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Pars Prior

Commentary on the Second Book of the Sentences

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DISTINCTIO I — ON THE CREATION OF THINGS, AND THAT THE WORLD WAS MADE BY GOD ALONE FROM NOTHING (*DE RERUM CREATIONE, ET MUNDUM A SOLO DEO EX NIHILO FACTUM ESSE*)

§ 1. Concerning all of these [errors] Epiphanius, Philastrius, and St. Augustine treat.[1] These men are thought to have drawn their error from the doctrine of Pythagoras, who laid down two principles of things, the good and the evil. From this error another necessarily followed. For when they said that all bodily things had been fashioned by the evil God, they consequently taught, in line with this principle, that whatever is bodily is evil by its very nature. This heresy of the Manichaeans was held before them also by the Gnostics, and afterwards by the Priscillianists.

§ 2. Against all the foregoing and other similar errors, it must be shown, according to the Catholic faith, that one and good God, and He alone, is the Creator of all things which are not God Himself; and that consequently every creature is good; that the world, too, did not exist from eternity, but that, whereas previously it existed in no part of itself, it at some time received the beginning of its duration.

§ II — That the world and whatever is in it was made by God alone (Mundum et quidquid in eo est, a solo Deo factum esse)

§ 3. It must be held with certain faith that this whole universe, which we call the world, with all its parts — whether those things be corporeal or incorporeal, simple or composite, animate or inanimate, endowed with mind or not endowed with mind — was created by one true God, and by Him alone. Which Sacred Scripture clearly teaches in many places, especially in Genesis 1, where the creation of the world, accomplished by the mere word of divine command, is described in detail, as the Psalmist also attests, saying: "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created."[3] Other Scriptures expressly teach that all things were created by God, as Exodus 20: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them.",[4] Again, Wisdom 1 says: "He created all things that they might be";[5] Ecclesiasticus 18: "He who lives for ever created all things together";[6] Hebrews 3: "He who created all things is God.",[7] And John in chapter 1 speaks thus of the Word of God: "All things were made through Him," and again, "The world was made through Him.",[8] And concerning the same, Paul says in Colossians 1: "In Him were created all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominations" and the rest.[9]

§ 4. The same is held by the Christian confession in the symbols of faith. For although the Apostles' Creed expressly asserts only that God is the Creator of heaven and earth, yet that under these two all other things must be comprehended has been more expressly declared in the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, and other

Creeds, in which we confess one Maker of all things visible and invisible. Peculiarly also, against the heresy of the Manichaeans and of Priscillian, there was decreed an anathema in the First Council of Braga (ch. 13) against those who said that the creation of all flesh is not God's, but the work of evil angels.[10]

§ 5. And this is the common doctrine of all the Fathers, which they expressly teach and prove by many arguments: Augustine in *De Trinitate* III, ch. 8, and *De Civitate Dei* XI, and XII, ch. 24, and in the other places already cited;[11] Cyril in book 2 of the *Disputations against Julian*, teaching that there is one sole God, Maker of all things, who created all things out of nothing, and to Himself is the glory of having made all things, nor did He communicate this with angels or any other nature whatsoever, according to that word: "My glory I will not give to another";[12] Damascene in book 2 (at the end of *De Fide Orthodoxa*), where he says: "Whosoever say that angels, or any substance whatsoever, are the makers of things, these are the mouth of the devil, their father";[13] Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3, teaches at the outset that it is to be principally held that every nature which is not God is from the Holy Trinity itself, which alone is the eternal and true God, from nothing, and what follows;[14] likewise Epiphanius, Philastrius, and Augustine in their books on heresies.'[15] To all which there at last acceded the authority of the great Lateran Council held under Innocent III, in whose first chapter it was defined that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is the one universal Principle, the Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by His omnipotent power from the beginning of time made together both creatures out of nothing, namely the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the mundane.'[16]

§ 6. Moreover, from what has been said it is clear that by this doctrine there is excluded not only every principal cause of the creation of things besides God, but also any instrumental cause whatsoever. For, as Scripture attests (Gen. 1 and elsewhere), God in the beginning created all things out of nothing; therefore no other creature preceded the creation of the universe, such as God might assume as an instrument for creating the universe. Which also the words of the Lateran Council just recited prove most clearly. Wherefore, if anyone should say that God used some instrument in the creation of things, he would seem to speak against the faith. But whether one ought to hold the like concerning him who should say that God, in the manner in which He now creates rational souls, does so by means of some instrumental cause, is a question whose resolution must be sought below. In this place it is enough to have shown that, according to the Catholic Faith, it must be granted that the one true God immediately, and without the cooperation of any other cause whatsoever, produced this whole universe from nothing.

§ III — Certain objections are refuted (Refelluntur quaedam objectiones)

§ 7. Against this Catholic truth it can first be objected that Scripture sometimes calls the devil "prince of this world," as John 12 and 14, and "god of this world," as 2 Cor. 4, and his demons "ministers, rulers of the world," as Eph. 6.[17] Whence it may seem consequent that the world, or some parts of it, were made by the devil or by his angels. For of those things of which the devil is the prince, ruler, and god, it seems fitting that he should also be the author. For so we rightly reason about the true God: if the world is ruled and preserved by Him, that the world also was made by Him, since it pertains to one and the same to create and to preserve the world. But it is answered that in the cited passages of Scripture, as often elsewhere, "world" and "age" are not the names of natures, but of vices, by which are signified men, in so far as they cling by a disordered love to the world and to worldly things. Whence John (1 Ep., ch. 2), calling us away from love of the world, speaks thus:

"All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, and concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life."[18] In the same way, "flesh" is frequently in Scripture taken in a bad sense, namely for the man, in that part in which he is vicious and contrary to God, as in John 3: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh."[19] Of these, then, the devil is called prince and god; elsewhere also king and father, as Job 41: "He is king over all the sons of pride";[20] and John 8: "You are of your father the devil,"[21] not because the devil is the author of the nature of any men, but because he rules over wicked men, and works in them depraved desires, and because they are held captive under his power, as is said (2 Tim. 2),[22] and finally because they give themselves wholly to fulfilling his will, as though of their God and Lord. In which sense it is said of certain men, Phil. 3: "Whose god is their belly."[23] For that is each man's god which he chiefly cultivates, and on which before all others he bestows his care.

§ 8. Secondly, there is objected that saying of Ecclesiasticus 11: "Error and darkness are created together for sinners."[24] Which creation, since it cannot be referred to God who is good, must of necessity be ascribed to an evil principle. It is answered that the sense of Scripture is that error and darkness are created together for sinners, not by God, whether good or evil, but by those very persons who make themselves sinners. For immediately upon becoming sinners, they are involved in many errors and in the darkness of ignorance. But these are not any real things, nor parts of the universe, but defects and vices of things. Whence also this third objection is resolved: Besides the good God, there is some first principle of evil; therefore not by God alone was the universe created, and whatever is in it. For it is answered that evil is not anything in the universe, but the privation of something, that is, of a good; whose principle is not God, but the will of the intellectual creature, defecting from God, that is, from the unchangeable good.

§ 9. Fourthly: the forms of natural and artificial things are produced by their agents, that is, by nature or by art, not out of some matter, for a form does not consist of matter; therefore they are produced by them out of nothing, and consequently are created. St. Thomas answers (I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 1)[25] that forms are not *per se* made, but only *per accidens*, inasmuch as they begin to be in their composites when these come to be. Which composites, whether natural or artificial, are not made by secondary causes except from pre-existing matter. That, moreover, to be created is proper to composites and subsistents, the same St. Thomas teaches (ibid., a. 4).[26]

§ 10. Fifthly: Whatever things are made by nature or by art are creatures; therefore when they come to be, they are created, and their production is creation; wherefore it seems to follow that nature and art create. For what else is it to create than to produce a creature? St. Thomas answers there (ad 4) that the operation of nature is only upon the hypothesis of created principles, and for this reason he says that the things which come to be by nature are called creatures.[27] And the same judgement is to be made of the operation of art, and of the things which are made by art. For whatever things were made by God after the creation of heaven and earth — by which creation, namely, the whole matter of all corporeal things was created — are not called created for that reason, that they were immediately made out of nothing, but because the elements out of which they were made had in the beginning been made out of nothing. Although it must be granted that the works of the first institution, following upon the creation of heaven and earth, are said to be created by a stronger reason than whatever things, after the work of the six days, are produced by nature. For these latter already exist beforehand, not only according to matter, but also according to their seminal reasons (*rationes seminales*), in their natural causes. In the former, however, nature itself was instituted, and the seminal reasons were imparted to things once instituted.

§ 11. Lastly: it is the opinion of many Fathers that the angels were created before heaven and earth, as will appear below (at dist. 2);[28] therefore the angels, as pre-existent, could have been assumed by God as an instrument for the production of the entire corporeal world; nor will it seem to assert anything contrary to the faith if someone shall say it was so done. Nay rather, it appears that this might be said very fittingly, since the angelic nature was to be set over the whole corporeal world, so that it should also exhibit its own ministry and instrumental cooperation to God for its creation. It is answered that one must stand altogether by the Lateran decree, by which it is defined that at the beginning of time both creatures, the angelic and the mundane, were founded together out of nothing.'[29] And even if this did not yet seem sufficiently defined, nevertheless the consentient and constant doctrine of the Fathers absolutely rejects any angelic cooperation in the creation of the corporeal world, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor does being set over argue a diversity. For it is no inconvenience that someone be set over things to the production of which he did not cooperate — as man over beasts, the wise man over the foolish, the king over the people. For otherwise, not even among the angels themselves could a prelacy be acknowledged, since no Catholic would say that the lower angels were created by God with the instrumental or ministerial cooperation of the higher. To say nothing, meanwhile, of the possibility of this kind of cooperation, which will be treated of presently. But what must be answered concerning those ancients who place the creation of the angels before the visible world, we shall say at the next distinction.

§ IV — Whether the power of creating can be communicated to a creature (An creandi potentia communicari possit creaturae)

§ 12. It is a celebrated question among the scholastic Doctors, whether creating is so proper to God that it can be communicated to no creature. We, setting aside the manifold variety of opinions, shall reply to it piecemeal, by heads or points; of which the first is: that no creature can be the principal cause of creation, not even by God's absolute power. The reason of this doctrine is assigned by St. Thomas, in the place cited above (art. 5),[31] because creation is the production of being out of non-being; but being, as such, is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause. Which he proves thus: because more universal effects must be reduced to more universal and prior causes; since, therefore, among all effects the most universal is *esse* itself, it is necessary that it be reduced to the first and most universal cause, which is God. Another reason: Nothing can be the principal cause of creating unless it has infinite power. For the more remote from potency is the form to be produced, the greater power is required in the agent; and therefore, to produce a form out of no potency whatever, which takes place in creation, infinite power is required; and this cannot be communicated to a creature. Again another reason: Nothing can be the principal cause of creating unless it has a power productive of the whole of being, since creation is the production of being inasmuch as it is being. But it is impossible to posit such a power in a creature; for thus it would follow that a creature could produce itself, which indeed implies a manifest contradiction, namely of being and not-being. Finally, the consensus of all who philosophize rightly holds that by no created power can anything be produced out of nothing. This doctrine is also confirmed by the testimonies of the Fathers.

§ 13. St. Augustine, treating (in *De Trinitate* III, ch. 9) not only of the fact but also of the possibility, teaches that neither the good nor the wicked can be creators of any thing; whence it follows, much less can other creatures do so.[32] The same, in bk. 11 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 4), says: "setting aside the prophetic voices, the world itself, by its most ordered mutability and mobility and by the most beautiful appearance of all

visible things, somehow silently proclaims both that it has been made, and that it could not have been made save by a God ineffably and invisibly great and ineffably and invisibly beautiful"; so he. Where, although Augustine is speaking not so much of the power of creating as of the fabric of the whole universe, which he denies could have been made by any other than God, the argument being drawn from its most ordered composition and beauty, yet the reasoning is equivalent. For if the power of creating could belong to anyone besides God, nothing would stand in the way but that this fabric could be produced by another than God.[33] Further, Cyril, in bk. 2 (*Contra Julianum*), affirms in the most express words that to be able to create is proper to the divine nature, and is one among those things which are inaccessible, that is, incommunicable to created nature; nay, that this pertains to the highest glory of God, and therefore that it most of all militates against the divine glory, if anyone should think that others also can create and produce something out of nothing.[34] Similarly Fulgentius (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3) says that the omnipotence of God is understood in this, that He made every creature out of nothing. Wherefore, according to Fulgentius, just as omnipotence cannot be communicated to a creature, so neither can the power of creating.[14] Damascene also, in bk. 2 (*De Fide Orthodoxa*, ch. 3), proves by this argument that Angels are not creators of any substance whatever: because they are creatures—manifestly signifying that the power of creating is proper to God and incommunicable to a creature.[35]

§ 14. This, therefore, being as certain established, it is disputed whether by way of an instrumental cause a creature can concur in creation. Let this, then, be the second point: that no creature has from its nature the capacity to be an instrument of the divine power for creating. We speak here of a physical instrument; namely, to whose formal character (*ratio*) it pertains that it operates dispositively, through something proper to itself, towards the effect of the principal agent, as St. Thomas defines in article five.[31] In which manner heat is the instrument of fire for producing another fire, and the axe the instrument of the craftsman for making a bench: for it is proper to heat to heat, and to the axe to cut. The reason of this doctrine, therefore, is that no creature, through anything proper to itself, can cooperate dispositively towards the action of God creating. Which St. Thomas proves thus: because creation, since it is the production of a thing out of nothing, presupposes nothing about which the action of an instrument could be exercised. It can also be proved by the same reasons by which it was shown that a creature cannot be the principal cause of creation. For if the creature operates dispositively towards the effect of creation through something proper to itself, it will have the character of a most universal cause, and will have infinite power, and that productive of the whole of being, according to the deduction made above—as can be clear to one who weighs the reasons themselves diligently. Whence, on this point of doctrine, the theologians agree well enough.

§ 15. The third point. A creature cannot by a supernatural power be elevated to such an action, by which, as a physical instrument, it should cooperate in creation. The proof of this is the same as of the foregoing. For the reasons adduced simply and absolutely prove that a creature cannot be a physical instrument for creating, inasmuch as it pertains to the proper character of this kind of instrument to operate dispositively, through something proper to itself, towards the effect of the principal cause. Wherefore, neither by divine power can a creature be assumed to create as a physical instrument, the proper character of such an instrument remaining intact. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the article cited above, and in *De Potentia* (q. 3, art. 4) and in *Contra Gentes* II, ch. 21;[36] likewise of Albert the Great (on this distinction, art. 7) and of Gabriel (on the same, q. 4), and also of Scotus (*In IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1), although he dissents from St. Thomas in the manner of proof.[37] But of a different opinion are the Master (*In IV Sent.*, dist. 5) and Durandus (on this distinction, q.

3); which opinion St. Thomas himself, in his writings on the Master in both places, followed as probable, namely (q. 1, art. 10, on this distinction; q. 2, art. 1, in distinction q. 5, bk. IV).[38]

§ 16. The fourth point. A creature can be assumed by God, as a moral instrument, for the work of creation. The reason: because a moral instrument is called every means which is taken up by the principal moral cause for those effects which such a cause regards, as are words, nods, writing, a signature, and whatever else is at the pleasure of the said cause. Thus, then, it is manifest that God could, and can, at the creation of any creature, or at its action as an instrument—as at the prayer of Peter, at the raising of Moses' hand or rod—create some new thing upon the earth. But that this very thing was not done in the creation of the world, we have shown above.

§ V — The arguments to the contrary are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta in contrarium)

§ 17. Against the third proposition of the foregoing doctrine, not a few arguments are wont to be brought by those who think otherwise; although most of them are such that they can equally be urged against the second proposition. These, however, are the chief ones.

§ 18. *First.* A creature can cooperate with God after the manner of an instrument in performing a miracle, nor does it require an infinite power for this; therefore it will likewise be able to cooperate in creating, notwithstanding the fact that infinite power cannot be communicated to it. The inference is proved, because for either work an infinite power is required in the principal cause. For each is such as to exceed the strength of the whole created nature.

§ 19. *Second.* A corporeal creature can be taken up by God — nay, it is in fact taken up — for exercising an instrumental action concerning a spiritual thing, even though by its own power, and (as Thomas puts it) "through something proper to itself," it cannot operate dispositively with regard to such a subject; for the sacraments by instrumental action cause grace in the soul, and the fire of hell causes pain in demons and in separated souls: therefore for the character of an instrument it is not required that through something proper to itself it should be able to operate dispositively towards the effect of the principal agent, and consequently nothing will prevent a creature from being taken up by the divine power as an instrument for the work of creation.

§ 20. *Third.* A natural cause corrupting the sacramental species of the Eucharist produces another new body according to matter and form: therefore it creates.

§ 21. *Fourth.* Man generates man; but this would not be true properly speaking unless he produced, at least instrumentally, the form of the begotten, that is, the rational soul. But that form is produced by creation: therefore he creates, at least as an instrument, the soul of the one begotten. This argument is confirmed from the character of a physical instrument, whose office is through something proper to itself to cooperate dispositively to the effect of the principal agent, as was said above: for man, by the power of generation, disposes matter to the reception of the soul.

§ 22. *Fifth.* God can bring it about that an animal should generate an animal, and that fire should generate fire; therefore He can bring it about that an Angel should produce an Angel; but this cannot be done except

by creation, since an Angel is an immaterial thing: therefore God can communicate to an Angel the power of creating.

§ 23. *Sixth.* A creature can produce an accidental form outside matter, as heat, cold, and the like in the sacramental species, no matter existing in which it should be received: therefore it can create.

§ 24. *Seventh.* It is of the same power to annihilate and to create; but a creature can be taken up by God as an instrument for annihilating something, because prior to annihilation there exists the thing upon which the instrumental action can be exercised; therefore it can also be taken up for creating.

§ 25. *Last.* Augustine[40] seems to remove from creatures only that they are the principal cause of creation, but does not deny that they can cooperate instrumentally towards creation; nay rather he seems to assert this. For he says (ch. 8) that neither are parents to be called creators of men, nor farmers creators of crops, although, by their motions extrinsically applied, the power of God inwardly operates these things that are to be created; and, with a similitude interposed concerning justification — by which our mind cannot be inwardly formed except by God — thus, he says, "God inwardly works the creation of visible things, but the outward operations, whether of good or of evil Angels or of men, He so applies to the nature of things in which He creates all things, as He does agriculture to the earth," and what follows. Then at the beginning of ch. 9: "It is one thing, from the innermost and highest order of causes, to found and administer the creature — which He who does is the sole Creator, God; but it is another, according to the powers and faculties distributed by Him, to apply some operation from without, so that what is created should come forth at this or at that moment, in this or that manner," and so on. Whence at last, concluding, he says: "But He is not Creator save who principally forms these things." By which sentence, as also by the preceding, Augustine signifies that Angels or men can not principally but instrumentally or ministerially form those same things, although he denies that on that account they can be called creators; because the name of creator is to be attributed only to the principal cause.

§ 26. For the solution of these and similar arguments, many and various things are said by those who, following St. Thomas's doctrine, hold that the creatures which are taken up by God for performing miracles and for producing the effects of the sacraments and other things of this kind constitute the physical character of an instrument. Concerning which see Cajetan and D. Bañez on I,[41] where it is asked whether to create belongs to God alone; and again Cajetan and Medina on III,[42] where there is disputed the power of the Soul of Christ with respect to the changing of creatures. For us, however, in this place it will be enough to reply briefly to each as shall seem more probable.

§ 27. *To the first argument,* therefore, it can be answered that the creature, in miracles, stands only after the manner of a moral instrument, or of a meritorious cause, or of a *sine qua non.* Which St. Thomas himself seems to have thought, when, writing on III,[43] he says that neither any corporeal nor spiritual power, nor that of the Soul or of an Angel, nor even of the Soul of Christ, could avail for the changing of the law of nature divinely imposed, except after the manner of prayer or intercession; "and therefore," he says, "this was the sign of Christ's Deity, that by commanding He perfected signs, and not by praying, as the other Saints." Which solution, however, if it pleases anyone less — because St. Thomas in the *Summa* seems to think otherwise — he will be able to say that the motion of the creature which God uses for a miracle is its dispositive operation towards the effect of the principal cause, not indeed naturally belonging to it in order to the miracle, but inasmuch as it is taken up and elevated by God to this. Nor is the case similar with a miracle and with creation,

because what is done miraculously for the most part does not so exceed the powers of nature but that God could have placed this in nature — such as restoring sight to the blind, gait to the lame, and so on; otherwise with creation, on account of the reasons adduced at the beginning.

§ 28. *To the second it is replied* that it is also the opinion of many that no corporeal creature — not even by an action divinely communicated to it — can act upon a thing merely spiritual; but that both the Sacraments with respect to grace in the soul, and corporeal fire with respect to pain in demons, are called instruments because God uses these things for producing those effects, as being effective through His will and ordination, although otherwise, after the manner of nature, they do nothing. Others say that although creatures of this sort cannot by their action attain the very subject in which the effect is produced — the spiritual nature being repugnant, which is not capable of passion from a corporeal thing — they nevertheless operate dispositively through something proper to themselves, that is, by an action or motion towards the effect of the principal agent, although they do not by their action reach the subject of that effect. But this solution has no small difficulty, as must be more fully declared elsewhere.

§ 29. *To the third* some reply that that production of a new body is not a creation, because it is not from nothing: since, as they say, the accidents supply the place of matter for receiving the dispositions prior to such a production. But this response does not yet evacuate the force of the argument, because, since new matter cannot be produced except by creation or at least by an operation similar to creation, it will seem to follow that a natural cause producing the very whole by the way of natural generation likewise avails for creation or for a new production of matter. Wherefore it seems rather to be said that the cause corrupting the sacramental species does not extend itself, not even after the manner of a physical instrument, to the production of matter, nor to the production of the whole composite, but only to the prior dispositions, upon which, though the form of the composite naturally follows, nevertheless the composite itself — that is, the natural body — does not, since another part of its essence is matter. Hence it can be said that this cause operates indeed dispositively through something proper to itself towards the form of the composite, yet not towards the composite itself, because it does not operate towards the form in matter.

§ 30. *To the fourth it is replied* with St. Thomas, I,[44] that man generates man inasmuch as by the power of his seed matter is disposed to the reception of the rational soul. But because the rational soul does not follow that disposition from the power of the begetter — for it is not drawn forth from the potency of matter, but is infused by God by creation into the body so disposed — therefore it cannot be said that man, not even as a physical instrument, by his operation attains the soul or its production. Hence it is that the same St. Thomas,[45] teaches that it is altogether impossible that Angels, even insofar as they operate in the power of God, should cause rational souls; because the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. But if an Angel cannot be taken up to this, that in the power of God, as His instrument, he should produce a rational soul, certainly neither can man do this.

§ 31. *To the fifth it is said* that there is not a like account of the antecedent and the consequent. For the production of an Angel, since it is an immaterial thing, presupposes nothing about which the action of the producer should be exercised, and therefore is impossible save to God alone: but the generation of an animal or of fire presupposes matter, about which an animal and fire can act. This solution more fully and subtly explained, see in Thomas.[46]

§ 32. *To the sixth it is replied* that the accidental change which occurs in the sacramental species does not take place with no subject presupposed. For quantity is the subject in which all that change is received. If you say that quantity itself is there conserved without a subject: I reply that this is not done by the power of any creature, but of God alone; for it does not seem that for the production of quantity — which is ungenerable and incorruptible, especially if it be posited outside a subject — any creature can cooperate instrumentally save according to the general mode of an instrument; wherefore neither for its conservation. For conservation in reality is nothing else than a certain continued production of the thing.

§ 33. *To the seventh* some reply, besides the reason set down in the argument, that a creature can be taken up for annihilating, but not for creating; and therefore, although each is of the same uncreated power, yet not of the same created. But the more probable response is that neither for annihilating can a creature be taken up after the manner of an instrumental physical cause; the reason for which is that annihilation cannot be done except by the cessation of the divine operation by which He conserves the thing; but for a cessation of this kind no creature can operate instrumentally.

§ 34. *To the last it is replied* that Augustine so attributes to God alone the principal operation in the creation of things, that in creatures he does indeed acknowledge some secondary operation with respect to the creation of certain things, not however standing after the manner of a physical instrumental action, save as to the prior dispositions, upon the positing of which, namely, God creates. For that this is Augustine's meaning appears from the fact that he will in no way allow men, who apply their operation from without, to be called creators; and from the fact that he adduces the similitude of our justification, which none but God can inwardly work. If on the contrary you object the comparison which he brings in from agriculture — in which men, by applying and ordering natural causes, [cooperate towards the effect] of the principal agent: where the natural causes themselves, which are created causes, doubtless produce the effect, even as causes in some sense principal — I reply that men in agriculture do indeed ministerially operate towards the effect which is expected from God, that is, towards the reaping of crops, yet not instrumentally, if we speak of a physical instrument. Whence also the Apostle, transferring this similitude to justification, says in 1 Cor. 3: "I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the increase. Therefore neither he that plants is anything, nor he that waters, but God that gives the increase." But the natural causes with respect to the increase of crops, Augustine does not bring into the comparison. And although this solution can suffice, yet it can also be said that Augustine makes the comparison in the general character of a cause, only applying from without those things upon which, whether naturally or supernaturally, by divine ordination, the effect follows, God inwardly operating; but this is a ministerial cause, whether it attains by its own power and action the effect for whose sake it performs its ministry, or does not, as in the Sacraments. For it is not necessary that a cause of this sort should be an instrument according to the mode of physical efficiency, by which it should touch the effect itself — as an axe, by cutting, produces the figure of a bench — but it suffices that it operate something by its own power, which at least by the will of the principal cause is required as previous and preparatory to the effect. And in this manner there is no doubt that for the work of creation God can use creatures as ministers and instruments.

§ VI — That the work of creation is common to the whole Trinity (Creationis opus esse commune toti Trinitati)

§ 35. What has been shown generally with reference to distinction 20 of the second book, namely that the works of the Trinity are inseparable, avails for proving this very point specifically concerning the work of creation: that this work is not proper to any one Divine Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. Briefly, however, in this place where creation is treated, it is proved thus: because one and the same undivided and most simple power belongs to the three Persons; therefore every operation proceeding from one power is common to the three Persons; but creation is of this sort.

§ 36. Likewise, to create belongs to God according to His *esse*, which is His Essence. Since this is common to the three Persons, it is necessary that to create itself be common to the same Persons. St. Thomas uses this reasoning.[47]

§ 37. That it may be understood, however, that this doctrine is of catholic truth, there must be annexed a confirmation from the Scriptures, from the judgments of the Fathers, and from decrees. The Scriptures indeed everywhere attribute the work of the creation of things indifferently to the three Persons;[48] similarly the Church, although in the Apostles' Creed she expressly calls the Father alone creator of heaven and earth, yet the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea and of Constantinople inserted into their creeds that clause concerning the Son: "through whom all things were made." The Holy Spirit also the whole Church professes to be creator in the hymn whose beginning is *Veni creator Spiritus*. But there exists a most clear definition of this dogma in the great Lateran Council, chapter 1,[49] where the Fathers of that council attest that they firmly believe and simply confess "that one only true God, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, is the one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible," and so forth.

§ 38. From these things, therefore, it is clear that, according to faith, it must be confessed not only that all three Persons have produced the whole universe of things out of nothing — so that there is no creature whose creatrix is not the whole Trinity — but also that in the individual creatures themselves there is nothing at all which all the Persons do not equally claim for themselves. For this must be noted against certain followers of Raymond Lull, who, in order to defend the opinion of their master (by which he said that the mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated by natural reason), teach that in every created effect there is found something real produced by the Father alone, and something by the Son alone, and likewise something by the Holy Spirit. Which doctrine is established to be heretical, inasmuch as it is openly contrary to Scripture and to the ecclesiastical definition.

§ 39. Furthermore, certain men have been of the opinion that, although all created effects and all their formal characters (*rationes*) proceed simultaneously from the three Persons, yet the Divine Persons themselves concur in their production in one way and another. For Henry of Ghent teaches[50] that essential cognition and love in God is not to Him the *ratio* of operating outwardly, but notional cognition and love; and thence he concludes that, just as an artisan operates through an idea preconceived in the mind, and through the inclination of his will, by which he determines himself to operating, so God the Father operates all things through the Son, as through the idea of His mind, and through the Holy Spirit, as through the inclination of His will, and that He could not have operated otherwise.

§ 40. Which opinion is not only false, but not even sufficiently consonant with the Faith. For if, as was defined in the Lateran Council, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle of all things, then they do not concur in one way and another to the effect of creation, nor do they aid one another in the production of things — which is manifestly a consequence of this opinion — but they produce things by one and the same undivided action, and therefore in altogether the same mode: just as from the fact that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Holy Spirit does not proceed otherwise from the Father than from the Son, but by a single spiration, and on that account is produced by both in altogether the same mode.

§ 41. Now the absurdities which follow upon the said opinion — such as that all the Persons together would have greater power than each singly; that the Father would be wise and powerful by generated Wisdom and Power; that to create would not belong to God as God, but as Father; and that therefore it would not belong to the three Persons, but to the Father alone, on the ground that God is held to produce creatures not through essential cognition, but through notional cognition, which is the Father's alone — these Scotus[51] and Domingo Bañez,[52] learnedly and copiously set forth.

§ VII — That every creature is good (Omnem creaturam bonam esse)

§ 42. From what has been shown above, namely that things distinct from Him have been founded by the one true and good God alone, the foundation of the Manichaeans is overthrown, who taught that certain creatures are evil by their very nature on the ground that they had been made by an evil God, that is, by the prince of the evil Angels. For since God, the author of all things, is so good that He is goodness itself, and therefore in His work cannot fall short of what is good, it follows necessarily that every work of His is good. Very similar to this argument is that which Theophylact uses for the same purpose, writing on John 6, namely drawn from the fact that Christ is read to have multiplied the loaves: "For if," he says, "the creature were evil, the Good One would certainly not have multiplied what is evil."[54]

§ 43. Now that every creature is good is said both of the work of each day individually — "God saw that it was good" — and it is concluded of all things together once they had been perfected: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good."[55] For individual things are good with the goodness of their own nature, but all things together are *very* good, because to the goodness of the individual items out of which the Universe consists there is added that most beautiful order by which all things most aptly suit one another in turn, and constitute this most adorned world. The same is proved by those words of the Wise Man to God (Wis. 11): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."[56] For from this it follows that all things which are, are good. For if all or any were evil, they could not be loved by Him who is supremely good. Finally, plain and definite is the sentence of the Apostle Paul (1 Tim. 4): that "every creature of God is good.",[57]

§ 44. This Catholic doctrine, moreover, against the Manichaeans, both other Fathers confirm and defend, and most especially and everywhere Augustine in those not-a-few books which he elaborated against their heresy, teaching that the origin of evil is not to be referred to God, but solely to the mutable will of a good but nevertheless defectible creature.[58] The assertion of the Manichaeans — which afterwards was also that of the Priscillianists — we read condemned in several ancient councils, and specifically in the Council of Braga;[59] although it is established that the Manichaeans were not the first authors of this error, but that already in the

time of the Apostles this doctrine began to be scattered by certain pseudo-apostles, as can be understood from the Apostolic epistles. Yet this pestilent doctrine was no sooner made known than at once by Apostolic authority and by the so-great consensus of the whole Church it was reproved — a fact which those same Apostolic writings confirm. On the same heresy let Epiphanius, Philastrius, and Augustine be read, under various titles of heretics.[60] This heresy, moreover, coincides with that which makes God the author of evil, that is, of sin.

§ 45. For those who said that all creatures, or some, are evil by their nature and origin, spoke of that malice which is repugnant to the Divine goodness. For to intellectual substances, which they said were evil by their nature and creation, they attributed the malice of sin. But other things they held to be evil and unclean because their use would render the user unclean, that is, contaminated with sin. Against whom the Apostle (Rom. 14): "Not that which goes into the mouth defiles a man," and so on.[61] But those things which can be adduced against this doctrine from the Scriptures and from the Fathers are for the most part such as must be understood not of the evil of fault, but of the evil of penalty — which indeed is good, because just, as will be more fully explained in its proper place, namely below at distinction 36. Others are to be interpreted of the permission and ordination of sin. Others, finally — those which ascribe uncleanness to certain creatures, especially animals — are to be understood not of natural uncleanness, but of legal uncleanness, by which, namely, some things are called unclean, not because they have anything abominable in their nature, but because they have been instituted to signify something which, not by nature but by the vice of one's own will, is truly and before God unclean — of which sort are whatever things are reckoned unclean according to the Mosaic Law.

§ VIII — That the world and matter had a beginning of their duration (Mundum et materiam habuisse suae durationis initium)

§ 46. That the world has not always existed, but at some time began to be, although by natural reasoning it can scarcely be shown — as the examples of the greatest philosophers, Aristotle and others, prove, who did not arrive at the knowledge of this matter — this same truth is nevertheless so clear in the sacred Scriptures that it belongs to those doctrines to be held by certain faith.

§ 47. For, first, Moses testifies,[55] and repeats,[63] that God made heaven and earth and all things that are in them in the space of six days, from which time onward the subsequent times are reckoned throughout the sacred Scriptures as from a starting-point. Whence it is manifest that the world was not from eternity, but founded with some beginning of time. Moreover, thus speaks the eternal Wisdom of God:[64] "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning." And again: "The depths were not as yet, nor the fountains, nor the mountains, nor the hills; as yet He had not made the earth," and so on. And:[65] "From the beginning and before the ages I was created." And the Lord in the Gospel:[66] "Glorify me, Father, with the glory which I had before the world was." And in the same chapter: "Thou hast loved me before the foundation of the world." In which manner the Apostle also says[67] that we were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, and[68] that the Son of God is before all things, and foreknown before the foundation. Likewise it is written[69] that all things were known to the Lord God before they were created. Hither is also not ill referred what we confess in the Creed, that God is the Creator of heaven and earth, of things visible and invisible; and, in general, whatever the whole of Scripture testifies, namely that the

world was created: for what is eternal is uncreated, although it can proceed from someone as from a principle. But how far this proof, which is drawn from the creation of things, avails, is to be more fully discussed below.

§ 48. That, however, is more manifest which follows in the same Creed: that the Son of God is born of the Father "before all ages." By these and other testimonies the error of those also is refuted who grant that the world itself has some beginning of duration, but assert that the matter out of which the world was made is eternal, and coeternal with God. Both errors together were condemned by the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter 2,[70] when it defines that by the omnipotent power of God the world and the angels together, from the beginning of time, were founded out of nothing. For this properly is to create: to produce something from nothing; whereas "to make" belongs also to those who produce anything from a pre-lying matter. Although this distinction between "to create" and "to make" was not received from the first authors of the Latin tongue — since the very thing that the word "creation" imports to us was not known to them — but from the usage of the ecclesiastical writers. Where this too must be noted: that not only those things which were made on the first day of creation are said to be created (although it most properly belongs to them), but also those things which were made on the five subsequent days, even though they were made from matter created on the first day — in this sense, namely, that on those days new species of things were produced, not from preceding seminal causes, but by the omnipotence of God instituting nature and the seeds of things; but produced from those things which, a little earlier, had been made out of nothing by God the same author. Nay, even whatever is naturally generated after those first six days may rightly be said to be created, because these come from those which were created from nothing at the beginning, as we have already shown above. For it is certain that among existing things no middle term is given between Creator and creature, and therefore whatever is, and is not God, is a creature.

§ IX — How that phrase is to be understood: "In the beginning He created," etc. (Quomodo intelligendum illud: In principio creavit, &c.)

§ 49. That the world had some beginning of its duration is most commonly proved by alleging the opening of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." How much this proof avails, in order that it may be understood, the sense of that sentence must be sought out; for it must be known that it is not taken by all in one sense.

§ 50. For some have said that "in the beginning" means the same as "in the Son" — which exposition is in St. Augustine,[72] and in St. Basil,[73] and St. Ambrose.[74] This sense, although it be not literal, is nevertheless probably mystical, from other places of Scripture, wherever either the Son of God is called the Principle, or all things are said to have been made in the Son. But the word "beginning" understood in this way does not serve to teach that the world had some beginning of duration.

§ 51. Another sense is that the beginning of time should be understood, in which God is said to have created heaven and earth. This sense, as literal, the Fathers just mentioned adduce: Augustine,[75] Basil (in the place cited), and Ambrose.[76] According to this sense it is manifestly shown that the world had a beginning of its duration — namely that very same beginning which was the beginning of time. Whence the same Augustine teaches[77] that the world was not made in time, but together with time. For he judges that those things are made "in time" whose arising some part of time, or at any rate a point of time, precedes — as necessarily happens with things whose effecting is successive — but that that is said to be made "together with

time" whose production is perfected in the first moment of time. Which perhaps Basil, attending to in the place mentioned, said that God made heaven and earth in a moment, and in less than a moment — wishing, namely, to signify the first indivisible point of time. Although we do not see this distinction between those two phrases, "in time" and "with time," observed either by speakers or by writers. For indifferently they say that the world was made in time and with time; for it was made in that moment which was the beginning of time. Whence also Scripture,[63] affirming that God made heaven and earth and all that is in them in six days, sufficiently signifies that the world was made in time.

§ 52. Add that nowhere, either in the Scriptures or in the Fathers, do we read that the world was made before time — which manner of speech will nevertheless be true and to be received, if we wish to deny that the world was made in time on the ground that it was made in the inchoate moment, and before the course of time, and in which it was true to say, "as yet there is no time." Wherefore there is no reason why we should fear to confess that the world was made in time, in that it was made in the very beginning of time, that is, in the first instant of time, from which the whole of time began to flow.

§ 53. A third sense, and the simplest, is that "in the beginning" be the same as "first of all," in such a way that nothing was before. For in this way the same locution is taken at that opening of John's Gospel, "In the beginning was the Word" — and this according to Cyril's exposition, so that the sense be: the Word was first of all, so that nothing was before the Word. Whence the Evangelist leaves it to be gathered that the Word is eternal. Thus therefore also by this opening of Genesis it is signified that God first of all created heaven and earth, in such a way namely that He created nothing before them. Nor nevertheless can the eternity of the world be likewise established from this; because it is one thing to be "in the beginning," another to be "created in the beginning." For that is "in the beginning" which is first of all, that is, than which nothing is prior. But that is "created in the beginning" which is first of all created, that is, than which nothing was previously created. This exposition is read in Augustine at the start of his work,[78] and in Book XI of *De Civitate*, ch. 6. Although, however, this sense, from the word "beginning," which is read with the same signification in John, is not apt for proving the beginning of the duration of the world, as neither is the first, both senses nevertheless avail for this from the word "creation," because, as was said above, it cannot happen that the same thing be created and eternal. For Scripture does not so say that God created the world as though He always or continuously creates, that is, always grants being to the world; but in such a way as to signify that God once created the world, and afterwards desisted from creating. For this is what is meant by "In the beginning," and the past-tense verb "created." It is also clear from the fact that Scripture testifies[79] that God rested, and ceased from the whole work of creation. Therefore, to create, according to the usage of Scripture, is said of God, not because He gives being to things by preserving them, but because He produces in being a thing which previously was not. From which it also follows that that which is created did not previously exist.

§ 54. Furthermore, as to the verb "to create" (*creavit*), by which both Jerome and Pagninus rendered the Hebrew word into Latin — in order to weigh its signification still more properly — it must be noted that the Seventy Interpreters rendered the Hebrew word by a Greek word which signifies nothing other than "to make," that is, to produce some thing which previously was not. For thus also in the Constantinopolitan Creed the Church sings that God is "maker" of heaven and earth, in place of what is said in the Apostles' Creed as "Creator." For the same Hebrew word which is used in Genesis 1 is also used below when it is said: "And God created great whales, and every living and moving soul," etc.; and again there: "And God created man" — in which places, however, not an immediate production from nothing is described, but from matter

previously made. But also elsewhere it is not rarely taken in this general signification. Different from this word, however, is that by which Scripture says, "And God made the firmament"; likewise, "And God made two lights"; likewise, "And God made the beasts of the earth." From all which it appears that Moses, in describing [80]

§ 55. Since from the foregoing it is established that it must be acknowledged, according to the Catholic faith, that the world has not always existed but has at some point begun to be, there nevertheless remains among theologians a problematic question, namely: whether God could have produced the world without a beginning. For the following arguments seem to urge the affirmative side.

§ 56. *First.* God can do all things that do not include a contradiction; but such is the case that the world should always proceed from God as from its producing principle, for no contradiction is apparent herein. *Second.* God was omnipotent from eternity; therefore from eternity He could operate *ad extra*, for God is called omnipotent only with respect to works of this kind. This argument is confirmed: because if there be a cause having an eternal power, nothing prevents its effect also from being eternal — indeed, in certain cases the eternity of the effect follows from the eternity of the cause. For positing the eternity of the heaven, the sun, the fire, there follows the eternity of motion, of splendor, of heat; but God is eternal, having eternal power; therefore nothing prevents an effect from proceeding from Him eternally. *Third.* God is no less able to act by a free will than He could act by a necessity of nature; but if He were acting in this latter mode, He would act from eternity; therefore He can also act from eternity by a free will. *Fourth.* The world is eternal on the posterior side, because it is destined always to endure; therefore in like manner it could have been made eternal by God on the anterior side. *Fifth.* From the moment God could will to act, He could from that moment act: for nothing was from eternity which could impede His will from acting; but He could from eternity will to act — indeed, from eternity He actually willed to act; therefore He could act from eternity. *Sixth.* Whenever God is, He can operate; but He is from eternity; therefore from eternity He can operate. *Seventh.* That it be possible for the world to be eternal from the eternal God — this even the philosophers, led by the sole natural light of reason, have understood, namely the Platonists, of whom Augustine relates[81] that they taught that the world has no beginning of time or of its creation, so that, in a certain manner (as he says) scarcely intelligible, it has always been made: which they declare by the likeness of a foot and its footprint. For if, they say, a foot had been from eternity in the dust, the footprint would always lie beneath it, and yet no one would doubt that the footprint was made by the one treading. Thus, therefore, the world could always have existed, from God always existing; indeed, according to them, it has in fact so always been.

§ 57. For the negative side there are these arguments. *First.* "Made" and "eternal" are mutually repugnant; but every creature must necessarily have been made; therefore it is impossible that any creature be eternal. The major is proved, because every past thing was at some time present; therefore of everything that is made, it was at some time true to say, "now it comes to be"; therefore in that "now" it had a beginning of its duration, and accordingly was not eternal. *Second.* The world, if it is, must of necessity be from nothing; it must therefore have received being after non-being; it could not, therefore, be from eternity. *Third.* Eternity is a property of the Divine nature. Hence in Psalm 54 it is set down as a sort of periphrasis or epithet of God, "He who is before the ages,"[82] and Gen. 26, "He invoked the name of the eternal God":[83] it cannot therefore be communicated to a creature. This argument is unfolded by the authorities of the Fathers set down at the end. *Fourth.* The infinite cannot be traversed; therefore if the world had been acting from eternity, never could one have arrived at this present day, since the whole past span would be infinite. *Fifth.* If the world had been from

eternity, an infinite multitude of men would already have passed away, whose souls, since they are immortal, it would follow that innumerable souls actually exist: which among those who philosophize rightly is impossible. But since St. Thomas answers that this argument is particular,[84] a sixth, more general one is adduced. *Sixth.* If God could have been operating from eternity, He could therefore always have been making one thing after another, things of the same permanence and not perishing — such as matter, world, heaven, stars — and thus something would actually exist infinite both in bulk and in number, as infinite matter, innumerable worlds, and so on: namely if on each day, or on each hour of that infinite time, He produced one world, or one heaven, or one star, or some portion of matter, the prior ones remaining. *Seventh.* God cannot produce anything actually infinite, neither according to magnitude nor according to multitude; therefore neither according to duration. For in these three there is the same ratio of impossibility, namely that something infinite should already be taken in a completed act. For this holds both in past time, if it be posited eternal, and in permanent things. For of past eternal time all parts have already been received and traversed — whereas it is otherwise with future time, inasmuch as it is never to be fully unrolled, though it is always being unrolled. Hence there is *Eighth.* God cannot make the world eternal in completed act on the posterior side; therefore neither on the anterior side. *Ninth.* God could not have made the world earlier than He made it; therefore neither could He make it from eternity. The consequence is proved, because if He had made it from eternity, He would have made it earlier. The antecedent is proved, because before the foundation of the world there was no "before" and "after," but a stable eternity, which is nothing other than the Divinity itself. It is likewise proved by the authority of Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 5 (at the end).[85] *Tenth.* Whatever could be done from eternity can always be done; therefore also it can be done now; but now He cannot make the world or any creature eternal on the anterior side; therefore neither could He have done so from eternity. The major is proved, because in God's eternity there is no "before" and "after," but His eternity is an immutable *esse*, in which there has no place "to be able to have been able" and "God always to be able"; and accordingly that response is invalid which says that God now cannot do what He could from eternity because there is no potency toward the past. For, as has been said, in eternity nothing is past. *Eleventh.* When God made this world, He could not make it eternal; therefore He could not from eternity make it eternal. The antecedent is proved, because He did not make this world from eternity. The consequence is proved, because, since in God there was no past before He made the world (for there was stable eternity), He could then no less, when He made the world, than He could from eternity. *Twelfth.* God creating this world in time did not take from Himself the power of creating another world from eternity, because God nonetheless remained in His eternity, in which there is neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; but He cannot now make another world eternal; therefore neither could He have made it from eternity. For it is asked: if God could from eternity make the world eternal, and now cannot, when did He cease to be able? whether before the creation of this world, or in that instant in which He created this world? The former cannot be said, because before the creation of the world there was nothing "after" another, such that one could say "from eternity He was able." But neither the latter, for it seems most absurd to say that, since God up to that instant could have made the world eternal, in that very instant He lost this power. If you say that God even now can make some creature eternal, or make it from eternity, this is indeed not conceded by those who hold the affirmative opinion; nor indeed does it seem able to be conceded, since this world would be a creature older than that one, and even God Himself, who preceded this world. *Thirteenth.* If the world had been from eternity, it would be as true to say "in the beginning was the world" as John truly said: "In the beginning was the Word."[86] Which sentence he set forth in declaration of the divinity of the Word, as likewise that at the opening of his First Epistle: "That which was

from the beginning," and so forth.[87] *Lastly.* Authority supports reason. For the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea thought these two incompatible, to be created and always to have been. Hence that sentence of the Synod: "Whoever says the Son is a creature, says that He was not at some time."[88] For the Arians also, as is evident from the acts of the same Synod, and from the letter of Alexander, Patriarch of Alexandria, indeed from the letter of Arius himself to Eusebius of Nicomedia, for this reason denied that the Son of God had always been: lest they be compelled to confess Him to be properly God equal to the Father. Hence they said, "there was when He was not"; although the later Arians in the Council of Ariminum, as Jerome reports in the *Dialogue against the Luciferians*,[89] attempted with a certain treacherous subtlety to distinguish between "eternal" (*sempiternum*) and "uncreated" (*increatum*) — namely, expressly condemning that "there was when He was not," and yet again in other words doing this, so that the Son might be believed to be a creature. For they denied the consequence to follow: "if He always was, therefore He is not created." But this, as I said, was against the mind of their predecessors, from whom they had drawn their error.

§ 58. To these add the sentences of the other Fathers denying that it can come about that anything created should always have been. For Athanasius in the former letter to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit speaks thus:[90] "Just as the Son, because He always is, is not a creature: so since the Trinity always is, there is no creature in it; wherefore the Spirit is not a creature." Basil,[73] notes those philosophers as impious who set the world as coeternal with God, as making the creature equal to the Creator. Ambrose,[91] when speaking of the opinion of the Peripatetics: "What," he says, "is so unsuitable as that they should join the origination of a work with the eternity of the omnipotent God?" And in book I, ch. 3 of the same work,[92] he says that those who assert the world coeternal with God associate the creature with the Creator and make it equal. Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 23:[93] "Altogether," he says, "immutable is that nature of the Trinity, and on this account so eternal, that nothing coeternal with it can be." The same in book XII of *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 15,[94] denies that the angels could have been coeternal with the Creator, although in some sense he concedes that they always were — namely, because no created time can be given in which they were not. Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, ch. 8,[95] distinguishes between the generation of God and creation: because generation, since it is a work of nature and from the substance of the one generating, is eternal; but creation, he says, since it is a work of the will, is not coeternal with God, since the nature of a thing does not allow that what is led from non-being to being should be coeternal with Him who is without beginning and always is. Richard of Saint-Victor writes to the same effect in book II, ch. 1 of *De Trinitate*:[96] "That could not be made from nothing," he says, "which never was nothing." And more ancient than all these, Lactantius, book II of the *Divine Institutes*, ch. 8,[97] simply denies that matter could have been coeternal with God. From these, accordingly, it appears on both counts what the ancients thought of the possibility of the eternity of the world, or of any creature whatsoever.

§ 59. But among the Scholastics there have been various opinions on this matter. And indeed St. Thomas in *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 14,[98] disputes for the affirmative side; yet in the *Summa*, Part I, q. 46, where he discusses the beginning of the duration of created things, he does not plainly open his own view. For in art. 2 he only denies that it can be demonstratively proved that the world at some point began; and in the solutions of the arguments he declares not so much what he himself thinks as what others think on this problem. But on the contrary in art. of the same question,[99] he absolutely says that nothing besides God could have been from eternity. And also in q. 2, art. 3,[100] from the possibility of not being he concludes the negation of eternity in this manner: "If all things are possible-not-to-be, there was some time when nothing was in the

order of things." Subsequent theologians disputed this matter more expressly and more distinctly, but with such variety that one may easily number five or six diverse opinions.

§ 60. Of which *the first* is: that God could have produced this whole Universe, and any part of it whatsoever, from eternity, in that disposition and mutability which it now has. *The second* teaches the same, with the exception of the one human species, because — if its eternity be posited — it would follow that souls are infinite in number, as the fifth argument of the negative side urged. But both of these opinions are attended by many absurdities, especially by reason of an infinite time, such as those which are inferred through the fourth and sixth arguments, and others like them. Such is this one: for since one infinite is not greater than another, it would follow that there have been as many past years as past months, and again as many months as days, and likewise concerning hours. Nor does the exception concerning the human species much help the second opinion. For the same absurdity will follow concerning any other species of corruptible things, if we posit — as cannot be denied — that God could conserve the forms of individual corrupted things. For if He had done this, it would follow no less as a consequence that either the souls of brutes, or the forms of other things, exist infinite in number.

§ 61. *The third* opinion holds that successive things, and whatever begin by motion or succession, could not have been produced from eternity, but only and all permanent things, both corruptible and incorruptible, even if left to their own nature. But to refute this opinion as regards corruptible things is not difficult: both by the argument just brought forward, and because it would be necessary that infinite generations and corruptions of individuals in the same species would already have preceded, together with their alterations and the time in which those changes would have been made; and thus it would follow that even successive beings would have been from eternity, which is contrary to the former part of this opinion. *The fourth* opinion posits that only incorruptible creatures, even left to their own nature — such as an angel, a rational soul, the heaven — could have been from eternity. Thus Dominic Soto.[101] But to this opinion too it is objected that angels and souls, according to their nature, undergo changes as to the operations of intellect and will, so that in them thoughts and volitions succeed one another in turn; the heaven also is naturally moved in a circle. If therefore these things had been from eternity, it would follow that infinite operations and motions or revolutions of this kind had passed; and other absurdities would also follow, which can easily be gathered from the foregoing. *The fifth* opinion is therefore that which posits that God could have produced from eternity this universe encompassing all things both corruptible and incorruptible, both successive and permanent, yet not otherwise than by changing the natures of these things, in a different order from that which they now have. They understand this change not in the essentials (for thus the things would not be the same), but in certain accidental properties, namely that for an infinite time they should undergo no variation or succession of operations, or of any accidents whatsoever, but would be things entirely bereft of mutability — as that an angel for an infinite time should have either no operation, or one constant operation. This opinion, although it seems to evade the absurdities that follow from the prior ones, nevertheless has no small difficulty. First, because the natures of successive things, such as time, and motion, and the instant, do not seem to be able in any way to be so changed, with their essence preserved, that they should be or have been from eternity — as this hour, this walking, this instant. The reason is because the nature of time and motion consists in succession, but the instant excludes all duration. Secondly, because that immutability of itself makes nothing toward eternity: for even now God can make such a creature, which nevertheless would not be eternal. But what difference is there between God creating now, and from eternity, if neither in God nor in the creature is there a before and an after? God could also annihilate such a creature; in which case it will not be eternal on

the posterior side. Wherefore, by the very fact that it is posited immutable, it cannot be said to have been from eternity. Nay even before this world, when there was no duration save the stable eternity of God, God could both make and annihilate a creature of this sort. Finally, the principal reasons adduced for the negative side of the question overturn this opinion no less than the others.

§ 62. These therefore being rejected, there remains, as the most probable of all, that opinion which denies that any creature, on whatever possible supposition, could have been produced from eternity. For the arguments adduced seem not only to prove this, but certain of them, examined more subtly, even to demonstrate it. This is also far more agreeable to Sacred Scripture, and to the sentences of the ancient Fathers and Councils, as is clear from what was said above. The arguments adduced to the contrary must therefore be dissolved.

§ 63. *The first* is resolved by a denial of the minor: for the affirmative side implicates this contradiction, that something be made and not made, created and not created. *To the second* it is answered, that God is indeed omnipotent from eternity, and that from eternity He could produce the world — that is, He had the power of producing — yet the world could not be produced from eternity, but could be produced, as it was produced, according to the mode and nature of a creature, that is, in time, or with some beginning. Just as from eternity God could make time itself, and motion, and the instant — that is, He had the power of making these — but according to the nature of these, which is incompatible with having been from eternity. So what we say has this sense: God in His whole eternity, which is indivisible, could produce the world, yet He could not produce it from eternity. *To the confirmation* it is answered that one absurdity is drawn from another, and that the comparison of creature with creature is not equal, as neither is that of cause with effect, and of Creator with creature.

§ 64. *To the third*: it proves nothing, for it assumes an impossible contradiction: from which there would follow not only what is concluded, but also that God is not God; for if He does not act freely but necessarily, He is not God. *To the fourth* it is answered that the ratio of past and of future is not the same, as we indicated above in the seventh argument of the negative side. For what has passed is already wholly taken up. But what is future, if it be infinite, always remains in potency, because it will never be traversed. Therefore an actual infinite follows, if the world always has been; not likewise, if it always will be. *To the fifth*: just as God's willing is eternal, so also His action by which He produces the creature, insofar as it is in Himself, is eternal; but not insofar as it is terminated at the created thing, nor can it come about that it be terminated at it from eternity, because this is incompatible with a creature. *To the sixth* a similar reply. For God could from eternity operate, both because from eternity He had the power of operating, and because every operation of God on His part is eternal, although it is not from eternity terminated at the work itself. *To the seventh* it is answered that the philosophers do not rightly use the likeness of created causes — which, if they were eternal, would have eternal effects — to prove the same concerning an uncreated cause. The reason for the dissimilarity, some assign as follows: because created causes, which are wont to be adduced as examples, produce their effects naturally; but God [produces them by will]

§ 65. — outside he acts on nothing naturally, but only freely. This reply is not badly refuted by others, on the ground that God does not deliberate in acting, and therefore His actions, precisely because they are free, do not require any duration prior to the effect. For not even in intellectual creatures does this appear necessary, since many act freely without deliberation. Hence the reason seems rather to be drawn from the repugnance of the creature to eternity. Furthermore, it must be known that, as regards the arguments of the negative side,

St. Augustine[102] and Boethius[103] indicate a certain solution of the third argument — namely, that even if some creature had always existed, it would still not be equal to God in eternity, because the divine *esse* is *esse* wholly simultaneous without succession, whereas the *esse* of a creature, even if it had always been, would not be such. Yet this reply is not admitted by the authorities of the Fathers, who call him eternal — though it is established that they were not speaking of that stable eternity in which there is no prior and posterior. Furthermore, this solution does not help the assertors of the fifth opinion cited above, which concedes that a creature could have existed from eternity only if all mutation and succession be removed from it — unless they say that such a stable eternity, free from succession, belongs to God alone by nature, but can belong to others by participation. But this is precisely what the Fathers contend to be impossible.

§ 66. Some also attempt to resolve the ninth argument — the antecedent of which having been conceded, as it seems it altogether must be — by denying the consequence. For even though, as they say, the world could not have been created earlier, that is, at some prior time, it could nonetheless have been created from eternity. But this does not appear to be a good solution: for the reason why it could not have been created earlier is that in eternity there is no succession; yet this reason excludes an eternal prior creation just as much as a temporal one. But someone will say that it can at least not be demonstrated that the world had a beginning, since this is an article of faith. I reply: there is nothing to prevent something from being proposed as an object of belief that can also be demonstrated — as that God exists, that He can do all things, and similar matters. First, because it may be doubted whether this particular proposition is demonstrable; second, because demonstrative knowledge belongs to few, whereas faith is open to all; third, because even those who have received a demonstration of some article hold it more certainly through faith, as happens when a philosopher becomes a Christian. And it must be noted that St. Thomas appears to deny that it can be demonstrated that this world, in the disposition and mutability which it has, began at some time[104] — as is sufficiently gathered from the arguments he adduces and their solutions. Yet today most Thomists grant this, on account of the arguments drawn from motion, time, and the mutability of things.

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§ XI — Why the World was made (Quare factus sit Mundus)

§ 67. When it is asked why God made the world, the question does not concern the cause of the Divine will or the end proposed to God, which He Himself was to acquire for Himself through this His work — as a craftsman builds a house for the sake of habitation, or a place, or something of that sort. For God, most perfect and in need of nothing, just as He has no efficient cause, so also He has no final cause; He is Himself the Beginning and End of all things. With this consideration in mind, St. Augustine, when asked why God made heaven and earth, answers only: *because He willed it*; and when asked further why He willed it, he says that the question is foolish, since there is no cause of the Divine will[106] — the truth of which opinion we set forth at distinction 45 of the second book. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the doctrine of that same passage, a final cause of the work which God willed and does make can rightly be assigned — a cause on account of which God made it and willed to make it. Hence, just as it was said in Prov. 16: "The Lord has made all things for Himself," so it can also be said: the Lord willed to make all things for Himself — yet by one and the same will, which is His very essence, both willing the work itself and its end. The final cause, therefore, of the created world is the goodness of God, insofar as it is communicated to creatures — that is, in other words, the communication of the Divine goodness (*bonitas Divinae*): so that to one who asks why God made the world,

the right answer is given, that He might communicate His goodness outwardly. For in this sense the Fathers teach that the cause of the creation of things is the goodness of God — as St. Augustine,[107] and what is likewise read in the book *De diligendo Deo*, or the *Meditations* under the name of Augustine, chapter 2, among his works in volume 9.[108] And St. Augustine himself,[109] vigorously approves the opinion of Plato saying that the most just cause of founding the world was this: that by a good God good works should be made. For this is the difference between God working and a creature: every creature works in order that it may be good, that is, in order to acquire or preserve its own perfection; but God works only because He is good — that is, He communicates His own perfection in working to others, being Himself in need of no perfection and capable of acquiring none.

