works interiorly in the soul.

The ninth argument: St. Jerome, in book 8 (that is, the *Dialogue against the Pelagians*, ch. 4),[345] acknowledges that a just man can, by the powers received, abstain from sin for a brief time, though not continually and perpetually. And elsewhere he says that a just man, if he is attentive and is not disturbed by great temptation, can through grace once obtained continue in good; therefore at least in that case the just man has no need of the assistance of special grace.

The tenth argument: St. Augustine says in book 2 (*De Peccatorum Meritis*, ch. 19):[346] "When we implore from God His assistance for doing and perfecting justice, what else do we implore than that He open what was hidden, and make sweet what was not delightful?" From these words it appears that it suffices for a man to act well that the habits of grace, or charity, and the other virtues stand firm. For it is the proper function of habits to make one operate readily and with delight.

The eleventh argument: St. Athanasius (in the *Life of St. Anthony*)[347] relates that when St. Anthony, after having overcome a grievous temptation, said to Christ, "Good Jesus, where wert Thou?", Christ answered him: "I was here, but I waited to see thy combat." Hence it appears that Christ in that combat was only a spectator, not assisting him with the grace and fortitude previously given, for fighting bravely and for conquering.

The twelfth argument: The Council of Milevis, canon 3 — just as Pope Celestine likewise recites it (ch. 10 of his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul)[348] — decrees in the following manner: "Likewise it is resolved, that

whosoever shall say that the grace of God, whereby we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, is of avail only for the remission of sins already committed, and not also as an assistance so that sins may not be committed, let him be anathema." From these words they gather that the grace of justification is of such avail for avoiding sins that there is no need of a further and distinct assistance.

§ 223. In order to reply to these and similar objections, certain persons note that what is principally to be considered in the present matter, and is to be established as a foundational principle, is this: in justified and holy men, as long as they carry about this mortal body, the tinder of concupiscence (*fomes concupiscentiae*) is never extinguished; by it they are, as it were, continually solicited toward sinning and are drawn down toward earthly things as by a certain weight — so much so that all of them must say with the Apostle: "For the good that I will, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do," and: "With the mind I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin" (Rom. 7).[349] This tinder, moreover, they say, is like some natural and incurable malady which, unless it be restrained by a perpetual and forceful operation of divine grace — just like an untamed beast held in by enclosures — immediately breaks forth and exercises its natural malice. On the other hand, charity never, so long as we dwell in this body of death, becomes second nature, but needs, like something violent, a continual and powerful conservation — just as heat in water, and being upward in a stone. Hence the Lord in the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.",[350] And for this reason, they say, it belongs to the singular grace of God that a just man not fall away, as St. Augustine teaches (in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 12, and *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7).[351]

§ 224. But if the matter be rightly considered, this foundation seems not to be adequate and sufficient for proving that grace is necessary for individual acts — hence we have not made use of this foundation above for proving that thesis, nor have we used it for solving the arguments advanced against it. And this for the following reasons.

First: because habitual grace and the other virtues, especially if they are intense, incline toward acts of piety so powerfully as to diminish concupiscence itself — even though they do not extinguish it in this life. Therefore, if the *ratio* of this foundation were sufficient, it would follow that the more the just advance in God's grace and in the mortification of the flesh and its vices, the less they stand in need of God's assistance for individual acts — since the cause of their needing it would be diminished. And further, it would follow that for those in whom the tinder of concupiscence were extinguished — as many hold to be the case with the Virgin Mother of God (a)[352] — it would not be necessary to have God's grace for individual acts, the cause of this necessity having ceased. And accordingly such a person would neither need to pray to God for assistance for individual acts, nor to give thanks to God for them, nor to glory in God on account of them, but rather to glory in oneself. All of which are altogether absurd.

Second: because concupiscence, although it endures throughout this life, is not always actually stirred up — as St. Augustine himself acknowledges (in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 8).[353] When it is not actually stirred up, it will not, according to the *ratio* of this foundation, obstruct the just man from performing a good work without a new assistance of grace.

There can also be added a third reason: just as concupiscence inclines toward vices, so also there are in men by nature certain inclinations toward certain virtuous works. These inclinations can be developed and increased even unto moral virtues through exercise and study. To these, moreover — when the habits of grace and charity are added — the power of concupiscence seems not to be so great that the natural inclination,

moral virtue, and charity together could not sufficiently draw in the contrary direction; at least as regards those works of the virtues to which all three of these concur.

§ 225. Since this is so, we say that it is indeed necessary for fallen man — however much he has been justified and healed through grace — while he is in this mortal life, to have God's assistance because of the corruption and infection of concupiscence, and also on account of ignorance of things to be done. For on these grounds even the just and holy stand in need of being directed and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things — as St. Thomas teaches.[257]

But because for showing the necessity of divine assistance for all and every individual act, according to the sense held by the Fathers and sufficiently declared above, this foundation does not suffice — for this reason the same Doctor, in the same place, presses more forcefully and as a primary consideration the general argument: because, he says, no created thing can issue into any act whatsoever except by the power of divine motion. This argument has also seemed to us the most powerful for demonstrating the proposed thesis, as we indicated above. Therefore, whether concupiscence actually and continually withdraws man from the good and inclines him toward evil, or whether it does not; and whether man labours under some ignorance of what is to be done, or not (for it is established that man always knows well in many things what is to be done) — this argument which we have stated always remains, on account of which man stands in need of assistance for individual acts, that is, of the operation and motion of divine power. This assistance, moreover, since in the present matter it is of such a nature as to be given for those acts to which the powers of nature cannot reach — that is, for acts of true piety — therefore it receives the name of special assistance; while that divine motion and operation which is directed toward those acts for which a sufficient *ratio* exists in nature is called general assistance (b).[354]

§ 226. With these premises laid down, let us reply to the objections.

Reply to the first: with St. Thomas we answer that habitual grace and the virtues are not given for this purpose — that, having received them, we should have no need of further assistance — but rather that we may be able and fitted for operating; and since they do accomplish this, they have neither been given in vain nor are they imperfect in their own kind, even though actual operation does not follow without a particular motion — that is, God's assistance. For the same holds in every other habit and active created principle.[355]

Reply to the second: it is answered that a Christian man who has been justified can, no less than an unbeliever, exercise acts that are merely morally good — that is, acts of the same order as those that are performed by unbelievers through nature, inasmuch as they can be so performed — by his natural powers alone without God's special assistance. But it does not follow from this that one who possesses grace can, without special assistance, exercise acts of piety — for to this class of acts grace is ordained. For even if nature suffices to reduce moral habits to their acts, it is not therefore to be thought that nature suffices also to reduce supernatural habits to their own proper acts. For this purpose an assistance is needed that is of the same order as the habit — that is, supernatural assistance — which we call special, and which is not given save through the merit of Christ the Saviour. Nor is this to be wondered at. For these acts differ from those to which moral habits are ordained in dignity and end to an infinite degree, and are therefore of a far higher order than those. They tend toward God as the author of eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*) and salvation, which they also apprehend in the mode of merit. Such dignity, however, does not belong to acts that are merely morally good — even if (what we are not here discussing) they are performed by Christians and by those who are justified.

Nor does it matter that it may happen that the substance of the act is the same in both cases; because in one case there is a certain dignity superadded to the substance of the act, on account of which that special divine motion is required. For an act of piety requires this motion not insofar as it is an act, nor insofar as it is an act of nature or of morality, but insofar as it is an act of piety — that is, insofar as through it man tends toward God as his beatific good (*bonum Beatificum*).

§ 227. To the third it must be said: the more a man has been made healthy and strong through grace, the less does he stand in need of that assistance which heals his infirmity and strengthens his powers — just as those who are less physically infirm have less need of bodily medicine. A man in the state of original rectitude had no need of healing and strengthening grace, because he was not infirm; for this reason neither do the blessed (*Beati*) have need of this kind of grace. Therefore this argument seems sufficiently to prove — on the basis of the prior reason adduced above — that not all the justified, even after the fall, need God's assistance for each and every act, just as neither for that reason did the man in the state of integrity need it for any act, nor do the blessed need it. But for the other reason man has need of it, however healthy, strong, and blessed he may be. For the increase and confirmation of a habit, as well as the health and strength which a man possesses through grace, do not exclude the divine operation from each of his acts, nor do they bring it about that God's operation for individual acts is less necessary than before. On the contrary, the more perfect the habit, the more perfect the acts produced in man from that habit through divine motion. For God generally moves according to the mode and perfection of the habits He has given, as in natural things. Hence from the fact that the habits are very intense and firm, it does not follow that God's grace is not given for individual acts; rather it follows that it is given for more perfect and better acts. Otherwise — which is most absurd — the infirm would glory in God on account of their acts, while the strong would glory in themselves and in their own virtue. When it is said, therefore, that the stronger a person is, the less he needs the help of another — this is to be understood of human helps, which contribute only a part to the work, as happens when one person helps another in carrying a burden; but not of divine assistance, through which man is so helped that everything which man does is from God.

§ 228. The solution of the fourth argument is clear from what has already been said, and more fully from what we have discussed (in the foregoing Distinction) regarding the assistance of the first man.[356] For certainly grace was necessary for individual acts even for the first man. For although in him there was no infirmity on account of which he might need healing and repairing grace, yet insofar as he was a rational creature, he could exercise no act of piety without a special divine motion. Therefore in him too all the arguments adduced above for this doctrine of grace as necessary for individual acts had their application — just as they also apply to the blessed. Hence St. Thomas (in the place cited above)[257]

§ 229. When grace shall be wholly perfect, man will stand in need of divine assistance, namely for all and each individual acts. The reply to the fifth objection is likewise evident. For the health of the body, together with its powers and habits, does not so suffice for the actions of the body that there is not need, even for each individual one of them, of the power of divine motion. But that motion is to be referred to the general assistance in those matters which do not pertain to piety. To the sixth it is answered that the argument proves that grace once given suffices in its own kind — that is, after the manner of a habit — for bringing a man to salvation, so that there is no need for it to be given more often. But it does not follow from this that, beyond the habit of grace, there is no need of a special assistance of God for individual acts. To the seventh it is answered that in that parable, by the man who sows, and who afterwards sleeps and knows nothing while the

seed of its own accord germinates and grows, there is signified not God giving grace but rather the man who preaches the Word of God.[357] For when that man's ministry has ceased, God works in the hearts of those who have heard, that they may believe and advance in faith and good conduct. For it is God who gives the increase (1 Cor. 3), and of Him it is written: "Behold, he that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep."[358] To the eighth it is answered that in the bodily miracles corporally performed by Christ there are indeed significations of those works which God specially and supernaturally works in men through His grace. But not all miracles signify these works of God in the same manner, nor equally perfectly. For some signify only the conferral of habitual grace as a certain principle of good actions — such as the illumination of the blind, the raising of the dead, the making fruitful of a barren woman. For by these and similar miracles there was supernaturally given or restored the faculty of performing something in a natural manner. Yet lest it should be thought that such habitual grace thus suffices for the good acts to be exercised thereafter — just as, for example, sight even restored by miracle suffices for actual vision thereafter, without any new and continued miracle, the natural faculty naturally executing its actions with that general co-operation of the First Cause which pertains to the institution and conservation of nature — God was therefore pleased that there should also be other miracles by which that continual and special co-operation of God might be signified, which we say is necessary for individual acts, and which the miracles of the former kind did not signify. Such are: Peter walking upon the waters; Paul remaining unharmed night and day in the depth of the sea; Jonah kept alive for three days in the belly of the whale; the power of fire restrained lest it should burn the bush, or harm the youths cast into the furnace; the mouths of the lions closed lest they should devour Daniel; the sun and moon held still, lest they should move for the space of a whole day; the waters standing upright in the Red Sea and in the Jordan at the passage of the children of Israel — and many such things: of which not only the beginning but also the continuation was miraculous and above nature, so that when the supernatural operation ceased, the effect too immediately ceased.

§ 230. For as soon as Christ withdrew the operation by which He made the waters solid, Peter began to sink;[359] and so likewise in the other cases. Therefore by this class of miracles it was signified that not only is the habit of grace given by God, but that moreover a continual and special assistance is furnished for the exercise of each individual work of justice and for the retaining of justice itself; and that when that assistance ceases, man is left to the infirmity and corruption of his nature.

This same truth was expressed yet more plainly by that alternation described in Exod. 17, whereby when Moses raised his hands Israel prevailed, but when he let them fall Amalek prevailed.[360]

§ 231. What is objected in the ninth place from St. Jerome presents no difficulty. For we grant that a just man is able for a time to persevere in good by means of the powers he has received, without an augmented grace — provided, that is, he is assailed by no heavier temptation, to overcome which a greater virtue would be required. But we deny that this very thing — that he perseveres in the grace received, by doing good and abstaining from sins — can come to pass without a special assistance of the grace of God for each individual act. And that this is St. Jerome's own view is evident not only from what we have cited above, but also from the very passages here alleged on the contrary side. For in book 3, chapter 1, speaking of a man freshly baptized, who therefore seems to be entirely without sin, he says: "But that time during which he is without sin is ascribed in no wise to human possibility but to the grace of God."[361] And in chapter 2 he says that a man can do nothing unless God always assist him.[362]

§ 232. To the tenth it is answered, from the mind of St. Augustine, that God delights — *delectat* — when He inspires in a man the affection and will to work well; but not by that alone whereby He infuses the habit by which one is able to use it with delight and promptness whensoever he wills. Innumerable other passages declare the mind of St. Augustine sufficiently.[363] To the eleventh I answer that Christ was a spectator in the combat of St. Anthony in such a way as to have been also a helper. For He was not a spectator in the human manner, as though He had merely looked on or favoured the fighter while conferring no assistance in the meantime — such as spectators among men are — but He Himself furnished strength to the fighter and, so to speak, fought in him and together with him. This is a point which St. Athanasius too did not pass over in silence. For in the preceding passages he cites that word of the Apostle: "Not I, however, but the grace of God with me" (1 Cor. 15:10); and he says that the reason why St. Anthony overcame the Devil was that the Lord was aiding His servant.'[364]

§ 233. To the last objection, also, the reply is easy. For the Council does not say that the grace by which we are justified suffices to serve as an assistance so that sins are not committed, but that it avails for an assistance of this kind (*valere ad hujusmodi adjutorium*) — which the Pelagians denied, placing grace in the remission of sins alone.[365] Moreover, by the name of the grace of God in which we are justified through Christ, the Council did not understand the habitual grace which is commonly called sanctifying grace, but the uncreated grace — that is, the mercy and beneficence of God — by which through Christ He not only pardons us our sins, and not only bestows the habit of grace and of the other virtues, but also works each individual act of the virtues in us and together with us.'[366]

§ XXIII — That the beginning of a good work is from the grace of God (Initium boni operis esse a Gratia Dei)

§ 234. It has been sufficiently shown above that grace of God through Christ is given for all works of piety and for each one individually. But because in any given work there can be considered a beginning, a progress, and a completion (*consummatio*), one might now ask further: whether each work is so from the grace of God that the whole of it also is from grace; or whether something of it — such as the beginning, or the progress, or the completion — ought properly to be ascribed to free will (*liberum arbitrium*) and not to grace; in such a way, namely, that grace and free will have their own distinct parts as between themselves in a good work. This was the imagination of certain persons, who supposed that in this way a conciliation could be achieved between grace and free will. But how false that opinion is, and how opposed both to Sacred Scripture and to the teaching of the holy Fathers and to the decrees of the Councils, will become manifest from what we shall say in sequence. Yet for the declaration of this whole doctrine I briefly premise that the beginning, the progress, and the completion of a good work can be considered in three ways: either according to the earlier and later parts of the work — for example, in a pious meditation, in fasting, in the endurance of torment, in prayer, in exhortation, and in similar actions that have a succession of parts; or according to the imperfect and the perfect, as when someone at first wills some good imperfectly and languidly, and advances by degrees until he wills it at last perfectly and intensely; or according to the description whereby a good work is said to have its beginning in thought, its progress in the will, and its completion in the external act. And according to all these modes it is true — and we intend to prove — that both the beginning and the progress and the completion of a good work are from the grace of God.

§ 235. But that we may treat first of the beginning of a good work, we lay down the following concerning it, that it is to be held by faith: that the beginning of our conversion and justification (*justificatio*), and of any good work whatsoever pertaining to true piety, is from the grace of God through Christ. This is taught first by the general arguments from Scripture, such as: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5) — therefore neither can you begin a good work. "What do you have that you have not received?" (1 Cor. 4:7) — therefore not even the beginning of a good work. "God works all things in all" (1 Cor. 12:6) — therefore also the beginning of a good work. Likewise: "A man cannot receive anything unless it be given to him from heaven" (Jn. 3:27).[368] "Every best gift is from above" (Jas. 1:17).[369] The same is demonstrated by the general arguments drawn from the prayers of the faithful, from thanksgiving, from glorification, and from the universal efficient causality (*efficientiam*) of the First Cause — concerning each of which something was said above. For if the faithful pray to God on behalf of unbelievers and sinners, that He may inspire in them the beginning of faith and of good will; if they give thanks to God both for themselves and for others that He has begun a good work in them; if they glory regarding the beginning of any good work not in themselves but in the Lord; if, finally, God is the first and universal efficient cause (*causa efficienis*) of all things, forms, and actions, without exception of beginning, middle, or end — then every good work must have God as its author. Thus Pope Celestine, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul,[370] proves from the sacerdotal prayers which, by the custom handed down from the Apostles, are offered throughout the whole Church, and from the subsequent thanksgiving of the faithful, that among other things even the very beginnings of good will are to be referred to the grace of Christ and attributed to God as their efficient cause.

§ 236. But let a special proof be added to these general arguments, both from Scripture and from the Fathers and the decrees of the Fathers. And indeed the testimonies of Scripture are very many, such as Ps. 76 (77):11: "I said: now I have begun; this is the change wrought by the right hand of the Most High." Phil. 1:6: "He who began a good work in you will bring it to completion." And ch. 2:13: "For it is God who works in you to will" — that is, the good work. 2 Cor. 3:5: "We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as if of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." And again Ps. 75 (76):11: "For the thought of man shall give praise to thee, and the remainders of thought shall keep holiday to thee." Likewise Jn. 6:44: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draw him." And again: "No one can come to me unless it be given to him by my Father" (Jn. 6:65). 1 Jn. 4:19: "We therefore love God, because He first loved us." Is. 42:16: "I will lead the blind into the way which they know not, and in paths which they knew not I will make them walk." And ch. 65:1: "They have found me who did not seek me" — for which passage, in the rendering of the Seventy as cited by Paul in Rom. 10:20: "I was found by those who did not seek me." Jer. 31:19: "After thou didst convert me, I did penance." And Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted." 2 Macc. 1:4: "May God open your heart in his law and in his commandments." Acts 16:14: "The Lord opened her heart to attend to the things which were said by Paul." And Ps. 50 (51):17: "O Lord, thou wilt open my lips." All these testimonies most plainly teach that the beginning of faith, of conversion, of good will and of good work, and the very first good thought, is from God, who by His grace anticipates (*praeveniente*) the free will of man. The same is shown from the fact that Christ first looked upon Peter with the eyes of His mercy before Peter was moved to compunction for penance (Lk. 22:61).

§ 237. The same doctrine the Fathers also, even those earlier than Pelagius, consigned to their writings. St. Hilary, in his commentary on Matthew,[371] openly confesses that we owe to God both our origin and our progress. He elegantly and piously treats this doctrine with the narrative of Christ looking upon Peter and by that very look converting him. The same author prays in his hymn: "Look upon us as we waver, Jesus; correct

us by seeing us. If thou lookest upon us, our falls are healed." And again in his work on Luke,[372] he says: "No one can begin anything without the Lord." These words St. Augustine also cites, among others, in his work *On the Grace of Christ*.[373] St. Ambrose likewise, in his work *On Abel and Cain*,[374] writes thus: "Whatever holy thing you shall have thought, it is the gift of God, the inspiration of God, the grace of God." St. John Chrysostom also should be seen writing on all the passages of Paul already cited. The same author, on the text of the Epistle at Rom. 11:35 — "Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" — says: "He is perpetually first in conferring benefits." And on the text of Heb. 8:9 — "Because they did not continue in my covenant" — he says: "Evil things take their beginning from us; but good things are in God." These words Theophylact also incorporated into his own commentary.[375]

§ 238. St. Augustine, in his exposition of Ps. 118 (119), Sermon 7,[376] speaks thus: "He who prays, if he were entirely dead, would not pray; but he has received the beginning of holy desire from Him from whom he asks the obedience of life." The same Augustine is frequent in the works he wrote against Pelagius in teaching that the beginning of good will and of good work is from God, and to this end he uses the testimonies of Scripture set down above. In a particular manner he teaches it through nearly the whole book *On the Predestination of the Saints*,[377] at the same time retracting what he had at another time thought differently concerning faith, from which the beginning of our justification proceeds. Prosper, in his work *Against the Collation* — that is, against John Cassian, who attributed certain beginnings of good will, as it were certain strivings (*conatus*), to free will without the grace of God — disputes at length and expressly, showing how that doctrine agrees with Pelagius, and learnedly refuting it from the Scriptures and the decrees of the Fathers.[378] He is of the same opinion that without grace no one runs toward grace (in *Response 8 to the Chapters of the Gauls*, and in his poem *On the Ungrateful*, ch. 25).[379] Fulgentius, in his *Letter 6*, ch. 7,[380] says: "That we desire the help of grace — this very thing is also the work of grace." Pope Celestine — beyond the passage cited above, in the same letter, ch. 12,[381] — teaches and concludes from the responses of his predecessors that God is the author of all good works and affections from beginning to end, so that we may both will and begin to do what is good. Pope Leo likewise, in his first sermon on the fast of the tenth month,[382] teaches that the beginning of our restoration is nothing other than from the grace and mercy of God, adducing to that effect several testimonies of Scripture.

§ 239. And most clearly we have this doctrine defined, by the authority of the same Pontiff, in the Council of Orange, canons 3 through 8 and the five following.[383] The substance of these canons is: that grace causes God to be invoked by us; that God does not await our will but brings it about through the operation of the Holy Spirit that we even will; that the beginning of faith and the very disposition of belief are present in us through the gift of grace correcting our will; that through the inspiration of grace it comes about in us that we believe, will, desire, strive, and so forth. Finally, in the last chapter, the Fathers of the same Council speak thus: "This also we profitably profess and believe: that in every good work it is not we who begin and are afterwards helped by the mercy of God, but rather He Himself, with no preceding good merits on our part, first inspires in us both faith and love of Himself," and so on.[384]

§ 240. To this is added, moreover, the custom of the faithful and of the whole Church, whereby they are accustomed to implore the help of God at the beginnings of good works. For indeed the Church begins its prayers and consecrations almost always from these versicles: "O Lord, thou wilt open my lips" (Ps. 50 [51]: 17); "O God, come to my assistance" (Ps. 69 [70]:2); "Our help is in the name of the Lord" (Ps. 123 [124]:8). And in a certain prayer she asks that all our prayer and action may always begin from God. Certainly even the

Gentile poets, who possessed an obscure and confused knowledge of the Divinity, used to begin their poems with an invocation: hence the saying, "From Jove, O Muses, let us begin," and "Ye gods, breathe upon my undertakings."[385] To confirm this doctrine, moreover, all things serve that prove prevenient grace, of which we treated some time ago, and all things that show that grace is not given according to our merits, of which we shall treat a little further on.

§ 241. From all these considerations the doctrine of those is easily refuted who say that God offers His grace to all, but that it will profit only those who accept the offered grace — with the consequence that the beginning of a good work comes from man himself, who accepts the offered grace. The falsity of this doctrine is to be exposed elsewhere at greater length.[386]

§ XXIV — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 242. Certain objections are customarily raised from Scripture and the Fathers against the truth already demonstrated. And first, there is that text of the Apostle, Rom. 7: "To will is present with me, but to perform that which is good I find not." Here the Apostle seems so to distinguish between willing and performing, that man has the will of the good of himself, but cannot perform the good except through the grace of God — for otherwise the distinction would not hold. Second: in Ps. 80 the Lord says, "Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it"; therefore the first effort of a good work, which is signified by the opening of the mouth, belongs to our will alone, while the completion belongs also to the grace of God. Third: Jas. 4: "Draw near to God and He will draw near to you"; therefore it is first required that man draw near by some beginning of good will, before God draws near to man through His grace. Fourth: Is. 30: "The Lord waiteth that He may be gracious unto you"; therefore it is man's part to begin, so that God may thereafter through His grace have mercy upon him. Fifth: St. Cyril of Jerusalem (in the *Procatechesis*) says that God is indeed disposed toward beneficence, but awaits each person's own will. And again: "He is able," he says, "to make one faithful, if only one offer Him one's heart." And in the First Catechesis: "God, making an election of souls, scrutinizes those wills; if He finds anyone worthy, to that person He gladly bestows grace." And below: "If He sees a good purpose, there He imprints His saving mark." He writes similar things in the Sixteenth Catechesis.[388] All of which seem to signify that He requires from man some beginning of good will — which he calls a *propositum* (purpose) — and then through His grace brings man's work to completion. Sixth, St. Jerome is objected,[389] who (in book 1 of the Dialogue against the Pelagians, ch. 1) argues as a Catholic — that is, he rejects the opinion asserting that grace is efficacious from within itself — saying: "Therefore among us, in good works, after our own will, we lean on God's help." And ch. 2: "To will and to run is indeed ours, but that our will should be brought to completion in its course pertains to God's mercy; and so it comes about that both in our willing and in our running, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is preserved, and in the consummation of the willing and the running, all things are left to the power of God." And book 3, ch. 1: "To pray is ours, to bestow what is prayed for is His; to begin is ours, to perfect is His; to offer what we can is ours, to supply what we cannot is His." And ch. 2, when the adversary asks, "What then does God assist and crown in us, and praise what He Himself has wrought?", he replies: our will, which offered all it could, and our labour, which strove to act, and our humility, which always looked to the help of God. Likewise ch. 3: "Free will consists in this alone, that we will, and desire, and give assent to what is pleasing; but it is already in the Lord's power that what we desire, what we labour and strive for, we should be able to fulfil with His help and assistance." Seventh: St. Gregory, Homily 21 on the Gospels, says: "A good work comes to be ours in the will; for it will be through divine assistance that it reaches

perfection."[390] And finally, among the Greeks, not a few similar sentiments are found in St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact. From all of which it appears that a man is assisted by God in a good work only if he first brought of himself some beginning of good will, through which he merits and becomes worthy to be assisted by God. But these matters must be addressed when it is asked whether grace is given on account of merit. For now, therefore, let us reply to the other objections that have been raised.

§ 243. To the first, it is answered that the Apostle does not contradict himself — he who elsewhere says that God works in us both to will and to perform (Phil. 2:13). But in this passage (in Rom. 7) the Apostle does not distinguish between that which is from us and that which is from the grace of God; rather he says absolutely that a just man — for it is in the person of a just man that he speaks — wills what is good, and does it in some manner, namely imperfectly, yet not without the grace of God; but that in this body of death he cannot *perfect* it, that is, do the good perfectly, namely with that perfection which would exclude every contrary movement of concupiscence. For in this life there is not given so powerful a grace of God as would exclude every such movement from our works.

§ 244. To the second, it is answered that even the opening of the mouth itself is a divine gift, according to that text: "O Lord, Thou wilt open my lips" (Ps. 51:15). God requires of us the opening of our mouth, not in order that He may thereby begin to work in us and with us through His grace, but that He may bring our good to completion. Yet that good we must believe to have been begun in us by none other than Him. Although, to speak literally, the passage is not there speaking of the completion of a good work, but of the fulfilment of a vow or desire, so that the sense is: "If you hear me and keep my law, open and enlarge your mouth as much as you wish" — that is, ask whatever you please — "and I will make you partaker of your petition and vows." This is also a promise of the New Testament, Christ saying: "Ask, and it shall be given you" (Matt. 7:7).

§ 245. To the third, it is answered that man cannot draw near to God unless he has been anticipated by God's grace; and when man thus draws near, God draws near to him by increasing grace, according to that text from the same passage: "But He giveth grace to the humble" (Jas. 4:6) — namely, a more abundant grace.

§ 246. To the fourth, I reply that the sense of the Prophet is that God awaits our repentance, in order to take away chastisements from us and to bestow upon the penitent and upon those keeping the law the promised goods. Yet that very repentance is itself a gift of God. God is said to await in a human manner (*more humano*), inasmuch as He requires something from us first, before He Himself does something else. And He is said to require it because, although what He requires is His own gift, it is nevertheless also an act of our free will, falling under His precept.

§ 247. To what is objected in the fifth place from St. Cyril, I reply that St. Cyril must be numbered among those Fathers who, before the Pelagian heresy had yet arisen, sometimes spoke of the benefit of God's grace not with altogether sufficient precision and fullness — especially because against the heresy of the Manichaeans, then raging, which denied free will, they thought they must be more vigilant for the moment. Their statements in the matter of grace, therefore, are not to be pressed too hard, but if any of them sound unduly harsh, they are to be bent by a charitable interpretation toward the Catholic sense, which is elsewhere expressed more clearly by those same authors. What St. Cyril says, therefore — that God is indeed disposed toward beneficence but awaits each person's own will — signifies nothing other than that through grace free will is not taken away, but that the co-operation of free will with grace is necessary; or he understands man's

own will as being so awaited by God that it is nevertheless understood to be moved by His prevenient grace. For although he does not express this in those very words, he does not deny it; indeed, in the same treatise he clearly affirms that salutary repentance is given to us by God. As for how God is said to await, this has been explained a little above. The second saying of St. Cyril seems to have this sense: God makes no one faithful without that person's own will — but understand the will as moved by God; for God opens the heart of man so that he may attend to the word of faith, as Acts 16:14 shows. The remaining two statements are to be understood not of first grace, but of the grace of Baptism, which God bestows upon each person according to the degree of preparation of his will, which preparation is made through faith and repentance — and yet these themselves are from a prior grace.

§ 248. To the sixth: St. Jerome, saying that after our own will we lean on God's help in good works, seems to intend only this: that in good works free will must be presupposed — which we have from nature — yet this free will is not moved toward the good without the assistance of the grace of God. The other texts cited from St. Jerome are to be understood thus: to will and to run is ours, and to pray, to begin, to desire, to assent, to strive, to labour — but not without the grace of God. This is what St. Jerome himself most frequently professes in the same book (in the preface-epistle addressed to Ctesiphon), asserting that we can do absolutely nothing good of ourselves, but that everything and all that we do is to be ascribed to the assistance of God's grace. Let what we cited from him above regarding grace necessary for individual acts be consulted. Certainly in individual acts there are also willing, and praying, and assenting, and the other things just enumerated. If, therefore, St. Jerome were to attribute these to free will and not to grace, he would be most manifestly contradicting his own doctrine, which he professedly and deliberately treats — that God's assistance is necessary for each individual act. Indeed concerning the beginning of a good work or of a good will, that this is from the grace of God, he expressly teaches (in book 2, ch. 7 of the same Dialogue).[391] For citing that text of the Psalmist, "I said: now have I begun; this is the change wrought by the right hand of the Most High" (Ps. 77:10), he expounds that text in his own words thus: "Now have I begun, or now do I make progress; and this very transition from good things to better things is not the power of my own strength, but of the right hand of God." When, therefore, St. Jerome ascribes the completion, perfection, and consummation of our works in a special way to the help and power of God, he is speaking of the external execution of works. For it belongs to God alone through His providence, by which He disposes all things, to furnish the opportunities and occasions of good works, and to avert impediments, and altogether to direct and prosper our external actions — which, though one may be of ever so excellent a will, can and commonly do get impeded in many ways. Hence Paul (1 Thess. 2:18): "We would have come unto you, even I Paul, once and again; but Satan hindered us." In this sense is to be expounded also that text of Jer. 10:23: "The way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." If these explanations do not satisfy some person on behalf of St. Jerome, let him know that St. Jerome, in his disputation against the Pelagians, was not as precise as St. Augustine — a fact which St. Jerome himself acknowledges (at the end of the Dialogue), referring the reader to St. Augustine as the one who has written better on the subject.[392]

§ 249. In the same manner must be understood what was objected in the final place from St. Gregory.[393] For St. Gregory is exhorting us to exercise good works with a good and ready will, with this confidence: that God will supply both the strength of body and the occasions for fulfilling them, and will remove contrary impediments — among which there is also the bodily infirmity of which St. Gregory there speaks. And in this sense are to be expounded those sayings of Prov. 16: "Man's is the preparation of the heart, and the Lord's is

the governance of the tongue" (v. 1); and "A man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps" (v. 9). On which texts the commentaries of the Doctors are to be consulted.

§ XXV — That the progress and consummation of a good work are from the grace of God (Progressum et consummationem boni operis esse a gratia Dei)

§ 250. That the progress (*progressus*) and consummation (*consummatio*) of good works are from the grace of God, just as their beginning is, could be sufficiently proved by the general arguments drawn from the Scriptures which we were also adducing to prove that the beginning of every good work is from God — such as: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5); "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7); "God works all things in all" (1 Cor. 12:6). For it is manifestly a consequence of these texts that no one can complete a good work except through the operation of the grace of God. Likewise, the general arguments drawn from the prayers of the faithful, from the giving of thanks, from glorying, and from the universal efficiency of God as the first cause (*prima causa*) — of which things mention was made above — could likewise suffice. For if God is prayed to not only for the beginning of every good work but also for its continuation, progress, and consummation; and if thanks are given to God for these things; and if the faithful glory not in themselves but in the Lord concerning them; and if, finally, it must be granted that God is the first, inmost, and most perfect cause of all good without exception: then it can in no way be denied that the progress and end and consummation of all good things, just as their beginning, must be referred to God as their author. Likewise, the general teaching of the Fathers and Councils, by which they teach that grace is given for individual acts, could suffice. For they understood acts — as it is easy to show from their testimonies — not according to some part of them, but as whole and entire.

§ 251. Nonetheless, there are also particular arguments for proving this truth. The first is from Scripture. Phil. 1: "He who has begun a good work in you will bring it to completion" (v. 6). And ch. 2: "God works in you both to will and to perfect" (v. 13).[395] Jas. 1: "Every perfect gift is from above" (v. 17). Ps. 16: "Perfect my steps in your paths" (v. 5). And Ps. 67: "Confirm, O God, what you have wrought in us" (v. 29). Judith 13: "Confirm me, O Lord, that what I have devised, believing through you it could be done, I may bring to completion" (v. 7). Lk. 17: "Lord, increase our faith" (v. 5). Heb. 10, of Christ: "By one oblation he has perfected for ever those who are sanctified" (v. 14). And ch. 12: "Looking upon Jesus, the author and finisher (*consummator*) of faith" (v. 2). Pertinent to this also is the fact that in Mk. 8, Christ first restored sight to a certain blind man imperfectly, and then perfectly, so that he saw all things clearly (vv. 24–25). For by this he mystically wished to signify that not only the beginning of a good work but also its progress and perfection are from God.

§ 252. Second, from the prayers of the Church — such as those by which she prays that God would accompany our actions by his help; that all our prayer and work, having been begun by him, might likewise be finished by him; likewise, that he would bring his gifts to perfection in us; that he would grant us a pledge of faith, hope, and charity; and other petitions of this sort.[396]

§ 253. Third, from the Fathers — such as those words of St. Hilary concerning the origin and progress of good.[397] Similar sentences occur in St. Jerome writing against the Pelagians, and most especially throughout St. Augustine, and it is not necessary to linger in citing them.

§ 254. Fourth, from the definition of the Church. For Pope Celestine (in the decretal Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11) defines that not only the beginnings of good will, but also the increases of praiseworthy endeavours — that is, of actions — must be referred to the grace of Christ.[398] The Council of Orange, under the authority of Pope Leo (can. 5), ascribes both the augmentation and the beginning of faith to the grace of God.'[399] And (can. 10) it teaches that the help of God must always be implored even by the reborn and the saints, so that they may arrive at a good end even in a good work.'[400] And (the final canon) it equally teaches that the beginning and the completion (*complementum*) of every good work are to be expected from the grace of God.[401] The Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 16), after having said that Christ, as the head in the members and the vine in the branches, pours virtue (*virtutem*) into the justified themselves, adds the following: "which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works."[402]

§ 255. Finally, there is a particular argument proper to this doctrine. For those things which are better are to be attributed to God rather than those which are less good; but a perfect good, such as the augmentation and consummation of a good work, is better than an imperfect good, such as the beginning; therefore, with all the more reason (*potiori ratione*) must the progress and consummation of a good work be attributed to the grace of God than its beginning. To this there is added what has been said in its proper place concerning subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*), aiding grace, accompanying grace, cooperating grace, and perfecting grace — for this whole genus of grace claims for itself the progress, advancement, increase, and perfection of a good work.

§ 256. Moreover, this teaching will become more manifest and certain from that doctrine by which it is taught that perseverance in good is a gift of God (*donum Dei*), of which we shall treat afterwards. For under perseverance are comprised not only all the good works which a man performs from the beginning of a good life to its end, but also all the parts of every good work: its beginning, its middle, and its end.

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§ XXVI — Objections are resolved (Objectiones solvuntur)

§ 257. Certain arguments are raised against the foregoing doctrine. The first objection is taken from Gennadius (in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, ch. 11), who says: "We have the beginning of our salvation by the mercy of God; but that we acquiesce to the salutary inspiration is in our own power." Similar statements are found in Faustus (as in his two books *On Grace and Free Will*).[404]

§ 258. The second objection: grace is sometimes compared by the Fathers to a light which God offers to men so that they may see, if they are willing to open their eyes — as expressly by St. John Chrysostom (Hom. 7 *In Joannem*).[405] Therefore, just as the light is first offered, and then the man opens his eyes, so that the vision is completed, so in a good work the prior parts belong to God offering the light of grace, and the subsequent parts to the man opening his heart.

§ 259. The third objection: a good work is perfected in the acceptance of grace and in consent; but to accept and to consent belongs to free will (*liberum arbitrium*) alone. For grace itself is not rightly said to accept grace or to consent to grace; therefore a good work is perfected by free will alone. Moreover, it is not the function of the same agent both to give and to receive; wherefore, just as it belongs to God alone to give grace, so it belongs to free will alone to receive grace by consent.

§ 260. It is answered that these and similar arguments, and whatever force they have, bear against not only the progress and consummation, but also the beginning of a good work — since a good work cannot even be begun except with the will consenting, acquiescing to the inspiration of the divine grace, and accepting it. But because the will can do none of these things unless it has been forestalled (*præventa*) by grace working these very things in it, hence it is truly and properly said that the beginning of a good work is from the grace of God. And the reasoning is the same (*par ratio*) concerning progress and consummation. For in every part of a good work, grace and free will act together, but in such a way that grace moves free will to the work, not the other way round. This being so, to the first objection I reply that the sentence of Gennadius, as alien from sound doctrine, is not to be received, nor are other sentences of the same author to be received — inasmuch as he was among the Massilians (*Presbyteri Massilienses*), whose doctrine on grace and predestination, as reprehended by St. Augustine, Prosper, and Hilary, was condemned by Pope Celestine in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul.[406] The same reply is to be made concerning Faustus, who is established to have been gravely accused of Pelagian heresy and even condemned by the Fathers.[407]

§ 261. To the second objection it is answered that the comparison of grace with light is imperfect (*imperfecta*). For grace is not merely like an offered light, but itself also opens the eyes and makes one see, according to that word of Ezek. 36: "I will make you walk in my commandments and keep them" (v. 27). Hence Prosper in the poem *De Ingratis*: "Grace itself consummates its work," etc.[408] Indeed, it is the very office of grace to produce the consent of the will — that is, to make man be willing and obey. For the offered light merely shows what is to be done: that is the office of the law, not of grace. Furthermore, St. John Chrysostom is speaking not of internal and properly so-called grace, but of external vocation.[409]

§ 262. To the third objection it is answered: just as the Father was not incarnate, and yet wrought the incarnation of his Son; and just as God is not moved nor does he walk, and yet produces every motion in things — so too grace does not accept grace, but it nonetheless brings about that acceptance by which our will accepts grace. For "to accept" includes a certain relation, on account of which it cannot be predicated of grace itself; for to accept is to produce an act of reception (*actum receptionis*), not in any manner, but in oneself — just as to walk is to produce in oneself the motion of walking. The same judgment holds concerning consent and similar acts. But this in reality is nothing other than to cooperate; and God, though he does not cooperate as the cooperative itself does (for that is the role of the created agent), nonetheless efficaciously brings about this cooperation and produces it in the created will.

§ XXVIII — That every good work is to be ascribed entirely to Grace (Bonum opus totum Gratiae adscribendum esse)

§ 263. What we have hitherto shown concerning the parts of a good work, that same thing we shall now demonstrate concerning the whole. Although, if all the parts and individual elements of a good work are from the grace of God, there can be no doubt but that the whole good work proceeds from that same grace: yet, in order that the truth of this doctrine — which ascribes the whole good work and every part of it to the grace of God — may be established with greater certainty and evidence, I have resolved to prove it still further by particular arguments. This I thought all the more necessary to do, because there are certain persons who shrink from this manner of speaking, by which the whole good work is said to be from God, with a kind of

vain timidity, supposing that by it nothing whatsoever is left to free will (*liberum arbitrium*). To these we shall reply below.

§ 264. Now the first proof is from Sacred Scripture, which, since it attributes all our good without exception to God and to his grace in so many places, assuredly attributes the whole of it to him as well. For if not the whole; then something of the whole is excluded, and accordingly not every good is to be attributed to God. For instance, the Lord says: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5); therefore neither can you do any part of the work. For a part too is something, to which *nothing* is contradictorily opposed. But if we can do no part of the work without Christ, then the whole work is therefore of the grace of Christ. The same proof arises from these sentences: Jn. 3: "A man cannot receive anything, unless it have been given him from heaven" (Jn. 3:27).[368] 1 Cor. 4: "Who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received?" (1 Cor. 4:7). And ch. 12: "God worketh all things in all" (1 Cor. 12:6). 2 Cor. 3: "We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as it were of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor. 3:5).[411] Heb. 13: "God fit you in every good thing" (Heb. 13:21). Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above" (Jas. 1:17).

§ 265. To the same effect are these Scriptures: 2 Cor. — "If anyone thinks himself to be something, when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself" (Gal. 6:3). And Lk. 17: "When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants" (Lk. 17:10). For statements of this kind signify that man is utterly unprofitable of himself, and has no good of his own, but whatever he has, all of it and the whole of it he has from God.

§ 266. A certain figure of this same reality was what is read in Num. 17, that the rod of Aaron first put forth buds, then blossomed, and lastly brought forth almonds. Each of these things, in a dry piece of wood, was a miracle. For by this it was signified that all the good we do is of the grace of God, whether it be first considered as something to be done, or decreed to be done, or finally brought to completion in the very act. The second proof is from arguments founded in Sacred Scripture — arguments most certain and most solid — which we have already adduced several times in the preceding sections, and which we briefly repeat here: namely, from the prayers of the faithful, from thanksgiving, and from glorying. For Scripture teaches us both through the prayer delivered to us by the Lord, in which we are bidden to say "Thy will be done," and in other places, especially in the Epistles of Paul, that no good work whatsoever, nor any part of it, is enjoined upon us that is not to be sought from God, so that it may be done by us through his grace. The same Scripture teaches us — and Paul above all, in his Epistles throughout — that thanks are to be rendered to God for every good we have and for every good we have done, under which heading every part of the good is without doubt comprehended. The same Scripture teaches, and Paul expressly, that no one is to glory save in God. Therefore neither is any part of a good work to be gloried in by us save in God as its author.

§ 267. Add to these the most efficacious argument drawn from the universal causality (*efficientia*) of the First and Supreme Cause; which, just as it suffers no good whatsoever, nor any part of it, to be excluded from the general operation and assistance of God, so it permits no work pertaining to piety and eternal life, nor any part of such a work, to be excepted from the special assistance, that is, from the operation of the grace of God through Christ. Of the same character is this argument: every good is from God, and that according to every part in which it is good, because there cannot be any good by accident (*secundum accidens*) save from that which is essentially good; therefore all our good is entirely from God.

§ 268. The particular arguments are as follows. The first: Nothing can please God save what is his own, nor does he love anything in the whole of creation save what he himself has made, nor does he love in us anything save his own gifts. But God is pleased with and loves the whole good work insofar as it is good; therefore the whole of it has God as its author and bestower. And this is not obscurely signified by the Wise Man, who in ch. 11 speaks thus to God: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made" (Wis. 11:25).

§ 269. The second: Nothing is to be offered to God which we have not received from him; for the oblation which is made to God must always be conjoined with thanksgiving for the very thing that is offered, as being received from him. But all and the whole of our good is to be offered to God; therefore we have received all and the whole of it from God. This argument is indicated by canon 11 of the Council of Arausica (Orange II) in these words: "No one can rightly vow anything to the Lord unless he has received it from him, as it is written: 'What we have received from thy hand, we give to thee'" (1 Chr. 29:14).[412] This canon is drawn from St. Augustine,[413] — the words also being repeated by Prosper.,[414]

§ 270. The third: There is a special signification of this matter in the holocaust sacrifice, which was formerly offered according to the law. For this kind of sacrifice contains the profession that a man had received from God all and every good of his, whatever it was and whatever he had; to whom accordingly, by means of such a sacrifice, with recognition and thanksgiving, he rendered it all back. For on that account, the entire sacrifice, no part of it being reserved, had to be consumed by fire in honour of God. Hence it was called in Greek *holocaustum*, that is, wholly burnt. He therefore offers a spiritual holocaust to God who, acknowledging that he has received all his good from God, renders it all back to him. And every Christian ought to do the same. For all goods are to be referred to their Author from whom they spring, says Pope Celestine I after Pope Zosimus, in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 8.[415]

§ 271. The fourth: All our good is frequently attributed to God and to his grace with the addition of an exclusive term; as when the Apostle says, 1 Tim. 1: "To God alone be honour and glory" (1 Tim. 1:17). And as the Church prays in the fifth Sunday after Epiphany: "Guard thy household, so that it, relying on the hope of heavenly grace alone, etc." Such too is what St. Leo says in his Sermon on the fast of the tenth month (*de jejunio decimi mensis*), that the cause of our restoration is nothing other than the mercy of God.[416] And what St. Gregory says in Homily 29 on the Gospels: "In order that Stephen might overcome in the land the unbelief of his persecutors, the grace of Christ fought for him from heaven.",[417] For statements of this kind do not signify that nothing in a good work is to be attributed to free will, but rather that this very thing which is from free will is entirely from the grace and mercy of God. This same sense is borne by certain other sayings of the Fathers which we shall cite presently.

§ 272. The fifth: A good work is wholly and in every part free (*liberum*), which is easily proved both because the whole of it proceeds from the free will (*libera voluntas*) and because the whole of it is meritorious — which it could not be if the whole were not free. If, therefore, this total freedom of the work does not prevent any part of it from proceeding efficiently from the grace of God, it assuredly cannot prevent the whole and every part of it from being from that same grace.

§ 273. The sixth: The works of Christ our Redeemer, by which, with his human will — and that a free will — he merited our restoration, all proceeded efficiently from the divine will; therefore our good works too, although proceeding from our own free will, are wholly from the grace of God. For if Christ as man had

nothing of his own that was not from God, far less shall we be able to have or do anything of such a kind — that is, anything that is genuinely good.

§ 274. The last: Whatever entity (*entitas*) there is in sin is entirely from God, as St. Thomas writes in his commentary on Rom. 11 and elsewhere, when he disputes concerning the act of sin — which the Scholastics commonly concede and teach as well.[418] Far more certainly, therefore, and more securely must it be confessed that whatever entity there is in a good work is entirely from God.

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§ XXVIII — Proof of the same doctrine through express testimonies of the Fathers (Ejusdem doctrinæ probatio per expressa testimonia Patrum)

§ 275. So that no scruple may remain preventing us from openly, freely, and securely confessing with thanksgiving that every good work whatsoever that we shall have done is from God and from His grace, we shall bring forward on this matter several testimonies of the Fathers, in which they either say this altogether expressly or signify it in such a way that from them a collection of the expressed opinion is plainly evident. Let the first and chief testimony be that of the Church herself, which prays thus on the sixth Sunday after Pentecost: "O God of powers, whose is all that is best (*totum quod est optimum*); pour into our hearts love of Thy name," etc. Nor is there anything for anyone to cavil at in that Prayer, namely that not all that is good but only what is best (*optimum*) is there attributed to God. For *optimum* is placed there for *bonum*, according to that manner of speaking which the Translator of the New Testament frequently employed: as when he renders Lk. 8, "These are they who with a good and best (*optima*) heart, hearing the word, retain it"; Lk. 10, "Mary has chosen the best (*optimam*) part"; Heb. 13, "It is best (*optimum*) that the heart be established by grace"; Jas. 1, "Every best (*optimum*) gift," etc.[420] In all of which places in the Greek stands the positive form *καλόν* or *ἀγαθόν*. We have the expressed judgment of the same Church from the definition of the Apostolic See. For Pope Celestine, speaking in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul of the conversion and repentance of unbelievers and sinners, says: "which is so felt to be entirely the work of God, that thanksgiving and confession of praise for the illumination or correction of such persons is always rendered to God as its author."[320] And at the end of the same letter: "Nothing at all is to be subtracted from the work and condescension of the grace of God." Again, the same judgment of the Church is plainly evident from those things that were defined at the Council of Arausica (Orange) under the authority of Pope Leo. Such is canon 20: "No man does any good works which God does not bring it about that man should do." And canon 22: "No one has anything of his own save lying and sin." And the last canon: "No one has any good thing except it be given him from above."[421] Of these testimonies the first and second are taken from St. Augustine, the third from the Gospel. But with these, as the voices of the whole Church, set forth in advance, let us come to the testimonies of the individual Fathers.

§ 276. St. Cyprian, in his exposition of the Lord's Prayer at the words "Lead us not into temptation," says: "We are reminded of our weakness and infirmity when we pray thus, lest anyone proudly exalt himself, lest anyone arrogantly and presumptuously claim anything for himself." And below: "Humble and submissive confession goes before, and everything is given to God."[422] St. Augustine also cites these words in his work against the two letters of the Pelagians, and elsewhere.[423] The same St. Cyprian likewise, in his work of testimonies to Quirinus, saying that nothing is to be boasted of because nothing is ours, manifestly leaves to

be understood that everything belongs to God.'[424] "These things we owe: body, soul, will; for we retain these things, having received them from Him and being advanced by Him. Therefore it is fitting that we render back to Him the whole of what we acknowledge we owe to Him both in origin and advance."

§ 277. St. Ambrose, in his commentary on Ps. 118, speaking of the Apostle Paul, says: "He claims nothing for himself, but attributes the whole to the grace of God."[425] The same, in his work *De Abel et Cain*, says that by Abel and Cain are signified two contrary sects of men. By Abel, that which attributes all its good to God as the one who works it. By Cain, that which attributes the whole to its own mind as to the principal cause — and this he calls improbable doctrine.[426] And in chapter 9: "The just man refers to God as author whatever good things he shall have obtained." And chapter 10: "Whatever holy thing you shall have thought, this is God's gift, God's inspiration, God's grace." And in his work *De Abraham*, that Abraham attributes everything to God and claims nothing for himself.[427]

§ 278. St. Jerome, in his first dialogue against the Pelagians, says: "This is the highest justice of man: whatever power of virtue he may be able to have, not to think it his own, but to think it the Lord's, who bestowed it" — evidently because he has nothing of his own, since he has everything from God.[428] The same Doctor asserts this more expressly near the beginning of book four of his commentary on Jeremiah. For treating of the good work of the human will, he says: "It is entirely of the grace of God, who has given all things. For free will is so to be preserved that grace of the Giver excels in all things: for it is 'not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.'",[429]

§ 279. St. John Chrysostom, in homily 35 on Genesis, on the text of chapter 14, "Blessed be the most high God, who has delivered your enemies into your hands," says: "He who delivered them is He who wrought the whole."[430] And in his exposition of Psalm 7, David gave thanks to God, offering hymns to God, and ascribing the entire strategy (*Stratagema*) to God. Thus St. John Chrysostom — notwithstanding that in both victories, namely those of Abraham and David, human industry and human strength had intervened. The same, in homily 4 on the second letter to the Thessalonians, speaking of the faith and sanctification of the Thessalonians, says: "See how he shows nothing to be theirs, but everything to be God's."[431] And at the end of the same homily, treating of the spiritual generation of children through the preaching of the word of God, he says: "For we do not generate of ourselves, but the whole is of the grace of God." And at the beginning of homily 5 he says that cooperation is demanded of us, so as to depend on His benevolence and clemency, and therefore we ought to refer to God the whole of what we do.'[432]

§ 280. St. Augustine's opinions on this same matter are distinguished. In his exposition of Ps. 99, on the words "He made us and not we ourselves," he says: "All the good that we have, we have from our Maker; for what we have made in ourselves, we are thereby condemned; for what He has made in us, we are thereby crowned."[433] And in book 2 of *De Peccatorum meritis*, chapter 18: "Men labour to find in our will something that is our own good and not from God. How this can be found, I do not know." In that same passage he then presses to the same purpose the Apostle's saying "What do you have that you did not receive?" And chapter 19, he warns that care must be taken lest we think to be ours what belongs to God: "This error," he says, "is greatly contrary to religion and piety."[434] Likewise in his work *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, chapter 8: "Our life is nothing other than the grace of God."[435] And in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 32: "Therefore it is rightly understood that 'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,' so that everything may be given to God, who both prepares the good will of man to be aided, and aids it once prepared," etc.[436] And in his work *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter 7: "Whatever Cornelius did well

before he believed in Christ, and after he believed, is all to be given to God, lest haply anyone should be exalted."[437] And finally in *De Dono perseverantiae*, chapter 13, writing in imitation of St. Cyprian: "It is expedient for us to believe and to say this; this is first, this is true; so that humble and submissive confession goes before, and everything is given to God."[438] In these words note that it is St. Augustine's judgment that it is expedient for us not only to believe but also to say and confess with the mouth that everything belongs to God — lest anyone should think there is anything offensive in such a manner of speaking. And thus far from St. Augustine.

In praise of this holy man, Prosper sang: "And while he attributes no goods to himself, God is to him all things."[439] The same Prosper, writing on the last Psalm, says: "God is wonderful in His saints, so that whatever virtue and merit belongs to them is referred wholly to the glory of God."[,440] And in his work *De Vocatione Gentium*, chapter 4, he reproves those who do not refer to the gifts of God all that they judge praiseworthy in themselves, but claim it for themselves and ascribe it to the effort of their own will.[441] The same, in his work *Contra Collatorem*, chapter 39, finds fault because a certain person had in part attributed this to free will.[442] And in the last chapter: "It is not devotion," he says, "to have given nearly the whole, but fraud to have retained even the least."[,443] A judgment to be noted against those who seek or exact some small thing in a good work which they make proper to free will, as Erasmus did in his work *De Libero arbitrio*.

§ 281. Fulgentius, in book 1 to Monimus, chapter 11, says: "The Apostle assigns the whole to God, saying: 'For those whom He foreknew He also predestinated,'" etc.[444] And chapter 14: "Whatever just and good things we see, let us give them to God who is just and good." And below: "What else is 'I will bring it about that you should do' but that every good that you shall have worked will be my work? He therefore brings it about that we do, so that in Him working within us all the good that we do comes to be." And in Epistle 6, chapter 8: "Whatever you have of good will or good action, assign it to God who gave it; and humbly beg Him that He may both preserve and increase what He has given; assign no good thing to yourself as your own."[,445] The same, in book 1 *De Remissione peccatorum*, chapter 9, says that God Himself works in us every good of will and of work.[446]

§ 282. St. Gregory, in homily 8 on Ezekiel: "Whatever is accomplished in the virtues of the saints belongs to that grace which bestows the merits."[447] The same, in book 22 of the *Moralia*, chapter 5, citing the text "What do you have that you did not receive?" says that the saints acknowledge whatever good they behold in themselves to be the gift of immortal grace.[448] And in part 3 of the *Cura pastoralis*, admonition 21, he warns that careful heed must be taken lest they claim anything for themselves when they shall have fulfilled everything rightly, and lest they at the same time lose everything after they have accomplished it.[449]

§ 283. Theophylact, in his commentary on Rom. 1, says: "To proclaim the word is the Apostles' task; but to persuade the hearers is entirely God's."[450] And on 2 Cor. 12: "That we should even think anything of ourselves is not the case. But this too is wholly to be attributed to God." This passage is to be observed, so that we may understand other opinions of the same author and of other Greek writers, in which they say that we too must bring something of our own — these are to be taken in the sense in which Theophylact himself here explains himself: namely, that even this very thing which we bring as our own, by thinking, striving, and consenting, is not so our own that the whole is not to be attributed to God. For many good things indeed are done in a man by God which man does not do; but no good things does man do which God does not bring it about that man should do, as was defined at the Council of Arausica, canon 20.[,451] The same Theophylact inquires why all four Evangelists committed to writing the denial of Peter, and answers that they did this not

to accuse Peter but to teach us how great an evil it is not to attribute everything to God but to rely upon oneself.'[452] The same point was noted by Euthymius on Matt. 26.'[453] Likewise Oecumenius, on the text of Rom. 15, "For I dare not speak of any of those things which Christ has not effected through me," says: "He shows that nothing was his own, but all was Christ's."'[454] And no differently at the same place Theophylact teaches that all things are Christ's. Both drew this commentary from St. John Chrysostom, who writes thus on the same Apostolic text: "See how he insists on showing all things to be God's, nothing his own — understand: in the proper sense."'[455]

§ 284. St. Bernard wrote his book *De Gratia et Libero arbitrio* for this reason: that since he was accustomed to commend the grace of God so as to attribute all his good to God working within him, a certain person objected to him: "What then do you yourself work, if God does everything?" — as he himself records at the beginning of that book. He answers, however, in such a way as to show that nothing is thereby taken away from free will. His words near the end of the book are: "Not partly grace and partly free will, but each accomplishes the whole by an undivided working. The whole is accomplished by the one, and the whole by the other; but the whole in the one, and the whole from the other."[456] He confirms what he says by the Apostolic sayings: "It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy"; and "What do you have that you did not receive?" The same, in his work *De Modo bene vivendi*, sermon 3, says: "Ascribe everything to the divine gift and the divine grace."[457]

§ 285. Richard of St. Victor, St. Bernard's contemporary, in book 1 of *De Eruditione interioris hominis*, chapter 3, near the end, says: "Let us strive to presume the whole of what we purpose from grace; to ascribe the whole of what we accomplish to divine grace, and this pertains to living for ever."[458] And in book 2, chapter 21: that a man ought truly and without pretence to ascribe to himself whatever is evil, and to divine grace whatever is good; and to attribute nothing of his own goods to himself, but to ascribe to the Lord the whole of what he can do profitably.'[459]

§ 286. Abbot Franco, in volume 1 *De Gratia Dei*, speaks thus of the Angels: "What they are, what they understand, and what they are able — all this they ascribe to the grace of God." And below, speaking generally: "Whatever shines with virtue and glory in the whole universe, is rightly ascribed entirely to the grace of the Creator. And this is the true beatitude of all things that have been made: that they refer all things to the praise of Him from whom they have even their very being." And in volume 3, he ascribes all things to that grace from which he recalls that all things have been freely bestowed upon him. And in volume 7: "See how the master of grace assigns the work of grace wholly to grace." The same, in volume 8, says that God freely gives all things, even the very obedience that He seems to require of us, and that all things are to be referred to the praise of God, whose gifts they are. And in volume 10, adducing the example of the Son of God, who referred all His things perfectly to the Father: "So too let the branch know," he says, "that the glory of the whole fruit belongs to the vine." And after much more: "As much good as he shall have found in each individual, so much grace of God let him acknowledge in each individual." Finally, in volume 12, he concludes thus: "Therefore whatever shines with virtue or spiritual effort in a man flows from this fountain of piety; of which thing there are as many witnesses as there are professors of the true faith."[460]

§ 287. Pope Innocent III, in the prologue to his book *De Vilitate conditionis humanae*, says: "If the reader shall have found anything worthy in it, let him ascribe it wholly to divine grace."[461] Antony of Padua, in his sermon on Passion Sunday, says: "I attribute everything to God, I give thanks to Him."'[462] St. Thomas Aquinas, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, art. 5, in the body: "What is from free will and what is from

predestination are not distinct, just as what is from a secondary cause is not distinct from what is from the first cause. Hence even what is by free will is from predestination." And below: "Whatever there is in man that orders him to salvation is comprehended wholly under the effect of predestination, including even the preparation for grace," etc.[463] Likewise in q. 63, art. 5, ad 3: "Whatever there is in merit is from God.",[464] And in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, art. 2, ad 2, replying to that saying of St. Augustine, "He who made you without you does not justify you without you," he says: "God does not justify us without us, because by the movement of free will, while we are being justified, we consent to God's justice. Yet that movement is not the cause of grace but its effect. Hence the whole operation pertains to grace."[126] And in q. 114, art. 1, where treating of a meritorious work he says that everything that is good in a good man is from God.',[465] The same expressed judgment is found in *De Malo*, q. 3, art. 2: good works have their cause in God.[466] And on 2 Cor. 10, lecture 3: "Whatever good we do is entirely from God." And again: "God is the cause of the entire good work done through men.",[467] And on Heb. 6, on the words "If indeed God shall permit," he says: "He says less and signifies more. For it is not only necessary that the Lord should permit, but He must do everything.",[468]

§ 288. St. Bonaventure, writing on the present distinction, question 2, says: "It is the mark of pious minds that they attribute nothing to themselves but everything to the grace of God; hence however much anyone gives to the grace of God, he does not depart from piety," etc.[469] And in book 2 of *De Profectu Religiosorum*, chapter 29: "The truly humble render everything back to God from whom they have everything; for he is guilty of theft who retains anything for himself, since God says: 'I will not give my glory to another.'"[470] And chapter 33: "The truly humble pours everything back into God and makes complete restitution to Him from whom every good flows.",[471] The same, in the *Life of Blessed Francis*, records that this holy man was accustomed with great affection towards God to say: "My God and my all."[472]

§ 289. Lyranus, expounding 1 Cor. 4, "What do you have that you did not receive?", writes that the Apostle says this because everything that we have is from God.[473] Let Thomas à Kempis be added to all these, whose four books on the *Imitation of Christ* are extant — a truly golden work, equally praised by all learned and pious men alike.[474] In book 1, chapter 15 of that work, he says that every good is totally to be referred to God, from whom all things proceed as from their fountain. And in book 2, chapter 10, he writes in these words: "A man acts wrongly by not rendering everything back to God with thanksgiving; and therefore the gifts of grace cannot flourish in us, because we are ungrateful to the Author, and do not pour everything back into the fountainhead." And below: "Give to God what is God's, and ascribe to yourself what is yours — that is, give thanks to God for grace, but to yourself alone ascribe the fault and the punishment for the fault." Again: "Those who ascribe to God the whole of the good they have received do not seek glory from one another, but desire the glory that is from God alone." And in book 3, chapter 20, he represents God speaking thus: "I am He who gave all things; therefore you ought to ascribe no good thing to a gift of your own, nor attribute virtue to any man, but give everything to God, without whom man has nothing. I gave the whole; I wish to receive it all back, and I require it back with great gratitude, since vainglory is put to flight thereby.",[475] In chapter 10, he addresses God thus: "Of all that I have, I serve Thee." And in chapter 23, to the same effect at greater length. And in chapter 39: "My God and my all" — which has been said enough for the devout, and must often be repeated for the foolish. And below, concerning the just: "The just man savours God in whatever is found in creatures, and refers it all to the praise of his Creator.",[476]

§ 290. From these testimonies it is manifest that every good work is to be ascribed to God and His grace, and that this most rightly is held even by Johan Driedo in book 2 *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, chapter 3, who

adopts this position, and after him Ruard Tapper in his article on free will, where they say that every good work and whatever good there is are simultaneously both from grace and from free will, equally — according to the judgment of St. Bernard just cited.[477] But also other Catholics not unwillingly subscribe to the same opinion, although some of them interpret it with insufficient care, as we shall presently see.

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§ XXIX — Replies to certain arguments of the opposing side (Respondetur ad quædam in contrarium argumenta)

§ 291. Some persons recoil from the opinion which says that everything is to be ascribed to God, partly for the reason we noted above: because they suppose that by it no place is left for free will and for our merits. To this belongs what St. Bonaventure (at the beginning of his book *On Grace and Free Will*) relates: that someone said to him, "Well then, do you labour, or what do you earn or deserve as a reward, if God does all?" For a similar reason a certain writer of this age — otherwise a Catholic, who composed a book on free will — says in his work (folio 89) that not all good things are done in us by God, but that something also proceeds from our will; as though these two things were inconsistent, that everything should be from God and something also from our will. And in another place of the same book (folio 212) he writes: "In no way could there be virtue and merit in men who are distant from one another, if all things were to flow from the fountain of divine grace." But others, not wishing to say that the sentence so often and so plainly enunciated by the Fathers is false, have attempted to twist it into a different sense. For they say that everything is to be ascribed to God when one regards the totality of our actions as a whole; because, they claim, the word "totum" — that is, "all" — is to be taken not distributively, of each individual action, but collectively, of all actions together, so that "totum" (*the whole*) is understood as meaning the entire aggregate of good works; or, what comes to the same thing, that each individual good work is not total in every part — that is, not total in every respect. This interpretation is found in Driedo[479] and in a certain tractate.[480]

§ 292. Thirdly, the following argument may be urged against this position: A good work is brought to completion by two things — the impulse (*aspiratio*) of grace, and the acceptance (*acceptatio*) of free will. But these two are distinct; therefore, what grace does in a good work is different from what free will does, and accordingly the whole is not done by grace alone. Fourthly, the argument runs as follows: God assists a man in a good work; therefore God does not do the whole, unless in the sense that He assists in the whole — that is, because He brings His aid to bear upon the whole work and not merely upon a part of it. Just as when the same ship is drawn by several men, or the same burden is carried by several, it can truly be said that the whole work is assisted by each individual who hauls or carries, even though each contributes his own share in the hauling. And the proof of the consequence is that where one assists another, each does his own proper share in the whole work, and accordingly each does the whole only in the sense in which each is said to assist in the whole.

§ 293. Fifthly, they object that St. John Chrysostom, in his fifth homily on 2 Thess. 3,[481] appears to reprove those who think that everything is of God. For in expounding the words of the Apostle, "But the Lord is faithful, who shall establish you and keep you from evil," he says: "But lest by these words he should lead them into sluggishness, and they, thinking everything to be of God, should themselves sleep" — and then he shows how he also requires from them that they cooperate, and so forth.

§ 294. Lastly, against what was said on St. Bernard's authority — that the whole good work is done by both, that is, by grace and by free will — one may object that St. Jerome (near the beginning of his fourth book on Jer.),[482] while asserting that everything belongs to the grace of God, denies that everything belongs to man. "Nor," he says, "shall that which comes to pass immediately be wholly man's, but rather of the grace that has bestowed all things." Hence it appears that according to St. Jerome these two things do not consist together: that the whole is grace's and the whole is also free will's.

One may also object what St. Bernard says in the same place: that distinguishing these three — thinking, willing, and accomplishing — he says that God works the first of them, namely the thought of good in us, without us, and that in this we do nothing; so that what has been begun by grace alone is brought to completion equally by both, that is, by grace and by free will.

§ 295. But all these things in no way obstruct the conclusion which must absolutely and properly speaking be admitted: that the whole good work is from the grace of God, and that it is nonetheless also true that the whole is from free will. For nothing prevents something from being wholly from two causes, one of which is subordinate to the other; in such a way, namely, that the inferior cause receives all its operative power and all its movement from the superior cause. This indeed holds universally in the case of the First Cause and a second cause, whatever the second cause may be, whether it acts freely or by natural necessity. In such cases it comes about — indeed it is necessary — that the whole of what is done by the second cause is referred to the First Cause. Nor can there be in such cases any division of works, as though anything in any part of itself were thought to be done by the second cause without also being done wholly and in every part by the First Cause, which applies the second cause to its every operation. We say therefore, with St. Bernard, that the whole good work is performed simultaneously and inseparably by grace and by free will. We say likewise, with St. Thomas, that what is from free will and what is from grace or predestination are not distinct; because what is from a second cause and from the first are not distinct.[483] But according to those same authors, between the two agents the distinction is this: just as free will has its very being from God, so too it has the whole of what it rightly does from the grace of God operating in it and through it; but the converse does not hold — not wholly nor in part does God, in what He does, depend upon the free will of man. For God brings it about that man acts, but man does not bring it about that God acts. This same ratio (*reason*) holds in every work or action performed by any second cause whatsoever.

§ 296. From these considerations it is manifestly clear how ineptly and with how little Catholic sense a certain writer denied that all good things are to be attributed to God and flow from His grace — lest no place should seem to be left for our will, our virtues, and our merits.[484] Certainly I do not see how propositions of that sort can be excused from Pelagian error.[485]

But those who interpret the Fathers' sentence — that everything is to be ascribed to God — as referring to the entire aggregate of works and not to each individual work in its totality, depart widely both from the mind of the holy Fathers (as is very readily seen from their testimonies cited above) and from the mind of the Scriptures, by which those same Fathers were led to speak in this way. For, instructed by the Divine Scriptures, they wish not only that all good works as a whole are from the grace of God, but that in each and every good work there is nothing whatsoever which God does not work through His grace. And for signifying this, they could not have used language more proper than by saying that the whole is from God and the whole is to be rendered to God. For he who speaks thus intends that nothing be excepted — not only no work from the

number of works, but also no part of a work — which is not from God and which is not to be returned to Him with thanksgiving.

§ 297. Reply to the third argument: It is answered that the acceptance by free will — that is, its consent and choice, by which it chooses the good — is itself the proper effect of inspiring grace (*gratia aspirans*); if we understand inspiring grace to be the same as prevenient and operative grace, in the sense in which we have long since said it is to be understood according to the usage of the Church. Although, therefore, it does not belong to inspiring grace to accept grace, yet inspiring grace brings about its own acceptance, because it causes free will to cooperate with it. Hence St. Thomas, writing on Eph. 5, sect. 5,[486] having said that for the justification of the ungodly two things are required — namely free will cooperating in rising from sin, and grace itself — immediately added: "And assuredly this very capacity free will has from prevenient grace."

§ 298. To the fourth objection I reply that it can be conceded that God does the whole in a good work because He assists in the whole, if one rightly understands what "to assist" (*adjuvare*) means when it is attributed to God. For God assists us as the First Cause operating in us, so that our entire operation is in Him operating in us. But if "to assist" is understood in a human manner, as meaning that one who brings his own proper powers and his own proper contribution to a work also joins his efforts to the same work — as, for example, one hand is applied to carrying a litter or hauling, and another hand lends itself to the same task — then the presupposition of the objection is false. For we are not to imagine that God assists us after that fashion, as though we were capable of bringing something of our own to the work that we had not received from Him; and in this sense it would not be valid to say, "God does the whole because He assists in the whole." For not even in human affairs would one speak so; it would be inapt and false to say that one man, or one horse, does the whole simply because he assists in carrying the bier, or in drawing the carriage, along with others. However, regarding the mode in which God assists us, more must be said in its proper place.

§ 299. To the fifth objection: St. John Chrysostom does not reprove those who hold that everything is of God; indeed the very passage shows that one ought so to think, just as we showed from the testimonies of the Fathers drawn together above. But he reproves those who, holding that very true opinion, abused it as an occasion for sloth, imagining that no cooperation was required of them because everything was of God — and who therefore misunderstood what it means for the whole to be of God. For although the whole is of God, it is not of God alone in such a way as to exclude the causality of the second cause, that is, of our free will. And this is what is customarily said — that among the things God does through second causes, He is indeed the total cause and the entire cause of their effects, and yet He is not the sole cause (*causa sola*), as He is in creation.[487] For in creation He alone is the entire cause, since He alone causes and besides Him there is no other cause of the effect.

§ 300. To the last objection: St. Jerome speaks not of the sole act of the will but also of the outcome and success of the work, as is manifest from his words. Now the outcome of our actions is not in our power and can be impeded in many ways against our will. Hence it is rightly attributed by him to the grace of God alone — who bestows all things — both the very work of the will and the success of the work.

As for what is objected from St. Bernard, the reply must be that he ascribes to grace alone the thought of the good insofar as that thought is in the intellect alone, and not insofar as it is a kind of beginning of good will. That this is the sense of St. Bernard is clear, because he distinguishes "thinking" and "willing" as different things, of which the former precedes the latter. Taken in this way, "thinking" — that is, the thought of the

good — is worked by God in us without us, and in this we do nothing, according to the mind of St. Bernard: because the first thought of the good in any given work does not arise from an act of election on the part of our will, but rather precedes it, being infused by God. For the good cannot be chosen unless it has first been thought. Yet that thought is not a part of the good work as we are here speaking of the good work — namely insofar as it proceeds wholly from the free will — but rather it necessarily precedes the good work, at least in the order of nature. Hence it also becomes clear in what sense St. Bernard places the thought at the beginning of a good work and accordingly says that a good work is begun by grace alone. For he is speaking of the thought of the good in a somewhat different way from the way in which St. Augustine, following the Apostle (2 Cor. 3), speaks of it when he affirms it to be itself the effect of prevenient grace — namely, insofar as it is not without some beginning of good will, as we showed above when treating of the effects of prevenient grace.[488] For as St. Bernard speaks of the thought of the good, it is not an effect of grace in the manner in which the knowledge of the law pertains to grace.

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§ XXX — The sentence is explained: that grace is not given according to our merits (Exponitur sententia: Gratiam non dari secundum merita nostra)

§ 301. Among the dogmas once defined by the Fathers against the Pelagian heresy, this also is one: that the grace of God is not given according to our merits. The truth of this sentence is established abundantly enough from the preceding teaching, in which we demonstrated that the whole good work is from the grace of God; yet it will not be useless to confirm it also by its own proper arguments and testimonies. But before we do so, we must explain briefly what in this sentence is meant by the name "grace," what by the name "merit," and what is designated as "our merits."

§ 302. By "grace" the Fathers in their Decree understood not only the gift of habitual grace but grace generally — the grace of God through Christ — as it comprehends also the grace of special assistance, or any effect of that grace whatsoever; that is, every good of man pertaining to piety and to the salvation of eternal life. This general understanding will be apparent from what follows. Likewise by "merit" they understood not only what is called condign merit (*meritum condignum*), but every preparation or disposition by which something to be given by another is obtained or procured, whether it has the formal character (*ratio*) of condign merit or of congruous merit, or is something less than either; and — to say it once for all — every good that in any way can serve as a provocation to some recompense. That this general acceptance of merit is clear from the writings of the Fathers, who explain this sentence and press and defend it against the Pelagians; and in particular from St. Augustine,[490] with whom even faith, prayer, and penance are a form of merit with respect to the remission of sins, and every preceding good is a form of merit with respect to a subsequent good which can by any mode be acquired with regard to it.

We have said more on this matter above, at dist. 41 of Book I,[491] where the question was discussed whether predestination proceeds from our merits. To the same end reduces the interpretation according to which "merit" with respect to grace is understood to mean whatever has of itself some order toward obtaining grace. Of this kind, however, are not the morally good works of unbelievers, nor anything else that precedes faith. For such things lead man by themselves in no way to that renewal which is unto eternal salvation, because those who lack faith do not know it; but such things as do have that order are hope, prayer, and Christian

penance. For these have an order toward righteousness and salvation, such that through them God is in some way invited — as can easily be shown from the Scriptures.

§ 303. Finally, in the same Decree of the Fathers those merits are called "our merits" which we have from our own powers and not from the grace of God. For if you understand "our merits" in a general sense, including even those which come to us from God's grace, then it must altogether be admitted that some grace is given according to our merits — namely, eternal life, and the increase of grace, and in general every grace that follows upon the first grace. For every grace of this kind is given on the basis of the merit of the first grace, taken in a general sense according to what has been said above.

§ 304. Therefore the meaning of the Fathers' sentence is this: that a man cannot of himself and by his own powers have any preparation for the grace of God, nor can he do anything good whereby he might provoke or invite the grace and beneficence of God toward himself in what pertains to eternal salvation. St. Augustine expounds and declares this sentence in this manner, in his work *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 6, and extensively in his letter to Sixtus.[492] To this also belongs the statement of the same St. Augustine, from his work *On Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 68:[493] "The very grace which has been given through faith has been given not preceded by any merits of ours" — namely, for this reason: because faith, even if it is in some sense a merit with respect to the grace that follows it, as St. Augustine teaches, is nonetheless not our merit, that is, a merit obtained by us from ourselves, but a gift bestowed by God.

§ XXXI — The truth of the same teaching established from the Scriptures (Astruitur ejusdem sententiae veritas ex Scripturis)

§ 305. Let us now prove the teaching of the Fathers, as explained in accordance with their mind, first from the Scriptures, then from the Fathers, and finally from reason. Setting aside, however, those general Scriptures by which we have long since shown that man can do nothing salutary without the grace of God — such as: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5); "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7); "We are not sufficient of ourselves" (2 Cor. 3:5); and very many others of the same kind — let us bring forward those which are more specific and directly pertinent to the present matter.

§ 306. To this purpose, therefore, the Scriptures serve in the first place and directly — namely, those which utterly remove our works, that is, works done from ourselves, from the business of our justification and salvation, and, on the contrary, commend the sole grace of God. Such are Rom. 3: "By no flesh" — and again: "They are justified freely by his grace" (Rom. 3:24). And ch. 4: "If Abraham was justified by works, he has whereof to glory, but not before God" (Rom. 4:2). And shortly after: "Now to him that works, the reward is reckoned not according to grace, but according to debt" (Rom. 4:4). And again: "David declares the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes justice without works" (Rom. 4:6). The same thing is said briefly and explicitly in ch. 11 of the same Epistle: "But if by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace" (Rom. 11:6). From these passages it is clear that the opposition between grace and our works or merits is such that they mutually exclude one another.

§ 307. To the same purpose belong these Scriptures: Eph. 2: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God, not of works, lest any man should glory" (Eph. 2:8–9); 2 Tim. 1: "God has delivered us and called us with his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 1:9); and Tit. 3: "Not by works of

justice which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us" (Tit. 3:5). Likewise Ezek. 36: "I will do this not for your sake, but for the sake of my holy name, which you have profaned among the nations" (Ezek. 36:22). And again: "I will do this, not for your sakes; be it known unto you" (Ezek. 36:32). Hence also in the same place of the Prophet it is said: "I will give you a new heart, and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you a heart of flesh" (Ezek. 36:26) — concerning this entire passage of the Prophet, see St. Augustine.[495] Likewise Eph. 2: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God has prepared, that we should walk in them" (Eph. 2:10). For by these words it is signified that just as a creature cannot in any way dispose itself for its own creation — since prior to creation it is nothing as regards its natural being — so neither can man dispose himself by any preceding work toward the grace of good works and justice in Christ, that is, toward his own restoration and, as it were, re-creation; since he too, prior to the grace that restores and re-creates him, is nothing as regards spiritual being.

§ 308. To this purpose likewise serve those Scriptures which attribute our conversion to God himself and to his grace: as Ps. 84: "Convert us, O God our saviour" (Ps. 84:5); Jer. 31: "Convert me and I shall be converted. For after you converted me, I did penance" (Jer. 31:18); and Lam. 5: "Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted" (Lam. 5:21); and Lk. 22, where it is recounted that the Lord, having turned toward Peter, looked upon him, so that Peter was moved to repentance through that look.[496] Such also is Ps. 76: "I said: Now I have begun; this is the change of the right hand of the Most High" (Ps. 76:11). By which it is assuredly signified that even the very beginning of our conversion is to be attributed to the gift of God, as St. Augustine witnesses.[497] And whatever other Scriptures teach that faith and penance are gifts of God — of which there is proper treatment in their own places.

§ 309. To the same end belong those Scriptures which signify that we are drawn by God to the things pertaining to our justice and salvation. For that which was of itself contrary, resisting, and holding back is drawn — as St. Jerome[498] and St. Augustine[499] rightly expound that phrase. The scriptural passages are: Jn. 6: "No man can come to me, except the Father who has sent me draw him" (Jn. 6:44); and ch. 12: "And if I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to myself" (Jn. 12:32); Song 1: "Draw me: we will run after you" (Song 1:3); Jer. 31: "I have loved you with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn you, taking pity on you" (Jer. 31:3).

§ 310. To this same head are also to be referred those Scriptures which signify that God seeks us when we stray and pursues us when we flee. For this is taught by the parable of the lost sheep, sought and found (Lk. 15); and by that of Is. 65, cited by the Apostle in Rom. 10: "I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask for me" (Rom. 10:20); and by what the same Apostle says in the same Epistle, ch. 9: "The Gentiles who followed not after justice have attained to justice; but Israel, by following after the law of justice, is not come to the law. Why? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by works" (Rom. 9:30–32).

§ 311. Add to these the Scriptures which represent God as giving first, in comparison with us: as Rom. 11: "Who has first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom. 11:35). And the reason follows: "Because from him are all things" (Rom. 11:36). And Job 41: "Who has first given to me, that I should repay him?" (Job 41:3). Where likewise a general reason is added: "All things that are under heaven are mine" (Job 41:11).

§ 312. Add also other Scriptures which commend prevenient grace, such as Ps. 58: "His mercy shall prevent me" (Ps. 58:11). And Prov. 8 (according to the Septuagint), frequently cited by St. Augustine and the other Fathers against the Pelagians: "The will is prepared by the Lord" (Prov. 8:35 LXX).[500]

§ 313. In a particular manner, however, those Scriptures serve this purpose which teach that our election or predestination is purely gratuitous, to such a degree that they exclude all our merit from it. Such are: Jn. 15: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you" (Jn. 15:16); and 1 Jn. 4: "Not as though we had loved God, but because he first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:10). And again: "Therefore let us love God, because God first loved us" (1 Jn. 4:19). Rom. 9: "That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger" (Rom. 9:11–12). And the rest of what the Apostle discusses in that same chapter, and then in ch. 11, concerning gratuitous election. And other Scriptures, very many of which we adduced to demonstrate the doctrine of gratuitous predestination.[501] For whatever arguments prove that predestination does not proceed from merits, those same arguments equally convince that the grace of God, which is the proper effect of predestination, is not given according to the merits of those to whom it is given.

§ 314. Now to this place are also to be referred the various comparisons by which the Scriptures everywhere employ in order to declare the justification of the sinner. For, beyond the fact that in these comparisons justification is likened to creation — as in Eph. 2, of which passage we have already spoken — it is also compared to generation, as Jas. 1: "Of his own will has he begotten us by the word of truth" (Jas. 1:18); and 1 Pet. 1: "According to his great mercy, he has regenerated us unto a lively hope" (1 Pet. 1:3). And yet no thing is able to dispose itself toward its own generation. Therefore neither does man have anything of his own by which he might dispose himself toward his own justification, but receives it entirely as a wholly gratuitous gift — to signify which, one Apostle adds "of his own will," that is, according to the good pleasure of his own will; while the other adds "according to his great mercy."

§ 315. Moreover, according to allegory, the justification of man is compared to the fecundation of barren women. For the reason, as Franco says,[502] that the holy Patriarchs obtained barren wives by the secret counsel of God — Abraham obtained Sarah, Isaac Rebecca, Jacob Rachel — and in their conjugal act and offspring the sacrament of Christ and the Church was prefigured: so that, with the aid of nature being wanting, man might understand that he is saved by grace alone and not by merits. Furthermore, the sinner with respect to justification is compared to clay, as in Is. 45, Jer. 18, and Rom. 9; is compared to dry land, as Ps. 142: "My soul is as earth without water unto you" (Ps. 142:6); and is compared to a dead man, as Lk. 15, Jn. 5, Eph. 2 and 5, and Col. 2. Yet none of these things brings from itself any disposition toward receiving form, fruit, or life. In this manner, therefore, does the sinful man stand with respect to justification.

§ 316. Finally, let there be added the example of the conversion of the Apostle Paul, as the exemplar and model of the justification of all sinners. He, who had formerly been a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, nevertheless obtained mercy, and was called to the faith at the very moment when he was engaged in the act and heat of persecution — namely, so that in him, as the first, Christ might show forth all patience for the instruction of those who should hereafter believe in him, as Paul himself records (1 Tim. 1:13–16). Concerning which, St. Augustine says:[7] "We find that the Apostle Paul obtained the grace of God without any good merits, indeed with many evil merits — God rendering good for evil." And the same Doctor affirms that the same is to be said of the rest of sinners:[503] "Whose good works," he says, "did the Lord find? No one's. For he found the works of all to be evil."

§ XXXII — Proof of the same teaching from the Fathers and the Councils (Ejusdem sententiae probatio ex Patribus et Conciliis)

§ 317. Led by so great an authority of the Scriptures, the Fathers deservedly condemned with anathema, in eighth place among the twelve heretical articles of Pelagius, that opinion of his by which, acknowledging the Grace of God to some extent, he said that it is given according to our merits; and they decreed that the dogma contrary to that opinion is to be held by faith. This was done at the Synod of Palestine held at Diospolis, where Pelagius himself, being present lest he should be condemned, recanted and condemned that article together with the rest, though not sincerely. St. Augustine recalls this definition chiefly in his letters[504] and,[505] in which places he enumerates in order the twelve articles themselves. The same St. Augustine likewise recalls it in another letter,[506] in his work against the two letters of the Pelagians,[507] and in his book on the predestination of the saints.[508] Prosper also recalls it.[509]

§ 318. The same definition was repeated at the Council of Orange. For after several canons of the council by which it is taught that man can of himself do nothing that pertains to piety and eternal life, at length in the final canon it declares that God Himself, with no preceding good merits on our part, first inspires in us both faith and love, so that we may both faithfully seek the grace of Baptism, and thereafter, with His assistance, be able to fulfil those things that are pleasing to Him. The Council of Trent likewise proves and confirms this teaching, declaring[134] that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from the Grace of God coming through Christ Jesus, from His very vocation, whereby they are called with no existing merits on their part; so that they who, through sin, had turned away from God, may be disposed through His Grace toward converting themselves to their own justification.

§ 319. Beyond these definitions of the Councils, even if the testimonies of individual Fathers need not be required, yet, in order that the teaching of the Church may appear the more illustrious, we shall note down the opinions of some — though only of the chief among them. St. Jerome says,[510] "It is grace: we are saved not by merit nor by work." And on Eph. 2: "Without the blood of Jesus, no one draws near to God."[511] St. Augustine says,[512] God "does not find but makes merits." And again: "In all things the mercy of God comes before us." From his book on original sin:[513] "The Spirit breathes where He wills, not following merits, but even making merits themselves." And in his exposition of Ps. 51:[514] "I will confess to Thee — not from my merits, but from Thy mercy — that I might hope in Thy mercy." See the same author in his work against the two letters of the Pelagians,[515] in his book on free will,[516] at the beginning of his book on the predestination of the saints,[517] and in his letter to Simplicianus[518] — which passage is especially to be noted. Leo says:[519] "The cause of our restoration is none other than the mercy of God, with no preceding merits of ours." And again in another sermon:[520] "God had no cause for showing us mercy except in His own goodness." See the same author in a letter.[521] Prosper says:[522] "For all men the cause of receiving Grace is the will of God, with whom the reason of election lies hidden, beginning from that grace which they received without merits, who begin with merits." The same author may be seen in his poem on the ungrateful and against the Collator.[523]

§ 320. Fulgentius writes:[524] "If it is ours to will to believe before the Grace of God begins to assist us, then Grace is unjustly so called; for it is not given gratuitously to men but is paid back as a due to a good will." And in a letter:[525] "Even that we should desire the assistance of Grace is itself also the work of Grace." Gregory writes:[526] "We do not come to faith by virtues, but through faith do we arrive at virtues." And in his *Dialogues*:[527] "All gifts come before every work, though through subsequent work those very gifts also increase." The

same author says, speaking of God's gifts bestowed upon man:[528] "Let him attribute nothing to his own merits."

§ 321. These Fathers harmonize beautifully with Franco, in his book on the Grace of God. For he says[529] that man, by no wisdom of his own, by no virtue of his own, by no merits of his own, but solely by the Grace of his Creator, finds a way of recovering Grace — citing for this purpose the Scripture of Deut. 9: "Do not say in your heart: Because of my righteousness," etc. And in another tome he says:[530] "Thy grace, O Christ, brings about all these things, being so given freely to all that it is prevented by the merit of none, by the desire of none, but itself comes before all, itself assists all, itself grants to all that they may arrive." And so forth with what follows.

§ 322. It is well worth the effort to add, among the other testimonies of the holy Fathers, the words of Philo the Jew — not a Christian, perhaps,[531] yet one well versed in the Mosaic religion and the Scriptures of the old law. He writes in his book *On the Sacrifices of Abel and Cain*: "A vow is the petition of some good from God. The commandment, moreover, is that one who has obtained his vow should offer a crown to God, not to himself, and that without delay, if it can be done. In this matter those who sin do so in different ways: some, by forgetfulness of benefits, deprive themselves of the giving of thanks, than which nothing is more precious; others, by excessive arrogance, regard themselves as the authors of their own good things, and not that true Author of all things. A third class sins less seriously than those just mentioned, yet more seriously than the first. These refer their good things indeed to God as Author, but say that they obtain them by their own merit. For they are, they say, prudent, brave, temperate, just, and are therefore to be regarded as worthy of the divine Grace. Against each of these classes sacred Scripture resists." So Philo, thereafter confirming each point in turn by adducing the testimonies of Scripture.

§ 323. Furthermore, lest we be too prolix here, it must be noted once for all that, whenever the Fathers teach that all our merits are gifts of God, they manifestly show that the Grace of God is not given according to our merits which are from ourselves; for if it were so, some of our merits would not be gifts of God. They teach this, and diligently impress it, especially those who wrote against the Pelagians. This is also confirmed by Pope Celestine in his letter written to the Bishops of Gaul,[532] where he says: "So great is the goodness of God toward us, that He wills to be ours the merits which are His own gifts." This very sentence is repeated word for word by the Council of Trent.[402]

§ 324. Second, all the testimonies of the Fathers by which they teach that we are predestined not on account of foreseen merit but by the gratuitous mercy of God pertain to this same point.

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§ XXXIII — Demonstration of the Same Doctrine from Reason (Ejusdem Doctrinae demonstratio ex ratione)

§ 325. Whatever arguments prove that every good work, and likewise the whole of it, proceeds from grace (*a Gratia*) — these same arguments have equal force and carry altogether the same weight for demonstrating that every merit of ours is a gift of God (*donum Dei*), and consequently that grace is not given according to our merits, which do not come from grace. For merit, in its relation to the grace of God by which we are restored to eternal life, could not exist unless the work were in some measure good and salvific. To this point, therefore,

converge those general arguments drawn from the prayers of the Church, from thanksgiving, from glorying, and from the universal efficacy of the Supreme Cause.

§ 326. For the Church prays to God that He may, by the power of His prevenient grace (*Gratiae praevenientis*), convert to faith and repentance those who are altogether strangers to the Christian faith — heretics, schismatics, pagans, even Jews, persecutors of the Christian name, and whatsoever great sinners in whom there is no good merit; and for the conversion of all she gives thanks to God, and by this she professes that the whole of that divine work belongs to Him, as Pope Celestine reasons in his epistle.[320] And indeed the Church does this in accordance with the precept of the Apostle Paul in 1 Tim. 2, where he wishes both prayers and thanksgivings to be made for all men.[534]

§ 327. Furthermore, if anyone could by his own merit anticipate the grace of God, he ought not to glory in God on account of his merit but in himself — which is contrary both to piety and to the Scriptures, inasmuch as one would glory not in the Lord. And finally, if anyone can possess of himself some good merit by which he disposes himself toward the grace of God, then God is not the primary cause properly efficient of things and actions, and it will not be true that God works all things in all (1 Cor. 12), and that all good things are to be referred back to God as to their author from whom they spring.[535]

§ 328. If you say that such a preparation can be obtained from God's general assistance alone, and that a man may thus still glory in God — at least it will follow that he cannot glory in God through Christ with respect to such a work by which he prepared himself for grace; because those things that have remained within nature are not obtained through the merit of Christ — as that one is a man, that he has hands and feet, that he can speak, and so forth — and so glorying in nature will not be excluded. For a man will be able to glory that by the powers of nature he accomplished so much that in consideration thereof God gave him grace. And so grace would in truth come from works, namely from deeds that call forth the benefit of divine grace — which is openly contrary to the Apostle.[536]

§ 329. But to these there are added special and proper arguments. The first is from the very name of grace (*gratia*). For grace (*gratia*) is so called because it is given freely (*gratis*): it is therefore repugnant to grace that it should be given according to merits, unless those merits themselves are also from grace. The Apostle presses this argument dialectically in Rom. 11, saying: "But if by grace, then not of works: otherwise grace is no more grace."[537] Now it is the same thing to speak of works and to speak of merits. The Fathers also press this same argument, as St. Augustine,[538] and Fulgentius,[524] and others.

§ 330. The second argument: What is natural has no causal order toward what is supernatural, because the two are entirely different in kind; therefore no work of ours can have the formal character (*ratio*) of merit with respect to grace. The inference is clear, because the work of ours here in question is that which we perform from the powers of nature, whereas grace is a supernatural good.

§ 331. The third argument: Even if nature, considered in itself, could strive toward grace through some merit, yet it cannot do so in man as corrupted by sin — by which sin it has come about that he is totally turned away from God and can have no beginning of conversion to God unless he has first been mercifully anticipated by God's grace. For from the corruption of sin comes what the Apostle recalls from the Psalm in Rom. 3: "There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God; they are all gone aside, they are together become unprofitable, there is none that doeth good, no not one."[539] Hence the same Apostle says

also of those who were under the Law, in Tit. 3: "For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, unbelieving, erring, serving divers lusts and pleasures," etc.'[540]

§ 332. The fourth argument: It belongs to the same cause — namely to the efficient cause — both to produce a form and to dispose toward that form; but God produces and gives grace; therefore it is God who disposes man for receiving it, and not man himself, except insofar as he is moved by God through some assistance of His grace. This argument is St. Thomas's,[257] and it concludes not only regarding habitual grace but also regarding the grace that disposes toward it, as St. Thomas himself well explains. The fifth argument: Grace is the proper effect of predestination; therefore if grace is given according to our merits, predestination will be from merits. Now this is not only false but also contrary to the Catholic faith.'[541] The inference is manifest, because when the question is asked whether predestination is from merits, predestination is understood according to its entire effect. St. Thomas had this in mind when he conjoined these three things — predestination, election, and justification (that is, grace) — saying that they depend on God's will alone.'[542] To this point, therefore, all the arguments may be referred by which it was shown in the preceding book that we are predestined not from merits but purely gratuitously.

§ 333. Hence, in the last place, it must be noted that when the Fathers say that grace is not given according to our merits, they exclude not only merits preceding grace itself but also merits subsequent to it — so that from the same dogma the teaching of those too must be condemned who have said that God gives grace to certain persons because He foresaw that they would either accept the grace offered to them or would make good use of grace once accepted. To this end also tend the opinions of those who suspend predestination and the entire purpose of giving grace upon the foreknowledge of the co-operation of free will (*liberi arbitrii*) — as though the very co-operation of free will were not itself an effect of predestination or of divine grace. We have spoken of this whole matter with sufficient fullness elsewhere.[543]

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§ XXXIII [continued] — That no one can prepare himself for grace without grace (Neminem sine Gratia posse se ad Gratiam praeparare)

§ 334. Regarding the fact that grace is not given according to merits, four different senses can arise, according to the varying acceptation of grace (*Gratiae*) and of merit (*meriti*). The first: habitual grace is not given from merit of condignity (*merito de condigno*). The second: habitual grace is not given from merit of congruity (*merito de congruo*). The third: grace taken in the general sense, as also comprehending the assistance of special grace, is not given from merit of condignity. The fourth: grace taken in the general sense is not given from merit of congruity, taken in the general sense. We have shown above that only this last sense was intended by the Fathers when pronouncing and defining the aforesaid proposition — although the first and third senses also contain truth; indeed also the second, if it be understood of merit that one has from oneself.

§ 335. Yet among the Scholastics, certain ones, not attending to what the Fathers had in view in that proposition, have slipped into other senses, thinking that the Fathers meant nothing other than what is contained in the first, or the second, or the third of the senses mentioned above. And consequently they supposed that it had not been defined by the Fathers that grace is not given according to merits in the sense of the last of those meanings. On that account they thought there was no danger in saying that a man by the sole powers of nature can do certain things that are morally good; and that thus, by making good use of his natural

endowments, he can merit — not by condignity, yet by congruity — the assistance of God's grace, and in this way can prepare and dispose himself for grace without grace. This is the opinion of Durandus, Scotus, and Gabriel;[545] and again Durandus,[546] Antissiodorensis in his *Summa*,[547] Thomas of Strasbourg,[548] and among more recent writers Alfonso de Castro,[549] who fights so vigorously for this opinion that he condemns the contrary view as impious and heretical — not without great rashness.

§ 336. But this opinion of theirs is plainly out of harmony with the Catholic sense of the holy Fathers, and is refuted by all the same arguments by which we have already overthrown that thesis of Pelagius: "Grace is given according to our merits." For if this be understood in the sense in which it was asserted by Pelagius and condemned by the Fathers — namely that a man without grace, that is, without the movement of the special assistance that is given through Christ, equipped solely with the powers of nature, can prepare or dispose himself for receiving grace — and if this preparation toward grace has a certain formal character (*rationem*) of merit, it is a certain consequence that grace is given according to our merits. Therefore, in refuting that opinion, there is no need here to dwell at greater length. We add only this: that the Fathers have rejected it in express terms together with the rest of Pelagius's doctrine. For the Council of Orange, in canon 6, condemns whoever says that divine mercy is conferred on those who desire, strive, labour, knock, or do anything of the sort without the grace of God — while not confessing that through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit these very acts are brought about in us in the way that they ought to be performed; condemning him as resisting the Apostle who says: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" and "By the grace of God I am what I am."[550] And in canon 7, it says that whoever maintains that a man can by the vigour of nature think anything good that pertains to the salvation of eternal life, or choose it as is fitting, apart from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, is deceived by the heretical spirit and does not understand the voice of God saying in the Gospel: "Without me you can do nothing," and the Apostle's word: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves," etc.[551] Now under the words of both canons it is manifest that everything is comprehended by which someone could prepare or dispose himself for grace.

§ 337. It is also the well-known opinion of Prosper in his Responses: "Without grace no one runs to grace."[552] And in his work *De Vocatione Gentium*: "With God as guide, one comes to God."[553] And in the same work: "Grace itself," he says, "prepares the first willing reception of its gifts in the one it calls."[554] The same author in his poem *De Ingratis* sings thus of grace: "That it may be sought by the desire and affection of anyone, it itself acts, coming as guide to all who come to it, and unless one runs through it, one does not arrive at it."[555]

§ 338. Furthermore, beyond the Scriptures cited in the aforesaid canons of the Council of Orange, there are also the following, no less clear: Prov. 8: "The will is prepared by the Lord."[556] And Ezek. 36: "Not for your sakes do I this, saith the Lord."[557]

§ 339. Now among the Scholastics, St. Thomas treats this matter most excellently. Consult him in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 15; *Contra Gentes* III, ch. 149; and *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, in the body.[558] In all these places he clearly teaches that no one can without the assistance of grace prepare himself for grace, but that every such preparation must itself also be attributed to grace. Indeed he says — which is especially to be noted — that it belongs to the Pelagian error to suppose that a man can prepare himself for grace without the assistance of divine grace.[559] Let one also consult what Cajetan and Bartholomaeus Medina write on *Summa theologiae* I-II at the aforesaid places.[560] For they rightly teach the mind of their Doctor against Durandus: that even every imperfect disposition toward grace is from

the God who anticipates it; and that any work, however merely morally good, or whatever can be accomplished from the faculty of nature, is a disposition toward grace only by a certain disposition of congruity and imperfect formal character (*ratione*) of merit, and therefore cannot be called a merit for grace.

§ 340. Finally, this too must not be passed over: that those also cannot be excused from the error we have now refuted who taught that the attrition (*attritio*) which alone, when joined with the sacrament, suffices to obtain the grace of justification, can be had from the sole powers of nature. This was the opinion of Domingo de Soto, Melchior Cano, Francis of Victoria, and certain others.[561] But this view is well and solidly refuted by Medina at the article mentioned, on the basis of Scripture and the councils of Orange and Trent; showing that attrition together with the sacrament suffices only when it is recognized as having a supernatural motive and as being an effect of preventing grace — which he also proves thus: every adult is justified only with some disposition necessarily present before the reception of the sacrament; if then attrition alone, held from the powers of nature together with the sacrament, suffices for justification, it follows evidently that a man can prepare himself for the very grace of justification without assistance, by the sole powers of nature. But this is nothing other than to prepare oneself for grace without grace — which has already been sufficiently shown to pertain to the Pelagian error.

§ 341. But the doctrine laid out above seems to be greatly opposed by that commonly received maxim of the Schools which says: to the man who does what is in him (*facienti quod in se est*), God imparts His grace. For from this it plainly appears to follow that grace is given according to some merit of the man who does what is in him, and that a man can prepare himself for grace without grace — namely by doing what is in him. This maxim is found not only among ordinary theologians but also in St. Thomas himself in more than one place: as in *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2, where he says that although a man cannot by free will acquire grace, which makes meritorious works, he can nevertheless prepare himself for having grace, which will not be denied him by God if he has done what is in him (*si fecerit quod in se est*).[562] And in the same work, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1, where he says that it belongs to divine Providence to provide each one with what is necessary for salvation, provided there is no impediment on the person's part; for if someone, he says, were nurtured in the forests or among brute animals and followed the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil, it is most certainly to be held that God would either by interior inspiration reveal to him what is necessary for belief, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, just as He sent Peter to Cornelius.'[563] And in the same work, ad 2: "If we have done what is in us, namely followed the guidance of natural reason, God will not fail us in what is necessary for us." Moreover, earlier in article 10, he had said, commenting on the fact that man, unlike all other animals, was given reason, through which he could both provide for the necessities of this life and dispose himself for receiving the divine aids toward eternal life.'[564] A similar passage in him is on man nurtured in the forests, in *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1.[565] His commentator Medina too, writing on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, considers it probable the opinion of those Doctors who say that to the man who does what is in him from the faculty of nature, God never denies grace out of His mercy.[566]

§ 342. To this are further adduced certain passages of St. John Chrysostom, in which he says that a man must first bring what is his own, and that God will then give him His grace. For thus he speaks in Homily 35 (*In Genesim*), inculcating the same point several times,[567] and also in a Homily on Ps. 7 and in the little work on the fact that no one is harmed except by himself, and elsewhere.'[568] Now these two expressions — "to bring what is one's own" and "to do what is in one" — seem to amount to the same thing. And as for the very phrase

or manner of speaking, some think it is approved by Scripture. For Christ says in Lk. 12: "But why do you not even of yourselves judge what is right?",[569] And the Apostle in Rom. 1: "So, as much as is in me, I am ready to preach the gospel to you also who are at Rome.",[570] And in ch. 12: "If it be possible, as much as is in you, having peace with all men.",[571] Of the same kind is what Cyprian writes in his Epistle to Fidus concerning the baptism of infants: "As much as is in us, if it can be done, no soul is to be lost.",[572]

§ 343. In order to reply to these and to understand what is to be judged concerning that common saying of the Schools, one must distinguish its multiple senses. One sense is that a man can by the sole powers of nature keep the law of nature and live innocently according to reason; and that if he does so, God, moved by this moral goodness of his, illumines his mind from within or at least directs a preacher to him, or procures some occasion by which he may at length arrive at faith and justice. This sense is without doubt Pelagian, and contrary both to the defined judgment of the Fathers that grace is not given according to merits, and to the canons of the Council of Orange, and to the Catholic doctrine of gratuitous predestination. Moreover, even the opinion that supposes there to be some man who by the sole powers of nature can keep the law of nature in such a way as never at any time to sin mortally against it, is not a little opposed to our faith concerning original sin and the corruption of human nature from that sin, according to Scripture: "They are all gone aside," etc. — as will be disputed below in its proper place.

§ 344. A second sense is that a man by his own powers can aspire toward the grace of God by desiring and invoking it — whether he has previously lived morally well or ill, and whether he is faithful or not. Concerning this sense the judgment is the same as for the former. This kind of doctrine is also condemned in express words in canons 3, 4, and 6 of the Council of Orange.[573]

§ 345. A third sense is that a man, doing what is in him — that is, doing in the powers of nature and of his free will as much as observance of the natural law permits — receives the grace of God at the same moment; for the reason that divine goodness does not permit a man who is living morally justly to be deprived even for a moment of that grace whereby he may be worthy of eternal life, even if he has not yet been imbued with faith in Christ nor yet placed his hope in Christ. In this way Alfonso [de Castro] in the place cited above explains that opinion, adding that God would not permit such a man to die before he has been sufficiently instructed concerning faith in Christ. For unless this be said, he argues, we shall be hemmed in on every side; because it will be necessary to confess either that one is saved without faith in the Mediator, or that one who dies with grace is condemned, or that one who does what is in him is deprived of God's grace — any one of which to assert would be impious and heretical. This sense is no less Pelagian than the two foregoing. And moreover it adds this absurdity, and a gravely erroneous one: that someone may be in sanctifying grace (*in Gratia gratum faciente*) without faith in the Mediator — which is contrary to the entire doctrine of the Apostle Paul and of Christ Himself on justification.

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§ XXXIII — Demonstration of the same doctrine from reason (Ejusdem Doctrinae demonstratio ex ratione)

§ 346. The absurdity of that sense is diminished by the fact that a man who does what is in him is posited as having grace at that same instant; for it makes no difference whether these two things are conjoined in time or not, provided that doing what is in oneself is posited as the cause and formal character (*ratio*) of obtaining

grace. For in this way too grace is given according to merit. Nor need one here fear the difficulty arising from the last of the three cases — namely, that a man who does what is in him lacks the grace of God — so far is that from being rejectable as impious and heretical, that rather the contrary opinion is to be rejected as Pelagian heresy, as has now been sufficiently proved.

§ 347. The fourth sense is that a man who does what lies within his power with the help of the grace of God moving him obtains further grace — such as the grace of justification, or its increase, or even explicit and perfect faith, if he previously had only implicit or imperfect faith. And this sense is the Catholic one. St. Thomas expounds that locution in this sense,[575] where, having objected to himself the saying "If a man does what is in him, God does not deny him grace," he replies that one must say that a man can do nothing unless he is moved by God, according to that word of Jn. 15: "Without me you can do nothing." And therefore, when it is said to be in the power of a man to do what is in him, this is according as he is moved by God. St. Thomas declares this same sense more fully,[576] where he disputes at length the question whether grace is necessarily given to one who does what is in him. He explains this same sense clearly in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 10, lect. 3,[577] saying: "This very fact that some do what is in them — that is, converting themselves to God — is from God moving their hearts to good, according to that word of Lam. 5: 'Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted.'"

§ 348. Hence it is evident that St. Thomas did not begin to hold this view only when he wrote the *Summa*, but also did so much earlier. This same sense is indicated by the Roman Catechism for parish priests (in the title on the degrees of prayer),[578] when it says that certain persons who have not yet received the light of faith — such as Cornelius — are so aroused to the pursuit of truth by the divine goodness kindling their slender natural light that they seek, with earnest prayers, to be taught it; and if they persevere in that will, says the Catechism, their pursuit is not rejected by the clemency of God: "For to no one who seeks it from the heart are the doors of divine goodness shut." These are its words. Nor do those final words mean anything other than what Christ Himself promised when He said: "Ask, and you shall receive; seek," etc.[579] It is certain, however, that a man neither asks nor seeks, nor is capable of anything of the sort, without the help of the grace of God, as has been declared most clearly in canon 6 of the Council of Orange.[580]

§ 349. The sense and explanation of St. Thomas are followed and defended by Cajetan,[581] Medina,[582] and Bannes.[583] With these agrees Peter of Soto.[584] St. Thomas in the *Summa* — which he wrote last — must be considered either to have clarified, or to have retracted, whatever he had said elsewhere in a different or more obscure manner. Note likewise that throughout the whole *Summa* he nowhere speaks absolutely and expressly so as to say that God gives grace to one who does what is in him; rather, he only explains how that common saying is to be understood. Nor does he anywhere else say that a man does what is in him without the help of the secret grace of God, such that by this he could be said to be prepared for grace. Indeed, he expressly denies this,[585] and the same is sufficiently indicated in that same work.[586] Moreover, a similar exposition is found in the common[587] (in *In dist. 28 of the present book*, a. 2, questiuncula 1).[588] In this same sense those passages adduced from Adrian and Navarro are rightly received. For that which they say is of faith, if you understand "doing what is in oneself" as being from the help of the grace of God. It rests upon the most certain promise of Christ: "Ask, and you shall receive."

§ 350. But perhaps someone will say that this common saying can rightly be received in the following sense: that to a man who does what is in him — that is, as much as he can by the forces of nature — God always gives grace, not indeed on account of any merit of his, nor as though regarding his work as a

preparation for grace, but out of pure liberality and mercy. For this is what Medina seems to mean when he says that that opinion is probable if one says that God never denies grace to such a man out of His mercy.[589] And St. Thomas himself seems to suggest something of the sort.[590]

§ 351. It is answered: that saying does not hold firm unless it is understood that God gives grace because a man does what is in him — so that some formal character of giving grace is thereby indicated on the part of the man. But no other formal character can be understood than a meritorious one, at least in the general signification of merit which we explained above; and where there is merit, there too is preparation. Hence it does not stand that God gives grace to a man because he does what is in him, and yet gives him grace purely liberally and mercifully. Moreover, Medina in the same place presently destroys that very opinion; for he adds that it is not an infallible law, and proves this through the Scriptures: "Who distinguishes thee?"[333] and "Who has first given to Him?",[591] — adding also reasons and the authority of St. Augustine. Finally, he weighs the whole matter more carefully in the second passage cited above.[592]

§ 352. Reply to the objections drawn from St. John Chrysostom:[593] he speaks of those who have already received something from God by which they can make progress — such as faith, the desire of virtue, a good will, even if imperfect. For these things are the man's own, yet received from God; a man brings these forward while by faith he prays to God and offers to Him his good desire and will, so as to receive more. And in this sense it is rightly said to someone: "Do what is in you, and God will help you" — that is, do what you can according to your present powers, but powers received from God; and God will help the pious effort which He gave, and will bring to completion what He has begun.

§ 353. As for the Scriptural passages alleged in support of the phrase whereby one is said to do what is in him: the passage adduced from Lk. 12[569] has this sense: "Why do you not of yourselves" — that is, by yourselves, without my external admonition — "judge what is just?" — yet not without the interior movement of the grace of God, from which every effect of correction is to be expected, as St. Augustine teaches.[594] Again, in the Apostle,[595] those locutions "what is in me" and "what is from you, or in us" are not opposed to "what is in God, or from God," but to what is in others — namely, in men, or even in demons. For the Apostle desired indeed to preach the Gospel among many, but he complains that he was frequently hindered by wicked men and by Satan himself. And in order that one may have peace with others, it is not enough if he alone is willing, unless the others are willing too; for peace and concord are made only by the consent of several. In a similar sense St. Cyprian speaks,[596] opposing what is in us to external impediments, which happen to us even against our will. And this is a common mode of speaking according to this sense.

§ 354. Furthermore, the refutation of the first three senses is abundantly covered by what has been said about grace not being given according to merits, and by what was said in the preceding book on predestination not being from merits; though experience can also be brought forward to refute this kind of sense and opinion. For those who are read to have lived most innocently among pagans according to moral justice were not on that account called back from the worship of false gods — Socrates and others, for instance — nor can any certain example whatever be brought forward to that purpose. Moreover, that God takes no account of moral justice in calling men to faith is shown by many examples of Scripture: Paul, Matthew, the Thief, the sinful woman, and the fact that it is so often read that Christ ate with tax-collectors and sinners. On this matter let St. Augustine be consulted,[597] as well as Prosper.[598]

§ XXXVI — Reply to the remaining arguments that would derive Grace from merits (Ad cetera argumenta, quae Gratiam ex meritis volunt responsio)

§ 355. Against the doctrine of the gratuitous Grace of God there are also many other objections, which are customarily raised both from the Scriptures and from the Fathers.

The first is from Zech. 1:3: "Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you," which they expound thus: turn ye to me through nature, and I will turn to you through Grace. And they prove this interpretation on the ground that, before God turns to us through His Grace, no other turning to Him can be required of us than one through nature.

The second is from Prov. 16:1: "It is for man to prepare the soul, and for the Lord to govern the tongue." This antithesis, they say, does not hold unless the first member is understood with exclusion — namely, that it belongs to man *alone* to prepare the soul. For the second member does not seem to admit an exclusive sense, since man himself also governs his own tongue, as Ps. 33:14 says: "Refrain thy tongue from evil."

The third is from Matt. 10, where the Apostles, about to preach the Gospel to the cities, are commanded, on entering, to inquire who in it is worthy — that is, to whom they should preach the Gospel. And hence in Matt. 7 the same preachers are forbidden to give what is holy to dogs and to cast pearls before swine.

The fourth: Christ says in Matt. 11:25: "I confess to thee, Father, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and hast revealed them to the little ones" — that is, to the humble; therefore someone merits the grace of faith by humility. Similar to this is that text from Jas. 4 and 1 Pet. 5, drawn from Prov. 3 according to the Septuagint: "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble."

The fifth is from Jn. 4:35, where the Lord says: "Behold the countries, for they are white already to harvest." By this figure of speech He wished to signify that the souls of men were already prepared to receive the Gospel that His disciples were to preach.

The sixth: In many places of Scripture God is said to find certain persons good, and on that account to bestow upon them certain benefits of Grace — as in Gen. 18, Job 1:3,[600] Ps. 88, Wis. 3, Matt. 8. Now one is not said to find what he himself has made, but what has been made by another.

The seventh is from Acts 10, where Cornelius, not yet a Christian, merited through alms and other good works that Peter be sent to him as a messenger of Christ and the faith — as the words of the Angel saying to him are adduced: "Thy prayers and thine alms are gone up for a memorial in the sight of God," and so on. Therefore, through works done without faith in the Mediator, and hence without Grace, he merited the grace of faith. And this is confirmed by the words subsequently spoken by Peter: "In very deed I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him and worketh justice is acceptable to him." These words seem consonant with what St. Augustine commonly says and is wont to cite (in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*): "He merited to believe, because he was a good man, even before he believed." The same can be said of Cornelius, whose acceptable alms and heard prayers preceded his believing in Christ.[601]

The eighth: In Lk. 19, Zacchaeus, by his devotion in wishing to see Christ, merited to be called to faith and salvation. Hence St. Ambrose (*De Abel et Cain*, bk. 1, ch. 4[602]) says that Zacchaeus obtained by prayer that he might see and be called by Christ.

The ninth: In Lk. 23, the thief who rebuked his companion and proclaimed Christ's innocence — having as yet heard nothing about the Mediator — merited to hear: "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise." This example, together with the preceding one, is adduced by Cassian (*Collatio* 13[603]) to show that the Grace of God is sometimes preceded by the will and merits of men. For, he says, if the grace of God always follows upon the beginnings of a good will, what shall I say of the faith of Zacchaeus? What shall we say of the piety of that thief, who by a certain longing was bringing beforehand, as it were, upon himself the decisive calls of the kingdom of heaven?

The tenth: There is the case of Basilides, a soldier (commemorated in the Roman Martyrology on the last of June), who, having defended the holy virgin Potamiaena from the insolence of others as she was being led to execution, received from her as the reward of this religious service an apparition of her after death, who not only converted him to Christ but also through her prayers brought it about that he received martyrdom. The history is recorded by Eusebius (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, ch. 4[604]).

The eleventh is from Origen, who (*In Genesim*[605]) says that we are illuminated by Christ, unless a blindness of mind impedes us — just as the sun and the moon illuminate mortals unless they are blind. And even if this blindness should occur, it is first necessary for those who are blind to follow Him and to cry out after Him, so that, receiving sight from Him, they may also be illuminated by Him. And in *Homily* 24 (*Super Numeros*[606]): "Let us offer our justice to God, that we may receive from Him the justice of God. If we offer our own — that is, the chastity of the body — we shall receive from Him His own chastity," and so on.

The twelfth is from St. Ambrose, who (*In Lucam*, bk. 4[607]) says: "For divine benefits are not conferred on those who are sleeping, but on those who are watchful." And in *De Hexaemeron*, bk. 5, ch. 24,[608] concerning Peter after his denial: "Yet the same man," he says, "becomes stronger after the cock's crow, and is now worthy that Christ should look upon him, because the eyes of the Lord are upon the just." The same St. Ambrose writes (*In 2. Apologia David*, ch. 11[609]) that the Church merited Grace from Christ, because she had sought and desired the word of God, and so on.

The thirteenth is from St. John Chrysostom, who in *Homily* 45 (*In Genesim*[610]) says that Abraham first disposed himself through good works before receiving from God such great benefits of Grace; and in *Homily* 17 (*In Joannem*[611]) he denies that God anticipates our wills; but says that when we shall have made ourselves ready, then God is present with us and helps us through His grace. Similar things are read in him in *Homily* 42 to the people of Antioch, *Homily* 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews,[612] and near the end of *De Compunctione Cordis*, bk. 1.[613]

The fourteenth is from St. Augustine, who in *Epistle* 49, § 2,[614] in which it was asked why Christ came to bring the doctrine of salvation to the world only after so many ages, answers at length: "The salvation of this religion, through which alone true salvation is truly and faithfully promised, has never been wanting to any man who was worthy of it, and he to whom it was wanting was not worthy of it." The same, in *Tractate* 10 (*In Joannem*[615]), admonishes catechumens to prepare themselves for Grace. And in *Tractate* 26: "If thou art not drawn," he says, "pray that thou mayest be drawn." And in *Sermon* 16 (*inter* 50[616]) he speaks thus: "It is in your own free choice to prepare a place for God: prepare it for God or for the devil; when you have prepared it, he who possesses it, he himself will reign."

The fifteenth argument is this: "The law was our pedagogue in Christ," as the Apostle testifies in Gal. 3:24. Now it is the office of the pedagogue to prepare and bring the boy to the superior master; therefore by the

guidance of the law alone a man can be prepared so as to be fit for the teaching of Christ. Hence the Fathers also say that the law was given for this purpose — that man, convinced by it of his own infirmity, might take refuge in the medicine of the Grace of Christ; as St. Augustine (*De Perfectione Iustitiae*, ch. 6,[617] and elsewhere) teaches.

The sixteenth: It is fitting that God should give His Grace rather to one who is nearer to Him than to one who is more remote; but the morally good man is nearer and less remote from God than the morally wicked man; therefore it is fitting that He give His Grace rather to the former than to the latter, and consequently in the former some merit of congruity can be posited. The major is proved because love is like fire, which acts more powerfully upon what is nearer than upon what is more distant; and Grace is the effect of divine love.

The seventeenth: Matter is rightly said to be prepared to receive form by the gradual removal of contrary forms; therefore the pagan prepares himself for grace while he gradually abstains from graver sins and accustoms himself to the decency of dutiful conduct. For in this way he seems to be rendered less unsuitable and more fitted as matter for receiving Grace than he was before. And to this purpose St. Luke seems to relate in Acts 13 that the proconsul Sergius Paulus was "a prudent man."[618]

The eighteenth: It is natural to fear a known evil; therefore, given faith in hell, a man will be able, by the powers of nature alone, to fear its punishment, and consequently, from fear of that future punishment, to grieve for sin — which grief is called attrition, and is a disposition to Grace, since it justifies when a sacrament is added. Therefore, by the powers of nature alone a man can dispose himself even sufficiently to receive the very Grace of justification when a sacrament is applied.

The last argument: Why did God raise man up after his fall rather than the angel? Among other reasons, this is given: because man immediately grieved for his sin, whereas the angel remained obstinate. Likewise, because man after his fall wished to rise again, and therefore it was fitting that God should extend His hand to him — so that God's hand stretches out to those who wish to rise, not to those who are unwilling. These reasons are read in St. Bonaventure (*In III Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 1[619]).

Beyond these, there could further be adduced arguments that seem to prove that the beginning of good works is from us, and that a man is predestined by his own merits; but let these be sought with their solutions in their proper places. Let us now dispel the arguments that have been proposed.

§ 356. To the first it can be replied that God commands us to turn to Him through penitence, yet not without His prevenient Grace; and that, when we have done so, He then turns to us through the grace of the remission of sins — so that in this way Grace is not the result of our merit, but of a prior Grace. This reply is indicated by St. Augustine (*De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 5 and ch. 8[620]). Moreover, the true sense of that text is this: "Turn ye to me through the amendment of life and good works, and I will in turn turn to you by bestowing temporal benefits." For it is a promise of the Old Testament, such as are many in Leviticus and Deuteronomy; such also is Is. 1:19: "If you be willing and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land." This sense is argued from what follows in that same prophet and from what is read in the book of Haggai. And similar to these Scriptures are Mal. 3:7: "Return to me, and I will return to you"; 2 Par. 15:2: "The Lord is with you, because you have been with him"; and Jer. 15:19: "If thou wilt be converted, I will convert thee" — the last of which means: if thou shalt have turned to me through penitence, I will restore thee to thy former honour and dignity.

§ 357. To the second I reply that the antithesis holds between the two members, because the latter must be understood with exclusion. For it is signified that, although a man prepares himself with great care and solicitude to speak with a prince, it belongs nevertheless to God alone so to govern his tongue that the prince is moved by his discourse — because God alone knows the inmost affections of souls. Thus Esther, in ch. 14, about to approach the king, prays to God, saying: "Give me a well-ordered speech in my mouth in the sight of the lion, and turn his heart to hatred of our enemy." Wholly parallel to this is the text from the same chapter of Proverbs: "The heart of man disposeth his way; but the Lord must direct his steps." For the meaning is that the outcome of our actions depends on God alone, according to the saying that is wont to be cited: "Man proposes, God disposes."

§ 358. To the third: Christ in that passage calls a "worthy" person one who is respected and of good repute. Nor does He command the Apostles to preach to the worthy, but to choose lodging among the worthy — lest, to wit, the Gospel should be ill spoken of if the Apostles were to lodge with persons of ill-fame. Moreover, it is manifest that the passage there deals with preaching the Gospel to Jews, who already believed in God and in the coming Messiah; for what precedes is: "Go not into the way of the Gentiles," and so on. Nor does it tell against this that in the same passage it is said: "And if that house be worthy, your peace shall come upon it." For "worthy house" there is spoken not out of human merit but according to the predestination of Grace — that is, a house of that kind which God has predestined for that Grace; as it is said in Acts 13:48: "And as many as were ordained to life everlasting believed." Nor is it proved from the command to keep dogs and swine away from the mysteries that in the rest there is any merit of Grace; but only that these would receive the Gospel — since "dogs" and "swine" signify open and manifest despisers, such as many Jews were, especially when Paul was preaching, as is clear from the Acts of the Apostles. And yet prayer must be made even for these.

§ 359. To the fourth I reply: "little ones" (*parvulos*) means unlearned men, idiots, and contemptible persons, such as the Apostles were — fishermen, and the like. In this there is no merit discerned, but rather an admirable gratuity of God's Grace. But if someone prefers to take "little ones" to mean the humble in spirit, it is better to understand Christ as speaking of the Jews who had believed with a certain faith that the Messiah was coming, and who, imbued with that faith, were humble because of God. In this sense, without doubt, that text must also be received: "But to the humble he giveth grace" — meaning a greater and more abundant grace, as is said in the corresponding text in St. James: "He giveth a greater grace." For humility is not a merit of Grace, but rather a vessel of other graces, because it renders the soul capable of receiving more copious graces.

§ 360. To the fifth I reply: the preparation is to be understood as made not without Grace. For by the "regions" ready for the harvest are signified the Jews and Samaritans who believed in God and awaited the Messiah taught by the Prophets, of whom the Lord there says to His disciples: "Others have laboured, and you have entered into their labours." This is clear from the discourse of the Samaritan woman.