§ 68. As for what the Master says in the text — that the world was made in order to serve man, which is also found in the already-mentioned book *De diligendo Deo* (ch. 2 and 4)[110] — this is not to be understood of the whole world. For the world was not entirely made for man's sake; nor was the Angel made for man's sake. But it refers to the world as distinguished from intellectual creatures — that is, to that part of it which comprises solely things devoid of mind. For concerning inferior things it was said in Ps. 8: "You have subjected all things under his feet," etc.; and concerning superior things, that is, the celestial ones, it is written (Gen. 1) that the luminaries placed in the heaven are for signs, seasons, days, and years, and so on — clearly for the use of men. And Deut. 4 states that the sun and moon and all the stars of heaven were created by God for the ministry of all peoples. Yet this corporeal world was so made for the ministry of man, that through it man might be raised to the knowledge and love of God his Creator.

§ 69. Furthermore, the error is absurd — and therefore to be avoided — of those who say that God made matter and from matter the world in order to punish the devil, or for this purpose (as the author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament*, question 2, among the works of Augustine, phrases it) that He might destroy the devil's presumption not by power but by reason. It is absurd, I say, first because it is sufficiently manifest of itself that this most beautiful work of the world is an instrument not for exercising punishment but rather for declaring the goodness of God. Moreover, the authority of that work is suspect for many other reasons as well — for it is most certainly established that it is not by Augustine — and is deservedly rejected by all learned men.

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§ XIII — That there is one World, not several (Unum esse Mundum non plures)

§ 70. Certain philosophers introduced several worlds — indeed some even introduced innumerable ones, more by fable than by reason — such as Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Alexander, and others, whose opinion among historians was followed by Pliny, and among heretics by the Ophites, as St. Augustine reports from Philaster, heresy 77.[112] The Talmudic writers also are said to transmit, among other mysteries of their doctrine, the tradition of ten times nineteen thousand worlds. But all these opinions concerning many worlds are rejected not only by right philosophy, as can be seen in Plato's *Timaeus* and in Aristotle's second book *On the Heavens and the World*, chapters eight and nine,[113] and in his commentators, but the consensus of all theologians also condemns them as alien to right faith. And indeed St. Augustine in the passage already cited, and Isidore,[114] — which is also quoted by Gratian,[115] — and some at the end, expressly numbered the opinion

positing innumerable worlds among the heresies. And elsewhere St. Augustine likewise reproves this teaching as erroneous, in the book *De vera Religione*, chapter 49, in the letter to Dioscorus,[116] and in *De Civitate Dei* XI, chapter 5.[117] Furthermore, Methodius in his book *On the Resurrection*, as reported by Epiphanius in the heresy of the Origenists, and St. Jerome[118] among other errors of Origen, ascribe to him also this error: that he asserts innumerable worlds — not, indeed, existing simultaneously as Epicurus held, but in perpetual succession, one after another. Origen wrote these things in books 2 and 5 of the *Peri Archon*.[119] St. Jerome in the letter mentioned adduces his very words. St. John Chrysostom also appears to argue against this kind of error,[120] when he says that those are not to be tolerated who affirm that there are many heavens, inasmuch as they teach things contrary to Sacred Scripture and to the doctrines of the Church. For by the name of "heavens" he seems to have understood worlds — as the Philosopher too sometimes speaks. And not without good reason do the Fathers attack that opinion as erroneous and heretical. For the truth of Scripture cannot stand if a plurality of worlds be posited. For according to the Scriptures the whole human race was born from one man (Acts 17). And "in one man all men sinned" (Rom. 5). And "in one all die" (1 Cor. 15). And "Christ Jesus is the Saviour of all men" (1 Tim. 4). And the Apostles were sent to teach all nations (Matt. last chapter). These things would not be true if, besides this world, there were another world in which there were other men not descended from Adam, not redeemed by Christ, and not to be brought to faith by Apostolic preaching. And many other such general statements can be brought forward from the Scriptures which could not hold true unless the world be posited as one and singular. Hence also it is that Scripture, wishing to signify that God is the author and maker of all things whatsoever that exist up to this point, says that He made heaven and earth and all things that are in them. Hence also in Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing," and "the world was made through Him." From which it is manifest that outside the one and singular world there is nothing that was made.

§ 71. The best argument by which the unity of the world is proved, St. Thomas adduces as follows[20]: because whatever things are from God have order toward one another and toward God Himself; but several worlds would not have order toward one another — for in that case they would not be worlds but parts of one world, since "world" signifies the universe. Hence it is necessary that all things pertain to one world. Nor is it dissimilar to the argument by which Plato in the *Timaeus* proves the unity of the world from the unity of the exemplar; and Aristotle in turn infers from the unity of order which is in things the unity of God governing, in *Metaphysics* XII. Moreover, this doctrine is not contradicted by the fact that Scripture sometimes names this world as though there were another besides it — as when the Lord says in Jn. 18: "My kingdom is not of this world"; and the Apostle in 1 Tim. 1: "Christ came into this world to save sinners." For by the name "this world" in those passages, the whole of this universe is not understood, but the human race dwelling on earth — a usage which is also frequent in the Scriptures.

§ 72. There is also wont to be objected what St. Jerome writes, citing from the letter of Clement — in his commentary on the second chapter of Ephesians, at the words "according to the age of this world" — "the Ocean, and the worlds which are beyond it." St. Jerome seems to mention this as though casting suspicion of several worlds. But the evident reply is that the "worlds" placed beyond the Ocean are to be understood as the lands or regions situated there, most remote from us — in the same way that we call the New World that which, lying far to the west of the world across the sea, is frequented by the navigations of our age.

§ XIV — Why the intellectual creature was established by God (Intellectualis creatura quare a Deo condita)

§ 73. No creature approaches more closely to the participation of the Divine Nature than that which is endowed with mind — namely, the angelic and the human. When, therefore, it is asked on what account such a creature was made by God, nothing else is sought than its highest good and its supreme perfection. But this is the most perfect operation of the mind or intellect, which indeed is the perfect cognition of God, which the Doctors, following Scripture, call the vision of God; from which there follows in the will a perfect delight, by which, namely, it takes pleasure, and rejoices, and comes to rest in the good now possessed. Concerning which matter St. Augustine, in *Confessions* I, ch. 1, says: "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you."[122] Things similar to these he also writes in Book XIII of the same work, ch. 8, and in Book II, ch. 6 and 10, and in Book IV, ch. 12.[123]

§ 74. This end of the created man (the judgment concerning the angel is entirely the same) the Psalmist signified when he said: "It is good for me to adhere to God," Ps. 72.[124] Whence again St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 1, says that it is the vice of the rational creature if it does not adhere to God;[125] and St. Gregory, in *Moralia* VIII, ch. 14, and Book XXVI, ch. 26, says that man was established to contemplate the Creator, so that nothing suffices him which is not God.[126] The same thing is taught by St. Anselm, in *Cur Deus homo* II, ch. 1,[127] and by the author of the book *De diligendo Deo*, ch. 2, and Sermon 181 *de tempore* among the works of St. Augustine.[128] Likewise St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1, and I-II, q. 2, a. 8, and *Contra Gentiles* III, ch. 54.[129]

§ 75. At times, however, the Fathers have assigned not the ultimate end, but either intermediate or secondary ends of man's creation — as St. Augustine, in *De symbolo ad catechumenos* I, ch. 1, saying that we were made for this, that we might rule over the other creatures;[130] and the author of the *Tractatus de creatione primi hominis* among the works of St. Augustine, saying that man was created that he might have charity, that he might be good, just, patient, and so forth;[131] and Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* III, ch. 9, saying that man was born for the sake of worshipping God.[132] Among these ends is also to be reckoned that which some name, saying that man was made for the restoration of the angelic ruin, which is read in St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *de Adventu Domini*;[133] although others, speaking more properly, say that man was not made, but redeemed, on account of the angelic ruin, as St. Augustine holds in *Enchiridion* chs. 26, 61, 62, and in *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 1.[134] But of this matter more below, at Distinction 9.

§ 76. It must, however, be known that the end higher than all these, on account of which not only man and angel, but the whole universe, was established, is the glory of God. For concerning man, Scripture testifies (Deut. 16[135]) that God created all the Gentiles unto his own praise, name, and glory. And concerning the whole universe and its individual parts as established unto the glory of God, that text of Prov. 6 is most rightly understood: "The Lord has wrought all things for himself."[136]

§ I — That angels exist in the nature of things (Angelos esse in rerum natura)

§ 77. Concerning the angels, whose dignity is first among creatures, the Master treats through ten distinctions; and in this distinction indeed he inquires into the time and the place of their creation. But because, in the first place, it is asked of each and every thing whether it exists — a question which the Master

has left untouched concerning the angels — we therefore think it must be treated in this place. Now there is, on this matter, the most ancient heresy of the Sadducees, who, as Luke attests (Acts 23[138]), not only denied the resurrection of bodies, but altogether acknowledged neither angel nor spirit — that is, a separated soul. Of which error St. Thomas, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1,[137] assigns this cause: that the Sadducees, just like certain ancient philosophers, not distinguishing between sense and intellect, thought that there is nothing in the world except what can be perceived by sense and imagination — of which sort are only corporeal things and their affections. And although the Sadducees, rejecting the oracles of the Prophets (as St. Jerome writes *In Matthaeum* 22[139]), at least received Moses's Pentateuch as Divine Scripture, in which mention of angels everywhere occurs, yet not even this recalled them from their error. For, in the manner of heretics, they interpreted Scripture perversely, not wishing substances or certain persons to be understood, but hidden inspirations by which, as by messengers of God, men are admonished of the Divine will.

§ 78. For thus they also interpreted the resurrection as the raising up of seed, whereby, to be sure, someone in a certain manner revives and rises again in a son whom, begotten of himself, he leaves after him. And they placed immortality in the perpetual succession of posterity. By which example certain other heretics in the time of the Apostles said that the resurrection had already taken place (2 Tim. 2[140]) — acknowledging, namely, no other resurrection except that which is from sins to justice. The error of the Sadducees has today been in some part revived by the Anabaptists, while they transfer the guardianship of angels and the assault of demons to thoughts alone, whether good or evil; but no heretics after the birth of Christ are read to have gone so far as, with the Sadducees, altogether to deny the angelic nature.

§ 79. It is very easy to refute this error from the Scriptures, in which on almost every page angels are named as substances and as certain persons, whose sayings and deeds are described. All of which, if anyone should wrest to thoughts alone or to inspirations, he will do a thing most alien to common sense and judgment, nor will it be difficult to refute so violent an interpretation from the circumstances of this sort. More manifest than the rest is the passage Heb. 1,[141] where the Apostle compares the person of the Son of God with the angels as persons inferior in nature and dignity; and in ch. 2,[142] where he teaches how the same Son of God was made less than the angels, according to that text of Ps. 8, "You have made him a little less than the angels,"[143] namely on account of the human nature, inferior to the angelic. And in the same place, when he again says of the Son of God: "Nowhere does he take hold of the angels, but he takes hold of the seed of Abraham"[144] — that is, he assumed not the angelic but the human nature. Moreover, Christ, replying to the Sadducees, obliquely noted their error concerning the angels, when he said that the sons of the resurrection will be equal to the angels of God (Lk. 20[145]). Add to these what is read concerning the ministries and the joy of angels, the benefits and punishments wrought through them, and their other works as ministers of God, in each of which we need not linger.

§ 80. Peculiarly against the Sadducees, who received only Moses, this matter is proved most openly from Num. 22[146] and very many other passages of the Pentateuch, which assuredly no one except a shameless man and a violator of the literal and historical sense will interpret of bare and naked inspirations alone. From all which it is clear that it is a truth of faith that the angels exist in the nature of things, as certain persons and substances surpassing, by the excellence of their nature, all the corporeal things known to us by sense. Which truth of faith the Symbol of Constantinople professes, declaring God to be the Creator "of things invisible"; and the Lateran Synod under Innocent III, ch. 1, declared more expressly, defining that God created a spiritual, that is, angelic, substance.[147]

§ 81. No less efficacious is the proof from the sense and consent of the whole Church, which venerates the angels as persons exceedingly excelling in nature, and invokes them as ministers of God and guardians of men, enjoying the beatific vision of God. But a Sadducee will object that in Gen. 1, where the creation of the world and of its parts is treated, nothing is said of the angels, which yet would seem to have been most fitting, if the angels are in the genus of created things, lest perhaps the Jewish people, to whom Genesis was written, being prone to idolatry and reading nothing there of the creation of angels, might suspect the angels to be uncreated, and therefore gods.

§ 82. It is answered that that people was more prone to worshipping sensible things, such as the sun, the moon, the stars. The creation of these Moses therefore carefully described, lest they be thought eternal and uncreated, and therefore to be worshipped with divine honors. But concerning the angels, as of things incorporeal and insensible, there was no need, with that same people, to make mention of them in the description of the creation of things. But you will say: Moses in the same book often makes mention of the angels; therefore, lest they seem to be uncreated and eternal, and hence be worshipped by the Jews as gods, he ought at the beginning of the book to have described their creation. The reply is: Moses makes mention of them only as of the ministers and messengers of the one God, and through this there could be no suspicion among the Jews that they were gods; wherefore nowhere do we read that the angels were honored by the Jews with divine worship.

§ 83. Again, someone will object that "angel" is a name not of a nature but of an office; for it signifies messenger or legate. I reply that, although among the Greek authors *angelos* is a name of office, yet that Hebrew word which corresponds to it is a name of substance and person. And indeed, both in the sacred Scriptures and among the ecclesiastical writers, Greek and Latin, this name "angel" is used for the spiritual substance which we call angelic, the word of office being transferred to signify the nature. But even if it were nothing other than a name of office, nevertheless we should rightly say that angels are substances and persons — as we say that a messenger or ambassador is a man, because an office of this sort cannot inhere except in a substance and person which is denominated from it.

§ II — Whether it can be proved by reason that Angels exist (An ratione probari possit Angelos esse)

§ 84. It is asked whether by natural reason it can be taught, or even demonstrated, that Angels exist in the nature of things. For St. Thomas indeed endeavours to prove it by this sort of argument.[137] The order and perfection of the universe demand that there be in it certain creatures which are assimilated to God the Creator according to that whereby He causes the universe itself. Now He causes it through intellect and will; therefore for the perfection of the universe it is required that there be in it intellectual creatures, that is, Angels. The Philosopher, however, in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics* (and in Book 8 of the *Physics*),[148] proves that intelligences exist chiefly by that argument which is drawn from the motion of the heavens: for since it is certain that the celestial bodies are moved, and yet are not moved by themselves, the consequence is that they are moved by assisting Intelligences, which we call Angels. A third argument is taken from the *Energumens*, that is, from possessed men, whom we sometimes see do or say things which they could in no way do, unless they were moved and acted upon by some superior intellectual substance — as when they speak in a foreign and unheard-of tongue; when they disclose certain secrets of men unknown to them; when they relate things

which are done in the most distant places. For these exceed human power, unless a man is moved by a higher mind, that is, by an Angel, good or evil. Lastly, not only Aristotle, but also the Platonists and Stoics, and several other gentile Philosophers instructed by natural reason alone, acknowledged certain intellectual substances, although they called them by different names. For Plato posited a twofold kind: some inferior, whom he called *daemons*; others superior, whom he called *gods*. Whence Apuleius also entitled a book *On the God of Socrates*. Some indeed called them *Genii*, most *Intelligences*.

§ 85. But the proofs thus drawn from reason, though they be good inasmuch as they make it probable that Angels exist, do not however seem to be demonstrative. Nor indeed is it necessary that it be demonstrated by natural reason that Angels exist, as in the preceding book it was demonstrated that God exists; for God is the first and universal cause of all things, which from every effect is evidently and necessarily inferred — not so the Angels. It is likewise established that the Angels were created by God freely, so that He could have not created them; and nevertheless He could without doubt have administered and governed this whole universe without them, have moved the heavens, and provided for men, if so it had seemed good to Him. Whence it sufficiently appears that from these things no demonstration of the existence of Angels can be drawn. For although very many things in the universe are done through Angels, nevertheless, since things and their motions do not necessarily depend on them as on causes, as they do on God (for God can do all those things without Angels), hence the demonstration of Angelic existence from effects of this sort is not necessary.

§ 86. That the arguments adduced are not demonstrative is easily shown. For to the argument of St. Thomas it could be answered that it was not necessary that the universe be founded by God in that perfection in which it has in fact been founded. Again, if there were no Angels, nevertheless intellectual creatures would not be lacking to the universe; for man himself, according to his soul, is such. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, given that perfection of the universe which embraces all grades of entity (as they speak), it follows demonstratively, and is taught, that Angels exist. Nor does it matter what is objected concerning the rational soul. For the grades of entity, which the perfection of the universe is said to require, are certain total natures, which singly have their own place in the ordering of the parts of the universe; such are the Angels, but not the rational soul, which is only a part of man.

§ 87. The Philosopher's argument also is not necessary; not only because someone could reply that the heavens are animated and therefore moved by an internal principle (concerning which matter what is to be held shall be said elsewhere), but chiefly because it is much controverted whether the heaven is moved by its form, of whatever sort it has, or not. For if it is moved by it — which no slight arguments seem to show — then Aristotle's argumentation, by which from the motion of the heavens he founds his doctrine of assisting intelligences, already falls. Nay, even if it be not moved by its own form, one might say the heaven, as a first body, is moved immediately by God.

§ 88. To the argument from the Energumens someone might perhaps say that those things which, above human faculty, are done by others are not done through Angels, but through God. But against this you will say: often evils are done by them, as when they blaspheme and mock divine things, or speak shameful things, which cannot be from God; and so by necessary reason it is at least gathered that there are evil Angels. But it is easily answered that these things do not exceed human faculty, for many such things are done by men who are not possessed. Therefore it seems one must say that this entire argument rests on particular experience through the senses, from which indeed Angels, good or evil, are known, inasmuch as in assumed or possessed

bodies they manifest themselves through certain signs. Whether these have the force of demonstration, that is, of infallible proof, can be disputed.

§ 89. Nevertheless, from what has been said it sufficiently appears that, prescinding from particular experiences of this kind — which are rather in the manner of revelations which those Spirits make concerning themselves — it is not demonstrable, but only credible, that Angels exist; nor indeed from the mere contemplation of the world and its parts does it seem possible to be proved by necessary reason. The gentile Philosophers, moreover, in positing separate intellectual substances, did not have a certain and necessary demonstration of that matter; but they followed probable arguments, as we have already said of Aristotle, although perhaps they held them in place of a demonstration — which sometimes happens in other matters also.

§ III — When the angelic creature was made (Quando facta sit angelica creatura)

§ 90. Concerning the time of the creation of the Angels, it must first of all be held with certain faith that they were at some time created and had some beginning of their duration. This is taught by almost the same testimonies of Scripture by which this was shown above generally concerning the world. But peculiarly concerning the Angels, the very sentence of the Apostle in Colossians 1 establishes this point, where he thus speaks of the Son of God: "In him were created all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether Thrones or Dominations or Principalities or Powers. All things were created through him and in him, and he is before all."[150]

§ 91. But since Moses, in describing the Genesis of the world, makes no mention of the creation of the Angels — and that, as St. John Chrysostom bears witness,[151] and St. Augustine,[152] and St. Thomas[153] attest, because he was writing for a rude and carnal people not capable of that more hidden doctrine — and since we have nowhere else in the Scriptures anything clearly expressed about this matter, hence it has come about that concerning the time of the creation of the Angels diverse opinions of Doctors have arisen. For there are not a few who think that they existed before the corporeal world was founded, either by much or by some time. In this opinion the Greeks especially are found to have been, as Origen,[154] Basil,[155] Gregory Nazianzen,[156] John Chrysostom,[157] John Damascene,[35] where, this question having been proposed and the sentence of Gregory Nazianzen alleged — that Angels were made before every other creature — he declares himself also to assent to it, adding this reason: "For it was fitting," he says, "that the intellectual substance be first of all created; then the sensible; and then man, composed of both."

§ 92. Among the Latins, likewise, Hilary was of this opinion,[158] Ambrose,[159] Jerome,[160] Isidore,[161] John Cassian,[162] where he affirms that no one of the faithful doubts that God made the spiritual and celestial powers before the founding of this world. Hugh of St. Victor also manifestly inclines to this sentence.[163] Augustine also is alleged,[164] saying that Angels and all celestial powers were made before this visible world, that the Goodness of God might not be idle but might have those in whom through many prior spaces it might show forth its Goodness — which very thing he signifies that he also holds concerning matter. And again,[165] saying that on the first day the Spiritual, that is, the Angel, was made, before that heaven which we discern with our eyes. But it is established that these books are not Augustine's, but the former indeed is by Gennadius the Presbyter of Marseilles; the latter by an uncertain author. The same opinion is that of the

author who wrote the work *On Questions of the Old and New Testament*. For, saying[166] that the world was made on account of the presumption of the devil, he plainly signifies that he holds the devil to have existed and to have sinned before the world was founded.

§ 93. But there are some who assert that the Angels were created after the visible world was founded. This opinion is said to be Philo's, relating in his *Sacred History* that which is from 1 Kings about Saul seized and David striking the harp. In which place he introduces David rebuking the pride of the demons and objecting to them that he knew they were created after heaven and earth. Eucherius held the same view,[167] writing: "If first of all heaven and earth were made, the Angels were made afterward," etc. Hither also they adduce the place just cited from the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*: for there it is said that the Angels were made when as yet darkness was concealing the water, and water the earth. But from what follows it is sufficiently clear that the Author wishes nothing else than that matter is more ancient than the Angels, but that the Angels themselves [were created before] the visible world, as has been said.

§ 94. Further, a third sentence proceeds midway between these two, which teaches that the invisible, that is, the angelic, creature was made neither before nor after, but at the same time with the visible world. Thus among the Latins teach Gregory of Rome,[168] Cassiodorus and Bede,[169] the Master of the Sentences (in the text), Hugh[170] — who also on Romans 16 and 2 Timothy, although he seems to approve a different opinion more, as we said above, yet confesses that almost all hold otherwise. And the Master all the later Theologians have followed, chiefly because of the authority of the great Lateran Council, in which it is written in chapter 1 that God, by his omnipotent power, from the beginning of time founded out of nothing both creatures, the spiritual and the corporal, namely the angelic and the mundane.[29] Among the Greeks, however, Epiphanius[171] and Theodoret[172] and the author [of the work ascribed to] Athanasius expressly maintain this sentence. From which it is clear that what St. Thomas says[173] — that all the Greek Doctors agree in holding that the Angels were created before the corporeal world — cannot be universally understood.

§ 95. And although Augustine in some places speaks doubtfully of this controversy, permitting each one to think what he wills — as in *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 32, and XXII, ch. 1[174] — yet the sentence which teaches that the Angels were founded together with the visible world pleased him more, as he openly signified both there and in certain other places, as in *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 6 and 9, and *Confessions* XII, ch. 13.[175] Wherefore he is altogether to be numbered with the assertors of this sentence. Nor can there stand against this what he says in *Confessions* XII, ch. 15,[176] namely that the angelic substance precedes the creature of time. For the same thing he also says of the unformed matter of bodies.[177] But the sense is that the angelic creature and the unformed matter of bodies preceded, by a certain order, time and the vicissitude of things already formed, and the things themselves formed. But whether they preceded in the order of nature only, or also in the order of time, is not altogether clear from Augustine's opinion. And of this matter we shall treat ex professo at distinction 12 of this book. This stands fast, that Augustine asserts that the spiritual creature preceded the creation of corporeal matter.

§ 96. To these may be added the sentence of certain men choosing nothing certain about the time of the creation of the Angels, because they think the matter is nowhere set forth in the Scriptures, and therefore is remote from our cogitation and not to be scrutinised by us. Thus seems to hold the author of the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*, ch. 6 (among the works of Augustine, tom. 4),[178] and Prudentius in his *Apotheosis* (chapter on the Nature of the Soul). Indeed Ambrose also somewhere so speaks, as in his book *On the*

Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, ch. 3:[179] for he says that he cannot find the beginning of the Angels, although he does not doubt that they have a beginning.

§ 97. But if we consult the Sacred Scriptures, although in them we do not have express mention of the time at which the Angels were created, yet there will be found that by which the first and second opinions are destroyed. Whence it will necessarily follow that the third be established. To the first opinion stands opposed the opening of Genesis taken according to the letter, where it is said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." And that of Psalm 101: "In the beginning, Lord, thou didst found the earth." For hence it follows that nothing was created before heaven and earth, and consequently not the Angels either. This Scripture Rupert uses as an evident one for the interpretation of this sentence.[180] Another place is Exodus 20, where it is thus said: "In six days God made heaven and earth and all things that are in them." For this clause, "all things that are in them," after the manner of Scripture comprehends the Angels also. So too in Psalm 148 the Angels are numbered among those that are in the heavens, where also generally concerning the work of creation is subjoined: "He spoke, and they were made." And in Psalm 102 the same are numbered among the works of the six days. Elsewhere also, as in Matt. 18, Luke 15, etc., the Angels are said to be in heaven. Nor does the passage of Proverbs 8 press lightly: the Wisdom of God, wishing to show herself prior to every creature, says that she was before the earth was made and [before] heaven. Which demonstration is not firm if anything was created before heaven and earth. But that the Angels were not made after heaven and earth — which was the second opinion — the Lord indicates in Job 38, saying that then the Angels praised him, when he was founding the earth.

§ 98. Reason also persuades this: for if they were made after heaven and earth, then at that time, when there was not yet an angelic creature, God would not have been glorified in the creature, since no creature existed which might glorify him; but he created all things for his glory: therefore from the beginning he willed to be glorified in the creature; there was therefore from the beginning a creature which might glorify him, according to that which has been alleged from Job. The same seems to be shown by the Canticle of the Church: "Glory to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. As it was in the beginning," understand, of the creature: for hence it follows that at the time in which the creature was made, God was glorified in the creature, which was none other than the angelic; nor yet did he will to produce such a creature before the corporeal world, so that, to wit, it might glorify God not only in itself but also in other creatures, from the very beginning. Since therefore the Angels, according to Scripture, were created neither before nor after the corporeal world, it follows from the same authority of Scripture that they were [made] together with it.

§ 99. To this, however, they adduce Ecclesiasticus 18: "He who lives forever created all things at once." For, they say, after the first day, properly nothing was created, that is, made out of nothing, but all things were created out of matter on the first day; and so the creation of all spirits and bodies may truly be said to have been made at the same time, that is, in one instant. But we shall open the understanding of this Scripture below at distinction 12. For the rest, St. Thomas, in the place cited above, proves this sentence by an excellent reason, which is of this kind: the Angels do not by themselves constitute any universe, but are a certain part of this universe, together with the corporeal creature constituting the universe as co-part; but no part is perfect when separated from its whole: therefore the Angels were not created before the corporeal creature, but together with it. For if they had been created after it, the same inconvenience would follow on the part of the corporeal creature. If you say that after the first day many parts were added to the universe, it is answered that all these were already in existence on the first day according to matter, and that the more principal parts of the

universe existed. This reason is to be set against that which we said John Damascene brings for the first opinion. For it was more fitting that the universe should be created complete according to its principal parts, than that one part should precede another in time.

§ 100. But the argument of Eucherius for the second opinion is easily resolved. For heaven and earth are said to have been made "in the beginning," that is, first of all, not because [they were made] before all other things, but because nothing [was made] before them — which is what is wont to be said, that a superlative is to be expounded not affirmatively but negatively. Which is clear from the verse of Psalm 101, in which the earth alone is named; and if you expound this affirmatively, it will follow that the earth is prior to heaven. The same can be replied to that of Ecclesiasticus 1: "Wisdom was created before all things." Which some understand of the angelic nature, wishing hence to show that the Angels were made before the corporeal world. But better otherwise is it answered, that Ecclesiasticus speaks of the eternal Wisdom, which he says was the first of all created — that is, generated — from the Father. For this sense is clear from the circumstances.

§ 101. But as to what concerns the sentences of the Fathers, Greek as well as Latin, adduced on the contrary, we make no other reply than that it is not to be wondered at if, in a matter not yet sufficiently examined, certain ones have held otherwise than the truth had it. Whence...

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1. St. Epiphanius; Philastrius; St. Augustine (cited together by Estius as treating of the errors just rehearsed — the Manichaeans, Gnostics, and Priscillianists). The longer marginal note printed beneath the column is an editorial excursus: it adduces Eusebius of Caesarea, *Demonstratio evangelica*, prop. 4, ch. 5, n. 2 (others refer this dogma to Plato, who posited universal Ideas of all things, real and subsistent, from which the particular species of things flowed forth); on which see Dionysius Petavius, *Theologicorum dogmatum* tom. I (bk. 4, ch. 9; and ch. 10, on what (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite held in *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 5, concerning the Ideas — treating the subject accurately, and expounding the same Father's opinion, clearing it of error, at n. 15; and he had in part explained it already in bk. 1, ch. 13, nn. 10 & 11). Truly, if we may believe Plutarch (*De Iside*), this fabrication — by an unknown author, yet with firm faith — was common currency among the pagans. But the first among Christians to embrace this error was Simon, that famous Magus, of whom in the Acts of the Apostles, whom Eusebius calls the prince and father of all the heretics (*Ecclesiastical History*, bk. 2, ch. 13, Valois's edition), as is also the view of Epiphanius (in *Anacephalaeosis*) and of St. Irenaeus (cited in St. Eusebius, bk. 5, ch. 10). From Simon the rest of the heretics are seen to have derived, most of all the Gnostics — whose sect was not a single one but manifold — as Saturninus, Basilides, Valentinus, who built up by degrees that inextricable series of Deities which they called Aeons: chiefly Valentinus, who by multiplying the quaternities of these Aeons reckoned them up to thirty. Concerning whom Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Epiphanius are to be consulted. But Manes, or Manichaeus, a certain Persian, in the third century of the Church, imbued with these wicked dogmas, undertook to promulgate and spread his impious error concerning a twofold God (of whom one he called Good, the other Evil), whose impious doctrines, and his more-than-brutish opinion, Archelaus, bishop of Mesopotamia, reports and refutes in a *Disputation against the Manichaeans*; which Henricus Valesius saw through the press from a manuscript codex of the monastery of Bobbio, now kept at Milan in the Ambrosian Library, added to his own version and edition of Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius, after the History of Sozomen, together with his notes, and had it printed at the end of the second volume; which, if it please the reader to read, is relevant here. St. Augustine treats at length of the Manichaeans in many places, and surveys and refutes their errors: namely in the two books *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*; in the *Tract. de moribus Manichaeorum*, tom. 1 of his works; likewise in the *Tract. de utilitate credendi*; in the book *Contra epistolam Manichaei, quam vocant Fundamenti*; *De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos*; *Contra Fortunatum Manichaeorum presbyterum*; *Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum*; in the thirty-three books *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*; in the two books *De actis cum Felice Manichaeo*; in the book *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*; in the book *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*; and in the two books *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*. All which works of Augustine, in the old edition, stood gathered in the sixth volume; in the new edition, prepared by the Fathers of the Benedictine Congregation of St. Maur, are to be found in the eighth volume.
2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 1.
3. Ps. 148:5 (also Ps. 32:9): "Ipse dixit, et facta sunt; ipse mandavit, et creata sunt."
4. Exod. 20:11.

5. Wis. 1:14.
6. Sir. 18:1.
7. Heb. 3:4.
8. Jn. 1:3, 10.
9. Col. 1:16.
10. First Council of Braga, ch. 13, against the Manichaeans and Priscillianists.
11. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 8; *De Civitate Dei* XI; *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 24; and other passages cited above.
12. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 2; citing Is. 42:8 ("Gloriam meam alteri non dabo").
13. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II (at the end).
14. St. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.
15. St. Epiphanius, Philastrius, and St. Augustine, in their books *De haeresibus*.
16. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 1 (*Firmiter credimus*).
17. Jn. 12:31; Jn. 14:30; 2 Cor. 4:4; Eph. 6:12.
18. 1 Jn. 2:16.
19. Jn. 3:6.
20. Job 41:25 (Vulgate).
21. Jn. 8:44.
22. 2 Tim. 2:26.
23. Phil. 3:19.
24. Sir. 11:16.
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 1.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 4.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 4.
28. See below, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2.
29. Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1 (*Firmiter*).
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5; q. 90, a. 3.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5.
32. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 9.
33. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 4.
34. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 2.
35. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 3.
36. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, ch. 21.
37. Albert the Great, *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, art. 7; Gabriel Biel, *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 4; Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1.
38. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* IV, dist. 5; Durandus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 3; St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 10; *In IV Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 2, a. 1.
39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5, ibidem.
40. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, chs. 8 and 9.
41. Cajetan and Domingo Bañez, on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5.

42. Cajetan and Medina, on *Summa theologiae* III, q. 13, a. 2.

43. St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, dist. 16, q. 1, a. 3.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 4.

45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90, a. 3.

46. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1.

47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 6.

48. Cf. Gen. 1; Ps. 32; Prov. 8; Wis. 1; Jn. 1 and 5; Rom. 11; 1 Cor. 8.

49. Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1 (*Firmiter credimus*).

50. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* VI, q. 2.

51. Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, on this distinction.

52. Domingo Bañez, on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 6.

53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 65, a. 1; q. 6, a. 4.

54. Theophylact, *In Ioannem*, on ch. 6.

55. Gen. 1.

56. Wis. 11:25.

57. 1 Tim. 4:4.

58. St. Augustine, in the many books he composed against the Manichaean heresy (e.g. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*; *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*; *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*; *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti*; *Contra Fortunatum*; *Contra Secundinum*; *Contra Adimantum*; *De duabus animabus*; *De actis cum Felice Manichaeo*).

59. Council of Braga, canons 7, 8, 12, 13, 14.

60. Epiphanius, *Panarion*; Philastrius, *De haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* — under the various titles of heretics.

61. Rom. 14 (cf. Matt. 15:11).

62. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 1.

63. Ex. 20.

64. Prov. 8: "Dominus possedit me initio viarum suarum, antequam quicquam faceret a principio."

65. Sir. 24: "Ab initio et ante saecula creata sum."

66. Jn. 17: "Clarifica me, Pater, claritate quam habui, priusquam mundus esset."

67. Eph. 1.

68. Col. 1.

69. Sir. 23 (al. 21).

70. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), under Innocent III, ch. 2 (*Firmiter*).

71. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 3.

72. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XI, ch. 9; *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 32; *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 1.

73. St. Basil, *Homiliae in Hexaemeron*, hom. 1.

74. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 5.

75. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 2.

76. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 4.

77. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 6.

78. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* (opening); *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 6.

79. Gen. 2; Ex. 20; and elsewhere.

80. The page breaks off mid-sentence; the continuation follows in the next sub-chunk. Estius here adds a lengthy marginal note (signaled by "(a)") debating, with Dionysius Petavius (*Theol. dogm.* III, *De opificio sex dierum* I, ch. 1, n. 8) and others, whether the Hebrew *bara* properly signifies production *ex nihilo*, or whether it is used more broadly — noting especially Num. 16:30, where the same verb is used of the novel punishment inflicted on Korah, Dathan, and Abiron. Petavius holds that Moses had in view rather the excellence of God's workmanship than strict creation from nothing, which latter truth he nevertheless proves from many other scriptural and patristic testimonies, and cites Aben-Ezra's commentary on the opening of Genesis in support.

81. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 31; XI, ch. 4.

82. Ps. 54 (Vulgate): "He that is before the ages."

83. Gen. 26 (Vulgate): *Invocavit nomen Dei aeterni*.

84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 8.

85. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 5 (at the end).

86. Jn. 1:1: "In the beginning was the Word."

87. 1 Jn. 1:1: "That which was from the beginning."

88. Council of Nicaea (325), anathema following the Creed.

89. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Luciferianos*.

90. St. Athanasius, *Epistola I ad Serapionem de Spiritu Sancto*.

91. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, preface.

92. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 3.

93. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 23.

94. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 15.

95. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 8.

96. Richard of Saint-Victor, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 1.

97. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* II, ch. 8.

98. St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 14.

99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. [3].

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 3 (the third way).

101. Domingo de Soto, *In VIII libros Physicorum*, q. 2.

102. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 15; Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, prose 6.

103. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, prose 6.

104. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 2 and q. 7, a. 3–4.

105. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 4.

106. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 2; *Quaestiones LXXXIII*, q. 28.

107. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 9; *Confessiones* VI, ch. 4; *Expositio in Psalmum* 138.

108. Book *De diligendo Deo* (or *Meditationes* under the name of Augustine), ch. 2, among his works, vol. 9. [Note: the footnote in the source reads *(a) In antiqua editione: at it no. 4 PP. Benedikt. in appendice ad tomum sextum.*]

109. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 21.

110. Book *De diligendo Deo*, ch. 2 and 4 [abbreviation as in source].

111. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 47, a. 3.

112. St. Augustine, *De haeresibus*, heresy 77; Philaster [cited therein].

113. Plato, *Timaeus*; Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* I, chs. 8–9.

114. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* VIII, ch. 5.

115. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 24, q. 3, c. [abbreviation as in source].

116. St. Augustine, *De vera Religione*, ch. 49; *Epistola* 56 (to Dioscorus).

117. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 5.

118. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 59 (to Avitus), chs. 2–3.

119. Origen, *Peri Archon* (= *De principiis*), books 2 and 5; Epiphanius, *Panarion* (heresy of the Origenists); Methodius, *De resurrectione* [as reported by Epiphanius].

120. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, homily 4.

121. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1; q. 44, a. 4; and I-II, q. [2, a. 8].

122. St. Augustine, *Confessions* I, ch. 1: "Fecisti nos ad te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te."

123. St. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, ch. 8; II, chs. 6 and 10; IV, ch. 12.

124. Ps. 72:28: "Mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est."

125. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 1.

126. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* VIII, ch. 14; XXVI, ch. 26.

127. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, ch. 1.

128. Ps.-Augustine, *De diligendo Deo*, ch. 2; Ps.-Augustine, Sermo 181 *de tempore* (the Louvain editors note this sermon was rejected from tom. X as spurious; the Maurist Benedictines identify it as a treatise on the exposition of the Creed found in their edition at tom. VI in *De symbolo ad catechumenos*).

129. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1; I-II, q. 2, a. 8; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 54.

130. St. Augustine, *De symbolo ad catechumenos* I, ch. 1.

131. Ps.-Augustine, *Tractatus de creatione primi hominis*.

132. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* III, ch. 9.

133. St. Bernard, Sermo 1 *de Adventu Domini*.

134. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 26, 61, 62; *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 1.

135. Deut. 16 (cf. Deut. 26:19).

136. Prov. 16:4 (Estius cites as Prov. 6): "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus."

137. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1.

138. Acts 23:8.

139. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Matthaeum* on Matt. 22.

140. 2 Tim. 2:18.

141. Heb. 1.

142. Heb. 2.

143. Ps. 8:6: "Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis."

144. Heb. 2:16: "Nusquam angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit."

145. Lk. 20:36.

146. Num. 22.

147. Symbol of Constantinople (Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed); Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 1 (*Firmiter*).

148. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII; *Physics* VIII.

149. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, aa. 2 and 3.

150. Col. 1:16–17.

151. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 2; *Sermo de jejuniis*, tom. I.

152. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, ch. 17.

153. St. Thomas, *Opusculum* 15, *De Angelis*, ch. 17.

154. Origen, *Peri Archon*, especially lib. III, ch. 3; also *In Genesim*, hom. 1, and *In Isaiam*, hom. 4.

155. St. Basil, *In Hexaemeron*, homilies 1 and 2.

156. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio in Christi nativitatem*.

157. St. John Chrysostom, *De Providentia Dei*, lib. I, near the beginning.

158. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* XII, past the middle of the book; and in his *Libellus contra Auxentium*, not far from the end.

159. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 5, following Basil; and *Praefatio in Psalmum I*.

160. St. Jerome, *In Titum* 1, in the words cited by the Master.

161. St. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* I, ch. 12.

162. John Cassian, *Collationes* 8, ch. 7.

163. Hugh of St. Victor, *Super 2 Tim.*, q. 3; and *De Sacramentis* I, pars 1, ch. 3.

164. Pseudo-Augustine, *De Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, ch. 10 [in fact Gennadius of Marseilles].

165. Pseudo-Augustine, *Quaestiones* LXV, q. 21.

166. *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 2.

167. Eucherius, *Super Genesim* 1.

168. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXIII, chs. 7 and 14; and lib. XXXII, ch. 10.

169. Cassiodorus and Bede, *Super Genesim* 1.

170. Hugh [of St. Victor], ch. 5, *Adnotationes super Genesim*.

171. St. Epiphanius, *Haereses*, against Paul of Samosata (haer. 65).

172. Theodoret, *In Genesim*, quaest. 3.

173. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 3, ad 1.

174. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 32; XXII, ch. 1 [actually XXII.14 in the source's note].

175. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 6 and 9; *Confessiones* XII, ch. 13.

176. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, ch. 15.

177. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, ch. 3 and following.

178. Pseudo-Augustine, *De Incarnatione Verbi*, ch. 6 (among Augustine's works, tom. 4).

179. St. Ambrose, *De Sacramento Dominicae Incarnationis*, ch. 3.

180. Rupert, *De Victoria Verbi Dei* II, ch. 28.

§ 1. And we see that some, such as St. Ambrose and Hugh, spoke variously as of a doubtful matter. The Master excuses St. Jerome on the ground that he spoke in such a fashion not because he himself thought so, but as one reporting the opinion of others — as he is often wont to do in his commentaries; for thus does Jerome himself excuse his having done so on a number of other occasions in his *Apology against Rufinus*.[1] This excuse would be probable if there existed some other passage in Jerome in which he declared his own contrary

view. Therefore it must rather be admitted that Jerome agreed with the Greeks, of whom he was a diligent reader, and by name with St. Gregory of Nazianzus, his teacher.

§ IV — Whether it is of faith that the angels were created at the same time as the corporeal world (An fidei sit Angelos simul cum Mundo corporeo creatos esse)

§ 2. A doubt arises from what has been said: whether the truth we have shown, namely that the angels were created at the same time as the corporeal world, must also be held by faith. And indeed this appears wholly from the Lateran decree by which, as we said, this truth is established. For this is the beginning of the decree: "We firmly believe and simply confess."[3] It makes for confirmation that in that whole decree, although lengthy, nothing is contained besides what is established as to be held with the certitude of faith. Add that from the Scriptures it seems evidently shown that before heaven and earth nothing was created. In this opinion are Gregory of Rimini (writing on this distinction), Ferrariensis on Book II,[4] Melchior Cano in Book VII,[5] and some others.

§ 3. But the negative side relies on these arguments. First: because the Fathers, in roughly equal numbers, hold differing views, as is clear from what has been said above. Wherefore one side is not to be called contrary to the faith in comparison with the other. Secondly: because none of those who hold the view we have proved true affirmed it as something to be held by faith. Thirdly: rather, on the contrary, some of them expressly denied it to be of faith — as St. Augustine, Theodoret, Hugh, and the Master in the passages previously cited — and judged that it is left to each to hold either opinion freely. Fourthly: St. Thomas, who was later than the Lateran decree, answering the question in the place cited above, says that since among the opinions of the Doctors a twofold view is found, that view seems more probable which holds that the angels were created together with the corporeal creature; but he denies that the contrary view is to be reckoned erroneous. And in his reply to the third he teaches how the Scripture of Genesis 1 can be expounded according to each differing opinion.[6] The same Doctor, writing on this Distinction, openly says that the other opinion is not to be prejudged, because, he says, "it is not determined nor expressed by faith."[7] Nor does St. Bonaventure, contemporary with St. Thomas, in treating the same question (on this distinction),[8] make mention of error in faith, but only of opinion. Moved by these reasons, Cajetan and Domingo Báñez (on the First Part of St. Thomas's *Summa*), and Sixtus of Siena in Book V,[9] and some others, hold that this question does not pertain to faith — although they do not think one must depart from that side which is commonly held by the theologians. Nor are they much moved by the Scriptures adduced on that side, as though from them it were taught that the matter is of faith. For, as has now been judged from St. Thomas, and said more fully on the preceding Distinction, the Scripture of Genesis 1 admits various expositions without prejudice to the faith — which St. Augustine also teaches in Book XII of the *Confessions*, through several chapters.[10] And the passage of Exodus 20 and the like, they say, can be expounded of all corporeal things, namely those whose creation is described at the beginning of Genesis.

§ 4. But to what is adduced from the Lateran Council, some reply that by that word *simul* ("at the same time") there is not signified the same instant of the creation of both substances, but the same *time*, having a certain latitude of its own — in the manner that things done on the same day, and sometimes things done in the same year, are said to be done *simul*. They confirm this reply from the fact that the Fathers of that Council

did not labour about the instant of the creation of the angels in comparison with the creation of the corporeal world, but their care was to exclude the error of Origen, who dogmatised that for many ages before this world was founded the angels and souls had existed, and that, upon their sinning, on this occasion this corporeal world was made so that they might be punished by means of corporeal things or in bodies.[11]

§ 5. But this reply does not satisfy others: both because the Council adds "from the beginning of time," plainly signifying the beginning of time to have been one and the same with the beginning of the existence of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature; and because it subjoins that *the human creature* was made "afterwards, that is, with some time interposed." Hence they gather that, according to the mind of the Council, two things are opposed: "to be made together," which is attributed to the angels and the world, and "to be made afterwards," which is attributed to man with respect to the world and the angels.

§ 6. Another reply, therefore, is adduced by Cajetan, which Sixtus and Báñez also approve. It is this: that the mind of the Council was not to define this opinion — although it received it as by far the more probable, and inserted it into its decree of its own accord — but to condemn the error of Origen and of the like who held that spiritual creatures alone were brought forth by God *per se*, and corporeal creatures afterwards produced on account of the demerits of the spiritual ones. This explanation of the mind of the Council is found in St. Thomas, in *Opusculum* 23.[12] Hence Cajetan: "Since in two ways it may be held that the angels were produced before bodies — either according to the error just mentioned, or simply and absolutely, namely that by God's will the angels preceded the visible world — that decretal, although it destroys both positions, is nevertheless to be interpreted against the first as against a heresy, while to the second it can be applied as against a less probable view. And the reason for this gloss is that determinations are not wont to be made except against certain errors."[13] So he, not improbably.

§ 7. If, however, another opinion pleases someone, so that he thinks one must cling firmly to the words of the decree as they sound, he will be able to reply that a question controverted for a long time and doubtful in preceding ages could at last be defined by a decree of the Church, from the Scriptures being more diligently examined — in whose true understanding the Church daily progresses, and one need not doubt. Whichever be said, it is altogether likely that St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, although posterior to the Lateran Council, were not mindful of that decree when they treated this question; for otherwise they would have made some mention of it, nor would they have spoken of the contrary opinion as though it were a free opinion — since even those who now deny this question to be of faith nevertheless, on account of the words of the decree, mark the said opinion as at least of some rashness.

§ VI — Objections are resolved (Objectiones diluuntur)

§ 8. It is objected against the foregoing from the words of Is. 14, where, speaking in the person of the sinning Angel, it is said: "I will ascend into heaven, above the stars of God I will exalt my throne." For if he was already in the highest heaven — namely, established there by his very creation — how could he, shortly thereafter, have desired to ascend into heaven and above the stars? St. Jerome indicates a certain solution to this argument[15] for, inquiring how the devil, already placed in heaven, could say "I will ascend into heaven," he replies thus: "But because we read of 'the heaven of heavens' belonging to the Lord, when he was in heaven — that is, in the firmament — he desired to ascend into the heaven where the habitual dwelling of the Lord is." By these words he seems to signify that the devil was created in the heaven of the firmament, even though he

does not express what he understands by the name of the firmament. This reply, however, is contrary to the opinion stated above, according to which it was said that the Angels were created in the highest heaven. And so it increases the difficulty rather than removes it. To this is added, moreover, that in the same passage of the Prophet the same transgressing Angel says: "I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the Most High"; for since it is established that clouds exist far below the sidereal heaven, the consequence appears from this that the Angels were created not even in the heaven which is customarily called by the name of the firmament, but in this aerial heaven closest to the earth, in which clouds gather. But this is sufficiently refuted by the fact that the apostate Angels were cast down into this thick and murky air as into a prison appointed for them until the day of judgment — and this according to the celebrated opinion of the Fathers drawn from the Scriptures, as will be taught below,[16] — for if they were sent into the air as into a prison, they were therefore not created in the air. Accordingly, to the passage of Isaiah it must be replied that the words of the Prophet pertain according to the literal sense to the King of Babylon, to whom, on account of his signal pride, this kind of hyperbolic speech is attributed, so that he is imagined to say: "I will ascend into heaven," etc. In the same way it is written of the impious King Antiochus in 2 Mac. 9 that, in his arrogance, he seemed to himself to command the waves of the sea and to weigh the heights of mountains in a balance and to touch the stars of heaven; just as also in Ezek. 28 the King of Tyre is introduced saying that he is God and sits in the seat of God, and other things of that kind. But since, just as the King of Tyre, so also the King of Babylon bore the figure of the devil, it remains to be explained here how, at least in the mystical sense, one who was in heaven boasted that he would ascend into heaven. The Master,[17] replies that the heaven to which the devil wished to ascend is to be understood as the loftiness of God, to the equality of which he wished to be matched. Similarly, St. Thomas,[18] replies that what the sinning Angel desired is to be understood not as any corporeal heaven, but as the heaven of the Holy Trinity into which the sinning Angel wished to ascend in desiring to be equated with God in some manner — which interpretation is probable; for immediately, as it were in the place of an exposition, it is subjoined: "And I will be like the Most High." And this sense is intimated by St. Augustine,[19] and by St. Ambrose.[20] Moreover, by the name of heaven there can also be spiritually understood the Church, over which the devil dared to promise himself the principate. He, however, who was first cast down from the Empyrean heaven was afterwards also ejected from the hearts of men, in which he reigned through sin, so that God chose from among them a Church for Himself, against which the gates of hell shall never prevail — in accordance with which exposition this passage of the Prophet will be similar to the one in Rev. 12, where not the first ruin of the devil and his angels, as it seems to some, but this second ejection and defeat of his, of which we have spoken, is described.

§ 9. A second difficulty is raised here by those who ask how Angels are said to have been created in the corporeal heaven, since the Angelic substance, as incorporeal by its very *esse*, depends in no way upon body, and consequently not even as regards its coming-into-being (*fieri*); for God could have created Angels before the corporeal world, as many have supposed was actually done. St. Thomas replies[21] that the Angels were made in a corporeal place not as though depending on body according to their *esse* or their coming-to-be, but to manifest the order they bear toward corporeal nature and the fact that they reach corporeal things by their power. But this reply does not dissolve the difficulty. For there remains the question of how, from the very beginning of their *esse*, they are said to have been in a place, and specifically in the Empyrean heaven, if, according to that power by which they have an order to corporeal nature, they were not performing any operation upon a corporeal thing — namely, upon the Empyrean heaven itself. And the same question holds for Angels remaining in heaven up to the present and who will remain there perpetually. Moreover, the

question is augmented when it is extended to the souls of the Blessed, to whom not even such a power as that by which they might touch heaven seems capable of being attributed — so that by that formal character (*ratio*) they might be said to be in heaven — since by nature they have no power except to inform and govern the body to which they are naturally united.

§ 10. Certain thinkers have replied that the Angels are in the Empyrean heaven as in a place because they adorn that heaven with their presence, and indeed adorned it with their presence from the beginning of their creation. But this is not rightly said. For it must first be explained by what formal character they are locally present to heaven — which is precisely what is now being asked — before one can reply that they adorn heaven with their presence.

Others therefore reply that the Angels were created in the Empyrean heaven because they were there from the beginning through essence, or substantial presence, without regard to the power of operating or to operation itself. This opinion seems most of all to conform to the common conception of men, who imagine something to be present to a thing before they imagine it to operate about that thing.

Others, again, say that the Angels are in the first heaven and were created there because, as was said above, they have a natural order toward corporeal nature, in which the first heaven excels — so that their presence is to be understood as a presence of order.

Others say that the Angels were there from the beginning by the application of their operative power to that body, even though they never actually operate upon it.

Others again acknowledge that the Angels were there from the beginning through some operation, albeit unknown to us. Thus Cajetan replies,[22] who nevertheless adduces also another reply — namely, that the Angels are said to be in the Empyrean heaven metaphorically, because they are in glory, for the signification of which the Empyrean heaven was designated. The sign of this, he thinks, is that, as the Master adduces in the text, that heaven is full of Angels — which cannot be understood except metaphorically. But this reply is contradicted by the fact that the Angels were not created in glory. Hence in this sense they cannot be said to have been created in the Empyrean heaven. Nor does the Master merely say that the highest heaven is full of Angels, but that as soon as it was created it was filled with the holy Angels. Wherefore if in these words there is a metaphor, it ought not to be expounded of glory, which the Angels did not have from the beginning, but in some other way.

§ 11. Furthermore, since the solution of this question depends on another — namely, the question of how Angels are in a place — let us therefore append the treatment of that question here.

§ VII — How Angels are in a place (Quomodo Angeli sint in loco)

§ 12. That the mode of existing in a place which belongs to bodies is not the same as that which belongs to incorporeal substances — such as Angels and separated souls — is manifest and beyond doubt. For bodies are in a place by reason of their dimensive quantity (*quantitas dimensiva*), through whose contact they are applied to a place; hence they are also said to be in a place *circumscriptively* (*circumscriptive*). But that this cannot apply to Angels is certain, because, as is here supposed, they are incorporeal and therefore devoid of quantity. It is asked, therefore, on what ground they are to be said to be in a place. And indeed all agree that

they are in a place *definitively* (*definitive*) — that is, that they are somewhere in such a way that they are not everywhere; at least not in the way in which God is everywhere. I add this qualification on account of Durandus, who concedes that in some sense the Angels are everywhere.[24] But what the mode is by which they are definitively in a place becomes a matter of inquiry.

Scotus and Gabriel,[25] writing on this distinction, and followed by several others, held the opinion that Angels are in a place through their essence, or, as they say, through *substantial presence* (*praesentia substantialis*), without any reference to operation or to the principle of operating. This opinion they prove in various ways, beyond the reason noted above, which is drawn from the common conception of men.

First: because to operate presupposes to be; therefore to operate in a place presupposes to be in a place. Therefore the Angel is in a place first by its essence, and only then by its operation. And the same argument holds of the power of operating, for this too presupposes the essence.

Second: because if the Angel is in a place by reason of its operation, since operation is received in the patient and is thus commensurate with the place of the patient, it follows likewise that the Angel is commensurate with the same place — whence the consequence will be that it is in a place circumscriptively.

Third: if the Angel is not in a place through its essence but only through its operation, then an Angel resting from operation will be in no place at all, and will thus be nowhere. The same applies to the separated soul.

Fourth: Angels and souls are in heaven, and yet operate nothing around it; therefore they are there in no other way than through their essence.

Fifth: if God were to remove the quantity from some body existing in a place, that body would still remain in the same place through its essence; therefore likewise a spirit is rightly posited to be in a place through its essence, with all operation set aside.

There are also other arguments among the aforementioned authors, which for the sake of brevity we omit.

§ 13. This opinion is refuted. First: because the substance of an Angel is indifferent to any particular place; therefore, if the Angel is in a place by reason of its substance, it will on that account be in every place. Second: because the substance of an Angel is indivisible; therefore, if it is in a place by reason of its substance, it will never be in a divisible place but only in an indivisible one. Third: because if the Angel by reason of its substance and in advance of operation occupies some portion of space, then the Angel will be extended according to its essence — which is manifestly false, since the essence is indivisible. Fourth: because not even bodies, to which it properly belongs to be in a place, are in a place by reason of their substance but by reason of their quantity; much less, therefore, is it to be admitted that incorporeal things are in a place by reason of their substance; rather, something else must be sought by reason of which they are in a place. Fifth: because God could have created Angels before the corporeal world, and so they would not have been in any place; therefore they do not require a place or space by reason of their substance; nor, after the world was subsequently created, would it have been necessary that they be in it, or in some part of it, or outside it at some definite distance. This argument is well expounded by Cajetan.[22]

§ 14. The opinion of others, therefore, is that Angels are in a place only through operation (*per operationem*). For if they are not in a place through their essence, nothing more probable seems to be sayable

than that they are in a place through operation — for through operation they attain to corporeal things, moving and altering them.

Nevertheless, even this mode appears to be disproved by some of the things said above. For if an Angel operates nothing, it does not thereby begin to be outside the world, just as Angels and the souls of the Blessed are not outside heaven if they operate nothing around it. Nor is it to be doubted that demons and the souls of the damned are in hell, even though they do nothing in it but rather suffer from it. Add to this that guardian Angels and those presiding over men and peoples do not always operate something around those committed to their care, to whom nonetheless they are truly said to be present.

§ 15. Hence others say that Angels are in a place through the *application of their power to operating* (*applicatio virtutis ad operandum*), whether the operation itself follows or not. For they hold that an Angel can, through its own freedom, apply its operative power to a place and yet not operate — just as when someone strains to pull a ship that he does not in fact pull because of the resistance of another from the opposite direction. This is more easily illustrated in the case of evil Angels, whose efforts are frequently frustrated, than in the case of good ones. Hence it is also sufficiently clear that the application of the power to operating is something that is at least by nature prior to the operation itself; therefore they hold that Angels are in a place not immediately on account of the operation but on account of the application which is prior to the operation. And they consider this to be the very opinion of St. Thomas.[23] For when, in place of the dimensive quantity through whose contact bodies are in a place, he had attributed to Angels a virtual quantity (*quantitas virtualis*), he added: "Through the application, therefore, of the Angelic power to some place in whatever manner, the Angel is said to be in a corporeal place." And this is how Cajetan interprets the mind of St. Thomas.[22]

Furthermore, others think that the opinion of St. Thomas is more fully explained if it is said that Angels are in a place through operation taken in the common sense (*per operationem communiter dictam*). Under this they comprehend not only the actual operation by which a thing is changed, but also the aforesaid application of the power — even if operation does not follow — as well as every contact of the Angelic power that has the character (*ratio*) of operation, such as presiding, guarding, protecting, containing, defending: which are, or can be, without any real mutation of that which is cared for in the said ways.

That this is the opinion of St. Thomas they prove, first, because when he said that the Angel is in a place through the application of its power to some place, he adds *in whatever manner* (*qualitercumque*) — clearly to intimate that he does not understand the application of power as only through operation properly so called, but as application and operation of whatever kind: the former even if operation does not follow; the latter even if not conjoined with a mutation of the patient. Then, because in the *Quodlibeta*[26] he declared this same point more expressly in these words: "Just as," he says, "a body is in a place through the contact of dimensive quantity, so an Angel is in a place through the contact of its power. But if anyone wishes to call this contact of power 'operation,' because to operate is the proper effect of power, let it be said that the Angel is in a place through operation — yet so that by 'operation' is not understood mere motion, but any initiative (*initio*) by which it unites itself to a body through its power, by presiding, or containing, or in any other manner whatsoever." So there. By which words St. Thomas quite plainly expounds what he had said many times elsewhere — that spiritual substances are not in a place except through operation — as in his commentary on the *Sentences*,[27] in all of which passages, according to the mind of the author as explained in the *Quodlibeta*, operation must be understood in the general sense.

§ 16. It must further be noted that the same Doctor,[28] in the *De Potentia*, says that Angels, even if they operate nothing, are nonetheless always in a place because of the order by which a spiritual creature presides over a corporeal one, and for this he cites St. Augustine.[29] Hence what he says in the *Summa*[30] — that spiritual creatures were so created as to have some order to corporeal creation and to preside over the whole of corporeal creation — this alone, from the opinion of St. Thomas, seems to suffice for them to be said to be wherever corporeal creation is, over which they have this order and which they preside, even if they cease from all operation or application of power; because the said order and presence does not necessarily have operation or application of power conjoined with it.

From all these things, therefore, it is gathered that, according to the opinion of St. Thomas — and the more probable and true one — what should be said concerning the proposed question is as follows. In one mode (*uno quidem modo*), Angels are in a place through operation properly so called, by which they produce some effect in a body — whether that effect be motion or change, or a form consequent upon it, or the rest opposed to motion or change; as if an Angel holds a stone aloft lest it fall, or stops a running man. In another mode (*alio autem modo*), Angels are in a place for this reason: that they preside over and guard corporeal things, even if they actually produce nothing in them. "In this mode," says Cajetan, "Angels guarding men and presiding over Provinces or places are said to be there. For he who guards or presides need not always do something to that which is guarded or to his subject, but must always be vigilant, attentive, and devoted to this — now removing impediments, now advancing the things committed to him, now awaiting the outcome of a matter so as to provide for what arises." So he. These two modes differ according to perfect and imperfect — or, as Cajetan speaks, according to complete and incomplete. For where the Angel operates something with respect to a body, there it is completely present; but only incompletely where it operates nothing, but attends and devotes itself to operating merely as guardian and president.

§ 17. Some moreover hold that it can be said that Angels are in a place because of the order they have to corporeal creation, which order is considered from the power of moving — even if they neither move nor operate anything in it, nor apply their power to operating, nor have any presidency or custody at all committed to them; according to which opinion it would have to be admitted that Angels are everywhere, that is, in every corporeal place — which Durandus also grants.[24] But this manner of speaking, even if it has some reason to it, is nonetheless alien to the Scriptures and to the Ecclesiastical Fathers, and therefore is not to be rashly admitted.

§ 18. But now we must reply to the arguments of the first opinion. To the first, St. Thomas replies[26] that there is no obstacle to something being prior simply speaking (*prius simpliciter*) which is not prior with respect to a particular thing (*quantum ad hoc*). For a body is the subject simply prior to a surface, but not with respect to the act of being colored. "So likewise," he says, "a body is prior simply speaking to contact, and yet a body is in a place through contact of dimensive quantity; similarly the Angel through contact of power."

To the second I reply that in this kind of case a double operation (*duplex operatio*) is to be understood: one active, which is in the agent (for the Angel does not operate without some change in itself, by which it passes from not-operating to operating); the other passive, which is in the recipient; and each is in a place according to the mode of its own nature — the passive one circumscriptively, because it is extended to the extension of the body, as are all corporeal forms; the active one, however, because it is in an incorporeal subject and therefore has no extension, is in a place only definitively, because it is there in such a way as not to be elsewhere — in the same way as the Angel itself, in which it is subjected, is in a place.

What the third argument collects as an absurdity — namely, that Angels would be nowhere, that is, in no place, if they operate nothing (at least according to the general mode explained above) — is not absurd; just as it is not inconvenient that an Angel be called invisible and without color, as St. Thomas well declares.[31] And the same must be said of the separated soul.

The solution to the argument of the fourth is evident from what follows below.[32]

To the fifth, Cajetan replies well that, with quantity removed, the corporeal substance would not remain in the same place but would be nowhere — that is, in no place at all — if we suppose at the same time all active and passive power to be absent, according to which it would act upon or suffer from something. For otherwise, even with quantity excluded, it could be said on this ground to be in a place — definitively, not circumscriptively.

To the argument indicated in the preceding section, which was drawn from the common imagination of men, it must be replied that imagination — which does not transcend sensible and continuous things — is not to be trusted when disputing about incorporeal things and their location; for these are perceived by the intellect, not by the imagination. Wherefore see St. Thomas.[28]

§ 19. Now, however, returning to the Empyrean heaven, it must be known, according to the same Doctor,[33] that this heaven cannot be investigated by us through reason, because it is subject neither to motion nor to sight; but it is held on authority alone, by which we say that it is a certain supreme body ordered principally to be the habitation of the Blessed. "And this," he says, "more on account of men, whose bodies also will be glorified and to whom a place is owed, than on account of the Angels, who have no need of place." But how, since they do not need a place, they are said to be in heaven and to have been created there, he explains,[34] writing: "It must be said that a place is not owed to an Angel according to its essence, but only according to its operation — and that either by way of fittingness (*per modum congruentiae*), as in the work of contemplation, or by way of necessity, as in those things which it operates around us. Now the operation of an Angel, according to its nature, since it is an intellectual substance, is to contemplate. Hence all were created in the place fitting for contemplation — namely, in the Empyrean heaven. But the operation of glory does not differ from the operation of their nature except as the perfect from the imperfect; and therefore the same place is owed to Angels at their creation as to those already made glorious." So there.

With these there must be compared what the same Doctor writes[35] in these words: "A place is not owed to operation according as it goes forth from the essence of the one operating, which is absolutely without qualification, but according to the object to which it is terminated — and therefore no corporeal place is owed to the contemplative Angelic operation, since the object of contemplation is spiritual; and hence the Empyrean heaven is not necessary for contemplation, but is assigned to contemplation by fittingness, inasmuch as that place has been sanctified for the glory of the Blessed — just as even the Church, rather than the marketplace, is said to be the more proper place for contemplation. Hence it is not necessary that whenever an Angel contemplates, it should be in the Empyrean heaven." Again, the same Doctor says,[36] that Angels are in the Empyrean heaven as in the place fitting for contemplation, but not as a necessity of contemplation. Yet in the *Summa*[30] he seems to hold that the reason the Angels are said to have been created in the Empyrean heaven is that they preside over the whole of corporeal nature, in which the first and highest thing is the Empyrean heaven. Then, further, in the same work,[37] on the same matter he writes thus: "It must be said that the Empyrean heaven is the supreme of corporeal places and is outside all mutability. And with

respect to the first of these, it is the place fitting to the Angelic nature, because God governs corporeal creation through the spiritual. Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature be constituted above all corporeal nature, as presiding over it. With respect to the second, it befits the state of beatitude, which is established in the highest stability. Thus, therefore, the place of beatitude befits the Angel according to its own nature. Hence it was created there." Thus far St. Thomas.

§ 20. From all these things it appears, from the mind of the Angelic Doctor, that Angels are said to be in, and to have been created in, the Empyrean heaven for a double reason (*duplici ratione*). One: because they preside over the whole of corporeal nature, in which the Empyrean heaven holds primacy and preeminence. The other: on account of the work of contemplation; for since the Empyrean heaven, among all corporeal things, is the most excellent and likewise immobile, on the one hand it most especially serves the Angels among all bodies for the contemplation of God in creatures; and on the other, for both reasons together, it is the most fitting place for the glory of Christ and of all the souls of the Blessed, and hence also of the Angels, whose society with these is one.

A further reason can also be given why Angels are said to be in heaven: because heaven is the place and dwelling of God, according to the manner in which Scripture speaks; for God is said to be in corporeal things in a local sense because He contains them by His power — wherefore He is most especially to be said to be corporally in that to which He has granted the greatest perfection. And this is the supreme heaven. Now the holy Angels are always present to God through the beatific contemplation (*contemplatio beatifica*). Therefore they are most rightly said to be in heaven, where God is in the manner just described.

From these three reasons it is clear that the evil Angels are now no longer in heaven, even though they were created in it. For in them the first two reasons still held at that time. Demons, however, and the souls of the damned are in hell — not so much as operating something as as suffering; but to suffer from a corporeal thing is rightly comprehended under operation taken in the common sense, as was said above. By a similar reasoning, other demons are in this murky air, as in a prison, as the Fathers speak — though they also operate many evils properly speaking around us. But also the soul of Christ descended to hell in order to operate something there properly speaking — that is, to liberate the souls of the just detained in those places of punishment.

§ 21. Furthermore, some hold that Angels are said to have been created in, and to be in, the Empyrean heaven for this reason: that that heaven has some action upon these lower things, which celestial power of acting they say proceeds from the Angels. But this is said with little probability. For it is manifest that the Fathers, when they say that Angels were created in heaven and operate there, did not have in mind such an operation — which the heaven is supposed to have, directed or perfected by Angels, as it were unknown to themselves — but rather considered the reasons stated above as being more theological. Not to mention that even according to this reason it would not be shown that all the Angels were created in heaven, but only those to whom that direction and perfection of celestial power had been committed.

§ 22. One objection remains, from St. Gregory, who in his homilies[38] calls Angels *circumscribed spirits* (*spiritus circumscripti*), from which it might appear that, according to St. Gregory's opinion, they are in a place circumscriptively. But the reply is easy: St. Gregory is not speaking of circumscription of place but of nature and power — in the same way as, on the contrary, we say that God is *uncircumscribed* (*incircumscriptus*) because His nature and power are infinite. Angels, therefore, are circumscribed because they have a finite and

limited nature and power; though they can also be called circumscribed with respect to place (*loco circumscripti*), if you understand "circumscribed" to mean the same as "finite" — because they are in one place in such a way as not to be in another, which is to be definitively in a place (*definitive esse in loco*).

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1. St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Rufinum*.
2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 3. [The printed reference "q. 3. art. 3" appears to be a misprint; the relevant Thomistic locus is *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 3.]
3. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), *Firmiter credimus*, constitution 1, *De fide catholica*.
4. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), *In Summam contra Gentiles*, II, ch. 83.
5. Melchior Cano, *De locis theologicis* VII, ch. 3; also XII, ch. 10.
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 3, ad 3.
7. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2 (writing on the present Distinction).
8. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2 (on this distinction).
9. Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta* V, annot. 5.
10. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, through several chapters.
11. On Origen's error, cf. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI.
12. St. Thomas, *Opusculum* 23.
13. Cajetan, commenting on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 4 [*ibid.*, as in source].
15. St. Jerome, *Commentarii in Isaiam* VI (commenting on Is. 14).
16. Below, at Distinction 6.
17. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2, at the end of this distinction.
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 3, ad 3 [referred to in source as "in solutione tertii"].
19. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13.
20. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 84.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 4, ad 1 ["in solutione primi"].
22. Cajetan, commenting on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 52, a. 1.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 52, a. 1.
24. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2.
25. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2; Gabriel Biel, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2.
26. St. Thomas, *Quodlibeta* I, a. 4.
27. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 1; q. 3, a. 1 and 3; q. 4, a. 1; *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, a. 3.
28. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, last article (*articulo ultimo*).
29. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 61, a. 4.
31. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 1.
32. The solution to the argument from the fourth objection is indicated below in this same section.

33. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2 [on this distinction], q. 2, a. 1.

34. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6 of this book, a. 3.

35. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 2 [referred to in source as "super Dist. 37. lib. 1. qu. 3. articul. 2."].

36. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 3, last article, ad 4.

37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 2, ad 1.

38. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, hom. 8; and *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34.

DISTINCTIO III — ON THE NUMBER OF THE ANGELS, WHETHER THEY DIFFER IN SPECIES, AND WHETHER ANY WERE CREATED EVIL (*DE NUMERO ANGELORUM, EORUMQUE DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA ET CREATIONE*)

§ I — What is to be thought concerning the number of the Angels (De numero Angelorum quid sentiendum)

§ 1. Among the pagans there were various opinions concerning the number of the separated substances (*substantiae separatae*). For the Platonists, as St. Thomas reports,[2] posited between us and the supreme God four orders: namely, of the secondary Gods, of the separated Intellects, of the celestial Souls, and of the good and evil demons — though this last order they did not separate from matter. In each of the orders, however, except the third, which was that of the celestial souls, they posited an indeterminate number proportioned to the number of celestial bodies. The Peripatetics, by contrast, contracted the entire number of the Intelligences (for by this name they called the separated substances) to the number of the spheres, or rather of the celestial motions, assigning individual Intelligences to individual motions. So indeed the prince of their school, Aristotle, teaches,[3] although elsewhere, as in Book I of *On the Heavens*,[4] he sufficiently intimates that he acknowledges certain other Blessed Minds beyond the heaven. The common people among the pagans, moreover, believed that the Genii were of the greatest number. For, as Prudentius reports,[5] they attributed individual Genii to individuals — not only to kingdoms, regions, and cities, and to men, but also to houses, gates, baths, stables, and the like. There were also certain heretics, as St. Thomas reports on this Distinction,[6] who posited only one Angel, receiving different names according to different acts.

§ 2. But Christian philosophy and the Catholic faith, while not rejecting what is said of the Angels as movers of the celestial spheres, nor yet receiving it as certain, and condemning the other opinions mentioned as alien to sound doctrine, teaches in accordance with Sacred Scripture that the Angels exist in a very great number, and, as we may say, infinite. For thus it is said in Job 25 concerning God: "Is there any number to His armies?" — as if it were said that they are so many that their number cannot be reckoned by us. St. Gregory expounds this passage in this sense,[7] although otherwise that passage there seems to speak literally not of Angels as stars, but in the manner in which the whole multitude of celestial lights is customarily called in the Scriptures the army of heaven. More certain is that passage of Daniel, chapter 7: "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him."[8] Here the Prophet did not intend to signify some definite number, but, as St. Jerome noted on that passage,[9] he set down this number because human speech could not express a greater multitude. This too was signified in 4 Kgs. 6,

where we read that to the servant of Elisha the mountain appeared full of horses and fiery chariots, by which the innumerable army of Angels was signified, concerning whom Elisha had said: "There are more with us than with them." Moreover Christ showed this more plainly in His own words (Matt. 26), affirming that the Father could forthwith furnish Him with more than twelve legions of Angels. Likewise the Apostle Jude in his Epistle, saying: "Behold, the Lord cometh with His holy thousands" — in Greek, *myriadibus*. The same was signified by the Apostle (Heb. 12), where he describes us as enrolled in the Church in which is "the company of many thousands of Angels." In which passage the Greek, in place of "many thousands," has *myriades*; now a *myrias* contains ten thousand, but it is frequently used to denote an innumerable multitude.

§ 3. To this pertains finally what is said in many passages of Scripture: God is called God of Sabaoth, that is, God of armies — namely, on account of the immense numerousness of the heavenly soldiers attending upon Him, that is, of the Angels. It must be noted, moreover, that Scripture speaks almost always of the good Angels whenever it declares their number: as is evident from the testimonies cited. And yet that the multitude of demons is also very great is argued from the fact that in the Gospel we read that a single man was possessed by a legion of demons.

§ 4. This is the concordant doctrine of all the Fathers on the numerousness of the Angels: as of (Pseudo-)Dionysius,[10] St. Jerome, and St. Gregory,[11] in the places already cited, of Hugh of St. Victor,[12] and of others.

§ 5. It is proved also by the following argument: because it is the common opinion of theologians, founded in the Scriptures, that not only to provinces and kingdoms, but also to individual men, individual Angels have been deputed as guardians — as will be taught below.[13] Hence it follows that the number of Angels surpasses the number of men, since it is established that besides the Angels who are the guardians of men, there are many more besides.

§ 6. St. Thomas proves that the Angels exist in a very great number[1] by the following reasoning: the more perfect things are by their nature, the more they have been created in a greater excess — either of magnitude, if they are corporeal, or of multitude, if they are incorporeal. This is evident in the case of the celestial bodies, which exceed all other bodies in magnitude almost immeasurably. Since, therefore, the Angels are the most perfect among creatures, and are incapable of magnitude, their multitude ought to be the greatest; and this reasoning rests upon the proposition that things which are more perfect in nature are more *per se* intended. From this St. Thomas concludes that it is reasonable to hold that immaterial substances, that is, Angels, exceed material substances in multitude in a manner almost incomparable — especially since this is also confirmed by the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius,[14] who says that the armies of heavenly Minds are so numerous that they exceed the weak and confined commensuration of our material numbers.

§ 7. However, this doctrine does not seem to be understood of the multitude of material things according to number, but only according to species; and this is also how St. Thomas himself expounds his own opinion.[15] Hence, according to this teaching, it is not necessary to admit that the number of Angels surpasses the number of the grains of dust of the earth and the sands of the sea and the drops of rain, or likewise of flies, worms, and things of that sort — but rather the species of all things, not only incorruptible but also corruptible, as Cajetan well explains.[16]

§ 8. It is also very fitting that we acknowledge the number of Angels to far exceed the number of rational souls. For Scripture does not speak of the number of men with such exaggeration as it does of the number of

Angels. Though this cannot be established from the fact alone that individual guardian Angels have been assigned to individual men; for one could reply that different men — at least at different times and ages — receive one and the same Angel as their guardian from God. Wherefore it is rather to Scripture and to the reason just stated that we must have recourse.

§ 9. To this there is added moreover this further argument drawn from the final cause: namely, that the Angels were made in so great a number so that the greatness of the King, whose Angels — that is, messengers and ministers — they are, might in some way shine forth. The Scriptures allude to this reason, which in many places call God the God of armies and describe Him as a king whose command a vast multitude of soldiers and ministers obeys.[17]

§ 10. Whether, however, the Angels who minister are more numerous than those who stand before God, as St. Gregory wishes,[18] or whether they are equal, or indeed fewer — in the manner in which St. Thomas seems to hold in conformity with the teaching of (Pseudo-)Dionysius[19] — remains doubtful on account of another question, namely: Whether all are sent forth in ministry; and the question connected with that one: How those who minister differ from those who stand before. These matters will be treated below.[20] St. Gregory's argument is that it is said indefinitely in Daniel, "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" — that is, thousands from thousands, for Gregory understood these words in that sense — whereas there follows a definite number: "And ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Now an indefinite number customarily signifies something greater than a definite number, because it is put as though innumerable. But this argument seems of no force, since it is far more probable that a definite number is put in both places: in the former place, thousands of thousands, that is, a thousand times a thousand; in the latter place, according to one version from the Greek, ten times a hundred thousand — which is the same as the former. And thus the number of both will appear to be indicated as equal. According to our version from the Hebrew, ten thousand times a hundred thousand, and according to the Seventy, *myria myriadum*, that is, ten thousand times ten thousand — these two readings, though differing from each other, express a greater number of those standing before than of those ministering, though, as we said above, both among those ministering and among those standing before, the definite number should be understood as an indefinite one.

§ 11. This much at least can be said with probability in this place, in accordance with the argument from the numerousness of the Angels and the ordering of the Angelic choirs drawn from St. Thomas: that the higher and more perfect a choir is, the more numerous it is — inasmuch as even among the principal bodies of the world, the more perfect each one is, the higher is its place and the greater its extent. This doctrine is moreover useful for this: that just as we are moved to admiration and praise of the power and magnificence of God by the greatness of the celestial bodies, so also, and far more, we should be stirred by the multitude of the celestial spirits — especially if we consider that a single Angel surpasses in dignity of nature the entire corporeal world.

§ 12. There remains a single objection to be resolved, from Deut. 32, where according to the Seventy the following sentence concerning God is read: "He established the borders of the nations according to the number of the Angels of God." From which it appears that the number of Angels corresponds to the number of nations or peoples of the whole world, and consequently is much less than the number of men. It could be replied that the sentence is to be understood not of all the Angels but only of those whom God willed to be princes of peoples. But according to the literal sense of the Hebrew version, which in place of "Angels of God" has "sons of Israel," the meaning is altogether different: namely, that when God distributed the regions of the

world among the nations, He so established their borders as to preserve some best portion of the land that would abundantly suffice for the number, that is, the multitude, of the sons of Israel. Nor do the Seventy interpreters disagree; for by "Angels of God" we can understand "sons of Israel." From this, moreover, the foundation of those is overturned who gathered from the same Scripture that as many men are to be assumed into the society of the Angels as Angels remained in heaven — as though by "borders of the nations" the number of the elect among men were signified. In what standing this opinion is to be held, we shall say below.[21]

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§ II — Whether Angels differ from one another in species (Utrum Angeli specie differant inter se)

§ 13. The question is much controverted among theologians: Whether Angels differ from one another in species (*specie*), or only in number (*numero*).

§ 14. The doctrine of St. Thomas in many places is that all Angels, whether of the same or of different orders, differ from one another in species. The relevant passages are:[23] in all of which places he considers this so certainly true that he says it is impossible for the matter to be otherwise — namely, that two Angels should be of the same species, differing in number alone. His reasoning is that every natural distinction in things of the same nature must be sought from matter, of which the Angelic substance is entirely devoid. He confirms the reasoning by an analogy: just as there cannot be several separated humanities, nor several separated whitenesses, except insofar as they exist in several supposits (*supposita*) or substances — so neither can Angels, since they are separated from matter, be many within the same species. A further reason: the multiplication of individuals is not *per se* intended by nature, but only for the sake of the conservation of the species; therefore where the species is conserved in one individual, the multiplication of individuals is not to be posited. Examples are found in the Sun, the Moon, and the other incorruptible bodies. This reasoning, however, does not prove the impossibility of the contrary, but only that the matter is in fact thus.

§ 15. From this opinion, however, a considerable number of others dissent. Some think that some Angels, namely those who are of the same order, are also of the same specific nature; whereas others, namely those of different orders, differ also in nature or species. They attribute this opinion to Methodius,[24] though it cannot be clearly gathered from his words. Some, however, place all Angels, whether of the same or of different orders, within the same species and distinguish them by number alone. And they wish St. Basil to hold this view,[25] writing thus: "Among Angels there is a difference of order and dignity, and yet all are of the same nature, as they are also of the same name."

§ 16. Others, finally, acknowledging that this matter is remote from human knowledge — since it has not been handed down by divine revelation, nor can it be known by natural light — say that it is entirely uncertain to us whether all Angels, or some of them, are of the same species, or whether they are of different species. Hence Durandus confesses his ignorance here.[26] St. John Damascene too says[27] that only God, who made the Angels, knows for certain their substantial difference from one another — that is, whether they are equal or different according to substance. Although the same Damascene, if the title does not mislead, affirms in the *Institutiones primae*, chapter 1,[28] that all Angels have one nature, as all men have one, having perhaps in that place followed the opinion of St. Basil in this matter. St. Augustine himself too openly professes[29] that he does

not know how those things which are named by the Apostle — Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, etc. — differ from one another. And in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 58, he similarly denies that he knows what the differences of persons are in the supreme society of the Angels.

§ 17. In this variety of opinions, it must be held, first of all, that nothing is certain according to the faith, because nothing definite has been divinely handed down. This is attested by St. Augustine and St. John Damascene in the places already cited. Second: it is highly probable that a specific diversity is found among them, because in corporeal nature there occurs not only a specific but also a generic diversity; it seems to accord with the order and perfection of the universe if in incorporeal substances we acknowledge a diversity of nature similar in some fashion. For that God could do this does not seem to be doubted. To this purpose makes also the distribution of Angels received by all theologians — first into Hierarchies, then into orders, and of the orders into highest, middle, and lowest — taken indeed from diverse gratuitous gifts, but compared with reference to a diversity of natural endowments as well. St. Jerome seems to favor this opinion, saying[30] that among invisible creatures (he is speaking of Angels) there is a manifold and infinite diversity. For although he is speaking properly of a diversity of merits, yet he so moderates his words that he seems to wish to embrace also a disparity of nature.

§ 18. Perhaps someone will bring forward here the Scripture of Matt. 17: "This kind of demon is cast out only by prayer and fasting," etc. And Tob. 6: "Its smoke drives away every kind of demon." From which it might seem to appear that not only species but also genera of demons are several — and consequently also of Angels. But this argument does not compel. For the easy reply is that a generic accident (*genus accidentale*), not a substantial one, is signified: so that the sense of the former passage would be, "demons of this evil character are not cast out except by such means"; and of the latter, "there is no demon so evil and hostile that the smoke is unable to drive him away." For we also speak of men in this way — saying that Turks are a servile kind of men, or that women are a changeable kind of men — while it is established that all men have one species.

§ 19. Third: it is more probable that all Angels differ in species than that some agree in species and differ only in number. The two reasons adduced at the beginning make for this opinion. As to the argument from St. Basil, the reply is easy. All Angels are of the same spiritual nature, indeed — but not specifically the same. For Basil seems to be rebuking the opinion of the Platonists, who distinguished Angels as different from other intellectual substances by assigning to them bodies naturally united to them.

§ 20. Fourth: although it seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas that it is absolutely — and even according to Divine Power — impossible for several Angels to exist in the same species, it is nevertheless preferable to subscribe to the opinion of those who do not withdraw this from Divine Omnipotence. The first part is proved because St. Thomas both in the *Summa* and in the other places cited above simply affirms that this is impossible. Nor can it be replied that he means what is impossible according to the order of nature, because the order of nature is not to be presupposed when the discussion concerns the work of creation. For here the question is properly raised: whether Angels were created by God, all or some of them, within one species. Therefore St. Thomas, in answering that this is impossible, does not presuppose the order of nature, but is speaking of absolute power.

§ 21. This is proved further from *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 7,[31] where he says that it cannot be understood that in incorporeal substances there is a numerical diversity without a specific diversity, and

without numerical inequality. He therefore wishes a contradiction to be included in this. But what is such is impossible for God.

§ 22. This is proved again from what he writes on this Distinction:[32] in the reply to the first objection he cites only St. Augustine saying that the position of those heretics who said that several souls were created before the body is impossible. In which words the impossibility is without doubt understood with respect to God, because the text manifestly speaks of the work of creation, which belongs to Divine Power alone. And indeed Scotus and others received St. Thomas's opinion about Angels in this sense, by whom it was also vigorously attacked — so much so that William of Rubio[33] says that this opinion (though without naming the author) is excommunicated, and altogether irrational and absurd. So too Cajetan understood St. Thomas's opinion, and defended it in this sense in his commentary on the book *On Being and Essence*, chapter 5, question 9[34] — though certain other Thomists interpret the mind of their Author differently.

§ 23. The latter part — which is held by almost all the Doctors — is proved by the general reasoning that nothing is to be denied to Divine Omnipotence except what manifestly implies a contradiction. But no contradiction is involved in the proposed matter, since God could annihilate some Angel who now exists and thereupon create another of wholly the same nature — as St. Augustine teaches in general concerning Angels.[35]

§ 24. By this further argument as well: All rational souls, even when separated, are of the same species, differing from one another in number only. And yet there is no difficulty in them of the same kind as there is in separated ones, since when they are separated they lack the matter by which, while united, they had their diversity; yet the singularity of individual properties by which they are diversified remains. Nor does it seem in any way to be denied that God could, if He had willed, create all souls before bodies — as we shall show below.[36] Now, what St. Thomas alleges to the contrary from St. Augustine is not found to be in St. Augustine's writings. If the matter stands thus in souls, the same seems possible in Angels. This argument St. Thomas attempts to resolve:[37] he says that a soul receives its individuation from the body, and since it does not depend on the body, therefore its individuation remains even when the body is destroyed.

§ 25. But this reply seems not to satisfy the difficulty: because it neither gives the reason why individuation remains when the body is destroyed, since rather the effect ought to cease when its cause ceases; nor does it show by what reasoning there can be several souls separated from matter from the beginning — it rather removes the possibility of this thing being so. Further, the other reasons by which this possibility of a plurality of Angels in one species is proved — these are to be seen in Scotus.[38]

§ 26. To these there is added the fact that this article — that "God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter" — is reported to have been condemned by the Parisian theologians nearly three hundred years ago. The most cogent reason for this condemnation seems to be that the article is judged in its foundations to agree with the condemned doctrine of Averroes, who taught that there is one intellect in number (*unum numero intellectum*) in all human beings. Which doctrine St. Thomas himself attacks as heretical in many places and expressly and avowedly does so in *Opusculum* 16, entitled *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*,[39] where he says also (chapter 5) that, even if it were the case that the intellect could not, by the nature of the intellect, be multiplied, yet its multiplication would not include a contradiction, nor consequently would it be impossible for God. Now whether the same is similarly to be said of St. Thomas's opinion concerning Angels — as some Thomists wish, interpreting the mind of their author

from this passage — is not clear, on account of what has already been said, and because the manifest reason for the diversity is apparent: the intellect is the power of the soul, which is the act (*actus*) of the body, whereas Angels are substances whose nature is separated from matter. The diversity which St. Thomas there introduces between these.[40]

§ II — Whether the Angels differ from one another in species (Utrum Angeli specie differant inter se)

§ 27. Indeed, a difference among them is effected not by matter, of which, while they are separated from bodies, they are devoid, but by the diversity of the singular properties with which they are endowed. Hence it does not seem that it can in any way be denied that God could, had He so willed, have created all souls before bodies — as we shall show below.[36] For what St. Thomas alleges to the contrary from St. Augustine is not plausibly to be found anywhere in St. Augustine's writings. And if the matter stands thus in the case of souls, the same seems possible in the case of Angels. This argument St. Thomas endeavours to resolve,[41] For he says that the soul receives its individuated *esse* (*esse* individuatum) from the body, and that because it does not depend upon the body, individuation therefore remains even when the body is destroyed. But this reply does not seem to satisfy the difficulty: because it renders no reason why individuation should remain when the body has been destroyed, when, on the contrary, the effect ought to cease when the cause ceases. Nor does it show by what formal character (*ratio*) several souls could exist as separated from the beginning, but rather removes the possibility of this. Other arguments, moreover, by which this possibility of a plurality of Angels within a single species may be proved, are to be seen in Scotus.[38]

§ 28. To all this there is finally added the fact that, three hundred years before the time of writing, the following article is recorded to have been condemned by the Parisian theologians: *God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter.* The principal reason for this condemnation[42] is that this article is judged in its foundations to be in agreement with the condemned doctrine of Averroes, who taught that there is numerically one intellect in all human beings. Yet St. Thomas himself attacks this doctrine as heretical in many places, and does so explicitly and at length in Opusculum 16,[39] where he also says (ch. 5) that even if it were not of the nature of the intellect that it could be multiplied, its multiplication would nonetheless involve no contradiction, and would therefore not be impossible for God. Whether, however, from the mind of St. Thomas the same is similarly to be said of Angels — as certain Thomists maintain, interpreting his mind from this passage — is not clear, on account of what has already been said to the contrary, and because a manifest reason for the difference appears: since the intellect is a power (*virtus*) of the soul, which is the act (*actus*) of a body, whereas Angels are substances separated from matter by their very nature. This difference St. Thomas himself adduces in the same place.[43]

§ III — That no Angels are evil by nature (Nullos Angelos natura malos esse)

§ 29. The Catholic faith teaches that no Angels are evil by nature or by their creation — that is, by reason of what they received through creation from God their Author. The general and most certain reason for this

doctrine is that God cannot be the author of evil, that is of sin, nor can He incline toward evil, that is toward sin, since He cannot be the cause of defection. Hence it follows that neither Angels nor human beings, according to the exposition given above, are evil by nature — not only because through creation they did not receive that they should be in sin, but also because through creation they did not receive

an inclination toward sin, although as regards nature, some think otherwise. For something to be evil by nature pertains to the heresy of the Manichees. In what sense, and by whom — namely by the Manichees themselves and by certain other older heretics — this was said, we explained above.[45] There, treating the matter generally, we showed that every creature, insofar as it is a creature, that is insofar as it has been made by God, is good. In particular, moreover, concerning demons, the following Councils long since defined: the Fourth Council of Carthage (can. 1), the First Council of Braga (can. 7), and furthermore the great Third Lateran Council under Innocent III (ch. 1)[46] — namely, that the Angels who are evil became evil not by virtue of the nature they received from God, but by the fault of their own will; and that even the devil, who is the prince of the evil Angels, was not evil by nature but good when he was created, both good and upright — a thing which St. Ambrose expressly attests in three places.[47] The other Fathers everywhere press the same teaching against the Manichees. Therefore not only erroneous but also impious is the opinion of those who said that certain demons are evil by their very nature. Porphyry the philosopher seems to have held this, as we read in St. Augustine.[48]

§ 30. The refutation of this opinion also serves to make us understand that depraved inclinations, properly speaking, cannot be natural to any rational nature — for if they were, they would come from God as author of nature. Hence nothing prevents us from saying that certain demons are by nature deceitful and naturally prone to deception. This matter will become clearer from what will be said below,[49] where it will be asked whether concupiscence comes from God.

Now some bring forward in objection the case of brute beasts: because foxes, they say, are by nature deceitful, and wolves rapacious. To this the ready reply is that such is the dignity of rational nature — whether one speaks of intellectual nature, or of human nature, or of Angelic nature — that what is natural in a beast is a vice in a human being and an Angel. Hence the Psalmist says: "Man, when he was in honour, did not understand; he is compared to the senseless beasts, and is become like to them" (Ps. 48:13). And elsewhere: "Be not like the horse and the mule, who have no understanding" (Ps. 31:9). So St. Augustine teaches of man.[50] And the same is similarly to be said of Angels. This reply is further clarified by the fact that such a quality — for example, deceitfulness — inclines a human being or an Angel toward doing what is contrary to the law given to him, whereas it does not incline a beast, which is incapable of law. Hence it comes about that such an inclination, in beasts, is natural, while in the others it is a vice that dishonours their nature.

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§ IV — Whether the Angels were evil from the beginning (Utrum Angeli ab initio mali fuerint)

§ 31. A question superior to the foregoing is: whether the Angels who were transgressors were evil from the beginning, that is from the instant of their creation — not indeed in the sense that they received malice as it were as a nature from God, that is from their Creator, but in the sense that they made themselves evil by their own will. The common opinion both of ancient writers and of Scholastics is that between the creation and

the first sin of the Angels some interval of time elapsed; during which interval they were good, adorned with righteousness and with the gifts of grace received at creation, and they cleaved to God with pure love, by which they would also have merited eternal life — life which they would have received had they persevered in this goodness of will; or at least they were so good from creation that, although, as some have supposed, they were not created in grace, yet they did not fall into fault except after some interval from creation. This doctrine is strongly in harmony with Holy Scripture.

§ 32. And the first argument for this is that the devil together with his Angels is said to have fallen and to have tumbled down. For just as a fall of bodies cannot be conceived unless from a higher place, so a fall of souls does not occur except from some height of good which they previously possessed, whether in human beings or in Angels; and it is in this sense that we are to understand this fall. For to refer the fall of the Angels only to a bodily place is utterly absurd, since the fall of man — to whom bodily place is more proper than to an Angel — we refer not to a change of place but to the soul. Therefore what is said in Scripture about the devil having fallen from heaven is to be referred not so much to a local motion as to his change from righteousness into sin; whence consequently the change of place also followed as the punishment of sin. This is the argument of St. John Chrysostom,[52] who, from the fact that the Lord says in Lk. 10: "I saw Satan falling like lightning from heaven," concludes that the devil, before he fell, was good.

§ 33. The same is shown also by other testimonies of Scripture. For in Is. 14, under the figure (*typo*) of the King of Babylon, it is said to the devil: "How have you fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, who rose in the morning?" And in Ezek. 28, under the figure of the King of Tyre: "You were the seal of resemblance, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; you were in the pleasures of the paradise of God," and so on; and a little further on: "You walked perfect in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you." These words are interpreted by St. Jerome and other Commentators as having been said figuratively of the devil.[53] Furthermore, in Jn. 8, the Lord says that the devil "did not stand in the truth," that is, did not persevere — for this is what it means to *stand* in Sacred Scripture (Gal. 5; 1 Cor. 16; 2 Thess. 2; 4 Kgs. 6; and elsewhere). It therefore signifies that he was at some time in the truth. So also the Apostle Jude says of the evil Angels in his Epistle, that "they did not keep their principality, but forsook their own habitation" (*domicilium*); and from the Greek it can be rendered: who did not keep their own origin, that is, the rectitude in which they were created — as if to say, original righteousness (*justitiam originalem*).

§ 34. Moreover, the passages of the Fathers in favour of this opinion are very numerous; of which these are the most important: (Pseudo-)Dionysius;[54] Origen;[55] St. Basil;[56] Gregory of Nazianzus;[57] St. Ambrose;[58] Epiphanius in the heresy of the Manichees and again in the words of Methodius in the heresy of the Origenists; Prudentius;[59] St. Jerome, beyond the passages cited above, in the Epistle to Pammachius which refutes the errors of John of Jerusalem;[60] St. John Chrysostom, beyond the passage indicated above;[61] St. Augustine;[62] St. Cyril;[63] Fulgentius;[64] St. Gregory the Great;[65] St. John Damascene;[66] St. Anselm.[67] These were followed in harmony by Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, and all subsequent theologians. And this opinion is so strongly confirmed by the First Council of Braga (can. 7) that it anathematises anyone who says that the devil was not previously a good Angel.[68] To this is also adduced the definition of the Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. 1, which says that the devil and other demons were created by God good by nature, but that they made themselves evil by their own act. Yet these words, since they do not express any temporal priority, do not seem to prove the matter proposed. But St. Thomas[69] and St. Bonaventure[70] rightly

rejected the opposite opinion as an error, and a condemnation of this same article among the Parisian Masters, made some 350 years before the time of writing — which St. Bonaventure himself recalls — also concurs.

§ 35. Furthermore, once it is established that some time elapsed between the creation and the fall of the devil, it nonetheless remains uncertain how long that time was, and on which day from the beginning of the world he sinned. Nor does the fact that it was said of the sixth day, "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good," make it necessarily follow that the Angel had not sinned up to that point — because even on the fifth day you could truly say that all the things God had made were very good; and the same would always be truly said, for the Angels and human beings who are evil, insofar as they were made by God, are good. And indeed St. John Chrysostom maintains, from the Scriptures, that the Angel sinned before the creation of man.[71] Indeed the Fathers commonly hold this very thing, from the fact that they teach that man was created to repair the Angelic ruin — which matter we shall treat below.[21]

§ 36. But it is credible that the devil remained in righteousness for only a very short time, and fell through pride either, as some hold, immediately after the instant of his creation, or, as others hold, shortly after he was created — that is, on the first day — at which point the good Angels were confirmed in righteousness, namely when those Angels who were turning themselves away from the good toward which the good Angels perseveringly converted themselves. This is the opinion of the Scholastics, conformable to the mind of the Church, which in certain Martyrologies records under the same day, namely the 25th of March (*8 Kalends of April*), the creation of the world and the victory of the Archangel Michael against the dragon. Hence it is improbable what some have supposed: that the devil did not sin until man was made, being moved by envy against the being whom he saw created in such great honour — as if his first sin had been envy rather than pride. On this matter, see below at dist. 6.[72] This opinion is found in Cyprian.[73] But it is refuted by St. Augustine.[74]

§ V — Reply to certain arguments to the contrary (Ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta Responsio)

§ 37. Against the doctrine set forth above, certain objections are raised from the Scriptures. For of the Devil it is said in Jn. 8: "He was a murderer from the beginning." And in 1 Jn. 3: "From the beginning the Devil sins." And in Ps. 13 (according to the Septuagint): "This dragon, whom thou hast formed to mock at him." And in Job 40 according to the Seventy: "This is the beginning of the formation of God, which was made that his angels might mock at him." And in Sir. 39: "There are spirits that are created for vengeance." These last three passages might appear to signify even this — that the Devil was evil by reason of his creation. Certain passages from the Fathers are likewise adduced.

§ 38. St. Basil affirms that the Devil made use, for the purpose of deceiving man, of that same ambition of desire which he had from the beginning — namely, the wish to be like God.[76] St. Augustine also endeavours to render probable the opinion that holds the Devil to have been always evil, in his work on *Genesis according to the Letter*, chapters 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 26 of book XI,[77] in which passages he likewise shows how one may reply to the testimonies of Scripture that sound the contrary. The same author, writing on Ps. 96, says: "There is a certain innate malice in evil spirits." Finally, Rupert, in book XIII on Matthew,[78] intimates that the angel fell not from virtue into vice, but from vice into vice. For he writes of him thus: "He was proud and pleased himself as if he were self-sufficient. This was not to fall from virtue into vice, but to remain in that

which he had been made — namely, in vanity, which is a kind of middle between the true and incontaminable essence of God, and that from which He created all things, namely, nothing."

§ 39. But to these objections we reply as follows, and first to the Scriptural passages. The Devil is said to have been "a murderer from the beginning" — not from the beginning of his creation, for at that time the man whom he was to kill did not yet exist, but from the beginning of the creation of man. For as soon as man was formed, the Devil began to envy his happiness and to consider how he might cast him down into death through sin. Which he also accomplished a little while afterward. He was therefore a murderer first in will, according to that saying: "He who hates his brother is a murderer" (1 Jn. 3:15); and afterward also in the actual perpetration of the deed; yet in both respects not before man had been created. He is said to "sin from the beginning" because he himself was the first author of sin, which he afterwards also transmitted into man by his persuasion. Or — which comes to the same thing — the Devil sinned from the beginning because no one sinned before him; just as "in the beginning God created heaven and earth" (Gen. 1:1) because He created nothing before heaven and earth. Some also, not improperly, interpret "from the beginning" as meaning "immediately after the beginning, or around the beginning, of the creation of the world."

§ 40. As for what is read in the Psalm and in Job according to the literal sense (for which see the commentators), it has no bearing on the present matter. Insofar, however, as it is mystically referred to the Devil, it has this meaning: that the Devil was a certain pre-eminent creature of God, and that although God foreknew he would sin, He nevertheless willed to create him, knowing nonetheless how greatly his malice would profit His elect — whether angels or men — who would frustrate and mock his endeavours and machinations. This matter is beautifully expounded by Hilary in a certain homily on holy Job,[79] which homily is not extant, but whose words are read in St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, book II, chapter 8.[80]

§ 41. Ecclesiasticus, moreover, speaks not of incorporeal spirits but of winds and storms, which it is well established are frequently called "spirits" in the Scriptures. Hence that verse of the Psalm: "stormy winds" (*spiritus procellarum*). If, however, someone thinks it is said of angels, the sense will be that evil angels are appointed by God for the punishment of impious men.

§ 42. Furthermore, St. Basil, in saying that the Devil had from the beginning the desire for likeness to God, means nothing other than that, as soon as he was created, he conceived this desire in his mind. For he expressly teaches in the same place that the Devil was good at the beginning.

§ 43. Concerning St. Augustine, we reply that, although he was at some point not foreign to this opinion — namely, that the Devil had always been evil, as appears from the passages adduced — yet afterward, having weighed the matter better, he embraced the common opinion as true, as is clear from his later writings, from which we have cited passages above. As for what is adduced from his *Enarrations on the Psalms*, it proves nothing; for the malice said to be innate in evil spirits is described as innate not by nature nor from the beginning, but because it inheres so judicially in them through the obstinacy of their own will that it seems as it were innate by nature. And moreover this argument tends rather to prove that demons are evil by nature — which is well established to be utterly foreign to St. Augustine's teaching — than that they were evil from the beginning by the choice of their own will.

§ 44. To the last point: although Rupert's authority is not very great, it is nevertheless replied that his opinion is not that the Devil was always evil with the malice of sin. For in book III of *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, chapter 9,[81] he asserts that it must altogether be granted according to the Scriptures that some interval

elapsed between his creation and his fall; but that he was made in vice and vanity — that is, empty of the grace of God — which he likewise holds concerning all angels and also concerning the first man. But this matter will be dealt with below in its proper place.'[82]

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§ VI — Whether the Devil could have been evil from the beginning (Utrum diabolus potuerit ab initio malus esse)

§ 45. It is now asked: whether it was possible that the Devil should, in the very first instant, by his own will have been evil. Here, before all else, it must be noted that the question here is not: whether an angel created in grace could have sinned and been evil in the first instant — since it is established that those two things cannot coexist, namely, to be in grace and to be evil — but the question is an absolute one: whether an angel could have been evil from the beginning by his own free will, through sinning.

§ 46. On this question, however, not all give the same answer. St. Augustine, in *De Genesi ad Litteram*, book XI, chapters 20 and 21,[84] denies that those who think the Devil sinned from the beginning of his creation thereby fall into the error of the Manichees, by which God is asserted to be the author of sin. And he likewise taught this afterward in *De Civitate Dei*, book XI, chapter 13,[85] and adduces the reason: that even so, God would not be constituted the author of the first sin, but rather the defectible will of the creature, turning itself at the very beginning toward mutable good.

§ 47. But the whole difficulty here is: whether this could in fact have occurred. Certain theologians — such as Scotus, Ariminensis, and Gabriel, and several others — hold the affirmative, induced by these reasons.

First: because an angel could, at the very moment of creation, understand not only the end but also the means; therefore he could also will; but the will in respect of means is free; nor was the will confirmed in good; therefore he could, in willing, fail in the choice of means, and consequently sin.

Second: because an angel could have merited at the first instant of creation — indeed did merit, as many hold, and above all the Thomists; therefore he could also have demerited. The consequence is proved because both meriting and demeriting are grounded in a will not yet confirmed. Likewise, because he was a wayfarer (*viator*) even in the first instant.

Third: an angel could sin in the second instant; therefore also in the first. For in the second instant he did not acquire any new freedom for evil, but had the same freedom as in the first.

Fourth: an angel in the first instant consented to grace, just as also the first man did, as St. Thomas teaches concerning him.[86] But consent implies freedom; and if he could consent, he could also refuse consent, and consequently sin — for he was obliged to consent, and therefore not to consent would have been a sin for him.

Fifth: man can sin in the first instant in which he begins to use reason; therefore so too can an angel at the instant of creation. For as regards free action, man is as it were created at the point when he begins to use reason.

Finally: if a man can be born evil by reason of another's will — as we are all born from Adam — it seems far more possible that either man or angel should be evil from the beginning of his origin by reason of his own will.

§ 48. Others, however — such as St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Henry of Ghent, Cajetan, and the other Thomists — deny that this is possible, though they do not all agree on the reason and proof of the opinion. Domingo Báñez collected seven reasons from various sources, of which none proves the point except the last, which is St. Thomas's:[51] namely this. Every operation that begins simultaneously with the nature of a thing has the same author as the nature itself; just as the movement upward is in fire from the one who generates it; but the author of the natures of angels is God; therefore whatever operation began with them has God as its same author. But God is not the author of sin; therefore no such operation could have been a sin.

§ 49. But this reason seems clearly capable of being refuted; because, although every operation that begins simultaneously with the *esse* of a thing is from God, it does not therefore follow that the defect which God permits in connection with such an operation is from Him; but sin is nothing other than a defect or privation of good. Nor does there appear to be any obstacle to prevent God, with respect to the first operation, from permitting a defect by reason of which that very operation (which, as operation or act, is from God) becomes a sin — which is not from God — as happens in other operations.

§ 50. This refutation is further confirmed in the following way: because God acts with no less power in preserving an angel than in creating him; for preservation is nothing other than a certain continued creation. Therefore, if at the instant of creation a sin were to be attributed to God by reason of the argument stated — because it is attributed to the angel — it would similarly have to be attributed to God as preserver of the angel at whatever instant follows creation.

§ 51. Moreover, it is to be noted that St. Thomas himself varied in the reason he assigned for this teaching. For he assigns one reason for it in his *Commentary on the Master* (at this place),[87] another again in *De Malo*, question 17, article 4,[88] and finally yet another entirely different from all the previous ones in the *Summa* (at the passage cited).[89] Indeed, in the said question of *De Malo* he confesses that it is difficult to assign the reason for this matter — which Domingo Báñez likewise confesses.

§ 52. Furthermore, if the above-stated reason is sound, then it follows that if a man were now born with the use of reason, he could not sin in the first instant of his *esse*; because, although he is born in original sin, it is nonetheless true that his *esse* is from God. But to say that a man who is born in sin cannot sin in the first instant of his *esse* — granting that he then has the use of reason — seems too paradoxical, seeing that he is wholly inclined toward evil by the tinder of concupiscence (*fomes concupiscentiae*).

§ 53. Likewise, if that reason is sound, then one who says that the angel sinned from the beginning of his creation makes God the author of sin, and thus sides with the Manichees, whose heresy that was. But this St. Augustine denies at the passage cited above, which St. Thomas also cites in the *Summa* and approves.[90] These refutations of the reason that is held to be the strongest on the side of the negative, joined to the reasons adduced on the other side, render the affirmative position very probable.

§ 54. Whoever, however, prefers to embrace the negative as safer, let him seek from the commentators on St. Thomas the resolution of the aforesaid reasons. Let him also consult St. Thomas himself in the said question of *De Malo*, where he resolves twenty-three objections which he had set against himself.[91]

§ VII — Whether the Angels were created in grace (Utrum Angeli creati sint in gratia)

§ 55. The question debated among the Scholastics is: whether the Angels were created in grace (*gratia*) — understanding by grace a certain habitual and supernatural gift (*donum*) by which one who is endowed with it is formally constituted pleasing and acceptable to God unto eternal life. The negative of this question was maintained by not a few: as Hugh of St. Victor,[93] where he says that the Angels were created not in grace but only in a certain goodness and natural justice (*justitia*) by which they would live rightly, yet would not merit the reward of beatitude (*beatitudo*); and this his opinion he repeats and expounds there through several chapters. Hugh is followed by the Master,[94] in which places he attributes to the Angels created without grace not only a certain cognition (*cognitio*) of God but also love (*dilectio*), namely one proceeding from a natural gift — not, however, one by which they could merit beatitude. The same was the opinion of Rupert, who was almost a contemporary of the authors already cited. For in Book XIII of his commentary on Matthew[78] he denies that the Angels were created in virtue (*virtus*), holiness, and grace. And in Book III, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*,[95] treating of the first angel who fell, he wishes those words in Ezekiel, "full of wisdom," etc., to be understood ironically of him. And in chapter 9, that passage of the same Prophet, "the gold, the work of your beauty," he supplies: "ought to have been." In that same chapter he says that the angel who fell never received the Holy Spirit within himself. And in chapter 17 he holds it as an absurdity that the demons ever burned with love of God. The same author in Book I, *On the Victory of God*,[96] says that the Angels, beholding the works of God with a good and simple eye and praising the wisdom of the Artificer, were worthily advanced to friendship with him, while those others who with an evil eye envied and hated were justly repelled and driven far off. The opinion of these authorities was followed by many Scholastics: as Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Marsilius of Auxerre,[97] and indeed before the age of St. Thomas most of them — so much so that St. Thomas himself[98] acknowledges that in his own age that opinion was the more common. Scotus and Gabriel also adhere more to the same view. These men are moved partly by authority and partly by reason.

§ 56. By authority, indeed, because they believe this opinion to be found in the Fathers. For St. Augustine,[99] in a number of subsequent chapters (which passages the Master cites in the text), teaches that the angelic nature was first created formlessly and called "heaven," and then was formed and called "light." He also says,[100] in the same work, that the angel fell not from what he had received but from what he would have received had he been willing to be subject to God. The same author writes[101] that God so ordained the life of the Angels and of men that in it he first showed what their free will (*liberum arbitrium*) could do, and then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do. St. Gregory[102] says that the first angel was capable of charity (*charitas*). St. John Damascene[27] writes thus: "All the Angels were created by the Word, and perfected by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit, receiving illumination and grace according to the proportion of their dignity and order." There is also adduced here what Pope John in a certain decree preserved in Gratian[103] says in these words: "The devil grieves and is ashamed that men, formed from the clay of earth, hold firm on earth that charity which he was unable to possess in heaven." There is also added the authority of Scripture. For in Job 4, where we read in our version "and in his Angels he found wickedness (*pravitatem*)," the Hebrew reads: "and in his Angels he placed not praise or light" — for the Hebrew expression can be rendered in either way; and it is common in Scripture to signify grace by the name of light, as when the just are called sons of light. Hence also Peter, commending the grace (*gratia*) of God in chapter 2, says: "He has called us into his admirable light."[104]

§ 57. The rational arguments for this view are as follows. First: grace is a mean between nature (*natura*) and glory (*gloria*); therefore, just as in the order of time grace preceded glory in the Angels, so nature too ought to have preceded grace. Second: everything with which a thing is created is natural to it — for from the very fact that something is created along with a thing we gather that it is natural to it; therefore if the Angels had been created in grace, grace would have been natural to them and not supernatural, which is false and condemned. This is sufficiently proved by the fact that grace is distinguished from nature as its contrary, as St. Augustine likewise distinguishes them.[105] Third: if the demons had been created in grace, they would assuredly have known the dignity of grace — namely, that it makes one a son of God and heir of eternal life; therefore they would not have immediately cast it away by their own free will. For it is not plausible that they would so quickly have freely relinquished a gift so excellent, the nature and excellence of which they had perfectly well known.

§ 58. Notwithstanding these considerations, the opposite view, as far more probable and more conformable to both Scripture and the sayings of the Fathers, is not without reason accepted by most, and receives our approval as well. Now because the assertors of the aforesaid opinion are divided into two groups — for some deny grace to have been conferred on the angels in such a way that they concede it was conferred not on all of them but only on the elect (to which the authorities cited seem to point, and to which the third argument also looks), while others concede that all angels, both elect and reprobate, were endowed with grace after creation before they reached the terminus of the way (*terminus viae*) in which they were established — it must therefore first be shown against the former group in that point on which the affirmative position holds together with the latter group, namely, that grace was conferred even on the reprobate before they arrived at the terminus of the way in which they had been placed. For of the elect there can be no doubt, since it is established that they merited the beatitude which they certainly could not have merited without grace, as will be taught below.

§ 59. Proof: This is proved from Ezek. 28, where to the devil under the type of the King of Tyre it is said: "seal of resemblance, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty." But wisdom, which Scripture commends by allegory, is not without grace (*Gratia*). Likewise from the fact that it is said in Jn. 8 that the devil "did not stand in the truth," that is, did not persevere — by which it is signified that he was at some time in the truth (*veritas*). Now "truth" in the Scriptures customarily signifies justice (*justitia*), that is, that rectitude by which a person is pleasing to God. Hence in a similar phrase Hezekiah said in 4 Kgs. 20: "Remember, O Lord, how I have walked before you in truth." The Fathers teach this, speaking now in general terms of all the Angels, now specifically of the reprobate. For St. Jerome,[106] commenting on Hos. 3, comparing the Jews who looked to idols — who had lost their former grace, being fallen from their proper dignity and possessing nothing of grace, dry and withering in their ancient barrenness — with the demons. Likewise, St. Augustine,[107] testifies that all the Angels participated in the divine Wisdom (*Sapientia*) not only that they might live, but also that they might live wisely and blessedly. But such a life is by no means without grace. No less openly does St. Gregory,[102] expounding in Book 32 of the *Moralia* the passage of Ezekiel concerning the devil, say among other things: "For what good did he not possess, if he was the seal of resemblance of God?" And consecutively he teaches that Scripture attributed to him something beyond what belongs to a man made to the likeness of God, since the devil himself is called "the very seal of the resemblance of God" — which, he says, "is more subtle in nature, so that the likeness of God may be believed to be more fully expressed in him." The same author in Book 34 of the same work, chapter 17,[108] says that the devil lost the beatitude of eternal happiness (*felicitas*), and says that he was so made and established as to love and revere his Maker and to merit while

loving — and he expounds this of the chaste fear (*timor castus*) which charity begets; he says he lost the likeness of God; he says he lost the charity of God which he ought to have imitated; he says he was not content with participation in true loftiness and so justly lost participated loftiness. He says further: "For him whom a free servitude (*libera servitus*) was exalting, a captive liberty (*captiva libertas*) cast down" — by which he manifestly signifies that he served God in free servitude, which is through charity. The same is the view of St. Anselm.[109]

§ 60. But since the question now asked in a more particular way is whether all Angels were created in this grace — for this is equally denied by both groups whose opinion we have set out above — it must therefore be seen by what arguments this is proved against them. The first argument, therefore, is from Scripture: Ezek. 18, where to the devil it is said: "You were perfect in your ways from the day of your creation until iniquity was found in you." What is said "from the day of your creation" is to be understood, according to Hebrew idiom, as if it were said "from the beginning" or "from the very moment of creation." Nor is there room for anyone to object that this argument seems too weak because it proceeds from an allegorical sense. For its solidity is given by the common interpretation of the Fathers — of St. Jerome, St. Gregory, and others — who expounded that Scripture mystically of the devil. And assuredly the Spirit of God would not, through the Prophet, speak such great things concerning the King of Tyre unless under the veil of those words a sublimer sense were concealed.

§ 61. The second argument is from the Fathers, among whom St. Augustine,[110] discoursing on all the Angels, says: "At the same time as they were made, they were made light — created not merely so that they might exist in some fashion, but also illuminated so that they might live wisely and blessedly." And more openly, Book 12, chapter 9: "Who made good will in them, if not he who created them together with a good will, that is, with a chaste love (*amor castus*) by which they would adhere to him, at once both constituting their nature and bestowing grace (*Gratia*)? Hence it must be believed that without good will — that is, the love of God — the holy Angels never existed." And what follows there. Where he expressly teaches that even the evil Angels received grace of divine love (*amor divinus*) from the beginning. The same author in *On Correction and Grace*,[111] says that the Angels in the beginning received charity (*caritas*) by which they could stand, that is, persevere if they willed — but not that abundance of charity by which they could not fall further. And from these texts it is sufficiently clear that this is beyond doubt the opinion of St. Augustine. Moreover, before him, St. Basil,[112] commenting on that verse of Ps. 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established," in many and clear words teaches that the heavenly virtues — that is, the Angels — received holiness infused by the Holy Spirit in their very creation. He teaches the same thing most openly in chapter 16 of *On the Holy Spirit*.[113] To these is added the *Glossa Ordinaria*[114] on that verse of Hos. 2 "grape-raisins": "By grape-raisins are meant the demons who were created in great fatness of the Holy Spirit but, dried out through pride, were cast down from heaven." St. Cyril likewise,[115] Book 6 on Jn. chapter 6, says that the devil did not stand in the truth because "he slipped away from the truth" and was unwilling to remain in the origin of his soundness: "for he had been made to the image and likeness of God, but by pride he retained the image yet lost the truth of the likeness, because from a just and good angel he was made an unjust and evil devil."