§ 361. To the sixth: God, from whom nothing is hidden, is improperly said to "find" something when, with an eye to merit or demerit, He acts or disposes something new in respect of a certain person. But this does not deny that merit may also exist in such cases. However, as regards the good and the good person, God finds nothing other than what He Himself has made. This is taught plainly by St. Augustine (*Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, ch. 7[621]): "God," he says, "does not elect one made good by another and then find him; but what He finds, He makes." And in *Tractate* 29 (*In Joannem*[622]): "You do not have what you exact, unless He has given what He finds." Similarly, St. Leo (*Sermon* 1 *De Jejunio Septimi Mensis*[623]): "In order

that God may find in us the form of His own goodness, He gives the means by which we ourselves also work." And St. Bernard (*Sermon on the Ascension of the Lord*[624]): "Let us pray that He may find — or rather, that He may bring about."

§ 362. To the seventh the reply is evident from the same passage of Acts, where it is said of Cornelius that he was "a religious man and one that feared God, always praying to him." For, as St. Augustine says in responding to this very objection (*De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7[437]): "Not without some faith did he pray to God. For how would he call upon him in whom he had not believed?" and so on. From these very words it is also apparent that St. Augustine is not proving, but rather disproving, what is commonly said: "He merited to believe, because he was a good man." For when St. Augustine says "what can be said of Cornelius," he does not think it is rightly said, but only that it can be said in some sense according to that popular formula — as if to say that the example cited can be applied to Cornelius, but that, just as that formula is not true in itself, so neither does the example confirm it. If you insist that this is proved by St. Augustine, I answer: it is at least established that St. Augustine does not prove it in any other sense than to signify that a certain person merited to receive explicit faith because he was previously good from some faith at least imperfect. For St. Augustine expressly says that Cornelius, of whom he affirms that popular formula can be applied, had prayed to God not without some faith before he believed in Christ. But this imperfect faith, and the works that proceeded from it, were gifts of God through Christ; wherefore St. Augustine concludes generally (*ibidem*): "Whatever therefore Cornelius did well before he believed in Christ, even though he had believed, it is all to be attributed to God, lest perchance something be taken away." The same solution is found in St. Gregory, *Homily* 19 (*In Ezechielem*[526]), where, speaking of Cornelius whose alms were acceptable, before his baptism he says thus: "He came to faith not through works but through faith to works. For he did not pray without faith, nor indeed could he do good deeds unless he had first believed," and so on. Likewise in Prosper, who, replying to adversaries who adduced the example of Cornelius against the prevenient Grace of God (*Epistola ad Rufinum*[625]): "They do not understand," he says, "that all the preparation of Cornelius was conferred through the Grace of God," and what follows. Nor does Hugh of St. Victor reply differently, *Quaestio* 266 (*In Epistolam ad Romanos*[626]). What faith Cornelius had before Peter was sent to him is set forth at length at *Distinctio* 25 of Book III. Furthermore, what Peter says to Cornelius — "In very truth I perceive," and so on — signifies nothing other than that all are equally acceptable to God without respect of persons, whoever shall have believed the Gospel and lived according to it, whether Jews or Gentiles — understanding "acceptable" as meaning unto eternal life, which is grace for grace. But those err who think that Peter is speaking of works that precede faith. For who, according to Apostolic teaching, fears God and works justice without faith?

§ 363. To the eighth and ninth Prosper replies, ch. 13 and 14 (*Contra Collatorem*[627]), that all that preparation which preceded in Zacchaeus and the thief, before Christ spoke to them, was from the Grace of God inwardly drawing them to Christ. For both were Jews, from which it is easily understood that their preparation was not without some faith.

To the objection from St. Ambrose, the reply is easy from St. Ambrose himself. For in the same work, a little further on, he says that the utterance of Christ — "salvation is made" — was that of one who anticipates, not of one who promises a reward. And below he teaches that the word of God anticipates all things and all men's thoughts. And in ch. 7 of the same book he teaches that we have nothing that we have not received, citing that text of the Apostle: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?"[333]

§ 364. To the tenth a similar reply can be made: for perhaps Basilides had already conceived some beginning of faith, which the Virgin subsequently obtained perfectly for him from God. But the more certain reply is that the "reward" in that case means not the faith and conversion of Basilides, but the prayer made for him by the Virgin and the apparition that the Virgin made to him — and this in respect of the good service he had rendered in defending her chastity. By that good work he had merited in the eyes of the Virgin that she should be mindful of him before the Lord. But he did not for that reason merit Grace from God, even if God gave him that reward through the Virgin. For the reward was a reward insofar as it was given by the Virgin, towards whom he had rendered good service — not insofar as it was from God. For not everything that has the character (*ratio*) of reward or merit among men has the same character between man and God. Hence this argument too does not hold: "Basilides merited the prayer of the Virgin for himself; this prayer merited for Basilides the grace of faith; therefore Basilides merited the grace of faith for himself" — because it does not follow that if a first person merits from a second, and the second from a third, therefore the first merits from the third. Nor does it follow that if a third owes a debt to a second, and the second to the first, therefore what the third owes the second is owed also to the first — even if what is owed to the second is a benefit in respect of the first. This matter can be easily illustrated by what occurs among men.

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§ XXXVI (continued) — Replies to the remaining objections concerning merit and grace

§ 365. — if an alms be given by someone to a pagan, and he repays this favour (*gratiam hanc*) as a wage to him, so that he might pray to God for that man's conversion: in which case the one who gives the alms does indeed merit a prayer from the man on behalf of Grace, but he merits neither the formal character (*ratio*) of grace nor Grace itself from God. This solution is well worth noting, because cases of this kind are frequent. But you will ask: if such a work provokes the benevolence of a man to procure Grace, why not also that of God? I answer: because the man has received a benefit which he needed; God, however, has no need of our good things.

§ 366. To the objections drawn from Origen in the eleventh place, the answer is ready: that Origen, as in many other matters, so also concerning the Grace of God did not hold sound opinions, and from such sentences of his it is easy to understand how true is what St. Jerome writes in the Epistle to Ctesiphon: "The teaching of Pelagius is a shoot of Origen."[628]

§ 367. To the twelfth: The first passage from St. Ambrose does not prove merit of Grace. For he is treating there of the grace of justification signified by the cleansing of the leper, which grace requires preparation, but in such a way that even that preparation itself is an effect of a prior grace. Nor does the second passage prove it: for just as the Thief was anticipated (*praeventus*) by the grace of God before Christ addressed him, so also Peter could have been anticipated by it, so that he might be stronger and approach justice, before Christ looked upon him with bodily eyes. Nor does the third passage prove it, because the Church also, in order that she might seek and desire the Word of God and thereby merit grace from Christ, had already been anticipated by a prior grace.

§ 368. To the thirteenth I answer: St. John Chrysostom, since the Pelagian heresy had not yet arisen, did not preach so clearly and expressly the gratuitous grace of God, especially in the homilies addressed to the

people, who, lest they grow sluggish in good works, had to be carefully exhorted to cooperate with Grace through free will (*liberum arbitrium*); and especially on account of the heresy of Mani already stirred up before, which denied free will. This observation must also be made regarding the other Fathers who wrote before Pelagius. Nevertheless, the passages objected from St. John Chrysostom readily receive a Catholic sense. For what he says — that Abraham had first disposed himself through good works — understand this as meaning not without the Grace of God, by which, being anticipated, he performed those works whereby he merited those benefits which belonged to God alone, namely that he should be the father of many nations, and that in his seed all the nations should be blessed.[629] For God said to him (Gen. 15): "I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great."[630] And (Gen. 17): "Walk before me and be perfect, and I will make my covenant between me and thee, and I will multiply thee exceedingly."[631] Therefore similarly St. John Chrysostom wants us first to do something — but not without grace — so that God may bestow upon us those goods which He alone works, such as the remission of sins, the increase of grace and of the virtues, and other things of this kind. Moreover, when he denies that God anticipates our wills, he means nothing other than that grace does not impose necessity upon our will, but leaves it in its natural freedom. For prevenient grace must not be preached in such a way that free will is taken away: for this is what he says in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews: "He does not anticipate our wills, lest he destroy our free will."[632] And the same author says a little before: "All things are indeed in God's power, but not in such a way that our free will is injured."

§ 369. To the fourteenth: The first passage adduced from St. Augustine is retracted and explained by himself in the *Retractations*, book 2:[633] "This," he says, "I did not say in the sense that anyone should have been worthy by his own merits, but in the sense in which the Apostle says: 'Not from works, but from him that calleth it was said that the elder shall serve the younger' — which calling he asserts pertains to the purpose of God." And what follows. On this matter see more above.[634] The second passage treats of the grace of baptism, which in adults requires preparation, yet not without grace. Nor does the third passage exclude grace, because whoever prays is already drawn by grace, in accordance with that which St. Augustine had premised in the same place: "No one comes unless drawn."[635] The fourth passage indeed asserts free will both toward good and toward evil, but it does not deny the necessity of grace in good; for good is not so placed in the power of free will that free will can accomplish it unless moved by God. But after a man has, through preparing grace, made room for God, then God through the indwelling Spirit possesses and reigns.

§ 370. To the fifteenth argument I answer: just as, on the authority of Prosper, grace leads to grace, so Christ leads to Christ. Therefore, that a man is led through the law as a pedagogue to Christ — while, having recognised his own sin and the weakness of the law, he seeks from Christ a remedy — this is not due to any fault of the law but occurs on the occasion of sin lurking in man, as the Apostle witnesses (Rom. 7 and 2 Cor. 3).[636]

§ 371. To the sixteenth I answer: there are many things congruous to the Divine Goodness which nevertheless suppose or include no merit on our part. I answer further: congruences are of different kinds. For just as it can be said that it is congruous to God to give grace rather to one who is morally good than to one who is evil, if that goodness alone is considered, so on the contrary it is congruous that He give grace to the worse person, in order thereby to show the power of His grace and at the same time to declare how gratuitous and unowed that gift is — as has been shown in the case of Paul and others.[637] Although therefore some congruence of giving grace to a morally good man may be imagined, it does not follow that in him there is

placed the merit of congruence with respect to grace — that is, a work of such a kind that God is provoked thereby to give grace; such as are faith, prayer, repentance, trust in the mercy of God. For these of themselves have a certain order and relation to true justice and to eternal life; but works of unbelievers, however praiseworthy from moral goodness, do not, since unbelievers neither know true justice nor true beatitude. Hence, God calling them to His grace does not look upon those works as upon any sort of merit. Rather, from among such morally just persons — from those especially celebrated among pagan writers — He has left many in their unbelief and has chosen many who were wicked and of depraved morals, converting them to Himself. Although it must be known that morally good and just men without faith in the Mediator can be called such absolutely speaking only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), but not absolutely (*simpliciter*), because the law is not fulfilled except through the grace of Christ — not even according to the substance of works, as we shall show below.

§ 372. Furthermore, the solution already stated applies also to the seventeenth argument. For merely to act morally well and to abstain from vices does not properly dispose a man for grace; because, as has been said, acts of this kind have of themselves no order to the salvation of eternal life in God. Hence it is also not true that matter is disposed to receive a form by the mere fact that the contrary form is removed, because a disposition toward a form cannot consist in the bare negation or privation of the contrary, but requires something positive.

§ 373. Moreover, as to what fear of hell is, so long as it is servile — even if it brings with it some pain regarding sin, inasmuch as punishment follows from sin — this is not a benefit of the Grace of Christ but an effect of the law; as the Apostle says (Rom. 8): "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons."[638] For even the damned under that condition grieve over their sins and are touched by a certain repentance, as we have it from Wis. 5.'[639] But such pain does not simply remove or diminish the love and inclination toward sin insofar as it turns man away from God. Hence it is altogether insufficient for the Grace of justification, even with the addition of the sacrament, nor does it at all dispose toward that Grace. But if fear of hell be ordered toward detesting from the heart and abandoning sin as an offence against God, then under that aspect it will belong to the Grace of God through Christ — and much more so does the very detestation and flight of sin of that kind belong to it.

§ 374. To the last argument I answer: St. Bonaventure enumerated those arguments among others as being better — not so much from his own opinion as from the opinion of certain others.[640] Nor indeed was the holy Doctor ignorant that repentance itself is also a gift of repairing grace and that no one without Grace can rise from sin, since he teaches this expressly elsewhere.'[641]

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§ XXXVII — Whether without Grace a man can love God above all things (Utrum sine Gratia possit homo Deum supra omnia diligere)

§ 375. Since it seems possible that someone might especially merit the Grace of God, if he loves God above all things, the question must therefore be treated: whether a man can without Grace and by the forces of nature alone love God above all things. From this, at the same time, it will be understood what a nature corrupted by sin can or cannot accomplish without the Grace of God.

§ 376. For the affirmative part of the question stand Durandus, Scotus, Gabriel, and certain others writing on the Master, partly at dist. 28 of this book, partly at dist. 27, bk. 3.[643] Likewise, James Almain in his *Tractatus Moralium*, question — [644] He says that a man can by the forces of nature, without any special auxiliary grace, love God above all things, even as He is a supernatural object. Now the said authors are moved by roughly these arguments.

§ 377. *First:* A man can by the forces of nature alone know God as the highest and greatest good, and accordingly as the good loveable above all his own goods; therefore he will also be able to love Him above all things, because toward that to which the intellect avails in knowing without grace, the will also seems able to attain in loving without grace, since the will can conform itself to the dictate of reason. Indeed, the will necessarily follows the final judgment of reason, as has been demonstrated above.[645] Furthermore, this argument is confirmed from the Apostle (Rom. 1), where he more severely accuses the philosophers because, although by natural understanding they had known God from creatures, they did not glorify Him as God — that is, as the highest good — nor give thanks to Him.'[646] For by this he seems to indicate that they could have done these things by natural faculty.

§ 378. *Second:* A man can by the forces of nature love some creature above all things — such as pleasures, wealth, honours, power; therefore also God. For there is in God a greater formal character (*ratio*) of being loved. And that formal character a man can know and consider without grace. This argument is confirmed by the example of those who love their friends or their homeland so greatly that they do not hesitate to face death for them.

§ 379. *Third:* It is natural to man to love God above all things. For the will is naturally inclined toward good insofar as it is good, as toward its proper object; much more, therefore, is it inclined toward a greater good, and most of all toward the highest and supreme good. Therefore a man will be able through this natural inclination to love God most and supremely. To this seems to pertain that saying of St. Augustine which he states at the opening of his *Confessions*: "Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rest in Thee."[647] This argument is also confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas, who (at I, q. 60, a. 5, and elsewhere) writes that man is naturally inclined to love God more than himself.'[648] Hence also in the same place, reply to obj. 5, he affirms that demons and the damned love God above all things insofar as He is a certain common and universal good.

§ 380. *Fourth:* Naturally each thing is more inclined toward the good of the whole than toward its own proper good, as the same St. Thomas testifies (I-II, q. 109, a. 3).[642] But God, who is the Author of the whole of nature, has the position of a certain whole, while man has the position of a part; therefore man is naturally more inclined by love toward God than toward himself.

§ 381. *Fifth:* Love of God arises from love of self. For, as the Philosopher says, the friendly feelings which are toward another arise from the friendly feelings which are toward oneself; therefore by this alone a man can love God supremely, because he has come to know that his own highest good consists in the contemplation of Him.

§ 382. *Sixth:* The love by which God alone as Author of nature is loved above all things is not of itself ordered toward supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo supernaturalis*); therefore it ought not to be ascribed to the grace of Christ but to natural faculty. This consequence is proved, because only those goods which pertain to

the salvation of eternal life — which is our supernatural beatitude, as has been shown elsewhere — are to be referred to the grace of Christ.

§ 383. Now St. Thomas teaches the negative part, namely that a man in the state of corrupted nature (*status naturae corruptae*) cannot by natural powers alone love God above all things, but for this requires the auxiliary grace that heals nature.[642] Likewise (II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1), asserting that a man cannot love God and his neighbour — understand, according to the precept of the law — without repairing grace.'[649] This teaching other approved theologians also follow, and they fortify it both by the authority of Sacred Scripture and by the testimonies of the holy Fathers and the Councils; by which it is shown that love of God is from God and pertains to the gifts of the Holy Spirit and to those benefits by which fallen man is restored and repaired through the grace of Christ.

§ 384. In the first place these texts are brought forward from Scripture: Rom. 5 — "The charity (*caritas*) of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us."[113] Eph. 6 — "Charity with faith from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.",[650] 1 Jn. 4 — "Charity is of God.",[651] Again, from the Apostle (Gal. 5): charity is named first among the fruits of the Spirit.'[114] And (1 Cor. 12 and 13): charity is commended among all the charisms of the Holy Spirit as the greatest and most excellent.'[652] Likewise Sir. 24: divine Wisdom is called "the fair mother of love.",[653]

§ 385. In the second place, the authority of the Councils is brought forward. For the Council of Milevis, can. 4, has: "Both are the gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love so that we do it."[654] The Council of Orange, last canon: "It is altogether the gift of God to love God: He Himself, who is loved though He loved not, gave it so that He might be loved; being displeasing we were loved, so that there might come to be in us that by which we might be pleasing. For the Spirit of the Father and of the Son diffuses charity in our hearts.",[655] And here, a little later, it is added that faith and the love of God are first inspired in us, so that we may faithfully seek baptism. And can. 22 states generally that no one has anything of his own but falsehood and sin.'[656] Hence neither the love of God, not even as Author of nature, does anyone have of his own — that is, by the faculty of his own nature. To these is added the Council of Trent (sess. 6, cap. 6), where it says that a man, moved and aroused by God and aided by Him, begins to love God.'[657] And can. 3, where anathema is pronounced against one who shall say that without the preceding inspiration of the Holy Spirit and without His help a man can love God as is fitting.'[658] But certainly he who loves God above all things, loves God as is fitting, because he loves Him with his whole heart, as the first and greatest commandment of God demands.

§ 386. In the third place testimonies of the Fathers are brought forward, of St. Augustine and Prosper by name. St. Augustine, Epistle to Vitalis 107 (Serm. CCXVII in the latest edition): "By the greatness of the first sin, free will lost the power to love God."[659] And Serm. 2 *De Diversis* (Serm. XXXIV among the Sermons of the First Class in the same edition): "Seek whence it comes that a man can love God, and you will find nothing at all, except because God first loved him."[660] And below: "Neither can we love God except through the Holy Spirit." Likewise, bk. 1 *De Patientia*, c. 25: "Unless the love of Him be given to us from within, there is no source from which it can be in us. And thereby the good will by which God is loved cannot be in a man except in one in whom God works the willing."[661] And bk. 4 *Contra Julianum*, c. 3: "The love of God by which one arrives at God — whence does it come if not from God? Through this love of the Creator, each one makes right use of creatures; without this love of the Creator, no one makes right use of creatures."[662] And bk. *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, c. 17: "Who gave even that small charity which he had begun to have, unless He who prepared the will?"[127] And c. 17: "Why was it said 'Let us love one another'? — because charity is from God —

if not because free will was admonished by the precept to seek the gift of God, which admonition would profit nothing at all unless one had first received some charity, so that he might seek that more might be added to him, by which he might fulfil what was commanded.",[127] These two passages manifestly prove that even small and imperfect charity — which is sufficient for fulfilling the commandments of God — is the gift of God. St. Augustine concludes in the same place: "If the love of God and of neighbour be from men, not from God, the Pelagians have won; if however it be from God, we have conquered the Pelagians." Therefore according to the judgment of St. Augustine it is Pelagian to say that God can be loved by the forces of nature alone, even with an imperfect love. See the same St. Augustine, bk. 21 *De Civitate* c. 15, bk. 8 *De Trinitate* c. 7, and Tract. 102 on John.[663] From this last passage were taken the words which we cited above from the canon of the Council of Orange. These same words were in turn transcribed by Prosper into his *Book of Sentences* (no. 368).[664] The same Prosper, writing *Contra Collatorem* c. 30, contends from the Scriptures that the love of God is had from no one but God, adducing among other things that word of the Apostle: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" (1 Cor. 4:7).[665] In that same place he likens human nature stripped of all grace to something frozen stiff with glacial cold, so that no warmth whatsoever can be drawn from it unless the Spirit of God relaxes that stiffness through Him who said: "I came to cast fire upon the earth" (Lk. 12:49).

§ 387. The same teaching further is that of St. Bernard in the book *De Diligendo Deo*, where, having shown that all men, even unbelievers, are bound by the law of nature to love God with their whole heart, etc., and are inexcusable if they do not so love Him, he then adds: "But this is difficult — nay, impossible — for anyone to turn his will from God to God entirely of his own free will without grace received from God, and not to place his own interests first."[666] For "all seek the things that are their own" (Phil. 2:21). And again: "The sense and thoughts of man are prone toward evil" (Gen. 8:21). Against which the faithful plainly know how utterly necessary they have Jesus, this one crucified. These are his words. Finally, arguments are adduced from reason.

§ 388. *First:* Prayer is the surest attestation of grace; but the Church petitions the love of God from God in her prayers — as when she prays that God may pour into our hearts the affection of His love, that He may infuse into our breasts the love of His name, that He may cause us to love what He commands, and other things of this kind — therefore the love of God is the work of the Grace of God and cannot be had without it. For otherwise it would be petitioned from God uselessly and without necessity.

§ 389. *Second:* If a man could without Grace love God above all things, he could fulfil all the commandments of God. For he who loves God fulfils the law and observes the commandments of God, as the Apostles Paul (Rom. 13) and John (throughout his Epistle) teach.[667] But to say that one can fulfil all the commandments of God without Grace is the Pelagian heresy itself, as St. Augustine witnesses (*De Haeresibus*), and as it is expressly condemned in the words of the Council of Milevis, can. 5.[668] Therefore it pertains to the Pelagian heresy to hold that one can love God above all things without grace.

§ 390. *Third:* Through love of God above all things, man is converted to God, as through hatred he had been averted from God; but without His Grace no one can be converted, according to that of Lam. 5: "Convert us to thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted."[669] Therefore neither can one love God supremely without Grace.

§ 391. *Fourth:* If someone were to love God above all things by the forces of nature alone, he with the addition of the sacrament would —

§ 392. — that he will be justified in baptism who does not place an obstacle of evil will: therefore, by the sole forces of nature and without the preventing gift of God, a man will be able to dispose himself sufficiently for the justification and remission of sins of one coming to receive grace — at least without the sacrament — which is entirely Pelagian, as is evident from St. Augustine,[670] and is condemned under anathema by the Council of Trent.'[671]

And Jn. 14: "He who loves me shall be loved by my Father." Now God is said absolutely to love a man when He wills to him his supreme good, which is eternal life; therefore if anyone loves God above all things by the sole forces of nature, he will be able to attain to salvation by that alone which he has in nature, without Grace. But if this is so, then Christ died for nothing. The sixth: If a man can love God by purely natural endowments, then without Grace he will merit Grace — which is likewise Pelagian and condemned by the Fathers. The consequence is proved, because nothing so strongly provokes love as love itself; for it is supremely consonant with right reason and the natural inclination of the will that one who is loved should love in return. To this point belong the two Scripture texts just cited, and the example of the sinful woman in Lk. 7, to whom many sins were forgiven, "because she loved much."

§ 393. The seventh: No work of true piety can be performed by the sole forces of nature, as the canons of Orange abundantly teach and as we have already proved sufficiently above;[672] but the love of God, however imperfect and merely inchoate it may be, and even if it tends toward God only as the author of nature, is a work of piety. For St. Augustine says in Epistle 29 to St. Jerome:'[673] "Piety is the worship of God, which is rendered chiefly through love." Therefore no love of God can be had by the sole forces of nature. That the love of God as Author of nature pertains to piety whereby God is worshipped can be shown from the state of purely natural man. In that state one would indeed owe to God the worship of piety, and yet would not love Him as the Author of supernatural beatitude, but only as the Author of nature and the bestower of natural beatitude.

§ 394. The eighth: The first man, through sin, lost faith and love of God, and retained only a certain servile fear of God — whence he said: "I heard Thy voice and I was afraid."[674] Therefore he who is born of Adam can no more recover true love of God than he can recover faith, unless he be reformed for this purpose by the Grace of Christ. It is confirmed by that passage of St. Augustine cited above:'[675] "By the greatness of the first sin we lost free will for loving God."

§ 395. The last argument is directed against those who indeed admit that perfect love of God — by which God is loved from one's whole heart — cannot be had by the sole forces of nature without the Grace of Christ, but who think otherwise regarding imperfect love. The argument runs as follows. If perfect love of God cannot be had without Grace, then neither can imperfect love. For of whatever thing the perfection is from God, from the same is the beginning, since the perfect and the imperfect are in the same genus. Hence, just as we confess that the beginning of faith is from God, because faith itself is from God, so likewise must we confess that the beginning of charity (*caritas*) or love, however imperfect, is from God, because charity is from God. This St. Augustine also teaches in these words:[676] "Neither is its beginning from us, and its perfection from God; but if charity is from God, the whole of it is from God. Far be it from God to let this madness prevail in us, that in His gifts we should place ourselves first and Him last, since 'His mercy shall come before me.'" Finally, there is this further argument: just as charity presupposes faith, so the beginning of charity presupposes at least some beginning of faith, which would not be necessary if it could be had by the sole forces of nature. For those things which are acquired by the sole power of nature do not depend upon faith.

§ XXXVIII — The determination of the question through several propositions (Questionis determinatio per aliquot propositiones)

§ 396. In order that the proposed difficulty may be correctly judged, we must first recall to memory those things which we have already discussed at length concerning the first effects of prevenient Grace (*Gratia præveniens*), and in general concerning that good which man cannot achieve without the Grace of Christ. It will also be of some use to see what Bartholomew Medina writes on this question,[678] where he explains it through nine conclusions, four of which concern supernatural love of God and five concern natural love. For our part, in order to explain the whole matter, these propositions seem to us to be established.

§ 397. The first proposition: In no state can man love God (*Deum diligere*) — whether by natural or by supernatural love — without the gift and assistance of God. This proposition, as most certain, is established from the general assistance and cooperation of God, which is necessary for absolutely all effects of secondary causes, so that no good at all can be done by man without it. It is also established that God, who is goodness by essence (*bonitas per essentiam*), is the author of every participated good that exists in creatures. To this belong the general texts of Scripture: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7); "God worketh all things in all" (1 Cor. 12:6); "Of him, and through him, and in him are all things" (Rom. 11:36); "In him we live, and move, and are" (Acts 17:28); and others of this kind. More specifically, that Arausicane canon is relevant to proving this proposition: "No one has of his own save mendacity and sin."[679] Likewise, the other testimonies which we have adduced for the first proposition concerning the good which we have from the Grace of Christ. And this is what St. Thomas means whenever he says that man can do absolutely nothing good without the assistance of God moving him, since God himself is the first mover in every operation.[642]

§ 398. The second proposition: In the state of integral nature (*status naturæ integræ*), man could not, by the sole forces of nature, without the special assistance of grace, love God in the order directed toward supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo supernaturalis*), that is, toward eternal life. The reason is evident: because the forces of nature do not of themselves have order and proportion except toward natural goods. Therefore, in order to attain that which is supernatural, they must be elevated by grace in whatever state.

§ 399. The third proposition: In the same state of integral nature, man could not, by the sole forces of nature, love God as the Author of nature (*Auctor naturæ*). This proposition seems to be efficaciously proved by this argument: because so great was the perfection of the state of integrity that man referred, and was bound to refer, all his works to God alone as his ultimate and supernatural end (*finis ultimus et supernaturalis*), that is, as his beatifier (*beatificator*); whether he considered God as the Author of nature or as the bestower of beatitude. Hence also all his works, whatever they were, were meritorious of eternal life, and the state itself required that all his works be of that sort. Now it is certain that no work meritorious of eternal life — not even in that state — could have been performed without Grace, insofar as Grace is distinguished from nature. Medina does not attend to this argument when he establishes, contrary to this proposition, his first conclusion concerning natural love, contending to prove it by this argument: that man in the state of integral nature was able to love God above all things (*super omnia*) by natural love. But to this argument it is replied that man in the state of integrity could indeed, by the sole forces of his nature, perform all the good connatural to him, if that good be considered in itself, because it was proportioned to the forces of his nature not yet corrupted; but that he could not do this in the manner which the perfection of that state required to be done — namely, by referring it to God as his ultimate end, as has been said. Moreover, when St. Thomas

says[680] that in the state of integral nature man was able to work the good connatural to him without the superaddition of a gratuitous gift (*donum gratuitum*), he is abstracting integral nature from Grace, and consequently from the supernatural end, which is evident from the fact that he says "without the superaddition of a gratuitous gift" — that is, if we suppose him created without the superadded gift of Grace. For that gift, that is, Grace, ordered man to the supernatural end. Hence, if he had been created without that gift, he would not have been obliged to supernatural acts, but only to those which were within the capacity of nature. This reply is confirmed from the third article of that same question,[642] in which St. Thomas says that man in the state of integral nature, as regards the sufficiency of operative power (*sufficientiam operative virtutis*), was able by his natural endowments to will and to work the good proportioned to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue. Note there that determination "as regards the sufficiency of operative power" — as if he were saying: unless there be an impediment from elsewhere, as there would be from the excellence of that state, as I have said.

§ 400. The fourth proposition: Man established in pure naturals (*puris naturalibus*), that is, in the sole goods of nature, could by the forces of that same nature love God above all things — namely, as the Author of his own nature and of natural beatitude. Proof: because this good was connatural to him, nor would there have been prescribed in that state a mode of acting exceeding nature's capacity, as there was in the state of first integrity, as we have just said. And moreover, the nature of man so constituted would not have been wounded by sin, as it now is, nor would there have been in him the conflict of flesh and spirit, as we have already shown. Hence, for proving this proposition, all the arguments adduced above in the affirmative part of the question are also of force. It is further proved by this argument, which is found in Medina,[681] namely: Man so constituted would have had the precept of the law of nature to love God, and sufficient forces to fulfill it. For otherwise, he would have bound man to something impossible for his own powers. And these arguments prove not only that man in that state could have loved God above all things in some fashion through the sole naturals, but also with a perfect love — whereby he would so love God that he would place nothing above God and his precepts; although Medina denies this,[682] and would indeed deny it correctly, if his hypothesis were true, that in the state of pure nature there would have been a rebellion of the flesh against the spirit.

§ 401. The fifth proposition: Man in the state of corrupted nature (*status naturæ corruptæ*) can, from the forces of nature, without grace, love God in some manner (*aliquo modo*). This proposition is proved in several ways. First, by the authority of St. Thomas and other Doctors, who place the question only as to whether fallen man can love God above all things by the sole naturals; by which they surely signify that they suppose man in the fallen state can do so in some fashion, even if not above all things. Which matter is also clear from the resolution of the same question in those same Doctors. Next, it is proved by an argument from the Councils and Fathers, who do not deny that love of God of whatsoever kind can be had without Grace, but restrict their doctrine to love of a certain genus and mode. For the Council of Milevis says that it is a gift of God to love so as to do.[683] The Council of Orange, speaking generally of any work whatsoever, denies that it can be done by us as it ought (*sicut oportet*) without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit;[684] and in the last canon expressly says that free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) has been so bent and weakened by sin that no one can love God as he ought unless the divine Grace and Mercy have gone before him. By which limitation it sufficiently signifies that without such Grace God can be loved in some manner, but not as he ought. The Council of Trent likewise,[65] in its definition, studiously added the same clause "as he ought." Likewise, St. Augustine used a not dissimilar restriction when he said that the love of God by which one arrives at God is not except from God.[685] And Prosper, saying: "We would not have holy love (*dilectionem sanctam*), unless the charity of God

were poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit."[686] To these add those testimonies of the Fathers and Councils cited by us elsewhere, by which they explain that good which we cannot have without the Grace of Christ as the good pertaining to piety and the salvation of eternal life. From all these it is openly gathered that there is a certain love of God by which he is loved not as he ought, nor with the will to obey, and by which one does not arrive at God, and which is not a holy love, nor pertains to piety, nor conduces to eternal salvation; and that such love can be had without the special assistance of Grace — even though St. Augustine rightly does not deign to call such love by the name of love,[687] on the ground that it is not true love but is rather to be called *cupiditas* (desire). "This, however," he says, "is true love: that, cleaving to the truth, we live justly." Furthermore, the proposition is confirmed by reason. For he who knows from natural endowments the excellence of the Divine Nature — as the philosophers, according to the testimony of the Apostle (Rom. 1:19–20), recognized — can be somewhat affected toward that good through the will. But this is to love. Hence neither does the Apostle in that passage deny that those who thus knew God loved God; but he denies that they glorified him as God or gave thanks — without which two things some love can subsist. But that such love is not from the Grace of God through Christ is proved thus: for it has no order toward supernatural beatitude, nor toward the hope of eternal life. For where there is no supernatural illumination, there can be no work having order toward supernatural beatitude and eternal life. And this is what the Fathers mean when they teach that, among the gifts of Christ, faith is given first of all, through which the rest are then obtained — as St. Augustine expressly says[688] — concerning which we have spoken where we dealt with the first effect of prevenient grace. Likewise, when they teach, according to Evangelical and Apostolic doctrine, that no one is justified, not even inchoately in any manner, except through faith, and that the merit of Christ is applied to us for no benefit without faith. Therefore, whatever man does before such illumination neither pertains to true piety nor proceeds from the Grace of Christ — unless perhaps, I say, it is ordered by Divine Providence to the salvation of man. By which general reason, to have been born in Rome, or of Catholic parents, can pertain to the benefit of Christ and be numbered among the effects of predestination, as we have said elsewhere.

§ 402. Further: such love does not proceed from Grace, because it is a sin, just as the disordered love of a creature is a sin. For it is the same malice to love God beneath a creature as to love a creature above God. But many love God in this manner — as those who love God with the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiæ*) alone, as formerly the carnal Jews, who referred their entire — such as it was — love of God wholly to earthly happiness as their ultimate end. Hence they say through the Prophet: "Blessed is God, we have become rich" (cf. Jer. 5:2). These, simply speaking, loved themselves more than God. And such are today very many. Therefore, by those men God is loved from the sole forces of nature. This argument seems to proceed concerning all those who love God not above all things nor from their whole heart. For all such love of God is disordered, because it places something else before God.

§ 403. This fifth proposition is confirmed by the sixth, which is as follows: **The sixth proposition:** Man in the fallen state can love God above all things in some manner of love (*aliquo dilectionis modo*) by the sole forces of nature. This is affirmed by Medina[689] and before him by St. Thomas.[690] Proof: because just as man can know God and his most excellent and highest good through nature, so also he can love him as such. But this is in some fashion to love above all things, because the will in so loving tends toward him as the highest good (*summum bonum*) and is affected toward him as the highest good. Next, it is proved by the third and fourth arguments brought forward for the affirmative part of the question, and by those things which were there adduced from St. Thomas, who writes also that demons and the damned naturally love God in some manner above all things.[691] But it must be known that not even this kind of love is worthy of the name of true

love, according to what we cited a little before from St. Augustine; nor is it, simply speaking, love of God above all things, but only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), nor can it in any way be called love of God from one's whole heart. It is customarily called an inefficacious love (*dilectio inefficax*), as proceeding from an inefficacious will — whereby man, forsooth, so loves God that he nevertheless does not on that account resolve to obey his precepts. For then does he love God with an efficacious will when he deliberately resolves to set God and his worship before all other goods, so as not to wish to offend him for the sake of other goods which he loves. And this, simply speaking, is...

§ 404. Concerning which is this **final proposition:** Man in the fallen state cannot by the sole forces of nature love God above all things — neither as his beatifying good (*bonum beatificum*) nor even as the Author of nature, not even for a single moment of time. Against this proposition, Durandus and the other authors named above contradict it insofar as it concerns love of God as the Author of nature, which they call natural love (*dilectio naturalis*). For concerning supernatural love they are in agreement. Although in truth that love too is supernatural by which God, considered as the Author of nature, is loved absolutely above all things — if we call supernatural that which exceeds the forces of corrupted nature — even though the same love is rightly called natural if we have regard to nature not corrupted. Moreover, concerning both kinds of love, almost all the arguments adduced in the negative part of the question plainly convince the proposition to be most true. For although uncorrupted nature in whatever state had sufficient forces for loving God above all things as the Author of nature, as was shown above, the forces of corrupted nature are by no means sufficient for that. For, as the last Arausicane canon has it, through the sin of the first man free choice was so bent and weakened that afterwards no one is able to love God as he ought, unless Grace and divine mercy have gone before him.[692] But he loves God as he ought who, according to the present proposition — that is, speaking absolutely — loves him above all things. For if by the sole forces of nature man could love God above all things, he could love him from his whole heart; and thus fulfill the whole law without Grace and thereby merit and obtain eternal life, since the Lord says of the precept of love: "This do and thou shalt live" (Lk. 10:28). And other absurdities would follow, as have been sufficiently explained in the arguments. From which it is furthermore evident that the doctrine contrary to our present proposition pertains to the Pelagian heresy, even in that part which says that God as the Author of nature can be loved above all things by us without Grace. Since the general sentences of the Councils and of the Fathers do not admit the distinction employed here by the authors of the opposing opinion. The arguments too conclude generally.

§ 405. Here there can be added yet one further proposition concerning the inchoate and imperfect love (*dilectio inchoata et imperfecta*) by which the sinner, not yet abandoning sin, begins to depart from sin; and it can be said that this is from the Grace of Christ, because it is a salutary good, and is a certain beginning — not insofar as it is disordered love considered apart and without comparison; or because the man loving in this way does not in the very act compare it to a creature, and so the act itself is not disordered. And the proposition is proved by those things that prove that the beginning of faith and of love is from the Grace of Christ, and by the authorities set forth concerning inchoate and imperfect good. Likewise, because it is joined to the initiation of justice (*initiatio justitiæ*).[693]

§ XXXIX — The arguments adduced on the opposing side are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta in contrarium adducta)

§ 406. It remains now to address the arguments. To the first, therefore, it is answered that it suffices for loving God above all things with an efficacious love that God be recognized as the supreme good and accordingly as worthy of the highest love, so that the will may be borne toward that good with such love — yet it is also necessary that the intellect here and now judge that God is to be loved above all things, and that nothing be preferred to Him. Given this judgment, the will cannot not follow what has been thus adjudged by reason. But such a judgment the intellect cannot pronounce without the special assistance of Grace — and this on account of the corruption of the will, which by love clings to a changeable good toward which it was inclined and converted through sin. Hence it is no wonder that the intellect can know something in a general way and judge according to the power of nature what it cannot, through those same powers, cause the will to desire; for, as St. Thomas teaches,[680] insofar as sin was committed by the will, and inasmuch as sin is a voluntary act, it therefore infected the will more than the other powers. And that this is true, experience itself confirms, since by reason of the propensity of the will toward evil we often do not do what right reason counsels us to do — according to that line of the Poet: "I see and approve the better things; I follow the worse."[695]

§ 407. To the confirmation drawn from the Apostle, it is answered that a man is rightly reproved and corrected even for the omission of a work which without God's grace he was unable to perform — as St. Augustine teaches.[696] To the second, the reply is evident. For the will is so corrupted and weakened by sin that, although the intellect shows the formal character (*ratio*) of loving God, which is not found in any created good, nor even in all created goods taken together, yet the will, by the weight of its evil inclination, is borne toward sensible good, or at any rate follows its own private good, unless it be healed by the Grace of God — as St. Thomas says.[642] The same formal character is at work whereby someone can wish to die for his country, or for his friends, or even for a false religion, but not for the true God and true religion without the grace of God. For through sin man has been turned away from the true God, but not from other goods. On this matter see more in Medina.[697]

§ 408. To the third I reply that the natural inclination which is in man toward loving God above all things is impeded from its act by a contrary inclination — and one far more vehement — by which through the corruption of sin man is drawn to love a created good. And here it must also be noted that not every natural inclination of this kind is such that, even anticipating the corruption of nature, it could be fulfilled by the power of nature alone. For a separated soul naturally inclines toward the body, yet without a supernatural virtue it cannot be joined to it. Therefore, although — in accordance with the opinion of St. Augustine cited in confirmation of the argument — there is in man a natural inclination toward God as toward the ultimate good, it does not follow from this that that inclination can be fulfilled by the powers of nature alone.

§ 409. Moreover, St. Thomas, in the places cited,[698] speaks partly of a certain love of God whereby He is loved above all things only *secundum quid* and in a certain imperfect mode, and with a will utterly without efficacy — which is the love of which our sixth proposition treated; and partly he speaks of a certain general inclination that is implanted in all things, even insensible ones, by which they are naturally inclined to the conservation or perpetuity of the universal good, which is God: so much so that if, by an impossible hypothesis, that good were brought into danger, they would naturally labor more for its preservation than for

their own, as we see happens in the movement of heavy bodies upward and of light bodies downward, to prevent a vacuum. And by this the fourth argument is resolved.

§ 410. To the fifth, certain writers answer that the love of God as Author of nature arises from self-love — not any self-love whatever, but ordered self-love, that is, the love by which a person loves himself as a creature of God. For, as they say, disordered self-love does not produce love but contempt of God — as St. Augustine witnesses[699] — whereas ordered self-love does not belong to corrupt nature but to Grace healing nature. But this solution seems to be obstructed by the fact that self-love is not ordered unless one loves himself on account of God. Wherefore, since an end is prior to the love of what is ordered toward that end, it follows that ordered love of God is prior to ordered self-love, and therefore does not arise from it. Hence it seems that one must say that this argument proves our fifth proposition well. For self-love can naturally bring a man to some love of God as Author of nature — yet not in such a way that he loves Him absolutely above all things, because the will, through the corruption of nature, has implanted in it a contrary inclination by which it is always drawn toward pursuing its own private good. But there is a contradiction in God's being loved above all things by a man and His being loved on account of the man's own private good. Therefore self-love, with this corruption persisting, cannot beget love of God above all things.

§ 411. To the sixth it is answered that the act of love by which God, considered only as Author of nature, is loved above all things, can and ought to be ordered by us toward supernatural beatitude — that is, toward hope of eternal life — just as an act of love by which He is loved as Author of temporal goods and benefits which we receive from Him also ought to be so ordered. And every love of God of this kind is an effect of the Grace of Christ. But that love by which God is loved only as Author of nature, without faith and without at least implicit reference to supernatural beatitude, inasmuch as it does not proceed from the Grace of Christ, so neither is it love above all things.

§ 412. Furthermore, it is now necessary also to reply to the arguments of the denying side, insofar as it seems to prove that no love of God at all can be had by the powers of nature alone. Therefore we say that the Scriptures, Councils, and Fathers commending the love of God as a gift of His Grace are speaking of that love which is commanded by God Himself — that is, of love that is right and ordered, by which He is loved above all things and with the whole heart, at least in some imperfect manner and according to a certain beginning (*inchoatio*). To signify this they add "as is fitting," or something of the sort, as we have declared more fully in treating the fifth proposition.

§ 413. Wherefore it is true that even a small and imperfect love which does not yet suffice to fulfill the commandments, so long as it is a certain beginning of a greater and more perfect love, is a gift of God through Christ, and cannot without the danger of the Pelagian error be denied to be such. But such is not the love of which we were speaking in the fifth and sixth propositions. For that small and imperfect charity of which St. Augustine speaks is not altogether inefficacious. For it is called imperfect either because, although a man has the will — even an efficacious and deliberate will — to fulfill the commandments, he does not yet have the power of fulfilling them, because he could not resist a more serious temptation — such as was the charity that Peter had before his denial, when it was said to him: "You cannot follow me now."[700] Or certainly it is called such when it is joined with the desire of pleasing God and of keeping His commandments, even if the man falls short of this, either on account of a contrary habit of sinning, or on account of the weakness whereby he succumbs to temptation.

§ 414. Such was the imperfect charity that was in Peter when he denied his Lord, still retaining at that very first affection of love toward him even in the very act of denial — since it proceeded from fear of death alone. St. Augustine says[701] that when Peter denied Christ, the action of his love was not averse but was troubled. And St. Bernard, in the work *On the Nature and Dignity of Divine Love* (ch. 6),[702] speaks of this imperfect love when he says: "Neither Peter by denying, nor David by committing adultery, lost charity — for charity was not destroyed in them but, as it were, put to sleep."

§ 415. St. Augustine also deigns to honor imperfect love with the name of a good will, when he says:[703] "He who wills but cannot fulfill the commandment, already has a good will, but a small one." We therefore do not hesitate, with blessed Augustine, to ascribe this imperfect love, or good will — however small — to the gift of God through Christ, and to attribute it to the working of the Holy Spirit.

§ 416. Concerning the same love, the concluding argument of the denying side is well resolved: such imperfect love, inasmuch as by a kind of desire it tends toward perfect love, and God calls someone toward bestowing it on him, is not therefore to be numbered among the gifts of nature but of Grace. But it is another matter with the love by which God is perversely and disordered loved. For such love does not propitiate God but rather provokes His wrath; for it is unworthy — as when someone, for example, loves God on account of his own will, or money, or possessions. And the love of God which in some way proceeds from a man who as yet has no faith[704] —

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§ XL — Whether the commandments of the Law can be observed without Grace (An sine Gratia possint servari mandata Legis)

§ 417. Having determined the foregoing question, it will not be difficult also to judge this question, which has long been disputed by a number of theologians of the first rank. For if a man cannot love God above all things without the help of Grace, then neither can he fulfill the precepts of the Law; for charity — that is, love of God and of neighbor — fulfills the law, and without it the law cannot be fulfilled. But so that the whole matter may be explained more fully, we set forth the following propositions.

First proposition. The precepts of the Law can be fulfilled in two ways: one way only according to the substance of the works; the other according to the mode by which they are ordered toward eternal life and toward the beatitude promised to us. This distinction St. Thomas delivers,[706] where he treats the present question, and it is commonly received by all the Scholastics. Moreover, it is easily proved from the state of man in a purely natural condition, in which the latter mode of fulfilling the law could have had no place; likewise from the morally good works of unbelievers, who have no knowledge of supernatural beatitude; and finally from the fact that two articles, in which that distinction is denied, have been condemned by the Roman Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII — namely articles 58 and 59.'[707] This distinction will become clearer from what follows.

§ 13. Second proposition. Without the gift and assistance of God, the precepts of the Law cannot in any state be observed — neither all of them nor any single one, neither according to the substance of the works nor in any other mode. This is most certainly evident, because every good thing of a creature is from God its

Author. Wherefore without His assistance — at least the general assistance — no good whatsoever can be done by a man. This matter has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes.

§ 14. Third proposition. Man could have fulfilled all the precepts of the Law through nature without special grace in the state of pure nature. This proposition holds true concerning the precepts of the law of nature and the positive precepts of God that do not exceed the order of nature. For in that state, as such, no supernatural precepts would have been given to man, nor would any mode of acting have been prescribed to him by which he would tend toward —

§ 418. — the proposition is also proved from what was said in treating the fourth proposition of the preceding question. For the formal character and foundation of this and that proposition are the same.

§ 16. Fourth proposition. Man in the state of integral nature could not have observed all the precepts of the Law through the powers of nature alone without the special assistance of Grace. This proposition — as regards supernatural precepts, and also as regards the meritorious mode of operating even in those things that belong to the law of nature — all concede as certain and beyond doubt. But as regards the bare substance of works in natural precepts, there is doubt. Nevertheless, if what was said in treating the third proposition of the preceding question be weighed, the truth of the whole proposition will easily become evident. For, as we said there, the excellence of that state was such that whatever work was done by a man had to be referred to God as his ultimate and supernatural end; and therefore his every work would be meritorious of eternal life.

§ 419. Hence it follows that a man, standing in the perfection of that first state, could not have exercised works by which he would fulfill the Law only according to the substance of the works. For the mode by which he was to refer them toward hope of eternal life was so prescribed for him that he was never to deviate from it. But what St. Thomas says[708] — that a man in the state of integral nature could have fulfilled all the commandments of the Law according to the substance of the works without Grace — we have shown in the explanation of the aforesaid third proposition that this is not contrary to our present proposition. For he considers precisely the integrity of nature, with the consideration of the supernatural gift and end set aside, as was said there.

§ 18. Fifth proposition. In the state of fallen nature, man cannot by the powers of nature alone observe any precepts of the Law, whether all of them or individual ones, either according to the substance of the works or in any other mode, without the special grace of God. The truth of this proposition is elucidated from those things which we showed above concerning the proposition of the preceding question. For it is the same formal character and the same foundation for this and for that proposition.

§ 19. Sixth proposition. Even in the state of intact nature, man could not have fulfilled all the precepts of the Law taken together over the whole course of life without some special help of Grace — and this for the same formal character (*ratio*) as the foregoing. And this is why St. Thomas says[706] — in the passage cited above — that in the state of intact nature man could have fulfilled all the commandments of the Law according to the substance of the works *sine Gratia*, which we have shown in explaining the third proposition to be not contrary to our present proposition. For he considers precisely the integrity of nature with the consideration of the supernatural gift and end set aside, as was stated there. Indeed — as the Bulls of the aforementioned Pontiffs make clear — the distinction itself, that the divine commandments can be fulfilled in two ways: one way according to the substance of the works alone; the other according to a certain definite mode, by which

works are able to lead to the Kingdom of Eternal Life (that is, according to the mode of merits) — this distinction is fictitious and is to be rejected.[709]

§ 20. Seventh proposition. There are certain precepts — both in general and in particular — which cannot be observed individually without the assistance of Grace. Such in general is the precept by which we are commanded to love God with the whole heart, a precept whose proper disputed question is already above. In particular, there are such as are so difficult on account of incidental temptations that human strength cannot rise to fulfill them without special auxiliary Grace —

§ 420. In the state of corrupt nature, man cannot without grace keep any supernatural precept, nor indeed any moral precept according to the manner in which it is ordered to eternal life. A supernatural precept, properly so called, is one by which some supernatural act is commanded. For the precept of receiving baptism does not properly command something supernatural, but is ordered toward the supernatural. Hence we do not deny that it can be kept without grace as regards the substance of the act — that is to say, in such a way that one does not sin against it. Nor is it properly a supernatural precept, but only a ceremonial one in the service of supernatural things. The precepts of faith, hope, and charity, on the other hand, are properly supernatural, because they command supernatural acts. The formal character (*ratio*) of the first member is perspicuous: because our natural powers cannot reach to those things which are supernatural, unless they are elevated by some assistance of grace (*Gratia*). The second member is proved from Scripture: "Without me you can do nothing" — which words the Fathers of the Council of Orange interpreted as referring to any work that pertains to the salvation of eternal life.[710] The same can be proved at length by those things which we have already said above concerning the good that man cannot perform without the grace of Christ.

§ 421. The sixth proposition: In the state of corrupt nature, man can without the grace of Christ, by the sole powers of nature, keep certain precepts of the natural law — namely as regards the bare substance of the acts. This proposition is clearly proved by all the arguments by which it is shown that not all the works of unbelievers are sins, but that many works are and have been done by them that are morally good. This matter will be disputed in its proper place at Distinction 41 of this book.[711] For it is certain that works of this kind are not performed by unbelievers through the assistance of the grace of Christ, whose first effect is faith, which is entirely absent in them. It follows, therefore, that such works are performed by them through the sole powers of nature.

§ 422. The seventh proposition: Man in the state of corrupt nature can, for some brief period of time, without grace, keep all the precepts of the natural law that present themselves to be kept during that same time. This proposition is set forth in second place by Medina and is well proved by him: because the affirmative precepts of the law do not bind at all times, as is commonly said, nor do they all present themselves to be fulfilled simultaneously; while the negative precepts are kept simply by doing nothing — such as "Thou shalt not kill." Moreover, man is able, for some period of time, even while temptation runs its course, to refrain from acting contrary to them.

§ 423. The eighth proposition: No one in the state of corrupt nature can by his own powers without the assistance of grace keep all the precepts of the natural law, not even as regards the substance of the acts. Durandus[712] and Scotus,[713] and the Abbot of Ávila,[714] dissent from this proposition. For they hold that man can keep all the moral precepts, or the precepts of the natural law, according to the substance of the acts

without grace, though not in the order toward the supernatural end. See also Gabriel Biel. But agreeing with us are St. Thomas,[715] Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and other theologians,[716] and Henry of Ghent.[717]

§ 424. Therefore, for the understanding of this proposition and for establishing its truth, it must first be known that it was the chief dogma of Pelagius, by which he taught that without the grace of God man can fulfil all the commandments of the law — though more easily through grace, as St. Augustine reports.[718] That doctrine is found in the letter written to the virgin Demetrias, which was at one time falsely attributed to the blessed Jerome and is carried in the last volume of his works; but that Pelagius is the true author of it can easily be shown from St. Augustine and others. In that letter it is taught that through nature all the goods of the virtues can be present in every man, and that in some men they actually were. Likewise, that through the natural law all the just who lived from Adam to Moses pleased God, and other things of that sort. The foundation of his doctrine is also disclosed in the same letter, where he says and diligently insists that the good of nature remained entire in every man; and that free will was in no way wounded or changed for the worse by the sin of the first man, but is by its own nature equally capable of both good and evil, even in those who are strangers to the Christian religion. And yet Christians are able to do more, because through Christ their nature has been instructed for the better in life, and they are also aided by the assistance of divine grace. It is therefore manifest that the opinion which contradicts our said proposition belongs to the heresy of Pelagius, and that consequently the proposition itself belongs to the Catholic faith.

§ 425. This will be made still more certain by what follows. For God says in Ezekiel: "And I will make you walk in my commandments" — therefore the observance of commandments is a gift of the grace of God through Christ. The Apostle Paul concludes in Rom. 3 that Jews and Greeks are all under sin: "As it is written," he says, "There is none righteous, no not one; there is none that understands, there is none that seeks after God; they have all turned aside," etc.[719] These words could certainly not be said of one who had kept the whole law of nature according to the substance of the prescribed act. To the same effect is that passage in the same chapter: "By the law is the knowledge of sin"; and in 1 Cor. 15: "The strength of sin is the law"; and in 2 Cor. 3: "The letter kills" — as well as other similar passages in Rom. 7. For these openly show that the knowledge of the law is in no way sufficient for man, without grace, to fulfil the precepts of the law; but that rather, by occasion of the law, he falls more gravely and sins against the law, on account of the lurking concupiscence of the flesh which opposes the law. Now that the Apostle is speaking about the natural law is manifest: for he is speaking about the Decalogue, which as a whole is of the natural law. And from it he expressly cites: "Thou shalt not covet" (Rom. 7) — which precept is established to be of the natural law.

§ 426. The definite and settled judgment of the same Apostle is in Rom. 8: "The law," he says, "of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death. For what was impossible to the law, in that it was weakened through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us."[720] In these words the Apostle not only affirms that the fulfilment of the law is impossible for us without the grace of Christ the Redeemer, but also discloses the cause of this impossibility — namely the infirmity of the flesh, that is, the corruption of our nature contracted through sin. To this also belong the things which the same Apostle conveys in Gal. 2 and following, concerning the weakness of the law and the necessity of the grace of Christ for fulfilling the law and obtaining justice: "For if justice comes by the law, then Christ died in vain."[721] For in precisely the same way, as St. Augustine teaches in the book *On Nature and Grace*, one can say: if justice comes by nature, then Christ died in vain. For the law, without grace, stands on the side of nature, and

whatever nature can do, the law is considered to be able to do equally. Nor does it diminish the force of this argument that the Apostle seems to be speaking of a justice that includes within itself the remission of sins. For it is certain that when the Apostle teaches that without the grace of Christ no one can be justified, he has regard chiefly to that part of justice by which the law is fulfilled through the observance of its commandments, and of which it is written: "He that does justice is just."[722]

§ 427. The same Apostle in Titus 3 depicts in the following terms what all men are like before the grace of Christ — even those who appear to live honestly and blamelessly in the law, among whom he himself had formerly been numbered: "For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, unbelieving, erring, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another."[723] Note here that he does not name thefts, rapines, homicides, adulteries, and manifest crimes of that kind — from which many who are strangers to the grace of Christ nonetheless refrain, since they are punished by laws — but instead enumerates hidden vices, to which even many who appear good outwardly are liable. Moreover, Christ in the Gospel of Jn. 10, when he says: "I am the door of the sheep. All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers," wishes to teach parabolically that without his grace not only could no one keep the law, but no one even delivered the true method of keeping it. Hence he also says generally to the Jews in chapter 7: "Did not Moses give you the law, and yet none of you keeps the law?",[724]

§ 428. Instructed by these and other testimonies of Scripture, the Fathers condemned the doctrine contrary to this truth with anathema in councils. For canon 5 of the Council of Milevis states: "Whosoever shall say that the grace of justification is given to us so that what we are commanded to do by free will we may be able to fulfil more easily through grace — as though, even if grace were not given, we could indeed not easily but yet possibly fulfil the divine commandments without it — let him be anathema."[725] The Fathers of the same council also attest this anew in their letter written to Pope Innocent — which is found among the letters of St. Augustine as number 95,[726] — declaring that human nature was so ruined by the sin of the first man that it cannot fulfil the law unless aided by the grace of God.

§ 429. Likewise the Council of Orange[727] says in its final canon that God first inspires in us faith and love of himself, so that with his assistance we may be able to fulfil those things that are pleasing to him. By these words it is again openly signified that without God's assistance we cannot fulfil those things that are pleasing to him — that is, the commandments of the law. And in canon 21 it says that Christ therefore did not die in vain, "that the law might be fulfilled through him, who said he did not come to destroy the law but to fulfil it; and that through him the nature lost in Adam might be restored, through him who said he had come to seek and to save what was lost.",[728]

§ 430. But let the testimonies of the holy Fathers also be added. Pope Innocent I, in his letter addressed to the Council of Milevis — which is among the letters of St. Augustine as number 93[729] — writes thus of the Pelagians: "Denying the assistance of God, they say that man can be sufficient unto himself, and that he has no need of divine grace, deprived of which he must necessarily be caught in the snares of the Devil and perish, while he strives to accomplish all the commandments of life by free will alone." And he holds that the advocates of such doctrine are to be deprived of ecclesiastical communion. Pope Celestine, writing to the Bishops of Gaul in chapter 10, recites and repeatedly confirms canon 5 of the Council of Milevis just cited above.[730]

§ 431. St. Augustine in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter* teaches ex professo that the law without the spirit of grace is not fulfilled, but rather makes a greater sinner, according to the word: "The letter kills, the Spirit gives life."[731] And among other things, treating that passage of Gal. 3: "Scripture has concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe," he says: "From this promise — that is, from the benefit of God — the law itself is fulfilled, without which promise it makes transgressors." See chapter 14 of the same book.[732] The same St. Augustine, in Discourse 7 on Ps. 118, says: "The words of God cannot be kept except by the faith that works through love."[733] And in his exposition of the letter to the Galatians, on the passage of chapter 5: "All the law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," he writes thus: "The observance of the law the Apostle calls charity — and other things of this kind pertaining to good morals — which cannot be fulfilled without charity, faith, and hope."[734] In these words note that St. Augustine expressly interprets the Apostle's sentence as referring to the moral law — that is, to what we call the natural law.

§ 432. The same Doctor, in Tract 45 on John,[735] expounding the words of Christ, "All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers," and speaking specifically of the Philosophers who discoursed much on the morals of the soul and the happiness of man, denies that anyone without the grace of Christ could live well. Now to live well and to keep the precepts of living well are the same thing. Let these places of the same Doctor also be consulted: *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, book 2, ch. 5; *On the Grace of Christ*, ch. 8 and 9; *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 10 and 11; *On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed*, the last chapter; and among the letters, from letter 90 and the following up to letter 96.[736]

§ 433. Prosper, in the book *Against Cassian*, ch. 9, denies that there are any men who by their own powers fulfil the law. And in ch. 23 he says that a commandment is given to man so that, the letter killing, he may have recourse to the life-giving Spirit, and may seek from grace the capacity which he does not find in nature.[737] His judgment, drawn from St. Augustine, is expressed in number 44 under the heading *On Law and Grace*: "The law was given that grace might be sought; grace was given that the law might be fulfilled. For it was not through its own fault that the law was not fulfilled, but through the fault of the prudence of the flesh — a fault which the law was to reveal and grace to heal."[738] The same Prosper, in his exposition of Ps. 118, on the verse "Therefore I have loved thy commandments above gold and topaz," writes: "Grace brings it about that the commandments of God are fulfilled by love, which could not be fulfilled by fear."[739] And on the verse "Thy testimonies are wonderful": "By the difficulties of the law the mercy of God brought it about that those who could not fulfil the law were converted to grace and laid hold of divine works — what they could not attain by their own powers."[740]

§ 434. St. Bernard likewise, in Sermon 50 on the Canticle of Canticles, simply affirms that without Christ the precepts are impossible to man.[741] Let there also be consulted St. Gregory, *Moralia* book 2, ch. 12,[742] and the Author of the *Opus Imperfectum* on Matt. 21,[743] treating those words of Christ: "Loose him and bring him to me." Furthermore, St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and other Fathers take this same position whenever they contend that the Scripture of Rom. 2 concerning the Gentiles who do the things of the law pertains not to unbelievers but only to those who were converted to Christ — for no other reason than that otherwise it would seem to follow, as the Pelagians argued, that some people were able to fulfil the natural law without faith and the grace of Christ.

§ 435. From this same argument it is likewise manifest that the Fathers, in denying that the law of God can be fulfilled by us without grace, were speaking of the law of God even as regards that part of it which is merely

natural. For Gentiles estranged from the faith of Christ had no law other than the natural law. Hence it is also shown in general that the Fathers are speaking of the natural law whenever they deny that pagan Philosophers or other unbelievers were able to fulfil the law without the grace of Christ. The same is shown from the fact that the Fathers in such statements of theirs generally indicate that they are speaking of the precepts of the Decalogue, which are all of the natural law.

§ 436. Now, to the authority of Scripture and the Fathers there are also added invincible arguments. The first: The one and first commandment of the law is that God be loved above all things and with the whole heart. But that this cannot be performed by man without grace has been demonstrated above; it is established, therefore, that not all precepts of the law can be fulfilled without grace.

§ 437. The second argument: If anyone could without grace keep all the commandments of the law, he could without grace merit and obtain eternal life — because it is written: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. 19), in which passage it is perspicuous that Christ is speaking of the commandments of the Decalogue, that is of the natural law; for he enumerates some of them.

§ 438. The third argument: In order that a person may keep all the precepts of the natural law in such a way as not to sin mortally against them, it is necessary that the higher reason in him be subject to God as his ultimate end, whom he prefers to all other things. But this subjection does not obtain without grace healing nature; therefore neither does that observance of the precepts of the law. The major of this argument is proved thus: because, as St. Thomas says,[257] "When a man does not have his heart steadfastly set on God in such a way that he would be unwilling to be separated from him for any good to be obtained or evil to be avoided, many things occur, for the obtaining or avoiding of which a man departs from God, contemning his precepts, and thus sins mortally" — above all because in sudden actions a man acts according to the end he had preconceived and according to the pre-existing habit, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* book 3.[744]

§ 439. — although from premeditation of reason a man can do something beyond the order of the end he has conceived, and beyond the inclination of his habit; yet because a man cannot always be in such premeditation, it cannot come about that he persevere for long without acting in accordance with the tendency of a will disordered from God, unless it be repaired to the due order through grace. Thus St. Thomas learnedly and from the very foundation of reason sets out the present doctrine.[745]

The fourth argument: Man without grace is in sin and under sin; but sin is of such a nature that, unless it be taken away by grace and the will be healed, it straightway draws one sin after another in its train — according to that saying of St. Gregory, Homily 13 on Ezekiel: "Sin which is not blotted out by repentance, straightway by its own weight draws one into another."[746] Therefore without grace man will not be able for long to persevere so as not to transgress the law of God. For this reason also, in the Scriptures the sinful man (and such is every man destitute of God's grace) is called the slave of sin (*servus peccati*), yea, and the slave of the Devil. To say, therefore, that man without grace can fulfil the law is tantamount to saying that a man who is a slave of sin and placed under the power of the Devil can fulfil the law — which is indeed a most absurd thing to say.

§ 440. The fifth argument: The written law was given by God for this purpose, that it might illuminate and perfect the law of nature obscured in the hearts of men; and yet the written law without grace was not sufficient for man to fulfil it — how much less, then, is the law of nature alone sufficient? The proof of the minor is evident from what the Apostle writes to the Romans and to the Galatians.[747] Finally, all those things

serve this same purpose which were adduced above to demonstrate that no one can, without grace, love God above all things and with the whole heart. For this, as we have already said, is the first and foremost commandment of the law, and indeed one upon which the whole law depends, as the Lord himself attests. And this is sufficient concerning the eighth proposition.

§ 441. Ninth proposition: There are certain precepts, both in general and in particular, which cannot be individually observed without the auxiliary grace of God. Such a precept in general is that by which we are commanded to love God with the whole heart — concerning which precept there has already been a proper disputation above. In particular, such precepts are those which, on account of the temptations that arise, are so very difficult that human infirmity, because of the corruption contracted from sin, cannot reach up to a special auxiliary grace to fulfil them. This matter is illustrated by the comparison of bodily infirmity. For a man infirm in body, just as he cannot perform certain more difficult works except for a brief time — such as walking on foot or doing any work with his hands, for he is at once wearied and gives out — so by reason of their greater difficulty and the resistance of what is contrary, he can simply not perform certain other works even for a moment of time, such as running, crying out, or lifting a heavy burden; whereas a strong and healthy man can do all these things easily and for a long time.

§ 442. In like manner, therefore, just as there are certain precepts of the law which, so far as the doing of them is concerned, the infirmity of corrupt nature is indeed in some measure capable of, though not in such a way as to be able to persevere long in their observance — inasmuch as the concupiscence of the flesh drags in the opposite direction and offers resistance — so there are certain precepts of such great difficulty that no one in this state of corruption can fulfil them even for a short time without grace; such as all those by which certain singularly arduous works are commanded, works for the undertaking of which great strength is required — for instance, to meet death for the sake of justice; not to depart from rectitude under severe torments; to overcome a vehement temptation of the flesh by love of chastity; and so forth. To these the precept of loving God above all things is deservedly added, although some dissent without reason. For if this precept could be fulfilled even for a brief time without the help of grace, it would follow that a man could be saved without grace — that is to say, if within the space of that brief time during which he loved God above all things, it should happen that he were taken from this life — and the other absurdities would follow of which we have spoken in their proper place.[748]

§ 443. Those things which the Apostle writes about the weakness of man, arising from the perpetual warfare of the flesh against the spirit — in Rom. 7, Gal. 3, and elsewhere[749] — serve to prove this proposition, as does also that saying of Christ: "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak."[,750] Moreover, the truth of the said proposition will be made more clear from the treatment of the question discussed below — whether any temptation can be overcome without grace.

§ 444. Tenth proposition: Man after his fall, once restored and justified, and accordingly endowed with the gift of habitual grace (*gratia habitualis*), cannot observe the whole law without the help of special grace (*gratia specialis*). Proof: because without help of this kind he cannot love God with the whole heart — [here the text continues:][751] and certain precepts which have very great difficulty he cannot observe. For although he is justified and endowed with the habit of grace, he still bears the infirmity of his corruption and suffers the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. For this reason the Apostle, who was certainly just and spiritual, speaks thus in Rom. 7: "But I am carnal, sold under sin," and so forth.[,752] For the grace of Christ heals nature while we are in this mortal life, but imperfectly. Perfect health, of which the Psalmist speaks in Ps. 102: "Who

healeth all thy diseases,"[341] is reserved for the future life — concerning which the same Psalm adds: "Who redeemeth thy life from destruction, who crowneth thee with lovingkindness and tender mercies."

§ 445. This is the express doctrine of St. Thomas[751] and has likewise been defined by the Council of Trent,[753] where the observance of the commandments is treated, and also in the chapter on the gift of perseverance. But more will be said on these matters when we necessarily treat of the help needed for persevering and for overcoming temptations. Furthermore, concerning the observance of supernatural precepts — whether and how far it is possible for man in the state of fallen nature or of integral nature, with grace or without grace — Medina,[754] following Cajetan, discusses the matter at length through seven conclusions. To that author, lest we be more prolix than is fitting, we refer the reader.

§ XLI — The arguments against the eighth proposition are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta quae sunt contra octavam propositionem)

§ 446. Against the doctrine of the preceding section's proposition, the Pelagians fought both by the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, and by arguments of reason. Their arguments are roughly as follows.

The **first argument**: The Apostle says in Rom. 2: "When the Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are a law to themselves; who show the work of the law written in their hearts." Therefore, according to the Apostle's judgment, the whole law can be fulfilled by the forces of nature alone. That the Apostle is speaking of the law being fulfilled, and not merely performed in some superficial manner, is clear from what he says further on: "And wilt thou judge him who by nature fulfils the uncircumcision as if it were circumcision, thee who through the letter and circumcision art a transgressor of the law?" That he is moreover speaking of the fulfilment of the law by the forces of nature alone is shown by the circumstance that he is speaking of unbelieving Gentiles not yet converted to Christ; for of the faithful it is not true that they do not have the law. For all the faithful have received the law of Christ through faith and baptism. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 9 that he himself is not without the law, because he is under the law of Christ.[756] This argument belonged to Pelagius (in the *Epistle to Demetrias*) and to Cassian in the *Collationes* (*De Protestatione Dei*), and to others who agreed with them.[757]

It is confirmed (*Confirmatur*) moreover by the testimony of St. John Chrysostom, who in Homily 5 (*on the Epistle to the Romans*) expounds the Apostle's meaning as referring to Gentiles who preceded the coming of Christ and the time of Evangelical Grace, and as referring to the observance of the whole natural law, that is, all its precepts.[758] For he says that those who obeyed the law of nature observed all those things which pertain to piety. And again he declares them worthy of admiration, because they had no need of the law and yet performed all the things that belong to the law. Theophylact likewise (*in his Commentary*) writes that they fulfilled the law, inasmuch as they used conscience and natural reasonings as a testimony of the good and the honourable.[759] The author of the *Commentary on Paul* (found among the works of St. Ambrose) similarly interprets this passage, and so do certain others.[760] For indeed St. Jerome, writing (*on Ezek. 29*), manifestly refers this passage of the Apostle to heathen unbelievers.[761] To these testimonies is added the fact that among certain articles condemned by Pope Pius V, there is also found (number 22) the following: that those who understand the text of the Apostle in Rom. 2 — "The Gentiles who do not have the law do by nature the things of the law" — as referring to Gentiles not having the Grace of Faith, hold the same view as Pelagius.[762]

From this condemnation it follows that the said text either must, or at least may, be understood of Gentiles of this kind.

§ 447. Reply to this argument (*Respondetur*): The Apostle is speaking of Gentiles imbued with faith in Christ the Mediator. This is proved, first, from the Apostle's design, whose purpose is to teach — and who concludes in chapter 3 — that without faith in Christ, all men, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin; that all have turned away, that all together have been made useless, and that there is no fear of God before their eyes, and so forth, as is read there.[763] Moreover, this cannot be in doubt to anyone who considers and carefully weighs the entire context of the Apostle in chapter 2. For he is treating of that observance of the law whereby a man is justified and merits eternal life. This is proved by the following sentences: "The doers of the law shall be justified"; "Glory and peace to every one who works good, to the Jew first, and to the Greek"; "Who will render to every man according to his works: to them indeed who, according to patience in good work, seek glory, and honour, and incorruption, eternal life.",[764] Now it is most certain from the Apostle's teaching that no one can, without faith in Christ and by the forces of nature alone, be justified, obtain glory before God, and merit eternal life. For if Abraham, as he says in chapter 4, "is justified by works, he hath glory, but not before God.",[765] Furthermore, this is evident from what follows in the same chapter. For the one of whom he had said that he does by nature the things of the law, he calls at the end of the chapter "a Jew inwardly," and his justice "the circumcision of the heart in the spirit, not in the letter, whose praise is not from men but from God.",[766] But to say such things of Gentiles estranged from Christ and of their works and their justice is wholly contrary to the Apostle's design and doctrine.

§ 448. We admit, therefore, that the Apostle is speaking of the law being fulfilled and brought to completion, but by believers and through faith, as he himself expressly teaches in chapter 3 — and accordingly not without the help of the Grace of God, whose primary effect is Faith. This interpretation is that of St. Augustine (*De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 26, and the three following chapters, and elsewhere),[767] likewise of Prosper (*Contra Collatorem*, ch. 22),[768] and of Fulgentius (*De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, chs. 25–26);[769] these authors do not advance this meaning as a bare assertion but prove it solidly from the apostolic context itself.

Nor does it militate in favour of the different exposition that the Apostle says of the Gentiles of whom he speaks that they do *naturaliter*, or as the Greek has it, *natura*, the things of the law. For by "nature" he does not there oppose nature to grace, but to the written law which had been given by God to the Jews, not to other Gentiles. But understand "nature" as meaning nature reformed by Grace. Hence St. Augustine says (*De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27): "Let it not disturb us that he said they do by nature the things of the law; for this is precisely what the Spirit of Grace effects, that He restore in us the image of God in which we were naturally made."[770]

§ 449. Nor is it an obstacle that Gentiles who have been converted to Christ are said to have the law of Christ, and therefore are not without a law; partly because the law of Christ was not a written law like the law of Moses; and partly because, beyond the law, the things delivered by Christ are to be observed, so that the law of Christ consists more in the spiritual gift of Grace by which the law is fulfilled, than in the precepts which are commanded to be fulfilled.

To the confirmation drawn from St. John Chrysostom, certain respondents grant that he did indeed understand the Apostle's meaning as referring to Gentiles estranged from the faith of Christ; yet they deny

that he says that individual Gentiles of whom the Apostle treats did all the things of the law, but rather that some did some things and others did others, so that the statement that the Gentiles did all the things of the law by nature is verified in a distributed or collective sense. But those who respond in this way do not consider that this solution contradicts the new proposition set down above — which they themselves also accept — wherein it was said that there are certain precepts of the natural law so difficult that not even individual ones can be observed by anyone without the special help of Grace, and that in particular such is the precept of loving God above all things. Besides, if some can perform some things and others others, so that collectively all things are performed, it is not sufficiently clear why they could not also all be performed by any single individual. Add to this that the words of St. John Chrysostom — in which he says that those Gentiles observed all the things that pertain to piety, and performed all the things that belonged to the law, and that for this reason they were worthy of admiration — do not admit the said solution, because it is not worthy of admiration if they observed all in the sense that some did some things and others did others, since this could be said even of wicked men.

§ 450. The true solution, therefore, is that St. John Chrysostom is not speaking of unbelievers, but of believers — that is, of those who, outside the Jewish people, were imbued with the faith of the one God, and also with the faith of the Mediator at least implicitly, and who through that faith, by the Grace of God, fulfilled the law of nature. This is clearly taught by the very words of St. John Chrysostom: "Those whom he here calls Gentiles," he says, "are not called so because they were idolaters, but those who knew God and, obeying the law of nature and setting aside Jewish ceremonies, observed all those things which pertain to piety" — such as was Melchizedek with all his household, such as was Job, such as were those Ninevites, such as was the centurion Cornelius.[771] Now Melchizedek and Job would not have lacked the faith of the Mediator; nor could the Ninevites, with their true penitence, have obtained mercy from God without implicit faith; so that neither Christ in the Gospel nor the Church in her Office has hesitated to hold up their example to the Jews and to her own faithful. That the centurion Cornelius was not wholly lacking in faith in Christ before Peter was sent to instruct him, and that consequently he did not perform the works of piety recorded of him (Acts 10) without the special help of God — this we have shown from St. Augustine and other Fathers (in the solution of the seventh argument concerning preparation for Grace).[772] There too it was explained in what sense Peter said in that same passage that "in every nation, he who fears God and works justice is acceptable to Him." Therefore, as regards the argument which could be drawn from the works of Cornelius and the words of Peter, there is no need for us to reply here at greater length.

§ 451. Furthermore, if any of the Fathers have interpreted the passage of the Apostle in Rom. 2 as referring to Gentiles estranged from Christ, they did not hold that those Gentiles did all the things of the law by nature, but only some of them — such things as honouring parents, returning a deposit, pronouncing a just sentence, not perjuring oneself, and other easier matters of this kind, about which the sixth proposition spoke; and accordingly from such an understanding of the Apostle's sentence, that proposition is well proved. And it is clear from the context that it is only in this sense that St. Jerome accommodated the passage of the Apostle to heathen unbelievers, both because he says "if they did anything good," and because he speaks of Nebuchadnezzar, of whom it is most well known that he violated the law of nature in very many respects.

§ 452. Furthermore, from the pontifical condemnation of the article mentioned in the argument, it does not at all follow that this is the true and genuine exposition, still less that which Pelagius adhered to. For the Pontiff forbids only the assertion by which it is said that those who understand the text of the Apostle as

referring to Gentiles not having the Grace of Faith hold the same view as Pelagius. And he forbids it with good reason, because this understanding, according to the interpretation just given, is not only far removed from Pelagian error but also coheres with the truth, as has been shown above.

§ 453. The **second argument**: It is predicted of Cyrus, King of Persia — a man estranged from the Grace of Faith — in Is. 44, that he will fulfil all the will of God; and in Is. 46, the Lord calls him "a man of His good pleasure."[773] Therefore a man can, even without the Grace of God, fulfil the whole will of God and all His commandments.

Reply (*Respondeo*): It is established from the histories that Cyrus was a bloodthirsty man and an unjust invader of the kingdoms of others, and that for this reason he came to a bad end. The Prophet, however, is speaking not of the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), which consists in the commandments, but of the will which is called the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*). For the meaning is: all the things which I promise and predict concerning the deliverance of my people from captivity and their leading back into their land, and concerning the restoration of the Temple and the city — all these Cyrus will fulfil by his own decree and command. Nor is it surprising, even if he was wicked and ignorant of the true God, as the same Prophet testifies in chapter 45.[774] For God often fulfils His will even through the wicked and the ignorant, while they think otherwise, or pursue their end with a perverse intention. This is expressly stated in the same Prophet concerning the King of Assyria, in chapter 10.[775]

§ 454. The **third argument**: A certain man in Mk. 10, commanded by the Lord to keep the commandments — among which Matt. 19 also enumerates "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," concerning which precept Paul affirms in Rom. 13 that "he who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law" — replied: "All these have I observed from my youth."[776] That this reply was truthful is proved by what follows: "And Jesus, looking upon him, loved him." That moreover he had performed this without grace is apparent from this, that he did not yet acknowledge the grace of the Mediator, but was instructed only by his knowledge of the law.

Reply (*Respondeo*): If he truly observed all these things, he did not observe them without the help of the Grace of God. For he was a Jew, and perhaps had some faith in the Mediator. Although it is more probable that he did not truly observe all the precepts of the law. For when invited by Christ to give up his many possessions, as the Evangelist writes, he did not agree but went away sorrowful. Hence the Lord immediately says to the disciples: "How hard it is for those who trust in riches to enter the kingdom of God."[777] By these words He tacitly pointed to that rich man as one who trusted in his money. But trust in riches is opposed to the great commandment of the law which prescribes that God be loved with the whole heart, and generally drags with it as well the transgression of other commandments; and for this reason this vice is frequently and gravely censured in the Scriptures.

§ 455. Christ is said to have looked upon him and loved him — not because he had truly, or according to the substance of the works, kept all the commandments of the law, but because he had kept the precept of love of neighbour to the degree that it is shown by external conduct, namely by refraining from manifest injuries to his neighbours; and also because he was consulting Christ not in a simulated fashion but simply and sincerely concerning the business of his salvation, and was even ready to add something beyond the commandments by his very question — asking what might still be lacking to him. Certainly, if according to truth he had observed

all things without grace, it would follow from the same passage that he could be saved without grace. For the Lord had said to him: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments."[778]

§ 456. The **fourth argument**: Paul, while still living under the law and not under grace, fulfilled the justice of the law, inasmuch as, according to the justice which is in the law, he lived blamelessly, as he says of himself in Phil. 3.[779] For to live blamelessly under the law (as in Lk. 1 and elsewhere) is attributed to those who live justly and blamelessly according to the law of God.

Reply (*Respondeo*): Paul in other passages charges and deplores his former manner of life: in 1 Tim. 1, where he calls himself a blasphemer, a persecutor, and calls himself the first and foremost of sinners;[780] and in Tit. 3, where he speaks generally thus: "For we ourselves were also once foolish, incredulous, erring, serving desires and diverse pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful and hating one another."[540] By these words it is excellently shown what kind of men all men are — even those imbued with some knowledge — before God calls them to Himself by His grace, of which the same Apostle consequently speaks. Indeed, in the said passage in Phil. 3, concerning his justice under the law, he goes on to add: "But the things that were gain to me, the same I have counted loss for Christ." And again: "For whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them as dung."[781]

§ 457. When therefore the Apostle says that he lived blamelessly according to the justice which is in the law, he means only that he lived, after the Jewish manner, irreproachably in the law — in the sense that he abstained from the external act of sin as regards the manifest injuries against God and one's neighbours which the law expressly forbids, such as injustice, homicides, adulteries, and so forth. He does not mean, however, that he kept the law from his soul and with sincere affection of heart — namely, by repressing even the evil desires which the law forbids.

§ 458. The **fifth argument**: Hilary, in his exposition of Ps. 68, at the words "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living," distinguishes a twofold book: one of the living, and another of the just. And he says that those are written in the book of the living who previously, without any knowledge of Christ, lived piously — of whom the Apostle says in Rom. 10: "He who does them shall live in them." But those are written in the book of the just to whom Christ has been made justice, according to the word: "The just man lives by faith."[782]

Reply (*Respondeo*): Although this passage is obscure, and at first sight seems to favour not a little Durandus and others who think that, without the faith and grace of Christ, all the precepts of the law can be observed as regards the substance of the works — yet in this respect Hilary manifestly dissents from Pelagius, in that he denies that true justice and consequently true salvation can be had without faith in Christ. But perhaps Hilary, by those former ones whom he said to have been written in the book of the living but not in the book of the just, understood those who lived morally well under the law — in the manner in which we have already said that both the rich man and Paul lived — namely by a certain human judgment by which those are reckoned to live well and lawfully who abstain from manifest and more serious offences, especially those by which the tranquillity of human society is disturbed; the existence of many such men among unbelievers we do not deny.

§ 459. And in such cases there can have place the saying "He who does them shall live in them," if it be understood — as many understand it — of temporal life, because the law does not punish with the penalty of temporal death except those who manifestly transgress the law. This is also signified by the following verse of the poet: "I have not committed theft: I shall not feed the crows on the cross." Thus Hilary seems to have

understood the "book of the living" as referring to those who live this temporal life, not those who live eternal and blessed life.

§ 460. The **sixth argument**: God commands nothing impossible to man, as the Council of Trent holds (Session 6, ch. 11),[783] and indeed it is foolish and absurd to command anyone to do what is not in his power. But God has commanded us not only to observe individual precepts of the law, but all of them — that is, to transgress no precept of the law. Therefore it is in the power and forces of our nature to perform this.

This was the argument of the Pelagians, which — as St. Jerome (*Contra Pelagianos*, bk. 2) and St. Augustine (*De Perfectione Iustitiae*) report — they set forth in the form of the following dilemma:[784] Either You have given us commandments that are possible, O God, or ones that are impossible. If possible, they can be observed by us through our free will. If impossible, then we do not sin if we do not observe them, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid.

§ 461. To this argument St. Thomas replies briefly and well: that things which are impossible to us absolutely speaking are possible through friends, according to the saying of the Philosopher (*Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 3, ch. 3): "What we can do through friends, we can in some sense do ourselves."[785] And therefore the Council of Trent (at the cited place) adds, from St. Augustine, that when God commands, He admonishes us to do what we can, and to ask for help for what we cannot, so that He Himself aids us that we may be able.[786]

But you will object: that such help is not in the power of man, especially of one who has never heard anything of the Grace of God but is guided only by the light of human reason; and therefore the observance of the whole law is absolutely impossible for such a man. Some respond to this by saying that there is no man to whom the help of Grace from God is not always readily available and at hand, by which he can observe the whole law and avoid sins, provided he wills — as he can — to use that help through his free will. But this response agrees neither with Sacred Scripture, nor with the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, nor is it consistent with the efficacious operation of the Grace of God, as we shall show more fully in its proper place. Moreover, St. Augustine himself, though hard-pressed by this argument of the Pelagians, nowhere employs a response of this kind — as can be particularly observed throughout the entire book *De Perfectione Iustitiae* — to say nothing of his other passages which teach the contrary.

§ 462. The truer response, therefore, is that "possible" is said in more than one sense; and that the observance of the law is not equally possible to the just man who already has the habit of grace and of the virtues, to the sinner who nevertheless has faith which shows and teaches from where help is to be sought, to the unbeliever who is nevertheless invited to faith through the preaching of the Gospel, and finally to the pagan who has never heard anything of the Faith and the Grace of God necessary for observing His law. For the first can observe the whole law with a potency very close and indeed conjoined with act — since he in fact does so in reality. The second can do so with a less proximate potency. The third with a more remote potency. The fourth with the most remote potency of this kind. Yet the fourth is not absurdly said to be able absolutely speaking, because the Gospel can be preached to him, and the other means can be applied by which God is accustomed to call men to faith and justice, and such a man still has free will that remains flexible toward the good. Nor indeed ought that to be called absolutely impossible for a man which, in many others placed in altogether similar circumstances, the subsequent course of events has proved to have been possible.

§ XLI — continuation

§ 463. This solution is indicated by St. Augustine in various places, and expressly in the book *De Perfectione Iustitiae*,[787] and wherever he teaches that the precepts of God are therefore not impossible to man, because his nature can be healed by Grace, so that he may fulfil those precepts. The same point is made clear from the condition of wayfarers, concerning whom, as long as they are alive, despair must nowhere be entertained, since through the means divinely ordained — such as the preaching of the Gospel, the reputation of the Christian religion, the prayers of the faithful, and the like — they can arrive at the grace of Faith and of justice, God mercifully calling them. Hence Prosper (in his *Response to the Sixth Vincentian Objection*)[788] says: "This is the difference between wicked men and demons, that for men, even the very wicked, there remains, if God has mercy, the possibility of reconciliation; whereas for demons there is preserved no conversion for eternity." Here it must be noted that he says "if God has mercy," not, however, "if they are willing to make use of that assistance once offered." By which he sufficiently indicates that that assistance is not prepared for all in such a way that its use depends upon the free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) of man.

§ 464. But on this matter there will be more to say in the place where the question will be raised how a good work is possible or impossible to a man destitute of the Grace of God.[789] Let what Medina adduces also be consulted in his solution of the fifth argument,[790] although he does not seem altogether to satisfy the difficulty.

§ 465. The seventh argument: A man can, by the sole forces of nature, for some brief period of time observe all the precepts of the law that present themselves to be observed during that same period — as was maintained in the seventh proposition. But one who does this is made stronger and more capable of doing the same thereafter. For acts dispose to habit (*habitus*), and a habit renders the faculty ready and prompt for the repetition of similar acts; therefore a man will also be able, from that point forward and throughout his whole life — and indeed more easily, once the practice has been acquired — to observe them.

§ 466. It is answered: this argument does not conclude. First, because although someone, by acting, becomes more capable with respect to similar acts and acts of the same kind, he does not thereby become capable with respect to more difficult acts, nor indeed with respect to any acts whatsoever of a different kind — especially if the man is infirm and weak, and has within himself a repugnance to such acts, as we all have in the state of fallen nature. Next, because during a brief period of time there may not occur grave temptations, to overcome which a greater fortitude is needed than can be had without the assistance of Grace, whereas such temptations do occur within a longer period of time. Finally: the observance of moral and natural precepts even throughout an entire life is something proportioned to human nature and naturally owed to it — for otherwise they would not be natural precepts but supernatural ones; therefore the observance of those precepts does not exceed the powers of nature, so that it cannot be rendered by those powers alone.

§ 467. It is answered: these precepts are rightly called natural, both because natural reason dictates that they are to be done, and also because through an integral, sound, and uncorrupted nature — so far as pertains to nature itself — all of them can be observed, as has already been declared. But because by sin nature is now wounded and enfeebled, it comes about that for observing these same precepts it is no longer sufficient unless aided by the supernatural gift whereby its infirmity is raised up and healed. The Pelagians are also accustomed to raise other objections against Catholics, of the kind that may be seen in St. Augustine and St. Jerome in the books already cited.[791] But the solution of all of these can easily be gathered from what has now been said.

§ XLII — A notable passage of St. Augustine is to be expounded (Eximius locus Augustini exponendus)

§ 468. A notable passage of St. Augustine from his book *De Natura et Gratia*, chapter [—],[792] is to be expounded. The holy Doctor says: "It has been granted to man to know his weakness, so that when He comes to his aid He is not met with labour; and after a brief pause" — urging through the creature that serves Him as Lord the same creature, loving, exhorting, striving — "to assist." Here it must be noted: what St. Augustine in his *Retractations* says he nowhere withdrew from the doctrine he had delivered in that place, namely that Grace of God is required — without which human nature, now wounded and darkened, cannot be illumined or healed. And pertinent here also is a notable passage of St. Thomas (from *De Veritate*, q. 14, art. 11, ad 1),[793] where he says: "This pertains to Divine Providence" —

§ XLII — What is signified by the name of perseverance (Quid nomine perseverantiae significetur)

§ 469. From those matters which have already been debated at length concerning the necessity of the Grace of God for all and each individual good works, and for the beginning, progress, and consummation of each work, and likewise from what has just been said concerning the necessity of that same Grace for the fulfilling of the commandments of the law, it can be understood that no one without the Grace of God is able to persevere in good until the end of life. Yet because perseverance in itself encompasses several things which must be explained and distinguished, and because the gift of perseverance is singular inasmuch as it is proper to the elect alone, and is accordingly commended to us in a singular manner in the Sacred Scriptures, and because the Fathers — and most especially St. Augustine — have also treated it specifically in controversy against the Pelagians, it seemed to us that this matter demands a treatment of its own as well. First, therefore, it must be known that the gift of perseverance is not to be understood as some single and determinate quality residing in the soul, by which it comes about that a man perseveres or is able to persevere. For no such quality can be posited beyond habitual Grace; nor is any posited by the Theologians. Now it is established that habitual Grace is not the same as the gift of perseverance, for many have Grace who do not persevere. Therefore, the gift of perseverance is to be understood in actual Grace (*actuali Gratia*), that is, in the gratuitous operation of God whereby He brings it about and provides that a man remain and endure until the end of life and overcome all temptations that arise in the meantime, by which he might have been drawn back from the course of a good life — or, what comes to the same thing, it is to be understood in the very effect of this divine operation, namely in the fact of actually persevering in good until the end.

§ 470. Hence it is required that, although many who do not persevere are able to persevere, and many likewise persevere for a time — even a long time — and at last fall away, nevertheless, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), the gift of perseverance which Scripture commends to us is possessed by those alone, and by all of them, who in fact persevere until the end by living justly; as St. Augustine clearly teaches.[795] Hence it must be noted that the course of perseverance does not always have its beginning from the first justification of man, by which he is plainly justified in baptism. For one who is to recover justice in baptism — the course of perseverance takes its beginning only from that justification from which a man thereafter does not fall away.

For whoever loses justice certainly does not at that point persevere in it, and therefore does not yet have the gift of perseverance. From which it follows that many are just who do not have the gift of perseverance — that is, all those who are about to lose their present justice by sinning. It likewise follows that many are just who do not yet have the gift of perseverance but are going to have it — that is, all those who are indeed just and elect, but are yet about to sin mortally, and thereby to lose justice; who nevertheless, since they are elect, are with absolute certainty going at some point after their fall to recover justice and to persevere in it until the end.

§ 471. Furthermore, it must be noted that a just man who is going to remain in the justice he possesses for as long as he lives, and runs, and contends, is indeed already persevering and possesses the gift of perseverance — but in an imperfect act (*actu imperfecto*). At the end of life, however, when he can already say "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course,"[796] he is persevering and possesses the gift of perseverance in a perfect and consummated act (*actu perfecto et consummato*). For perseverance, by which one perseveres unto the end, cannot be called complete and consummated before the end is reached. Hence St. Augustine says:[797] "This gift of God, when it has been given, cannot be lost by stubbornness. For when anyone has persevered unto the end, he can no longer lose either this gift or the others which he was able to lose before the end." From these words understand that the gift of perseverance is indeed given, and is accordingly possessed in an imperfect act while a man is still running the course of this life, but it is not given, nor is it possessed in a perfect act by a man, except when he has persevered unto the end.

§ 472. Moreover, perseverance seems to encompass chiefly these three or four things, continued unto the end: the observance of the divine law, the conservation of justice and Grace, not being separated from contrary temptations but rather overcoming and conquering them, and this especially in the manner which Scripture proclaims — that is, through faith and hope in the promise of eternal life. All of these are distinct from one another and can be distinguished by their proper formal characters (*rationibus*), as is evident to one who considers each carefully and more closely. And indeed it is evident that perseverance does not consist solely in the fact that one is assailed by no temptations drawing one from the course of an upright life, but rather in the continuation of good works and holy conversation, even if no temptation were pressing one in the contrary direction. This is manifest from the example of the apostate Angels, and especially of the supreme Angel, who fell impelled by no temptation and spontaneously abandoned justice, and thereby did not persevere in good; just as, on the other hand, the elect Angels are said truly and properly to have persevered in good, because they did not withdraw from it, though solicited by no temptation to withdraw. Therefore, we shall first have to speak of the gift of perseverance in general, and then specifically of that part of perseverance which consists in victory against the temptations that arise, which is the more perfect mode of persevering.

§ XLIII — That no one can persevere in good without Grace (Neminem in bono perseverare posse sine Gratia)

§ 473. When it is asked whether anyone can persevere in good without grace, the question is not this: whether one can do so without habitual grace (*Gratia habituali*) — for the question presupposes that grace and its permanence, since without it no one is just. Nor is the question whether a man established in grace needs another habitual grace in order to persevere in it, for habitual grace in any one man is only one. Rather, the question is whether he needs, in order to persevere in good and holy conversation, a special assistance of God (*speciali auxilio Dei*) of the kind we described in the preceding section. St. Thomas explains and definitively

answers this question affirmatively,[799] and this teaching is one we must hold with certain faith, as will be evident from what follows.

§ 474. Let the first proof of this teaching be drawn from the Scriptures. David, in 1 Chr. 29, acknowledges this divine gift of perseverance, praying thus on behalf of the people who had shown a good will in their spontaneous offerings for the house of God: "Keep, O Lord, this will in them always; may this mind remain in the veneration of Thee." The same Prophet supplicates God in the Psalms with words of this kind: "Preserve me, O Lord"; "Keep us as the apple of the eye"; "Be Thou my helper, forsake me not"; "Depart not from me"; "Let not pride come upon me"; "Remove from me the way of iniquity"; "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart"; "Direct my steps, that no injustice may have dominion over me."[800] Likewise: "Thou, O Lord, wilt preserve us, and keep us."[,801] "The Lord hath delivered my feet from falling."[,802] And elsewhere the Psalmist refers to the praise of God what he says: "And we have not departed from Thee"[,803] — for in saying this the Psalmist did not wish to praise himself but to proclaim a benefit of God. This is recalled by the mother of Samuel in her canticle, saying: "He will keep the feet of His saints."[,804]

§ 475. In Isaiah ch. 42, where the Lord describes the promises of the New Testament, He says among other things: "These words I have spoken to them, and I have not forsaken them"[805] — which the Seventy rendered as a future: "These words I will speak to them, and I will not leave them," as Pope Leo I cites it;[,806] and to speak and not to forsake is to speak continuously to the very end. In Jer. 32 a kindred promise of God is found: "I will give them one heart and one way, that they may fear Me all their days."[,807] And again: "I will put My fear in their heart, that they may not depart from Me."[,808] Paul says in 2 Cor. 13: "We pray God that you may do no evil"[,809] — and this is to persevere in good. And in Phil. 1: "Being confident of this very thing, that He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus."[,810] And in 2 Tim. 4: "The Lord delivered me from every evil work."[,811] Likewise Peter in 1 Pet. 1: "Who by the power of God are kept through faith unto salvation."[,812] And the Lord Himself in the Gospel refers the perseverance of faith to the gift of God when He speaks thus to Peter in Lk. 22: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith may not fail."[,813]

§ 476. To these add the general Scriptures which attribute every good of ours by which we tend toward salvation to God as its Author, such as: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15); "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" (1 Cor. 4); "All our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor. 3); "Every best gift is from above" (Jas. 1); "I will cause you to walk in my commandments" (Ezek. 36), and the like. From all these it evidently follows that the perseverance (*perseverantia*) of good conversation and of good works is had only through the grace (*Gratia*) of God.

§ 477. The second proof comes from the Fathers. St. Cyprian, in his exposition of the Lord's Prayer (on the words "Hallowed be Thy name"), says: "We ask and pray that we who have been sanctified in baptism may persevere in what we have begun to be."[814] And a little later: "We pray that this sanctification may remain in us." And again: "We make this petition in continuous prayers, we request it day and night, that the sanctification and vivification which is from the grace of God may be preserved by His own protection." This text is also adduced by St. Augustine in confirmation of this teaching.[,815]

§ 478. Hilary, at the end of his work *On the Trinity*,[816] prays thus to God for the perseverance of the Catholic faith: "Preserve, I beseech Thee, this my faith undefiled until the departure of my spirit; and grant that I may always maintain this testimony of my conscience, which at the font of my regeneration I held in the Symbol, when I professed my faith in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." Likewise in his

commentary on Ps. 123 he says: "While we remain, while we rest in the fear of God, while we are steadfast in the hope of eternal goods, aided by the mercy of God, knowing Him who said: 'Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world' — here he states the matter in a general proposition — whatever in us is good, we owe entirely to God, taught by Paul who says nothing is ours, when he says: 'What hast thou that thou hast not received?'",[817]

§ 479. St. Basil in his Liturgy, as Peter Deacon cites it,[818] represents the priest praying thus: "Preserve the good in goodness, for Thou art able to do all things.",[819] St. Jerome in his letter against the Pelagians,[820] says: "Let us give thanks to the giver of grace and know that nothing will exist unless He has granted it, as the Apostle himself says: 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy' (Rom. 9). And again: 'God is always the giver, always the preserver; it does not suffice me that He has given once, unless He shall always have given. I will receive, and when I shall have received I will grow,' and so forth.",[821] And in his second book against the Pelagians, on Ps. 88 ("Mercy shall be built up forever"), he says: "There is no saint in whom mercy is not built up forever in the individual saints.",[822]

§ 480. St. Augustine, most prolific in commending the gift of perseverance, wrote a special treatise on it, in which, after the Scriptures and drawing also upon St. Cyprian and others, he demonstrates at length that the perseverance of a good life is a gift of God — and indeed so great a gift that, as he says in ch. 2, the other gifts of God are preserved by it.[815] He likewise calls it "the great gift of God" in ch. 13.,[438] Moreover, in *De Correptione et Gratia* ch. 6 he proclaims the greatness of this gift, by which it comes about in a man through the grace of God that he does not abandon the good but perseveres in it.[823] See also chs. 7, 8, and 22 of the same work.,[824] Likewise in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* ch. 6, he interprets Song 8 — "Who is this that cometh up from the desert, leaning upon her beloved?" — of the Church, which, leaning upon her beloved, ascends into heaven, because she is sustained by the continuous operation of Christ so that she may persevere in the grace once received and thus arrive at heavenly beatitude.[825] The same is the teaching he addresses to God in *Confessiones* II, ch. 7: "I ascribe to Thy grace whatever evils I have not done."[826] In that same passage he also teaches that the man who has not sinned is more obliged to love God than he who after sin has been brought back to repentance — namely because it is a special benefit of God not to have sinned, that is, to have been preserved from sin. This same teaching is that of St. Thomas,[827] who teaches that the innocent man is more obliged to render thanks to God than he who has fallen and done penance, because he has received a greater benefit from God. And both Joannes Driedo confirms that teaching of St. Thomas,[828] and also the following passages of St. Augustine should be consulted: *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* ch. 44; *De Natura et Gratia* ch. 26; Epistle 59, qu. 9; Epistle 142; Epistle 208;[829] and Prosper, *Responsio* 6 to the *Capitula Gallorum*.[263]

§ 481. St. Augustine's argument on the gift of perseverance in the aforesaid book also confirms: "perseverance in good even to the end, which those who did not persevere manifestly did not have," and so forth.[830] And in *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 23, he teaches that gold — that is, every good merit of man from the beginning of faith to the consummation of perseverance — is a divine gift and work.[831] And he continues this teaching to the end of the same book. He teaches the same in *Responsio* 14 to the Objections of Vincentius and elsewhere.[832]

§ 482. Peter Chrysologus, Sermon 135 on St. Lawrence, says: "That faith might not fail, that hope might not turn away, that charity might be kindled still more amid the bodily fiery torments — these were the gifts of God. Let no one arrogate to his own power what God alone gives."[833]

§ 483. To these add St. John Chrysostom, Homily 8 on John;[834] St. Cyril of Alexandria, Book 11 on John, ch. 21;[835] St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* Book 23, ch. 28, and Homily 8 on Ezekiel;[836] St. Bernard, Sermon 3 on the Canticle;[837] and the rest, none dissenting.

§ 484. Moreover, it is manifest that the Fathers wish this teaching to pertain to the Catholic faith, because they reckon the contrary among the condemned positions of Pelagius and Caelestius — as is attested by St. Augustine in various places,[838] and by St. Jerome in his *Dialogues against the Pelagians*.[839]

§ 485. That the matter may be more firmly established, let a third proof come from the definition of the Church. Pope Innocent I, in the letter addressed to the Council of Carthage (found among St. Augustine's letters, Epistle 91),[840] says: "Although God has redeemed man from past sins, yet knowing that he can sin again, He has reserved many means for his restoration and provides daily remedies." From which words, presently cited by Pope Caelestinus I in his letter to the bishops of Gaul, ch. 6, that Pope defines that no one receives the perseverance of good conversation except through the daily assistance of God.[841]

§ 486. Likewise Pope Zosimus, in his letter to the bishops of the whole world, cited by Caelestinus in the same letter, ch. 9, says: "What interval of time is there in which we do not need the help of God? In all our actions therefore, and in all our thoughts and movements, He must be implored as helper and protector. For it is proud to assume anything for human nature by itself."[842] And what follows.

§ 487. The Council of Milevis, canon 3, defines under anathema that grace avails even to the end that sins may not be committed.[259] It is established that this Council is speaking of necessary assistance, for otherwise it would say nothing against the Pelagians, who did not deny assistance but denied its necessity, as is evident.

§ 488. The Council of Orange, canon 9, decrees: "It is of divine bounty when we think rightly and keep our feet from iniquity and injustice; for as often as we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may work."[843] This canon is cited in two places by Blessed Prosper.[844] Again, canon 10: "The assistance of God must always be implored even by the saints and the just, so that they may be able to arrive at the good end or to persevere in good works."[845]

§ 489. The Council of Trent, Session 6, defines that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from anyone other than Him who is able to establish as persevering the one who stands — from the text: "He who shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved" (Matt. 10 and 24); and that gift it calls "the great gift of perseverance."[846] And finally in canon 22 it thus defines: "If anyone shall say that the justified man, even without the special assistance of God, can persevere in the justice received, or that with it he cannot — let him be anathema."[847]

§ 490. The fourth proof comes from the prayers of the Church (*ex orationibus Ecclesiae*). For prayer is a most certain argument of the necessity of assistance, as St. Augustine teaches in *De Natura et Gratia* ch. 18, saying: "What could be more foolish than to pray God to do what is in your own power?"[848] St. Augustine frequently employs this argument to show that perseverance is a gift of God — as in *De Correptione et Gratia* ch. 11 and elsewhere,[849] but above all in *De Dono Perseverantiae* ch. 2, where he says: "When perseverance is asked of God, is it not given by God? Or is this too a mocking petition, not truly given by Him but existing in man's own power without His giving it?" And he teaches that perseverance is asked of God in the subsequent words: "As for him who says perseverance is not requested of Him — he is not to be refuted by my disputations, but is to be recalled by the prayers of the saints. For indeed whose prayer is it among those who do not ask a thing of God for themselves, but persevere in it themselves, when in the very Lord's Prayer — which is called *dominica* — it is understood that when prayed by the saints, nearly nothing other than

perseverance is asked?" So he.[815] In that same place he then confirms what he had said, proceeding through nearly every part of the Lord's Prayer from Cyprian's treatise *On the Lord's Prayer*, showing that the just ask of God perseverance through the individual petitions of the Lord's Prayer.[850]

§ 491. But besides the Lord's Prayer, it is most manifest that this gift of perseverance is asked of God everywhere in the public prayers of the Church. For God is prayed to grant to His faithful persevering service in His will; to keep the works of His mercy; to cause the Church to persevere in confession of His name, and to propitiate it with perpetual favour; so that by His assistance it may always be both drawn away from harmful things and directed toward salutary ones; to give to all who are reckoned under the Christian profession the power to repudiate what is hostile to that name; to make us have both the fear and the love of His name perpetually; to keep His favours toward us; to deign to keep us without sin day and night; to prevent us from inclining toward sin, and to direct our speech, thoughts, and works always toward the doing of His justice; that we may never cease from His praise; to make us always cleave to His commandments; and not to permit us ever to be separated from Him — and many other such petitions, which it would take too long to enumerate one by one. To this also pertains the above-cited text from the Liturgical Prayer of St. Basil: "Preserve the good in goodness"[851] — which prayer, as Peter Deacon testifies, together with the entire Liturgy, St. Basil composed.

§ XLIII — Proof of the same doctrine by reason (Ejusdem Doctrinae demonstratio ex ratione)

§ 492. The Church offers prayers of this kind following the example of the saints David and Paul, whom we have seen above praying thus on behalf of the faithful, and indeed following the example of Christ, who prayed for Peter — an example which the faithful themselves individually, when praying for themselves, ought, as we saw in Hilary, to imitate. Hence St. Thomas,[799] having shown that the help of God's grace is necessary for possessing perseverance, says: "And therefore, after someone has been justified by grace, he must needs ask of God the aforesaid gift of perseverance, namely that he be kept from evil until the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom it is not given to persevere in grace." So he. See him also,[852] where he uses this same proof, repeating the saying from St. Augustine, that it would be mockery to ask of God for something of which God himself were not the giver. Now, the faithful ask for the gift of perseverance not only when they pray in a general way that God grant them to persevere in good, but also as often as they ask God for some virtue which they already possess. And this is what St. Augustine, on the authority of St. Cyprian, wishes to be understood when the just and the sanctified say in their prayers: "Hallowed be thy name." For what else is it to ask for what we have already received, he says,[815] "than to ask that He also grant that we cease not to possess it? Just as, therefore, when a holy man asks God that he may be holy, he is asking that he may remain permanently holy; so when a chaste man prays that he may be chaste, a continent man that he may be continent, a just man that he may be just, a pious man that he may be pious, and so on for all the other gifts which, against the Pelagians, we defend as gifts of God — these men are without doubt asking that they may persevere in those good things which they acknowledge they have received." So he.

§ 493. The fifth proof is from thanksgiving. For, as St. Augustine says in the same passage already cited,[815] thanksgiving is likewise mockery if thanks are given to God on account of something which He himself did not give and did not bring about. Now the faithful give thanks to God, while they are still in this life, for the

completed perseverance of those who have departed this life, and also for their own, which is as yet incomplete, since they have not yet reached the end. And this after the example of David in the Psalms and of the Apostle Paul in his Epistles. Such was the thanksgiving of St. Agatha when she said: "Lord, who hast kept me from infamy, who hast taken from me the love of the world," and so on. Such thanksgiving St. Jerome earnestly exhorts us to offer, in the words from his Epistle to Ctesiphon cited above.[853]

§ 494. The sixth proof is from glorying. For no one among the saints glories in his perseverance except in God. The seventh proof is from the universal operation of God, by which, as First Cause and first principle, He moves, acts upon, and preserves all things. That this operation belongs to the benefits of the grace of Christ in all those things which conduce to the salvation of eternal life — of which benefits perseverance is the chief — we have sufficiently shown elsewhere. Hence that saying of Prosper:[522] "This faith must be fixed in our hearts, immovably and firmly founded, that we most wholesomely believe all good things, and above all those which advance toward eternal life, to be preserved by the gift of God." The eighth proof is from individual good works. For if every entire good work must be ascribed to God's grace, it manifestly follows that the perseverance in good works — which is nothing other than a certain perpetual chain woven and bound together out of good works — is the gift of that same grace of God. The ninth canon of the Council of Orange contains this argument.[854] The ninth proof is from our predestination, which is purely gratuitous — which it certainly would not be if perseverance were not the gratuitous gift of God. The tenth proof is from the perseverance of the holy Angels, which we have shown to have been the gratuitous gift of God,[855] though there is this difference, that the perseverance of men must be referred to the merit of Christ, but not so that of the Angels. The last proof is from the corruption and weakness of human nature contracted from the sin of the first parent, of which the Apostle speaks in Rom. 7, 8, and Gal. 5, and elsewhere. For since grace does not so heal and repair fallen nature in this life as to prevent concupiscence — that is, the flesh warring against the spirit — from remaining in all men until death, nor is the weakness and ignorance of acting with which we are born entirely removed even in the most holy during this mortal life, it follows that even just and holy men, while they live here, always stand in need of the grace of God healing, helping, directing, and protecting them. This argument is urged in the proofs already mentioned above.[856] The same argument is contained in the prayer of the Church where it is said: "And because without thee human mortality slips away, may it always by thy helps both be drawn back from harmful things and directed toward wholesome ones." Concerning this proof, however, let what we said when we were showing by arguments that grace is given for individual acts be consulted.[857]

§ XLIV — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 495. The doctrine set forth above can be assailed by the following arguments. First: habitual grace (*Gratia habitualis*) is given to us for this purpose, that we may both perform good works and avoid sins — and this not merely once or a few times, but continuously and always right to the end of life; therefore it avails for this even if no other special help is added. For otherwise it would seem to have been given in vain. Second: more was restored to man through the gift of Christ than he had lost through the sin of Adam, as the Apostle attests in Rom. 5. But Adam had received the wherewithal to persevere without any other help, as St. Augustine teaches;[859] therefore much more is this given to us through the grace of Christ, so that we can persevere without a new and special help. Third: for perseverance in good it suffices not to sin and to avoid sin;

but a man can do both of these through free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) without grace. For the propositions by which this is denied are among the articles condemned by Pius V, numbered 27 and 28, in these words: "Free choice without the help of God's grace avails for nothing except sinning," and "It is the Pelagian error to say that free choice avails for the avoidance of any sin."[860] Therefore much more will a man justified through grace be able, without a new help of grace, not to sin and to avoid sin, and consequently to persevere in good. Fourth: a sinful man, indeed even an unbeliever, can for at least some brief time without grace observe all the precepts of the law of nature which during that same time present themselves to be observed, as was said in earlier discussions; therefore much more will a faithful and justified man, subsisting in grace, be able to do this without a new help of grace. Therefore also without grace he will at once be able, for that brief time before it ends, to persevere, if after a short while he should die. Fifth: God will not desert one whom He has once justified by His grace unless that person first deserts Him, as the Council of Trent affirms;[783] therefore it is within the power of the justified man to persevere, without there being any need, on God's part, for another special help on his side in order to retain justice and persevere in it. For otherwise, if this help were not supplied — since it is not owed — God would seem to desert the justified man without having been first deserted by him. Sixth: Let two just men be posited having equal grace, and moreover equal helps for living well, of whom one dies in grace after a year, while the other after ten years during which he lived in grace at length sins mortally and, dying in that sin, is damned. In this case the former had no help of grace which the latter did not have. In fact rather the latter, who is supposed to have lived in grace for more years, received more than the former. But the latter did not receive from God the gift of perseverance; therefore neither did the former, and accordingly what he persevered was not from the special gift of God but from free choice.

§ 496. In addition to these, there could here be urged the arguments by which the grace necessary for individual acts is impugned; but let these be seen with their solutions in their proper place. To those arguments now set forth, however, a reply must be given.

To the first, we say with St. Thomas[861] that the gift of habitual grace is not given to us for this purpose, that those who possess it no longer stand in need of divine help; because not only habits but also acts are from God. Although, therefore, grace once given suffices in its own genus — that is, in the genus of habitual gift (for to persevere there is no need of another habitual grace beyond what was once given) — it does not nevertheless suffice for actually persevering in good works to the end without the special help of God which is given for such actual perseverance; just as it does not suffice without special help for any one single act, as has been more fully declared in the passage already cited. Therefore it does not follow that grace is given in vain if without a new help it does not suffice for a man to persevere; nor indeed does it follow that it is imperfect: because, as St. Thomas says in the same place, even in the state of glory (*statu Gloriae*), when grace will be wholly perfected, man will stand in need of divine help.

§ 497. To the second argument I reply in the manner in which the same holy Doctor replies,[862] namely that more was conferred upon us through Christ than we lost in Adam; because in the first state Adam had the gift by which he could persevere, yet he did not receive the gift by which he would actually persevere. But through the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace by which they can persevere, and beyond this it is given to them that they actually persevere — and this indeed is the very gift of perseverance. Adam, however, did not then have this, because, although in that state he could persevere — and that much more easily than we now can, who suffer the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit — he nevertheless did not persevere. This reply is taken from the passages of St. Augustine cited in the argument, and moreover from

chapter one of *De Dono Perseverantiae*.[795] Moreover, not even Adam himself before the Fall could have persevered in the grace once received through free choice without another help, even though at that time he did not need the help of healing grace, which we need, as was explained above.'[863]

§ 498. To the third and fourth arguments some reply that a man can for a short time persevere in good without a new help of grace — namely if no more serious temptation arises, and no difficult precept presents itself to be observed — yet that he cannot persevere in this way absolutely speaking, that is, throughout the whole of life, unless perhaps he has acquired grace a little before death, so that he lives in it for only a short time. For in this case, to persevere in grace, they judge that the very justifying grace, together with the helps through which it was acquired, may suffice, provided there be protection from temptation and a certain providence of God as regards the manner of death so that there be no danger of sinning. But for one who perseveres for a long time until the end of life in grace, overcoming temptation and keeping the more difficult commandments, they hold it absolutely necessary that he stand in need also of actual helps newly and frequently conferred. This distinction, however, since it introduces a certain exception — and no uncommon one (for how many there are who, having deferred repentance while they were in health, receive the grace of justification shortly before death) — is in no way consistent with the teaching set forth and defined in the sacred canons of the Councils, and especially in canon 22 of Session 6 of the Council of Trent,[847] which teaches generally and without exception that no one can persevere in good without the special help of God, which must always be sought anew and expected from God — that is, by which God himself works perseverance in man. For that such a help is what must be understood is evident from what has been said above, and above all from the words of Pope Zosimus and from the canon of the Council of Orange,'[864] since the Fathers and Councils make no such distinction in this matter between a just man who has lived in grace for a long or a short time, nor between a long or a brief period of perseverance.

Therefore, to the proposed difficulty the reply must be given differently, in accordance with the mind of the holy Fathers and Councils; namely, that not even for the briefest time can a man persevere in good — in such a way that he performs some good thing pertaining to the salvation of eternal life — unless he receive this from the gift of God's grace operating that good in him and with him, according to the saying: "Without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5). And because in a just and persevering man, even the not-sinning and the avoidance of sin conduces to the salvation of eternal life, however easy that may be for him (for by these things he perseveres, because he is preserved in grace, which without doubt is ordered to eternal life) — for this reason even these things in such a man must be referred to the special help of God by which He works in man the things that belong to salvation.

Therefore, in order to reply to the objections, one must say that the case of him who is in no way in grace, such as an unbeliever, is different from the case of him who is in grace, either absolutely or in some inchoate manner. For the fact that the former avoids sin or does not sin is in no way ordered to eternal life; whereas in the latter it is so ordered, inasmuch as that man already has grace, which orders him to eternal life — and thus the fact that he does not fall from grace by sinning is a special benefit of the grace of God through Christ. For just as it is a benefit of Christ's grace to be in the state of grace, so it is a benefit of the same grace to remain continuously in that state and not to fall from it. Although, therefore, for the purposes of not sinning, avoiding sin, and acting in a morally good manner, taken in themselves, the powers of nature may avail to some extent, yet they do not avail for these things insofar as through them one remains in the state of grace leading to eternal life. This is evident from the fact that every benefit of God pertaining to the salvation of

eternal life must be numbered among the benefits of the grace of Christ, as we have shown elsewhere. Furthermore, according to the opinion which we find probable — which holds that no works of the justified man are merely morally good, but that whatever is done by him in a laudable and morally good manner is wholly directed, actually or virtually, to the supernatural end, according to the precept of the Apostle: "Do all things to the glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31) — the comparison is the more easily made between the morally good works of him who is in grace and of him who is not; because they are of different orders by reason of the end intended by the agent: the former are directed mediately or immediately to the supernatural end, the latter only to the natural. Hence if a man can do the latter without grace, it does not follow that he can do the former.

§ 499. But someone will still object: a just man often does not sin, not by any action of the will by which he wills against sin, but wholly negatively, inasmuch as he does nothing at all — for instance, while sleeping, or out of his mind, or thinking of nothing; therefore at least during that time he has the burden of persevering without any special help.

Reply: It must be plainly admitted that the whole of a man's perseverance in good from beginning to end, and according to every part of it — whether while he is doing something, or while he ceases or rests from all human action — God must throughout the whole of that perseverance be implored through Christ. Hence Pope Zosimus said in general terms that there is no time that intervenes in which we do not stand in need of God's help.[865] But this is to be understood according to the manner of the parts of perseverance themselves. For in order that a just man may perform good, there is need of a help which causes him to act; and in order that he may will not to sin, there is need of a help which causes him not to will. But in order that one ceasing from all action may persevere, the preservation of the supernatural gift which is grace suffices. For St. Thomas also ascribes even this preservation to divine help.[866]

§ 500. To the fifth, it is answered that included in the gift of perseverance is precisely this: that the justified man who is established in grace does not desert God — and therefore he must expect this from God. For this reason he prays, saying: "Be my helper; forsake me not" (Ps. 26:9), and "Lead us not into temptation" (Matt. 6:13), and other such prayers. Nor does it follow that, if a just man is abandoned by God — as happens in the case of all who do not persevere — what the Fathers of the Council say will on that account be false, that God does not desert those once justified by His grace unless He is first deserted by them. For this saying is made regarding justifying grace, as is evident from the very words; and its meaning is this: God never withdraws justifying grace from a man, nor renounces His friendship with him, except on account of his mortal sin. For it is sin that expels grace and dissolves friendship. But if we speak of the withdrawal of that special help by which a person actually perseveres, the cause of its withdrawal is not always the sin of the man deserting God; but sometimes it is the divine will alone. This St. Augustine attests without ambiguity,[867] in all those passages in which he teaches that it belongs to the inscrutable judgments of God why, among many just men, He gives perseverance to the end to one and not to another. This solution is presented and explained and confirmed at greater length by Bartholomaeus Medina.[868]

§ 501. To the last argument it is answered that he who lived in grace for a shorter time and died in it has received more than the other who lived in grace for longer but did not die in it — namely this: that by the singular providence of God ordering opportune and efficacious means for his salvation, he was preserved in grace to the very term of his life, when now he can no longer fall from grace. And in this the gift of perseverance consists. But this benefit the other, however long he was just, did not receive; because, although

he was in grace for longer, and perhaps possessed even greater grace, it was nevertheless not given to him to persevere in it to the end of life. No more can the reason for this difference be rendered by us than the reason why God predestined one rather than another to salvation. For, as we said above, the gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined. Moreover, that it pertains to the special care and providence of God for His elect to snatch some just men quickly from this life before they fall away from justice, is shown by that text of Wis. 4: "He was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul."[869]

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§ XLV — Whether any temptation can be overcome without the Grace of God (An possit aliqua tentatio superari sine Gratia Dei)

§ 502. We must now treat of that part of perseverance which we have said consists in overcoming the temptations by which a just man is drawn back from the course of good works and from the path of justice. For this is the chief element of perseverance: not to succumb to temptations — so much so that Prosper has said: "What else is it to persevere, than not to be conquered by temptation?"[553] And this is rightly said, because one who is not conquered by temptation will much less fail when not tempted. But now, in order that we may understand whether a temptation to sin can be overcome by a man without the aid of the Grace of God, before we answer this question we must briefly explain in what ways a temptation can be understood to be overcome by a man.

§ 503. One mode is when someone, driving out, as it were, one nail with another (as St. Jerome says),[871] resists one desire whilst conquered by another — as when a man restrains himself from drunkenness and licentiousness out of the impulse of avarice. In this way many unbelievers have overcome those vices which carry a manifest accompanying baseness or infamy, by their desire for honour. Of this mode St. Augustine says:[872] "Sometimes the most open vices are overcome by other hidden ones, which are thought to be virtues, and in which pride reigns." Hence that verse of the Poet concerning Junius Brutus, who punished his own sons with death as traitors against the fatherland: "Love of country conquered, and the immense desire for praise" (*Aeneid* VI).[873] Of this mode also St. Jerome speaks in the passage cited above to Rusticus.

§ 504. The second mode is when the temptation to some sin is overcome in a praiseworthy manner, which occurs whenever sin is resisted out of hatred of sin and love of the honourable, even if this is not done out of the charity which Scripture commends, nor for the hope of eternal beatitude (*beatitudinis*). The third mode — and it is likewise the most perfect — is when the temptation to sin is overcome out of the charity (*charitas*) of God, that is, out of that love by which God is to be loved according to the Scriptures; and that victory is one which is conducive to the salvation of eternal life. By this mode, only those who know God through faith can be conquerors against the temptation of sin.

§ 505. These things having been premised, for the determination of the proposed question certain propositions must be set forth by us. Let this be the first: **No divine assistance, neither general nor special, is required for overcoming a temptation to sin in the first mode.** The reason is manifest, because God does not assist in sinning. But sin is not overcome in the first mode except by another sin. For, to speak truly, sin in that mode is not so much overcome by the man as it is overcome by another contrary sin, to which the man succumbing cannot at the same time admit the other. For, as far as the man himself is concerned, since he is simply overcome by sin, he cannot be called a conqueror of sin. Indeed, not even that

first sin itself is properly overcome — for, as St. Augustine says:[874] "Carnal concupiscence is not healed by another concupiscence."

§ 506. Second proposition: No temptation can be overcome in a praiseworthy manner, and in such a way that no sin is admitted, without the general assistance and co-operation and beneficence of God. This proposition has a manifest truth in its favour, for God is the first and universal cause of all good things. Therefore, just as every natural good is to be referred to God as its most proper efficient cause, so too every moral good — and such a good it is to repel and overcome a temptation to sin in whatever praiseworthy manner.

§ 507. Third proposition: Even a man placed in this state of corruption can, without special divine assistance, through the forces of nature alone, overcome some light temptation to sin, so as not to sin, and accordingly even so as to merit some praise. Proof: because through the transgression of the first parent human nature has not been so corrupted that moral good has been altogether extinguished in it. Wherefore, just as a man can by the forces of nature observe certain precepts of the natural law — indeed, just as he can observe all those which arise over some brief time, as we were teaching in the sixth and seventh propositions concerning the question of the observance of the commandments of the law without Grace[875] — so too by those same forces of nature he can fight against and overcome some light temptation to sin: namely, out of that same love of virtue and the honourable by which certain precepts of the natural law are observed, especially if someone has been endowed with a better natural character and a greater inclination toward certain duties of the virtues, or if there has further come from education some exercise of the virtues, so that, occupied with and delighted in better things, he resists the enticements of vices, according to the warning of Horace: "You will be tormented, wakeful with envy or love, if you do not bend your mind to studies and honourable pursuits.",[876]

§ 508. Next the proposition is again confirmed from this: because if a man could not by the forces of nature alone overcome any temptation to sin, not even the lightest, it would not seem that free will (*liberum arbitrium*) without grace avails for avoiding any sin; yet the opposite of this has been proved by the Apostolic See, as we have said above.[877] For those sins are properly said to be avoided to which men are in some way enticed through temptation. This is even more clearly apparent from the condemnation of that other article (no. 29),[878] which said that man cannot resist any temptation without the help of the Grace of God, so as not to be led into it or overcome by it. For these last words — "so as not to be led into it" — do not seem to present an obstacle, since their apparent sense is: so as not to be led into temptation. But even he is led into temptation who, conquered by desire for one sin, abstains from committing another. This sense, at any rate, is what the teaching seemed designed to serve, which that article was seen to support.

§ 509. Now let us confirm the proposition also by the testimony of St. Augustine. His words are these:[879] "Whence does it come about that a man from early boyhood is more modest, more intelligent, more temperate, conqueror for the most part of the passions — who hates avarice, detests licentiousness, and rises as more advanced and more fitted for the other virtues — and yet finds himself in a place where Christian Grace cannot be preached to him?" And a little later he says of the same man that he was so born as to have both a good disposition and to be pressed by milder concupiscences, which he could easily overcome. Now Augustine says these things, as is clear, of one who is not yet a partaker of the Grace of Christ, of which he had learned nothing — and therefore not yet a partaker of that special assistance which is given only through Christ.