§ 62. The third proof is from reason. For it must not be supposed that the angel, as regards the gift of grace, was made inferior to man; therefore, if man from the beginning was upright and just, endowed with grace, and gifted with the Holy Spirit — as will be shown from Scripture and the Fathers below[116] — reason requires that we think the same of the Angel. Another argument: if the angelic nature was created without grace, it was not perfect according to time (*perfecta secundum tempus*) — which, however, must be attributed

to it, as both Hugh of St. Victor[117] and the Master[118] themselves attribute. For it could not be moved toward its end for which it was created, since in order to do this, grace was necessary. Nor is there any force in the reply that it could without grace be moved toward a natural end; for it was created not only for a natural end but also and chiefly for a supernatural end. For it was not destined for this supernatural end after creation, but from the beginning, because it was created on account of it. If, therefore, it could not from the very beginning be moved toward it, then it was not, as I have said, perfect according to time.

§ 63. This argument is corroborated by that which is found in St. Thomas[119] and which runs thus: All things which are brought forth in the course of time by the work of divine Providence were produced in the first establishment of things according to certain seminal principles (*rationes seminales*), like trees, animals, and other such things, as St. Augustine teaches.[120] But it is manifest that grace (*gratia*) which makes one pleasing (*gratia gratum faciens*) is related to beatitude as a seminal principle (*ratio seminalis*) in nature is related to a natural effect. Hence in 1 Jn. 3, grace is called "the seed of God." Therefore, just as natural things in their creation received within themselves the seminal principles of all their effects and natural operations, so too the Angels in their creation received grace as a certain seed of the operation for which they were created, that is, of eternal beatitude. With St. Thomas agree all his followers, and moreover Albert the Great, Durandus, and the Archbishop of Rimini;[121] to whose view the *Catechism for Parish Priests* also subscribes, on the article of the Creed "Creator of heaven and earth," where it says: "It is evident that the devil and the other angels who abandoned their station were endowed with grace from the beginning of their existence."

§ VIII — The arguments of the negative opinion are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta negantis opinionis)

§ 64. It remains now to reply to the arguments of the negative position set out above. What was therefore adduced in the first place from St. Augustine is easily resolved if we say that St. Augustine in those passages, treating allegorically of the Angels under the figure of heaven and light, is attending not to an order of time but of nature (*ordo naturae*). For he himself[123] declares that by the formlessness (*informitas*) of both natures — spiritual as well as corporeal — he understands something prior to the formation not in time but in origin and causality. As regards time, his words from *The City of God*, Book 11 (cited above), are manifest, where he says of the Angels: "At the same time as they were made, they were made light." This reply is further confirmed by the fact that, according to the opinion of St. Augustine expressed in those same books and elsewhere (concerning which at dist. 12 below), all things were created simultaneously — whence it is clear that according to him no order of time can be posited between the creation of heaven and the creation of light.

§ 65. To that which is objected in the second place from St. Augustine, some reply that he is there speaking not of grace but of beatitude (*beatitudo*), which the reprobate angel would have received had he been willing to be subject to God — so that we may speak of the evil son who through disobedience fell away from the paternal inheritance which he did not possess but was going to possess had he remained in filial obedience. But the passage, examined more carefully, requires a different meaning. For there St. Augustine is speaking in dispute from the position of those who say that the devil was evil from the moment he was made, not indeed by nature but by his own will; and he teaches how it can be consistent with that view that the devil is said to have fallen — namely, if he is said to have fallen not from what he had received but from what he would have received had he not sinned. Yet that this is not a true but only an apparent solution is sufficiently established

from what has been said above. As for what is objected from the same author's *On Correction and Grace*, it does not pertain to the present matter. For St. Augustine in that place is not treating of grace added to the angel or to man after creation, but of the restoring grace after the fall. For what he says — "then what the benefit of his grace could do" — is not to be referred to the angel but to man, who by the benefit of grace was raised up after his fall, since by his free will he had been unwilling to stand. But the phrase "and the judgment of his justice" pertains both to the reprobate angels and to men. For this resolution it must be noted that St. Augustine there considers the angelic and human natures together as a single genus of intellectual creature (*creatura*), in which genus what he speaks of occurred — not in the individual parts or species separately. Therefore God showed what their free will could do when he permitted man and certain angels to fall; for this they could do through free will alone, without the auxiliary grace by which they might persevere. And this sense is plainly confirmed by another passage of St. Augustine where he expresses it. For in the *Tractate on the New Canticle*, chapter 8,[124] he says: "What free will can do when not aided is shown in Adam himself: for evil it is sufficient to itself, but for good it is not, unless aided by God." Therefore when he says (in *On Correction and Grace*) "what their free will could do," understand: *when not aided*.

§ 66. What is next objected from St. Gregory is to be resolved from the same source. For he signifies that he is speaking of perfect and consummated charity. Hence he does not say "which if he had been willing to receive," but "which if he had been willing to be filled with" — and below concerning the same: "That stone therefore had cavities, but through the vice of pride they were not filled with the gold of charity." He who denies that the angel was filled with charity does not deny that he possessed charity; for the charity of the heavenly homeland alone fills the mind. For the fact that the first angel was created together with charity, as were the other angels, is indicated by these subsequent words of Gregory still on the same subject: "Who walked perfect in the midst of the fiery stones, because among the hearts of the angels aflame with the fire of charity he stood forth glorious with the glory of his creation." Furthermore, St. John Damascene establishes no order of time, but only signifies that grace was not natural to the Angels but adventitious to their nature. Hence he says they were created by the Word, but perfected — that is, consummated, that is, endowed with the grace of sanctification — by the Holy Spirit.

§ 67. As for what is adduced from the Decree of Gratian, some interpret it of consummated charity, but as it seems not correctly; for the very words resist this, since it is said that men placed on earth hold that charity which the devil was unable to possess in heaven. For men in this mortal life do not have consummated charity. One must therefore say that the sense is that the devil was unable — that is, unwilling — to hold perseveringly that charity which many men hold perseveringly. And this sense is argued by the phrase "that men hold charity" — for *to hold* signifies perseverance, as in the text "Hold what you have" and "let him who holds, hold fast"; and this sense is confirmed by St. Ambrose, cited above, who says that the devil could not *hold* — that is, *retain* — the grace he had received.

§ 68. To the argument taken from Job it is replied in the first place that those words are not Sacred Scripture. For they are the words of Eliphaz the Temanite, a friend of Job, whose words, like those of the other friends, the Church does not intend to canonize. Furthermore, they do not tell against us. For the sense of his statement, as it is rendered word for word from the Hebrew, can be fittingly given thus: God in the creation of his Angels did not instill in them light — that is, consummated and perfect grace. Hence it is no wonder that some of them did not remain in the received grace but by their own will withdrew from God. Thus therefore, according to our version [the Vulgate], the text is to be

§ 69. — the preceding verse corresponds to this interpretation: "Behold, those who serve Him are not stable" — or, as in the Hebrew, "Behold, in His servants He will find no firmness," that is, He finds no stability in them — because, namely, He had not conferred it upon them from the beginning. This interpretation is confirmed (*Confirmatur*) by the Hebrew word, which signifies not just any light, but an excellent and most exact light, as Vatablus says.[125] Hence the morning star, which excels among the stars in brightness, is called by that name among the Hebrews.

Reply to the first argument (*Ad primam rationem respondetur*): it is not necessary that nature should precede grace in temporal order, in the way that grace precedes glory (*Gloria*); for glory is the end and reward (*praemium*) of operation, and a reward must be posterior in time to merit. Grace, however, is the principle (*principium*) of acting well, and therefore it was fitting that grace should exist simultaneously with nature, which is the principle of operation, so that in the intellectual creature there should be no prior acting before acting well — that is, acting in an ordered manner toward its end.

Reply to the second argument (*Ad secundam respondetur*): "natural" is sometimes said of everything with which something is born or created, even if it be, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), either above or contrary to nature. For even sin, which is without doubt a vice and a corruption of nature (*corruptela naturae*), is natural to us, because we are born with it. Hence we are also said by the Apostle to be "by nature children of wrath" (Eph. 2). In the same way, certain diseases are natural because they are hereditary. In this sense, therefore, grace can also be called natural to the angels, and likewise to our race, inasmuch as all of us received it in Adam, who was created with it. It can also be called natural in a second sense, because it is greatly fitting to nature, as being its perfection. Absolutely speaking (*simpliciter autem*), however, it must be called supernatural (*supernaturalis*), because it is neither in accordance with itself, nor in accordance with any seed of itself, present in the principles of nature, but is a gift exceeding every faculty of nature.

Reply to the third argument (*Ad tertiam*): Just as the reprobate angels came to know the excellence of their nature, which became for them the occasion of sinning through pride. For while they were still wayfarers (*viatores*) and accordingly had a will that could be turned toward evil, they abused by their free will those very gifts by which they saw themselves adorned both naturally and supernaturally, and thus fell into sin.

§ IX — That the angels, whether placed all in the same species or in different species, were created unequal both in natural and in grace-gifts (Angelos ut naturae, ita gratiae donis creatos fuisse inaequales)

§ 70. That the angels, whether they are all placed in the same species or in different ones, were unequal with respect to their natural gifts (*dona naturalia*) — this is the consenting doctrine of all theologians, whose reason (*ratio*) is drawn from the perfection of the whole universe, which, as it requires various degrees of things, so also requires within the same degree a diversity either of species and individuals according to their properties or natural conditions (*conditiones naturales*), so that they may either be different one from another, or may be the same but more or less perfect. This is evident (*patet*) in bodily creatures, both celestial — as in the stars, one of which differs from another in brightness and in other properties — and in those things below, such as the elements, the various genera of animals and plants, and in the human race itself, though it is comprehended under a single species. Thus, therefore, it is entirely consonant with reason that the same

should hold in incorporeal substances, that is, in the angels, namely that some should be by nature more subtle than others and more keen-sighted in understanding — as the Master teaches in his text.[127] This doctrine is confirmed by the distinction of the angels into Hierarchies and orders, which is grounded in Scripture, concerning which matter we shall treat below.'[128]

§ 71. Moreover, because according to St. Thomas's opinion all angels differ in species, he accordingly teaches that the nature of one angel must always be more sublime than the nature of another, whichever two are compared with each other. And therefore, he says, no two angels equal to each other in the entire Celestial Hierarchy are to be found — which are his words on Dist. 9 of this book, article 5.[129] And even if all, or some, are placed in the same species, it is nevertheless probable that even so no two are found entirely equal in natural endowments. For the most ordered disposition of the whole universe seems to require this, especially in those individuals that are incorruptible, whose multiplication is therefore not ordered toward the conservation of the species, but which are such that each one of them individually holds a place of its own in the universe.

§ 72. Furthermore, just as the angels were created differing from one another in their natural endowments, so it is credible and altogether reasonable that they were also created unequal with respect to the gifts of grace (*dona Gratiae*), and indeed in such a way that the gifts of grace were conferred upon them in proportion to the degree and capacity of their natural gifts — so that as each one was more excellent in natural endowments, accordingly he received a higher degree of grace (*gratia*), holiness (*sanctitas*), and justice (*justitia*). This inequality is manifestly handed down by (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite[130] — not only treating of the variety of natural gifts but also of supernatural ones, and this according to the proportion of the natural gifts — as, for instance, when he teaches that the inferior angels are illuminated by the superior ones and instructed concerning hidden mysteries, and other such matters. St. Basil likewise teaches this,'[113] saying that the angels, in proportion to the measure by which they surpass one another, hold from the Holy Spirit a measure (*mensura*) of sanctification — a point which he also hints at in the work against Eunomius.[131] St. John Damascene follows St. Basil in this matter,'[132] when he says that the angels, in accordance with the formal character (*ratio*) of their dignity and order, have participated through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit in illumination and grace (*gratia*). The same is the doctrine of the Master (in this Distinction), whom all the Scholastic Doctors thereafter followed.

§ 73. Moreover, this is further proved from the following consideration: the Hierarchies and orders of angels were constituted from the beginning through nature — that is, in accordance with natural gifts — and yet were not changed through grace, nor indeed could they be changed, if — as the better opinion holds — God simultaneously, in the angels, both established nature and infused grace. And neither through the exercise of grace nor through the ensuing glory was that hierarchical order changed, but remained altogether such as it had been constituted from the beginning. From this it is gathered that, just as in the angels grace (*gratia*) corresponded to nature, so also the exercise or merit (*meritum*) corresponded to grace, and glory (*gloria*) to merit. Hence the theologians rightly teach that not only grace but also glory was attained by the angels in accordance with their natural endowments — so much so that if indeed any two were equal in natural endowments, it would consequently have to be said that no two are equal in glory. From these considerations, the following argument of the present doctrine is elicited: because the gifts of grace were conferred upon the angels simultaneously with their very nature in creation, grace therefore had to be given in accordance with the proportion and exigency of their natural endowments. This is also proved by analogy (*ex*

simili): for to Adam in his creation grace was given that was fitting for a man, and to the woman a grace suited to her sex; just as also the Sun, created to rule over the day, was given a greater light than the Moon and the other stars, made to illuminate the night.

§ 74. But now, after man has fallen into sin, since he lost through sinning the dignity of his original state and the adornment or perfection of his nature — that is, grace (*gratia*) — it comes about that the conferral of grace now in no way follows the proportion of natural endowments, but is made without regard to natural endowments, according to the mere good pleasure (*beneplacitum*) of God showing mercy. For since this grace by which fallen nature is restored is so gratuitous (*gratuita*) that it is given not only without any merits but to those undeserving and ill-deserving, God, in order to make this clear, no longer attends in the distribution of the gifts of His grace to the capacity of nature or to the quantity of natural endowments, but — as the Apostle says, Rom. 12 — "divideth to every one according as he will," sometimes conferring less upon those who were by nature more capable of receiving such gifts, and more upon those who otherwise were less capable.

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§ X — Resolution of objections (Objectionum solutio)

§ 75. Against this doctrine, on the side by which it attributes grace to the angels in accordance with the quantity of their natural endowments, there is one objection and a second. First, it seems to follow from this that at least in the angels, and in the first man, nature was a disposition (*dispositio*) to grace, and that the natural striving (*conatus*) of their free will (*liberum arbitrium*) predetermined the measure of the grace which they received. This, however, appears contrary to the Catholic dogma (*Catholicum Dogma*) already long defined against Pelagius, by which we believe that grace is not given according to merits (*merita*). For, as will be said below,[134] under the name of merit in the opinion of the Fathers is comprehended any disposition whatsoever of nature and any preparation of the will.

§ 76. It is answered (*Respondetur*): First, that the Fathers, in defining this, spoke of the grace of God through Christ, by which, namely, man, after he had lost the grace received in creation, is mercifully restored by the inspiration of faith and of a good will. For it is the most certain doctrine of the Fathers from the Scriptures that this grace is not given according to merits but anticipates every merit. But concerning the grace given to the angels and to the first man in creation, we read nothing of the sort defined. Next, it does not in reality follow that if grace was conferred upon the angels in accordance with the quantity of their natural endowments, nature or any natural endowment whatsoever was in them a disposition (*dispositio*) to grace — if we speak of disposition properly speaking. For since grace (*gratia*) is a supernatural gift, being as it were a certain seed of glory (*gloria*), that is of supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo supernaturalis*), neither nature nor any natural perfection or movement can dispose and prepare an angel or a human being for it, but only a perfection exceeding nature — namely the movement of free will excited and assisted by a supernatural divine motion and aid. For every natural perfection is, as they say, disproportionate (*improportionata*) to grace and glory. When, therefore, it is said that grace was given to the angels according to the quantity of their natural endowments, nothing else is signified than that God, when He infused grace into the angels at creation, willed to take account of their nature, so as to infuse a more abundant grace into those who were more excellent in natural gifts — not because there was merit or disposition in nature toward grace, but because it pleased Him

to regard this order in conferring grace. This order, however, as we said above, He willed not to follow in restoring fallen human beings, in order to show how gratuitous the gift of grace is.

§ 77. Moreover, since from the beginning nature in the angels was ordered toward grace, and grace toward glory (*gloria*), hence the diversity of angels as regards grace and glory is ultimately to be referred back to God and to His most free will (*liberrima voluntas*). For although He gave them grace, and consequently glory, in accordance with the capacity or quantity of their natural endowments, He nonetheless implanted this diversity of natural endowments on account of the diversity of grace, and conferred this grace in turn on account of the diversity of glory, to which He had from eternity freely predestined them. On this matter, see Cajetan[135] and Bannes.'[136]

§ 78. The second objection is that from the foregoing doctrine there appears to follow the conclusion that just as in the angels, so also in human beings the matter stands with respect to inequality of grace and glory — in such a way, namely, that no two human beings will be equal in grace and glory. And some think this to be shown to be utterly false by the example alone of baptized children who die before the use of reason, of whom they say that all will be equal both in baptismal grace and in heavenly glory. They prove the inference (*sequela*) because, as it is the common opinion of the Fathers, human beings are assumed in order to supply the ruins of the angels. Therefore, if all the angels that fell were unequal in grace, and would similarly have been unequal in glory had they persevered, it follows that those who take their place must retain the same inequality.

§ 79. It is answered (*Respondetur*) that the Fathers do not mean, when they say that the ruin of the angels is to be supplied by human beings, that just as many human beings in number are to be assumed as angels fell, and that these are to hold the very same degrees of glory that the angels would have held had they not fallen. For Christ without doubt attained, according to His human nature, a far greater degree of grace and glory than the highest of the angels who fell had or would have had. And moreover the matter of number is entirely uncertain. The ruin of the angels is therefore to be supplied from human beings in a general sense of supplementation (*generali quadam ratione supplementi*), whether an equal number succeed or not, and whether they are to be substituted in an equal degree of grace and glory or not — as will be explained more fully below.[128] As for whether it is necessary to admit that many human beings will be at an equal degree of grace and glory among themselves — especially on account of the argument drawn from children departing with baptismal grace alone — that is to be inquired elsewhere,'[137] where the quality of baptismal grace is debated.

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§ XI — Whether all the Angels merited in the first instant (Utrum omnes Angeli in primo instanti meruerint)

§ 80. Since God alone is naturally blessed (*beatus*), whereas beatitude (*Beatitudo*) is set before intellectual creatures as the ultimate end toward which they ought to attain by means of certain operations ordered as means to that end, it was necessary that both the Angel and the human being should not come into possession of beatitude before they had tended toward it through the merits of good operations — as St. Thomas rightly teaches.[139] But since it is not necessary that whoever tends toward the end of beatitude by merit should ever actually attain it (for it can happen, and happens very often, that on account of the impediment of sin one does not arrive at the proposed end), it is rightly asked whether through the grace received at creation all the

Angels merited — even the reprobate ones — and whether they merited immediately at the beginning, that is, in the first instant in which they were created, or only afterward. For these two questions are connected and are therefore to be treated together.

§ 81. Some are of the opinion that all the Angels merited, inasmuch as they recognize a good operation in all of them, namely the natural cognition of their own selves. For they say that immediately after this first operation — which they call the *vespertina* (evening) cognition — some turned toward God with a supernatural cognition, which they call the *matutina* (morning) cognition; while others, remaining in themselves with a disordered love of their own excellence, became darkened. And they hold that those who turned toward God attained beatitude immediately by that single act of conversion, while those who turned away in the contrary act fell into damnation. For this reason, however, they deny that the devil, even though created in grace, merited beatitude, because it would follow as a consequence that he had actually obtained beatitude itself — such being the condition of the Angels, that they arrive at beatitude through a single meritorious act — just as St. Thomas expressly teaches[92] and repeats.[140]

§ 82. But those reason far more correctly who teach that all the Angels, and indeed in the very first instant in which they were made, merited beatitude, and this according to the properly so-called and full formal character (*ratio*) of merit. For this is more consonant with reason, with the Scriptures, and with the sayings of the Fathers.

For if we consult reason: since all the Angels were created in grace, and in the first instant had some operation not only of the intellect but also of the will, there appears no reason why that operation should not be said to proceed from grace as from a habitual principle — which they already possessed — and, as the Scholastics say, to be informed by grace (*gratia informata*) and thereby meritorious; especially since they are posited as created in grace — as has been said in its proper place — in order that from the very beginning they might be moved toward the end for which they were made. Nor does it tell against this that at the beginning they had natural acts of cognition and of love of themselves. For nothing prevents supernatural and therefore meritorious acts from having been present simultaneously from the beginning alongside natural ones, just as both can coexist in the state of beatitude: for glory does not destroy nature.

§ 83. Proof: it is confirmed likewise from the example of Christ, who in the very instant in which His most holy soul was infused into the body merited most perfectly. Hence it is manifest that nothing prevents grace from so perfecting nature that in the first instant both the Angel and the human being merits, and merits even perfectly.

§ 84. Scripture too bears witness (Ezek. 28) that the devil walked perfectly in his ways, and this from the day of his creation. In this passage, merit is signified according to the customary usage of Scripture. For so God said to Abraham (Gen. 17): "Walk before me and be perfect." But also at Jn. 8, where it is said that the devil did not stand in the truth, only his perseverance in good is denied. Hence St. Augustine, adducing this Scripture,[141] says: "We must so understand this, that he was in the truth but did not remain in it." Therefore, according to this Scripture and St. Augustine's exposition, all that was needed for him to obtain beatitude was that he should persevere in what he had received: he had merit therefore, but not the perseverance of merit. The same St. Augustine again plainly signifies this elsewhere,[111] for there likewise he removes from the apostate Angel only the perseverance of good in the order toward beatitude.

§ 85. Now these Scriptures sufficiently show that even the evil Angels — for what is said of the head is understood of the whole body — merited beatitude. And moreover, from the former Scripture it is gathered that they merited from the beginning; for that phrase "from the day of your creation" carries this force, as we have said elsewhere. This same point can be proved from Scripture (Job 28),[142] where the Lord testifies that He was praised by all the sons of God — that is, the Angels — at the time when He was laying the foundations of the earth, that is, at the beginning of the creation of the world.

§ 86. Furthermore, St. Augustine expressed his own opinion on this same matter more clearly,[143] asserting expressly that all the Angels were created with a good will — that is, with the chaste love (*amor castus*) by which they cleave to God. For he understands a good will in the actual (*actualis*) sense, because he expounds it through an act, adding, "that is, with chaste love"; and also because he argues in that passage whether the Angels produced the good will in themselves — which is certainly understood of an act. And moreover it is familiar to St. Augustine to put the will in the place of an act of the will. To this also pertains what St. Basil says in his exposition of Ps. 32 on the words "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made firm" — that the Angels were confirmed almost at the very moment at which they were created.[144] For by this he appears to leave only the single first instant as remaining for their merit, so that from immediately after the first instant they received stability. And that he acknowledges the same perfection of the first instant also in the reprobate Angels is gathered from the fact that he says they could be moved to malice only with difficulty.

§ 87. St. Thomas himself expressly states this[145] — saying that all the Angels created in grace merited in the first instant, and that some, by sinning, lost this merit; and this is also the same Doctor's view concerning the first man,[146] in that he says the first man in the first instant of his creation consented to grace.

§ XII — Reply to the objections (Responsio ad objectiones)

§ 88. Among the things urged against the foregoing doctrine, the first argument is drawn from the Angels' vespertine and matutine knowledge (*cognitio vespertina et matutina*), of which we made mention above, and which appears to have been supplied by St. Thomas himself.[148] For he has it thus: "The first instant in the Angels is understood to correspond to the operation of the angelic mind by which it turns back upon itself through vespertine knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*), because in the first day evening is recorded but not morning; and this operation was indeed good in all of them. But from this operation some were converted, through matutine knowledge (*cognitio matutina*), to the praise of the Word; others, however, remaining within themselves, became night, swelling with pride. And so the first operation was common to all. But in the second they were distinguished — and therefore in the first instant all were good, but in the second the good were distinguished from the evil." So he. He cites St. Augustine,[149] where Augustine says that the Angel at creation knew himself as it were through an evening, but was straightway made a morning. "Because," he says, "angelic knowledge does not remain in what has been created, but continuously refers this to the praise and glory of the same Word. For if the angelic nature were to turn towards itself and delight in itself more than in that by whose participation it is blessed, it would fall, swelling with pride, as the devil did." So St. Augustine.

From the words of both Doctors it appears that in all the Angels the first operation corresponding to the first instant was knowledge of self; whereas the second operation was, in some, a conversion to God through

praise of Him, and in others an act of pride through inordinate delight in their own excellence. Whence it seems to follow that in the first instant no Angels merited, and that in the second instant some

§ 89. — yet nothing is contained therein contrary to what was adduced above from these same Doctors in the opposite sense. For, as is established from the doctrine of St. Augustine himself, who holds that all the works of the six days were created simultaneously, the order between the Angels' vespertine and matutine knowledge cannot on his account be understood as an order of succession, but only of nature or causality. For since the one cognition is referred into the other, nothing prevents both from occurring simultaneously — that is, in the same instant — especially since the operation of grace does not hinder the operation of nature, but rather perfects it.

Moreover, that this is also St. Thomas's meaning is clear from what he had already said in the preceding article, that all the Angels in the first instant merited, which could not be without matutine knowledge by which they were converted from knowledge of self to the praise of God. Therefore, when he says that some were converted to God by vespertine knowledge, as though not all were so converted, understand this of a persevering act (*actus perseverans*): in this sense some were not converted to God, because they relapsed immediately into themselves and sinned through pride.

§ 90. To the second argument indicated above — namely, that if the devil had merited beatitude (*beatitudo*), he would have obtained it, given that Angels apprehend beatitude by a single act (*unus actus*) — various replies are offered by the Thomists. But, granting what St. Thomas teaches (though many dispute it), namely that such is the condition of the Angels that they arrive at beatitude through one meritorious act (*actus meritorius*), this reply seems preferable to the rest: that the act is understood as perfect — that is, persevering — and since the devil did not have this, but, while others persevered in such an act, he immediately deflected from it through inordinate self-love (*inordinatus sui amor*), he did not attain beatitude. St. Thomas points to this solution with sufficient clarity.[145] For having said that all Angels merited in the first instant, he added: "But some of them immediately presented an obstacle to their own beatitude, mortifying (*mortificantes*) the preceding merit; and therefore they were deprived of the beatitude they had merited."

§ 91. Third, the argument is as follows: the Angels in the instant of their creation could not have had a free act (*actus liber*); therefore neither a meritorious one. They prove the antecedent, because for that instant they could not but have that act and the judgment to exercise the act with which God was creating them. It is answered: freedom does not require that, while one exercises an act, one should be able not to exercise the same act; it suffices that, from the mode of producing such an act — that is, from the judgment of indifference (*judicium indifferentiae*) — the act towards its end be such that one can not act. For in such a judgment the freedom of the act of the will originally (*originaliter*) consists.[150]

§ XIII — How many instants there were from the creation to the end of the Angels' way (Quot instantia fuerint a creatione usque ad terminum viae Angelorum)

§ 92. Those who deny that the Angels were created in grace, or at least that they could have merited in the instant of creation, rationally interpose some instant between the creation and the fall of the evil Angels, and likewise between the creation and the confirmation of the good Angels — an instant in which all possessed a

good and meritorious act, after which some fell by sinning while others, persevering, were raised to the act of Glory. Those, however, who hold that all were created in grace and merited in the first instant have neither the same rationale nor the same necessity for multiplying instants, or delays as they call them, from creation to the end of the Angels' way. Nevertheless, both parties have entertained widely varying opinions concerning these instants, and there are almost as many opinions as there are heads, as Domingo Bañez says.[152]

For some posit five instants: the first of creation in purely natural endowments; the second of the conferral of grace; the third of the good and meritorious operation of both groups; the fourth of the defection and fall of some, while others persevered in good; the fifth of the confirmation of the good and the damnation of the evil. Others posit only four, namely by subtracting from the aforesaid five that instant in which all merited through good operation — for they judge that the reprobate never merited beatitude. There are yet others who likewise posit only four instants, but on different grounds: namely, because they do not divide what was attributed to the second and third instants, admitting that the Angels operated according to grace in the same instant in which they received grace, and therefore merited, just as in the same instant in which they received nature they exercised natural operations. There are still others who posit the same number but on yet another ground. For they conflate what belongs to the first and second instants — namely, the conferral of nature and of grace — but assign meritorious operation to the second instant.

Others sanction only three instants: the first of creation, in which all, even though endowed with grace, merited nothing; the second, in which some were supernaturally converted to God while others turned away from Him by sinning; and the third of reward and punishment. Again, others, following Scotus as their authority, likewise positing only three instants, diverge from the foregoing opinion in this: that they say the good Angels in the second instant had not one but many merits, and the evil Angels likewise many demerits, as though that instant was not simple but composed of many moral instants.

Not far removed from these are certain others who teach that it is not plausible that the devil's sin was of only one instant — as if he had been so suddenly raised to that supreme pride by which he wished to be equal to God, with the remaining multitude of apostatizing Angels sharing in his pride in the same instant. Rather, they judge it more probable that, having turned away from God whom they had previously loved and having turned toward themselves, they gradually rose to such a peak of pride as to wish to be like the Most High, and that first one sinned, and then by his persuasion the rest. Those who hold this opinion do indeed hold that all the Angels were created in grace and merited in the first instant, but they add further instants — not only of the defection and growth of pride in the evil Angels, but also of the progress and perseverance of virtue in the good ones; they do not even deny that several instants of good operations may rightly be attributed to the reprobate Angels before they sinned, adducing that passage in Ezek. 28, where it is said to the prince-Angel: "Thou didst walk perfect in thy ways from the day of thy creation, until iniquity was found in thee."[153] For "ways" signify works, and "walking" imports a certain continuation of actions, as at Ps. 127: "Blessed are all they that fear the Lord, who walk in his ways."[154]

Furthermore, Cajetan posits only two instants: the first of creation, in which all merited through grace and were pure wayfarers; and the second, in which some, continuing their merit, received in the same instant the reward of stability and of Glory, while others fell by sinning and were at the same time damned. But this view seems inadmissible, because one cannot see how in one and the same instant an Angel should both merit beatitude and possess it — as though he were simultaneously believing and seeing God — which two things are certainly repugnant according to the Scriptures (Rom. 8; 1 Cor. 13, and elsewhere).[155] Hence Ferrariensis,

agreeing with Cajetan in the number of instants, holds a different view concerning the second instant: namely, that in it some sinned and were simultaneously made miserable, while others were beatified by the merit of their preceding good operation in the first instant.[156] But this opinion has two inconveniences. The first is that it places the good Angels already in Glory when the evil Angels first sinned. For if the merit was already equal in the first instant according to each one's capacity, why in the second instant were some confirmed while others were still permitted to fall? For all the merit of Glory that the good had, the evil also had — namely, having persevered equally as long as they according to this opinion. This is against the doctrine of St. Augustine who says, in *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 10, that while some persevered — that is, while others were persevering — others fell; but perseverance belongs to the way, not to the homeland, where grace is already immovably held.[111] The second inconvenience is that it places demerit and damnation in the same instant, in this not departing from Cajetan.

Finally, a certain other scholar judges that the opinion of St. Thomas, and the truth itself on this question, is best explained as follows: if two instants are attributed to the good Angels — the first of creation in grace and, through grace, of good and meritorious operation; the second of glorification and confirmation in good — and to the evil Angels two instants up to the fall, but three up to damnation — namely, the first common with the good; the second in which they immediately impeded their beatitude by sinning; and the third in which they were damned. That this is indeed St. Thomas's opinion regarding the good Angels is clear, because in the *Summa theologiae* he teaches that the Angels, after one meritorious act, obtained beatitude, and he places this act in the instant of creation, as we showed above from the same Doctor; nor does he anywhere mention a third instant among the good Angels.[157] As for the evil Angels, that he holds the same view seems to be shown by the fact that he teaches in the same work that between the creation and the fall of an Angel there was no delay — that is, no intermediate instant.[140] But since the instant of an Angel's fall must be distinguished from the instant of his damnation (for he could not be simultaneously in the way and at the term), it follows that three instants must be acknowledged among the evil Angels. Nor is it surprising that St. Thomas does not name the third instant at that point, since the question had only been raised concerning the delay between creation and the fall, with no mention made of the damnation.

In this opinion there appears more probability than in the rest, because no fewer instants can be attributed to the good Angels up to the end of their way inclusive than two, nor fewer to the evil Angels than three — to the former indeed the instant of merit and the instant of reward; to the latter the instant of merit, the instant of demerit, and the instant of punishment. Nor is there any reason compelling one to posit more, inasmuch as the instant of creation, the instant of glorification, and the instant of merit are not diverse instants but one and the same, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said above. The remaining objections that seem to stand in the way we shall now resolve.

§ XIV — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 93. The arguments on account of which certain others posited a greater number of instants in the affair of the Angels we have already indicated above. The first is taken from the plurality of acts by which the Angels merited or demerited. For since the grace in which they were created was accompanied by all the virtues befitting angelic nature, it was altogether fitting that they should merit beatitude through the acts of all the virtues, and not through the act of charity (*caritas*) alone. Similarly, it is credible that the evil Angels too

sinned not against one virtue only, but against several or against all. It is answered: that on account of such a plurality of acts, instants ought not to be multiplied; for just as the operation of nature and of grace is ascribed to one and the same instant, as was explained above, so also there could simultaneously exist in one and the same instant acts of several virtues — of faith (*fides*), hope (*spes*), charity, humility, and others, indeed of all the virtues they possessed. Nor does the axiom of the Philosopher stand in the way — that the intellect cannot understand several things simultaneously — for it cannot do so in the manner of several things, but it can well do so in the manner of one, as is the case with these acts inasmuch as they are mutually subordinated. And what has been said of good acts, the same holds manifestly for evil ones as well.

§ 94. Hence it is clear in what sense St. Thomas teaches[92] that the Angels, immediately after the act informed by charity — that is, the meritorious act — obtained beatitude (*beatitudo*). For he does not simply deny that there were in them several meritorious acts, but only that there were several that could not coexist simultaneously and that would therefore require several instants — as he himself sufficiently declares in the same place, in his reply to the second objection.[159] Accordingly he does not say that the Angels obtained beatitude through one act, but *after* one act, because there was no plurality of acts in succession for the purpose of meriting beatitude.

§ 95. The second argument was taken from progress and increase of merit in the good Angels, and of demerit in the evil. For where there is progress and increase, there must necessarily be a before and an after according to succession, and consequently several instants. But to this it is answered with probability by denying that any such progress or increase of merit or demerit existed in the Angels. For as regards merit, progress is removed from them by St. Basil[160] in his exposition of Ps. 32, in these words: "For they were not created in an infantile condition and thereafter gradually trained and perfected, but in their first establishment and, as it were, in a certain admixture of their substance, they had holiness infused simultaneously" — understand this as perfect holiness; for he continues: "Wherefore they could with difficulty move themselves to malice" — namely, confirmed as they were almost in an instant by the holiness granted to them, as by a kind of dye. Hence also Ezekiel describes the Prince of the Angels as perfect from the beginning;[153] nor does any Scripture ascribe an accession of merits to the Angels. Nor does St. Augustine attribute to them anything other than perseverance. Moreover, as regards both together — merit, that is, and demerit — St. Thomas says that it belongs to the proper nature of Angels not to investigate conclusions from principles by way of discursive reasoning, but to see conclusions in the principles immediately; and similarly not to be moved by the will toward something through progress, but immediately to be borne with their whole force toward an object, whether good or evil. In human beings, however, for whom discursive cognition is natural, the matter is otherwise.

§ 96. The third argument is taken from the perseverance of the good Angels, which does not seem intelligible except through a before and an after in one or more good works. Hence it seems to follow that in the merit of the Angels there must be acknowledged at least two instants. To this is added that, according to the opinion of St. Augustine, some Angels fell through pride; therefore, if two instants are granted to the evil Angels — namely, of merit and of sin — of necessity two must also be granted to the good Angels corresponding to those two, namely of merit and of perseverance or continuation of merit up to the term. This argument, which is judged the most difficult in the present matter, is resolved with probability in the following way: if we say that nothing prevents one instant of the operation of one Angel from corresponding to two, or indeed to ever so many, instants of two or more operations of another Angel. For since in the single

operation of one Angel there is no before and after — for example, in the act of the love of God, if it endures through many days — there could correspond to it extrinsically many operations of another Angel succeeding one another, just as there also correspond extrinsically many operations of human beings and many motions of bodies. Therefore, according to this reply, there was one act of the good Angel by which he merited and persevered, because intrinsically there was no before and after within it; but there were several acts of the evil Angel, corresponding nonetheless to the duration of the act of the persevering Angel — and so at length the two Angels, the good and the evil, converged upon the same instant, in which the good one received his reward and the evil one his punishment.

§ 97. The fourth argument is taken from the fact that the Prince of the Angels was the cause of the sin of the others through persuasion and example. Hence, on the side of sin or demerit, there seem to be at least two instants to be posited: one corresponding to the first sin of the Devil, and another to the sin of his Angels. It is answered: that all of this could have been accomplished in angelic and spiritual nature in one and the same instant; for just as there are not two instants — one in which colour moves sight and another in which sight is moved by colour — but both are accomplished in one and the same instant, so also to persuade and to be persuaded, to give an example and to receive one, do not require diverse instants; indeed, even in human affairs they are most properly accomplished in one and the same instant, since they are simultaneous by nature. This matter is aptly illustrated also by the following comparison: for just as at the same instant the sun illuminates the moon and the moon illuminates the earth, so at the same instant the first Angel could, by persuading, move the middle Angels, and the middle ones the last.

§ 98. Finally, as regards the passage of Ezekiel, together with St. Thomas[161] — to be continued below.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 3.
2. St. Thomas, *Opusculum* 15 (*De Angelis*, ch. 1).
3. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book XII.
4. Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, Book I, ch. 9.
5. Prudentius, *Contra Symmachum*, Book II.
6. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3 [as reported in the commentary on this Distinction].
7. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, Book XVII (*Moralia in Job*), ch. 9.
8. Dan. 7:10.
9. St. Jerome, commentary on Dan. 7.
10. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, ch. 9 and ch. 14.
11. St. Gregory the Great, in the places already cited.
12. Hugh of St. Victor, commentary on ch. 14 of the book *De Caelesti Hierarchia*.
13. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 11 (below).
14. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, ch. 14.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 112, a. 6, ad 2; and more expressly in *Quaestiones de Potentia*, q. 6, a. 4, in the body of the article.
16. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 3.
17. 3 Kgs. (i.e., 1 Kgs.) last chapter and elsewhere.

18. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, Book XVII, ch. 9.

19. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, this dist., q. 1, a. 3.

20. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 10 (below).

21. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9 (below).

22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 4.

23. St. Thomas: *In II Sent.*, this dist., q. 1, a. 4; *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book II, ch. 91, 92, 93; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 4; q. 75, a. 7; and elsewhere.

24. Methodius, as reported by Epiphanius, *Adversus haereses* (in the heresy of Origen).

25. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, Book III.

26. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, this dist. [confession of ignorance].

27. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Book II, ch. 3.

28. St. John Damascene, *Institutiones primae*, ch. 1 [if the title is correctly given in the source].

29. St. Augustine, *Contra Priscillianistas ad Orosium*, ch. 20; and *Enchiridion*, ch. 58.

30. St. Jerome, *Contra Jovinianum*, Book II, ch. 15.

31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 7.

32. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, this dist., q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

33. William of Rubio, *In II Sent.*, dist. 44.

34. Cajetan, commentary on *De Ente et Essentia*, ch. 5, q. 9.

35. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, Book III, ch. 12.

36. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17 (below).

37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; and in *In II Sent.*, this dist., at the place cited above.

38. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, this dist., q. 7.

39. St. Thomas, *Opusculum* 16 (*De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*), ch. 5.

40. See footnote (a) in the printed text, recording three articles condemned by the University of Paris and the subsequent history of the Parisian censures regarding St. Thomas's doctrine.

41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; and in *In II Sent.*, this dist., at the place mentioned above.

42. The footnote printed in the original text (marked *(a)*) records three articles condemned by the University of Paris. The first: "To say that, because intelligences have no matter, God cannot make more of the same species: Error." The second: "To say that God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter: Error." The third: "To say that forms do not receive division except according to matter: Error." The same University, which had given testimony of its veneration for the doctrine of St. Thomas in an epistle to the Friars Preachers assembled in General Chapters at Lyon in 1274, revoked the said censure on the Wednesday before the Finding of the Holy Cross in the year 1324, as is established from the Epistle of Stephen, Bishop of Paris, written in the name of the other Masters of Paris on the Thursday before Ash Wednesday in the year 1324. In that Epistle, after a lengthy commendation of St. Thomas's doctrine and holiness, the following words are read among other things: the said condemnation of articles which touch or are asserted to touch the doctrine of Blessed Thomas, we annul entirely. These documents are published in Vol. I, pp. 204–205 of the *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*. The same Epistle is cited in full by Pietro da Bergamo in the *Tabula Aurea*, p. 325. The same writer in the same work cites an integral diploma of Pope Urban VI, dating to 1379, addressed to the Archbishop of Toulouse, to the Chancellor of the University, and to the other Masters and Doctors and all clerics and laics dwelling in the city and province of Toulouse, at the end of which these words appear: "We will and enjoin you by the tenor of the present [document] to embrace the said doctrine of Blessed Thomas as truth-telling and catholic, and to foster it with all your strength."

43. St. Thomas, *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*, in the same place.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 4.

45. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 1 (above).

46. Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 1; First Council of Braga, can. 7; Third Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 1.

47. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, ch. 4 (and two other places noted in the source).

48. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book X, ch. 11.

49. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30 (below).

50. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, ch. 40.

51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5.

52. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 10, *De Paenitentia*.

53. St. Jerome, and other Commentators, interpreting Is. 14 and Ezek. 28 typologically of the devil.

54. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.

55. Origen, *Contra Celsum*, Book VI (citing Ezek. 28).

56. St. Basil, Homily 9, *Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*; and Homily 21, *In aliquot Scripturae locos*.

57. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration *In Natalem Domini*.

58. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam*, ch. 4.

59. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*.

60. St. Jerome, Epistle *ad Pammachium* (refuting the errors of John of Jerusalem); and the other passages cited above.

61. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 3, *De Patientia Job*; Hom. 16, *In Genesim*; Hom. 13, *In 2 Cor.*

62. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, chs. 11, 13, 15; Book XII, ch. 9; *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 10, 11; *De Dono Perseverantiae*, ch. 7.

63. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum*, Book IV.

64. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3; *Ad Thrasamundum*, Book II, ch. 2.

65. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, Book XXXIV, ch. 17.

66. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Book II, chs. 3 and 4.

67. St. Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli*.

68. First Council of Braga, can. 7.

69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, a. 5; *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, q. 16, a. 4.

70. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, this dist., q. 2.

71. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 22, *In Genesim*.

72. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6 (below).

73. Cyprian, *Sermo de Zelo et Livore*.

74. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book XI, ch. 14.

75. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5 (the article proximately cited).

76. St. Basil, Homily 9, *Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*, and Homily 21, *In aliquot Scripturae locos* [cited from the prior section].

77. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book XI, chs. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26.

78. Rupert of Deutz, *In Matthaeum*, Book XIII.

79. Hilary of Poitiers [attributed], *Sermo de Sancto Job* (not extant as an independent work).

80. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, Book II, ch. 8.

81. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Book III, ch. 9.

82. Estius, *In II Sent.*, below, in its proper place (*infra suis locis*).

83. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5 (*ibidem*).

84. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book XI, chs. 20 and 21.

85. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 13.

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1, ad 6.

87. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.* (Scriptum super Magistrum Sententiarum), this distinction.

88. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, q. 17, a. 4.

89. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5 (as cited above).

90. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book XI, chs. 20–21 (cited above); St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5, where Augustine's dictum is cited and approved.

91. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, q. 17, a. 4 (where twenty-three objections are resolved).

92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5.

93. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, pt. 5, ch. 16.

94. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, this distinction, §§ F, I, K; and again dist. 4 and 5.

95. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Book III, chs. 9 and 17.

96. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Dei*, Book I, ch. 29.

97. Marsilius of Auxerre (Marsilius Altissiodorensis) — scholastic theologian of the pre-Thomistic period.

98. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententias* II, dist. 4, q. 1, a. 3.

99. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book I, ch. 1 and following chapters.

100. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book XI, ch. 23.

101. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 19 [10].

102. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, Book 32, ch. 18.

103. Pope John, decree preserved in Gratian, *Decretum*, Causa 16, q. [abbreviation as in source], ch. *Visis*.

104. 1 Pet. 2:9: "he has called us into his admirable light."

105. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XII, ch. 9.

106. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Hosea*, ch. 3.

107. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 11.

108. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, Book 34, ch. 17.

109. St. Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli*, ch. 3.

110. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XI, ch. 11; and Book XII, ch. 9.

111. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 10.

112. St. Basil, *Commentary on Ps. 32* (on "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established").

113. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 16.

114. *Glossa Ordinaria* on Hos. 2 (on "grape-raisins," *vinacia uvarum*); derived from St. Jerome.

115. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, Book VI, ch. 6, on Jn. 8.

116. Estius, *In II Sent.*, below at dist. 25.

117. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, Book I, ch. 5.

118. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, the next following distinction.

119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 3.

120. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book VIII, ch. 3.

121. Gregory of Rimini (Gregorius Ariminensis); also Albert the Great and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain. The *Catechismus ad Parochos* (Roman Catechism), on the article "Creator of heaven and earth."

122. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5 (*ibidem*).

123. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Book V, ch. 5.

124. St. Augustine (attributed), *Tractatus de Cantico Novo*, ch. 8. [Note: The Benedictine editors placed this tractate or sermon in the sixth volume of their edition of Augustine's works under his name, but whether it is genuinely Augustine's is doubted; see the editor's footnote in the source.]

125. Vatablus (François Vatable), humanist Hebraist; his annotations on the Hebrew text of Job 4:18 are referenced here for the sense of the term signifying "excellent" or "most exact" light.

126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 6.

127. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, Dist. 3.

128. Below, at Dist. 9.

129. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 9, a. 5.

130. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, the entire book.

131. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, bk. 3, not far from the beginning.

132. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 3.

133. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 6 (the article cited immediately above).

134. Below, at Dist. 26.

135. Cajetan, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 3.

136. Bannes [Domingo Báñez], *In Summam theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2.

137. Below, at Dist. 4 of Book IV, where the quality of baptismal grace is disputed.

138. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 4 and 5; q. 63, a. 5 and 6.

139. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 4.

140. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 6.

141. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 15.

142. Job 28 [as cited in source; Estius refers to the passage where the Lord testifies that the sons of God praised Him when He laid the foundations of the earth — cf. Job 38:7].

143. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9.

144. St. Basil, *Expositio in Psalmum 32*, on the words "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made firm."

145. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5, ad 4.

146. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1, ad 5.

147. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 5 and 6 (as cited above).

148. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 6, ad 4.

149. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 24.

150. The argument and its resolution here concern the compatibility of freedom with the first instant of creation; Estius's reply turns on the sufficiency of *judicium indifferentiae* for freedom, without requiring the simultaneous power of actual contrary exercise.

151. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 6.

152. Domingo Bañez, cited by Estius as an authority on the diversity of opinions concerning the instants of the Angels' way.

153. Ezek. 28:15.

154. Ps. 127:1.

155. Rom. 8; 1 Cor. 13.

156. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), commentary on *Summa contra Gentiles*, agreeing with Cajetan on the number of instants but diverging on what occurs in the second.

157. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5 and q. 63, a. 6.

158. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, qq. 62–63, at the articles already cited (*locis jam allegatis*).

159. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5, *ad* 2.

160. St. Basil, *Expositio in Psalmum* 32.

161. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 6, *ad* 1.

DISTINCTIO IV — WHETHER THE ANGELS WHO WERE MADE BLESSED WERE ALSO PERFECT (*UTRUM ANGELI FACTI SINT BEATI ET PERFECTI*)

§ 1. — by bodily motions which are measured by time and in which some succeed others — it is sometimes signified metaphorically in the Scriptures that spiritual motions are instantaneous; whether they succeed one another and thus possess distinct instants, or whether they coexist in the same instant, as in the case of the Angels the acts of Faith, Hope, Charity, and the like coexisted, because through those simultaneously existing acts they were walking — that is, they were operating — on the way.

§ I — Whether the Angels were made blessed and perfect (Utrum Angeli facti sint beati et perfecti)

§ 2. The question which the Master treats almost solely in this distinction — namely, whether the Angels were created blessed and perfect, or wretched and imperfect — will not be difficult to answer, if we first explain by way of distinction what is meant by "blessed" and what by "perfect."

For "blessed" (*beatus*) can be explained in three ways. Since by the term beatitude (*beatitudo*) is understood the ultimate perfection of an intellectual substance, and since this perfection is twofold — one which can be attained by the power of nature, whence it is also called natural beatitude (*beatitudo naturalis*), and another which surpasses the power of nature and is accordingly called supernatural (*supernaturalis*) — in the first sense, someone is said to be blessed with natural beatitude who possesses the ultimate perfection to which the power of his nature extends. In this sense it is reasonably said that the Angels were blessed at their creation, because they had perfect operations of intellect and will with respect to their ultimate natural end. But it must be noted that this natural beatitude of the creature, according to St. Thomas,[1] is called beatitude, or rather happiness (*felicitas*), not absolutely but only in a qualified sense (*quodammodo*). The reason for this, as is indicated in the same place, is that an intellectual creature is capable of a certain higher beatitude — namely, supernatural beatitude — and was created for it. And therefore natural beatitude is not simply and absolutely the ultimate perfection of that creature, but only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*); hence it does not fill the creature's whole desire (*desiderium*), because neither does it fill its capacity.

Therefore, in the second sense, someone is said to be blessed by reason of supernatural beatitude — not yet, however, as having attained it, but as tending toward it. Hence neither can such a person be called simply blessed, but only incipiently (*inchoative*) — that is, through grace (*gratia*) and merit (*meritum*) — and all the more so if he tends thither without impediment. On this account the Angels and the first man, having been created in a state of grace, were blessed: because they were endowed with those gifts by which they could tend — and did indeed actually tend through meritorious operations (*operationes meritoriae*) — toward the

ultimate supernatural end, suffering no impediment either inwardly or outwardly that might have turned them aside from that course, and subject to no miseries by which that happiness might have been diminished with respect to its accessory goods. To this category also belongs the beatitude of man restored after the Fall to grace and justice, as to a way along which he can tend toward the happiness above — but not without the impediment of concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and of daily lapses and temptations, by which he is held back from his course, nor without the manifold wretchedness that diminishes that happiness in itself, even though it promotes it incidentally (*per accidens*). Hence in the Scriptures "blessed are those who fear the Lord," "blessed are those who mourn," and "blessed are those who suffer persecution for justice's sake," and the like — blessed, I say, *in hope* (*in spe*), because they already have material for the virtues through which they are commanded to hope with certainty for beatitude itself.

In the third sense, blessed is said of one who has already obtained the ultimate perfection of which he is capable — that is, the supernatural perfection that consists in the vision of the Divine Essence (*visio Divinae essentiae*). For this is consummated happiness (*consummata felicitas*), in which the intellectual creature, having reached its end, rests in it, so that it desires nothing further. In this sense the Angels were not blessed at their creation, since according to the order of Divine wisdom they had to be so created that they would tend toward this supernatural beatitude through merit and, after merit, would obtain it. And this teaching is drawn from St. Augustine[2] and from Fulgentius,[3] with whom Gennadius is in agreement.[4] Hugh, the Master, and all later theologians hold the same view, with very few exceptions — such as Alexander and the Ariminensian — who were of the opinion that the Angels saw God through His essence from the beginning.[5]

§ 3. Furthermore, "perfect" (*perfectum*) can be distinguished in four ways. In one sense something is called perfect according to substance (*secundum substantiam*) — namely, that to which nothing is lacking of those things that pertain to the substance of the thing. In this sense there is no doubt that all the Angels, like all other things, were perfect at their creation. In the second sense, that is perfect to which nothing is lacking of the perfections proper to its nature — and we have already said that the Angels were made perfect in this sense, as being endowed with natural beatitude. In the third sense, according to supernatural perfection (*perfectio supernaturalis*), insofar as one tends toward it through supernatural gifts. This is accordingly an inchoate perfection of this kind. That the Angels at their creation were perfect in this sense is clear from what has been said above, because they had both grace and merit from the beginning. This perfection in the Angels was indeed the perfection of the *way* (*via*), not of the *homeland* (*patria*); yet it was so much greater in them than in men, as it was more ample according to the capacity or measure of their natural endowments, and as it was freer from all sin and wretchedness than it now is in men. Therefore these two perfections — according to nature, and according to grace and the state of meriting — excluded all vice and defect from the Angels. For the perfection of the way that belongs to us men has much vice and defect mixed into it, and therefore is not absolutely perfect even according to the state of the wayfarer (*status viatoris*), however much anyone in this state may have advanced.

In the fourth sense, something is called perfect according to that same supernatural perfection insofar as it is now actually possessed — which perfection, like the beatitude of the last kind (for it is one and the same thing), the Angels received not at their creation, nor while on the way, but at the term of the way, at which they were confirmed. It must be noted, however, that although we can say that the Angels were in some sense imperfect at their creation — insofar, namely, as they had not yet attained this ultimate perfection — it must

by no means be said that they were wretched (*miseri*). For, as the Master rightly says, they could not have been wretched before sin, because wretchedness arises from sin.

§ II — That the Angels were not foreknowers of their future state (Angelos futuri sui status non fuisse praescios)

§ 4. That the Angels — both the elect and the reprobate — were ignorant of their future condition, that is, of their perseverance and fall, of their beatitude and their wretchedness, is a teaching that all the same theologians who deny that they were from the beginning blessed with consummated beatitude constantly maintain after the Master. This indeed follows manifestly from what has already been said, so far as the reprobate are concerned, that is, those who subsequently fell: for if these had possessed foreknowledge of their fall and their wretchedness, they would already have been wretched before they were evil, and — what is more — they would already have had an incipient taste of eternal damnation. For it is no small part of eternal damnation to foresee one's own damnable fall and, accordingly, one's own damnation — as is evident in the case of Judas the traitor and certain others. Indeed, by the very act by which one's eternal damnation is revealed to him, he is placed outside the state of the wayfarer (*status viatoris*), because through faith and hope he cannot tend toward that which he knows with the greatest certainty — that is, by God's own revelation — he will not attain; as has been more fully set forth above.[6] This kind of foreknowledge St. Augustine removes from the reprobate Angels,[7] as does St. Basil,[8] and St. Cyril.[9]

§ 5. But it is also very probable that not even the elect — that is, those who persevered — possessed foreknowledge of their perseverance and eternal felicity. For such knowledge is itself a certain part of the reward, and therefore is not ordinarily granted before the end of the course, as is evident in the case of human beings, who, unless they have reached the term — whether in heaven or at least in Purgatory — do not receive certainty of their beatitude, with very few exceptions to whom their predestination was revealed in an extraordinary manner before the end. Although it is sufficiently apparent that St. Augustine doubted this matter at some point in his earlier writings,[10] from which passages are adduced by the Master,[11] he afterwards came to prefer the opinion we have established — as is gathered both from that same chapter 13, and is shown more certainly from his *De correptione et gratia*,[12] where he acknowledges absolutely no difference between the elect and the reprobate Angels before the fall of the latter and the perseverance of the former.

§ III — That the Angels could not have been converted to God without grace (Angelos non potuisse sine Gratia converti ad Deum)

§ 6. In this distinction the Master, treating of the conversion and aversion of the Angels, presupposes what he had already taught in the preceding discussion, namely that the Angels were created *informes* — that is, devoid of grace — and here he indicates the foundation of this his opinion: that the Angels were created willing neither to turn away nor to turn toward, but capable of willing the one or the other, namely through the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) received at their creation, as he declares in the same place. Hugh of St. Victor also advances the same argument in support of his opinion,[14] teaching that the Angels were not made willing, and

therefore immediately at the beginning merited nothing. That they could not from the beginning have been willing he proves thus: "Because," he says, "to will and to do has movement and succession, which cannot be at the beginning." Hence he also says, in chapter 22, that free will is not referred to the present time but to the future.

§ 7. But this proof advanced by both of them is invalid for a twofold reason. First, because even if the act of willing could not have existed in the Angels from the beginning, nothing would prevent them from being created in habitual grace (*habituali Gratia*); through which, even if they did not merit (because we merit properly by acts alone), they would nevertheless be worthy of eternal life — just as we affirm of baptized infants. Second, because what is laid down as the foundation is false. For, as we showed at the third distinction, just as the act of understanding, so also the act of willing, and accordingly merit as well, can exist in the first instant. Nor is it always necessary that a free act be preceded by deliberation, nor does the formal character (*ratio*) of free will altogether require that it look toward a future time — as will be taught below,[15] and as I here briefly show by a single argument: because free will most properly belongs to God, who does not deliberate and for whom nothing is future. Let it therefore stand, as has been proved elsewhere, that all the Angels were in grace and merited in the first instant.

§ 8. Given this, we do not accept the conversion and aversion of the Angels in the sense the Master understood them — namely, a conversion by which certain ones, starting from the state of the aforesaid *informitas* in which they were created, with grace superadded to them, converted themselves to God; and an aversion by which from that same intermediate state others were turned away from God through sin and became contrary to God. Rather, we understand by conversion that act by which, in creation itself, through grace infused simultaneously with their nature, all began by love to tend toward God as the beatifying good; and hence it is called "conversion" — not because an evil or intermediate state preceded from which they were converted, but because it was a movement of the soul tending toward God, and a movement of this kind we are accustomed to call conversion even if the soul has never been averse. And by "aversion" we understand that act by which certain ones were turned away from the good they loved by their own will. According to this account, conversion was common to all the Angels, although not all persevered in the same movement of the will.

§ 9. But if you understand by conversion that by which one tends toward God through consummated love (*dilectio*), that is proper to the elect Angels alone and followed upon the aversion of the wicked — and it occurred at the term, not on the way, as is evident from what was said concerning the instants of the Angels at the third distinction.[16] However you take "conversion," the assistance of the grace (*Gratia*) of God was necessary for it — as the Master (in the text) and St. Thomas explain more fully,[17] in these words: "Every movement of the will toward God," he says, "can be called a conversion to Him, and therefore there is a threefold conversion to God. One is through perfect love (*dilectio*), which belongs to a creature already enjoying (*fruens*) God — and for this conversion consummated grace (*Gratia consummata*) is required. Another conversion is that which is the merit of beatitude, and for this habitual grace (*habitualis Gratia*), which is the principle of merit, is required. The third conversion is that by which someone prepares himself to have grace — and for this no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God converting the soul to Himself, according to that verse of Lamentations at the end: 'Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.'" So he — evidently tacitly retracting what he had said less correctly at the second distinction.[18]

§ 10. When therefore it is taught in general that grace is necessary for conversion to God, by the name of grace is to be understood some gift and supernatural aid of God whereby the mind is raised to that supereminent good — whether it be a habitual gift or something else — as St. Thomas sufficiently indicates in the body of the same article.[19] Now that such a gift was necessary for the Angels for their conversion is so certain a doctrine that St. Augustine rejects it as most absurd if anyone should say that an Angel made himself better by his own will than he was made by God.[20] Therefore, whether the good will by which he was moved toward God was had simultaneously with his nature, or whether it came to him afterward, St. Augustine firmly maintains that without the operative aid of the Creator, the Angel could not have had it. This doctrine is most firmly founded in the Scriptures, as God the Author must be ascribed all good of the intellect and of creatures — as Jas. 1, Rom. 11, 1 Cor. 4 and 12, and so forth, attest. Indeed, if this good be supernatural, the aid of God itself through which such a good is conferred is consequently understood to be supernatural as well, because the powers of nature do not extend themselves beyond nature.

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§ IV — What manner of aid was given to the Angels for persevering (Quale adjutorium fuerit Angelis datum ad perseverandum)

§ 11. Just as for loving God, so also for persevering in the love of God, the aid of grace was necessary for the Angels, because just as the love of God, so also the conservation and perseverance of the love of God is a gift. But it is asked what manner this aid was — whether it was the same as the grace of creation or different; and whether it was such that through it the very act of persevering was given, or rather only such that through it the Angels could persevere if they willed.

§ 12. For certain ones, relying on the authority of St. Augustine,[21] say that the Angels through the grace received at creation could not have persevered unless there had been given to them in addition some other aid — namely, such that without it they could not persevere, and through it they could persevere if they willed; but that whether they willed was left to their free will. For it is in this sense that St. Augustine in that passage speaks of the aid given to the Angels for persevering, adding furthermore: "Which aid, if it had been absent from the Angel or from man when they first fell — since their nature was not of such a kind that it could remain without divine aid if it willed — they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault, for the aid would have been absent without which they could not remain." From these words of St. Augustine they teach that this aid, distinct from the first grace, was likewise present for all the Angels — just as it was for the first man before the fall — but that some through it alone persevered by free will, while others, like the first man, deserted it by free will through sin.

§ 13. Others, however, do not think it necessary that beyond the first grace of creation any other habitual aid be posited for persevering, since in the genus of habitual gift the first grace, if conserved, was sufficient for this. By the aid necessary for perseverance, distinct from the first grace, they understand a special and supernatural aid of God, by which the very act of persevering is worked in the Angel or in the man — efficaciously making him persevere — so that through this gift the Angel or man not only has the ability to persevere but also the actual persevering itself. And this aid they deny was given to all the Angels: for if it had been given to all, all would certainly have persevered; rather, they say it was given to the elect alone.

§ 14. This opinion is held by us to be far more probable and altogether true, whether we consult Scripture, or the doctrine of the Fathers, or reason. For both Scripture and the authority of the Fathers, and reason itself as well, testify to us that every good must be referred to God as its Author, and that thanks must be given to God for every good, and that in every good God alone is to be glorified. But if this is so — as certainly cannot be doubted — then the Angels, whoever persevered, not only received from God the ability to persevere but the very act of persevering itself: so that the word of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 4, "For who distinguisheth thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received?" holds true not only in fallen men restored through the grace of Christ, but also in the elect Angels — as we have shown at length at the forty-second distinction of Book I,[22] where the election of the Angels was treated, so that there is no need to repeat the same things in this place.

§ 15. It is worthwhile to adduce here a passage of St. Augustine, which is in Book XII of *De civitate Dei*, chapter 9,[20] so that what he thought on this matter may be understood. For, treating of the discrimination of the good Angels from the evil, he says: "Those who, having been created good, are nevertheless evil by their own evil will, etc., either received a lesser grace of divine love than those who persevered in the same, or if both were created equally good, and those fell by evil will, these were aided more so as to arrive at that fullness of beatitude from which they became most certain they would never fall." So he. By these words, according to both parts of the disjunctive sentence, he refers the discrimination of the good from the evil to God; but more fully and perfectly according to the latter part, in which he says that while the others fell, these others were aided more — namely by the efficacious aid of grace which He bestowed upon them so that they should not fall, but should persevere in the good they had received all the way to the term of their way. To this doctrine the Master also, following Hugh, thus far gives his assent in the text, attributing the discrimination to God by giving grace to some

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 1.
2. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 10; *De civitate Dei* XI, chs. 11 and 13.
3. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.
4. Gennadius, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, ch. 58 and following chapters.
5. The reference is to Alexander of Hales and Gregory of Rimini (Ariminensis).
6. The reference is to the last distinction of Book I (*ad Distinctionem ultimam lib. 1*).
7. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, chs. 17, 18, and 13.
8. St. Basil, *Homilia 9: Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*.
9. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4.
10. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, chs. 17 and 19.
11. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 4; and St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, chs. 11 and 13.
12. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 10.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2.
14. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* I, chs. 19 and 20.
15. The reference is to Distinction 24.
16. The reference is to the third distinction of Book II.

17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2, ad 3.

18. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 2 [a tacit retractation].

19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2, in the body of the article.

20. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9.

21. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 11.

22. The reference is to Distinction 42, Book I (*ad Distinctionem 42. lib. 1*).

DISTINCTIO V — ON CERTAIN POINTS OF THE MASTER'S TEACHING CONCERNING THE ANGELS THAT ARE TO BE REJECTED (*QUAEDAM IN DOCTRINA MAGISTRI DE ANGELIS IMPROBABILIA*)

§ 1. That statement was made by him indeed with reference to the first sanctifying grace (*prima Gratia gratificans*): for he holds that this grace was not given to all. But he would have stated the matter more correctly had he said this of the gift of perseverance (*donum perseverantiae*); for that this gift was not given to all is shown by the event itself. Now the discourse will necessarily return to the assistance required for persevering when, in this same book, the grace given to the first man at creation is treated.[1] Moreover, what the passage of St. Augustine in *On Correction and Grace* — upon which those who hold the contrary opinion chiefly rely — means for itself, we endeavoured to explain in the preceding book.[2] But how it came about that those to whom the efficacious assistance for persevering was not given fell not without their own fault — this must be declared elsewhere, when the topics of free will and grace are treated. For that difficulty is common to all who sin, and also in the state of corrupted nature: because, just as it cannot come about that someone sins while possessing efficacious assistance toward not sinning, so neither can it come about that someone avoids a fall when such assistance is absent — each of these, to be sure, is necessary in the composite sense (*sensu composito*) — for it is necessary that by whose help we conquer, by that same one's failing to help us we are in turn conquered, as Pope Innocent writes.[3]

§ II — The refutation of two opinions concerning the order of merit relative to reward in the Angels (Refelluntur duæ opiniones de ordine meriti ad præmium in Angelis)

§ 2. Concerning the merit of the holy Angels, two opinions are enumerated by the Master (in the final section of this Distinction).[5] For some were of the opinion that the Angels merited beatitude (*Beatitudo*) through the grace (*Gratia*) by which they were confirmed — in such a way, that is, that in them the reward was simultaneous in time with the merit, being posterior only in the order of nature or of causality. Others, however, supposed that the Angels merited through the services which they render to us, or rather to God on our behalf, the beatitude already long since received — so that the reward in them is prior in time to the merit. The former opinion pleased St. Bonaventure, Marsilius, and also St. Thomas writing upon this Distinction,[6] as well as in the *Quodlibeta*.[7] But the same St. Thomas afterwards withdrew from this opinion and refuted it (in the *Summa*, I, q. 62, a. 4, in the body),[8] so that it is remarkable that Cajetan should have persisted in that same fancy, writing upon I, q. 63, a. 6.'[9]

§ 3. Those who held this opinion said that one and the same act of conversion toward God, inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), is meritorious, while inasmuch as it attains the end, it is the beatific enjoyment (*fruitio Beatifica*). According to which explanation — which can be seen in St. Thomas at the places just cited — not only would merit and reward have been simultaneous in the Angels, but one and the same act would at once have the formal character (*ratio*) both of merit and of reward. But St. Thomas himself refutes this by the following argument: free choice without grace (*gratia*) cannot be a sufficient cause of merit; wherefore no act can be meritorious insofar as it proceeds from free choice, except insofar as it is informed by grace; but it cannot simultaneously be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. "Hence it seems," he says, "that it is not possible for an Angel simultaneously to enjoy and to merit his own enjoyment." To this argument add, that it cannot come about that the same thing is simultaneously the way (*via*) and the terminus; but merit is the way to reward as its terminus; therefore it is impossible that merit and reward be the same thing of itself — as that opinion holds according to the said explanation. Nor will the opinion be able to stand even if you posit different acts, one of which is the merit and the other the reward. For if, as has already been said, imperfect grace is the principle of meriting and perfect grace the principle of enjoying, and perfect and imperfect grace cannot simultaneously exist in the same subject, it follows that merit and reward cannot be simultaneous, whether they be posited as falling upon the same act or upon different acts. Finally, if the same thing cannot simultaneously be in the way and at the terminus (for thus it would simultaneously be moving toward the terminus and be at the terminus), and merit is the way to reward, as we have already said, it manifestly follows that no one can simultaneously merit and possess the reward of that merit.

§ 4. The latter opinion the Master himself acknowledges to be more pleasing to him, and he follows it also elsewhere (as in Distinction 11 of this book).[10] But in truth there is far more absurdity in this opinion than in the former. Hence all the Schools contradict the Master here and count his opinion among select errors. Beyond the argument already stated above from way and terminus — which can easily be applied here — the following arguments also destroy it.

First, Scotus reasons that the recompense of the Angels would depend upon the creation of men, which was yet to follow, or even upon their fall.[11]

§ 5. The second and chief argument is this: merit and reward, as they are considered in this place, are certain perfections of the one acting; merit is a certain inchoate perfection of the one acting, while reward is a consummated perfection. Now it is utterly absurd that a consummated perfection (which will assuredly not be consummated if it can ever be lost or diminished) should be followed by an inchoate perfection. For just as one who has attained the age of manhood cannot return to the years of boyhood, so one who has attained the terminus of the way — that is, consummated beatitude — cannot afterwards move toward it; indeed, this is still less possible, since a contradiction is involved in the matter, namely, being and not being blessed simultaneously.

§ 6. For although a reward or recompense that is external to the agent can be given before the merit — as is clear in the case of a workman to whom wages, or some part of wages, are advanced before his labour — yet this can by no means come about in the reward or recompense of which we now speak, that is, in that which we have said to be the internal perfection of the agent. Hence the internal rewards of Christ followed His passion, such as the resurrection and glorification of His body; certain external rewards, on the other hand, preceded it, such as the justification of those who lived before His coming. Therefore, as regards the services or

ministries which the Angels now render to God on our behalf, these are not the meritorious cause of their beatitude, but are rather the effect of their beatitude. For services of this kind proceed from perfect charity (*charitas*), which has in them the formal character of reward, just as the prayers of holy men who have departed this life and reign with Christ proceed from a similar charity by which they are affected toward us. Wherefore, works of this kind cannot have the formal character of merit with respect to the essential reward (*præmium essentiale*), nor indeed properly with respect to the accidental reward (*præmium accidentale*), of which more below (in Distinction 11).[12]

§ 7. Since, therefore, it is now sufficiently clear from these arguments that the Angels received neither before their merit nor simultaneously with their merit the reward — that is, beatitude — it follows that what we showed long since (at Distinction 3)[13] is the case: that they received the reward after the merit, in different instants, the earlier of which was the merit and the later the reward. The same order of demerit and punishment, we have also said, obtained in the evil ones.[14]

Nor does this stand in the way of what the same St. Augustine teaches elsewhere (in *De Libero Arbitrio*, Bk. 3, ch. 15),[15] namely, that guilt always has punishment conjoined to it, as if similarly reward could be conjoined to merit. To this objection *it is answered* by some that St. Augustine does not mean conjunction at the same point of time, but rather that one follows immediately upon the other. But that reply is contrary to the mind of the author; for he says that guilt and punishment are divided by no interval of time, so that, as it were, the soul should not at one time fail to do what it ought and at another time suffer what it ought, lest even for a moment of time the universal beauty be blemished, so that there be in it the disgrace of sin without the adornment of punishment: he wishes therefore that guilt and punishment exist absolutely simultaneously.

§ 8. The truer reply, therefore, is that St. Augustine is speaking not of any punishment of sin whatsoever, but of that by which one, by the very fact that one sins, is rendered wretched and unhappy, even if one takes the greatest delight in sin — a punishment which is established as inseparable from sin. For that the afflicting and tormenting punishment is posterior to guilt he teaches in the following words: "But what is now most secretly avenged is reserved for the future judgment for the manifestation and most keen sense of misery" — so he writes. But something of this kind can also be understood in the case of merit and reward. For by the very fact that someone acts rightly, it goes well with him and hence he is already in some way blessed; yet he is bidden to await for his good work a future retribution — that is, consummated beatitude.

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§ IV — Certain improbable points in the Master's doctrine concerning the Angels (Quædam in doctrina Magistri de Angelis improbabilia)

§ 9. Since there are in the Master, in this Distinction and the three preceding ones, certain things concerning the Angels which are rejected by most of the Scholastics, or indeed by all of them, partly as absurd and incredible, partly as less probable, it will not be out of place that we enumerate and note them in order, so that a more certain, or at least more probable, doctrine concerning the state of the Angels may be established for us.

The **first**, therefore, is: that the Angels were not created with an act of the will but only of the intellect — although at the end of the third Distinction he attributes to them some love of God, through which, however,

he thinks they did not merit, and it is not clear whether he attributes this to them in the first instant of creation or after it.

The **second**: that the Angels were not created in grace, of which we have already treated sufficiently above.

The **third**: that the good Angels did not receive grace, nor were converted to God before their confirmation.

The **fourth**: that the evil Angels never had grace and were never converted to God.

The **fifth**, which follows from the third: that the good Angels did not merit before their confirmation, but either in the very act of confirmation through the grace then added, or — what is more pleasing to the Master — after confirmation through the services rendered to us.

The **sixth**, which follows from the fourth: that the evil Angels never merited beatitude.

The **seventh**: that the Angels had no need of grace in order to stand firm in what they had received, because there was nothing to impel them toward a fall, and therefore that the sin of some came about because, being able to stand without grace, they did not stand until grace was added, just as others persevered until grace was added to them. This is the Master's doctrine in § F. of this Distinction,[17] but it conflicts with the teaching of St. Augustine (*De Correctione et Gratia*, ch. 11),[18] where he says that a certain assistance distinct from the grace of creation was necessary for the Angels in order to persevere in what they had received in their condition, notwithstanding that there was nothing by which an Angel would be impelled toward a fall.

§ 10. For although for a man who has fallen and been vitiated through sin, and has now been justified through the grace of Christ, there is on that account necessary some other assistance of grace in order to persevere in the justice received — because he is, as it were, continually pressed toward a fall by the weakness of the flesh — yet this is not the sole cause of the necessity of grace for persevering, but this also, and the chief cause: that both angelic and human nature was so created by God that it can attain wisdom, justice, and beatitude only from its same creator, and once these have been received can abide and persevere in them only through continuously maintained assistance from that same one — just as air is not only first illuminated but continually maintained in a luminous condition: it receives this from the sun. On which matter one should consult St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 106, and other places),[19] which will be more conveniently adduced by us elsewhere, when the state of the first man is treated (at Distinctions 25 and 29).[20]

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§ I — What was the origin of sin in the Angels (Quæ fuerit origo peccati in Angelis)

§ 11. St. Thomas rightly proves that the Angels could sin (I, q. 63, a. 1)[21] by this general argument: because to sin is nothing other than to deviate from the rectitude of an act which the agent ought to have, whether sin be understood in natural things, in artificial things, or in moral things; but it happens only to that act whose rule is the very power of the agent itself that it does not deviate from rectitude, which indeed belongs to God alone; for the Divine Will alone is the rule of its own act, because it is not ordered to a higher end. For the will of any creature whatsoever does not have rectitude in its act except insofar as it is ruled by the Divine Will. It is clear, therefore, that sin cannot exist in the Divine Will alone, but can exist in the rest if they are regarded

according to the condition of their nature — on which matter more will be said (at the immediately following Distinction).'[22]

§ 12. Now that the Angels, although they hold the highest rank in creation, both could sin and in fact did sin, is so certain according to the Scriptures that it cannot be denied while keeping the faith. But since in human beings after the fall of the first parent sin is accustomed to arise either from the tinder of concupiscence with which we are all born and which is left in all throughout this life, or from evil habit, or from immoderate passion, or from ignorance of things to be done — none of which appears to have preceded the sin itself in the Angels — it can rightly be asked in what manner or by what path sin could have had its origin and entry into the Angels. This question must also be asked in its own place concerning the sin of the first human beings (at Distinction 22).[23]

§ 13. And first, it must be guarded against that we refer the origin of sin to some first evil principle. This was the error of the Manichaeans, long since condemned in the Church, whose refutation belongs to Distinction 34.[24] Then, ignorance, or an erring and corrupted judgment concerning things to be done, is not to be posited in the Angels before sin. For error did not precede guilt, but guilt drew error after it as a punishment and companion, both in the Angels and in the first man. Nor was there in them any perverse inclination such as is in us.

§ 14. Therefore the first origin of sin is to be placed in a defectible will, turning itself away from a greater good toward a lesser good — namely, when the lesser good, considered apart and not compared with the more excellent good, is loved as a good simply speaking, in such a way that it is not subjected to the greater good but one rests in it and is pleased with oneself in it; and this not by any natural necessity, nor by violence applied from without, but by free choice.

§ 15. In this way, therefore, pride arose in the Angels, when, considering their own excellence and not comparing it with the divine excellence, they clung to themselves with disordered love and were thus turned away from God. Wherefore in them the perverse judgment was not antecedent but consequent, or at least concomitant, to the first sin. For by reason of the fact that they loved their own excellence in a disordered way, the judgment of the mind was darkened in them, so that they thought themselves sufficient to themselves. For blindness of mind arises from sin, not sin from blindness — if we are speaking of the first origin of sin.

§ 16. Now that it should not be said that the first sin arose from some prior error, St. Augustine teaches in *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. 11, ch. 11, and Bk. 14, chs. 10, 11, and 13,[25] and St. Thomas holds the same (art. 1 of the aforesaid question, reply to the fourth objection, and in *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1),[26] and the same is the common opinion of the Doctors. But as St. Thomas teaches in those same places, it is necessary to say that a certain inconsiderateness preceded the first sin of the Angel — not indeed in the order of time but of nature. This is proved as follows: because the election of the will by which the Angel chose his own excellence was a sin from the fact that it lacked the order of the due measure or rule, that is, because the rule of the superior was not applied, which rule indeed could not be applied except through the intellect, to which the act of consideration belongs; therefore in the intellect there was an inconsiderateness of the rule or measure, that is, the intellect lacked the actual consideration of that circumstance which the Angel was obliged to have in that very act by which he loved his own excellence. For if he was not obliged to have it, then the election of the will consequent upon it would not have been a sin. For just as all freedom that is in the act of the will is radically in

the intellect, so every formal character of merit or demerit — which are certain differences of acts of the will — presupposes either a right or a defective judgment of the intellect.

§ 17. Now certain thinkers opine that also in fallen man sin does not necessarily arise from error of judgment concerning what is to be done, but that, with the right judgment of reason remaining, the will is able, by reason of its natural freedom whereby it dominates the other powers, to avert the intellect from consideration of the better good and to move it to consider vehemently what is less, and, with that thing thus considered, to be inordinately fixed upon it through love. Hence they say that the Apostle in 1 Cor. 4, wishing to repress the glorying of the Corinthians, does not say: "Why dost thou glory, thinking that thou hast not received?"; but, "Why dost thou glory *as if thou hadst not received*?"[27] If this is how the matter can stand in fallen human beings, it is established that it could also be so in an Angel — namely, that although he did not not know from whom he had received so great a benefit of nature and grace, he nevertheless gloried in it as if he had not received it from another, while gazing upon that good without simultaneously considering the author of so great a good, who is infinitely more excellent than his own good.

§ 18. But whether this is rightly said of fallen man is no light question. Certainly St. Thomas in the aforesaid places seems to extend even to human beings the point that they sometimes sin without error, through a defect of consideration of that circumstance which ought to be considered — as, for example, if someone should choose to pray without attending to the order established by the Church; for this is the example he adduces (in the *Summa*).[28]

§ 19. But against this doctrine, whether placing sin in the Angel or also in man as not proceeding from error of judgment, there seems to work above all the celebrated opinion of St. Thomas himself, by which he teaches that there cannot be sin in the will unless there is a preceding error of the practical judgment (*judicium practicum*) in the intellect. He holds this in many places of the *Summa* and elsewhere, and expressly upon Distinction 5 of this book, q. 1, a. 1,[29] where he denies that sin can be in the will unless there is in some way a deception in reason (*ratio*), and proves this through the Philosopher in *Ethics*, Bk. 3,[30] who says that "every evil man is in some manner ignorant."

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1. Cf. this book, dist. 24 and dist. 29, where the grace given to the first man at creation is treated.
2. Cf. the preceding book, dist. 41, where the passage of St. Augustine, *De Correctione et Gratia*, is explained.
3. Pope Innocent I, *Epistola ad Concilium Carthaginense*.
4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 4.
5. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, final section.
6. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, commentary on this Distinction.
7. St. Thomas, *Quodlibeta*, q. 9, a. 8.
8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 4, in the body.
9. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 6.
10. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 11.
11. Scotus, reasoning cited in context of this discussion.
12. Cf. dist. 11 of this book, where the accidental reward is discussed.

13. Cf. dist. 3 of this book, where this point was demonstrated.

14. St. Augustine, *De Correctione et Gratia*, chs. 10–11; *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 7.

15. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, Bk. 3, ch. 15.

16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62.

17. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, § F.

18. St. Augustine, *De Correctione et Gratia*, ch. 11.

19. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 106, and other places.

20. Cf. dist. 25 and dist. 29 of this book.

21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1.

22. Cf. the immediately following Distinction (dist. 6).

23. Cf. dist. 22 of this book.

24. Cf. dist. 34 of this book, where the Manichaean error is refuted.

25. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. 11, ch. 11; Bk. 14, chs. 10, 11, and 13.

26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1, reply to the fourth objection; and St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1.

27. 1 Cor. 4.

28. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* (locus as adduced in context).

29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* and St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1.

30. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. 3.

DISTINCTIO VI — ON THE SIN OF THE ANGELS, THE ERROR OF JUDGMENT, AND THE NATURE OF ANGELIC PRIDE (*DE PECCATO ANGELORUM, ERRORE IUDICII, ET SUPERBIA ANGELICA*)

§ 1. [He] acknowledges that there was error of choice in the sinning angels. Proof: This is also proved by the following argument: no one does anything by rational will unless he judges that it is to be done. For in order that there be choice (*electio*) in the will, judgment must precede in the intellect; wherefore if the choice is evil, the judgment is perverse and erroneous. Add to this that the aforementioned want of consideration (*inconsideratio*) is posited as having been voluntary, for otherwise it would not have the formal character (*ratio*) of want of consideration. For one is not called inconsiderate who fails to consider what he is not bound to consider; it seems, therefore, that a bad will preceded that want of consideration, from which it could be called voluntary. But if this is so, nothing prevents the error of judgment arising from a bad will from being put in the place of that want of consideration. Moved by these arguments, certain thinkers hold that in the same way as the first sin is said to have proceeded from want of consideration, it can equally be said to have proceeded from an error of practical judgment (*iudicium practicum*), by which the angel judged that this act — which was certainly a sin — was one he ought to perform. They deny, however, that it follows from this that any error preceded the first sin, if the sin is considered as a whole. For they say that, if one is to speak properly, ignorance or error of this kind — according to which every sinner errs — is not a cause of sin, but rather something belonging to sin itself.

§ 2. For a man sins by the very fact that reason judges perversely, and sin itself is consummated, as it were, by those two inseparable parts — false judgment and evil choice — and each occurs freely according to its own mode: because the origin of freedom is in reason, and its term and perfection in the will. And what is said of man is to be said similarly of the angel. They hold this doctrine to be consonant with what St. Thomas teaches.[1] But as for what is said there — that a certain sin requires no preceding ignorance but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered, and that in this way the angel sinned by turning himself through free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) to his own proper good without reference to the rule of the divine will — they do not think that by those words he meant to signify that in the first sin of the angel there was no error of practical judgment, since elsewhere he expressly names an error of choice in that sin; but only to exclude the ignorance or error by which something, considered under certain removed circumstances, would be judged good and therefore to be chosen, when it was not such — as happens in sins which are said to be committed through ignorance.

§ 3. Other thinkers, however, who deny that there was a properly so-called error of judgment in the first sin, interpret that general teaching of St. Thomas — by which he holds that every sinner errs — in such a way that by the name of error there is comprehended the want of consideration whereby what ought to be

considered is not considered. In this sense they acknowledge that there was an error of choice in the first sin, and hold that St. Thomas used those expressions *aliquo modo* ("in some manner") and *quodammodo* ("in a certain way") to signify this, because a want of consideration of this kind is not properly a deception, nor does every sinner properly speaking fail to know, but does so in a general manner of speaking. To the second objection, however, they reply that in the sinning angel there was only one want of consideration and one evil choice, each of which was prior and posterior to the other in different respects (*diversis rationibus*), in such a way that the want of consideration, inasmuch as it had conjoined to it the practical judgment, was prior to the choice in the genus of formal cause (*genus causae formalis*); while the choice was prior to that same practical and inconsiderate judgment, as the motivating cause thereof. But whether these things are rightly said or otherwise is a question that must be weighed more carefully in its proper place,[2] where the topic under discussion is ignorance as a cause of sin, or as conjoined with sin.

§ II — What was the first sin of the Angel? (Quod fuerit primum Angeli peccatum?)

§ 4. Concerning what the first sin of the Angel may have been, various opinions of authors are found. One opinion, held by certain of the ancients who were deceived by a perverse understanding of the history of Gen. 6, supposed that the Angels, seized by love of women, sinned through lust, and seem to have placed this as the first sin in those Angels of whom they so think, inasmuch as by it the sons of God, that is, the good ones, were made evil angels. Such was the opinion of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Justin, Origen, Lactantius, and certain others; but this same opinion was wholly repudiated by later authors, and expressly by St. John Chrysostom.[4] It is refuted above all by this argument: Angels are incorporeal, and hence utterly incapable of sensible and carnal pleasures. Indeed, even if they had bodies naturally united to themselves, these would not be composed of the elements nor similar to our bodies, but ethereal — bodies which, as they would have no need of food or drink, so they would be affected neither by tastes nor by any other sensible quality, any more than are the heavenly bodies, even on the hypothesis that these are animated.

§ 5. Moreover, it is established that long before that time the envy of the devil had brought death into the world (Wis. 2); therefore the sin of lust which, according to this opinion, is supposed to have been committed by the Angels shortly before the Flood, could not have been the first of all sins in the angelic kind. Another opinion held that the first sin of the devil was a sin of the tongue. This is found in the author of the *Commentary on the Psalms* ascribed to St. Jerome[5] (in the second exposition of Ps. 119, which is found at the end of the work); where, if the sin of the tongue be taken properly — that is, as something committed *by means of* the tongue — it is clear that the opinion is false, because angelic spirits have no bodily members. But if that author means by the sin of the tongue the act performed through the mouth of the serpent, it is established that this was not the first sin, for it proceeded from envy and hatred towards man. If, however — which seems more fully to express what that author intended — a kind of spiritual utterance is understood, namely blasphemy against God, the devil could not have broken out into this sin except from hatred of God; for the root of cursing is hatred. Therefore the third opinion establishes hatred of God as the first sin of the devil.

§ 6. This is proved thus: because principal adherence to God is through charity (*caritas*); therefore principal departure from Him is through hatred, as the direct opposite of charity. Likewise, charity is the first

of the virtues; therefore hatred is the first of the vices. Yet not even this can be maintained, because every hatred arises from love; hence it was necessary that hatred of God should proceed from some perverse love. For just as God is principally adhered to through love of God, so departure from God is principally effected through disordered love of self, from which there afterwards arises hatred of God as of One who forbids the lover from that which he loves in a disordered manner. Therefore the first sin could not have been hatred, but a disordered love, or certainly something else.

§ 7. The fourth opinion is that of those who think it can be said with probability that the first sin of the devil was ingratitude towards God: for then, it is said, he first sinned when he ceased to give thanks to God. But neither is this rightly said; for he ceased to give thanks to God precisely because he began to take inordinate pleasure in himself. For although in a single instant several sins may have been conjoined, there is nonetheless a causal order by which one was prior to another.

§ 8. The fifth opinion is that of those who make envy the first of all — namely, the envy by which the Angel envied man the dignity in which he saw him created. St. Cyprian seems to have held this view[6] (in the *Tractate on Jealousy and Envy*); for he says that the devil perished and was cast down from the state of his felicity through the envy that blazed up in him towards man. But this is refuted by St. Augustine[7] (in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, ch. 14) in these words: "Some say that the fall of the devil from the higher seats came about because he envied man made in the image of God; but envy follows pride, it does not precede it. For the cause of pride is not envy, but the cause of envy is pride. Since pride is the love of one's own excellence and envy the hatred of another's happiness, it is sufficiently evident which arises from which." And shortly after: "By being proud, therefore, one becomes envious, and not by being envious does one become proud." So he. Although therefore Scripture (Wis. 2) ascribes to the devil the envy by which sin and death were introduced into the human race, it does not thereby place envy as the *first* sin. Wherefore what is adduced from St. Cyprian in favour of this view must either be understood in such a way that envy is taken according to its root and origin, which is pride — since it is otherwise the commonly received opinion that the devil sinned before the creation of man, when he still did not know that man was to be created, and indeed with such dignity of nature that he himself could envy it — or else the opinion must be corrected by the authority of St. Augustine. For it appears that St. Augustine, when he says "some say this," wished to designate this opinion of Cyprian by name, though without naming him.

§ 9. The sixth opinion is that of Scotus, who, writing on this Distinction[8] (q. 2, a. 2), thinks that the first sin of the Angel can be reduced to the vice of lust, not properly but metaphorically. For he supposes that there was in the devil a certain spiritual lust, whereby he was, that is to say, excessively delighted in himself and in his own excellence. Gabriel Biel, commenting on this same Distinction, agrees with this opinion to the extent that he thinks the first sin in the Angel was indeed the sin of pride, by which, loving himself beyond measure, he rested in himself; but that there followed from this a second sin of lust, in that he desired for himself a certain singular excellence as supremely delightful. But since lust can only be understood in Angels by way of trope — by which same token gluttony and drunkenness could also be attributed to them, namely to signify the sin of excessive and disordered delight — these authors seem nevertheless to have preferred to call that sin lust, on the grounds that in this class of sin the delight is more vehement than in others. But whether such a lust be called the first or the second sin of the Angel, this opinion is refuted by reason: because to take delight in some operation is evil only because the operation itself is evil; hence, if the Angel's delight was evil, it was prior that the operation should be evil. Nor, however, are two sins to be posited — a bad operation and a bad delight —

because delight does not constitute an operation distinct from the prior one, but is something consequent upon it. Nor indeed could the mere vehemence of delight constitute a sin: for if the object be good, no intensity of delight that is centred upon it can ever be evil, considered in itself. For the good Angels loved themselves with natural love no less intensely than the evil ones.

§ 10. There remains, therefore, the last and truest opinion: that the first sin of the Angel was pride (*superbia*). For this is openly taught by Scripture, handed down by the Fathers, and demonstrated by reason. The scriptural passages are these: Sir. 10: "Pride is the beginning of all sin"; Tob. 4: "In pride all perdition took its beginning"; Prov. 16: "Before ruin the heart shall be exalted"; likewise Is. 14 and Ezek. 28, in which passages, under the figure of two kings, the pride of the devil as his first sin is described at length. To these also pertain the words of Job 41: "He is king over all the children of pride"; 1 Tim. 3: "Not a neophyte, lest, puffed up with pride, he fall into the judgment" — that is, the condemnation — "of the devil"; Lk. 10: "I was watching Satan fall like lightning from heaven." For it is clear that this was said by the Lord on account of his pride, because by those words He wished to repress the elation of His disciples, who were exulting and pleased with themselves that even the demons were subjected to them.

§ 11. That this is the common opinion of the Fathers is established: for thus have taught St. Basil[9] (Homily 9, *That God is not the author of evils*); Gregory Nazianzen[10] (Oration *On the Nativity of Christ*); Athanasius, or whoever the author may be[11] (Question 6, or according to another edition, 10, *To Antiochus*); St. Ambrose[12] (on Ps. 36, at those words: "I have seen the wicked highly exalted"; and on Ps. 118, at the verse "Thou hast rebuked the proud," and again at "The proud acted wickedly throughout"); St. Jerome[13] (on Is. 14); Prudentius[14] (in the *Hamartigenia*); St. John Chrysostom[15] (bk. 2, *On Compunction of Heart*; and in the *Homily on Adam and Eve*); St. Augustine[16] (bk. 12, *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 6), where, speaking of the apostate Angels, he says: "Turned away from Him who is supreme, they turned to themselves, and this vice is nothing other than pride"; who again (bk. 14, ch. 13) writes that the beginning of an evil will could not have been anything but pride, and proves this with the words that follow. The same author (bk. 11, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 15) uses to prove this that saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6: "The root of all evils is concupiscence" — or avarice — understanding under the word *avaritia* the general vice of concupiscence, by which one desires one's own good more than is fitting. "Hence the devil fell," he says, "who certainly loved not money but his own power." To these add Prosper[17] (in the *Letter to Demetriadis*, which is also read among the Ambrosian letters, no. 84),(a) Cassian[18] (*Collationes*, bk. 5, ch. 18); Gregory[19] (bk. 34, *Moralia*, chs. 14 ff.; and bk. 4, *Epistles*, no. 38); Isidore[20] (bk. 1, *De summo Bono*, ch. 12); St. John Damascene[21] (bk. 2, *De Fide*, ch. 4); St. Anselm[22] (*De Casu Diaboli*, ch. 4); St. Bernard[23] (on the *Canticle*, Sermons 22 and 69); Franco[24] (vol. 1, *De gratia Dei*); the Master[25] in this Distinction (§ A); and after these, almost all the later theologians have followed them.

§ 12. Furthermore, St. Thomas proves this opinion by reason[3] (I, q. 63, a. 2): because a spiritual nature, such as the angelic, cannot be affected by goods proper to the body, but only by those that can be found in spiritual things. For nothing is affected except towards that which can in some manner be fitting to its nature; but in the case of spiritual goods, no sin can arise through affective desire for them unless, in such desire, the rule of a superior is not observed. "This," he says, "is the sin of pride — not to be subject to a Superior in that in which one ought to be subject"; whence he concludes that the first sin of the Angel could have been none other than pride. This assertion of the Angelic Doctor accords with the above-cited words of St. Augustine, who denies that the beginning of an evil will could have been anything other than pride — although St.

Augustine speaks generally of sin as found also in the human race, while St. Thomas's proof concerns the angelic nature alone.

§ 13. Other arguments also concur. For the first temptation of the devil, by which he attacked and overthrew the first human beings, was aimed at pride; it is therefore probable that he himself first fell through pride, so that through that same vice he strove to cast man down from his state, through which vice he knew he had himself lost his original dignity. Likewise, humility is most specially commended to the City of God on pilgrimage in the world, and the same virtue is most specially praised in the King and Head of that City, Christ; and this is so because both in man and in the devil, the prince of the earthly city, the first and chief sin was pride. These reasons are indicated by St. Augustine in the passage just cited. Finally, the prince of the good Angels reproved the vice of pride as the first sin in the prince of the demons when, resisting him, the very name *Michael* speaks, as if saying: "Who is this who dares to compare himself with God?" Therefore this was the first sin he recognised in him.[26]

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§ III — That the devil's second sin was envy (Alterum diaboli peccatum fuisse invidiam)

§ 14. That pride gives birth to envy, and not the reverse, has already been shown in the words of St. Augustine in the refutation of the fifth opinion. Therefore it is not to be doubted that after the sin of pride there followed in the Angel envy accompanied by hatred; as Scripture testifies, Wis. 2: "By the envy of the devil death entered into the world." The Fathers teach this: St. Basil,[28] St. Augustine,[29] St. Gregory,[30] St. Bernard,[31] and very many others, all the Scholastics being in agreement. St. Thomas proves it in a manner similar to that of St. Augustine: because, namely, when the affection of someone tends toward something desirable, it consequently also strains against the opposite — that is, against that by which it is impeded from attaining what it desires. Therefore when someone desires a singular excellence, which is the mark of pride, he immediately strains against the excellence of another inasmuch as it stands in the way of his own excellence, which he wills to be singular; and this straining belongs to envy. And so envy follows pride as its own proper passion almost immediately; envy being nothing other than sorrow at the good of another inasmuch as through that good one's own singular excellence is impeded. Moreover, the devil envied both God and man, albeit in different ways, as St. Thomas teaches.[32]

§ IV — When did envy follow upon pride in the devil? (Quando invidia superbiam in diabolo fuerit subsecuta?)

§ 15. It is asked when envy followed upon pride — whether in the same instant, being posterior only in the order of nature, or rather in a subsequent instant. And indeed, if envy is, as it were, the proper passion (*propria passio*) of pride, it could appear that both were present simultaneously in the same instant, since proper passions are not separated in time from the natures out of which they flow. On the other hand, the devil could not have envied man before man had been created. Now this, according to the common opinion, took place on the sixth day after the angel's fall into pride; wherefore envy seems to have followed upon pride only on the sixth day.

§ 16. It seems one must answer (*Respondendum videtur*) that in that same instant in which the angel first sinned, there was no explicit act of envy or hatred toward God, and far less toward man, whom the devil did not yet know; but there was only a disordered appetite for his own excellence, in which, however, envy and hatred of God were already contained radically. But in a subsequent instant he had an explicit act of envy and hatred of God — joined, namely, to that grief, which he conceived to the highest degree from the condemnation of his own conscience. The reason for this answer is: because in the first act of pride the angel had the greatest delight; therefore there was in that act no grief of condemnation, nor explicit envy and hatred of God. For otherwise one would have to admit that the devil in the act of pride was no more delighted at the beginning, when he first became proud, than at any time thereafter. This same reasoning subsequently also shows that the instant of the first sin was not also the instant of damnation, as some have held.

§ 17. With respect to man, however, he did not conceive envy until he saw man created for that blessedness which he himself would have had, had he not by sinning fallen away from it; for so the Doctors commonly teach. But if, as some have held, the first angel had from the very beginning a revelation concerning the man to come, or even concerning Christ, God and man yet to be born, then there would be nothing absurd — indeed, it could be said most truly — that in him envy's sin followed immediately after pride, whereby he was moved with evil zeal against the human race, or against God made man (which excellence was indeed to be the greatest of all). But whether such an opinion is to be approved, we shall say below.[34]

§ V — Whether the devil was made worse through envy (Utrum diabolus per invidiam factus sit deterior)

§ 18. It is asked whether the angel who was made evil through pride was made worse through the envy that followed upon it. That this is so seems apparent: because sin added to sin renders worse the one in whom it resides, even if one is the cause of the other — as when someone falls from drunkenness into lust, or from theft into perjury. This is then proved from John Cassian, who[36] introduces the Abbot Serenus disputing of the fall of the devil in such a way as to say that he first fell through the pride by which he said "I will be like the Most High," and afterwards fell again and more gravely through the envy by which he was inflamed against man — and in such a manner that the former ruin was the cause of the latter. And therefore he says that the first fall, by which the devil had fallen through pride, and by which he had deserved to be called the serpent, was followed by a second ruin through envy; this second ruin, finding him still possessing something upright in himself — to the extent that he could even have a certain share of conversation and counsel with man — was, by the sentence of the Lord, usefully cast down into the lowest depths, so that no longer, as before, gazing upon something lofty, he should walk with his head high, but, cleaving to the ground, should creep. By which words it is manifestly signified that in the devil, before this second ruin of envy, there still remained something of uprightness, which he lost by merit of his envy at the moment when he heard: "Upon thy breast thou shalt go," Gen. 3.'[37]

§ 19. But one must reply that if we assign to the transgression and demerit of the evil angel several instants, in the first of which he sinned through pride, and in another subsequent one through envy — by which he burned either against God, or against man foreknown from God's revelation — then it can be said with probable reasoning that the devil, made evil through pride and liable to eternal damnation, was made worse through envy, and consequently subject to graver damnation. For according to this hypothesis he was

still on the way, not at the term, when he sinned through actual envy, and therefore, by adding sins to sins, he could be made worse and could augment the guilt of his damnation. But that opinion we rejected as less probable when we were treating of the instants of merit and demerit of the angels.[38]

§ 20. Therefore, just as it is more probable that the transgression and demerit of the angel was only of a single instant, so with equal probability one must assert that through those sins, whatever they are, which he committed after that instant — whether envy or anything else — he was not made worse with respect to the internal malice of his will. This is also proved from the opposite direction: for the good angels, once confirmed in good, are not made better by the many good works they subsequently perform, however many they exercise; therefore neither are the evil angels, once obdurate in evil (which we hold to have occurred at once immediately after the first instant of demerit), rendered worse through any evil works. For just as good works proceed from the good angels out of a will that has once attained its perfect goodness, so evil works proceed from the evil ones out of a will that long since attained its complete malice. And the same judgment holds for the souls of damned men and of the blessed.

§ 21. Finally, this reply is confirmed by that brief and well-worn saying of St. John Damascene, commonly received among theologians:[21] "What death is to men, that the fall is to angels; for after the fall there is no place of repentance for them, just as there is none for men after death." From which it follows that the angel, at the moment of his fall, was totally affected, so that he could neither deserve merit nor be made worse thereafter — just as men cannot be from death, according to that passage of Ecclesiastes: "Where the tree falleth, there it shall lie." For before death men are still on the way — that is, in the state of meriting and demeriting — and one cannot deny, indeed it is established, that sins added to sins render them worse; hence the solution to the objection based on reason is clear.

§ 22. As to what is adduced from Cassian — that something of uprightness remained in the devil until he sinned through envy against man — since this is both contrary to reason and alien from the common teaching of theologians, it is easily rejected. Nor does the opinion gain anything from the fact that he adduces the devil's association and conversation with man as having been first granted and then denied. For this is false: because not less after that seduction of man, but rather much more, as a punishment of that transgression of our first parents, is the devil permitted association and conversation with men — while he transforms himself into a human form or even into an angel of light, and, what is greater, insinuates himself into the inmost senses through wicked suggestions in order to deceive and seduce men — whereas with the first mother he conversed in the form of a serpent alone.

§ 23. As to what Cassian contends by those words, "Upon thy breast thou shalt go," etc. — namely, that something of uprightness remained in the devil after the first fall of pride, which was taken from him after his fall through envy — we reply that those words, insofar as they pertain to the spiritual and mystical serpent, that is, the devil, bear this sense: "Thou who didst will to usurp dominion over men, shalt henceforth be accounted accursed by all, and shalt be the most wretched and most vile among all sinners; nor shalt thou eat anything but earth" — that is, earthly and carnal men. For, as St. Augustine says,[39] "man in punishment of sin was made the food of the devil." Therefore the sentence of God pronounced against the serpent took nothing of uprightness from him, but foretold his future vileness among men. See St. Augustine.[40] Moreover, concerning the curse of the serpent and what sense it bears, this will be treated below.[41]

§ VI — Wherein consisted the pride of the angel (In quo sita fuerit Angeli superbia)

§ 24. Concerning the pride of the devil — of what kind it was, and what was its proper seat, that is, what its object was — the opinions of the Doctors are various. The first of these places the pride of the devil in this: that he desired equality with God, that is, that he should be God. This opinion is frequent among the ancient Fathers. For St. Augustine, in Tractate 17[42] on John, on those words of chapter 5 "making himself equal to God," says that the devil willed to make himself equal to God, and that he poured this same pride into man. And in Discourse 1,[43] on Psalm 68, treating those words "What I had not stolen, I then restored," he affirms that the devil willed to seize the Divinity — namely, the same dignity which Christ did not usurp by robbery but received by nature, Phil. 2. Similar passages are adduced from the same St. Augustine;[44] likewise Prosper,[45] St. Gregory,[46] Isidore,[20] and St. Bernard;[47] and before all of them Prudentius,[48] who says that the devil persuaded himself through pride that he was begotten of himself, that is, from no other, which belongs to God alone.

§ 25. Moreover, they use as confirmation of this position the following Scriptures: Is. 14, "I will be like the Most High"; Ezek. 28, "Thou hast said: I am God"; Matt. 4, "All these things will I give thee, if falling down thou wilt adore me"; Phil. 2, "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God" — meaning that the devil willed to seize this by robbery. Likewise 2 Thess. 2, concerning Antichrist, the instrument of the devil: "He is lifted up above all that is called God, or that is worshipped, so that he sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself as if he were God." Furthermore, they wish to find evidence for this in the fact that the devil formerly took the greatest pains to procure that sacrifice be offered to him under various forms and names of divinities throughout all nations, and that other divine honors be rendered to him — and still endeavors to procure this, as much as he can.

§ 26. To these they add the testimony of the ancient Fathers — Irenaeus,[49] St. Augustine,[50] Prosper,[51] and St. Cyril[52] — who attest that the first man was raised to such pride that he willed to make himself equal to God. Wherefore they consider it much more credible of the angel, whose purely spiritual nature approaches much more closely to the immaterial and most simple nature of God. Of this opinion are Scotus[53] and those who follow him. Their most powerful argument is this: since Scripture openly signifies that the devil desired the divine sublimity, and since it is established that the pride of the devil is the greatest, if it is possible that the devil sinned in this way, one must hold that he sinned thus. Now that it is possible, notwithstanding that it is impossible for a creature to be made equal to God, they prove from this: that the will can be directed toward impossibilities, as the Philosopher teaches.[54]

§ 27. A second opinion is that the devil desired not indeed to be equal to God, but to be like him in this — that he should be subject to no one — and they interpret in this sense the equality which the words of Scripture and the Fathers express. Hence also St. Gregory[55] seems to place the sin of the angel in this, that he willed to be his own master (*sui juris*); for he says in the latter passage concerning the devil: "He would have been exalted, had he been willing to adhere to him who is truly exalted; he would have been exalted, had he been content with participation in true sublimity; but by proudly desiring a private sublimity, he rightly lost the participated one. For in abandoning the principle to which he ought to have adhered, he sought for himself, as it were, his own principle; in abandoning him who could truly have sufficed for him, he judged that

he could suffice for himself." So much there. Of this opinion are Alexander of Hales in his *Summa*,[56] Lyranus, and Burgensis.'[57]

§ 28. Both of the foregoing opinions St. Thomas[35] rejects with two arguments. The first is that since the angel knew both to be impossible, there could not be in the angel a choice of an impossible thing except from a prior error, and it is manifest that no such error existed in him before the sin. As to what is objected from the Philosopher in the contrary sense, it is refuted from that same Philosopher. For in that passage the Philosopher says that the will indeed can be directed toward impossibles, but that intention and choice are only of possible things — understand, as regards the estimation of the agent, who intends or chooses only what he judges to be possible. Therefore, since the angel did not judge it possible for himself either to be equal to God or to be simply his own master (for otherwise there would have been error in him, since both of these are impossible), he could not have chosen either of them.

§ 29. The second argument of St. Thomas is that no creature can desire its own non-existence; yet this would follow if the angel were to become either equal to God or simply his own master. For these things are proper to God and incommunicable to creatures; nor was the angel ignorant of this — indeed, he knew evidently that it was so. Therefore he could not have chosen either of them.

§ 30. Furthermore, the third opinion belongs to those who so hold both the aforesaid opinions to be true (as they are persuaded from Scripture and the authority of the Fathers) that they nonetheless think some beginning of pride was present in the angel — from which an error was caused — before he desired what, according to those opinions, he is said to have desired. For they distinguish the beginning of the angelic sin from its consummation: and they say that the beginning was without error, but they admit that the consummation could not have been without error and great blindness of mind. For they place the beginning of that sin in the consideration and love of his own excellence without comparison to a superior and more excellent good; and from this, they say, there then arose in the angelic mind a blindness by which he attributed more to himself than was fitting and less to God; so that at length, with pride and the opinion of his own excellence increasing, he dared to promise himself equality with God. And they render this opinion of theirs probable on the ground that in man's fall too there was a similar progression of pride. Nor is it to be wondered, they say, that from this beginning of sin man and angel should at once have fallen into such great darkness of mind — since that beginning of sin was an incipient pride of self; and it is the nature of pride, whenever it begins to occupy anyone's soul, straightway to envelop it in a kind of mist and fog of ignorance, whereby it comes about that one does not estimate oneself or others as one ought.

§ 31. Therefore those who hold this opinion say that the ancient Doctors — who say the devil desired equality with God, or at least to be his own master and subject to no one — had in view the consummation or progress of his sin, not its beginning; and they readily concede that such desire was in him from a prior blindness of mind, contracted, to be sure, from the very beginning of his pride, in which he began inordinately to be pleased with himself, first by considering his own good without comparison to a superior good. For, given this beginning, they hold that a step was made toward the growth and that summit of pride which followed — namely, that he willed to seize the Divinity and said "I will ascend into heaven," etc.

§ 32. But this opinion, which posits a beginning, a progress, and a consummation in the angelic sin, is impeded by that saying of St. John Damascene, received everywhere and cited above: "What death is to men, that the fall is to angels." For from this it follows that just as for men there is no place for increasing malice or

further demerit after death, so neither is there for angels after they have once fallen. Therefore, after that sin which they posit as the beginning of the angelic pride — by which sin they were assuredly lapsed from justice — they could neither grow in malice nor incur further demerit. This is also impeded by the other considerations from which it was proved (at Dist. 3) that there was only a single instant of transgression and demerit for the angels.

§ 33. The fourth opinion, therefore, is that the angel sinned through pride in this: that he willed to have the supernatural ultimate end — that is, the likeness to God which is given through grace — by the power of his own nature. St. Thomas presents this opinion in the passage cited[35] in such a way as not to reject it, but rather seems to admit it as more probable, adding that it is consonant with what St. Anselm says — who[22] states that the devil desired that to which he would have attained had he stood firm. Others, however, such as Báñez, refute this opinion as well, by the same argument with which St. Thomas rejected the first and second opinions. For the angel could not have willed to attain the supernatural end by the powers of nature unless he judged this to be possible. But this judgment would not only have been false but heretical, and contrary to the faith which he had received in his creation. From which it would follow that the first sin of the angel arose from an erroneous and heretical judgment preceding it — which is impossible; both because no error could precede the first sin of angel or man, and because it involves a contradiction that the first sin should have arisen from heresy, since heresy itself is a great sin.

§ 34. The fifth opinion is that the pride of the angel consisted in this: that he desired as the ultimate end of beatitude that to which he could attain by the power of his own nature — turning away his desire from the supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo*) which comes from the grace of God. This manner of explaining the angelic pride is set forth and most approved by St. Thomas. Nor indeed does it seem alien from the teaching of St. Augustine. For in book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 1,[58] he expounds the contrary desires of the good and the evil angels as follows: that some persevered constantly in the common gift to all, which is God himself, and in his eternity, truth, and charity; while others, finding greater delight in their own power, as though they were their own good, fell away from the superior good common to all who enjoy blessedness, declining toward their own things; etc. And in chapter 6 he says: "When the cause of the misery of the evil angels is sought, it properly presents itself as the fact that they turned away from him who supremely is, and turned toward themselves, who do not supremely exist; and this vice — by what other name is it called than pride?" By the words of both passages St. Augustine signifies that the object of the angelic pride was not the equality of God, but their own power and excellence combined with an aversion from the superior Good.

§ 35. Now if you ask here how, according to this explanation, it is true that the devil willed to be like and equal to God, and willed to seize the Divinity, and all the rest that has been alleged for the first opinion from Scripture and the Fathers — they reply that all these things are said in this sense: because just as God by his own nature is blessed, having no superior from whom he draws his beatitude, so the devil willed to be blessed by his own natural goods, not subjecting himself to the order prescribed by his Superior, which required that he extend his desire toward the supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo supernaturalis*) to be attained through the grace of God. Therefore, insofar as he willed to cleave to and rest in the goods of his nature, neglecting the rule of his Superior by which he was called to the supernatural good — they say that he desired the likeness and equality of God; just as if some vassal of a king willed to enjoy his own goods without rendering the due tribute to his superior, he would be said to will to be like or equal to the king — that is to say, in this respect,

that he does not acknowledge a superior, or at least does not do what is the sign and testimony of such acknowledgment.

§ 36. But although these things are said with some probability, they do not nonetheless seem to satisfy those arguments which were adduced for the first opinion. For Scripture and the Fathers speak of the pride of the devil as though expressly, and not merely interpretively, in terms of his desiring dignity; nor do they refer to any likeness to God whatsoever, but to equality — to which he aspired. Hence even unto this day men worship the devil as God, and this same pride he inspires even in certain men. This is obstinately retained from the original pride, because it was so great that he does not feel that he acted wickedly — as St. Gregory says.[46]

§ 37. To this add: if the pride of the devil consisted in this, that he wished as the natural end — that is, the end to which the power of his own nature could attain — to establish for himself the ultimate end of his beatitude, then the pride of the devil would be nothing other than the pride of the Gentile philosophers, and of nearly all unbelievers, who in like manner establish for themselves an ultimate end of beatitude to which they may attain by the power of nature — indeed, there is no other pride than that of those who, though knowing the supernatural beatitude (*beatitudo supernaturalis*), are yet, turning away from faith, minded to rest in the goods of nature in their desire for that beatitude.[59]

§ V — On the location (situs) of the devil's pride (In quo sita fuerit Angeli superbia) (continued)

§ 38. For thus do Scripture and the Fathers speak of the devil's pride, as though he had desired dignity expressly and not merely in an interpretative sense; and as though he had aspired not to any likeness of God whatsoever, but to equality with Him. Hence even to this day he wishes to be adored by men as God, and he inspires the same pride in certain men as well. This he retains obstinately from that first pride, by which he was so blinded that he does not perceive that he has acted wrongly — as St. Gregory says.[46]

§ 39. To these considerations add the following: if the pride of the devil had consisted in this, that he established for himself as the ultimate end of his beatitude (*beatitudo*) the natural end — that is, the end which he could reach by the powers of nature — then the pride of the devil would be no different from that of the Gentile philosophers, and from that of nearly all unbelievers, who in like manner established for themselves as the ultimate end of their beatitude that end which is attained by the power of nature. Indeed, it would be no different from the pride of those who, though they know supernatural beatitude through faith, yet turning themselves away from the desire for it, wish to rest in the goods of nature.[60]

§ 40. For these reasons, therefore, the first opinion is to be retained, which says that the angel desired the equality of God — that is, the Divinity (*Divinitas*) itself. Now, in order that it may be understood how this was possible, St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold will: namely, the will of efficacy (*voluntas efficaciae*), or absolute will, and the conditional will — in other words, the efficacious will and the will of complacency (*voluntas complacentiae*), which he also elsewhere calls *velleity* (*velleitas*). He says, accordingly, that the devil desired the Divinity not by an efficacious will — for since he would not absolutely intend to obtain it (since he knew this to be impossible, he could not strive to attain it, as St. Thomas rightly argues) — but by a will of complacency, by which, that is, he coveted the Divinity as something pleasing to himself; in the same way as a sick man, even if despairing of health, nonetheless desires and wills it: for not by an efficacious will — that is,

that will by which one applies means to an end — does a sick man will health, for he does not reckon it possible for himself, but he tends toward it by desiring and longing for it as something good for himself, even knowing that he cannot attain it. Now this will is called conditional because, if the one desiring knew that the thing he desires were possible, he would efficaciously strive for its attainment. Therefore it can be said in this way that the appetite of equality was present in the devil when he first sinned: namely, such that, although he would not will it efficaciously, knowing it to be impossible for himself, he would nevertheless have willed it if it had been possible. For a conditional willing or not-willing suffices for sin; indeed, so great a sin can it be, as great as an absolute willing and unwilling, provided the act of willing proceeds in equal intensity.[61]

§ 41. It is answered: the first opinion is to be retained — which says that the angel desired the equality of God, that is, the Divinity itself. As for how this was possible to understand, St. Thomas distinguishes a twofold will: namely, the efficacious or absolute will, and the conditional will — or in other words, the efficacious will and the will of complacency, which he also elsewhere calls *velleity*. He says accordingly that the devil desired the Divinity not by an efficacious will, since, given that he would not absolutely intend to obtain it (for since he knew it to be impossible he could not strive to attain it, as St. Thomas correctly argues), but by a will of complacency, by which he coveted the Divinity as something pleasing to himself; in the same manner as a sick man, even despairing of health, nonetheless desires and wills it: for not by an efficacious will — that is, the will by which one applies means to an end — does he will health, for he does not reckon it possible for himself; yet he tends toward it by desiring and longing for it as something good for himself, even knowing he cannot attain it. Now this will is called conditional because, if the one desiring knew that the thing he desires were possible, he would efficaciously strive to attain it. In this way, therefore, it can be said that in the devil, when he first sinned, there was an appetite for equality: namely such that, although he would not efficaciously will what he knew to be impossible for himself, he would nonetheless have willed it if it had been possible. For a conditional willing or not-willing suffices for sin; indeed, so grave can the sin be, as great as an absolute willing and unwilling, provided it arises with equal intensity.