§ 510. The same author writes in another place[880] that the virtue of Regulus merits praise, for he preferred to experience the cruelty of the enemy rather than fail to fulfil what he had sworn. To this also contributes what Prosper acknowledges:[881] that among unbelievers there were those who by their natural understanding strove to resist vices, even though they did not advance toward true virtues and eternal beatitude. For that very effort of resisting is a certain beginning of conquering. Finally, many works of unbelievers — in which, according to the common and approved opinion of theologians, moral goodness is recognised — are of such a kind as to appear to have been accomplished not without some resistance of a contrary desire. This is easy to illustrate with examples and testimonies, but see those things at Distinction 41,[882] where the question of the works of unbelievers is treated.

§ 511. Moreover, certain persons, dissenting from our proposition not so much in substance as in words, absolutely deny that it must be conceded that anyone can overcome any temptation through the forces of nature alone and without special divine assistance. For they say they are speaking of a true temptation — that is, one which in an absolute and proper sense merits the name of temptation; and such they do not consider to be every light temptation, but only that which is overcome not without some difficulty. To these it must be replied that, just as venial sins are truly and properly sins, so too light temptations to sin are truly and properly temptations. Since even these persons themselves agree that these can be overcome through the forces of nature alone, it follows that it must not be denied — and that it is altogether true and rightly said — that some temptation can be overcome by the forces of nature alone. Nor indeed is any one of the Fathers or Scholastics read to have spoken in such a way as to say that light temptations are not true temptations. On the contrary, all of them count even the lightest impulses toward sin among temptations. Hence they wish every temptation, however slight, to be comprehended in what we say: "And lead us not into temptation" — so that it is remarkable by what authority Bartholomaeus Medina was led to restrict that petition of the Lord's Prayer to graver temptations, writing in his commentary on the *Summa*.[883] Certainly, when St. Augustine said "I count as the Grace of God all the evil things I have not done," he excepts no temptation, not even the lightest, for whose overcoming he did not give thanks to God. How, however, this prayer and thanksgiving does not overthrow our said proposition will be explained below.

§ 512. Fourth proposition: No grave temptation to sin can be overcome by a man through the forces of nature alone, so as not to be led into sin — understand this of sin, whether the very sin to which he is tempted, or another by whose prevailing the former is excluded. The reason for this proposition is evident from what has already been said: because, although human nature is not altogether incapable of fulfilling the things that are of the natural law, it is nevertheless greatly weakened and enfeebled by the corruption of sin. Hence it comes about that it can neither observe the more difficult commandments of the law nor overcome graver temptations, unless it be specially assisted by God. Therefore, those things which were adduced above for the proof of the ninth proposition concerning the fulfilment of the precepts of the law contribute to confirming this proposition,[884] as does also the notable sentence of St. Jerome which says of Paul not yet converted to Christ,[885] that he could not extinguish the blazing flame of pleasures when he was not yet a temple of God. This, therefore, is what St. Bonaventure teaches:[886] that a man without Grace can resist neither every temptation nor none — wishing thereby to signify that he can resist lighter temptations but not graver ones, in the sense explained by us.

§ 513. It must moreover be noted in passing that it often happens that a temptation which is light for one person is grave for another, and conversely — namely on account of diversity of natural character and

disposition, or also of superadded education, as St. Augustine signifies.[887] From which it follows that one person can by the forces of nature alone overcome a temptation which another could not; and the same Doctor sufficiently suggests this in the same passage. Against this proposition it might be objected that St. Thomas in his commentary on the *Sentences* teaches that a man without Grace can avoid all mortal sins, though with difficulty — indeed (what manifestly follows from this) that without Grace he can resist all temptations, though he is unwilling to admit that without grace he can overcome them; because, he says, that man properly conquers sin who is able to attain to that against which the battle of sin is waged, that is, to eternal life — which was indeed the third mode of overcoming explained by us above.[888]

§ 514. But I reply briefly: St. Thomas, having written these and similar things in his commentary on the *Sentences* while following certain common opinions of his time and before the matter had been sufficiently carefully examined, tacitly retracted them in his later writings, in which he expressly teaches the contrary. The relevant passages are in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, in *De Veritate*, and ex professo in the *Summa theologiae* itself.[889]

§ 515. It is objected next that there are examples of Romans and certain other pagans whom histories report to have preferred to meet death and endure dreadful tortures rather than betray the safety of their fatherland, or fail to keep faith even pledged to an enemy, or do anything else against justice. Among these, the virtue and patience of Marcus Regulus, of whom we spoke above, is especially wont to be praised. Certain persons reply that these things were done by them not without the special assistance of God — for they acknowledge this assistance even in unbelievers, wherever they attribute to them certain excellent works of virtue. In support of this reply can be adduced what St. Augustine says of a certain Polemon, who, having entered the school of Xenocrates not merely drunk in habit but actually in a state of drunkenness, was suddenly converted to other ways of life by his discourse:[890] "Although he," says Augustine, "was acquired not for God but was only freed from the dominion of licentiousness — yet not even that itself which was better wrought in him would I attribute to human agency, but to divine."

§ 516. However, against this reply stands the fact that special divine assistance is not given except through Christ; and those benefits which are given through Christ take their beginning from faith, as St. Augustine and Prosper frequently testify — and this we showed when we were treating of the first effect of prevenient Grace. Moreover, from this we recognise what good still remains in nature, if we see good things done by unbelievers and those estranged from Christ; which would not be a certain sign thereof, if special divine assistance were present even among them. From all which it follows that special assistance is not given to unbelievers for any works of virtue, however excellent they may appear in outward show.

§ 517. Therefore it is better replied that in those who are thus praised there was indeed a love of virtue and moral justice, but not enough of that on its own to suffice for overcoming temptations so grave in the contrary direction — unless there had been conjoined and intermingled with it the desire for human glory and love of self, that is, of private good and one's own excellence. Since this, in all who are estranged from the faith of Christ, is more deeply rooted and more intimately embedded than any love of virtue can be, it must certainly be thought to have availed more for resisting certain great temptations than the love of any virtue could have availed. And the poet did not conceal this, when, not content to say "Love of fatherland conquered," he added what was the chief element: "and the immense desire for praise." And hence it is that St. Augustine and Prosper everywhere attribute those deeds which are reported to have been done with fortitude and distinction

by unbelievers to the desire for glory. This same author also suggests as much concerning Regulus — highly praised though he be — in the same chapter a little below,[891] when he calls his virtue into doubt.

§ 518. Nor indeed does what is adduced from the same St. Augustine concerning Polemon tell against us, because by "divine work" he understands any true and proper operation of God, without however restricting it to special assistance. For he says in general terms that what was better wrought in him is to be attributed to divine agency. He is speaking therefore of the assistance necessary for any moral good, and not specifically for the more excellent works of virtue. This is more clearly evident from the words immediately following, by which he extends that divine work and benefit to all the goods of body and soul. The words run thus: "For even the goods of the body, which is the lowest part of us — such as beauty and strength and health and whatever of that kind there may be — these are not, except from God the creator and perfecter of nature; how much more can no one else give the goods of the soul?" "For what more proud or more ungrateful thing can human folly think, than to suppose that, while God makes man beautiful in body, man can make himself chaste in soul?" — and what follows.[892] Nor on account of these things must it be supposed that by Polemon a grave temptation was overcome in a praiseworthy manner; because, even though St. Augustine truly judges — as we have now explained — that everything which was better wrought in him is to be attributed to divine agency, he does not, however, affirm in respect of what or how greatly he was changed for the better. For the dominion of licentiousness, from which he says he was freed, could have been suppressed by the dominion of vain glory, with some love of temperance, conceived from the discourse of the philosopher Xenocrates, coming in and assisting.

§ 519. Fifth proposition: No temptation, however slight, can be overcome in the third mode of overcoming, without the special assistance of the Grace of God which is given through Christ. This proposition is proved in the first place by all those things which teach that no good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life can be done by man without the Grace of Christ — of which matter enough has been said in its proper place. For it is certain that the victory over any temptation, even one wrought in the most imperfect manner out of that love of God commended to us in the Scriptures — by which, namely, God is loved as the author of our salvation and beatitude — is to be numbered among the goods conducive to the salvation of eternal life. But let proper arguments also be added for a fuller proof.

§ 520. These offer themselves first from the Scriptures, of which the following are examples: Ps. 17: "For in Thee shall I be snatched from temptation." Ps. 26: "Be Thou my helper, forsake me not." Ps. 29: "I said in my abundance: I shall not be moved for ever. Thou didst turn away Thy face and I became troubled." Ps. 36: "When he shall fall he shall not be bruised, for the Lord putteth His hand under him." Ps. 117: "Being pushed, I was overturned that I might fall, and the Lord took me up." Ps. 118: "Let not all iniquity have dominion over me." So also Christ teaches us to pray among other things: "And lead us not into temptation." And Matt. 26: "Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation." Rom. 8: "But in all these things we overcome through Him who loved us" — for so St. Augustine and others read, conformably to the Greek text.[893] Lk. 22: "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not" — therefore without the Grace of Christ he could not have persevered in the faith. These same words in Lk. 22 the Apostle Paul repeats a second time in the final chapter of Romans: "And the God of peace shall crush Satan under your feet.",[894] 1 Cor. 15: "Thanks be to God, who hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." 2 Cor. 2: "Thanks be to God, who always causeth us to triumph in Christ Jesus." 2 Tim. 4: "The Lord hath delivered me from every evil work." James, when he was treating of bearing temptations — especially those which are stirred up by one's own concupiscence — added:

"Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above." Finally, Rev. 4: the twenty-four elders, in the person of all the Saints who have fought against the flesh, the world, and the devil, cast the crowns of their victory before the throne of God, saying: "Worthy art Thou, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honour."[895]

§ 521. The second argument is drawn from the testimonies and teaching of the holy Fathers and councils. For just as the Fathers taught against Pelagius that the Grace of God is necessary for each individual good act, so they laid down the necessity of that same Grace for overcoming individual temptations, setting this their teaching in opposition to the opinion of Pelagius who said that our victory is not from the assistance of God but from free will — as St. Augustine records from the Synod of Palestine, which was the first to condemn the teaching of Pelagius.[896]

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§ 522. The Fathers placed the chief weight of this matter in the Lord's Prayer. For just as from that part of His Prayer, "Thy will be done," they taught that the grace of God is given for each individual good action, so also from that other part, "Lead us not into temptation," they held it to follow that grace is necessary for overcoming each individual temptation, making no distinction whatsoever between greater and lesser temptations. The whole of this matter can be clearly understood from the testimonies set out below.

The Synod of Carthage, in the letter sent to Pope Innocent (which is found in St. Augustine's correspondence)[897], writes, among other things, that from the teaching of Pelagius it necessarily follows that we ought not to pray that we enter not into temptation — which the Lord both enjoined upon His disciples and set down in the Prayer that He taught — nor that our faith fail not, which He Himself testified that He had prayed for the Apostle Peter. In turn, Innocent I, in his letter to that same Synod,[898] says: "Unless grace, implored from Him, descend upon us with great prayers, we strive in vain to overcome the errors of earthly defilement and of the carnal body, since it is not free will but only the aid of God that can make us equal to resistance." And a little further on: "He furnishes daily remedies, upon which if we do not rely and trust, we shall in no wise be able to overcome human errors. For it is necessary that we be overcome by the same one whose assistance we lack when we are conquering." This sentiment is repeated and confirmed by Pope Celestine[899] and by the Synod of Milevis in its letter to the same Innocent,[900] which Synod St. Augustine himself attended. The Synod says: "That petition, 'Lead us not into temptation,' is not, as the Pelagians say, to be understood as though we ought to ask for the divine assistance merely that we fall not into sin when tempted; but that this lies within our own power, and that the will of man alone suffices to fulfil it — as though the Apostle had spoken in vain: 'It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.'" Again, Innocent, in his letter to that Synod,[901] says: "Deprived of grace, one must necessarily succumb, ensnared in the snares of the Devil."

§ 523. Pope Zosimus, in words cited by Celestine,[902] says that God must be prayed to as helper and protector in all our acts and thoughts, because it is presumptuous for human nature to arrogate anything to itself, with the Apostle crying out: "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers" (Eph. 6:12). Celestine himself, in the same letter,[903] writes as follows: "No one, even though renewed by the grace of baptism, is capable of overcoming the snares of the Devil and of conquering the concupiscences of the flesh, unless he has received, through God's daily assistance, perseverance in good conduct." These definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the ancient Councils are confirmed also by the rest of the Fathers.

St. Cyprian, in his treatise on the Lord's Prayer, says: "When we pray that we fall not into temptation, we are admonished of our own infirmity and weakness, in that we so pray — lest anyone insolently exalt himself, lest anyone presumptuously and arrogantly claim anything for himself." And a little later: "So that while the humble and submissive confession goes before, and all is given to God, whatsoever is sought in suppliant fashion with fear and honour of God is bestowed by His own piety." These words are repeated by St. Augustine.[904]

St. Athanasius, in the *Life of St. Antony*, says: "Antony overcame the Devil because the Lord helped His servant."

St. Basil, in his *Moral Rules*, rule 62, says: "But if, under divine permission, one falls into temptations, he ought to seek from God by prayers the faculty by which he may be able to endure them and to satisfy His will." The same Father, in Homily 20, introduces the forty martyrs praying that none of them may fail under their sufferings.[905]

St. Ambrose, in his exposition of Ps. 43 (Ps. 44), says: "Who is so strong as to be in no wise moved in temptation, unless the Lord stand by him as his helper?"[906]

St. Jerome, in his work against the Pelagians, Book II,[907] having cited the Lord's words, "Rise, watch, and pray, lest ye enter into temptation," adds: "He ought, on your account, to have said: 'Rise and resist; for you have free will, power having been granted to you once for all by the Lord.'"

§ 524. St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 24 on 1 Cor. 10 (on the text: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able"), says: "He will not suffer you to be tempted beyond your strength, but will make the temptation, as it comes upon you, tolerable in proportion to your powers. Indeed, any temptation whatever surpasses our strength unless He assist us and provide a happy outcome." Oecumenius, in his commentary on the same passage, says: "Any temptation would overthrow you, unless Christ were to lend His aid."[908] Thus those two Greek authors, having beyond doubt followed Chrysostom in the matter and confirmed his opinion with their own assent.

§ 525. To all these let the Synod of Trent be added, whose words in Session 6, chapter 12, are these: "All ought to fear regarding the struggle that yet remains with the flesh, with the world, and with the Devil; in which they cannot be victorious unless they, with the grace of God, obey the Apostle saying: 'We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh'" (Rom. 8:12).[909]

The third argument is drawn from the prayers of the Church. For not only do all and each of the faithful petition in the Lord's Prayer that they be not overcome by temptation, but that they themselves may overcome it, and this without any distinction between a greater or lesser, or even the least, temptation; but also throughout the public prayers the Church makes the same petition in other words, as when she asks to be delivered from all the temptations that assail us and from all evils; that we may henceforth incline to no sin; that, having received pardon for past sins, we may henceforth avoid sin; and other petitions of the same kind. Pertaining to this are also the sacerdotal blessings over the people, which the Synod of Carthage mentions in its letter to Innocent. Now this custom of praying and of blessing is founded upon Sacred Scripture and has come down to us from the Apostles themselves, as is evident from the Scripture testimonies adduced above; and all those petitions, as the Fathers of that same Synod of Carthage teach, are sought from God in vain, if the forces of free will suffice for them. Hence St. Augustine, in his letter to Palatinus,[910] writes: "You pray that you enter not into temptation. This, if a man could furnish it for himself by willing, it would not be sought by

praying. Wherefore, if will alone sufficed that we enter not into temptation, we would not pray." This argument is used most frequently elsewhere by St. Augustine and by other Fathers. Their testimonies cited above are to be consulted.

§ 526. The fourth argument is from the thanksgiving of the faithful. For it is their custom to give thanks to God as author and helper for whatever temptation has been overcome. This same practice is also founded upon Scripture and derives from apostolic teaching, as is most clearly taught by the passages 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 2,[911] in which the Apostle gives thanks to God for all victory and triumph. Thus St. Augustine reckons as belonging to the grace of God whatever evil a man has not done, attributing it to God's grace that he was not a drunkard, saying in this vein: "I have never been a drunkard; but I know persons who were drunkards and have been made sober by Thee. It was brought about by Thee that they who never were drunkards should not be such; and it was brought about by Thee that they who were such should not be such always."

§ 527. The fifth argument is from glorying. For that one ought to glory in God alone for having overcome whatever temptation, even the least, is the settled conviction of the faithful from the teaching of the Apostle, who says: "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord" (1 Cor. 1:31; 2 Cor. 10:17); and from the Psalmist singing: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory" (Ps. 113 [115]:1). Hence the whole company of all the Saints refers the crowns of all their victory to the glory and honour of God (Rev. 4:11). And the Church prays that we be kept from sin in our daily actions, so that, being pure by abstinence, we may sing glory to God. Likewise she sings in the praises of God: "Thou art victorious in the Martyrs."

§ 528. But now let us show briefly, in the last place, that the foregoing teaching, confirmed by so many arguments and testimonies, is to be understood of the victory over temptations that is obtained through charity (*caritas*) toward God and hope (*spes*) of eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*). This is the third mode of victory set out at the beginning.

Proof: first, because the testimonies adduced from Scripture and from the Fathers all, or nearly all, speak generally and without distinction concerning every temptation, even the least — just as those by which it was previously shown that we can do no good without the grace of God spoke of doing every good, even the least. Therefore, just as that teaching had to be restricted to a definite mode of doing good — namely to that mode by which something is done for the sake of the hope of eternal life — so also this teaching concerning overcoming temptation must necessarily be restricted to the same mode of overcoming; since otherwise it is established, and it is here supposed from what has been premised, that some moral good can be done and some slight temptation can be overcome without the special aid of God.

Secondly: because Scripture teaches that all temptations are to be overcome by faith (*fides*); Eph. 6: "Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the most wicked one"; 1 Pet. 5: "Resist him, steadfast in the faith" (1 Pet. 5:9). This is also taught by many examples in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 11 — namely of those who overcame various persecutions, adversities, and temptations of this world from faith and hope in future good things. Now this is the mode of overcoming that has been spoken of.

Thirdly: because whoever prays "Lead us not into temptation" intends — or certainly ought to intend — to obtain victory over temptations for the sake of the hope of eternal life, because prayer ought to proceed from faith and hope in heavenly goods. Hence this proof is common to every prayer by which we ask God for deliverance from temptation.

Fourthly: because Scripture ascribes the victory of temptations to the merits of Christ. This the Apostle expressed in 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 2, when he adds "through Christ" and "in Christ." And David calls blessed him who shall take and dash the little ones against the rock (Ps. 136 [137]:9), which the Fathers interpret mystically of crushing the first and small beginnings of temptations, by invoking the name of Christ, who is our rock and our strength. Hence Christ Himself says to the disciples: "In the world you shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world" (Jn. 16:33) — as if to say: through me and my victory, by which I overcame the world, you ought to hope and be of good cheer that you will overcome every temptation and affliction that the world will bring upon you. But through Christ, who is the high priest of the good things to come, victory is neither promised to us nor given to us except as ordered toward hope of eternal life.

Fifthly: because the Church likewise concludes all her prayers "through Christ our Lord"; therefore, as often as she prays for overcoming temptations, she seeks no other victory than that which is given through Christ — that is, the victory ordered toward the hope of eternal life, as has just been said.

Lastly: because the Fathers and the Councils, when they deny that temptations can be overcome without the aid of God, speak in conformity with the Sacred Scriptures, from which they drew their teaching; therefore they speak of that victory over temptations of which it has now been shown that the Scriptures speak. Likewise, just as they defined that the grace of God is necessary for individual acts, so also they established its necessity for overcoming individual temptations. Wherefore, just as they treated of acts pertaining to salvation, so also of the victory that advances the salvation of man. And on this matter we adduced above the most explicit passage from St. Augustine, Book 21 (i.e., *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 16),[872] where he says that sins cannot be truly and sincerely overcome except in the faith of Christ, and that only then are vices reckoned as conquered when they are overcome by the love (*amor*) of God, which God alone gives, and gives only through the Mediator Christ. A similar passage is found in the same author.[912]

§ XLV — Reply to objections (Respondetur ad objectiones) [continued]

§ 529. — having spoken of the dangers which Paul recounts throughout 2 Cor. 1,[913] dangers which can indeed be enumerated but cannot be endured without the aid of the Holy Spirit — he presently adds that that same Holy Spirit, in the hope of eternal beatitude (*beatitudo aeterna*), softened all hardships and lightened all burdens. Nor do the words of Oecumenius appear to mean anything other than this, when he says that any temptation whatsoever would overthrow us, did not Christ come to our aid — for by "Christ" he understands one who aids through His merit. From these observations it further follows, conversely, that in the aforesaid teaching of the Fathers every temptation to sin, without exception, must be understood to be intended. The reason is that, by that mode of victory which we have shown the Fathers to have had in view according to the Scriptures in their teaching, no temptation — not even the least — can be overcome without the aid of the grace of Christ.[914]

§ 530. Nevertheless, we do not think it should be denied that the Fathers, just as they sometimes speak generally about the manner of doing good, do so when they teach that we can do no good without God — in which sense it is said in the Council of Orange that man has of his own nothing but lies and sin, and by Pope Zosimus that all good things are to be referred to their Author from whom they spring.[915] So too they sometimes speak generally about the manner of overcoming temptations, when they deny that any temptation

can be overcome without God's aid — that is, they extend their meaning to the second mode of overcoming, namely that whereby a temptation to sin is conquered through love of the honourable good. Now when they speak in this way, whether concerning doing good or concerning overcoming temptation, it follows that they also speak generally about the aid of God, that is, about that aid without which no created cause can do anything whatsoever. Hence the matter here noted, if I am not mistaken, opens up the understanding of certain sayings which we have cited from the Fathers and which might otherwise seem to ring more harshly. This is perhaps why Pope Innocent says that it is necessary that by the aid of him through whose help we conquer, we should again be conquered if he no longer helps us;[916] and why St. Gregory says that it necessarily follows that every temptation subjects him who has been abandoned by God; and other similar sayings.[917] For to restrict all these statements of the Fathers (as some prefer) to the more grievous temptations seems too violent and alien to their meaning.

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§ I — What virtue is (Quid sit Virtus)

§ 531. Among the good things which are conferred upon man through the grace of Christ, Christian virtue is by no means to be separated; especially if, as we have for some time made probable, grace itself is also a virtue — indeed the greatest of virtues, namely charity (*caritas*). But in order that it may be understood what virtue is to be ascribed to the grace of Christ, one must first enquire what virtue is. Now various descriptions of virtue are found in the authors. Aristotle defines it as the disposition of the perfect toward that which is best;[919] and elsewhere he says that virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, and renders his work good.[920] St. Augustine, however, in the *Book of Eighty-Three Questions* (q. 31), taking the definition from Cicero, defines virtue as a habit of the soul conformable to nature and to reason.[921] This definition he repeats and affirms to be a sound one in the fourth book (*Against Julian*, ch. 3).[662] To the same St. Augustine the Master ascribes this definition: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, and which God alone works in man." This definition is gathered from various passages of St. Augustine. That virtue is a good quality of the mind is read in book six (*Against Julian*, ch. 8).[922] That by it one lives rightly and that no one uses it badly is found in book two (*On Free Choice*, ch. 18, and book one of the *Retractions*, ch. 9).[923] The final part is taken from the *Exposition on Psalm 118*, conference 26, on the words: "I have done judgment and justice."[924] These are the words as found in the Master.

§ 532. It must be noted, however, for the understanding of this definition, that there are three kinds of goods, as the Master shows from St. Augustine (in the preceding distinction, § K).[925] For some goods are great, some are the least, and some are intermediate. The great goods are those by which one lives rightly and only rightly; the least are those without which one can live rightly; the intermediate are those by which one can live either rightly or not rightly, and yet without which one cannot live rightly. It is therefore clear that virtues are to be placed in the first kind of goods, because through them one lives rightly and no one uses them badly — understanding this as meaning as operative principles of action, even though one might use them badly as objects, as those do who take pride in their virtues. In the least goods St. Augustine places the species of bodies, to which may be joined many qualities of the soul, such as those that are called graces freely given (*gratiae gratis datae*). In the intermediate goods he places the faculties of the soul, the intellect and the will, without which we do not exercise the works of virtue. St. Thomas expounds in particular detail this definition of virtue.[918]

§ II — That virtue is a habit is shown more fully (Virtutem esse habitum plenius ostenditur)

§ 533. The Master disputes (in the text) whether virtue is a habit (*habitus*) or an act (*actus*), and in the end, having set out arguments on both sides, he decides to define nothing for himself. Yet just as it cannot be denied that the name of virtue is sometimes attributed by authors to acts or operations themselves — as the authorities adduced by the Master for the latter part readily prove — so it must not be doubted that a certain habit of virtue must be acknowledged in man, a habit that is not always joined to an act.

§ 534. This is evident first from the definition of Cicero, cited and approved by St. Augustine in two places, as was said above, by which virtue is defined as a habit of the soul (*habitus animi*). And in the former passage even justice is defined by means of habit by the same author.[927]

Second: the same St. Augustine, on Ps. 118, at the words "I have done judgment and justice," openly distinguishes virtue from the work of virtue in these words: "In this place by the name of justice, not virtue itself is signified, but its work. For who performs justice in this sense save he who justifies the ungodly — that is, by his grace makes the just man from the ungodly? Hence the Apostle says, *justified freely by his grace*: he therefore performs justice, that is, the work of justice, who has in himself justice, that is, the work of grace." So he.[928]

Third: with every action, even internal action, ceasing, one must confess that in the just man there is a virtue by which he pleases God — as when he sleeps, or is otherwise free from action, or even when he sins venially. Therefore there is in him a habit of virtue.

Fourth: a brave man does not always act bravely, and a temperate man does not always act temperately, and so of the rest, because occasions for such works do not always present themselves. Hence one must acknowledge in him habitual fortitude, and likewise temperance, and the other virtues.

Fifth: some men have in themselves a hidden virtue unknown even to themselves — for instance the martyrs, who have a latent virtue of martyrdom; and a certain virginal chastity, as in the holy Patriarchs, as St. Augustine witnesses in book one (*On the Good of Marriage*, chs. 21, 23, and book one, *On Holy Virginity*, ch. 44).[929] The same can truly be said of the patience of Job before he was struck, and of the obedience of Abraham before he was tempted. Therefore in those men there existed habits of such virtues.

§ 535. A sixth argument is taken from the opposing vices. For St. Augustine testifies (*Against Julian*, book 6, ch. 8)[922] that a depraved concupiscence resides in man even at the moment when no temptation stirs it, and that besides the act or movement of concupiscence there is also the vice from which those movements arise; and that vice is nothing other than concupiscence in some sense habitual. And the same St. Augustine, in the book (*On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 2),[930] taking a similitude from lameness and the defect of the foot from which lameness proceeds, declares that in the soul there is a vice — such as avarice — from which a bad act, such as robbery, proceeds. And he defines vice as a quality according to which the soul is bad, even when it does nothing. Hence all these things can similarly be said of virtue and its act, and one will be able to define virtue as a quality according to which the soul is good, even when it does nothing. Finally, to this point are to be referred the discussions concerning the habit of charity which were conducted in book one (at distinction 17),[931] where we showed that, besides the Holy Spirit, there is in man not merely an act or movement of the

soul, but also a created habit of charity, from which, as from an operative principle determining the natural faculty, good acts proceed.

§ III — In what sense virtue is sometimes called an act (Quo sensu virtus interdum dicatur actus)

§ 536. We sometimes read in the writings of the Ancients the name of virtue attributed to acts. For St. Augustine, in *Retractationes* I, ch. 9,[933] says that the good use of free will is a virtue, which is counted among great goods. In Tractate 40 on John,[934] he says: "What is faith?" and answers: "To believe what you do not see." Again, in *De Doctrina Christiana* III, ch. 10,[935] he calls charity a movement of the soul (*motus animi*). Furthermore, in *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3,[662] he calls true and Christian virtues right acts done with a right end. Hence St. Ambrose also, wishing to speak of virtues, entitled his book *De Officiis*,[936] following Cicero. Again, St. Augustine, in *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* ch. 15,[937] speaks of virtues through the lens of their ordering to God.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 1 and following.
2. Lk. 1:30.
3. Gen. 6:8; Exod. 33:17.
4. Rom. 4:4–5 (faith reckoned according to the purpose of the grace of God); Rom. 4:16 (that the promise might be firm according to grace); Rom. 11:5 (the remnant saved according to the election of grace).
5. Ps. 93 [Vulg.]:18; Sir. 1:8; Ps. 149 [Vulg.]:4; Ps. 50 [Vulg.]:20; Phil. 2:13; Ps. 29 [Vulg.]:6.
6. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 106 (ad Paulinum). [Abbreviation as in source: "Epist. 106."]
7. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6.
8. Second Council of Orange, canon 5.
9. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 14.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 2.
11. St. Epiphanius, *Epistola ad Joannem Episcopum Hierosolymitanum*.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 21, a. 4.
13. Sixth Ecumenical Council (Third Council of Constantinople), actio 11. Estius refers back to his commentary on Dist. 8 of this book.
14. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 95; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 143 (on the verse "Memoriam abundantiae," etc.).
15. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*.
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 1.
17. 1 Cor. 12:4, 7–8.
18. 1 Pet. 4:10.
19. Eph. 1:6.
20. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 1. [Abbreviation as in source: "Medina ad supradictum articulum."]
21. Rom. 6:23.

22. Eph. 1:6; Rom. 6:23; the grace discussed against Pelagius by the Catholic Fathers.

23. Second [Ecumenical] Council of Trent; St. Augustine; St. Jerome; Prosper of Aquitaine; Pope Innocent I; Pope Zosimus; Pope Celestine I.

24. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 42.

25. St. Augustine, various places cited in context; the comprehension of the first beginnings of good will under the name of goodness.

26. The distinction between servile fear and the grace of the New Testament; cf. the promulgation of the law to Israel amid great fear (Exod. 19–20).

27. Cardinal de Aguirre, *Theologia Sacramentalis* (Dogmatica), vol. 3, disp. 112, sect. 4.

28. Dionysius Petavius, *De Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Dogmatum Historia*, especially ch. 4 and ch. 8.

29. Cardinal Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vol. 5, dissert. 4.

30. Henry de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, lib. 2, chs. 5 and following.

31. Clement XI, condemnation of Quesnellian propositions, especially nos. 20 and 21. [Abbreviation as in source: "a Domino nostro Clemente XI."]

32. Reference to Estius's earlier warning: lib. 1, ad Distinct. 11, § 6, p. 142.

33. Is. 55 (well of water); Jn. 4:14 ("a well of water springing up into eternal life"). St. John Chrysostom; St. Basil, *Expositio in Psalmum* 45; St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* I, ch. 19; St. Jerome, *In Isaiam* 55.

34. St. Basil, *Expositio in Psalmum* 45.

35. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* I, ch. 19.

36. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Isaiam* 55.

37. 2 Pet. 1:4.

38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2.

39. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, part 1.

40. St. Irenaeus, *Contra Hæreses*, bk. 5, ch. 6.

41. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 26.

42. St. Ambrose, *Hexameron*, bk. 6, ch. 8.

43. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Philemonem*, ad loc. (the closing verse of the epistle: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit").

44. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia ad Neophytos*; St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 1.

45. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 40 on 1 Cor.

46. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 9.

47. St. Augustine, exposition of Ps. 103 ("That He might make the face shine with oil").

48. St. Cyril, *In Isaiam*, bk. 4, Oration 2, expounding Is. 44 ("I have formed thee, my servant"); with reference to Gal. 4:19.

49. St. Cyril, *In Isaiam*, bk. 11, ch. 2; bk. 12, ch. 56; bk. 7 of the *Dialogi*; and *Quod Spiritus Sanctus est Deus*, at its beginning.

50. Pope St. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 *De Jejunio Decimi Mensis*.

51. Caesarius of Arles, Homily 7 *De Corpore Domini*.

52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2; and *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 3, ch. 150.

53. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 2, part 1 (as cited above).

54. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 11.

55. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 32.

56. Council of Trent, Session 6; treatment of infants: *In IV Sent.*, dist. 4 [abbreviation as in source].

57. Rom. 5:19.

58. Reference to Estius's earlier discussion: *In I Sent.*, dist. 17.

59. Albert Pighius, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 5.

60. Scholastic theologians' commentaries on *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, and on *In II Sent.*, dist. 26 and 27.

61. Council of Vienne, *Clementina unica, De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*.

62. Guido the Carmelite, *De Hæresibus*.

63. Domingo de Soto, *In IV Sent.*, q. 2, a. 5.

64. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7 (*De Gratia*).

65. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 3.

66. Rom. 5:5; Tit. 3:5–6.

67. Matt. 15 (thoughts and other actions going out from the heart).

68. Jn. 4:14.

69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 3, ch. 150.

70. Reference to the treatment of baptism and infants in *In IV Sent.*, dist. 4.

71. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110.

72. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, ubi supra [as cited above: I-II, q. 110].

73. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2 (first and second arguments concerning the distinction of grace from charity).

74. Bartholomaeus Medina, *In I-II*, ad supradictum articulum [abbreviation as in source].

75. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiæ*, ch. 14; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 3 (using the argument from Augustine).

76. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7.

77. Domingo de Soto, *De Natura et Gratia*, bk. 2, chs. 17–18.

78. Bartholomaeus Medina, *In I-II*, q. 110, a. 2.

79. Andreas Vega, *In Concilium Tridentinum*, Session 6, ch. 7.

80. *Catechismus Romanus ad Parochos* (Roman Catechism), treatise on Baptism.

81. Guido the Carmelite, *De Hæresibus* [as cited above].

82. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, aa. 3–4.

83. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 1.

84. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, q. 14 *De pœnitentia*, member 2.

85. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, IV, q. 10.

86. Richard (of St. Victor), *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 4.

87. Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 27.

88. Marsilius (of Inghen), *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, a. 1.

89. Maironius, Gabriel (Biel), John Major, and others, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26.

90. Andreas Vega, *In Concilium Tridentinum*, bk. 7, chs. 26–27.

91. Albert the Great, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, a. 3.

92. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, pt. 3, q. 69, member 2, a. 4.

93. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 1, aa. 3, 4, and 6; *In IV Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quesito 5.

94. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 27, a. 2.

95. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, aa. 3–4; III, q. 7, aa. 1–2; II-II, q. 62, a. 2; II-II, q. 89, a. 1; also *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 3, ch. 150.

96. Capreolus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26.

97. Cajetan and Medina, *In I-II*, q. 110 [loc. cit.].

98. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), *In Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 3, ch. 150.

99. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 5.

100. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 27, a. 1, q. 3.

101. Navarre (Martín de Azpilcueta), *Praeludia*, 5, n. 12.

102. Sir. 13:19.

103. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In I Sent.*, dist. 26, q. 1 [argument cited].

104. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk. 15, ch. 18.

105. St. Augustine, Sermon 50 *De verbis Domini* [abbreviation as in source].

106. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 39.

107. St. Augustine, *Expositio in Psalmum* 118, Sermon 26.

108. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 70.

109. The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, dist. 17 [on charity being the Holy Spirit himself, not a habit inhering in the soul].

110. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 3.

111. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as cited above [i.e., I-II, q. 110, a. 3, as referenced in the preceding section].

112. 1 Jn. 4:10.

113. Rom. 5:5.

114. Gal. 5:22.

115. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 14.

116. Council of Vienne [1311–12], definition on grace and virtues in baptism.

117. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 11: the singular forms *diffundatur atque inhaereat* (referring to grace/charity as a single gift) are contrasted with the plural *diffundantur atque inhaereant* that the Council would have used had it intended to denote two distinct gifts.

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 4.

119. Henry of Ghent (*Henricus a Gandavo*) [abbreviation as in source].

120. Author of the *Hypognosticon*, lib. 3 [abbreviation as in source; the *Hypognosticon* is a work long attributed to St. Augustine but of disputed authorship].

121. Peter Lombard [the Master], *In I Sent.*, dist. 5 [this distinction, §. 1, as cited in the source: *hac Dist. §. 1.*].

122. Bouby [abbreviation as in source; author not further identified in this passage].

123. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2.

124. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Augustinum* [abbreviation as in source; the letter to St. Augustine cited by Prosper's name].

125. Peter Lombard [the Master], *In hac Distinctione*, §. 1.

126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2, ad 2.

127. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 17.

128. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 5.

129. St. Augustine, Epistle 105 (also cited as Sermon 167 among the first-class sermons) to Sixtus.

130. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum*, q. 2.

131. Second Council of Orange, canon 20 (drawn from St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, ch. 6).

132. Bartholomaeus Medina, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source].

133. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 32.

134. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 5.

135. Second Council of Orange, canon 20.

136. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, chs. 8, 9, 10.

137. St. Augustine, Sermon 5 *De Verbis Apostoli*, ch. 8 (= Sermon 15 *De Verbis Apostoli* in some editions).

138. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Justitiae*, ch. 9.

139. St. Augustine, Sermon 15 *De Verbis Apostoli*, ch. 11.

140. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 72.

141. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2 (*ubi supra*).

142. Bartholomaeus Medina, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2.

143. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 3.

144. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 13. De Civ. cap. 1.*].

145. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Homily 19 (bk. 1, Hom. 9 in some editions).

146. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 5.

147. St. Augustine, *Retractationum*, bk. 1, ch. 9.

148. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 32.

149. Second Council of Orange, canons 6 and the last (canon 25).

150. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 34.

151. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 86.

152. The note in the source text at (a) and (b) refers to editorial remarks concerning the book *De Modo bene vivendi ad Sororem* — attributed in some editions (marked as no. 118 in the Naissian edition) among works of uncertain authorship, though Bellarmine and Horst, in their preface to the edition of St. Bernard's works, make it sufficiently clear that it was composed by someone of advanced age and addressed to a virgin sister — and the significance of the terms *præveniens* and *subsequens* in their more usual sense, as is easy to observe from the Prayers of the Church and the sentences of the Fathers, when the discourse concerns prevenient and subsequent grace.

153. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epigrammata*, no. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *in Epigrammate 5.*].

154. St. Augustine, Epistle 96 (= Ep. CLXXXVI in the newer edition), to Doscorus [abbreviation as in source: *Epist. 96. ad Doscorum*].

155. Fulgentius, Epistle 6, final chapter [abbreviation as in source: *Epist. 6. cap. ult.*].

156. St. Bernard, *De Modo bene vivendi* [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Modo bene vivendi*]. — Note: The editors of St. Bernard's works (Bellarmine and Horst, as noted in the preceding chunk) remark on the uncertain authorship of this work.

157. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Gratia Libero Arbitrio*].

158. St. Augustine, Epistle 106 (*ad Paulinum*) [abbreviation as in source: *Epistola 106. ad Paulinum*].

159. Venerable Bede, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *Commentarium super Epist. ad Rom. 5.*].

160. St. Augustine, *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* [abbreviation as in source: *Opere imperfecto Contra Julianum*]; and also *Ad Simplicianum*, bk. 1, q. 1 [*ad Simplicianum q. 1.*]; and *Enchiridion*, ch. 32 [*Enchirid. cap. 32.*].

161. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Justitiæ*, ch. 19 [abbreviation as in source: *De Perfectione justitiæ cap. 19.*].

162. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Augustinum*; and *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 1, ch. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 1. De Vocatione Gentium cap. 1.*].

163. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. dicta qu. 111.*].

164. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 18 [abbreviation as in source: *De Peccatorum meritis cap. 18.*].

165. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *sess. 6. cap. 5.*]; also ch. 6 and canon 4.

166. The discussion of the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* and related editorial questions (concerning Bede's commentary on Rom. 9, the Alypius correspondence, Julian of Eclanum, Prosper, Possidius, and the publication history of those works) belongs to the extended footnotes of the source, which Estius incorporates as editorial apparatus (marked (a) and (b) in the text), touching the Benedictine edition of St. Augustine's works and related critical controversies.

167. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. dicta quest. 111.*].

168. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 9 [abbreviation as in source: *Greg. Hom. 9. Super Ezechielem.*].

169. Council of Orange (II), canon 5 [abbreviation as in source: *Araufícanum Concilium, can. 5.*].

170. Council of Orange (II), canon 6 [abbreviation as in source: *can. 6.*].

171. Council of Orange (II), final canon [abbreviation as in source: *can. ult.*].

172. Jer. 31; Lam. 5; Rom. 8.

173. Jn. 6.

174. The text breaks off at this point in the present chunk (*sufficientem & superabundan-*), the remainder belonging to the subsequent section.

175. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 113; q. 114; also II-II, q. 6.

176. Council of Orange (II), canon 25 [abbreviation as in source: *Concilii Arausicani can. 25.*].

177. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 (to Vitalis) [abbreviation as in source: *Aug. Epist. 107. ad Vitalem.*].

178. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 18 [abbreviation as in source: *ad Dist. 18. lib. 3.*].

179. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 23 [abbreviation as in source: *ad Dist. 23. ejusdem libri.*].

180. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 23 [abbreviation as in source: *ad dictam Dist. 23. lib. 3.*]; cf. 2 Cor. 10.

181. Council of Orange (II), canon 5 [abbreviation as in source: *can. 5.*].

182. Council of Orange (II), canon 7 [abbreviation as in source: *can. 7.*].

183. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as above [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. ubi supr.*].

184. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractate 26 [abbreviation as in source: *Aug. Tract. 26. in Joan.*].

185. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 23 [abbreviation as in source: *Dist. 23. lib. 3.*].

186. Council of Orange (II), canons 4 and 6 [abbreviation as in source: *can. 4. & 6. Arausicani Concilii.*].

187. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *De Praedestinatione SS. cap. 2.*].

188. St. Augustine, Sermon 8 on Ps. 118 [abbreviation as in source: *Augustinum Concione 8. super Psal. 118.*].

189. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 2 and following [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. 1. 2. qu. 109. art. 2. & seq.*].

190. St. Augustine, Epistle 130 [abbreviation as in source: *Augustinus Epist. 130.*].

191. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione Gentium*, Book I, ch. 8 [abbreviation as in source: *Prosper lib. 1. De vocatione Gentium cap. 8.*].

192. Council of Orange (II), canon 22 [abbreviation as in source: *Concilii Arausicani Can. 22.*].

193. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractate 5; Prologue to *De Doctrina Christiana* [abbreviation as in source: *Augustino Tractatu 5. in Jo. in Prolog. librorum De Doctrina Christiana.*].

194. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 28, q. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. Dist. 28. qu. 1.*].

195. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, through the individual articles [abbreviation as in source: *in 2. q. 109. fere per singulos articul.*].

196. The author of the *Hypognosticon* [i.e., the pseudo-Augustinian *Hypomnesticon*], Book III, as found in the works of St. Augustine [abbreviation as in source: *Auctor Hypogn. apud Augusti. lib. 3.*].

197. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Homily 27 [abbreviation as in source: *Gregorius Hom. 27. in Evangelia.*].

198. The commentary on dist. 41 of this book [abbreviation as in source: *ad Dist. 41. hujus libri.*].

199. Jn. 15.

200. The immediately following distinction [abbreviation as in source: *Dist. proxime sequenti*].

201. Prosper of Aquitaine, citing the Council of Africa of 214 bishops [abbreviation as in source: *Concilii Africani 214. Episcoporum, citata a Prospero*]; see below.

202. 2 Pet. 1:3.

203. Heb. 9.

204. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 3 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 4. Contra Julianum cap. 3.*].

205. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 8 [abbreviation as in source: *cap. 8.*].

206. St. Augustine, *Contra Mendacium*, ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. Contra mendacium cap. 5.*].

207. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 28 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Spir. & Litt. c. 28.*].

208. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 26 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Gratia Christi c. 26.*].

209. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 13 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Dono perseverantia cap. 13.*].

210. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, chs. 25, 26, and 27 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De Spiritu Litera cap. 25. 26. & 27.*].

211. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* II, ch. 10 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. De Libero arbitrio cap. 10.*].

212. St. Augustine, Epistle 130 (or Epistle 69, to the people of Cirta, written c. 412) [abbreviation as in source: *Epist. 130. (seu 69. ad Cirtenses scripta circa annum 412.)*].

213. Commentary on dist. 41 of this book [abbreviation as in source: *ad dist. 41. hujus libri.*].

214. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, chs. 4 and 7 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 1. De Vocatione Gentium cap. 4. 7.*].

215. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 10; *Responsio ad capitulum octavum Gallorum* [abbreviation as in source: *Contra Coll. cap. 10. & Responsione ad 8. Capitulum Gallorum.*].

216. Council of Africa of 214 bishops [abbreviation as in source: *Concilio quodam Africano 214. Episcoporum.*]. Estius adds an extended footnote (b) discussing the identification of this council with the Plenary Council of Carthage of 418, held against the Pelagian heresy; the question of whether 214 or 217 bishops attended is discussed with reference to Prosper's *Chronicle*, Cardinal de Noris (*Historia Pelagiana*, book 1, ch. 45), Cornelius Jansenius, Gerard John Vossius (*De Historia Pelagiana*, pp. 15, 16, 22), and the Benedictine editors of St. Augustine's works (tom. 10, Appendix, col. 69 of the Antwerp edition).

217. Council of Orange II, convened under the authority of the Roman Pontiff (Felix IV) with capitula transmitted from the Apostolic See [abbreviation as in source: *Concilii Arausicani II. jussu Pontificis (Felicis nimirum quarti) transmissis etiam capitulis congregati.*].

218. Petrus Diaconus, *De Incarnatione et Gratia*, ch. 6 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. De incarnatione & Gratia cap. 6.*].

219. Fulgentius, in the chapter of the same title, ch. 21 [abbreviation as in source: *Fulgentius in suo ejusdem tituli lib. cap. 21.*].

220. Maxentius, book of faith (*Fidei libellus*) [abbreviation as in source: *Maxentius in suo Fidei libello.*].

221. Richard of St. Victor, *De Eruditione Hominis Interioris* II, ch. 21 [abbreviation as in source: *Richardus Victorinus lib. 2. De Eruditione Hominis Interioris cap. 21.*].

222. Baronius [abbreviation as in source: *sententia Baronii*].

223. 1 Cor. 13.

224. Jas. 2 (Epistle of James, ch. 2).

225. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thomas 1. 2. qu. 109. art. 2.*].

226. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, art. 14 [abbreviation as in source: *De Veritate qu. 24. art. 14.*].

227. Commentators on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, the article mentioned [abbreviation as in source: *Commentatores S. Thomae in 1. 2. artic. memorato.*].

228. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the place cited above [*S. Thom. ubi sup.*].

229. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 2.

230. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 9.

231. Council of Orange II, canon 20.

232. Pope Leo the Great, Sermon 8 *On the Passion of the Lord*.

233. Council of Orange II, canon 22.

234. Cf. Jas. 5 (the Apostle James on the anointing of the sick).

235. The question of overcoming temptation without the grace of Christ is deferred to a special disputation below (*infra*).

236. Eph. 1 (St. Paul, Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. 1).

237. Council of Orange II, canon 19.

238. The reference is to the first proposition established in the preceding chapter of this distinction, treating the necessity of the grace of God considered universally.

239. 1 Cor. 12.

240. The Council in question (not further specified at this point in the text) speaks of the condition that bodily healing through extreme unction is given only insofar as it is expedient to the salvation of the soul.

241. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 66.

242. 1 Tim. 2; Lk. 1 (Canticle of Zacharias).

243. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, and II-II, q. 9.

244. Is. 54; Jn. 6; Jer. 31; Heb. 8; Ps. 93 (Vulgate); Ps. 118.

245. 1 Cor. 1; 1 Cor. 12; 1 Cor. 13; 2 Tim. 2:7.

246. Council of Milevis, ch. 4; Ps. 63; Council of Orange II, can. 22.

247. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Malachi*, ch. 3.

248. Rom. 1; Rom. 3; Rom. 7; 1 Cor. 8; 2 Cor. 3; Gal. 2.

249. Gal. 2.

250. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 12.

251. Jas. 1.

252. 1 Kgs 2 (Vulgate: *1 Reg. 2*); Ps. 63; Sir. 1.

253. Phil. 3.

254. 1 Cor. 8; 1 Cor. 15; 2 Cor. 3; Rom. 7.

255. Jer. 31; Ps. 143; Ps. 118; 1 Thess. 4.

256. Council of Orange II (Council of Arausica II), canon cited above in the preceding section of this distinction.

257. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9.

258. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 41.

259. Council of Milevis, canon 3.

260. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 79 [*ad Augustinum*].

261. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 106 [*ad Paulinum*].

262. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 20.

263. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsio* 6 *ad capitula Gallorum*.

264. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Chronicon*; and *Responsio* 8.

265. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 47.

266. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 106.

267. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 107.

268. [Abbreviation as in source: *Contra Profanas Novitates*.]

269. Ferrandus Diaconus, *De Officio Militis Christiani* [citation as in source].

270. Council of Orange II (*Concilium Arausiacanum II*), can. 22.

271. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 9 [and parallel references as given by Estius at the head of this section].

272. The Second Council of Orange (529), whose canons define the necessity of grace for every salvific act.

273. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem* [i.e., *Contra Joannem Cassianum*]. The work targets John Cassian's *Collationes*.

274. Ibid.

275. Ps. 20:3 (Vulgate: *Mittat tibi auxilium de sancto*).

276. Ps. 57:11 (Vulgate: *Misit Deus misericordiam suam*).

277. St. Augustine, Epistle 105 (to Paulinus). [Source note: the marginal letter (a) refers to this; the editor's note corrects the numbering: *seu* Ep. CLXXXVI and CCXVII in the newer edition.]

278. Pope Innocent I, Epistle 91 (among St. Augustine's letters; in newer editions, CLXXXVI and CCXVII).

279. St. Jerome, Epistle to Ctesiphon [*Epistola ad Ctesiphontem*].

280. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, q. 24, art. 14.

281. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 9.

282. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 8.

283. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, art. 9, and II-II, q. [as cited by Estius at head of § XVIII].

284. The Scripture passages cited are: Jn. 15:5; 1 Cor. 4:7; 1 Cor. 12:6; 2 Cor. 3:5; Eph. 2:10; Phil. 2:13; Is. 26:12; Ezek. 36:27.

285. St. Augustine, Epistles 47 and 106 (citing the letter of Innocent I).

286. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chs. 5 and 6.

287. The reply of the African bishops to Pope Zosimus; text cited also in Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 8.

288. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chs. 8, 9, and 12.

289. Pope Leo I (attributed; the marginal note corrects: *rectius* Felix IV, as approver), cited in the Second Council of Orange, can. 9.

290. Second Council of Orange, can. 20.

291. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, penultimate chapter.

292. St. Jerome, Epistle to Ctesiphon, ch. 8. [The source's marginal note identifies this alternatively as *Serm. CLVI* among the sermons of a certain class in the newer edition.]

293. The Scripture texts cited by St. Jerome: Rom. 9:16; Ps. 42:2 (Vulgate *Ps. 42*: *Oculi mei semper ad Dominum*); Ps. 34:23 (Vulgate: *A Domino gressus hominis diriguntur*).

294. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, bk. 1, chs. 1 and 2.

295. St. Jerome, Commentary on Jeremiah, bk. 5, at ch. 25.

296. St. Augustine, Epistles 206 and 107 [marginal note (b): *seu* Ep. CLXXXVI and CCXVII in the newer edition].

297. St. Augustine, Sermon 3 *De verbis Apostoli*, chs. 10, 11, and 12 [marginal note (c): *seu* Serm. CLVI, among the Sermons of Class P, in the newer edition, vol. V].

298. St. Augustine, *ibid.* The source's marginal note adds: "Boniface II ought also to be added, as approver of this Council. See the newer edition, vol. V."

299. Petrus Diaconus, book expounding the faith of the universal Eastern Church concerning the Incarnation and grace of Christ, ch. 8.

300. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109.

301. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

302. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 28; Epistle 105 (to Sixtus); Epistle 107 (to Vitalis) [marginal note (a): *seu* Ep. CXCIV and CCXVII in the newer edition].

303. St. Augustine, Epistle 252 [marginal note (b): *seu* Ep. CLXXIX, to John, in the newer edition].

304. Pope Innocent I, Epistle to the Council of Milevis; found among the letters of St. Augustine, no. 93.

305. Second Council of Orange, can. 10.

306. Eugippius (Eugypius), abbot, vol. 2, ch. 288 [the marginal note identifies this as a fragment of a sermon of St. Augustine, recorded as no. 288 in Eugippius, and placed by Florus *ad* 1 Cor. 13; Tom. V, after Sermon 394, col. 1057, in the Benedictine edition].

307. The works of St. Augustine, vol. 10, newer (Benedictine) edition.

308. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, chs. 10 and 11 [the marginal note (b) records at length the controversy over the authorship of this collection — whether it belongs to Celestine I himself or to another, noting the opinions of Dionysius Exiguus, Florus, Hincmar of Reims, Baronius (at the year of Christ 431, no. 185), Labbe, Vossius, Sirmondus (in his notes to vol. 1 of the Councils, *Pelag.* cap. 30), as well as the Benedictine editors in the Appendix to vol. 10 of the works of St. Augustine, col. 87, and Cardinal de Aguirre (vol. 6, disp. 114, sect. 5), Louis Ellies Dupin (*Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica*, century 5, on Celestine), and Cardinal Henry de Noris (*Vindiciae Augustinianae*, cap. 8). The source notes that certain recent scholars adjudicate the collection away from Celestine and attribute it to Prosper, and that another recent writer does not hesitate to ascribe it to Pope Leo I or Felix IV].

309. 1 Par. 29 (i.e., 1 Chr. 29:14).

310. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 17, ch. 4.

311. Second Council of Orange, can. 11.

312. Prosper of Aquitaine, Sentence 54.

313. Ezra 7.

314. Acts 21.

315. Gal. 1.

316. 1 Thess. 5.

317. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 (to Vitalis) [marginal note (a): *seu* Ep. CCXVII in the newer edition].

318. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 68.

319. St. Augustine, sermon against the Pelagians (as cited above, found in Eugippius, vol. 2, ch. 288; Tom. V of the Benedictine edition).

320. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11.

321. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 4.

322. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, bk. 22, ch. 6, toward the end; on Job 31.

323. Gal. 6.

324. 1 Cor. 1.

325. 2 Cor. 10.

326. Eph. 2.

327. 1 Tim. 1.

328. On the antiquity and practice of this custom, see Cardinal John Bona, *De Divina Psalmodia*, ch. 16, bk. 6 [marginal note (a)].

329. St. Cyprian, *Testimonia ad Quirinum*, bk. 3, ch. 4.

330. St. Augustine: *Contra 2. Epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 4, ch. 9; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chs. 3 and 4; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, chs. 14, 17, and 19.

331. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 13.

332. Rom. 11:36.

333. 1 Cor. 4:7.

334. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6; *De Correctione et Gratia*, ch. 9.

335. Ps. 29 (Vulgate).

336. Ps. 118 (Vulgate).

337. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 2, chs. 17 and 19.

338. St. Gregory the Great, *Cura Pastoralis*, pt. 3, Admonition 34.

339. The source's marginal note (a) at this point refers the reader concerning the antiquity and practice of this custom to Cardinal John Bona, *De Divina Psalmodia*, ch. 16, bk. 6. The text here trails off, indicating that these last arguments — particularly the fifth reason from God as universal cause — will be developed more fully in a subsequent section on the efficacy of divine grace.

340. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the location cited above [i.e., I-II, q. 109].

341. Ps. 102:3 (Vulgate).

342. Jn. 6:58.

343. Mk. 4:26–28.

344. 1 Jn. 3:9.

345. St. Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos*, bk. 3 [listed in source as "lib. 8"], ch. 4.

346. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, bk. 2, ch. 19.

347. St. Athanasius, *Vita Sancti Antonii*.

348. Council of Milevis, canon 3; Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 10.

349. Rom. 7:15, 25.

350. Matt. 11:12.

351. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 12; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

352. Marginal note (a) in the source: "More correctly, and more consonant with the sense of the Church, it should be said that in the Blessed Virgin, preserved from every stain of original sin, the tinder of concupiscence never existed, rather than that it was extinguished. But what the Church has determined on this matter we shall note in its proper place."

353. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 8.

354. Marginal note (b) in the source: "Note how far the faithful interpreter of St. Thomas in this matter, following the Jansenian system which posits the efficacy of grace for individual acts in the perpetual rebellion of concupiscence, departs from him."

355. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9 (reply to the first objection).

356. Reference to the foregoing Distinction [Distinctio 25], on the assistance of the first man.

357. The parable referred to is Mk. 4:26–29 (the parable of the seed growing of itself).

358. Ps. 121 (120):4 (Vulgate).

359. Matt. 14:30.

360. Exod. 17:11.

361. St. Jerome, *Adversus Pelagianos*, bk. 3, ch. 1.

362. St. Jerome, *Adversus Pelagianos*, bk. 3, ch. 2.

363. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* and related works [abbreviation as in source].

364. St. Athanasius, *Vita Sancti Antonii*; 1 Cor. 15:10.

365. Reference to the Council cited in the preceding discussion [abbreviation as in source]; the Council in question is identified in context as the Council of Milevis or the Council of Orange, which denied the Pelagian restriction of grace to remission of sins alone.

366. The Council referred to here is identified in the broader context of the discussion as the Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*) and/or related conciliar definitions; see the preceding sections of this distinction.

367. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, articles 6 and 7 [abbreviation as in source: *S. Thom. 1.2. qu. 109. c. 111.*; the precise article numbers in the source are somewhat garbled by OCR but refer to that question].

368. Jn. 3:27.

369. Jas. 1:17.

370. Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*, ch. 11.

371. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Matthaeum*, ch. 23.

372. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Lucam*, bk. 2.

373. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 44.

374. St. Ambrose, *De Abel et Cain*, bk. 1, last chapter.

375. Theophylact, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, on Rom. 11:35; and on Heb. 8:9.

376. St. Augustine, *Expositio in Psalmum 118*, Sermon 7.

377. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*.

378. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collationem* (i.e., against John Cassian).

379. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum*, response 8; and *Carmen de Ingratis*, ch. 25.

380. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Epistola 6*, ch. 7.

381. Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*, ch. 12.

382. Pope Leo the Great, *Sermo 1 de jejunio decimi mensis* (Sermon 1 on the fast of the tenth month).

383. Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*), canons 3–8 and the five following canons.

384. Council of Orange, final chapter (*caput ultimum*).

385. Virgil, *Eclogues* 3.60: *"Ab Iove principium Musae"*; and a similar tag from classical invocatory tradition: *"Dii ceptis aspirate meis."*

386. The author's note appended in the source reads: "The author is to be understood as speaking of efficacious grace, the efficacy of which depends on the use of free will — which he denies." (*Intelligendus est Auctor de Gratia efficaci, efficaciam ab usu liberi arbitrii dependere, negans.*)

387. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as cited above (*ubi supra*).

388. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Procatechesis*; *Catechesis I*; *Catechesis XVI*.

389. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, bk. 1, ch. 1; ch. 2; bk. 3, ch. 1; ch. 2; ch. 3.

390. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 21.

391. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, bk. 2, ch. 7; citing Ps. 77:10.

392. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, end of the Dialogue (*in fine Dialogi*).

393. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 21; as cited above.

394. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, aa. 2–3.

395. Phil. 1:6; Phil. 2:13.

396. These orations of the Church include those praying that God would accompany our actions by his assistance (*adjuvando prosequatur*), that all our prayer and work begun by him might likewise be finished by him, that he would perfect his gifts in us, etc.

397. St. Hilary [of Poitiers], on the origin and progress of good [abbreviation as in source: *Hilar. de origine et progressu*].

398. Pope Celestine I, Decretal Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11.

399. Council of Orange II (Arausican Council), can. 5.

400. Council of Orange II (Arausican Council), can. 10.

401. Council of Orange II (Arausican Council), final canon (*can. ult.*).

402. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 16.

403. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 111, as cited above (*ubi sup.*).

404. Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 11; Faustus of Riez, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, bks. 1–2.

405. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, hom. 7.

406. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul.

407. On the condemnation of Faustus, see the editorial note (*a*) in the source, where the author recounts the judgments of Gelasius, Hormisdas, and others concerning Faustus of Riez and the Semi-Pelagian controversy; Gerard Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana*, a. 1599, Thesis XVIII, is also cited there.

408. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de Ingratis* [abbreviation as in source]; Ezek. 36:27.

409. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, hom. 7, as cited above.

410. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5; q. 105, a. 1; I-II, q. 109; *ibid.*, q. 111, a. 2, ad 2; q. 114.

411. 2 Cor. 3:5.

412. Council of Orange II (Arausican Council), can. 11; 1 Chr. 29:14.

413. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVII, ch. 4.

414. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae*, no. 54.

415. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 8.

416. St. Leo the Great, Sermon on the fast of the tenth month (*de jejunio decimi mensis*) [abbreviation as in source].

417. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, hom. 29.

418. St. Thomas, commentary on Rom. 11 [abbreviation as in source: *super Rom. 11*].

419. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5; q. 105, a. 1; I-II, q. 109; q. 111, a. 2, ad 2; q. 114.

420. Lk. 8:15; Lk. 10:42; Heb. 13:9; Jas. 1:17.

421. Council of Orange II (Arausican Council), can. 20; can. 22; last canon (*ultimum canonem*).

422. St. Cyprian, *Exposition of the Lord's Prayer* [on "Lead us not into temptation"].

423. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 9; and elsewhere.

424. St. Cyprian, *Ad Quirinum testimoniorum* lib. III, ch. 4.

425. St. Ambrose, commentary on Ps. 118, sermon 20 (on the Apostle Paul).

426. St. Ambrose, *De Abel et Cain* I, ch. 1; ch. 9; ch. 10.

427. St. Ambrose, *De Abraham* I, ch. 2.

428. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* I, ch. 3.

429. St. Jerome, commentary on Jeremiah, book IV, near the beginning; citing Rom. 9:16.

430. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 35, on Gen. 14 ("Blessed be the most high God who delivered your enemies into your hands").

431. St. John Chrysostom, hom. 4 on 2 Thess.

432. St. John Chrysostom, hom. 5 on 2 Thess., beginning.

433. St. Augustine, *Expositio in Psalmum* 99, on the words "He made us and not we ourselves."

434. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 18–19; citing 1 Cor. 4:7.

435. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 8.

436. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 32; citing Rom. 9:16.

437. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7.

438. St. Augustine, *De Dono perseverantiae*, ch. 13.

439. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de Ingratis*, v. 2 (approximate).

440. Prosper of Aquitaine, commentary on the last Psalm (*in ultimum Psalmum*).

441. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 4.

442. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 39.

443. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, last chapter.

444. Fulgentius, *Ad Monimum* I, ch. 11; citing Rom. 8:29–30.

445. Fulgentius, Epistle 6, ch. 8.

446. Fulgentius, *De Remissione peccatorum* I, ch. 9.

447. St. Gregory the Great, *In Hiezechielem*, hom. 8.

448. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXII, ch. 5; citing 1 Cor. 4:7.

449. St. Gregory the Great, *Cura pastoralis* III, admonition 21.

450. Theophylact, commentary on Rom. 1.

451. Council of Orange II, can. 20.

452. Theophylact, on the denial of Peter [reference as in source].

453. Euthymius, commentary on Matt. 26.

454. Oecumenius, on Rom. 15:18.

455. St. John Chrysostom, commentary on Rom. 15:18.

456. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero arbitrio*, near the end.

457. St. Bernard, *De Modo bene vivendi*, sermon 3.

458. Richard of St. Victor, *De Eruditione interioris hominis* I, ch. 3, near the end.

459. Richard of St. Victor, *De Eruditione interioris hominis* II, ch. 21.

460. Franco Abbas, *De Gratia Dei*, vols. 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 [abbreviation as in source].

461. Pope Innocent III, prologue to *De Vilitate conditionis humanae*.

462. Anthony of Padua, sermon on Passion Sunday (*in Dominica Passionis*).

463. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, in the body.

464. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5, ad 3.

465. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 1.

466. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 2.

467. St. Thomas, commentary on 2 Cor. 10, lecture 3.

468. St. Thomas, commentary on Heb. 6 [on the words "if indeed God shall permit"].

469. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26 [present distinction], q. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *in præsentem Distinct. q. 2*].

470. St. Bonaventure, *De Profectu Religiosorum* II, ch. 29; citing Is. 42:8.

471. St. Bonaventure, *De Profectu Religiosorum* II, ch. 33.

472. St. Bonaventure, *Legenda Maior S. Francisci* [*Vita B. Francisci*].

473. Nicholas of Lyra, commentary on 1 Cor. 4:7.

474. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, I, ch. 15; II, ch. 10; III, ch. 20; with further references as noted.

475. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi* III, ch. 20.

476. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi* III, ch. 10; ch. 23; ch. 39.

477. Johan Driedo, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio* II, ch. 3, v. 146; Ruard Tapper, article on free will (*articulo de Libero arbitrio*).

478. St. Thomas, at the places cited above (*dictis locis*); cf. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5; I-II, q. 109; I-II, q. 111, a. 2; I-II, q. 114.

479. Johan Driedo, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* II, ch. 3.

480. Driedo, *Tractatus de Captivitate et Redemptione generis humani*, ch. 1, part 2 [abbreviation as in source].

481. St. John Chrysostom, *In II Thessalonicenses*, hom. 5 (on 2 Thess. 3).

482. St. Jerome, *Commentarii in Hieremiam* IV, near the beginning.

483. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, in the body; cf. also the places noted above.

484. The author referred to is the Catholic writer (unnamed by Estius) whose book on free will is cited above, fol. 89 and fol. 212.

485. Estius adds a footnote at this point in the original: "The author seems to have gone too far in his censure of the opposing authors; what they say contains nothing Pelagian, even if it is not altogether conformable to the words of the Fathers, understood in their own sense." [Footnote as printed in margin of source: *(a) Excessisse videtur Auctor in censura — tamen non adeo conformis dictis Patrum inveniatur.*]

486. St. Thomas, commentary on Eph. 5, sect. 5.

487. Estius adds a marginal note here: cf. *supra*, and see below [abbreviation as in source: *(a) Vide qui ex hac doctrina — eam significans*].

488. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6; *Epistola* 105 [to Sixtus]; cf. also 2 Cor. 3.

489. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 114, a. 5.

490. St. Augustine, *Epistolae* 105, 106, 107; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 2; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19, and II, ch. 8; and numerous other places.

491. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 41, on the question whether predestination proceeds from our merits.

492. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6; *Epistola* 103 (to Sixtus), extensively.

493. St. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 68.

494. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* at the place cited above [*ubi supra*].

495. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 14.

496. The reference is to Lk. 22:61–62, where the Lord turned and looked upon Peter, and Peter went out and wept bitterly.

497. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 10.

498. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos* [abbreviation as in source].

499. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19; II, ch. 6 and ch. 8.

500. The Septuagint reading of Prov. 8:35 (*Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*) was commonly cited by St. Augustine and other Fathers against the Pelagians.

501. Estius, commentary on *In I Sent.*, dist. 41, on whether predestination proceeds from our merits.

502. Franco, *De Gratia Dei*, tom. 3 [abbreviation as in source: *Franco, tom. 3. De Gratia Dei*].

503. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 12 *in Iohannem*, on the words: "For their works were evil."

504. St. Augustine, Epistle 106 (to Paulinus) [*Ep.* 106 *ad Paulinum*].

505. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 (to Vitalis) [*Ep.* 107 *ad Vitalem*].

506. St. Augustine, Epistle 105 (to Sixtus) [*Ep.* 105 *ad Sixtum*].

507. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19.

508. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 2.

509. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 3; *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 10.

510. St. Jerome, *Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon*.

511. St. Jerome, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, ch. 2.

512. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 86 *in Ioannem*.

513. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali* [chapter as in source].

514. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi* 51.

515. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 8.

516. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 24.

517. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, beginning of bk. 1.

518. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Simplicianum* [*ad Simplicianum*; especially to be noted].

519. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 1 *de jejunio decimi mensis*.

520. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 13 *de Passione Domini*.

521. St. Leo the Great, Epistle 86.

522. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 8.

523. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de Ingratis*; *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 6, 16, and elsewhere.

524. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 18.

525. Fulgentius, Epistle 6, ch. 7.

526. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 19.

527. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* I, ch. 4.

528. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 27.

529. Franco, *De Gratia Dei*, tome 4.

530. Franco, *De Gratia Dei*, tome 12.

531. On the question of whether Philo the Alexandrian is to be numbered among ecclesiastical writers, St. Jerome speaks *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* in the article on Philo; writing of the book of the Evangelist Mark's first conversion at Alexandria, he also notes what Epiphanius attests (*Haeresis* 29); and the same is attested by the histories — that he went to Rome under Caligula as

deputy of the Alexandrians against the Gentiles, and again came to Rome, and had familiarity with Peter the Prince of the Apostles. [Abbreviation and note as in source: *(a)* — see footnote (a) in original.]

532. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 12.

533. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109 (the *S. Thom. ubi sup.* reference as given in the source).

534. 1 Tim. 2:1–4.

535. 1 Cor. 12:6.

536. Cf. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 8.

537. Rom. 11:6.

538. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19, and frequently elsewhere.

539. Rom. 3:11–12, citing Ps. 14(13):1–3.

540. Tit. 3:3.

541. Cf. Council of Trent, Session 6; and the sources on predestination cited above (dist. 41, lib. 1).

542. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 59.

543. Estius refers to his earlier treatment of predestination at Distinctio 41 of Book I.

544. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2.

545. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26; Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26; Gabriel Biel, *In I Sent.*, dist. 26.

546. Durandus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 15, q. 4.

547. Antissiodorensis (William of Auxerre), *Summa* III, lib. 1, ch. 15, q. 3.

548. Thomas of Strasbourg (*Thomas Argentinensis*), *In I Sent.*, dist. 26; and *In I Sent.*, dist. 41, a. 2.

549. Alfonso de Castro, *De Lege Poenali* II, ch. 14.

550. Council of Orange, canon 6; citing 1 Cor. 4:7 and 1 Cor. 15:10.

551. Council of Orange, canon 7; citing Jn. 15:5 and 2 Cor. 3:5.

552. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones*, Response 8 *ad Capitula Gallorum*.

553. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 24.

554. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* II, ch. 26.

555. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de Ingratis*, ch. 25.

556. Prov. 8:35 (Vulg.: *Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*).

557. Ezek. 36:22: "Non propter vos ego faciam, dicit Dominus."

558. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 15; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 149; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5.

559. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 7.

560. Cajetan and Bartholomaeus Medina, commentaries on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2.

561. Domingo de Soto, Melchior Cano, Francis of Victoria, and certain others [abbreviation as in source].

562. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2.

563. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

564. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 10, ad 5 [as cited by Estius; reference as in source].

565. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1.

566. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6.

567. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 35.

568. St. John Chrysostom, Homily on Ps. 7; and the work *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a seipso* [that no one is harmed except by himself]; and elsewhere.

569. Lk. 12:57.

570. Rom. 1:15.

571. Rom. 12:18.

572. St. Cyprian, Epistle to Fidus (*Epistola ad Fidum*), on the baptism of infants.

573. Council of Orange, canons 3, 4, and 6.

574. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* [as cited above — *S. Thom. ubi sup.*].

575. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, ad 2.

576. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 112, a. 3.

577. St. Thomas, *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos*, ch. 10, lect. 3.

578. *Catechismus Romanus ad parochos* (Roman Catechism), on the degrees of prayer.

579. Lk. 11:9 / Matt. 7:7.

580. Council of Orange, canon 6.

581. Cajetan, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6.

582. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, and more fully on q. 112, a. 3.

583. Bannes (Domingo Báñez), commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

584. Peter of Soto, *Lectiones de paenitentia*, lect. 9.

585. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. ultimo (last article).

586. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 10, ad 1 and 2 [reference as in source].

587. [Abbreviation incomplete or OCR-damaged in source; the reference appears to be to a common scholastic exposition.]

588. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 28, a. 2, questiuncula 1.

589. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II [as cited above].

590. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. ultimo [as cited above].

591. Rom. 11:35.

592. Bartholomaeus Medina, second passage cited above [reference as in source].

593. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 35; Homily on Ps. 7; and *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a seipso* [as cited in the preceding chunk].

594. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* [book cited as in source].

595. Rom. 1:15; Rom. 12:18.

596. St. Cyprian, *Epistola ad Fidum* [on the baptism of infants, as cited in the preceding chunk].

597. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum*, bk. 1, end; and *De Peccatorum meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 22.

598. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 1, ch. 17; *Carmen de Ingratis*, ch. 17 and 18; and passim in *Contra Collatorem*.

599. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the places cited above.

600. The OCR reads "Joh. 13" but the page image confirms "Job 1:3" [i.e. the book of Job, not St. John's Gospel, as context requires].

601. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* [passage as cited in source].

602. St. Ambrose, *De Abel et Cain*, bk. 1, ch. 4 [abbreviation as in source: *De Abel & Cain cap. 4*].

603. Cassian, *Collationes*, Collatio 13.

604. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 6, ch. 4.

605. Origen, *Homiliae in Genesim* [homily number not specified in source].

606. Origen, *Homiliae in Numeros*, Homily 24.

607. St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam*, bk. 4.

608. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, bk. 5, ch. 24.

609. St. Ambrose, *Apologia Prophetae David Secunda*, ch. 11.

610. St. John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Genesim*, Homily 45.

611. St. John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Joannem*, Homily 17.

612. St. John Chrysostom, *Homiliae ad Populum Antiochenum*, Homily 42; *Homiliae in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, Homily 12.

613. St. John Chrysostom, *De Compunctione Cordis*, bk. 1, near the end.

614. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 49 (or 102 in some enumerations), § 2.

615. St. Augustine, *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tractate 10.

616. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 16 among the Fifty Sermons (*inter 50*) [= *Sermo* 16 *de Diversis* in older editions].

617. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, ch. 6.

618. Acts 13:7.

619. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 1.

620. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 5 and ch. 8.

621. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, ch. 7.

622. St. Augustine, *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tractate 29.

623. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 1 *De Jejunio Septimi Mensis*.

624. St. Bernard, *Sermo de Ascensione Domini*.

625. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Rufinum*.

626. Hugh of St. Victor, *Quaestiones in Epistolam ad Romanos*, Quaestio 266.

627. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 13 and 14.

628. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Ctesiphontem* [= *Ep.* 133, *Ad Ctesiphontem*].

629. Gen. 17:5; Gen. 22:18.

630. Gen. 15:1.

631. Gen. 17:1–2.

632. St. John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, Homily 12.

633. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 13.

634. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, ch. 3.

635. St. Augustine, *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tractate 26 (on Jn. 6:44: "No one comes unless drawn").

636. Rom. 7; 2 Cor. 3.

637. Estius refers to his discussion at the end of § XXXVI (dist. 26, ch. 6).

638. Rom. 8:15.

639. Wis. 5.

640. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 28, art. 1, q. 1 [as referenced by Estius].

641. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 28, art. 1, q. 1.

642. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

643. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), Scotus, Gabriel Biel, *In I Sent.*, dist. 28; *In III Sent.*, dist. 27, q. 3.

644. James Almain, *Tractatus Moralium*, *De Attritione et Contritione*, qu. 1 [abbreviation as in source].

645. Estius refers to his discussion at the preceding distinction.

646. Rom. 1:21.

647. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* I, ch. 1.

648. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 60, a. 5.

649. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1.

650. Eph. 6:23.

651. 1 Jn. 4:7.

652. 1 Cor. 12–13.

653. Sir. 24:24 (Vulgate).

654. Council of Milevis, can. 4.

655. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), last canon (*can. ult.*).

656. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 22.

657. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 6.

658. Council of Trent, Session 6, can. 3.

659. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 107 *ad Vitalem* (Serm. CCXVII in the most recent edition).

660. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 2 *De Diversis* (= Serm. XXXIV *inter Sermones Prima Classis* in the same edition, Tom. V).

661. St. Augustine, *De Patientia* I, ch. 25.

662. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3.

663. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 15; *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 7; *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus*, Tractate 102.

664. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, no. 368.

665. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 30; 1 Cor. 4:7.

666. St. Bernard, *De Diligendo Deo* [abbreviation as in source]; Phil. 2:21; Gen. 8:21.

667. Rom. 13; 1 Jn. (passim).

668. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus* [abbreviation as in source]; Council of Milevis, can. 5.

669. Lam. 5:21.

670. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* I, last chapter [abbreviation as in source].

671. Council of Trent, Session 6, canons 1 and 3.

672. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), canons passim, as cited above.

673. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 29 *ad Hieronymum* [abbreviation as in source].

674. Gen. 3:10.

675. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 107 *ad Vitalem* (Serm. CCXVII in the most recent edition), as cited above.

676. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 9 [abbreviation as in source].

677. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3; and *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 2; q. 26, a. 3.

678. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3.

679. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), canon 22: "Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum."

680. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

681. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, conclusion 2 on natural love.

682. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, conclusion 3.

683. Council of Milevis [Mileve], as cited [abbreviation as in source].

684. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), canon 6; and final canon (canon 25).

685. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3 [abbreviation as in source].

686. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum* (Response 1, *ad Excerpta Genuensium*) [abbreviation as in source].

687. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 7.

688. St. Augustine, *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7 [abbreviation as in source].

689. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, conclusion 4 on natural love.

690. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 2.

691. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3 (and elsewhere, *quæst.* 60, a. 5).

692. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), final canon (canon 25).

693. Footnote marker *(a)* in the source refers to a note at the foot of the page, the beginning of which is partially cut off in the source; it relates to inchoate love and the beginning of justice, as discussed above.

694. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 2–3 (the places cited immediately above).

695. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII, 20–21: *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor.*

696. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia* [abbreviation as in source: *De Corr. & Gr.*].

697. Bartholomew Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3 [abbreviation as in source].

698. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 2–3.

699. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 1.

700. Jn. 13:36.

701. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 9 *de Passione Domini* [abbreviation as in source], on Peter's denial.

702. [Pseudo-]Bernard (the work *De Natura et Dignitate Amoris Divini*, ch. 6, attributed in the source to St. Bernard but noted by later scholars as of disputed authorship; see Mabillon's annotation).

703. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 18 [abbreviation as in source].

704. The sentence in the source breaks off at this point; the continuation is resumed at the beginning of § XL.

705. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4 and following.

706. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4.

707. Articles 58 and 59 (in some printed editions numbered 61 and 62) condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII in the censure of the propositions of Michael Baius [abbreviation as in source].

708. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4 (the article cited above).

709. The Bulls of Pius V and Gregory XIII condemning the Baianist articles 61 and 62 [abbreviation as in source].

710. Council of Orange, canon 7; cf. Jn. 15:5.

711. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 41 [as cited in the source].

712. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sent.*, dist. 28, q. 4.

713. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 28, q. 1.

714. The Abbot of Ávila (Alfonso Tostado, *Abulensis*), *In Matt.* 19, qq. 177–178.

715. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 4 and 8.

716. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and other theologians, *In II Sent.*, dist. 28 [abbreviation as in source].

717. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5, q. 20.

718. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, n. 88 (the Pelagian heresy).

719. Rom. 3:10–12.

720. Rom. 8:2–4.

721. Gal. 2:21; cf. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia* [abbreviation as in source].

722. 1 Jn. 3:7.

723. Titus 3:3.

724. Jn. 7:19.

725. Council of Milevis, canon 5.

726. The letter of the Fathers of the Council of Milevis to Pope Innocent I, found among the letters of St. Augustine as Epistle 95 (also numbered Epistle 182 in some editions).

727. Council of Orange (Arausicanum), final canon (*canon ultimum*).

728. Council of Orange, canon 21.

729. Pope Innocent I, letter to the Council of Milevis, found among the letters of St. Augustine as Epistle 93 (also numbered Epistle 181 in some editions).

730. Pope Celestine I, letter to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 10.

731. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera* [abbreviation as in source]; cf. 2 Cor. 3:6.

732. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 14; cf. Gal. 3:22.

733. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 118, Discourse 7.

734. St. Augustine, *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas*, on Gal. 5:14.

735. St. Augustine, *In Evangelium Joannis*, Tract 45.

736. St. Augustine: *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* II, ch. 5; *De Gratia Christi* ch. 8–9; *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* ch. 10–11; *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, last chapter; *Epistolae* 90–96.

737. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem* (Against Cassian), ch. 9 and ch. 23.

738. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, n. 44, under the title *De Lege et Gratia*.

739. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Expositio Psalmorum*, on Ps. 118 (on the verse "Therefore I have loved thy commandments above gold and topaz").

740. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Expositio Psalmorum*, on Ps. 118 (on the verse "Thy testimonies are wonderful").

741. St. Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, Sermon 50.

742. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* II, ch. 12.

743. Author of the *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum*, on Matt. 21.

744. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III [abbreviation as in source].

745. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9; the argument drawn from the third book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle) concerning the pre-conceived end and habitual inclination.

746. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Homily 13.

747. Cf. Rom. 7 and 8; Gal. 3 and 5; where the Apostle sets forth the powerlessness of the written law without grace.

748. The absurdities referred to are those discussed earlier in the distinction concerning the impossibility of salvation without grace.

749. Rom. 7; Gal. 3.

750. Matt. 26:41.

751. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 9–10.

752. Rom. 7:14.

753. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11 (on the observance of the commandments) and ch. 13 (on the gift of perseverance).

754. Bartholomew of Medina, *Commentary on* Summa theologiae I-II, q. 109, a. 4, treating seven conclusions after Cajetan.

755. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, at the places cited above.

756. 1 Cor. 9:21.

757. Pelagius, *Epistola ad Demetriadem*; Cassian, *Collationes*, *De Protestatione Dei*.

758. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Homily 5.

759. Theophylact, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 2.

760. Ambrosiaster, *Commentarius in Epistolas Paulinas* (attributed to St. Ambrose in Estius's source), on Rom. 2.

761. St. Jerome, *In Ezechielem*, on ch. 29.

762. Pope Pius V, condemnation of article no. 22 (from the errors of Michael Baius).

763. Rom. 3:9–18.

764. Rom. 2:13; Rom. 2:10; Rom. 2:6–7.

765. Rom. 4:2.

766. Rom. 2:29.

767. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 26 and the three following chapters.

768. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 22.

769. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, chs. 25–26.

770. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 27.

771. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Homily 5; the examples of Melchizedek, Job, the Ninevites, and Cornelius the centurion.

772. Acts 10; St. Augustine and other Fathers, as cited in the solution of the seventh argument concerning preparation for Grace (treated earlier in this distinction).

773. Is. 44:28; Is. 46:10–11 (the Vulgate text rendered as "vir voluntatis suae").

774. Is. 45:4–5.

775. Is. 10:5–7.

776. Mk. 10:20; Matt. 19:19; Rom. 13:8.

777. Mk. 10:24.

778. Matt. 19:17.

779. Phil. 3:6.

780. 1 Tim. 1:13, 15.

781. Phil. 3:7–8.

782. Hilary of Poitiers, *Tractatus super Psalmos*, on Ps. 68 (69), at the words "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living"; citing Rom. 10:5 ("He who does them shall live in them") and Hab. 2:4 / Rom. 1:17 ("The just man lives by faith").

783. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11.

784. St. Jerome, *Contra Pelagianos*, bk. 2; St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae*.

785. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 3, ch. 3.

786. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11; the addition drawn from St. Augustine.

787. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*.

788. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad Capitula Objectionum Vincentianarum*, response to the sixth objection.

789. The question of whether a good work is possible or impossible to a man destitute of the Grace of God, to be treated below at the appropriate place.

790. Bartholomew Medina, in his solution of the fifth argument [abbreviation as in source].

791. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*; St. Jerome, *Contra Pelagianos* [as cited in preceding sections of this distinction].

792. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. [chapter number illegible in source].

793. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 14, art. 11, ad 1.

794. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 137.

795. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 1.

796. 2 Tim. 4:7.

797. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 6.

798. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 9–10; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 137, a. 4.

799. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10.

800. Ps. 15:1; Ps. 16:8; Ps. 26:9; Ps. 70:9 (various Psalms combined); Ps. 118:133.

801. Ps. 11:8.

802. Ps. 114:8 (Vulgate).

803. Ps. 43:18.

804. 1 Kgs (1 Sam.) 2:9.

805. Is. 42:16 (adapted).

806. Pope Leo I, Sermon 1 *De jejunio decimi mensis* [Sermon on the fast of the tenth month].

807. Jer. 32:39.

808. Jer. 32:40.

809. 2 Cor. 13:7.

810. Phil. 1:6.

811. 2 Tim. 4:18.

812. 1 Pet. 1:5.

813. Lk. 22:32.

814. St. Cyprian, *Expositio Orationis Dominicae* (on "Hallowed be Thy name").

815. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 2.

816. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, Book 12 (end of the work).

817. St. Hilary, *Expositio Psalmi 123*.

818. Peter Deacon, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 8.

819. St. Basil, Liturgy.

820. St. Jerome, Epistle to Ctesiphon against the Pelagians [Epistle 133 in some editions].

821. Rom. 9:16, cited within St. Jerome's text.

822. St. Jerome, *Adversus Pelagianos*, Book 2 (on Ps. 88).

823. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 6.

824. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 7, 8, and 22.

825. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 6 (on Song 8).

826. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, ch. 7.

827. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 106, a. 2.

828. Joannes Driedo, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Book 1, ch. 5, par. 2.

829. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 44; *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 26; Epistle 59, qu. 9; Epistle 142; Epistle 208. [Note: The editor observes that Epistle 142 as cited here is questioned as genuinely Augustine's; it has been identified by some scholars as a letter of Pelagius; in the Benedictine edition it is numbered Epistle 188, written by Augustine and Alypius in 417 or early 418; some editions number it 143; a separate Epistle to Juliana (Demetrias's mother) bears number 188 in other recensions. Estius's note refers these editorial complications to Marianus Victorius, Bellarmine, and Caesar Baronius.]

830. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae* (the cited passage on those who did not persevere).

831. St. Augustine [or pseudo-Augustine], *De Vocatione Gentium*, Book 1, ch. 23.

832. St. Augustine [or pseudo-Augustine], *De Vocatione Gentium*, *Responsio* 14 *ad Objectiones Vincentii*.

833. Peter Chrysologus, Sermon 135 *In S. Laurentium*.

834. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, Homily 8.

835. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem*, Book 11, ch. 21.

836. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, Book 23, ch. 28; *In Ezechielem*, Homily 8.

837. St. Bernard, *In Cantica*, Sermon 3.

838. St. Augustine, *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 2 (and elsewhere).

839. St. Jerome, *Dialogi adversus Pelagianos*.

840. Pope Innocent I, Epistle to the Council of Carthage [= St. Augustine, Epistle 91 in the collected epistles].

841. Pope Caelestinus I, Epistle to the bishops of Gaul, ch. 6.

842. Pope Zosimus, Epistle to all bishops of the world, as cited by Caelestinus in the same letter, ch. 9.

843. Council of Orange (Arausican), canon 9.

844. Prosper of Aquitaine, cited in two places: in the *Expositio Psalmi 118* (on "I have thought on my ways") and elsewhere.

845. Council of Orange (Arausican), canon 10.

846. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 13 (on perseverance); cf. Matt. 10:22 and 24:13.

847. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 22.

848. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 18.

849. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11.

850. St. Cyprian, *De Oratione Dominica*.

851. St. Basil, Liturgy (as cited above at note 22).

852. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 155 [cited in the source as cap. 135, which corresponds to the chapter on perseverance in grace].

853. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Ctesiphontem* [= *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos*], as cited above.

854. Council of Orange (Second), canon 9.

855. As shown above at Distinction 5 of this Book (Book III), and at Distinction 41 of the preceding book (Book II).

856. Referring to the proofs (*rationes praedictae*) set out earlier in this section.

857. The passage referred to is the earlier treatment where grace for individual acts was discussed.

858. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10 [as cited at the head of the preceding section].

859. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 38; *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11 and 12.

860. Articles condemned by Pope Pius V, nos. 27 and 28 [from the condemned propositions of Michael Baius].

861. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109 [a. 9, ad 1].

862. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3; and again II-II, q. 137, a. 4, ad 2.

863. As declared above at Distinction 25 [of this Book].

864. Pope Zosimus, as cited earlier; Council of Orange (Second), canon [cited above at notes 50 and 52 of the preceding chunk].

865. Pope Zosimus, Epistle to all bishops, as cited above.

866. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9, ad 1; and II-II, q. 137, a. 4.

867. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 8; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 8.

868. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10, reply to the third argument.

869. Wis. 4:11.

870. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8.

871. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 4 (to Rusticus).

872. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 16.

873. Virgil, *Aeneid* VI.

874. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 4.

875. Referring to the sixth and seventh propositions treated above in the discussion of the observance of the commandments of the law without Grace.

876. Horace [*Epistulae* I, 2, 36–37, slightly adapted].

877. Referring to the declaration of the Apostolic See cited in the preceding discussion.

878. Article 29 condemned [among the propositions of Michael Baius, condemned by Pope Pius V; note that in some printed editions of the Bull this article is numbered 30, as Estius notes in the source].

879. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, ch. 22.

880. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 15.

881. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 7.

882. Referring to Distinction 41 of this Book (Book III), where the question of the works of unbelievers is treated.

883. Bartholomaeus Medina, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 106, a. 4, conclusion 4.

884. Referring to the arguments adduced for the ninth proposition above, concerning the fulfilment of the precepts of the law.

885. St. Jerome, *Commentary on the Epistle to Titus*, ch. 3.

886. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 28, a. 2, q. 2.

887. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 21.

888. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 2.

889. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 160; *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1; *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, a. 2, ad 2; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8 (with marginal passages there cited).

890. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 130.

891. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 15 (a little below the passage cited earlier in the same chapter).

892. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 130 (the words cited continue the passage on Polemon).

893. St. Augustine and others reading Rom. 8 conformably to the Greek text: "we overcome through Him who loved us."

894. Rom. 16 (final chapter of Romans): "And the God of peace shall crush Satan under your feet."

895. Rev. 4:11 (adapted): "Worthy art Thou, O Lord our God, to receive glory and honour and power."

896. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 106, recounting the proceedings of the Synod of Palestine which first condemned the teaching of Pelagius.

897. The Synod of Carthage, *Epistola ad Innocentium Papam*, found in St. Augustine's correspondence, letter 175 (also cited as letter 90 in older editions).

898. Pope Innocent I, *Epistola ad Synodum Carthaginensem*, found in St. Augustine's correspondence, letter 181 (also cited as letter 91 in older editions).

899. Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*, ch. 5.

900. The Synod of Milevis, *Epistola ad Innocentium Papam*, found in St. Augustine's correspondence, letter 176 (also cited as letter 92 in older editions).

901. Pope Innocent I, *Epistola ad Synodum Milevitanam*, found in St. Augustine's correspondence, letter 182 (also cited as letter 93 in older editions).

902. Pope Zosimus, letter cited by Celestine, ch. 9.

903. Pope Celestine I, same letter (*Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*), ch. 6.

904. St. Cyprian, *De Oratione Dominica*; the words are repeated by St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 9, and *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 6.

905. St. Basil, *Regulae Morales*, rule 62; and *Homilia* 20 (on the Forty Martyrs).

906. St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Psalmum* 43.

907. St. Jerome, *Contra Pelagianos*, lib. II.

908. St. John Chrysostom, *Homiliae in 1 Corinthios*, hom. 24 (on 1 Cor. 10); Oecumenius, *Commentarius in 1 Corinthios*, on the same passage.

909. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 12.

910. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 208 (to Palatinus); in newer editions cited as letter 208.

911. 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 2.

912. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 105 (to Sixtus); *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 18, 56, 67; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 6 and 10; *Confessiones* X, ch. 31; and *fragmentum* I. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 36. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 10; *Moralia* IX, ch. 7; and *Expositio in Psalmum* 5. Theophylact and Oecumenius, commentaries on 1 Cor. 10.

913. 2 Cor. 1, where Paul recounts the many dangers he has suffered.

914. The reference is to Oecumenius, *Commentary on 1 Corinthians*, cited in the preceding section.

915. Council of Orange, canon [2]; Pope Zosimus, letter cited by Celestine, as noted above.

916. Pope Innocent I, *Epistola ad Synodum Milevitanam* (cf. previous footnotes).

917. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 10, and related passages cited above.

918. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 55, a. 4.

919. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (definition of virtue as disposition of the perfect toward what is best).

920. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, ch. 6: virtue makes the one who has it good and renders his work good.

921. St. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 31, drawing on Cicero's definition of virtue as a habit of the soul (*habitus animi*) conformable to nature and reason.

922. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 8.

923. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* II, ch. 18; *Retractationes* I, ch. 9.

924. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 118, conference 26, on the words "I have done judgment and justice" (Ps. 118).

925. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* I, Distinctio preceding dist. 26 (dist. 25), § K; drawing on St. Augustine's threefold division of goods.

926. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 55, a. 1.

927. St. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 31 (Cicero's definition: *habitus animi*); and the same St. Augustine on justice defined by habit, in the same or a parallel passage.

928. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 118, conference 26.

929. St. Augustine, *De Bono Coniugali* I, chs. 21, 23; *De Sancta Virginitate* I, ch. 44.

930. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis*, ch. 2.

931. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 17, discussion of the habit of charity.

932. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 55, a. 3.

933. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 9.

934. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem* (Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis), Tractate 40.

935. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* III, ch. 10 (also noted as Quaest. 36, lib. 38 in the source).

936. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis*.

937. St. Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae*, ch. 15.

DISTINCTIO XXVII — ON THE COMPARISON OF CHRISTIAN VIRTUE WITH PHILOSOPHICAL HABITS, AND THE SUPERIORITY OF GRACE OVER FREE WILL (*DE COMPARATIONE VIRTUTIS CHRISTIANAE CUM HABITIBUS PHILOSOPHICIS ET DE PRAEPONDERANTIA GRATIAE SUPRA LIBERUM ARBITRIUM*)

§ 1. The summary of these opinions calls virtue *to will the good* (*velle bonum*); and this is repeated in book I.[1] Moved by the opinions of such Doctors — the account of whose opinion St. Thomas sets down in writing in his commentary on this Distinction — certain men said that virtues are continuous but latent acts. And even if this is true in a certain sense, because through Christian virtues as such the will is disposed so that, when occasion presents itself, it acts according to them, and one who is truly just can say on their account: "My heart is ready, O God," etc. — yet properly speaking it does not hold, because it is false that the will is in continuous act.

§ 2. Others have been of the opinion that a habit is not really distinct from an act, but only in formal character (*ratio*) and mode, because they think that an act arises from a virtue as a flower springs from a gem, since the flower is nothing other than the gem open, and the gem nothing other than the flower closed; in which fashion Zeno the philosopher once acknowledged no other difference between Dialectic and Rhetoric than what exists between a closed and an open hand. But this comparison is not consistent with what is found in St. Augustine,[2] from which it is manifest that St. Augustine really distinguishes a habit, whether of virtue or of vice, from the acts proceeding from it, just as lameness is really distinct from that defect of the foot from which it arises. Hence one must say that virtue is a habit that is never an act, but only the cause and principle (*principium*) of acting.

§ 3. That the Fathers sometimes attribute the name of virtue to acts, especially to internal ones, came about by a certain extension whereby the term "virtue" is extended also to the acts that proceed from virtue, as the Master declares in the final section,[3] and this will be more evident if we descend to the species of the virtues, such as faith, hope, charity, and justice, which we not infrequently read used for acts both in Sacred Scripture and among the Fathers. For concerning faith and charity there are the passages from St. Augustine already cited, and concerning justice there is the passage at Ps. 118 on those words: "I have done judgment and justice."[,4]

§ IV — Comparison of Christian virtue with philosophical habits (Comparatio virtutis Christianae cum habitibus Philosophicis)

§ 4. For a better understanding of what has been said concerning the habit of virtue, it is worth examining how Christian virtue — that is, the virtue proper to Christians — agrees with the virtues and other philosophical habits, and again in how many ways they differ from one another.

They agree, therefore, in this: that both Christian and philosophical virtue can exist without any actual movement of the mind, as has been shown above. They also agree in this: that through each of them the natural powers are in some way determined toward good actions. Likewise in this: that each can be acquired and increased through acts.

§ 5. They differ from one another in many ways. First, in that philosophical virtue can be attained by human effort and labour without the grace of Christ, whereas Christian virtue is to be reckoned among the peculiar gifts of God, concerning which it is said in Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above," etc.[6] Hence also in the definition of virtue drawn from St. Augustine, that part was added: *which God works in man*. By this part Christian virtue is distinguished from all others, to which the remaining definitions of virtue none the less extend. Now in what sense it is said that God alone works virtue in man — when Prosper teaches that it cannot arise except from our own will[7] — must be explained in the same way as was explained in the preceding Distinction,[8] the saying of St. Augustine that God works even our good wills in us without us; although St. Thomas understands it otherwise, contrary to St. Augustine's meaning.

§ 6. Second, they differ in that the philosopher uses philosophical virtue, or does not use it, whenever he wishes and at his own discretion, whether or not the matter calls for an operation — the virtue itself meanwhile remaining safe and whole — just as someone can retain knowledge for a long time even without using it, even where the matter and occasion demand it; which cannot be said of Christian virtue. For Christian virtue has a will to act conjoined with it, as often as right reason (*recta ratio*) requires action. Hence St. Gregory says that charity, if it is great, works mighty things, but where it ceases to work, there is no charity.[9] And Prosper teaches that the functions of the virtues cannot be idle.[10]

§ 7. Third, in that Christian virtue, even when acquired through acts, perishes through a single contrary act — for example, sobriety through a single act of drunkenness, chastity through a single act of fornication once committed — which is not so in the case of philosophical habits.

§ 8. Fourth, in that Christian virtue does not require prior acts as philosophical virtue does, but can be acquired by a single act, or infused without any prior act, as is evident in the case of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are infused in baptism, and in some fashion also in the other sacraments.

§ 9. Fifth, in that every philosophical habit causes one who possesses it to act easily, promptly, and readily, which Christian virtue does not always do; rather, it has conjoined with it a will to act even though it may go forth into act only with difficulty.

§ 10. Sixth, in that by Christian virtue one serves God, not by philosophical virtue, as St. Augustine teaches.[11]

§ 11. Seventh, in that the philosophical virtues have their interconnection in prudence, while the Christian virtues have theirs in charity — according to that saying of St. Gregory, Homily 27 on the Gospels: "For as many branches of a tree go forth from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity."[12]

§ 12. Lastly, in that Christian virtues, even lying hidden in the soul and not exercising themselves through operation, receive a reward from God, as St. Augustine testifies.[13] Not so philosophical virtues — neither before God nor before men. For, as Aristotle says in the *Ethics*,[14] "In the Olympian contests it is not those who are most skilled in the art, but those who exercise it most excellently, who receive the prizes."

— *Distinctio XXVIII — That God's grace is not to be subjected to free will, but placed before it (*Gratiam Dei non esse subjiciendam libero arbitrio, sed praeponondam*) (continued from previous chunk)* —

§ I — That God's grace is not to be subjected to free will, but placed before it (Gratiam Dei non esse subjiciendam libero arbitrio, sed praeponondam)

§ 13. From the two headings established and proved long since in Distinction 26[16] — of which the one was that grace is given for individual acts, and the other that it is not given according to our merits — and from the other matters there likewise disputed concerning grace, it is now sufficiently evident that good works are performed through grace together with free will in such a way that in them the prior parts must always be assigned to God's grace, and therefore the grace of God is not to be subjoined or postponed to free will, but must be placed before it and take precedence as the more principal cause of the entire good work. In order that this matter may be understood more certainly, we shall set out certain modes in which it happens that grace is subjoined to free will.

§ 14. The first of those who subject grace to free will are those who so distinguish grace and free will as to say that for works of piety free will is absolutely necessary, but not the grace of God. This is what Pelagius once did. Concerning him, St. Augustine[17] reports that when he had been rebuked by his brethren for attributing nothing to the aid of God's grace in performing His commandments, he yielded to their correction only to this extent — that he did not place it before free will, but with faithless cunning placed it beneath it, saying that grace is given to men so that what they are commanded to do through free will they might be able to fulfil more easily through grace. For by saying "more easily," says St. Augustine, he wished it to be believed that, even though with more difficulty, men can nevertheless without divine grace perform the divine commands. This same doctrine of Pelagius the same St. Augustine combats in many passages which we have adduced when we were treating of the fulfilment of the commandments of the law. The same doctrine the Church also condemned with an anathema in canon 5 of the Council of Milevis,[18] where after the condemnation these words are subjoined: "For the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments, where He did not say: 'Without me you can do it with more difficulty,' but: 'Without me you can do nothing.'"

§ 15. Second, those subject grace to free will who posit or require some prior effort (*conatus*) on the part of free will as a condition for grace to be given. But this doctrine also St. Augustine refutes in the many passages where he teaches that both the beginning and the progress and the completion of a good work must be attributed to the grace of God, and wherever he teaches, in accordance with the ecclesiastical definition, that grace is not given according to our merits — understanding by the name of merit any whatsoever preparation

of the will, as has been shown in the proper place.[19] There exists on this matter a very explicit definition in the Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausiacanum*),[20] canon 6, where every desire, labour, and every striving of the will toward the good is referred to God's grace. In that same council the opinion is condemned in explicit words of those who subject the aid of grace to human humility or obedience, and of those who teach that through the strength of nature man can think any good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life as is expedient, or choose it, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Similar things are enacted in several of the following canons. The Fathers of that Council employ many testimonies of Scripture to prove these things, which it is not necessary to enumerate here, for they have been adduced by us when we were treating of gratuitous grace and of the beginning of a good work. Prosper also argues against this error in his book *Against the Collator*.[21] Furthermore, it does not affect the substance of the error whether someone posits some effort (*conatus*), or — as some call it diminutively — a little effort (*conatulus*) in free will by which God's grace is invited. For just as a small grace is truly grace, so a little effort is truly an effort. Hence the refutation of this error is the same.

§ 16. Third, those fall into a similar fault who, even while acknowledging no effort of will toward the good that precedes grace in time, yet think that in the order of nature free will is prior to grace for the production of a good work. But this error too St. Augustine refutes in more than one place — as in Epistle 186[22] — and whenever he teaches that God does not have mercy on a man because the man has willed well, but that the man has willed well because God has had mercy on him, according to that word of Rom. 9: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy."[,23] The passages have been noted in Distinction 26,[,24] where we were speaking of prevenient grace. To this also pertains what the same St. Augustine says in the aforesaid Epistle to Paulinus:[,25] that the will is the companion of grace, not its leader; its attendant, not its guide. And what the author of the *Hypomnesticon* (*Hyponosticon*), book 3, compares free will to a beast of burden and grace to its rider.[26] And finally what was defined in the Council of Orange, canon last:[,27] that in every good work we do not begin and then God comes to our assistance, but rather God Himself, with no good merits preceding on our part, inspires in us both faith and love of Himself first. Therefore, whatever has been disputed against the merit of grace in Distinction 26 also overthrows this opinion. Moreover, that neither of the two errors already mentioned is served by subsequent grace — which all Catholics rightly acknowledge — is evident from the division of grace into prevenient and subsequent grace which we have set out long since.[,28]

§ 17. Lastly, those too do not uphold the proper dignity of God's grace, but in some measure subject it to free will, who think that free will can be so rebellious and obstinate as to frustrate and elude the operation of divine grace, so that it cannot be converted by grace.[29] But in order that the falsity of this opinion may appear, it remains for us to explain what the power and efficacy (*efficacia*) of grace is with respect to free will for the production of a good work.

§ II — In what sense grace is called efficacious (Quo sensu gratia dicatur efficax)

§ 18. Although the operation of the grace of God in man is most secret, and known in its fullness to God alone its giver, as St. Augustine truly says[31] — that there are few who can penetrate by intellect how God draws men to Himself by grace and yet leaves them to their own free choice — nevertheless those things concerning

this operation of grace that have been made known to us in Sacred Scripture, in Ecclesiastical tradition, and in the teaching of the Fathers, ought without hesitation to be received and retained by all, even though most of us are somewhat slow in comprehending them by the intellect. Such are the following: that God works in us the very works themselves and causes us to do them; that He draws us to Himself; that He converts hearts; that He changes wills; that He gives repentance, obedience, and good consent; and finally that from the contumacious He makes the humble, and from the unwilling the willing — and other things of this kind. All of which things prove so certainly the efficacy of Divine grace with respect to the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) of man that there is no Catholic who does not confess the efficacious grace of God. Yet when the question is raised in what sense grace is called efficacious, the opinion of all is not the same. Indeed on this matter many very diverse opinions have arisen among theologians, which we here briefly review.

§ 19. One opinion holds that efficacious grace consists in some gift with which a man, already anticipated by calling and arousing grace, is able through God's help to attain by the pious use of his free will; and that this gift is in one genus of cause naturally prior to the free conversion itself, and in another genus subsequent. This gift, according to this opinion, consists in the infusion of habits of grace and virtues, inasmuch as through those habits the mind of man, strengthened, elicits the act of conversion. According to this opinion, therefore, efficacious grace is either the habitual grace when it is infused, or the infusion itself; inasmuch as through that infused grace the free will elicits its own conversion.

§ 20. Another opinion is that of those who constitute efficacious grace in human assent and co-operation; so that grace is called efficacious from the outcome, namely when it obtains its effect through the fact that the human will co-operates with it. From this opinion it follows, and it is conceded by the authors who so teach, that it lies within the power of free will to make grace efficacious, indeed that this very thing pertains to the office (*officium*) of free will.

§ 21. A third opinion constitutes efficacious grace in the calling, or internal illumination and persuasion, by which God so moves the will of a man as He foresees it will follow; namely by proposing to the man those things which He knows to be congruent to his mind and disposition. Hence they call this grace by a new name: *congruent* grace.

§ 22. Of these opinions, the first manifestly falls short in this, that it acknowledges no efficacious grace except in the infusion of habitual grace whereby the sinner is justified; whereas there is no doubt that it ought to be acknowledged for each individual act of true piety, both those that precede and those that follow justification itself. But all three opinions fall short in this: that according to them the efficacy of God's grace is not altogether absolute in bringing about a good action, but depends on the consent of free will, as the very authors themselves acknowledge. Hence among those authors it is also called *moral* efficacy.

§ 23. The fourth opinion, then, is that of those who constitute efficacious grace in the gratuitous and benevolent operation of God, because it properly operates in the free will of man the very conversion itself, or any other whatsoever act of true piety — that is, by efficiently reaching the very movement of the will itself, namely by applying and determining the will to willing and choosing. This operation is called *physical*, that is, properly so-called, such as is recognized in God with respect to any other effects whatsoever proceeding from Him. Since it cannot come about that God determines the will without the will itself being determined and performing that to which it is applied as a second cause by God, it follows that it cannot come about that this

grace should not have its effect. Hence by this reasoning, according to this fourth opinion, the grace of God is called efficacious — that is, with a physical and most properly so-called efficacy.

§ 24. The three prior opinions can each be refuted by many arguments and reasons. But since, once truth is well established and confirmed, whatever is contrary to it at once and by itself falls, it will therefore suffice for us to establish the fourth opinion — which we embrace as the most true and most sincere — by its own reasons.

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§ III — Arguments from Scripture and the Fathers for the absolute efficacy of God's grace (Rationes ex Scriptura et Patribus pro absoluta efficacia gratiæ Dei)

§ 25. From the Divine Writings and the writings of the Holy Fathers very many arguments or reasons can be gathered, by which it is taught that God's grace efficaciously and absolutely moves the wills of men, according to the opinion declared a little before. These reasons can indeed be called the fundamental and demonstrative ones of this doctrine. For most of them have the force of demonstration, and they are of such a kind that for each one of them many texts of Scripture and testimonies of the Holy Fathers can be adduced. We have arranged them in the following number and order.

§ 26. The first argument is from the promise of God. For what He promises, He Himself by His own power fulfils, as the Apostle says, Rom. 4: "Whatsoever He hath promised, He is able also to do."[33] For a promise concerns those things that are to be performed by the one who promises. Hence Solomon, wishing in 3 Kgs. 8 to signify that God had performed what He had promised, addresses Him thus: "Thou hast fulfilled with Thy hands what Thou hast spoken" — that is, what He had promised. Now the promises pertaining to the grace of the New Testament are of this kind. Ezek. 11 and 36: "Not for your sakes do I this, but for My holy name's sake; and I will give you a new heart, and I will put a new spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in My precepts," etc.[34] And Jer. 24: "I will give them a heart that they may know Me, because I am the Lord; and they shall be My people," etc.[35] And more expressly in ch. 31: "I will give My law in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart," etc.[36] — which passage the Apostle cites in Heb. 8.[37] There is also a like promise in Deut. 30.[38]

St. Augustine makes use of this argument in the book *De Spiritu et Litera* ch. 24,[39] saying: "For this is what God promises, which He Himself does: for He does not promise one thing while another does it; which is no longer to promise, but to foretell." And in the book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* ch. 10,[40] he says: "God promised, not from the power of our will, but from His own predestination. For He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men were going to do; because, although men do good things pertaining to the worship of God, He it is who makes them do what He commands — not they who cause Him to do what He promised; otherwise, that God's promises may be fulfilled is within the power not of God but of men." So he. Which last point is without doubt a consequence of the opinion of those who suspend the operation of grace on the condition of the co-operation of free will, as if that very co-operation were not properly an effect of grace. Hence Prosper absolutely removes a condition of this kind from God's promise, in book I *De vocatione Gentium* ch. 9,[41] saying: "That which the Lord promised to Abraham without condition and gave

without law remains entire and is daily fulfilled." Now this promise he subsequently expounds according to the Scriptures as referring to the faith of the Gentiles and the obedience and perseverance of good works.

§ 27. The second argument is from the difference between the law and grace. For to the law belongs the knowledge of what is to be done and what is to be avoided: "For by the law," says the Apostle, "is the knowledge of sin."[42] To the same belong all illuminations, inspirations, exhortations, reproofs, terrors, and persuasions — both internal and external — so long as they do not touch the affection nor soften the heart. But the proper effect of grace is love, obedience, good will, a new heart, and a new spirit. Hence Pelagius, constituting the grace of Christ in teaching and example in the law, since he did not thereby exclude divine inspirations and inward movements, was by no means seen to hold the right and sincere confession of grace. This difference between law and grace is proved by the prophetic and apostolic doctrine, especially by the Epistles of Paul to the Romans and Galatians.[43]

§ 28. The third argument is from the prayers (*orationes*) of the faithful and of the whole Church. For whatever we ask from God, we believe that God can do and will do that very thing. But we ask from God not only internal illuminations and persuasions, in which He proposes objects to the will as He knows to be congruent to it so that it may follow and be willing; but the good will itself, the choice (*electio*), the acceptance, and the good works themselves. Therefore to all these things is extended the efficacious operation of God's grace. This is proved above all by the Lord's Prayer, in which we say: "Thy will be done," and "Lead us not into temptation" — so much so that, if other documents were lacking (as St. Augustine says in the book *De dono perseverantiae* ch. 7),[44] this prayer alone would suffice for us to establish the cause which we defend. Yet the same efficacy of grace is also evidently shown and confirmed by other prayers of the Church, concerning which St. Augustine says:[45] "Let the Church attend to its daily prayers: it prays that unbelievers may believe. God therefore converts them to faith; it prays that believers may persevere unto the end," etc. And Pope Celestine in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul ch. 11[46] says: "Let us look to the rites of the sacerdotal prayers, which handed down from the Apostles are celebrated uniformly throughout the whole world and in every Catholic Church, so that the law of praying may establish the law of believing." And from thence, after enumerating those things for which the Church prays on behalf of the whole human race, he concludes: "Which is so entirely the work of the Divine operation, that thanksgiving and confession of praise is always offered to God for the illumination of such persons, or the correction of the faithful." Further, let there be seen Innocent I in his Epistle to the Council of Milevis (which is in St. Augustine no. 93),[47] and Augustine himself, Epistle 107,[48] to Vitalis of Carthage (at the beginning of the Epistle), where he presses this argument very vigorously. Also Epistle 252,[49] and book I *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* ch. 19 and 20,[50] and book *De Gratia Christi* ch. 25,[51] and book *De dono perseverantiae* ch. 23,[52] and the *Catechismus ad Parochos* under the title of those for whom prayer is to be offered.[53]

§ 29. The fourth argument, connected with the preceding, is from those things commanded to us by God. For as St. Augustine says in book II *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* ch. 10:[54] "Nothing in the Sacred Scriptures is commanded to man by God for the purpose of proving free will, which is not found either to be given by His goodness, or to be sought in view of demonstrating the assistance of grace." Hence it is that well-known prayer of St. Augustine frequented in the *Confessions*,[55] and urged against the sting of Pelagius in the book *De dono perseverantiae* ch. 20:[56] "Lord, give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt." Likewise that of the same author on Ps. 118 (the letter *He*), and Prosper in the same place: "Grant Thyself what Thou commandest."[57] Which is surely nothing other than saying what we say in the Lord's Prayer: "Thy

will be done" — that is: "Make us do what Thou commandest." To this pertains what the Fathers according to the Scriptures both teach, that Faith and the Catholic doctrine declare that grace fulfils and perfects the precepts of the law, according to that word of Christ the Author of grace, Matt. 5: "I am not come to destroy the law but to fulfil it."[58] Hence also the Scriptures mutually respond to one another concerning precept and grace: "Make you a new heart." And: "I will give you a new heart." — "Walk in My precepts." And: "I will cause you to walk in My precepts." — "Work out your salvation." — "For it is God who worketh in you to will and to accomplish," Phil. 2.[59] — 2 Cor. 13: "Be perfect," and "We pray for your perfection."[60] — Ps. 31: "Be not like the horse and the mule who have no understanding"; and: "I will give thee understanding, and instruct thee in this way wherein thou shalt go."[61] — 2 Tim. 2: "Understand what I say; for the Lord will give thee understanding in all things."[62] — Jer.: "Be not afraid of their faces. For I will make thee not to fear them."[63] All of which manifestly prove that this very thing is brought about or expected from God's grace — which is commanded by God — that is, the very obedience of the law, and not only the persuasion toward what is commanded; which alone, had Augustine understood it in the above-cited words, he would not have been reproached with mockery by Pelagius.

§ 30. The fifth argument is from thanksgiving (*gratiarum actio*). For for good works thanks are to be given to God, not only because He offered grace, or because He persuaded in a manner He foresaw we would follow, but also because He bestowed even the very following, willing, choosing, accepting, and working well. For this entire thing must necessarily be comprised in the full and perfect act of thanksgiving, such as God requires from us for all good things, as the Apostle says, 1 Thess. 5: "In all things give thanks,"[64] and as the praying Church says: "It is meet and just, right and salutary, that we should always and everywhere give thanks to Thee" — that is, in all things give thanks. The mind of the Church in rendering thanks is made clearly explicit — that no other grace is acknowledged, and consequently that sufficient grace is considered to act passively only — as it happens that into our hands has unexpectedly come a most learned and elaborated work of our most dear colleague and Prefect, the Most Reverend Master Gregory Sellers, in which work, in the opinion of the most learned Master, which we have adopted, he shows this against the condemned propositions of Quesnel. In that work the volumes are already in the press, in which all the deceitful contentions of the Quesneliians and the enemies of the Church are to be exposed, and as we who are now advanced in age and approaching the borders of old age fully trust, decisively refuted — God granting.[65]

§ 31. The sixth argument is from glorying. For the Scriptures teach us that we are not to glory in anything of ours except only in the Lord: "Who glorieth," says the Apostle, "let him glory in the Lord," 2 Cor. 2.[66] And: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Ps. 113.[67] And the Psalmist: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory."[68] And the Apostle speaks peculiarly of our works in Eph. 2: "Not of works, that no man may glory."[69] Hence it is that saying of Cyprian, ten times quoted with praise by St. Augustine: "In nothing is there room for glorying, because nothing is ours." But if only the persuasion or the offering of grace belongs to God, while our acceptance and choice and determination of will toward good is ours — that is most certainly left to us very greatly, in which, as if in our own thing, we would glory. There are many testimonies of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Bernard, and of other distinguished Fathers to this effect, which for the sake of brevity we omit. That which is not to be omitted is that the Fathers of the Council of Trent (Session 14, ch. 8)[70] professed in these words: "Man has nothing to glory in, but all our glorying is in Christ."

§ 32. The seventh argument is from the virtue of hope (*spes*). For this consists in the fact that we are directed not only to the goods of the future age but also to all the means leading thither, which are chiefly

good works, good desires, and a good will, to be received from God as their Author and Giver. Which hope the Church professes in so many public prayers, as is most efficaciously attested.

§ 33. The eighth argument is from the virtue of humility (*humilitas*), and from the contrary vice of pride. For to the virtue of humility it properly belongs that a man acknowledge no good in himself except what is given by God, according to that word: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Hence St. Augustine in the book *De dono perseverantiae* ch. 13[71] says: "It is pious, this is true, that it be a humble and submissive confession, and an act altogether belonging to God."

§ 34. The ninth argument, joined to the preceding, is from the lapse of the Saints. For God therefore permits the just sometimes to fall into sins, that they may acknowledge that their standing and good conduct was not of their own will and choice, but that that entire work and benefit was divine. Concerning which we have spoken at greater length above when treating of grace for each individual act.[72]

§ 35. The tenth argument is from the spiritual sacrifice of good works. For to the general notion of sacrifice it above all belongs that we confess that this very thing which we offer to God we have all received from God. Now it is certain from the Sacred Scriptures that all good works, desires, and movements of will are certain spiritual sacrifices, and — as Peter speaks in 1 Pet. 2 — spiritual hosts to be offered to God, and acceptable through Jesus Christ.[73] Therefore we must necessarily confess that we have received these from God; which we cannot properly confess any more than Jews, who confessed that they ought to offer bodily sacrifices which they had received from His hand, ought to confess, and as we also ought to confess all corporal goods as received by us from God.

§ 36. The eleventh argument is from the power (*potentia*) attributed to the grace of God. For Scripture, the Fathers, and the whole Church in public prayers attribute to the Divine grace an effect of omnipotence and the virtue of God. "God is powerful," says John the Baptist, "to raise up children to Abraham from these stones," Matt. 3.[74] And the Church in a certain Prayer: "O God who dost greatly spare and abundantly show mercy"; and again: "O God whose virtue is all that is best." Indeed very many prayers of the Church have their beginning: "O God omnipotent," or "O God omnipotent and merciful." And in the daily Prayer the Church prays: "O Lord God omnipotent, who hast caused us to arrive at the beginning of this day; keep us this day safe by Thy virtue, so that at no point of this day do we decline into sin, but that all our thoughts, words, and works may ever be directed to the doing of Thy justice." And St. Augustine (in *Enchiridion* 97 and 98)[75] refers this to God's omnipotence: that He can convert the evil wills of men, whatever they have willed, to good. Which thing St. Basil confirms beautifully in a liturgical Prayer: "The wicked make good, for Thou art able to do all things.",[76] To which St. Bernard responds in Rule ch. 28,[77] saying: "Pray for an incorrigible brother to God, who is able to do all things." Now if the efficacy of grace consisted in persuasion, because God persuades in a manner He foresees the will will follow — it would certainly be said more correctly to belong to the infallibility of the Divine foreknowledge than to the omnipotence of God; for its efficacy would properly depend on the knowledge of that inclination or congruence of will that is to follow, if so or so moved, as they say, when excited.

§ 37. The twelfth argument, which confirms the preceding, is from the fact that grace is called *most efficacious* (*efficacissima*). Thus St. Augustine calls it in the book *De gratia et libero arbitrio* ch. 4,[78] and in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* book I ch. 20.[79] And St. Thomas in Part I, q. 19, a. 8,[80] affirms universally that the will of God is most efficacious, not only because it brings about the effects themselves, but also the

mode in which they come about. From which it follows that not only should our acts be referred to the efficacy of the divine will, but even the very mode in which they freely come about from our will. But if grace consisted in the persuasion by which God persuades as He knows the man will follow, it would with certainty be rightly called, because of the infallible certitude of divine foreknowledge, efficacious, but not most efficacious, because it would not properly effect the following of the will.'[81]

§ 38. The thirteenth argument is from this, that grace not only tributes to be able to do good (*posse bonum*), as Pelagius used to say, but to act (*agere*) good itself, as St. Augustine teaches throughout almost the whole book *De natura et gratia*.[82] Wherefore not only does God persuade, but in the will itself He perfects that which He persuades — namely by reaching the very act of the will itself.

§ 39. The fourteenth argument is from the vocabulary of *operating* and *doing* attributed to the grace of God with respect to our operations. Is. 26: "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works for us." The Apostle: "Who worketh all things in all," 1 Cor. 12.[83] Likewise: "God it is who worketh in you to will and to accomplish," Phil. 2.'[59] Ezek. 36: "I will cause you to walk in My precepts, and keep My judgments and do them."'[84]

§ 40. The fifteenth argument is from this, that our entire good is attributed to God without exception, as we showed in the proper chapter.[85]

§ 41. The sixteenth argument is from this, that our willing itself, which properly speaking is an act of the will, is attributed to the operation of God's grace: "God," says the Apostle, "worketh in you to will." And Wisdom, Prov. 8 — often cited by St. Augustine — says: "The will is prepared by the Lord," or, as it reads, "directed."[86]

§ 42. The seventeenth argument is from the name *creation*, by which Scripture uses to signify the effects of God's grace attributed to it, such as to *give*, to *bestow*, to *distribute*, to *provide*, and the like. And as the Church in public prayers uses the name of Scriptures most frequently for signifying the divine grace's operation in us, Scripture is not able to be a container — unless God has given it. Jer. 31: "I will give My law in their bowels." Ezek. 36: "I will give you a new heart and a new spirit," and "I will give them a heart of flesh." 2 Paral. 31: if God would give them a heart as one. Matt. 19: "Not all receive this word, but they to whom it is given," Lk. 1: "To serve Him in holiness and justice in all our days." 1 Cor. 3: "God gave the increase." 2 Tim. 2: "Lest God give them repentance." 1 Cor. 8: "The grace of God who gave him the same solicitude in the heart of Titus." Acts 11: "Ergo to the Gentiles also God had given life." Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from God." "If then God gives, grants, and provides all these things, He leaves nothing among them that free will might claim as its own, as he who acquiesces only to one persuading and not to one efficiently and properly moving rightly claims as his own." By which argument the Apostle himself uses this, Eph. 2, when he says: "Not of works, for it is the gift of God."[87]

§ 43. The eighteenth argument is from the vocabulary of *giving* and other significations of this kind attributed to God and to God's grace, such as *to give*, *to distribute*, *to provide*, *to furnish* and the like, after which the Church in public prayers uses Scripture most frequently for signifying the divine grace's operation in us. Now Scriptures are Wis. 8: "I cannot be continent, unless God gives." Jer. 31: "I will give My law in their bowels." Ezek. 36: "I will give you a new heart," and "I will give them a heart of flesh." 2 Paral. 31: if God would give them one heart. Matt. 19: "Not all receive this word, but they to whom it is given." Lk. 1: "To serve Him in holiness and justice." 1 Cor. 3: "God gave the increase." 2 Tim. 2: "Lest God give them repentance." 1 Cor.

8: "Who gave that same solicitude in the heart of Titus." Acts 11: "To the Gentiles also God had given life." Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from God." "If then God gives, distributes, and furnishes all these things, He leaves nothing among them that free will might claim as its own, as he who only acquiesces to one persuading and not to one efficiently and properly moving claims as his own." With this argument the Apostle uses Eph. 2, saying: "Not of works, for it is the gift of God."[88]

§ 44. The nineteenth argument, from the vocabulary of *drawing* and *compelling*. Jn. 6: "Unless the Father who sent Me draw him." And Jn. 12: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to Myself" — which is chiefly to be understood of wills.[89] But God draws through grace, not by compelling the will, but by efficaciously moving it. The Church likewise prays for this same thing: that He make "our rebellious wills propitious to Himself." For the same reason St. Augustine says (which had been objected to him by the Pelagians) that grace can be inspired in an unwilling and reluctant man, in book 2 *Contra Epistolas Pelagianas*: [90] "So it is, that through grace even from one unwilling and reluctant a consenting and willing person is made, as the same author there consequently explains, like the Lord who wonderfully restored to health a sick person in body. From the same tract, differing in book I (ch. 19), he says: 'He draws in a wondrous way to will, the one who inwardly knows how to operate in the very hearts of men; so that it cannot be that men should not will, because they cannot believe; but that willing is made from unwilling. God does not draw the unwilling, but makes the willing from the unwilling; for He makes the willing because He is the Almighty.'",[91]

§ 45. The twenty-first argument is from this, that all our merits are the gifts of God. This most pleasing opinion is found at St. Augustine and Prosper and many other Fathers, and Celestine the Pope writes to the Bishops of Gaul ch. 12,[92] and the Synod of Trent (Session 6, ch. 16),[93] lucidly proves it — when they say that so great is the goodness of God toward men, that He wills that what are His own gifts should be our merits. But this would not properly be said, if it were not the very motion of free will by which we merit that God efficaciously operated. For merits are properly the actions of free will.