§ 42. It is a wonderfully strange thing that the Author, in the matter of the angels, should have departed from the opinion of the Angelic Doctor; and that his most acute mind should have been, as it were, enveloped by such flimsy objections as a thin garment, failing to penetrate the rays of so clear a demonstration. For what is clearer than this: that an angel, apprehending its own substance by a single simple act (*simplici obtutu*) without discursive reasoning and knowing itself to have an existence dependent upon God alone, could not — at least at that first moment in which we suppose no prior error — desire equality with God, or the Divinity itself? For an angel, perceiving everything by the intuition of its nature with perfect clarity and unable to be deceived in those things which fall within its natural cognition — who then could it happen that it would desire, as something clearly known to be impossible, what cannot subsist in any way? Assuredly, the Author's evasion — that is, Scotus's evasion — of a will of complacency or conditionality, which is said to express this act in the angel at that very first moment, when not even the slightest ray of reason shines on it, is immediately evident: that a mind possessed of itself, and clearly perceiving that it apprehends an impossible thing, cannot conceive that will, or complacency regarding it, which it clearly recognises as impossible. These things can easily occur in men, since the senses, being subject especially to the representations of the Imagination or the Imaginative faculty, do not infrequently apprehend an impossible thing as possible: thus the sick man, to use the Author's own example, however desperate his health, is readily drawn by the very appetite for his health so that the Imagination, disturbed by the appetite for health itself, represents it to him

as possible; no wonder, then, if in him there comes forth an act by which — with a condition added — he desires it.[62]

§ 43. After the devil, by merit of his first pride, incurred the blindness of mind, there is nothing absurd in saying that he also, even efficaciously, desires the Divinity — laying claim to whatever belongs to it or is in some way possible, or which he in his blinded mind judges to be possible. For he declared this when he wished to bring the Son of God to adore him as God; when he arranged for the cult of himself to be established under the various names of gods throughout the whole world; and when he did other similar things tending to the same end.[62]

§ 44. As for what is brought forward from St. Augustine in favour of the fifth opinion, it can be resolved thus: if we say that in the sinning angel there were simultaneously an inordinate delight (*delectatio inordinata*) in its own proper good, and an aversion from the superior Beatific Good, and the appetite for equality with God as already explained — for these things are not mutually contradictory. St. Augustine, by saying what is the lesser, did not deny what is the greater; especially since elsewhere he expresses that greater thing with sufficient clarity.[63]

Scotus teaches these things in his commentary on this distinction.[64]

§ VII — Other opinions of certain authors concerning the pride of the fallen Angel are refuted (Aliae quorumdam opiniones de superbia Angeli refelluntur)

§ 45. Besides the opinions concerning angelic pride set out above, there exist also other opinions held by certain authors, of which we shall treat briefly. For some say that it was revealed to all the Angels from the beginning that the Son of God would at some time assume a man of earthly substance, and that he would be the same Son of God; and that a command was given them to submit themselves to that man and to adore him, and to believe in him as the author of their salvation: and that some obeyed the command of God, while others did not; but that the prince of these latter wished through pride and envy to seize and arrogate to himself that honour prepared for that man, while the rest consented to his pride. Some, however, say that the Prince of the Angels, upon receiving this revelation, conceived a desire for the hypostatic union of the Divine Word, which he knew had been prepared for human nature. This opinion is transmitted by Jacobus de Valentia,[66] by Viguerius in his *Institutiones Theologicae*,[67] and by Ambrosius Catharinus.[68] (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Carthusian[69] likewise recounts this opinion as probable, while not wishing to affirm anything rashly.

§ 46. A certain Guilielmus Postel narrates the matter differently[70] — for he writes that all the Angels were first commanded to adore the Son of God; and when they had done so, it was revealed to them that the same Son of God would at some time assume a man, and they were commanded to submit themselves to that man: and that some did this readily, others reluctantly. Then it was revealed that the same man, the Son of God, would at some time present himself in the form of bread, and again they were commanded to adore him in that manner also. And this some did as they were bidden; but others, moved by pride and envy, could in no way bring their minds to so abase themselves.

§ 47. Not unlike this is what is read and repeatedly inculcated in the Koran of Mahomet: that the first man was created more worthy than the Angels, and that the Angels were therefore commanded by God to

show themselves humble before man; and that all obeyed this command, with one exception — Beelzebub — who said that he, being of fiery nature, was far superior to that earthen vessel. Athanasius, or whoever the author is,[71] recounts this same thing but rejects it as a fable — and rightly so, since it contains many manifest falsehoods: such as that the first man was created superior to the Angels; that the Angels were commanded to submit to him, and that all did so with but one exception, as if there were only one disobedient and transgressing Angel; and finally that the Angels are of fiery nature.

§ 48. Now the narrative which Postel presents, though agreeable and not openly opposed to Christian piety, is nevertheless rightly rejected as the invention of a man who was otherwise a heretic, inasmuch as no trace of it exists among Catholics. But the first opinion, since it has Catholic authors, must be examined more carefully. In it four things are contained.

The first is that a revelation was made to the Angels at the beginning concerning the Son of God who was to assume human nature, and that they were accordingly commanded to adore him; and that the good Angels did this, while the evil ones refused. These things cohere sufficiently with one another. And the whole seems to be rendered probable by the following arguments.

First: because if a revelation concerning Christ was made to man before the fall — as when Adam said, "This now is bone of my bones," etc. (Gen. 2:23) — it seems all the more that this should be attributed to the Angels, as beings to whom, by reason of their more excellent nature, it is more fitting to receive divine revelations concerning future mysteries. Second: because in Jn. 8 the devil is said to have been a murderer from the beginning; therefore he had from the beginning a revelation concerning man and his so great excellence, at which he could take envy. And what other excellence could this have been than the hypostatic union of the Divine Word with human nature? For in all other respects man is far inferior to the Angels. Third: just as a positive precept was given to man in Paradise to test his obedience, so it is credible that for the same reason a precept of this kind was also given to the Angel; and no more fitting precept for testing angelic obedience can be posited than the adoration of the Word to be incarnate, that is, of the God-man; whence also a prior revelation of him would have had to be made.

§ 49. Although the first member of this opinion may not seem improbable to many, and may indeed contain nothing contrary to Scripture or the doctrine of the Church, nevertheless, because on the other hand it has no solid foundation in Scripture or in the teaching of the Fathers, it can with the same ease wherewith it is asserted be also denied and rejected. To the arguments, the reply is as follows.

To the first: the revelation concerning the future Christ ought rather to have been made to man than to the Angel from the very beginning, because the Incarnation of the Word was to take place not on account of the Angels but on account of man; although it is not improbable that a revelation was made first to the Angel rather than to man — not, however, to a wayfaring Angel, but to one already confirmed and blessed — for revelations are accustomed to be made by God to men through the ministry of Angels, as Scripture testifies to have occurred in Isaiah, Daniel, Zechariah, and other Prophets.[72]

To the second: it has already been stated elsewhere in what sense, according to the expositions of the Fathers, the devil is said to have been a murderer from the beginning — for there is not a single Father who understood this as meaning that the devil envied man the dignity of the hypostatic union revealed to him from the beginning.[73]

To the third: it was sufficient for the Angels, established in the highest degree of creation, to be tested by this — that they should subject themselves to God, and not take inordinate delight in their own excellence there on account of the pre-eminence of their nature.

§ 50. Furthermore, the second thing contained in this opinion is that Christ was revealed to the Angels as the author of salvation having been set before them, and that they were commanded to believe in him as the author of their salvation. This they wish to understand as referring to Christ as man, as if he had been the author of the Angels' salvation by the merits of those actions which he performed as man — just as we believe him to be through those same actions the author of the salvation of men. But this opinion, which some embrace as highly plausible because it appears to magnify the power of Christ's merits, is in reality little consonant with Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers. For the Scriptures commend to us no other cause of the Incarnation and Passion of the Son of God than the redemption and salvation of the human race, which had wholly perished in its first parent. And therefore, according to the Apostle in Heb. 2, "Christ took hold not of Angels but of the seed of Abraham," because the Angels had no need of a liberator.[74] Hence the Angels themselves, announcing the birth of Christ to the shepherds, do not say "unto us" but "unto you is born this day a Saviour."[,75] Hence also in the Creed of Constantinople it is said that the Son of God descended from heaven "for us men and for our salvation" — a phrase so carefully and precisely set down by the Fathers for the exclusion of the Angels, namely on account of the Origenists, who imagined that a future liberation of the demons through Christ would at some time occur.

§ 51. Now it would have been less cautiously set down, if not indeed for the evil Angels, then at least for the good Angels, and hence not for men alone, that the merits of Christ profited unto salvation. Thus St. Augustine teaches expressly,[76] denying that Christ died for the Angels; and so likewise Hilary.[,77] With these agree the principal Scholastics, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, when they teach that the Incarnation of Christ would not have taken place if man had not sinned — concerning which matter, see Dist. 1 of Book III.[,78] Although some others think that the Word would have been incarnate even if man had not sinned, they give as the reason for this not that Christ would be the mediator of the Angels unto salvation, but another reason, as must be declared in the place already mentioned.

§ 52. As for what others adduce in favour of their opinion from the Apostle in Col. 1, saying that all things are reconciled through the blood of Christ, "whether things on earth or things in heaven" — this is resolved by St. Augustine in the passage already cited.[79] For he understands that heavenly things are reconciled to earthly things, inasmuch as the human race, the enmities which sins had made between men and the holy Angels having been dissolved through Christ, returns in some way into favour; or inasmuch as also from the very redemption of men the losses of the angelic ruin are repaired. This is also the interpretation of St. John Chrysostom on that passage of the Apostle.[,80]

§ 53. Nor indeed does St. Bernard lend support to the said opinion (as some falsely suppose) when he says[81] that Christ was made for us not only wisdom, justice, sanctification, and redemption, but also for the Angels. For we reply that Bernard, by such words — as is clear to one considering the passage more attentively — means nothing other than that Christ, insofar as he is the Word of the Father, that is, according to his Divine Nature, was the author of salvation for the Angels; who also gave them perseverance lest they fall (for in this sense, though improperly speaking, he says and explains that Christ redeemed the holy Angels from ruin) and conferred upon them the reward of perseverance, namely eternal beatitude. And that the same Word, made flesh afterwards, merited and conferred these same things for us through his Passion. That

Bernard did not understand this in the sense which those authors want is clear from his first sermon *On the Advent of the Lord*,[82] where he affirms that the cause of Christ's advent and Incarnation is the salvation not of the Angels but of men. And from Homily 3 *On the Missus est*,[83] where he says that a little child was born for us, not for the Angels, who, since they already had the great one, had no need of the little one. And see also the passages in dist. 1 [of Book III], where the cause of the Incarnation of Christ is inquired into; and at Dist. 18 and 19, where the merit of Christ and the redemption accomplished by him are discussed.'[84]

§ 54. The third member of the opinion is that the Prince of the Angels wished to seize and arrogate to himself the Divinity which the Man was to possess. Now this is said with sufficient probability, given the presupposed revelation described above. For if by revelation he knew that a man was to be God, it is credible that he took such envy at so great a dignity being given to an inferior creature — yet in such a way that the cause of the envy was pride, not the other way around, as has already been said above.

§ 55. The fourth and final member is that the Angel wished to aspire to the Divinity by desiring for himself the hypostatic union of the Word which he saw prepared for man — namely that not a man but an Angel, and not just any Angel but himself as their Prince, should be assumed by the Word of God into the unity of his Person, and thus be himself true God. In support of this, St. Bernard is again cited.[85] But in those passages Bernard indeed indicates that the devil envies Christ his Divinity — which is most true, and he does so to this very day — yet he does not say that this was his first sin by which he fell, nor is there any mention there of a hypostatic union desired by the Angel.

§ 56. Moreover, this opinion is overthrown by the following argument: if the Prince of the Angels desired that union for himself, then consequently he desired that he himself — that is, his own person — should cease to be; for this is the necessary consequence of that union. For since the Angel already subsisted in his own hypostasis (*hypostasis*), he could not be assumed by the Word into the unity of his Person unless the Angel's own proper person ceased to exist. Hence it is proved that this desire for the hypostatic union of the Word could not have been the Angel's first sin — unless it were said that he desired it in the manner in which, according to Scotus, we said above that he desired equality with God.[86] But this understanding is contrary to the intention of those who transmit this opinion. If, however, it be said that this desire was not the Angel's first sin but followed from some other prior one, it will not be incongruous to attribute to him this blindness of mind contracted from a previous sin — that he desired that union for himself as possible, while his own hypostasis remained intact.

§ VIII — What was the sin of the angels who fell with the devil (Quodnam peccatum Angelorum qui cum diabolo ceciderunt)

§ 57. By the same reasoning whereby it was shown above that no sin other than pride could have been the first sin in the chief angel, the same is also proved concerning the remaining transgressor angels; for that reasoning is common to the whole angelic nature. Therefore, what was said of their prince the devil must likewise be said of these, namely that all of them, from a consideration of their own beauty not compared with the excellence of the Divine Nature, fell into a disordered love of self, and were thereby turned away from God.

§ 58. Yet here there is a certain diversity of opinion. For some think that all fell of their own accord, with none urging them on, into this sin of pride. Others, however, hold that one was the instigator and persuader of the transgression for the rest, just as it is also established that he persuaded the first human beings to sin.

This latter opinion is more consonant both with Sacred Scripture and with the sayings of the Fathers. For it is said in Matt. 25: "Depart into the eternal fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels"; and in Rev. 12: "the dragon fought, and his angels" — which seems to have been said for no other reason than that the lower demons are subject, by the just judgment of God, to the one supreme spirit (who is now called the devil and the dragon), because they consented to his suggestion unto sin.[88] For as Peter says in 2 Pet. 2: "by whom a man is overcome, of the same is he also a slave"; hence also the man who consented to the devil's suggestion was reduced, together with all his posterity — that is, the entire human race — into his servitude.

§ 59. And indeed, on this matter the opinion of Prosper is explicit, writing in his letter to Demetriadis that the devil drew the angels into the consent of his impiety.[89] Rupert, in his work *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, says that the devil, filled with great knowledge, proclaimed to all the choirs of angels with great skill that he himself was God; but that only those spirits who sought their own glory and not God's flattered him; and he says these are signified by the trees of pleasure in Ezek. 29: "And all the trees of pleasure that were in the paradise of God envied him."[90]

§ 60. Although, therefore, all the transgressor angels sinned through the pride by which they aspired to the Divinity, it is nonetheless to be held that the chief angel sinned first and by his own sole impulse, and was thereafter the instigator, suggester, and solicitor of the others to a like sin — and they consented to his persuasion, not in order to be subject to him as their prince and lord, but so that, withdrawing from God and removing themselves from His dominion, each might establish his own principate and dominion. This is not unlike what commonly happens in a sedition, where those who cleave to the author of sedition do so not in order to make him their prince, but lest they be compelled to remain subject to their lawful prince, and in order to secure private advantages.

§ 61. Now St. Bonaventure, writing on this Distinction, holds that the sin of the first angel preceded the sin of the others by at least one instant — as if it could not happen even among angels that the sin of one concurs in the same instant with the sin of another or of others who perish at his instigation.[91] But to others a different view seems more probable, as has also been shown from the analogy of corporeal things (at Dist. 3), where the instants of the angels were treated. Therefore, it is necessary for us to acknowledge no other than a natural order between the sin of the first angel and that of the others.

§ 62. There is moreover this further point to be noted: that just as one was the instigator of the rest unto defection, so likewise it is probable that one was the instigator of the rest who persevered unto perseverance — he who, opposing himself to the pride of the devil who wished to make himself equal to God, and addressing his companions, said humbly: "Who is as God?" For this is what the name Michael signifies; and all those who assented to his holy address and exhortation are likewise called his angels. For so we read in Rev. 12: "Michael and his angels fought against the dragon."[92]

§ 63. Moreover, those who say that the chief angel envied man and sought for himself the hypostatic union of the Word add that he wished to preside over the angels in place of Christ, and to be for the others as a mediator of attaining beatitude (*Beatitudo*). Hence they also say that the other apostate angels, consenting to his pride and envy, judged that the said union and the dignity of mediator was owed rather to him, as the most excellent angel, than to a man, and thus hoped through him as mediator to obtain beatitude, and to this end submitted themselves to him voluntarily. So, in substance, Viguerius and Catharinus hold, in the places cited above.[93]

§ 64. But this view is refuted by what can be gathered from what was said above. For it supposes that Christ as man was set before the angels as mediator of salvation — which we have shown to be false.[94]

§ IX — From which orders angels fell (E quibus Ordinibus Angeli ceciderint)

§ 65. St. Gregory, in Homily 34 on the Gospels, treating the parable of the ten lost drachmas anagogically, holds that some angels fell from all the orders.[96] And this is consistent with sacred Scripture, in which the names of angels of diverse orders are attributed to demons: as in Rom. 8, Angels, Principalities, Virtues; in 1 Cor. 15, Principality, Power, Virtue; in Eph. 6, Princes and Powers. Under Angels, moreover, Archangels are easily included, and under Principalities, Dominations. Furthermore, in Ezek. 28 the prince of demons is called a Cherub — concerning the interpretation of which passage, however, we shall speak below.[97] But Scripture would not name a Cherub in an evil sense unless some had also fallen from that order. That some from the Seraphim also fell will be made plain from what we shall teach below: namely, that the prince of demons was the supreme angel of all. Nor indeed is it credible that from the highest order only the highest angel fell. Now if from all the orders already mentioned some fell, it is also probable that some fell from the Thrones. Yet for this reason Scripture does not attribute the names of Thrones and Seraphim expressly to demons — as St. Thomas teaches[98] — inasmuch as these names carry a certain signification of justice, which after the fall remained entirely absent in demons. For the Seraphim are named from the ardor of charity, and the Thrones from the indwelling of God. The remaining names of orders, however, are taken from knowledge or from ministry, which could be common to good and evil alike. This opinion, furthermore, St. Thomas renders probable from the fact that men are assumed into every order in supplement of the ruin of the angels.[95] "In which," he says, "the freedom of the will is also the more confirmed, since according to every grade of creature it can be bent toward evil." For the proof of this same conclusion, some employ the following argument: the heavenly Hierarchy is a certain form and exemplar of the ecclesiastical hierarchy; now from all the orders and grades of the Church — as from bishops, priests, deacons, monks, virgins, the married, and so forth — some fall; therefore it is probable that the same holds in the heavenly Hierarchy.

§ 66. But this argument does not persuade very strongly, because in the Church militant upon earth all are frail, and on account of concupiscence and the various temptations of the flesh and the world are prone to falling — a condition that was altogether absent in the angels, who were solicited to sin and to aversion from God, in whose love they had been created, by neither internal nor external temptation. The fault of the argument, therefore, is that from a defect in the exemplar a defect in the exemplar itself is inferred, which is not necessary, since the exemplar as such is always more perfect.

Now what is read to the contrary in St. John Damascene, book 2 of *De Fide*,[21] where he distinguishes two kinds of angels — one of the supercelestials, to whom the ministries of heavenly things are entrusted; another of the mundane, to whom the guardianship of the earth is committed — and holds that the apostate angels fell only from this latter kind: even though this view cannot be refuted by the most certain authority and therefore should not be rejected as alien to the faith, as St. Thomas says,[99] nevertheless from what has already been said it is sufficiently apparent how improbably it is maintained, and this will appear still more from what remains to be confirmed: namely, that the prince of demons was the supreme of all the angels. Moreover, St. Augustine, in book 11 of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, chapters 19 and 26, says that this opinion about a twofold kind of angels is uncertain;[100] and likewise in book 11 of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 33, he affirms that angels

were cast out from the heavens of heavens, that is, from the supercelestial places, on account of pride.[101] This same thing is also read in St. Basil, Homily 8.'[102] With this view also accord what is read in the same St. Augustine concerning the fall of the angels in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapters 11 and 12.[103]

Again, someone will object the opinion of Rupert, who in book 3 of *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, chapter 17, holds that angels fell from no orders, because before the fall the orders had not yet been established, but the excellence of the diverse orders was given as a reward to those who persevered.[104] Precisely the same view is held by the author of the *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, chapter 3.[105] But because this opinion rests on a foundation whose discussion belongs to Distinction 9,'[106] where it is asked whether angels were distributed into their orders from the beginning, it would be superfluous to refute it in this place. Indeed, Rupert himself, in the same passage, granted that orders were established from the beginning, readily concedes that some from all of them fell.

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§ X — Whether the prince of demons was the supreme of all the angels (Utrum princeps daemonum fuerit omnium Angelorum supremus)

§ 67. That the prince of the apostates, before he fell, was not only more excellent than all the others who fell, but was, absolutely speaking, the first and supreme of all the angels, is asserted with great probability. For in support of this view Scripture, Tradition, and reason appear to concur.

Scripture, indeed: as in Job 40, where under the figure of Behemoth it is said of the devil, "He is the beginning of the ways of God" — that is, the first and most excellent work or creature of God.[107] And in Ezek. 28, where under the figure of the King of Tyre the same devil is described in such a way that he is understood to have been more perfect than all others and the prince of all.'[97] And in chapter 31, where under the figure of the King of Assyria it is said of him: "The cedars in the paradise of God were not higher than he"; and again: "No tree in the paradise of God was like unto him in its beauty.",[108] From these Scriptures St. Gregory, in book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 24, shows and teaches that the devil was from the beginning made more eminent than the remaining angels.[109] He teaches the same thing in book 4, chapters 12 and 19, in book 9, chapter 2, and in Homily 34 on the Gospels.'[110]

Other Doctors both ancient and recent concur. Tertullian, book 2 *Against Marcion*, toward the middle;[111] Origen, Homily 9 on Matt., on the words of chapter 20, "The first shall be last";'[112] St. Jerome on Daniel;'[113] Prudentius in the *Hamartigenia*;[14] St. John Chrysostom, Homilies 3 and 5 (which are found in volume 1, after those he wrote on Genesis) and Homilies 5 and 7 to the People of Antioch;'[114] St. Augustine, book 11 of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, chapter 19, and the author of the work *De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae* found in the same Augustine, book 1, chapter 2;[115] Isidore, book 2 of *De Summo Bono*, chapter 12;[116] Bede on Job 40;'[117] St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *De Adventu* and the book *De Gradibus Humilitatis*;[118] in this Distinction, § I. All later theologians follow them in this, and it is likewise the common persuasion of the faithful.

§ 68. For its proof there are also the following arguments. The first: in the sin of the angels, one should attend not so much to the proneness to sinning — which was non-existent in them before sin — as to the occasion moving to sin; and this occasion was greater in the superior angels than in the inferior, and greatest of all in the supreme one. For the sin of the angels was pride, whose motive is excellence; and excellence was

greater in the superior angels and greatest in the supreme: whence it becomes probable that he who sinned first was superior to all the rest. This argument is from St. Thomas.[99] It is confirmed by examples. For we see that very many who were first and pre-eminent in some kind of dignity, on the occasion of their own excellence, were lifted up into pride and fell and were cast down by God. So the first man, having been constituted lord over all bodily creatures, fell through pride and dragged the human race into ruin. So also the Jewish people, chosen before all other nations by God, was cast off on account of pride; and Saul, the first king of that people, was reprobated for disobedience; and Nebuchadnezzar, the most powerful king in the world, was expelled from human company on account of pride. Therefore it is also very credible that for the first angel his own excellence was the occasion of pride.

§ 69. A second argument: God permitted the sin of the angels in order to show that not the capacity or excellence of nature, but His own grace, is efficacious for beatitude (*beatitudo*). Now for the demonstration of this truth the permission of the fall of the supreme angel especially served, as one who among all creatures possessed the most excellent nature. Hence it is that we read in Scripture that God generally chose those who according to the order of nature were posterior to those rejected or passed over in favour of the greater — as the examples of Abel and Cain, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and Reuben, Ephraim and Manasseh, David and his brothers, and the like, prove.

§ 70. A third argument: If the prince of demons had not been the supreme of the angels but had had some superior among them, he would not have lifted himself up first against God but against a superior angel through pride, wishing either to equal him or to surpass him; which we nowhere read to have happened. Indeed, since there was nothing above him with which he could be compared for excellence, he sought that which alone was above him, namely the divinity. St. Thomas adduces this argument in his commentary on this distinction.[119]

It must be known, however, that although these arguments carry a certain probability, they are not nevertheless necessary, as St. Thomas correctly declared regarding the first argument. Hence, without the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, not much reliance ought to be placed on these arguments alone.

§ 71. Now it is customarily objected against this view that in the person of the King of Tyre it is said to the prince of demons in Ezek. 28: "Thou art a Cherub stretched out and protecting," and so forth — as if he fell from the order of the Cherubim, which is the second order, not from that of the Seraphim, which is the first. It is answered, however, that he is called a Cherub by the prophet not by reason of order, but — as St. Gregory explains in book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 24[109] — on account of the fullness of knowledge, by which he is not doubted to have surpassed all others; and it is not unfitting that a superior angel should receive the name of an inferior order, since the superior order includes within itself the perfection of the inferior. That he is not, however, called a Seraph is because, by sinning, he lost his entire charity, which he ought to have had, but not his entire knowledge. And this solution is indeed not a bad one. Yet perhaps more correctly you would say that the prophet in this passage had in mind the Cherubim that, spread above the Mercy-seat of the Ark, overshadowed and protected it, and that he speaks of them as certain living beings most proximate and intimate to God, who was represented in the Ark. Hence also on this account, through the appellation of Cherub, the supreme pre-eminence of nature of that angel is signified — the angel whom the prophet mystically described in these words.

§ XI — Whether the evil angels are more or fewer in number than the good (Utrum Angeli mali plures an pauciores sint bonis)

§ 72. Although it is not in doubt that the multitude of evil angels, just as of good angels, is exceedingly great in number — as we showed in treating Distinction 3 — it is nonetheless plainly probable that there are more good than evil, that is, that more persevered than fell. For "they that are with us are more than they that are with them," as Elisha says in 4 Kgs. 6 — a text which is rightly understood of the good angels who are with us in our aid, and of the evil ones who are against us, as St. Thomas expounds it,[95] where he treats this very question. Tending to the same point also appears to be the passage of Rev. 8, where a third part of the stars is said to have been struck so that a third part of them was darkened.'[120] But more manifest is what is read in Rev. 12 concerning the dragon, that is, the devil, in these words: "And his tail drew the third part of the stars of heaven and cast them to the earth."'[121] That this is to be understood of his angels is shown by what follows in that same place, concerning the battle of Michael and his angels with the dragon and his angels, in which battle, the dragon being overcome, scripture says he was cast to the earth "and his angels were cast with him." Yet one ought not to suppose that, from the fact that scripture says the dragon drew with him a third part of the stars, the evil angels bear this precise numerical ratio to the good. For, for the sake of a definite mystery, a certain determinate proportion of inequality could be expressed, placed there so as to be understood as standing for an indeterminate one. For it is probable that the excess in number of the good angels over the evil is far greater than double, since the scriptures speak of the multitude of the good as though innumerable, far more frequently and more emphatically than they do of the evil, as is clear from the testimonies we adduced in treating Distinction 3.'[122]

§ 73. Hence St. Augustine did not hesitate to assert affirmatively that the number of the good angels is far greater than that of the evil.[123] Nearly all theologians concur in this opinion, and many of them are cited by Dionysius the Carthusian.'[124]

Furthermore, St. Thomas employs the following argument to prove this: because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; and those things which are contrary to nature occur in fewer cases, for nature achieves its effect either always or in the greater number of instances.

§ 74. Against this argument someone may object that among the human race more bad persons are found than good, according to that text of Eccl.: "The number of fools is infinite"[125]; and that word of Christ in Matt. ch. 7: "Wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat,"'[126] and so on; and likewise according to that saying of the Philosopher in *Ethics* II, ch. 6: "Evil is in the greater number, good as in the fewer."[127]

Reply: St. Thomas answers that evil in men arises from this, that they follow sensible goods, which are more widely known, forsaking the good of reason, which is known to fewer; whereas in angels there is nothing but an intellectual nature, and therefore the formal character (*ratio*) applicable to angels and to men is not the same.[95]

§ 75. Yet someone will still resist this solution by means of the argument adduced, and will say that sin is no less contrary to the natural inclination of men than of angels; nor does it constitute an obstacle that in man there exists not only intellect but also sense and the appetite for sensible things — because all of this comes from God as the Author and Ordainer of human nature, and therefore the cause of the inclination toward sin

in the human race cannot be referred to the sensual nature. Therefore a truer, or at any rate a fuller, reply will be this: that in the human race more evil persons are found than good, because the entire human race was originally in one man, who sinned by free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) — and not through an inclination of nature toward sensible things, just as the angel sinned by free choice — so that the whole of his posterity not only contracted sin and guilt, but also an inclination of the powers of the soul, both of the higher part and of the lower, toward evil. Since this inclination is disordered (*vitiosa*), it not only would not have existed in the state of integrity in which Adam was formed, but would not even have had a place in the state of pure nature, had man been created in that state. For man in his purely natural condition, created without defect, would not have been inordinately disposed toward sensible things, but would rather have been led by them in right order to knowing and loving God his Creator, so long as he himself had not freely turned away from God by sinning. Hence, even in that state of uncorrupted human nature, the argument of St. Thomas concerning the angels would have had its place.

§ 76. And by this reply one can give satisfaction to the complaint of Cajetan, writing on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 71, a. 1,[128] in which he laments the misery of the human species among all other creatures — inasmuch as, while the rest follow the good in the greater number of cases, men alone follow the good that is proper to them according to nature, that is, the good of virtue, in the fewer cases. For the reason is not that man is an animal endowed with sense, by which he is inclined toward sensible things. For neither as he was created by God, nor as he would have been created, would he have been inordinately moved toward sensible things, in such a way that that word of the Apostle would have had its place in him: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh",[129] — a word that was spoken concerning the present corruption contracted from the sin of man. The reason, as we have said, is that when one man sinned by free choice, the whole race contracted sin together with a certain proneness to sinning; and from that entire mass, doomed to perish, merciful God by a singular benefit of His grace separated a certain few to be saved, leaving the rest in their condition of perdition. This therefore seems to us to be the true reason why in the human race there are fewer good than evil, and far more perish than are saved.

§ XII — To what place the demons were cast down (In quem locum dejecti daemones).

§ 77. After the demons were cast down from the place of happiness, the holy Scriptures indicate in several places that they wander through this lower world. For in Job, chapters 1 and 2, Satan, when questioned by God as to where he came from, says: "I have gone around the earth and walked through it."[131] And Peter in his First Epistle, chapter 5, says: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.",[132] Paul likewise in Eph. 2 calls the devil "the prince of the power of the air,",[133] and in chapter 6 calls the demons "the rulers of the world of this darkness" and "spiritual wickednesses in high places,",[134] that is, in the aerial regions — in the same locution by which elsewhere birds are called "the fowls of the air," that is, of the atmosphere. The same thing seems to be indicated by Peter in his Second Epistle, chapter 2, and by Jude in his Epistle, when they say that the demons are kept under certain bonds in darkness, reserved for the last judgment.[135] They are detained in this place, moreover, both in order that this darkened air may serve as a kind of prison for them until the day of judgment — when they shall be brought forth openly before all to be judged — and in order that the human race, which is by reason of sin deservedly subject to diabolical servitude, may be permitted, within the limits set by divine providence, to be tempted and vexed by them.

§ 78. Now this teaching concerning the place of the demons has always been so universal in the Church that St. Jerome, writing on Eph. 6, testifies that it is the opinion of all the Doctors that this air, which lies between heaven and earth and is called the void, is full of contrary Powers.[136] See likewise St. Jerome on Eph. 2,[137] as well as St. Basil in Homily 9,[138] and St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 28; in *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 1, ch. 19; bk. 14, ch. 33; bk. 14, ch. 3; also in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 1, ch. 26; in *De Trinitate*, bk. 3, ch. 7; and in *De Natura Boni*, ch. 23.[139]

§ 79. Now what the Master says in § 3 — that it has not been granted to the demons to dwell with us on earth, lest they should molest men too greatly, but only in the air midway between heaven and earth — if the opinion is to be held as true, must be explained as referring to the familiar habitation and intimate intercourse of the demons with men, such as men have among themselves. For otherwise it is beyond doubt, both from the Scriptures and from the teaching of the Fathers, that demons move about in the world among men. And indeed this is manifestly indicated by the texts of Job, chapters 1 and 2, and of 1 Pet. 5, already cited;[140] to which add the passage of Rev. 12, where the dragon is said to have drawn with him a third part of the stars and to have cast them upon the earth,[121] and again where the dragon himself with his angels is said to have been hurled down to earth; and then, when the heavenly voice proclaims: "Woe to the earth and the sea, because the devil is come down to you, having great wrath."[141] The same is proved by the obsession of men by demons. But most certainly of all, it is proved by the temptation by which the demons daily, as Scripture teaches in many places, solicit men to sin — which they could not do unless they were present on earth and among men. Nor indeed does any other meaning seem to be conveyed when they are said to dwell in the darkened air; for the darkened air is that which is nearest to the earth, in which men themselves also move about upon the earth.

§ 80. Furthermore, the attempt made by some to show from the foregoing that all the demons are in hell — on the ground that all the holy Angels are in heaven — finds an easy solution from this very comparison with the holy Angels. For, as St. Thomas teaches,[130] there is a twofold place for both the holy Angels and the demons alike, assigned to each by God: one corresponding to their merits, by which reason the place of the holy Angels is heaven and the place of the demons is hell; the other arising from a special divine ordinance made on behalf of men, by which the place of the holy Angels is among men, over whom they are set to guard and govern, and the place of the demons is likewise among those same men, for the reason stated above — in which matter the demons also in their own way serve the will and justice of God. Nevertheless, just as certain Angels are in heaven as companions of the holy souls, so also certain demons have been consigned to hell, where they torment the damned souls. This is what the holy Fathers teach: St. Gregory Nazianzen in his Oration on St. Cyprian;[142] St. Ambrose on Lk. 8,[143] where the legion of demons is discussed; St. Jerome on Is. 14, at the words "Hell below was in an uproar at thy coming";[144] St. John Chrysostom in Homily 24 on Matt. 8, at the words "Art thou come hither to torment us before the time?";[145] St. Cyril in bk. 6 *Against Julian*, before the middle;[146] St. Thomas cites him in the *Catena* on Lk. 6;[147] St. Gregory in bk. 4 of the *Dialogues*;[148] Bede in bk. 5 of the *History of the English People*, ch. 13;[149] and Oecumenius on 2 Pet. 2.[150]

§ 81. These Fathers drew this doctrine of theirs from Scripture, especially from Lk. 8, where the demons are read to have besought Christ not to command them to go into the abyss, but to be permitted to enter into the swine. For they did not obtain the whole of what they asked: they were indeed permitted to enter the swine — so that it might be understood how great a multitude of demons had possessed one man, and thus the greatness of the divine benefit toward the possessed man might become known — but they were

nonetheless commanded to descend into the abyss, which they did immediately when, having entered the swine, they drove them headlong into the sea; by this act at the same time being confined so that they could harm men no further for as long as they were permitted. They were allowed to destroy the swine because the Gerasenes were sinning through them — namely, by keeping for food an animal forbidden by the Law.

§ 82. For the rest, it must here be remembered that when demons are said to dwell in the air or on earth as in a place, this is to be understood according to that mode of existing in a place which, as we showed at Distinction 2,[151] can belong to Angels — namely, according to their operation, at least broadly speaking.

(Note: The long footnote (a) embedded in the OCR text at the beginning of this section, concerning the nature of concupiscence, the opinion of Estius on the state of pure nature, the condemnation of Baianist articles by Pius V and Gregory XIII, and the teaching of St. Thomas on the inclination to sensible objects in the state of pure nature — this is a marginal scholion appended by the author to an earlier section and has been displaced in the OCR. It does not belong to § XII on the place of the demons and is not part of the continuous text translated above. It pertains to the discussion in the preceding sections on original sin and concupiscence.)

§ XIII — What is the punishment of the demons before and after the Last Judgment? (Quae poena Daemonum ante et post judicium?)

§ 83. Joined to the question concerning the place of the demons is another question concerning their punishment — for since not all of them have as yet been cast down into hell, it may seem that not all are as yet tormented by the eternal and infernal fire. Hence it is asked first, whether all demons, both those who are in hell and those who still wander in this dark air outside hell, endure the punishment of eternal damnation. Then, if this is so, whether their punishment will be greater and more severe after the Last Judgment.

To both questions, according to the common and highly probable teaching of theologians, it is answered: that all demons, from the very beginning at which they transgressed — that is, immediately after their sin — fell into the eternal punishment and misery which Scripture calls *ignem aeternum* (the eternal fire); and that this punishment will not be greater after the judgment, but was from the beginning as great as their guilt required.

§ 84. This is proved in multiple ways.

First, from the beatitude (*beatitudo*) of the holy Angels: for this beatitude is not deferred until the day of judgment, but was given to them from the very beginning at which they were confirmed in righteousness — which is signified by that Scripture, Matt. 18: "Their Angels in heaven always behold the face of the Father."[152] Nor will it be increased after the judgment; for after the resurrection the happiness which the Angels now enjoy is promised to us,'[153] Matt. 22. Therefore it is consistent that the punishment of the evil Angels should stand in a parallel relation. Yet understand all this of the essential (*essentialis*) misery and beatitude of the Angels; for just as the accidental (*accidentalis*) reward of the holy Angels increases until the day of judgment, so also the accidental punishment of the demons increases.

§ 85. *Second*: The souls of men seduced by the demons, as soon as they are stripped of their bodies, are tormented by the fire of Gehenna, as the Gospel narrative proves — concerning the rich man Dives, Lk. 16 —

which we also hold as defined in the Council of Florence with the consent of the Greeks.[154] Yet this punishment of those souls will not be increased after the Last Judgment, as has been defined in a certain *Extravagans* of Benedict XII.[155] Therefore, much more fittingly, the demons themselves, who were the seducers, are tormented by the same punishment — and that punishment complete — from the time at which their fall occurred, just as that fall is to the demons what death is to men, as St. John Damascene testifies.'[156]

§ 86. *Third*: The demons have merited Gehenna, and there is no impediment to their suffering it now according to their desert. For they are not awaited for repentance as men who have sinned while in this present life; indeed, one must affirm that the demons could never have performed repentance: both because no remedy was divinely ordained for them as it was for men, and because through sin, as has just been said, they were immediately placed at their final term (*terminus*). Therefore it is not to be denied that from the very time at which they fell they are tormented by the fire of Gehenna.

§ 87. *Fourth*: Christ, who is the Head of the good, was the first of all to rise to blessed immortality; therefore the devil, who is the head of the evil, ought likewise to have been the first of all to be cast down into eternal misery.

§ 88. *Fifth*: Certain demons are already set over the punishments of the souls of the damned in hell, as was proved in the preceding section; therefore they too are afflicted by those same punishments of hell. This consequence is proved in one way because they are there as in a place of torment, and are themselves more deserving of it than the souls they torment. And in another way, because just as it would be absurd for the holy Angels to be in heaven with the blessed souls and yet not to enjoy the vision of God together with them, so it is absurd to say that the demons are in hell with the souls of the damned and yet do not sustain the punishments of hell along with them.

If, then, the demons already cast down into hell are punished with the ultimate penalty, the same must be said of all the rest: both because the formal character (*ratio*) of merit is the same in all — for some did not deserve to be punished sooner and others later, even though some are punished more severely and others more lightly in proportion to their sin — and also because the situation is similar in the case of the good Angels, of whom, even though some are in heaven and others are present on earth, all nonetheless perfectly behold the face of God.

§ 89. Nor indeed is it probable what Melchior Canus says in his *Scholia* on this matter,[157] namely that the more wicked demons have been cast into hell, whose essential punishment therefore is not to be increased after the judgment, just as it is not for the souls which are in hell; whereas the rest, who linger in this air as being less evil, suffer essential punishment, but one that is to be increased and completed at last after the judgment. The falsity of this opinion is clear, beyond the argument already given, because many of those who dwell in the air and tempt men are also sent into the abyss before the day of judgment, as has been shown above from the Gospel.'[158] Furthermore, because the Prince of the demons, who is certainly the most wicked of all, does not appear to have been so cast down into hell as not to be permitted to go forth to tempt men. For according to the opinion of many and nearly all, he it was who tempted our first parents in Paradise, and afterward tempted Christ our Lord in the desert; and there is no doubt that, as we read in Rev. 20, that same one is yet to be loosed and to go out to seduce the nations throughout the entire world and to stir them up against the Church and the people of God. Indeed, of him it is said in 1 Pet. 5: "As a roaring lion he goes about

seeking whom he may devour."[159] For what is said in the Apocalypse — that he is bound and cast into the abyss — is understood of his power restrained and constrained by Christ until the time of Antichrist.

§ 90. *Sixth*, this is proved by the authority of the Fathers, as of St. Augustine, who in his work *De Correptione et Gratia*[160] makes the cause of the misery of the demons equal to the cause of the beatitude of the Angels with respect to the judgment already rendered long ago.

Likewise by Prosper,[161] who in his *De Vita Contemplativa*[162] affirms that the demons have already been judged and made miserable. "This judgment," he says, "which we say is to come between just men and unjust, we believe to have taken place between the holy Angels and the envious ones."

And by St. Gregory, who in his *Moralia*[163] says that the devil is subject to all penalties.

Most openly, moreover, Bede, writing on James ch. 3,[164] sets forth this teaching, for in explaining the words "set on fire by Gehenna," he says: "He says 'by Gehenna': by the devil and his angels, for whom Gehenna was made; who, wherever they fly about in the air or wander upon the earth or beneath the earth, or are kept in detention, always carry with them the torments of their flames, after the manner of one sick with fever, who, even if laid on ivory beds, even if placed in sunny spots, cannot avoid the heat or the cold of the malady innate to him. If therefore the demons, even if worshipped in gilded temples, even if they race through the air, burn always with the fire of Gehenna; and, prompted by their very punishment, they suggest by way of envy to the men they have deceived also the tinder of vices from which they too may perish." Thus far his words, a part of which were cited in the same passage above.

§ 91. To these is added Prudentius, who in his *Hymn on Hemiterius and Cheledonius*[165] sings thus of a demon obsessing a man: "Confessing that he burns, for he is an inhabitant of Gehenna." And in the *Hamartigenia*[14] concerning the devil: "He is hemmed in with smoke and fire." And again in the same work concerning the same: "He who must first expiate his deeds by punishments, for the soul corrupted by debauchery and for the world brought to ruin."

The same is the position of St. Thomas,[166] and of the other Scholastics writing on this Distinction.

§ 92. Lastly, the authority of Scripture also does not appear to be lacking to this position. For the Apostle James, in ch. 3, says that the tongue is set on fire by Gehenna — that is, by the devil — who seems to be called Gehenna for no other reason than that he is always bound to Gehenna by punishment. And in 2 Pet. ch. 2: "God," he says, "spared not the Angels that sinned, but having drawn them down by ropes of hell into Tartarus, delivered them to be tormented, to be reserved unto judgment."[167] Since this sentence is ambiguous and obscure, it can be rendered clearer from the Greek thus: "God did not spare the Angels who sinned, but having cast them into Tartarus in chains of darkness, delivered them to be kept — or: to be reserved — unto judgment." From these words it is clear (*liquet*) that the apostate Angels have already been cast into hell, which is to be understood not so much by reason of place — for many are still found in this air — as by reason of the punishment which they sustain. And Jude signified the same thing when he said that those same Angels are reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day.[168]

It must be noted that the Apostles Peter and Jude, in these passages, add also other examples of divine justice: as the original world destroyed by the flood, Sodom overthrown, and the Israelites who did not believe, who perished.[169] These examples are assuredly of punishment already long since exacted, not of punishment yet to come; hence it similarly appears that they are speaking of punishments long since inflicted upon the

Angels. How it is, however, that they say the Angels are still reserved unto judgment, if they are already tormented by the punishments of hell, will be explained presently.

§ 93. As for what is found in Paul, 1 Tim. 3: "Not a novice, lest being puffed up with pride he fall into the condemnation of the devil,"[170] the Apostle has not expressed whether he speaks of the past judgment or of the future; and therefore it cannot be established from this passage what bearing it has on the present teaching.

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§ XIV — Reply to the objections raised against the foregoing (Responsio ad ea quae contra objiciuntur)

§ 94. Around the doctrine proved above, no small amount of difficulty — though sufficiently tractable — is brought by certain passages of Scripture and, in particular, by a considerable number of opinions of the ancient writers; which tend partly to prove that the devil and his angels have not yet been judged, and are therefore not yet subject to punishments, and partly to teach that they are to be tormented more severely after the last judgment. From Scripture the following passages are adduced: Matt. 8, where the demons say to Christ, "Have you come to torment us before the time?" Matt. 25, where at the last judgment it will be said to the wicked, "Depart into the eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels." 1 Cor. 6, where the Apostle says, "Do you not know that we shall judge the angels?" From these passages it appears that the demons are not yet being tormented, have not yet been cast into the eternal fire, and finally have not yet been judged, but are being kept in reserve for judgment — as Peter and Jude plainly testify in the words cited above.[171]

§ 95. From the Fathers the following passages are adduced. St. Andrew (as recorded by Abdias), when casting out demons, commands them to go to arid places: "until," he says, "you receive the punishment of eternal fire that is owed to you." Likewise, in the account of James (in the same author), demons say to the Apostle: "Before the time of burning comes, we are scorched." Justin, in his *Apology* (chs. 1–2),[172] says and repeatedly affirms that demons are to be handed over to the everlasting fire, but have not yet been handed over. Irenaeus, in book 5 (of *Against Heresies*, past the middle),[173] says that the devil never blasphemed God before the coming of Christ, because he was still ignorant of his own damnation, but that he finally learned of it from Christ and the Apostles, when they taught that eternal fire had been prepared for the devil and his angels. The same Irenaeus attributes this opinion to Justin as its author. The same view, cited as Justin's, is also related and confirmed by the judgment of Eusebius in book 4 (of the *Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 17)[174] and of Oecumenius writing on the last chapter of the Epistle of Peter,[175] in the passage: "Your adversary the devil." Epiphanius, in the heresy of the Sethians (which is number 23),[176] says that demons, before Christ came, not only were ignorant of their damnation and therefore abstained from blaspheming the Divine Name, but even hoped for salvation from Christ's coming; but when they saw that nothing was being done by Christ for the demons, then they taught heretics to blaspheme God. Antony, as recorded by Athanasius in his life,[177] says: "The demon is not ignorant of the future torments; he knows the fires of the burning Gehenna." Lactantius, in book 7 of the *Divine Institutions*, ch. 28,[178] says that the devil was not thrust immediately at the outset of his transgression into punishment by God, and that this was in order that by his malice he might exercise man unto virtue.

§ 96. St. Augustine, in book 21 of *The City of God*, ch. 3,[179] writes that after the last judgment eternal fire will receive the demons, even though they are already pre-condemned. St. Gregory, in Homily 34 on the Gospels,[180] writes that the ancient enemy is left until the end of the world to be punished with the final punishment. And in Homily 39,[181] that from the day of judgment he himself, together with the condemned men, is tormented in the fires of hell. Similar things are read here and there elsewhere among the Fathers, of whose passages it will suffice here to note: St. Hilary on Psalm 118, at the verse "When wilt thou execute judgment on them that persecute me";[182] St. Ambrose on the same Psalm (Sermon 20, verse 2, and on Lk. 8);[183] St. Jerome (on Habakkuk 2, and on Matt. ch. 8);[184] St. John Chrysostom (on the same passage in Matthew);[185] St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, ch. 23, and *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 23, and XIV, ch. 3, and bk. 20, ch. 1;[186] likewise in the *Exposition of Psalm 85*, and *Tractate 6 on the Epistle of John*;[187] St. Gregory, *Moralia* IV, ch. 10, and *Dialogues* IV, ch. 29;[188] Theodoret, in his *Epitome of the Divine Decrees*, in the chapter on Demons;[189] and Bernard in the Sermon on St. Malachy.[190]

§ 97. Indeed, Prudentius also seems to contradict his earlier opinion when, in the same book *Hamartigenia*,[14] he calls the devil "the bondsman of Gehenna," on the ground that he is yet to be condemned to the Stygian abyss — as though he were not yet condemned. Furthermore, there is no slight argument drawn from the ceremonies of the Church, which by ancient rite she places before baptism; in which, during the exorcism, these and similar words are said to the devil: "Let it not be hidden from you that the punishments, the torments, the day of judgment, the day of everlasting punishment are drawing near for you — which will come like a burning furnace, in which eternal destruction shall come upon you and all your angels; and therefore, O damned one, condemned and yet to be condemned (*damnate, damnande*), give honor to God. For the judgment of God is at hand." Nor does it seem that the proof is blocked by the fact that the devil is there called both "condemned" (*damnatus*) and "yet to be condemned" (*damnandus*). For by this it is signified that he has already paid part of his due punishment, but is to receive its increase and completion at the last judgment. Bede also seems to intend this when, in book 3 on Samuel,[191] he says that demons have been condemned and are yet to be condemned (*damnatos atque damnandos*) to eternal fire. But more clearly in the book *De Natura Rerum*, ch. 25,[192] where, speaking of the air, he says: "There also the powers of the air, hurled down from their lofty seat, with torment await the day of judgment, to be condemned yet more severely then."

§ 98. Finally, the argument is constructed from reason as follows: Not all demons are in hell; many still wander in the air; therefore the fire of hell does not torment all of them. The consequence is proved because fire does not burn where it is not. Hence they also beseech Christ (Lk. 8) not to send them into the abyss, that is, into hell — evidently fearing the punishment of hellfire. If you say that they carry their Gehenna with them wherever they go, this is shown to be improbable: first, because the extreme swiftness of demons, indeed their instantaneous movement, removes from them all matter joined to them whether essentially, or accidentally, or by way of binding. For it is not possible that any corporeal thing should be moved instantaneously; secondly, because wherever they are, the greatest heat would have to be perceived from the presence of the fire of Gehenna, especially by those whom demons bodily possess; yet no experience teaches this. Nor does the reply avail if you say that that fire is an instrument of Divine Justice and therefore burns only the condemned; for since it is of the same nature as elemental fire, it could not be near us and yet not burn except by a miracle. But it must not be said that God perpetually works a miracle in this dark air full of demons. And since it is an instrument of Divine Justice, it therefore always remains in its own place, that is in hell, where none are found except those who ought to be tormented.

§ 99. For the resolution of the objections brought from Scripture and from most of the Fathers, a threefold condemnation of the devil must be distinguished. The first is that by which he was condemned at the beginning, when on account of pride he was cast down from Heaven and plunged into eternal misery; concerning which condemnation the Apostle Jude says: "He did not spare them," etc.[193] The second is that by which through Christ he was so cast out from among men that he no longer holds dominion far and wide with that freedom and success with which he had been permitted to hold dominion before the coming of Christ; concerning which condemnation the Lord says (Jn. 12): "Now the prince of this world shall be cast out."[194] And Mk. 7 (actually Mk. 3): "No one can enter a strong man's house and plunder his goods, unless he first binds the strong man, and then he will plunder his house."[195] And Rev. 12, where it is said: "Now is come salvation, and strength, and the kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ; because the accuser of our brethren is cast down," etc.[196] And ch. 20, where the Angel, in the person of Christ, binds the devil for a thousand years.[197] The third condemnation of him will be at the last, universal, and manifest judgment; in which, although there will be no future addition to his principal punishment — just as there will be none for the souls of the damned — yet the greatest addition will be made to the secondary punishment.

§ 100. First, because since the devil and all demons are exceedingly proud, they will endure the greatest punishment of confusion from the fact that their malice will then be made manifest to the whole world; and that it will be publicly acknowledged by all how vile and contemptible they are. Second, because they will be judged not only by God but also by the holy men — that is, in the same manner in which all the impious will be judged by them, as is taught below.[198] This likewise will pertain to their greatest ignominy, that they are condemned by a public and irrevocable judgment from those whom they have always persecuted with extreme hatred. Third, because all power of harming the Elect in the future will be taken away from them; which they, given their immense malice and hatred by which they pursue all good people, as being most eager to harm, will account as the greatest torment; just as it is wont to be a great torment for a malicious man if he is prevented from harming others, or from any evil work in which he takes great pleasure — something that may even sometimes be observed in children. Fourth, because they will no longer extort from anyone the divine worship and honor, as they now do when they cause themselves to be adored by idolaters and practitioners of evil magic; and this will similarly be the greatest torment to their pride.

§ 101. To this judgment, then, according to the Scriptures and the opinions of the Fathers, the devil with his angels is reserved; for then he will receive the completion of his punishments, and thereafter will be kept confined in the eternal prison of hell. Hence it is that in exorcisms he seems to be tormented by nothing more than by the commemoration and threatening of the coming judgment; which is also why exorcisms nearly always conclude with these words: "By him who is to come to judge by fire." With these preliminaries thus established, let us reply to the objections: wherever the Scriptures or the Fathers make mention of a judgment, or condemnation, of demons, and of punishment to be inflicted upon them at the end of the age, they speak of the condemnation of the third kind already sufficiently explained; even if they sometimes express this by the name "fire." For it is not that demons are not tormented by the principal punishment before that time, or less than afterwards; but that the prison of hell and the fire of Gehenna, with the full measure of its punishment — which will consist in the addition of the accidental punishments already enumerated — will then receive all demons together; so that it will be true to say that they will then be plunged into the extreme and ultimate misery, to which nothing further will afterwards be added.

§ 102. As for what they say to Christ (Matt. 8): "Have you come to torment us before the time?", this can also be taken in reference to the second kind of condemnation; so that by "torment" they understand being cast out from men and not being permitted to harm them, even before the last judgment. For in this sense precisely is to be understood what one of them says to Christ (Lk. 8): "I beseech you, torment me not" — for (the Evangelist adds) he was commanding the unclean spirit to depart from the man; therefore the torment of the devil was to depart from the man and to be unable to harm him any longer. Hence also the fact that the demons there are said to have besought Jesus not to command them to go into the abyss: they are not to be believed to have made this request as though they were going to suffer a more grievous punishment from the fire in the abyss, that is in hell, but because, once relegated there, they would no longer be able to vex and seduce men — which was in their estimation a place of great torment.

§ 103. Furthermore, as regards the opinion of those Fathers who absolutely deny that demons were handed over to eternal fire before the last judgment, or before the coming of Christ — which Justin, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Eusebius, Epiphanius, and Oecumenius seem to have thought[199] — these are not to be agreed with in this matter. And as for what some of them say, that the devil, still ignorant up to the advent of Christ of his own condemnation, abstained from blaspheming God: this is even more absurd, alien from the sense of the Church, and contrary to reason. For if the good Angels, by the merit of their perseverance, were immediately made certain and secure of their perpetual beatitude (*beatitudo*), why were not the evil ones also, by the merit of the pride in which they fell, made immediately certain of their perpetual condemnation and punishment? Especially since it belongs to the condemned opinions of Origen to hold out to demons a hope of salvation through repentance. Certainly the demons themselves, when complaining in the Gospel that they are being tormented before the time, openly confessed that they know they are to be tormented at some point, and therefore that they are by no means ignorant of this sentence of their own condemnation — as Chrysostom also concludes when writing on that passage.[185]

§ 104. It is also certain that the devil from the beginning of the human race taught men to blaspheme God, just as he taught them to commit other sins contrary to religion, such as idolatry, various superstitions, and the very worship of demons. Hence also he hoped that St. Job would sin by blasphemy, saying (in his own person): "Unless he will bless you to your face" — that is, curse you;[200] and a little later solicited the same man to blasphemy through his wife, who said: "Bless God" — that is, curse — "and die."[,201] Indeed he dared to say to the Son of God: "All these things I will give you, if falling down you will adore me."[,202] From all of this it is also clear how far from the truth is what is read in Epiphanius alone, that demons hoped for salvation through Christ. For how did the devil hope for salvation through him, when he endeavored to lead him to worship himself — that is, to the gravest of all sins? Or how did he hope in him, when he hated him as a man and as the seed of the woman with an utterly hostile mind, according to that word: "I will put enmity between you and the woman, and your seed," etc. (Gen. 3).[,203] These things, therefore, as said by these authors from private opinion, but wholly at variance with the Scriptures and the ecclesiastical traditions, are to be rejected.

§ 105. To the argument brought in last place from reason, it is answered: just as the holy Angels, even while they dwell among us, always behold the face of the Father, and on this account are said by Christ (Matt. 18) to be in the Heavens[152] — as also Raphael the Angel says in Tob. 12 that he is one of those who always stand before the Lord,[,204] and Gabriel in Lk. 1 declares that he stands before God[,205] — so also demons, even while they move about in this air, sustain the punishments of hell; because they carry their Gehenna with them wherever they go, as was proved above by the words of Bede.[,206]

§ 106. But they are said always to carry their Gehenna with them, not because they actually have the fire of Gehenna joined or bound to themselves wherever they move outside of hell — as certain people have thought, though quite improbably (whose opinion is sufficiently refuted by the reasons adduced in the argument above) — nor yet because they suffer from the fire of Gehenna existing in hell and exercising its force upon them even when absent in a certain spiritual manner of action, for which mode of action (as they say) no determinate distance is required, as is required for corporeal action; which opinion pleased St. Thomas when writing on this Distinction, a. 3, ad 6.[207] But rather because they know that the punishment of Gehenna is owed to them, and they apprehend it unceasingly as owed to them and most certainly to be undergone; from which apprehension their punishment is no less than if they were actually bound to the fire of Gehenna; because the whole of their punishment is grief of the will, and the grief in their will is no less from the fact that they know they are consigned to the prison of hell than if they were in actual fact detained therein. For the resistance of the will is equal — and indeed this alone can be grief or pain in demons, since they have no sense-perception. In this sense St. Thomas replies in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 4, ad 3,[208] as though tacitly retracting what he had said differently from this opinion in his *Commentary on this Distinction*.[209] See also what he says about the pain of demons in the same place (*Summa*, a. 3).[210]

§ XV — What kind of authority (praefectura) belongs to the demons (Quae praefectura daemonibus competat)

§ 107. Holy Scripture attributes to the demons both an authority (*praefectura*) or principality (*principatus*) and likewise the name of a kingdom — sometimes indeed over one another, and at other times over human beings. The former kind of authority is attested by the words of the Lord in Matt. 12: "If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; how then shall his kingdom stand?" In which passage Beelzebub is also called the Prince of demons. Moreover we have already shown above that all the demons are subject to one supreme being, whose angels and messengers, or ministers, they are said to be — following his example and authority in apostatizing from God.

§ 108. This is proved likewise by a reason found in St. Thomas:[211] among those whose natures are ordered, it is necessary that their actions also be ordered one under another; but demons are constituted by natural order, some under others. For, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius says,[212] "their natural endowments remained in them whole and unimpaired"; therefore they stand in such relation to one another that the actions of inferior demons are subject to the actions of their superiors — and in this consists the order and formal character (*ratio*) of authority. This argument is confirmed by the fact that demons fell from all the orders of angels, as has been proved above; hence they also retain the names of their orders after sin, so that they are called Principalities and Powers and Virtues (Rom. 8; 1 Cor. 15; Eph. 6). Indeed even if all had fallen from but a single order, they would still retain the same degree of authority and subjection which they had held within that one order, according to the formal character already stated. Furthermore, this is consonant with Divine Providence, which leaves nothing in the universe without order, so that the demons, though all are evil through their own fault, are nonetheless not deprived of an order of authority and subjection among themselves — as St. Thomas teaches in the same passage.[211]

§ 109. To these considerations is added the authority of the *Glossa Ordinaria*, which says, in its comment on 1 Cor. 15: "As long as the world endures, angels rule over angels, men over men, and demons over

demons." These words are also cited by the Master in this Distinction.[213] The Gloss says "as long as the world endures" because it is sufficiently probable that the exercise of authority will cease after the Last Judgment — either entirely, or, as St. Thomas supposes in his commentary on this Distinction at the end of his exposition of the text,[214] at least with respect to those acts which they exercise toward human beings, whether by guarding them or by tempting them. On this matter see the same author more fully.[215]

§ 110. If it is asked what order of authority demons hold among themselves, it is already clear from the reason adduced that it is precisely the same order which they held before sin; since the order of authority in them follows the order of their constituted nature. Hence it also seems to follow that the more excellent they were simultaneously in natural and in gratuitous endowments, the worse they became through sin — just as the contrary obtains among the good angels, who received gifts of grace (*gratia*) and glory (*gloria*) in proportion to their natural capacity. This consequence is proved because the higher demons are in authority, the more wicked they are — which is indeed manifest in the case of their prince, the devil — just as, conversely, the higher the good angels are, the better they are. And that St. Thomas holds this view is clearly gathered from his reply to the fourth objection in his commentary on this Distinction,[216] where he says that the higher demons are in authority, the heavier the torment they suffer, according to that text: "The powerful shall suffer torment powerfully" (Wis. 6). And from the *Summa theologiae*,[211] where, speaking of them, he says: "That inferiors are placed under superiors is not for the good of the superiors, but rather for their evil. Because to do ill pertains supremely to the misery of a sinner, and to be set over others in evil is to be more miserable" — so says he. From which the solution to this argument also becomes clear: if the higher demons sinned more grievously, then as a punishment for their sin that superiority ought to have been taken from them, and on the contrary they ought rather to have been subjected to their inferiors.

§ 111. It is answered: it pertains to greater punishment and greater misery for them to hold authority (*praesint*) in evil than to be subjected to others, as has already been said.

§ 112. Furthermore, the other authority which demons hold over human beings is signified in many passages of Scripture. Thus: "He is King over all the children of pride" (Job 41) — though some refer this too to the former authority, understanding by "sons of pride" the demons who followed the proud devil. Likewise Jn. 12 and 14, where the devil is called the Prince of this world. And 2 Cor. 4, where he is called the god of this age. And Eph. 6, where the demons are called "the world rulers of these present darknesses." And 1 Cor. 15, where Christ is said to evacuate every Principality and Power and Virtue.[217] All of which St. John Chrysostom and other learned authors most rightly interpret as concerning the power of the demons over human beings.[218] To this also belongs what Scripture sometimes attributes a kingdom to the demons — for this is understood principally with respect to wicked human beings who through sin have come under the kingdom and power of the devil; just as the Kingdom of Christ is spoken of with respect to the good, because Christ has transferred them from the power of the devil into His own Kingdom. To the same effect they adduce 2 Tim. 2, where certain persons are said to be held captive by the devil according to his will.[219] But this is more correctly understood as referring to the will of God than to the will of the devil, as can easily be shown from the Greek text and from the context.

§ 113. It must be noted, however, that in each of these two kinds of authority there is a certain likeness between the demons and the holy angels, though tending toward dissimilar and contrary ends. For the angels too have their own Prince or Archangel, and are distributed in various orders among human beings — concerning which the Apostle, writing to the Ephesians (Eph. 3),[220] bears witness that all Paternity — that is,

authority (*Praelatura*) — is derived from God the Father, not only on earth but also in Heaven. Over human beings, moreover — whether through Kingdoms and Provinces, or through individual persons — Scripture ascribes authority (*Principatum ac Praefecturam*) to the angels: Dan. 10 and 12; Gen. 48; Matt. 18; Acts 12; and elsewhere.[221] But of these matters more fully in their proper place.

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§ XVI — Whether some demons preside over others in respect of particular vices (An daemones alii aliis vitiis praesint)

§ 114. Beyond the two kinds of authority (*praefectura*) over demons already discussed, a third is attributed to certain demons by some; namely, that they have their functions so distributed among themselves that some preside over particular vices, to which they especially tempt human beings. The Master (of the Sentences) appears to hold this opinion (in this Distinction), when he says that each demon is named after that vice regarding which he is most able to tempt human beings — so that one is called the spirit of lust or fornication, another of pride, another of envy, and so on for the rest. They add examples from Scripture: Asmodeus, of whom we read in Tobias, as having presided over lust; Mammon, of whom we read in Matt. 6 — "You cannot serve God and Mammon" — as being the demon who is the overseer (*Praefectus*) of avarice, as the Master holds; and so other demons are said to be called by the names of other vices.

§ 115. The testimonies of the Fathers are also adduced. For Origen, in Homily 14 on Joshua 11,[222] understood the diverse kings fighting against Israel as diverse demons set over different vices, by means of which they assail us. In consonance with this, St. Jerome writes in his Commentary on Eph. 6.[223] Most fully, however, does Cassianus hand on this doctrine in Collation 7.[224] "This," he says, "we must know: that not all demons inflict all passions indiscriminately upon human beings, but that certain spirits are appointed to brood over each vice; and that some indeed delight in the filth of impurity and licentiousness; others in blasphemies; others are peculiarly intent upon anger and fury; others feed on sadness; others are soothed by vainglory and pride; and each one inserts into human hearts that vice in which he himself takes pleasure." These things he adds in chapter 17; and other things of the same kind in chapter 19; and yet further many more in chapter 32.

§ 116. Finally, St. Gregory appears to have expressed the same opinion in Book 15 of the *Moralia*, chapter 16,[225] when he says: "Individual malignant spirits are to be believed to be obedient to certain particular vices." And further below: "Into whose mind therefore will vices come upon him with horror? — because as many vices press upon him in succession, departing and returning, so many malignant spirits lay waste his soul, as it were coming and going" — thus far Gregory.

Some writers also report that certain demons, mindful of their ancient nobility, do not deign to tempt human beings regarding impurity; and they adduce as a sign of this that Lucifer, when tempting Christ in the desert, did not tempt him regarding lust. Peraldus makes mention of this in his *Summa on Vices*, in the chapter on lust.[226] This appears, moreover, to be consistent with what was quoted from Cassianus.

§ 117. But this doctrine does not please other authors, and it is attacked by the following arguments. First: because each of the demons is in himself most ready and most eager to tempt and solicit human beings to whatever vices and sins may be; nor is the ability or the expertise lacking to them for this, provided they are

permitted by God. Second: because nothing assists the promotion of the devil's kingdom — but rather hinders it — if the power of the demons is so restricted that each is allowed to tempt human beings regarding one particular vice only; therefore this restriction of their power is not from their prince the devil. Nor, moreover, does it appear to be from God, because since it frequently happens, with God's permission, that the same human being is tempted regarding different vices, it makes no difference whether this is permitted to occur through different demons or through one and the same demon. Third: certain vices have a natural kinship among themselves — pride and envy; sadness and blasphemy; gluttony and lust; avarice and deceitfulness — and therefore it is not probable that different demons are set over vices so naturally related. Fourth: the prince of the demons himself is read in the Gospel to have tempted the Lord regarding three or four different sins; and no reason appears why he should not, through each of his angels individually, do likewise.

§ 118. Since, therefore, the aforesaid opinion seems to be effectively overturned by these arguments, a brief reply must be made to those considerations by which it appeared to be established. And indeed the authority of Origen and Cassianus in this matter is not of great weight. For Origen has also fabricated many other things about both good and bad angels which the Church of Christ does not receive. Among those things, he also taught that to each human being, just as a good angel, so also a bad angel is assigned from birth — which is inconsistent with the former opinion; for one tempter assigned to the exercise of a human being will not suffice if he can tempt that person only in one kind of sin; so Origen contradicts himself.

Furthermore, Cassianus also (in the same Collation) writes certain things about demons that are inept and fabulous, and alien from the sense of the Church: as in chapter 17, that no one is tempted simultaneously to several distinct vices, on the grounds that demons must take turns among themselves in the work of tempting. And in chapter 21, that demons grow weary and fatigued by the work of tempting. And in chapter 32, that there are certain demons who are playful (*jocos*i), who do not seek to harm but only to amuse and provoke laughter in human beings — and other things of the same sort.

Moreover, St. Jerome transcribed the opinion of Origen in his Commentary as a matter of record, not as something he approved; for he writes that "certain people say thus," thereby sufficiently signifying that he is reporting someone else's opinion, for which he does not wish to contend.

§ 119. To the authority of St. Gregory we can reply that the spirits of whom he speaks are understood to be diverse only in name; for since names are assigned to demons according to their offices, hence if the office is changed — whether the person behind it be the same or not — they may appear, by reason of the change of name, to be several and different ones, namely formally (*formaliter*); and this can also happen in the case of good angels. A similar reply could be applied to those passages of Scripture in which these names are read: "the spirit of lying," "the spirit of fornication," "the spirit of whirling," "the spirit of jealousy." For, as has been said, one and the same demon, insofar as he solicits to different vices, can be signified by various names; just as the Holy Spirit, though singular, is called "the spirit of wisdom" and "the spirit of knowledge," and so forth (Is. 11, and elsewhere).[227] For Scripture does not say that these spirits are many or distinct from one another.

§ 120. But the truer reply is that in the peculiar idiom of Scripture, by "the spirit of lying," "of fornication," and so on, it is not demons who suggest vices that are signified, but the vices themselves, or rather the vehement impulse and proneness toward vices. So also in Matt. 6 (to note this in passing), by "Mammon" no demon presiding over avarice is signified, but riches themselves, which men are said to serve —

in that manner of speaking by which certain people are said to serve their belly, and certain people are called "slaves of vainglory," and generally "slaves of sin" (Jn. 8; Rom. 6; 2 Pet. 2).[228] This is clear from another passage of the Gospel, namely that concerning "the mammon of iniquity" — in which passage it is universally acknowledged that not the devil but riches are meant.

§ 121. Finally, it is a purely fabulous notion that there are certain demons who disdain to tempt human beings to shameful things. For if the inclinations of the demons themselves toward vices are considered, they are not in the least moved by any affection toward carnal sins, since they are incorporeal. But if their malice is weighed — seeing that they desire in every way to harm human beings — they endeavor no less by temptation to lead them into carnal sins than into spiritual ones. Indeed, there is no kind of sin which is not present in the demons by way of guilt; for as St. Thomas says in the first part, question 63, article 2,[3] while they lead human beings into all sins, they incur the guilt of all sins.

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§ XVII — Whether demons, once defeated, desist from tempting (An daemones semel victi a tentando desistant)

§ 122. To those dogmas peculiar to Origen and little consonant with ecclesiastical teaching belongs also the following, which the Master (at the end of this distinction) signals he does not find displeasing, citing from Origen himself words found in Homily 16 on Joshua — namely, that from demons once defeated, as by the law of boxers who, having been defeated once, are not admitted again to the contest, the power of again tempting a man is taken away, whether that man be the same or a different one, and whether the temptation concern the same vice or a different one.[230] This teaching is likewise at variance with Sacred Scripture, which testifies that the devil, having been overcome by Christ once and again, came to him a third time for the purpose of tempting him, and that even then, having been overcome, he withdrew from him only for a time, as is recorded in Lk. 4.[231] And lest you suppose this to be something extraordinary in the case of Christ alone: in Matt. 12 and Lk. 11,[232] the unclean spirit, as Christ narrates it, says, "I will return to my house from which I departed." And the Lord describes this return — for the purpose of tempting again the one from whom it had been cast out — in such terms as to say that the last state of that man becomes worse than the first.

Likewise, holy Job, after one victory over Satan, is tempted again and repeatedly by the same, even through his wife and friends.[233]

§ 123. Now, still less open to doubt is the fact that even after one or more victories, men are tempted again and again, whether that temptation be inflicted by the same demon or by different ones. Indeed, the devil is generally more hostile to holy men than to others, so as to cast them down and prostrate them in the end. For upon the wicked, whom he already holds as captives and as his own bondmen, he presses less urgently — as Cyprian testifies.[234] Nevertheless it must not be denied that the power of the demons is often divinely restrained, lest they be able to tempt the saints as much as they wish; and that, in proportion to the merit of virtue and for the consolation of God's servants, it is at times brought about that the demons are not permitted to assail them again so grievously, especially in the same kind of sin; and that they are even sometimes commanded to desist for a time from assaulting those by whom they have been vanquished — as can be sufficiently understood from the history of Anthony the Hermit and certain others. This is rendered probable also by the example of Christ, concerning whom it is said that the devil withdrew from him for a

time; and this seems to be indicated by the Apostle James, chapter 4: "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you." See St. Thomas at the last article on this distinction, and in the first part, question 114, article 5.'[235]

§ I — That the holy angels enjoy the beatific vision of God (Angelos sanctos frui beatifica Dei visione)

§ 124. Since the holy angels, from that moment in which — while the evil angels were falling into sin and forthwith into eternal misery — they persevered in the love of God, are no longer *in via* (on the way) but, by merit of their perseverance, were immediately thereafter established in the *terminus* (the end); as can be clearly understood from what was said at the third distinction:[237] it follows also from this that they at once — that is, in the very instant in which they were established in the *terminus* — received the reward of their justice and perseverance. For when the time of meriting had come to an end, just as there was nothing that detained the evil angels from the punishment owed to them, so there was nothing that delayed the good angels from their reward. For it was not fitting that any interval should be interposed in the case of angels between their merit or demerit and their reward or punishment; since neither on God's part nor on their own part

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 76, a. 4; q. 77, a. 2; q. 78, a. 1; and I, q. 63, a. 1.
2. At Distinction 22 (*ad Distinctionem 22*).
3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 2.
4. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentary on Genesis* 6 (*in Commentario illius loci*).
5. The author of the *Commentary on the Psalms* ascribed to St. Jerome, second exposition of Ps. 119, found at the end of the work.
6. St. Cyprian, *Tractatus de Zelo et Livore* (*On Jealousy and Envy*).
7. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 14.
8. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 6, q. 2, a. 2.
9. St. Basil, *Homilia 9, Quod Deus non est Auctor malorum* (*Homily 9, That God is not the Author of Evils*).
10. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration *De Nativitate Christi* (*On the Nativity of Christ*).
11. Athanasius (or the author of the work *Ad Antiochum*), Question 6, or according to another edition, Question 10, *Ad Antiochum*.
12. St. Ambrose, *In Psalmum 36*, at the verse "Vidi impium superexaltatum"; and *In Psalmum 118*, at the verse "Increpasti superbos," and again at "Superbi inique agebant usquequaque."
13. St. Jerome, *In Isaiam* 14.
14. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*.
15. St. John Chrysostom, *De compunctione cordis*, bk. 2; and *Homilia de Adam et Eva*.
16. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 6; and *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13; and *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 15.
17. Prosper (of Aquitaine), *Epistola ad Demetriadem* (also read among the Ambrosian letters, no. 84). [Note: Estius appends a lengthy editorial note (marked (a) in the source) discussing the disputed authorship of this letter, citing Gerard John Vossius (*Historia Pelagiana*, bk. 2, ch. 14), Cardinal Noris, Joseph Antelmus's dissertations (*De veris operibus Sanctorum Patrum Leonis Magni et Prosperi Aquitani*), Lodovicus Elias Dupinus, Natalis Alexander, and the Benedictine Fathers (Appendix to vol. 2 of the *Opera S. Augustini* in the new edition, Appendix Epistle 17); the letter is there numbered 142 among Augustine's letters,

inscribed to Demetriadis, and the Benedictines declare it to be assigned — whether to Prosper or rather to Leo the Great — on the authority of Pelagius and by reasoned argument.]

18. Cassian, *Collationes*, bk. 5, ch. 18 [as in source: *collat.* lib. 2, ch. 18 in the OCR; the page image reads *Collationes* with chapter references].

19. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXIV, chs. 14 ff.; and *Epistolae* IV, no. 38.

20. Isidore, *De summo Bono* I, ch. 12.

21. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 4.

22. St. Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli*, ch. 4.

23. St. Bernard, *In Canticum Canticorum*, Sermons 22 and 69.

24. Franco, *De gratia Dei*, vol. 1.

25. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, Dist. 6, § A.

26. Estius appends a second editorial note (marked (a) in the source) on the Oration against [something unclear in the running footnote], noting it to have been long recognised by scholars [the footnote in the source is partially cut off and concerns an edition of works].

27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 2 [as indicated in the section header: *S. Thom. ibidem*].

28. St. Basil, *Homilia* 11 *de invidia*.

29. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 48; *De libero arbitrio* III, at the end; and (a) *Oratio contra Iudaeos*, ch. 2.

30. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* V, chs. 32–33.

31. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 17 *super Cantica*; and *Sermo* 2 *in Octava Paschae*.

32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 2 [the article cited above: *supradicto articulo 2, q. 63*].

33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63.

34. The question of whether the first angel had a revelation from the beginning concerning man or concerning Christ is taken up below (as Estius indicates with *dicemus infra*).

35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, art. 3.

36. John Cassian, *Collationes* (Conferences), coll. 8, ch. 10.

37. Gen. 3.

38. This refers to the discussion above at Dist. 3 of the instants of merit and demerit of the angels.

39. St. Augustine [exact locus as in source: *Homo in poenam peccati factus est diaboli cibus*].

40. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 36; *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 17; *De Agone Christiano*, ch. 2.

41. The curse of the serpent and its sense is treated below, at Dist. 21.

42. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 17, on ch. 5 ("making himself equal to God").

43. St. Augustine, Discourse 1 on Ps. 68, treating the words "What I had not stolen, I then restored."

44. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 1; XII, ch. 1 and ch. 6; XIV, ch. 13; book 22 *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, ch. 17; *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*, ch. 17; Sermon 7 *de tempore* [note: this sermon, attributed to St. Augustine, was regarded with doubt by the Louvain editors and the Benedictine editors of the new edition, who placed it in the appendix to the fifth volume of the works of St. Augustine; the Fathers who edited it include it among the Sermons of the fourth class, number 234; they note that it contains excerpts, one from an opuscule of Faustus of Riez, entitled *De Ratione Fidei ad objecta quaedam Responsio*, another from the Vigils of Tapentis (*De Trinitate*, book 6)].

45. Prosper, *Epistola ad Demetriadem* [note: the Louvain editors, the Benedictines, and many learned men dispute whether this letter is authentically Prosper's; some assign it rather to Leo the Great or others; see Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vol. V, cent. V, ch. IV, art. XXIV, n. 10; Cardinal Henry Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, ch. XI; Ludovicus Ellies du Pin].

46. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXIV, ch. 17.

47. St. Bernard, Sermon 3, *Super Missus est*; and *De Gradibus Humilitatis* [before all of them, as source notes].

48. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia* (*in Hamart.*), saying that the devil persuaded himself through pride that he was begotten of himself, i.e., from no other, which belongs to God alone.

49. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* III, ch. 22.

50. St. Augustine, Tractate 17, *In Joannem*.

51. Prosper, *De vita contemplativa* II, ch. 19 [note: the work *De vita contemplativa*, cited here as Prosper's, is by learned opinion ascribed not to Prosper of Aquitaine but to Julianus Pomerius, a Moor by birth, priest in Gaul, who had as his pupil St. Caesarius of Arles; see Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vol. V, cent. V, ch. IV, art. XXIV, n. 10; Cardinal Henry Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, ch. XI; Jacques Sirmond (*In auctoritate Isidori, de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus*, ch. 12)].

52. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum* III.

53. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2.

54. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, [ch. 2].

55. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXII, ch. ult.; and XXXIV, ch. 17.

56. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, part II, q. 109, art. 2.

57. Lyranus and Burgensis, *In Is.* 14.

58. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 1; ch. 6.

59. The footnote (a) in the source, appearing at the bottom of this section, reads as follows: "It is indeed remarkable that the Author should have diverged from the opinion of the Angelic Doctor in the matter of the angels; but what is still more remarkable is that his most acute mind — otherwise so perspicacious — should have failed to penetrate the light of the clearest demonstration. For what is clearer than this: the angelic intellect, apprehending its own substance by a single simple act (*simplici obtutu*) without discursive reasoning, and knowing itself to be dependent in its existence upon God alone, could not — at least at that first moment, in which we suppose no prior error — desire equality with God or the Divinity itself? It is certainly most certain that an angel, perceiving a thing by the intuition of its nature clearly, and unable to be deceived in those things which fall within its natural cognition, could not desire — as a thing clearly known to be impossible — that which cannot subsist in any way. For a will, or complacency in a thing which a clearly deficient intellect conceives as impossible, cannot subsist; since to whomever — being in possession of himself and clearly discerning an impossible thing — that will or appetite or complacency regarding a thing which he clearly recognizes as impossible could be attributed, this could easily happen to the senses-bound; for since the senses are subject to the representation of the Imagination, they apprehend an impossible thing somewhat as possible: thus a Sick person, to use the Author's own example, however desperate his health, is easily moved by the very appetite for his own health so that he represents it to himself as possible; no wonder then if in him there comes forth an act by which — with the condition added — he desires it."

60. The argument here is that if the devil's pride consisted merely in seeking natural beatitude as his ultimate end, this would be no worse than the error of pagan philosophers or unbelievers who place their ultimate end in that which nature can attain — or even the error of those who, knowing supernatural beatitude through faith, yet turn away from desiring it and wish to rest in natural goods.

61. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1; dist. 3 [of the *Sentences*], q. 1; dist. 33, q. 1. [Citations as in source.]

62. This entire passage represents Estius's own refutation of Scotus's evasion (the *evafio* of the Author, i.e., Scotus), defending the opinion of the Angelic Doctor that the devil truly, expressly, and not merely in an interpretative or conditional sense, desired equality with God.

63. The fifth opinion referred to is that opinion which, following St. Augustine, identifies the root of the devil's sin as inordinate self-delight and aversion from the supreme Good rather than the explicit appetite for divine equality. Estius argues the two are compatible: St. Augustine's formulation does not exclude the larger claim.

64. Scotus, *In hanc Distinctionem* [i.e., *In II Sent.*, dist. 6], q. 1; also *In III Sent.*, dist. 15, q. 1; and dist. 33, q. 1.

65. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, art. 3 [cited *ibidem* in source, i.e., same article as preceding section].

66. Jacobus de Valentia, *In Psalmos*, Ps. 81 and Ps. 102.

67. Viguerius, *Institutiones Theologicae*, ch. 3, § 2, vers. 15.

68. Ambrosius Catharinus, *De Gloria Bonorum Angelorum et lapsu malorum*; also his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians*, ch. 2; and his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, ch. 2.

69. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Carthusian, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 1.

70. Guilielmus Postel, *De Arcanis mysteriis* [citation as in source].

71. Athanasius (or whoever the author), *Quaestiones ad Antiochum*, q. 6.

72. Cf. Is. 6; Dan. 8–10; Zech. 1–6, and other prophetic books.

73. The reference is to the earlier discussion of this point in a preceding section of this distinction (Estius writes *jam alibi dictum est*).

74. Heb. 2:16: *"Non enim Angelos apprehendit sed semen Abrahae."*

75. Lk. 2:11: *"quia vobis natus est hodie Salvator."*

76. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 61.

77. Hilary, *In Psalmum 43* [*Expositio in Psalmum 43*].

78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* (cf. *In III Sent.*, dist. 1); St. Bonaventure, *In III Sent.*, dist. 1. Reference also to Estius's own commentary at Dist. 1 of Book III.

79. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 61 [*loco jam allegato*].

80. St. John Chrysostom, commentary on Col. 1 [*in eum Apostoli locum*, citation as in source].

81. St. Bernard, *In Canticum*, Sermon 22.

82. St. Bernard, *De Adventu Domini*, Sermon 1.

83. St. Bernard, *Super Missus est*, Homily 3.

84. References to Estius's own commentary: *ad Dist. 1, lib. 3*; *ad Dist. 18 et 19* of Book III.

85. St. Bernard, *De Adventu Domini*, Sermon 6; *Feria III Paschae*, Sermon 2; *In Cantica*, Sermon 17.

86. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 1 [as discussed in the preceding section of this commentary].

87. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, aa. 2, 8.

88. Matt. 25:41; Rev. 12:7.

89. Prosper (of Aquitaine), *Epistola ad Demetriadem* [citation as in source].

90. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, bk. 3, ch. 11 [citation as in source]; Ezek. 29 [the verse cited: "Et emulata sunt eum omnia ligna voluptatis, quae erant in Paradiso Dei"].

91. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6 [commentary on this Distinction].

92. Rev. 12:7.

93. Viguerius and Catharinus (Ambrosius), in the places cited above [*locis supra citatis*].

94. The refutation refers back to the discussion in the preceding sections of this commentary; cf. discussion at Dist. 1 of Book III and at Dist. 18–19 of Book III (as cited in earlier sections of this distinction).

95. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 9.

96. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Homily 34.

97. Ezek. 28.

98. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 9, ad 3.

99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 7.

100. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, chs. 19 and 26.

101. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 33.

102. St. Basil, *Homiliae*, Homily 8.

103. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 11–12.

104. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* III, ch. 17.

105. Author of the *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, ch. 3.

106. The discussion of whether angels were from the beginning distributed into their orders belongs to Distinction 9 of this Book.

107. Job 40 (Vulg.: "Ipse est principium viarum Dei").

108. Ezek. 31: "Cedri non fuerunt altiores illo in Paradiso Dei"; "Omne lignum Paradisi non fuit assimilatum illi, et pulchritudini ejus."

109. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXII, ch. 24.

110. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, chs. 12 and 19; *Moralia* IX, ch. 2; *In Evangelia*, Homily 34.

111. Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* II, toward the middle.

112. Origen, *In Matthaeum*, Homily 9, on the words of ch. 20: "The first shall be last."

113. St. Jerome, *In Danielem*.

114. St. John Chrysostom, Homilies 3 and 5 (found in vol. 1, after those on Genesis); Homilies 5 and 7 *Ad Populum Antiochenum*.

115. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, ch. 19; and the author of *De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae* I, ch. 2 (found among the works of Augustine).

116. Isidore of Seville, *De Summo Bono* II, ch. 12.

117. Bede, *Super Job 40*.

118. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 1 *De Adventu*; and *De Gradibus Humilitatis*.

119. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, commentary on this distinction [i.e., Dist. 6].

120. Rev. 8.

121. Rev. 12: "Et cauda ejus trahebat tertiam partem stellarum Caeli et misit eas in terram."

122. Cf. the testimonies adduced above at Distinction 3 of this Book.

123. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 23.

124. Dionysius the Carthusian, *In II Sent.*, q. 2, on this Distinction.

125. Eccl. (= Sir.) — the text quoted is from Eccles. (Ecclesiastes): "Stultorum infinitus est numerus."

126. Matt. 7: "Lata porta, et spatiosa via est quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi sunt qui intrant per eam."

127. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, ch. 6: "Malum est in pluribus, bonum ut in paucioribus."

128. Cajetan, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 71, a. 1.

129. Gal. 5:17: "Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem."

130. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 4.

131. Job 1–2: "Circuivi terram et perambulavi eam."

132. 1 Pet. 5: "Adversarius vester diabolus tamquam leo rugiens circuit quaerens quem devoret."

133. Eph. 2: *principem potestatis aeris hujus*.

134. Eph. 6: *mundi rectores tenebrarum harum* and *spirituales nequitias in caelestibus*, that is, in the aerial regions.

135. 2 Pet. 2 and Jude 1: demons kept under certain bonds in darkness, reserved for the last judgment.

136. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Ephesians*, ch. 6: testimony that all the Doctors hold this air to be full of contrary Powers.

137. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Ephesians*, ch. 2.

138. St. Basil, *Homilia* 9.

139. St. Augustine: *Enchiridion*, ch. 28; *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 19; XIV, ch. 33; XIV, ch. 3; *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 26; *De Trinitate* III, ch. 7; *De Natura Boni*, ch. 23.

140. Job 1–2 and 1 Pet. 5, cited above in this section.

141. Rev. 12: "Vae terrae et mari, quia descendit diabolus ad vos habens iram magnam."

142. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio in Sanctum Cyprianum*.

143. St. Ambrose, *Commentary on Luke*, ch. 8.

144. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Isaiah*, ch. 14, at the words "Infernus subtus conturbatus est."

145. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, Homily 24, on Matt. 8 ("Venisti huc ante tempus torquere nos").

146. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, before the middle.

147. St. Thomas, *Catena aurea* on Lk. 6.

148. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi*, bk. 4.

149. Bede, *Historia Gentis Anglorum*, bk. 5, ch. 13.

150. Oecumenius, *Commentary on 2 Pet.* 2.

151. Distinction 2 of this book (*In II Sent.*, dist. 2), on the mode of Angels existing in a place.

152. Matt. 18:10.

153. Matt. 22:30.

154. The Council of Florence, with the consent of the Greeks, defined that souls undergo the fire of Gehenna immediately after death. Cf. Lk. 16 (the parable of the rich man and Lazarus).

155. *Extravagans* of Benedict XII [*Benedictus Deus*, 1336], defining that the souls of the damned descend immediately into hell and are tormented there.

156. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 4: "What death is to men, that the fall is to the Angels."

157. Melchior Canus, *Scholia* on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 4.

158. Reference to the Gospel passages cited in the preceding section, where demons are cast into the abyss before the day of judgment (cf. Lk. 8).

159. 1 Pet. 5:8.

160. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 10.

161. Prosper of Aquitaine (cited here as "Prosper").

162. Prosper of Aquitaine [attr.], *De Vita Contemplativa* I, ch. 3.

163. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXXIII, ch. 17.

164. Bede, *Commentary on the Epistle of James*, ch. 3 (on "set on fire by Gehenna").

165. Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, hymn on Hemiterius and Cheledonius.

166. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 4, ad 3; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, a. 3.

167. 2 Pet. 2:4 (Vulgate): *"Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit cruciandos in iudicium reservari."*

168. Jude 6.

169. 2 Pet. 2:5–6; Jude 5–7.

170. 1 Tim. 3:6.

171. 2 Pet. 2:4 and Jude 6, cited above in the preceding section.

172. Justin Martyr, *First Apology*, chs. 1–2.

173. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* V (past the middle).

174. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica* IV, ch. 17.

175. Oecumenius, *Commentary on the Second Epistle of Peter*, last chapter, at the verse "Your adversary the devil" (1 Pet. 5:8).

176. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (heresy of the Sethians), no. 23.

177. St. Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* (Life of Anthony).

178. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* VII, ch. 28.

179. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 3.

180. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34.

181. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 39.

182. St. Hilary, *Commentary on Psalm 118*, at the verse "When wilt thou execute judgment on them that persecute me."

183. St. Ambrose, *Commentary on Psalm 118*, Sermon 20, verse 2; and *Expositio Evangelii Lucae* VIII.

184. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Habakkuk* II; *Commentary on Matthew* ch. 8.

185. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentary on Matthew* ch. 8.

186. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* I, ch. 23; *De Civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 23; *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 3; *De Civitate Dei* XX, ch. 1.

187. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 85*; *Tractatus 6 in Epistolam Joannis*.

188. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* IV, ch. 10; *Dialogorum libri* IV, ch. 29.

189. Theodoret, *Epitome divinorum decretorum*, chapter on Demons.

190. St. Bernard, *Sermo de S. Malachia*.

191. Bede, *Commentary on Samuel* III (*In Samuelem*).

192. Bede, *De Natura Rerum*, ch. 25.

193. Jude 6: "He did not spare them."

194. Jn. 12:31.

195. Mk. 3:27.

196. Rev. 12:10.

197. Rev. 20:2.

198. Cf. the Master, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 47: St. Thomas, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 47, lib. 4.

199. Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Eusebius, Epiphanius, and Oecumenius, in the passages cited above.

200. Job 1:11 (Vulgate paraphrase: "unless he bless [i.e., curse] you to your face").

201. Job 2:9 (Vulgate: "Bless God and die," understood as an ironic imperative meaning "curse").

202. Matt. 4:9.

203. Gen. 3:15.

204. Tob. 12:15.

205. Lk. 1:19.

206. Bede, cited above (§ 4 of this section).

207. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, a. 3, ad 6.

208. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 4, ad 3.

209. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 6.

210. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 3.

211. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2.

212. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.

213. The Master (of the Sentences), *In II Sent.*, dist. 6 (Glossa Ordinaria on 1 Cor. 15).

214. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 6 (end of the exposition of the text).

215. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 7.

216. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 6, a. 3 (reply to objection 4); cf. also *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, a. 2, ad 4.

217. Rom. 8; 1 Cor. 15; Eph. 6; 2 Cor. 4; Jn. 12; Jn. 14.

218. St. John Chrysostom and other learned authors, on the power of the demons over human beings (passages cited in the source text).

219. 2 Tim. 2 (those held captive by the devil to his will).

220. Eph. 3 (the Apostle on all Paternity derived from God the Father, in heaven and on earth).

221. Dan. 10; Dan. 12; Gen. 48; Matt. 18; Acts 12.

222. Origen, *Homiliae in Iesum Nave* (Homilies on Joshua), Homily 14, on Joshua ch. 11.

223. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Ephesios* (Commentary on Eph. 6).

224. Cassianus (John Cassian), *Collationes* (Conferences), Collation 7, ch. 17; ch. 19; ch. 32.

225. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, Book 15, ch. 16.

226. Peraldus (William Peraldus), *Summa de vitiis*, chapter on lust.

227. Is. 11, and other passages.

228. Jn. 8; Rom. 6; 2 Pet. 2.

229. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 5.

230. Origen, *Homiliae in Iesum Nave* (Homilies on Joshua), Homily 16; and the Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 6, end.

231. Lk. 4.

232. Matt. 12; Lk. 11.

233. Cf. Job 1–2.

234. St. Cyprian, *Epistolae*, Book 1, Epistle 1.

235. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 5; and St. Thomas, commentary on this distinction, last article [abbreviation as in source: *artic. ultimo in hanc distinct.*].

236. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5.

237. Cf. the discussion at Distinctio 3, above.

DISTINCTIO VII — ON THE BEATITUDE OF THE HOLY ANGELS AND THE OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST IT (*DE BEATITUDINE SANCTORUM ANGELORUM ET OBJECTIONIBUS CONTRA EAM*)

§ 1. — nor would anything else stand in the way of their receiving, immediately and at once upon the close of the time appointed for meriting, the retribution due to their merits. For the reason why the souls of the ancient just did not receive the reward of their righteousness before the way to heaven had been opened by Christ is one that is proper to them and has no bearing on the angels, to whom the redemption of Christ does not pertain; just as the same applies to the fact that certain souls are delayed from their reward because something still remains in them to be purged — for neither does this reason have any place in the angels. Now the reward of righteousness is beatitude (*beatitudo*), and beatitude consists in the clear vision of God (*clara Dei visio*); hence it follows that the holy angels enjoy the clear vision of God, and are blessed through it even from the very beginning, when, after a single act of charity that was also persevering, they were established at the term — as St. Thomas teaches.[1] This doctrine, which holds that the holy angels see God and are accordingly blessed not only now in the time of the New Testament but also of old before the coming of Christ, is so certain from the Scriptures and the perpetual Tradition that it would be impious to doubt it.

§ 2. And first, the most explicit Scripture is Matt. 18: *"Their angels in heaven always behold the face of the Father."* By these words there is attributed to the angels in the present what is promised to us as the reward to be awaited, in Matt. 5, where it is said, *"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God";* and in 1 Jn. 4: *"When he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is."* To this also pertains the equality with the angels promised to the children of the resurrection in Lk. 20 — for it is clear that this is to be understood of the angels according to their present state, not a future one. To the same point contributes the fact that Gabriel, in Lk. 1, and Raphael, in Tob. 11, declare themselves to be among those who stand before God — that is, who continually see God. This was indeed said by them before the coming of Christ in the flesh, just as the text of Matt. 18 concerning the angels was spoken by Christ before his own death. It is therefore evident that the Greek scholiast Nicetas on St. Gregory Nazianzen erred[2] in writing that before the resurrection of Christ the angels were neither stable in grace nor had they seen the Divine Essence.

§ 3. Moreover, beyond this Catholic doctrine, many testimonies of the Fathers confirm it. Among these, St. Augustine, in book one of the *Retractations*, chapter fourteen,[3] says of the holy angels that there is no question that they are now in that possession to which this way leads — that is, he wishes it to be held as a matter of indubitable belief. Hence also in book eleven of *The City of God*, chapter thirteen,[4] he says that no Catholic is ignorant of this. He holds the same doctrine in chapter eleven of the same book and in chapter nine of book twelve,[5] likewise in book twelve of the *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, chapter thirty-five,[6] in the *Exposition of Psalm 56*, and in Homily thirty-two, chapter five, among the fifty.[7] St. Gregory Nazianzen, in

his oration *In Gorgoniam*,[8] says that the angels enjoy the most pure illumination of the Trinity. St. Gregory the Great, in Homily eight on Ezekiel,[9] writes the following: *"In the holy angels there is a festivity of the vision of the Lord without end, and joy without failure, and desire of the vision of God together with satiety, satiety together with desire"*; and after much more: *"The heavenly Spirits behold Christ in his divinity."* He writes to the same effect in book two of the *Moralia*, chapters two and three.[10] St. Bernard, in Sermon one on the Feast of St. Michael,[11] pronounces that the angels are blessed by the presence and vision of God.

§ 4. To these add what has already been defined in the Church: that the souls of the just, stripped of their bodies and fully purged, enjoy the clear vision of God. Of which matter there will be a thorough treatment below.[12] What is held to be certain and defined by faith concerning the souls of men must much more certainly and definitively be held concerning the holy angels.

§ 5. Finally, so fully persuaded of this doctrine is the Church that she does not hesitate daily to invoke the holy angels in her prayers as those who are blessed by the perpetual sight of God.

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§ II — Objections Resolved (Solvuntur objectiones)

§ 6. Against the foregoing, a first objection can be drawn from the general testimony of Scripture: Jn. 1 and 1 Jn. 4, "No man hath seen God at any time"; and 1 Tim. 6, "Who inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see." For although this latter text seems to be spoken of men alone, yet it must, as is apparent from the reason indicated by those words — "Who inhabiteth light inaccessible" — be extended also to the angels. Second, certain scriptural passages are objected which seem to ascribe sadness to the holy angels: as Is. 33, "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly"; and Matt. 18, "His fellow-servants, seeing what was done, were exceeding sorry." These fellow-servants Theophylact interprets as angels,[14] in accordance with what follows: "And they came and told their lord all that was done" — for it belongs to angels to announce. But sadness is not consistent with beatitude and the vision of God, inasmuch as the highest joy necessarily accompanies that vision. Third: Scripture testifies that the angels not only are ignorant of many things, but even learn certain things from one another, and that some command others concerning things to be done — as in Dan. 12 and Zech. 2 — which would not be the case if they saw God; since, as St. Gregory says,[15] "What is there that they do not know, who behold Him who knoweth all things?" — and since, moreover, they would behold in the Word all things to be done and to be learned, and one would not receive anything from another. Fourth: St. Jerome,[16] writing thus, says: "John dared to say what the angels perhaps did not know: 'In the beginning was the Word'"; St. Jerome therefore doubts whether, when John was writing this, the angels saw God through His essence. For if they were seeing Him, they could certainly not be ignorant of the eternity and divinity of the Word; for neither can the divine nature be seen without the Persons, nor one Person without another. Fifth: the Fathers, and especially the Greeks, everywhere deny that God, as He is, can be seen by any creature, even angelic. For St. Cyril of Jerusalem says:[17] "The angels see God, yet not as He is, but according to what they themselves are capable of receiving; for Jesus Himself says that no one hath seen the Father." Likewise St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 23 on Genesis and Homily 14 on John,[18] says that what God is — that is, the divine essence — has been seen not only by no prophet, but by no angel and no archangel; only, he says, the Son Himself and the Holy Spirit see it. He adds, however, that the Son of God, from the moment He took on flesh, has been seen by the angels. He makes use of those scriptural texts which

we cited in the first place, and of certain others. In agreement with these are Theodoret in the dialogue *Immutabilis*, as well as Theophylact and Euthymius,[19] on that text of Jn. 1, "No man hath seen God at any time." To these authors, as St. Augustine reports in his Letter,[20] can be added, among the Greeks, Athanasius and St. Gregory Nazianzen, and among the Latins, St. Ambrose and St. Jerome, whose words are cited in that same Letter. Sixth: St. Bernard, in Sermon 2 on Pentecost,[21] says that Christ ascending into heaven restored to the angels His face — as if thereby signifying that before that time they had not seen His face. One could also adduce here whatever passages seem to attribute sin, or the danger of sinning, to the angels; for these things are not at all consistent with the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*). But concerning this argument there will presently be a more fitting occasion to treat it.

§ 7. Let us therefore reply to the objections. To the first, some answer that John is speaking of bodily vision. But this is not well said, because even the Only-Begotten, by contrast with whom it was said "no man hath seen God at any time," had not seen God with bodily eyes. Others, therefore, more correctly render the sense thus: no creature can comprehend God, for this belongs to God alone. Yet others give this sense: no one of those dwelling in this life hath seen God through His essence, for this is reserved for the just as their reward after death. In favour of this sense are the words of Paul, restricting his meaning to men when he says, "Whom no man hath seen, nor can see" — that is, in this age. Finally, Cajetan[22] holds that all such scriptural texts are to be understood of the vision of the triune God taken from the resources of nature's own power. All these senses are probable, though the middle one seems most natural. According to this sense, that text of the Apostle likewise — "Who inhabiteth light inaccessible" — is to be understood as: light inaccessible to us who are mortal.

§ 8. To the second it is answered that there is no sadness properly so called in the holy angels, but that it is sometimes attributed to them figuratively: for they are said to be sad when they learn that something has come to pass which displeases them and which would bring them sadness if they were capable of disturbances of this kind. Moreover, the passage drawn from Isaiah is to be understood literally not of incorporeal angels but of men — that is, of the ambassadors or envoys of King Hezekiah, whom the Prophet says were sent to seek peace and would return sadly with their mission unaccomplished.

§ 9. To the third the reply is that those who see God do not thereby see absolutely all other things, but only those things which pertain to themselves and which it is fitting that they should know; as St. Gregory himself explains,[10] saying that the blessed see in the Word not whatsoever is in Him by way of knowledge, but whatsoever the Word Himself wills them to know. Nor is it necessary that if something is enjoined upon them by God to be done, this should be revealed to them immediately in the Word. For God is able, for the sake of maintaining the order instituted by Himself, to instruct and illuminate even those to whom He shows His essence concerning things to be done externally, through the mediation of one by means of another.

§ 10. To the fourth it is answered that St. Jerome appears to have spoken hyperbolically, and in the meantime, to soften the hyperbole, added "perhaps." For if one presses Jerome's words, he will seem to be saying that the angels had not received even by faith the mystery of the eternity and divinity of the Word, until John gave utterance to "In the beginning was the Word." But to hold this is absurd in many ways and is simply unheard-of in the Church.

§ 11. To the fifth, the single reply derived from St. Augustine[23] is that those writers are speaking of bodily vision; for he so interprets the meaning of those whom he cites. But this solution does not seem satisfactory:

first, because the aforesaid Fathers, as is evident from their writings, hold that angels are incorporeal — yet deny that God is seen by them. Then, because they assign this as a general reason for what they say: that a creature cannot see the Creator — a reason which, if it is to hold good even for intellectual creatures, must be extended to intellectual vision. Third, because they add that God is visible to Himself alone; yet God does not see Himself with bodily eyes. Therefore the other and better reply is that offered by St. Thomas,[24] namely that these authors, by the term "vision," understood that cognition which theologians call comprehension (*comprehensio*) — that is, the most perfect cognition, by which, to be sure, the thing known is comprehended. In this manner of seeing, God is seen by none but God Himself, since He alone comprehends Himself. St. Cyril hints at this solution when he says that the angels see God, not indeed as He is — that is, not with a cognition comprehending the whole thing — but according to what they themselves are capable of receiving, that is, with a cognition indeed of His very essence, but only insofar as a creature is capable of such cognition. Furthermore, this same understanding is intimated when he says that the angels see God "as they are able" and the archangels "as they can," while Thrones and Dominions see more than the former yet less than is due to God's bounty.[25] The Holy Spirit alone sees "as is fitting," and the Son of God knows "as is fitting." And again, in *Catechesis 7*,[26] he says: "The face of God the angels behold perpetually in the heavens; yet each one beholds according to the measure of his own order and rank; but the pure splendour of the paternal vision is given to contemplate properly to the Son alone together with the Holy Spirit" — so far he. The same solution may be taken from St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 14 on John,[27] where he openly calls the vision of God which he removes from creatures "comprehension." And what he says in the same place — that the Son of God, from His incarnation, began to be seen by the angels — he understands of the Son of God according to His human nature, according to which the angels see Him in such a way as even to comprehend Him.

§ 12. Now the reason why St. Cyril, St. John Chrysostom, and the other Fathers of the same age, whose manner of speaking was imitated by later writers, spoke in such a way as absolutely to deny that God can be seen by any creature, seems to be this: because they were directing their language and style against the Anomoean heretics of their time, who taught that God's nature could be comprehended by man — nay, boasted that they had comprehended it. For since we are said to comprehend by sight what we see with the bodily eye, therefore the Fathers, wishing to deny that comprehension of the divine nature is possible for us, said that God cannot be seen by a creature. And that they wished nothing other than this is proved by the very text of St. John Chrysostom's Homily 5 *On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature against the Anomoeans*.[28] Theophylact likewise mentions this error, in his commentary on Eph. 3.[29] Against the same error are directed the things written by St. Augustine in Letter 150 to Elpidius — or Letter 152, chapter 9 — and in *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, chapter 6,[30] where he shows that the nature of God is incomprehensible even to the angels.

§ 13. To the last objection it is answered that St. Bernard is speaking improperly and after the human fashion concerning the angels and God. For the Son of God, descending from heaven to earth, seemed as it were to have left the angels and withdrawn His face from them, which He then, as it were, restored to them — following the pattern of what customarily happens in human and bodily affairs. By this figure of speech the Fathers sometimes likewise say that the Son of God, descending from heaven, left His heavenly Father.[31]

§ III — That the good angels are confirmed in good (Angelos bonos esse in bono confirmatos)

§ 14. From the time that the good angels received the reward of their perseverance — namely, eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*), that is, the vision of God (*visio Dei*) destined to endure perpetually — in accordance with that saying, "Their angels always behold the face of the Father" (Matt. 18:10), they also obtained this: that they are confirmed in good will (*bona voluntas*), so that they are now altogether unable to sin. And indeed this follows necessarily from that prior gift. For he who beholds the supreme and immutable good as it is cannot, so long as he enjoys (*fruitur*) the contemplation of that good, will anything repugnant to it; just as he cannot fall into error who never turns the eyes of his mind away from that same supreme truth. In order that this may be understood, it must be noted that he who sees God through His essence (*per essentiam*) is so disposed toward God as any other person who does not see God is disposed toward the common formal character (*ratio*) of good. For the essence of God which he sees is the very essence of goodness; but it is impossible that anyone should will or act except with regard to good, on the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius. [33] Therefore neither can he who sees God will or do anything except in directing himself toward God; and consequently, so long as he sees God, he cannot sin. St. Thomas employs this proof.' [34]

§ 15. But it must be noted that this argument proves only that the angels are confirmed in good *so long as* they see God through His essence; it does not, however, prove that they cannot fall for all eternity, unless one grants and presupposes that they will always see God. For, otherwise, God could grant to someone a vision of Himself for a time, and such a person would through that gift have no security against falling again, nor would he be perfectly blessed, because the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) could be taken from him; and therefore he would not have security — though, while the vision endures, he cannot sin. There is therefore another, fuller proof, which the same Doctor adduces[35] from the common formal character of beatitude (*ratio beatitudinis*). For since beatitude is a perfect and sufficient good, it is necessary that it be of such a kind as to exclude all evil. Now it is natural to each being to wish to retain the good it possesses, and to desire to have security of retaining it perpetually; for otherwise the evil of fear and sadness would not be excluded. Therefore, true beatitude requires that one embrace in his soul the firm persuasion of never losing that good. If this persuasion is true, it follows that he will never lose beatitude, and consequently will never commit any evil, because beatitude excludes all evil; if it is false, he already thereby has some evil — namely, a false persuasion — and is therefore not blessed.

§ 16. Another argument comes from Durandus, writing on this Distinction.[36] The blessed, he says, who see God fully know all things that pertain to themselves, whatever they are to do. Since, therefore, without the existence of error in the intellect there cannot be perversity or sin in the will, it follows that the blessed who see God cannot sin. Another argument: the blessed person cannot be unwilling to possess beatitude, just as he cannot will misery; but he knows with absolute certainty that as soon as he sins — indeed, by the very act of sinning — he will lose beatitude; therefore he cannot will to sin. Another argument still: the blessed person wills to please God in all things and to persevere in the blessed life. Moreover, he knows perfectly well that not sinning is necessary for both of these ends; therefore he never wills to sin. This inference, as also that of the immediately preceding argument, is proved by the principle that whoever efficaciously wills an end also efficaciously wills the means he knows to be necessary to that end, and likewise efficaciously shuns all those things which lead away from the end.

§ 17. These arguments show that the holy angels and all the blessed are impeccable, and that this follows from the very nature and condition of beatitude (*status beatitudinis*) itself — and not merely from a gift or privilege of grace confirming them in good, as though the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*) of itself were insufficient for this purpose, as Scotus, Gabriel, and certain others have supposed.[37] Nevertheless, it must not be denied that the grace confirming in good is given to some who are not yet blessed, and to whom accordingly impeccability from the state of beatitude does not belong. For the ancient Fathers in Limbo could not sin — not by reason of the beatific vision, which they did not yet enjoy, but because the gift of confirming grace excluded from them all sin. And the same judgment applies to the souls that are in Purgatory. Hence it is apparent that in the blessed there is a twofold formal character (*ratio*) of impeccability: one, and the principal one, from the state of beatitude; the other from the benefit of confirming grace. And each of these is sufficient by itself, to such a degree that if we suppose the beatific aspect of God (*Beatificus adspectus Dei*) to be withdrawn from the blessed for a time, impeccability would still belong to them from that gift by which they are confirmed in grace, just as it belonged to those same souls while they existed in Limbo or Purgatory before they saw God.

§ 18. Furthermore, for the confirmation of the present teaching, this above all carries weight: that the dogma of Origen was condemned long ago by the common consent of all Catholics — the dogma by which he taught that, after certain revolutions of years, even the good angels and all just souls would sin and, by the desert of sin, be sent to hell; and, conversely, that demons and damned souls would repent, obtain pardon, and attain to blessedness. He further added that this alternation had already taken place an infinite number of times and would yet take place an infinite number of times — across infinite ages, which he posited as both past and future, following the error of the Platonists, who imagined a return of all things together with time after the completion of the great year. Against these views St. Augustine argues learnedly.[38] And this was by itself a sufficient cause for Origen to be condemned by name for heresy in the Fifth and Sixth Ecumenical Councils. Against this error, Epiphanius, in a letter to John of Jerusalem (inserted among the letters of St. Jerome), says, among other things, that Peter and Paul will be co-heirs of the devil — which single inference he judged sufficient to make the absurdity of that dogma abundantly apparent.[39] See also Epiphanius himself,[40] and, on the same matter, Philastrius,[41] as well as St. Augustine.[42]

§ 19. Moreover, that the holy angels cannot sin, St. Augustine teaches in many places:[43] in the *Enchiridion*, chapters 57 and 105; in Book II of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 7; in Book XI of *De Civitate Dei*, chapters 11 and 13; in Book XII, chapter 9; in *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapters 10 and 11; and in the *Exposition of Psalm 56* (*Homilia* 32, ch. 5).[44] The same is taught by St. Basil,[45] and by St. John Chrysostom — or whoever the author of the *Homilies on Elijah* may be — who calls the angels impeccable.[46] Prosper[47] likewise teaches this, saying that in the angels there exists a voluntary and happy necessity of persevering in justice. Vincentius Lirinensis, in his treatise against heretical novelties;[48] Fulgentius, in his *De fide ad Petrum*, chapters 3 and 23;[49] St. Gregory, in Homily 8 on Ezekiel, attributing immutability to them;[50] St. Bernard, in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*;[51] Rupertus, in *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, chapter 27, and elsewhere.[52] In short, all Catholic writers have held the same view. The Master likewise transmits this teaching in this Distinction,[53] with all the Scholastics concurring in the same opinion.

§ 20. That this teaching is to be held is proved, first, by Scripture, which declares that the Kingdom of Christ, of which the angels are fellow-citizens, will endure without end, and which promises us eternal life together with the angels. Now the Kingdom of God and eternal life consist in peace and justice and holy joy

(Rom. 14:17). It is proved next by the perpetual consent of the Church, by which it has been handed down not only that the holy angels are blessed and confirmed in good, but also that the contrary teaching has always been rejected as heretical, and has been noted among the heresies by the Fathers — St. Augustine, Philastrius, and others. Hence St. Augustine, treating this matter,[4] says that no Catholic is ignorant of the fact that the good angels can henceforth neither sin nor become evil. And Fulgentius, in the place cited, says it must be held most firmly "that the blessed angels, although mutable by their nature, nevertheless, after attaining to beatitude, can neither be changed for the worse nor fall away from beatitude."[54] It is proved finally by the condemnation of Origen effected in the two Ecumenical Councils. From these same facts it is also evident that those labor in vain who, attempting to excuse Origen of this error and similar ones, shift all the blame onto certain corrupters of his books. That this is a pure fiction is demonstrated by St. Jerome, writing against Rufinus in his *Apologia*, and elsewhere.[55] For the Fathers would certainly not have leveled against Origen himself the censure of anathema, had it not been sufficiently established to them that Origen had truly written those things.

§ 21. From all this it is finally evident what weight must be assigned to the opinions of certain obscure authors: such as Nicetas the Greek, who wrote in his *Scholia on Gregory Nazianzen* that angels were able to sin up until Christ;[56] and Jacob Faber, as well as Giorgio Veneziano (the former in his treatise *De tribus Magdalenis*, the latter in his *Sacra Problemata*), to whom it seemed acceptable, without qualification, that angels are able to sin.[57] For these opinions conflict with the Catholic Faith, as has now been shown.

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§ XIII — Reply to the objections (Responsio ad objectiones)

§ 22. Against the things that have been said, certain objections are raised.

And first, a passage of Gen. 6 is objected, where the sons of God are read to have sinned by loving the daughters of men and joining them to themselves. By "sons of God" in this passage not a few of the ancients understood the good angels, who were corrupted by love of women and thus made into demons: so Philo in the book *On the Giants*, Tertullian in the book *On the Apparel of Women*, Clement of Alexandria in *Stromata* book 3 and book 5, Justin Martyr in both his *Apologies*, Methodius Martyr in the sermon *On the Resurrection*, Lactantius in book 2 of the *Divine Institutes*, chs. 14 and 15, Eusebius in book 5 of the *Preparation for the Gospel*, ch. 4, Sulpicius at the beginning of the *Sacred History*.[59] St. Ambrose seems to agree with these in book 1 *On Noah and the Ark*, ch. 4, in book 1 *On Virgins*, and in the first *Apologia for David*, ch. 1.[60] They also add St. John Chrysostom, Homily 15 on various passages of Matthew.[61] Furthermore, this interpretation is made probable by the fact that Scripture elsewhere also — as in Job 1 and Job 38 — calls the good angels "sons of God"; and that the Seventy Interpreters, as their version was formerly read, rendered "sons of God" both in Genesis and in the book of Job as "angels of God."

§ 23. Second, from Job 4 there is objected the following: "Behold, those who serve him are not stable, and in his angels he found perversity." Third, in Dan. 10 discords and battles of angels among themselves are related — of those who had been set over kingdoms. Hence from this Scripture, Cassian,[62] in *Collationes* 8, ch. 13, proves that angels stir up discords among the nations and kingdoms, and says that they cannot be at peace among themselves, since some favour some and others favour others. Fourth, in Rev. 2 and 3, the angels of the churches are rebuked for certain sins, and not trivial ones, and are admonished that they do penance and

persevere in good unto the end. To this argument there is added a confirmation from St. Ambrose and St. Jerome: the former, in book 2 *On Luke*, on the text "There were shepherds in the same region watching," and the latter on Micah 6, on the text "Contend in judgment against the mountains," and on Matt. 18, on the text "Their angels always behold," etc., signify not obscurely that they understood this passage of Revelation in the proper sense of angels.[63] Fifth, Origen, Homily 20 on Numbers ch. 25 (expounding the words "Take all the princes of the people"), and Homily 24 of the same work, likewise Homily 4 on Ezekiel, and Homily 13 on Luke, says that the angels who have been appointed as our guardians are to be summoned to judgment by God, in order to receive a recompense according to the diligence or negligence with which they performed their office,[64] And lest Origen's view be dismissed, the same thing was written in plain words by St. Jerome himself on the prophet Micah (in the place already cited). Sixth, the same St. Jerome, in the letter *To Ctesiphon against Pelagius*, says that a man would be greater than the rank of angels, and would possess what angels do not possess, if he were to live without sin.[65] And in *Dialogue* 2 *Against Pelagius*, not far from the beginning, he proves that no man is without sin by this argument: because God alone is without sin. He also, in *On Ephesians*, ch. 1, asking why even the angels who were never contrary to God are subjected under the feet of Christ, replies that none is without sin, and that even the stars are not pure before God. Hence, he says, the Cross of the Saviour is said to have purified not only what is on earth but also what is in the heavens.