§ 46. The twenty-second argument is from this, that our good works are more God's than ours. St. Augustine testifies to this in his last book *De continentia* (ch. final),[94] when he says: "They are better understood as God's than ours." And in the book *De continentia* (from ch. 13): "They are," he says, "the works of a man that ought to be called works of God. For it is God who worketh in you to will and to accomplish." Likewise book 4 of Genesis, on the literal sense, ch. 16: "The good works that we recognize in us are more His than ours." Likewise St. Augustine writing on Ps. 137 (on the verse: "Despise not the works of Thy hands") says: "Whatsoever they are; and therefore Thy works, not mine"; and to this he cites that word of the Apostle Eph. 2: "Created in good works," etc.[95] Similarly St. Thomas (I-II, q. 93, a. 6),[96] writes that the works of man that are performed by the Holy Spirit are more the works of the Holy Spirit than of the man himself. The same reason is found in St. Augustine, book *De correctione et gratia* ch. 14,[97] which says that God has more power over the wills of men than they themselves. And something similar St. Thomas has (De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8).[98] But these things would not be true if God's good works were not physical, that is in their proper and perfect formal character (*ratio*), but only morally and persuasively in them.

§ 47. The twenty-third argument is from the victory over temptation, which according to the Scriptures and the definitions of the Fathers is properly to be attributed to God as its author. "Thanks be to God," says the Apostle (1 Cor. 15), "who hath given us victory through Jesus Christ our Lord."[99] And in the Palestinian Synod —

§ 48. Pope Celestine I confirms this with the words cited above, wherein he says: "This is felt to be so entirely the gift of the divine bounty, that the act of giving thanks to God for it, and the confession of praise, should be referred back to Him."[100] And this same meaning is indicated in those words of the Saviour, Matt. 22, "Render to God the things that are God's," as Hilary understood it in his Commentary.[101]

§ 49. The sixth argument is from glorying (*ex gloriatione*). For the Scriptures teach us that we ought to glory in nothing except in God: "He that glorieth," says the Apostle, "let him glory in the Lord" (2 Cor. 10).[102] And, "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?" And the Psalmist: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory" (Ps. 113).[103] And specifically concerning works, again the Apostle: "Not of works, that no man may glory" (Eph. 2).[69] Hence also that saying of St. Cyprian, so often praised and cited by St. Augustine: "Let no man glory in anything, because nothing is ours."[104] But if only the suggestion or the offering of grace were God's, while the acceptance and choice and the determination of the will to the good were ours, very much would certainly be left to us in which we might glory as in something of our own. There are many notable passages of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Bernard, and other Fathers on this matter, which for the sake of brevity we pass over. Yet this must not be omitted, that the Fathers of the Council of Trent professed in these words: "Man has nothing whereof to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ."[105]

§ 50. The seventh argument is from the virtue of hope (*ex virtute spei*). For hope consists in this: that we expect not only the goods of the world to come, but also all the means leading thither—chief among which are good works, and holy desires, and the good will—from God as their author and giver. The Church professes this hope in so many public prayers, as has been shown above.

§ 51. The eighth argument is from the virtue of humility (*ex virtute humilitatis*), and from its contrary, the vice of pride. For to humility it properly belongs that a man acknowledge no good in himself save what is given by God, according to that saying: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?"[106] Hence St. Augustine says:[71] "This is expedient for us to believe and to say; this is pious, this is true, that there be a humble and submissive confession, that everything be referred totally to God."

§ 52. The ninth argument, closely connected with the preceding, is from the fall of the Saints (*ex lapsu Sanctorum*). For God sometimes permits sins for this reason: that men may acknowledge that it was not by the strength of their own will and choice that they stood firm and walked rightly, but that the whole of that good work and benefaction was divine. We have spoken at greater length on this matter when we discussed the grace necessary for individual acts.

§ 53. The tenth argument is from the spiritual sacrifice of good works (*a sacrificio spiritualium bonorum*). For to the general notion of sacrifice (*sacrificii rationem*) it belongs first and foremost that, in the very act of offering something to God, we profess that we have received it from God. Now it is certain from Holy Scripture that all good works, desires, and movements of the will are certain spiritual sacrifices, and, as Peter says (1 Pet. 2), "spiritual hostages to be offered, acceptable to God through Jesus Christ."[73] Therefore we are necessarily bound to profess that we have received all these things from God—no less properly than the Jews were bound to profess, when they offered bodily victims, that they had received them from God's hand; and in the same way as we also ought to profess that we have received from God all corporeal goods.

§ 54. The eleventh argument is from the power (*potentia*) attributed to divine grace (*ex potentia Gratiae Dei*). For Holy Scripture, the Fathers, and the whole Church in public prayers attribute every divine effect in us to the omnipotence and power of God. "God is able," says John the Baptist, "of these stones to raise up

children to Abraham" (Matt. 3).[74] And the Church in a certain prayer: "O God, who dost most manifestly display Thy power above all in showing mercy and in sparing"; and again, "O God, of Whose power is all that is best."[107] Indeed very many prayers of the Church have this opening: "Almighty and everlasting God," or "Almighty and merciful God." And in the daily prayer said at Prime the Church prays thus: "O Lord God Almighty, who hast brought us to the beginning of this day, save us today by Thy power, that in this day we turn aside from no sin, but that our words, thoughts, and works proceed ever to the doing of Thy justice."[108] Thus also St. Augustine refers it to the omnipotence of God that He converts to good the evil wills of men, as many as He wills.[109] Which he likewise professes in the liturgical prayer of Basil: "Make the evil good," it says, "for Thou art able to do all things."[110] To which St. Bernard beautifully agrees, saying that prayer should be offered for an incorrigible brother to God, who is able to do all things.[111] But if the efficacy of grace consisted in a suggestion—because God suggests in the way He foresaw would be appropriate to the will so that it should follow—certainly the effects of grace would have to be attributed not so much to the omnipotence as to the foreknowledge of God, since grace's proper efficacy would rest upon that knowledge by which the inclination or congruity of the will to follow is foreseen, if it be excited in such or such a manner, as they say.[112]

§ 55. The twelfth argument, confirming the preceding, is namely from the fact that grace is called *most efficacious* (*efficacissima*). St. Augustine so calls it in the book *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, chapter 5, and in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, Book I, chapter 20.[113] And St. Thomas, part I, q. 19, a. 8, affirms in general that the will of God is most efficacious (*efficacissimam*), not only with respect to the effects themselves but also with respect to their manner. From which it follows that not only are our acts to be referred to the efficacy of the divine will, but also the very manner in which they are freely performed by our will. But if grace consisted in the suggestion by which God persuades a man whose future compliance He foreknows, that suggestion would rightly be called most certain, by reason of the infallible certitude of divine foreknowledge, but it would not properly be called most efficacious, because it would not properly produce (*efficeret*) the following of the will.[80]

§ 56. The thirteenth argument is from the fact that grace does not merely confer the *ability* (*posse*) or the *ease of being able* (*facile posse*) to do good, as Pelagius used to say, but the very *doing* (*ipsum agere*) of good itself, as St. Augustine teaches in nearly the whole book *De natura et gratia*.[114] Therefore God does not merely suggest, but in the will itself He brings to effect what He suggests, namely by attaining to the very act of the will itself.

§ 57. The fourteenth argument is from the vocabulary of *working* and *doing* (*ex operandi et faciendi vocabulo*), attributed to the grace of God with respect to our works. Is. 26: "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works for us."[116] The Apostle: "Who worketh all in all" (1 Cor. 12).[83] Likewise: "It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2).[59] Ezek. 36: "I will cause you to walk in My commandments and to keep My judgments and to do them."[84]

§ 58. The fifteenth argument is from the fact that the whole of our good without exception is attributed to grace, as we have shown in a proper chapter.

§ 59. The sixteenth argument is from the fact that our very *willing* (*ipsum velle nostrum*), which most properly is the act of the will, is attributed to the operation of divine grace: "God," says the Apostle, "worketh

in you to will" (Phil. 2).[59] And the Wise Man says (Prov. 8, according to the Septuagint, frequently cited by St. Augustine): "The will is prepared by the Lord" (*Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*), or "is made ready."

§ 60. The seventeenth argument is from the name of *creation* (*ex nomine creationis*), which indeed means to bring about everything that the supreme Provider wills. Why then, you will ask, have propositions XXIII, XXIV, and XXV been condemned, which attribute to grace that same, or rather a wholly different power, that is alien to the definitions of the Fathers and yet pertains to these Theses? How is that? Assuredly, because the said propositions attribute to grace in its working that same power which they grant to the free cooperation of the creature, so that in acting they admit a free cooperation of the creature, in such a way as to accommodate such things as the creation of things from nothing, the miraculous restoration of health to the sick, the hypostatic union of the Word Incarnate—things which they force upon us against the prior definitions of the Church when they speak of grace. Nothing indeed is more usual in the books of St. Augustine, particularly, and of St. Thomas, than that grace operates in such a way that it does not take away the faculty of free choice, and yet is so omnipotent that it does not, by coming, so conduct itself as it does in the creation of things, or in the conservation of the other things which are from God in such a way that they are in creatures, not worked by creatures. The places of St. Augustine and St. Thomas abound, which the aforesaid most Reverend Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace provides in abundance; to transcribe them word for word would be laborious to the reader and long; and what is more to the point, the propositions there cited and recorded will speak for themselves. Consider them, I ask, O Reader, and contemplate whether you can recognize in them that efficacy of grace which the Fathers proclaim and the Church defines, or rather something altogether different.[115]

Here are the words of certain of them: "X. Nothing can impede or retard the hand of Almighty God. XI. Grace is the operation of the hand of God commanding and doing what He commands. XXIII. By His grace God gives to us its own significance, pointing to it through that by which He signifies it, for life." The remaining of the aforementioned propositions are of the same import; consider only the ones transcribed here and see whether what the Fathers preach, and the Church defines, is not rather something altogether different.[117]

§ 61. The eighteenth argument is from the words attributed to the grace of God throughout Scripture, to signify its efficacious operation in us. For grace—or God Himself through grace—is said to convert, change, open, incline, and renew the hearts and wills of men. And it is unheard of in the Church that God converts sinners by a merely moral and persuasive means. The Scripture uses such words for signifying the effects of grace, Eph. 2 and elsewhere.[118] Hence also God calls the elect "the work of His hands" (Is. 19).[119] And in the Ecclesiastical Office at Prime it is said: "Look, O Lord, upon Thy servants and upon Thy works"—not merely on account of the creation of their nature, but on account of the whole reparation of grace.

§ 62. The nineteenth argument is from the vocabulary of *drawing* and *compelling* (*ex vocabulo trahendi et compellendi*). "No man cometh to Me," says the Lord (Jn. 6), "except the Father who sent Me draw him."[120] And (Jn. 12): "If I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to Myself"—which is understood especially according to the wills. Now God draws through grace, not by compelling the will but by efficaciously moving it. For this same reason the Church prays to God: "that He mercifully bend even rebellious wills to Himself."[121] For this reason also St. Augustine admits (as had been urged against him by the Pelagians) that grace is inspired even in a man unwilling and struggling, so that through grace the unwilling man becomes consenting and willing—as he himself subsequently explains in the same work; and in Book I of the same work he says, treating of the same passage: "He is therefore drawn in marvellous ways to will, by Him

who knows how to work inwardly in the very hearts of men; not so that men believe against their will, which cannot be, but so that from unwilling they are made willing. God therefore does not draw the unwilling man, but draws him to become willing: He draws him already willing, because by that very drawing He makes him willing from unwilling.",[122]

§ 63. The twentieth argument is from the vocabulary of *giving* (*ex vocabulis dandi*) and of other terms of the same signification, attributed to God and to His grace—such as *to give* (*donare*), *to bestow* (*tribuere*), *to be lavish* (*largiri*), *to supply* (*praestare*), and the like—which the Church uses most frequently in her public prayers, following the Scriptures, to signify the operative action of divine grace in us. Now the Scriptures say: Wis. 8: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it."[123] Jer. 31: "I will put my law in their bowels.",[36] Ezek. 36: "I will give you a new heart, and I will give you a heart of flesh.",[124] 2 Par. 30: "That He would give them one heart.",[125] Matt. 19: "Not all receive this word, but they to whom it is given.",[126] Lk. 1: that He would grant unto us that we should serve Him in holiness and justice all our days.,[127] 1 Cor. 3: "God gave the increase.",[128] 2 Tim. 2: "If peradventure God may give them repentance.",[129] 1 Cor. 8 [2 Cor. 8:16]: "Thanks be to God who gave the same solicitude for you in the heart of Titus.",[130] Acts 11: "Therefore also to the Gentiles God hath given repentance unto life.",[131] Jas. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, from God.",[132] "If therefore God gives, bestows, and supplies all these things, He leaves nothing in them by which a man may, as it were, claim free choice as his own, as he rightly claims it who merely acquiesces in one who only suggests and does not efficiently and properly move him." By which argument the Apostle himself used (Eph. 2) when he says: "Not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.",[87]

§ 64. The twenty-first argument is from the fact that all our merits are gifts of God (*ex eo, quod omnia merita nostra sunt Dei dona*). This most celebrated opinion is found in St. Augustine and Prosper and other Fathers; and both Pope Celestine, writing to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 12, and the Synod of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, clearly confirm it, when they say that such is the goodness of God towards men that He wills those things to be our merits which are His own gifts.[133] But this would not properly be said if God did not efficaciously work in us the very movement of free choice by which we merit. For merits properly speaking are actions of free choice.

§ 65. The twenty-second argument is from the fact that our good works belong more to God than to us (*ex eo, quod bona opera nostra magis sunt Dei quam nostra*). St. Augustine testifies to this in his last book *De Civitate Dei*, final chapter, when he says: "Those good works of ours are understood to be rather His than ours."[134] And in the book *De continentia*, chapter 13, he says: "They are works of man that are more rightly to be called works of God; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do."[135] Likewise in Book IV of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 16: "The good works which we acknowledge in us are rather His than ours."[136] The same Augustine, writing on Ps. 137 (on the verse "Despise not the works of Thy hands"), says: "Whatsoever they are, and therefore are rather Thine than mine"; and to this end he cites that text of the Apostle, Eph. 2: "Created in good works," etc.,[137] Similarly St. Thomas writes,[96] that the works of a man who is moved by the Holy Spirit belong more to the Holy Spirit than to the man himself. Of the same tenor is what St. Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia*, chapter 14: that God has more the will of men in His power than they themselves have.[138] And St. Thomas makes a similar point in *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 8.[98] But these things would not be true if God were to work good works in us not physically—that is, in the proper and perfect sense—but only morally and by suggestion.

§ 66. The twenty-third argument is from the victory over temptations (*ex victoria tentationum*), which must according to the Scriptures and the definitions of the Fathers be properly attributed to God as its author. "Thanks be to God," says the Apostle (1 Cor. 15), "who hath given us the victory through Jesus Christ."[99]

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1. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, par. 6, ch. 17 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 1. de Sacramentis par. 6. c. 17.*].
2. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 8; and *De Perfectione Justitiae*, ch. 2.
3. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], in the final section of this Distinction.
4. Ps. 118 (119): "I have done judgment and justice."
5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, aa. 2, 3, 4; q. 65, a. 2; and elsewhere.
6. Jas. 1:17: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above."
7. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 16; and I, ch. 2, ch. 27 [abbreviation as in source: *l. 16. De Voc. Gent. cap. 1. & l. 2. cap. 27.*].
8. Above, in the preceding Distinction [i.e. Distinction 27], where the saying of St. Augustine was explained: that God works even our good wills in us without us.
9. St. Gregory the Great, cited frequently; cf. also the context of *Homiliae in Evangelia*.
10. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium* II, ch. 35 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. de vocat. gen. 35.*].
11. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3.
12. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 27: "For as many branches of a tree go forth from one root, so many virtues are generated from one charity."
13. St. Augustine, *De Bono Conjugali* and *De Sancta Virginitate*, passages cited above.
14. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* [abbreviation as in source: *in Eth.*]: "In the Olympian contests not those who are most skilled in the art, but those who exercise it most excellently, receive the prizes."
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 2, 4, 5; q. 111, aa. 1, 2, 3; and elsewhere.
16. Above, Distinction 26 [abbreviation as in source: *ad dist. 26.*].
17. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 88.
18. Council of Milevis (*Concilium Milevitanum*), canon 5.
19. Above, in the proper place, when treating of grace given not according to our merits.
20. Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausiacanum*), canon 6 [abbreviation as in source: *Conc. Arausicano can. 6. is 7.*].
21. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*.
22. St. Augustine, Epistle 186 (in the most recent edition: Epistle CLXXXVI) [note in source: *seu CLXXXVI. in Noviss. editione*].
23. Rom. 9:16.
24. Above, Distinction 26, where we were speaking of prevenient grace.
25. St. Augustine, Epistle to Paulinus [the same letter referred to above].
26. *Hypomnesticon* (*Hyponosticon*), book 3 [attributed in the source to an author called *Auctor Hypognost.*].
27. Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausiacanum*), final canon.
28. Above, in our division of grace into prevenient and subsequent.
29. Footnote by the editor of the printed edition: The reader should be warned, even at the very outset of this section, that the opinion here referred to is far different in its sense from propositions XIV, XV, XVI of the condemned Quesnellian theses, and

hence should not be judged to be opposed to the Author's doctrine in the same way as the opinion of Quesnel itself. For the contrary opinion, against which the Author argues, maintains the efficacy of grace from itself (*ex se*), so that grace is said to be efficacious when it is given together with the consenting will. Against the school of St. Thomas — which, as most hold, is grounded on the principles of St. Augustine — our Author teaches with the Thomists that grace has its efficacy for its own intrinsic reason, so that because grace is efficacious, therefore the human will consents. Moreover, it is another matter to say that the human will can be so rebellious as to frustrate the operation of grace — which the Thomists, who venerate the grace of Jesus Christ and the apostolic definitions with sincere and unfeigned devotion and submit all judgment to the command of Christ the Lord, do not admit — and to speak of sufficient grace, that so great a rebellion of human nature can occur under divine grace that it cannot be converted; for under this name efficacious grace is in most cases indicated, and such a saying of Divine Omnipotence and the sweet providence of God the Author rightly rejects. But the words of Quesnel's condemned propositions bear a different character, from which this doctrine is drawn: that the grace of God, absolutely and in general, includes both efficacious and sufficient grace, so that it cannot be resisted, and that free will is so overcome by it as to be compelled in every respect to what is needed for action. This is contrary both to the doctrine of the Thomists and to the assertions of the Author, which are entirely sound. Whose explanation, in order that it may be perfectly clear to every reader, in praise of Quesnel's condemned theses as they are cited, proposition XIV, here related, reads thus: "However far removed a sinner may be from salvation, when Jesus presents Himself to be seen by him with His saving light, it is right that he yield himself, hasten forward..."

30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 8; q. 105, a. 4, 5; I-II, q. 10, a. 4; and frequently elsewhere.

31. St. Augustine, *Contra litteras Petiliani* IV, ch. 84.

32. St. Thomas, at the places cited above.

33. Rom. 4:21.

34. Ezek. 11:19–20; 36:26–27.

35. Jer. 24:7.

36. Jer. 31:33.

37. Heb. 8:10.

38. Deut. 30.

39. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 24.

40. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10.

41. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 9.

42. Rom. 3:20.

43. St. Paul, Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.

44. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

45. St. Augustine [letter or treatise cited: source reads *Attendat Ecclesia quotidianas orationes suas*; cf. St. Augustine, Epistle 217 and related texts].

46. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11 (*Observationum*), also known as the *Capitula Caelestini*.

47. Innocent I, Epistle to the Council of Milevis (= St. Augustine, Epistle 93 [Seu CLXXXII in the New Edition]).

48. St. Augustine, Epistle 107 [CCXVII in the New Edition], to Vitalis of Carthage.

49. St. Augustine, Epistle 252 [Seu CLXXIX in the New Edition, which is Epistle 116 among Epistles of the third class, addressed to John Bishop of Jerusalem, written around a.d. 416].

50. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19 and 20.

51. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 25.

52. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 23.

53. *Catechismus ad Parochos* (Roman Catechism), under the title on those for whom prayer is to be offered.

54. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 10.

55. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* [cf. X, ch. 29, 40].

56. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 20: "Lord, give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt."

57. St. Augustine, on Ps. 118 (letter *He*); Prosper of Aquitaine, in the same place: "Grant Thyself what Thou commandest."

58. Matt. 5:17.

59. Phil. 2:13.

60. 2 Cor. 13:9–11.

61. Ps. 31:9 (Vulgate); Ps. 31:8 (Vulgate): "I will give thee understanding, and instruct thee in this way."

62. 2 Tim. 2:7.

63. Jer. 1:8, 17.

64. 1 Thess. 5:18.

65. Reference to the work of the Most Reverend Master Gregory Sellers, Prefect of the Sacred Apostolic Palace, whose work against the Quesneliian propositions came unexpectedly to the author's hands while writing this section.

66. 2 Cor. 10:17 (and 1 Cor. 1:31).

67. 1 Cor. 4:7 (not Ps. 113; Estius appears to give the Pauline text after citing Ps. 113:9: "Non nobis Domine, non nobis, sed nomini tuo da gloriam").

68. Ps. 113:1 (Vulgate): "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory."

69. Eph. 2:9.

70. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 8. [The text cited — "Non habet homo unde glorietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra in Christo est" — appears to be from Session 6; the precise chapter reference as given in the source is Session 14, ch. 8, and is reproduced as printed.]

71. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 13.

72. Cross-reference to the discussion above at *Dist.* 26.

73. 1 Pet. 2:5.

74. Matt. 3:9.

75. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 97 and 98.

76. St. Basil, liturgical prayer (*in Oratione liturgica*): "The wicked make good, for Thou art able to do all things."

77. St. Bernard, *Regula* [*De consideratione*? — source reads *in regula c. 28*; abbreviation as in source], ch. 28.

78. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 4.

79. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 20.

80. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8.

81. Footnote of the source (b): That it is not ambiguous to derive the efficacy of Divine grace from the omnipotence of God. All scholastic schools are agreed that the efficacy of Divine grace is derived from the omnipotence of God; whatever at length by any formal character (*ratio*) efficacious grace may be represented. For what God wills to be done, He certainly brings it about efficiently, which creatures can impede no more than the Omnipotence of the same God can be impeded. Omnipotence is indeed the same in all. [The remainder of this long footnote of the source continues at length in similar terms, noting that the condemned propositions of Quesnel (X, XI, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV) propose the same idea of efficacious grace as the Thomists, but in a different way, since those Theses attribute to it the same force as belongs to God's action in creating or in the hypostatic union of the Word Incarnate, which allows no free co-operation from the creature — which is plainly different from the Thomist opinion and from the author's assertions.]

82. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* [throughout].

83. 1 Cor. 12:6.

84. Ezek. 36:27.

85. Cross-reference to the proper chapter above (Dist. 26).

86. Prov. 8:35 (Vulgate variant); or Prov. 16:1: "The preparation of the will is from the Lord" (*Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*).

87. Eph. 2:8–9.

88. Eph. 2:8–9. [This section corresponds to the *ratio vigesima prima* in the printed text, which develops arguments from the vocabulary of *dandi* and related significations; the citations given are: Wis. 8:21; Jer. 31:33; Ezek. 36:26; 2 Chr. 30:12; Matt. 19:11; Lk. 1:74–75; 1 Cor. 3:6; 2 Tim. 2:25; 2 Cor. 8:16; Acts 11:18; Jas. 1:17; Eph. 2:8–9.]

89. Jn. 6:44; Jn. 12:32.

90. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 8 and 9.

91. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 19.

92. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 12.

93. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 16.

94. St. Augustine, *De continentia*, last chapter [De Libro de Continentia, tom. IV Antiquae, tom. VI Novissimae Edit.; cf. Ph. Labbe, *Distibutio de Script. Eccles.* in Augustini; also cited by Trithemius, Bede, and others; Augustinus himself in Epistola ad Darium CCXXXI, alias CCLXIII, no. VII, recognises the book *De continentia*, as also the book *De patientia*, as his own].

95. St. Augustine, on Ps. 137, on the verse "Despise not the works of Thy hands," with citation of Eph. 2:10.

96. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 93, a. 6.

97. St. Augustine, *De correctione et gratia*, ch. 14.

98. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 8.

99. 1 Cor. 15:57.

100. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 12. The words cited: "This is felt to be so entirely the gift of the divine bounty, that the act of giving thanks to God and the confession of praise should be referred back to Him."

101. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *Commentary on Matthew*, on Matt. 22:21 ("Render to God the things that are God's").

102. 2 Cor. 10:17.

103. Ps. 113:1 (Ps. 115:1 in Hebrew numbering).

104. St. Cyprian, cited frequently with praise by St. Augustine: "Let no man glory in anything, because nothing is ours." [Abbreviation as in source; the precise work of Cyprian is not specified in the text.]

105. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 8: "Man has nothing whereof to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ."

106. 1 Cor. 4:7.

107. Collecta liturgica (Roman Rite): "Deus qui omnipotentiam tuam parcendo maxime et miserando manifestas"; and "Deus virtutum cujus est totum quod est optimum."

108. Daily prayer at Prime, Roman Breviary: "Domine Deus Omnipotens, qui ad principium hujus diei nos pervenire fecisti, tua nos hodie salva virtute, ut in hac die ad nullum declinemus peccatum, sed semper ad tuam justitiam faciendam nostrae procedant eloquia, dirigantur cogitationes, operentur opera."

109. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 97–98.

110. Liturgical prayer of St. Basil: "Malos bonos fac, omnia enim potes" ("Make the evil good, for Thou art able to do all things").

111. St. Bernard, *Regula*, ch. 28.

112. The argument against the Molinist-type theory of congruous grace consisting merely in suggestion.

113. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 5; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, Book I, ch. 20.

114. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* (nearly the whole book).

115. The footnote in the printed source at this point (marked *(a)*) reads: "That the efficacy of Divine Grace is derived from the Omnipotence of God is not doubtful from St. Augustine above all. The opinion of all Schools is likewise agreed: that the efficacy

of Divine Grace is to be derived from the Omnipotence of God; for by whatever ultimate reason the efficacy of grace may be represented, what God wills, He certainly effectively brings about, so that movement of the creature is no more from the creature's Omnipotence." [Marginalia from printed edition, rendered as closely as the damaged OCR permits.]

116. Is. 26:12.

117. The propositions cited (X, XI, XXIII, XXIV, XXV) are the condemned Jansenist *Theses* of Quesnel. The text here quotes them verbatim: "X. Nothing can impede or retard the hand of Almighty God. XI. Grace is the operation of the hand of God commanding and doing what He commands. XXIII. God gives us the idea of His grace, signifying it by that through which He signifies it, for life." The present author (Estius/his continuator) argues that the condemned *Theses* in fact present an idea of grace altogether alien to St. Augustine and St. Thomas, not the same; for while they attribute to grace in its working the same power they attribute to the free cooperation of the creature, they simultaneously claim that grace is omnipotent in the manner of creative omnipotence, which no Catholic would grant in this context.

118. Eph. 2 and elsewhere: Scripture's vocabulary of God converting, changing, opening, inclining, and renewing hearts and wills.

119. Is. 19 (God calls the elect "the work of His hands").

120. Jn. 6:44.

121. Liturgical oration of the Church: "ut rebellium etiam voluntates ad se propitius complectat" (that He mercifully bend even rebellious wills to Himself).

122. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II, chs. 8–9, and Book I, ch. 19. The extended quotation: "He is therefore drawn in marvellous ways to will, by Him who knows how to work inwardly in the very hearts of men; not so that men believe against their will, which cannot be, but so that from unwilling they are made willing. God therefore does not draw the unwilling man, but draws him to become willing: He draws him already willing, because by that very drawing He makes him willing from unwilling."

123. Wis. 8:21.

124. Ezek. 36:26.

125. 2 Chr. 30:12.

126. Matt. 19:11.

127. Lk. 1:74–75.

128. 1 Cor. 3:6–7.

129. 2 Tim. 2:25.

130. 2 Cor. 8:16.

131. Acts 11:18.

132. Jas. 1:17.

133. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 12; Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 16.

134. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, final book, final chapter [lib. XXII, cap. ult.]: "Ipsa quoque bona opera nostra ipsius Dei potius intelliguntur esse, quam nostra."

135. St. Augustine, *De continentia*, ch. 13: "opera hominis quae magis dicenda sunt opera Dei. Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis velle et operari." [On the book *De continentia* placed among Augustine's works in Tom. IV of the Antiqua edition, Tom. VI of the most recent edition, see Phil. Labbe, *Distributio de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* in the entry on Augustine; it is also cited by Trithemius and Bede; and Augustine himself in his Epistle to Darius (Ep. CCXXXI, alias CCLXIII), no. VII, acknowledges the book *De continentia*, as also the book *De patientia*, as his own.]

136. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 16: "Quae bona opera in nobis agnoscimus, illius potius esse quam nostra."

137. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 137, on the verse "Despise not the works of Thy hands": "Quaecumque sunt, et ideo tua magis, quam mea sunt"; citing Eph. 2:10.

138. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 14: "quod Deus magis habet in potestate voluntates hominum, quam ipsi suas."

DISTINCTIO XXVIII — ON THE EFFICACY OF GRACE AND FREE WILL (*DE EFFICACIA GRATIAE ET LIBERO ARBITRIO*)

§ 1. [The Synod against Pelagius decreed] that our victory is from God, not from free will. Yet he would not have spoken badly to Pelagius if he had said that our victory is from free will, provided that God only persuades — however congruently He may do so with respect to our will.

The **twenty-fourth** argument is from the love or charity (*dilectio*) of God. For God loves nothing except Himself and His own works, that is, those things of which He is properly the Author. He loves good works, that is, every good action and movement and choice of the will; nor does He love them in a common or ordinary fashion, but as good deeds commanded by Him, for which He wills to render eternal happiness. Therefore all these things are properly the works of God and in no way alien to Him — because God is unable to love anything alien to Himself, but only that which is properly His own.

§ 2. The **twenty-fifth** argument is from the *word* (*dictio*) of God. For God's speaking is making. The Word of God is efficacious with an efficacy properly so called for doing whatever He wills, according to that saying of Ps. 32 and Ps. 148: "He spoke, and they were made."[1] Moreover God speaks in Hos. 2: "I will say to that which is not my people, 'Thou art my people'",[2] — therefore God efficaciously makes of that which is not His people His people, namely by converting evil wills into good ones, in the manner in which He said "Let there be light, and light was made." St. Bernard presses this argument in a Sermon *On Conversion, addressed to Clerks*, treating that verse of Ps. 89[89]:3: "Thou hast said, 'Return, O sons of men.'"[3]

§ 3. The **twenty-sixth** argument is from the *blessing* of God. For to bless is, for God, to do good. Now grace is a blessing, as the Apostle says in Eph. 1: "Blessed be God who hath blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ."[4] Hence also priests, invoking the grace of God upon the people, say in this or a similar form: "May the blessing of the Lord come upon you" — as was also enjoined upon the priests of the Old Testament in Num. 6 to pronounce a blessing upon the people of Israel: "The Lord bless thee."[5] Wherefore, just as God is said to bless the earth when He makes it fruitful, so too does He bestow the blessing of grace upon a man when He efficaciously causes him to work well.

§ 4. The **twenty-seventh** argument is from *prevenient grace*. For prevenient grace would not properly anticipate free will in a good work if it did not move and apply free will to that work by a physical action — that is, an action properly so called — and thus efficaciously. This is the sense of all prevenient grace, because, as has been said by St. Augustine, the mercy of God anticipates us in all things.[6] Concerning this matter we have spoken at greater length in connection with the division of grace into prevenient and subsequent.

§ 5. The **twenty-eighth** argument is from *cooperating grace*. For even the adversaries admit that this grace operates physically. Therefore, by like reasoning, the same must be conceded concerning exciting or prevenient grace — since Scripture, the Fathers, and the prayers of the Church sound similarly concerning both, and

since hitherto all theologians have spoken alike, as regards efficacy, concerning both prevenient and subsequent grace.

§ 6. The **twenty-ninth** argument is from the *predetermination of grace*. For if God through grace predetermines and predefines the will of a man to a good work — as we have shown from St. Thomas and others at dist. 25[7] — He therefore moves the will efficaciously, not merely by persuading, but by physically causing.

§ 7. The **thirtieth** argument is from the fact that grace is said *not to await the will*, as canon 4 of the Council of Orange states.[8] For it would await the will if it moved only in the manner of one who persuades. For every one who persuades awaits the assent of the person whom he persuades.

§ 8. The **thirty-first** argument is from the *discrimination* originally attributed to grace, as the Apostle testifies: "For who distinguisheth thee?" (1 Cor. 4:7). For if grace elicited the assent of the will only morally — that is, in the manner of one who persuades — it would most certainly follow that not God through grace, but man through free will, would originally and primarily distinguish himself. To this belongs what is so often read in St. Augustine and Prosper: that it is inscrutable to us why God draws one man rather than another to Himself through grace.

§ 9. The **thirty-second** argument is from the *absolute and by no means conditional predestination* of God — concerning which we have dealt sufficiently at dist. 41, bk. I.[9] For if, as was there demonstrated at length, God does not predestine a man because He foresees some good movement of his will, but predestines him by an absolute decree whereby He preordains and determines to give to the man every good pertaining to salvation — it is plainly consequent that grace itself, which is the executrix of predestination, is entirely independent of the condition of foreseen human cooperation, and is of itself the efficacious cause of every such cooperation. And it is confirmed from St. Augustine, who says that "to preach divine predestination is nothing other than to preach that God works every good of piety in us."[10]

§ 10. The **thirty-third** argument is from the *reward of works*, that is, heavenly glory. God causes glory by a physical action; therefore He also causes grace — that is, the good works of this life. Which consequence is valid, both because Scripture speaks similarly of each: "He will give grace and glory"[11] — and because God is no less efficaciously and properly the Author of merit than of the reward.[12]

§ 11. The **thirty-fourth** argument is from *spiritual joy*, which ought to be ours only in God and in divine things and works. For just as he who glories should glory in the Lord, so too he who rejoices should rejoice only in the Lord — as the Apostle admonishes in Phil. 4: "Rejoice in the Lord always"[13] — and the same Apostle says in Rom. 14: "The kingdom of God is joy in the Holy Spirit."[14] And the joy of the Saints reigning with Christ is entirely in God and in nothing outside of God. Hence it follows that we are to rejoice in no work or merit — whether our own or another's — except insofar as that work is the work of God, that is, such as has God properly as its Author. Now in every good work joy is to be had; therefore every good work proceeds from God in such a way that nothing in it is properly one's own.[15]

§ 12. The **thirty-fifth** argument is from the *examples of those efficaciously called and converted by God*, such as Matthew, the Sinful Woman, the Good Thief, Peter, and Paul. For setting aside the external aids of Christ calling, receiving, addressing, and looking upon and casting down those mentioned sinners as we read they were applied to them — the calling of all those who come to Christ is similar in its efficacy, and the conversion of all sinners is similar. Now concerning these persons the Fathers — St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St.

Augustine, St. Gregory — speak as though they were drawn efficaciously by God, that is, by a calling that is of itself efficacious; and to signify this St. Jerome employs the comparison of a magnet drawing iron.[16] Therefore the same must be held concerning all others.

§ 13. The **thirty-sixth** argument is from the *example of the Blessed*, concerning whom the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15 that "God will be all in all"[17] — assuredly efficaciously and most properly working all things in them. Now free will does not cease in the Blessed. Nor is anything more to be attributed to the free will of the blessed in respect of good actions than to the free will of the wayfarers; therefore also in this life God works all good things in all with equal efficacy.'[18]

§ 14. The **thirty-seventh** argument is from the *example of Christ*. For it cannot be denied that the Divinity efficaciously operates, and has operated, in the soul of Christ every action, movement, and assent of the will — albeit acting in the most free manner — by efficacious, physical, properly-so-called causality. This is plainly signified by these words of Christ in John ch. 5: "I cannot of myself do anything"[19]; ch. 8: "Of myself I do nothing",[20]; and again: "If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing",[21]; and ch. 14: "The Father who abideth in me, He doeth the works",[22]; and ch. 17: "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do."[23] Now surely if anyone were to say that the Divinity, and the very Word of God, operates only persuasively upon the movement of the human will in Christ, he would seem not sufficiently to depart from Nestorius, who divided Christ into two persons — as we have shown more fully when we were treating of gratuitous predestination. Now if the matter stands thus in Christ, therefore also in us. And if that efficacious operation of the Divinity does not exclude freedom from the human will of Christ, neither does it exclude it from ours. This argument from the example of the Son of God is employed by Franco,[24] and, before him, by St. Augustine, Tract. 105 on John, on that text "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do": "He says not 'thou commandedst,' but 'thou gavest,' where evident grace is commended. For what hath he not received, even in the Only-begotten, the human nature? Did he not receive that he should do nothing evil but all things good, when he was taken into the unity of the person by the Word, by whom all things were made?",[25] Similarly, this was required by the virtue of most perfect humility in Christ, so that Christ might refer all good things to the Divinity as their Author.

§ 15. The **thirty-eighth** argument is from the *merit of Christ*. For Christ merited for us every salvific good to be given by the Father without any exception, as is taught at bk. III, dist. 18.[26] Now among salvific goods, movements, assents, and the choice of the will in a good work hold the principal place — for in these, good works principally consist. Therefore not only persuasion is from God, but that very thing which is persuaded proceeds equally and perfectly from God as Author. Hence the Church does not hesitate to hold that this whole matter must be sought from God through the merit of Christ, since she concludes all her prayers with this clause: *per Christum Dominum nostrum* ("through Christ our Lord").

§ 16. The **thirty-ninth** argument is from the *difficulty of understanding the concord of grace and free will*. For all the Fathers who have disputed concerning grace and free will acknowledge this difficulty. And above all St. Augustine does so in very many places — as in lib. II *contra litteras Petiliani*, ch. 48; *de gratia Christi*, ch. 24 and 47; lib. IV *contra Julianum*, ch. 8; lib. II *de peccatorum meritis*, ch. 18; *de praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 8 and 20; and Epist. 46 and 47.[27] Yet it is not difficult to understand how grace consents with free will, if the efficacy of grace is to be constituted in the assent and cooperation of free will — or, as others prefer, in that persuasion by which God so moves free will as He foresees it will follow. For in these modes the parts of free will, as distinct from the office of grace — namely, to assent, to follow, to acquiesce, to cooperate with grace,

while it pertains to grace to excite and to persuade — are very easily and even by mediocre intellects discerned. Yet the judgment of the Fathers, and especially of St. Augustine, is not to be reconciled with grace and free will in these modes; nor is the efficacy of grace to be explained in these ways: but in that mode which we have by now established by so many arguments. For this mode is the one — and no other — which the Adversaries have repeatedly attacked as utterly difficult to understand, crying out again and again that they cannot understand it; when by the way of simple faith they ought to procure for themselves the path to understanding, as Dominicus Bannes rightly admonishes.[28]

§ 17. The **fortieth** — and at the same time the most efficacious — argument is that which is drawn from the *universal operation of God as the First Mover and Supreme Cause* with respect to all effects and all movements proceeding from whatever secondary causes. For God does not in the whole of creation produce some effects by physical causality and others by moral causality; but He produces all effects whatsoever in the most perfect mode of causality — that is, as a principal cause and the first to operate, whether He operate through natural or through free secondary causes. Since, therefore, under the universal operation of God there is contained the operation of His grace through Christ — by which, that is, He works in us those things that pertain to the salvation of eternal life — it is manifest that even that operation is, according to the aforesaid most perfect mode of causing, efficacious with respect to all its effects. This argument is indicated by Fulgentius in the last section of *De incarnatione et gratia Christi*.[29] It rests upon the Scriptures which say that God works all things in all; that we are, live, and are moved in God; and that all things are from Him, through Him, and in Him. Hence the Church places her order of being and living according to God in this, that she prays: "who without thee cannot be, that we may be able to live according to thee."[30]

Moreover, this general argument embraces many special ones, no less valid for demonstrating the matter at hand: namely those which are drawn from the unity of the principle of grace, from the truth and property of the efficient cause, from the will of God's good pleasure which is rather an absolute will, from His universal and perfect dominion, from the perfect dependence of the creature on God, from the true and proper formal character (*ratio*) of instrument competent to created free will with respect to God, and others of like kind, the explanation of which we pass over for the sake of brevity.

§ 18. Now let those writings which St. Augustine sets forth in Epist. 105 to Sixtus, in *Enchiridion* ch. 95, 96, and 98; lib. IV *contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 6; *de praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 20; *de dono perseverantiae*, the two last chapters; *de Gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 14 and 16; and Homil. 44 in the volume of fifty Homilies[31] — let all these be consulted for this whole doctrine, which concerns the efficacy of the grace of God. Let also Prosper, *de Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 14 and the four following; and lib. II, ch. 33; likewise the Commentary on Ps. 147; and the poem *de Ingratis*, ch. 15; and *contra Collatorem*, ch. 6[32] — be consulted. In these places the following and similar things are taught: that the grace of God suffers no delay on account of our behaviour, and nothing can resist it so that it should fail to fulfil what it wills; and that it itself brings its own work to completion; and that there are no crimes so detestable that they can drive away the grace of Christ, just as there are no works so excellent that they can call it to themselves.

§ 19. Finally, this doctrine is manifestly transmitted by the Fathers of the Council of Orange (can. 3, 4, 6, and several following)[33]; by Pope Hormisdas in his Epistle to Possessor: "Concerning grace," he says, "and free will, which the Roman — that is, the Catholic — Church follows and keeps: let it be learned from various books of Blessed Augustine and above all from the letter to Hilarus and Prosper" (these are *de*

Praedestinatione Sanctorum and *de dono perseverantiae*), "yet expressed in the ecclesiastical chapters it is to be recognized."[34] These are the chapters of the Epistle of Pope Celestine.'[35]

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§ 20. Such are our thoughts on the matter. We acknowledge our own mediocrity; it is enough that, so as not to fail in our duty, we as a novice theologian here exhibit to him — provided he attend — those things which are themselves most likely to deter him from rash error, so long as he takes heed, those things which sufficiently bear upon the matter. To come, therefore, to the point: there are certain things to be briefly noted about the great gulf that lies between Quesnell and St. Thomas. Operating grace — both in this very section and elsewhere — the Author [i.e., Quesnell] named together with St. Augustine and St. Thomas more than once; following those aforementioned Doctors, he also named the Councils and the Church itself, which most frequently preaches to its children Faith, Hope, Charity, Penance, and all gifts of that kind as goods of God, as things coming from God into men through God's own operation, as coming from His bounty, to be believed by us wholesomely — as is most clearly established from those things which the Author transmits. Quesnell appears to have taught the same under expressions bearing the appearance of piety in a great number of his theses; certain words from those theses we shall relegate to the end of this note. Such theses are especially: II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXV.[36]

§ 21. In what, therefore, do the Thomistic doctrine and the system of the Jansenians differ? The Thomists, following St. Thomas, assert Grace as operating in such a way that they do not take away the operative power from human free will (*liberum arbitrium*): for they are mindful both of the definitions of the ancient Churches of St. Thomas's disciples and above all of the definition of the Council of Trent.[37] There, the Sacred Synod clearly defines that the free will of man, moved and aroused by God, is able to dissent, if it so wills, while cooperating by assenting to God who moves and arouses it. It is indeed heretical, and most frequently anathematized by the Church, that false dogma which asserts that human will is driven, not driving, in cooperation with Divine Grace: a dogma, I say, exploded from the very beginning of the Church by the holy Fathers, and refuted and confounded most especially by St. Augustine against the Manicheans — not once, and not in a single work — but rejected in many works, and especially in his books *De Duabus Animabus* and *Contra Adimantum*.[38] St. Thomas therefore, retaining this dogma as defined by the Church, in infinitely many passages near at hand insinuates, and teaches, and most vehemently defends it — indeed demonstrates — that God so operates in all things as to work (*operari*), that is, to act upon, to give and preserve the virtue of operating to all things, and at length to apply [them] to action; by which name is understood the Thomistic Premotion (*Praemotio Thomistica*), or efficacious Grace in the supernatural order in the Thomistic sense.

§ 22. In accordance with this truth, our Author above[39] most clearly proved that the free will of man is not a mere passive recipient to good; and that the idea of human freedom cannot be conceived otherwise than as freedom from necessity is conceived; which freedom he demonstrated with great force of argument as being not in the least impeded by the operation of Grace — just as in § 14 he defended from the foreknowledge of God that the same freedom is not in the least impeded — in which passage he cited several places of St. Thomas: both from the *Summa Theologiae*, and from the *Summa contra Gentiles*, and from the Disputed Questions, and from the *Compendium of Theology*, and from the Commentary on the Book of the Sentences.[40] To these it is permitted to add the most apt text of St. Thomas (from q. 3, *De Potentia*, art. 7),[41] whose

doctrine in that article he repeats and confirms in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, art. 5,[42] with words changed a little. St. Thomas in that article asks: "Whether God operates in the operation of Nature" — which title of the article he expresses in the *Summa* at the aforementioned place thus: "Whether God operates in every operating thing." The conclusion of St. Thomas in the former place, *De Potentia*, is of this kind: "Since there is a necessary order of all things, and God Himself is not uselessly engaged, God does not operate every operation but is said to operate by preserving." He then expounds his assertion, saying that God operates, not in one mode alone, in every operating thing, but operates by giving the virtue of operating, and likewise by preserving the same.

§ 23. The Doctor had indeed already established in the same article that God so operates in every natural thing as that the thing itself, even operating, is operated upon — which is said of the will also. Hence St. Thomas does not say that it is thus so that the natural power (*Ars naturalis*) operates of itself, but because — and here progressing in his explanation he adds the points mentioned above — "In a third mode," he says, "it is said that one thing is the cause of the action of another, in so far as it moves it to act; in which is understood not the conferral or preservation of an active power, but man is the cause of the cutting of the knife from the very fact that he applies it by moving it" — and, after a few words, he thus concludes: "it follows, with respect to the operation of any natural thing, that God as mover and applier of the virtue to action is the cause of the action of any natural thing whatsoever." Applying this general doctrine to the operation of Grace most clearly, St. Thomas extends it in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, through nearly all the articles, especially arts. 2, 4, and 9.[43] From this position of St. Thomas it follows most manifestly, from the sentence of the same Holy Doctor, that efficacious Grace, which operates the act, presupposes the virtue of acting, namely the proximate and complete potency (*potentia*) for acting; that is, the will already capable of acting with respect to those things to which it is to act, which things the human being in the state of St. Thomas's sentence is able to do if, from the Divine Grace giving the ability to act (for we speak indeed of acts ordered to eternal life), he is obliged to do the commands of the Law. Accordingly, it follows beyond this that efficacious Grace, which gives the act according to the principles of St. Thomas, necessarily prerequires sufficient Grace, and indeed as something less efficacious: for if at some point the efficacious were supposed, the virtue of the acting agent would already be applied and efficacious; but were it not applied, because according to St. Thomas the Divine motion applying is required beyond that possibility, then the Divine motion applying would be required. That this is openly contradictory, who does not see?

§ 24. Meanwhile we have indicated in a sense another principle in which the sentiment of the School of the Thomists differs from the Jansenian system: namely, that the School of St. Thomas embraces wholeheartedly the ancient doctrine of the holy Fathers and likewise the doctrine of the Church concerning Grace in Christ — medicinal, efficacious, and sufficient — and indeed sufficient interior Grace, and not merely that which is exterior in doctrine, that is placed in external vocation, by which God calls all to himself through the significance of external signs and the like. This doctrine of sufficient Grace the Thomists have derived from the Angelic Teacher (*Angelico Praceptore*), both elsewhere and especially in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 13, art. 2, ad 2, and q. 106, art. 2, ad 2,[44] in which passages, transmitting the idea of sufficient Grace, he says: "if anyone after having received the Grace of the New Testament has sinned, he is worthy of greater punishment, as being ungrateful toward greater benefits, *and toward the aid given to him and not used*." "The New Law works wrath, because as far as it is of itself, it is sufficient not to sin." Let Ludovicus Montaltius now go forth (whose true name modesty bids us be silent) and deride the Dominicans as departing from the teaching of the ancient Doctors of their own order, and imposing a name of sufficient Grace: for certainly the

Dominicans preach that sufficient Grace which is asserted in the definitions of the Church and explained by St. Thomas — as they find it. The same doctrine of sufficient Grace is to be read in St. Augustine, being indicated, asserted, explained and defended in innumerably many passages by that same Holy Doctor, especially in his book *De Gratia Christi* and in the book *De Correptione et Gratia*.[45] The texts of St. Augustine are cited, praised, and transcribed by all the authors who contend against the Jansenians; and most especially in my opinion from all the writings of St. Augustine — before baptism, and after his presbyterate, and from his episcopate, and after the arising of the Pelagian heresy — these texts are praised, transcribed, compared, and expounded by the Most Illustrious Bishops, of Luçon and of La Rochelle, in their Pastoral Document, Part 2, against Jansenius and Quesnell's positions exhibited to their flocks, printed at Lucca in the year 1714.[46] For St. Augustine most frequently commemorates the Grace of possibility (*gratia possibilitatis*), and the *auxilium sine quo* [aid without which], which he places in opposition to the *auxilium quo* [aid by which]; not indeed in that sense which Jansen invented — whose invention we noted above as having been exploded by everyone — since the Holy Doctor in either state of Nature, both in the state of integrity and in that of fallen nature, adduces both the *auxilium sine quo* and the *auxilium quo*, and acknowledges them: for thus the Doctor adduces the *auxilium quo* for the state of integral nature, so far is he from excluding it, that he does not fail to assert the *auxilium quo* more than once.

§ 25. By the name of sufficient Grace the Thomists understand that by which a man has the ready faculty so that he can carry out the good, nor does anything else fail him besides the will: just as food is called sufficient for one who is about to eat, beyond which nothing else is required, but only the expectation of the man who is to eat, namely the will. But efficacious Grace they say is that, as the Thomists declare, which applies the will to the work and the work unfolds from the will: which Grace is therefore given so that above all the hardness of the heart may be removed, by which there operates in us God willing and working; that is, it causes us to operate, by which God Himself at length both prepares the human will and assists the prepared — which is therefore called in the sense of the Fathers unconquerable, invincible, triumphant; which nevertheless does not deprive freedom but perfects it; which renders the will more interior — since indeed the human will can dissent, if it wills, in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*). The Thomists do not deny that certain actual interior graces illuminate the mind and incite men to conversion, which in a certain mode can be said to be efficacious; yet with respect to the principal effect of conversion — namely perfectly sufficient forces for ejecting conversion — they assert these interior Graces to be only of that kind: namely sufficient forces for effecting conversion given by those interior Graces, and thus through them a man could convert himself; and yet those interior Graces do not efficiently bring conversion upon them, whence, neither is a man who is able to convert through them able to convert himself in the converting, unless he wills it. Thus[47] it is to be understood that God operates in every natural thing, in as much as the very nature operating, or God operating with the will operating: progressing in his explanation, after the first and second mode of operating have been set forth, the third mode is already set down — that one thing is the cause of the action of another, in so far as it moves it to act; in which is understood not the conferral or preservation of an active virtue, but man is the cause of the cutting of the knife from the very fact that he applies it, by moving it: and after a few words he concludes thus: "it follows with respect to the operation of anything natural whatsoever, that God as moving and applying the virtue to action" — applying this general doctrine to the operation of Grace most clearly through individual articles, especially arts. 2, 4, 9.[48]

§ 26. From this position of St. Thomas it manifestly follows from the sentence of the same Holy Doctor that efficacious Grace, which operates the act, presupposes the virtue of acting, namely the proximate and

complete potency for acting; that is, the will already capable of acting in respect of those things to which the Divine motion applies it. There are, therefore, in the sentence of St. Thomas, possible for a man the precepts of the Law when, namely, they urge, and when from some Divine Grace giving the power to act (for we speak indeed of observance of the precepts with an order to Eternal Life) it follows beyond this that efficacious Grace, which gives the act according to the principles of St. Thomas, necessarily prerequires sufficient Grace, and indeed merely sufficient: for if it were at some point efficacious, the virtue of the acting agent would already be supposed as applied and efficacious; but were it not applied, because according to St. Thomas the Divine motion applying is required beyond that possibility — the Divine motion applying is required. Who does not see this to be openly contradictory? Meanwhile we have indicated in a sense another principle in which the sentiment of the School of the Thomists differs from the Jansenian system.

§ 27. Namely, the School of St. Thomas embraces wholeheartedly the ancient doctrine of the holy Fathers, and indeed of the Church itself, concerning the Grace of Christ — medicinal, efficacious, and sufficient — and indeed sufficient interior Grace, not merely the exterior kind placed in doctrine, nor that in exterior vocation by which God calls all to himself through the significance of external signs and the like warnings. This doctrine of sufficient Grace the Thomists have derived from the Angelic Teacher, both elsewhere and especially in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 13, art. 2, ad 2, and q. 106, art. 2, ad 2,[44] in which passages, transmitting the idea of sufficient Grace: "if anyone," he says, "after having received the Grace of the New Testament has sinned, he is worthy of greater punishment, as being ungrateful toward greater benefits, *and toward the aid given to him and not used*." "The New Law works wrath, because as far as it is of itself, it is sufficient not to sin." Let Ludovicus Montaltius now go forth (whose true name modesty bids be silent) and deride the new Dominicans, as departing from the teaching of the ancient Doctors of their own order, and imposing the name of sufficient Grace upon the ignorant populace: for certainly the Dominicans preach that sufficient Grace which is asserted in the definitions of the Church and explained by St. Thomas — as they find when they examine it. That same doctrine of sufficient Grace is to be read in St. Augustine, being indicated in innumerably many passages by the same Holy Doctor, asserted, explained, and defended, especially in the book *De Gratia Christi* and in the book *De Correptione et Gratia*.[45] The texts of St. Augustine are cited and praised and transcribed by all the authors who contend against the Jansenians; and most especially in my opinion from all the writings of St. Augustine — before baptism, and after the presbyterate, and from the episcopate, and after the arising of the Pelagian heresy — these texts are praised, transcribed, compared, and expounded by the Most Illustrious Bishops, of Luçon and of La Rochelle, in their Pastoral Document, Part 2, against Jansenius's and Quesnell's positions exhibited to their flocks, printed at Lucca in the year 1714.[46] St. Augustine most frequently commemorates the Grace of possibility and the *auxilium sine quo* [aid without which], which he opposes to the *auxilium quo* [aid by which]; not indeed in that sense which Jansen invented — whose invention we noted above as having been exploded by everyone — since the Holy Doctor in either state of Nature, both the state of integrity and the fallen state, adduces both the *auxilium sine quo* and the *auxilium quo*; for thus the Doctor adduces the *auxilium quo* for the state of integral nature, so far is he from excluding it, that he does not fail to assert the *auxilium quo* more than once.

§ 28. By the name of sufficient Grace the Thomists understand that by which a man has the ready faculty so that he can carry out the good, nor does anything else fail him besides the will: just as food is called sufficient for one who is about to eat, beyond which nothing else is required, but only the expectation of the man who is to eat, namely the will. But efficacious Grace they say is that, as the Thomists declare, which applies the will to the work, and the work unfolds from the will: which Grace is therefore given so that above

all the hardness of the heart may be removed by it, by which there operates in us God willing and working; that is, it causes us to work (*operemur*), by which God Himself at length both prepares the human will for assistance and assists the prepared — which Grace is therefore called in the sense of the Fathers unconquerable, invincible, triumphant; which nevertheless does not deprive freedom but perfects it; which renders the will more interior — since indeed human will can dissent, if it wills, in the divided sense. The Thomists do not deny that certain actual interior graces illuminate the mind and lead men to conversion, which can in a certain mode be said to be efficacious; yet with respect to the principal effect of conversion — namely perfectly sufficient forces for effecting conversion — they assert these interior Graces to be only of that kind: namely they are sufficient forces for effecting conversion given by those interior Graces, and thus through them the man could convert himself; and yet those interior Graces do not efficiently bring conversion upon them — whence neither is a man who is able to convert himself through them able to convert in the converting, unless he wills it. No conversion itself is caused by them, so that the converting man is able to convert himself.[49]

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1. Ps. 32[33]:9 and Ps. 148:5: "He spoke, and they were made" (*Ipse dixit et facta sunt*).
2. Hos. 2:24 (Vulgate): "I will say to that which is not my people, 'Thou art my people'" (*Dicam non populo meo, populus meus es tu*).
3. St. Bernard, Sermon *De Conversione ad Clericos*, treating Ps. 89[90]:3.
4. Eph. 1:3: "Blessed be God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places, in Christ" (*Benedictus Deus qui benedixit nos in omni benedictione spirituali, in caelestibus in Christo*).
5. Num. 6:24: "The Lord bless thee" (*Benedicat tibi Dominus*).
6. St. Augustine, on the mercy of God preventing us in all things; cf. the division of grace into prevenient and subsequent, discussed above.
7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* (as referenced); also Estius, commentary at Dist. 25.
8. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II, 529), canon 4.
9. Estius, commentary at Dist. 41, bk. I, §1.
10. St. Augustine (source indicated in text as supporting the thirty-second argument): "to preach divine predestination is nothing other than to preach that God works every good of piety in us."
11. Ps. 83[84]:12: "He will give grace and glory" (*Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus*).
12. Footnote (a) in the source: The author speaks here of formal beatitude, not objective beatitude — that is, of that beatitude which, on the part of the intellect of the Blessed, the Thomists commonly maintain is produced efficiently by the intellect of the Blessed, and to which the Blessed bears itself not merely passively — as against the Nominalists, who reject the singular opinion, attributed to Henry of Ghent, asserting that formal beatitude consists in a certain special inpouring of God into the soul, through whose inpouring the soul is as it were substantially sanctified and in some manner transformed into God. With this common Thomistic position therefore as the premise, behold the Author's argument: just as the Blessed Soul does not bear itself merely passively, like something inanimate, in relation to the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) — by which the school of St. Thomas teaches it is constituted in beatitude, since it is a vital act elicited by the living soul and in the manner of a living thing, as the Council of Trent (Session 1, ch. 4) states — a man does not bear himself merely passively toward the acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition by which he is prepared for justification, but actively is required for those acts; likewise, the divine premotive action, or premotion (*praemotio*) of God, is required for the beatitude of man: therefore, for good works of this life, which proceed from human will actively though freely, there is prerequisite a physical grace applying the power, so that it operate here and now. These matters, and other things that precede and follow them, we wish to note, so that it may be clearly evident that

our Author's doctrine in this matter of grace — that is, the Thomistic doctrine — has nothing in common with the tenets of the Bajanists, Jansenians, and Quesnellians.

13. Phil. 4:4: "Rejoice in the Lord always" (*Gaudete in Domino semper*).

14. Rom. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is joy in the Holy Spirit" (*Regnum Dei est gaudium in Spiritu Sancto*).

15. Footnote (b) in the source: The Author is consistent with his principles; he had taught at Dist. 7, §§7–8, that free will remains in the Blessed in relation to any good things, even whatever they do by God's command; he taught at the same place that they do these things by command. For the Blessed have the same freedom of choice (*libertas electionis*) with respect to those things which have no necessary connexion with the love of God as they are free — and yet God works all things in them through His Divine assistance or movement, as St. Thomas clearly teaches (qu. 109, art. 9 ad 1): therefore the good works of the glory of wayfarers, though free, nothing prevents us from saying that God works them in them through His own work, as below. Furthermore, we do not doubt that the Blessed are necessarily — as regards the necessity both of specification and of exercise — carried, as far as concerns the status of beatitude itself, in the love of God clearly seen, or of the Divine Goodness and His necessary perfections — in the manner that Thomists commonly teach concerning the beatific love of Christ; but of these things it is sufficient to have said thus much, the rest to be noted below.

16. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Gregory on the efficacious calling of Matthew, the Sinful Woman, the Good Thief, Peter, and Paul; St. Jerome uses the comparison of a magnet drawing iron to signify a calling efficacious of itself.

17. 1 Cor. 15:28: "God will be all in all" (*erit illis Deus omnia in omnibus*).

18. Footnote (b) in the source (continuation): The Author is consistent with his principles: he had taught at Dist. 7, §§7 and 8, that free will remains in the Blessed regarding any good things, even whatever they do by God's command; he there taught them to do these things from God's command. The Blessed have the same freedom; yet God works all things in them through His Divine assistance or movement, as St. Thomas clearly teaches (*qu*. 109, *art*. 9, *ad* 1): therefore the good works of the glory of wayfarers, though free, nothing prevents us from saying that God works them; as below. Furthermore, we do not doubt that the Blessed are necessarily, by necessity both of specification and of exercise, as far as it is from the side of the state of beatitude, carried into love of God clearly seen, or of Divine Goodness and His necessary perfections, as the Thomists commonly teach concerning the beatific love of Christ; but of this it is enough to have said thus much; the rest to be noted below.

19. Jn. 5:30: "I cannot of myself do anything" (*Non possum ego a me ipso facere quicquam*).

20. Jn. 8:28: "Of myself I do nothing" (*A me ipso facio nihil*).

21. Jn. 8:54: "If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing" (*Si ego glorifico meipsum, gloria mea nihil est*).

22. Jn. 14:10: "The Father who abideth in me, He doeth the works" (*Pater in me manens, ipse facit opera*).

23. Jn. 17:4: "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do" (*Opus consummavi quod dedisti mihi ut faciam*).

24. Franco, *De gratia Dei*, tome 10.

25. St. Augustine, Tract. 105 *in Joannem*, on the text "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do." The passage is also indicated in the source with the note: "Bartholomaeus Medina expressly transmits this opinion in *primam secundae* (qu. 4, art. 3) in the reply to the argument of the second doubt §. *Tertio*, as it is to be said that the rest and not a few other theologians do not seem to depart from it and silently transmit it." St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 4, art. 3, reply to obj. 3, seems in the Blessed to recognize at least from supposition the necessity, or the necessary connexion with the love of God, of free things; but the locus of St. Thomas, as one who looks more carefully will see, the holy Doctor has rather transmitted the contrary opinion. But in these matters the argument is formed by our Author thus: the Blessed with respect to those things which they say have no necessary connexion with the love of God are free; and yet God works all things in them through His Divine assistance or movement, as St. Thomas clearly teaches (*qu*. 109, *art*. 9, *ad* 1): therefore the good works of the glory of wayfarers, though free and actively proceeding from human will, nothing prevents our saying that God works them in them through His own motion; and the auxiliary works in that sense, as below.

26. Estius, commentary at bk. III, Dist. 18.

27. St. Augustine: lib. II *contra litteras Petiliani*, ch. 48; *de gratia Christi*, ch. 24 and 47; lib. IV *contra Julianum*, ch. 8; lib. II *de peccatorum meritis*, ch. 18; *de praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 8 and 20; Epist. 46 and 47 (or, in newer editions, Epist. CCXIV and CCXV).

28. Dominicus Bannes, cited here in support of the Thomistic mode of grace.

29. Fulgentius, *De incarnatione et gratia Christi*, final section.

30. Church prayer: "who without thee cannot be, that we may be able to live according to thee" (*ut qui sine te esse non possumus, secundum te vivere valeamus*).

31. St. Augustine: Epist. 105 (or CXC in the newer edition) to Sixtus; *Enchiridion*, ch. 95, 96, and 98; lib. IV *contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 6; *de praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 20; *de dono perseverantiae*, two last chapters; *de Gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 14 and 16; Homil. 44 (or Serm. CCXC among the Sermons of the Third Class in the same edition) in the volume of fifty Homilies.

32. Prosper of Aquitaine: *de Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 14 and the four following; lib. II, ch. 33; Commentary on Ps. 147; poem *de Ingratis*, ch. 15; *contra Collatorem*, ch. 6.

33. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II, 529), canons 3, 4, 6, and several following.

34. Pope Hormisdas, Epistle to Possessor, on grace and free will.

35. Footnote (c) in the source: We are compelled, willing or unwilling, to force upon the unwilling what is, so to speak, a reheated dish (*crambem recoquere*). We have noted that the efficacy of grace in the Jansenian sense is entirely contrary to the efficacy of that same grace in the Thomistic sense; and those things which are here collected together into one, noted at the side, had already been noted above. But the true gravity of the matter, and the condition of the times, as much as possible demands — so that the Thomistic doctrine may everywhere, whenever occasion offers, be stated more clearly and explicitly — and it is permitted to speak thus, so as to change minds. For Quesnell, a man otherwise learned and clever, fashioned his theses or Moral Reflections on the New Testament in such a way as could easily deceive the less cautious and those unfamiliar with the Thomistic doctrine, employing terms to fashion his assertions which would reflect well upon themselves; thus he thought he had taken good counsel for himself. For to one objecting error or falsehood he would reply: the Apostolic See has used its own right to condemn whichever sort of faithful it willed — Quesnellian, in the matter above all of grace, so greatly demonstrated, accepted, commended by the highest presidents of the Church themselves, and deviating. The followers of Quesnell proceed by prejudices and party zeal to cry out against the censure of the First See, and do not cease to maintain that in Quesnell the Augustino-Thomistic doctrine has been condemned. His Holiness Our Lord Clement XI appeared, and clearly testified to the whole Church that the Thomistic doctrine — and above all the contingent grace of Jesus Christ — is entirely among those things in which he condemns the rebellious. The rest, according to their duty, so that they might satisfy the expostulations, grumble in opposition, the Quesnellian supporters. What therefore — we judge that those men will achieve what they plan, and that our labor will profit only so much as that...

36. The author refers to the numbered Theses or Moral Reflections of Quesnell on the New Testament, of which theses II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXV are here specifically identified.

37. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 4 (*Concilium Tridentinum*, sess. 6, can. 4).

38. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus* and *Contra Adimantum*.

39. Above, at Dist. 24, through several questions (*ad Distinct. 24, per plures quaestiones*).

40. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*; *Summa contra Gentiles*; Disputed Questions (*Quaestiones Disputatae*); *Compendium Theologiae*; Commentary on the Book of the Sentences (*Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum*).

41. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 7.

42. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, art. 5.

43. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, arts. 2, 4, and 9.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 13, art. 2, ad 2; and q. 106, art. 2, ad 2.

45. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*; and *De Correptione et Gratia*.

46. Most Illustrious Bishops of Luçon (*Lucionensis*) and La Rochelle (*Ruppellensis*), Pastoral Document (*Documentum Pastorale*), Part 2, against Jansenius and Quesnell, printed at Lucca, 1714.

47. Here the text resumes the exposition of St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 7, as above, applying it to the operation of Grace.

48. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, especially arts. 2, 4, and 9.

49. The conclusion here refers to the last pages of the printed text (pp. 229–230 of the source), which describe the Thomistic teaching on the distinction between sufficient and efficacious Grace and the manner in which the latter does not destroy human freedom.

DISTINCTIO XXIX — THAT INTEGRAL MAN STOOD IN NEED OF OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE (*HOMINEM INTEGRUM EGUISSE GRATIA OPERANTE ET COOPERANTE*)

§ I — That integral man stood in need of operating and co-operating grace (Hominem integrum eguisse gratia operante et cooperante)

§ 1. The matters treated by the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard] in this distinction are clear from what we have commented above (around distinctions 24 and 25) concerning the grace of the first man in which he was created, and concerning the additional assistance which was given to him for the continuation of grace.[1]

Now we wish here to raise the question concerning the formal character (*ratio*) by which grace is efficacious — provided that each position be understood in its own sense. Our sole concern is to vindicate the position of the Author [i.e. Peter Lombard] and of the Thomists from the calumnies of Jansenius and the Jansenians, and to set before the eyes of readers how far the system of Jansenius differs from the doctrine of St. Thomas and the Thomists. Jansenius and Quesnel, then, travel a path that is in all respects contrary: for the state of fallen nature (*status Naturae lapsae*) they entirely banish [the auxiliary]; for the state of integral nature they are content with that one and the same auxiliary, departing from the opinion of St. Thomas and the Thomists; for the indifference of the creature moved by the first mover toward action, they thrust upon the Church an efficacious grace unknown to her, by which human freedom is ruined and the Stoic and even Manichaean dogmas concerning fatal necessity are imported. They affirm in various places that precepts are laid upon men which are for those same men impossible, and that the strength to keep those same precepts is everywhere lacking. They establish the will of the grace of Jesus Christ as supreme — under the name of which they understand the one stripped of its own power — enervated, impotent, indeed inanimate toward any good works; and they place freedom in some remotely situated unknown, in the very essence of rational Nature, which even the Manichaeans themselves acknowledged — contending that it suffices for works worthy of praise and blame. The passages of Jansenius — cited, as they are, in the appendix added to this book, together with the other concatenations of his dogma expounded and confirmed by himself — we pass over, so as not to insert them here for praise and citation at length. In that Appendix we shall present, God aiding, the idea of the entire Jansenian system together with the opposing Thomistic doctrine set out in view.

Surely indeed Quesnel presents the same doctrine of Jansenius in the condemned Theses, as anyone who carefully weighs the words of those theses can easily see. The second of the fabricated Theses reads as follows: "The grace of Jesus Christ is the efficacious principle of every good of whatever kind; without it not only is nothing done, but nothing can even be attempted." The fifth: "When God does not soften the heart through

the interior unction of His grace, exhortations and exterior graces serve for nothing save to harden it further." The sixth, seventh, and eighth theses, which taste of the same error, in which he strives to distinguish between the Jewish and Christian covenants, endeavoring to establish for the Christian covenant a grace that so operates as to take away all freedom, and for the same new covenant acknowledges no sufficient grace; and in the old covenant asserts that no grace was present among the Jews, and consequently banishes all grace from the Jews — the words of which propositions we omit, lest we be too prolix. The ninth thesis, moreover, is as follows: "The grace of Jesus Christ is the supreme grace, without which we can never confess Christ, and with which we never deny Him." The same wicked dogma concerning freedom taken away in the state of fallen nature most clearly set forth refer theses X and XI — the words of which we have already transcribed above. Likewise theses XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, and of all most manifestly XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, and XXV. The first of these, namely XXIX, reads: "The grace of God is nothing other than His omnipotent will: this is the idea which God Himself delivers to us in all His Scriptures." The second: "The true idea of grace is that God wills that He be obeyed by us, and He is obeyed, and commands, and all things come to pass, and He speaks as Lord, and all things are subject to Him." The third: "The grace of Jesus Christ is a grace strong and powerful as the will of the omnipotent, the rule and imitation of the operation of God incarnating and raising His Son." The fourth: "The harmony of the omnipotent operation of God with the free consent of His will is demonstrated to us at once in the Incarnation as in the source and archetype of all other operations of mercy; and all graces are thus gratuitous and thus dependent on God, just as the original operation itself." The fifth, namely XXIII, the words of which we have already reproduced above. The sixth, namely XXIV, is expressed in these words: "The just idea which the Centurion holds concerning the omnipotence of God and of Jesus Christ in healing bodies — that by the sole motion of His will He commands them and they obey — is the estimate of the idea which must be held concerning His supreme power in healing souls from concupiscence." The last of those cited, namely XXV, reads: "God illumines the soul and heals it, just as He governs a body by the sole motion of His will; He commands and it obeys." In these theses, however, nothing other than the efficacious grace of Jesus Christ is proclaimed, and grace that is efficacious after such a manner that the cooperation of human freedom is entirely denied, or the blind are seen to defile it.[2]

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§ I (continued) — That every man is born subject to original sin (Omnem hominem nasci peccato originali obnoxium)

§ 2. The doctrine concerning original sin (*peccatum originale*) St. Augustine calls the foundation of the Christian religion.[4] Likewise the same Doctor in his book *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* (ch. 22) indicated it in approximately these words: "Of all things that a man possesses, the most troublesome and most grievous is the body on account of the ancient sin; whence nothing is so evident to proclaim openly, nothing so secret to understand inwardly." Concerning this sin, therefore, above all things it must be held with certain faith that it exists, and that every man who is conceived by the ordinary law of generation is born subject to it. This doctrine is so certain that the faith of the Incarnation and of the grace of Christ rests on this same foundation as its most firm basis. For the Son of God took on human flesh and willed to suffer in it, in order that He might free humankind from the servitude of sin in which it had been held through the transgression of the first parent. Hence it came about that long ago the Church experienced, in the same persons, adversaries of

both dogmas — namely both concerning the grace of Christ and concerning original sin — to wit, the Pelagians. Who, while striving to defend the integrity of human nature, endeavored at the same time to evacuate the grace of Christ.

§ 3. Moreover, the first proof of this dogma is from Sacred Scripture, in which the most evident testimony is that of the Apostle Paul in Rom. 5: "Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so death passed through to all men, in whom all sinned." And afterwards: "For just as through the disobedience of one man the many were constituted sinners."[5] These sentences of the Apostle concerning the transmission of sin by propagation — as Catholics understand them — and not by imitation, as the Pelagians understand them, must be held, as is shown in many ways. First, because sin passed through Adam in the same manner as justice passes through Christ, as the Apostle teaches in the same place. But Christ constituted the just not by example alone but rather above all by the hidden inspiration of the grace of the Spirit — as St. Augustine says — "according to occult assimilation of nature." Then, imitation properly speaking is not of just any similar thing (for in that case Adam would in turn be said to have imitated his own posterity; and any sinner whatsoever would be said to have imitated any other, whether a contemporary or one who came before, however entirely unknown to him) but only of that thing which someone has come to know and has proposed to himself to express and fashion in himself by his own act. Therefore, since there are and have been very many among the posterity of Adam for whom nothing whatsoever has been heard and nothing at all is known concerning the first man and his transgression, it would follow that in their regard, even if they were very grave sinners, sin had not passed through the first man — contrary to the authority of the universal sentence of the Apostle.[6]

Nevertheless it must not be denied that in a somewhat more general signification one is said to imitate those who preceded him in similar sins, even when they are unknown to him. Hence it is said of the Devil in Wis. 2: "But they imitate him, who are on his side."[7]

Yet if the Apostle were speaking of this kind of imitation, he would rather say: through the Devil sin entered into the world, than through one man; because the sin of the Devil was the first of all — as St. Augustine rightly argues against the commentary of the Pelagians in his book *De peccatorum meritis* (chs. 8, 9, 10), and in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* (bk. 4, ch. 4), and in *De verbis Apostoli*, Sermon 13, and in Letter 89.[8] And lest any room for doubt should remain concerning the true sense of the Apostle's words, it has been defined in the Council of Milevum (canon 2) and repeated in the same words in the Council of Trent (Session 5, ch. 4) that the Apostle's words are not to be understood otherwise than of the propagation of sin from one to all — in which sense also the Catholic Church has always understood these same words.[9]

Therefore commentaries, whether of more recent or of older authors, which offer a divergent interpretation — among whom is he who is falsely attributed to St. Jerome, but who, as can be shown by many conjectures, is truly Pelagius himself — as alien from the Catholic sense, are to be rejected.[10]

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1. Cf. the commentary on distinctions 24 and 25 above; see also what was said at dist. 25, § 7.

2. The theses of Quesnel here cited and transcribed are the condemned propositions from the bull *Unigenitus* (1713). The theses are numbered according to the source: II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXIX. Estius refers the reader to the Appendix at the end of the volume for the full Jansenian system set against the Thomistic doctrine.

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, aa. 1 and 3.

4. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 90 (or CLXXV in the newest Benedictine edition) and *Epistola* 94 (or CLXXVII); also *De peccato originali*, ch. 14, where the ground of Christianity is placed in the cause of two men, Adam and Christ: "by one we were sold under sin, by the other we are redeemed from sin, which is the proper faith of Christians." St. Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* II (i.e. *De moribus Manichaeorum*), ch. 22.

5. Rom. 5:12, 19.

6. The argument from the nature of imitation is drawn at length by St. Augustine; see references in the following footnote.

7. Wis. 2:25 (Vulgate).

8. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, chs. 8–10; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4; *De verbis Apostoli*, Sermon 13 (= Sermon CCXCIV in the Benedictine edition); *Epistola* 89 (= Epistola CLVII in the same edition).

9. Council of Milevum, canon 2; Council of Trent, Session 5, ch. 4.

10. The commentary falsely attributed to St. Jerome on Paul's Epistles: Estius notes, with many conjectures, that this commentary is in truth the work of Pelagius himself — as is recorded also by the note at the foot of the page: "Pelagius is written to have published fourteen books of exposition on the Pauline Epistles" (*Quatuordecim expositionum libros in Epistolas Paulinas edidisse Pelagium scribit* Ge[lasius?]).

DISTINCTIO XXX — ON ORIGINAL SIN: ITS NAME, NATURE, TRANSMISSION, AND ERRORS CONCERNING IT (*DE PECCATO ORIGINALI*)

§ 1. Besides this passage there are also other testimonies from both the Old and the New Law to this doctrine: as Ps. 50, "For behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me"; and Ps. 57, "Sinners are estranged from the womb; they have gone astray from the belly." Job 14, "Who can make clean one conceived of unclean seed?" — more fully according to the Septuagint version: "No one is clean from defilement, not even an infant whose life upon earth is but one day." This passage is cited by the ancients with the greatest frequency. Likewise Gen. 8, "The sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from its youth" — or, as the Chaldean translator renders it, "from its infancy." Hos. 6, "But they, like Adam, have transgressed my covenant; there they have dealt treacherously against me." And Wis. 1, the malice of certain persons is called natural, and "a seed accursed from the beginning" — which St. Augustine extends to the whole human race.[1] Again, the Apostle at 2 Cor. 5, "If one died for all, then all died." And Eph. 2, "We were by nature children of wrath, as were the rest" — that is, from the very moment of birth sinners and liable to divine wrath, just as all others.[2]

§ 2. Now, to descend to the testimonies of the Fathers. St. Augustine, even as he was the foremost defender of the grace of Christ against the Pelagians, was likewise the most vigorous champion of this dogma concerning original sin against those same adversaries — as his many volumes composed against that heresy attest.[3] Nor is there any doubt that in his own time and after him the consenting doctrine of the whole Church was what it had been, as the writings of Prosper, Fulgentius, Leo, Gregory, the venerable Bede, and others declare. Among these, Fulgentius in his book *On Faith to Peter*, ch. 6, numbers among the rules of faith — which the Master (in the letter) calls the dogmas of the Church — and counts this: "Believe most firmly and by no means doubt that every human being who is conceived through the intercourse of man and woman is born with original sin, subject to impiety, liable to death, and on that account by nature a child of wrath."[4]

§ 3. Moreover, St. Augustine himself teaches that this same faith of the whole Church existed even before his own time, having set forth the opinions of many earlier commentators on that matter (throughout nearly all of Book I and Book II of *Against Julian*), of whom the chief are: Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom, and Jerome.[5] Their authority he even compares to that of a universal Synod (Book II, final chapter), saying: "If an episcopal synod were gathered from the whole world, it would be remarkable if persons such as these could easily be seated together in it, since these men were not all alive at one and the same time." St. Augustine is similarly engaged in reviewing testimonies of like tenor elsewhere, as in *On Original Sin*, ch. 40 and 41, and *Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians*, chs. 8 and 12.[6]

§ 4. But to all these has been added the authority of the Apostolic See and of Councils, both particular and universal. For Innocent I, in his Epistle to the Council of Carthage and another to the Council of Milevis,

so teaches; and after him Zosimus, in his Epistle to all the bishops of the world.[7] The Councils are: the Council of Palestine, in which Pelagius was condemned; the Council of Carthage, at which Augustine was present; the Council of Milevis, can. 2; and the Council of Orange, cans. 1 and 2. Likewise the Ecumenical Council of Florence, whose doctrine was harmoniously received by both Greeks and Latins; and finally the Council of Trent, Session 5, cans. 2, 3, and 4. The words of these canons were taken in large part from the older Councils of Carthage, Milevis, and Orange.[8]

§ II — Why this sin is called original (Quare hoc peccatum vocetur originale)

S. Thom. ubi sup.[9]

§ 5. Three reasons are found for calling this sin *original* (*originale*): either because it is present in each person from birth, that is, from the very moment of conception; or because it is contracted from the first origin, that is, from the first parent; or because all, from the very beginning in Adam, have sinned. The first reason is assigned by Hugh of St. Victor, Book I of *On the Sacraments*, Part 7, ch. 28, and in the *Summa Sententiarum*, Tract. 3, ch. 10.[10] The Master follows it (in the following Distinction). The same reason is to be recognized in the words of Gregory, cited under the name of St. Damasus by the Master — even though they are not found in Gregory himself. The words of Ambrose cited against the Novatians by St. Augustine in *On Original Sin*, ch. 40, as well as various other Patristic passages cited by him in *Against Julian*, Book I, ch. 3, sound similarly.[11]

§ 6. There is no conflict with this reason in the fact that original sin was in Adam himself — as is the common and true opinion — since it was not present in him from birth. For the sense in which this is said is: because that vice and sin which in us is original, whether it be understood as the privation of original justice (*privatio justitiae originalis*) or as concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), was in Adam and was sin in him, even though in him it came not from his origin but from the moment when he began to sin. The second reason is made probable by the Scripture text of Rom. 5, "Through one man," from which a third probable reason also follows: as indeed the Council of Trent (Session 5, can. 3) says that the sin is proper to each individual, though it is one in origin — because it has one single cause, namely the actual sin of the first man. According to the first reason, the origin (*origo*) of each man is the beginning of his birth; according to the second, it is the first parent; according to the third, it is the first sin of man. Though the immediate parents are also not inappropriately understood by the name of "origin" from which original sin is said to be so called, since from them, as from a certain intermediate principle, that sin is contracted.

§ III — In what sense sin is said to have entered the world (Quo sensu peccatum in mundum intrasse dicatur)

S. Thom. 1. 2. qu. 82. a. 1. qu. 82. a. 2. a. 4.[12]

§ 7. Since the interpretation of those who understand the Apostle concerning the entry of sin into the world by way of imitation is foreign to the Catholic sense, as we have shown above, it is now necessary to explain briefly what the true understanding of the Apostolic text is. First, therefore, the Apostle's words are not to be taken as though the actual transgression of the first man passes over into his posterity in such a way that it is numerically the same in all — which is manifestly false. For none of the posterity either received that

first law or transgressed it; or at least to no one among infants, in whom there is no use of their own will (*usus propriae voluntatis*), can a transgression of that kind be attributed; nor finally is it to be thought that any of Adam's posterity will be condemned solely on account of Adam's first prevarication as though it were their own proper sin.

§ 8. This is also illustrated by analogy: for death too, of which the Apostle adds, "And through sin, death," is not numerically one and the same death in the first man and in us. For it is not the case that when Adam was dying or incurring mortality, his descendants who did not yet exist properly speaking either died or incurred the necessity of death. Likewise the obedience of Christ, which the Apostle opposes to the disobedience of the first parent, is not numerically the same as the obedience of the justified, but is only the meritorious cause thereof. Nor again does the Apostle speak of the entry of sin according to its effect, as though sin is understood to have entered the world only to the extent that certain effects of the sin perpetrated by Adam — such as death and other punishments — have passed over into his posterity. But he speaks of entry in the proper sense: namely, that sin itself, even if not numerically the same, passes through into all men, so that truly and properly, according to the Apostle, all have been constituted sinners (*peccatores constituti*) by this propagation of sin.

§ 9. This is how the Fathers of old understood the mind of the Apostle, as St. Augustine shows.[13] Nor do the Fathers of the Council of Trent think otherwise: for they (Session 5, can. 3) testify that Adam's sin, which is one in origin, is so diffused by propagation into all that it is present in each as his own.[14] The expositions already set forth above confirm this interpretation. For death too, which entered the world through sin, entered into the human race properly and not only according to some effect, so that it becomes proper to each individual. And justice passes through Christ into the elect in such a way that it inheres in each as his own proper possession. This can also be illustrated by the comparison of leprosy, plague, and other diseases that are accustomed to pass from some to others by a kind of contagion — either through generation or otherwise — and to which original sin is frequently compared by the Fathers.

§ 10. Moreover, what the Apostle adds — "in whom all have sinned" — does not signify that there is some actual sin common to all either in reality or by imputation, but is said in this sense: in that one man, as the efficient and infecting cause, all his posterity contracted sin, and, as the Apostle himself afterward explains, "many were constituted sinners." The Master too conveys this sense (in the text). And that this is the true and Catholic sense will become more fully apparent from what follows.

§ IV — The fourfold error concerning original sin (Quadruplex error circa peccatum originale)

S. Thom. 1. 2. qu. 81. art. 1. da 3. qu. 85. a. 5.[15]

§ 11. Four errors in general can be noted concerning original sin, of which the two earlier were asserted by the Pelagians openly denying original sin, and the two later by others who, to be sure, acknowledge original sin by name, but in fact appear to deny it. The first is the error of Pelagius, who teaches that Adam's sin harmed Adam himself alone, and that his posterity contracted neither sin nor death through being born from him, but are born such as he himself is said to have been created by God — namely, not indeed free from sin, since all will die, but dying by the necessity of nature, not by the desert of sin. This twofold error is refuted first of all by everything that has been adduced above to prove that each person is born with sin. Then also by what

was said (around Dist. 19) to prove that death is the punishment of sin and does not belong to the constitution of nature — such as this, from the canon that says that if anyone shall have declared the first man to have been made such that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die in body not by the desert of sin but by the necessity of nature.[16]

§ 12. From this error, as evidently contrary to Sacred Scripture, certain followers of Pelagius, retreating somewhat, devised an error close to this one, teaching that death along with other punishments has passed into the whole human race through the prevarication of one man, but not sin itself. This error is overthrown by what we have said above about original sin, and above all by the fact that the Apostle at Rom. 5, distinguishing between sin and death, says that both entered the world through one man. This error, however, was expressly condemned by the Fathers of the Council of Orange, can. 2, in these words: "If anyone asserts that the prevarication of Adam harmed him alone and not his posterity, or maintains that only bodily death, which is the punishment of sin, and not sin also, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will attribute injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle who says, 'through one man,' etc." St. Augustine had already refuted this same error before the time of that Council, as is evident from Book IV, *Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians*, ch. 4, and after him Prosper (*Against the Collator*, ch. 20), and Fulgentius in *On the Incarnation of Christ*, ch. 14.[17] These authors, besides Scripture, press the same reason as the Council of Orange: namely, that it is not just for death and other punishments to pass into infants without sin.

§ 13. The third error is that of those who think they can maintain the truth of original sin if, from the transgression of the first parent, they say that not some guilt (*culpa*) passes over into the posterity but only the liability (*reatus*) to punishment — which they wish to be denoted by the name of original sin, using figurative speech whereby an effect assumes the name of its cause. This error differs from the preceding one in words alone; for in proper speech it indeed abolishes original sin.

§ 14. The fourth is the error of those who acknowledge original sin and profess it to be a sin in the proper sense, but deny that it is anything other than the actual sin of the first man.[18] But this opinion too not obscurely removes sin from the whole of Adam's posterity, just as those remove real justice from the saints who teach that such justice is only external.

§ 15. Of these two latter errors, however, there will need to be separate and somewhat more extended discussion.

§ V — Not only does punishment pass to posterity, but also guilt (Non modo transire poenam, verum etiam culpam in Posteros)

S. Thom. qu. 81. art. 1.[19]

§ 16. That original sin is not figuratively but properly sin, and that each person is born in that corruption which has the formal character (*ratio*) not only of punishment but also of guilt, the Scriptural passages which we have adduced above to establish original sin sufficiently prove — especially these four from Rom. 5, where sin is manifestly distinguished from the punishment of sin, and all men are said to have sinned in Adam and to have been constituted sinners through his disobedience, where also the sin opposed to the grace and justice to be received through Christ is mentioned. Likewise Ps. 50, where the Prophet deplores that he is subject not to

misery but to malice and iniquity from his birth; and Ps. 57, where he rebukes not the misery of certain persons but their malice, for they were sinners from the mother's womb. Likewise Job 14 and 25, where he pronounces that a man is born unclean not on account of misery but on account of the defilement of sin. The other passages too, more carefully considered, declare the same sufficiently.

§ 17. To these must also be added those Scripture passages that deny that God inflicts punishment on anyone in whom sin has not first preceded: Ezek. 18 and Jer. 31, where the speech of those is rebuked who said, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the teeth of the children are set on edge."[20] For the Lord answers that he will see to it that this proverb is no longer used in the manner of a saying — namely, foretelling the times of the New Testament, when all will recognize that punishment did not pass from one man into the whole human race without sin. Hence he also adds in the same place: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This Scripture is used by the Fathers of the Council of Orange, ch. 1, to teach that through the offence of Adam's prevarication not only was the body made subject to corruption

§ 18. — also liable to sin (*peccato obnoxium*), but that the freedom of the soul (*libertas animi*) is likewise injured. A similar passage of Scripture is Wis. 12: "To condemn him who does not deserve punishment you deem foreign to your power" — that is, it is alien to your justice to condemn the innocent. For that is the true and genuine reading of that passage.[21] For in certain codices it is read incorrectly, and with entirely contrary sense: "You condemn and deem him foreign." Now what the opinion of the Fathers is on this matter, no one who reads the writings of those who disputed against Pelagius on original sin can doubt — namely St. Augustine, Fulgentius, Leo, Prosper, and others. For St. Augustine[13] refers to the Pelagian heresy the opinion of those who say that only death has passed to us through Adam. Moreover, elsewhere in almost innumerable places he teaches in like manner that man is born liable to sin, so that he manifestly signifies that we are to understand not the punishment but the guilt of sin — as will appear more fully when we come to explain the proper formal character (*ratio*) of original sin. Fulgentius likewise[22] refutes from set purpose the said error, which Maxentius, a contemporary of Fulgentius, also condemned,[23] and Prosper[24] accuses that opinion of impiety. Moreover, what Pope Leo thought on the same matter is clear from canons 1 and 2 of the Council of Orange,[25] in which the said error is manifestly condemned. The decrees of that Synod were collected by Leo[26] and transmitted to the bishops assembled in it, so that, signed by their hands, they might be proposed to the rest for observance, as is clear from the preface of the Council. And furthermore the Council of Trent[27] wove together its first and second canons of Session 5 from the words of the first and second canons of the Council of Orange, and confirmed the same doctrine in virtually the same words.

§ 19. Now as regards the Doctors of a later age, the opinion of St. Anselm is not doubtful, since he affirms[28] that little children are condemned not on account of Adam's sin but on account of their own sin. Among the Scholastics, however, St. Thomas[29] says that the opinion which places punishment in little children without guilt does indeed acknowledge original sin by name, but in reality denies it. Albert the Great agrees with him.[30] But St. Bonaventure appears to have treated this argument most openly of all, and — as it seems — best of all.[31] There he shows, first, that the corruption of human nature arose not from the very beginning of its condition but from the occasion of sin; then, that human nature has been corrupted by the merit (*merito*) of the first transgression, not merely in a penal manner (*pœnaliter*) but also, as he himself says, in a culpable (*culpabiliter*) and blameworthy (*vituperabiliter*) manner: insomuch that he maintains that original sin renders even each individual who is born with it justly imputed in sin. And he affirms this doctrine in such a way that he repeatedly asserts that on this point there is no room for doubt.

§ VI — Confirmation of the same doctrine by arguments (Ejusdem doctrinæ per rationes confirmatio)

§ 20. Although authority alone ought to suffice for confirming the said dogma and for refuting the contrary error, yet for greater evidence some arguments urging the same conclusion must be added; which carry so much weight in this matter that — as St. Bonaventure says in the place cited[33] — this doctrine is certain to Catholic Doctors not only by the evidence of faith but also by the evidence of arguments.

The first argument is taken from the punishment of the world to come which is inflicted for original sin, namely the privation of the divine vision (*carentia divinæ visionis*). For no one ought to be deprived of the eternal good to which he has been made, unless he bear within himself something whereby he is unworthy of the divine sight; but that is nothing other than guilt (*culpa*). St. Augustine indicates this argument,[34] affirming that it is a great punishment for a little child to be excluded from the Kingdom — a punishment that a just God does not inflict except on account of guilt. Similar things appear at the same work, book 6.[35]

§ 21. The second argument is taken from shame (*erubescentia*). For no one rightly feels shame on account of the passions he has from nature, except on account of an adjoining guilt (*culpa*). For in the works of God there is nothing shameful. Since, therefore, in the members of the human body and their movements there is something that causes shame, it is manifest that something is joined to them which is by its very nature culpable. St. Augustine indicates this argument.[36]

§ 22. The third argument is taken from the dominion of concupiscence (*dominatus concupiscentiæ*). For just as the soul of man is then well ordered when reason is subjected to God and sensuality to reason, so it is necessary that the soul be then disordered and — as Bonaventure says — perverted, when either sensuality is not subjected to reason or reason does not obey God. This argument too is drawn from various passages of St. Augustine.

§ 23. The fourth argument rests upon divine justice, which does not inflict punishment upon one in whom no prior guilt has preceded. The Fathers of the Council of Orange expressly allege this argument, as does St. Augustine[37] in several places; likewise Prosper, Fulgentius, and St. Anselm in the places cited above; and among the Scholastics, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Albert the Great, whose places we have also noted above.

§ 24. If against this argument you object that Christ, who was the lamb without blemish, underwent punishments without guilt: we reply, first, that it belongs to the original constitution of things that no one should be subjected to punishments and miseries in whom some sin has not preceded; but that Christ, being fully innocent and immaculate, suffered — this came about beyond and above the original constitution of nature, and by the special counsel of God, for the purpose of redeeming through his death the human race from the penalty of eternal death which, according to the original constitution, was owed to it on account of the transgression of the first parent. Second, that the punishments were inflicted on Christ not unwillingly but willingly, whereas they are inflicted on those born from Adam against their will. Third, that God, in order to redeem the human race, did not choose some being of a different nature, but gave himself for the sins of men into death; and injustice properly speaking is not of anyone towards himself, but towards another. The fifth argument, connected with the foregoing, is taken from the prerogative of Christ, which is to undergo punishment without the deserving of punishment — something which Catholic faith knows of Christ the

one Mediator alone, as St. Augustine says.[13] He also says in the same work that this opinion, which he refutes, destroys the souls of little children. The same argument, he says, is to be seen in St. Anselm.'[38]

§ 25. To the arguments already stated others may be added to prove in particular that the original fault in little children is sin in the proper sense of the name: for instance, that there corresponds to it a punishment properly so called, both in this world and in the world to come, as St. Bede notes in his commentary on the Canticles against Julian, book 6.[39] Likewise, that St. Augustine embraced both actual and original sin under the same definition,'[40] whereas for equivocal names there is no single common formal character (*ratio*). Finally, that just as the law of nature lying latent in the child and exercising itself in the adult is numerically one and of the same formal character, so likewise that fault of nature which lies hidden in the child is the same and of the same formal character as that which at length shows itself in the adult and produces perverse desires. Therefore, just as that latter is properly a sin, so too is the former properly a sin. To these add the fact that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 4,[41] confess and teach that original sin, which is removed by Baptism, has the true and proper formal character (*ratio*) of sin.

§ VII — That original sin is internal to little children and proper to each (Peccatum originale parvulis internum esse, & cuique proprium)

§ 26. Whatever things prove that it is not punishment alone but also guilt that passes into little children, those very same things almost all avail to prove that original sin is internal to little children and that they are not called sinners merely from the actual transgression of the first parent. For the Scriptures attribute to those being born sin, iniquity, and uncleanness as though inherent, on account of which those same individuals are justly blamed and cast away from the face of God; since that actual transgression of the first parent passed away long ago and was, even in its author, remitted and expiated through penance. Therefore, if they were sinners only by reason of that first sin, they would be sinners by a sin that exists neither in act nor in liability (*reatus*), since it has been fully forgiven. Furthermore, as the Apostle testifies (Rom. 5), sin passed into all men just as death did; therefore, just as death befalls each individual as his own, so sin is inherent in each individual as his own. The same may similarly be argued from the other penalties. Again, in the same place the Apostle teaches that many are constituted sinners by the disobedience of one, just as many are constituted just by the obedience of one. Since, therefore, just as justification in Christ confers upon individuals their own proper justice — as has been defined by the Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7 and canons 10 and 11[43] — so it must also be established that those who are born from Adam have their own proper and internal justice. Of this argument St. Augustine makes use,'[44] teaching from the fact that Christ gives to the faithful the most hidden grace of his Spirit, which he infused secretly even into little children, that Adam likewise by a hidden taint of carnal concupiscence contaminated within himself all those coming from his stock.

§ 27. Another argument is taken from Rom. 9, where it is said of Jacob and Esau that they had not yet done anything good or evil when it was said to their mother: "The elder shall serve the younger." Therefore that statement of Rom. 5, "in whom all have sinned," cannot be understood of the actual sin of the first man; for in that case they would already at some earlier point have done something evil.

§ 28. Likewise, the effect of baptism refutes this fiction. For not only to adults but also to little children is sin truly remitted in baptism; and since to them is not remitted the sin of the first parent — whose own forgiveness he obtained long ago — it follows that a proper sin is remitted. Finally, from the Council of Trent,

beyond that argument about internal justice which we have just recalled, two other arguments can be drawn against this doctrine of those who place original sin outside the little children. The first is from Session 5, canon 3,[14] where it is defined that Adam's sin, which is one in origin and spread by propagation into all men, is inherent in each as his own. The second is from canon 5 of the same session,[45] where it is said that in the regenerate God hates nothing. From which it is evidently inferred that in those not yet regenerate there is something that God hates. And this sentence of the Council overturns the foundation of those who deny that sin is internal to the little child. For they say that nothing is in the child except what God established in it — which cannot be true, if according to the sentence of the Fathers there is something in the child that God hates, since, as Scripture testifies (Wis. 11), "God hates nothing of what he has made." And indeed this same foundation of their error had been laid of old by Pelagius and his disciple Caelestius, as is clear from St. Augustine,[46] where these words of Pelagius are reported by St. Augustine: "All good and evil whereby we are praiseworthy or blameworthy does not arise with us, but is done by us; we are born capable of either, but full of neither; and as we are procreated without virtue, so also without vice." With this error, as St. Augustine teaches in the same place, the Catholic faith concerning original sin is plainly overthrown. A fuller refutation of the said opinion, moreover, must be sought from what remains to be said concerning the proper formal character of original sin.

§ VIII — That original sin is not only acts praiseworthy or blameworthy before God (Non solos actus coram Deo laudabiles, aut vituperabiles esse)

§ 29. The other foundation of those who deny that original sin is internal to little children is this: because — so they urge — there is no sin properly so called that is not a voluntary act contrary to the law of God. But Pelagius himself used this very foundation to abolish original sin, as is clear from the words of his just cited above and more fully from St. Augustine's disputation against him, which disputation overturns that foundation. Now that not only acts of the will but also habits, and whatever else that is analogous to a habit in the will, deserve praise or blame, can be shown in many ways.

§ 30. First, because actions both of vices and of virtues arise from habits; for which reason, when a man is worthy of praise or blame on account of them, it follows that he is worthy of praise and blame on account of those habits, and that through those habits he is justly accounted praiseworthy or blameworthy.

§ 31. Second, because little children baptized on account of the justice infused — which is not an act but a habit — are worthy of eternal life; hence it ought not to seem absurd that little children not baptized, on account of original sin contracted, are — although it be not a voluntary act — worthy of eternal damnation.

§ 32. Third, because a wicked man who has ceased from action, whether through sleep or any other mode, has in himself something on account of which he ought to be blamed and subjected to punishment.

§ 33. Fourth, because Scripture threatens men with exclusion from the Kingdom of Heaven not only on account of acts but also on account of evil habits; as in 1 Cor. 6, where it is said: "neither the covetous, nor the drunkard, nor the rapacious" — which are names not of acts but of habits — "shall possess the Kingdom of God."

§ 34. Fifth, because Scripture promises the Kingdom of Heaven to men not only on account of good acts but also on account of good habits; as in Matt. 5, where the blessed (*beati*) are called "the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, the peacemakers," and so on.

§ VIII — That not only acts but also habits are praiseworthy or blameworthy before God (Non solos actus coram Deo laudabiles aut vituperabiles esse)

§ 35. A further foundation of those who deny that original sin is internal to infants is this: they say that no sin is properly so called unless it is a voluntary act against the law of God. But this very foundation was used of old by Pelagius to abolish original sin, as is clear from his words cited a little earlier and more fully from St. Augustine's disputation against that same man, in which he overturns that foundation. Now that not only an act of the will but also a habit, and whatever else in the will resembles a habit, is deserving of praise and blame, can be shown in multiple ways.

First: because the actions of vices just as of virtues arise of themselves from habits; wherefore, since through those actions a man is worthy of praise and blame, it follows that through those habits too he is deservedly to be accounted praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Second: because baptised infants, on account of the justice infused into them — which is not an act but a habit — are worthy of eternal life; hence it ought not to seem absurd either that unbaptised infants, on account of original sin contracted by birth, although it is not an act of the will, are worthy of eternal damnation.

Third: because a wicked man who ceases from action, whether through sleep or in some other way, has within himself something else on account of which he is to be blamed and held deserving of punishment.

Fourth: because Scripture threatens the exclusion from the kingdom of heaven upon man not only on account of acts but also on account of habits; as in 1 Cor. 6, where it is said that neither the covetous, nor the drunkards, nor the rapacious (which are names of habits, not of acts) shall possess the kingdom of God.[49]

Fifth: because the same Scripture promises the kingdom of heaven to man not only on account of good acts but also on account of habits; as in Matt. 5, where the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, and the peaceable are called blessed, and the like — whose kingdom of heaven is promised to them.[50] Yet it must be remembered that those habits are to be understood which we said above are proper to Christians, and by which we distinguished them from the merely philosophical habits.

Sixth: from the fact that St. Augustine[51] affirms that avarice is a quality — that is, a quality according to which the mind is disposed, even when it is not acting — from which rapine and avarice spring. And in the same work,[52] he openly asserts that not the act alone but the habit also makes a man guilty and deserving of just punishment. And most explicitly in *De Bono Conjugali*[53] he says: "Just as there is no unequal merit in Peter who suffered and in John who did not suffer, so there is no unequal continence in John who entered into no marriage and in Abraham who married." But John and Abraham had continence in habit alone. Although therefore, among men who see what appears outwardly, a good habit of the mind receives neither praise nor punishment, but only external actions whether good or bad do so; yet before God, who searches hearts, just as internal actions, so also those things which are as it were continuous and abiding acts, receive their recompense.

§ IX — Whether concupiscence is original sin, or a privation of justice (Utrum concupiscentia sit peccatum originale, an justitiae privatio)

§ 36. It must now be asked what it is in a newly-born man that is truly and properly called sin. On this matter there have been diverse opinions. For some said that the actual transgression of the first man is the original sin in each one of those being born. But we refuted this opinion above, and the Master (in the text) rejects it as erroneous.[55] Apart from this opinion, therefore, there are two other celebrated ones. Some hold that original sin is the privation or lack of original justice. Others hold that it is innate concupiscence (*concupiscentia innata*). The author of the former opinion is St. Anselm,[56] who can also be claimed as a supporter of Plato's position. The latter is transmitted by the Master (in this distinction),[55] — followed by St. Augustine, who in various places calls original sin concupiscence and says that it is remitted in virtue in baptism: as in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*,[57] in *Contra Julianum*,[58] and in *De Peccatorum Meritis*,[59] and in the Sermon on the Words of the Apostle,[60] and on Ps. 57,[61] and in *Retractationes*.[62]

§ 37. Moreover, a testimony to this latter opinion not obscure can be drawn from Sacred Scripture, which, nearly every time it suggests to us original sin, names not a privation but something positive — namely such a vice by which man concupiscences against the spirit, that is, by reason of which man is prone to evil and contrary to the divine law; as in Rom. 6: "Let not therefore sin reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof."[63] These words signify that there is in man a certain habitual concupiscence, whose proper acts are the actual concupiscences. And that habitual thing alone the Apostle calls sin. Likewise in ch. 7: "I did not know sin but through the law."[64] And expounding what sin he understands, he adds: "For I had not known concupiscence, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not covet."[64] And again, naming the same concupiscence sin, he subjoins: "But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence" — that is, every kind of depraved desires, as it were its own proper acts. Which the following words likewise declare, where he says that sin, without the law, was dead, and that with the law received it revived — because namely concupiscence, on the occasion of the law, if the grace of Christ be absent, burns the more fiercely in man.

§ 38. It must be noted furthermore that the Scriptures also suggest original sin to us under the name of some act, or certainly designate it through works as through its effects; as in Job 7: "Why hast thou set me opposite to thee, and I am become burdensome to myself?"[65] And in Rom. 8: "They that are according to the flesh mind the things of the flesh."[66] And in Gal. 5: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit."[67] And again: "Manifest are the works of the flesh,"[67] and the passage cited a little before from Rom. 7: "Sin wrought in me all manner of concupiscence." From all of which it appears that, although it must not be denied that original sin is the lack of justice — or rather, of original justice (*justitia originalis*) — which was owed to each one being born, yet its formal character (*ratio*) is more fully expressed by what exceeds a mere privation. For the proper character of a privation does not include any acts, yet Scripture everywhere attributes acts to original sin. Just as therefore, for example, the proper formal character of pride is better expressed by one who defines pride as the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence than by one who says it is a privation of humility: so the formal character of original sin will be more fully explained if it is said to be the vice by which man concupiscences those things which are forbidden by the law of God — which vice is called *flesh* (*caro*) by the Apostle — than if it is named solely the privation of original justice.

§ 39. The same can also be taught by reason. For no one turns away from some good except led by desire and longing for another good which cannot coexist with the former. For in this way both the Angel and man, desiring their own excellence (*excellentia*) more than was fitting, departed from God. What therefore holds true in acts, the same must be understood conformably in the habitual vice contracted from the first man's transgression. For we are born turned away from the immutable good because we are born bent and inclined toward changeable goods. This congenital vice of ours we call concupiscence (*concupiscentia*).

§ 40. Moreover the Apostle suggested both evils to us — both that of aversion and that of conversion — in one passage, when in Rom. 3, describing the corruption diffused throughout the whole human race from Adam's sin and teaching that all men without exception are under sin, he first alleges that passage: "There is none just, none that understandeth, none that seeketh after God. All have turned out of the way, they are become unprofitable together, there is none that doth good, no not one."[68] Which words signify the aversion of man from God and the privation of justice. Then he adds those by which acts proceeding from inward and hidden concupiscence are expressed, when he says: "Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they dealt deceitfully," and what follows.'[69] So too St. Augustine, comprehending at once both original and actual sin in a single definition, says that every such thing is an aversion from the better good and a conversion to a lesser good.'[70]

§ 41. Although the Fathers of the Council of Trent were unwilling to define in which it is more proper to locate the formal character (*ratio*) of original sin — whether in the privation of justice or in concupiscence — yet by the fact that they teach that concupiscence in the regenerate is not sin,[45] they seem sufficiently to have indicated that it is sin in the non-regenerate, and this is a good argument from the contrary sense. For in the same place it is similarly said that in the regenerate God hates nothing. Hence it well follows from the mind of the Council: therefore in the non-regenerate there is something He hates. So it follows from the same mind that concupiscence in the regenerate is not sin; therefore in the non-regenerate it is sin.'[71]

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§ X — What is to be understood by the name of concupiscence (Quid nomine concupiscentiae intelligendum sit)

§ 42. Concupiscence, which we have said to be itself original sin, and which Scripture in very many places pursues as something evil and vicious, is neither appetite in the genus of rational and sensitive taken together, nor sensitive appetite peculiarly so called, nor that which is peculiarly called the concupiscible appetite, nor any wholly natural faculty or condition of human nature. For these things were in Adam from the beginning of his creation, and were assumed together with the truth of human nature by Christ. But it is a defect of nature — that is to say, a habitual vice — which through sin crept into nature and culpably infected it.

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concupiscible (*concupiscibilis*) appetite, nor any wholly natural faculty or condition of human nature. For these things were in Adam from the beginning of his creation, and were assumed together with the truth of human nature by Christ. But it is a vice of nature, which through sin crept into nature and culpably infected it.

§ 44. It ranges, moreover, over all those things that can be evilly and inordinately sought by man. Hence, when the Apostle had said in Gal. 5 that the flesh lusts against the spirit, in order to show how broadly the concupiscence of the flesh extends itself against the spirit, he subjoined a catalogue of certain works of the flesh, saying: "The works of the flesh are manifest, etc." Among these he enumerates not only fornication, uncleanness, revellings, and drunkennesses, which are committed through the sensitive appetite and are called peculiarly carnal sins; but also heresies, enmities, contentions, murders, sects, and things of this kind, which are accustomed to be called spiritual sins. It is clear, therefore, that under the name of *flesh* and *concupiscence* the Apostle signified the vice that incites to the whole genus of sins. For he also called the Corinthians carnal not on account of carnal but of spiritual vices, when he said to them in 1 Cor. 3: "For whereas there is among you jealousy and contention, are you not carnal?" Moreover, that every genus of sin proceeds from concupiscence, the same Apostle more openly signified when, speaking of concupiscence in Rom. 7, he says: "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence."[73]

§ 45. How broadly, therefore, the commandment extends in prohibiting, so broadly also does concupiscence extend in desiring. Hence St. Thomas teaches that all defects of the virtues are to be reduced to original sin.[74] This general signification of concupiscence was noted by St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, chapters 2, 3, 4, and XV, chapter 7; likewise in book 2 *Against Julian*, chapter 8, where, citing the words of Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose, he attributes various genera of sins to concupiscence; and in book 4, chapter 14, he extends it to all sensible things. And again in book 6, chapter 7, he says that the concupiscence which is concerned with venereal matters is only a certain part of that concupiscence to the mortification of which the Apostle exhorts the faithful.[75]

§ 46. Nor does St. Jerome hold a different view from these. For in book 9, question 8 (*To Algasia*), treating the passage of the Apostle in Rom. 7 where it is said "I did not know concupiscence, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not covet," he says that by *concupiscence* he understands all the disturbances of the soul, by which we grieve and rejoice, fear and desire. For he speaks entirely generally of disordered affections of this kind, and not only of those belonging to the sensitive part, as is declared by what he thereupon continues to discuss.[76] Now all these disturbances proceed from that habitual vice of which we are now treating.

§ 47. From these considerations it is clear that those who restrict concupiscence to the interior part of the soul, and especially to venereal pleasures, designate only in part, and not in its full genus, the concupiscence innate in us. St. Thomas therefore rightly, describing it in its full genus, says it is the disorder of the powers of the soul (*inordinatio virium animae*), which consists chiefly in this: that all the powers are inordinately turned toward mutable good — which is called by the common name concupiscence.[54]

§ XI — By what names original sin is called (Quibus nominibus originale peccatum vocetur)

§ 48. St. Bonaventure collects the names by which this original vice is called, and they are arranged in this order: original sin, law of the flesh, concupiscibility (*concupiscibilitas*), tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*),

concupiscence, law of the members, languor of nature, tyrant. The reasons for these names could in part be gathered from what has been said above, and in part from St. Bonaventure, who expounds them severally.[78] There are found, moreover, other names by which both Sacred Scripture and the Fathers signified this vice innate in us.

§ 49. Scripture often calls it *the flesh*, as in Gal. 5: "The flesh lusts, etc." To this belongs that saying of Jn. 3: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Hence St. Augustine also says (*De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 67) that we are all born subject to the flesh.[79] Elsewhere this sin is called *iniquity*, as in Ps. 50: "For behold, I was conceived in iniquities." Elsewhere *uncleanness*, as in Job 14 and 25. Sometimes also *death of the soul*, as in 2 Cor. 5: "Therefore all are dead"; and in canon 2 of the Council of Orange, where this sin is expressly called the death of the soul.[80] At times it is also called *impiety* by the Fathers, as by Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 26), where he asserts it must be held by faith that every man is born subject to impiety.[81] St. Augustine also indicates this in book 5 (*De Peccatorum Meritis*, ch. 9, and book 6 *Against Julian*, ch. 5, and book 1 *Against the Adversary of the Law*, ch. 22), saying that man is born with an impious will.[82] Prosper, moreover, beyond what he writes against the Collator — setting faithlessness and other vices in one original sin — also calls it in his poem (*Carmen de Ingratis*) now a crime, now a wickedness.[83] Although not all of these are said in the proper sense of the word, yet the recalling of them serves this purpose: that we may understand how great an evil it is, which has been thus magnified by the Fathers, and from which, as from a root, the shoots of other evils spring up and increase.

§ XII — That concupiscence is not the work of God (Concupiscentiam non esse opus Dei)

§ 50. When the Pelagians said that there is nothing in a newly-born infant which God has not placed in him — as we showed above from St. Augustine (*De Peccato Originali*, ch. 13) — and yet could not deny that in any man whatsoever, even a just man who has been reborn, there exists concupiscence soliciting toward seeking those things which are prohibited by God's law, they were compelled to confess that concupiscence also has been implanted in us by God as a certain natural good, by which we might usefully be exercised unto the virtues.[85] But this error is refuted by the plain testimonies of Scripture. For the Apostle says in Gal. 5: "The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: for these are contrary the one to the other." Expounding this Scripture, St. Augustine in Sermon 43 *On the Words of the Lord* understands by *spirit* the Holy Spirit, that is, God Himself.[86] Since, therefore, neither does God act contrary to His own work, nor does His own work act contrary to God, except by reason of a vice contracted from elsewhere, it follows that concupiscence is not the work of God.

§ 51. This opposition of concupiscence against God the Apostle also expressed elsewhere, as in Rom. 7: "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." By *the law of his mind* he understands that which in the words immediately preceding he had called *the law of God*, saying: "For I am delighted with the law of God according to the inward man"; and in the words that follow: "Therefore I myself, with the mind, serve the law." The judgment of James is also manifest, removing from God what he attributes to concupiscence: "God," he says, "tempts no man. But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured: then, when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin."[87] Most open of all is that passage in 1 Jn. 2, where, having admonished the faithful not to love those things that are in the world,

and having said that all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life — which latter is itself a concupiscence of honour — he added that this threefold concupiscence is not from the Father, but from the world, understanding by the name *world* the human race insofar as it has been depraved by the vice of the first parent.[88] It is clear, therefore, that concupiscence is not the work of God.

§ 52. And this was the intention of blessed St. Ambrose in his letter 82 (*To the Church of Vercelli*), teaching that it is foreign to truth — what Epicurus taught — that pleasure in man was created principally by God as its author. "This," he says, "divine Scripture refutes, which declares that pleasure was infused into Adam and Eve through the snares and enticements of the serpent." For by the name *pleasure* he understands the lust of the flesh (*libido carnis*), which is indeed moved inordinately and against reason. Now this lust is a certain part of that concupiscence of which we are now treating.[89]

§ 53. The reason for this doctrine is that concupiscence solicits toward sin not only by suggesting what is evil — in the manner in which the devil is said to solicit toward sin — nor only accidentally and merely by way of occasion, by stirring up evil desires in man (in the manner in which wine and the form of a woman solicit toward lust, or the sight of gold solicits toward theft); but per se and by its own nature (*per se ac suapte natura*), and by its own proper act, by inwardly moving and disturbing, so that when concupiscence has been moved, since it is something of the man himself, it is impossible that the man not be moved, even though that motion without consent cannot be a sin. A sign of this same truth is that one is justly ashamed of concupiscence; therefore it is not the work of God. For as it is said in Tob. 12: "It is honourable to reveal and confess the works of God." These proofs, just as the Scriptures cited above, extend also to the concupiscence of the regenerate.

§ 54. St. Augustine further confirms this same doctrine in book 1 *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, chapters 15, 16 and following, and in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapters 13 and 14, where he teaches at large that concupiscence is not from God; and he teaches that what John has said — that concupiscence is not from the Father — is to be understood also of the concupiscence of the regenerate.[90]

§ XIII — That concupiscence is to be combated and held in hatred (Concupiscentiam oppugnandam & odio habendam)

§ 55. As a consequence of the doctrine set forth above, it follows that concupiscence is not only not to be loved — as John admonishes in 1 Jn. 2:15: "Do not love the things that are in the world, such as the concupiscence of the flesh," and so forth — but is, in truth, also to be held in hatred and to be combated. For if it incites to evil and resists the law of God, it must be held in hatred as a vice that draws and turns us away from that which is supremely to be loved.

§ 56. This is the teaching of St. Augustine in various places: for instance, on Ps. 35, treating the verse "But iniquity he did not hate," where by "iniquity" he understands that which dwells in man as sin, that is, concupiscence; and he wishes us to hold it in hatred just as God holds it in hatred, drawing his argument also from the struggle by which we resist it.[92] And in Sermon 8 on Ps. 118, treating the verse "My soul has longed to desire," and so forth,[93] he expressly affirms that our concupiscence — whereby the flesh lusts against the spirit — is to be hated, and from this he proves that the love of God is to be cherished. Similar passages are to be found in *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 28,[94] which passage was transcribed by Prosper (Sentence 142).[95] Likewise

in *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5 and 6,[96] and in Sermon 5 on the Words of the Apostle.[97] In the same vein writes also St. Gregory in *Moralia* IX, ch. 28 and 29.[98]

§ 57. The Fathers derived this teaching from Sacred Scripture, and chiefly from the Apostle in Rom. 7 and Gal. 5. For in the former passage the Apostle testifies that he hated the evil which he did in the flesh, even though no consent of the mind concurred; and he supplies the cause of this hatred: because the law of the members resists the law of the mind. In the latter passage he says that the spirit lusts against the flesh, which occurs when a man, aided by the Spirit of God, fights against concupiscence. To these St. Augustine adds that word from Col. 3: "Mortify your members which are upon the earth"[99] — for he extends this precept also to the concupiscence of the reborn in *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5.[100] Nor is the passage dissimilar in the Epistle of Jude: "hating even the garment that is defiled by the flesh",[101] — a sentiment which accords with that of Job 9: "And my garments shall abominate me," that is, shall render me abominable; as St. Gregory treats it in the place cited just above.[102]

§ 58. Finally, the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5,[103] so confess that concupiscence remains in the baptized that they nonetheless admonish that the baptized must manfully resist it through the grace of Christ. From which decree, just as from the Scriptures and from the judgments of the Fathers, this teaching — which declares concupiscence to be evil, to be combated, and to be held in hatred — is extended also to the concupiscence of the reborn.

§ 59. Nor does what is said in the same canon of the Council by the Fathers contradict this teaching — namely, that "God hates nothing in the reborn" — as though it thereby followed that God does not hate that concupiscence which is left in the reborn, and which He admonishes must be crucified and persecuted. "And how," says St. Augustine (*Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 4), "does God command the body to be persecuted, if there is nothing there that displeases God?"[35] But the Fathers have sufficiently indicated the proper understanding of this their decree through the reason which they immediately subjoined: "Because there is nothing of condemnation for those who are truly buried in Christ," and so forth — that is, in the reborn, insofar as the concupiscence still residing in their flesh is concerned. The sense, therefore, is: that God hates nothing in the reborn that would make them hateful to God and liable to condemnation. This sense is indicated more plainly by what follows: "so that nothing whatsoever may remove them from entry into heaven." Moreover, in what sense this same concupiscence of the reborn is called "sin" by the Apostle will have to be discussed at dist. 33.[104]

§ XIV — How original sin is voluntary (Quomodo peccatum originale sit voluntarium)

§ 60. Those who deny that concupiscence is original sin make use of the following argument. The concupiscence of infants before regeneration is not voluntary; therefore it cannot have the formal character (*ratio*) of sin in them. They prove the inference, because, as St. Augustine witnesses,[106] "every sin is so thoroughly voluntary that in no way is it sin if it is not voluntary." And as St. Thomas says,[107] "aversion from God would not have the character of guilt unless it were voluntary. Hence," he says, "the formal character of guilt consists in voluntary aversion."

§ 61. We reply briefly: original sin — whether it be properly concupiscence itself, or aversion, or something else — is not voluntary in infants in that same manner in which actual sins are said to be voluntary,

namely by the proper and actual will of those in whom they reside. For it is established that infants have no use whatsoever of their own will. But it is rightly and correctly called voluntary, partly by the will of the first parent, from which as from an efficient cause this original evil has been propagated into posterity, and partly by the will of the individual persons in whom this sin resides; for the reason that their will, although it may never have been in act, is in truth infected with the vice of depraved concupiscence, by which it is itself said to be evil, perverse, averted from God, and perversely inclined.

§ 62. The former formal character (*ratio*) of voluntariness St. Augustine had in view in very many places, as in book 1 of the *Retractationes*, chapters 11, 14, and 15; *De peccato originali*, chapter 28; book 3 *Contra Julianum*, chapter 5; and *Enchiridii*, chapter 46.[108] The latter formal character he seems to have considered elsewhere, as in book 1 *Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, chapter 22,[109] where he says that all are born with an evil will. And in *De Natura et gratia*, chapter 67,[79] where he testifies that all are born subject to the flesh. With the same phrase it was said by Fulgentius, book *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 26,[110] that every man is born subject to impiety. To the same point belongs what Prosper says (*Contra Collatorem*, chapter 20)[111] — that in those who are born, free will has been impaired — and the Fathers of the Council of Orange, canon 1, condemn those who teach that only the body was rendered liable to corruption through the offence of the first man, while the freedom of the soul remained unharmed.'[112]

§ 63. Moreover, neither formal character of voluntariness in original sin, taken separately, seems sufficient to constitute the formal character of sin. Not the former; because if that alone is considered, voluntariness belongs to what is called original sin in the infant only extrinsically, and consequently that original evil in the infant will not be internal to the infant under the formal character of sin. Nor yet the latter; because it is necessary that every sin, in order to be sin, be committed or have been committed by some act of will. For otherwise it would have to be ascribed to God or to nature, of which God is the founder and author. Therefore, in order that we may acknowledge the true formal character of sin in the infant, it is necessary to look back to that will from which, as from a root and origin, this evil was propagated. For, as St. Augustine rightly teaches,[113] "there would be no guilt of man, if he had been created by God such as he is now born." Furthermore, the same St. Augustine, in book [*Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*], chapter 13, says that sin is not absurdly called voluntary — being drawn from the first man's evil will — and has in a manner become hereditary.[114]

§ XV — Whether something external is converted into the truth of human nature (Utrum externum aliquid convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae)

§ 64. Since all men contract original sin for the reason that they all were in Adam according to seminal principle (*secundum seminalem rationem*) — just as, had he persevered in justice, all would have been born just from him, so, after he sinned, they are born sinners — the Master takes occasion from this to ask in what sense men are said to have been in Adam according to seminal principle: since it cannot be that from the body of Adam anything passed over materially into each individual man, however many have descended from him throughout the course of so many ages throughout the whole world, and however many shall descend until the end. To this the Master responds — as stated in the preceding distinction — saying that whatever is materially present in human bodies was materially in Adam; for whatever descends by way of propagation,

increasing in itself and multiplying, does not take anything external into its substance, and he affirms that only what was originally in Adam will rise again at the resurrection. Accordingly, bodies in the act of being nourished do indeed receive something, yet nothing external is converted into their substance. In favour of this opinion is the fact noted above (in dist. 18) that woman was formed from the rib of man without the addition of any external matter. What the more probable view on this is, we discussed in that place.[116] The Master appears to have derived this opinion from St. Augustine, who teaches the same doctrine.[117] This opinion is also found in Peter Comestor.[118] Moreover, the occasion and material for this opinion seems to have been furnished by the argument of Origen, which he employs against the resurrection of bodies.

§ 65. For Origen, writing on Ps. 1, "The wicked shall not rise in judgement," argues that the human body, because of its continuous flux, scarcely remains in the same state for two days, and therefore that not the same body numerically but some other, and a spiritual one, shall rise. But to this argument it is more correctly replied — as St. Epiphanius argues in disputing against the heresy of Origen — first, that the efflux of the human body is not so great as Origen imagined; since experience teaches that the principal parts of the human body subsist and are preserved in such a manner that their change through the efflux of material particles, as they are called, is either nil or so slight and slow as to be imperceptible to the senses. Then again, even granting such an efflux, this does not straightaway destroy the truth of the resurrection; since it is not some other body but the very same body that was once animated by a rational soul that is to be raised on the day of judgement — though not according to all those parts which were at some time animated. What, however, shall rise from the human body after the multiple changes it undergoes in this life has been stated (around Distinctio 44 of Book IV of the *Sentences*).[119]

§ 66. Since, therefore, it is not necessary, for the sake of the truth of the resurrection, to confess that nothing external passes into the substance of the human body through nutrition, the contrary opinion — which also accords better with sense-experience, with reason, and with authority — has by far the greater probability. For sense and experience testify that human bodies, no less than those of other living beings, are nourished and grow by the intake of food, and that when food is withdrawn, nourishment and growth continually cease and life fails. Reason likewise recommends the same conclusion. For if nothing external is added that is converted into the substance of the human body, then the entire construction of the human body will have to be ascribed to a singular miracle, of which sort there is nowhere found in the Sacred Scriptures. Indeed, concerning the formation of woman from the rib, and concerning the multiplication of the five loaves, what the truer opinion is has been stated in the place cited above.[120] Furthermore, not a single one of the ancients agrees with the Master, and the Scholastics with great unanimity reject this opinion as altogether improbable. And St. Augustine himself also has a clear opinion to the contrary, in the book *De Vera Religione*, chapter 11,[121] where he says that foods, losing their own form, pass into the structure of the bodily members.

§ 67. Therefore, in accordance with the common sentence of the Doctors, one must say that foods are truly converted, according to something of themselves, into the substance of human bodies — the substance of the man nonetheless remaining the same, both absolutely speaking according to the soul, and according to matter in the manner sufficient for the numerical identity of mutable things.

§ XVI — Reply to the objections that are raised (Responsio ad ea quae objiciuntur)

§ 68. In support of the contrary opinion, certain arguments are put forward partly by the Master, partly by others, and these must here be resolved by us; the chief ones are as follows.

The first: The Lord says in the Gospel, Matt. 15: "Everything that enters into the mouth goes into the stomach and is cast out into the sewer"; therefore none of it is converted into the substance of the human body.

The second: St. Augustine, in book 22 of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 14,[123] says that all men have the measure of virile perfection in such a manner that they are conceived and born with it. "But they have it," he says, "in principle (*in ratione*), not in mass, just as all the members are already latently present in the seed; since in those newly born some are still wanting, such as teeth and anything of that sort."

The third: Infants who die will rise in the stature which they would have had had they lived to mature age; but that stature will not come to them from food, but from the multiplication of prior matter in itself. Therefore, neither, if they had lived to full age, would their substance have been increased from elsewhere, but in itself.

§ 69. To these objections the reply is as follows. In the first place, the words of Christ, understood in so general a sense, are opposed not only to our approved opinion but also to the opinion of the Master himself, who, at the end of the distinction, says that he does not deny that foods and humours pass into flesh and blood, though not into the truth of human nature — which alone he asserts will be restored in the resurrection — the rest, namely the flesh into which foods passed, being as it were a superabundance to be cast off. One must therefore say that Christ's words signify nothing other than that all food — yet according to its more impure parts, which are not a suitable nourishment for the human body — is expelled from the body. Hence in Mark there is added: "purging all foods," that is, leaving them clean, namely by separating what is purer from what is more impure.[124]

§ 70. What is objected from St. Augustine does not prove that no external matter will accede to the bodies of infants as they are advanced to their proper size, but only that they have at their very birth, according to the seminal principles (*rationes seminales*), that measure of perfection which they are to have in the adult state — which seminal principles, it is clear, do not exclude the accession of external matter. Moreover, that something external will accede for the growth of their bodies, pertaining even to the truth of their nature, is clear from the very same passage of St. Augustine. For, discussing the resurrection of those who died in tender age, he says that what would have come to them more slowly in time had they lived to the age of manhood, they will receive in the resurrection by the wonderful and most swift work of God.[125] Hence the reply to the argument put forward in the third place is also evident. For small children rising from the dead will not receive their proper size by the multiplication of bodies in themselves — as the Master supposes — but by God miraculously supplying thence that which, had they lived, they would naturally have received, or certainly by a similar addition from without.

§ XVI — How all men are said to have been in Adam (Quomodo omnes in Adam fuisse dicantur)

§ 71. From what has been said above,[127] it is clear that all men were not in Adam in such a way that either their whole substance, or some part of it, was really or materially in him; rather, they were in him as in an efficient and generative cause — and not a proximate cause, from which it is necessary that some matter be communicated to what is begotten, but a mediate and remote cause, from which it is not required that any matter pass to those things which are mediately begotten from him. This is declared by the example of other living beings which are propagated by generation.

§ 72. Christ was in Adam, because He was born mediately from him. Yet we were in Adam in a certain peculiar manner in which Christ was not there — namely, according to the seminal principle (*ratio seminalis*), by which generation comes about through the commingling of both sexes. For Adam neither had, nor was able to transmit to his posterity, the power of generating from one sex alone. Hence St. Augustine,[128] expounding that passage in Heb. 7 where Levi is said to have been tithed in the loins of his father Abraham, acknowledges indeed that Christ was in the loins of Abraham, yet was not tithed there, because He was not there according to the seminal principle according to which all others begotten from Abraham were there. This matter is to be treated more fully below.[129]

§ 73. One thing must briefly be added: that what St. Augustine[13] cites as if from Hilary — namely the words, "It is manifest that all sinned in Adam as in a mass" — is found nowhere today in Hilary. It is found, however, in the Ambrosian Commentary on that passage of Rom. 5, "in whom all have sinned." Since this Commentary belongs neither to St. Ambrose nor to Hilary (those whose authority is celebrated in the Church), it is probable that it belongs to another Hilary — namely the deacon of the Roman Church — who seems to have shared the views of the Luciferians, as appears from the Dialogue of St. Jerome written against them.[130] In the meantime, as regards these words approved by St. Augustine, all men are said to have been in Adam as in a mass — not in the proper sense, but by a certain likeness of the efficient cause to the material cause. For properly speaking it is to the material cause that the mass belongs, out of which something is made. But because the generating cause also communicates something of matter to what is immediately begotten from it, hence the word "mass" is not improperly transferred to the generating cause.

§ XVII — How original sin is contracted from parents (Quomodo ex parentibus contrahatur peccatum originale)

§ 74. Although it must be held by undoubted faith that all descendants of Adam are born with what is called original sin (*peccatum originale*), the manner in which it is transmitted to children is by no means certain, nor easy to understand. Two or three modes of this transmission can be conceived, of which the first — and also the easier to understand — is if we say that the soul is transmitted together with the body through generation from parents. Given this, it does not seem difficult to explain how the soul of the one being born contracts sin. For just as a corrupt flesh of the child is propagated from the corrupt flesh of the parent, so one would say that a soul infected with sin is propagated from a sinful soul. But because that opinion regarding the transmission (*tradux*) of souls is not received by the Church, as we have shown,[132] it follows that this mode of the propagation of sin cannot be approved either.

§ 75. It remains, therefore, that the soul — which God immediately infuses into the body — since it does not have sin from God, is said to contract sin only through the flesh that is received from parents. But this again can be understood in more than one way. There is therefore a second mode of the propagation of sin: if we say that the soul, which does not exist prior to its being present in the body, is vitiated by the body as by a corrupted and tainted vessel — just as happens when a fruit, or a flower, or some other thing is infected by the foul odor of the body in which it is contained. If it is born in such a place, it has already contracted such an odor from its very origin.

§ 76. That this may be better understood, it must be noted that there is a mutual and natural *sympatheia* (*sympatheia*) — that is, a communication of passions and affections — between body and soul, as substantial parts concurring into the same natural composite. Hence we see that when the body is ill-affected, the soul suffers, and conversely, from the gladness of the soul the body is refreshed. Since, therefore, the soul is made by God neither just nor unjust, nor does it exist at all before its conjunction with the body; and the body, before the infusion of the soul, having been sown from the flesh of sin, does not yet have sin, but nevertheless has a certain hidden disposition toward sin — it comes about that the soul, which is born in the body like a flower in a fetid place, simultaneously contracts from the body a certain habitual and culpable vice. For just as if a soul were infused into a wounded body, or one placed in fire, it would straightway suffer pain in that body, so likewise when it is infused —

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1. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 8.

2. 2 Cor. 5:14; Eph. 2:3.

3. Gerardus Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana* I, ch. 4; St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* I, ch. 1, n. 21.

4. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 6.

5. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I–II (throughout nearly all of Books I and II).

6. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, chs. 40–41; *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, chs. 8 and 12.

7. Innocent I, Epistle to the Council of Carthage; Epistle to the Council of Milevis; Zosimus, Encyclical Epistle to all bishops of the world (cited by St. Augustine, *Ep.* 157 [alias 190], n. 22; cf. Gerardus Vossius, *Historia Pelagiana* I, ch. 13; Cardinal De Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, ch. 16; Marius Mercator, *Commonitorium*, ed. Lucas Holstenius and Christianus Lupus; Cardinal de Aguirre, *Theologia* vol. 3; Benedictine editors, Appendix to *Opera S. Augustini*, tom. X, Antwerp 1700, pp. 42 and 77).

8. Council of Palestine (condemning Pelagius); Council of Carthage, can. 2; Council of Milevis, can. 2; Council of Orange, cans. 1 and 2; Council of Florence; Council of Trent, Session 5, cans. 2, 3, and 4. The words of these canons were drawn from the earlier Councils of Carthage, Milevis, and Orange.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1 (as cited above).

10. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, Part 7, ch. 28; *Summa Sententiarum*, Tract. 3, ch. 10.

11. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 40; *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 3.

12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 1; q. 82, a. 2; q. 82, a. 4.

13. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4.

14. Council of Trent, Session 5, can. 3.

15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3; q. 85, a. 5.

16. Council of Trent, Session 5, can. 1 (condemning the assertion that the first man would have died by necessity of nature whether or not he sinned).

17. Council of Orange, can. 2; St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4; Prosper, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 20; Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione Christi*, ch. 14.

18. This error is noted with reference to the Baianist theses condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs, theses 56 and 58; cf. footnote (a) in the source: "In sin there are two things: act and liability (*reatus*); when the act passes, nothing remains except the liability, which is removed by the Sacrament of Baptism or by the absolution of a priest, and only the proper liability (*proprius reatus*) of sin is thereby lifted."

19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1.

20. Ezek. 18; Jer. 31:29–30.

21. Wis. 12. The true and genuine reading is: "To condemn him who does not deserve punishment you deem foreign to your power" (*Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri, condemnare exterum æstimas a tua virtute*). Note (a) in the source: "And so it is read in the Vulgate Bibles published by order of Sixtus V and confirmed by Clement VIII."

22. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione Christi*, ch. 14 and 15.

23. Maxentius, *Libellus fidei suæ*, ch. 19.

24. Prosper, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 20.

25. Council of Orange, can. 1 and 2.

26. Note (b) in the source: "We have now once, twice, and indeed a third time admonished that the canons of the Caesarean Council of Arles, confirmed by those present at the Council of Orange, were transmitted not by Leo I but by Felix IV."

27. Council of Trent, Session 5, can. 1 and 2.

28. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 22 and 23.

29. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 2 [as cited in the distinction].

30. Albert the Great, *Summa sua*, Part 2, Tract 107, member 1.

31. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 2 (on the present distinction).

32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above (I-II, q. 81, a. 1, etc.).

33. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 2 (loc. cit.).

34. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* V, ch. 1.

35. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 4.

36. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 34; *Contra Julianum* III, ch. 10; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 16.

37. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4, in several places.

38. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 2; St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 3.

39. Bede, *In Cantica* (commentary); St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 6.

40. St. Augustine, *Quæstiones ad Simplicianum*, q. 2.

41. Council of Trent, Session 5, can. 4.

42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2.

43. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7; can. 10 and 11.

44. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, ch. 9 and 10.

45. Council of Trent, Session 5, can. 5.

46. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 6 and 13.

47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 2; q. 82, a. 1; q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 2; q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

49. 1 Cor. 6.

50. Matt. 5.

51. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Justitiae*, ch. 2.

52. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* II, ch. 5.

53. St. Augustine, *De Bono Conjugali*, ch. 21.

54. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 3.

55. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30 (the present distinction), text of the Master.

56. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 26 and 27.

57. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, ch. 23, 24, 25; II, ch. 33.

58. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* II, ch. 3, 5, 9, 10; V, ch. 3; VI, ch. 6, 7, 8.

59. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, ch. 9, 10, 29; II, ch. 4, 19.

60. St. Augustine, Sermon 12 (*de Verbis Apostoli*) [abbreviation as in source].

61. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum 57*.

62. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 15.

63. Rom. 6.

64. Rom. 7.

65. Job 7.

66. Rom. 8.

67. Gal. 5.

68. Rom. 3 (quoting Ps. 13/14).

69. Rom. 3.

70. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum*, q. 2.

71. The footnote (a) appended in the printed edition at this point reads: Although the Author's opinion is altogether free from the error of the Lutheran and Calvinist sectarians, who do not hesitate to assert that the corruption of nature, or concupiscence as it remains in men after justification, is truly and properly sin by its own nature — indeed the Author most invincibly refutes this error below — nevertheless he seems to refer to the opinion of Henricus and Gregorius Ariminensis, who constitute the formal character of original sin, or original sin itself, in two qualities: one in the flesh, one in the soul, yet hold that both concupiscences are original sin; nor do they hesitate to call concupiscence also a later sin in the following distinction (§§ B and C), where he calls it a certain morbid quality which those same authors in the soul especially declare to be original sin. Whatever difficulty the Author's opinion admits, Robertus Cardinalis Bellarminus (*De Statu Peccati*, lib. V, ch. XV and XVI) reviewing the opinions of those authors and of Albert the Great, Ambrosius Pighius, and Catharinus, did not hesitate at the beginning of ch. XV to write: "We have refuted up to this point three errors of the heretics of our time; now two inconvenient opinions of Catholics are to be refuted, which seem also to be able to be called errors." From this censure, however, due regard is to be had for the opinion of our Author, who explains the matter so moderately that he can easily be vindicated from the charge of error.

72. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 3; also II-II, q. 53, a. 1, ad 2.

73. The Apostle's words are from Gal. 5:17 ("The flesh lusts against the spirit"); Gal. 5:19 ("The works of the flesh are manifest, etc."); 1 Cor. 3:3 ("For whereas there is among you jealousy and contention, are you not carnal?"); and Rom. 7:8 ("Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence").

74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 53, a. 1, ad 1.

75. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 2, 3, 4; XV, ch. 7; *Contra Julianum* II, ch. 8 (citing Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose); *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 14 (extending concupiscence to all sensible things); *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 7 (on venereal concupiscence as only a part).

76. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 9, q. 8 (*Ad Algasiam*), treating Rom. 7:7.

77. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 1, at the end of the body.

78. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 30 [abbreviation as in source]; the names listed are: *peccatum originale*, *lex carnis*, *concupiscibilitas*, *fomes peccati*, *concupiscentia*, *lex membrorum*, *languor naturae*, *tyrannus*.

79. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 67.

80. 2 Cor. 5:14; Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), canon 2.

81. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 26.

82. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* I (bk. 5 in Estius's numbering), ch. 9; *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5; *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* I, ch. 22.

83. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 20; *Carmen de Ingratis* [abbreviation as in source].

84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 1; also III, q. 15, a. 2, ad 2.

85. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 13.

86. St. Augustine, Sermon 43 *De Verbis Domini* (= Sermon CXXVII among the Sermons of the First Class, vol. 5 of the Benedictine edition).

87. Jas. 1:13–15.

88. 1 Jn. 2:15–16.

89. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 82 (*Ad Ecclesiam Vercellensem*).

90. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 15, 16 and following; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 13, 14.

91. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 4; II-II, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3.

92. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 35, on the verse "But iniquity he did not hate."

93. St. Augustine, Sermon 8 (*Concio* 8) on Ps. 118, treating the verse "My soul has longed to desire."

94. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 28.

95. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae*, sentence 142.

96. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5 and 6.

97. St. Augustine, Sermon 5 *De Verbis Apostoli* (= Sermon CLIV among the Sermons of the First Class, vol. 5 of the Benedictine edition).

98. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IX, ch. 28 and 29.

99. Col. 3:5.

100. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5.

101. Jude 23: "hating even the garment that is defiled by the flesh."

102. Job 9:31: "And my garments shall abominate me." St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, in the place cited just above (bk. IX, ch. 28 and 29).

103. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5.

104. The question of the sense in which the concupiscence of the reborn is called "sin" by the Apostle is deferred to dist. 33.

105. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1; II-II, q. 108, a. 4; III, q. 84, a. 2, ad 1.

106. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14.

107. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 34, a. 2: "Aversion from God would not have the character of guilt unless it were voluntary. Hence the formal character of guilt consists in voluntary aversion."

108. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, chs. 11, 14, and 15; *De peccato originali*, ch. 28; *Contra Julianum* III, ch. 5; *Enchiridion*, ch. 46.

109. St. Augustine, *Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* I, ch. 22.

110. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 26.

111. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 20.

112. Council of Orange (Arausican Council), canon 1.

113. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* III, ch. 12: "There would be no guilt of man, if he had been created by God such as he is now born."

114. St. Augustine, *Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* I, ch. 13.

115. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 1.

116. The reference is to Estius's own commentary above, at dist. 18 of Book II of the *Sentences*, where he discusses the formation of Eve from Adam's rib.

117. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* [abbreviation as in source], bk. 1 (lib. I), chs. 5–6, final chapter. [Estius's marginal note reads: "lib. I. (de Genitis p. 5. 6. cap. ult.)"; text as in source.]

118. Peter Comestor, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, ch. 78.

119. The reference is to Estius's own commentary at dist. 44 of Book IV of the *Sentences*, on the resurrection of the body.

120. See the place cited above in the commentary (dist. 18), on the formation of woman from the rib and the multiplication of the five loaves.

121. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 11.

122. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 1 (as above).

123. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 14.

124. Cf. Mk. 7:19: "purging all foods" (*purgans omnes escas*).

125. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 14 (same passage as cited above for the second objection).

126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 2, ad 4; III, q. 31, a. 1; *In I Sent.*, dist. 6, 7, 8.

127. That is, from what was said in the preceding sections of this distinction.

128. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* X, chs. 19–20.

129. The fuller treatment is promised at dist. 3 of Book II of the *Sentences* [abbreviation as in source: "circa dist. 3. l.2."].

130. St. Jerome, *Dialogus adversus Luciferianos* [as cited by Estius in this context].

131. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 2 and following.

132. The reference is to Estius's commentary at dist. 17 of this book (Book II of the *Sentences*), where the opinion on the transmission of souls is discussed.

DISTINCTIO XXXI — ON THE MODE OF TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN (*DE MODO PROPAGATIONIS PECCATI ORIGINALIS*)

§ 1. This mode of explanation is indicated by St. Augustine[1] — where he says among other things that Christ therefore did not have the flesh of sin, because what He received from His mother He either purified before assuming it, or purified it in the very act of assuming. The Master (in the text) follows this declaration,[2] and after him Innocent III[3] — where the following words are read: "From sanctified and corrupted seeds a body is conceived that is equally corrupted and defiled, into which the soul, when at last infused, is corrupted and defiled — not from the integrity or purity which it had, but from that which it would have had if it were not united to a defiled and corrupted body, since it is both created in the act of infusion and infused in the act of creation." So he writes, adding also a comparison about a liquid drawing corruption from a corrupted vessel. The foundation of this view seems to be had from Scripture, which calls human seed a "filthy humour" (Lev. 15),[4] and the menstrual flow of a woman is held to be the height of uncleanness, whereas the seed of wheat or of other things is nowhere called unclean. Thus Job 14: "Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed?"[5] And another passage of the same book seems to look to that same uncleanness, ch. 25: "Can one born of a woman appear clean?" — for which the Seventy rendered: "No one is clean from filth, not even an infant," etc. It must also be noted that in Lev. 15 uncleanness is contracted from the flux of seed and of the menses, but not from the flux of blood or of phlegm, nor of other humours, nor indeed from the flux of the most fetid excrement, whether from dysentery or from the flow of urine.

§ 2. Another mode of this propagation is if it is said that it pertains to the original institution of human nature that, while the first man kept the justice in which he was created, God would have given that same justice to all his posterity in each one's own origin; but that man forsaking justice, God would not indeed cease to bring nature into being in the posterity to be born from him, yet would not give the justice which that man had received on behalf of himself and all his posterity and had abandoned. Although therefore the soul is not born by way of traducianism but is infused by God, yet because at the first moment of its existence it is the soul of a man nascent from Adam, it is justly denied that from which it comes to be good, and without which it can only be evil. Original sin is therefore contracted according to this mode, because from parents the body is received, to which God — lest He fail the propagation of the nature He has instituted — does indeed join a soul, but one devoid of justice; and this by reason of the original institution of man of which we have spoken. This mode of the propagation of sin is suggested by St. Cyril[6] and more clearly by St. Anselm.[7] Furthermore, it must be known that according to this declaration as well, sin is contracted by the soul through the flesh — not in the sense that the flesh, or the seed from which the flesh is made, has a defilement by which the soul is infected (for those who hand on this mode hold that even from an uninfected seed, so long as it has proceeded from Adam by the common law of generation, men will be born subject to original sin), but only in the sense that man, whose substance the rational soul constitutes, is not a son of Adam except by means of the flesh.

But since privation of justice does not necessarily follow upon sin or injustice — for God could create a soul that was neither unjust — it seems altogether that nothing is to be acknowledged in the seed of the parent or in the flesh of the newborn from which the infused soul contracts corruption and sin according to the former mode; and therefore, in order that the propagation of sin be fully and sufficiently explained, we think that former mode must be conjoined with this latter one.

§ II — Original sin is contracted even from just parents (Peccatum originale contrahi etiam ex parentibus justis)

§ 3. From the general teaching, shown in the previous distinction, that every man who is conceived by the common law of generation is born with original sin, it follows as a consequence that this sin is contracted also from those parents in whom it has been blotted out and remitted by regeneration — and absolutely from parents who are just and holy. And this is to be held with certain faith, against the heresy once of the Pelagians and today of certain more recent ones, namely Zwingli and Calvin, who teach that baptism is not necessary for those born of baptized parents, on the ground that they do not contract sin from them, or at any rate that on account of the parents from whose seed they are born the sin is not imputed to them. Against this dogma, besides the general testimony of the Scriptures, there protests the perpetual tradition and practice of the Church. The tradition, indeed, by which the Church has always held and believed that the children even of faithful and just parents stand in need of the sacrament of regeneration. The practice, by which it has always baptized infants as well in the remission of original sin — as St. Augustine teaches in many places:[9] There is also a clear testimony to this matter in Leo.[10] Wherefore the Fathers of the Council of Trent deservedly pronounced anathema against those who deny that infants newly born from their mothers' wombs, even if they have been born of baptized parents, are to be baptized in the remission of original sin.[11]

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§ III — Reply to the objections of the heretics (Responsio ad objectiones Haereticorum)

§ 4. Against this Catholic faith the Pelagians once brought an objection, as St. Augustine records[2]: "If baptism cleanses that ancient sin, then those who are born of two baptized parents ought to be free of this sin. For parents cannot transmit to their children what they themselves do not have." To this it must be replied, following St. Augustine — both in the same place and in his more exact treatment of this difficulty[14] — that concupiscence, which is the very sin of our origin, passes away in the baptized as regards its guilt (*reatus*), yet remains as an act (*actu*). For concupiscence, or the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), remains in the baptized, as the Fathers of the Council of Trent teach;[15] yet it remains having lost the true formal character (*ratio*) of sin, as is to be explained more fully in connection with the following distinction. From that remaining oldness of concupiscence, says St. Augustine, that which is born has need of being reborn in order to be healed, "because the parents, though faithful and reborn spiritually, having been born carnally, begot children carnally; but those children, before they were born, could not be reborn. Because therefore the parents, though reborn, beget not from the spirit by which they are reborn, but from the flesh which is still old — for this reason they beget children corrupted both in mind and in flesh; because, as Scripture says, 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh'" (Jn. 3:6). St. Augustine employs for the clarification of this matter certain familiar examples: as from

the seed of the cultivated olive the wild olive is born; from the purified grain of wheat, chaffy wheat; from the seed of the vine, the wild vine. And finally what comes closer to the present subject: from a circumcised father a son is born uncircumcised — thus it does not seem absurd that from baptized and righteous parents a child infected with original sin should be born.[16]

§ 5. Another argument the Pelagians brought forward was from the Apostle (1 Cor. 7), which is recounted by St. Augustine[17] in these words: "The Apostle says: 'Your children would be unclean; but now they are holy' — and therefore the children of the faithful ought by no means to be baptized." To this St. Augustine correctly replies (in the very next chapter) that there is a manifold sanctification not only of things but also of persons, which nevertheless does not necessarily of itself bring with it the remission of sins. For even catechumens, before they are baptized, are in a certain manner sanctified through the sign of Christ and the prayer of the laying-on of hands — yet that sanctification avails them not at all for the remission of sins. And secondly, according to the same place of the Apostle, the unbelieving spouse is sanctified through the believing spouse. Yet no one has understood this as meaning that the unbelieving spouse, as though already sanctified, has no need either of conversion to the faith or of the sacrament of faith in order to obtain salvation. Therefore what the Apostle says — both that children are sanctified in their parents and that the unbelieving spouse is sanctified in the believing one — is rightly understood, in accordance with the custom of Sacred Scripture, as referring to a certain preparation for true holiness and righteousness. For the consent of the unbelieving spouse, not refusing to cohabit without injury to Christ with the believing spouse, is a certain preparation both of that unbelieving spouse and of all the children for receiving the Christian religion; and at the same time it effects that, by the example either of the spouse or of the other parent, they cultivate Christian uprightness and abstain from those impurities by which the Gentiles are accustomed to be defiled against nature.

§ 6. The third argument of Calvin is drawn from the promise made to Abraham and his seed (Gen. 17), where God promises to be the God of Abraham himself and of his seed forever. Whence Calvin concludes that by the very fact that someone is the seed of Abraham, the promise made to Abraham pertains to him. But the reply is manifest: that promise, understood of spiritual blessing, pertains not to the carnal seed of Abraham but to the spiritual seed, just as the Apostle himself interpreted it (Rom. 4; Rom. 9). For if you understand it of the carnal seed, then that promise will pertain to no one from among the Gentiles, but only to those born according to the flesh from Abraham and Isaac. If, however, it is to be understood of the spiritual seed — as it truly must be understood — then this argument avails nothing for the case of unbaptized infants, since they do not become children of Abraham except through baptism.

§ 7. There is also brought forward that text of Rom. 11: "If the first-fruit is holy, so is the lump; and if the root is holy, so also are the branches" — hence, if the parent is holy, so too are the children, especially since the Apostle wishes this to be understood of the Jewish people descended from the holy Patriarchs. But it is answered: the Apostle uses this comparison for no other purpose than to teach by it, as a probable argument, that the Jews have a greater share in the grace of God than the Gentiles, by reason of the fact that their fathers were holy and had received the promises. And because it ordinarily comes about through upbringing and instruction that posterity cultivates the same religion and piety as their forebears, it is fitting that the Jewish people, descended from holy fathers, should retain their holiness as if by hereditary right. This, however, has not occurred in the case of many of them on account of their own personal wickedness, whereby many of them, like branches violently broken from the tree to which they naturally adhered, have fallen away from the

holiness of their ancestors. One may also briefly respond, following St. Augustine,[18] that that "first-fruit" is to be understood from the communion of the sacrament and the likeness of faith, not from mortal descent.

§ 8. Again, they will object that Isaac was born according to the Spirit, not according to the flesh (Gal. 4), and therefore that in the type of Isaac all children of the promise are born according to the Spirit. I reply: Isaac is said to have been born according to the Spirit not because he was not born subject to the flesh and to sin — according to that text of Jn. 3: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh" — but because he was born above the natural power of the flesh, from an aged father and a mother who was barren, conceived according to the promise and born of a sterile womb.

§ 9. Finally, there is also objected that text of Wis. 8, where the Wise Man, speaking of his own birth, says that he obtained a good soul and came to a body undefiled. St. Augustine replies[19] that this Scripture can be understood of Christ. For He alone obtained a soul good in every way, and He alone came to a body wholly undefiled. But because, as St. Augustine himself admonishes, not everything that is said there can be accommodated to Christ — and especially not that in which the Wise Man says he was conceived from the seed of a man — the truer reply is that the good soul in that passage is to be understood not in the goodness of character or of justifying grace, but in the goodness of natural disposition; which is, to be sure, a certain inclination and propensity toward many acts of the virtues. In this same way it seems one must understand what is said in Sir. 1: that the fear of the Lord is said to have been created together with the faithful in the womb; and what holy Job says (Job 31) about mercy having gone forth with him from his mother's womb — unless perhaps someone prefers to recognize a hyperbole in such expressions, or divine predestination, as in Jer. 1.

§ IV — Original sin remitted through baptism (Peccatum originale remitti per baptismum)

§ 10. Against original sin, the remedy of baptism has been divinely instituted, in which both this sin and all other sins whatsoever that have been contracted thereafter by personal action are remitted — as the most certain faith and perpetual tradition of the Church holds. This remedy was instituted at Jn. 3, the Lord saying: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Wishing to intimate the rationale of this institution of His, the Lord added: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit." As if He were saying: since every man is born of the flesh — that is, of carnal and unclean seed, inasmuch as it has been vitiated from its very origin — it follows that he himself also is flesh: that is, carnal, unclean, and defiled by sin. But since flesh cannot possess the kingdom of God, it is necessary that the man born of flesh be reborn of the Spirit, so that he himself may thereby become spirit — that is, spiritual, and conformed to the divine law.

§ 11. To this effect, therefore, Christ instituted the remedy of baptism, and instituted it in such a way that without it no one can be made spirit from flesh and enter the kingdom of God. Concerning this remedy St. Augustine speaks thus[10]: "The gift of baptism has been given against original sin, namely that which was contracted by birth through generation, and which regeneration removes. And yet it also takes away actual sins as well — whatever sins of the heart, mouth, and deed it shall have found." Hence it comes about that Scripture everywhere in general names the remission of sins as the effect of baptism, as in Acts 2: "Let each of

you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins." And Acts 22: "Be baptized and wash away your sins." And because that remission of sins does not take place without an interior renewal of the mind, for this same reason that sacrament is called in sacred letters the washing of regeneration and renewal (*lavacrum regenerationis ac renovationis*), as at Tit. 3 and 1 Pet. 1. Elsewhere Scripture attributes to it the cleansing of the person, as at Eph. 5: "Cleansing her by the washing of water in the word"; and Jn. 13: "He who is washed has no need except to wash his feet, but is wholly clean"; and Ezek. 36: "I will pour out upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your uncleannesses." Finally, the full effect of baptism was expressed by the Apostle in these words (1 Cor. 6): "And such indeed you were; but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified."

§ 12. That in baptism is conferred a full remission both of original sin and of all other sins, is the constant and certain doctrine of all the Fathers, and in particular of St. Augustine, in whom the chief passages on this matter to be noted are the following:[22] It must also be noted that St. Augustine says,[23] that Christ alone as mediator, and baptized infants, are in this life free from every sin. Rightly therefore the Fathers of the Council of Trent definitively declared, under anathema,[15] that through the grace of baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted and everything is taken away that has the true and proper formal character of sin. But a fuller explanation of this doctrine is partly to be awaited from what follows, and partly to be sought from the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, where (at the fourth distinction) the proper treatment of baptism and its effects is given.

§ V — How the remission of original sin comes about (Quomodo peccati originalis fiat remissio)

§ 13. In order that we may explain the mode of remission (*modus remissionis*) of original sin, it must be known that, for the remission of any sin whatever — both actual and original — there is before all else required that sin not have dominion over the man, but that his mind either in act (*actu*) or at least in habit (*habitu*) be displeased with it, and that there be in him a purpose of a better life. Hence it is that Scripture everywhere requires conversion, repentance, and a change of life for the better as prior to the remission of sin — and this indeed according to the demand of the natural law, which does not permit sin to be remitted to one who still perseveres in delight in it. But beyond this it is necessary that the guilt (*reatus*) contracted by sin — that is, the obligation to punishment arising from sin — be dissolved and abolished. When that dissolution has been accomplished, the sin is truly and fully remitted.

§ 14. Now although between actual sin and original sin there is this difference — that actual sin passes away in act (*actu*) yet remains in guilt until it is remitted, whereas original sin, when its guilt is remitted, remains in act — they nevertheless agree in this, that just as actual sin is not dismissed unless it ceases to be, so original sin is not remitted unless it ceases to be sin: that is, unless the true and proper formal character of sin (*vera et propria peccati ratio*) is removed from it. Now that formal character is removed when the dominion of concupiscence (*dominium concupiscentiae*) is taken away, so that the will no longer takes pleasure in it nor does it draw the will toward unlawful desires. This is the doctrine of St. Augustine in many places:[25]

§ 15. Nor indeed does the Master dissent from this account, seeing that he — as St. Bonaventure teaches, and rightly proves from certain passages of St. Augustine — teaches that original sin is remitted to the

baptized, partly because through the grace of baptism the vice of concupiscence is weakened and diminished, so that it no longer reigns in the man; and partly because the guilt itself is dissolved. The same thing has been sufficiently indicated in the words of the Council of Trent,[15] in which, explaining the remission of original sin, the Fathers say that its guilt (*reatus*) is remitted through the grace of Christ, and that moreover all that is taken away which has the true and proper formal character of sin. And that is the dominion of concupiscence, whereby the mind, turned away from God and toward earthly things, is buried in desires.

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1. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 3; *De peccatorum meritis* II, chs. 25 and 26.
2. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, dist. 31 (in the text).
3. Innocent III, *In expositione Ps. 5*, on the verse "Behold, for in iniquities."
4. Lev. 15 (referred to in the text as "Lev. 25" — the source reads "Lev. 25" but the page image confirms "Lev. 15"; corrected accordingly in context).
5. Job 14.
6. St. Cyril, *De Incarnatione Unigeniti*, ch. 3.
7. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 5; *De Libero Arbitrio*, ch. 22.
8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2.
9. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis* II, chs. 9, 25, 26, 27, and 28; *De peccatorum meritis* III, chs. 8 and 9; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, chs. 22 and 33; *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 3; *De peccato originali*, ch. 39; *De Sancta Virginitate*, ch. 7.
10. Leo the Great, *Epistola* 86.
11. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 4.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above [i.e., the cross-reference given in the prior section].
13. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* III, ch. 8.
14. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, chs. 9, 28, and 29.
15. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5.
16. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 3; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, chs. 32 and 33; *De Peccatorum Meritis* III, chs. 8 and 9.
17. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 25.
18. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 196 (to Paulinus), ch. VI, no. XX (in the Benedictine edition).
19. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, ch. 18.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 69, aa. 1, 2, 3.
21. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 64.
22. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, ch. 17; *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, chs. 27 and 28; *De Peccatorum Meritis* II [ch. 27 and 28]; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 22; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* II [ch. 16]; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, ch. 25; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II [ch. 25]; *Contra Litteras Petiliani* [lib. 2, ch. 103].
23. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XX, ch. 26.
24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2; q. 81, a. 3, ad 2; q. 113; III, q. 69.
25. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, chs. 25, 26, and 27; *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, ch. 39; *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, chs. 28 and 46 [abbreviation as in source]; *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 13; *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 19.

DISTINCTIO XXXII — ON CONCUPISCENCE IN THE BAPTIZED, AND RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE CONCUPISCENTIA IN RENATIS*)

§ 1. It must be noted that between these two things — namely, the guilt (*reatus*) of sin and the dominion (*dominium*) of sin — the relation is such that the guilt cannot be dissolved unless the dominion of sin is first removed, either in time or by nature, whereas the dominion of sin can be taken away while its guilt still remains, until it is dissolved through the sacrament or in some other way. And indeed in infants these two things happen simultaneously in time, while in adults they happen successively.[1]

Now that the very dominion of concupiscence (*concupiscentiae dominium*) is overthrown and extinguished in the baptized, both in infants and in adults, Sacred Scripture declares in several places. In Jn. 3: "What is born of the Spirit is spirit" — that is, whoever has been reborn through the Spirit has been made spiritual, so that the flesh no longer has dominion over him. Likewise in Rom. 6, where the Apostle says that the baptized are dead to sin and buried together with Christ, and "as Christ rose from the dead, so let us walk in newness of life," and what follows. All of which signifies that the yoke and dominion of sin have been taken away from the baptized. Again in chapter 8, speaking of the baptized: "They that are in the flesh," he says, "cannot please God; but you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit." And below: "If Christ be in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit liveth because of justification." And in Col. 1, he says the faithful are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand — that is, with a spiritual circumcision, which consists in the cutting away and removal of carnal desires (*carnalium desideriorum*), not that they should not exist, but that they should not reign in us. And in 1 Jn. 3: "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed abideth in him." To the same purpose belong the passages of Scripture cited above to teach that through baptism we are cleansed and sanctified — none of which is consistent with the dominion of concupiscence.

§ 2. Furthermore, St. Augustine's view on this matter may be discerned both from other passages and from his letter to Vitalem, which is letter 107,[2] where he affirms that the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) of infants is freed through baptism from the power of darkness; and that, although this does not appear in infancy, yet when they have come to the age of reason, they have a will consenting to the saving doctrine in which they have been nurtured. And in Book I of *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, chapter 9,[3] he says that Christ infuses into the faithful a hidden grace of His Spirit, which He infuses gently into infants and works in them illumination and justification inwardly. Wherefore, what was declared at the Council of Vienne under Clement V — that the more probable opinion, which holds that habits of the virtues are infused into infants through baptism — is the same thing defined absolutely in the Council of Trent, Session 7, chapter 7,[4] not only with respect to infants but generally with respect to all who receive the grace of justification.[5]

§ III — That concupiscence does not cease to be in the baptized is proved from Scripture (Concupiscentiam in renatis non esse peccatum probatur ex Scriptura)

§ 3. In the baptized, while they sojourn in this corruptible body, concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) remains as a tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*), from which arise evil motions by which we are solicited to sin; and against this a perpetual struggle must be maintained by the faithful in this life — this is sufficiently established both by the experience of the faithful and by the authority of Sacred Scripture, which frequently exhorts to this kind of struggle, and is confirmed by the testimonies of all the Doctors, especially St. Augustine. Concerning this matter the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5,[7] speak as follows: "This holy Synod confesses and perceives that concupiscence or the tinder (*fomes*) remains in the baptized."

It has been shown above that concupiscence is evil and must be opposed, not only in the wicked and impious, but even in holy men, as that which is opposed to God and to His law and solicits to transgression of it.

§ 4. Now, since, as we showed a little earlier, concupiscence does not have dominion over those who have been reborn through the grace of Christ, nor does it drag them to transgression of the divine law, it follows that in them, once its guilt is removed, it truly cannot be called sin. For, as the Fathers of the Council of Trent (at the same place) teach following St. Augustine, Book I, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, chapter 25,[8] since concupiscence is left behind for the combat, it cannot harm those who do not consent to it but manfully resist it through the grace of Christ. This same point, therefore — namely, that concupiscence in the baptized is not sin in the proper sense of the name — contrary to the novel dogma of almost all the Sectarians of this age, must be more fully demonstrated by us. Now the proof of this matter is manifold, which we shall thus arrange: the first from Scripture, the second from the teaching of the Fathers, the third from reasons.

First: The primary and open proof from Sacred Scripture is the saying of the Apostle in Rom. 8, that there is nothing of condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh; because the law of the spirit of life has freed them from the law of sin and death.[9] With this passage the Fathers of the Council of Trent (in the aforesaid canon) also made use for the confirmation of this teaching, understanding by "condemnation" metonymically sin deserving of condemnation or punishment; and that the baptized do not walk according to the flesh we showed above, and it is sufficiently manifest from the context of the same chapter.

§ 5. Likewise the Apostle James, in chapter 1 of his Epistle, does not locate sin in the fact that a person has concupiscence in himself, or even that he is tempted by it, experiencing its evil motions and enticements — concerning which he says: "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured"; but rather in the fact that by coveting he extorts consent: "For concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin," says the Apostle. Hence Bede, writing on that passage of James, and St. Augustine in Book I, *On the City of God*, chapter 16,[10] vindicate from sin even the delight aroused by concupiscence, so long as the chaste mind resists it. And Prosper, Book III, *On the Contemplative Life*, chapter 2,[11] says: "We sin not by feeling concupiscence within us, but by consenting to it."

Another Scripture text is Gal. 5, where the Apostle teaches that the baptized bring forth the fruits of the spirit, and therefore against such there is no law — namely, one that might punish their sins. And the Apostle

contrasts two things: not attaining the kingdom of God, and there being no law against someone; of which the former he attributes to those doing the works of the flesh, the latter to those who bring forth the fruits of the spirit. Similar is the passage 1 Tim. 1: "The law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust," etc. — therefore in the baptized and just man there is nothing which the law can punish.

§ 6. Furthermore, the Lord in the Gospel, Jn. 3, having said that he who does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, lest his works be reproved, added: "But he that doth truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God." This would certainly not be true if the concupiscence of the baptized man, and the motions arising from it, were sins — and indeed sins of such a kind as to infect and besmirch the whole body of his actions, as the adversaries maintain. Nor, if it were so, would Scripture compare the justifications — that is, the just works — of the saints to fine linen bright and splendid (Rev. 19), but rather to menstruous rags, to which we read that the righteousness of the Pharisees is compared (Is. 64). To this point belongs finally what we showed above, that through the sacrament of baptism original sin is remitted, and remitted in such a way that by that remission a man is made truly clean, holy, and just.

§ IV — From the Fathers it is taught that neither concupiscence in the baptized nor its involuntary motions are sins (Ex Patribus docetur, neque concupiscentiam renatorum, neque motus ejus involuntarios esse peccata)

§ 7. Since the Sectarians teach indifferently both concerning the concupiscence of the baptized and concerning its involuntary motions that they are sins in the proper sense, and claim that for this reason both of them must be shown to be of their number — for it is indeed the same question of the present business — therefore, to refute their teaching, I will show from the sentences of the Fathers that neither the habitual concupiscence of the baptized, nor its actual motions, so long as the will in no way consents to them, can rightly be imputed as sin, nor are they sins at all. Therefore, besides the passages of Augustine and of Bede cited a little above, which expressly admit no sin without any consent (and besides what we noted above at Dist. 21)[13] where it could be asked whether a temptation of the flesh might exist without sin, there are other passages of the Fathers by which the Catholic faith, against this error, is most openly confirmed.

§ 8. For St. Augustine, Book II, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, chapter 4,[14] says of concupiscence: "It is born with little ones; in the baptized it is dissolved as to guilt; in adults it is left behind for the combat, to be harmful to none of those who do not consent to it." And Book II, *On Genesis against the Manichees*, chapter 14,[15] he says: "Sometimes reason, even when vigorously aroused, restrains and curbs concupiscence; and when this happens, we are not forthwith drowned in sin, but are crowned with some measure of struggle." And Book I, *Against the Second Epistle of the Pelagians*, chapter 13,[16] on concupiscence, he says: "Do not impute to us concupiscence itself, whose guilt has now been washed away by the bath of regeneration, as they say in the baptismal prayer: Forgive us our debts — not for the sins that have been committed, but for those that happen or for the consents thereto," etc. Similar things he teaches in the same book, chapter 14; and likewise *Against Julian*, Book 2, chapters 3, 8, 9, and 10; and Book 6, chapters 5 and 6; and in *On the Work of Monks*, chapter 50; and Book III, *On the City*, chapter 18; and Book I, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, chapter 23; and Book II, *On Genesis against the Manichees*, chapter 34; and *On the Letter to the Galatians*, chapter 15. Nor does St. Augustine simply wish concupiscence in the baptized, or its involuntary motions, to

be called sins, because God does not impute them as sins to them; as if in truth, according to God's judgment and estimation, it were a sin, but God in his reputation does not wish it to be a sin — but because in reality in them the formal character (*ratio*) of sin is no longer found in it.

§ 9. Likewise the various passages of St. Augustine can be noted, in which he teaches that parents who are just transmit original sin, which they do not possess.[17] To the same view belong also these passages of other Fathers: St. Ambrose in *On Arca and Noah*, chapter 9;[18] Hilary cited by St. Augustine, Book II, *Against Julian*, chapter 9;[19] St. Jerome writing in Matt. 5 on the passage "Who shall have seen a woman" etc.;[20] Epiphanius in *Against the Heresy of Origen*,[21] where he cites the words of Methodius declaring that the saints exercise justice without admixture of sin; likewise St. John Chrysostom, Homily 50 on Matthew;[22] and St. Cyril, Book 4;[23] and finally, to hold this opinion as certain and indubitable, the consent of all the later Schools of Theologians — in that all agree on this, that not all motions of concupiscence are sins. Wherefore rightly Leo X condemned as the first error, in the bull of condemnation of the articles of Luther,[24] and then the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5,[7] anathematized it.[25]

§ V — Proof of the same teaching through reasons (Ejusdem doctrinae probatio per rationes)

§ 10. That this Catholic doctrine is entirely in accord with reason, it is not difficult to confirm it by several arguments.

The first argument is drawn from the definition of sin. For the proper formal character of sin (*ratio peccati*) is completed only with what is voluntary; nor is any injustice rightly punished in a man for something which is not in some way voluntary; and the rape which a girl suffers against her will is altogether exempt from punishment by law. And it is by Rom. 7 that the Apostle so excuses the involuntary motions that he says: "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me" — therefore they are not properly sins. Hence it follows most rightly that there is nothing of condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. Wherefore the orthodox Fathers, and especially St. Augustine, constantly teach against the Manichees that voluntariness belongs to the formal character of sin, as in *On True Religion*, chapter 14:[27] "So greatly," he says, "is sin a voluntary evil that in no way is it sin if it be not voluntary." And Book I, *Retractions*, chapter 13 and 15.[28]

§ 11. The second argument, which has its foundation from Scripture itself, is this: That which is less voluntary is less a sin. For so the Lord says in Lk. 12: "The servant who knew not the will of his Lord, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." And Jas. 4: "To him who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin." This is so because, just as knowledge increases voluntariness, so ignorance diminishes it; and therefore diminishes the formal character of sin. Therefore where voluntariness is wholly lacking, the formal character of sin (*ratio peccati*) will also be wholly lacking.

§ 12. The third argument is taken from the opposite, namely from a good act. For however much a good act may be in a man which is at the same time voluntary according to a secondary mode — that is, if it be not done by one who is willing but by one who is unwilling, and be done without any willing on his part — it merits no praise, because, as Ecclesiasticus 14 says: "If thou hast done good, know that thou hast done it ignorantly and not willingly." Hence neither the Devil nor Judas the traitor, although delivering Christ to death, merit much praise in the elect — and what more properly pertains to the purpose, neither usurers nor

fornicators are to be praised for the holy thoughts and inspirations to which their conscience is touched from time to time, when they receive them with a non-consenting will — as St. Augustine teaches (*To Simplicianus*, Book 1)[29] and St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 21, a. 2.[30] Therefore neither do they who feel the motions of concupiscence and the evil agitations of it unwillingly incur blame or punishment; and accordingly these are not sins. For every sin deserves blame and punishment.

§ 13. The last argument: Every sin is a human act; but the involuntary motions of concupiscence are not human acts; for they do not proceed from the mind or from reason, but arise while reason is resisting — so that it is truly said by the Apostle: "Now I work that" not, and therefore they are not properly sins.

§ VI — Resolution of the objections raised by the heretics (Solutio eorum ab Haereticis objiciuntur)

§ 14. Although the reply to several arguments by which the Catholic doctrine is impugned should be sought at *around Dist. 21*,[32] where the triple temptation is treated, yet since this dispute is more proper to this place, and there are certain other arguments which the adversaries urge, these must now be answered.

The first, therefore, are the plain words of the Apostle which the heretics bring forward, in which he calls evil dwelling once and again in the flesh of the baptized "sin," in Rom. 7 and chapter 6, saying thus: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body to obey the lusts thereof"; and again: "For sin shall not have dominion over you." To this objection the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5,[7] respond that the Catholic Church has never understood that concupiscence, as said by the Apostle, is sin which is truly and properly sin in the baptized, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. This reply is taken from various passages of St. Augustine — at the same places cited above from various books. Alibi tamen absolute negat peccatum esse, usque adeo ut affirmet, Book II, *On the Merits of Sinners*, chapter 28,[33] that this evil in the baptized is overcome and slain — overcome, that is, so that it does not reign; slain, so that it does not live, except — he says — "if it in some manner by consent takes mastery and is called back into its own dominion." To this also belong the passages of St. Augustine by which he teaches that just parents transmit sin which they do not have.

§ 15. Moreover, the passages of other Fathers can be adduced to the same opinion: St. Ambrose in *On Arca and Noah*, chapter 9;[18] Hilary, cited by St. Augustine, Book II, *Against Julian*, chapter 9;[19] St. Jerome, writing on Matt. 5, on the passage "Who shall have seen a woman";[34] Epiphanius, *Against the Heresy of Origen*,[21] where he cites the words of Methodius declaring that the saints exercise justice without admixture of sin; likewise St. John Chrysostom, Homily 50 on Matthew;[22] St. Cyril, Book 4;[23] and, in fine, all the later Schools of Theologians concede this as certain and indubitable, in that all agree on this, that not all motions of concupiscence are sins. Wherefore Leo X rightly condemned as the first of the errors in the bull of condemnation of the articles of Luther,[35] and then the Fathers of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5,[7] anathematized it.

Reply: We reply, concerning concupiscence which is in the baptized, that it does not in this sense — as said by the Apostle — repugn the law of the mind, or the law of God, or concupisce against the spirit; as if it itself, or its desires, were prohibited by the precept *Non concupisces* ("Thou shalt not covet"), or as if they were truly the disobedience of the law — as some wrongly understood it. For precepts are given only to the will; but

it has hitherto been said only that it now inclines and solicits to transgression of the law, that is, to sin properly speaking, and thus it strives against the law of concupiscence insofar as it strives against the law itself.

§ 16. Another argument: Concupiscence before baptism is truly sin; therefore — for the nature of it is not changed through baptism, but the same remains. It is answered that concupiscence does not remain in the baptized with the formal character of sin; because before baptism it dominates the mind, whether in act or in virtue of the voluntary will; but afterward baptism it is overcome, and put to death, and made involuntary — and therefore the formal character of sin ceases to be in it. So teaches St. Augustine, Book II, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, chapters 27 and 28,[36] and Book II, *Against Julian*, chapter 9;[37] and Book 14, *On the Trinity*, chapter 17,[38] who compares concupiscence which is before baptism to a fever and a dart fixed in a body; but that which remains after baptism, to the languor left over from a fever, and to the wound remaining when the dart is removed. Moreover, that the dominion of concupiscence has been taken away from the baptized has been sufficiently demonstrated above.

§ 17. Fourth: In the baptized who are holy there remains an iniquity against which they must constantly struggle — as Ambrose testifies, *On Isaac and the Soul*, chapter 8[39] — and this is cited by St. Augustine, Book I, *Against Julian*, chapter 5.[40] But every iniquity is a sin — 1 Jn. 5. It is answered from the same passage of St. Augustine, where, explaining the mind of Ambrose, he says that concupiscence whose guilt has been remitted in a sacred font is called an iniquity for this reason — that it is iniquitous for the flesh to concupisce against the spirit, even if one does not consent to it — which is an iniquity, not because it is sin, not because it is an evil disordered vice and displeasing to God and disposing to sin, but because the formal character (*ratio*) of sin is lacking only the assent of the will. In this sense the same St. Augustine, Book VI, *Against Julian*, chapter 8,[41] says there is no iniquity when the lower members struggle against the higher, even if they conquer, provided they are not consented to. And Hilary (*in Ps. 52*)[42] pronounces generally that it is iniquitous which is outside the law. And indeed iniquity is broader than sin — as is established from Ambrose, who is the author (*in Apologia David*, chapter 13)[43] — saying that in baptism all sin is taken away, but that the whole iniquity cannot be removed except in the resurrection.

Furthermore, the saying of John: "Every iniquity is sin," as the context of the passage makes clear, is to be understood of that iniquity which a man himself commits — not of that of which Paul says: "I work that not."

§ 18. Fifth: St. Jerome, writing on Matt. 5, chapter 5, on the passage "Who shall have seen a woman" etc., calls this — *προπαθείαν* — a kind of propassion, by which, namely, the mind is stirred without consent, though it has the culpability of vice, yet is not held in guilt. But the ready reply is that by the name of *culpa* Jerome did not mean to signify what is properly sin, but only this: the propensity, though consent has not yet been elicited, merits on account of this that it be blamed or reproved — as it is something to be reproved and overcome. Such things are said in defence of the teaching of the Author, lest so rigid a censure of Bellarmin as is worthy of censure should be seen. But we by no means follow him; for in all things we profess to follow St. Thomas, who in all the Schools is found to be of a thoroughly false and utterly groundless opinion.

For St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 3,[44] most clearly affirms that the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; and that the disordering of the other powers of the soul has the character of something material in original sin. *The disorder*, says St. Thomas, *of the other powers of the soul is principally in that they are turned to mutable good;*

which disordering is indeed concupiscence. And thus original sin is materially indeed concupiscence, but formally it is the defect of original justice. And in the same place, q. 86, a. 1,[45] he explains the stain (*macula*) left on the soul from sin through a certain defect of the brightness of the soul on account of recession from the light of reason or of the divine law; which stain, however, he teaches ceases through the infusion of grace — with no mention made of the removal of concupiscence itself or of the overturning of the dominion of concupiscence. "Stain," says the Holy Doctor, "imports a certain defect of brightness on account of recession from the light of reason, or of the divine law; and therefore so long as a man remains outside this light, the stain of sin remains in him; but when he returns to the light of reason and to the divine light, which happens through grace, then the stain ceases."

§ 19. Finally, before our eyes must be held the two Bajian articles 48 and 49,[46] among the rest condemned by the Holy Apostolic See. The first of them is of this kind: "Original sin is voluntary by the habitual will and dominates the infant habitually; by reason of his not carrying a contrary act of will." Now this article has nothing in common with the teaching of our Author, who openly teaches and proves that original sin is not therefore called voluntary in the infant because the infant does not carry a contrary will — since above, at Dist. 30, § 14,[47] he teaches that original sin is called voluntary partly from the will of the first Parent, from which as efficient cause this evil was propagated in his posterity, partly from the will of each individual in whom it is this sin — namely for this reason, that although their will was never in act, yet in reality it is infected with the vice of evil concupiscence, from which it is itself evil, perverse, and averse from God, and evilly inclined. The Author thus acknowledges both the true disordering in the will of the infant and the relation to the sin of Adam — which the aforesaid article does not seem to acknowledge; since the author of those articles, Michael Bajus, manifestly relegates this respect for the sin of Adam entirely from original sin. But the second article, namely 49, is as follows: "From the habitually dominating will it follows that the infant departing this life without the sacrament of regeneration, when he attains the use of reason, actually hates God, blasphemes God, and repudiates the law of God."

§ IV — The Fathers teach that neither the concupiscence of the regenerate nor its involuntary movements are sins (Ex Patribus docetur, neque concupiscentiam renatorum, neque motus ejus involuntarios esse peccata)

§ 20. Since the Sectarians teach indifferently both concerning the concupiscence of the regenerate and concerning its involuntary movements that they are sins in the proper sense of the name — because, when either of the two is shown, the other appears to follow as a consequence (for in truth, as regards the present matter, the formal character (*ratio*) is the same whether one considers habit or act) — for this reason, in order to refute their doctrine, we shall show from the judgements of the Fathers that neither the habitual concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) of the regenerate, nor its actual movements, so long as the will in no way consents to them, can with justice be imputed as sin, nor are they sins at all.

§ 21. Therefore, besides the passages of St. Augustine and Bede cited a little above, in which they deny that any sin is committed without consent, and besides those things which we noted above (at dist. 21)[48] when it was asked whether temptation of the flesh can exist without sin, there are also other passages of the Fathers by which the Catholic faith is confirmed most openly against this error. For St. Augustine in Book 2,[14] says: "Concupiscence is born with little children; in the baptised it is released from its debt of guilt; in adults it

remains for the contest, and to those who do not consent to it in illicit things, it is utterly harmful in nothing." And in Book 2,[15] he says: "Sometimes reason manfully restrains and checks even the aroused concupiscence; and when this happens, we do not fall into sin, but are crowned with some degree of struggle." And in Book 1,[49] concerning concupiscence, he says: "Nor on account of this — whose guilt has already been consumed by the washing of regeneration — do the baptised say in prayer: 'Forgive us our debts,' but on account of the sins that are committed, whether in consenting to it, etc." The same things are taught in the same work,[50] and in the *Contra Iulianum*.[51]

§ 22. Nor does St. Augustine wish to say only that the concupiscence of the regenerate and its involuntary movements are not sins for this reason — that God does not impute them as sin — as though God's judgment were not according to truth and His estimation of things not such that what is truly sin should be sin in His reckoning; but rather because in them the formal character of sin is truly no longer to be found. Hence, though he sometimes says that concupiscence is not imputed as sin to the regenerate, as in Book 2[52] — in which passage he also uses the phraseology of Scripture (Ps. 31 and Rom. 4) — yet elsewhere he absolutely denies that it is sin, going so far as to affirm in Book 2,[33] that this evil is in the regenerate overcome and slain: "overcome," he says, "so that it does not reign; slain, so that it does not live, unless by illicit consent it somehow revives and is recalled into its own dominion and sovereignty." Pertinent to this point are also those passages of St. Augustine in which he teaches that parents transmit sin, which a just man does not have.[53]

§ 23. Furthermore, to the same effect the following passages of other Fathers may also be adduced: St. Ambrose in his book[18]; Hilary as cited by St. Augustine,[19]; St. Jerome,[54]; Epiphanius,[21] — where he reports the words of Methodius saying that the saints exercise justice without the admixture of sin; likewise St. John Chrysostom,[22] and St. Cyril.[55] To this judgement, finally, as certain and indubitable, the entire school of later theologians has conceded regarding concupiscence, although not all agree regarding the movements of concupiscence. Wherefore rightly was that error condemned by them: first by Leo X,[35] in the bull of condemnation of the articles of Luther, then by the Fathers of the Council of Trent,[7] who noted it with anathema.[56]

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§ V — Proof of the same doctrine by reasons (Ejusdem doctrinae probatio per rationes)

§ 24. This Catholic doctrine, being also supremely in conformity with reason, it is not difficult to confirm by several arguments.

The first argument is taken from the definition of sin: For the proper formal character of sin (*ratio peccati*) is not completed without something voluntary; nor does justice suffer that a man be punished for a wrong that is not in some mode voluntary to him; and a rape which a virgin endures is wholly exempted from the punishment of the law. Matt. 15 teaches that those things are said to defile a man which proceed from the heart — that is, from the will. And concerning involuntary movements, the Apostle so exculpates himself as to say: "Now it is no longer I that work it, but sin that dwells in me" (Rom. 7). Hence he most rightly infers that "there is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8). Wherefore the orthodox Fathers, and St. Augustine above all, against the Manichaeans, constantly teach that the voluntary pertains to

the formal character of sin, as in *De vera Religione*, ch. 14:[27] "So much so," he says, "that sin is a voluntary evil, such that in no way is it sin if it is not voluntary." And in Book 1 of the *Retractationes*.[28]

§ 25. The second argument, which itself also has its foundation in Scripture, is as follows: That which is less voluntary is less of a sin; for the Lord says in Lk. 12: "The servant who did not know the will of his master, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes" (Lk. 12:48). And Jas. 4: "To him who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin" (Jas. 4:17). This is so because, just as knowledge increases, so ignorance diminishes the voluntary and consequently the formal character of sin. Therefore where the voluntary is wholly absent, the formal character of sin ceases entirely.

§ 26. The third argument is taken from the opposite good act: For however great a good act there may be in a man according to itself, if it is not voluntary but is done by one who is unwilling or ignorant, it merits no praise; as Ecclesiasticus says of the miser, ch. 14: "Even if he has done good, he has done it unknowingly and unwillingly" (Sir. 14:7). Hence neither the Devil nor Judas the traitor, although by delivering Christ to death they greatly benefited the elect, were to be praised for this. And what is more pertinent to the matter at hand, neither are usurers and fornicators to be praised on account of the holy inspirations and thoughts by which their conscience is now and then touched, so long as they do not receive them with consenting will — as both St. Augustine teaches[57] and St. Thomas.[30] Therefore neither do those who feel concupiscence and its evil commotions against their will deserve reproof or punishment; and accordingly these are not sins. For every sin is worthy of reproof and punishment.

§ 27. The final argument: Every sin is a human act; but the involuntary movements of concupiscence are not human acts — for they do not proceed from the mind or reason but arise in spite of its resistance, so that the Apostle truly says: "It is no longer I that work it" (Rom. 7:17); therefore they are not properly sins.

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§ VI — Resolution of the objections brought forward by the heretics (Solutio eorum ab Haereticis objiciuntur)

§ 28. Although replies have already been given to some arguments by which this Catholic doctrine is assailed (at dist. 21)[48] where the triple temptation was treated, yet since this disputation more properly belongs here, it is now necessary to reply to certain other arguments upon which the adversaries chiefly rely.

§ 29. It is objected first, therefore, that the Apostle uses open words by which he calls the evil dwelling in the flesh of the regenerate sin, once and again, in Rom. 7. Concerning which he also says in ch. 6: "Let not therefore sin reign in your mortal body so that you obey its concupiscences." And again: "For sin shall not have dominion over you." To this objection the Fathers of the Council of Trent reply[7] that the Catholic Church has never understood the Apostle to call concupiscence sin in the sense that it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is *from* sin and *inclines toward* sin. This reply is drawn from various passages of St. Augustine:[59] in which passages he joins both reasons together. Elsewhere, however, he sets forth only the former, as in Book 1 of the *Retractationes*[60] and in Book 3 *De libero arbitrio*.[61] Elsewhere he presses only the latter, as in Book 2 *Contra Iulianum*[62] and at the end of *De perfectione iustitiae*.[63] It must be noted, however, that the latter reason is more proper to concupiscence, and the one by which it comes nearer to the formal character of sin. For as to the former part, death too and other punishments were made consequent upon sin,

yet these are not on that account called sins; and the context of the Apostle shows that he was referring rather to the latter reason. For he calls concupiscence sin insofar as it is the tinder (*fomes*) of sins — that is, insofar as it stirs up in us evil movements and desires toward every kind of sin.

§ 30. Again, they object that the Apostle (in the same passage) recognises the proper formal character of sin in the concupiscence of the regenerate, when he says it resists the law of the mind — that is, the law of God, as he himself explains a little later, saying that with the mind he serves the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin. To the same purpose they would have it belong that in Gal. 5 he affirms that even in the regenerate the flesh lusts against the spirit. We reply (*Respondemus*) that concupiscence which is in the regenerate is not said by the Apostle to resist the law of the mind, or the law of God, or to lust against the spirit, in this sense — as though either it itself, or its desires to which reason does not consent, were forbidden by the precept "Thou shalt not covet," as being true disobedience to the law, as some have wrongly understood; for precepts are given only to the will; but only thus far: because, as has already been said, it inclines and solicits toward the transgression of the law, that is, toward sin properly so called, and thus concupiscence, insofar as it is in itself, strives against the law.

§ 31. Another argument: Concupiscence is truly sin before baptism; therefore it is also after; for through baptism its nature is not changed but remains the same. It is answered (*Respondetur*) that concupiscence does not remain the same according to the formal character of sin; because before baptism it dominates the mind and is, either in act or virtually, voluntary; but after baptism it is overcome and slain, and consequently involuntary, and in it the formal character of sin therefore ceases. Thus St. Augustine teaches in Book 2[64] and comparing, in Book 14 *De Trinitate*,[38] the concupiscence that exists before baptism with a fever and an arrow fixed in the body, and that which remains after baptism with the lingering weakness left by a fever and the wound that remains after an arrow is removed. That its dominion has been taken away from the regenerate has been sufficiently shown above.

§ 32. Fourth: In the regenerate and holy there remains iniquity against which they must continually struggle, as St. Ambrose attests[39] and as St. Augustine cites,[40] from Ambrose. But all iniquity is sin, according to 1 Jn. 5. It is answered from the same passage of St. Augustine, where explaining the mind of St. Ambrose, he says that the concupiscence whose guilt has been remitted at the sacred font is called iniquity by him on this account: because it is iniquitous (*iniquum est*) that the flesh should lust against the spirit, even if one does not consent to it — not because it is sin, nor because it is a disordered and vitiated evil displeasing to God, to the formal character of which as sin only the assent of the will is lacking. In this sense the same St. Augustine in Book 6[41] says that there is no iniquity when inferior things struggle against superior ones, even if they are not overcome. And Hilary,[42] pronounces in general terms that iniquity is whatever is outside the law. And that iniquity extends more widely than sin is attested by St. Ambrose,[43] when he says that in baptism all sin is taken away, but iniquity cannot be wholly removed except in the resurrection. Moreover, the sentence of John, "all iniquity is sin" (1 Jn. 5:17), as is clear from the context of the passage, is to be understood of the iniquity which a man himself commits, not of that of which Paul says: "It is not I that work it."

§ 33. Fifth: St. Jerome, writing in ch. 5 of Matt. on the words "whosoever looketh on a woman" etc., says that *propatheia* — that is, the preliminary motion (*propathia*) by which the mind is moved without consent, having the semblance of a vice but not being held in guilt — is called sin. But the ready reply is that St. Jerome did not mean by the word *culpa* (*"guilt"*) that which is properly sin, but wished to say that *propatheia*, though it does not elicit consent, is rightly to be reproached and treated as a vice; because it inclines and solicits a man

toward sinning; in which way we also read that Gregory wrote that temptation of the flesh cannot be without fault, as has been explained (at dist. 12).[65]

§ 34. Sixth: St. Augustine in Book 4[66] says that concupiscence is most rightly accused by its own movements, by which it is resisted lest it exceed. And a little before he affirms that it causes harm by its mere presence, even if one does not consent to it. This he repeats in other passages as well.[67] It is answered (*Resp.*) that concupiscence is rightly accused, blamed, and reproached — not because it is sin, but because it inclines toward sin. It causes harm, however, not because it renders a man liable to punishment or altogether worse; but because, as St. Augustine himself explains, it diminishes the spiritual delight (*delectatio*) of holy minds, while they are occupied in combating it and are impeded from being freely borne toward God. And it must be noted that St. Augustine speaks of concupiscence by a kind of personification (*prosopopeia*) when he says it is most rightly accused by its own movements. For if concupiscence were a person, it would rightly be both accused and convicted of sin — that it impels a man to sinning — and would therefore deserve to be punished, just as the Devil is. In the same way he also speaks of it in Book 3, ch. 24,[68] saying that the thing whose cause draws others into guilt ought to be punished. Concupiscence, however, is punished, according to the same figure of speech, in the saints, as it is gradually diminished and finally, at the death of man, extinguished and as it were slain.

§ 35. Seventh: St. Augustine in Book 5[69] says that the concupiscence of the flesh against which the good spirit lusts is both sin, because there is in it inobedience against the dominion of the mind, and punishment of sin, because it was returned for disobedience, and cause of sin, by the falling-away of one who consents or by the contagion of one being born. It is answered (*Respondetur*) that St. Augustine is speaking of concupiscence as it is in the non-regenerate. This is clear from the fact that in the preceding words he compares it with blindness of heart, that is, infidelity — which is certainly a great sin and cannot be present in the regenerate. The same is sufficiently declared by the other circumstances of the passage. Nor does it stand in the way that he says: "Against which the good spirit lusts against the flesh." For even in the wicked and ungodly those words can hold, as well as in the regenerate and holy. These words of this clause can also be understood thus: The concupiscence against which the good spirit lusts in the pious and holy is sin in the impious. For he seems to be speaking of concupiscence in general — which in some is sin and in others is not. But the adversaries press the reason added by St. Augustine: "because there is in it inobedience against the dominion of the mind." This reason, they say, applies also to the concupiscence of the regenerate. To these we reply that, since it is established from the many other passages cited above that the resistance of concupiscence against the spirit is not, in St. Augustine's view, a sufficient formal character of sin, the inobedience of concupiscence against the dominion of the mind which is to be understood in this passage is not just any inobedience but perfect inobedience — that is, such as subverts the state and dominion of the mind. For thus also St. Augustine speaks elsewhere, as in Tract. 5 on the first Epistle of John, on the words "He who is born of God does not sin,"[70] where he teaches that he who keeps the birth from God cannot act against the commandment of love in such a way that fraternal charity is subverted and perishes.

§ 36. Eighth: John Cassian, in Collation 25, interpreting the words of the Apostle in Rom. 7, teaches that the saints are led unwillingly and unknowingly into the law of sin and death, adding that on account of that same law of concupiscence all the works of the just are sins; and says certain other things greatly in accord with Lutheran doctrine. But it is answered (*Sed respondetur*) that on account of such opinions, as well as on account of his other errors — and most of all concerning grace, in which St. Prosper refuted him — authority

as an orthodox writer has been withdrawn from this author by Pope Pelagius, and his books placed by the same among the apocrypha.

§ 37. As to what they object last — that the concupiscence even of the regenerate is the mother of sins, the Apostle saying: "Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin" (Jas. 1:15), and that therefore it cannot but itself be sin, since mother and daughter are understood to be only in the same nature — this is easily resolved if we answer that concupiscence is not made the mother of sin unless our consent comes to it as a father. For concupiscence, concerning which we are now disputing — that is, that which is in the regenerate — so long as it retains such a character, being deprived as it is of dominion which it had before regeneration, can never bring forth sin.

§ VII — Whether the foulness of the flesh is washed away in baptism (An foeditas carnis in baptismo diluatur)

§ 38. The Master raises the question (in the text)[72] whether, just as the soul is cleansed from sin, so also the flesh is cleansed in baptism from that foulness (*foeditas*) which it contracted by generation and which was discussed in the preceding distinction. It must be answered: just as concupiscence remains in act, though having lost the formal character of sin, so that foulness also remains in the flesh after baptism; and just as concupiscence is not abolished and extinguished except by death in the elect, so that vitiated and foul quality of the flesh is not wholly removed from the saints except by death of the flesh; and the flesh itself is constituted clean from that foulness only through the resurrection, which is a kind of regeneration of the same flesh, as Christ calls it in Matt. 19. Through baptism, however, by which properly the soul is regenerated, the flesh is also to this extent regenerated and renewed: because, although it is not yet simply cleansed from that foulness, yet it comes about that, notwithstanding it, on account of the dominion of concupiscence having been removed, the members of the man which before served uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity now begin to serve justice in sanctification (Rom. 6), and become members of Christ and a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 6).

§ 39. That foulness, however, remains in the flesh of the regenerate man — this is shown from the very generation by which that foulness, communicated to the seed by the parent, is transmitted to the offspring, and infects it with original sin, as has been made clear in the preceding Distinction. The same thing is argued by the words of St. Augustine in Book 2[73] saying that Christ either cleansed by assuming, or cleansed the thing that was to be assumed, what He assumed from the Virgin. These words plainly presuppose that in the flesh of other parents something unclean remains, from which the offspring begotten of them according to the flesh and soul is made unclean.

§ VIII — In what class of evils the concupiscence of the regenerate is to be placed (In quo malorum genere concupiscentia renatorum collocanda sit)

§ 40. That the concupiscence of the regenerate is not to be attributed to God as its author is sufficiently clear from the teaching set out above,[75] where it was shown in general concerning concupiscence that it is not the

work of God, inasmuch as it is always evil and opposed to the law of the mind, and even after baptism is an inciter to transgression of the law. It is asked, therefore, in what class of evils the concupiscence of the regenerate is to be placed. For since some evils are evils of fault (*culpae*) and other evils are evils of punishment (*poenae*), and concupiscence after baptism is not an evil of fault — for fault is washed away by baptism — it seems to follow that it must be numbered among those evils which are purely evils of punishment. Now, evils of that kind have God as their author, as do death, disease, hunger, and the like.

§ 41. Reply: To the standard division by which evil is divided into evil of punishment, which has God as its author, and evil of fault, which does not have God as its author, a third member must be added, by which something mixed in a certain manner from both kinds of evil is contained — and such is concupiscence after baptism. For inasmuch as it resists the law of the mind and works evil desires in man (Rom. 7), it participates in something of the evil of fault; whereas inasmuch as through it the first sin of man is justly punished, and it brings affliction, weariness, and difficulty of good works upon the regenerate themselves — in accordance with that text of Job 7: "Why hast Thou set me contrary to Thee, and I am become burdensome to myself?" — it is from God as from a just judge, and participates in the evil of punishment. Nevertheless, in the regenerate it is simply (*simpliciter*) to be called a punishment rather than a fault. Simply a punishment, to be sure, because the entire formal character (*ratio*) of punishment is found in it — for it is an involuntary evil; but not simply a fault, because it is not voluntary, and without voluntariness the full formal character of fault does not subsist.

§ IX — Whether original sin is rightly imputed to the infant (Peccatum originale an recte imputetur parvulo)

§ 42. The Master, inquiring by what justice original sin is imputed to the soul of the infant, presupposes that original sin is imputed to the infant — or to the soul of the infant — by God. Although this is called into doubt by some, on the ground that common estimation holds that nothing is justly imputed to anyone except what he himself has done, and that it is certain that infants have done neither good nor evil (Rom. 9), yet the affirmative part, which is asserted by the Master at § E, can be established as probable.

§ 43. First: because Scripture in Ps. 31 pronounces blessed him to whom the Lord has not imputed sin. Therefore, if to the unbaptized infant his own sin is not imputed by God — in the genus of original sin in which he is born — he will be blessed and hence just, as the Apostle interprets it in Rom. 4. But this is contrary to Catholic doctrine.

St. Augustine, in Book III of *De peccatorum meritis*, ch. 3,[77] recites these words of Pelagius: "On no account is it to be conceded that God, who remits a man's own sins, should impute another's sins." And he replies to them (at ch. 8),[78] by teaching that sins no longer alien but proper are imputed to the infant, because through carnal generation they are now the infant's own — sins as yet not remitted through spiritual regeneration. And among the Scholastics, St. Bonaventure, writing in dist. 30 of this book in the first principal question, q. 2,[79] affirms that original vice is imputed to us as sin; and he teaches the same again expressly in the present distinction in the third principal question, q. 1.[80] Hugh of St. Victor similarly teaches in the third tractate of his *Sentences*, chs. 11 and 12,[81] whom the Master appears to have followed at this place.

§ 44. The same is also proved by reason. For original sin is punished in infants; but it is alien to justice that a sin should be punished in anyone to whom it cannot justly be imputed; therefore sin is imputed to the

infant along with its punishment. As for what they say, that sins are justly imputed only to their author and not otherwise — this is indeed true in its own way; for the Apostle says in Rom. 1 that those are worthy of death not only who do evil willingly but also those who consent to the doers — evidently because in these also there is something which is justly imputed to them. Accordingly, although the author of the original sin that is in the infant is not the infant himself but the first man — who must be said to have committed that sin in all his posterity by the very act of transgressing the divine commandment — yet it is truly and justly imputed to the individual souls who contract it as if they had consented to it, not in act, but in habit; because by this sin their will has been depraved and turned away from God and made contrary to God. We showed above (at dist. 30)[82] in what sense this sin can be called voluntary in each individual. Yet that argument will not suffice by itself unless regard be simultaneously had to the actual will of him who committed this sin. Hence St. Bonaventure rightly says (at the place cited above),[83] that this original evil is imputed to us as sin, because, from the will of Adam, this evil propagated into his posterity has infected and depraved their will. And St. Augustine, in Book I of the *Retractationes*, ch. 13,[84] declares from this that it is not absurd to call original sin voluntary, because, having been contracted from the first man's evil will, it has become, as it were, hereditary.

§ 45. In the same sense he teaches also in the book *Contra Adimantum*, ch. 21,[85] that what was voluntary in Adam is natural in us. To the objection that may be raised on the other side — that no necessary and unavoidable evil is rightly imputed to anyone — it is answered that what is so necessary as to be involuntary, with the necessity of violence or compulsion, is not rightly imputed to anyone if he did not incur that necessity by his own will. But what is necessary while at the same time voluntary — necessary indeed because it cannot be avoided, yet voluntary according to the mode stated above — is by that very fact, because it is voluntary, justly imputed to him in whom it inheres, and is punished in him. Therefore the Master at § E, and after him St. Bonaventure (at the place cited above),[86] and other Scholastics, rightly teach that original sin is both necessary and voluntary; although in the manner of explaining this there is a certain diversity among them.

§ X — Whether the souls of those being born are such as they are created by God (An animae nascentium tales sint quales creantur a Deo)

§ 46. The Master appears to teach that the soul of each person descending is created by God as good, clean, innocent, and unspotted — as is evident from §§ E, G, H — which doctrine he received from Hugh of St. Victor, who hands down similar things in Tractate 3 of his *Sentences*, chs. 11 and 12.[88] This doctrine is not so much to be refuted as to be declared and explained. For those authors mean that the soul is created clean, good, and right by God, because the uncleanness, evil, and injustice which the soul contracts at its birth is not from God but from elsewhere; and if it had only what it receives from God, it would be good and clean and right — insofar as these words signify merely the privation of their opposites. In another sense also these things are said truly — that the soul is created clean and just in the way we are all said to have been created upright in Adam. But these are figurative locutions.

§ 47. However, according to the propriety of speech one must speak differently. For properly speaking, God did not make the soul clean or right, which was never clean or right; nor did He make it unclean or depraved, since He did not make the uncleanness or depravity in it. Accordingly one must say that in each

infant born He makes the soul neither clean nor unjust: for the one the soul does not have when it is born; the other it has indeed, but not from God. This, then, will be the plain answer to the Master's question as proposed at § H — namely, that the soul is born such as it is created by God, because whatever it receives from its Creator it has when it is born; yet it is not created by God such as it is born, because not everything it receives at its birth does it have from the Creator.

§ XI — Whether all souls are equal in endowments by reason of creation (Utrum animae omnes ex creatione sint aequales)

§ 48. The last question with the Master is whether all souls are equal in natural endowments by reason of creation. To this question the Master's negative answer is very probable — which is also the answer of St. Bonaventure commenting on this passage of the Master, and of certain others — namely, that souls, considered according to what they have solely from creation and prescinding from the disposition of the body into which they are infused, are not equal in natural endowments, but differ one from another according to that diversity which either now exists and is observable among men, or would have been future had man not sinned. Moreover, that diversity extends to many things: for instance, that one man surpasses another in happiness, or in acuteness of intellect, or in liveliness of memory; that one is by nature more inclined to theoretical sciences, another to practical ones — and this across the diverse species of these sciences — that one is drawn by a certain inclination toward mercy, another toward justice, another toward another kind of virtue; that likewise one is by nature more apt to command, another to obey; and whatever other natural and non-vicious varieties of character are found among men.

§ 49. This diversity in souls from creation does not arise altogether and solely from the varying disposition of bodies — something proved first of all by the creation of the first man, who, according to the body made from the clay of the earth, received a soul most richly endowed with natural gifts. The formation of woman argues the same: made from the rib of the man, namely from his firmer and harder part according to the body, she nevertheless received a soul suited to a sex of lesser strength. The same is shown from the souls of twins, who, being formed at the same time from the same parents in the same womb and coming into the light together, are very often exceedingly different in character and intellect. Of which matter the famous example is Jacob and Esau (Gen. 25).[90]

§ 50. Proof is also drawn from the souls of the separated, whom it would be absurd to call all equal in natural endowments, since in this life they were exceedingly different. Another argument for this the Master draws from the Angels, who, although they lack a body, yet differ very greatly among themselves in natural endowments. This proof would be more certain if, according to the doctrine of some, all the Angels were of the same species — a matter disputed at dist. 3 of this book.[91] For it will thereby come about that souls too, even though all of the same species, receive a diversity of natural qualities similarly to those, from creation and not from corporeal matter. Nor will it be an obstacle that souls are by nature joined to a body, whereas Angels are not. For since the soul exists not for the sake of the body but the body for the sake of the soul, it is more consonant that the body be affected by the soul than the soul by the body. For just as matter is prepared for the reception of its form, so the form once received is wont to make that same matter ever more and more apt for itself.

§ 51. To these considerations is added the plain testimony of Scripture, Wis. 8, where the Wise Man says: "I was a witty child, and had received a good soul; and whereas I was more good, I came into a body undefiled." Or as it is more clearly rendered from the Greek: "And when I was moreover good, I came into a body undefiled." By these words the Wise Man attributes to the soul's goodness — from which he had said himself to be clever — what he ascribes as something prior and well-disposed before the disposition of the body. Therefore the goodness of the soul did not arise from the disposition of the body.

§ 52. This view is also confirmed by St. Augustine, who in Book IV, *Contra Julianum*, ch. 3,[92] relating the opinion of physicians who say that every inequality of souls arises from the body adjoined to them, denies that they can prove this assertion of theirs. St. Thomas does indeed adduce a proof of this kind — that, he says, philosophers conjecture the intellect of the soul from bodily disposition, as from softness of flesh the goodness of intellect.[93] But this is not perpetual, as experience sufficiently teaches; nor, even if it were perpetual, does it prove that the goodness of intellect originates from the body rather than from the soul. For when, in a man, the more important parts are those of the soul, if the soul has fashioned for itself a suitable body, nothing then prevents a conjecture being made from the quality of the body about the quality of the soul. For conjectures are wont to be drawn from effects, which are frequently more known than their causes.

§ 53. Nor is it a contrary argument that the Wise Man says the corruptible body weighs down the soul. For by that statement nothing else is signified than that the soul, from the body that was attributed to it at the beginning as its most fitting instrument for all its actions, is now, on account of the corruption of that body contracted through sin, impeded in many ways from those same actions, especially those pertaining to piety. From which it by no means follows that the diversity of natural qualities existing in souls — whether entirely, or principally — derives from bodies. For just as an excellent craftsman who through a fit instrument works well, and through an unfit instrument works less well, does not receive his excellence from the convenient instrument — though he does receive an impediment to his excellent operation from an inconvenient one — while another craftsman who is less excellent will neither work equally well through a good instrument, nor will he receive less impediment from a bad one: so must one think concerning the diversity of souls both as regards natural endowments and as regards the operations which are performed in different and differently disposed bodies.

§ I — Whether the sins of later parents pass to their children (An posteriorum parentum peccata transeant in filios)

§ 54. Since it has been sufficiently established above that the sin of the first man is propagated...

1. The footnote (a) in the margin treats at length whether before the reception of the Sacrament sin can subsist in a converted and contrite person without the actual act of love of God above all things being posited ordinarily — and whether it can be remitted in a man turning as much as he wishes to God without the actual reception of the Sacrament. The author defers treatment to Dist. 17, § 5 (Book 4), promising more will be added there.

2. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Vitalem*, Letter 107 (= Letter 217 in the Bened. edition).

3. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, I, ch. 9.

4. Council of Trent, Session 7, ch. 7.

5. The footnote (c) in the margin presents a full discussion: the doctrine that through baptism the dominion of concupiscence is taken away — such that it no longer has dominion in the baptized — is affirmed by Robert Cardinal Bellarmin in the cited place, Book 2, *De peccato originali*, ch. 15, § 9. He argues acerbically that this repugns the decrees of the Council of Trent, because the Council's grace does not take away the dominion of concupiscence, but only binds it and diminishes it for a time — that with grace lost through actual sin it returns, and the same dominion of concupiscence is clearly deduced from the same Council, Session 5, canon 5. But so great a censure, if rightly understood, must by no means be said to be deserved. For the dominion of concupiscence which our Author affirms to be taken away through the remission of sin and the infusion of grace is by no means that dominion which the holy Synod of Trent calls *fomes* left behind for the combat — but an entirely different one; namely that by which concupiscence so subjects the will to itself that it makes it its slave through consent; which dominion is indeed entirely removed through grace. Indeed, the positive disordering of the will and of the powers of the soul — that is, concupiscence itself — by which all those aforesaid defects are indicated, renders the will of the infant habitually averse from God; and accordingly it can be said to some extent to serve concupiscence. But the infant's will before baptism is habitually averse from God through something inhering in it, yet connoting the will of Adam, as the same Author explains. With the coming of baptismal grace, that habitual aversion is entirely removed, and the soul of the infant is habitually converted toward God: it follows therefore that the dominion of concupiscence is in this way explained through the remission of sin to be removed; for at that time concupiscence thus dominates that it makes the mind its slave — by which the Author understands the sentence of the dominating. Now what St. Thomas most strictly affirms is that it is the privation of original justice; every other disordering of the powers of the soul is in original sin as something material. The disorder, says St. Thomas, of the other powers of the soul is principally in that they are turned to mutable good; which disordering can in common parlance be called concupiscence. And thus original sin is materially indeed concupiscence, and formally indeed the defect of original justice; and at the same place q. 86, a. 1, he explains the stain remaining in the soul from sin through a certain defect of brightness on account of recession from the light of reason or of the divine law; which stain, however, he teaches to cease through the infusion of grace, with no mention made of the ablation of concupiscence or of the subversion of the dominion of concupiscence. "Stain," says the Holy Doctor, "imports a certain defect of brightness on account of recession from the light of reason, or of the divine law; and therefore so long as a man remains outside this light, the stain of sin remains; but after he returns to the light of reason and to the divine light, which happens through grace, then the stain ceases." Finally, before our eyes must be held these two Bajian articles 48 and 49, among others confirmed by the Holy Apostolic See.
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, aa. 1, 2, 3; q. 80, a. 3 ad 3.
7. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5.
8. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, I, ch. 25 (= ch. 28 in some editions).
9. Rom. 8.
10. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, I, ch. 16.
11. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa*, III, ch. 2.
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the same places cited above (*ubi supra*).
13. Dist. 21 of this same Book II.
14. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, ch. 4.
15. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II, ch. 14.
16. St. Augustine, *Contra secundam epistolam Pelagianorum*, I, ch. 13.
17. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, chs. 27–28; *Contra Iulianum*, I, ch. 9; *De Trinitate*, XIV, ch. 17.
18. St. Ambrose, *De Arca et Noe*, ch. 9.
19. Hilary, cited by St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, II, ch. 9.
20. St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 5, on "Who shall have seen a woman."
21. Epiphanius, *Contra Haeresim Origenis*.
22. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, Homily 50.
23. St. Cyril, Book 4.
24. Leo X, *Bulla damnationis articulorum Lutheri* [Exsurge Domine].

25. Also the supreme Pontiffs Pius V and Gregory XIII in the Diploma against Bajus condemned and damned these articles, among which in order are L and LI. Their condemned sense is as follows: "Evil desires to which reason does not consent and which a man suffers against his will are prohibited by precept: *Non concupisces*." The second of these reads: "Concupiscence, or the law of the members, and its evil desires which those who are unwilling experience, are true disobedience to the law."

26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the same place cited above (*ubi supra*).

27. St. Augustine, *De vera Religione*, ch. 14.

28. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, I, chs. 13 and 15.

29. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum*, Book 1 (q. 1).

30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 21, a. 2.

31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the same place cited above (*ibidem*).

32. Dist. 21 of this Book II.

33. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, ch. 28.

34. St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 5.

35. Leo X, *Bulla damnationis articulorum Lutheri*.

36. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, chs. 27–28.

37. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, II, ch. 9.

38. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XIV, ch. 17.

39. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et anima*, ch. 8.

40. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, I, ch. 5.

41. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, VI, ch. 8.

42. Hilary, *In Psalmum 52*.

43. St. Ambrose, *Apologia David*, ch. 13.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 3.

45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 86, a. 1.

46. The Bajian articles 48 and 49, condemned by the Holy Apostolic See.

47. Dist. 30, § 14 of this same Book.

48. Dist. 21 of this same Book.

49. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, I, ch. 13.

50. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, I, ch. 14.

51. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, II, chs. 3, 8, 9, and 10; Book V; Book VI, ch. 5; *Opus imperfectum*, Homily 50, chs. 3, 19, 8; *De Civitate Dei*, XVIII, ch. 18 [reading from the page image]; Book 1, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, ch. 23; Book 2; *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, ch. 15; *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, proposition 16.

52. St. Augustine, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, II, ch. 24; using also the phraseology of Ps. 31 and Rom. 4.

53. Passages of St. Augustine in which he teaches that parents transmit sin, which a just man does not have.

54. St. Jerome, on Matt. 5 (on "whosoever looketh on a woman").

55. St. Cyril, Book 4 (*In Joannem*, ch. 51).

56. Note (a): The Supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V and Gregory XIII also condemned this error in their Diploma against Baius, condemning those articles which are among the rest numbered L and LI: *"Wicked desires to which the precept 'Thou shalt not covet' is forbidden, and what a man unwillingly endures, are sins"*; and the second: *"Concupiscence, or the law of the members, and its evil desires, which men unwillingly feel, are true disobedience to the law."*

57. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum*, q. 1.

58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the same place (*ibidem*).

59. St. Augustine, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, I, ch. 23; II, ch. 13; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, I, ch. 13 and ch. 19; *Contra Iulianum*, II, ch. 9.

60. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, I, ch. 15; *De libero arbitrio*, III, ch. 19.

61. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III, ch. 19.

62. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, II, ch. 10.

63. St. Augustine, *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, at the end.

64. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, chs. 27 and 28; *Contra Iulianum*, II, ch. 9.

65. Dist. 12 of this same Book.

66. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, IV, ch. 2.

67. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, VI, ch. 5; *De peccato originali*, ch. 39.

68. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, III, ch. 24.

69. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, V, ch. 3.

70. St. Augustine, *In primam Epistolam Joannis*, Tract. 5, on the words: "He who is born of God does not sin."

71. No cross-reference to St. Thomas in this section heading as given in the source.

72. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, in the text of this distinction.

73. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, ch. 25.

74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3; q. 93, a. 3, ad 1, 3, 8, 9; I-II, q. 25, a. 2.

75. Dist. 30 of this same Book.

76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 61, a. 1.

77. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* III, ch. 3.

78. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* III, ch. 8.

79. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30, first principal question, q. 2.

80. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 32 (the present distinction), third principal question, q. 1.

81. Hugh of St. Victor, *Sententiarum* (De Sacramentis), Tractate 3, chs. 11 and 12.

82. Dist. 30 of this same Book (as above).

83. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30, first principal question, q. 2 (place cited above).

84. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 13.

85. St. Augustine, *Contra Adimantum*, ch. 21.

86. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30 (place cited above).

87. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 5; I-II, q. 83, a. 1, ad 4.

88. Hugh of St. Victor, *Sententiarum*, Tractate 3, chs. 11 and 12.

89. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 7.

90. Gen. 25.

91. Dist. 3 of this same Book (Book II).

92. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3.

93. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 7 (as cited above).

94. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 2.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII — ON ORIGINAL SIN: WHETHER THE SINS OF LATER PARENTS ARE TRANSMITTED TO THEIR DESCENDANTS, AND ON RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE PECCATO ORIGINALI: UTRUM PECCATA POSTERIORUM PARENTUM AD POSTEROS TRANSEANT, ET DE QUAESTIONIBUS ANNEXIS*)

§ 1. — it is rightly asked whether the same is to be thought concerning the sins of later parents, whether of all or of some of them, namely whether these also pass to their descendants by a similar law of propagation. Although some have attempted to assert this, it is, however, far more probable[1] that the truth holds in the case of the sin of the first man alone.

For this is found to be more consonant with reason, with Scripture, and with the testimonies of the Fathers. For Scripture, at Rom. 5, comparing the benefit of Christ with the harm contracted from Adam, teaches that "judgment indeed is from one unto condemnation, but grace is from many offences unto justification."[2] This antithesis will not hold if by carnal generation not one but many offences are contracted. Furthermore, what is said in the same chapter concerning Adam — "who is the figure of him who was to come" — will not pertain to him alone but also to other parents, if the sins of these also are contracted by way of original transmission. But if we grant this, Adam will have associates in the corruption of the human race. Therefore it will not seem absurd to attribute to Christ also helpers in the redemption of that same human race — which, since it is established to be absurd, neither was the former to be conceded. The famous comparison of Adam with Christ, not only in this chapter (Rom. 5) but also elsewhere, and most especially in 1 Cor. 15, where the Apostle testifies that "all are vivified in Christ, even as all die in Adam,"[3] contributes not a little to this opinion as well. This comparison will not be singular if what is said of Adam could similarly be said of any other parent with respect to his own descendants.

§ 2. Furthermore, among the Fathers, St. Cyprian expressed this opinion with sufficient clarity in Book III (Epistle 8, which is addressed to Fidus), saying: "An infant recently born has sinned in nothing; except that, born carnally according to Adam, it has contracted the contagion of the ancient death by its first birth."[4] These words are cited both by St. Augustine[5] and by St. Jerome.[6] Hence we understand that these Fathers also hold the same opinion. To the same point belongs what that same St. Augustine teaches,[7] that the sin of Adam alone is the common sin, in which, namely, all sinned, whereas all other sins are each person's own. St. Anselm expressly sets forth this doctrine[8] and confirms it with arguments. The Master (*Magister*) is of the same opinion in this place, and the Scholastics follow him concordantly.

§ 3. Now the arguments in favour of this opinion are the following. The first: The first man had received justice not for himself alone but for his whole posterity, so that if he remained in justice he would transmit it together with nature to his descendants; but if by sinning he forsook it, he would also pour out sin into his whole posterity together with that same nature. Since, therefore, none of the later parents was established under a like law, it is clear that their sins cannot be propagated to descendants any more than their justice, but are merely individual and, as they say, personal sins only. For none of the descendants possesses original justice. It was indeed in the same covenant that whosoever should lose original justice — whether Adam or any of his descendants — should lose it for himself and for his whole posterity. So hold St. Bonaventure and Scotus; but once that justice was lost, there remained no further infection.

§ 4. The second argument: In the state of innocence, the justice of later parents would not have been infused into their descendants; for otherwise descendants would have been born more just than their elders, inasmuch as they would have contracted more justice. Therefore, neither is the wickedness of later parents poured into their children as persons to be burdened with a greater weight of injustice.

The third: The whole good of justice was lost by the first sin of Adam; therefore the wickedness of later parents cannot take away more justice. This argument holds according to those who hold that original sin consists in the bare privation (*privatio*) of original justice.

The fourth: Later parents cannot transmit good habits (*habitus*) to their children; therefore neither can they transmit bad ones. For just as the benefit of the grace of Christ granted to a parent is personal, so that he cannot communicate it to his child by generation, so also a sin committed by the same parent must be merely personal. This argument, together with the one immediately preceding, is to be found in St. Anselm.[9]

The fifth: If the sin of the nearest parent were contracted, by equal reasoning the sins of all higher parents all the way to Adam would be contracted. Nor will the great distance be able to prevent our acknowledging that consequence, since the sin of Adam is most distant from those who are born, being, namely, the first of all. But if we grant this plainly, it would come about in the end that those being born would be burdened to an immeasurable degree.

The last: Experience teaches that from most wicked parents children are sometimes born less wicked, even if they are not regenerated by baptism. Therefore such children do not contract the corruption of their own parents.

§ I — Reply to the Arguments on the Contrary (Respondetur ad argumenta in contrarium)

§ 5. What stands contrary to the foregoing doctrine appears above all to be that which is read in St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 46),[11] where, from what is said in Exod. 34 — "I will render the sins of the fathers upon the children" — he teaches that it is not improbable that little ones are held obligated by the sins of their parents, not only of the first parents but also of those from whom they have been most recently born, until that guilt is dissolved by the sacrament of regeneration. And further below he simply asserts that the sins of other parents, although they cannot alter nature in the way that first sin did, nevertheless bind the children with guilt unless the grace of God come to their aid. And then (in the following chapter) he inquires further how far the sins of parents extend into their children — whether, namely, into all posterity or only into the third and fourth

generation — lest those to whom the grace of regeneration is not conferred be oppressed with too great a burden in their eternal damnation, etc. On this matter he declares that he is unwilling to affirm anything rashly. The words of St. Augustine (from ch. 15) are read also in St. Leo (Epistle 86).[12] Moreover, St. Augustine seems to indicate something similar in Book VI (*Contra Julianum*, ch. 10),[13] explaining in what sense the sins of parents are called either alien or our own, and says at ch. 7: "What they are from parents, or whether they are ours, is something for us to inquire; whether it be easy, or difficult, or impossible to discover."

§ 6. But to these passages the reply is given, together with the Master, that St. Augustine in these places delivers no definite opinion on the proposed question, and that he spoke by way of disputation and conjecture rather than by way of assertion, as is clear both from the beginning of ch. 46 of the *Enchiridion* and from the end of ch. 47, as well as from Book VI of *Contra Julianum*, ch. 7.[14] It must also be noted that he says the sins of other parents cannot, as that first sin could, alter nature, but only bind the children with guilt. By this he seems to signify that children are punished on account of the sins of their parents, whose own sins, however, do not pass to the children themselves. But how this is to be understood according to Scripture, which teaches that God avenges the sins of parents upon their children, will be explained by us further on.

§ 7. Another argument is adduced from Prosper (*Sentences*, no. 306),[15] which reads as follows: "Just as certain parents aggravate original sin, so certain others alleviate it." To which it must be replied that certain parents aggravate original sin, not because they add anything to it by their own sins or make it itself greater, but because they aggravate its temporal punishment. For thus the son of David (2 Kgs 12)[16] died while still an infant — a child who would have lived had he not been born of his father's adultery — on account of the adultery of his father in which he had been conceived. And those parents alleviate it on account of whose holiness their children are temporally punished less than they could justly have been punished on account of original sin. And note that Prosper did not say that certain parents increase, and certain others diminish, that sin in their children, but rather "aggravate" and "alleviate" — words which properly regard the punishment.

§ 8. They also urge this argument: If, while the first man remained in innocence, some one of his posterity had transgressed the commandment of God, that person by his own sin would have infected his own descendants in the same way as the sin of Adam has infected the whole human race; therefore even now the sins of later parents pass in some way of contagion into their children. To this we reply that, an effect once produced by an antecedent and sufficient cause, that cause excludes the posterior cause as superfluous. And accordingly, nature once infected by the first sin is not further infected by later ones, just as blindness or darkness once sufficiently caused cannot be caused again.

§ III — That there is a single original sin in each individual (Unicum in singulis esse peccatum originale)

§ 9. That original sin is single in each individual person, the Apostle signifies at Rom. 5, when he says that "judgment is from one" — namely, from one offence — "unto condemnation, but grace is from many offences unto justification."[18] Treating this passage and pressing its words, St. Augustine says:[19] "There indeed he wishes one and only one offence to be understood." This is also shown by probable argument: for original justice, in which the first man was created, was a single justice; wherefore also the sin opposed to that justice is a single one. For just as original justice was charity (*caritas*), that is, right and ordered love, so original sin is a

perverse and disordered love — which, although it can be directed toward most diverse objects, yet embraces them all under one formal character (*ratio formalis*), inasmuch as it is signified by the name either of concupiscence or of aversion from God.

§ 10. As for the fact that little ones are said to be baptized "for the remission of sins," this seems to have been said according to the general efficacy of baptism, because baptism remits not original sin alone but also all actual sins, if any there be in the one being baptized. For baptism is common to the whole age. Although it can also simply be answered with St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 44)[20] that the plural number is used for the singular. The same answer is given to that text, Ps. 50: "For behold I was conceived in iniquities,"[21] etc., just as St. Augustine gives the same answer in the same place (ch. 46),[11] and after him St. Leo (Ep. 86).[12] Nor indeed is this exchange of number in the said passages without reason. For original sin, although it is in itself single, is nevertheless the root and cause (as regards the concupiscence left behind) of many sins. Indeed in David himself, whose are those words, "Behold I was conceived in iniquities," etc., two most grievous sins had sprung forth: adultery and murder. Similar is the answer to the words of St. Ambrose (*Apologia David*, ch. 11),[22] which are also cited by St. Augustine,[23] where he says that little ones do not have a single contagion of sin, signifying, namely, that in that one sin many are contained virtually. Nevertheless, multiple sins can also be understood in a single original sin for another reason, namely because original sin infects and depraves several powers of the soul — namely the intellect, the will, and the lower appetite, both the irascible and the concupiscible.

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§ IV — Whether Adam's sin was one or many (Adæ peccatum fueritne unum an plura?)

§ 11. What has been said — namely, that original sin in each individual born is a single sin — certain persons endeavour to prove by yet another argument: because, that is, the first transgression of man, from which original sin passes into all human beings, was a single sin, not many. But how far this holds true must be carefully considered. For it is established clearly enough from Sacred Scripture that the transgression of the first man is called in the singular number "sin" or "transgression (*delictum*)": as in Rom. 5, "For if by one man's transgression many have died"; and again, "For the judgment indeed was from one" — understand: from one transgression — "unto condemnation."[25] In which passage nothing prevents the understanding of Adam's own transgression itself, although others prefer to understand the sin contracted from Adam's transgression by way of origin. And again: "For if by one man's transgression death reigned through one."[26] And in Wis. 10, the first man is said to have been "led out from his transgression (*a delicto suo*) by wisdom."[27]

§ 12. In this manner we read that the Fathers also have spoken everywhere, as St. Augustine (in *Enchiridion*, chs. 45 and 46, and elsewhere).[28] But if we carefully inspect the narrative of Genesis, in which the transgression of the first man is described, and at the same time call to mind those things which were said (around Dist. 22 of this book), it will easily be understood that the first man's transgression was not simply a single sin, but that in it there were in truth contained several actual sins. For the first sin was pride, conceived from those words of the tempter: "You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."[29] The second was infidelity, by which he both refused to believe God threatening death from the eating of the forbidden fruit, and believed the serpent promising that from that same eating he would both become like God and receive

knowledge of good and evil. The third was the eating itself of the forbidden tree, in which none the less, in the one external act, two sins — theft and gluttony — which are usually committed separately, are found conjoined. These and certain other sins in that single transgression of the first man, besides St. Augustine (cited by the Master in *Enchiridion*, ch. 45), were also considered by other Fathers, such as St. Ambrose (in his commentary *On Luke*, bk. 4)[30] and Gregory (Homily 19).[31]

§ 13. Nor indeed must it be said that these several sins concur into one in the same way as we said above of original sin. For original sin is simply one according to its formal character (*formalem rationem*), as is clear from the preceding section; whereas the actual transgression of Adam comprised several actual sins, even though all of them converge upon one end — namely, the ambition by which he sought equality with God. By reason of that end, nothing prevents the entire transgression from being called in a certain sense one sin; just as one who lies or breaks open another's storehouse to take possession of it commits in a certain manner a single sin.

§ V — Whether all are born equally sinners (An omnes nascantur æqualiter peccatores?)

§ 14. It is the common teaching of the Scholastics, following Hugh and the Master, that all human beings are born equally subject to original sin, so that there is no diversity either in guilt or in the corresponding punishment among those who depart this life in this sin alone. St. Anselm also expressed this opinion in his book *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 23.[33] The reason for this can be given from the words of St. Cyprian, bk. 3 (*Epistola* 8): because "an infant, newly born, has sinned in nothing, except that, being carnally born from Adam, it has contracted the contagion of ancient death."[4] Wherefore, since that carnal birth from Adam is equal for all, the contagion too will be equal.

§ 15. A second reason can also be added: for through the second man, Christ, equal glory in salvation is rendered to all little ones in baptism — if they depart this life before the use of reason and become partakers neither of any other sacrament nor of martyrdom. It is therefore fitting that through the first man Adam, likewise, all those born of him are constituted equally sinners.

§ 16. But if you object that little ones, after they have come to the age of the use of reason, are not all equally inclined to evil, but some more, some less, nor are all inclined to the same vices, but one to this, another to that — I reply that that innate and radical concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) is equal in all, by reason of the unity of the infecting cause. But because in one person more, in another fewer, aids to sinning are found — whether on the part of the soul or on the part of the body, and that in accordance with the diversity of vices — it comes about that in adult age not all sin equally, but either more or less, and in one or another kind of sin according to the variety of natural constitution and natural instruments, or also of the occasions which present themselves through life. In the same way it also comes about that those who as infants have received equal grace in baptism, once they have now received the use of reason, neither equally serve God nor devote themselves to the same works of piety, but dispense the grace of God received in different ways according to the diversity of natural gifts, or of other aids and occasions — as the Apostle Peter teaches in his First Epistle, ch. 4, and Paul in Rom. 12.[34]

§ VI — On what is certainly to be held concerning the punishment of original sin (De poena peccati originalis quid certo tenendum sit)

§ 17. The punishment (*poena*) of original sin is of two kinds: one temporal, the other eternal. To temporal punishment belongs the death of the body, and the other wretchedness and miseries of this mortal condition, according to that text of Rom. 5: "Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death." And 1 Cor. 15: "In Adam all die." And again: "By man came death." And Rom. 8: "The body is dead because of sin." The same has been decreed by the Fathers in canon 2 of the Council of Orange,[36] and in canon 2, session 5, of the Council of Trent,[37] with the words repeated from the Canons of Orange.

§ 18. Now concerning the punishment of the world to come, the question is more difficult — whether on account of the obscurity of the matter, or on account of the diversity of opinions — yet here, in accordance with the authority of Scripture and the definitions of the Fathers, it must above all be established as certain that little children dying in original sin alone will not enter the Kingdom of Heaven: for there is the definitive sentence of the Lord in Jn. 3: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God." Even Pelagius, moreover, confessed this concerning unbaptised infants, although he denied that they were subject to sin. But since he was promising them eternal life outside the Kingdom of Heaven, it must be examined whether a doctrine of this kind is permitted by sound teaching.

§ 19. It is certainly sufficiently clear in the Sacred Scriptures that eternal life and salvation are understood to mean nothing other than the Kingdom of Heaven. For what the Lord said in Jn. 3 as "the Kingdom of God," He afterwards in the same discourse calls "eternal life" and "salvation": "That whosoever," He says, "believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." And again: "That the world may be saved by Him." And in the words of John the Baptist in the same chapter: "He that believeth not the Son shall not have life." Acts 8: "There is no other name under heaven given to men whereby we must be saved." And Rom. 6: "The grace of God is life eternal." And 1 Jn. 5: "He that hath not the Son of God hath not life." And other passages of this kind are almost innumerable, so that it was with justice that, already long ago in the Synod of Palestine held against Pelagius, this article of Pelagius was condemned: *Infants, even if they be not baptised, have eternal life* — as St. Augustine reports in Epistle 106 (that is, Epistle 186 in the most recent edition), to Paulinus.[38] Concerning this matter one may also see the letters of the Councils of Carthage and Milevis to Pope Innocent,[39] (which are found in St. Augustine, numbers 90 and 92), as well as that letter in which Innocent replies to the Fathers of the Council of Milevis (which is found in the same St. Augustine as number 93),[40] in which he interprets, concerning little children, that text of Jn. 6: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you." And the very words of Innocent are repeated by St. Augustine in book 2, *Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians*, chapter 4.[41]

§ 20. Moreover, words of precisely the same import are read in Pope Gelasius, in his Letter to the Piceni,[42] where he calls impious and profane the proposition of those who say that little children are not damned for original sin alone, but assign to them some third place in which, outside the Kingdom of Heaven, they lead a blessed life. He also employs the proof from the words of the Lord: "Unless you eat." From which he concludes that little children too, unless they eat, cannot have life in themselves. St. Augustine disputes about this same matter against the Pelagians in various places, but especially in book 2, *On the Origin of the Soul*, chapter 10; and in the book *On Heresies*, at the heresy of Pelagius; and in his commentary on John, at the text "In my Father's house" — Tract 67; and in book 3, *On the Merits of Sinners*, chapter 4.[43]

§ 21. To these has finally been added the definition of the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 4,[44] in which those are condemned with anathema who deny that little children contract from Adam a sin which it is necessary to expiate by the washing of regeneration, for the attaining of eternal life.

§ 22. Beyond these things, it must also be held as certain that those who depart this life in original sin are never to be freed from its punishment for eternity, and that no heed whatsoever is to be given to those who promise them salvation — that is, a certain blessed life — at the universal resurrection, as the dangerous and rash opinion of Catharinus holds, who to confirm it employs these and similar Scriptural texts: "The last enemy to be destroyed is death"; "The prince of this world shall be cast out"; "In Christ all shall be made alive."[45] But it is established that these Scriptural passages, in accordance with sound and Catholic interpretation, have a quite different meaning. Moreover, to destroy that error no other proof is needed than the one the Fathers used against Origen, who taught that the punishments of the damned would some day have an end. Enough has been said about this matter at the end of the Fourth Book of the Sentences.[46] For it must not be doubted that even little children who are bound by original sin alone are to be reckoned among the number of the damned after this life, since the Apostle says in Rom. 5 that through the offense of one man condemnation passes to all men.

§ 23. From what we have said, therefore, it manifestly follows that the punishment owed to original sin is the perpetual privation (*carentiam*) of the divine vision (*visionis divinae*). For since the vision of God — of which it is said in 1 Cor. 13: "We shall see Him face to face," and in 1 Jn. 3: "We shall see Him as He is" — has no existence outside the Kingdom of Heaven and eternal life, but rather itself constitutes the Kingdom of Heaven and eternal life, it must by no means be doubted that those whom we have now shown to have no part in the Kingdom of Heaven nor in eternal life will be aliens from it. This is what Innocent III teaches in the Decretals, chapter *Majores*, on the title *On Baptism and its Effect*.[47] And this doctrine is so certain that the contrary error surpasses even the Pelagian heresy, as is evident from what has been said above.

§ 24. [Here Estius appends a note concerning] blessed Benedict, who, when asked about little children dying without baptism, was accustomed to reply: "Where they do not go I know; where they are I do not know" — signifying that he was certain that they do not go into the Kingdom of Heaven. St. Augustine bears witness to this in the book *On Original Sin*, chapter 21.[48]

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§ VII — Whether non-baptised infants will exist in some kind of beatitude (An parvuli non renati in beatitudine aliqua futuri sint)

§ 25. It has been the opinion of certain Catholics that infants dying without baptism will enjoy a certain natural beatitude, in which they will both be wholly free from sadness and pain, and will know all natural things, and will praise God known in creatures, and will rejoice and delight in Him — endowed, of course, with a good will, one consenting in all things to the will of God. But whether these and similar claims are in good harmony with Sacred Scripture and with the judgements of the Fathers must now be examined.

First of all, it has been shown that non-baptised infants will be outside the Kingdom of God and strangers to the vision (*visio*) of God. Yet St. Augustine testifies[50] that it is no slight punishment (*poena*) for the image of God to be exiled eternally from the Kingdom of God. And in the *Enchiridion*[51] he says that no torments of

this present life can be compared to it. He says similar things in Sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle,[52] And St. John Chrysostom, in multiple homilies,[53] vehemently amplifies with forceful language the being-cast-away from the face of God as a grave punishment. St. Basil likewise, in his commentary on Ps. 33 at the words "the fear of the Lord,"[54] says that this is the most grievous of all punishments.

§ 26. Nor is one to acquiesce in the reply of those who say that this punishment is indeed great in itself, yet constitutes no punishment for infants, inasmuch as these will not grieve over that privation, for the reason — so they claim — that they were not proportioned to the beatitude of the heavenly Kingdom. This reply empties the truth of original sin (*peccatum originale*) of its content. For if original sin, as we have shown in its proper place, is a sin to which some proper penalty of its own must correspond — this being the case, once that proper penalty is removed, the proper formal character (*ratio*) of sin will also be removed.

Add to this that neither Sacred Scripture nor any one of the Fathers has ever made any mention of this natural beatitude which certain persons attribute to infants outside the heavenly Kingdom. On the contrary, they seem sufficiently to have excluded it when they condemned in the Pelagians the assertion that those infants would not indeed have the Kingdom of heaven, yet would nevertheless have eternal life. For when the Pelagians distinguished between the Kingdom of heaven and eternal life, they seem to have understood by "eternal life" nothing other than what these men call "natural" — and that an eternal beatitude; especially since a blessed and tranquil state of life is customarily understood by the name of "life." On this matter there are passages in St. Augustine:[55] and it must be noted in those passages that the Fathers openly reject any middle place between eternal beatitude and eternal damnation — a place, that is, in which some persons would be neither blessed nor wretched — and they would all the more reject a place of some natural felicity.

§ 27. Furthermore, the Fathers everywhere either designate or indicate that state of infants dying without baptism by names that are wholly inconsistent with the aforesaid beatitude. For St. Cyprian in his letter to Fidus[56] says that all who are not reborn in Christ perish. In like terms speaks Pope Leo in his Epistle 95, ch. 15.[57] And this is consonant with Scripture: Gen. 17, "The male whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be cut off, or shall perish, from his people." St. Augustine in many passages calls it eternal death and the second death,[58] as does likewise the Commentary ascribed to St. Ambrose on 2 Cor. 5 at the words "if one died for all, etc."[59] Prosper calls it eternal misery.[60] And yet graver expressions are read in Fulgentius[61] and in St. Gregory.[62] For these call it the torments and punishments of Gehenna. To this is added the established fact that infants, before they are baptised, are in the kingdom and power of the devil, from which they are rescued only through the sacrament of baptism — as those exorcisms that precede baptism argue, in the manner that St. Augustine collects.[63] Therefore all who depart this life without baptism remain in the kingdom and power of the devil. And this is expressly affirmed by St. Augustine in numerous passages, both against Julian and elsewhere.

§ 28. Finally, by the authority of the Council of Florence, with the Greeks consenting, it has been defined that the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, descend immediately into hell, to be punished with unequal punishments.[64] Hence it is clear that the proper character of punishment must be acknowledged even in such persons, though far less than that with which those are to be punished who have committed their own personal sins, as we shall teach below.

§ 29. As for the claim that infants who have died without baptism praise God in His works — this appears to conflict with the manifest words of Scripture, such as these and the like: "The dead shall not praise Thee, O

Lord, neither all they that go down into hell" (Ps. 113).[65] And: "In hell who shall confess to Thee?" (Ps. 6).,[66] And Baruch 2: "The dead who are in hell shall not give honour and justification to the Lord.",[67] Moreover, how can they praise and bless God, and acquiesce in His will, who by reason of the sin that is in them and will never be taken from them are evil and turned away from God and contrary to God, and will remain such forever — as we have shown in the discussion around Distinction 30?

§ 30. These things, therefore, and others like them — the arguments regarding the punishments of infants dying in original sin alone, resting either on reason or on authority — plainly declare the opinion to be altogether improbable of those who promise a certain state of natural beatitude (*naturalis beatitudo*) to non-baptised infants. For where there is eternal perdition (*aeterna perditio*), damnation, misery, the second death, hell, Gehenna, and subjection under the kingdom and power of the devil, and other designations of this kind, no beatitude — not even an imperfect one — can be understood.

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§ VIII — Whether the punishment of sense is owed to original sin in the world to come (An peccato originali debeatur in futuro seculo pœna sensus)

§ 31. Another question is whether the punishment owed to original sin after this life is the sole privation of the vision of God, or whether it also includes the punishment of sense (*pœna sensus*). For both sides of this question there are arguments that are not lacking. In confirmation of the former position the following are commonly advanced.

The first: sensible punishment answers to illicit delectation of sense, according to that passage in Rev. 18: "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and mourning give ye to her." But infants have never been illicitly delighted; therefore they will not be afflicted with sensible punishment. The second: the blessed Job (ch. 3), in preference to the miseries of this life, wished that he had died in his mother's womb, adding: "For now I should have been asleep and still, I should have slept then had rest." Therefore such dead are separated from the sight of God yet have rest from punishments. The third: Matt. 25, only those are condemned to eternal fire who have not performed works of mercy — under which other good works too are included — or, as St. Augustine subsequently expounds, who have neglected to redeem their sins by works of mercy. But such guilt cannot be attributed to infants; therefore they will not endure the punishment of fire. The fourth: St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 93, says that the punishment of those who have added no other sin to original sin will be most mild.[69] And in bk. 5 (*Contra Iulianum*, ch. 11) he does not hesitate to say that infants dying without baptism will be in the lightest of all condemnations, nor does he dare to say that it would be better for them not to exist than to exist thus.[70] Therefore he does not hold that they are tormented by fire. The fifth: St. Ambrose, bk. 2 (*De Abraham*, last chapter), says that infants have immunity from punishments but not the honour of the Kingdom.[71] The sixth: Gregory of Nazianzus (*Oration on Holy Baptism*, which is numbered 40) says that infants who die without baptism are afflicted neither with heavenly glory nor with punishment from a just judge God.[72]

§ 32. The seventh: Gregory of Rome, bk. 13 (*Moralia*, ch. 21), indicates this distinction between original sin and actual sin: that the punishment of original guilt is not to see the face of the Creator, whereas actual sins incur torment.[73] The eighth: these are the words of St. Bernard, Sermon 3 (*On Easter*): "What does God hate or punish except one's own will? Let self-will cease and there will be no hell. For upon what will that fire

rage except upon self-will?" Since therefore infants have done nothing by their own will, they will not suffer from that fire.[74] The ninth: Innocent III (*c. Majores*, in the *Decretales*, on Baptism and its effect) says: "The punishment of original sin is the privation of the vision of God; but the punishment of actual sin is the perpetual torment of hell."[75] The tenth: the Master (*in this Distinction*, § E.) says that infants, on account of original sin, will experience no other punishment of material fire or of the worm of conscience, save that they will lack the vision of God in perpetuity.[76] This opinion of the Master is followed by almost all the Scholastics.

§ 33. Moreover, others endeavour to establish the contrary opinion by the following arguments. First: Christ, describing the universal judgement in Matt. 25, makes nothing intermediate between the Kingdom of the Father and eternal fire; and that infants too, whether good or bad, are comprehended in that judgement appears from the fact that they belong to the multitude of nations which the Lord says are all to be gathered to that judgement — as the inclusion of the good is established by this promise made to Abraham: "In thy seed shall all nations be blessed." Hence also St. Augustine, in the letter to Vitalis,[77] and in bk. 6 *Contra Iulianum*, ch. 10,[78] says that infants will be judged on the last day and will receive according to what they have done in life. Second: Matt. 3, the Lord says that the wheat is to be gathered into the barn, but the chaff is to be burned with unquenchable fire. And Matt. 13 he says: "The Angels shall go forth and shall separate the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." Since therefore infants who are not regenerate are neither just nor belong to the wheat, they belong with the wicked — which the chaff signifies — and will be cast into the fire.

§ 34. Third: Rev. 20, the dead, small and great, are said to be judged, and all those who are not found written in the book of life are cast into the pool of fire. In the same passage hell and death are said to be cast into the pool of fire, because outside that pool neither hell nor death will any longer exist as they now exist in some manner. Therefore, since it is certain that infants who are not regenerate descend into hell according to the definition of the Council of Florence, it follows that they must be cast into the pool of fire. Fourth: the Fathers, speaking of the punishment of infants who are not regenerate, name not merely separation from the sight of God but also torments and sufferings of hell and eternal fire, as does Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3 and 27[79]), and Gregory, bk. 9 (*Moralia*, ch. 16[80]), and St. Augustine himself at times, as in Sermon 14 (*b*) on the words of the Apostle, *Enchiridion* ch. 26 and 116, *De Civitate Dei* bk. 21, ch. 12 and 35, *De Peccatorum meritis* ch. 28, and elsewhere[81]; and Prosper, on Ps. 128, citing the passage Matt. 13: "Whatever shall have lacked the substance of charity," he says, "shall be consigned to fire.",[82]

§ 35. Fifth: original sin is punished in this world by sensible punishments, as is evident in the miseries of infants, and St. Augustine attests this in bk. 3 (*Contra Iulianum*, ch. 3 and 5).[83] But this present world is not the time of retribution and vengeance, but rather of mercy; therefore much more will it be punished sensibly in the world to come. Hence the same St. Augustine, bk. 3 (*De Libero arbitrio*, ch. 15), says: "Whatever is now punished most secretly is reserved for the future judgement, for the manifestation and most acute experience of misery."[84] Sixth: in infants who are not regenerate there is a habitual distaste for holy delectation (*fastidium sanctae delectationis*). For this reason Prosper, bk. 2 (*De Vocatione Gentium*, ch. 24), asserts them to be sharers in a most grave sin.[85] Therefore such a sin is deservedly punished by sensible punishment. Seventh: Christ in his passion underwent sensible punishment in order to abolish original sin; therefore sensible punishment is owed to it. Eighth: regenerate infants by reason of the justice received from Christ are worthy of sensible joy; therefore, by the same reasoning, non-regenerate infants by reason of original injustice are worthy of sensible torment.

§ 36. Ninth: infants who are not regenerate will have passible bodies (*corpora passibilia*), inasmuch as these are not endowed with the gift of impassibility (*dos impassibilitatis*). This St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 92 and 93) not obscurely signified; they will therefore suffer according to the body.[86] Last: the tinder of concupiscence (*fomes concupiscentiae*) will not be extinguished in them; it will therefore stir desires for things which they will nonetheless be unable to attain, and accordingly they will be tormented by their own desires. Hence St. Augustine, bk. 6 (*Contra Iulianum*, ch. 16), says: "In those who shall not rise to life, the concupiscence will be not felicitously but penally; not because anyone will then be cleansed from it, but because it will then not be roused toward pleasures of evil but will turn into torments."[87]

§ 37. Moreover, this opinion concerning the punishment of infants was held after the ancient writers — St. Augustine, Fulgentius, Prosper, and Gregory of Rome — of whom it evidently was the view, and was subsequently followed among later writers by Gregory of Rimini, Johannes Driedo, and several others.

In this contrariety of opinions it must be known above all that neither side has been asserted by its authors (with the exception of Fulgentius, who in ch. 27 *De Fide ad Petrum* sets forth his opinion as a rule of faith to be held) as something to be held as a matter of faith, nor has the opposing view been condemned as heretical; wherefore we too, leaving this question about sensible punishment open, say that the arguments advanced on both sides are not all of such a kind as to conclude efficaciously or as to be incapable of being answered with probability, as will be evident to one who weighs their force more carefully.

§ 38. For example: what was proposed first in favour of the former side does not conclude; because for spiritual sins, in which there is no delectation of sense, sensible punishment is owed by common consent. And it is certain that Gregory of Rome — which was objected in the seventh place — is speaking of the saints of the Old Testament established in the limbo, of whom, however, original sin had been remitted through circumcision. Hence from the very opinion of Gregory it seems to follow that those in whom that sin was in no way remitted are more severely punished than by the mere privation of the vision of God — especially since elsewhere there exists a sufficiently express statement of the same Gregory in the passage cited by us.[88] But neither does that which was proposed in favour of the opposite side in the fifth place appear to conclude. For whatever merits a temporary sensible punishment does not thereby merit an eternal one, as is evident in the case of venial sins; and the otherwise undesirable consequence would be that infants are afflicted with most severe torments in the world to come, since both baptized and non-baptized infants sometimes suffer in this present world. To the sixth, however, we reply that properly speaking infants do not have evil habits (*habitus mali*), but rather the root of evil habits and acts — namely, concupiscence itself. For no one would say that in a newborn infant there is a habit of avarice, drunkenness, or impurity. For habits must be determined toward a certain kind of actions; but the will of an infant, though evil, is not yet determined to any particular thing. For that determination follows upon the use of the senses and of the rational powers in adult age. Wherefore neither will the infant in the world to come be punished as a miser, a profligate, or a drunkard, but only as an evil person and one averse from God.

§ 39. And we do not doubt that those err who attribute to the infant who is not regenerate a habitual evil will of such a kind that from it, in the world to come, he will actually hate God and blaspheme him — since this does not even seem to be truly sayable of all adults.[89] Nor does it seem consonant with reason that anyone, whether adult or infant, should be worse in the world to come than he was in the present; for it is the work of divine justice not to augment malice but to punish sins.

The seventh argument likewise does not appear to conclude. For Christ suffered for the most grave sins as well, and therefore sustained the most severe sufferings even in body; yet that passion, just as it availed for venial sins, so too availed for the abolition of original sin. For it must not be denied that Christ, by the sole sorrow of soul accepted, could have made satisfaction for all the sins of men. But he who out of abundant charity made satisfaction for all things willed that his redemption should also be copious in sufferings.

§ 40. These things being so, we nonetheless append several conclusions for some explanation of this question. The first is: if not the punishment of the body, at least the sorrow of soul cannot be excluded from infants who are not regenerate and who have the use of reason. For it cannot be that those who understand themselves to be for ever deprived of so great a good for which they were created should not grieve in their soul. This is also attested by the opinions of St. Augustine and St. John Chrysostom cited above in their proper places.[90] Indeed, Gregory, bk. 13 (*Moralia*, ch. 21), attributes to the Fathers placed in the limbo a grave weariness (*grave tedium*) arising from the mere privation of the vision of God.[73]

The second: infants will be wretched and unhappy not only according to the soul but also according to the body. For the reason on both sides is equal, as regards the general condition of misery. And for this reason too those souls will at some time take up their bodies again, that they may receive full retribution for their sin.

The third: from misery of body it does not follow that there is sensible pain or sensation (*dolor seu fœra sensibilis*), not even in this life, as is evident in those who sleep and in those whose members are numbed or otherwise unfit for operation.

The fourth: even if the punishment be sensible, the punishment of infants among all the damned will be the most mild and lightest, as St. Augustine attests (*Enchiridion*, ch. 93, and bk. 5 *Contra Iulianum*, ch. 11).[91] Pertinent here is the fact that David, who mourned inconsolably for the dead Absalom, did not mourn for his son born of adultery who died before the eighth day, but immediately laid aside the signs of mourning.

The last: even if the punishment be sensible, it is not to be affirmed that it will be so grave that, in view of the magnitude of the punishment, it would be better for them not to exist than to endure some slight pain in sense, however perpetual. St. Augustine does not shrink from this opinion (*in the place just cited against Julian*), even though he does not affirm it without qualification.[92] The same can also be gathered from the act of David just mentioned.

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§ IX — Whether the sin of Adam was the most grave of all sins (An Adae peccatum fuerit omnium gravissimum)

§ 41. For the exaggeration of the sin of the first man many things concur, as can be understood from what was said (around Distinction 22). The first is that he sinned directly against God, by seeking to be as God, by not believing his words, and by turning the guilt of his sin back upon God. Hence from the standpoint of its object it was the most grave sin — since the gravity of sins is absolutely judged (*simpliciter*) by their objects. Then, from another consideration, it was the most grave of all sins committed by men, insofar as it was at its outset most free and most voluntary, inasmuch as at that time no ignorance or passion impeded reason — still wholly integral — from the choice of good, nor drove it toward evil. From this consideration St. Augustine

frequently exaggerates that sin, as in bk. 14 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 12 and 15, bk. 21, ch. 1), and in bk. 3 (*De Libero arbitrio*, ch. 19), and in *Retractationum* bk. 1, ch. 9, 13, and 15.[94]

§ 42. Third, it was most grave from the standpoint of the harm that followed from it and that the first man was bound and able to prevent. For he injured, and, as far as was in him, for ever ruined, the entire human race. St. Augustine attends to this consideration (*Enchiridion*, ch. 48), saying that that one sin was so great that in one man the entire human race was condemned originally and radically.[95] And in bk. 22 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 14) he says that too great a sin preceded in the first man from whom the rest have sprung.[96] And Gregory, on 1 Kgs 8, at the words "according to all his works," says: "For what greater guilt is there than that by which we shall all die?",[97]

§ 43. Nevertheless, from these things it does not follow that Adam's sin was absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) more grave than any other sin ever committed or to be committed by a man. For as regards the first consideration, only this is gathered from it: that this sin was in the genus of the greatest sins — within which genus, however, one sin can be graver than another. For a blasphemer or atheist sins more gravely against God than a superstitious person; and again, within the same species it can happen that one person transgresses more gravely than another. The second and third considerations, moreover, will not prove greater gravity absolutely speaking, but only other things being equal — especially since he did not intend the harm, which was therefore only indirectly voluntary to him.

§ 44. Whether that first transgression was the sin against the Holy Spirit (*peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum*), which the Master denies, depends on the understanding of what is called in the Gospel the sin against the Holy Spirit — for this is variously expounded by the interpreters. Nor again is it improbable, as the same Master asserts, that the first man by sinning did not merit so grave an eternal punishment as many afterwards merited through other sins — such as Cain through the murder of his brother, Judas through the betrayal of the Son of God, and others like them, whose sins are held to be greatly execrable.

§ 45. Add the consideration that either some of Adam's posterity can or cannot sin more gravely than he did. If they cannot, a reason must be sought — since the will of a man living here can always advance toward worse, just as it can always advance toward better. If they can, it is rashly affirmed that in so great a multitude no example exists.

§ X — Whether the first parents obtained pardon for their transgression (An primi parentes transgressionis suae veniam fuerint consecuti)

§ 46. That the first human beings obtained pardon and salvation for their sin through penance, and above all the first-formed man Adam, is so constant a judgment of the whole Church that those who contradicted their salvation were regarded as heretics already in ancient times — such as were the Encratites and the followers of Tatian. Of these Irenaeus writes in book three,[98] and after him Epiphanius and Philastrius in their treatments of that same heresy, and St. Augustine.[99] St. Augustine likewise in book two[100] says of both first parents together that it is rightly believed that they afterwards lived justly and were by the blood of the Lord freed from the extreme punishment. And in his letter numbered 99,[101] he writes: "Concerning the first man, that Christ released him from the underworld, virtually the whole Church agrees. And this must be believed to have been not an empty belief, from whatever source this tradition was handed down, even if an express authority from the canonical Scriptures is not produced in support of it." Thereupon, citing the text that is

said of Wisdom (Wis. 10): "She guarded and led out from his sin him who was first formed by God," he says that this Scripture speaks more in favour of this opinion than for any other interpretation. Although that Scripture does not expressly signify that the first man was saved (for after receiving pardon for his first sin he could have relapsed into another), the aforementioned Fathers nevertheless numbered the contrary opinion among heresies, because concerning the salvation of the first man — indeed of both first parents — and concerning their being led out by Christ from the underworld, there was a certain perpetual tradition in the Church received by hand from hand. And this tradition St. Augustine judged should be urged more strongly than Scripture.

§ 47. It is possible nonetheless, for the confirmation of the same ecclesiastical judgment, to adduce also the fact that God, after both had sinned, did not abandon them; but rebuked them and demanded an account of them, and called them to penance, and, to raise them to a greater hope of pardon, promised that a seed would be born of the woman by whom the head of the serpent — who had led them into the transgression of the divine law — would one day be crushed (Gen. 3).

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§ XI — Whether and how the sins of parents are punished in children (An et Quomodo peccata parentum puniantur in filiis)

102

§ 48. The question whether the sins of parents are punished in their children, and by what justice this comes about, was given occasion by two passages of Scripture that appear to be in conflict with each other. The one is from Exod. 20: "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of fathers upon children unto the third and fourth generation." With this accords that complaint of Jer. in Lam. (last chapter): "Our fathers sinned and are no more; and we have borne their iniquities." The other is from Ezekiel 18, where the Lord reproves a similar complaint of the Jewish people who said: "Our fathers ate sour grapes, and the teeth of the children are set on edge." And he corrects it with this verdict: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." A similar passage is Jer. 31. St. Augustine endeavours to resolve this apparent contradiction[103] by referring the words of the Lord in Exodus to men born from Adam and not yet reborn, who on account of the sin contracted from Adam are liable to eternal damnation; whereas the words of the Lord in Ezekiel he takes to refer to the reborn and to the children of the New Testament, for whom, since original sin has been remitted, no punishment of the world to come is owed on account of it. But this reply does not seem satisfactory. First, because the passage in Exodus extends the punishment only to the third and fourth generation. Second, because in that same passage not only the iniquity of the first man is meant, but the iniquity of whatever parents. Third, because it seems to have included the aforesaid words. Lastly, because the Jews at Ezekiel were complaining of the miseries of this life, which assuredly are not taken away from the children of the New Testament by that promise of God.

§ 49. St. Jerome (writing on that same passage of Ezekiel)[104] understands the text of Exodus of those who are imitators of their parents' sins and who, having received a certain hereditary evil from their parents, hate God. This sense may be seen also in St. Augustine,[105] and in St. Gregory.[106] And it seems to be confirmed by the appended clause "unto those who hate me," on which the same Fathers insist. To others this reply appears true indeed, but incomplete. For we do not read in Exodus "unto those who hate me," but "of those who hate me" — namely, of the fathers; for that had preceded, even though the Seventy rendered it with a dative. For in

the following part also, where it is said "unto those who love me," the reference is not to the sons but to the fathers. Therefore the passage in Exodus is more fully understood in this manner: "I am God, visiting the iniquity of fathers who hate me unto the third and fourth generation; because, although I am merciful and defer the temporal punishment which the parents had deserved, waiting for them unto penance, yet if they are not converted and have sons and grandsons who imitate them in their sins by reason of the iniquity of the parents from which their descendants did not depart, a heavier punishment will fall upon the descendants than would have been the case if the sins of the parents had not preceded." And this is what Jeremiah laments in his lamentations: "Our fathers sinned and are no more, and we have borne their iniquities" — not indeed denying that the people of his own time had sinned, against whose sins he inveighs frequently and severely elsewhere; but signifying that, by reason of the idolatry and other crimes committed by their ancestors, which had not yet been temporally punished, the punishment of the descendants was heavier than it would have been had the ancestors not so sinned. Moreover, examples of this can be brought forward from the descendants of Jeroboam, of Solomon, of Manasseh, and others. But those whose complaint Ezekiel introduces considered themselves innocent and thought themselves afflicted so grievously solely on account of the sins of their fathers, attributing injustice to God not without blasphemy; whereas the children of the New Testament (whose times Ezekiel there prefigures, saying that the proverb would no longer be used in Israel) understand themselves to be so afflicted on account of the sins of their ancestors, yet themselves also acknowledge their own iniquity, saying with Tobias: "Remember not my transgressions nor those of my parents"; and with Ps. 105: "We have sinned with our fathers." This interpretation is also indicated by the words of Moses at Exod. 34: "And no one is innocent before thee," after which immediately follows the similar statement to that from chapter 20 which we have just been treating.

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§ XII — What is the first origin of sin (Quae sit prima peccati origo)

107

§ 50. The Master inquires into the origin of evil, that is, of sin (in this distinction).[108] To this inquiry satisfaction has already in part been given by what we said (around dist. 6 and 22 of this book),[109] in the former of which the question of the origin of sin in the Angel, and in the latter the question of its origin in the first man, was treated. But for a fuller explanation of that question it must be noted that the evil of fault (*malum culpae*), of which we are here speaking, can be understood in three ways: either as an exterior act, or as an interior act, or as a habit. Sin that consists in a habit is easily referred to its own origin. For the exterior act proceeds from the interior act, as theft or lying proceeds from the will to steal or to lie; and the evil habit is caused by an evil act or evil acts. For because we do evil things, we are evil. But concerning the origin of that sin which consists in the interior act of the will the question is more difficult. To this question, nevertheless, one must answer without hesitation that its first origin is neither God — who is the supreme, uncreated, and most perfect good, and likewise the source and origin of all good things — nor any evil principle, as a source of all evils, such as the Manichaean invented; but rather it is a created and defectible good, namely the will of the intellectual creature. For inasmuch as the will was made from nothing, it can fall away from him by whom it was made, and deviate from the rule of divine justice — just as in general every creature, inasmuch as it is from nothing, can return to nothing. This is the doctrine of St. Augustine in various places, and especially those in which he disputes against the Manichaeans, as throughout the book *De duabus animabus* (for the

Manichaeans attributed two souls to each individual man: one good, given by the good God, the other evil, given by the evil one, so that they might assign the good as well as the evil works of man each to its own proper principle). Likewise in book two,[110] and in book one,'[111] and again in the book *De Haeresibus*, in the heresy of the Manichaeans.[112]

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1. The marginal note in the source reads: "Rectius diceretur: certo tamen tenendum est illud in uno primi hominis peccato veritatem habere: quandoquidem ceteras inter Baji propositiones haec, quae est in ordine LII, proscripta recensetur: *Omne scelus est ejus conditionis, ut suum auctorem, et omnes posteros ea conditione inficere possit, qua infecta prima transgressio*." That is, it would be said more correctly: it is, however, certainly to be held that the truth obtains in the case of the sin of the first man alone, inasmuch as this proposition, which is no. 52 in order among the other condemned propositions of Baius, is listed among those proscribed: "Every crime is of such a condition that it can infect its author and all his descendants with the same condition with which the first transgression infected."
2. Rom. 5:16.
3. 1 Cor. 15:22.
4. St. Cyprian, *Epistola* III, 8 (the epistle to Fidus).
5. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 3; and *Contra duas Epistulas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 8.
6. St. Jerome, near the end of the third *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*.
7. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 10.
8. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu virginali* ch. 23.
9. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu virginali*, ch. 23 (as cited above).
10. St. Thomas, as cited above [*Summa theologiae*, reference as given in the source: *ubi supra*].
11. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 46.
12. St. Leo, *Epistola* 86.
13. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 10.
14. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 46–47; *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 7.
15. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae*, no. 306.
16. 2 Kgs 12 (Vulgate; = 2 Sam. 12).
17. St. Thomas [*Summa theologiae*, reference as given in the source, *ubi supra*].
18. Rom. 5:16–18.
19. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 6.
20. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 44.
21. Ps. 50:7 (Vulgate).
22. St. Ambrose, *Apologia David*, ch. 11.
23. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 3.
24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1; q. 82, a. 2, ad 2; II-II, q. 163, a. 1.
25. Rom. 5:15, 16.
26. Rom. 5:17.
27. Wis. 10:1–2.
28. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 45–46, and elsewhere.

29. Gen. 3:5.

30. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, bk. 4.

31. St. Gregory the Great, *Homily* 19 [abbreviation as in source: *Hom. 19*; likely *Homiliae in Evangelia* or *Homiliae in Hiezechihelem*].

32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 4.

33. St. Anselm, *De Conceptu Virginali*, ch. 23.

34. 1 Pet. 4; Rom. 12.

35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75; q. 86; q. 87; II-II, q. 164.

36. Council of Orange (Arausican), canon 2.

37. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 2 (with words repeated from the Canons of Orange).

38. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 106 (= Epistle CLXXXVI in the most recent [Benedictine] edition), to Paulinus.

39. Letters of the Councils of Carthage and Milevis to Pope Innocent; found in St. Augustine, Epistles 90 and 92 (= CLXXV and CLXXVI in the Benedictine edition).

40. Pope Innocent I, reply to the Fathers of the Council of Milevis; found in St. Augustine as Epistle 93 (= CLXXXII in the Benedictine edition).

41. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 2, ch. 4.

42. Pope Gelasius I, *Epistola ad Picenos* [letter to the bishops of Picenum].

43. St. Augustine: *De Origine animae*, bk. 2, ch. 10; *De Haeresibus*, at the heresy of Pelagius; *In Ioannem*, Tract 67, at the text "In my Father's house" (Jn. 14:2); *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, bk. 3, ch. 4.

44. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 4.

45. 1 Cor. 15:26; Jn. 12:31; 1 Cor. 15:22 [Catharinus's proof-texts].

46. Estius refers to his own commentary, sub finem Quarti Sententiarum (at the end of the Fourth Book of the Sentences).

47. Pope Innocent III, *Decretales*, chapter *Majores*, title *De Baptismo et ejus effectu*.

48. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 21.

49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 5, ad 2 and 3; III, q. 52, a. 7.

50. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 3, ch. 3.

51. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 112.

52. St. Augustine, Sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle (= Sermon CCXCIV in the new edition, among the sermons of the third class, in the new edition, vol. V, on baptism of children against the Pelagians).

53. St. John Chrysostom: *In Matthaeum*, hom. 24; *Ad populum Antiochenum*, hom. 47; *Ad eundem populum*, hom. 57; *In Epistolam ad Philippenses*, hom. 13.

54. St. Basil, *In Psalmum 33*, at the words "the fear of the Lord."

55. St. Augustine: *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, bk. 1, ch. 28 and 30; *De Peccato originali*, ch. 21; Sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle (= Serm. CCXCIV in the new edition); and *Hypognosticon*, response 5 (or bk. 5). To which may also be added the other passages cited in the preceding section.

56. St. Cyprian, *Epistola ad Fidum* (Epistle 8 in Cyprian's collection).

57. Pope Leo I (the Great), *Epistola* 95, ch. 15.

58. St. Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 14; bk. 21, ch. 16 and 21; *De Peccatorum meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 28; *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 1, ch. 3 [recte bk. 3] and bk. 6, ch. 8; *De Peccato originali*, ch. 2.

59. Commentary on 2 Cor. 5 (at "if one died for all," etc.), ascribed to St. Ambrose [i.e., Ambrosiaster].

60. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 2, ch. 22, 19, and 24.

61. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3 and 27; *De Incarnatione*, ch. 14 and 30.

62. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 4, and bk. 9, ch. 12. (Correction from source: the citation reads bk. 4, *Moral.* c. 3, and bk. 9, ch. 12.)

63. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, bk. 1, ch. 34.

64. Council of Florence, definition with the consent of the Greeks (cited above in the preceding section).

65. Ps. 113 [Vulgate].

66. Ps. 6 [Vulgate].

67. Baruch 2.

68. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 52, a. 2, arg. 2.

69. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 93.

70. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 5, ch. 11.

71. St. Ambrose, *De Abraham*, bk. 2, last chapter.

72. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration on Holy Baptism* (Oration 40).

73. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 13, ch. 21.

74. St. Bernard, Sermon 3 *On Easter* (*De Paschate*).

75. Pope Innocent III, *c. Majores*, in the *Decretales*, on Baptism and its effect.

76. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In hac Dist.* 33, § E.

77. St. Augustine, Epistle to Vitalis (Serm. CCXVII in the most recent edition).

78. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 6, ch. 10.

79. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3 and 27.

80. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 9, ch. 16.

81. St. Augustine: Sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle (Serm. CCXCIV in the Benedictine edition); *Enchiridion*, ch. 26 and 116; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 21, ch. 12 and 35; *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 28.

82. Prosper of Aquitaine, on Ps. 128, citing Matt. 13.

83. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 3, ch. 3 and 5.

84. St. Augustine, *De Libero arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 15.

85. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Gentium*, bk. 2, ch. 24.

86. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 92 and 93.

87. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 6, ch. 16.

88. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 9, ch. 12 (cited above).

89. This opinion, that a habitual evil will is attributed to an infant not regenerate such that it will actually hate God and oppose the law of God in the world to come when the use of reason follows, was asserted by Michael Baius in his Thesis numbered among those condemned as the forty-ninth, which reads: *Ex habituali voluntate dominante fit, ut parvulus discedens sine regenerationis Sacramento, quando usum rationis consecutus erit, actualiter Deum blasphernet, et legi Dei repugnet* ("From the dominating habitual will it comes about that an infant departing without the Sacrament of regeneration, when it shall have attained the use of reason, will actually blaspheme God and oppose the law of God").

90. The opinions of St. Augustine and St. John Chrysostom cited above in their proper places [in the preceding sections of this distinction].

91. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 93; *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 5, ch. 11.

92. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, in the place cited above.

93. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 163, a. 3.

94. St. Augustine: *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 14, ch. 12 and 15; bk. 21, ch. 1; *De Libero arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 19; *Retractationum*, bk. 1, ch. 9, 13, and 15.

95. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 48.

96. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 22, ch. 14.

97. St. Gregory the Great, *In I Reg.* 8, at the words "according to all his works."

98. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, bk. 3, ch. 34, and several following chapters.

99. Epiphanius and Philastrius, in their treatments of the heresy of the Encratites; St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 25.

100. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis*, bk. 2, ch. 34.

101. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 99 (Seu Serm. CLXIV in edit. noviss. Benedicti). The letter reads: "Concerning the first man, that Christ released him from the underworld, virtually the whole Church agrees. And this must be believed to have been not an empty belief, from whatever source this tradition was handed down, even if an express authority from the canonical Scriptures is not produced in support of it."

102. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 1 ad 1; a. 2 ad 1; q. 87, a. 7, 8; and elsewhere.

103. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 6, ch. 12–13.

104. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Ezekiel*, on that passage (Ezek. 18).

105. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 108.

106. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 15, ch. 22.

107. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 49; I-II, qq. 76, 77, 78, 79.

108. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In I Sent.*, this distinction.

109. Estius refers to his own commentary on dist. 6 and dist. 22 of this book (Book III of the *Sentences*).

110. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et concupiscentia*, bk. 2, ch. 28.

111. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 1, ch. 3, and the last chapter; bk. 3, ch. 5.

112. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, in the heresy of the Manichaeans.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV — ON SIN: ITS NATURE, DEFINITION, AND EXTENT (*DE PECCATO: EJUS NATURA, DEFINITIONE, ET EXTENSIONE*)

§ 1. From the testimony of those authors[1] it is shown, first, that the first origin of sin is not an evil thing but a good one; next, that sin properly has not an efficient cause but a deficient one, inasmuch as sin itself is a defect and privation of the good; and lastly, that the very cause in question — namely, the will — can fail, not insofar as it is from God, but insofar as it is from nothing. As for what can be objected from the Gospel, Matt. 7, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits," it is answered with St. Augustine[2] that by "a good tree" one must understand not the nature or natural power which we call the will, but the good interior act of the will. For St. Augustine calls this the good will. Although, therefore, a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruits, yet just as from good earth both vines and thorns spring up, so, he says, from the good nature of man both a good and an evil will can arise. "Nor was there any source whatsoever from which an evil will could at first arise save from the good nature of the Angel and of man." And this the Lord Himself most plainly showed in the same passage where He spoke of the tree and its fruits. For He said: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree evil and its fruit evil" — sufficiently admonishing us that evil fruits cannot spring from a good tree, nor good fruits from an evil one; and yet from the very earth itself, to which He was speaking, both kinds of tree could arise. Thus St. Augustine.

§ 2. Now if you object that the will of both the Angel and the man, even in the sense of act, was good — that is, just and right — from the beginning, as has been demonstrated above, and that therefore evil could not have arisen from it: we reply with St. Augustine that sin proceeded not from the good act of the will but from the natural faculty of free choice (*liberi arbitrii*), which is naturally nothing but good — when, namely, the will abandoned the unchangeable good in whose love it had been created and turned itself toward a mutable good, thereby falling away from the rectitude of the divine and eternal law. For to sin is nothing other than to fall away from the law of God. But how one ought to understand this defection as the cause of that failure, St. Augustine explains.[3]

§ II — That evil exists only in the good (Malum non esse nisi in bono)

§ 3. Sin, and in general every evil, just as it has a good thing for its origin and cause, so likewise can exist only in a good thing. The reason for this is that evil is nothing other than defect, privation, and corruption; and what is of this kind can exist only in the good as its subject. For if the good were completely extinguished and ceased to be, there would then be nothing in which evil could inhere — so that someone has rightly said: "If evil destroys the whole good, it destroys itself." Furthermore, that evil is not a thing or any nature, but the corruption of a thing and of a nature, is taught first by metaphysics, which holds that the good and being are

convertible. Since, therefore, evil is not good, absolutely speaking, it follows that it is not contained in the genus of beings either; for of convertible terms, if you remove one from anything, you remove the other as well. Furthermore, since every nature is from God, and evil is not from God, it is manifest that evil does not signify a nature.

§ 4. To demonstrate the same point, (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite[5] uses this argument: Whatever is desirable is good; but every thing is desirable, because it naturally loves and preserves itself; therefore every thing is good. Evil, then, is not any thing, but a privation of some good in a good thing — as injustice is the privation of justice in a man or an Angel, or in some natural faculty of theirs, which is plainly good by nature. Wherefore not less foolish than impious was that Manichaean doctrine by which, under the name of evil, they invented a certain nature evil in itself and so separable from the good that it could exist apart from it — positing two natures in the universe of things, namely that of the good and that of the evil; of which they supposed that neither arose from the other, and that neither necessarily inhered in the other, but that both could subsist separately as substances. Moreover, we ought not to imagine evil as even a sort of accident, but only, as we have said, as the privation of the good, whether substantial or accidental. Hence evil cannot be defined otherwise than by privation.[6]

§ 5. For St. Ambrose says:[7] "What is wickedness, but the want of good?" And St. Augustine:[8] "Evil has no nature; but the loss of good has received the name of evil." And in the *Enchiridion*:[9] "What else is that which is called evil, but the privation of good? For just as in the bodies of animals to be afflicted with diseases and wounds is nothing other than to be deprived of health; so too all the vices of souls are privations of natural goods." St. Augustine pursues this doctrine at length in the same place.[10] And indeed in chapter 13, from the foregoing teaching, he concludes that evil is what is good, and therefore that no evil exists except what is good; because whatever things are called evil, insofar as they are things or natures of some kind, are good — as man, as Angel — but insofar as they are deprived of some good, such as justice or wisdom, they are evil. And in the next chapter, treating of these contraries — good and evil — he says that the logicians' rule "No two contraries can be simultaneously present in any one thing" fails with respect to them, to such a degree that the one of these cannot be found without the other, that is, evil cannot be found without good. He says this failure is to be understood only to this extent: that the logicians' rule does not extend to these opposites, good and evil, which are called contraries only in a general sense (*generali ratione*).

§ 6. But if you object that passage of Is. 5: "Woe to those who call good evil and evil good," St. Augustine replies in the same chapters 13 and 19 that this is said of the things by which men are evil, not of the men themselves — so that, for example, one who calls adultery good, or chastity evil, falls under that prophetic sentence; not one who calls a man who commits adultery, whom another calls chaste, simply good, but who declares the adulterous man, insofar as he is a man, to be good, and insofar as he is an adulterer, to be evil.

§ I [of Distinctio XXXIV] — What sin is and to what things it extends (Quid sit peccatum et ad quae extendatur)

§ 7. The definitions of sin (given near the beginning of this Distinction) are set down by the Master,[12] of which the two former are taken from St. Augustine and the last from St. Ambrose.[13] The first is this: "Sin is every word or deed or desire" against the law of God. The second: "Sin is the will to retain or to pursue what justice forbids." The third: "Sin is the transgression of the divine law, and disobedience to heavenly

commandments." There are also other definitions of sin found in various authors, such as this one in St. Augustine:[14] "To sin is, neglecting eternal things, to pursue temporal ones." And this one in the same author:[15] "Sin is to use things that are to be enjoyed, and to enjoy things that are to be used." But these definitions do not encompass all those things that have the true formal character (*ratio*) of sin. For — leaving aside for the moment the question about venial sins (which must be discussed in the next chapter), and to which the last definitions certainly do not seem to apply — it is clear enough that only actual sins are contained in all the definitions already given; those sins, I say, alone which consist in an actual thought, word, or any other — whether internal or external — operation of a rational creature. Wherefore original sin, which itself also has the true and proper formal character of sin, yet since it is not a transient act but a permanent corruption and languor, is not comprehended by the stated definitions; nor is that malice which, left behind after the transient act of sin, constitutes a man a sinner even when he is no longer actually sinning, and remains until it is removed through penance. And there is a like judgment to be made about whatever evil habits (*habitus*) by which the will, infected and held subject, is bound even then when it is not actually moved through them — as is gathered from the words of St. Augustine.[16] To this also belong the things we said above (around Dist. 30) to the effect of teaching that not only acts but also habits are praiseworthy or blameworthy before God. Furthermore, a similar question can be raised about sins of omission, which are not properly acts but consist in the bare cessation of acts.

§ 8. Therefore, in order to embrace in a single definition of sin all those things in which the true formal character of sin is found, sin can be explained by this notion, so that according to Scripture every sin may be said to be iniquity. For thus John says in his first Epistle, chapter 3: "Everyone who commits sin commits iniquity, and sin is iniquity." In Greek *ἀνομία* — as if you said "illegality," that is, deviation from the law. Everything therefore in man, whether it be in man or proceed from man, that deviates and departs from the rectitude of the divine law, is sin. By this definition of sin it is manifest that there are comprehended not only acts, whether internal or external, but also omissions and evil habits; insofar as all these things are either done by the will or are pleasing to the will.

§ 9. From these considerations the answer is easy to the question which the Master raises in the text — namely, whether the will alone is sin and not also external acts. This might seem to follow from the second definition of St. Augustine given above. Or whether, besides an evil will, external acts are also sins, as the other definitions indicate. Or, finally, whether, on account of the fact that every act is good inasmuch as it has God as its author, one must say that no act — neither internal nor external — is sin, but that only the privation of good joined to the act and the falling away from the law of God is to be counted under the name of sin. It must be answered with the Master that evil acts — both external and internal — are sins; all of which are forbidden by the law of God; yet that sin consists principally in the evil act of the will — both because from an evil will, as from an evil root, evil works proceed outward as evil fruits, and because external works derive their malice from the internal act of the will, and not conversely. Hence that second definition of sin from St. Augustine named the will alone as that which is principally sin. But how it is not inconsistent that every act is from God and yet that certain acts are evil and are truly called sins, must be more fully explained at Dist. 37.[17]

§ 10. Furthermore, certain other improper and figurative acceptations of sin, which appear from time to time in Sacred Scripture — such as when a sacrifice offered for sins is called "sin," or the punishment of sin, or an obligation to punishment, or something inclining toward sin — are not of the present purpose, nor are they to be referred to the aforesaid definition of sin.

§ II — Whether venial sins are against the law of God (An venialia peccata sint contra legem Dei)

§ 11. The notion of sin by which it is defined as a defect or deviation from the law of God comprehends also venial sins. For these have, albeit in an imperfect manner, the true formal character of sin; and therefore it is necessary that they too be contained under some general notion of sin properly so called. But the question is asked whether that definition also by which sin is defined as whatever is done contrary to the law of God, and that by which it is said to be the will to do what justice forbids, comprehends venial sins. This the Master denies in the text, saying that in each formulation the discussion concerns mortal sin, not venial. In this opinion the Master is followed by not a few Scholastics. Among them, St. Thomas[19] says thus: "Venial sin is not against the law; because one who sins venially does not do what the law prohibits, nor does he omit what the law obliges by precept, but he acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends." So he.

§ 12. In favour of this position, Scripture seems to declare one who commits only venial sins to be just, and to say that he fulfils the law. For the Apostle says in Rom. 13: "He who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law." And again: "The fullness of the law is love." And Gal. 5: "The whole law is fulfilled in one word: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Since, therefore, not venial sins however numerous, but only mortal sins, exclude charity, it seems to follow that venial sins are not against the law of God, on the ground that they do not prevent the law of God from being fulfilled.

§ 13. On the contrary: that there is no venial sin which is not against some law of God by which that sin is prohibited seems to be shown in many ways, both by reason and by authority.

First: Every sin is a deviation or declination from the law of God; wherefore just as the law has the formal character of the right, so every sin has the formal character of the crooked. But everything crooked is contrary to the right; therefore every sin is contrary to the law.

Second: Evil is nothing other than privation of good, as has been declared above, which without doubt extends also to venial sins, which are truly evils — not of punishment, but of fault — since by them the rational nature is deprived of some due good. Therefore venial sins are contrary to those goods of which they are the privations, and consequently to the law that commands those same goods and prohibits the opposing evils.

Third: Every lie, however small, is contrary to truth; therefore every sin, however slight, is contrary to justice.

Fourth, by induction: For an officious lie is against the law that universally prohibits lying. And to desire (*concupiscere*) venially is against the law that says in general "Thou shalt not covet" — prohibiting, namely, consent even to imperfect evil desires. And the same holds for any and all other venial sins. For there is no sin whatsoever which does not run counter to a law that either in general forbids us to sin, or commands us to do all things to the glory of God — 1 Cor. 10.

Fifth: If venial sins were not against, but only beside, the law of God, they would not be sins but works of indifference, and therefore licit; for whatever is prohibited by no law is licit.

Sixth: The daily confession of Christians, which concerns itself almost entirely with venial sins, does not falsely acknowledge that all things committed in thought, word, and deed are against the law of God.

Seventh: A proper punishment is due for venial sins; therefore they are committed against the law, for it is against the law that such a punishment is decreed for sinners.

Eighth: St. Augustine[20] speaks thus of venial sins: "Nor is it to be denied that God commands us, in doing justice, to be so perfect as to have no sin at all. For there will not be — if there is any — any sin, if one is not divinely commanded that it should not be." And in the following words he affirms that God commands all men not to commit any sin at all, though He foreknows that no one will fulfil this. From which it is clear that he comprehends venial sins. And he adds: "How is it not forbidden by God's command, if it is a sin?" This sentence of his seems to fight head-on with the words of the Master and of St. Thomas, who deny that one who sins venially does what justice and the law prohibit. And the same St. Augustine,[21] in Epistle 29 (which is to St. Jerome), generally affirms that no one sins except by acting against charity.[22]

Ninth: St. Gregory[23] testifies that venial sins defile the soul, whereas crimes extinguish it. Akin to this is what is read in St. Augustine,[24] that venial sins so deform the soul as to prevent it from coming to the embraces of the heavenly Bridegroom, or to allow it to come only with the greatest difficulty or with great confusion. This would certainly not be true if they were not contrary to the justice of God, just as filthiness is contrary to purity, and deformity to beauty.

Tenth: St. Bernard[25] most plainly teaches that every sin, even venial, is against God's commandment by the very fact that it is a sin. "Moreover," he says, "when a man knowingly and deliberately in idle words — even though silence has not been commanded — loosens his tongue, can anyone deny that this is to usurp against the rule of truth?"

Eleventh: The Ordinary Gloss[26] on Rom. 7, "Unless the law had said, Thou shalt not covet," says: "The Apostle chose this general precept from which all derive. A good law, which in prohibiting this prohibits all things; therefore venial sins too are prohibited by the law."

Twelfth: St. Thomas, although he teaches the contrary in one and another place, yet elsewhere — as in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, art. 10, ad 1[27] — speaks in such a way as to say that a sin which is against the eternal reasons, although it be mortal in kind (*ex genere*), can nonetheless be venial on account of the imperfection of a sudden act. But in the very same article (in the body of the question) he interprets "eternal reason" as the law of God. Likewise, in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 88, art. 2,[28] he affirms that every sin is against God.

§ 14. These arguments and others of the same kind, which a diligent student can easily collect, make that opinion quite probable — the opinion which grants that venial sins are also prohibited by the divine law and are opposed to it; albeit only in an imperfect manner, just as it must be admitted that to them there belongs only an imperfect formal character of sin.

As for what was advanced on the contrary side, it must be answered that the fullness of the law — that is,

1. The authors referred to at the head of the text are: St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 15, 23, 24; *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 1; III, ch. 17; VI, ch. 3; *Contra Julianum*, VI, ch. 2 and ch. 21; *De Civitate Dei* XII, chs. 1, 6, 7; and, before St. Augustine, (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.
2. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 15.
3. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, chs. 6–7.
4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 48, art. 3 and following.
5. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.
6. The text here breaks off the quotation and continues: "Hence evil cannot be defined otherwise than by privation."
7. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et anima*, ch. 7.
8. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 9.
9. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 11.
10. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, through the three following chapters (i.e., chs. 12–14).
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 71, art. 7.
12. The Master (of the Sentences) [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, Dist. 34, near the beginning.
13. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 8.
14. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, final chapter.
15. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 30.
16. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 19; and *De perfectione justitiae* sub initium.
17. Cf. below, Dist. 37.
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, art. 10, ad 1; q. 88, art. 1, ad 1.
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 88, art. 1, ad 1.
20. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 16.
21. St. Augustine, Epistle 29 (i.e. Epistle CLXVII in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers, among the Epistles of the Third Class, in which St. Augustine treats of the sentence of Jas. 2:10, "Whoever offends in one point is guilty of all," and intermingles many things from the Stoics, who said that all sins are equal and that whoever lacks one virtue has none).
22. The editors note: "Sermon XLI de Sanctis" — attributed to St. Augustine, placed by the Benedictine editors in the Appendix to Vol. V of the works of St. Augustine, rejected as spurious and attributed by Cajetan to Arles, numbered among the Sermons of the First Class.
23. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXI, ch. 9 [*Moralia in Job*, lib. 21, c. 9, as cited in the marginal note].
24. Sermon 41 (*de Sanctis*) [as above, note 22].
25. St. Bernard, *De praecepto et dispensatione*, ch. 14.
26. Glossa ordinaria, on Rom. 7 ("Unless the law had said, Thou shalt not covet").
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, art. 10, ad 1.
28. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 88, art. 2.

DISTINCTIO XXXV — ON SINS AS CAUSES AND PENALTIES OF SINS, AND ON EVIL ACTS IN RELATION TO GOD (*DE PECCATIS CAUSIS ET POENIS PECCATORUM, ET DE ACTIBUS MALIS IN ORDINE AD DEUM*)

§ III — Whether there are sins in what is done contrary to human laws (An peccata sint quae fiunt contra leges humanas)

§ 1. Since sin is defined by St. Augustine as that which is done contrary to the law of God, and by St. Ambrose as the transgression of the divine law, it is rightly asked whether those things also which are forbidden not by divine but only by human laws are sins, and if so, how they are contained within the definitions just stated.

For the explanation of this question, it must be known that every legislative power which is in creatures descends from the supreme power, that is, the divine power, and consequently that every law enacted by human authority — provided, however, that the authority is legitimate and the law itself is legitimately promulgated, otherwise it will not properly be a law — is derived from the eternal and immutable law of God as from its principle and source, and from thence borrows all its rectitude; in keeping with that saying of St. Augustine:[2] "In the temporal law nothing is just, nothing is legitimate, that men have not derived for themselves from the eternal." Therefore whatever is committed against a human law is also committed against the law of God, who, by the very fact that He has instituted among men the legislative power, also commands that that power be obeyed, namely by keeping the laws enacted by it. For the power of commanding cannot be conceived without the obligation of obeying. It is clear, therefore, that it is impossible for anyone to transgress a human law without also sinning against the law of God — that law, namely, by which God, in establishing among men the power of enacting laws, simultaneously instituted and ordained that the laws proceeding from that power should be obeyed.

§ 2. That such power has been communicated to men, and that therefore transgressions of laws proceeding from it are truly sins, so as truly to make one guilty before God and in conscience, the Apostle plainly teaches in Rom. 13: "Let every soul," he says, "be subject to the higher powers. For there is no power but from God; the powers that are, are ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation." And below: "Therefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake." Concerning which power also it is said in Wis. 6 to the princes of the earth: "For power is given you by the Lord."[3]

§ 3. To the same point belong all the Scripture passages in which obedience to superiors, both secular and ecclesiastical, is commanded — such as chiefly that of Rom. 13 already cited; and such are also these: Heb. 13: "Obey your prelates and be subject to them." And 1 Pet. 2: "Be subject to every human creature, whether to

the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him," etc. Tit. 3: "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers." And Acts 15: "Commanding them to keep the precepts of the Apostles and Elders." Likewise wherever children are commanded to obey parents, servants to obey masters. There belong here also those Scripture passages which ascribe the precepts of men to God: Lk. 10: "He who hears you hears me." Acts 15: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us." 1 Cor. 14: "The things I write to you are the commandments of the Lord." And that of Rom. 13: "He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God." Likewise 1 Thess. 4: "He who despises these things despises not man but God." Which sentiment Ignatius repeated in nearly the same words in his second epistle, to the Magnesians.[4]

§ 4. Nor is that dissimilar which St. Augustine says in his first sermon on Ps. 70: "Where a father commands what is not against God, he is to be heard just as God is heard; because God commanded us to obey a father."[5] And that of St. Bernard:[6] "Whatever a prelate commands in the place of God, which is not certainly displeasing to God, is to be received in every respect just as if God Himself commanded it. For what does it matter," etc. In which book also, among other things which the same author learnedly discusses concerning the force of human laws or constitutions, he says: "Although the quantity of the enjoined work may in itself be of little account, the added weight of authority makes one liable, and makes one liable to sin by transgression." And again in the same book: "Let this therefore be the general rule for all things that are fixed neither by divine institution nor by anyone's own profession, that what has not been commanded may indeed licitly be either observed or omitted; but what has been commanded may not without fault be neglected, nor without guilt be despised." Thus he.

§ 5. It is therefore perspicuously clear from what has been said that those things which are done contrary to human laws — if those laws contain nothing unjust and proceed from legitimate authority, that is, if they are true laws — are also done contrary to the law of God, and accordingly that to them belongs the true formal character (*ratio*) of sin, sometimes venial, sometimes mortal, according to the variety of the precepts and of the transgressions.

— *Distinctio XXXVI — That sins are both causes and penalties of sins (*Peccata et causas esse et poenas peccatorum*) (continued from previous chunk)* —

§ I — That sins are both causes and penalties of sins (Peccata et causas esse et poenas peccatorum)

§ 6. It is a doctrine established from the Scriptures that some sins are causes of others — just as it is certain that some sins are such as to be also penalties of preceding sins. And indeed one sin serves as cause of another in various ways: either because one furnishes matter to another, as gluttony to lust, avarice to contention and lawsuits and murders — hence the Apostle says in 1 Tim. 6: "Covetousness is the root of all evils" — or because a sin once committed with pleasure invites to a repetition of the same and to frequency of the act, from which arises the habit and custom of sinning; or because one sin is ordered to another as to an end, as theft to luxury, homicide to rapine and unjust possession of property; as in the case of Achab, to whom it was said: "Thou hast slain and also taken possession," 1 Kgs. 21; or because another sin is committed in order to conceal a preceding sin, as theft is often the cause of lying and perjury, and in the case of David adultery was

the cause of homicide; or because through a preceding sin some impediment to a subsequent sin is removed — such as shame, or fear, or the grace of God, or some other restraint by which a person could have been held back and prevented from sinning — in which manner pride is the beginning of all sin; or finally because a preceding sin is the merit of a subsequent one, as a Christian by living evilly merits to be permitted to fall into heresy or some other kind of infidelity. And this last mode is spread through all the preceding ones and differs from them only in formal character (*ratione*), as is evident to one who considers the matter carefully.

§ 7. What we were saying — that certain sins are the penalty of preceding sins — follows from this. For since a man by sinning merits not only to be left in sin destitute of the grace of God, but also to be permitted to fall into other and graver sins, it is a consequence that subsequent sins undergo the formal character of penalty with respect to the preceding sin. The proof of this matter from Scripture is, moreover, manifest. For the Lord says in Jn. 8: "Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin." And Peter in his second epistle (2 Pet. 2), speaking of sin: "By whom a man is overcome, of the same he is the slave." And in Rev. 22: "He who is filthy, let him be filthy still." For this is just, as the Glossa ordinaria notes in the same place. Such also is that of Ps. 68: "Add iniquity upon their iniquity." And 2 Thess. 2: "Therefore God shall send them the operation of error, to believe lying."[8] But the most explicit of all is the passage in Rom. 1, where the Apostle, magnifying the ingratitude of those who, although they had known God, did not glorify Him as God, but neglecting the worship of the Creator served creatures, extensively shows into what and how abominable sins they justly fell on account of that ingratitude, having been given up by God. For he says this once, again, and a third time: "For this reason God delivered them up," etc.

§ 8. This doctrine is found in many places in St. Augustine — as in his sermon on Ps. 37 ("Fire fell upon them"): "Between the first sin of apostasy," he says, "and the final penalty of eternal fire, those things which are in between are both sins and penalties of sin."[9] And a little before, on the words "the iniquities of your hands bind you together," he teaches that there is a certain mutual connection of sins among themselves, and as it were a chain, in which some are causes of subsequent sins. The same author states, in book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, ch. 5, that it comes about by the just judgment of God that crimes are punished by crimes, and that the chastisements of sinners are not only torments but also increases of vices.[10] Other passages are:[11] *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10; *Retractationum* book 1, ch. 9; *De Libero Arbitrio* book 3, ch. 18; book 87, q. 77; *De Natura et Gratia*, chs. 22 and 23. Conformable to these things St. Gregory writes in *Moralia* book 25, ch. 6, throughout, and in *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 11.[12]

§ II — Explanation of a certain difficulty regarding the foregoing doctrine (Difficultatis cujusdam circa superiorem doctrinam explicatio)

§ 9. It is a matter of no small difficulty in what sense it has been said that certain sins are penalties of sins, since every penalty is from God, in keeping with that saying of Amos 3: "If there is evil in a city, which the Lord has not done" — because, as St. Augustine witnesses in *Retractationum* book 5, ch. 9, every penalty of sin is just.[14] But whatever is just has God, the source of all justice, as its author. Therefore the consequence will seem to be that God is the author of some sin, if some sin is also a penalty.

§ 10. In order to reply to this difficulty, we must explain what is the sin that is called a penalty, and in what sense. For some think that a sin is called a penalty because its act afflicts its own author — in the way that envy

is said by the poet to be the greatest torment. Likewise because certain sins bring detriment to honour and reputation, as theft and perjury; and some also harm health, as gluttony and lust; and in general almost all of them lacerate the conscience by their recollection as with a bite. But in this way it is not being taught that certain sins are penalties of preceding sins, but only that they are of such a kind as to carry with them a manifest penalty or to leave it behind.

§ 11. Others hold that a sin is called a penalty in so far as it is a sin — which is (as the Master rightly teaches at the end of the preceding distinction) an active corruption — inasmuch as, proceeding from the free will, it has conjoined to it a passive corruption of a good, namely that by which a man is deprived of the good to which the sin is opposed; which passive corruption is a penalty. But neither in this way is it shown that subsequent sins are penalties of preceding ones; and accordingly, on this account, every sin whatsoever — including even that first sin of the first man — could be called a penalty of sin, that is, of itself. For since every sin corrupts some good, the passive corruption of that good follows necessarily from every sin. In consideration of which the Fathers sometimes teach that every sin carries its own penalty and misery inseparably with it, as St. Augustine in *Confessiones* book 2, ch. 5, saying that it is no small misery not to love God.[15] And in book 12, speaking with God, he says: "And so it is that every disordered soul is its own penalty." And elsewhere he attests that the justice of God does not permit that even for a moment there should exist the shame of sin without the beauty of vengeance.

§ 12. But it is one thing for a sin to be the penalty of a sin — namely, of some preceding sin — which, from the mind of St. Augustine, is not common to all sins, as is evident from *Retractationum* book 1, ch. 17, and the *Exposition on Ps. 17*, where it is stated that the first sin of Adam was such as not to be the penalty of any sin.[16] And the same is similarly true of the first sin of the Angel who transgressed; indeed, of the first actual sin of all who were baptized in infancy.

§ 13. One must therefore say that not all sins, but only certain ones, are penalties of sins — namely those into which someone falls by reason of merit on account of a previously committed sin. For that the Apostle in Rom. 1 is speaking of such sins is manifest. They are called penalties, moreover, not in so far as they are sins — because the formal character of sin is one thing, that of penalty another — but in so far as they are injuries done or permitted and ordained by God for the vindicating of what has been committed against His law. Hence St. Augustine in the book *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10: "Although," he says, "just as certain things that are sins are also penalties of sinners — whence it is said, 'God delivered them up,' etc. — the sin is not there God's, but the judgment."[17]

§ 14. How God exercises that judgment, the Fathers generally explain in such a way as to say that He vindicates a preceding sin by abandoning the sinner — that is, by not applying the grace by which the subsequent sin might be avoided. Hence St. Augustine in *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 22, says that God punishes sins with sins not by compelling men to those sins, but by deserting those who are worthy of desertion.[18] In book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, ch. 3, he says: "When a man is said to be handed over to his own desires, he thereby becomes guilty because, having been abandoned by God, he yields to them and consents. And there comes to be for him a consequent sin as the penalty of the preceding sin."[19] A similar passage is in book 1 of *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 18. And elsewhere frequently the same St. Augustine insists upon this mode of divine judgment. Conformable to this is St. Gregory in *Moralia* book 25, ch. 9, where, discussing the sin that is the penalty of a prior sin, he says: "Whomever He was unwilling to deliver, He struck by abandoning."[20]

§ 15. There is another mode whereby God exercises this judgment, when vindicating preceding sins He not only does not apply the grace by which a person might be corrected, but also either works inwardly in the man, or sets before him externally, those things that become stumbling-blocks for him and occasions of graver falls. St. Augustine indicates this mode in the same passage *Contra Julianum*, when he says that certain persons are handed over by God to shameful passions, either by being abandoned or in some other manner, whether explicable or inexplicable. And more fully in the same chapter, where he does not deny that certain persons are compelled by the power of God into sins — not as though God were in any way the author of anyone's sin or forced an unwilling person to sin, but because through His power He brings about those things which, as occasions, a man uses for sinning.[21]

§ 16. In the same way are to be understood those things that are read in the same author in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 20, and in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chs. 20 and 21.[22] Concerning the understanding of these passages we have said something at dist. 30 in book 1, where it was asked: whether the reprobation of God is the cause of sin in man. In a similar sense is to be taken what the Blessed Gregory says in *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 11, that God sets a stumbling-block before the impenitent so that they stumble more gravely.[23]

§ 17. Finally, it must generally be noted that in everything that is called a sin, only that is to be ascribed to God as author which is positive and ordered; but whatever is privative, defective, and disordered is, as an evil, to be removed by God as its author. The explanation of this matter — concerning the distinction immediately following — the Scholastics pursue at length.

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*— Distinctio XXXVII — Whether and to what extent evil acts are from God (*Actus mali an et quatenus sint a Deo*) (continued from previous chunk) —*

§ Unicus — Whether and to what extent evil acts have God as their author (Actus mali an et quatenus sint a Deo)

§ 18. The question concerning evil acts — whether and to what extent they have God as their author — the Master treats at length in dist. 35 and 37. But in order that we may explain it briefly, one must say that in every evil act two things are to be considered and carefully distinguished: of which the one is, so to speak, formal to the evil work, the other material — namely, the malice, and the very substance of the act — of which the former is not from God, but the latter is from God.

§ 19. That malice is not from God is shown both by reason and by Scripture. By reason: because God is not the deficient cause but only the efficient cause; but malice is a defect of good, which can have no cause except a deficient one. Likewise, since God is the source of all goodness, and accordingly is Himself the supreme and perfect goodness, it is altogether absurd to locate the origin of sin or malice in Him. Scripture, moreover, insists upon this same point everywhere — as in Ps. 5: "Thou art not a God that willeth iniquity." And Wis. 14: "Hateful to God are the impious man and his impiety." And Jas. 1: "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God," etc. And Hab. 1: "Thine eyes are too pure to behold evil, and thou canst not look upon iniquity." And Matt. 5: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." And other passages of the same kind. In keeping with which view also some things were said above in the preceding book at dist. 40

and 45. The consenting doctrine of all the Fathers is likewise the same — although the heretics of our own time cry out against it — so that it is not necessary to dwell longer in proving it.

§ 20. But that every act, considered in itself and according to its own nature, is from God — although certain Doctors at the time of the Master denied this of acts that underlie malice, as they say, so that even the Master himself did not dare to define this in his text but left the whole matter to the reader's judgment — the Scholastics rightly hold for certain and beyond doubt, moved both by the authority of Scripture and by arguments and the testimony of the Fathers. For Scripture attributes the origin of all things to God, as in Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made." But it is established that an act and a motion is something — namely, something positive. Likewise in Wis. 1: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made." And lest anyone should think these things said only of substances, it was also said of acts generally by the Apostle in Acts 17: "In Him we live, and move, and are." And elsewhere: "Who worketh all in all," 1 Cor. 12. There are also other Scripture passages in which absolutely and without exception all things that exist are referred to God as their author.

§ 21. Nor do arguments prove this less manifestly. One: because God is the first and universal cause; wherefore it cannot come about that any being whatsoever, however exiguous and imperfect in the genus of being [the text continues beyond this chunk].

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 96, a. 4.
2. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* I, ch. 6.
3. Rom. 13:1–5; Wis. 6:4.
4. Heb. 13:17; 1 Pet. 2:13–14; Tit. 3:1; Acts 15:28 (with reference to the keeping of apostolic precepts); 1 Cor. 14:37; Rom. 13:2; 1 Thess. 4:8; Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistola ad Magnesios*, ep. 2.
5. St. Augustine, *Concio* (Sermon) 1 *in Psalmum* 70 (i.e., *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 70, sermon 1).
6. St. Bernard, *De Praecepto et Dispensatione*, ch. 12.
7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 87, a. 2.
8. Jn. 8:34; 2 Pet. 2:19; Rev. 22:11; Ps. 68:28; 2 Thess. 2:11.
9. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 37 (sermon: "Supercecidit ignis").
10. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* V, ch. 5.
11. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10; *Retractationum* I, ch. 9; *De Libero Arbitrio* III, ch. 18; *Quaestiones* lib. 87, q. 77; *De Natura et Gratia*, chs. 22 and 23.
12. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXV, ch. 6, throughout; *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 11.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as above (I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 87, a. 2).
14. Amos 3:6; St. Augustine, *Retractationum* V (lib. 1), ch. 9.
15. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, ch. 5; XII, ch. 12 (with God).
16. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 17; *Expositio in Psalmum* 17.
17. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10; Rom. 1:24.
18. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 22.
19. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* V, ch. 3.
20. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 18; St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXV, ch. 9.

21. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, same passage (*eodem loco*).

22. St. Augustine, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 20; *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chs. 20 and 21.

23. Estius refers back to his discussion at dist. 30, book 1 (above). St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 11.

24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 1–2.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII — ON THE GOODNESS AND BADNESS OF THE WILL (*DE BONITATE ET MALITIA VOLUNTATIS*)

§ 1. — proceed from a secondary and particular cause, unless God cooperates as the first and universal cause and as the primary agent. The second reason is: because every created potency (*potentia*) is defectible, so that unless it has the uncreated power cooperating with it, it immediately fails in actual fact, inasmuch as it necessarily depends upon that power not only in existing but also in moving or operating. No action whatsoever, however small, can therefore proceed from it without the cooperation of the divine power.

It is confirmed: St. Augustine confirms this teaching in several places — as in the *Eighty-three Questions*, question 21:[1] "God," he says, "is the author of all things that are; which, in so far as they are, are to that same extent good." And at question 25:[2] "Everything that is, in so far as it is, is good. For that supreme good exists, by participation in which all other things are good." And in *De Doctrina Christiana*, Book I, chapter 32:[3] "He is supremely and primarily good who is altogether immutable; and the rest of things that are cannot exist except from Him, and are good in so far as they have received being from Him." And in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 13:[4] "Every nature is good, nor would any thing be evil, if the very thing that is evil were not a nature."

Furthermore, speaking in a particular way about the very action to which badness adheres and which we call sin, St. Anselm, in his book *De Concordia praedestinationis et praescientiae*, says:[5] "Quality, and every action, whatever possesses any essence, is from God, from whom is all justice and no injustice. God therefore makes all things that are done by a just or unjust will — that is, both good works and evil; in good works He makes both that they are and that they are good; in evil works, however, He makes that they are, but not that they are evil." And again: "He makes all actions and all motions, because He Himself makes the things from which, out of which, through which, and in which they come to be. And no thing has any power of willing or of acting except from Him who gives it. The very willing itself, which is sometimes just and sometimes unjust, is from God. But not-to-be-good is not any thing, and is not from God." So far St. Anselm. From all of which it is evident that all actions and motions — even those which are inseparably attached to sin — are so from God that God is the intimate and primary agent in every action and motion. The badness (*malitia*) itself, however — when it cannot be separated from the action (which is the case with those actions that are so expressed as necessarily to involve badness, such as hatred of God, blasphemy, and lying) — is to be referred not to God but to the cause that is defecting from God's law, namely the will of man or of angel. Therefore, the absolute answer to the question proposed is: evil acts are not from God; for badness is not from God. They are from God, however, in so far as they are acts; for it is in that respect that they belong to the generality of existing and God-made things.

§ I — From what source the goodness or badness of the will is to be estimated (Bonitas vel malitia voluntatis unde sit aestimanda)

§ 2. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], treating in this distinction and in the two immediately following of the goodness and badness of the will, understands by "will" (*voluntas*) not the natural faculty of willing or of not willing something — though this is more customarily called *voluntas* in the schools (even though that faculty may rightly be said to be good or bad on account of its acts, no less than the soul and the man himself may be) — but rather the internal act of the will, which they call the actual will (*voluntatem actualem*). This is clear from the sentences of St. Augustine, cited by the Master from *De Trinitate*, Book IV, chapter 6,[7] and from the Master's own words asserting, for instance, that in one and the same man there may be several good willings having their own distinct ends, which are nevertheless all referred to a single end; and, for instance, where he asks whether it is one and the same willing by which someone wills to feed a hungry person and wills to have eternal life — a question that has a perfectly certain answer if by "will" we understand the faculty, and yet the Master leaves it as difficult and undecided. This forewarning, therefore, is directed toward the question which the Master treats in this distinction and in the fortieth,[8] namely: from what source is the goodness or badness of the will, and of any external act proceeding from it, to be estimated — whether from the end or from some other source.

§ 3. One must answer: for the goodness of the will, or of any voluntary act, on account of which the will may be called good absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), three things are required: namely, that the end be good; that the action undertaken for the sake of that end not be evil in itself; and that the same action be orderable to such an end — for it is evident that this third condition is also required. For an action undertaken on account of an end cannot be good absolutely speaking if that for the sake of which it is done is not absolutely good; as, for instance, if someone gives alms to a poor person in order to lead him away from the Catholic faith, or in order to be praised by men. And to this point must be referred what is cited by the Master in distinction 40 from St. Ambrose, *De Officiis*, Book I, chapter 30,[9] and from St. Augustine, in the *Preface on Psalm 31*,[10] by which testimonies it is signified that the goodness of a work is to be evaluated chiefly from the goodness of the end that one intends in acting.

§ 4. It is required, furthermore, that the work itself not be evil in itself. For what is such cannot be made good by however good an end. This extends to every work prohibited by any law, even if only a positive one, whether divine or merely human. For the laws established for us cannot be changed at our own discretion, so that things prohibited by legitimate authority might become licit to us on account of the goodness of the end we intend. For example: it is not permitted to steal in order to relieve the poverty of a poor man; nor to lie in order to free a man from death; nor to leave the city against the edict of the prince in order to avert some loss to yourself. Hence St. Augustine, in *Contra Mendacium*, chapter 7,[11] says: "Those things which are established to be sins are not to be done under any pretext of a good cause, nor under what presents itself as a good end, nor under what presents itself as a good intention." And again: "When the works themselves are sins in themselves — such as thefts, fornications, blasphemies — who would say that they are to be done for good causes, or that they are not sins, or, what is more absurd, that they are just sins? Who would say: let us steal from the rich so that we may have something to give to the poor?" And other things that follow to the same effect, and likewise in the same chapter 8.

§ 5. Finally, we have said that it is required that the means which we perform be orderable to the end for the sake of which it is performed. For since some goods are greater and others lesser, greater goods are not rightly ordered as means toward lesser goods as ends; for the end ought to be better than the things that are for the sake of the end. For example: a man sins who serves God in order to receive temporal goods from Him as his proper end; for the worship of God is far better than the reception of temporal goods.

§ 6. Furthermore, for the badness of the will or of any act it suffices that any one of these three conditions be lacking. For just as good requires an integral cause, so evil arises from each individual deficiency.

§ 7. Now, this teaching does not conflict with what was said absolutely by the Lord in Matt. 6: "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light" — as though it followed from this that if the intention be good, every work undertaken with such an intention will be good. For St. John Chrysostom, commenting on that passage, understands by "eye" not intention but mind (*mens*).[12] The mind, however, comprehends both intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*) together. Therefore, whatever proceeds rightly from the mind is right; but a mind is not right that commands a work evil in itself to be done, even for a good end. St. Augustine, indeed, in *Contra Julianum*, Book 4, chapter 3,[13] understood by "eye" the intention. But neither must it be said that the intention by which an illicit work is ordered toward a good end is simply (*simpliciter*) good, although it could be called good in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), namely in so far as it regards the end. And this is what the Scholastics teach: that evil things cannot be done for a good end considered under the formal character (*ratio*) of finalizing; because such things are not of the kind that can receive perfection from the end, even if they are ordered into it, since the end is the perfection and completion of the means.

§ I — Why man is said to be good or bad from the will alone (Cur a sola voluntate dicatur homo bonus vel malus)

§ 8. The Master asks in this distinction: why is a disordered act of the will rather a sin than a disordered act of the other powers of the soul — such as intellect, memory, likewise sense, appetite, and the motive faculty — assuming that the acts of these too may be disordered? Connected with this question is the following: why is a man said to be good or bad absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) from an act of the will rather than from the acts of the other powers? The Master answers that the reason for this is that the act of the will is directed toward attaining or not admitting something, which act cannot, when concerning evil things, be other than evil, nor, conversely, concerning good things, be other than good. For to will evil things is evil, just as to will good things is good. But the matter does not stand necessarily in this way in the other powers. For it is not straightforwardly evil to apprehend (*intel-*

1. St. Augustine, *Octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 21.
2. St. Augustine, *Octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 25.
3. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, ch. 32.
4. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 13.
5. St. Anselm, *De Concordia praedestinationis et praescientiae* [abbreviation as in source].
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 28 [and] q. 19.

7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 6, cited by the Master [i.e. Peter Lombard].
8. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, dist. 40 [abbreviation as in source; the reference appears to be to a later distinction in the same book].
9. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* I, ch. 30, cited by the Master in dist. 40.
10. St. Augustine, *Praefatio in Psalmum 31*.
11. St. Augustine, *Contra Mendacium*, ch. 7.
12. St. John Chrysostom, commentary on Matt. 6 [homily number not specified in source].
13. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 64, a. 1 and a. 2.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX — ON THE TWOFOLD REASON WHY A MAN IS CALLED SIMPLY GOOD OR EVIL BY THE ACT OF THE WILL (*DE DUPLICI RATIONE CUR HOMO SIMPLICITER BONUS VEL MALUS AB ACTU VOLUNTATIS DENOMINETUR*)

§ 1. A twofold reason for this difference can be assigned. The first is that the act of the will is properly and principally love (*amor*), whose very force and property it is to transform the lover into the beloved. Whence it comes about that he who loves justice becomes just, he who loves falsehood becomes a liar. Hence it is read in Hos. 9: "They became abominable, like the things which they loved."[1] And 1 Cor. 6: "He who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit."[2] The act of understanding, however, does not do this; for even if it conforms the intellect in some manner to the thing understood by means of the received species, it nevertheless does not transform it, so that a man is called such a thing absolutely. For he who knows and judges injustice is not himself unjust, just as he who knows what is just is not for that reason continuously just. The second reason is that the object of the will is the good as such; hence if the will is directed toward what is truly good, it is called good; but if toward the opposite evil, which is only an apparent good, it is called evil. The object of the intellect, however, is the true as such. Hence the intellect assenting to what is in reality true is called true; but assenting to what is false, which is only an apparent truth, is called false.

§ 2. Moreover, since a false intellect as such is evil, just as a true intellect as such is good, and similarly the acts of the other powers, insofar as they are exercised around a fitting or unfitting object, can to that extent be called good or evil, there remains the question why it is that a man is properly and absolutely denominated good or evil from the act of the will. Reply: the cause is this — that through the will a man is master of his own operations and has free power over them, inasmuch as the other faculties of the soul are subject to it and are governed by its command. And indeed this is the reason why the will alone is capable of law, to which law, if it be conformed, the will is good and makes a man good; if disconformed, it is evil and renders a man evil.

§ 3. Nor, however, is the act of the will alone a sin in such a way that the acts of the other powers are not also sometimes sins. For both to think what is not fitting, and to believe falsehoods, and to dwell on harmful memories, and to look upon what is not lawful, and to take delight in carnal pleasure, and whatever things are done against the law through the members of the body — all these are sins; yet all of these are acts of the other powers. But insofar as those powers are subject to the command of the will, to that same extent their acts are also said to be acts of the will — not as elicited from the will, but as commanded by it, and this either expressly or interpretatively. In this same class also belong the voluntary omissions of acts that are owed. Such are noted by Scripture in Job 21: "Who said to God, Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of thy ways."[3] And Ps. 35: "They would not understand, so as to do well."[4]

§ II — In what sense a sinful man is said naturally to will the good (Quo sensu homo peccator naturaliter dicatur velle bonum)

§ 4. In four ways can that be understood which the Master says, on the basis of the Ambrosian Commentary (on the Epistle to the Romans), namely that a man subject to sin naturally wills the good. *First*, on account of the substance of the act, which in every sin is always good. *Second*, on account of the general object of the will, which is the good as such — although not always the good absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), but very often only the apparent good. For no one acts with his eye upon evil, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*.[6] *Third*, because man was created with a good and upright will, and therefore is not unfittingly said to will the good naturally, according to that manner in which that is called natural which is attributed to each thing in its creation. The *fourth* mode is that by which someone is said to will the good on account of certain inclinations or impulses (*inclinationes seu impulsus*) of the will toward the good, which follow upon that general — and indeed imperfect and confused — cognition of the good (*boni cognitio*) naturally implanted in man and left in him after sin; a cognition which is of itself fitted to move and impel the will to some degree toward that good which is thus known. Of this kind are: that beatitude is to be loved, that misery is to be fled, that truth is to be assented to, that the honourable is to be embraced, and indeed certain more particular things as well, such as that God is to be worshipped, that parents are to be obeyed, that benefactors are to be loved, and the like.

§ 5. This habitual cognition (*habitualis cognitio*) impressed upon the mind is called by various names by different authors: conscience (*conscientia*), the dictate of conscience (*conscientiae dictamen*), the natural law (*lex naturalis*), the spark of reason (*scintilla rationis*), *synderesis* (*συντήρησις*) — although some authors with a certain subtlety and on a definite principle distinguish conscience from synderesis. For generally by both terms the ancient authors signify that part of the soul which, retaining the cognition of the good, impels one toward following it, and in the corruption of the rational nature resists vice. Indeed this same knowledge is not extinguished even in the damned — of whom, on account of the perpetual remorse of conscience, it is said: "their worm shall not die."[7] Hence St. Jerome, writing on Ezekiel, on that verse "And the coals like the appearance of burning torches," says: "That which the Greeks call *synteresis* — the spark of conscience — is not extinguished even in the breast of Cain after he was cast out of Paradise; and when we are overcome by pleasures, or by fury, or are sometimes led astray by the likeness of reason, by it we feel that we are sinning."[8] And this is what that man too recognised, who said:

"I see and approve the better things; I follow the worse."[9]

In which verse both the intellect — cognising what the good is — and the will affected toward that same good to some degree, and the same will departing from and choosing the opposing evil, are briefly yet with force together signified.

§ 6. But what St. Jerome says (in the passage cited just below) — that this same conscience, according to what is written in Prov. 18: "When a wicked man has come into the depth of sins, he is contemptuous" — is hurled down in certain men and loses its proper place, is not said to mean that this spark of reason is ever utterly extinguished in man, but that it is sometimes impeded from its own act, which is to incline toward the good, on account of the great malice or blindness of man; and this either for a time, as happens in this life, or in perpetuity, as happens in the damned, in whom conscience or synderesis has no other use than that it continually murmurs against evil and in this way, as it were, stings and bites the soul — whence also its act is

called the remorse of conscience (*remorsus conscientiae*). For that murmuring has only the force of punishment in them, and not also of moral good. Furthermore, certain things pertaining to this subject have been treated by us above as well,[10] where the question was being asked whether by actual sins the good of nature is harmed.

§ Unicus — Whether there are any external acts that are evil in themselves (An sint aliqua opera externa per se mala)

§ 7. Since, with respect to the principal question of this Distinction — namely whether exterior acts derive their goodness or malice from the end alone — satisfaction has been given by what was said above,[12] we shall, with a few words, settle another question connected with and subordinate to this one: namely, whether there are any exterior acts that are so evil in themselves that in no way, in no case, with no intention can they be rightly done. For if certain such acts are found, it is at once clear from what we said above,[13] that the goodness of the end or intention does not suffice to establish the goodness of all exterior acts. If, however, there are no acts of that kind, nothing will prevent every exterior act from being made good by the end. And indeed, as the Master reports in the relevant place, there were those to whom it seemed that all acts are indifferent — that is, neither good nor evil in themselves — but each is made good or bad by the intention or will. Following whose opinion, consequently, every act receives its goodness or malice from the end alone. To this opinion not a few of the Scholastic Doctors have also subscribed.

§ 8. In order, therefore, to answer the proposed question, one must suppose here as certain and beyond doubt that certain interior acts of the will are evil in themselves, such that no circumstance of end or of any other kind can make them good or licit — for example: to hate God, to refuse to believe in God, to will to lie, to lust. The proof of this, both from the eternal law of God, by which such things are prohibited, and from the Decalogue, which is a certain declaration of the eternal law, is sufficiently manifest. For it is established that the eternal law of God is immutable, and therefore the precepts of the Decalogue admit of no dispensation in any case whatsoever — inasmuch as they contain an exposition of the eternal law on the side that most directly concerns it.

§ 9. This, therefore, having been established with respect to internal acts, as regards exterior acts one must answer with a distinction. For what is done exteriorly by a man may be considered either according to itself alone, and not as it proceeds from an act of the interior will and together with it constitutes one moral act — and under this consideration, the exterior act is in itself neither good nor bad at any time, for if it be separated from the interior will, in itself it has no moral character (*ratio moralis*) —

1. Hos. 9:10, Vulgate: *Facti sunt abominabiles sicut ea quae dilexerunt.*

2. 1 Cor. 6:17, Vulgate: *Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est.*

3. Job 21:14, Vulgate: *Qui dixerunt Deo, recede a nobis, scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus.*

4. Ps. 35:4 (Vulgate), *Noluit intelligere ut bene ageret.*

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 7; q. 71, a. 2; and elsewhere.

6. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* [abbreviation as in source].

7. Is. 66:24 (cf. Mk. 9:44), Vulgate: *vermis eorum non morietur*.
8. St. Jerome, *Commentarii in Ezechielem* I, on Ezek. 1:13 (the passage on the burning coals): *Quam Graeci συντήρησιν vocant, scintillam conscientiae, in Cain quoque pectore postquam ejectus est de Paradiso, non exstinguitur; et qua victi voluptatibus, vel furore ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare sentimus.*
9. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII, 20–21: *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*.
10. Dist. 24 of this Book [i.e. *In II Sent.*, dist. 24].
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 20.
12. Dist. 37 [of this Book, as above].
13. Dist. 3 [of this Book, as above].

DISTINCTIO XLI — ARGUMENTS THAT APPEAR TO PROVE ALL WORKS OF UNBELIEVERS TO BE SINS (*ARGUMENTA QUAE PROBARE VIDENTUR OMNIA INFIDELIUM OPERA ESSE PECCATA*)

§ 1. — [Concluding matter from the preceding distinction] — whether in itself it has that by which it is made conformable or disconformable to the law of God; since the law is imposed only upon the will. Or let that same external work be considered insofar as it proceeds from the interior act of the will and constitutes together with it one moral act. By this consideration it is certain that certain external works are evil in themselves — namely, all those which are prohibited by the Decalogue, such as: to sacrifice to foreign gods, to swear falsely, to steal, to bear false witness, and other such things. And concerning these the disputation of St. Augustine in his book *Against Lying* (chapters 7 and 8)[1] is chiefly to be understood, where he teaches that things which are established to be sins are not to be done for any ostensibly good end. For he declares himself to be speaking of works which are sins in themselves (*per se*). His teaching may nevertheless, as we admonished above, be extended also to those things which are sins solely because they are prohibited by divine or human law; for so long as such a prohibition stands, such works cannot be done well for any end. Nor can the goodness of the end straightway avail to cause such a positive prohibition to cease — not even in the case of human laws.

§ I — Arguments that appear to prove all works of unbelievers to be sins (Argumenta quae probare videntur omnia infidelium opera esse peccata)

§ 2. Since it has been shown above that both the will and an external work otherwise good are vitiated by an evil intention, the Master now fittingly subjoins this question: whether all works of those who lack faith are evil, and therefore sins. This could appear to follow from the fact that, since faith directs the intention and intention — as St. Augustine witnesses — makes a work good,[3] it seems to follow that where faith is absent, no work is good. This question, then, which is celebrated among the Doctors and has been agitated by the dispute of many, we shall endeavour to expound in the following order: we shall first set out nakedly the arguments of the affirmative part, then those of the negative part, and last of all we shall indicate which of the two is more probably to be held, together with the resolution of those things which have been objected on the opposing side.

§ 3. The arguments of the affirmative part are drawn from Scripture, from the Fathers, and from rational arguments. From Scripture, the first is:

The judgment of the Apostle: "Everything that is not of faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23). Now that faith is taken in that passage properly for the assent to those things which are divinely revealed is evident from what precedes. For a little before, where it is said "You have faith," etc., and at the very beginning of the chapter, where the Apostle enters upon the disputation concerning the non-discrimination of foods, it is evident that faith is taken in the said signification.

The second: Heb. 11:6 — "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; therefore no work without faith can please God.

The third: Matt. 6:23 — "If your eye be evil, your whole body will be in darkness"; therefore if the intention be depraved, as being destitute of the light of faith, all works proceeding thence will contract a defect, and accordingly will be sins, things which are accustomed to be signified in Scripture under the name of darkness.

The fourth: Matt. 7:18 — "A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit." Now it is established that the will of the unbeliever, as being subject to the dominion of sin, is a bad tree.

The fifth: Jn. 15:5 — "Without me you can do nothing," that is, bring forth no fruit. For this sense is demanded by what precedes. Since, therefore, unbelievers are wholly alien from the grace of Christ, it follows that no work of theirs is good or fruitful.

The sixth: Col. 3:17 — "Whatsoever you do, do all in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ." Now that unbelievers do nothing in his name is manifest; therefore in every work they sin against this precept.[4]

The seventh: 1 Cor. 10:31 — "Do all to the glory of God." But those who do not know God perform this in no work. And St. Augustine understood this Scripture to have the force of a precept.[5]

§ 4. Furthermore, from the Fathers these passages are customarily adduced. St. Augustine, disputing against Julian,[6] supports this opinion with words that are, as appears, manifest, and confirms it with arguments. For, treating this very question of which we speak, he says: "Know that virtues are to be distinguished from vices not by their offices but by their ends. An office is what is to be done; but an end is that for the sake of which it is to be done. When therefore a man does something wherein he seems not to sin, if he is not convinced to do it for that on account of which true wisdom prescribes that it be done, although he may seem blameless in respect of the office, he sins by reason of the wrong end itself." And after some intervening matter, interposing also the testimony of false virtues, he says: "But if any good be done by man, it is done for that reason for which wisdom commands it to be done; but if it is done for some other reason, even though the office appear blameless, he sins by reason of the wrong end itself." And then, with the testimonies of Rom. 14 and Heb. 11 cited above being interposed, he says that the Gentiles, although they had done naturally those things which are of the law, yet sinned in so doing, because they had not done them for the end without faith — that is, they had not referred them to the end to which they ought to have referred them. And after many things, when he had objected from the person of Julian these words: "If a man cover his nakedness, is it then sin because it is not of faith?" he replies: "Insofar as it is not of faith, it is sin; not because covering oneself is sin in itself, for covering oneself is a mere naked act, but regarding such a work the impious man glories not in the Lord alone — and this is sin." And thereafter he discusses at greater length that unbelievers can do nothing good, joining thereto also those testimonies of Matt. 6 and 7 which we placed above.'[7]

Similar things are read in the same author (at the close of chapter 8 of the same book),[8] and likewise in *The City of God*, book 10, chapters 18 and 20,[9] and in book 19, chapters 21 and 25,[10] and writing on John (Tractates 12, 15, 72, and 86)[11] he teaches that without the faith of Christ there are no good works, but all works are evil.

§ 5. Prosper also is seen to agree with this opinion, and that not in one place. For in the book of the Sentences of St. Augustine (*Sentence 106*)[12] he says: "The entire life of the unbeliever is sin, and nothing is good without the supreme good. Where the acknowledgment of the eternal and immutable truth is lacking, false virtue exists even in the best moral conduct." Which words are repeated by him in the *Epigrams 81*.[13] And in *Against the Collator*, chapter 28,[14] he says it is most manifestly evident that all works of the impious are unclean and defiled. The reason he premises is that in all things which even appear honourable, they serve not God but the Devil, namely the appetite for honour and glory. And in the poem *On Grace* he sings thus: "For every work of virtue that lacks the true seed of righteousness is sin," etc.[15] Nor is it dissimilar what Fulgentius writes,[16] book 2 (*On the Remission of Sins*, chapter 1), proving the necessity of the Catholic faith from the fact that it has been said by the Apostle that whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

§ 6. To these is added the authority of the Council of Arausica (Orange II), whose canon 22 here is: "No one has his own except lying and sin."[17] Which words are taken from Tractate 5 of St. Augustine on John.[18] Nor does the Master (*in this Distinction*) seem to have thought otherwise, even though he does not speak altogether definitively. Lastly, among the Scholastics this opinion is maintained by Gregory of Rimini and some others.[19]

§ 7. Now the rational arguments are these. The first: Every work proceeding from deliberate will either is referred to God as ultimate end and is good, or is referred to a creature and is evil. But the unbeliever, since he does not know God, cannot refer his works to God; therefore he refers them all to a creature, and thus sins in all things.

The second: Every human action is either ordered or disordered; ordered indeed if it is referred to the due end; disordered, however, if it is not referred to the due end. But the action of him who is ignorant of the due end cannot be ordered; therefore it is disordered, and consequently vicious.

The third: The first man was bound by the law of nature to refer all his works to God; and yet the law of nature has not been changed by sin; therefore fallen man is likewise bound to perform the same; therefore he sins as often as he fails to do so.

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§ II — Arguments on the contrary part (Argumenta in partem contrariam)

§ 8. Now the arguments that make for the denying part are to be set forth. And these as well as the former are in a threefold class of truth.

The first is from Scripture, in which we sometimes read unbelievers praised on account of certain good works — as Cyrus and Darius, kings, because they commanded the temple of Jerusalem to be restored and released the captivity of the Jewish people.

Likewise Ahasuerus, king, who both exalted Mordecai and punished Haman with a just penalty, and delivered the Jews from an unjust slaughter.

But also Nebuchadnezzar, when Zedekiah was faithless and perjured, he spoke judgment against him, 4 Kgs., last chapter.[21]

And the Ninevites turned aside temporal wrath by certain works of penance, not yet, as it appears, imbued with faith in the one God.[22]

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1. St. Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, chs. 7–8.
2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4.
3. St. Augustine, *In Praefatione ad Psalmum 31* [i.e. *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 31, Preface].
4. The source cites Col. 4 (*Coloss. 4*) for this text, which in modern editions is Col. 3:17; the reference is retained as in the source.
5. St. Augustine, *Epistola 81* [abbreviation as in source: *Epist 81*].
6. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, book 4, ch. 3.
7. The passage continues and cites Matt. 6 and Matt. 7, as placed above in the arguments from Scripture.
8. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, book 4, ch. 8 (sub finem).
9. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, book 10, chs. 18 and 20.
10. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, book 19, chs. 21 and 25.
11. St. Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus*, Tractates 12, 15, 72, and 86.
12. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae*, Sentence 106.
13. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epigrammata*, no. 81.
14. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 28.
15. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de Ingratis* [*De Ingratis*].
16. Fulgentius, *De Peccatorum remissione*, book 2, ch. 1.
17. Council of Orange (II), canon 22 (*Concilium Arausiacanum*, canon 22).
18. St. Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis Tractatus*, Tractate 5.
19. Gregory of Rimini (*Gregorius Ariminensis*) and certain others among the Scholastics.
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4 (*ibidem*).
21. 4 Kgs. (Vulgate), last chapter (i.e. 2 Kgs. 25 in modern numbering).
22. The footnote in the source reads: "The penance of the Ninevites is commemorated by Christ our Saviour in the Gospel (Matt. 12)." [*a*: Ninivitarum poenitentiam a Christo Salvatore nostro in Evangelio (Matth. 11/12) testari — abbreviation as in source.]

DISTINCTIO XLI — ON WHETHER ALL THE WORKS OF UNBELIEVERS ARE SINS, AND ON THE VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF SIN (*DE OPERIBUS INFIDELIUM ET DE VOLUNTARIO PECCATI*)

§ 1. Furthermore, Lk. 6 says: "If you do good to those who do good to you, what thanks is that to you? For sinners do the same." By "sinners" he seems to understand those whom Matthew in ch. 5 calls Gentiles (Ethnics).[1]

Likewise, Acts 13: Sergius Paulus the proconsul, not yet a believer, as the circumstances prove, desired to hear the word of God; and no one could rightly call that desire of his a sin. Nor does the deed of the barbarians, of whom it is said in Acts 28 that they showed no little kindness to the Apostle and his companions who had been shipwrecked, seem deserving of reproof.[2]

From the Fathers, moreover, the following passages are the chief ones on this same side of the question. St. Augustine, in *De Spiritu et Litera* ch. 27, says: "If these men do by nature the things of the law, they are not yet in the number of those whom Christ's grace justifies, but rather in the number of those of whom, even though they are impious and do not truly and rightly worship the true God, we nonetheless read, or know, or have heard, certain deeds which, according to the rule of justice, we cannot only not censure, but must even commend." And commended as such is represented to us by Scripture (Jon. 3) — so that in it Bellarmine[3] may recognise the three parts of penance, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction — for Scripture says there: "Let every man turn from his evil way, and let them cry mightily to the Lord, and let the men and the beasts not taste anything, nor feed, nor drink water, and let them be covered with sackcloth, both man and beast." Furthermore, that the penance of the Ninevites proceeded from a preceding faith, and that this faith generated penitence, are clearly indicated by the words of Scripture at the same passage (Jon. 3): "And the men of Nineveh believed in God, and they proclaimed a fast and put on sackcloth." Indeed St. Thomas[4] concerning that penance of the Ninevites says: "To the first it must therefore be said that by natural law it belongs, inasmuch as anyone repents of the evils he has done, that he grieve over them, and also that he show some sign of grief, as the Ninevites did (Jon. 3), in which there was, however, something added by faith — namely that they should do this under hope of obtaining pardon, according to what is read there (Jon. 3): 'Who knows but that God will turn and forgive, and we shall not perish?'" The Council of Trent[5] seems to declare that the Ninevites, through that penance, obtained mercy and remission of sins from the Lord; and therefore, since charity, which cannot be without faith, is required for formed (*formata*) penance, the same Holy Synod must be said to have asserted that it could not have been formed penance, since the same Holy Synod teaches in that place that at any time whatsoever the movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins even outside the Sacrament, as a proximate disposition; which contrition it declares to be perfect charity when it exists unto justification extra Sacramentum. Besides which, the Holy Synod

adduces the example of the Ninevites in that place to demonstrate the penance whose beginning can be taken from fear, so that nothing prevents the terrors of conscience and preconceived fears of divine justice from preventing a man, once shaken thereby, from being proximately disposed toward seeking pardon of sins — for the Holy Synod says: those Ninevites, usefully shaken by fear through the preaching of Jonah, wrought full penance terroribus (with terrors), and obtained mercy from the Lord. These notes I would wish to set before the reader, so that he may attend to the second argument adduced by the author from the testimony of Scripture, insofar as it concerns the penance of the Ninevites as sufficient to promote a man unto salvation not as an unbeliever, so that we may show that, as we have proved, it is false from the very words of Scripture itself.

§ 2. And St. Augustine goes on at the beginning of the next chapter to acknowledge that the image of God in the human soul is not so worn away by earthly affections that there remain in it no final traces, as it were, from which one could rightly say that even in its very impiety it does something of the law or knows something thereof. And a little later: "Just as some venial sins, without which this life is not led, do not impede the just man from eternal life, so certain good works, without which the life of any man however wicked is scarcely ever found, profit an impious man nothing toward eternal salvation." And various other things follow. The same author[6] says that the virtue of Regulus — who kept faith inviolate even to enemies at certain peril to himself — is deservedly to be praised. And likewise Prosper, following St. Augustine,[7] (*Sententiae* 46), asserts that without certain good works the life of any man however wicked is scarcely ever found. Pertinent here seems to be what the author of the work *Hypognosticon*[8] (attributed to St. Augustine, bk. 3) says: certain things are good but conducive only to earthly life, not to salvation; as also Prosper acknowledges at the same time (*in Carmine De Ingratis*, and *in Disputatione contra Collatorem*).

§ 3. Likewise St. Gregory, Hom. 27 (*in Evangelia*)[9], says that some love their neighbours by affection of kinship and of flesh, who nevertheless in this love do not contradict the sacred writings. In agreement with this one may see St. Jerome writing (*in c. 29 Ezechielis*)[10] and St. Leo, Serm. 7 (*de Quadragesima*)[11], of whom the former, from the fact that Nebuchadnezzar received the reward of his good work, teaches that Gentiles, if they do anything good, are judged not to be without the reward of God; and that we are condemned in comparison with Gentiles, if they do by natural law what we neglect even when it is written. These works of mercy enumerated by the Lord in Matt. 25 he says ought not to be deprived of their proper praise, if they are rendered to a man through the simple natural bond of helping him. "But because," he says, "this does not proceed from the fount of faith, it does not attain to the reward of eternal things; one is the condition of heavenly works, another of earthly. Mundane benevolence in those whom it helps has its end: Christian piety is transferred into its own author, so that in him himself we are said to be benevolent, in whom we confess operating for us," etc.

§ 4. Finally, the Fathers of the Council of Constance counted among the condemned articles of John Hus this one as well, number 16: *that all works are indifferent, but this is an immediate division of human works, that they are either virtuous or vicious* (*vitioca*). And rightly was this condemned: nothing prevents certain works of unbelievers from being indifferent, which, that they not deserve to be called good, are nevertheless not to be called sins. To this opinion, finally, the greatest part of the Scholastics subscribes, as to the more probable view.[12]

§ 5. This doctrine is also confirmed by natural arguments, of which this is one: If any Gentile, led by natural piety, honour his parents, or moved by natural compassion stretch forth his hand to the needy, such a

man does not deserve to be punished for such a work; therefore he does not sin in such a work. For to every sin a punishment corresponds.

Another: Every man who sins becomes worse; but the Gentile who from natural compassion gives alms to the needy, or raises a fallen man, or shows a blind man the way, is not worse thereby; therefore he does not sin.

Third: A Gentile who is ignorant of the Supreme Good can desire to know it, and to attain to it, and indeed can direct his studies toward that end. But in doing this he does not sin.

Fourth: Many are the actions of unbelievers that are repugnant neither to faith nor to good morals; therefore in those actions there is no sin.

Fifth: A believer can do something which he does not refer to the ultimate end that faith shows, namely when he sins venially or mortally, with his faith nevertheless remaining intact; therefore also an unbeliever can do something which he does not refer to the end which he has constituted for himself as ultimate through his unbelief; and accordingly he will be able not to sin. This last argument is that of St. Thomas[13]; the two immediately preceding are those of St. Bonaventure,[14] writing on this Distinction.

§ III — Explanation and determination of the aforesaid question (Supradictae quaestionis explicatio et determinatio)

§ 6. For the declaration of the aforesaid question, one must know first of all that it is to be understood of human actions alone. Now we call that a human action which proceeds from the judgment of reason (*rationis judicio*) and deliberate will. Those actions, therefore, which are not of this kind, but are done from mere imagination alone — such as scratching the head, stroking the beard, spitting on the ground — when they are done by a man with his attention directed to something else, are not to be brought into the present discussion.

§ 7. Furthermore, every human action must be either morally good or morally bad, as St. Thomas rightly teaches[16], not indeed from its genus or by reason of its object (*objecti ratione*), since it is established that many actions are indifferent by genus, such as walking, standing, sitting, speaking; but when considered in the particular according to circumstances, in which the end also is contained. For either all the circumstances required for the goodness of the work are present, and then the work is good; or some one is lacking, and then the work is bad — either absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) or in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*).

§ 8. Nor does the condemnation of the aforecited article about indifferent works stand in the way: both because it suffices for the condemnation of at least that article that the falsehood lies in what follows in the same article and was badly inferred from what preceded it, namely that if a man is vicious he necessarily acts viciously, and if virtuous he necessarily acts virtuously. The heretic added this reason: because just as sin infects universally all the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man. This reason is false on both sides: for not all the works of a just man are good, since it is established that he very frequently sins venially; nor are all the works of a man who has fallen into mortal sin bad, since faith, which he has not lost, can shed light upon him for many good operations, so that he performs them even while persisting in such a state.[17]

§ 9. It must be noted further in the present question that an unbeliever (*infidelis*) is not here called a Jew or a heretic, even though such a one in truth lacks faith; because faith is the name of a virtue in its integrity;

but rather a pagan or Gentile (*paganum seu ethnicum*), who has not even knowledge of the one God to whom he could refer his actions. Yet there is no doubt that one who is an unbeliever in this manner can perform many generically good things, which are called the offices of the virtues — as experience itself most manifestly testifies. But the question is whether whatever an unbeliever does receives a vice from an undue end, so as to be truly called a sin: whether because he proposes to himself in each action an end which he ought not to regard; or because he does not regard the end which he ought. For that the remaining circumstances can be present in the actions of unbelievers is not doubted. Therefore the proper difficulty of this question concerns the end.

§ 10. And indeed St. Augustine in Serm. 13 (*de verbis Apostoli*)[18] gravely reproves the Stoics and says that they lived according to the flesh because they referred the offices of the virtues to themselves. In which passage St. Augustine plainly teaches, and manifest reason convinces, that every work which is not referred to the end to which it ought to be referred, but to another end to which it ought not to be referred, is depraved and vicious, and therefore a sin. Wherefore one must carefully consider whether all the works of unbelievers are of this kind. We say therefore — just as the light of the human mind is not so extinguished by the darkness of ignorance that it does not judge soundly and rightly about many things — so also the human mind is not so defiled by the stain of vices that every spark of good and natural affection is extinguished; and that it does not sometimes, though amid innumerable vices of life, flash forth and appear, and express itself through certain actions. Moreover, that natural affection tends of itself to a good ultimate end, at least in general, even if what that end is in particular and distinctly be unknown. For just as all men naturally desire to be happy (*beati*), so also they naturally desire to be good, although they are ignorant of the things in which true goodness (*bonitas*) and beatitude consist. Therefore that natural appetite of good in general, when known and considered, is very frequently determined without any particular end being proposed, whether good or bad, according as the various ends of various wills are.

§ 11. Yet it is not necessary that every person who has constituted for himself some ultimate end in which, as in the highest good, he reposes, should refer all his actions to that end. For the ambitious man does not refer all things to vainglory, nor the licentious man all things to carnal pleasure, in every deliberate act he performs. For if we grant this, then not only the works of unbelievers, but also all the works of believers living badly, will be sins from the circumstance of the ultimate end. Which no Catholic would say. This can be understood from the contrary as well. For the just, in this life, do not refer all their actions to God, whom they have as their ultimate end — namely those in which they sin daily. Wherefore it is not necessary that the unjust, though unbelievers, should refer all their actions to that which by a depraved will they have determined upon as supremely to be loved. For just as there concupiscence sometimes seizes upon certain movements of the will that are not referred to God as ultimate end, nor indeed can be so referred; so here that natural instinct toward good sometimes elicits certain actions which a man does not direct toward what he particularly loves as the highest good. And St. Augustine made use of this comparison in *De Spiritu et Litera* ch. 28, in the words cited above.[19]

§ 12. Such movements, therefore, though they be still unformed (*informes*) and imperfect, inasmuch as they proceed from love of the good in general only, tend toward that same good under the same formal character (*ratio*); and hence they cannot be productive of eternal life, which is promised to those who worship and love God, as St. Augustine there testifies[20], and likewise St. Leo, Serm. 7 (*de Quadragesima*)[11]. They are nevertheless by their nature capable of being formed (*formabiles*), inasmuch as the same highest good in

particular — that is, God — may come to be known and loved with the charity by which He is loved as such. And there is absolutely no circumstance which prevents them from being in this manner formed and perfected; which cannot be said of those actions which truly are sins — inasmuch as those are either bad from the object, or affected by some bad circumstance, which excludes the formation of faith and charity.

§ 13. From all this it appears that those actions of unbelievers which are performed in the aforesaid manner are not only not sins, but are also morally good, although imperfectly so (*licet imperfecte bonas*). However, that movements or actions of unbelievers of this kind are very rare, on account of the most widely prevailing tyranny of unbelief and concupiscence, St. Augustine indicated in the same book, ch. 27, when he says: "If one examines for what end those good works done by duty are performed by unbelievers, scarcely are any found that deserve the proper praise and defence of justice."[20]

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§ IV — Resolution of the objections raised on the contrary side (Solutio eorum quae in contrarium objiciebantur)

§ 14. It remains to dissolve the arguments of the contrary side. And first, Rom. 14: "Everything that is not from faith is sin" — this can rightly be understood in two ways, setting aside the prejudgment of the probable opinion. In one way, according to the exposition of St. John Chrysostom and also of the commentaries of Theophylact and of St. Ambrose, so that by the word *fides* we understand confidence (*fiduciam*), which produces a tranquil conscience; or what comes to the same thing, the persuasion that what one does is licit, so that the sense is: every work that does not benefit a man through that confidence, through which a man is persuaded that what he does is licit, is conjointly bad with the opinion by which he thinks it illicit, or at least doubts whether it is licit — is a sin. For it is done against the dictate of conscience. And the preceding words of the Apostle give probable support to this sense: "Blessed is he who does not judge himself in what he approves" (*probat*) — that is, whom his conscience does not condemn in what he does. In another way, so that *fides* is properly taken, but under the negation, the opposite affirmation is understood. And then it is not said that something is done without faith because it lacks the intention that faith can direct or even direct further, but because it has the direction that unbelief and concupiscence direct. In this way St. Augustine appears to have understood it, bk. 4 (*Contra Julianum* c. 3)[22], where, in response to Julian's question "If a Gentile bare his head (*nudum operuerit*), is that a sin because it is not from faith?" he responds: "insofar as it is not from faith, it is a sin." Explaining afterwards his own sense, he says: "Those very things are sins, by which bad things are done, because they are done not by a faithful but by an unfaithful, that is a foolish and harmful, will." St. Augustine therefore understands by "not from faith" those things that are done by the unfaithful with a bad and harmful will, that is, with bad intention, which right faith cannot direct.[23]

§ 15. To the second argument taken from Scripture, it is answered: that some work of a man can please God, even though the man himself does not yet please God — which manifestly holds true of bad Christians, and conversely, good daily works that displease God hold true in those who are pleasing to God. And yet no work of an unbeliever so pleases God as to be conducive to the man unto eternal life, for the reason that it lacks the direction of faith. In which sense St. Thomas 2. 2. (q. 10, a. 5, *in fine*)[24] says: "If Cornelius the Centurion had been an unbeliever, his action could not have been acceptable to God," to whom without faith no one can please. (*Heb. 11.*)

§ 16. The solution to the third and fourth arguments appears partly from what has been said above, and partly is evident from elsewhere. And it is common to both to say to Christians who live badly: for just as not every intention nor every will of an unbeliever is bad, so in him it is possible that his works be morally good, and equally that an external work proceed from them.[25]

§ 17. The fifth objection concludes only concerning the work that pertains to eternal life, as the Council of Arausicum (*Canon 7*) declares.[26]

§ 18. To the sixth and seventh one can reply, if in those words of the Apostle a precept is detected, as St. Augustine seems to understand it, that it is not so much a precept about referring each individual thing as the object of conative acts of men, as the precept concerning the perfection of justice. For a man ought to strive so that at length he attain perfect justice, in which also individual works in the particular are referred to the glory of God — which sense Chrysostom expressed with those words in 1 Cor. 10[27], while giving those words of the Apostle not a precept but a universal admonition, proposing to us this one best end, that we glorify God in all things.

§ 19. To the words of St. Augustine against Julian disputing, we reply that he presupposes this — and has truth in it in the most part — namely that those things which are not referred to a legitimate particular end, are referred to an illicit end, and one that does not serve God but serves concupiscence: while, namely, the mind destituted of the light of faith is so driven by dominating concupiscence that it scarcely ever, breathing from its tyranny, follows the general instinct of good. That St. Augustine wished this can be gathered from the subject matter of his declarations throughout. For when he had said above: *"Inasmuch as virtues that serve carnal goods, or any temporal advantages whatsoever, cannot truly be virtues,"* he likewise subjoined by way of example: *"It is possible that some good things are done by those who are not benefactors from whom they are done. For it is good to support a man in danger, especially an innocent one. But he who does this, if by seeking the glory of men more than of God does it, does not do a good thing, because he does not do it with a good will. Far be it, then, that it should be said or even thought that the will is good, which in others or in itself* (*sive in aliis vel in seipsa*) *does not glory in the Lord."*[28] These words make it plain that what St. Augustine there says and endeavours to prove is that without right intention it is impossible that an action be without sin in the particular sense; or rather, understand it with the depraved and perverse end that results from the Apostle's sentence in Rom. 14, as we said above — namely from the contrary affirmation understood by the negative figure of speech, which the Greeks call *litotes* (*λιτότης*); in the way that Saul is said to have not looked upon David with right eyes (1 Kgs 2). Or it is not done rightly, St. Augustine understands, which is referred neither in the particular nor in general to a right end, but is deflected by cupidity to a perverse end; which sense in truth concurs with the first. Finally, after moderating his disputation at length, St. Augustine says: "At least grant, then, those works of unbelievers that seem good to you are not evil: but do not hold that they lead to eternal salvation; know that good without the grace of God through Christ can be conferred upon no one, through which alone a man can be led to the eternal Kingdom of God."[29] By which words he seems to himself to have sufficiently established the Catholic case which he had taken upon himself to defend: namely that works of such a kind can be performed by unbelievers, which do not promote them toward eternal salvation. In much the same manner, other general passages of St. Augustine are rightly taken. And that saying of the Apostle: "All things that are theirs, they seek" (*Phil. 4*).[30]

§ 20. Now that the Master cites Prosper's sentence that all the works of unbelievers are sins — this was partly said because unbelief is such a sin that it admits nothing by which a man can be freed; for faith, which is

the door of justice and salvation, is excluded by it, which is not so completely excluded by other sins; and partly because the works of an unbeliever, if they are to be esteemed from the end, incur the reproof of sin, escaping so that they are not reproachable, as we showed above. By which moderation also certain other general sentences of the Fathers are rightly received. And that saying of the Apostle: "All things that are theirs, they seek" (Phil. 4).[31]

§ 21. Now, concerning the opinion which maintained that all the works of unbelievers are sins — condemned once in Baius[32], having lost all probability and banished entirely from the census of probable opinions — the author of this work[33] seems to attribute some probability to it, as now not an opinion but an error. For he says that he will finally indicate which of two opinions is more probably to be held — namely the one denying, the other asserting, that all the works of unbelievers are sins — I marvel certainly that, where there was occasion, he did not recall the Bull of the Supreme Pontiffs proscribing the Baianist thesis in order XXV, which reads: *All the virtues of philosophers are vices. Philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.* Other theses likewise condemned in the same diploma contain the same error, which we cited and transcribed elsewhere in our notes.[34] Furthermore, Cornelius[35] in Tom. 2 of his *Augustine*, bks. 3 and 4, *De statu naturae lapsae*, is entirely occupied with asserting this error, which he endeavours to impute, most rashly — not to say impiously — to St. Augustine and even to the Catholic Church. Here are his words (*ex cap. 2 lib. 3, pag. 185, Edit. Parisien. ann. 1641*), faithfully transcribed: "The sentence therefore of St. Augustine, which the Pelagians so greatly detested, is not other than this: that free will after the fall of the first man, before it receives Divine Grace through faith — from which Grace begins, under the concupiscences of the flesh — is so artfully held captive, that the liberty of will is not held, as it were, in iron chains, in such a way that it can in no manner at all rise so as to will the good or do it, but only so as to be involved in captive fear of evil." And a little later: "This teaching," he says, "is so lucid and perspicuous in the writings of St. Augustine that I would dare to say there is in this whole matter no clearer one: which he himself teaches not as his own opinion but as the immovable base of the Christian faith, upon which the whole economy of Christian grace and will depends." What a thing! He does not hesitate to assert clearly that it is read in the writings of St. Augustine, and that it is the basis of faith — what the Catholic Church, with the Supreme Pontiff presiding, has detested and condemned. Alas! All except Jansenius were blind: the lucid and perspicuous could not be seen by the wretched ones. I omit the other passages of Jansenius from which the same thing is effused and which he endeavours to prove. Indeed, the virtues of philosophers he begins to establish as not true but vices, in bk. 4 (*De statu Naturae Lapsae* c. 8). And who could not curse the title of ch. 17 of the same work, thus worded: "Nugae, delirium, infamia, error: impietas contraria Christianorum sensui Scripturisque — that there is any true virtue, or works without sin, according to St. Augustine and the Council of Arausicum." His stomach is likewise moved by theses 26 and 27, which elsewhere also we have praised, so that he may withdraw from the stroke of the Diploma of the Supreme Pontiffs against Michael Baius. But truly to Jansenius are to be assigned the theses 8 and 11 noted with his black theta by Alexander VIII, which read as follows: 8. *It is necessary that in every work the unbeliever sins, (peccet) from Christian supernatural faith, which operates through charity.* 11. *Everything that is not from Christian supernatural faith, which operates through charity, is sin.* How clearly the same error is referred to by the Quesenllian theses[36] will be evident to one who reads them in order, especially the first — 26, 27, 28, 29, and likewise 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47.[37]

§ V — That every sin is voluntary (Omne peccatum esse voluntarium)

§ 22. Although the voluntary (*voluntarium*) is not universally accepted as belonging to the formal character (*ratio*) of sin — for indeed some sins of nature, such as monsters and the generations of monsters, and the concupiscence of the reborn together with the movements arising therefrom, which the just suffer unwillingly, are called sin in some sense, as we declared in its proper place — it is nonetheless of the formal character (*ratio*) of human sin properly so called, that is, of sin in the proper sense of the word, the kind that was explained above in several definitions (*dist. 35*). The reason for this can be given, because sin is an intellectual evil of nature, as such; and it is judged to operate as such when it operates by the judgment of reason. Such an act, therefore, if it is vicious and evil, receives the human or proper appellation of sin. But and above (*ad dist. 39*) we explained the cause on account of which alone a man is called morally bad or good — namely that the rest of the powers of the soul are governed by the command of the will and are subject to it.

§ 23. To this heading also belong the four groups of passages from Scripture and the Fathers' sentences supported by references (*circa distint. 22*) which we produced to teach that the concupiscence of the reborn and the movements arising therefrom, which the just suffer against their will, are not sins in the proper sense — passages which it is not necessary to repeat here. Insofar as this teaching extends to original sin, which is also voluntary in some sense, from what we have commented (*ad dist. 30*) it can be understood, where we showed that original sin is voluntary in kind.[39]

§ 24. Now that the Master cites from St. Augustine, bk. (*De duabus animabus* cap. 10)[40]: "*never to be sin except in the will, and not to be sin except through the will*" — and the same St. Augustine repeats and proves the same thing, bk. 1 (*Retract.* cap. 15, and 19)[41] — he does not understand thereby what would seem to someone at first glance: that the will alone is the subject of sin (*peccati subiectum*). For it is established from St. Augustine's own sentence, through the other powers of the soul as well — namely through the intellect, memory, sense, and appetitive faculty — that the motives (*motivas*) of sin can be exercised. But he wished to signify the will as the efficient and original cause of sin, so that without the will sin cannot consist in any other faculty of the soul whatsoever. Therefore all the acts of sin are in the will — either the will itself eliciting them, as they say, such as the very movement of a deformed will contrary to right reason; or imperating them, such as the vicious and culpable actions of the other powers of the soul.

§ 25. Moreover, the teaching by which all sin is said to be voluntary is not to be received universally only for mortal sins, as the Master seems to understand (*§. D.E.F.*) and as above (*dist. 36 §. I.*) we contended, while in both places he strives to restrict St. Augustine's general doctrine to mortal sins alone, as if venial sins are not all voluntary — which the truth of it universally maintains. That St. Augustine too sensed this is sufficiently argued by the general passages of his sentences: *"So much is every voluntary evil sin, that it is not sin at all if it is not voluntary"* (*Libro de vera Religione cap. 14*)[42]; and: *"Not to sin except by the will, and never except in the will to sin"* (*Et lib. de duabus animabus cap. 10*)[40]; and: *"And it is not rightly imputed as sin except to the will"* (*lib. 3. De libero arbitrio cap. 17*)[43]. It is established that St. Augustine by the general name of *peccatum* comprehends also venial sin. Which we also showed above concerning the definition of sin.

§ 26. But if some venial sin were not voluntary, no reason could be given why all the movements of concupiscence in the reborn, even for those not consenting, should not be called sins. Which error we have also rejected above as condemned by the Church (*ad dist. 21 et 32*).[44]

§ 27. Now what is said in the preceding places (*ad dist. 30*) — that St. Augustine attributes voluntariness (*voluntarium*) only to the sin of the first man — he does not understand thereby what might seem to someone at first sight: that the will alone is the subject of sin. For it is established, as we said, through the other powers of the soul as well. But he wished to mean that those things which are done unwillingly because of ignorance, infirmity, or compulsion, have not that perfect character (*ratio*) of the voluntary; because such circumstances always make voluntary actions to some extent less free; thereby producing, those actions being constrained, that they proceed less freely; they are nevertheless absolutely (*absolute*) voluntary and such sins are testified to by the same passages of St. Augustine in those very places. For (*Retract.* cap. 15)[45] speaking of him who sinned unknowingly and therefore not incongruently is said to sin unwillingly, he teaches that he therefore sins willingly (*volens*), because he voluntarily did what was sin although he did not know it to be sin. And ch. 16, when he says that it must principally be understood that voluntary sin is that which just condemnation has followed — that is, the first sin of the first man — he sufficiently signifies that the rest of the sins are also voluntary, though less perfectly. And lib. 2 (*cap. 13*)[46] after the words placed in the objection he thus continues: *"Howsoever those things, which are done not voluntarily, are not improperly called sins, because they are done by the unknowing or the compelled, who are not able entirely without the will to commit them"*; where he teaches that the reason for not doing otherwise (*agendi non aliter*) — how not-actual sins only, but also original sin — is voluntary, namely that it is alien will contracted, and the other truly of its own will committed.

§ 28. Since, moreover, liberty decreases as much as necessity increases, hence the same sins are rightly said to be done of necessity in a certain way, which those later passages of St. Augustine signify with the added testimony of Bede; though in the Psalms and other passages of Scripture *necessitates* is taken not literally for sins, but for anguishes and tribulations, in the customary phrase of Scripture.

§ 29. Furthermore, how many and how great are the degrees of the voluntary, more and less — these are diligently explained by St. Bonaventure (*in hanc dist.*)[14], where he enumerates nine degrees, of which the first and most perfect belongs to the sin of an angel; the second and itself perfect to the first sin of a man; the last and most imperfect to original sin; and the rest are intermediate, being among the various sins of fallen man, according to various modes of perfection and imperfection.

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§ VI — Reply to certain arguments on the contrary side (Ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta responsio)

§ 30. Those things which have been said on the contrary side can be resolved — and first that which is in St. Augustine, bk. 2 (*Retract.* cap. 13)[48], where he treats and interprets the general sentence drawn from the book *De Vera Religione*: "What is to be thought of sin is only what is sin, not what is also the punishment of sin, namely the sin of the first man." To which he similarly writes also in bk. 2 (*Retract.* cap. 15 and 16)[49], *asserting that some people also sin unwillingly. And likewise in bk. 3 (*De libero arbitrio *cap. 17 and 19. Item* lib. de praedestinatione Sanctorum *cap. 11. And* lib. de Natura et Gratia *cap. 66. And again* lib. Retract. *cap. 9*)[50], he teaches, as he himself says, that sins can be committed of necessity; and to prove this, besides other things he advances that passage of Ps. 24: *de necessitatibus meis erue me* ("rescue me from my necessities"). Nor unlike it

is what Bede writes (*in Prov. 24, ad illud*: "Seven times in the day" etc., there saying: "From ignorance, oblivion, surprise, necessity, we sin daily either willing or unwilling."

§ 31. To all this we reply that St. Augustine in the earlier passages seems to attribute voluntariness only to the sin of the first man, understanding thereby the more perfect and complete voluntariness; and the rest is also voluntary, but truly and perfectly — as the other sins are voluntary, though less perfectly (*minus perfecte*). Let those things, however, which are also punishments of sinners — such as things committed through ignorance, infirmity, or compulsion — he denies to have that perfect character (*ratio*) of the voluntary: because such circumstances always make voluntary actions in some measure less voluntary, making them such that those actions constrained by them proceed less freely; yet they are nevertheless absolutely voluntary, and that such sins too are voluntary is testified to by the same passages of St. Augustine in those same places. For (*Retract.* cap. 15)[45] *speaking of him who sinned unknowingly and therefore not incongruently is said to sin unwillingly, he teaches that he therefore sins willingly (*volens peccasse*), because he voluntarily did what was sin although he did not know it to be sin. And cap. 16, when he says that it is principally to be understood that voluntary is the sin which just condemnation has followed — that is, the first sin of the first man — he sufficiently signifies that the rest are also voluntary, though less perfectly. And lib. 2 (*cap. 13)[48] *after the words placed in the objection he thus says:* "Howsoever those things which are not done voluntarily are not improperly called sins, because they are done by the unknowing or by the compelled, who are not able entirely without the will to commit them"*; where he teaches that the reason for calling not only actual sins but also original sin voluntary is that the latter is alien will contracted, the former truly of their own will committed.

§ 32. Since moreover liberty decreases as much as necessity increases, hence the same sins are rightly said to be done of necessity in some measure, which those later passages of St. Augustine signify with the adjunct testimony of Bede; although in the Psalms and other passages of Scripture *necessitates* are taken not literally for sins but for anguishes and tribulations, in the customary phrase of Scripture.

§ 33. Furthermore, how many and how great are the degrees of the voluntary, more and less — these are diligently explained by St. Bonaventure (*in hanc dist.*)[14], where he enumerates nine degrees, of which the first and most perfect belongs to the sin of the angel; the second and itself perfect to the first sin of a man; the last and most imperfect to original sin; the rest are intermediate being among the various actual sins of fallen man, according to various modes of perfection and imperfection.

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*— Distinctio XLII — Whether an exterior act together with an interior act constitutes one sin or several (*An actus exterior cum interiore fiat unum peccatum an plura*) (continued from previous chunk) —*

§ I — Whether an exterior act together with an interior forms one sin or several (An actus exterior cum interiore fit unum peccatum, an plura)

§ 34. For the understanding and explanation of the question which the Master first raises (*in hac Distinctione*): whether a bad will, and the exterior act proceeding from it, are one sin or several — memories must be recalled of what we said (*ad Distinct. 40*), namely that exterior acts, if considered only according to themselves and not as proceeding from an interior act of the will, are neither good nor bad morally, but only naturally good; but considered insofar as they proceed from the interior act of the will, they are rightly said to

be morally good and bad. For there is no other ratio (*ratio*) of doctrine: exterior acts receive the whole of their goodness and badness or the formal character (*ratio*) of sin from the internal and proper act of the will.

§ 35. Therefore, to answer the question: just as we have already indicated in the place cited, the exterior act together with the interior, according to the proper formal character (*ratio*) of sin or formally, as they say, constitutes one sin — even though materially several sins can be said. The reason is clear from what has been said, because the exterior act, being not bad in itself nor receiving the appellation of sin from any badness inherent in it, is given the external denomination from the badness of the interior voluntary act, which is the bad interior will (*malus interior voluntatis*). Therefore since there is one badness or deordination of the will, from which both the will and its own act are called sin, it is perspicuous that it is formally one sin of the will and of the act. Several things can however be materially said to be the act internal and external, since it is not to be denied that there are several acts in terms of divine law; for there are several acts prohibited, but in such a way that the one is prohibited by reason of its repugnance with the other, so that it receives the formal character (*ratio*) of that repugnance from it, just as the ordinary Gloss understands (*ad illud Rom. 1: Repletos homicidiis*): *"Pluraliter dictum esse homicidiis, quia est homicidium actus et est voluntatis"* ("It is said in the plural 'homicides,' because the act itself is homicide and also of the will"). Though that passage is more rightly understood of voluntary homicide, which is conjunct with the external act; in which way homicide and other sins of the will, it is certain, are formally distinct from the same genus of sins externally completed.

§ 36. This our response is confirmed by what is said in Jas. 1: *Concupiscentia concepit, parit peccatum, peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit generat mortem* ("Concupiscence, having conceived, brings forth sin, but sin when it is consummated brings forth death"). These words signify that the action inchoate with lust consummated by the act does not constitute a number, but one and the same sin, which is generated by the will and consummated by the act. Moreover, this can be understood from the contrary. For an external good work proceeding from a good will does not establish a number with it in the formal character (*ratio*) of merit. Nor indeed if one gives alms, or teaches the ignorant, or defends the innocent, does one doubly acquire merit, but singly. Therefore also the external bad work does not constitute a number with the will in the formal character (*ratio*) of sin or demerit.

§ 37. And finally the same is answered from punishment. For by many sins multiplex punishment is due, whether retributory, or satisfactory; but for the sin that one has consummated by the act, a multiplex punishment is imposed not as for several sins, and diverse satisfactions are not imposed, but it is one sin and not several.

§ 38. It must be noted, moreover, that what we say of the external act is similarly to be understood of the act of the intellect and of any other act imperiated by the will. All actions of this kind, whether they appear externally or not, receive the formal character (*ratio*) of sin from none other than the will.

§ 39. But someone will ask: if it is one sin of the will together with the act, why are diverse things in the Decalogue forbidden by mandates? For one thing is the mandate which prohibits the coveting of a wife or a thing belonging to another; another is the mandate by which stealing and adultery are prohibited. *Reply:* the diverse prohibitions in the law concerning will and act are made because one contingently separates from the other — the will, namely, from the act — so that concupiscence may not be thought to be not sin unless it proceeds to the act of stealing illicit goods. Lest concupiscence of an illicit act be thought not to be sin unless it proceeds to the act, whatever is prohibited externally simultaneously includes the prohibition of the interior

will, without which what is done externally would not have the formal character (*ratio*) of sin, and therefore would not be able to fall under the prohibition of the law.

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§ II — Whether through the external act something accrues to the malice of the will (Utrum per opus externum accedat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis)

§ 40. The next question to the one above is: whether the external act adds something to the malice of the sole will — that is, whether a man sins more gravely, and more justly deserves to be punished, who has committed a sin by deed, than he who has sinned by the will alone. To this question the words of the Master (*§. A.*) give occasion, where he says that in the will and the act contemned is one sin, but the lesser is contained in the will alone, the greater when operation also is added to the will; and therefore a greater sin is made, though not more sins, when it is consummated by the act.

§ 41. To this question distinction must be made. For if the question is about the will that is able to proceed into the act, yet does not proceed, because the full will for perpetrating is lacking, in that case some malice of the will accrues from the perpetration of the act. For fuller consent of the will is in the sin when the very act is consummated, than while it is still being contained within the bounds of interior cogitation. But if the question is understood about the will that therefore alone does not proceed into act because it lacks the faculty or occasion of perpetrating the act, then it is to be distinguished: it either happens that the will is converted with equal love's affect to the illicit thing, whether it achieves it by act or not — and then the perpetration of the external act adds nothing to the malice of the will; nor does he sin more gravely who perpetrates the evil together with the will than he who wills alone. Or it happens that by the very perpetration of the act the will is more affected to that thing than it would have been if it had lusted for it without the act; and in that case the perpetration of the act does add something to the malice of the will.

§ 42. "Everything that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14) can rightly be understood in two ways, without prejudice to the opinion already proved. In one way, according to the exposition of St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact, and also of the Ambrosian Commentary, so that by the name of *faith* we understand the confidence (*fiducia*) that makes the conscience tranquil; or — which comes to the same thing — the persuasion (*persuasio*) by which someone deems licit what he does. The sense is then: every work that does not proceed from that confidence by which a man is persuaded that what he does is licit, but is conjoined with the opinion by which he thinks it illicit — or at least doubts whether it is licit — is a sin. For it is done contrary to the dictate of conscience. And this sense is rendered probable by the preceding words of the Apostle: "Blessed is he who does not judge himself in that which he approves" (Rom. 14:22), that is, he whose conscience does not condemn him in what he does. In the other way, so that *faith* is indeed taken in its proper sense, but under the negation the opposite affirmation is understood. And that is said to be done "not from faith" which is done not with that intention which faith directs or even can direct, but with that which infidelity and concupiscence direct. St. Augustine seems to have understood it in this way in book 4 of his work *Against Julian*, ch. 3,[53] where, when Julian asked: "If a Gentile has clothed a naked man, is it, because it is not from faith, a sin?" he replies: "Absolutely, insofar as it is not from faith, it is a sin." Then, explaining the sense of this, he says: "Their sins therefore are those by which even good things become evil, because they do them not with a faithful but with an unfaithful — that is, with a foolish and harmful — will." St. Augustine therefore

understands those things as "not from faith" which are done with an unfaithful and harmful will, that is, with an evil intention, which right faith, of course, cannot direct.

§ 43. Reply to the second argument taken from Scripture:[54] It is answered that some work of a man can please God, while the man himself does not yet please God — which manifestly holds true in the case of evil Christians; just as, conversely, in those who are good and please God, there are evil and daily works which displease God. Nor yet does any work of an unbeliever so please God as to conduce to eternal life for that man, because it lacks the direction of faith. In this sense St. Thomas, in *Summa theologiae* II-II (q. 10, art. 5, at the end), says that if Cornelius the Centurion had been an unbeliever, his action could not have been acceptable to God, to whom without faith no one can be pleasing.[55]

§ 44. The solution to the third and fourth arguments is evident partly from what has been said, partly from another source. It is common to both: they are addressed to Christians living under grace. Wherefore, just as not every intention and not every actual will of these is evil, so neither is that of unbelievers; but among these there can be at least a morally good intention, just as also the external work proceeding from it.

§ 45. The fifth objection concerns only that work which pertains to eternal salvation, as the Council of Orange declares in canon 7.[56]

§ 46. To the sixth and seventh it can be replied that, if in those words of the Apostle a precept is understood — as St. Augustine seems to understand — then the precept is not so much to be referred to individual acts as to the endeavour of a man, just as also the precept concerning the perfection of justice. For a man ought to strive so that he may at length attain perfect justice, in which he also refers individual works in particular to the glory of God. St. John Chrysostom expressed this sense in other words in his commentary on 1 Cor. 10,[57] when he interprets the mind of the Apostle not as a precept but as a universal admonition, by which he set before us this one best end: that we should glorify God in all things.

§ 47. To the words of St. Augustine arguing against Julian we reply that he presupposes as holding true for the most part and in the majority of cases — namely, that those things which are not referred to the legitimate particular end are referred to an illicit end, and that those which do not serve God serve concupiscence — since indeed the soul, bereft of the light of faith, is so driven by dominating concupiscence that, barely at any time breathing from its tyranny, it follows that general instinct of good. And that this is what St. Augustine wished can be gathered from the contextual declaration scattered throughout the passage. For when he had said above: "Therefore the virtues of those who serve carnal goods and whatever temporal advantages truly cannot be virtues at all" — then, declaring this by examples, he subjoined: "Therefore some good things can be done by those who do them without doing well. For it is good that a man in peril should be aided, especially if he is innocent. But he who does this, if he does it loving the glory of men more than of God, does not do good things; because he does not do good, since he does not act with a good will. For far be it that there be, or be called, a good will which glories in itself — and in other things — and not in the Lord." And certain other things in the same vein. What he had said, therefore — that a work done without the right end is a sin — is to be understood thus: that it is a sin in that perverted and wrong sense, as we said above regarding the mind of the Apostle in Rom. 14, so that the affirmation is understood from the negation, in that figure of speech which the Greeks call *λειπτοτήν* [*litotes*]; in the same way as it is said that Saul did not look with right eyes upon David (1 Kgs 2).[58] Or St. Augustine understands by "not with the right end" those things which are referred neither in particular, nor in general, to the right end, but are twisted by concupiscence or infidelity to

a perverted end — which sense indeed concurs with the former. Finally, after much moderating of his disputation, St. Augustine says: "Since you at least concede that the works of unbelievers which seem good to you are not, however, able to lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom; know that it is we who say that that good, without the Grace of God through Christ, can be conferred on no one, through which alone a man can be led to the eternal kingdom and realm of God."[59] By these words he seems to himself to have sufficiently answered the Catholic cause he had undertaken to defend — namely, that it is not goods of that kind that can exist in unbelievers which would advance them to eternal salvation. Certain other passages of the same St. Augustine are to be interpreted in a similar way.

§ 48. Now as to what the Master cites from the sentences of Prosper — that all the life of unbelievers is sin — this was partly said because infidelity is such a sin as to admit of no remission of those through which a man could be freed from sin; for it excludes faith, which is the gateway to justice and salvation, in a way that other crimes do not; and partly because the works of the unbeliever, if they are to be valued according to their proper end, will escape the category of sin only with difficulty, as we showed above. By this moderation also certain other general propositions are rightly received. Such is that of the Apostle: "All that is not from faith is sin" (Rom. 14).[60]

§ 49. As for the objection from the Council of Orange that no one has anything of his own except mendacity and sin — this is most true. For man without God can do nothing but fail. But nothing prevents there being many gifts of God in unbelievers, even though not through the Grace of Christ.[61]

§ 50. The reply to the arguments adduced to the contrary is evident from the foregoing declaration of the question. For although the unbeliever does not order his actions to a particular good end, which he does not know, he nevertheless orders them to a good end known in general. This general cognition of the good, together with the appetite or desire (*desiderium*) of the same, he possesses as naturally implanted.

§ 51. Others reply that there is indeed for man a precept by the law of nature from its very institution, that he refer his works to God as the ultimate end known and proposed in particular, by act or by habit — and therefore that he sins by an omission sin as often as he does not do this — but not that all works from which that particular intention is absent thereby become sins. For it is one thing for a man to sin in some work, and another for the work itself to be a sin. For even the just in those works which are without doubt good frequently sin when concupiscence, or negligence, or the defect of some lesser circumstance required for the integrity of a good work, mingles with them — as happens in a more prolonged prayer to God, in a sermon to the people, in the study of the sacred scriptures, and the like. This seems to be what St. Gregory had in view when he says (*at the end of the Moralia*): "The good things which we believe ourselves to have can in no way be pure good."[62] Nor yet, according to this opinion, does the unbeliever sin with a new sin in each and every work, but only that general circumstance of the due end in particular is lacking, the defect of which infidelity necessarily carries along with it, as a certain perfection prescribed and required by divine law that is absent from all his works. But whether this or the opposite is to be said, let more learned men weigh.[63]

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§ V — That every sin is voluntary (Omne peccatum esse voluntarium)

S. Th. I-II, q. 20; q. 74; and q. 81, a. 1; and elsewhere.[64]

§ 52. Although the voluntary (*voluntarium*) is not of the formal character (*ratio*) of sin taken in an altogether general sense (for there are certain sins of nature, such as monstrosities and the generation of monstrous offspring, and concupiscence in the regenerate, with its movements, is called sin in some sense, as we declared in the proper place), it is nevertheless of the formal character of sin properly so called — that is, of sin in the sense properly defined as explained above in the definitions at dist. 35.[65] The reason for this can be given: because sin is the intellectual evil of nature as such. But it is considered to operate as such when it operates by the judgment of reason. Such a work, therefore, if it becomes evil and vicious, receives the designation of human sin properly speaking. But and above (at dist. 39),[66] we set forth the cause why the sole will is said to make a man evil or good — namely, that by the command of the will the other powers of the soul are ruled and made subject.

§ 53. To this point also are to be referred the four passages of Scripture and of the Fathers, confirmed by the authorities, which we produced (around dist. 22)[67] for teaching that the concupiscence of the regenerate and the movements arising thence, which the just suffer involuntarily, are not sins in the proper sense — which it is not necessary to repeat here. To what extent this doctrine is to be extended to the very original sin, it can be understood from what we have commented (at dist. 30),[68] where we showed how original sin is voluntary.

§ 54. That, from St. Augustine in book *De duabus animabus*, ch. 10, the Master cites: "never is it sin except in the will, and never is there sin unless in the will"[69] — which the same St. Augustine also repeats and proves in book 1 of the *Retractationes*, ch. 15 and 16[70] — he does not mean by this that anyone might think at first sight that it would follow: namely, that the will alone is the subject of sin. For it is established from St. Augustine's own sentence, by the other faculties of the soul — namely intellect, memory, sense and appetite of feeling — that the faculties that occasion sin can be exercised. But he wished to signify that the will is so the cause and origin of sin that without it sin can in no faculty of the soul consist. Thus all sins are acts in the will, either of it as eliciting — as they speak — such as the very motion of the will disordered from right reason; or of it as commanding, such as the vicious and culpable actions of the other faculties of the soul.

§ 55. Moreover, the doctrine that says every sin is voluntary is not to be received universally for mortal sins alone, as the Master seems to restrict (at §§ D, E, F)[71] in both passages to mortal sins only, wishing to restrict the general doctrine of St. Augustine to mortal sins alone, as though venial things were not all voluntary — but the universal truth of venial things is obtained. This also sufficient arguments make clear from the general statements of St. Augustine: "So greatly is every sin a voluntary evil that it is in no way sin if it is not voluntary," in the book *De vera religione*, ch. 14.[72] And "nor is there ever sin except in the will, and never is there sin in the will," from the book *De libero arbitrio*, ch. 17.[73] And in book *De duabus animabus*, ch. 10: "and it is not rightly imputed as sin to anyone except in the will."[74] It is established that St. Augustine under the general name of "sin" comprehends also venial sins. Which was also shown above around the definition of sin.

§ 56. Now if some venial sin were not voluntary, no reason could be given why not all the movements of concupiscence in the regenerate, even to those not consenting, should be called truly sins — an error which we also rejected above as condemned by the Church (at dist. 21 and 32).[75]

§ VI — Reply to certain arguments to the contrary (Ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta responsio)

S. Th. as above.[76]

§ 57. Those things which have been said seem to be contradicted by what is especially found in St. Augustine in book 2 of the *Retractationes*, ch. 13,[77] where, treating and interpreting the general statement cited above from the book *De vera religione*, he says: "that is to be considered sin which is only and entirely sin — not that which is also the penalty of sin, that is, the first sin of man." To which he similarly writes in book 2 (*Retractationes*, ch. 15 and 16),[78] asserting even that some people sin unwillingly. Also in book 3 (*De libero arbitrio*, ch. 17 and 19),[79] and in the book *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 11,[80] and in the book *De natura et gratia*, ch. 66,[81] and again in the *Retractationes*, ch. 9[82] — he acknowledges that things which can be done of necessity are sins; and to prove this, among other things, he adduces Ps. 24: "for the necessities deliver me."[,83] Nor is it dissimilar to what Bede writes (*In Proverb.* 24, on the verse: "Seven times in the day...")[84] saying: "From ignorance, forgetfulness, surprise, necessity we daily sin either wittingly or unwittingly."

§ 58. To these we reply that in the earlier passages St. Augustine seems to ascribe voluntariness to the first sin of man — understanding it that he means what is more and perfectly voluntary. But the rest — which are also penalties of sins, such as those committed through ignorance, infirmity, or compulsion — he denies to have that perfect formal character (*ratio*) of the voluntary; because such circumstances always diminish voluntariness in some part, and make it the case that the actions with which they are conjoined proceed less freely; they are nonetheless absolutely voluntary, and that such sins are likewise voluntary St. Augustine testifies in those same passages. For in the *Retractationes*, ch. 15,[85] he who sinned not knowing, and thus not incongruously called unwilling, is said therefore to have wished to sin, because with his will he did what he did not know was a sin. And in ch. 16,[,86] while that is to be principally understood as a voluntary sin which consists in just condemnation — that is, the first sin of man — he sufficiently signifies that the rest of the sins are also voluntary, though less perfectly. And in book 2, ch. 13,[,77] after the words placed in the objection, he speaks thus: "Whatever therefore is sin is in the will" — by which he teaches not only that actual but also original sin is voluntary.

§ 59. Where he teaches by what reason not only actual sins but also original sin is voluntary, there and most manifestly St. Augustine convinces everyone that every work not referred to the end to which it should be referred is in another — and in an illicit — end to which it ought not be referred, and is therefore perverted and vicious, and therefore a sin. Wherefore it is diligently to be considered whether all the works of unbelievers are of such a kind. We say, therefore, just as we say that it is not the case that one who is vicious necessarily acts viciously, and if virtuous necessarily acts virtuously — whose reason the heretic subjoined: "because just as sin infects universally all the acts of a vicious man, so virtue vivifies all the acts of a virtuous man" — which reasoning is false on both sides: for neither are all the works of the just man good, since it is established that he frequently sins venially; nor in a man fallen into mortal sin are all works evil, since many good acts remain for him which faith, though he has lost it, could not take, and he even in that state persisting can perform.

§ 60. It must also be noted in the present question that an unbeliever cannot be called a heretic, even though he truly has no such faith, because faith of whole virtue gets the name; but he is a pagan or ethnick who does not have so much as the cognition of the one God to whom he could refer his acts. Nor is it to be

doubted that one who is in this way an unbeliever can perform many things from the genus of virtues which are called virtuous offices; which is most manifest from experience itself. But it is asked whether whatever the unbeliever does receives a due fault, so that it can truly be called sin; either because he proposes to himself some end in each action which he ought not, or because he does not look to that which he ought. For the remaining circumstances of infidelity cannot be absent from the actions of the unbeliever, it is not ambiguous. Wherefore the proper difficulty of this question is about the end.

§ 61. And St. Augustine in Sermon 13 (*De verbis Apostoli*)[87] gravely rebukes the Stoics and says that they lived according to the flesh, because they referred the offices of virtues to themselves. In the same passage St. Augustine most clearly and manifestly by convincing reason teaches that every work which is not referred to the end to which it ought to be referred is in an illicit end to which it ought to be referred, and is therefore perverted and vicious and therefore a sin. Wherefore it is diligently to be considered whether all the works of unbelievers are of this kind. We say therefore just as we say it is not the case that one who is vicious necessarily acts viciously, and if virtuous necessarily acts virtuously.

§ 62. That natural impulse tends, however, to the good in general, and at least in general, though what that end may be in particular and distinctly is unknown. For just as good things naturally desire all things, though they are ignorant in what things true goodness and beatitude consist, so that natural appetite of good known in general and thought upon is frequently determined without any particular proposed end, for the good or the evil, as the diverse wills of diverse persons tend to diverse ends. Nor indeed is it necessary that whoever sets for himself some ultimate end in which to rest in the highest good should refer all his actions to it. For neither does the ambitious man refer all things to empty glory, nor the libidinous man all things to pleasure, in whatever he does by deliberate will. For if we conceded that, already not only the unbeliever but also the just man living virtuously would have all his works sins from the circumstance of the last end, which no Catholic could say.

§ 63. It can also be understood from the contrary. For the just in this life do not all refer their actions to God, whom they have as ultimate end, and refer them; they refer them in those in which they daily offend. Wherefore neither is it necessary for unbelievers to refer all their actions to that which perverse will established for them as supreme diligence. For just as concupiscence there sometimes steals away from them certain movements of the will which cannot be referred to God as ultimate end, nor referred to anything; so here sometimes that natural impulse to good elicits certain actions which a man does not in particular direct toward the highest good that he loves. And of this comparison St. Augustine made use in the book *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 28.[19]

§ 64. Such movements of this kind, though still imperfect and unformed, since they proceed from love of good only in general and tend to the same under the same general character (*ratio*), neither conduce to eternal life which was promised to the cultivators and lovers of God, as St. Augustine and Pope Leo testify in Sermon 7 (*De Quadragesima*),[88] — yet they are by their nature formable by faith in that which is God known and loved in particular as the highest good, and by charity, by which it is loved in like manner. Nor does any circumstance at all prevent this from being so formed and perfected, with the result that those actions of which sins are said to be cannot be called sins, insofar as they are either evil in object, or affected by some particular evil circumstance, which is enough to exclude the formation of God's charity.

§ 65. From this it is apparent that those actions of unbelievers which are done in the said manner are not so much sins as morally imperfect goods. But moreover, such movements or actions of unbelievers — on account of the very widely raging tyranny of infidelity and the most rare breathing of concupiscence — St. Augustine indicated in the same book, ch. 27, when he says: "If it is discussed how those works of good appearance from unbelievers come about, it is barely possible to find those which merit the deserved praise of justice."[20]

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§ IV — Resolution of what was adduced in opposition (Solutio eorum quae in contrarium objiciebantur)

S. Th. as above.[89]

§ 66. It remains that we resolve the arguments of the contrary party. And first that passage of Rom. 14: "Everything that is not from faith is sin" can be understood in two ways, as we said above, without prejudice to the opinion already proved. One way is according to the exposition of St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact, and also of the Ambrosian Commentary, so that by the name *faith* we understand the confidence (*fiducia*) that makes the conscience tranquil; or, what comes to the same thing, the persuasion by which someone deems licit what he does. The sense being: every work that does not proceed from that confidence by which a man is persuaded that what he does is licit, but is conjoined with the opinion by which he thinks it illicit — or at least doubts whether it is licit — is a sin. For it is done contrary to the dictate of conscience. And this sense the preceding words of the Apostle render probable: "Blessed is he who does not judge himself in that which he approves" (Rom. 14:22), that is, he whom his conscience does not condemn in what he does. The other way, so that *faith* is indeed taken properly, but under the negation the opposite affirmation is understood. And that is said to be done "not from faith" which is done not with that intention which faith directs or even can direct, but with that which infidelity and concupiscence direct. St. Augustine seems to have understood it in this way in book 4 (*Contra Iulianum*, c. 3),[53] where, when Julian asked: "If a Gentile has clothed a naked man, is it, because it is not from faith, a sin?" he replies: "Absolutely, insofar as it is not from faith, it is a sin." Then, explaining the sense of this, he says: "Their sins therefore are those by which even good things become evil, because they do them not with a faithful but with an unfaithful — that is, with a foolish and harmful — will." St. Augustine therefore understands those things as "not from faith" which are done with an unfaithful and harmful will, that is, with an evil intention, which right faith cannot direct.

§ 67. Reply to the second argument taken from Scripture: it is answered that some work of a man can please God, while the man himself does not yet please God — which manifestly holds true in the case of evil Christians; just as, conversely, in those good persons who please God there are evil and daily works which displease God. Nor yet does any work of an unbeliever so please God as to conduce to eternal life for that man, because it lacks the direction of faith. In this sense St. Thomas in *Summa theologiae* II-II (q. 10, art. 5, at the end) says that if Cornelius the Centurion had been an unbeliever, his action could not have been acceptable to God, to whom without faith no one can be pleasing.[55]

§ 68. The solution of the third and fourth arguments is evident partly from what has been said, partly from another source. Both are addressed in common to Christians living under grace. Wherefore, just as not

every intention and not every actual will of these is evil, so neither is that of unbelievers; but among these it can be at least morally good, just as also the external work proceeding from it.

§ 69. The fifth objection concludes only concerning that work which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, as the Council of Orange declares in canon 7.[90]

§ 70. To the sixth and seventh it can be replied that, if in those words of the Apostle a precept is understood — as St. Augustine seems to understand — then the precept is not so much to be referred to individual acts as to the endeavour of a man, just as also the precept concerning the perfection of justice. For a man ought to strive so that he may at length attain perfect justice, in which he also refers individual works in particular to the glory of God. This sense St. John Chrysostom expressed in other words in commenting on 1 Cor. 10,[57] when he interprets the mind of the Apostle not as a precept but as a universal admonition, by which he set before us this one best end: that we glorify God in all things.

§ 71. To the words of St. Augustine arguing against Julian we reply that he presupposes as holding true for the most part and in the majority of cases — namely, that those things which are not referred to the legitimate particular end are referred to an illicit end, and those which do not serve God serve concupiscence — since indeed the soul bereft of the light of faith is so driven by dominating concupiscence that, barely ever breathing from its tyranny, it follows that general instinct of good. And that this is what St. Augustine wished can be gathered from the contextual declaration passim in the subject. For when he had said above: "Therefore the virtues of those who serve carnal goods and whatever temporal advantages truly cannot be virtues at all" — then, declaring this by examples he subjoined: "Therefore some good things can be done by those who do not do them well, by whom they are done. For it is good that a man in peril should be aided, especially if innocent. But he who does this, if he does it loving the glory of men more than of God, does not do good things; because he does not do good, since he does not act with a good will. For far be it that there be or be called a good will which glories in itself — and in other things — and not in the Lord." And certain other things to the same effect. What therefore he had said — that a work done without the right end is a sin — is to be understood thus: that it is a sin in that perverted and wrong sense, as we said above regarding the mind of the Apostle in Rom. 14, so that the affirmation is understood from the negation, in that figure of speech which the Greeks call *litotes*; in the same way as it is said that Saul did not look with right eyes upon David (1 Kgs 2).[58] Or by "not the right end" St. Augustine understands those things which are referred neither in particular nor in general to the right end, but are twisted by concupiscence or infidelity to a perverted end — which sense indeed concurs with the former. Finally, after much moderating of his disputation, St. Augustine says: "Since you at least concede that the works of unbelievers which seem good to you are not, however, able to lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom: know that it is we who say that that good, without the Grace of God through Christ, can be conferred on no one, through which alone a man can be led to the eternal kingdom and realm of God."[91] By these words he seems to himself to have sufficiently answered the Catholic cause he had undertaken to defend — namely, that it is not goods of that kind that can exist in unbelievers which would advance them to eternal salvation. Certain other passages of the same St. Augustine are to be interpreted in a similar way.

§ 72. Now as to what, from the sentences of Prosper, the Master cites — that all the life of unbelievers is sin — this was partly said because infidelity is such a sin as admits nothing by which a man could be freed from sin. For it excludes faith, which is the gateway of justice and salvation, in a way that other crimes do not; and partly because the works of the unbeliever, if they are to be assessed according to their proper end, will

with difficulty escape the category of sin, as we showed above. By this moderation also certain other general propositions are rightly received. Such also is that of the Apostle: "All things that are" (Rom. 14).[92]

§ 73. As for the objection from the Council of Orange that no one has anything of his own except mendacity and sin — this is most true. For man without God can do nothing but fail. But nothing prevents there being many gifts of God in unbelievers, even though not through the Grace of Christ.

§ 74. The reply to the arguments adduced to the contrary is evident from the foregoing declaration of the question. For although the unbeliever does not order his actions to a particular good end, which he does not know, he nevertheless orders them to a good end known in general. This general cognition of the good, together with the appetite or desire (*desiderium*) of the same, he possesses as naturally implanted.

§ 75. Others reply that there is indeed for man a precept by the law of nature from its very institution, that he refer his works to God as the ultimate end known and proposed in particular, by act or by habit — and therefore that he sins by an omission sin as often as he does not do this — but not that all works from which that particular intention is absent thereby become sins. For it is one thing for a man to sin in some work, and another for the work itself to be a sin. For even the just in those works which are without doubt good frequently sin when concupiscence, or negligence, or the defect of some lesser circumstance required for the integrity of a good work, mingles with them — as happens in more prolonged prayer to God, in a sermon to the people, in the study of sacred scriptures, and the like. This seems to be what St. Gregory had in view when he says (at the end of the *Moralia*): "The good things which we believe ourselves to have can in no way be pure good."[93] Nor yet, according to this opinion, does the unbeliever sin with a new sin in each and every work, but only that general circumstance of the due end in particular is lacking, the defect of which infidelity necessarily carries with it, as a certain perfection prescribed and required by divine law that is absent from all his works. But whether this or the contrary should be said, let more learned men weigh.[94]

§ V — That every sin is voluntary (Omne peccatum esse voluntarium)

§ 76. The voluntary (*voluntarium*) is not of the formal character (*ratio*) of sin taken in an altogether general sense (for certain things are called sin by nature, such as monsters and the generations of monsters, and the concupiscence of the regenerate together with its movements are in some sense called sin, as we have declared in the proper place), yet it is of the formal character of human sin — that is, of sin properly so called — of the kind that was set out above by several definitions (dist. 35).[95] The reason for this can be given thus: sin is an evil work of an intellectual nature, as such. Now such a nature is judged to operate as such when it operates using the judgment of reason. If therefore such a work be evil and vicious, it receives the appellation of human sin or sin properly so called. Moreover, we set out above (at dist. 39) the reason why a man is said to be evil or good by the will alone — namely, because by the command (*imperium*) of the will the other powers of the soul are governed and made subject to it.

§ 77. To this head also belong those four arguments, fortified by the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, which we advanced (around dist. 22) to teach that the concupiscence of the regenerate and the movements arising from it, which the just suffer against their will, are not sins in the proper sense of the name; it is not necessary to repeat them in this place. In so far as this doctrine extends also to original sin itself, this can be understood from what we commented upon (at dist. 30), where we showed in what sense original sin is voluntary.

§ 78. Now what the Master cites from St. Augustine[96] — that sin exists nowhere except in the will, and that sin is committed only by the will — which the same St. Augustine repeats and proves,[97] — does not intend what might seem to someone at first sight, namely that the will alone is the subject of sin. For it is established from St. Augustine's own teaching that sin is exercised through the other powers of the soul as well — through intellect, memory, sense, and the sensitive appetite, as also through the motive faculties. But he wished to signify that the will is so the cause and origin of sin that without it sin cannot consist in any other faculty of the soul whatsoever. Thus every act of sin resides in the will — either in the will *eliciting* it (as the Scholastics say), such as is the very movement of the will disconformable to right reason; or in the will *commanding* it, such as are the vicious and blameworthy acts of the other powers of the soul.

§ 79. Furthermore, this teaching — that every sin is voluntary — is not to be taken universally only of mortal sins, as the Master appears to think (§ D.E.F.), just as above (dist. 36, § I) he strives in both places to restrict the general doctrine of St. Augustine to mortal sins alone, as though not all venial sins were voluntary; yet the universal truth holds good also of venial sins. That St. Augustine also held this view is sufficiently argued by those general statements of his: "Sin is so voluntary an evil that in no way is it sin if it is not voluntary" (*De vera Religione*, ch. 14);[72] and "Sin is committed only by the will, and sin exists nowhere but in the will" (*De duabus animabus*, ch. 10);[74] and "Sin is rightly imputed to no one except to the will" (*De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 17).[98] Now it is established that St. Augustine under the general name of sin comprehends venial sin as well — which we also showed above, on the definition of sin. For if some venial sin were not voluntary, no reason could be given why all movements of concupiscence in the regenerate who do not consent to them should not be called sins — an error which the Church has condemned, as we also noted above (at dist. 21 and 32).

§ VI — Reply to certain arguments to the contrary (Ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta responsio)

§ 80. It is answered: against what has been said, something that appears contrary may be urged — first and foremost what is found in St. Augustine[77] where, treating and interpreting the general statement cited above from the *De vera Religione*, he says: "That sin is to be thought of which is solely and only sin, not that which is also the punishment of sin, namely the sin of the first man." Similar things he writes also[100] asserting that even some persons sin unwillingly. Likewise elsewhere — as in *De libero arbitrio* III, chs. 17 and 19; in *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 11; in *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 66; and again in *Retractationes*, ch. 9[101] — he admits and teaches that certain sins are committed by necessity, adducing in proof thereof, among other things, that text of Ps. 24: "From my necessities deliver me."[,102] Nor is it dissimilar what Bede writes (on Prov. 24, on the verse "Seven times in the day..."),[103] saying thus: "Out of ignorance, forgetfulness, inadvertence, and necessity we sin daily, either unwillingly or against our will."

§ 81. To these objections we reply that St. Augustine, in the former passages, when he appears to ascribe the voluntary to the sin of the first man alone, understands thereby what is purely and perfectly voluntary. The other things, however, which are also penalties of sins — such as sins committed through ignorance, weakness, or compulsion — he denies to have that perfect formal character (*ratio*) of the voluntary, because such circumstances always diminish the voluntary to some degree and make the actions to which they are joined proceed less freely from the will; yet that even sins of this kind are absolutely voluntary is attested by St.

Augustine in those same passages. For in *Retractationes* I, ch. 15,[104] he teaches that the man who sinned unknowingly — and hence is not incongruently said to have sinned unwillingly — nonetheless willed to sin, because he did with his will what he did not know to be sin. And in ch. 16,[105] when he says that that sin is chiefly to be understood as voluntary which a just condemnation followed — that is, the first sin of man — he sufficiently indicates that the other sins also are voluntary, though less perfectly so. And in *Retractationes* II, ch. 13,[77] after words set out in the objection, he says: "Even those which are not undeservedly called involuntary sins, because they are committed either by those who are ignorant or by those who are compelled, cannot in every way be committed without the will" — and so on with what follows. There he teaches in what sense not only actual sins but original sin is voluntary — the latter being contracted by another's will, the former committed by one's own will.

§ 82. Moreover, since the extent to which liberty is diminished is the extent to which necessity increases, hence these same sins are rightly said to be committed by a certain necessity — which is what the later passages of St. Augustine, together with the accompanying testimony of Bede, indicate; even though in the Psalms and other places of Scripture, *necessities* are understood by the literal sense not as sins but as the straits of tribulations, according to the customary phraseology of Scripture.

§ 83. Furthermore, how many and what the grades of the voluntary are according to the more and the less has been carefully explained by St. Bonaventure writing on this very distinction,[106] where he enumerates nine grades: the first — and at the same time the most perfect — belongs to the first sin of the Angel; the second, itself also perfect, to the first sin of man; the last — and at the same time the most imperfect — to original sin; while the remaining intermediate grades belong to the various actual sins of fallen man, according to the various modes of perfection and imperfection.

§ VII — Whether every sin can be avoided by man (An omne peccatum ab homine vitari possit)

§ 84. This question, connected to the preceding one — whether, in the present state of corrupted nature, man can avoid every sin (for concerning man in the integral state there is no question but that he could) — admits of a twofold meaning. Either the question is asked concerning individual sins, whether they can be avoided; to which the answer will be affirmative. For no sin is committed by a man that he could not avoid and turn away from, if reason diligently watches and the will steadfastly resists sin — both of which are possible even according to the state of this present corruption, and are accordingly proved by examples, either in the same man at different times, or in different men. Or the question is understood concerning all sins simultaneously and conjointly, so that a person commits not a single one throughout his entire life: to this the answer must be negative.

§ 85. This latter answer is proved by all those passages of Scripture which teach that no one in this mortal life lives without daily and venial offences. For although Scripture does not openly say that man cannot avoid all sins, but only testifies that no one lives without sin, the Fathers have rightly gathered from this a negation of ability — because the negation of an act in some entire genus throughout the whole of time entails the negation of the potency (*potentia*), at least the ordinary one and according to the common course and state of affairs. Nevertheless, the Wise Man also expressed the negation of potency in some fashion when he said, Prov. 20: "Who can say: my heart is clean, I am pure from sin?"[108]

§ 86. Moreover, the ancient writers taught this more expressly — for example, St. Augustine,[109] asserting that the life of the just can be without grave crime (*crimen*), but not without sin (*peccatum*). And St. Jerome,[110] without naming him, reproaches Pelagius, who had fabricated that a man can be without sin if he wills it. Likewise at length in the *Dialogue against the Pelagians*.[111] No less plainly does St. Gregory affirm the same thing in several places. For in book 28 of the *Moralia*, chapter 4, he says: "It must be known that there are sins which cannot be avoided by the just."[112] And in book 21, chapter 9: "In this life many can be without grave crime, but no one is able to be without sins.",[113] And in *Homily 17 on the Gospels*: "Human life cannot by any means be passed without fault."[114]

§ 87. To these testimonies was added also the authority of the Councils. For in the Council of Milevis, chapters 6, 7, and 8, it is shown — as the heading of chapter 6 states — that, according to the judgment of the Evangelist John, there is no one who can be without sin.[115] And in the Ecumenical Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23, anathema is pronounced upon whoever shall say that man can throughout his whole life avoid all sins, even venial ones, unless it be by a special privilege of God — as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin.'[116]

§ 88. If anyone objects against these points the Creed (*symbolum*) of St. Jerome addressed to Damasus, in which he detests the error of those who say, with the Manichees, that man cannot avoid sin,[117] we shall reply that that formula of faith is not by St. Jerome to Damasus, but rather by Pelagius himself to Innocent the successor of Damasus — as can be proved by no doubtful conjectures. But if we nonetheless receive it as a Catholic testimony, it can be answered either with the Master, Distinction 36,'[118] that what is said there is said of mortal sins, or rather we understand it to be said of the avoidance of individual sins. For in that sense that statement is rightly opposed to the dogma of the Manichees, who taught that men are driven into sins by a necessity of nature.

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§ [VIII] — Whether the external act together with the interior constitutes one sin or several (An actus exterior cum interiore fit unum peccatum, an plura)

§ 89. For the understanding and explanation of what the Master here raises in this distinction — namely whether an evil will, that is, the evil interior act of the will, and the exterior act proceeding from it, are one sin or several — the things we said at Distinction 40[120] must be recalled to mind: namely, that exterior acts, if considered only in themselves and not as proceeding from the interior act of the will, are neither morally good nor morally evil, but only naturally good; whereas, considered insofar as they proceed from the interior act of the will, they are rightly said to be morally good and morally evil. For the reason (*ratio*) of that doctrine is simply this: exterior acts receive the entire formal character (*ratio*) of goodness and malice, or of sin, from the internal and proper act of the will.

§ 90. The answer to the question must therefore be, as we also indicated in the passage just cited, that the exterior act together with the interior constitutes, according to the proper formal character of sin, or formally — as they say — one sin, although they can be called materially several sins. The formal character (*ratio*) is evident from what has been said: because the exterior act is not called evil, nor does it receive the name of sin from a malice inherent in itself, but by external denomination from the malice which is in the will. Since,

therefore, the malice or disorder of the will is one — from which both the will itself and its external work are called sin — it is evident that there is formally one single sin of the will and of the work.

§ 91. That the internal and external act are materially several sins must not, however, be denied; for there are several acts repugnant to the divine law, but in such a way that the one receives from the other the formal character of that repugnance.

§ 92. And in this sense they want to be understood what is said at Rom. 1 — that men were "filled with murders" (*homicidiis*) — that the plural "murders" is used because there is the murder that is the act of the will and there is the murder that is the act of the body. Although that passage seems more correctly to be understood of the murder of the will which is not joined to the external act; which murder of the will, like other sins of the will, is certainly also formally distinct in number from other sins of the same genus completed by an external work.

§ 93. This our answer is confirmed by what is said at Jas. 1: "Desire, when it has conceived, brings forth sin, and sin, when it is consummated, generates death."[121] These words signify that an action already begun, when brought to its consummation, does not constitute a number with itself, but that it is one and the same sin which is generated by the will and consummated in the work.

§ 94. This can also be understood from the contrary. For an external good work proceeding from a good will does not constitute, together with it, a number in the formal character of merit. For if someone wills by the will to give alms, or teaches the ignorant, or defends the innocent, he does not thereby acquire a double merit but a single one. Therefore neither in the formal character of demerit, that is, of sin, do the will and the work constitute a number.

§ 95. Finally, the same thing is proved from punishment corresponding to the act. For to many sins a multiple punishment is owed, whether retributory or satisfactory; but for a sin which someone has consummated in deed, neither is a multiple punishment retributed as for several sins, nor are diverse satisfactions imposed, but one; therefore the sin itself is one, not several.

§ 96. It must be noted, however, that what we have said of the external act is to be understood similarly of the act of the intellect and of any other act commanded by the will. For all acts of this kind, whether they appear outwardly or not, receive the formal character of sin from no other source than from the will.

§ 97. But someone will here ask: if the will and the work are one sin, why are they prohibited by diverse commandments of the Decalogue? For the commandment which prohibits coveting the wife or the goods of another is different from the one which prohibits stealing or committing adultery. Reply: the diverse prohibitions of the will and of the work have been made in the Law insofar as it happens that the one can be separated from the other — the will, namely, from the work. For lest it be thought that the coveting of an illicit work is not a sin unless it proceeds to the work of coveting — for whenever the will is found conjoined with the work, these two are then not prohibited by two precepts but by one, namely the one by which the external work is forbidden. For just as in the external work, insofar as it is moral, the interior act is always understood to be included, so in the precept by which the external work is forbidden the prohibition of the interior will is simultaneously understood to be included, without which what is done outwardly would not have the formal character of sin and therefore could not fall under the prohibition of the law.

§ [IX] — Whether through the external act something is added to the malice of the will (Utrum per opus externum accedat aliquid ad malitiam voluntatis)

§ 98. The question proximate to the preceding one is whether the external work adds something to the malice of the will alone — that is, whether he who has committed a sin in deed sins more gravely and deserves to be punished more severely than he who has sinned by the will alone. Occasion for this question was given by the words of the Master (§ A.), where he says that there is one and the same contempt (*contemptus*) in the will and in the work, but that the sin is lesser when it is contained in the will, and greater when the operation is added to the will; and therefore, even if not more numerous, the sin becomes greater when the will is put to work in the deed.

§ 99. To this question one must reply by making a distinction. For if the question is about a will that can proceed into act but nevertheless does not, because the full will of perpetrating the work is not yet present, in that case something is added to the malice of the will by the very perpetration of the work. For the consent of the will to sin is fuller when it is consummated by the act itself than while it is still kept within the bounds of voluntary deliberation.

§ 100. But if the question is understood of a will that does not proceed into act for the sole reason that it lacks the faculty or the occasion of the work, being otherwise ready to perpetrate the sin in deed itself, one must further distinguish. For either it happens that the will is turned to the illicit thing with an equal intensity of love (*amoris affectu*), whether it attains it in act or not: and in this case through the external work nothing is added to the malice of the will; nor does he who perpetrates the evil in deed and in will sin more gravely than he who sins by will alone. Or the same will happens to be more intensely moved toward that thing by the very perpetration of the work than it would be if it remained within the will alone —

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1. Lk. 6:33; Matt. 5:47.
2. Acts 13:7 (Sergius Paulus); Acts 28:2 (the barbarians' kindness).
3. St. Robert Bellarmine, *Controversiarum* lib. 1 *de paenitentia*, ch. 19 [abbreviation as in source: *controv. lib. 1. de pen. cap. 19.*].
4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 84, a. 2, ad 1.
5. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 4.
6. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 15.
7. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae* 46.
8. Author of the *Hypognosticon* (pseudo-Augustine), bk. 3, attributed to St. Augustine (ed. Benedictine, Tom. V).
9. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 27.
10. St. Jerome, *In Ezechielem* c. 29.
11. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 7 *de Quadragesima*.
12. Council of Constance, condemned article 16 of John Hus.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4.
14. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 41.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 118, a. 8 and 9 [as cited: *S. Thom. ubi sup. & 1. 2. quaest. 118. art. 8. & 9.*].

16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

17. Council of Constance, condemned article 16 of John Hus (on indifferent works).

18. St. Augustine, Serm. CLVI (*inter Sermones primae classis* in the Benedictine edition, Tom. V, *contra Pelagianos*, delivered in the Basilica of Gratian on the feast-day of the Bolitanian Martyrs, whose natalitia the Carthaginian calendar assigns to XVI Kal. Novemb.); cited as Serm. 13 *de verbis Apostoli* in older collections.

19. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 28.

20. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 27.

21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II [as cited: *S. Thom. ibidem*].

22. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, c. 3.

23. Rom. 14:23; St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, c. 3.

24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 5, *in fine*.

25. Cf. Council of Arausicum (Orange), canons 26 and 27.

26. Council of Arausicum, canon 7.

27. St. John Chrysostom, *In I Corinthios*, hom. 10 (on 1 Cor. 10).

28. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 27–28 (words cited above in the text).

29. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Litera*, ch. 27 (concluding moderation of the disputation).

30. Phil. 4:21 (*Omnes quae sua sunt quaerunt*).

31. Phil. 4:21 (repeated citation as in source).

32. Michael Baius: condemned thesis XXV: *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata, & Philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.*

33. "The author of this work" refers to Cornelius Jansenius of Ghent, *Augustinus* (Paris, 1641), Tom. 2, lib. 3 and 4, *De statu naturae lapsae*.

34. Estius refers to his own notes (*in nostris adnotationibus*) and to the Bull of Alexander VIII against the theses of Baius; cf. Estius, *In I hujus disput.* §§ 1. *et seq.*

35. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, lib. 3, p. 185, Edit. Parisien. ann. 1641.

36. The Quesenllian (Quesnel's) theses condemned by Clement XI.

37. Alexander VIII, condemned theses 8 and 11; Quesnel's theses 26, 27, 28, 29, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47.

38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 20; q. 74; q. 81, a. 1; and elsewhere.

39. Cf. Estius, commentary *ad dist. 30*.

40. St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus*, cap. 10.

41. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, cap. 15 and 19.

42. St. Augustine, *De vera Religione*, cap. 14.

43. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, cap. 17.

44. Cf. Estius, commentary *ad dist. 21 et 32*.

45. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, cap. 15.

46. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, cap. 13 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. cap. 13.*].

47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II [as cited: *S. Th. ubi supra*].

48. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, cap. 13.

49. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, cap. 15 and 16.

50. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, cap. 17 and 19; *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, cap. 11; *De Natura et Gratia*, cap. 66; *Retractationes*, cap. 9.

51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 72, a. 7, *in corp.* and *ad 3*; and q. 20, a. 3.

52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 20, a. 4; and q. 100, a. 3.

53. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 3.

54. The second argument was taken from Scripture.

55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 5, at the end.

56. Council of Orange, canon 7.

57. St. John Chrysostom, commentary on 1 Cor. 10.

58. 1 Kgs 2 [Vulgate numbering].

59. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* (the closing passage of the extended disputation referred to throughout).

60. Rom. 14.

61. Council of Orange [*Concilium Arausicanum*], cited in the objection.

62. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* (at the end).

63. The footnote marker (a) in the source refers to an editorial remark by Estius himself: "It is sufficiently and more than sufficiently the case that, while suppressing his own judgment, he declares that this response cannot be admitted at all, and therefore he himself produces a response not sufficiently satisfying to himself of referring any action whatsoever to God as ultimate end in act or in habit, since with that assertion one can say that a man does not sin, but only that he lacks a certain perfection prescribed and required by divine law." [The note in source reads: *Satis superque, dum suum reticet iudicium, declarat Auctor responsionem istam admitti neutiquam posse, ac proinde sibi minime placere...*]

64. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 20; q. 74; and q. 81, a. 1; and elsewhere.

65. Reference to dist. 35 of the same book, where definitions of sin were expounded.

66. Reference to dist. 39 of this commentary.

67. Reference to around dist. 22 of this commentary.

68. Reference to dist. 30 of this commentary.

69. St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus*, ch. 10; cited by the Master (Peter Lombard).

70. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 15 and 16.

71. Reference to §§ D, E, F of the Master's text in this distinction.

72. St. Augustine, *De vera religione*, ch. 14.

73. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, ch. 17.

74. St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus*, ch. 10.

75. References to dist. 21 and dist. 32 of this commentary.

76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above (I-II, q. 20; q. 74; q. 81, a. 1).

77. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 13.

78. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 15 and 16.

79. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 17 and 19.

80. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 11.

81. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 66.

82. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, ch. 9.

83. Ps. 24 (Vulgate): "for the necessities deliver me."

84. Bede, *In Proverbia* 24, on the verse "Seven times in the day..."

85. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, ch. 15.

86. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, ch. 16.

87. St. Augustine, Sermon 13, *De verbis Apostoli* [= Sermon CLVI among the first class of sermons in the Benedictine edition, Tom. V, against the Pelagians, given in the Basilica of Gratian on the natal day of the Bolitanorum Martyrs, whose nativities the Carthaginian Calendar assigns to XVI Kal. November].

88. St. Augustine and Pope Leo, Sermon 7 (*De Quadragesima*) [reference as in source; Estius cites both in *In Carmine De Ingratis* and *Disputatione contra Collatorem*].

89. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above.

90. Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*), canon 7.

91. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* (closing passage of the disputation).

92. Rom. 14 ("All that is" — *Omnia quae sunt*).

93. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, at the end.

94. The footnote marker (a) in the source refers to the same editorial remark noted at footnote 11 above.

95. Estius refers back to his commentary on dist. 35 of Book III.

96. St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus*, ch. 10; cited by Peter Lombard (the Master of the Sentences).

97. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 15, and ch. 10 [as cited by the Master].

98. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 17.

99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above (*ubi supra*).

100. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, chs. 15 and 16.

101. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, chs. 17 and 19; *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 11; *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 66; *Retractationes*, ch. 9.

102. Ps. 24 (Vulgate): "de necessitatibus meis erue me."

103. Bede, *In Proverbia* 24, on the verse "Septies in die..." ("Seven times in the day...").

104. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 15.

105. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 16.

106. St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, on this distinction (*in hanc dist.*).

107. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2; q. 109, a. 8.

108. Prov. 20:9.

109. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 64.

110. St. Jerome, *In Hieremiam* (Commentary on Jeremiah), ch. 17.

111. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*.

112. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXVIII, ch. 4.

113. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXI, ch. 9.

114. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Hom. 17.

115. Council of Milevis, chs. 6, 7, and 8.

116. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23.

117. The creed (*symbolum*) attributed to St. Jerome, addressed to Damasus.

118. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In III Sent.*, dist. 36.

119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 72, a. 7, in the body and ad 3; q. 20, a. 3.

120. Estius refers back to his commentary on Distinction 40 of Book III.

121. Jas. 1:15.

122. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 20, a. 4; q. 100, a. 3.

DISTINCTIO XLII — ON THE GRAVITY OF SIN AND THE ADDITION OF EXTERNAL ACTS TO THE MALICE OF THE WILL (*DE GRAVITATE PECCATI ET ACCESSIONE OPERIS EXTERNI AD MALITIAM VOLUNTATIS*)

§ 1. — only the consent of the will in regard to that matter would be concluded by concupiscence. In this manner it is certain that something is added to the malice of the will by an external act, not because the entire malice resides in the will as in its proper subject, but because the malice of the will is increased and the sin becomes more grievous by the addition of the external act. For it commonly happens that a habit grows and is more firmly established through the exercise of acts, even if this does not always come about by any and every act whatsoever. And this must be understood similarly of the malice of the will. The former mode, therefore, posits a will equal to and joined with the act, yet impeded by the act; the latter mode posits a certain intensification of the will arising from the very execution of the act.

§ 2. The former mode was considered by St. Augustine in *De Libero Arbitrio*, book [3], chapter 3,[1] where he testifies that he who covets another man's wife, yet lacks the opportunity to carry out the adultery, is no less guilty than if he had been caught in the very act. A similar passage is found in the same author's Sermon 250 (*de tempore*).[2] And the same St. Augustine also taught that this must be understood in like manner of the merit of the virtues and of good works. For he says in *De Bono Conjugali*, chapter 21:[3] "Just as the merit of patience is not unequal in Peter who suffered and in John who did not suffer, so the merit of continence is not unequal in John who never experienced marriage and in Abraham who begat children." Something similar is read in St. Jerome, in the book *Against Julianus*, a little after the beginning.[4]

§ 3. Hence St. Augustine also pronounces in general terms, writing on Ps. 57:[5] "Whatever you wish to do and cannot, God counts as done." These words are also recorded in the *Glossa Ordinaria* on that passage.[6] And in the same sense it was said by St. Bernard in the book *De Praecepto et Dispensatione*:[7] "The will, because *alone* it merits retribution, even alone, not without reason, claims the higher degree."

§ 4. The latter mode, however, in respect of the virtues, was considered by St. Augustine in Tractate 58 on John,[8] where, speaking of the washing of feet, he says: "What they do not do with the hand, they do with the heart; but it is by far better, and without controversy more truly done, that it be done also with the hands." And a little later: "For when the body is bowed down to the feet of a brother, the very affection of humility is thereby either aroused in the heart, or, if it was already present, strengthened." The same author in *De Cura pro Mortuis*, chapter 5,[9] having said that with the outward humility of the body we ought to pray and to act more humbly and fervently, adds: "And I know not how it is, that although these bodily motions cannot arise unless preceded by the motion of the soul, yet when they are made outwardly in a visible manner, that inner

and invisible affection which produced them is in turn itself increased; and so the affection of the heart, which went before in order that these things might be done, grows because they have been done." So far he. To this is similar what St. Jerome (on that passage of Eph. 3, "I bow my knees")[10] says: that when we worship God in supplication upon bended knee with our face fixed to the ground, we the more readily obtain what we ask of Him.

§ 5. Now what St. Augustine asserts of the work of virtue must without doubt be understood similarly of sins. As the Master accordingly proceeds (in the text) with the words cited by us at the opening. Furthermore, since the external act is truly a sin, it follows that whether or not the malice of the will grows through it, it must always be said that he has done more evil who has perpetrated the sin in act than he who has contained it in the will alone — not because he has committed more sins, but because he has completed with the act the sin conceived in the will. Hence thanks are also to be rendered to God whenever He removes from a man who has the will to sin the opportunity of carrying out the sin, as Canon 4 of the Council of Neocaesarea admonishes.[11] This is shown also by the example of David, who gave thanks to God, through whose providence and disposition he had been prevented from executing his evil purpose of killing Nabal (1 Kgs 25).[12] "Blessed," he said, "is the Lord, who has kept His servant from evil."

§ III — In what sense sins pass away in act yet remain in guilt (Quo sensu peccata actu transeant, maneant reatu)

§ 6. When the remission of original sin was being treated (Dist. 32), we said, following the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, that this is the difference between original sin and actual sins: that original sin remains in act and passes away in guilt when it is remitted; whereas actual sins pass away in act and remain in guilt until they are remitted. Now, in what sense this is to be understood of original sin was explained in that place. But what has been said of actual sins must now be explained more fully.

§ 7. First, then, the doctrine of St. Augustine is manifest in his work *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, book 1, chapter 26,[14] where he says that of those sins which cannot remain — since they pass away in the very act of their commission — the guilt (*reatus*) nevertheless remains, and, unless it be remitted, will remain forever. "For this," he says, "is what it means not to have sin: not to be guilty of sin. For if anyone — say — has committed adultery, even if he never commits it again, he is guilty of adultery until the guilt itself is remitted by pardon. He has the sin, even though what he committed no longer exists, because it has passed away with the time in which it was done." He then proves this from Scripture, from Sir. 21,[15] for, he says, if to desist from sinning were the same as not having sin, it would suffice that Scripture admonished us thus: "Son, thou hast sinned, add no more." But this does not suffice; and so it added: "And for thy former sins pray that they may be forgiven thee." They remain, therefore, unless they be remitted. But how do they remain if they are past, unless it is because they have passed away in act yet remain in guilt? So far St. Augustine. Repeating this his own doctrine in book 6 *Against Julian*, chapter 19,[16] he illustrates it with another example. "A sacrifice made to idols," he says, "if it is not made again, has passed away in act, but remains in guilt, unless it be remitted by pardon. For the nature of sacrificing to idols is such that the act itself passes away when it is done, and when that act has passed, the guilt of it remains, to be dissolved by forgiveness."

§ 8. It must be understood, however, that in the foregoing words of St. Augustine the name "act" (*actus*) does not signify only the external deed; for it comprehends therein also the habitual will to sin. For in that

man he understands sin to pass away in act, who has put aside the will to sin and turned it toward the love of God. Nor does St. Augustine in this place distinguish act from habit; he distinguishes it from guilt. This is clear first of all from the fact that he teaches that concupiscence in the reborn remains in act and passes away in guilt — and yet concupiscence is established to be not an actual but a habitual vice. Furthermore, the explanation which St. Augustine subjoins confirms the same point. For the will to sacrifice to idols, and the will to commit adultery — which can remain after the act of sacrilege and adultery — he does not now call guilt; he calls the former "impiety" (*impietas*) and the latter "concupiscence" (*concupiscentia*). For he says thus: "The impiety itself remains as long as one has not renounced idols and believed in God." And again: "The impiety by which sacrifice was offered, because after the sacrifice has been completed it remains, seems to be like the concupiscence by which adultery was committed." And a little after, declaring the same thing more plainly, he says that after the immolation made to idols — which is now neither in the action (because it has passed away) nor in the will (because the error by which it was done has been consumed) — its guilt nevertheless remains until it is dissolved in the washing of regeneration from all sins.[17] And again, after some further remarks, he recognises this guilt even in the man who has been corrected and who lives rightly and well, yet to whom the sin has not yet been remitted.

§ 9. From all these things it is evident that the guilt (*reatus*) of sin according to St. Augustine is nothing other than the obligation to punishment arising from the sin committed. For it is certain that this obligation remains in the man who is truly converted after sin and is performing true penance, until he obtains pardon of his sin.

Moreover, that the name *reatus* does not include anything more in its signification can be taught from elsewhere as well. For even venial sins have their corresponding guilt, and for mortal sins — once the fault (*culpa*) has been remitted — a temporal punishment is still for the most part owed; and the obligation to pay this punishment is a kind of guilt; and he who has sinned against the commonwealth, even if he has made satisfaction to God, still remains liable to temporal punishment. This guilt is nothing other than the obligation by which a person, on account of a crime committed, is subject to such punishment. This signification of this word occurs throughout the Sacred Scriptures as well, as in Matt. 5 and Matt. 26, Jas. 2, and elsewhere.[18]

§ 10. Indeed, St. Augustine — who in the aforementioned passages calls it *reatus* — elsewhere calls it "obligation" (*obligatio*), as in chapter 16 of book 6 *Against Julian*.[19] Finally, in the aforesaid chapter 19 of the same book,[16] he asks Julian what this guilt is and where it remains in a man who has already been corrected and is living rightly, yet has not yet been freed by the remission of his sins. When Julian had said that it remains in the conscience of him who has transgressed, until it is forgiven, he objects: "But what if he forgets that he has transgressed, and his conscience of this is no longer stirred — where will that guilt be then?" And at last he concludes that it remains neither in the body nor in the soul, but in the hidden laws of God, which are inscribed in some manner in the minds of the angels, so that no iniquity may go unpunished except that which the blood of the Mediator has expiated.

Yet these words must not be so understood as if the guilt truly did not remain in the man himself, or in some part of him, after the sin has been committed and not yet blotted out by remission. Rather, he denies that the guilt remains in the soul of man through knowledge or consciousness of the sin; because whether he has consciousness of it or not, he remains nonetheless guilty of sin until he receives its remission. Hence this statement of St. Augustine is not contrary to the doctrine of those who say that guilt (*reatus*), insofar as it is a

certain relation (*relatio*), is founded either in the past sin, or in a stain (*macula*), or in a certain deformity (*deformitas*) remaining from the sin and persisting in the soul of the sinful man until the remission of the sin. To this opinion the words of the Master strongly lend support (in the text of this Distinction, where he says) that a sin remains in guilt in a person when for it — whether it has passed away or is still present — the mind of the man is defiled and corrupted, and the whole man is bound over to everlasting punishments.[20]

§ IV — That some sins are mortal and others venial (Peccatorum alia Mortalia esse, alia Venialia)

§ 11. After the general division of sin into original and actual, there exist the multiple differences and various divisions of actual sins. Among these, that division is by far the most celebrated among Orthodox writers which the Master assigned in the first place (in the text of this Distinction), namely the division by which actual sin is divided into mortal and venial. A mortal sin (*peccatum mortale*) is said to be that which constitutes man as an enemy of God and deserves eternal death. A venial sin (*peccatum veniale*) is that which does not exclude man from the grace of God, nor renders him guilty of eternal but only of temporal punishment. Mortal sins are called by another name *crimina* and graver sins by the ancients; venial sins, however, are called both daily sins and lighter sins.

§ 12. To confirm both these kinds of sins from Scripture is not difficult. For Scripture does not attribute to all sins, but only to certain of them, the effects of excluding charity, of depriving one of the Kingdom of heaven, of deserving hell, of making a man impious or unjust; whereas to others it attributes none of these things; but those who are subject to such lighter sins, while free from the graver ones, it even calls just, and ascribes to them the observance of the divine law, and promises them indulgence and salvation. Concerning mortal sins these are the passages: 1 Cor. 6: "Neither fornicators, nor servants of idols, nor adulterers, etc., shall possess the Kingdom of God." And Eph. 5: "Every fornicator or unclean person, etc., has no inheritance in the Kingdom of Christ and of God." And Gal. 5, where, having enumerated certain works of the flesh, he concludes: "Because those who do such things shall not obtain the Kingdom of God."[22]

§ 13. Likewise, Rev. 21, several kinds of sinners are enumerated, a part of whom is said to have their future lot "in the pool burning with fire and brimstone, which is the second death."[23] And Matt. 5: "He who shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool,' shall be in danger of the fire of hell."[,24] And ch. 12: "He who shall speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him."[,25] And ch. 25, those who have not shown works of mercy to the needy are cast into eternal fire — among whom John also, in 1 Jn. 3, denies that charity can remain.[,26] And at the end of Mk. it is said generally: "He who does not believe shall be condemned."[,27]

§ 14. Concerning venial sins, however, these are the passages: 1 Cor. 3: "If anyone shall build upon this foundation wood, hay, stubble, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as through fire."[28] And 1 Cor. 7: "But this I say according to indulgence."[,29] And Eccl. 7: "There is no just man on earth who does good and does not sin."[,30] And in general, all those passages of Scripture which testify that no one lives without sin, compared with those passages which acknowledge certain men to be just and living without crime and friends of God and heirs of the Kingdom, manifestly prove that there are certain sins which do not exclude from grace and the Kingdom of God: as 1 Jn. 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves."[,31] And Jas. 3: "In many things we all offend."[,32] And 2 Chr. 6: "There is no man who does not sin."[,33] Since these passages do not conflict with such statements as Lk. 1: "They were both just before God,"[,34] and Tit. 1: "If

anyone is without crime," and similar texts, it follows that there are certain sins which do not take away justice and friendship with God, nor bring about eternal death.

§ 15. Hence it must further be gathered that all those passages of Scripture which attribute in a general way to sin these and similar effects — enmity with God, disinheritance from the Kingdom, perdition and eternal death — must be understood not of any and every sin, but only of that sin which has the perfect formal character (*ratio*) of sin, that is, of mortal sin; such as these: Rom. 6: "The wages of sin is death."[35] Jas. 2: "Whosoever shall offend in one point is become guilty of all."[36] Jn. 3: "He who commits sin is of the Devil."[37] Ps. 5: "Thou hast hated all who work iniquity."[38] Is. 59: "Your sins have made a division between you and your God."[39] Ezek. 18: "The soul that shall sin, the same shall die."[40] And Wis. 1: "A man through malice killeth his own soul."[41] This may also be referred to certain specific kinds of sin, such as lying, contention, anger, and the like, as these Scripture passages declare: Ps. 5: "Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie."[38] Wis. 1: "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul."[42] Rev. 21: "For all liars, their part shall be in the pool," etc.[23] And Gal. 5, among the works of the flesh excluding from the Kingdom of heaven, contentions, angers, quarrels, and dissensions are enumerated.[43] All of which must be understood only according to a certain perfection or completion of sin, since it is otherwise established even from Scripture itself that one can sin venially in these kinds of sin.

§ 16. But let us now confirm this same doctrine concerning the diversity of sins from the Fathers. St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 64) says: "Not because every crime is a sin, is therefore every sin also a crime."[44] And in ch. 78, in a similar sense, he distinguishes sins into light and grave; adducing for light, that is, venial sins, besides the testimonies already cited above, also this passage, which is 1 Cor. 6: "Already it is plainly a fault in you that you have lawsuits among yourselves."[45] And that text which is to be said daily even by the just: "Forgive us our debts."[46] Likewise in Tract. 41 (*In Joannem*), he defines a crime as a grave sin most worthy of condemnation and accumulation of guilt, and then teaches that many live without crime, though he denies that they live without sin.[47] And in bk. 1 (*De Symbolo*, ch. 6) he says: "There are venial sins without which this life does not exist."[48] Similar passages are found in *De Bono Conjugali*, ch. 6; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 21, the last chapter; and *Sermo* 12 (*a*) *de diversis*, ch. 9.[49]

§ 17. St. Jerome agrees in *Dialogus* 2 *contra Pelagianos*, and St. John Chrysostom in *Hom.* 16 (*in Matthaeum*).[50] The opinion of St. Gregory (the Great) is also clear in bk. 21 (*Moralia*, ch. 9), whose words are these: "This is the difference between sin and crime: every crime is a sin, but not every sin is a crime. And in this life many can exist without crime; but no one is able to be without sin."[51] And a little after: by which distinction, namely, of sins and crimes, it is to be weighed that certain sins defile the soul, whereas crimes extinguish it. A similar passage is found in ch. 5 of the same book and in ch. 4, bk. 18.[52] To these St. Bede subscribes in his comment on Jas. 3 at the words "In many things we all offend."[53]

§ 18. The entire subsequent Church followed the opinion of these and other Fathers, and the Fathers of the Council of Trent carefully expounded their mind in several places: as in Session 6, ch. 11, where they teach that venial sins are no obstacle to one being truly called just;[54] and in Session 15 (i.e., Session 14 of Trent on Penance), where they define that the grace of justification is lost not only by infidelity, but by any mortal sin whatsoever, and they prove this from Scripture, 1 Cor. 6;[55] and in canon 27 of the same Session, they condemn the contrary error with anathema.[56] Likewise in Session 14, ch. 5, they declare that all mortal sins, even those of thought, render men sons of wrath and enemies of God, and therefore must be disclosed to the priest through confession; but that venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into

which we more frequently fall, though they may rightly and profitably be declared in confession, can nevertheless be omitted without fault.'[57]

§ 19. From what has been said it is easy to refute the novel inventions of certain heretics of this age: not only of those who teach that all sins are mortal, or on the contrary of those who, with the exception of infidelity, teach that all sins are venial; but also of others who hold that every sin of a reprobate man is mortal, whereas every sin of a predestined man is venial. In refuting them we need not therefore dwell here any further.

§ 20. Finally, it must be noted with respect to the discernment of sins — whether they are mortal or venial — that although concerning many sins a certain judgment has been reached, and many things have been usefully handed down by more recent authors for recognizing them either with certainty or with probability, yet an exact and infallible judgment about all or the greater part of them cannot be had by us, as St. Augustine warned in more than one place. For in *Enchiridion*, ch. 78, he says: "Which sins are light and which are grave, these are to be weighed not by human but by divine judgment."[58] And in the following chapter he says: "There are some sins which would be thought very light, were they not shown in the Scriptures to be graver than one would suppose."'[59] In which passage he also repeats what he had written (in the *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, on the text *I fear for you lest perhaps*, etc.): "Woe to the sins of men, which we abhor only when they are unusual, but which are customary, etc."[60] But the most explicit and noteworthy passage is in bk. 21 (*De Civitate Dei*, the last chapter): "Which are the very sins that so impede the attainment of the Kingdom of God, that yet they obtain pardon through the merits of holy friends — this is most difficult to find, most dangerous to define. I certainly, up to this time, when I have been striving therein, have been unable to reach the investigation of them. And perhaps for this reason they lie hidden, lest the zeal of making progress toward avoiding all sins should grow sluggish."[61] Thus far he speaks there, together with various other things which follow to the same effect.

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§ V — Whether every sin is by its nature mortal (An omne peccatum natura sua mortale sit)

§ 21. Certain persons receive the above-mentioned division of sin in such a way that they nonetheless think that even those sins which are called venial are by their own nature mortal — that is, of such a kind as to exclude from the Kingdom of heaven and to cast men headlong into eternal death — but that they have it from the mercy of God alone that they are venial. Those who hold this opinion think that John Fisher of Rochester lends it support (in his *Reply to article 32 of Luther*), where he confesses that he is of the opinion that a venial sin is venial solely from the mercy of God, and that otherwise every sin is damnable, if it is judged strictly. From which, however, he denies it follows that a venial sin is absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) a mortal sin.[63]

§ 22. But multiple arguments are opposed to that opinion. The first is this: a venial sin, as John Fisher himself admits in the same passage and as the Synod of Trent declares (Session 14, ch. 5), does not exclude from the grace of God; therefore it cannot justly be punished by the eternal deprivation of the Kingdom promised to those who are friends of God through grace.[57]

The second: God, who in the future age renders to each according to his works, grants the remission of venial sins; therefore venial sins are not by their nature such that they are punished by eternal death.

The third: those who have committed venial sins only retain the pledge of the eternal inheritance — namely charity (*caritas*) and the Holy Spirit, through whom they have a right to obtaining the Kingdom; they are not subject to eternal damnation, since it is impossible for both to be rendered to them simultaneously.

The fourth: a father cannot by right disinherit his son for a minor fault; therefore neither can God, for a light fault, exclude a just man from the inheritance of the heavenly Kingdom owed to him by right of adoption.

The fifth: God could not justly damn all just men for ever — Abraham saying in Gen. 18: "Wilt thou destroy the just with the wicked? That is not thy way, who judgest all the earth."[64] Since therefore no just man is free from venial sins, God could not justly punish venial sin with eternal death.

§ 23. Lastly, this position is confirmed by the common opinion of the Doctors, supported also by this definition of venial sin handed down by Hugh of St. Victor: "A venial sin is that to which, in accordance with its nature, a transitory punishment is owed."[65]

§ VI — Reply to the arguments of the contrary opinion (Ad argumenta diversæ opinionis responsio)

§ 24. In favour of that contrary opinion, the following arguments are customarily adduced. The first is from Scripture. For the Psalmist says: "If thou shalt observe iniquities, O Lord, Lord, who shall endure it?" (Ps. 129).[67] And the Lord in the Gospel, Matt. 5: "Whosoever shall break one of these least commandments, shall be called the least" — that is, shall be despised and count for nothing — "in the Kingdom of Heaven."[,68] And Jn. 13: "If I wash thee not, thou shalt have no part with me."[,69] And Jas. 2: "Whosoever shall offend in one point, is become guilty of all."[,36] And Deut. 27: "Cursed be he that abideth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them."[,70] Which text was repeated by the Apostle at Gal. 3.[,71] From these testimonies it appears that venial sins — to which those Scriptures seem to be referring, or at least to which they extend — are by their own nature such as to exclude a man from the Kingdom of God and to make him liable to the eternal curse.

§ 25. Certain passages in St. Augustine seem to support these arguments. For in bk. 2 (*De Peccatorum Meritis*, ch. 3)[72] he interprets the text of Jas. 2 concerning venial sins, saying that anyone who departs this life with some hope of attaining salvation, while yet the sentence remains in force — that whosoever shall keep the whole law but offend in one point is become guilty of all — would depart with some hope of attaining salvation, were it not that the words following shortly after add: "But mercy exalteth itself above judgment." This same sentence he also cites in bk. (*De Perfectione Justitiæ*, ch. 15)[73] and subjoins: "If this were not so, what hope would there be?" Likewise (*in expositione Psalm. 129*)[74] speaking of the minute sins which cannot be avoided by us: "Who shall endure it," he says, "if thou shalt observe iniquities? If thou shalt wish to deal with us as a severe judge, not as a merciful Father, who shall stand before thine eyes?" And in the same place he calls it a minute sin of the tongue to say to one's brother 'fool,' yet says that this makes us guilty of hell-fire according to the Gospel. Another passage is bk. 9 (*Confess.*, ch. 13),[75] where he says thus: "Woe even to the praiseworthy life of men, if thou examine it with mercy set aside." Furthermore, in bk. 21 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch.

24),[76] he testifies that to certain persons, after purgatorial punishments, mercy is still to be given so that they be not cast into eternal fire. And (*last chapter*)[61] that to certain persons their own merits do not suffice for them to be received into the eternal tabernacles, but that to this end they are aided by the merits of others. Hilary also (*writing on Ps. 51*)[77] says that works of justice do not suffice for the merit of perfect beatitude, unless the mercy of God, even in this willingness toward justice, does not reckon against them the defects of human changes and motions.

§ 26. To these are added the Prayers of the Church for the departed: for she prays God to deliver their souls from eternal death, and that the nether regions swallow them not up, and other things of this kind. She therefore acknowledges that, by the just judgment of God, for the venial faults alone — with which alone the departed persons of this kind are burdened — the punishment of eternal death can be inflicted upon them.

§ 27. Certain arguments of reason are also advanced, of which one is this: every remission of sin pertains to mercy; therefore, remaining within strict justice alone, venial sins will never be remitted but will be punished eternally. A second: every good work, even the least, merits eternal life; therefore every sin, even the least, merits eternal death. A third: venial sins of those who are strangers to the redemption of Christ are never remitted; they are therefore punished eternally; wherefore, since God is not unjust, they merit eternal punishment. A fourth: mortal sin merits eternal punishment because it is committed against God who is infinite good. But this is also truly said of venial sin, as we showed (*at dist. 35*);[78] therefore venial sin also merits eternal punishment.

§ 28. In reply to these and the other arguments that can be brought forward on this side, answering them with probability, we say first of all that the testimonies of Scripture and the authorities of the Fathers that have been cited do not signify that venial sin, if it be alone and separated from mortal sin — as it exists in a just man — is by its own nature such as to make anyone deserving of eternal death and unworthy of the Kingdom of God; but rather that no one, however just, unless he has been cleansed even of venial sin by the blood of Christ the Redeemer, can be admitted to the Kingdom. This remission, although it must be ascribed to the mercy of God — as indeed the very name and formal character (*ratio*) of remission sufficiently shows — yet the just by the works of piety and mercy in this life, and by the merit of righteousness altogether, make that mercy owed to themselves. For to a just man, even though he be not free from lighter sins, yet on account of his piety and the righteousness that is dominant in him, the reward of eternal life is due, and he is worthy of it. Since therefore it is unjust that anyone should be excluded in eternity from that which is justly owed to him, it follows that even that mercy without which he cannot be admitted to the possession of eternal life is owed to the just man. Wherefore, although venial sin delays the just for a time from eternal life, yet mortal sin alone is that which by its own nature wholly excludes a man from it and renders him unworthy of it.

§ 29. Hence therefore can be derived the solution to those objections drawn from Scripture and the Fathers — except that the text of Jas. 2 is better understood of mortal sins alone, as the words following clearly declare.[79] And the same seems to be said of the other two texts, Matt. 5 and Deut. 27;[80] indeed, the sentence of James is an explanation of the text of Deut., for in that place mortal sins alone are enumerated, as is clear to anyone who inspects the passage.

§ 30. The Prayers of the Church likewise bear witness to the same grace and divine mercy. Yet that mercy is owed to all who remain in the body of Christ even to the end of life, by reason of that fellowship or union by which they have perseveringly adhered to Christ as members, and have remained as fruitful branches in the

vine. Nor is it absurd to seek by prayer something that is owed through mercy or promise. For thus David prays the Lord to fulfil his promise (2 Kgs. 7),[81] saying: "Now therefore, O Lord God, raise up for ever the word that thou hast spoken, and do as thou hast promised." Which prayer does not signify that it could happen that the Lord might not fulfil his promise, but acknowledges grace and mercy in the promise. In this sense, therefore, which we have stated, the words of John Fisher disputing against Luther are also rightly taken:[63] for venial sin in the just is venial by the mercy of God, but a mercy which it draws to itself with a certain right, on account of the perseverance of righteousness in him in whom it is found.

§ 31. The same reply serves for the first argument of reason. To the second it is answered: every good work proceeding from charity (*charitas*) merits eternal life on account of the ultimate end to which it is referred; which end, since not every sin destroys it, therefore not every sin merits eternal death. To the third it must be said that it comes about wholly by accident (*per accidens*) that venial sins are never remitted in the damned, because in them they are found conjoined with mortal sins. Furthermore, it is not surprising that they never obtain the remission of venial sins, since every remission of sin presupposes repentance, which is not true repentance in them, nor can it be. Hence St. Gregory (*Dialogorum*, bk. 4, ch. 39)[82] says: "This is to be known, that in the world to come not anyone will obtain any purgation even from the least sins, unless while still placed in this life he shall have merited to obtain it there by good works." Which words of St. Gregory are to be noted in support of this opinion, which places the punishment of venial sins in the damned as eternal. The same is confirmed by (Pseudo-)Dionysius and St. Augustine and by all who say that the works of the faithful living are therefore profitable to the departed for the relaxation of their punishments, because they merited, by their own good works, that those works should be profitable to them.[83] For what those authors intend is that, with the merit of their own works in this life being removed, the departed can obtain no diminution of their punishments whatsoever. Hence it manifestly follows that they are also punished for venial sins perpetually.

§ 32. To the fourth: mortal sin does not merit eternal death simply because it is committed against God, but because it is committed against God in such a way as to deprive a man of God who is infinite good — that is, to exclude him from His grace and friendship — which venial sins do not do. The reason for this difference is that mortal sins destroy the order toward the end, that is, toward God, whereas venial sins do not.

§ VII — A note on the seven capital vices (De septem vitiis capitalibus annotatio)

§ 33. Although by some authors — such as Cassian[85] and Isidore[86] writing on Deuteronomy — eight capital sins are enumerated, inasmuch as those authors make pride and vainglory two distinct vices, the common opinion, received by the usage of the faithful, acknowledges and enumerates only seven; these are also enumerated by St. Gregory[87] — though he does not reckon pride among them but sets it above all of them and makes it the queen of all vices. "The root also of all evil is pride," says St. Gregory, to which Scripture bears witness in the saying: "The beginning of all sin is pride" (Sir. 10). "Its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, spring forth from this venomous root: to wit, vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, and lust."

Nor is this contrary to the common opinion. For when, as is customary, pride is numbered together with the rest, it signifies nothing other than the disordered appetite for dignity and honour — that is, ambition or

vainglory, which the Greeks call *Κενοδοξίαν*. But when it is called by St. Gregory the queen and root of the rest, it signifies contempt of one's superior and the raising of one's spirit against him, as St. Bonaventure says.[88]

Now why these seven are called principal or capital vices the Master explained: because, he says, from them as from seven fountains all the deadly corruptions of souls flow forth, which are commonly called the daughters of those vices. What furthermore these corruptions and diseases of the soul are, which are to be referred to those general vices as to their fountains and heads, has been explained at length by St. Gregory.[89]

St. Gregory noted in the same place that these vices are divided into five spiritual ones and two carnal ones. The carnal ones are gluttony and lust; the rest are spiritual; and among these members the distinction is that the spiritual ones are of themselves of graver guilt, whereas the carnal ones are of greater infamy. It must further be noted that, although these seven vices are commonly called mortal by most writers, they are not always of such a kind as to bring death to the soul, but very often, on account of the imperfection of their act or by reason of other circumstances, they do not exceed the bounds of venial guilt: as is evident in the conjugal act on account of incontinence, in moderate excesses in food and drink, in sudden anger, and other things of this kind. Indeed, there is scarcely any venial sin which is not referred to one or another of these seven heads.

Now as regards what the Master discusses in the last place — how it is truly said in Sir. 10 that pride is the beginning of all sin, when the Apostle says in 1 Tim. (last chapter): "The root of all evils is covetousness" — this is rightly explained as follows: we should say that pride is called the beginning of all sin because pride in our first parents was the first sin in such a way as to become the very origin and cause of all sins thereafter. "For in it," says Tobias in ch. 4, "all perdition took its beginning." Covetousness, however, or avarice — for in Greek it is *φιλαργυσία*, that is, love of money — is the root of all evils: not because all evils arose from it, but partly because this kind of disordered attachment is wont to drive men into sins of every kind, such as homicides, lies, perjuries, and the like; and partly because through it men incur innumerable calamities and miseries. For this sense the Apostolic text seems to demand. For what precedes is: "For those who wish to become rich fall into temptation and the snare of the devil, and into many useless and harmful desires, which plunge men into ruin and destruction." And of covetousness itself what follows is: "which some, eagerly pursuing, have strayed from the faith and have pierced themselves with many sorrows."[90]

§ I — That no sin in this life is altogether irremissible (Nullum in hac vita peccatum esse prorsus irremissibile)

§ 34. Just as there is no sin which, under God's eternal decree, can be expiated and remitted by any means other than the blood of Christ, however light it may be, so there is no sin so grave that it cannot be expiated by the blood of that same Redeemer. The former of these two points is shown from the Scriptures. For the Apostle has said in general terms (Heb. 9): "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission." And in Gal. 6: "Far be it from me to glory except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ." And by John the Baptist (Jn. 1): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world." Indicating the reason for this, the Apostle says in Rom. 8: "What was impossible for the law, in which it was weakened through the flesh, God, sending his own Son, etc." Moreover, particularly concerning lesser sins, it is said by Christ (Jn. 13): "If I do not wash you, you will have no part with me." Finally, the Father remits no sin except while looking upon the face of his Son — inasmuch as he alone is fit to appease the wrath of the Father. Concerning this matter it

was expressly written by St. Augustine[16] that it is the law of God written in the minds of the Angels that no iniquity goes unpunished save what the blood of the Mediator has expiated.

The latter point, on the other hand, is no less clear from Sacred Scripture. For Scripture everywhere invites all sinners, even the most grievous, to penance, for no other reason than that through it, having received pardon, they may be reconciled to God. Hence Christ in the Gospel: "Come to me, all you who labour and are burdened, and I will refresh you." And Ezekiel, ch. 18: "If the wicked man does penance for all his sins, he shall live and shall not die." And ch. 33: "I desire not the death of the wicked, but that he be converted, etc." To the same purpose belong those Scriptures which hold out to all men the hope of salvation through faith in Christ: as Jn. 3 (ch. 2 of the same): "For God so loved the world that whoever believes in him should not perish." Rom. 3: "The justice of God through faith in Christ unto all and upon all who believe in him." And ch. 9: "Whosoever shall call upon him, etc." Finally, 1 Jn. 2: "He himself is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world." Hence the utterance of Cain in Gen. 4 is deservedly condemned: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Wherefore also the general and unlimited power of absolving from sins —[92]

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1. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 3.
2. St. Augustine, Sermon 250, *de tempore* — or rather Serm. CCXCIII in the Appendix to the Benedictine edition, which the Louvain editors (Verlinus and Vindingus) prefix with the note that it is of doubtful authenticity, being spurious under the title *De Honestate Mulierum*; the style throughout refers to Casarian, who published a canon 10 of the Council of Agathensis on this subject.
3. St. Augustine, *De Bono Conjugali*, ch. 21.
4. St. Jerome, *Adversus Julianum*, bk. [1 or 2], a little after the beginning.
5. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 57.
6. *Glossa Ordinaria* on Ps. 57.
7. St. Bernard, *De Praecepto et Dispensatione*.
8. St. Augustine, *In Iohannem*, Tractate 58.
9. St. Augustine, *De Cura pro Mortuis*, ch. 5.
10. St. Jerome, on Eph. 3 ("I bow my knees").
11. Canon 4 of the Council of Neocaesarea.
12. 1 Kgs (Vulgate) 25 [i.e., 1 Sam. 25].
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 87, a. 6.
14. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, bk. 1, ch. 26.
15. Sir. 21 [Vulgate].
16. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 19.
17. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 19 (continued).
18. Matt. 5; Matt. 26; Jas. 2.
19. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 16.
20. Peter Lombard [the Master], *In II Sent.*, dist. 42, in the text of the Distinction.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 88.
22. 1 Cor. 6:9–10; Eph. 5:5; Gal. 5:19–21.

23. Rev. 21:8.

24. Matt. 5:22.

25. Matt. 12:32.

26. Matt. 25:41; 1 Jn. 3 (implicitly).

27. Mk. 16:16.

28. 1 Cor. 3:12–15.

29. 1 Cor. 7:6.

30. Eccl. 7:20.

31. 1 Jn. 1:8.

32. Jas. 3:2.

33. 2 Chr. 6:36.

34. Lk. 1:6; Tit. 1:6.

35. Rom. 6:23.

36. Jas. 2:10.

37. 1 Jn. 3:8.

38. Ps. 5:7.

39. Is. 59:2.

40. Ezek. 18:4.

41. Wis. 1:16 (Vulgate: *homo per malitiam occidit animam suam*).

42. Wis. 1:11.

43. Gal. 5:20–21.

44. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 64.

45. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 78; 1 Cor. 6:7.

46. Matt. 6:12.

47. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 41 *in Joannem*.

48. St. Augustine, *De Symbolo*, bk. 1, ch. 6.

49. St. Augustine, *De Bono Conjugali*, ch. 6; *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 21, last chapter; *Sermo* 12 *de diversis* (Appendix), ch. 9 [note: this sermon is printed among the Appendix sermons in the Benedictine edition; its attribution is marked doubtful by Louvain editors].

50. St. Jerome, *Dialogus* 2 *contra Pelagianos*; St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, hom. 16.

51. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 21, ch. 9.

52. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 21, ch. 5; bk. 18, ch. 4.

53. Bede, *Commentary on Jas.* 3, at "In multis offendimus omnes."

54. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11.

55. Council of Trent, Session 14 (on Penance), ch. 15 [as cited by Estius]; 1 Cor. 6.

56. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 27.

57. Council of Trent, Session 14, ch. 5.

58. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 78.

59. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 79.

60. St. Augustine, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas*, on the text "Timeo vos ne forte," etc.

61. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 21, last chapter.

62. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 88 (as above).

63. John Fisher (Joannes Roffensis), *Responsio ad articulum 32 Lutheri*.

64. Gen. 18:23–25.

65. Hugh of St. Victor, definition of venial sin [abbreviation as in source].

66. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 88 (as cited above: *S. Thom. ibidem*).

67. Ps. 129:3.

68. Matt. 5:19.

69. Jn. 13:8.

70. Deut. 27:26.

71. Gal. 3:10.

72. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, bk. 2, ch. 3.

73. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Justitiæ*, ch. 15.

74. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 129*.

75. St. Augustine, *Confessiones*, bk. 9, ch. 13.

76. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 21, ch. 24.

77. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *Commentary on Ps. 51*.

78. Above, dist. 35 [as cited by Estius].

79. Jas. 2:10 ff.

80. Matt. 5:19; Deut. 27:26.

81. 2 Kgs. (2 Sam.) 7:25.

82. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum*, bk. 4, ch. 39.

83. (Pseudo-)Dionysius [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine [abbreviation as in source].

84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 84, aa. 3–4.

85. Cassian, *De octo principalibus vitiis*, Collation 5 [abbreviation as in source].

86. St. Isidore, *Super Deuteronomium* [abbreviation as in source].

87. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 31, ch. 17.

88. St. Bonaventure [abbreviation as in source].

89. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 31, ch. 17 (as cited above).

90. 1 Tim. 6:9–10.

91. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 14, a. 3; *Summa theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 1.

92. The Latin text breaks off here (*pec- / ca-*) at the end of the chunk; the sentence continues in the following chunk.

DISTINCTIO XLIII — ON SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND WHETHER THE POWER OF SINNING IS FROM GOD (*DE PECCATO IN SPIRITUM SANCTUM ET DE POTENTIA PECCANDI*)

§ 1. — the power delegated in His Church, which Christ left, as recorded in Matt. 16 and 18, and Jn. 20.[1] Now what the Fathers have thought on this matter is by no means obscure. For St. Augustine says[4]: "But neither concerning those very crimes, however great, that are to be remitted in the holy Church of God, is mercy to be despaired of for those doing penance according to the measure of each one's sin." And in his Sermon on the Words of the Lord[5]: "Concerning no one," he says, "is despair to be had so long as the patience of God is leading him to penance and does not snatch the wicked man away from this life." And there follow many further words. The same author, having said in his work on the Sermon on the Mount[4] that he supposed the sin unto death to be, namely, the opposition to recognized truth, subsequently revising that passage[5], says: "It should have been added: if he shall have ended this life in so wicked a perverseness of mind. For concerning any most wicked person established in this life, despair is by no means warranted, nor is prayer offered imprudently on behalf of one of whom despair is not held." By these words St. Augustine also indicates another argument by which this doctrine is not a little confirmed: namely, that the prayers of the Church and of individual faithful on behalf of enemies and even the most wicked sinners are profitable for their conversion. Similar writings were left before St. Augustine by St. Ambrose in his books against the Novatians on penance[6], and most particularly in Book II, chapter 4, where among other things he brings forward the example of Simon Magus, whom, though most wicked, the Apostles did not exclude from hope of pardon, Peter saying to him in Acts 8: "Do penance from this thy wickedness, and pray God if perhaps this thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee," and so forth. And at the end of that same chapter, inviting heretics and schismatics back to the Church, he appended a general clause, confirmed by the testimonies and examples of Scripture, saying: "For to all who are converted pardon is promised," and so forth.

§ 2. It is clear also from what has been said that it is vain and frivolous, what some object: that God has indeed promised pardon to all penitents without exception, but that there are certain sins so grave, or that can certainly grow to so great a number, that He has never decreed to inspire a salutary penance for them. For this is manifestly contrary not only to the aforementioned testimonies of Scripture but also to the opinions of the Fathers, inasmuch as all of them invite absolutely all sinners to penance and hold out hope of pardon to all — which would be futile if there were some magnitude or multitude of sins that were excluded from pardon by some determinate decree of God. Moreover, we read in Scripture that the gift of penance has been granted to the most grievous sinners: as to Manasses king of Judah, a most grievous enemy of divine worship; and to Saul, the most fierce persecutor of Christians; and to the Jews who crucified and mocked Christ, as recorded in Acts.[7] This last example is also adduced by St. Ambrose in the place cited above.[8] Hence St. Augustine,

commenting on Ps. 67, "I will convert into the depths of the sea,"[9] says that those signified thereby are persons who were to be converted but who were most desperate cases. And again, writing on Ps. 147, on the words "He sendeth forth his crystal like morsels,"[10] he interprets this mystically of the conversion of those who were obstinately fixed in their unbelief.

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§ II — What the sin against the Holy Spirit is (Quod sit peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum)

§ 3. Since the opinion of the Lord in the Gospel may seem contrary to the foregoing doctrine — where He says in Matt. 12: "Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men, but the blasphemy of the Spirit" (for so it should be read, not *blasphemiae*) "shall not be forgiven. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but he that shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come"[12] — therefore it must briefly be said at this point what, according to the sense of the Gospel, the sin against the Holy Spirit is, and in what sense it is said never to be remitted. First, however, it is clear that not all mortal sins are comprehended under the name of sin against the Holy Spirit. For every blasphemy is a mortal sin, and yet, according to the said opinion, not every blasphemy is committed against the Holy Spirit; but some also against the Son, which is said to be remissible. Next, a distinction must be drawn between sin against the Holy Spirit and blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, as between genus and species. For one can sin against the Holy Spirit in many ways short of blasphemy.

§ 4. In order therefore to answer the question, it must be known that this passage of Scripture — in St. Augustine's judgment the most difficult[13] — where he also treats it at length, is interpreted variously by various persons. Some understand that sin to be that by which a person, after having received the grace of God and Christian charity, attacks it. Thus St. Augustine, speaking indeed with some hesitation[16]: "This perhaps is sin against the Holy Spirit: to attack fraternal charity through malice and envy after having received the grace of the Holy Spirit — which sin the Lord says is not forgiven either in this age or in the age to come." According to this interpretation, the saying of the Lord is similar to that Apostolic text in Heb. 6: "For it is impossible for those who were once illuminated to be renewed again to penance."[14] And in chapter 10: "For there is now left no sacrifice for sins for us who sin wilfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth."[15] Such persons he also says in the same place to offer an affront to the Spirit of grace. This kind of sin was also noted by Peter in his Second Epistle, chapter 2, when he says of certain persons that "it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after the knowledge to turn back," and so forth.[16] However, St. Augustine, revising the said passage[5] (as we noted above), restricts that interpretation so as to wish added: "if, however, one shall have ended this life in that perverseness." And therefore in several other places — as in the Sermon on the Words of the Lord,[17] in Epistle 50,[18] in the *Enchiridion* ch. 83,[19] and in *De Correptione et Gratia* ch. 12[20] — he holds the sin against the Holy Spirit to be impenitence (*impoenitentia*), which the Greeks call *ametanoia*, that is, as St. Augustine says in Epistle 50, "hardness of heart continued to the end of this life, by which a man refuses to receive in the unity of the body of Christ, which the Holy Spirit quickens, the remission of sins."

§ 5. These two interpretations of St. Augustine gave occasion to later theologians to distinguish six species of sin against the Holy Spirit: namely, despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, the opposition to

recognized truth, and envy of a brother's grace. For the first four belong to the latter interpretation of St. Augustine, and the last two to the former. All of them are also rightly and fittingly called sins against the Holy Spirit because by them that which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit is directly attacked. Hence arose the dispute about sins of weakness, which are said to be committed against the Father — to whom power is appropriated — and about sins of ignorance, which are said to be committed against the Son — to whom wisdom is appropriated. Now these distinctions, though rightly and truly stated, do not, as is apparent, bear on the sense of the evangelical saying. For in the Gospel the discussion is of those who maliciously calumniated the miracles of Christ, attributing to demons what had been done by the power of the Holy Spirit. Nor is the discussion of just any sin against the Holy Spirit whatsoever, but of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, that is, of an insult offered to Him in words. Wherefore, the interpretation of those seems more conformable to the text who understand the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit to be that insult by which someone, maliciously and of set purpose, attributes to evil spirits those works that are manifestly of God — such as the casting out of demons. And generally, in conformity with that same reading, any sin against the Holy Spirit will be whatever is committed — whether in word, deed, or thought — against God in the manner just described. This is the interpretation of very many of the ancients, as of St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. John Chrysostom, Euthymius, and Theophylact, and certain others in their commentaries on this passage in Matthew and Luke 12;[21] and again St. Ambrose in his work on the Holy Spirit.'[22]

§ 6. According to this interpretation, some think that the name of the Holy Spirit is not taken in this passage so as to signify in particular the third person of the Trinity, but rather the whole Divinity. For they hold that the Lord did not wish to distinguish between sins against the Spirit and those committed against the Father or the Son, but only between sin against God and sin against the Son of man — and that the name "Holy Spirit" was expressed for this reason: that it is fittingly opposed to the unclean spirit, to whose power those calumniators attributed the divine works of Christ. Nevertheless, it can also be said that the Holy Spirit is named before the other Persons because those divine works that pertain to the restoration and sanctification of fallen man — such as were the miracles of Christ — are in Scripture peculiarly attributed to the Holy Spirit. Hence the words: "But if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils;"[23] and: "Conceived of the Holy Spirit;",[24] and: "Who through the Holy Spirit offered himself."[25] From all this we may now consequently understand what the blasphemy against the Son of man is: namely, that reproach by which some censured the human deeds of Christ, as those who called Him a glutton and wine-drinker, a friend of sinners and tax-collectors, taking offence, that is, at His familiar conversation among men.'[26]

§ III — In what sense the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be irremissible (Quomodo irremissibile dicatur peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum)

§ 7. Let us now see in what sense remission is denied to the sin against the Holy Spirit. And indeed if the sin against the Holy Spirit is understood as impenitence, or the perverse hardness of heart continued to the end of life, it is clear that that sin is absolutely never forgiven — not on account of the magnitude of the sin, but on account of its permanence and willful persistence to the very end of life, after which there is no place for penance. Hence it is clear that this is not contrary to the doctrine of the preceding section. But in whatever other sense it is understood, a greater question remains. For some think that, although it is possible for God to inspire penance for such a sin in a man, He nevertheless never does so, and that thereby it comes about that for

those sinning against the Holy Spirit that sin is never remitted — God always punishing it by means of final hardening. Hence they say that no example can be shown of anyone who, having sinned against the Holy Spirit, ever came to his senses. This interpretation seems to be handed down by Bede, writing on Mark 3.[28] But we have already rejected it above as improbable and contrary to Scripture, showing that God has fixed no limit to His mercy in any magnitude or multitude of sins, so long as life is lived here. St. Augustine also rejects it.[4]

§ 8. Theophylact interprets this sin as not forgiven because it is not forgiven without penance, whereas those sins that are committed against the Son of man can be forgiven without penance — understanding this of the more severe penance that the Apostle alludes to in Heb. 10, where there is "a certain dreadful expectation of judgment and a rage of fire."[29] But since there are also many other sins that require a more severe penance, it will not be consistent with this interpretation that the Lord said universally that every sin, excepting only that which is committed against the Holy Spirit, is forgiven to men. Therefore one must say that, just as the prior part of the saying — "Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men" — does not mean that every sin of this kind is forgiven to everyone (for there are many sins not committed against the Holy Spirit that in reality are never forgiven), but indicates that the remission of such a sin is more readily obtained: so the latter part, which denies that the sin against the Holy Spirit is ever remitted, does not mean that this absolutely never occurs, but that pardon for it is obtained only with the greatest difficulty. For St. Augustine says in the aforesaid work on the Sermon on the Mount,[30] that so great is the stain of that sin that the person who has sinned does not humble himself to the point of entreating pardon, even if he is compelled by a bad conscience to acknowledge and proclaim his sin. Or certainly, as Euthymius explains, the sin against the Son of man is said to be remissible because it can seem worthy of pardon as having a cause that excuses it, namely the humility of the assumed manhood, by which someone takes offence. And the same judgment holds for other sins committed out of ignorance or weakness. But the sin against the Holy Spirit is said never to be forgiven because, being a sin of malice, it retains in the man no cause of that kind to excuse it. For that which will be denied in the future is rightly denied now, when no cause or disposition for it remains — even if God can bring it about, and sometimes does bring it about.

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§ IV — It is resolved: the objection concerning the sin unto death (Solvitur objectio de peccato ad mortem)

§ 9. There is another objection concerning the sin unto death, for which, as St. John admonishes in his last epistle, one is not to pray[31] — and this apparently for no other reason than that such a sin is never remitted. Concerning this sin St. Augustine says in the place cited above on the Sermon on the Mount[37]: "I think the sin of a brother unto death to be when, after the knowledge of God through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, anyone attacks brotherhood and is inflamed by the torches of envy against it." The sin unto death is therefore for St. Augustine identical with the sin against the Holy Spirit, which he defines in the same chapter in similar words. Bede also holds this view, writing on this passage in John,[32] as do certain of the Greeks. Now, since St. Augustine in revising that passage wishes it to be understood of the sin unto death only insofar as it perseveres, it is easily understood according to his interpretation why one is not to pray for it. However, this interpretation seems to be opposed by the fact that John names a present tense — *sinning* — and not the past — *having sinned*. Hence, according to St. Augustine's interpretation, so long as anyone is alive, it will be uncertain whether a given person is sinning the sin unto death. There are those who interpret it as pertaining

to deliberate contumacy, against which sin there is a grave exaggeration in Sir. 28.[33] There are those who understand it of every mortal sin in the affect of which one still perseveres. It is indeed probable that that sin is to be understood of that of which Heb. 6 and 10 and 2 Pet. 2 speak.'[34] For although those former sins are also unto death, because they inflict a deadly wound on the soul, yet this last-mentioned one is most of all such. But whatever of these is understood, the Apostle does not forbid praying for it absolutely; he only says: "I do not say that one should pray for it,"[31] that is, I do not enjoin that you pray for it. The reason for this is either because such persons are converted with the greatest difficulty — hence in 1 Kgs. 2: "If a man shall sin against the Lord, who shall pray for him?"[35] as though to say, a man must have great merit before God who dares to set himself as intercessor for so grave a sin — or because it is also a great matter for penance to be obtained for a man still persevering in the affect of mortal sin.

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§ I [of Distinctio XLIV] — Whether the power of sinning is from God (An potentia peccandi sit a Deo)

§ 10. To the prior question of this Distinction — whether man or angel has received from God the power of sinning — we shall set forth a response comprised in three conclusions or members, corresponding to the three ways in which the power of sinning can be understood. For if it is understood as the natural power or faculty of the soul by which we act well or ill — of which kind is principally the will, and then also the other faculties by which the will commands its acts, such as the intellect and the senses — this is less commonly called the power of sinning. St. Augustine calls it "possibility" (*possibilitas*) and teaches that it is from God.[37]

§ 11. In a second sense, the power — or, as authors more frequently say, the capacity (*potestas*) — of sinning is understood as the unimpeded faculty with respect to committing sin, that is, one that without impediment can proceed to act. And this power too is from God, because not only does God author the natural faculty of acting itself, as we have just said, but also that it can proceed and does proceed to act — whether good or bad — at a determinate time and place belongs to the divine ordering. The capacity of sinning understood in this way we read very frequently attributed to God in Scripture and the Fathers. For the devil was not able to tempt holy Job,[38] nor to deceive King Ahab,'[39] unless he had received the power from God. Hence also when Pilate said to the Lord that he had the power to crucify Him — which was assuredly a power of sinning — the Lord answered in Jn. 19: "Thou shouldst not have any power against me, unless it were given thee from above."[40] And universally Scripture attributes to God all the power of the wicked by which they use it against the pious, injuring them in any way whatsoever while executing their evil will. Hence Hos. 13: "I gave thee a king in my anger;"[41] and Job 34: "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people;"[42] and Christ in the Gospel, Lk. 22: "This is your hour and the power of darkness,"[43] that is, the power given by God to sinners, that they might seize me. Thus St. Augustine very frequently teaches that the power of sinning is only from God, using to prove this even that Apostolic saying: "There is no power but from God" — as in his commentary on Ps. 32[53]: "The malice of men," he says, "has of itself the desire to harm, but if God does not give the power, it does not have it. For there is no power but from God." And again: "There is an evil desire, which is not from God; but that evil desire harms no one if He does not permit it: there is no power but from God." And the words that follow. A similar passage occurs in his commentaries on Pss. 56 and 96.'[45] He inculcates the same doctrine elsewhere, as in *De Natura Boni*, ch. 31,[46] where from

Scripture he teaches that the power to harm which the wicked have against the good is from God. Likewise Book 13 of *De Genesi* [*ad Litteram*],[47] and St. Gregory, Book 26 of the *Moralia*, ch. 19, and Book 14, ch. 18.[48]

§ 12. In a third sense, the power of sinning can be taken as the power of falling short of what is right and just, which in matters pertaining to morality we can designate by the single word "defectibility" (*defectibilitas*). Now since this properly speaking is not a power but an impotence (for "to be able to fail," just as "to be able to fall sick," is not properly speaking "to be able to do something," but rather "not to be able"), it is not from God, but from the imperfection of the creature itself, which, inasmuch as it was made from nothing, has of itself the capacity to fail, to sin, and to be reduced to nothing. For if this kind of power were from God, then also the sin that is born from it, and to which that power of itself is ordered, would be from God. For from whom a power is, from the same also is its proper act. Hence St. Augustine, Book 14 of *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 13[58]: "That nature exists," he says, "it has from that which God made it; that a nature falls short of that from which it was made, this it has from the fact that it was made from nothing." And in Book 23, ch. 2,[50] he teaches that all created things are mutable — not insofar as they are from God, but insofar as they are made from nothing. He writes similar things in Book 2 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, chs. 28 and 29, and Book 1 *Contra Julianum*, ch. 8, and Book 3, ch. 24, and Epistle 56.[51] Likewise Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.[52]

§ 13. It is true that a different thing is read in the Epistle to Demetriadem (whose opening words are *Si summo ingenio*), which is found also among the Epistles of St. Augustine and St. Jerome. But that letter belongs to neither of those men: it has Pelagius as its author, as can be demonstrated by certain arguments drawn from St. Augustine.[53] As for what is read in St. Augustine's commentary on Ps. 61,[54] — that God has given to men the power of doing what is good and of not doing what is evil — although this can be taken of that power of failing of which we have spoken, it seems nevertheless more rightly to be understood of some positive power whose proper and per se act is the doing of evil. For he argues in that place against the genethliaci, who said that men do evil things under the impulse of the stars.

§ II — Whether it is ever lawful to resist authority (An liceat aliquando resistere potestati)

§ 14. Concerning the latter question of this distinction — namely, whether one ought sometimes to resist authority — it must be noted, first, that the word "power" (*potestas*) in the present question is not to be taken in its most general sense, as though it meant any power or force whatsoever. For in that most general sense all resistance, even that by which the Devil tempting us and a robber pursuing us is resisted, is directed against some power; but that power alone is meant here which, speaking by way of designation, they call Superiority — that is, the power which someone holds as a superior over others as his subjects. Such is the power of a King, or of a Magistrate, or of any Prefect whatsoever over his subjects. It is in reference to this power that the Apostle's word in Rom. 13 is properly to be understood: "There is no power." Next, it must be presupposed, according to sound and Catholic doctrine, that subjects owe obedience to every such power, as the Apostle teaches us in that same passage and in many other passages of Scripture. This doctrine Scripture extends not only to good and Christian rulers, but also to bad and unbelieving princes, such as those who existed in the first age of the Church.

§ 15. Furthermore, it must be noted in the proposed question that "power" is here taken concretely, for those persons in whom power resides. For if it be taken abstractly, it is certain that it must never be resisted,

since power in itself can be nothing other than legitimate, and, as the Apostle testifies, ordained by God. Hence concerning power taken in this abstract sense it is universally true what the same Apostle says: "He who resists power resists the ordinance of God." The question therefore has this sense: whether subjects can or ought sometimes to resist their superiors — and that either by simply not obeying their commands, or also by fighting back against those who bring violence against them.

§ 16. To this it must be answered that it is by no means lawful to resist those who rightly and legitimately use their power — that is, as the Master says, in all things that God commands to be rendered to them. Now, God commands whatsoever is commanded by them that falls within the limits of the said power derived from God. But if something is commanded by them that goes beyond that power, then one must distinguish. For either that which is commanded is good, or evil, or indifferent. If it is either good or indifferent, then, although the subject is not simply bound by such a command, on account of the defect of authority in the one commanding, he is nevertheless in most cases bound to obey it for the sake of avoiding scandal, or the appearance of disobedience. For this reason Christ willed to pay the didrachma for himself and for Peter (Matt. 17), though he was not otherwise bound to do so. But if something evil and contrary to the law of God is commanded, it must under no circumstances be obeyed; because such a command not only exceeds the authority of the one commanding, but also perverts the order of the supreme power. Hence, when the chief priests forbade the preaching of the Gospel, the most wise reply was given by Peter in Acts 5: "We must obey God rather than men." It was in this manner that the Apostles and the Martyrs resisted authority — of whom the Church says in her liturgy that, despising the commands of princes, they merited the rewards of heaven. In like manner the seven brothers of the Maccabees resisted Antiochus, one of whom said: "I do not obey the commandment of the King, but the commandment of the Law which was given to us through Moses" (2 Macc. 7). Similarly the three young men replied to King Nebuchadnezzar, who had commanded them to adore the statue: "We need not answer thee concerning this matter" (Dan. 3). And again: "Be it known to thee, O King, that we will not worship thy gods, nor adore the golden statue which thou hast set up" (Dan. 3). Hence St. Augustine says in his Sermon on the Words of the Lord:[56] "If authority commands what you ought not to do, then indeed despise the authority, by fearing the greater Authority." And he adds a comparison drawn from human authorities subordinate one to another, of which the inferior is not to be obeyed when it acts against the superior.

§ 17. Whether, however, it is ever lawful actually to fight back against a superior who unjustly oppresses his subjects is not equally clear. To be sure, it appears from the history of Rehoboam in 3 Kgs. 12 and from the words of St. Augustine[57] that it is sometimes lawful for the nobles and people of an entire kingdom to do this — passages where St. Augustine does not think it blameworthy that a people deposed a king who wished to rule tyrannically. The reason, moreover, seems to be that in the nobles and people public authority resides, by which they can both vindicate themselves from manifest tyranny and also elect for themselves a legitimate prince, and even, if cause exists, deprive one already elected of his rule. As for private individuals, however, it is lawful for no one to resist by force a superior even though he commands tyrannically — and far less to remove him from the midst of the living — as is evident from the precept of the Decalogue: "Thou shalt not kill"; and from the definition of the Council of Constance, session 15.[58] David showed this by his own example repeatedly, when, though Saul had been delivered into his hands, he neither wished himself to kill him nor allowed him to be killed by others. "For who," he said, "shall stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed, and be guiltless?" (1 Sam. 26).[59] Although David had already been anointed King, he had not yet been confirmed by the votes of the people, nor did he yet hold any power of the kingdom. Hence Cyprian deserves

most fittingly to be heard on this point. In the Epistle in which he defends the innocence of Christians against their slanderers — the Epistle to Demetrianus — he writes as follows: "None of us, when he is apprehended, resists, nor does he avenge himself against your unjust violence, though our people is numerous and plentiful; the assurance of future vengeance makes us patient; the innocent yield to the guilty; the guiltless acquiesce in punishments and torments."[60]

[Here the Estius commentary on Distinctio XLIV concludes, and the text passes to the Appendix on the Jansenian System appended to Book II, Distinction XXVIII of the Sentences.]

APPENDIX ON THE JANSENIAN SYSTEM, APPENDED TO DISTINCTION XXVIII OF THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES — PRINCIPAL HEADS AND COROLLARIES OF THE JANSENIAN DOCTRINE, SET FORTH WITH THE OPPOSING TESTIMONIES OF ST. THOMAS PLACED IN VIEW

Admonition (Admonitio)

§ 18. Nothing is more customary, nor more habitual, among the fabricators of new dogmas than, first, to proclaim their own inventions as admirable, novel, and descended as it were from heaven, and to set them before all for celebration; then, when they have perceived that the matter will not turn out as they wished, to attribute those same things to the earlier Fathers, and to profess and assert that they themselves think things consonant with the opinions of the more celebrated Schools — indeed nearly identical with them, if you regard the substance of the matter. For thus they judge that sufficient provision has been made for themselves and their doctrine. Following this custom, Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres — whom the heretic Jäger, even with truth wresting the confession from him, did not hesitate to call the most celebrated founder of a new sect in the Roman Church, and one who, in the matter of the universality of Grace, approaches the Reformed Church — first, in no few places of his work (entitled *Augustinus*), boasted of having as his supporters, after the Fathers, the Scholastic theologians; and finally, as we have admonished elsewhere, strives with marvellous art to draw into the patronage of his dogma and doctrine that most celebrated School of Sacred Theology which he had previously attacked and banished to the Peripatetics.

§ 19. His followers have not departed from the path thus indicated; indeed, pursuing the same way with even greater alacrity, they now clothe their opinions in words that reflect Thomistic doctrine, now everywhere proclaim that in nothing which pertains to the efficacy of grace do they deviate a hair's breadth from Thomistic doctrine. Hence their protests, complaints, laments, and wailings — that they suffer grievous wrongs, being in no respect guilty, but as much at fault as anyone only if it be a fault to adhere to the principles of the School of St. Thomas and to draw from those same principles conclusions that are entirely consonant with Thomistic doctrine. Employing this artifice, Paschasius Quesnel had so arranged his *Annotations on the New Testament* — smacking of pure and unadulterated Jansenism and adorned with Augustino-Thomistic words so apt as to conceal the Jansenian venom — that he reckoned he could thereby easily both spread Jansenian inventions and also impose upon and deceive even learned and most erudite men. But alas, the wretch! he did not sufficiently provide for himself by his own fraud. The venom lurking beneath the skin burst forth; and though ugliness painted over with marvellous arts and colours had for a time lain

hidden, it was at last made known; namely, by his deceits he was by no means able to achieve that the thunderbolts should avoid his works, however much invested with the appearance of piety. Christ the Lord has placed a watchful Prefect over His Church, to whom, assisting him as He had promised in Peter, He did not permit the frauds of that clever man to remain hidden. The fraud was detected; the pernicious Assertions were laid before the Holy Apostolic See and called to examination, and — as guilty of the more wicked doctrine — the late Holy Father Clement XI immediately affixed to them the black mark of condemnation.[61] Yet although, by the sentence pronounced by the Holy See, the lawsuit was ended, error nevertheless did not come to an end; it still creeps onward, but creeps with its head diminished; and its defenders, not yet submitting to the Apostolic decrees, do not cease to cry out both that they have been unjustly struck and that the Thomistic position has been proscribed in their assertions. The Pontifical Constitution stands firm, and, established by the word of the Lord, it can by no means fear a fall; indeed it needs no further support from others, resting as it does upon the supreme cornerstone.

§ 20. But since the Scriptures everywhere admonish us that provision must be made for the weakness of the weak, we have judged it our duty to set before novice readers, as it were in a small picture, certain Jansenian dogmas depicted; and likewise to adduce the testimonies of the holy Doctor Thomas Aquinas clearly opposed to them. In this way we judge that sufficient provision is made for studious youth, to whom we write — indicating to them those heads and corollaries of the Jansenian doctrine, by examining which they may at once discern the most pernicious error lurking even in other theses and recoil from it. We do not adduce the testimonies of St. Augustine contrary to their doctrine, having judged it sufficient, as we have admonished elsewhere, to have indicated the Authors who supply these in abundance. But certain most clear passages of St. Thomas diametrically opposed, as they say, to the dogma of Jansenius we place in view alongside the individual positions — both so that candidates in theology may from the very beginning of their theological study learn the purity of St. Thomas's doctrine, and also because in these times adversaries more frequently invoke the name of St. Thomas than that of St. Augustine. Were we writing for the learned, or for those already admitted to the threshold of theology, this small labour would be useless, since there are very many books by Thomists abounding in testimonies of this kind of St. Thomas against the Jansenian doctrine; but since, as we have professed hundreds of times, we aim to serve only the more unlearned and the beginners, we judge it not altogether useless; indeed we hope it will be of no small assistance to those just beginning to read through the Commentaries of our Author.

Positions of Jansenius — Doctrine of St. Thomas

§ 21. Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, most eminent in doctrine and dignity,[62] affirms that the foundation of the Jansenian doctrine — upon which, as upon the mass of his most ample edifice, Jansenius built — is that invented distinction between the *Auxilium Sine Quo* and the *Auxilium Quo*, perversely understood, concerning which we have noted something above.

And indeed we do not doubt in the least that this is the chief foundation of the Jansenian system, for the laying of which Jansenius laboured so marvellously and laboriously that, as the aforesaid eminent Cardinal reports, one who made the count has testified that he mentions it more than a hundred and seventy times in the aforesaid work. Nevertheless, in order that the whole series of Jansenian dogmas may be more clearly

expounded to beginners, the matter must be taken up from a higher point; and it is worth the labour to exhibit the deeper foundations upon which Jansenius has superbuilt this distinction of the *Auxilium Quo* and *Sine Quo* for the diverse state of integral nature and of fallen nature.

§ 22. 1. Jansenius, then, in volume 2 of the aforesaid work, lays this first as the foundation of his entire doctrine — a foundation he attempted to demonstrate in three entire books on the state of pure nature — namely, that man could not have been created by God without sanctifying grace and without supernatural gifts; and accordingly he entirely rejects the possibility of the state of pure nature; and he even lays it down that human nature requires that man should be brought forth by God adorned with supernatural gifts, namely of Faith, Hope, Charity, and Sanctity. Wherefore he attacks with sharp pen the Scholastic theologians who maintain the state of pure nature as possible. For in the second book of the aforesaid work, chapter 1, page 289, column 1,[63] he says that they have departed far from the principles of St. Augustine, following rather the plumb-line of human reason than the tradition of the Church: "We do not doubt," he says, "that most professors of Scholastic doctrine, just as they have deviated very far from his mind in explaining the state of fallen nature, so in asserting the state of pure nature have departed far from his principles" — meaning the immovable principles of St. Augustine.

He had said at the opening of that chapter (page 288, column 1) that, according to the more recent authors, pure nature is defined by a negative purity, namely one that has nothing superadded to nature, nothing owed to it, neither evil nor good — so that it has neither sin nor the companion of sin, nor any gift surpassing nature. And then, from the assertions of the Scholastics concerning such a state of pure nature, he draws these conclusions: that if they will that man be created without an ordination to supernatural beatitude — that is, to the clear vision of God — they consequently say that he is to be created without faith in the intellect and without the will loving God. Such indeed was Jansenius, who at the end of that same chapter submitted himself to the judgement of the most holy Roman Church — whether truly or fictitiously it is not for us to judge. "Wherein," Jansenius says, "whether we have arrived at the genuine mind of the Doctor" — meaning St. Augustine — "we submit to the sole judgement of the holy Roman Church, in whose faith and obedience and bosom, as from infancy hitherto unto the last breath, I have resolved, God helping, to live and die." This submission of Jansenius — would that his followers had accepted it sincerely from the heart! But the disturbances with which, from the middle of the past century to the present, they have agitated the Church tell another tale.

§ 23. Jansenius then proceeds, in the fourth book, to attempt to bolster his opinion with a great many arguments. Indeed he prefixed this title to the fourth chapter of that book: "That the love without which a rational creature cannot be created must be breathed in by God through a true inspiration; and this from the necessity of truth." This assertion he demonstrates and confirms through the subsequent chapters up to nearly the end — though it is not pressed without some difficulty — in such a way as to make the state of nature in which a creature is established without that love impossible. From this same presupposed foundation of the impossibility of the state of pure nature destitute of gratuitous love, in the chapter on how that love, diffused through the Holy Spirit, is of necessity of natural precept — which urges in all good works, without which no other good can exist according to his principles — Jansenius derived the further conclusion, namely, that man must refer all his actions to God as to the supernatural end, and the ultimate act or virtue; so that he transgresses the first precept of the Decalogue, the greatest of all commands, who does not refer any action whatever, at least from its object and the nearest good end, to God as to the ultimate act and

virtue: which doctrine Jansenius imparts in book 3 on the state of fallen nature, chapter 17, page 215; and elsewhere throughout.

§ 24. The following is the *Doctrine of St. Thomas* placed in parallel.[64]

St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 1:[65] "God had bestowed upon human nature in its beginning, above the condition of its own principles, that there should be in reason a certain Rectitude of original Justice, which it could impress upon the lower powers without any resistance; because this was conferred gratuitously, it was therefore justly withdrawn through the ingratitude of disobedience. Hence it came to pass that, when the first man sinned, human nature which was in him was abandoned to itself, so as to consist ACCORDING TO THE CONDITION of its own principles."

Likewise in the same place, art. 2, *ad* 3:[66] "God could at the beginning, when He created man, have formed also another man from the slime of the earth WHOM HE WOULD HAVE LEFT IN THE CONDITION OF HIS NATURE — so that he would be mortal and passible, and feeling the struggle of concupiscence against reason — in which nothing would be detracted from human nature, because this follows from the principles of nature. Nevertheless that defect in such a man would not have had the character of fault or punishment, because that defect would not have been caused by his own will."

Likewise, *Contra Gentiles*, Book 4, ch. 52:[67] "Since God so has care of human acts as to render reward for good works and punishment for evil, as has been shown above, from the punishment itself we can be certified of the fault. Now the human race commonly suffers diverse punishments, both corporal and spiritual. Among corporal punishments the principal is death, to which all others tend and are ordered, etc. Among spiritual punishments the principal is the weakness of reason, from which it comes about that man arrives with difficulty at the cognition of truth, easily falls into error, and cannot entirely overcome bestial appetites but is many times clouded over by them. One might, however, say that such defects, both corporal and spiritual, are not penal but natural defects, following from the necessity of matter. For it is necessary that the human body, since it is composed of contraries, be corruptible; and the sensible appetite in it is contrary to reason and the intellect — possible, since it is in potency to all intelligibles, having none of them in act, but born to acquire them from the senses — with difficulty reaching to knowledge of the truth, and easily deviating from the true on account of phantasms. Nevertheless, if one rightly considers, it can be estimated with sufficient probability, given divine Providence — which has fitted to each nature its congruent perfections — that God joined a superior nature to an inferior to this end, that it should govern it; and that if any impediment to this governance should arise from a defect of nature, it would be removed by HIS SPECIAL AND SUPERNATURAL BENEFIT — so that, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, it is believed to be joined to the body under the condition that nothing in the body can be contrary to the soul through which the body lives; and similarly, if reason in man is joined to the sensual appetite and to the other sensitive powers, that reason should not be impeded by the sensitive powers but should rather govern them. THUS THEREFORE ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH WE POSIT THAT MAN WAS FROM THE BEGINNING SO CONSTITUTED THAT, AS LONG AS MAN'S REASON WAS SUBJECT TO GOD, AND THE LOWER POWERS SERVED IT WITHOUT IMPEDIMENT, AND THE BODY COULD NOT BE HINDERED FROM ITS SUBJECTION BY ANY BODILY IMPEDIMENT — GOD AND HIS GRACE SUPPLYING WHAT NATURE HAD LESS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHING OF THIS: but reason turning away from God, and the lower powers fighting against reason, and the body receiving contrary passions through the life which is through the soul, would ensue."

Here it is worth pausing a moment to wonder why a certain modern theologian — whom we have mentioned elsewhere — transcribing this entire passage of St. Thomas, by which he attempts to prove his own opinion about the impossibility of the state of pure nature as a potency of God ordained by the Thomists as commonly rejected, omits these last words of St. Thomas; although he subjoins the subsequent consequent words of the same St. Thomas, indicating however that something has been omitted.

§ 25. Likewise, *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 1, in the body of the article:[68] "It must be considered that to the first man when he was established there was conferred by God, beyond the proportion of his nature and the capacities of his own principles, a certain gift of original justice, by which reason was perfectly subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul, and external things to man: and because this gift was conferred beyond nature, when man sinned and this gift was withdrawn, he was left to the condition of his own nature, so as to have those defects which follow from the condition of his nature." And then, after some further words in the same article: "For in the state of integrity man's reason was so subject to God that it was impeded by no disorder of the lower powers, nor clouded by any ignorance or error; but it remained in the light of wisdom, and the lower powers were entirely subject to it, so that no desire moved against reason; and the body was entirely subject to the soul, so as to be impeded by no bodily infirmity. But when the gift was withdrawn, these defects followed from the conditions of the nature — as when a craftsman withdraws his hand, what was moved by his hand falls to the ground by its own weight."

THE POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS AND THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS (*POSITIONES JANSENII ET DOCTRINA S. THOMAE*)

§ II — The Positions of Jansenius and the Opposing Doctrine of St. Thomas (Positiones Jansenii et Doctrina S. Thomae contraria)

§ 26. [POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS] Jansenius, in chapter twenty (page 332 of the work already cited), begins to waver, and maintains that this impossibility is to be derived from fittingness (*decentia*), congruity (*congruitas*), the divine Goodness, and other equities arising from other chapters. Yet Jansenius remains consistent with himself: in the course of his argument he so explains these fittinesses and congruities as to render altogether impossible the creation of a man destitute of the gratuitous love of God. "It is impossible," he says (in that chapter 20 of the second book, page 333, column 1), "that God should act inconveniently, indecently, unwisely, against reason, harshly, and without mercy." Now these were the headings of the fittinesses, congruities, and equities, in accordance with which he had asserted that God was bound to create man endowed with the supernatural gift of justice. Moreover, we have already noted elsewhere that Michael Baius anticipated Jansenius in this assertion with his condemned theses, and that certain Quesnellian propositions akin to the same were proscribed by the Holy See.[69]

§ 27. From this presupposed foundation, Jansenius opens the way for himself to another assertion, which is widely celebrated among the Jansenists and embraced by them with open arms: namely, that two origins of human actions are to be recognized — cupidity (*cupiditas*) and the love of God (*Dei dilectio*) — of which the first generates actions that are nothing but evil and distorted, while the second generates good and upright actions worthy of some divine reward. This proposition likewise has been struck with anathema both by the supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V and Gregory XIII, and by Alexander VIII, as we have noted elsewhere.[70] For Jansenius, in order to prove that man could not have been created destitute of supernatural Grace, adduces this argument: namely, that without the gratuitous love of God — and indeed a chaste love (*amor castus*) directed toward God as lovable in Himself — a man once created would have been distorted and vicious; since, in the absence of the love of God, cupidity, the root of all evils, must of necessity hold dominion. This same assertion Jansenius establishes at length with many arguments, especially in book 1 *On the State of Fallen Nature* (page 218 of the same tome 2), to which he prefixes the title: "There is no mean between charity and culpability."

§ 28. Now from the same source another assertion of the same Jansenius is derived: he establishes that there is to be acknowledged no just and natural love of God, and that love of God can only be recognized as supernatural, proceeding from the Grace of God and infused by the Holy Spirit. He maintains, he says, this in accordance with Augustine's principle, and moreover that this is so true that he did not hesitate to affirm that the contrary opinion, concerning a natural love of God, had been proscribed by Augustine as Pelagian. Hence

in the same book 1 *On the State of Pure Nature* (chapter 10, page 308, column 2), he declares that the distinction of a twofold love and justice — whereof one is natural and the other supernatural — is foreign to the principles of Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and all the ancient defenders of Grace, and was devised many centuries later; which distinction indeed cannot be conceded to the Pelagians, since they were wont to link their entire doctrine with the Catholic faith. This is altogether consistent with those theses drawn from Baius which we have reported elsewhere.

§ 29. Having laid down these positions, Jansenius advances to other positions consonant with the same foundation, by which he prepares the way for the doctrine expressed in the five famous propositions condemned by the Apostolic See — namely, deriving from that distinction of the two principles of human actions, Cupidity and Charity, this consequence: that all those who are destitute of charity — and all unbelievers, since they lack faith, and accordingly can elicit no act of natural, inchoate, or imperfect love — sin in all their works, and can never do any good whatsoever, their virtues being vices, and their acts being sins. This he expressly teaches in many places, especially in book 3 (*On the State of Fallen Nature*, chapter 17, page 157, and book 4, page 246, and in that same book 4, chapter 36). And in this same book (page 324, at the beginning of that chapter), he prefixes this title: "Nonsense, Delirium, Madness, Error, Impiety, contrary to the sense of Christians, to the Scriptures, and to the faith" — namely, the opinion that unbelievers have any true virtue, or that their works can be without sin, according to St. Augustine and the Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*).[71] Yet this very assertion has also Baius as its patron in the condemned theses.

§ 30. From another presupposed foundation — the impossibility of the state of pure nature destitute of gratuitous love, on the ground that the love of God above all things, diffused indeed by the gift of the Holy Spirit, is a necessity of natural precept urging in all works, without which no action can be good according to his principles — Jansenius derived another conclusion: namely, that a man is bound to refer all his actions to God as supernatural and ultimate end, actually or virtually; so that he altogether sins against the first and greatest precept of the Decalogue who does not refer to God as ultimate end, actually or virtually, any action which is otherwise good from its object and proximate end. This doctrine Jansenius teaches both in book 3 (*On the State of Fallen Nature*, chapter 17, page 215) and elsewhere throughout.[72]

§ 31. [DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS] St. Thomas, expounding in his commentary on the first Epistle (to the Corinthians, chapter 10, lecture 7) the words of the Apostle, "All in the glory of God do" — replying to the objection: the relation of ordering all things to the glory of God, which is not only in good but also in venial sin, is divided against God as end; it is said: "If venially, everyone who sins venially acts against this precept; therefore he sins mortally" — resolves the controversy thus. The Doctor responds: "It is answered. Some say that this is a counsel; but this is not true. But it must be said that it is not necessary that all things be referred to God in act, but in habit. FOR WHATEVER IS DONE AGAINST THE GLORY OF GOD AND HIS PRECEPTS IS DONE AGAINST THIS PRECEPT. BUT ONE WHO SINS VENIALLY DOES NOT ACT AGAINST THIS PRECEPT ABSOLUTELY (*SIMPLICITER*), WHO DOES NOT ACTUALLY BUT HABITUALLY REFER ALL THINGS TO GOD." You see from this testimony of St. Thomas that there is indeed a precept of ordering works to God, but that there is not a precept of ordering them explicitly, but only implicitly — that is, of performing an action for some other honest end conformed to reason, which of itself implicitly and as it were by its own weight tends toward God, unless the agent refers it to another, that is, to a depraved end. For this reason St. Thomas says, in the words just cited, "whoever acts

against the glory of God and His precepts acts against this precept" — as if saying: if anyone acts against the glory of God and His precepts, he acts against this precept.[73]

§ 32. Nor should you suppose that St. Thomas at least concedes, in those cited words, that there is venial sin whenever an action is not expressly ordered to God; for when he says "one who sins venially does not act against this precept absolutely (*simpliciter*)," the word *simpliciter* there plainly denotes that an action not ordered to the glory of God is not gravely contrary to that precept; yet it is lightly, that is, venially, contrary to it — and therefore he seems to think that to avoid even venial fault it is necessary that all actions be explicitly referred to God. Do not suppose, I say, that this is what St. Thomas intends; since elsewhere he establishes this distinction between one who sins venially and one who performs an action good and honest from its object: namely, that one who sins venially performs an action in no way referable to God, whereas one who performs an honest work, although he does not actually refer it to God, nevertheless performs an action which of itself tends toward God and is referable to God — because the honesty of any virtue is pleasing to God immediately in itself, as is clear from the Sacred Scriptures, in which the honesty of the moral virtues is commended as worthy of being sought on its own account and pleasing to God.

§ 33. On this account the same Holy Doctor, in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 132, a. 1,[74] inquiring whether the desire of glory is a sin, having objected to himself in third place that passage from Sir. 41: "Have care of a good name," and from Rom. 12: "Providing good things not only before God but also before men" — replies thus: "To the third it must be said that it pertains to the perfection of a man that he himself know himself; but that he be known by others does not pertain to his perfection. Therefore it is not to be sought for its own sake. It can however be sought insofar as it is useful for something: either in order that God may be glorified by men, or in order that men may profit from the good which they perceive in him, or in order that the man himself, from the goods which he recognizes in himself through the testimony of another's praise, may strive to persevere in them and advance to better things. AND ACCORDING TO THIS IT IS PRAISEWORTHY THAT A MAN HAVE CARE OF A GOOD NAME AND THAT HE PROVIDE GOOD THINGS BEFORE GOD AND MEN: yet not that he take vain delight in human praise." Behold, here St. Thomas clearly teaches that the desire of honor is honest, not only with the end that God may be glorified by men, but also that other men, or that the man himself, may advance in virtue; even though he does not explicitly refer this to the glory of God.[75]

§ 34. Come then, let us exhibit other clearer passages of St. Thomas, altogether at variance with the Jansenian dogmas set before us. St. Thomas therefore, in his commentary on the first Epistle (to the Corinthians, chapter 10, lecture 7) on the words "Do all in the glory of God," says thus: "On the contrary, I respond. This relation of ordering to the glory of God, which is not only in good but also in indifferent things, is understood either in act or in the aptitude of ordering." And in *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, he inquires: whether venial sin is divided against mortal sin? He objects to himself, in ninth place, this argument: "Moreover, a man is bound by precept to order all that he does to God as end. For it is said (1 Cor. 10): 'Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all in the glory of God'; but venial sin is not referable to God; therefore whoever sins venially acts against the precept; therefore he sins mortally." To this objection St. Thomas responds thus: "To the ninth it must be said that since that precept of the Apostle is affirmative, it does not oblige to this, that it be always observed in act. It is observed however always in habit, so long as a man habitually has God as his ultimate end. Which is not excluded by venial sin."[76]

§ 35. Likewise St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3:[77] "It must be said that the same act in number, as it once proceeds from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible however that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will, just as this very act of killing a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to the satisfying of anger. And from this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals: because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way it will be an act of vice." And in the same place (a. 4, and q. 12, a. 2), St. Thomas teaches that there are intermediate ends, or some of which one is the end of another, which do not have the formal character (*ratio*) of the ultimate end, but are referred rather to the ultimate end itself simply; such he says are all those things which are desired for their own sake with reference to the ultimate end — because it is proper to the ultimate end that there be in it no relation of mode by which it would be ordered to another end, even though without any memory or thought of the ultimate end. Hence (I-II, a. 1, ad 3): "It is not necessary," he says, "that one always thinks of the ultimate end, whenever one desires or performs anything; but the efficacy of the first intention, which is with respect to the ultimate end, remains in whatsoever desire of anything, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of: just as he who is walking along the road need not think of the end at every step."[78]

§ 36. Likewise St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4,[79] inquiring: whether every action of an unbeliever is a sin? Responds: that not all works of unbelievers are sins, but that some morally good things are found among them. This assertion St. Thomas proves thus: "As was said above (I-II, q. 85, aa. 1 and 2), mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Hence since unbelief is a kind of mortal sin, unbelievers indeed lack Grace; BUT THERE REMAINS IN THEM SOME NATURAL GOOD: whence it is evident that unbelievers cannot perform works meritorious of eternal life, which are good works that suffice for merit of this kind. NEVERTHELESS THEY CAN PERFORM SOME GOOD WORKS PROPORTIONED TO NATURE. NOR IS IT NECESSARY THAT IN EVERY WORK THEY SIN. But when they perform works proceeding from unbelief, then they sin. For just as a person having faith can commit a sin in some act which he does not refer to the end of faith, either venially or even mortally in sinning mortally — so also an unbeliever can perform some good act in what he does not refer to the end of unbelief." He had objected to himself that passage of the Apostle (Rom. 14): "All that is not of faith is sin." To the first he says it must be understood either because the life of unbelievers cannot be without sin since their sins of unbelief are not taken away, or because whatever they do from unbelief is sin. And in the reply to the second: "To the second it must be said that faith directs the intention with respect to the supernatural ultimate end: but the light even of natural reason can direct the intention with respect to a connatural good." And to the third: "It must be said that through unbelief natural reason is not wholly corrupted in unbelievers, but there remains in them some true cognition by which they can perform some work of a good kind.",[80]

§ 37. Similar things St. Thomas teaches in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (chapter 14, lecture 3), expounding that word of the Apostle: "All that is not of faith is sin." From which, he says, it seems that the life of unbelievers is sin; just as the whole life of the faithful is ordered to the glory of God according to that passage (1 Cor. 10): "Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all in the glory of God." But he says it is otherwise with a believer as regards good, and with an unbeliever: "In a man who has formed faith, nothing is damned in him as sinner; but in the man who is an unbeliever, together with his unbelief there is natural good. When therefore an unbeliever, following the dictate of reason, does some good, he does not refer it to an evil end, and does not sin. Yet his work is not meritorious: because it is not informed by Grace.

And this is what is said in the Gloss: there is no good meritorious good without the Grace of God; and where there is no acknowledgment of eternal life and of immutable truth, that is, which is attained through faith, the virtues are false morals — INASMUCH AS THEY DO NOT TEND TO THE END OF ETERNAL RIGHTEOUSNESS. But when an unbeliever does something as an unbeliever, it is evident that he sins. Hence in the Gloss, that passage 'All that is not of faith is sin' is to be understood thus: either because it is against conscience that is sin; or because from its kind it seems good to them. If a pagan vows virginity in honor of his gods, by this very fact he sins."[81]

§ 38. And St. Thomas, expounding the same Epistle to Titus (1, lecture 4), the words "To the unclean and to unbelievers nothing is clean, but their very mind and conscience are defiled" — says: "When a sinner and an unbeliever does some good, the whole is sin from the root. But if" — [and here the preserved text breaks off].[82]

§ 39. [Continuing from St. Thomas's commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians (chapter 3, lecture 3), expounding those words of the Apostle: "Whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, giving thanks to God":] Thirdly, he sets down, he says, the use of love in work, saying "Whatsoever you do, etc." — because speech also is a kind of work (1 Cor. 10): "Whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all in the glory of God, etc." But against this: Either this is a precept or a counsel. If a precept, then whoever does not do this sins; therefore whoever sins venially, sins mortally. Having set forth this difficulty, he resolves the controversy thus. The Doctor responds: "Some say that this is a counsel; but this is not true. But it must be said that it is not necessary that all things be referred to God in act, but in habit. FOR WHATEVER IS DONE AGAINST THE GLORY OF GOD AND HIS PRECEPTS IS DONE AGAINST THIS PRECEPT. BUT ONE WHO SINS VENIALLY DOES NOT ACT AGAINST THIS PRECEPT ABSOLUTELY, WHO DOES NOT ACTUALLY BUT HABITUALLY REFERS ALL THINGS TO GOD." You see from this testimony of St. Thomas that there is indeed a precept of ordering works to God, but that there is not a precept of ordering them explicitly, but only implicitly — that is, of performing an action for some other honest end conformed to reason, which of itself implicitly and as it were by its own weight is carried toward God; unless the agent refers it to another, that is, to a depraved end. Therefore St. Thomas says, in the words just cited, "whoever acts against the glory of God and His precepts acts against this precept" — as if saying: if anyone acts against the glory of God and His precepts, he acts against this precept.[83]

§ 40. [POSITIONES JANSENII, continued.] It is worth the effort here briefly to transcribe a few of Jansenius's texts in which these positions are asserted. The first Proposition of Jansenius is this: Certain precepts of God are impossible to men of good will striving and doing what they can according to their present forces; and Grace also is wanting to them by which these precepts might be made possible. The supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII declare this proposition rash, blasphemous, condemned with anathema, and heretical, and condemn it as such. You are surprised, perhaps Reader, that a Catholic Doctor could have asserted this! But the supreme Pontiffs testify that this proposition was excerpted from the book of Jansenius himself; and by their judgment and assertion no Catholic ought to have subscribed to it? Come, here are the most express passages of Jansenius himself by which he most clearly asserts and establishes it. The first passage is from book 3 (*On the Grace of Christ the Saviour*, chapter 13, page 135, column 1). From this undoubted doctrine, he says, certain things that are not of small moment pertaining to this matter emerge and become clear. First, that there are certain precepts prescribed to man according to his condition and forces, which in his current state will be impossible — secondly, that Grace is not always present, by which we may

fulfill those same precepts. Third, this impossibility — [here the passage continues in the right-hand column of St. Thomas's doctrine].[84]

§ 41. [DOCTRINA S. THOMAE.] St. Thomas, in *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 1:[65] "God conferred upon human nature in its principle a condition above that of its own principles, so that it might consist in reason being subject to God and the lower powers to reason, through a certain rectitude which is that of original justice (*iustitia originalis*), which it could impress upon the lower powers without any resistance; for this was conferred on it gratuitously and therefore was justly withdrawn through ingratitude and disobedience. Hence it came about that, the first man sinning, human nature, such as it would be left to itself, is restored to consist ACCORDING TO THE CONDITION of its principles."

§ 42. And in the same place, a. 2, ad 3:[85] "God could from the beginning, when He created man, also form another man from the slime of the earth WHOM HE WOULD LEAVE IN THE CONDITION OF HIS NATURE, so that he would be mortal and passible, and with the struggle of concupiscence against reason, in which nothing of human nature is diminished; since this is a consequence from the natural principles of nature. This defect, however, would not have had in him the formal character of guilt or of punishment, since this defect would not have been caused for him by his own will."

§ 43. And in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1:[86] "It is manifest that that subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to reason, was NOT NATURAL: otherwise it would have remained after sin, since also in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius says (*De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4). Hence it is manifest that also that first subjection, by which reason was subject to God, was not only according to nature, but according to a SUPERNATURAL GIFT OF GRACE: from which it is given to understand that if Grace deserted, the obedience of flesh to soul was dissolved; and that by Grace existing in the soul the lower powers were subjected to it."

§ 44. And in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 2, ad 3:[87] "To the third it must be said that that objection proceeds of a habit by which a power is inclined to an act. Although also from original sin there follows an inclination to disordered acts, not directly but indirectly, namely by the removal of the prohibition, that is, of original justice, which prohibited the disordered movements: just as also from illness there follows indirectly an inclination to disordered bodily movements. And in q. 87, a. 7, in the body: Principally indeed it is a punishment of original sin that human nature left to itself suffers all the penalities which follow from the defect of nature, but also from the defect of men's nature there happen to men things not of original sin principally, but indirectly, and as a supernaturaI gift had been given divinely — namely original justice, by which reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul."

§ 45. Proceeding now to a matter of considerable importance: it is established from the foregoing testimony of St. Thomas that there is indeed a precept of ordering works to God, but not a precept of ordering them explicitly — only implicitly. St. Thomas, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article:[88] "The nature of man can be considered in two ways: in one way in its integrity, as it was in the first parent before sin. In another way according as it is corrupted in us after the sin of the first parent. ACCORDING TO BOTH STATES HUMAN NATURE NEEDS DIVINE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO DO OR TO WILL ANY GOOD AS A FIRST MOVER, as was said in the preceding article. But in the state of integral nature, man had sufficiency of operative virtue so that by his natural powers he could will and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; not however a superexceeding

good, such as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupted nature man falls short even of this, since he cannot fulfill by his natural powers the whole of such good. Since however human nature is not wholly corrupted by the sin of one man, so as to be deprived totally of the whole good of nature, man can even in the state of corrupted nature, by virtue of his natural power" — [the passage is continued below].[89]

§ 46. [Continuing the POSITIONES JANSENII column.] Jansenius, in his book on the *Gratia Primi Hominis* and of the Angels (chapters 14 and 15, page 61 and 64, and tome 3, book 2 *On the Grace of Christ the Saviour*, chapter 4, pages 33 and 40), distinguishes between voluntary Grace and efficacious Grace: the first he calls Grace, or the Auxiliary *Sine Quo Non*; the second the Auxiliary *Quo*. He explains the distinction between these two kinds of Auxiliaries (chapter 4, of the same book 2, *On Christ*, page 40, column 2) in this same place, saying: "That Auxiliary of the first integral nature so aided the will that if it wished, it could operate by it; now however the Auxiliary itself after the fall makes it will and operate, if it will: this is the Auxiliary *Quo* before the fall, which, inwardly flowing alongside the will, caused it to depend on the will's free motion, and so it left liberty safely in its indifference to flex in either direction. Now after the fall, no such Auxiliary makes the will will, and the Auxiliary *Quo* flows and wishes to will." Which distinction he himself expounds in the same place in such a way that, as we have noted elsewhere and will repeat here, Jansenius certainly, in transmitting this dogma, used the two Auxiliaries *Sine Quo Non* and *Quo* — the former celebrated and elaborately commended, and the latter — as he himself seems to think — proven. Jansenius then in his book *On the Grace of Fallen Man* (chapter 6, page 174, column 2) explains in what the efficacy of this Auxiliary consists, which he calls properly the Auxiliary *Quo* of fallen nature: "Creberrime docet Augustinus" — Augustine teaches most frequently, he says, that while we live in this mortal life, there is in man a battle between two delights: of the noxious and of the beneficial, of the earthly and of the heavenly; whichever of them conquers, draws the soul along with it. Then man is truly freed from sin, and a good work effected, when that heavenly sweetness from heaven comes and overcomes the adversary. Thence chapter 6 (page 174, column 2) he prefixes this title: "Name of the delight thence derived and imposed as the Grace of Christ the Mediator." And in the body of that chapter (page 175, column 1) he strives to establish as a most certain Axiom from Augustine the assertion: "What further delights us, according to that we operate, it is of necessity that" — [here the preserved text continues regarding Jansenism's claim about necessity].[90]

§ 47. [DOCTRINA S. THOMAE, continued.] Concerning § 13 and book 1 (ad *Distinctionem* 26):[91] "To the redundance of the most luminous passages of St. Thomas, which, as he asserted, he had commemorated in many places, or proven — namely in both states both of integral nature and of fallen nature requiring both an Auxiliary, and that sufficient forces be present, and that the power be applied to act. The consequences also that flow from that principle concerning diverse Predestination for Angels, and for human nature in the state of integral nature, and concerning the nature of merits in that state, and what is human and natural to Jansenius in the state of fallen nature, which he calls by the same name of divine and gratuitous — are refuted by the same testimonies of St. Thomas in the places cited by our Author, and also indicated by us in the Annotations on both sides, and are sufficiently refuted. Let it suffice therefore to refer here one or another passage of St. Thomas in which he most clearly manifested his own mind, and the Doctor's words are so express that it would be impudent for Jansenius to attribute to him any such view whatsoever."

§ 48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2, in the body:[88] "The nature of man can be considered in two ways — in one in its integrity, as it was in the first parent before sin. ACCORDING TO BOTH STATES HUMAN NATURE NEEDS DIVINE ASSISTANCE TO DO OR TO WILL ANY GOOD AS A FIRST

MOVER — but in the state of integral nature he had sufficiency of operative virtue so that by his natural powers he could will and do the good proportionate to his nature. But in the state of corrupted nature man falls short even of this — but since human nature is not wholly corrupted so as to be totally deprived of the whole good of nature, even in the state of corrupted nature by virtue of his natural power" — [the text continues thus to affirm that man can perform some good works proportionate to nature even without grace superadded].[89]

§ 49. It is moreover a very clear locus, and contrary to Jansenius, as we may say, decisive — from q. 6 *De Malo*, the unique article *On Human Election, or Free Will*. The title of the article is: Whether a man has free election of his acts, or whether he elects from necessity? He responds in the body of the article: Dicendum quod some held that the will of man is moved from necessity to choose something, yet they did not posit that the will is coerced. For not every necessary thing is violent, but only that of which the principle is external: whence the motions naturally found necessary are not violent: not however violent; for violent repugns to the natural, as well as the voluntary, since the principle of both is within; whereas of the violent the principle is without. Is not this position of Jansenius that which he strives so eagerly to prove with testimonies and reasons? And what does St. Thomas reply to this view of Jansenius? In his own words: "THIS IS A HERETICAL OPINION. For it takes away the formal character of merit and demerit in human acts. For it does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious what someone does if he cannot avoid it. And it is to be numbered among the foreign opinions of Philosophy, BECAUSE IT NOT ONLY CONTRADICTS THE FAITH BUT SUBVERTS ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. For if there is nothing in us that comes from necessity" — [the text breaks off here].[92]

§ 50. [Final summary — POSITIONES JANSENII concluded.] These, idem the same Author (Innocent X), from the same Gomarists condemned, are — the Antelapasarians and Sublapasarians who came forward to cause the medium of necessity to be induced, saying that men are not coerced by God to evil, or to sin, but are led only by allurement, or secret and arcane necessity, freely to sin and to be inexcusable at condemnation. They show, and the Remonstrants condemn in their brothers the Calvinists, the Authors of their sect (in *Acta* part 3 and part 2) where they ridicule those who hope that it is possible by that means to escape God coercing men to sins, if only He secretly and necessarily moves men to sin by arcane means and will. The fourth proposition, by the same Author reported, condemned also by Innocent X, was that of the Gomarists, as is most extensively evident from the Acts of the Synod of Dordrecht in which the Gomarist brethren prevailed against Arminians — the Remonstrants — on the grounds that they taught that the Grace of God is such that human will can resist it; they condemned them and called them Semi-Pelagians for this reason. Concerning this Dordrecht Synod consult Dionysius Petavius (*Theologici Dogmatis de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana haeresi*, cap. 17). The fifth proposition condemned by Innocent X was also that of the Gomarists, as is evident from the same Continuator of the *Acta* (part 2) where the Remonstrants begin to enumerate the words of their adversaries the Contra-Remonstrants, the Antelapasarians and Sublapasarians, who impiously teach that Christ the Lord our Saviour came not for all men but only for the Elect, or the Predestinate. As for who were the Gomarists, who their sectarian Author, who the Remonstrants, who the Contra-Remonstrants, the Antelapasarians and Sublapasarians, if you wish to know, consult the same Author (in the same book 9). The same Author subjoins these words: "The Roman Church has this glory: that from its bishop Innocent I it saw condemned the Pelagian abrogators of Grace, and from its Innocent X it sees condemned those who affixed irresistible necessity to Grace; and the Catholic Church has been freed by paternal charity equally from the

dangers of error and of schism, so that it may always give thanks to its Father and preserves his memory in eternal benediction."

§ 51. Behold, Reader, here a sufficiently representative summary of the Jansenian Dogmas, so that you may easily come to know the pernicious errors of Jansenius and have the whole doctrine of Jansenius in perspective. A sort of compendium of him who of Jansenius has written thus seems to have been exhibited here:

> *De Natura pura minus sane* — Of Pure Nature, less soundly; *De Natura sana minus pure* — Of Sound Nature, less purely; *De Natura lapsa minus recte* — Of Fallen Nature, less rightly; *De Natura Christiana minus Christiane sensit* — Of Christian Nature, he thought less Christianly; *Post calumnias naturae non pepercit Gratiae* — After calumnies of nature, he spared not Grace; *Ut negaret sufficientem, fecit inutilem* — To deny the sufficient, he made Grace useless; *Ut adstrueret efficacem, fecit necessitatem* — To establish the efficacious, he made necessity; *Ut everteret liberum arbitrium, fecit captivum* — To overthrow free will, he made it captive; *Ut corrumperet bona opera, corrupit merita* — To corrupt good works, he corrupted merits; *Ut excusaret peccatum, fecit necessarium* — To excuse sin, he made it necessary.

These indications are given to you so that in other Authors and in other places you may examine the Jansenian dogmas more closely, and arm yourself with the strongest arguments both from authority and from reason put forward most validly to refute them. Deign not to shrink from perusing with your eyes the testimonies of St. Thomas placed in plain sight, by which they are marvelously confuted.

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§ II — The Positions of Jansenius and the Doctrine of St. Thomas (Positiones Jansenii et Doctrina S. Thomae) (continued)

§ 52. Now, that what is done from a principle of some good that is held by nature is not unclean, St. Thomas himself teaches in *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, asking whether the moral virtues can exist without charity.[93] He replies: "One must say that, just as the moral virtues insofar as they are operative of good within the capacity of natural human faculty, they can exist without charity — just as faith without formed charity can exist — so also insofar as they are truly operative of a good ordered to the ultimate end and truly have the character (*ratio*) of virtue, they are infused by God." And such virtues as these cannot exist without charity. Furthermore, whereas the Adversaries, in establishing a precept of referring all things to God either actually or virtually (that is, by the reference to the good which is contained in the good work itself from its object, proximate end, and circumstances), press the authority of St. Thomas — especially from *Summa theologiae* I-II[94] — it is worth the labour to transcribe here almost the whole article, so that it may appear plainly how far St. Thomas stands from the position of the Adversaries.'[95]

§ 53. The title of the article is: "Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of divine law." After the objections proposed on one part, St. Thomas has the following *Sed contra*: "But on the contrary, whoever does not keep a precept sins mortally. If, therefore, the mode of charity falls under a precept, it follows that whoever performs actions not from charity sins mortally. But whoever does not have charity sins mortally in all that he does, no matter how much it may be of a good kind. Nothing is certainly more express than this."

But when St. Thomas does not apply any solution to this argument — as he is accustomed to do in other *Sed contra* arguments — and when the arguments adduced in those objections are not pleasing to him, it is clear that St. Thomas did not recoil from what was brought forward in that argument. St. Thomas replies in the body of the article with two propositions: "I reply that one must say: there have been contrary opinions about this matter. Some said absolutely that the mode of charity falls under the precept; nor is it impossible to observe this precept for one who has charity, because he can dispose himself for this, that charity be infused in him by God. Nor does one who lacks charity sin mortally in everything he does, because this is an affirmative precept that does not bind always, but for that time when someone who lacks charity does something of good kinds — he sins mortally because he is at that point a transgressor of an affirmative precept. Others said that the mode of charity in no way falls under a precept. And these said something true in a certain respect. For the act of charity can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it is a certain act by itself, and in this way it falls under the precept of the law that is specially given about this, namely, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God' and 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour'; and in this respect the first party said something true. For it is not impossible to observe this precept about the act of charity, because a man can dispose himself to have charity, and when he has it, he can use it. In another way, the act of charity can be considered insofar as it is the mode of the acts of other virtues — that is, insofar as the acts of other virtues are ordered to charity, which is the end of the precept, as it is said in 1 Tim. 1. For it has been said above that the intention of the end is a certain formal mode of the act ordered to that end. And in this way what the second party said is true, that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept." This is the meaning: in the precept *Honour thy father*, it is not included that the father be honoured from charity, but only that he be honoured. Hence, whoever honours his father, even though he does not have charity, is not thereby made a transgressor of this precept, which is about the act of honouring; but through this transgression he merits punishment. The concluding words of St. Thomas clearly enough declare this sense: namely, that he who honours his father but not from charity is therefore a transgressor of the precept to which he is bound to have charity, not however because he does not in act or virtue refer the honouring of his father to God as the supremely beloved. In the same place St. Thomas says, speaking in those words about the obligation of honouring the father only, when one has charity.[96]

§ 54. Furthermore, Cajetan, when he exposes the doctrine of honouring the father, does not understand it — I know not with what boldness — in the sense opposed to him by St. Thomas in that place in the objection — namely that all things be done for God — to which St. Thomas thus replies: "To the second, one must say that under the precept of charity, as one is obliged to love God with his whole heart, it pertains that all things be referred to God. And therefore even one who cannot fulfil the precept of charity unless everything be referred to God. Thus therefore, whoever honours his parents is bound from the force of the precept which is *Honour thy father*, but also from the force of the precept which is *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart*." So the words go against the Adversaries; but they omit what follows, which indeed refutes their assertion. And the words of St. Thomas that immediately follow are these: "AND SINCE THESE ARE TWO DISTINCT AFFIRMATIVE PRECEPTS, IT CAN HAPPEN THAT ONE FULFILLING THE PRECEPT ABOUT THE HONOURING OF PARENTS DOES NOT AT THAT MOMENT TRANSGRESS THE PRECEPT ABOUT THE OMISSION OF THE MODE OF CHARITY." So clear are those words that they need no rays of clarification — indeed, rays of the sun are less clear.[97]

§ 55. And truly with no less clarity does St. Thomas refute that other Jansenian assertion by which Jansenius denies the celebrated distinction of theologians between love of God as author of nature and love of

God as author of supernatural grace. For in commenting on 1 Cor. 13, lect. 4,[98] he writes thus: "One must know that love is a certain unitive force (*vis unitiva*), and every love consists in a certain union. Hence, according to diverse unions, diverse species of friendship are distinguished by the Philosopher. Now, we have a twofold conjunction with God. One is in respect of the goods of nature, which we here participate from Him. The other is in respect of beatitude, insofar as we are made participants of the supernatural felicity of heaven according as it is here possible — for we are striving also to the perfect attainment of that eternal beatitude and to being made fellow-citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem. And according to the first communion there is natural friendship; according to which each and every thing, according to its own mode — that is, either intellectually, or rationally, or at least naturally — loves and desires God as the first cause and highest good. According to the second communion, however, there is the love of charity (*amor caritatis*), by which only a rational creature intellectually loves God."[99]

§ 56. In the body of the same article he says: "One must say that from God a twofold good can be received, namely the Good of nature and the Good of Grace. Upon the communication of natural goods made to us by God, natural friendship is founded; in virtue of which natural integrity, nature loves God above all things, just as every creature in its own mode — that is, either intellectual, or rational, or animal, or at least natural love — and so forth."[100] And in *In II Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5, he says: "To the fifth one must say, that although unbaptized children are separated from God with respect to the conjunction which is through glory, they are nevertheless not separated from Him with respect to the conjunction which is through participation in natural goods — they will be able to see with NATURAL cognition and LOVE."[101] And in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 3, we can take the good in two ways — according to communication of natural goods — by which not only does a man love himself, and more than himself, but also according to the rational, or animal, or at least natural mode. The same thing St. Thomas clearly intimates in *In II Sent.*, dist. 23 [as above], where in reply to the fifth he says: "insofar as they are, with respect to that conjunction, separated, indeed they are most closely conjoined to Him through natural goods, and so also in the same way concerning the very LOVE OF GOD AS AUTHOR OF NATURE."[102]

POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS — DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS (Positiones Jansenii — Doctrina S. Thomae)

§ 57. Now whereas Jansenius, eliciting the proper acts from other virtues besides charity, says that beyond charity, the love of God poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us, all the acts of whatever virtues not directed to charity are repudiated, as tradition hands down — and those not directed to charity, [let us examine this against the testimony of St. Thomas on servile fear].[103]

St. Thomas in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 4,[104] inquires whether servile fear is good. And in the *Sed contra* argument he says: "Nothing evil is from the Holy Spirit. But servile fear is from the Holy Spirit, because it is the act — upon that passage of Rom. 8, 'For you have not received the spirit of bondage' — the *Gloss* says that servile fear, insofar as it is servile, is contrary to charity." Now Jansenius not in one place establishes acts of fear whereby God is feared as the Avenger of sins, inflicting the punishment of the torments of Gehenna for sins, as vicious and not good, and as not supernatural — being as they are derived from love of creature and of one's own interest — notwithstanding the faith which he requires as a prerequisite for such acts of fear, as he

especially maintains in Book 5 of *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 24, p. 234–235, col. 2 and 1, and ch. 31, p. 245 (and also ch. 33),[105] where he rejects the opinion — as he himself says — of certain Scholastics who held that sorrow for sin on account of the fear of Gehenna can exclude every will to sin and contain the resolution of a good life or of observing the whole law of God; and he says that this doctrine is greatly repugnant to the teaching of St. Augustine. He turns over this argument in almost the whole of the aforesaid Book 5 (*De Gratia Christi*), where he is wholly engaged in proving that what proceeds from love of justice and love of God is a truly good work; though in ch. 21 of the same book he asserts that fear of Gehenna, considered in itself, is lawful, good, and right; but that unless it is related to God through love of God, it is evil and vicious, as he proves both there and elsewhere — arguing that servile fear is bad as such when it regards punishment as its object or end, and does not tend toward God as its end, and in consequence is evil, which happens in one who has charity; and yet also [evil] by the very fact that its object or end is ordered to punishment, not feared as the principal evil, which happens in one who has charity. For the species of habit is not taken away by this, that its object or end is ordered to a further end. And therefore servile fear according to its substance is good, but its servility is evil if there is an affection toward sin, so that one does not have the resolution either formal or virtual. (So St. Thomas explains himself in the same article, in reply to 1.) "To the first therefore," he says, "one must say that that saying of Augustine is to be understood of one who does something through servile fear, that is, one who does not love justice, but FEARS PUNISHMENT ALONE." And to 3: "One must say that the mercenary love is said to be that of one who loves God for temporal goods, which according to itself is contrary to charity; and therefore mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear according to its substance does not import except fear of punishment, whether punishment be not feared as the principal evil, or whether it be feared."[106]

§ 58. St. Thomas explains himself more clearly in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 8, lect. 3, expounding that Apostolic text "For you have not received the spirit of bondage." "One must consider," he says, "that fear has two objects, namely the evil which someone fleeing avoids, and that from which he sees this evil threatening him. For a man is said to fear both killing and the king who can kill. But it happens sometimes that the evil which someone flees is contrary to bodily good, or temporal; which someone at times inordinately loves; and he flees suffering at the hands of some temporal man. And this is human or mundane fear; and the Lord forbids this (Matt. 10): 'Do not fear those who kill the body.' But another kind of fear is that which flees an evil that is contrary to the nature of the creature — namely the evil of punishment; but yet one flees this from a spiritual cause, namely from God: AND THIS FEAR IS LAUDABLE insofar as at least one fears God thereby: Deut. 5, 'Who would give them such a mind to have this fear.' But if someone does not flee the evil that is opposed to spiritual good, namely sin, this fear is not laudable. And this defect is not from the Holy Spirit, but from the weakness of the man; just as even faith without formed charity is from the Holy Spirit, but not its formlessness — insofar as through this fear (namely, that which does not flee sin) someone does not do good, but is merely coerced by fear of punishment; which is properly what is the mark of servants. And therefore this fear properly causes a man to work. But there is a third fear, which flees the evil that is opposed to spiritual good, namely SIN, AND THE SEPARATION FROM GOD: and this indeed one fears to incur from the just vengeance of God; and this fear has its object respecting a spiritual thing; but yet with this, it has its eye upon punishment as well." "SINCE GOD SAYS (Deut. 5)" — [the passage should be read integrally down to the point where he says] AND THIS FEAR IS LAUDABLE.[107]

§ 59. St. Thomas explains himself yet more clearly in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 7, where he inquires whether fear is the beginning of wisdom. In the body of the article, after the distinction of the two modes

which have been brought forward — as to what can be the beginning of wisdom, namely as to its essence insofar as wisdom begins to operate, and as to its effect — he says: "But servile fear is like a beginning outside of wisdom, insofar as someone from fear of punishment departs from sin, and thus disposes itself toward wisdom — according to Sir. 1: 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.' Filial fear, however, is in a different way a beginning: disposing towards wisdom, in which one is established through this, that one expels sin. And q. 45, a. 6, ad 3: 'One must say, as has already been said to the second, that wisdom pertains not only to the contemplation of divine things, but also to regulating human acts. In which regulation there first comes the removal of things that are contrary to wisdom, namely evil acts. And therefore fear is also said to be the beginning of wisdom, insofar as from it one departs from evils.'"[108] It is clear therefore from the doctrine of St. Thomas that servile fear is both good, supernatural, and by it one departs from sins — all of which things Jansenius denies in the afore-praised passages. Other passages of St. Thomas which could be adduced on this matter we omit for the sake of brevity.

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§ 60. Now Jansenius does not stop here — for his pernicious doctrine never keeps measure, as used to be said of old — but goes further. Having established the dogma of the impossibility of the state of pure nature (*status naturae purae*), other heads of the Jansenian dogma follow. For having asserted that the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) was owed to man and was due to him, and that man fell from it by his own fault, lapsing in the first man, he thinks that all those wounds must be attributed to this lapse which theologians commonly call penalties (*poenalitates*), and from this he derives the conclusion that ignorance of some natural thing, however invincible (*invincibilis*) from one's perspective, does not excuse from sin. Jansenius contends this is to be held as a defined dogma of the Catholic Church.[109] For he thus entitles chapter 2 of Book on the State of Fallen Nature, p. 1 (in the same vol. 2): "Ignorance of necessity, not of will, which is invincible, is not without sin — a dogma of faith handed down by the ancients."[110]

II. THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS (Doctrina S. Thomae)

§ 61. St. Thomas, in *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 4,[111] says: "One must say that ignorance which is altogether involuntary is not sin. And this is what St. Augustine says (*De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 67, and *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book 3, ch. 19):[112] it is not imputed to you as fault if you involuntarily are ignorant of justice; but by the fact that he adds 'if you neglect to know,' he gives to understand that ignorance has it that it is sin from preceding negligence."

Item, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 90, a. 4, in the body of the article:[113] "One must say," he says, "that as has been said (art. 1 of the same question), the law is imposed on others in the manner of a rule and measure. A rule and measure is imposed by the fact that it is applied to those which are regulated and measured. Hence, for a law to obtain the force of obliging — which is the proper function of law — it is required that it be applied to men who are to be regulated according to it. And such application comes about through its being brought to their knowledge."[114]

§ 62. Item, the same Doctor in the same *Summa theologiae* I-II[115] — [on antecedent, or invincible ignorance, causing it to be such that an antecedent and invincible ignorance]: Item, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 1, in the body he says: "Since —"[116]

Looking at the page images carefully, I can see this chunk covers material from the "Positiones Jansenii / Doctrina S. Thomae" parallel-column section of Distinctio 43, §II. The OCR is heavily garbled due to the two-column layout being merged. I will translate what the page images show, following the text column by column.

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§ 63. For since acts must be voluntary, it follows that the will is the principle of sins — which are evils — and that sin resides in the will as its subject. A defect of the apprehensive power (*virtus apprehensiva*) is in no way located in the will as its subject, nor in the apprehensive power itself, not even in the case of invincible ignorance. And therefore it remains that what is subject to the will is reckoned as sin, while invincible ignorance excuses entirely from sin. And St. Thomas replies: that the ignorance which causes an act to be involuntary causes that act to be, as it were, contrary to the will — which is what the notion of the involuntary imports. And such an act, he says, if knowledge were present, would be contrary to the will.[117] And a little later, treating of antecedent and invincible ignorance, he speaks as follows: "BUT IGNORANCE WHICH IS ITSELF INVOLUNTARY, BY THE VERY FACT THAT IT CAUSES THE INVOLUNTARY, HAS OF ITSELF THAT WHICH EXCUSES FROM SIN, INASMUCH AS IT TAKES AWAY THE FORMAL CHARACTER (*ratio*) OF THE VOLUNTARY." And at the end of the article he concludes: if indeed the ignorance be of such a kind as to be wholly involuntary — "EITHER BECAUSE IT IS OF SOMETHING WHICH ONE IS NOT BOUND TO KNOW: SUCH IGNORANCE EXCUSES ENTIRELY FROM SIN."[118]

Do you marvel that the distinction which Jansenius introduces — drawn from natural law and positive law, the first of which, however invincible, does not excuse, while the second does excuse — nowhere occurred to St. Thomas? What is more, St. Thomas, in the *Quodlibeta*, treating expressly of excusing ignorance, handles the case of one who acts on an opinion he judges probable, when no other opinion appears to him more probable: he can, says St. Thomas, seek to hold several benefices, asking whether it is lawful for one person to hold several prebends. And the sentence that antecedent ignorance excuses entirely from sin has been conceded even by the Heterodox themselves, such as Luther. The Scholastics say that invincible ignorance renders acts excusable. SUCH IS THE BLINDNESS IN THE SCHOOLS OF THE POPE. It were better for Jansenius to be blind together with Catholics than to see clearly with heretics against the doctrine of St. Thomas. THESE ARE THE PROPOSITIONS OF JANSENIUS.

§ 64. [On the teaching of St. Thomas.] The same judgment applies to Jansenius's teaching concerning the wound of concupiscence (*vulnus concupiscentiae*). By its force he strives to prove that the powers of human freedom are so broken that the will bears itself entirely under the weight of sin, and except by moving downward toward sin can do nothing: yet for all this incapacity, the sins into which it lapses are to be imputed to it entirely, and must truly be called voluntary. For in Book 3 of *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, ch. 2, p. 184, thrusting forward his fiction of total incapacity to perform any work whatsoever without sin as something to be embraced as a matter of faith — and in article 6, article 8, he undertakes expressly to prove ignorance as

causing the involuntary, while the act which knowledge opposed he calls simply involuntary — he goes on to say the same of antecedent and invincible ignorance.[119]

And Jansenius, in Book 3 of the same work, ch. 22 (p. 275, col. 2), having rejected the solutions of a number of Scholastics, is wholly occupied with asserting that in the state of fallen nature (*Status Naturae Lapsae*), for formal sin and demerit, that freedom suffices by which an act was voluntary and free in its cause, namely in original sin — in the freedom of Adam sinning — which is the first proposition among those proscribed by Alexander VIII. For after many arguments he has the following (p. 275, col. 2): "For through that first sin a departure was made from the mode in which man had naturally been made by his Creator. From which it follows that even the evils which spring of necessity from the condition of that state, as things done contrary to the constitution of nature, must be called vices and sins, however much it may be impossible for him to abstain from them by necessity of punishment. They are therefore true sins, although far lesser, and much less voluntary, less free, and more necessary than that first sin, from whose punishment they are committed." And after several further passages expressing the same thought in the same chapter (p. 276, col. 1), he concludes thus concerning sin necessarily committed in this state of fallen nature: "It is nevertheless called sin (a word which in its proper sense denotes the freest defection from truth in that first sin) because in that first sin it takes its origin from a free will."[120]

And concerning those things which are superadded to nature, without which "HE CAN DO NOTHING, ALTHOUGH HE CANNOT DO IT WITHOUT THE GRACE OF GOD — ACCORDING TO WHICH GOD IS 'FREELY GIVING' IN THAT HE IS THE PRINCIPLE NOT ONLY AMONG MEN BUT ALSO" — thus is that word to be understood: "without me you can do nothing" — and what the Apostle says: "we are not sufficient to think" — or those things which pertain to faith, for which man is not sufficient without grace.[121]

PROPOSITIONS OF JANSENIUS:

§ 65. "Therefore, having established the necessity of sinning in the state of fallen nature, and having asserted complete freedom in the state of innocent nature — or, if you prefer, in Jansenius's sense, in the state of pure nature — it was easy for Jansenius to establish his fiction, which he calls the key by which access is opened to the innermost chambers and depths — namely the distinction of the twofold auxiliary grace, the *Sine Quo Non* and the *Quo*, so greatly celebrated, commended, and, as he himself thinks, laboriously proved by him. Jansenius therefore, in his book *De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum* (chapters 14 and 15, pp. 61 and 64, Tom. 3), and in Book 2 *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, chapters 2 and 4 (pp. 33 and 40), distinguishes between the grace of the sound will and the grace of the sick will; the first he calls Grace, or the Auxiliary *Sine Quo Non*; the second the Auxiliary *Quo*. The difference between these auxiliaries (ch. 4 of the same Book 2 *De Gratia Christi*, p. 40, col. 2), he says, consists in this: that the auxiliary of that first integrity assisted the will in such a way that with it the will itself could operate, if it willed; but now the auxiliary itself causes the will to will. That is, the auxiliary before the fall was such that the influence of the auxiliary, just like the influence of the will upon the work, depended on the very motion of the free will, so that the indifference of freedom, flexible in either direction, remained intact; whereas now, after the fall, the auxiliary is such as to cause the will to consent, to act, and to will. Which distinction he sets out and explains at length in the same chapter. Who preceded Jansenius in teaching this dogma we have noted elsewhere, and it is not necessary to repeat it here. Certainly Jansenius himself, in Book 4 of the same work *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 4 (p. 173, col. 1), explains wherein consists the efficacy of that auxiliary which he calls proper to fallen nature, namely the auxiliary *Quo*,

in these words: 'Augustine teaches most frequently that, as long as we live this mortal life, there is in man a certain conflict of two delights, the harmful and the beneficial, the earthly and the heavenly; and whichever of these two gains the victory draws the mind with itself in agreement and consent. It is then that man is liberated from sin and a good work is accomplished, when that heavenly sweetness comes from heaven and overcomes and surpasses its adversary.' Then to chapter 6 (p. 174, col. 2) he assigns this title: 'The name of victorious delight derived from thence and imposed upon the medicinal grace of Christ.' And in the body of that same chapter (p. 175, col. 1) he strives to confirm, as a most certain axiom asserted by St. Augustine, that 'it is necessary that we act according to that which most delights us,' and that the whole argument presses toward proving[122] that a man cannot work well in the state of fallen nature unless that heavenly delight so floods the soul with sweetness as to overcome and surpass the contrary delight springing from concupiscence; to such a degree that he seems to recognize no other Grace of Christ the Victor than the Victorious Delight which so draws our will with itself that we not only act but act of necessity; and accordingly he depicts it as such that we necessarily obey it. Moreover (ch. 11 of the same book, p. 185, col. 1), defining this delight as so necessarily required for all good works, he says: 'The delight which St. Augustine demands for the performance of all good works is nothing other than a certain undeliberated act infused from heaven into the will, by which the proposed good either pleases it sweetly only (this is sometimes called simple will) — ' '.[123]

DOCTRINA S. THOMAE:

§ 66. "There is no reason to linger longer here in adducing the passages of St. Thomas in which this Jansenian fiction of the twofold auxiliary — *Sine Quo Non* and *Quo* — understood in the Jansenian sense for the twofold state of integral nature and fallen nature, is expressly and clearly demolished; inasmuch as our Author, in the preceding [annotations to Dist. 26, §2], has adduced very clear passages of St. Thomas, and moreover has asserted that the express teaching of St. Thomas is attested in almost innumerable passages, or has been commemorated or proved therein — namely, that in both states, both that of integral nature and that of fallen nature, both auxiliaries are required: both that which furnishes sufficient powers and that by which the potency (*potentia*) is applied to act (*actus*). The corollaries likewise which flow from that principle concerning the different predestination for Angels and for man in the state of integral nature, and concerning the nature of merits in that state (which Jansenius calls human and natural), and concerning merits in the state of fallen nature (which he calls divine and gratuitous) — these are sufficiently and more than sufficiently confuted and rejected by those same testimonies of St. Thomas in the aforesaid passages cited by our Author, as well as by the annotations indicated by us on both sides. Let it suffice therefore to cite here one or two passages of St. Thomas in which he opens his mind most clearly — the Doctor speaks in words so express that it is a mark of impudence to attribute Jansenius's view to him in any manner whatsoever. St. Thomas therefore, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article, has the following:[124]

'The nature of man can be considered in two ways: in one way in its integrity, as it was in the first Parent before sin; in another way as it is corrupted in us after the sin of the first Parent. BUT IN BOTH STATES HUMAN NATURE NEEDS DIVINE ASSISTANCE FOR DOING OR WILLING ANY GOOD WHATSOEVER, AS IN THE FIRST MOVER' (as was said in the preceding article). 'But in the state of integral nature, so far as concerns the sufficiency of operative power (*virtus operativa*), man could by his natural powers will and accomplish good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue, but not good exceeding that, such as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short even of what he can do by his nature, so that he cannot by his own natural powers accomplish the whole of

such good. Since, however, human nature is not wholly corrupted by the sin of one man so as to be entirely deprived of all natural good, it can, even in the state of corrupt nature, by the power of its own nature, accomplish some particular good — [such as building a house, planting a vineyard, and the like] — though not the whole good connatural to it, such that it fails in nothing. Just as a sick man can by himself make some movement, but cannot perfectly move with the movement of a healthy man, unless he be healed by the help of medicine.' "[125]

St. Thomas should also be read in *In I Sententiarum*, Dist. 28, q. 1, a. [1], in the body and reply to obj. 1, where he says that grace is spoken of in two ways: in one way as a gratuitous gift, in another way as God himself freely giving. Now gratuitous gifts are properly so called because "WITH THEM MAN CAN DO MANY MERITORIOUS GOODS, yet nothing good is understood without the Grace which is GOD HIMSELF, THE BEGINNING OF ALL GOOD, NOT NOW ONLY IN OTHER CREATURES, and without me you can do nothing." And similarly that which the Apostle says: "we are not sufficient to think" — or those things which pertain to faith, for which man is not sufficient without grace.[126]

Item, St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, in the body: "Because human nature through sin is not totally corrupted so as to be deprived of all natural good, it can indeed even in the state of corrupt nature accomplish by the power of its own nature some particular good, such as building a house, planting a vineyard, and the like; yet not the whole good connatural to it such that it fails in nothing. Just as a sick man can by himself make some movement, but cannot perfectly move with the movement of a healthy man, unless he be healed by the help of medicine."[127]

St. Thomas should also be read in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 85, inquiring whether sin diminishes the good of nature. He replies: "One must say that the good of human nature can be spoken of in three ways. First, as the very principles of nature of which nature itself is constituted, and the properties caused from these, such as the powers of the soul, and the like. Second, inasmuch as man has by nature an inclination to virtue — as was stated above (q. 63, a. 1); and this inclination to virtue is itself a certain good of nature. Third, the good of nature can be said to be the good of original justice, which was bestowed upon the first man for the whole of human nature. The first good of nature, therefore, is neither taken away nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature is entirely taken away by the sin of the first Parent. But the intermediate good of nature, namely the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. For by human acts a certain inclination toward similar acts is produced, as was noted above (q. 51, a. 2, ad 3). It must follow that insofar as someone is inclined toward one contrary, his inclination toward the other is diminished."[128]

Furthermore, in the following article 2, inquiring whether the whole good of human nature can be taken away by sin, he replies in the body: "One must say that, as was stated, the good of nature which is diminished by sin is the natural inclination to virtue, which befits man from the very fact that he operates according to reason. Now this can never be totally taken away from man, since it cannot be taken away by sin so long as he remains rational: for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Hence it is not possible that the said good be totally taken away."[129] Similar things are to be found in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2. Also to be consulted are the passages cited at no. 2 above. Also pertinent are the passages given by St. Thomas in the *Disputed Questions De Virtutibus in Communi*, especially a. 8, and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, a. 1 and following, especially a. 2, ad 2 and 3, where he says: "To the third it must be said that" — as was stated (a. 1 of the same question, and q. 51, a. 1) — "THE SEEDS OF ACQUIRED VIRTUES PRE-EXIST IN US AS CERTAIN NATURAL PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE MORE NOBLE AND SUPERIOR IN KIND

THAN THE VIRTUES ACQUIRED FROM THEM: just as the intellect of speculative first principles is nobler than the knowledge of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of reason is nobler than the rectification of appetite which is brought about by participation in reason, and which rectification pertains to moral virtue. THUS THEREFORE HUMAN ACTS, INASMUCH AS THEY PROCEED FROM HIGHER PRINCIPLES, CAN PRODUCE ACQUIRED HUMAN VIRTUES."[130]

§ 67. Furthermore, a complacency or love of the sensitive will (corresponding to the passion of sensitive love) also moves the will toward a good to be sought. And on page 186, column 2, he writes similar things concerning earthly delight drawing one toward sin. "If," he says, "there were no difficulty in bringing forward more examples, it would not be difficult; yet these alone make clearly manifest that the delight which precedes consent to sins and follows upon suggestion is nothing other than an illicit, undeliberated desire by which the soul, even while it resists, gapes after sin; or at least it is that very first movement of concupiscence, as a kind of undeliberated love through which even an unwilling man finds sin pleasant, although consent does not follow." From these considerations it is evident that Jansenius did not understand by the name of that delight — so necessary for operation, according to which we must necessarily operate — a voluntary and free delight, namely the very consent of the will, which resists concupiscence and consents to grace. And indeed according to this explanation St. Augustine must be understood when he says: "According to what shall have delighted us more, it is necessary that we operate accordingly" — that is to say, according to what we shall have freely chosen by the will through consenting, it is necessary that we operate accordingly; for he who wills has willed, as theologians commonly hand down and explain.[131]

§ 68. Furthermore, (as St. Thomas writes in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article):[132] "In the state of pure nature, man could do certain good works that pertain to his natural capacity — such as to build a house, to plant a vineyard, and other things of this kind — yet not the whole good connatural to himself, so that he should be deficient in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself have some motion, yet cannot move perfectly with the movement of a healthy man, unless he is healed with the help of medicine. So therefore the man in the state of integral nature needs, over and above the virtue of nature, the added gratuitous virtue for one thing, namely for performing and willing supernatural good. But in the state of corrupt nature, for two things: namely that he be healed, and further that he perform the good of supernatural virtue, which is meritorious. FURTHER, MOREOVER, IN BOTH STATES MAN NEEDS DIVINE AID, IN ORDER TO BE MOVED BY IT TO ACT WELL." And to the first objection he writes: "Man is master of his acts of willing and not willing by reason of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one part or the other. But that he deliberates or does not deliberate — even if he is likewise master of this — it is necessary that this take place through a preceding deliberation; and since this does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary that one finally arrive at this point: that the free will of man is moved by some exterior principle which is above the human mind, as even the Philosopher proves in the chapter on GOOD FORTUNE. HENCE THE MIND OF MAN EVEN WHEN HEALTHY DOES NOT HAVE SUCH MASTERY OVER ITS ACTS BUT THAT IT NEEDS TO BE MOVED BY GOD; and much more so the free will of the infirm man after sin, by which he is impeded from good through the corruption of nature.",[133]

§ 69. The same things are repeated by St. Thomas in article 3 and in article 4 of the same question, which he thus concludes: "In each state (namely of integral nature and of corrupt nature) man needs additionally the aid of God moving him to fulfil the commandments."[134] So perspicuous are the words of St. Thomas that to

adduce an explanation would be to perform an act already accomplished. He who still wavers on this point may be compared to one who grows blind in the midday light.

§ 70. Almost flowing forth from the same source are other assertions of Jansenius. He affirms that the merits of the state of innocence were human merits — in his work *De Gratia Christi*, book 2, chapter 6.[135] This position is proved secondly from the fact that, regarding the Angels — both before and after the fall — three effects of this difference are described; and he sets forth this second effect in the following way: that now the will cooperates with the aid *Sine Quo Non*; whereas now the divine aid operates as it were — (page 61, column 2) — after establishing that those aids are not sufficient, that grace gives to meritorious human free will the operations, and he adds: "Secondly," he says, "it is false concerning the Angels. For to those concurred — yes, and open actual influx — those were human merits, and so the Angels were in fact — free will, not through grace, which — constancy and certainty of doctrine." And in chapter 16, where (and in chapter 6) the same had been established; but also in book 9 (*De Gratia*, ch. 1) he recooks and expresses more clearly that the merits of the Angels were merits of free will by the powers of nature without the influx of grace — not from the mind of St. Augustine, but because, of a higher and purer truth, he saw that it was not the work of grace but of the will, to do; whereas on the contrary it is not of the will but of grace, to be done without grace; nor should the merits of that state be called merits now, but they ought to be called merits of nature, whereas now they are merits of grace, because grace — conformable to the Baianist theses condemned. That Quesnell likewise asserted this will easily be apparent to anyone weighing the condemned propositions 34, 35, 36, and 37.[136]

§ 71. Secondly: from that distinction — of the aid *Sine Quo Non* and *Quo*, so to speak — there flows a difference between the election of the Angels and that which would have been the election of men in the state of innocent nature, and the election of men in the state of fallen nature; which difference he strives to demonstrate in chapter 4 (book 2), saying it was not of grace but — and in chapter 12 — but foreknown; and these were not by grace, he contends — whence in chapter 13 he inscribes this heading: "Not by the election of grace but of merits they are efficaciously elected to Glory" — absolutely. In a similar manner he reasons regarding the state of innocence, had it persisted. And on column 1: THE POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS.[137]

§ 72. From the same principle, thirdly, another assertion of Jansenius follows: that in God there is no general and antecedent will to save all men after the fall of Adam. Concerning this, the luminously clear passages in which St. Thomas expressly asserts the general antecedent will of God, by which He wills all men to be saved and prepares and offers to them sufficient aids — these passages are as follows.[138]

In *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, book 3, chapter 1 and 2,[139] he teaches that before the sin of Adam, God willed by a general and antecedent will to confer eternal beatitude on all and individual men, and that from this will, in the state of innocence, sufficient aids flowed forth into the first parents, placed under their own will as regards efficacy and use; and thereupon that there is such a general will by which God wills that all men placed in the damnation of the first sin shall be saved, and which prepares for all general remedies and aids necessary for salvation. Hence in the aforesaid place, book 3, chapter 20, page 101, column 1,[140] he asserts that the antecedent will to save men after the fall of Adam (if there be any such in God) is nothing other than a bare *velleitas*, such as God holds with regard to creatures already damned, whether men or Angels; which notwithstanding, God can will that some shall not be saved, and in fact does not will it — namely those who are in fact damned. From these things, moreover, other Jansenian assertions, well known to all, spontaneously flow: to wit, concerning sufficient grace wholly banished from the state of fallen nature, concerning the death

of Christ and His passion not offered for all, concerning every sufficient aid denied to unbelievers, concerning the diversity of the Judaic and the Christian covenant, and other things of this kind — all of which are contained, either explicitly or implicitly, in the five famous propositions excerpted from his work and condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs.[141]

§ 73. It is also necessary to consider the fact that, although some cannot merit or acquire grace, they are nonetheless able to impede its reception; for it is said of some (Job 21:14): "They said to God, Depart from us"; and (Job 24:13): "They themselves were rebels against the light." Accordingly, to impede the reception of divine grace is not undeservedly imputed as a fault to him who places the impediment. GOD, FOR HIS PART, IS READY TO GIVE GRACE TO ALL; HE WILLS ALL MEN TO BE SAVED AND TO COME TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH, as it is said in 1 Tim. 2:4;[142] BUT THOSE ALONE ARE DEPRIVED OF GRACE WHO PLACE IN THEMSELVES AN IMPEDIMENT TO GRACE. Just as fault is imputed to one who closes his eyes if from this some evil follows — even though he cannot see unless he is first anticipated by the light of the sun.

Likewise, in the lecture on Heb. 12, ch. 3:[143] "Grace," he says, "although it is not held from merits, yet it is necessary that a man do what is in himself. For God most liberally gives it to all who make themselves ready"; and he cites (Rev. 3:20): "Behold I stand at the door and knock." And: "GOD'S AID IS LACKING TO NO ONE, BUT IS COMMUNICATED TO ALL SO FAR AS IN HIM IS, JUST AS THE SUN IS LACKING TO NO BLIND EYES." Therefore, he says — (namely the Apostle at that passage, ch. 12 of Heb.): "Let us contemplate, lest anyone fall short of the grace of God." Moreover, on chapter 6 of Jn.: "The human heart," he says, "unless it is drawn, cannot elevate itself upward from its tendency toward lower things; but if it is not elevated, the defect is not on the part of the one drawing, WHO IS LACKING TO NONE OF THEM, BUT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF HIM WHO IS NOT DRAWN; AND GOD STRETCHES OUT HIS HAND TO ALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING IN HIM SO FAR AS IN HIM IS; AND WHAT IS MORE, he not only draws the hand of the one receiving, but also converts those who are averse, and so on." Therefore, from this God is ready to give grace to all, and it is not imputed to him if someone does not receive it, but to the one who receives it. Are not these things decisively against Jansenius? What further need is there of many words? Moreover, that St. Thomas speaks of the true and formal antecedent will of God, and not of a mere *velleitas* as Jansenius interprets — this we have shown sufficiently in the annotations to the aforementioned passages.[144] Consult, however, article 1 of the *In I Sententiarum*, and *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2; likewise in *In I ad Tim.* Lect. 3, and q. 25 *de veritate*, a. 1, [145] where he has these words: "Concerning the will of God it is properly said — and this is the will of good pleasure which is distinguished from the antecedent and consequent." And in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1,[146] he says: "We can speak of will either as approval or of sign, and of the will of good pleasure or of the consequent or antecedent." For indeed from these places it is clearly evident from the sentence of St. Thomas that the antecedent will of God concerning the salvation of all men is referred to the will of good pleasure, which St. Thomas (in the place here cited from q. 23 *de veritate*) establishes as properly in God.

§ 74. It is therefore worthwhile to transcribe here a few texts of Jansenius in which these propositions are asserted. The first proposition of Jansenius is this: "Some commandments of God are impossible to just men who are willing and striving according to their present powers; and the grace by which they become possible is also lacking to them." This proposition the Supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII declare and condemn as rash, blasphemous, condemned by anathema, and heretical.[147] You may perhaps wonder, Reader,

that a Catholic Doctor could have asserted this — yet the Supreme Pontiffs testify that this proposition was excerpted from his book; and in the judgment of those whose Catholic assertion has not proved acceptable to him — well then, here for you are the most express passages of Jansenius in which he most clearly asserts and establishes this. The first passage is from book 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 13, p. 135, col. 1):[148] "From this indubitable doctrine," he says, "certain things that are of little moment for this matter are introduced and become clear. First: that there are certain things impossible to man according to his state and powers, in which state he is constituted. Second: that the grace by which those same things become possible is not always present — that is, the grace by which we can fulfil those same commandments." Thirdly, he says this impossibility is found not only in the excaecated, the hardened, and the unbelievers — of whom neither Augustine nor the Church, but only certain Scholastics from human reasoning, ever doubted — but also in the faithful and the just who have received both the faith of Christ and the charity of justice. Fourth, that this impossibility befalls the faithful not only when they do not will to fulfil the commandments, but also when they do will it. For it is manifest that those who pray to God for the grace to be able to do what is commanded already have the will to fulfil the commandment, yet lack the power. Does not this passage openly exhibit the aforesaid condemned proposition?

Yet something still more open is contained in the second passage, which we here transcribe from the same ch. 13 (p. 138, col. 2),[149] where he has these very words of the proposition: "All these things, therefore, most fully and most plainly demonstrate that nothing is more certain and more firmly established in the doctrine of St. Augustine than THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COMMANDMENTS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE NOT ONLY TO UNBELIEVERS, THE EXCAECATED AND THE HARDENED, BUT ALSO TO THE FAITHFUL AND THE JUST WHO ARE WILLING AND STRIVING ACCORDING TO THEIR PRESENT POWERS, AND THAT THE GRACE BY WHICH THEY BECOME POSSIBLE IS ALSO LACKING." Now consider whether Jansenius's assertions here are consonant with theses 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 20, 21, and 22 — indeed even with certain other condemned Quesnellian theses.

Furthermore, the same St. Thomas, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3,[150] where in the third argument he objected to himself that God is not the author of evil — (from *Physics* II: the same is the cause of the salvation of the ship and of all things; therefore He Himself is the cause of every evil) — replies thirdly by saying that the sinking of the ship is attributed to the pilot not because he acts in a way that is required for the ship's sinking, but BY NOT DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVATION OF THE SHIP. And in q. 14 *de veritate*, a. 11, ad 1:[151] "Therefore it must be said, given that whoever is bound to make something explicit — so that living creatures are nourished — this pertains to divine providence, to provide what is necessary for salvation, so long as someone thus nourished follows the leading of nature in the pursuit of good and the flight of evil. It is most certain that no one who turns himself to God in the way in which it is his to do — by converting himself, that is, toward the good — fails to have revealed to him those things that are necessary for salvation; just as God sent Peter to Cornelius." And he conveys the same in Lect. 3 on chapter 10 of the Epistle to the Romans,[152] and he likewise expounds this at *Summa theologiae* I-II.

POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS.

§ 75. Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, most eminent doctor and theologian, in his *Theologia* tom. 3 (the tract of St. Anselm, disp. 6, sect. 4, num. 28),[153] has laid the foundation of Jansenian doctrine, upon which as upon

the most vast edifice Jansenius built his system, asserting that it is the celebrated distinction of the aid *Sine Quo* and *Quo* — by which, as we above noted certain things, Jansenius understands the aid that in integral nature so assisted the will of the first parents that it operated with it if it willed — whereas now this same aid causes it to will; this was the aid before the fall of such a kind that the influx of the aid, just as the influx of the will, depended on the freely moving nature of the will itself, and thus free will retained that liberty of indifference flexible to both parts; whereas now after the fall it makes no such motion, and makes the will flow and will. This distinction Jansenius expounds and explains in the same work; and though, in transmitting this doctrine, he had already admonished us and others on many occasions to repeat it, it is not necessary here. Certainly Jansenius himself, in book 4 (*De Gratia Christi*, ch. 4, p. 173, col. 1),[154] explains in what the efficacy of that aid consists, which he calls proper to fallen nature — namely the aid *Quo*: "Most abundantly does Augustine teach," he says, "that as long as we live in this mortal life, there is in man a struggle between two delights, the harmful and the beneficial, the earthly and the heavenly; of these whichever conquers, draws the mind along with it in consenting. Then truly a man is liberated from sin and a good work is effected in him, when that heavenly sweetness from Heaven prevails and overcomes its adversary." Then, in chapter 6 (p. 174, col. 2),[155] he gives this heading to the tract thence taken and imposed upon the medicinal grace of Christ. And in the body of that chapter (p. 175, col. 1),[156] he endeavours to establish as the most certain axiom asserted by Augustine: "According to what delights us more, it is necessary that we operate accordingly" — stating moreover that the whole of what he argues inclines to proving this, and — not.

§ 76. Regarding the double aid *Sine Quo Non* and *Quo*, celebrated and recommended most operously as he himself considers it — proven — Jansenius therefore, in his work *De Gratia primi hominis* and in that on the Angels (chapters 14 and 15, p. 61, and tom. 3, book 2, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 4, p. 33, and 40),[157] distinguishes between the grace of the first parents and the sick grace; the former he calls grace — or the aid *Sine Quo Non*; the latter the aid *Quo*. The difference, moreover, between these two kinds of aids in the context of Adam's and the Angels' salvation is as follows (ch. 4, p. 40, col. 2):[158] that, he says, the operation and merit of that first aid was such that it could have become a human gift of God's grace — it was not able to comply with it. Jansenius strives at great length to prove this against the Scholastics — that whether a habitual grace or any actual grace influences, the merit is a gift of God and not the merit of human free will, condemned by Augustine; but that what ought to be the grace giving merit — hence he draws another demonstration as he calls it — that this is demonstrated from the merits of Adam and the Angels. For grace has been a habitual grace outside of controversy; most openly and most certainly Augustine teaches: and yet those were merits of free will, not gifts of God; he did not depart from God, he persevered through free will, not through grace — the same things he hands down with the force of assertion. The same he had transmitted in *De Gratia primi hominis*, books 8 and 9.[159] And in *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris* ch. 10, p. 41, col. 1,[160] he hands down this saying: "Hence it arose, fifth, that the merits of free will were human and one's own: not as if by purely natural powers they complied with the grace of God — far be it from Augustine's meaning; but because with the purer insight of truth he saw that it was not then the work of grace to cause the innocent to will as they willed; just as now on the contrary it is the work of grace to cause the fallen to will, even though neither then without a will, nor now without grace, was it the work of the will. He saw consequently that not only the merits of the special gifts of God, as they now are, but the merits of human free will were its own; just as on the contrary those things are merits of grace donated to the human will by grace. These things, moreover, we have on other occasions admonished, are consonant with the Baianist theses condemned; and upon pondering the

propositions among those condemned — 34, 35, 36, 37 — it will easily appear that Quesnell asserted the same."[161]

§ 77. From the same Author's axioms — the first of which is: human merits, and not properly gifts of grace — in that he so inscribes it (p. 46, col. 2)[162] — likewise the axiom concerning the twofold aid in Adam and in the Angels, and concerning their salvation — these things flowing from this (ch. 6, p. 47, col. 1):[163] that this very work and merit, which it could not comply with, would have been a human gift of God's grace. And in the same book (ch. 16),[164] where with numerous arguments he strove to prove against the Scholastics that whether a habitual grace or any actual grace influences — that merit is a gift of God and not a merit of human free will condemned by Augustine: but what ought to be grace and merit — hence he draws from there another demonstration as he says.

§ 78. This is demonstrated from the merits of Adam and the Angels: that grace has been a habitual outside of controversy; most openly and certainly Augustine teaches: and yet those were merits of free will, not gifts of God — he did not depart from God; he persevered through free will, not through grace — the same things he hands down with assertive force. And the same he had transmitted in *De Gratia primi hominis*, books 8 and 9,[159] laying the foundations of this his assertion, and endeavouring in *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 10, p. 41, col. 1,[160] handing down this: "Hence it arose, fifth, that merit was of free will and human and one's own: not as purely natural grace would comply — far be that from Augustine's meaning — but because with the insight of truth of a higher and purer order, he saw that it was then not the operation of grace to cause the innocent to will as they willed; just as now on the contrary it is the work of grace to cause the fallen to will, although neither then without the will, nor now without grace, is it the work of the will to will; he saw consequently that not only the special gifts of God, as they now are, but also the merits of human free will were its own; just as on the contrary those are merits donated by grace to the human will. These things, moreover, as we have admonished on other occasions, are consonant with the Baianist theses condemned; and pondering the propositions among those condemned — 34, 35, 36, and 37 — it will easily appear that Quesnell asserted the same."

§ 79. POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS.

It is therefore worthwhile here to transcribe a few texts of Jansenius in which these propositions are asserted. The first proposition of Jansenius is this: "Some commandments of God are impossible to just men who are willing and striving according to their present powers; and the grace by which they become possible is also lacking to them." This proposition the Supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII declare and condemn as rash, blasphemous, condemned by anathema, and heretical.[165] You may perhaps wonder, Reader, that a Catholic Doctor could have asserted this! Yet the Supreme Pontiffs testify that this proposition was excerpted from his book; and in their judgment, who that is a Catholic has not stood by his assertion? Come then. Here for you are the most express passages of Jansenius in which he most clearly asserts and establishes the same. The first passage is from book 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 13, p. 135, col. 1):[148] "From this indubitable doctrine," he says, "certain things that are of little moment for this matter are introduced and become clear. First: that there are certain things impossible to man according to his state and powers in which state he is constituted. Second: that the grace by which those same things become possible is not always present — that is, the grace by which we can fulfil those same commandments. Third, that this impossibility is found not only in the excaecated and hardened and unbelievers — of whom neither Augustine nor the Church, but only certain Scholastics from human reasoning, ever doubted — but also in the faithful and the

just who have received both the faith of Christ and the charity of justice. Fourth, that this impossibility befalls the faithful not only when they do not will to fulfil the commandments, but also when they do will it. For it is manifest that those who pray to God for the grace to be able to do what is commanded already have the will to fulfil the commandment, yet lack the power." Does not this passage openly exhibit the aforesaid condemned proposition? But something still more open is contained in the second passage, which we here transcribe from the same ch. 13 (p. 138, col. 2),[149] where he has these very words of the proposition: "All these things, therefore, most fully and most plainly demonstrate that nothing is more certain and more firmly established in the doctrine of St. Augustine than THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COMMANDMENTS WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE NOT ONLY TO UNBELIEVERS, THE EXCAECATED AND THE HARDENED, BUT ALSO TO THE FAITHFUL AND THE JUST WHO ARE WILLING AND STRIVING ACCORDING TO THEIR PRESENT POWERS, AND THAT THE GRACE BY WHICH THEY BECOME POSSIBLE IS ALSO LACKING." Consider now whether these assertions of Jansenius are consonant with theses 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 20, 21, and 22 — indeed also with certain other condemned Quesnellian theses.

§ 80. Moreover, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3,[166] where in the third argument he had objected to himself that God is not the author of evil — (in *Physics* II: the same is the cause of salvation as of all things; therefore He Himself is the cause of every evil) — St. Thomas replies thirdly: "the sinking of the ship is attributed to the pilot, not because he acts in a way that causes the sinking, but BY NOT DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVATION OF THE SHIP." And in q. 14 *de veritate*, a. 11, ad 1:[167] "To the first, therefore, it must be said — given that whoever is bound to make something explicit" — so that living creatures are nourished — "this pertains to divine providence, to provide the things necessary for salvation, so long as someone thus nourished follows the leading of nature in the pursuit of good and the flight of evil; it is most certain that one who does what is in himself — converting himself, that is, toward good — will have those things that are necessary for salvation revealed to him; just as God sent Peter to Cornelius." And he conveys the same in Lect. 3 on chapter 10 of the Epistle to the Romans,[152] and at *Summa theologiae* I-II likewise.

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§ 81. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS.[168]

"Truly, since from the above-recounted most luminous passages of St. Thomas the five Jansenian propositions condemned by the Holy See are utterly refuted — and since, moreover, innumerable authors, both from among the Thomists and from other distinguished writers, have by books published with splendour adduced testimonies of St. Thomas diametrically opposed to the aforesaid propositions — the labour of recounting them here ought to be judged superfluous. Yet because, as we have protested more than once, we are furnishing arms to the younger generation, particularly to those who perhaps have no leisure to read the previously recounted books of Jansenius, we therefore do not altogether consider it oil and expenditure that must perish, if we transcribe here certain principal and most luminous testimonies of the same Doctor.

With these words, therefore, St. Thomas uproots, as it were from the roots, the first proposition. The words are from the *Commentaries on II Sententiarum*, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, in the argument *Sed contra*,[169] where, praising a sentence of St. Jerome, he says thus: 'St. Jerome says: whoever says God commands impossible

things, let him be anathema. But that which a man cannot fulfil is impossible for him: therefore etc.' And in the second argument *Sed contra*: 'God,' he says, 'is not more cruel than man' —

and further,[170] finding this impossibility not only in the excaecated, the hardened, and the unbelievers — of whom neither Augustine nor the Church, but only certain Scholastics from human reasoning, ever doubted — but also in the faithful and the just who have received both the faith of Christ and the charity of justice. Fourth, that this impossibility befalls the faithful not only when they do not will to fulfil the commandments, but also when they do will it. For it is manifest that those who pray to God for the grace to be able to do what is commanded already have the will to fulfil the commandment, yet lack the power."

§ 82. It must be noticed also, that although some cannot merit grace or acquire it, yet they are able to impede its reception; for it is said of some (Job 21:14): "They said to God: Depart from us"; and (Job 24:13): "They themselves were rebels against the light." And since this is in the power of free will to impede or not to impede, it is not undeservedly charged as fault to him who places an impediment to the reception of grace. FOR GOD IS READY TO GIVE GRACE TO ALL: HE WILLS ALL MEN TO BE SAVED AND TO COME TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH (1 Tim. 2:4); BUT THOSE ALONE ARE DEPRIVED OF GRACE WHO IN THEMSELVES PLACE AN IMPEDIMENT TO GRACE. Just as fault is imputed to him who closes his eyes if from this some evil follows — even though he cannot see unless he is anticipated by the light of the sun.

Likewise in the lecture on Heb. 12, ch. 3:[143] "Grace," he says, "although it is not held from merits, yet it is necessary that a man do what is in himself. For God most liberally gives it to all who make themselves ready": and he cites (Rev. 3:20): "Behold I stand at the door and knock." And: "GOD'S AID IS LACKING TO NONE, BUT IS COMMUNICATED TO ALL SO FAR AS IN HIM IS, JUST AS THE SUN IS LACKING TO NO BLIND EYES." Therefore he says (namely the Apostle at that passage, ch. 12 of Heb.): "Let us contemplate, lest anyone fall short of the grace of God." Moreover, on chapter 6 of Jn.:[171] "The human heart," he says, "unless it is drawn, cannot elevate itself upward, tending as it does toward lower things; but if it is not elevated, the defect is not on the part of the one drawing, WHO IS LACKING TO NONE OF THEM, BUT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF HIM WHO IS NOT DRAWN; AND GOD STRETCHES OUT HIS HAND TO ALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING IN HIM SO FAR AS IN HIM IS; AND WHAT IS MORE, he not only draws the hand of the one receiving, but also converts those who are averse toward himself, and so on." Therefore, from this, God is ready to give grace to all, and it is not imputed to him if someone does not receive it, but to the one who does receive it. Are not these things decisively against Jansenius? What further need is there of many words? Moreover, that St. Thomas speaks of the true and formal antecedent will of God, and not of a mere *velleitas* as Jansenius interprets — this we have shown sufficiently in the annotations to the aforesaid passage (Dist. 46, § 2).[172] Consult, however, article 1 of the *In I Sententiarum* (q. 1, dist. 46, lib. 1), and *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2; likewise in *In I ad Tim.*, Lect. 3, and q. 25 *de veritate*, a. 1,[145] where he has these words: "Concerning the will of God, it is properly said — and this is the will of good pleasure which is distinguished by the antecedent and consequent." And in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1,[146] he says: "We can speak of will either as approval (*beneplaciti*) or of sign, and of the will of good pleasure (*beneplaciti*) or of the consequent or antecedent." For indeed from these places it is clearly evident from the sentence of St. Thomas that the antecedent will of God concerning the salvation of all men is referred to the will of good pleasure, which St. Thomas (in the place here cited from q. 23 *de veritate*) establishes as properly in God.

§ 83. POSITIONS OF JANSENIUS. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS.

1. It is therefore worthwhile here to transcribe a few texts of Jansenius in which these propositions are asserted. The first proposition of Jansenius is this: "Some commandments of God are impossible to just men who are willing and striving according to their present powers; and the grace by which they become possible is also lacking to them." This proposition the Supreme Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII declare and condemn as rash, blasphemous, condemned by anathema, and heretical.[165] You may perhaps wonder, Reader, that a Catholic Doctor could have asserted this! Yet the Supreme Pontiffs testify that this proposition was excerpted from his book; and in their judgment, who that is a Catholic has not stood by his assertion? Come then. Here for you are the most express passages of Jansenius in which he most clearly asserts and establishes the same. The first passage is from book 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 13, p. 135, col. 1):[148] "From this indubitable doctrine," he says, "certain things that are of little moment for this matter are introduced and become clear. First: that there are certain things impossible to man according to his state and powers in which state he is constituted. Second: that the grace by which those same things become possible is not always present — that is, the grace by which we can fulfil those same commandments. Third, that this impossibility is found not only in the excaecated and hardened and unbelievers — of whom neither Augustine nor the Church, but only certain Scholastics from human reasoning, ever doubted — but also in the faithful and the just who have received both the faith of Christ and the charity of justice. Fourth, that this impossibility befalls the faithful not only when they do not will to fulfil the commandments, but also when they do will it. For it is manifest that those who pray to God for the grace to be able to do what is commanded already have the will to fulfil the commandment, yet lack the power."
2. "Indeed since from the above-recounted most luminous passages of St. Thomas the five Jansenian propositions condemned by the Holy See are utterly refuted as confirmed: and since moreover innumerable authors, both from among the Thomists and from other distinguished writers, have by books published with splendour adduced testimonies of St. Thomas diametrically opposed to the aforesaid propositions — the labour of recounting them here ought to be judged superfluous. Yet because, as we have protested more than once, we are furnishing arms to the younger generation, particularly to those who perhaps have no leisure to read the previously recounted books of Jansenius, we therefore do not altogether consider it oil and expenditure that must perish, if we transcribe here certain principal and most luminous testimonies of the same Doctor.

With these words, therefore, St. Thomas uproots, as it were from the roots, the first proposition. The words are from the *Commentaries on II Sententiarum*, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, in the argument *Sed contra*,[173] where, praising a sentence of St. Jerome, he says thus: 'St. Jerome says: whoever says God commands impossible things, let him be anathema. But that which a man cannot fulfil is impossible for him: therefore etc.' And in the second argument *Sed contra*: 'God,' he says, 'is not more cruel than man.'"

§ 84. Regarding the sufficiency of the aid that is of itself sufficient, in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3,[174] where in the third argument he had objected to himself that God is not the author of evil — (from *Physics* II: the same is the cause of salvation as of all things; therefore He is the cause of every evil) — he replies thirdly:

"the sinking of the ship is attributed to the pilot NOT BY DOING WHAT IS NECESSARY TO CAUSE THE SINKING, but by not doing what is necessary for the salvation of the ship." And in q. 14 *de veritate*, a. 11, ad 1:[167] "To the first it must be said — given that whoever is bound to make something explicit — so that living creatures are nourished — this pertains to divine providence to provide what is necessary for salvation, so long as someone thus nourished follows the leading of nature in the pursuit of good and the flight of evil. It is most certain that one who does what is in himself — converting himself toward the good — will have those things that are necessary for salvation revealed to him; just as God sent Peter to Cornelius." And in the same sense he hands it down in Lect. 3 on ch. 10 of the Epistle to the Romans,[152] and at *Summa theologiae* I-II likewise.

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§ 85. The same Author — that is, the continuator of the aforesaid work — by Innocent X was condemned as being among the Gomarists, who among the Antelapsarians and Sublapsarians have ventured to introduce a medium of necessity,[175] saying that men are not coerced by God to evil or sin, but only allured or by hidden necessity constrained to sin freely, and thus are inexcusable of condemnation. They show this and condemn the Remonstrants in their Calvinist brothers (*Acta*, part 3 and part 2), deriding those who hope that escape is possible from God's coercing to sin if only God does so in an arcane manner and by necessity constrains men to sin. The fourth proposition, referred by the same Author from Innocent X, was condemned also among the Gomarists — as most prolix acts of the Synod of Dordrecht make evident — prevalents: their brothers in the school of Calvin, the Arminians, condemned on the ground that they taught that the grace of God is such that human will can resist it, and they were therefore called Semi-Pelagians. Concerning this see *Theolog. Dogmat. de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana haeresi*, ch. 17.[176] The fifth proposition condemned by Innocent X among the Gomarists is, as appears from the same Continuator (*Acta*, part 2), that the Remonstrants' words against the Remonstrants begin to be counted — by which they impiously teach that Christ our Lord has not died for all men but only for the Elect or Predestinate. Now whoever the Gomarists were — who their sectarian author was — the Remonstrants, the Counter-Remonstrants, the Antelapsarians, and the Sublapsarians — if you wish to know these, see the same Author (*eodem lib.* 9).[177] The same Author subjoins these words: "Therefore the Roman Church has this glory, that just as from its Bishop Innocent I it saw condemned the Pelagian heretics, the abrogators of grace, so from its Innocent X it saw condemned the opposing heretics, who attributed an irresistible necessity to grace; and the Catholic Church has so much liberty from the perils of erring and of schism paternally freed, as to give everlasting thanks to the Father in whose blessing it may be preserved for evermore."

The aforesaid Author thus. Moreover, Reader, you have here sufficiently represented the summary of Jansenian dogmas, so that you can easily avoid the pernicious errors and have the whole doctrine of Jansenius before your eyes. Of which he who seems to have exhibited a compendium wrote thus concerning Jansenius:

> Concerning pure nature — less sanely. Concerning healthy nature — less purely. Concerning fallen nature — less rightly. Concerning Christian nature — he sensed it less Christianly. After calumnies of nature, he spared not grace. To deny the sufficient, he made it useless; To assert the efficacious, he made it necessary; To subvert free will, he made it captive; To corrupt good works, he corrupted merits. To excuse sin, he made it necessary.

These things are furnished to you as an indication, whereby in other authors elsewhere indicated you can more deeply penetrate the Jansenian dogmas, and refute them with the most powerful arguments both from authority and from proper reasoning. Do not be reluctant to peruse with your eyes the testimonies of St. Thomas placed in comparison, by which they are miraculously confuted.

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§ 86. — but it is imputed to cruelty in a man if he binds someone by a precept to do what he cannot fulfil; therefore this is in no way to be supposed of God. Furthermore,[94] "It is not impossible," he says, "to observe this precept which concerns the act of charity (*caritas*), because a man can dispose himself toward having charity, and when he has had it he can use it." Likewise,[178] "Therefore it must be said that what God commands is not impossible for man to observe, because both the substance of the act he can preserve by free choice, and the manner by which it is elevated above the capacity of nature — namely, insofar as it is done from charity — he can preserve from the gift of grace, though not from free choice alone." And to the second objection: "Rightly," he says, "is a man rebuked who does not fulfil the precepts, because it is from his own negligence that he lacks the grace by which he could keep the commandments as to their manner; since he could nonetheless keep them by free choice as to their substance." Likewise,[179] expounding those words of the Apostle, "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able" (1 Cor. 10:13): "He shows," he says, "that help is prepared in temptation. Here he commends God as a helper, because He gives us the power of resisting — which is noted in the words: 'but will with the temptation also make a way to escape' — and perseverance, which is noted in the words: 'that you may be able to bear it.' Truly faithful is God, who gives power lest we be conquered, grace that we may merit, and constancy that we may conquer." Likewise,[180] "The law urges toward not sinning." And in the *First Part*, q. 49, arguing against his own conclusion, which he reduces there to this form — "just as God is said to be the cause of salvation, so also He is the cause of perdition and evil" — he replies: "God does not fail toward salvation. Hence the cases are not alike. And one need not believe that anything inconvenient follows if, in the woods or amid providence, it pertains to divine Providence that no one be impeded on His part. If this argument of reason were to follow in the appetite for good, God would provide for this man either through internal inspiration of the necessities, or some preacher of faith — as He sent the angel to Cornelius (Acts 10). For he adds: But yet this very thing — that God moves hearts from within — is itself from God."[181]

Positions of Jansenius (Positiones Jansenii) — The Second Proposition

§ 87. The second proposition of Jansenius condemned by the Church is this: "In the state of fallen nature, interior grace is never resisted." The Supreme Pontiffs note this proposition with the following censure: "The second: *In the state of fallen nature, interior grace is never resisted*, we declare heretical and condemn it as such." That this is indeed Jansenius's proposition can be established more than sufficiently from his own words, cited above, concerning the twofold grace of the sound and the sick will. But behold here clearer evidence from the above-cited book,[158] where after a carefully set-out distinction between the *auxilium* of sound nature and of fallen nature — which we displayed above in his own words — he adds: "The *auxilium* of the second kind, namely that medicinal grace which alone he acknowledges for the state of fallen nature, by its own efficacy causes the faculty to pour itself in, and is not subject to the free judgment of the faculty itself,

but invincibly causes this or that will to deliberate and to will. Such is the influx of every formal cause — for by the very fact that justice is present, the mind is just, and without it the mind can never be just." And a little later: "The grace of the fallen and sick will is in no way left to its own judgment, so that it might abandon it or seize it if it wished; but that grace is rather the supreme grace which most invincibly causes the will to will and is not abandoned by the will."

But Jansenius states the same proposition yet more clearly in the same book,[182] where, depicting the nature of medicinal grace, he asserts that it is the grace which, as soon as it knocks at the doors, breaks them open, tames the resisting will, removes all its resistance, carries the will along with it, and by an ineffable sweetness and power makes the unwilling willing and self-determining — being of the highest efficacy in persuading and bringing about what God desires to be persuaded and effected in man. He adds furthermore,[183] that it is not of the nature of Christ's medicinal grace that its effect be suspended by the will, but rather that through it the effect is most powerfully brought into and applied to the will — not by working *if* the will wills, but by working and determining so that the will wills. And he continues at length, establishing that victorious grace is set so above the will's free judgment that he not infrequently says that a man cannot resist God working through grace. Since therefore in our present state, according to Jansenius's opinion, no other actual interior grace remains than one which from the outset removes all resistance, which before all else breaks down the very stubbornness of the will through which its act would be impeded, it is clear that in Jansenius's system, in this state, grace is never resisted. He holds not dissimilar positions in the same book[184] and expresses himself most clearly where he says, in reply to someone who might perhaps object that St. Augustine, well-versed in these matters, had handed on all these things only concerning efficacious grace, and that nothing prevents some graces from lacking their effect through man's will. Here, he says, is the knot of the controversy: whether grace works through the human will with its free cooperation, and whether Augustine admitted any graces in addition which lack their effect through the will. What is the answer? "I reply that Augustine acknowledged no other actual grace of Christ, nor could he have acknowledged any, except upon the basis of the nature of medicinal grace as he handed it down."

Positions of Jansenius — The Third Proposition

§ 88. The third proposition of Jansenius proscribed by the Church is this: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man; it suffices to have freedom from coercion." The Supreme Pontiffs declare this false and heretical and condemn it as such. There is no need to labor in adducing Jansenius's texts bearing upon this proposition, since it is sufficiently evident from those things we cited above concerning the loss of freedom after Adam's fall, according to his principles, that this is a Jansenian dogma. But if you desire more, many testimonies will be furnished by the sixth and last chapters of his sixth book, as also by the tenth chapter. Indeed, Jansenius in that aforementioned sixth chapter of book six[185] is entirely occupied in asserting that necessity in no way conflicts with freedom, but only coercion does; for that chapter he entitles: "A twofold necessity according to Augustine: coercion and simple or voluntary necessity — the former, not the latter, conflicts with freedom." In that chapter his one aim — and he pursues it in that chapter and the other chapters of the same book, and indeed in both subsequent books as well — is to show that the will can never not be free, however great the necessity by which it is pressed, because it cannot not be a will. "By this," he says (in the same ch. 6 of book 6), "by the highest necessity, that is the necessity of

coercion, Augustine fears no other threat to the freedom of the will, however much he may say that it is necessary that we will." And in chapter 12 of the same book 6, where he endeavors to draw virtually all the holy Fathers to his side, he attributes to them — and especially to St. John Chrysostom — this very opinion: that what is done freely is what is done willingly, that is, not under compulsion, not unwillingly; and that for free choice the only necessity contrary to it is the necessity of coercion, the only force that is contrary to it being that which acts under compulsion and unwillingly. And finally, that a man is free and master of himself because he cannot be compelled. Indeed, having adduced in that place,[186] the testimonies of St. John Chrysostom, he ascribes to Chrysostom the opinion that he never feared the destruction of freedom except from the necessity of violence and coercion; which being absent, it suffices for him that men sin and do good willingly and of their own accord. And after a few words he concludes thus: "Many similar passages could be produced from the same Chrysostom, but these seem sufficient for us to understand that he feared no necessity other than that of violence and coercion for the free will." Furthermore, Jansenius through the following chapters, right through to and including chapter 33, endeavors to attribute this same error both to the other holy Fathers after Augustine and to the more celebrated Doctors of Theology; and even (chapter 24) dares to ascribe the Jansenian error to St. Thomas, who calls the opinion that Jansenius defends heretical — as will be plain to anyone reading the text of St. Thomas placed in full view — as is most clearly shown by the Quesnellian theses, nos. 7, 8, 22, 23, 24, and 25.[187]

Teaching of St. Thomas (Doctrina S. Thomae) — Against the Third Proposition

§ 10 [continued]. Against the third proposition of Jansenius, the Author has assembled very many passages of St. Thomas[188] — from dist. 24, §§ 5 through 15 of book 2 — where we also noted some things pertaining to this matter. We shall therefore adduce some passages, but ones so clear that it will be evident to anyone that only a man obsessed by the prejudices of his own opinion could have reached such a degree of impudence as to have cited St. Thomas on behalf of his own assertion in the place indicated by us. St. Thomas, therefore, everywhere teaches this doctrine: that free choice (*libera electio*) can in no way be consistent with necessity for acting. In the *First Part*, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2:[189] "It must be said," he says, "that faculty (*facultas*) sometimes names a power fitted for operation. And so faculty is placed in the definition of free choice." Likewise in the *Disputed Questions on Grace of Christ*, a., in the body:[190] "The faculty of meriting," he says, "is required on the part of nature and on the part of grace. On the part of nature, indeed, because through his own proper act no one can merit unless he is master of his own act, for he can as it were give his own act as a price for a reward. Now one is master of his act through free choice (*liberum arbitrium*); hence the natural faculty of free choice is required for meriting. On the part of grace, however, because since the reward of beatitude exceeds the faculty of human nature, a man cannot by pure natural endowments suffice to merit it; and therefore grace is required, through which he may be able to merit." And in *Contra Gentiles* I, ch. 68:[191] "The dominion," he says, "which the will has over its own acts, by which it is in the will's power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of a power to one thing and the violence of an external efficient cause; but it does not exclude the influence of a superior cause from which it has its being and operation — and so the causality remains in the First Cause, which is God, with respect to the motions of the will."

The locus, however, that is most clear and — if we may so say — decisive against Jansenius is from q. 6 *De Malo*, or the single question *On Human Election, or Free Choice*, in its single article.[192] The title of the article is this: "Whether man has free election of acts, or whether he chooses of necessity?" He responds in the body of the article: "It must be said that certain men maintained that the will of man is moved of necessity to choose something, yet they did not maintain that the will is compelled. For not everything necessary is violent, but only that whose principle is from without; whence also certain natural motions are found to be necessary, yet not violent. For the violent is contrary to the natural, just as it is contrary to the voluntary, because the principle of each is from within; but the principle of the violent is from without." Is this not Jansenius's position, which he strives so greatly to prove with testimonies and to confirm with arguments? But what does St. Thomas reply, or in what standing does he hold this opinion? Here are his words: "THIS OPINION IS HERETICAL. For it destroys the formal character (*ratio*) of merit and demerit in human acts. For it does not seem meritorious or demeritorious that someone should act if he acts of necessity, so that he cannot avoid it. It is moreover to be numbered among the foreign opinions of philosophy, BECAUSE IT NOT ONLY CONTRADICTS THE FAITH, BUT ALSO SUBVERTS ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY." If then nothing in us is done except of necessity, deliberation, exhortation, precept, punishment, praise, and blame are removed — all of which moral philosophy consists in. Now opinions of this sort, which destroy the principles of some part of philosophy, are called foreign positions (*positiones extraneae*), just as the claim that nothing moves, which destroys the principles of natural science. To advancing positions of this sort some were led partly by sophistical arguments which they could not answer, partly by other reasons. But to attribute some opinion to an author — and an opinion banished far from the Church and from the schools of the philosophers — is that not impudence? Moreover, so many loci of St. Thomas occur in which he teaches the same things contrary to the Jansenian position that we would be too prolix if we wished even to list them all. The principal ones are:[193] q. 1 *De Potentia*, a. 5; q. 22 *De Veritate*, a. 10; *First Part*, q. 19, in the body, and q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; and q. 83, a. 4, in the body; and I-II, q. 13, a. 6.

Positions of Jansenius — The Fourth Proposition

§ 89. The fourth proposition of Jansenius condemned by the Church is this: "The Semipelagians admitted the necessity of interior prevenient grace for all acts, even for the beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics — in that they wished this grace to be such that the human will could resist it or comply with it." The Supreme Pontiffs declare this proposition false and heretical and condemn it as such. Jansenius transmits this most clearly as regards both parts: as to the first, namely that the Semipelagians admitted the necessity of interior prevenient grace for the beginning of faith, he expressly teaches this in book 6, ch. 8 (*De Haeresi Pelagiana*, ch. 6, p. 193, col. 1),[194] where he speaks thus: "Therefore from the opinions of the Massilians and from St. Augustine's doctrine, most carefully weighed, I hold it to be certain and beyond doubt that the Massilians, in addition to preaching and nature, also confess that true, and interior, and actual grace — and even faith itself, which they ascribe to the powers of human freedom and will — is necessary." Thus the Semipelagians ascribed faith itself to human freedom, and they wished the grace unto believing to be such that the human will could resist it. That this was Jansenius's mind regarding the condemned proposition's first part is expressed clearly by his own words (p. 195, col. 2):[195] "In this, therefore, since something of pristine freedom remained, by which one could perseveringly work good if one wished, neither, however, without the

help of interior grace, of the use or abuse of which grace was left to the free choice and power of man." The same is repeated in book 2 *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 12, p. 54, col. 2:[196] "Most plainly can it be understood what the nature of Christ's medicinal *auxilium* was — namely that which Augustine and the Church have preached — in the conflict which it had with the Semipelagians, as we have set out at length in another place. The Semipelagians, for that beginning of faith, prayer, desires, and similar good acts, established as necessary a certain true, internal, and actual grace; and this Augustine recognized as well; they admitted an *auxilium* of God with which men could believe and pray, and wish and not wish, just as it would be in man's first free choice to dispose. They, however, shrank from that grace which acts upon the will so that it causes one to will. This is the first part of the condemned proposition, expressed clearly" (p. 55, col. 2): "With the help of present grace, they thought that the remains of freedom could believe, could pray, and could desire; and for this reason they were condemned as destroyers of medicinal grace and presumptuous claimants of free choice — which, in the same book (ch. 15, p. 61, col. 2, and ch. 25, p. 84, col. 2, and lib. 3, ch. 1, p. 103, col. 2) he repeats and explains." This proposition is certainly represented by several of the above-cited proscribed Quesnellian theses.

§ 90. Furthermore, lest the condemned propositions of Jansenius be misapprehended from those foregoing things, of which the theses numbered 12, 13, 14, and 15 are easily seen to be, it must be noted:[197] The Gomarists, condemned by Innocent X, admitted the necessity of interior prevenient grace for individual acts, even for the beginning of faith, and in this they were heretics, in that they wished this grace to be such that the human will could resist it or comply with it. This proposition, the same Author makes clear from the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht,[198] wherein the Gomarists — that is the Calvinists, and likewise the Antelaparians and Sublaparians — endeavored to induce a medium for drawing the Remonstrants, saying that men are not compelled by God toward evil or sin; but they are only enticed, or by hidden necessity compelled to sin freely, and are inexcusable in being condemned. They show and condemn their brothers the Calvinists in their own acts (part 3 and part 2), who mock those who hope that by that escape one can bring it about that God does not compel men to sins, if by a secret mode and the necessity of the will He necessitates men toward sin. The fifth proposition condemned by Innocent X as a proposition of the Gomarists is, as the same Continuator shows (from part 2 of the *Acta*), from the Remonstrants against the Remonstrantium verba: by which they teach impiously that Christ our Lord was not for all men but only for the Elect or Predestined. Now who the Gomarists were, who the Remonstrants, who the Contra-Remonstrants, Antelaparians, and Sublaparians — if you wish to know, see the same Author (same book 9).[177] The same Author subjoins these words: "Therefore the Roman Church has this glory, that just as from its Bishop Innocent I it saw condemned the deniers of grace, the Pelagian heretics, so from its Innocent X it saw condemned those who fixed an irresistible necessity upon grace; and the Catholic Church has been freed as much from the peril of error as from the peril of division under a most loving Father, so that it may always give thanks and preserve his memory in benediction for sempiternal blessing." Thus that Author. But here, reader, you have a sufficiently representative summary of the Jansenian dogmas, so that you can easily guard yourself against those pernicious errors, and have the whole of Jansenius's doctrine in perspective. A compendium of this, as it were, has been provided by one who thus wrote of Jansenius:

> *De Natura pura minus sane* — On pure Nature, less soundly; *De Natura sana minus pure* — On sound Nature, less purely; *De Natura lapsa minus recte* — On fallen Nature, less rightly; *De Natura Christiana minus Christiane sensit* — On Christian Nature, he thought less than

> Christianly. *Post calumnias naturae non pepercit Gratiae* — After calumnies against nature, he spared not Grace. *Ut negaret sufficientem, fecit inutilem* — To deny sufficient grace, he made it useless; *Ut adstrueret efficacem, fecit necessitatem* — To assert efficacious grace, he made it necessity; *Ut everteret liberum arbitrium, fecit captivum* — To overturn free choice, he made it captive; *Ut corrumperet bona opera, corrupit merita* — To corrupt good works, he corrupted merits. *Ut excusaret peccatum, fecit necessarium* — To excuse sin, he made it necessary.

These are offered to you as indicators, by which you may in other Authors look into the Jansenian dogmas more thoroughly, and refute them with the strongest arguments both from authority and from reason diligently sought out. Be not reluctant to examine with your eyes the testimonies of St. Thomas placed in full view, by which they are most admirably confuted.

§ 91. The fifth condemned proposition of Jansenius is this: "It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died for all men without exception, or shed His blood for them." This proposition, declare the Supreme Pontiffs, we pronounce to be false, rash, scandalous, and — understood in the sense that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined alone — impious, blasphemous, derogatory to divine mercy, and heretical; and as such we condemn it.[199]

The discourse would be drawn out to great length, and we should burden our readers with excessive tedium, were we to adduce all the texts of Jansenius exhibiting that doctrine which the Church proscribes in this fifth proposition. Let us be content with one or two. The first is taken from the *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, book 3, chapter 21, page 161, column 2,[200] where, after he had proposed in support of his own opinion — by which he maintained that sufficient helps are not given to all — the words of the Apostle in 1 Tim. 2 under the name of the Scholastics as an objection: "Who gave Himself as a redemption for all," he replies as follows: "This argument too is answered, like all the preceding ones, long since inculcated to the point of nausea by the Pelagians, and especially by the Massilians, as their own; so that it is astonishing that more recent authors should with such eagerness collect these well-worn weapons of heretics and reforge what is obsolete." Then, from the many things which he thinks he has admirably proved, he concludes thus (page 163, column 2) at the end: "From all of which I now consider it sufficiently clear that the argument by which Christ is said to have suffered and died for all, or to have given Himself as a redemption for all, does nothing whatsoever towards establishing that a sufficient help is to be supplied to all without exception; for according to the doctrine of the ancients, Christ neither suffered nor died for all men absolutely, nor shed His blood for all men absolutely in so general a manner, since they rather teach that this is to be rejected as an error abhorrent to the Catholic faith." And at the end of the same chapter, page 166, column 2, he says: "That vague extension of modern writers derives from no other source than from that general and indifferent will of God toward the salvation of all; which extension St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and the ancient Church repudiated, as a machine INTRODUCED BY THE SEMI-PELAGIANS."

What could be clearer in support of the first part of the condemned proposition? But Jansenius hands on the second part no less plainly. For in the same chapter, after it has become apparent that there is a threefold class of men — some to whom God has predestined to give faith, charity, and perseverance in them to the end, whom we call absolutely predestined, the elect, destined for salvation; others to whom He gives charity without perseverance; others faith without charity — he continues thus (page 164, column 1): "For the men of the first class, as for His true sheep, His true people, as for those absolutely to be saved, He gave and delivered Himself; for these, to be vivified unto eternity, He died; for these, to be freed from all evil, He prayed

to His Father; not for the rest, because, lacking faith and charity, they die in iniquity. For these indeed He prayed to His Father only insofar as they were to be adorned with certain temporal effects of divine grace. For since the offering of Christ cannot be empty, He for whom Christ shed His blood and died necessarily obtains the effect of that death and propitiation and prayer; because He always hears Him, as the Apostle Paul says — that He was heard for His reverence — it is likewise impossible that expiation of his sins should not be made." Do you not clearly see in these words the second part of the fifth condemned proposition expressed, namely that Christ died for the salvation of the predestined alone? For when Jansenius here maintains that Christ was not dead for the eternal salvation of those who do not persevere, but only that they might obtain some temporal effect of divine grace — the sequence is manifest that Christ died for the salvation of the elect alone. As Jansenius explains himself in the same chapter. But lest the Quesnellian theses should be cleared of the sense of Catholic authors, they flowed from the Jansenist dogmas; propositions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, indeed 19, among those struck out by Pope Alexander VIII.[201]

§ 12 (cont.) — DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

"From the testimonies of St. Thomas cited above, concerning the antecedent will of God for saving all men, by which sufficient helps for salvation are prepared, the fifth proposition of Jansenius — in which it is denied that Christ died for all or shed His blood for all — seems more than sufficiently refuted; inasmuch as sufficient helps toward salvation in this state of fallen nature are prepared only through Christ, and God wills men to be saved through the merits of His Son. Let us nevertheless adduce several passages of St. Thomas in which the Catholic truth is more expressly contained. St. Thomas, therefore, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, dist. 20, article 3, ad 2,[202] says that the reason why all men are not restored is not due to any insufficiency of the restorative medicine, since it is, as far as in it lies, sufficient to restore all who have or can have human nature; but it is due to the defect of those who impede the effect of the restoration in themselves. And in the *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 79, a. 7, ad 2:[203] 'To the second it must be said that the Passion of Christ profits all indeed as to sufficiency — both as to the remission of sin and as to the obtaining of grace and glory — but its effect is had only in those who are joined to the Passion of Christ through faith and charity.' And in Lecture 1 on chapter 2 of the First Epistle to Timothy,[204] he says: 'Christ is the mediating bond, because He is just and mortal, and through His death joins us to the justice of God (1 Jn. 2): He Himself is the propitiation for our sins — for some efficaciously, but for all sufficiently: because the price of His blood is sufficient for the salvation of all, but its efficacy is found only in the elect on account of the impediment.' Indeed there is no reason to say that St. Thomas in these passages was speaking of Christ's death for all only as to sufficiency — that is, that he meant merely that the price offered by Christ on the Cross is sufficient for the salvation of all — inasmuch as on that account it would be sufficient also for the salvation of demons, to whom nevertheless St. Thomas never said that the blood of Christ is of any profit unless the fruit thereof is impeded. Moreover St. Thomas himself anticipated this escape, for in Lecture 1 on chapter 8 of the First Epistle to the Corinthians,[205] expounding the Apostle's words 'the weak brother, for whom Christ died, will perish' — that is, in your knowledge, brother, that is, by the occasion taken from your knowledge; because he sees you, who are wise, eating, thinking that you eat in worship of an idol — FOR WHOSE SAVING CHRIST DIED. 'And so you sin gravely' — referring to Rom. 14: 'Do not destroy with food him for whom Christ died.' And in Lecture 3 on chapter 15 of John:[206] 'By the words "I thirst" is shown, he says, His ardent desire for the salvation of the human race (1 Tim. 2): He wills all men to be saved (Lk. 19): The Son of Man came to seek and to save what was lost. Now we are accustomed to express a vehement desire by thirst.'

Do you see, candid reader, how far St. Thomas departs from the principles of Jansenius — nay, how clearly those very principles are refuted by his doctrines? How then can it come to pass, as some disciples of Jansenius have blasphemously asserted, that, since their principles are so contrary, the conclusions could agree? St. Thomas sufficiently, and indeed most clearly, vindicates himself from these calumnies, even by the passages we have adduced. Many more could be sought, but for brevity's sake they are omitted; in the authors indicated below you will easily be able to read them at your leisure, if you are so inclined."

§ 12 (cont.) — Concerning the fifth condemned proposition

It must here lastly be added that the most diligent Continuator of the *Historia* of the rise, progress, and ruin of heresies up to the present time, composed from Calvinian to Catholic sources by Florimund Raemond, namely Ulembergius of Leipzig, a convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism, notes in his ninth book (chapter 5) at the end,[207] upon going through the condemned Jansenian propositions, that the doctrine of those propositions is that of the Gomarists; from which examination the same author next asserts the following. For, as he himself says, it is the doctrine of the Gomarists, as the Remonstrants show and demonstrate it to be taught by the Gomarists:

The first proposition condemned by Innocent X was also that of the Gomarists, as the Remonstrants show from the Acts of the Gomarists themselves (part 3), adducing the very words of those authors; and the same author notes that it was condemned by Innocent X.[208]

The second condemned proposition, says the same author, was also that of the Gomarists, as the Remonstrants demonstrate from the Acts of their brethren (part 3 and part 2), where they ridicule those who seek an escape by saying that men are not compelled to evil by God, but only necessitated in a hidden manner and by a hidden will to sin, and are sufficiently inexcusable for damnation. They show and condemn this in their Calvinian brethren from the Acts of the brethren (part 3 and part 2), where they mock those who hope to be able to escape with this evasion — that God does not compel men to sin if He only necessitates them in a hidden manner and will.[209]

The third proposition condemned by Innocent X was also that of the Gomarists — as appears most fully from the Acts of the Synod of Dordrecht, in which the Gomarists, prevailing over the Arminians, condemned them for teaching that the grace of God is such that human will can resist it, and for this reason called them Semi-Pelagians. Concerning the Synod of Dordrecht, consult Dionysius Petavius, volume 3 of the *Theologia Dogmatica de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana haeresi*, chapter 17.[210] The same condemned proposition was also that of the Gomarists, as the same Continuator says (from part 2 of the Acts), where the words of the Remonstrants against the Remonstrants begin to be enumerated, by which they impiously teach that Christ our Lord suffered not for all men but only for the elect, that is, the predestined. Who the Gomarists were, who their head of the sect, who the Remonstrants, who the Counter-Remonstrants, the Antelapsarians, and Sublapsarians — if you wish to know, see the same author (in the same book 9) and the other writers on the heresies of the seventeenth century.[211]

The same author thereupon adds these words: "The Roman Church therefore has this glory, that as she by her Bishop Innocent I saw heretics who denied Grace condemned as Pelagians, so by her Innocent X she will see oppressed the other heretics who affixed an irresistible necessity to Grace; and the Catholic Church has freedom from the peril of going astray in the matter of charity as well — freed paternally, whence she gives most loving thanks to her Father and prays for the eternal preservation of his memory in his blessing." Thus

the aforesaid author. Furthermore, you have here, reader, a sufficiently represented summary of the Jansenist dogmas, so that you may easily be on your guard against pernicious errors, and have the whole doctrine of Jansenius laid out in view. Of which a certain person is said to have offered as it were a compendium, who wrote of Jansenius thus:[212]

On pure nature — he thought less purely, On sound nature — he thought less soundly, On fallen nature — he thought less rightly, On Christian nature — he felt less Christianly. After slanders of nature he spared not Grace. To deny sufficiency, he made it useless: To establish efficacy, he made it necessity: To overthrow free will, he made it captive. To corrupt good works, he corrupted merit. To excuse sin, he made it necessary.

Yet let these things be an indication for you, from which you may in other authors elsewhere indicated more deeply examine the Jansenian dogmas, and most powerfully refute them by the strongest arguments drawn both from the authority and from the argument thence derived; but do not be reluctant to survey with your eyes the testimonies of St. Thomas placed in view, by which they are most admirably overthrown.

INDEX OF DISTINCTIONS AND PARAGRAPHS contained in these *Commentaries on the Second Book of the Sentences*[213]

DISTINCTIO XXIV. § 1. The proper character of free will. 2. § 2. Reply to objections; the definition explained. 3. § 3. Whether and to what extent the freedom of the will depends on the intellect. 10. § 4. Reply to what seems opposed to the foregoing. 12. § 5. The power of sinning does not belong to the formal character of free will. 17. § 6. Reply to objections. 18. § 7. Whether the will always seeks the good. 19. § 7 [*sic*]. Whether the freedom of the will has regard only to future things. [*page not given*] § 9. That free will exists in man even after the fall is taught from Scripture. [*page not given*] § 10. The same doctrine proved from the Fathers. 23. § 11. The same doctrine demonstrated by manifest proofs from reason. 26. § 12. That free will is not merely passive, not even toward the good. [*page not given*] § 13. That the liberty of free will is not impeded by the operation of grace. 30. § 14. That the freedom of our will is not taken away by the fact that it is moved by God. 32. § 15. Other arguments against free will drawn from the Scriptures are resolved. 40. § 16. Arguments drawn from the Fathers are resolved. 42. § 17. How freedom toward good or evil stands in relation to freedom of will. 45. § 18. In what ways has man's nature been vitiated by sin? 46. § 19 [*sic*]. Whether actual sins injure the good of nature. 48. § 20. Certain things to be noted concerning the order of temptation in man. 49.

DISTINCTIO XXV. § 1. Whether the first man was created in grace. 51. § 2. Reply to arguments of the contrary opinion. 55. § 3. Whether grace was natural to the first man. 58. § 4. A distinct reply to the question, with resolution of objections. 62. § 5. What original justice is, and what are its parts. 66. § 6. Whether original justice was supernatural for man. 69. § 7 [*sic*, numbered after §6*]. What help was necessary for the first man. 77.

DISTINCTIO XXVI. § 1. The manifold acceptation of the word "grace." 85. § 2. That not only actual but also habitual grace must be acknowledged. 89. § 3. Whether habitual grace is to be posited according to faith. 93. § 4. Whether grace is a quality distinct from charity. 94. § 5. Reply to arguments of the contrary opinion. [*page not given*] § 6. That the subject of habitual grace is the will. 100. § 7. The division of grace into operating and co-operating is explained. 101. § 8. How operating grace is said to operate without us. 102. § 9. The division of grace into prevenient and subsequent is explained. 104. § 10. Which grace is called leading,

and which accompanying. 105. § 11. The division of grace into exciting and helping is explained. 107. § 12. A note on certain other divisions of grace. 109. § 13. Whether the first effect of prevenient grace is faith with love. 111. § 14 [*sic*]. An objection concerning will and thought preceding faith without the grace of Christ is resolved. 115. § 15 [*not numbered in source*]. [*page*] 43. § 16. Objections are dissolved. 119. § 17. In what respect the knowledge of the law pertains to the grace of Christ. 124. § 18. That grace is given for individual acts, defined against Pelagius by the Fathers. 127. § 19 [*sic*]. In what sense it has been defined that grace is given for individual acts. 129. § 20. The foregoing doctrine is more widely proved from Scripture and the Fathers. 132. § 21. The same doctrine is confirmed by reasons. [*page not given*]. § 22. Reply to those who contradict the foregoing doctrine. 138. § 23. That the beginning of a good work is from the grace of God. 143. § 24. Reply to objections. 145. § 25. That the progress and consummation of a good work are from the grace of God. 147. § 26. Objections are resolved. 148. § 27. That a good work is to be attributed wholly to the grace of God. 150. § 28. Proof of the same doctrine through the express testimonies of the Fathers. 152. § 29. Reply to certain contrary arguments. 156. § 30. The opinion that grace is not given according to our merits is expounded. 158. § 31. The truth of the same opinion is established from the Scriptures. 159. § 32. Proof of the same opinion from the Fathers and Councils. 161. § 33. Demonstration of the same doctrine from reason. 163. § 34. That no one can prepare himself for grace without grace. 165. § 35. Whether God bestows grace on one who does what is in him. 166. § 36. Reply to the remaining arguments that would derive grace from merits. 169. § 37. Whether without grace a man can love God above all things. 175. § 38. Determination of the question through certain propositions. 178. § 39. Arguments adduced to the contrary are resolved. 182. § 40. Whether without grace the commandments of the law can be kept. 184. § 41. Arguments made against the eighth proposition are resolved. 190. § 42. [*page*] 133. § 43 [in source]. In what sense it is signified. 196. § 44 [in source]. That no one can persevere in the good without grace. [*page not given*] § 45 [in source]. Reply to objections. 199. 201. § 46 [in source]. Whether some temptation can be overcome without the grace of God. 204.

DISTINCTIO XXVII. § 1. What virtue is. [*page not given*] § 2. That virtue is a habit is shown more fully. 213. § 3 [*sic*]. In what sense virtue is sometimes called an act. 214 [*sic, reading 21*]. § 4 [in source]. A comparison of Christian virtue with philosophical habits. [*page not given*]

DISTINCTIO XXVIII. § 1. That the grace of God is not to be subjected to free will, but set before it. 216. § 2. In what sense grace is called efficacious. [*page not given*] § 3. Arguments from Scripture and the Fathers for the absolute efficacy of the grace of God. 216.

DISTINCTIO XXIX. § 1. That man in his integrity stood in need of operating and co-operating grace. 231.

DISTINCTIO XXX. § 1. That every man is born subject to original sin. *ibid.* § 2. Why this sin is called original. 234. § 3. In what sense sin is said to have entered into the world. 235. § 4. The fourfold error concerning original sin. *ibid.* § 5. That not only the punishment but also the guilt passes to posterity. 236. § 6. Confirmation of the same doctrine by reasons. 237. § 7. That original sin is internal in infants and proper to each one. 238. § 8. That not deeds alone are praiseworthy or blameworthy before God. 239. § 9. Whether concupiscence is original sin or the privation of justice. 240. § 10. What is to be understood by the name of concupiscence. 242. § 11. By what names original sin is called. 243. § 12. That concupiscence is not the work of God. *ibid.* § 13. That concupiscence is to be combated. [*page not given*] § 14. How original sin is voluntary.

245. § 15. Whether something external is converted into the truth of human nature. 246. § 16. Reply to what is objected. 247. § 17. How all are said to have been in Adam. 248.

DISTINCTIO XXXI. § 1. How original sin is contracted from parents. 284 [*sic in source*]. § 2. That original sin is contracted even from just parents. 249. § 3. Reply to objections of the heretics. 250.

DISTINCTIO XXXII. [*The text of the Index breaks off here.*]

End of the Index of Distinctions and Paragraphs.

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§ I — Index entries for Distinctions XXXIII through XLIV (Index Distinctionum et Paragraphorum)

§ 92. *Of Distinction XXXIII.* § 1. Whether the sins of later parents pass to their children. p. 262. — 2. Reply to the arguments to the contrary. p. 264. — 3. That there is a single original sin in each individual. p. 265. — 4. Whether the sin of Adam was one or many. *ibid.* — 5. Whether all are born equally sinners. p. 266. — 6. What is to be held with certainty concerning the punishment of original sin. *ibid.* — 7. [Whether the souls of children who die unbaptised will exist in some state of beatitude.] p. 268. — 8. Whether the punishment of sense is owed to original sin in the world to come. p. 269. — 9. Whether the sin of Adam was the gravest of all? p. 272. — 10. Whether the first parents obtained pardon for their transgression? p. 279. — 11. Whether, and in what manner, the sins of parents are punished in their children. *ibid.*

§ 93. *Of Distinction XXXIV.* § 1. What is the first origin of sin. p. 280. — 2. That evil exists only in good. p. 281.

§ 94. *Of Distinction XXXV.* § 1. What sin is, and to what extent it reaches. p. 282. — 2. Whether venial sins are against human laws. p. 285. — 3. Whether there are sins which are committed against human laws. p. 285.

§ 95. *Of Distinction XXXVI.* § 1. That sins and the causes of sins are also the punishments of sins. p. 286. — 2. Explanation of a certain difficulty concerning the foregoing doctrine. — 3. [continued.]

§ 96. *Of Distinction XXXVII.* § [unique]. Whether evil acts are from God, and in what respect. p. 288.

§ 97. *Of Distinction XXXVIII.* § [unique]. From what source the goodness or malice of the will is to be estimated. p. 289.

§ 98. *Of Distinction XXXIX.* § 1. Why man is said to be good or evil from the will alone. p. 290. — 2. In what sense man is said by nature to will good through sin. p. 291.

§ 99. *Of Distinction XL.* § [unique]. Whether there are any external acts that are evil in themselves. p. 292.

§ 100. *Of Distinction XLI.* § 1. Arguments that seem to prove that all works of unbelievers are sins. p. 293. — 2. Arguments on the contrary side. — 3. Explanation and determination of the aforesaid question. p. 296. — 4. Resolution of the objections brought to the contrary. p. 298. — 5. That every sin is voluntary. — 6. Reply to certain arguments to the contrary. p. 302. — 7. Whether every sin can be avoided by man. *ibid.*

§ 101. *Of Distinction XLII.* § 1. Whether an exterior act together with an interior act constitutes one sin or many. p. 303. — 2. Whether through an exterior act something accrues to the malice of the will. p. 304. —

3. In what sense sins pass by act yet remain in guilt (*reatu*). p. 305. — 4. Some sins are mortal, others venial. p. 307. — 5. Whether every mortal sin is by its very nature [mortal]. p. 309. — 6. Reply to the arguments of diverse opinions. *ibid.* — 7. A note on the seven capital vices. p. 311.

§ 102. *Of Distinction XLIII.* § 1. That no sin in this life is entirely irremissible. p. 312. — 2. What the sin against the Holy Spirit is. p. 313. — 3. In what manner the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be irremissible. — 4. [continued.] p. 315. — 5. It is resolved: the objection concerning sin unto death by its very nature. *ibid.*

§ 103. *Of Distinction XLIV.* § 1. Whether the power (*potentia*) of sinning is from God. p. 316. — 2. Whether it is ever lawful to resist authority (*potestati*). p. 317.

End of the Index of Distinctions and Paragraphs.

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1. The preceding matter (concerning the power delegated in the Church) refers to Matt. 16:18–19 and Jn. 20:23.
2. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 65.
3. St. Augustine, Sermon 11 on the Words of the Lord (Sermon LXX in the edition of the Benedictines, Tom. V).
4. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, Book 1, ch. 22.
5. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, Book 1, ch. 19.
6. St. Ambrose, *De Paenitentia* (books written against the Novatians), Book 2, ch. 4.
7. 2 Chr. 33 (Manasses); Acts 9 (Saul); Acts 2 (the Jews who crucified Christ).
8. St. Ambrose, *De Paenitentia*, Book 2, ch. 4, and at the end of that chapter.
9. Ps. 67:23 (Vulgate). St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 67.
10. Ps. 147:17 (Vulgate). St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 147.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 14.
12. Matt. 12:31–32.
13. St. Augustine, Sermon 11 on the Words of the Lord (Sermon LXX, Tom. V, Benedictine edition).
14. Heb. 6:4–6.
15. Heb. 10:26.
16. 2 Pet. 2:21.
17. St. Augustine, Sermon 11 on the Words of the Lord.
18. St. Augustine, Epistle 50 (or Ep. CXVIII in the Benedictine edition).
19. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 83.
20. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 12.
21. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. John Chrysostom, Euthymius, Theophylact, and others in their commentaries on Matt. 12 and Lk. 12.
22. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book 1, ch. 3.
23. Matt. 12:28.
24. Matt. 1:20 (cf. Lk. 1:35).
25. Heb. 9:14.
26. Cf. Matt. 11:19; Lk. 7:34.

27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 14, a. 3; and *Summa theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 1.

28. Bede, commentary on Mk. 3.

29. Heb. 10:27.

30. St. Augustine, *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, Book 1 (cited above).

31. 1 Jn. 5:16.

32. Bede, commentary on 1 Jn. 5.

33. Sir. 28 (on deliberate contumacy).

34. Heb. 6:4–6; Heb. 10:26–27; 2 Pet. 2:21.

35. 1 Sam. 2:25 (Vulgate: 1 Kgs. 2:25).

36. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, aa. 1–2.

37. St. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 17 (and following).

38. Job 1.

39. 3 Kgs. (1 Kgs.) 22 (Vulgate numbering).

40. Jn. 19:11.

41. Hos. 13:11.

42. Job 34:30.

43. Lk. 22:53.

44. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 32, Concio 2.

45. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 56; *Enarratio in Psalmum* 96.

46. St. Augustine, *De Natura Boni*, ch. 31.

47. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book 13 [abbreviation as in source: "l. 13 De Genel."].

48. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, Book 26, ch. 19; Book 14, ch. 18.

49. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book 14, ch. 13.

50. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book 22 [the OCR reads "lib. 23"; the source numbering is retained], ch. 2.

51. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, Book 2, chs. 28–29; *Contra Julianum*, Book 1, ch. 8; Book 3, ch. 24; Epistle 56.

52. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.

53. The Epistle *Ad Demetriadem* (opening *Si summo ingenio*), found among the letters of both St. Augustine and St. Jerome, is in fact by Pelagius, as can be demonstrated from St. Augustine.

54. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 61.

55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 42, a. 2; and q. 104, aa. 4, 5, and 6.

56. St. Augustine, Sermon 62 (in the most recent edition, Sermon LXX, Tom. V). [The source cites "Serm. 6. de verbis Domini"; the correct reference in the Benedictine edition is Sermon LXII, as noted by the author's own correction in the footnote "(a) Seu Serm. LXII. in edit. noviss. Tom. V."]

57. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book 17, ch. 21; *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 21.

58. Council of Constance, Session 15.

59. 1 Sam. (Vulgate: 1 Kgs.) 26.

60. St. Cyprian, *Epistle to Demetrianus*. [In the Benedictine edition: among the Sermons, Class P (or: Appendix V, inter Sermones P. Classis).]

61. Pope Clement XI, *Unigenitus* (1713), condemning the propositions of Paschasius Quesnel's *Moral Reflections on the New Testament*.

62. Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, *Theologia S. Anselmi*, tract. 6, disp. 116, sect. 4, num. 28, Tom. 3.

63. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, Book 1, ch. 1, p. 289, col. 1.

64. The parallel testimonies of St. Thomas in the right-hand column are here translated sequentially.

65. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 1.

66. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, *ad* 3.

67. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book 4, ch. 52.

68. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 1, in the body of the article.

69. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, Book 1 (*De Statu Naturae Purae*), ch. 19–20, pp. 332–333; cf. the condemned theses of Michael Baius and the Quesnellian propositions condemned by Pope Clement XI in *Unigenitus* (1713).

70. The proposition on cupidity and charity as the two sole principles of human acts was condemned by Pope St. Pius V, Pope Gregory XIII, and Pope Alexander VIII. See the respective papal constitutions.

71. The Council of Orange (*Concilium Arausicanum*), A.D. 529. The condemned theses of Baius on the same matter.

72. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, Book 3 (*De Statu Naturae Lapsae*), ch. 17, p. 215; and passim elsewhere.

73. St. Thomas, *In I Epistolam ad Corinthios*, ch. 10, lect. 7.

74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 132, a. 1.

75. The references in the text are to Sir. 41 and Rom. 12 (Vulgate: Rom. 12, "Providing good things not only before God but also before men"; this is in fact Rom. 12:17, cited after the Vulgate).

76. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 7, a. 1, ad 9.

77. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 1, a. 6; and q. 12, a. 2.

79. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4.

80. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 1, ad 2, ad 3.

81. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, ch. 14, lect. 3.

82. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam ad Titum*, ch. 1, lect. 4.

83. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam I ad Corinthios*, ch. 10, lect. 7; and *In Epistolam ad Colossenses*, ch. 3, lect. 3.

84. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 13, p. 135, col. 1.

85. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1; citing (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.

87. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 2, ad 3; and q. 87, a. 7, in the body of the article.

88. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article.

89. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2.

90. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 2 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 4, pp. 33 and 40; and Book (*De Gratia Primi Hominis*), chs. 14–15, p. 61 and 64 (Tom. 3).

91. The cross-reference is to Estius's own *Annotationes* at Distinctio 46, § 2, where the loci of St. Thomas on the antecedent will of God are reviewed; also St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2; *In I ad Tim.*, lect. 2; and *De Veritate*, q. 23, a. 1; and *In I Sent.*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1.

92. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 6, the unique article (*De Electione Humana seu Libero Arbitrio*), in the body of the article.

93. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 1 and a. 2.

94. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 10.

95. The discussion here concerns *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 10, on whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the divine law.

96. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 10, in the body of the article; with reference to 1 Tim. 1 and q. 12, a. 4 of the same part.

97. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 10, reply to the second objection; with Cajetan's commentary thereon. The capitalized passage is from the text of St. Thomas: "Et cum ista sint duo præcepta affirmativa, potest contingere quod aliquis implens præceptum de honoratione Parentum, non tunc transgrediatur præceptum de omissione modi Charitatis."

98. St. Thomas, *In I ad Corinthios*, ch. 13, lect. 4.

99. St. Thomas, *In I ad Corinthios*, ch. 13, lect. 4 (Tom. 8 of the Opera).

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 3, in the body of the article.

101. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

102. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 26, a. 3; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

103. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 3 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 13, p. 135, col. 1 (as cited in the prior chunk).

104. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 4.

105. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 5 (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*), ch. 24, pp. 234–235, col. 2 and 1; ch. 31, p. 245; and ch. 33.

106. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 4, in the body of the article and reply to objections 1 and 3.

107. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, ch. 8, lect. 3, expounding Rom. 8: "Non enim accepistis Spiritum servitutis." The reference to Deut. 5 is to the verse: "Quis det eos talem habere mentem." Matt. 10 is cited for "Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt."

108. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 7, in the body of the article; and q. 45, a. 6, ad 3. Sir. 1 is cited for "Timor Domini initium sapientiae."

109. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, Book 2 (*De Statu Naturae Lapsae*), ch. 2, p. 1.

110. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, ch. 2, heading.

111. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 4.

112. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 67; *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book 3, ch. 19.

113. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 90, a. 4, in the body of the article; with reference to a. 1 of the same question.

114. The citation continues the quotation from St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

115. The reference is to St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, on invincible and antecedent ignorance.

116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 1, in the body of the article; the quotation is left incomplete in the source as printed.

117. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 1, in the body of the article; with the reasoning that since moral acts properly belong to voluntary acts, and the will is the principle of voluntary and sinful acts, it follows that sin resides in the will as its subject.

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 3, in the body of the article, on invincible and antecedent ignorance: the quoted capitalized passages are Estius's emphatic rendering of St. Thomas's conclusions on ignorance that is wholly involuntary and excuses entirely from sin.

119. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, Book 3, ch. 2, p. 184.

120. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 2, *De Statu Naturae Lapsae*, Book 3, ch. 22, p. 275, col. 2; and p. 276, col. 1. The first proposition here referenced is among those proscribed by Pope Alexander VIII.

121. The passage, partially garbled in the OCR, refers to Jansenius's treatment of what man can do without grace, drawing on the Dominical word "without me you can do nothing" (Jn. 15:5) and St. Paul's "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves" (2 Cor. 3:5).

122. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 4 *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 4, p. 173, col. 1; ch. 6, p. 174, col. 2 (title); p. 175, col. 1 (body). The axiom "what more delights us, by that we necessarily act" (*quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur, necesse esse*) is attributed by Jansenius to St. Augustine.

123. Cornelius Jansenius, *Augustinus*, Tom. 3, Book 4 *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, ch. 11, p. 185, col. 1. The definition of "victorious delight" (*delectatio victrix*) as an undeliberated act infused from heaven into the will.

124. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article. Estius's Author (the annotator referred to) had cited this and related passages in the annotations to Dist. 26, §2.

125. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article (the passage on the sick man and the physician is the closing analogy of that article).

126. St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, Dist. 28, q. 1, a. 1, in the body and ad 1; with Jn. 15:5 ("without me you can do nothing") and 2 Cor. 3:5 ("we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves").

127. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, in the body of the article.

128. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 85, a. 1, in the body of the article; with cross-references to *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, a. 1 and q. 51, a. 2, ad 3.

129. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 85, a. 2, in the body of the article. The parallel passage is also in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2.

130. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Virtutibus in Communi*, a. 8; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, a. 1 and following, especially a. 2, ad 2 and ad 3. The capitalized passage is cited by Estius directly from St. Thomas's text.

131. The reference is to St. Augustine's axiom: "According to what shall have delighted us more, it is necessary that we operate accordingly" (*Quod amplius nos delectaverit, secundum id operemur, necesse est*), cited and explained in the context of Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris* lib. 4, cap. 6 (p. 174–175).

132. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, in the body of the article.

133. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1; with reference to Aristotle, *De bona fortuna* (= *Eudemian Ethics* VII, ch. 14).

134. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 3–4, conclusion of a. 4.

135. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 6.

136. Condemned propositions 34, 35, 36, 37 of the Baianist and Quesnellian theses; see Pius V's and Clement XI's condemnations.

137. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 9, cap. 10 (p. 399, col. 1), and cap. 14; lib. 9, cap. 25 (pp. 426–427).

138. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1; and other passages cited in what follows.

139. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 1 and 2.

140. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 20, p. 101, col. 1.

141. The five propositions condemned by Innocent X (*Cum Occasione*, 1653) and Alexander VII (*Ad Sanctam Beati Petri Sedem*, 1656).

142. 1 Tim. 2:4.

143. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, cap. 12, lect. 3; citing Rev. 3:20.

144. Estius's own annotations to Dist. 46, § 2.

145. St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, q. 1, dist. 46; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2; *In I Epistolam ad Timotheum*, lect. 3; *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 25, a. 1.

146. St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 1.

147. Innocent X, *Cum Occasione* (1653), and Alexander VII, *Ad Sanctam* (1656), condemning the first Jansenian proposition.

148. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 13, p. 135, col. 1.

149. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 13, p. 138, col. 2.

150. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3; with reference to Aristotle, *Physics* II.

151. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1; with reference to Acts 10 (Peter sent to Cornelius).

152. St. Thomas, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, cap. 10, lect. 3.

153. Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, *Theologia*, tom. 3 (tract of St. Anselm, disp. 6, sect. 4, num. 28).

154. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 4, cap. 4, p. 173, col. 1.

155. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 4, cap. 6, p. 174, col. 2.

156. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 4, cap. 6, p. 175, col. 1.

157. Jansenius, *De Gratia primi hominis*, cap. 14 and 15, p. 61; and *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, tom. 3, lib. 2, cap. 4, p. 33 and p. 40.

158. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 4, p. 40, col. 2.

159. Jansenius, *De Gratia primi hominis*, lib. 8 and 9.

160. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, cap. 10, p. 41, col. 1.

161. Condemned Baianist and Quesnellian propositions 34, 35, 36, 37.

162. Jansenius [abbreviation as in source], p. 46, col. 2.

163. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, cap. 6, p. 47, col. 1.

164. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, cap. 16.

165. Innocent X, *Cum Occasione* (1653); Alexander VII, *Ad Sanctam* (1656).

166. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3; Aristotle, *Physics* II.

167. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

168. The following double-column section (POSITIONES JANSENII — DOCTRINA S. THOMAE) is Estius's parallel juxtaposition of Jansenian positions and St. Thomas's doctrine. Each numbered point presents first the Jansenian position, then the opposing Thomistic text.

169. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, *Sed contra* argument; citing St. Jerome's dictum.

170. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 13, p. 135 and p. 138 (as cited above).

171. St. Thomas, *In Evangelium Joannis*, cap. 6, lect. [abbreviation as in source].

172. Estius's annotations to Dist. 46, § 2.

173. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, *Sed contra*; citing St. Jerome.

174. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3.

175. Condemned propositions of the Gomarists, by Innocent X; see *Acta* of the Synod of Dordrecht, part 3 and part 2.

176. [Continuator of the aforesaid Author], *Theologia Dogmatica de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana haeresi*, cap. 17.

177. [Continuator], *eodem lib.* 9 [abbreviation as in source].

178. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 14, ad 1.

179. St. Thomas, *In Primam Epistolam ad Corinthios*, cap. 10, lect. 3.

180. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2.

181. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 49 [body and *Sed contra*]; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, ad 2.

182. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 24, p. 80, col. 1.

183. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 24, p. 80, col. 2.

184. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 25, p. 83, col. 2; cap. 27, p. 85, col. 2; lib. 3, cap. 4, p. 108; and cap. 27, lib. 2, p. 86, col. 2.

185. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, lib. 6, cap. 6, p. 267.

186. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, lib. 6, cap. 12; p. 281, col. 2.

187. Quesnellian theses, nos. 7, 8, 22, 23, 24, and 25; condemned by Innocent X and Alexander VII.

188. See the Author [Estius], *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 24, §§ 5–15.

189. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2.

190. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia Christi*, a. [as in source], in corpore.

191. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cap. 68.

192. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo*, q. 6 (seu q. unica de Electione humana seu libero arbitrio), a. unica.

193. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia*, q. 1, a. 5; *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 10; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19 (in corpore), q. 28, a. 1, ad 3; q. 83, a. 4 (in corpore); *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 13, a. 6.

194. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, lib. 6 (*De Haeresi Pelagiana*), cap. 6 [= cap. 8 in some editions], p. 193, col. 1.

195. Jansenius, *Augustinus*, lib. 6, p. 195, col. 2.

196. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 2, cap. 12, p. 54, col. 2; and p. 55, col. 2.

197. Condemned propositions of the Gomarists: Innocent X, *Cum Occasione* (1653); Alexander VII, *Ad Sanctam* (1656).

198. [Continuator of the aforesaid Author], *Theologia Dogmatica de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana haeresi*, cap. 17; citing *Acta* of the Synod of Dordrecht, part 3 and part 2.

199. The fifth proposition of Jansenius condemned by the Church is: "It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died for all men absolutely or shed His blood for them." The Supreme Pontiffs — Innocent X and Alexander VII — declared it false, rash, scandalous, impious, blasphemous, derogatory to divine mercy, and heretical. See Innocent X, *Cum Occasione* (1653), and Alexander VII, *Ad Sanctam* (1656).

200. Jansenius, *De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, lib. 3, cap. 21, p. 161, col. 2; and p. 163, col. 2; and p. 166, col. 2.

201. Quesnellian theses condemned: propositions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 19, struck out by Pope Alexander VIII.

202. St. Thomas, *In III Sententiarum*, dist. 20, q. [unica], a. 3, ad 2.

203. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 79, a. 7, ad 2.

204. St. Thomas, *In I Epistolam ad Timotheum*, cap. 2, lect. 1.

205. St. Thomas, *In I Epistolam ad Corinthios*, cap. 8, lect. 1.

206. St. Thomas, *In Evangelium Joannis*, cap. 15, lect. 3.

207. [Continuator = Ulembergius], *Historia de Ortu, Progressu et Ruina Haeresium*, lib. 9, cap. 5, at the end [abbreviation as in source].

208. Innocent X, *Cum Occasione* (1653); cf. *Acta* of the Gomarists, part 3.

209. *Acta* of the Gomarists and Remonstrants, part 3 and part 2 [abbreviation as in source].

210. Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica de Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Haeresi*, tom. 3, cap. 17; on the Synod of Dordrecht.

211. [Continuator = Ulembergius], *eodem lib. 9* [abbreviation as in source]; and other writers on the heresies of the seventeenth century.

212. The verse summary of Jansenius's doctrine [author not identified in source].

213. This is the Index of Distinctions and Paragraphs (*Index Distinctionum et Paragraphorum*) for the *Commentaria in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, covering Distinctions XXIV through XXXII (and beyond, the text breaking off). Page numbers are those of the printed edition; where the source gives no page number, none is supplied.