§ 24. Seventh, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, in *Catechesis* 2, says: "We do not know how much God has pardoned the angels. For he is indulgent towards them, since he alone is the one who cannot sin."[66] Eighth, St. Ambrose, in book 3 *On the Holy Spirit*, ch. 19, says that "no one is without sin, except God alone."[67] Ninth, St. Augustine, in book 12 of the *Confessions*, ch. 11, doubts whether there exists any such creature as always adheres to God without any change.[68] Tenth, in the Preface of the Canon of the Mass, the angelic Powers are said to tremble; but trembling signifies fear either of guilt or of punishment — if not of guilt, then, since they know that punishment will not be inflicted on them by a just Judge except for guilt, it follows that they fear guilt, from which they might incur punishment, and hence acknowledge that they are not impeccable. Lastly, Leo IX, in Gratian *On Consecration*, Distinction 1, ch. *Hi duo*, says that the holy angels fear for themselves a ruin equal to that which they have seen befall others.[69] There are also other arguments drawn from free will, but on these see below. Let us now dissolve the objections.

§ 25. Replying therefore to the first scriptural passage, we say that those were without doubt in error who understood the sons of God in Gen. 6 as the good angels. Their error is vigorously attacked and refuted at length by St. John Chrysostom, Homily 22 on Genesis.[70] St. Augustine also, in question 3 on Genesis and in book 15 of *The City of God*, ch. 23, and in other places, rejects that opinion as absurd and impossible.[71] Philastrius moreover placed it even among the heresies, ch. 108,[72] And although various interpretations of that passage are adduced by various authors, we consider that interpretation to be the best according to which "sons of God" are understood as men who worshipped God, such as the posterity of Seth at that time, inasmuch as among them the true worship and piety of God had remained. For what Scripture blames is that they joined in marriage to themselves the daughters of men — that is, those who had descended from the posterity of Cain, alienated from the true worship of God. And into this sense Sixtus of Siena considers that the words of St. Ambrose can be taken, in book 5, annotation 77,[73] although I confess it is difficult to acquit St. Ambrose of this error. For his words seem too plain to be twisted in another direction. Now what is objected as if from St. John Chrysostom is not the work of John Chrysostom, but of some Latin author, whose view however presents no difficulty; for, explaining himself, he says that the angels — that is, the holy men who were making their way toward heaven — were cast down from heaven through women. Nor does

what was adduced as if something similar from the book of Job prove anything, for it is established that "sons of God" is not taken in one single meaning in the Scriptures. In the Seventy today we indeed read not "angels" but "sons of God"; but if they did interpret it as "angels," that is to be expounded about the sons of God in the sense already stated.

§ 26. The second scriptural passage means nothing other than this: that the ministers of God, the angels, did not possess stability from the beginning, or rather that stability does not belong to them by nature — the evidence for both of which is that some fell. And in the phrase "and in his angels he found perversity," the particle *Et* ("and") is taken causally: "because in the angels." Although these words belong not to Job himself nor to Sacred Scripture in its own voice, but to Eliphaz reproaching St. Job.

§ 27. To the third it is answered that it is a figurative manner of speaking whereby the angels are said to disagree and fight among themselves. St. Thomas, following St. Gregory, book 17 of the *Moralia*, ch. 4, explains this as follows:[74] the angels are said to resist one another inasmuch as they consult the divine will concerning the contrary and mutually conflicting merits of men — not because their wills are contrary, since in this all agree, that the sentence of God should be fulfilled, but because the matters about which they consult are conflicting. Cassian, however, understood the passage of Daniel not of good but of evil angels wishing to impede the efforts of the good — an interpretation also indicated in his Commentary on that passage by St. Jerome,[75] and more fully explained by Rupert of Deutz, book 9 *On the Victory of the Word of God*.[76] But the former solution is the better. For in that passage certain angels are called princes of certain kingdoms and nations — of the Persians and of the Greeks — just as Michael is called prince of the people of God, that is, angels appointed by God and set over kingdoms for their benefit. But whether evil angels disagree among themselves in their respective jurisdictions, as Cassian and Rupert hold, is irrelevant to this passage. Certainly their view does not accord well enough with the words of Christ, Lk. 11: "If Satan is divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand?"

§ 28. The fourth scriptural passage in no way applies to the heavenly spirits, as is perspicuously clear from the many things said in Rev. 2 and 3, and most clearly from what is said to the angel of the church of Smyrna, "Be faithful unto death." Wherefore by "angels" there we must understand the human heads of the churches, that is, bishops. But because the same churches, like all other men throughout the whole world, are also governed by the heavenly angels set over them, St. Ambrose and St. Jerome accordingly applied that Scripture to the latter as well; not intending, however, that everything said there to the angels of the churches should apply to the heavenly angels.

§ 29. To the fifth argument, the authority of Origen being reprobated, it is answered that St. Jerome, as is his custom in his commentaries, was reciting another's opinion — as he himself excuses himself in the *Apologia against Rufinus*.[77] What is objected in the sixth place from the same St. Jerome seems to be taken in this way: if any man were to live without sin, that man would have an excellence which the angelic nature would not have; for in it sin has been found. Indeed, he would have what belongs to the Divine Nature alone; for that nature alone is exempt from sin. Therefore St. Jerome is not comparing a man with some one angel, but with the angelic nature or the whole class of angels. In this same way understand also what is objected in the eighth place from St. Ambrose. For we will clearly show below that this is all St. Ambrose intends, when we demonstrate that no creature is impeccable by nature. As for what is objected in the seventh place from St. Cyril, it cannot easily be excused: for it altogether savours of Origenist doctrine, whose books he had perhaps incautiously read.

§ 30. To the ninth: St. Augustine does not mean a change toward sin, but the change that comes about through the succession of times, as is evident to anyone who inspects the passage.[68] To the tenth it is answered that trembling is attributed to the holy angels metaphorically, not to signify fear but reverence — the reverence which the contemplation of the severity of God's judgments on the reprobate produces in them — as among others Jean Gerson expounds learnedly in book 1 of the *Consolation of Theology*, Prose 4.[78] In this same manner also are to be expounded the words of Leo adduced in the last place. For the holy angels are said to fear for themselves the same ruin that befell the others, inasmuch as they consider that the ruin which happened to others could have happened to them as well, had they not been preserved by God; and from this consideration they are moved toward God as at once good and just — which pertains to reverence.

§ V — That demons are hardened in evil (Daemones esse obduratos in malo)

§ 31. The evil angels, immediately after their sin (*peccatum*), were so hardened in that sin that they never thereafter could, nor can they ever in eternity, perform true and fruitful repentance and return to the grace and friendship of God; nor can they at all elicit any good — that is, any pious and salutary motion of the will (*voluntatis motum*). This doctrine is proved first of all from their eternal damnation, concerning which there are the most explicit testimonies of Scripture: Matt. 25, 2 Pet. 2, the Epistle of Jude, and Rev. 20.[80] Hence also in the exorcisms of baptism it is said to the devil: "Acknowledge thy sentence" — namely, of eternal damnation. But more on this matter was said above, in the preceding Distinction, where the punishment of demons was treated.[81] Now that eternal wretchedness includes not only the eternal evil of punishment, but also the eternal abandonment by God, such that they shall never receive from Him justice, repentance, or any good motion of the will. For just as the confirmation of the will in love of the Supreme Good belongs to the reward of the saints, so the hardening (*induratio*) of the will in love of the evil end to which they once applied themselves by choice belongs to the punishment of the damned. This, therefore, is the reason why they cannot will what is good: because they adhere immovably to an evil end. This seems to have been signified by the Psalmist when he says, in Ps. 73: "The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually." Moreover, that after the fixed point (*terminus*) — which for demons was at their fall, just as for men it is at death, as St. John Damascene testifies[82] — the will is not changeable from evil to good or vice versa, is signified by Eccl. 11 in these words: "In whatsoever place the tree shall fall, there shall it be."

§ 32. St. Augustine hands down this doctrine concerning demons in many places, and most explicitly in *Epistle 107*,[83] where he teaches that no one of sound faith can say or believe that the apostate angels ever returned, with their will corrected, to their former piety. And in *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 13,[4] he affirms that no Catholic is ignorant that no demon shall ever return to the fellowship of the good angels. Prosper likewise teaches the same in *De Vita Contemplativa* I, ch. 3, and in his sixth reply to the objection of Vincent.[84] And Fulgentius, in *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3,[85] whose words are these: "Concerning the angels, God so disposed and fulfilled it, that if any of them should lose the goodness of will, he would never restore it through the divine gift." And a little further on: "All the transgressing angels can never be without an evil will, nor without punishment; but, the evil of unjust aversion remaining, the eternal damnation of just retribution also remains." So he. This is equally the opinion of St. Gregory in *Moralia* II, ch. 4,[86] and of Rupert in *De Victoria Verbi Dei* I, ch. 27,[87] and of the other authorities.

§ 33. That this doctrine pertains to the Faith is shown not only from the two passages of St. Augustine already adduced, but far more from the fact that the Fathers always rejected the contrary opinion of Origen — of which we also spoke above, where the confirmation of the good angels was treated — as contrary to the sound faith: as did Epiphanius in *Haeresis Origenistarum*, and in the *Epistle to John of Jerusalem* which is found in St. Jerome;[88] Philastrius in his *De Haeresibus*;[89] St. Jerome in the *Epistle to Avitus*, on Dan. 4, on Jon. 3, and in the *Apologia contra Rufinum*;[90] St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 17, and in *De Haeresibus*, n. 43;[91] and very many others.

§ 34. To these was added the condemnation of this same error at the Sixth Synod, Session 21, and the definition of the contrary dogma.[92] Moreover, although the entire school of later theologians agrees with this doctrine, it must nonetheless be known that they hold varying opinions concerning the manner and formal character (*ratio*) of the hardening (*obduratio*) which, according to the Faith, we acknowledge in the demons. To omit the opinion of some who say that God preserves in the will of the demons hatred of Himself — that is, of God — as though that preservation of hatred were an act of punitive justice; and likewise the opinion of others who said that God causes a certain evil habit in the will of the demons inclining it necessarily to a depraved affection — of which opinions the former pleased Ockham and Gabriel, and the latter is ascribed to Aureolus — both of which are altogether to be condemned as injurious to the Divine Goodness.

§ 35. There are others who locate this hardening in the fact that God has decreed never to concur with the will of the demons toward laying aside the depraved affection which they once put on. Hence they say that God per accidens necessitates their will to persevere in evil. So thinks Marsilius. Others judge that their will remains obstinate in evil because it plunged itself with its whole effort into the evil object to which it applied itself, so that it can no longer withdraw from it. So thinks Henry of Ghent.[93] Yet others — and not a few — consider that this hardening (*obduratio*) or obstinacy (*obstinatio*) of the will in evil proceeds from nothing other than the nature of a state at its terminus (*terminus*); since it is natural to every thing that, once it has reached its terminus, it be moved no further, but rest in the end attained.

§ 36. Again, others think that this obstinacy proceeds solely from the negation of the divine assistance; which being withheld, it cannot come to pass that demons be converted to God by true and fruitful repentance; yet nothing prevents them from having an imperfect and unfruitful displeasure at their sins. This is the opinion of Scotus and Durandus, from which St. Bonaventure and Richard seem not to differ much.[94] And indeed, according to these last, the obstinacy of the demons does not include any hardness — that is, a depraved affection whereby the will would adhere immovably to an evil end — although it excludes fruitful repentance. But according to the opinion of all the others, the will of the demons is so obstinate in evil that it cannot in any way cast off the depravity of the affection which it has toward the evil end to which it applied itself by sinning, even though opinions vary in assigning the cause of this, as has already been said.

§ 37. Now the opinion which appears most probable is the one which St. Thomas hands down in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2, and *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5,[95] and which we also indicated at the outset: namely, that the hardening of the demons proceeds from two causes, namely from the nature of their free choice (*arbitrium*) and from the nature of the state at the terminus — of which causes the former is common also to damned human beings, while the latter is proper to the demons. And the former cause indeed many acknowledge, whereas the latter is held by almost the Thomists alone, which St. Thomas declares thus in the *Summa*, at the cited place: "The apprehension of an angel differs from the apprehension of a man in this: that an angel apprehends immovably through intellect, just as we immovably apprehend principles, of which the intellect is

the faculty; whereas man apprehends through reason movably, by discoursing from one thing to another, having a path of proceeding toward either of two opposites. Hence also the will of a man adheres to something movably, as it were able to depart from it and adhere to its contrary; whereas the will of an angel adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore it is fitting to say that the free choice of man is flexible toward the opposite both before election and after; whereas the free choice of an angel is flexible toward either opposite before election, but not after. Thus, therefore, if good angels, once adhering to justice, are confirmed in it, the evil are obstinate in sin." So he.[96]

§ 38. Although this doctrine has been vigorously attacked by Scotus and others, the following argument nonetheless strongly confirms it: that unless one speaks thus, no sufficient reason appears to be discoverable why God did not grant to sinning angels any space of repentance, as He granted it to sinning man — seeing that just as the angel, so also man, sinned not from ignorance nor from passion but from malice of the will. For the rest, the other arguments by which this opinion of St. Thomas is established, as well as the solutions of the opposing arguments, see among his Commentators on the said question 64.[97]

§ 39. From this doctrine two consequences follow. The first: that the demons, after they once sinned, do not become worse, whatever sins are afterwards added. The second: that every act of their will is a sin. The first, because where there is a state at the terminus and a fixed and immovable adherence to the end once chosen, there is no change with respect to that same end, either by withdrawal or by approach. Hence, just as the malice of the demons cannot be diminished, so neither can it be increased. By which is excluded the error of Cassian, who said that the devil retained something of rectitude after the sin of pride, until he sinned further through envy — concerning which matter something was said in the preceding Distinction.[98] Nor does St. Jerome favour this error when writing on Hab. 1,[99] and saying that the nation of demons, weighed down at last by the greatness of its sins and the burden of its iniquity, shall come to its consummation — for these words do not signify that the demons are made worse by sinning or incur additional demerit with respect to their essential punishment; but rather that, during this present age, they commit many great sins against the human race, until at last in the final judgment they receive the completion of their punishments, as has been explained elsewhere.

§ 40. The second consequence follows because, since the will of the demons is immovably fixed upon an evil end, it comes about that the affection for that ultimate end has been turned for them into something like the nature of the will. Hence, just as every operation of the will in us proceeds from the natural inclination of the will toward good in general, so in them every operation of the will proceeds from the affection which they have for the evil ultimate end; and consequently every act of the will is vitiated in them, at the very least by reason of the circumstance of the end. This must be understood of the deliberate or moral act, not of the natural act. For, as St. Thomas says in the aforesaid question 64, a. 2, ad ultimum, "the natural act of a demon can be good."[100] It is indeed witness to the goodness of nature, even though the demons also abuse such a good for evil — whenever, that is, they refer such an act by free will to some end; for they cannot refer it otherwise than to the evil end conceived beforehand, and when this happens, even the natural act contracts moral fault.

§ 41. That every deliberate act of the demons is a sin and that they can do nothing morally good is proved also by this argument: that there ought to be no society between us and the demons; and this because it must be certain to us that the demons, in all things whatsoever they do, have an evil will and bestow no benefit upon men, as it were through friendship or fellowship, except with the intention of deceiving and harming. Hence Rupert, writing on Jn. 8 on the words "When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own,"[101] says:

"Everything that the devil speaks is a lie, even if what he speaks comes true or happens; for he speaks nothing with a simple heart, nothing at all without the temptation of deceiving." So he. For more on the hardening of the demons, see St. Thomas in *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5,[102] where he treats this matter at length, solving twenty-one arguments to the contrary; and among other things he says that the demons, although they choose various things through free choice, yet sin in all things, because in every choice of theirs the way of their first choice remains. Hence it likewise follows that every deliberate act of theirs is a mortal sin, as the same Doctor expressly affirms in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 4, in the body and ad 3.[103] Concerning which matter something will also be said in the last Distinction of Book IV,[104] where it is asked whether the damned can sin.

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§ VI — Objections against the foregoing positions are resolved (Objectiones adversus praedicta solvuntur)

§ 42. Against the perpetual obstinacy of the demons in evil, certain objections are brought forward, drawn partly from Scripture and partly from the Fathers. The first is that in Wis. 5, the damned — and the judgment concerning the demons is the same — are introduced as doing penance on the day of judgment, detesting their former life at great length, and acknowledging their error. Second: James, in chapter 2 of his Epistle, says: "Thou believest that there is one God: thou dost well; and the demons also believe, and tremble."[106] From this it appears that the demons, by believing, do not merely do something good but do so *well*. Third: The conclusion of the entire Psalter is: "Let every spirit praise the Lord"[107] — which the Psalmist would not say by way of a wish if it were impossible; therefore even the evil spirits can praise God, and hence can be converted to Him. Fourth: The same thing seems to be intended by the following passages of Scripture: Rom. 14, "Every tongue shall confess to God"; Phil. 2, "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father"; and Rev. 5, "Every creature which is in heaven and on the earth and under the earth I heard saying: To him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb, benediction, and honour, and glory."[108] Fifth: Gregory of Nyssa, in his oration (*De Anima et Resurrectione*), says that even the demons themselves, after long circuits of ages, will, having laid aside their malice, become good and with one accord confess the dominion of Christ.[109] Sixth: St. Jerome, writing on Eph. 1 upon the words "That we should be unto the praise of his glory," and on chapter 2 upon the words "That he might shew in the ages to come," and on chapter 4 upon the words "From whom the whole body being compacted, etc.," seems to descend into the dogma of Origen, which taught that the devil and his angels, after certain cycles of years are completed, will receive pardon for their sins and be admitted into the heavenly Kingdom; for Rufinus brought these very passages against St. Jerome to show that he had held the same view as Origen.[110] Seventh: Pope John (in Gratian, causa 16, quaestio 2, chapter *Visis*) says that the devil grieves that he did not hold fast the charity which man holds. This, however, seems to be the grief of one who truly repents, grieving over the charity he has lost.[111]

§ 43. There are also other objections that can be adduced here, but whose proper place for explanation is at Distinction 46 of Book IV, where the eternity of the punishment of the damned is treated. Therefore to the present objections we reply as follows.

To the first: One must say that the repentance of the damned does not have for its object sins as such — that is, insofar as they are contrary to the law of God and offend God — but insofar as they are the cause of the evil of punishment. Hence the damned repent of their sins only in the sense that they know themselves to be punished on account of them; wherefore they do not properly grieve over guilt, but over punishment. See St. Thomas,[112] in which passages he explains this matter well.

§ 44. To the second: It must be said that the demons believe there is one God not voluntarily, in the way that Christians believe it, but compelled and coerced by the very evidence of the thing. Moreover, what the Apostle says — "Thou dost well" — he does not repeat concerning the demons by adding "and they do well," but in place of this he says "and they tremble." If, however, someone thinks that this phrase is also to be referred to the demons in the mind of the Apostle, on account of the comparison of evil Christians with the demons, then the sense of the Apostle will be: "Thou dost well insofar as thou believest, though not always in an absolute sense." For many evil Christians too, by the very fact that they believe, refer this to an evil end, and thus they do not do well in an unqualified sense (*simpliciter*) — whereas the demons never do so in an unqualified sense.

§ 45. To the third: It is answered that the name "spirit" in that verse does not include the angelic spirits (*Spiritus Angelicos*). For the Hebrew expression signifies breath and the breath of life that belongs to living creatures, so that the sense is: "Let whatever breathes, both among brutes and among men, praise the Lord by its breath and spirit" — that is, in the way in which even irrational things can praise God. But if you extend the statement also to incorporeal spirits and understand praise in the proper sense, the statement will have to be limited to those spirits alone that are capable of being stirred to the praise of God; and such are neither the demons nor the damned souls. Nevertheless, in a general manner even the demons give praise (*benedicunt*) insofar as they are creatures of God, according to that verse: "Bless the Lord, all his works" (Ps. 102; Dan. 3)[113] — because in them too, by reason of the excellence of their nature, God is acknowledged to be worthy of praise.

§ 46. To the fourth: Some reply that by "hell" and "those who are under the earth" are to be understood not the demons but the souls that are being purged; and that the universality signified by "every tongue" and "every knee" and "every creature" is of the kind called universality of kinds, not of individuals, so that it suffices for the truth of such statements if some from the entire class of those in hell confess God with a confession of praise. But since in those passages Scripture wishes to show the universal lordship and kingdom of Christ — namely, the dominion he is to exercise most fully after the general judgment over all angels and men, even his adversaries — it is clear that, in order to demonstrate this, the sense just given is insufficient. Therefore a better reply is that in such passages of Scripture the confession and praise are to be understood as partly offered voluntarily and partly extorted by necessity. For the good will confess voluntarily; the evil will confess in the manner of one who has been overcome and is compelled to acknowledge the power of the victor. And in this sense (1 Cor. 15 and elsewhere) we read that all things are to be subjected to Christ — some by will, others by necessity — that is to say, at that time when neither the devil nor his angels will be able to deny that Christ reigns, as St. Jerome interprets, writing on Ephesians.[114]

§ 47. To the fifth: It is answered that Gregory of Nyssa says these things not as his own view but as the view of another — namely, of Origen and his followers. For he says "they say." What his own view on this matter truly is, he himself makes plain and perspicuously clear in Book I (*De Philosophia*, from chapter 3),[115] where he teaches that not the demons or the angels if they have sinned, but only man among intellectual

creatures, can be made worthy of pardon by doing penance. This he also proves by reason in the words that follow. Nor ought it to trouble anyone that he seems to remove not repentance but only pardon from the demons. For he did not wish to deny that the demons, like the damned among men, perform an unfruitful repentance of the kind described in Wis. 5, as has been explained in the reply to the first objection.

§ 48. A similar reply is to be made to what is objected in the sixth place from St. Jerome. For, apart from the fact that St. Jerome in those very passages gives sufficient indication that he is recording another's opinion, and that in his other writings he attacks Origen's error formally — as in those texts which we cited above from him in support of Catholic teaching — he finally, in his *Apologia* (*contra Ruffinum*, Book I),[116] concerning those points in which he appeared to agree with Origen, so vindicates himself as to say that in his Commentaries (as is the practice of commentators) he had set forth the various opinions of authors, which he should not straightway be thought to have approved, since they are often mutually contradictory. Finally, if St. Jerome ever held anything otherwise than the truth, he silently retracted all of it subsequently by the very fact that he attacked Origen's teaching vehemently.

§ 49. To the seventh: It is answered that the words of the Pope do not say that the devil grieves that he did not hold fast charity; but he says: "the devil grieves and is ashamed that men hold on earth the charity which he himself was unable to have in heaven." He grieves, therefore, that men have charity — which is a sign of great malice. Moreover, he grieves out of envy, because he knows that men will ascend by charity to the place from which he himself fell.[117]

§ VII — How the aforesaid confirmation and obduration are consistent with free will (Quomodo supradicta confirmatio, et obduratio consistat cum libero arbitrio?)

§ 50. The teaching set forth above — both that which attributes confirmation in good to the good Angels, and that which attributes obduration in evil to the demons — seems to be no little opposed by the argument (*ratio*) of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). For since it cannot be doubted that in the Angels, both the good after the attainment of beatitude and the evil after their fall, free will remained, it appears to follow that the will of all of them can be bent toward either alternative, that is, toward good and toward evil. For that this belongs to the formal character (*ratio*) of free will, the authority of St. Jerome — which the Master adduces in the text from his treatise (*On the Prodigal Son, to Damasus*) — seems to teach: "God alone," he says, "is He in whom sin cannot fall; the rest, since they have free will, can be bent in either direction."[119] To this the Master rightly replies that the sentence of St. Jerome is to be taken according to the state of intellectual nature as it was created. For man and Angel were created of such a kind that through free will they could be bent in either direction, that is, toward good and toward evil. This condition man retains even after sin, so long as the course of this life endures.

§ 51. Others reply that in that clause — "since they have free will" — there is not given a cause properly so called (for God also has free will, yet cannot choose evil, as Jerome himself acknowledges in this opinion), but rather that either the cause *sine qua non* is signified, or — which comes to the same thing — that what must necessarily be presupposed is being presupposed, so that the sentence may be universally true. For brute animals and inanimate things, since they lack free will, cannot sin. Therefore to have free will is a necessary condition for the possibility of sinning. But if we read the text in this way — "the rest, which are of free will"

— as some scholars suspect is the correct reading in St. Jerome — that reading will have no controversy, provided it is referred to "the rest" considered in general and not restricted to a determinate state. Although I think the Master's reply is most fully in accord with St. Jerome's mind, especially since he also speaks in this way elsewhere at times; nor ought the conjecture of a different reading to be accepted.

§ 52. To show that good and evil Angels have free will from the fact that they do not choose by some compelling spontaneous necessity but by their own will — that is, not under compulsion, but voluntarily, some choosing good, others evil — is not a sufficiently apt or adequate explanation, even though some Scholastics have followed it. For God also spontaneously and voluntarily begets the Son, and every intellectual creature spontaneously and voluntarily seeks beatitude (*beatitudo*), and the will is borne toward the ultimate end or good in general not under compulsion (for it cannot be compelled) but spontaneously and voluntarily; nay more, brute animals too are moved spontaneously toward what they desire through their sensitive will. And indeed the heretics who at this time assault free will — and Calvin by name — acknowledge only this sort of voluntariness, which is opposed to compulsion, both in God and in creatures endowed with intellect, excluding from them the freedom of election. Hence it is clear that the said explanation does not suffice for preserving freedom of will (*libertas arbitrii*) in good and evil Angels. For those things which we have already mentioned happen not under compulsion but spontaneously, and yet not freely but by natural necessity (*necessitate naturali*). For freedom of will (*libertas arbitrii*) is opposed not only to the necessity of compulsion, which is altogether alien to the will, but also to natural necessity, by which the will, though it acts spontaneously, acts in such a way that it cannot fail to act.

§ 53. One must therefore say that freedom of will, which the Church defends against old and new heretics, consists in the faculty of choosing either of two opposites. Yet these opposites are not necessarily good and evil. For both can be good, or both evil; nay, it suffices for an act to be free that it proceed from the will in such a way that the will is able not to choose it — which is called freedom of contradiction (*libertas contradictionis*). Thus God, who can neither will nor do evil, has free will — indeed, the most free will — because what He wills and does He can will not to do and not do, and conversely what He does not will and does not do He can will and do; and moreover among diverse things He can will and do some while omitting others. In the same manner, the Angel and man, created in the image of God, have free will, because they are not determined to one mode of acting as those things are that act naturally, but can act and not act with respect to things that are orderable to the end; they have the faculty of choosing any of these, although those means — in the good Angels, as also in the blessed souls — are only good, while in the evil Angels and in the souls of the damned they are only evil.

§ 54. This formal character (*ratio*) of freedom which we have set forth is conveyed by St. Augustine in *Retractions* I.[120] There, although once and again he seems to say that a will is free from the fact that it is moved to something without any compulsion, yet he indicates that this does not suffice for its freedom, but that it is further required that it be able to act and not to act — when he says that the man who wills to sin, and who is able to resist one driving him to sin yet does not do so, sins; and when he defends this definition of sin given by himself: "Sin is the will to retain or to obtain what justice avoids, and from which it is free to abstain"; and finally when he says that those souls do not sin which lack free movement of the soul toward doing and not doing. Moreover, he says that the first man sinned in acting against God's precept, because he did not lack this movement of the soul, and had supreme power of abstaining from the evil deed.'[121] Likewise in *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* II[122] he calls it "the choice of the will" (*voluntatis arbitrium*) that is freely bent hither

and thither. And so that we may understand from St. Augustine's judgment that not even the demons lack free will, the same author again in *Letter 107*[83] says that the devil rules the sons of distrust according to his own will (*arbitrium*). "Which will," he says, "he does not hold free for doing good, but hardened to the utmost malice by the punishment of his crime." Which we can say similarly of the holy Angels: namely that they have the choice of the will (*voluntatis arbitrium*), yet not free toward doing evil, but confirmed in good so as to be able to choose among diverse goods.

§ 55. Therefore, the ability to sin does not belong to the definition or proper formal character of free will. This is expressly testified by St. Anselm in the *Dialogue on Free Will*,[123] and by St. Bernard in the book *On Grace and Free Will*,[124] and before them by St. Augustine in *Enchiridion* ch. 105 and in the last book of *The City of God*, last chapter.[125] The manifest reason for this is, that defects and imperfections of things belong in no way to their proper definitions, but are outside the essence of things, and are thus beside their nature. Hence, just as the ability to die, to grow old, or to fall sick does not belong to the definition of animal or of man — whence it is less correctly defined by certain persons as a rational mortal animal — so neither does the ability to sin belong to the definition of free will. And just as one and the same man is now mortal and will afterwards be immortal, so it is free will of one and the same formal character (*ratio*) that can now sin and will not afterwards be able to sin. But concerning this matter there is more to be said below (*at Distinction 24 of this book*),[126] where it is taught expressly that the potency for sinning is alien to the formal character of free will.

§ 56. Now that which the Master teaches, following St. Augustine (*Enchiridion* ch. 105),[127] that the choice of the will (*arbitrium voluntatis*) in the Blessed is far more free than before — which the same St. Augustine repeats also in other places — is to be understood of another certain mode of freedom, namely that by which the will is said to be free from the slavery of sin, of which freedom it is written: Jn. 8, "If the Son shall have freed you, you shall be truly free" (Jn. 8:36); and Rom. 6, "Freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice" (Rom. 6:18). This freedom is acquired in this life to the extent that one does not serve sin, but is held more perfectly in the future age, when — as St. Augustine says — "the will shall not be able to serve sin." Yet this freedom is not essential to the choice of the will, nor does it follow upon its essence, but is only accessory to it, though pertaining to its great adornment and perfection.

§ 57. Hence the reply to the question — whether freedom of will (*libertas arbitrii*) is diminished in the demons — is clear. Insofar as it is a natural condition of the will, it is established that it has not been diminished: for natural endowments remained intact in the demons. But it can be said to be diminished, both because it has been depraved, that is, badly disposed according to accident, and because through it the will of the demons cannot tend toward all things to which it previously could, namely toward supernatural and moral goods. Hence from the side of the material object there has been made by sin a great diminution of freedom in them.

§ 58. You will say: for this latter reason, freedom of will is also diminished in the good Angels, because just as the will of the evil cannot tend toward goods, so neither can the will of the good tend toward evils, toward which it could before their confirmation. It is answered: this does not follow. For a power (*potentia*) is not diminished but perfected when the possibility of failing is taken away from it — which happens when it is so confirmed that it cannot fail in its operations. Hence neither is the power of understanding (*virtus intelligendi*) in those same good Angels diminished by the fact that they cannot assent to what is false, just as it is not diminished in the demons by the fact that they cannot receive many truths. For just as to will evil, so also to assent to falsehood, is not a matter of power but of powerlessness, that is, of failing power. Similarly,

neither in men will the power of locomotion (*potentia progressiva*) be diminished after the resurrection by the fact that it will not extend to the act of limping, and so in other cases.

§ VIII — Explanation of three doubts concerning the foregoing (Trium circa praedicta dubiorum explicatio)

§ 59. Concerning what has now been said about freedom of choice (*libertas arbitrii*) in good and evil Angels, a threefold difficulty can be raised.

First, it is asked: whether demons sin in what they will or do that is evil. For if (as has now been proved) they are hardened in evil, they therefore do not have freedom with respect to evil, and consequently they do not sin in willing evil. For no one sins in that matter concerning which he is not free.

But on the contrary: the common opinion of the theologians is (in the last distinction of Book IV)[129] that demons sin continually, although on account of their state at the terminus they do not incur further demerit. It is answered: evil in this doubt can be understood in two ways — namely, either as the evil end itself, to which the demons once applied themselves, or as the means ordered to this end. If the end itself is understood, it seems that one must grant that after the first choice by which the demons applied themselves to an evil end, they do not further sin by a new sin through the very fact that they will that end; but that the affection for the evil end, persisting in them without interruption, is a continued and single sin, one committed by them at the time when they freely chose this. If, however, one understands the means that can be ordered to this end, since with respect to means that do not have a necessary connection to the end the will of the Angels remains free, it is manifest that demons sin with a new sin as often as they take up and order such means to the wicked end to which they are attached; or — what comes to the same thing — as often as they take up that very wicked end as the formal character (*ratio*) for choosing these or those means. For although the affection for the evil end has turned, as it were, into a second nature for them, and thus that affection itself does not become a new sin, nevertheless the taking up of that same end through such an affection for the purpose of choosing certain means has the character of a new and successive sin.

§ 60. Second, it is asked: whether, in the things that the holy Angels do at the command of God, they have free choice. For this does not seem to be the case, because they cannot fail to do those things. For thus they could sin. But on the contrary: if in those things they are not free, therefore they do nothing freely. For as St. Augustine says in Book III of *De Trinitate*, chapter 8, "the good Angels do nothing except insofar as God commands."[130] And indeed it is probable that all the Blessed, whatever they do, do it at God's command. For beholding God, they behold in Him all things pertaining to themselves, among which the first is whatever is to be done by them. And so beholding in God His will of good pleasure concerning all things to be done by them, that known will is in the manner of a decree and precept with respect to the one who knows it, because everyone is bound to conform himself to the known Divine will — and this has been shown to obtain most especially and beyond controversy in the Blessed (at the last distinction of Book I).'[131] Add also that if the Angels are not free in the things they do at God's command — on the ground that they cannot do anything against God's will — then neither was Christ free in the things He did in the flesh for our salvation, such as His undergoing the Passion, the Cross, and death. For He did these things, as also all others, at the command of the Father, whence also His singular obedience is commended (Phil. 2, and elsewhere).'[132] But if He did not

do these things freely, therefore through them He merited nothing, either for Himself or for us. For it is agreed that freedom of action is required for merit and demerit.

It is answered, therefore, that whatever the holy Angels and the other Blessed do, or did, at the command of God, is done and was done freely by them — just as it was done freely by Christ the Lord — and that it is no obstacle that they cannot, or could not, do otherwise while the precept stands. For this determination of the will, by which through God's command they are determined to doing some particular thing, is not from within, that is, from nature or from what has become quasi-nature, but only from an external directive principle, namely from the precept; which being posited, it is not consistent that they should do otherwise, for the reason that they have a will inflexible from the rule both of the Divine will of good pleasure and of the precept. For otherwise, if the thing itself that is commanded be regarded in itself even with relation to the end, it does not have a necessary connection to the end of beatitude (*beatitudo*), even though it can be ordered to it; and therefore the angelic will remains free with respect to doing or not doing it.

§ 61. Third: it is asked how it can rightly be said that the election of any true good, or at least of supernatural good, and conversion to God, is impossible for demons — since God can without doubt convert them to Himself and correct their will from evil to good. For from this it seems to follow openly that they can be converted: first, by the consequence drawn from what has been stated, since if one of two correlates is posited as possible, the other is also posited; and then by that passage of St. Thomas (*Compendium Theologiae*, Book I, chapter 144):[133] "In things that are done above nature," he says, "the possible and the impossible are attended to according to Divine power, not according to natural power. That a blind man can be illuminated, or a dead man rise again, belongs not to natural power but to Divine power; but the gifts of grace are supernatural. That therefore anyone can obtain them pertains to Divine power. To say therefore that anyone in a state of sin cannot obtain gratuitous gifts is to derogate from Divine power." So he.

We reply: if Divine power be considered absolutely, demons can without doubt be converted to God, since God can convert them to Himself. Yet they are truly and rightly said to be unable to be converted to God and to will the good, because they are now in that state in which God, by a certain and immovable decree, has determined no longer to convert them to Himself or to move them to good, but to leave His justice perpetually in their sin as also in their misery. Hence, although they can be converted by God's absolute power, they nevertheless cannot be converted by His ordinary power — that is, by that power according to which only those things are possible that do not conflict with the justice required by the order once and immovably established by God. Of this mode of power we have treated above (at Distinction 4 of Book I).[134]

§ IX — That no creature is impeccable by nature (Nullam creaturam natura impeccabilem esse)

§ 62. Although the holy Angels are so confirmed in good that they can no longer sin, to such a degree that that blessed inability to sin has been, as it were, turned into their very nature, yet absolutely speaking it must not be said that the Angelic nature, or any other intellectual creature which God has made or could make, is impeccable by reason of its nature (*natura*); rather, whatever creature possesses the attribute of being unable to sin holds this from the gift of grace (*donum Gratiae*), not from the condition of its nature. So says St. Thomas,[135] who adds there this argument as well: because to sin is nothing other than to decline from the rectitude (*rectitudo*) of an act which one ought to have, whether sin be taken in the domain of natural things,

in the domain of artificial things, or in the domain of moral things. Now, that act alone cannot decline from rectitude whose rule (*regula*) is the very power (*virtus*) of the agent. For, he says, if the hand of the craftsman were itself the rule of the incision, the craftsman could never cut the wood except correctly. Since, therefore, the Divine Will alone is the rule of its own act — because it is not ordered to any higher end — whereas the will of every creature must receive the rectitude of its act from the rule of the Divine Will, to which the ultimate end belongs, it is plain that sin can exist in the Divine Will alone not at all, whereas in the will of any creature it can exist, according to the condition of its nature. This is briefly proved by the following argument: because every creature was made from nothing, and accordingly, just as it can be reduced to nothing, so too can it fail in its act. And indeed this is manifest in the Angels from the fact that before their confirmation they were able to sin, just as others of the same nature did sin. Wherefore, since their nature was not changed through confirmation, it is clear that they are impeccable not by nature but by the grace of God.

§ 63. Indeed, even if they had been created from the beginning in such a state as they have now been brought to through the grace of confirmation, even so they would not be impeccable by the condition of their nature, but by the gift of grace — which, even if it might in that case be called natural, because it would have been given along with and implanted in their nature, could nevertheless be removed while that same nature and essence remained intact. It is easy, moreover, to take a proof of this doctrine from the Fathers. For St. Augustine expressly says:[136] "Whatever rational creature is so constituted that it cannot sin, this belongs not to its own nature but to the grace of God; and therefore God alone is He who, not by the grace of anyone else but by His own nature, could not, cannot, and will never be able to sin." These words are also cited by the Master.[137] And Fulgentius,[138] in his book on this matter, held this so certainly that he counted it among the dogmas of the faith.

§ 64. St. Jerome too seems to have wished to signify this when, in his letter to Damasus concerning the prodigal son,[139] he affirms that God alone is He into whom sin does not fall; whereas all other things that possess free will (*liberum arbitrium*) can be bent in either direction, that is, to good and to evil. In that same passage he also extends to the Angels the word of Ps. 142: "No living being shall be justified in Thy sight" — not that there is or has been sin in them, but that in them there is not found that justice complete in every respect and inflexible, such as is the justice of God. Hence also in his work against Jovinian[140] he speaks of the Angels as follows: "Since they are creatures, they can at any rate receive sin" — evidently assigning the cause of this possibility from the fact that they are creatures. And in the same place: "Every creature is subject to fault, because although it has not sinned, it nevertheless could have sinned." Similarly Prudentius sings of the Angel in his *Apotheosis*:[141] "He sins, because he also was made, not begotten" — whence he also adds concerning God: "The Founder of the world alone is free from the stain of sin," etc. And further on: "Therefore look up to the One God alone who is without blame."

§ 65. Nor indeed do the Fathers seem to mean anything else when they sometimes say that God alone is without sin, than that the Divine Nature alone is exempt from and incapable of sin. Thus St. Ambrose in his Letter to Simplicianus:[142] "To be without sin," he says, "belongs to God alone." And on the words of Ps. 118, "I have gone astray like a sheep" — "God alone is without sin." And in his work on the Holy Spirit:[143] "No one is without sin save God alone" — which he afterwards explains as follows: "Every creature is subject to the capacity for sins; the Divinity alone is immune from sin." The same author in his work on the Faith[144] declares the same thing plainly in these words: "Every rational creature receives accidents and is subject to judgment; now among accidents, both the corruption of the penalty of judgment and also progress belong to creatures.

Hence Ecclesiastes says: 'For God will bring every work into judgment'; therefore every creature is capable of corruption and death, even if it neither dies nor sins; and this capability it holds not from an immortal nature, but from discipline or grace, if in some it is not changed toward vices. One thing therefore is the immortality that is bestowed, another that which exists always without any capacity for mutability." So far St. Ambrose.

§ 66. And this, perhaps, is what he meant who said at Job 4: "Behold, those who serve Him are not stable" — as if to say: so far as their own nature is concerned, they can fail and fall. In the same sense, without any doubt, is to be understood what St. Augustine says[145] — that God alone is without sin — since from St. Augustine's own judgment the good Angels are so without sin that they cannot sin, as has been proved in its proper place. But this belongs to them from grace, not from nature.

§ X — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 67. Against these positions an objection is raised from the omnipotence of God, to which he seems to do injury who denies that God is able to make a creature impeccable by its own nature. But it is answered that God cannot do this not from any defect of power, but because the very thing under discussion does not belong to the class of possibles. For it involves a contradiction that what is created — that is, produced from nothing — should be incapable of falling away. Therefore God cannot make a creature impeccable by nature, because He cannot bring it about that a creature should not be a creature. For by the very fact that it is a creature, it is defectible, since God is able to withdraw either its *esse*, or its operation, or the rectitude of that operation. From this it is manifest that it is not by the negation but by the very constitution of a creature that the notion of a creature impeccable by nature does injury to the power of God.

But you will object again: God is able to bring it about that what is gratuitous or supernatural in one creature is natural to the same creature or to another; if, therefore, the inability to sin belongs to certain beings through grace, God will be able to bring it about that this very thing belongs to those same beings, or to others, by nature. It is answered that, even though in a certain sense God can make gratuitous things into natural ones, He cannot in this manner make it natural to any being that it should be unable to sin, so that this should be altogether inseparable from its nature — and this for the reason stated above, namely, because created nature, by the very fact that it is created, is capable of falling away.

§ 68. There is further objected a passage from St. Augustine,[147] where he says that it is a great question whether there exists any rational creature that nothing illicit can delight; and he ventures to define nothing else about that question save that man, and that angelic nature which did not stand in the truth, are not of that kind — plainly leaving it doubtful whether that angelic nature which did stand in the truth is of such a kind. Since this doubt cannot be understood as bearing on the stability or impeccability that is possessed through the good of grace (for it was no doubt to St. Augustine that the good Angels — as we have shown in its proper place,[148] — are confirmed in grace), it seems to be understood as bearing on the stability that is possessed by the condition of nature. There is a similar passage in St. Augustine.,[68] For there too he speaks doubtfully about whether any creature of this kind exists.

But one must say that this doubt of St. Augustine, just as it does not pertain to the question whether there now exists any creature that cannot sin — since on this point we hold a certain judgment of St. Augustine — so it is not to be referred to the question whether there exists any creature that is by its own nature impeccable, because it has already been proved that this too was not doubtful to St. Augustine, and moreover it is proved

from the same passage of the *Confessions* itself; for there he acknowledges mutability even in a creature of this kind, though one that nowhere exercises that mutability, to the degree that it is changed neither by temporal succession nor by affective movements. The doubt expressed in those passages of St. Augustine is therefore this: whether there is any rational or intellectual creature that from the beginning was so constituted as to be unable to sin — not indeed, as we have said, from nature, but from grace conferred and implanted together with its very nature.

Although even this doubt he afterwards laid aside, when[149] he taught that all Angels were created in such a way that through free choice they could both will rightly and will wrongly. Nor is what he seems to teach in that same chapter contrary to what has been said — namely, that the impossibility of sinning is not a gift of grace for the holy Angels, but only for those men who are saved, as though it followed from this that that impossibility pertains to the nature of the Angels. For in that passage he understands by grace not just any benefit added to nature, but that which is given to the unworthy and to those who have ill-deserved it — such as are the benefits of salvation in respect of fallen man.

§ XI — On certain things to be noted concerning the knowledge of the Angels (De scientia Angelorum quædam notanda)

§ 69. Although to have an exact and precise knowledge of the mode and limits of angelic knowledge is naturally impossible for us, who are placed far below the sublimity of the angelic nature, nevertheless nothing prevents our knowing certain things about it, insofar as either Scripture or reason has made them manifest. Therefore, briefly and touching only a few of the most important points concerning the cognition of the Angels, the following observations will be set down by us here.

§ 70. The **first** point is that the Angels, although they know many things, also do not know many things. This is proved in multiple ways, but most efficaciously from the fact that, according to the Scriptures, the knowledge of all things — especially of future contingents, and likewise of hidden thoughts — belongs to God alone, as has been shown above.[151] Furthermore it is clear from the fact that the Angels speak with one another and that some illuminate others,'[152] as in Dan. 8 and Zach. 2. This could not be the case unless some received from others knowledge of things they did not know. And manifest is the sentence of Christ in Matt. 24, that the day and hour of judgment is known to none of the Angels of heaven.'[153] Moreover, the mysteries of Grace concerning the human race they did not know immediately, as the Apostle testifies in Eph. 3, saying, "That it might be made known to the Principalities and Powers in the heavenly places, etc." — whence he also calls it a mystery hidden from ages. Concerning this knowledge of mysteries, how much was present to the Angels, we shall speak below.'[154]

§ 71. The **second** point is that the Angels know and understand themselves — namely, each one knowing itself through its own essence; so that, marvellously, the essence of an Angel in this act of cognition supplies the formal character (*ratio*) of the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*), as St. Thomas teaches,[155] appealing also to the authority of St. Augustine.'[156]

§ 72. The **third** point is that each Angel knows others — and this not through the essences of those Angels, nor through its own essence, but through the innate intelligible forms (*species intelligibiles*) of all things implanted in each Angel by God from its creation — as that same St. Augustine teaches at the same place, and from him St. Thomas.[157]

§ 73. The **fourth** point is that the Angels know God through their natural endowments. For if even men after the fall can know God through their natural endowments, the Apostle saying of them in Rom. 1: "The invisible things of God, through the things that have been made, are understood and seen," all the more can the Angels do this, whose power of understanding is much more subtle — especially if they are considered according to the state of a nature marred by no sin. So St. Thomas teaches.[158] The Angels, however, know God more perfectly through immaterial things than through material ones; and also more perfectly through their own essence than through any exterior things. Likewise more perfectly through the essence of a superior Angel than through their own, and most perfectly of all through all things simultaneously considered than through individual things or several considered separately. Concerning all of these matters the Commentators of St. Thomas dispute accurately,[159] as do other Scholastics.[160]

§ 74. The **fifth** point: the Angels comprehend all material things in their cognition. St. Thomas proves this[161] by the following argument: because the Angels are superior to material and corporeal things, and superior things are more perfect than inferior ones, and therefore whatever is contained in inferior things, that very thing is contained in superior things in a more perfect mode — so that what is contained in inferior things deficiently, partially, and in a manifold way, is contained in these superior things eminently and according to a certain totality and simplicity. Hence all things are in God in the most perfect mode; but because among creatures the Angels are nearest to God, the nearest degree below God of that perfection by which inferior things exist in superior things is due to the Angels. Therefore, just as God knows material things through His own essence, so the Angels know them through intelligible forms (*species intelligibiles*). And hence gather that in the angelic intellect there are found forms of all material things.

§ 75. The **sixth** point: the Angels know not only universals but also singulars. This indeed is certain from the Scriptures according to the Faith. For the Scriptures teach that these lower things — especially human affairs — are administered by Angels, as in Ps. 90: "He has given his Angels charge over thee," and Heb. 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits, etc." If they did not have knowledge of singulars, they could have no care of the things that take place here, since acts are of singulars, and the very men entrusted to their guardianship are individually singular — as St. Thomas rightly argues.[162]

§ 76. The **seventh** point: the Angels know singulars and material things not through forms received from those things themselves, but through forms innate or connatural to them. And altogether there is no cognition in the Angels through forms received from things. So St. Thomas teaches,[163] proving it by the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius[164] and of St. Augustine.[156] It is proved likewise by reason: because an Angel, with respect to the cognition of natural things, was created perfectly wise, as is signified in Ezek. 28. Also because material things cannot by their own power act upon spirit, nor produce any spiritual quality whatsoever, and therefore cannot generate an intelligible form (*species intelligibilis*) in the angelic intellect; nor furthermore can an Angel abstract from things the forms by which it might understand those things, since this abstraction of forms through which the cognition of things comes about necessarily presupposes cognition of those things themselves. For an Angel could not abstract forms from things unknown to it; for that would be a rash and blind abstraction. This must be noted against Scotus, who posits an abstraction of this kind.

§ 77. The **eighth** point: one and the same intelligible angelic form (*species intelligibilis angelica*) represents immediately the common nature, and mediately all the individuals of that nature together with all their accidents. This doctrine is consonant with what St. Thomas sets down.[165]

§ 78. The **ninth** point: to the natural cognition of an Angel there belong only those things which are within the order of the universe, whether in themselves or in their determinate and natural causes. This doctrine is gathered from the words of St. Thomas,[166] where he says that God made each creature proportioned to the universe which He disposed to make. "And therefore," he says, "if God had intended to make more Angels, or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible forms upon the angelic minds; just as if a builder had wished to make a larger house, he would have laid a larger foundation. Hence it is a matter of the same principle that God should add some creature to the universe and some intelligible form to an Angel." So he.

§ 79. The **tenth** point: future things that proceed from their causes of necessity are known by the Angels through certain knowledge (*certa scientia*) — for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow, and that an eclipse of it will occur at a definite time.

§ 80. The **eleventh** point: future things that proceed from their causes not of necessity but for the most part are known by the Angels, not with certainty but by conjecture — in the manner in which a physician foresees the health or death of a sick person. And this mode of knowing future things belongs to Angels far more than to us, in proportion as they know the causes of things more universally and more perfectly than we do.

§ 81. The **twelfth** point: future things that proceed from their causes only in the minority of cases — such as chance and fortuitous events — are entirely unknown to the Angels by natural knowledge. The reason for this is that, as things have being in the universe, so they are known by an Angel; therefore those things that have altogether uncertain being in their causes cannot be known by them. These things concerning the knowledge of future events St. Thomas sets down.[167]

§ 82. The **thirteenth** point: Angels cannot by their natural power know future contingents with certainty; but this belongs to God alone. This proposition is certain according to the Catholic Faith. For the knowledge of future events of this kind Scripture very frequently makes proper to God alone, as in Is. 41: "Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods." Moreover, since future contingents are of two kinds — some depending upon the freedom of the will of a secondary cause, others proceeding from other causes that are indeed natural, but such that, so far as their nature is concerned, they can be impeded — it is more probable, from the mind of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Fathers when they remove from Angels certain knowledge of future contingents, that not only contingents of the former kind but also those of the latter are to be understood. For indeed, if those things that are of the latter kind could be foreseen with certainty by the Angels — namely in their natural causes, all of which the Angels have known and grasped — they would no longer be, with respect to angelic cognition, future contingents, but would be determined to one or the other outcome in their causes as known by the Angel, and would therefore proceed of necessity; just as if one were to suppose that an Angel knew when an impediment to a natural cause is going to occur and when it is not, on the ground that even those very impediments are supposed to come about naturally, that is, from the disposition and concurrence of other natural causes.

§ 83. The **fourteenth** point: it is not probable that the entire order of the universe and the disposition of all natural causes is known to the Angels so perfectly that, excluding from these effects the operation of free causes, they could know every variety of future natural motions and effects in animals, plants, the elements, and the remaining inanimate things — for example, how many ants or flies are going to be born throughout

the whole world within the next thousand years, and the individual motions and changes each will undergo and the individual manners in which each will perish; how many particles of dust, with what shapes and motions they will be stirred in the air; and so of all other things. It is indeed the opinion of some theologians that all these things can be known naturally by the Angels, on the ground that they consider every motion of these lower things, granted the natural disposition of each natural thing, to proceed efficaciously from the influences of the celestial bodies. But those hold the more probable view who teach that there are some motions in these lower things that do not proceed efficaciously from the influence of the celestial bodies, but from the apprehension or appetite of animals, or from some other particular cause — even apart from free choice — whose determination does not depend upon celestial causes. For universal causes, excepting the supreme cause — which includes every perfection of causality and moves all things efficaciously — are determined by partial and inferior causes. Meanwhile, however, it must by no means be denied that many things which are future contingents with respect to our cognition are certain and determinate with respect to angelic cognition — for example, the future death of a certain man from such a disease already present, which an Angel can know to be mortal while the man's physician is ignorant of this; or dearness or cheapness of grain from definite causes unknown to the astronomer; and so in many other cases.

§ 84. The **fifteenth** point: as regards the mode of understanding, the angelic intellect has this in common with ours, that it is not always in act (*actus*) with respect to the things it knows naturally, but is sometimes in act, sometimes in potency (*potentia*). For it does not always actually consider all the things it knows by natural cognition. This, however, is to be taken of second act (*actus secundus*). For if we speak of first act (*actus primus*), the intellect of an Angel is never in potency but always in act with respect to those things to which its natural cognition can extend. For just as the celestial bodies do not have a potency for being present that is not completed by act, so the celestial Intelligences do not have an intellectual potency that is not totally completed by intelligible forms (*species intelligibiles*) connatural to them — which forms are to the Angels in the manner of habits and first acts. So St. Thomas teaches.[168] We do not, however, deny that the intellect of an Angel with respect to certain naturally known things is always in second act, that is, in actual contemplation — for example, with respect to itself and with respect to God as the author of the angelic nature. For this is probably handed down by very many, although some dissent.

§ 85. The **sixteenth** point: the angelic intellect also has this in common with ours, that it cannot understand many things simultaneously, except those that are represented to it through one form; those represented through diverse forms it cannot understand simultaneously — just as it is impossible for one and the same body to be terminated by several figures at once. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.[169]

§ 86. The **seventeenth** point: the angelic intellect excels the human in this, that the Angels do not understand through discourse of reason as we do, but immediately and without discursion intuit, in those things they first know naturally, all things whatsoever that can be known in them. For this belongs to the perfection of the angelic intellect, to which plainly belongs the fullness of intellectual light. This is the doctrine of that same St. Thomas.[170] See Bañez. Moreover, this is to be understood of discursion properly so called — that is, of that which comprises several cognitions really distinct, of which one is the cause of another, as occurs when by reasoning we gather one thing from another through syllogisms, inductions, enthymemes, and the like. For we have already said that discursion improperly so called — by which one thing is known in another with one and the same cognition — belongs to the Angels.

§ 87. The **last** point: the angelic intellect also excels the human in this, that it does not understand by composing or dividing when it judges something affirmatively or negatively, but only by understanding what a thing is — that is, the quiddity (*quidditas*) of the thing itself. St. Thomas proves this[171] from the same foundation as the preceding doctrine. For since the Angel possesses perfect intellectual light — which is compared by (Pseudo-)Dionysius[172] to a pure and most clear mirror — it follows that just as the Angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does it understand by composing or dividing, but that immediately in the apprehension of the quiddity of the subject it has knowledge of all things that can be attributed to it or removed from it. "Nevertheless," says St. Thomas, "it understands the composition and division of enunciations themselves, just as also the reasoning of syllogisms. For it understands composite things simply, mutable things immutably, and material things immaterially." So he. Nor does it follow from this that there is no truth or falsity in the angelic intellect, on the ground that truth and falsity are only in composition and division. For in the angelic intellect, although not formally, yet virtually and eminently (*virtualiter et eminenter*) there is composition and division, while truth is there formally — just as in it there is knowledge formally, or rather eminently. Since also in the Divine Intellect truth and knowledge are formally and properly present, from which intellect, nevertheless, both composition and division and discursion are utterly remote.

§ XII — Whether Angels know the thoughts of hearts (Utrum Angeli noscant cogitationes cordium)

§ 88. The question whether the occult thoughts both of men and of Angels are subject to angelic cognition — in such a way that each Angel either naturally sees them in a man or in another Angel, or can see them whenever he wills, or at least whether it belongs to him supernaturally, and by reason of Beatitude (*Beatitudo*), to see the thoughts of all — presents a peculiar difficulty. The affirmative side is proved, first, by this argument: since Angels, both evil and good, see the very essence (*essentia*) of the soul and its powers (*potentiae*), nothing prevents them, if left to their own nature, from seeing also all the acts presently existing there. And by the same argument it is gathered that they also see the thoughts of other Angels.

§ 89. Second: those things which are in our intellect are more similar to an Angel than those which are in the imagination (*phantasia*). Now an Angel can naturally know the latter; therefore also the former. For cognition (*cognitio*) comes about through assimilation. Third: Angels can enter the hearts of men. For in Jn. 13 the devil puts it into the heart of Judas to betray the Lord; and in Acts 5 Peter says to Ananias: "Why has Satan filled your heart?" — for so the Greek reads, in place of what we have: "Why has he tempted you?" But if they can enter, therefore they can also see the thoughts lying hidden there; and if evil ones can do this, how much more the good? Fourth: sagacious men often perceive the hidden thoughts and plans of others, as Scripture attests: Prov. 17, "The hearts of men are manifest to the prudent"; and Job 21, "Surely I know your thoughts."[174] Therefore Angels can do this all the more.

§ 90. Fifth: St. Basil, in his book *On True Virginity*, commands a virgin to reverence not only God and Christ her Spouse, present to her and beholding all she does and thinks, but also the infinite multitudes of Angels and the most blessed Spirits of the holy Fathers. For there is none of these, he says, who does not observe each individual thing everywhere. "For even though," he says, "they are by no means visible to fleshly eyes, yet with incorporeal gaze they encompass and comprehend all things for their knowledge." And he adds below that it is impossible for a virgin to escape the presence of these beings. From which it seems to follow

that at least the blessed Angels — indeed even the spirits of holy men — know our thoughts, whether this belongs to them naturally or by reason of Beatitude. St. Basil does not explain this distinction; he does, however, invoke that Scripture, "Their Angels always behold the face of the Father," pressing it in favour of the affirmative — even though the argument is also against their incorporeal nature.[175]

§ 91. Sixth: St. Gregory, in the *Moralia* — commenting on Job 28, "Gold and glass shall not be compared to it," as cited by St. Thomas[176] — says that in the Beatitude of the risen, one man will be transparent to another as he is to himself, and that when anyone's intellect is attended to, his conscience is simultaneously penetrated. St. Augustine teaches the same in his last book *On the City of God* (penultimate chapter) and in Tractate 77 on John; and St. Bernard in his *Apologia to Abbot William*.[177] Now the children of the resurrection will be equal to the Angels (Matt. 22); therefore it belongs to Angels, at least from Beatitude, that all hearts are transparent to them. This is also supported by what the same St. Gregory teaches elsewhere: that those who see Him who sees all things know nothing is hidden from them.'[178]

§ 92. But on the contrary, Scripture and the Fathers strongly confirm the negative side. For Scripture everywhere makes it proper to God to search hearts and reins — that is, to penetrate the inmost thoughts of hearts with knowledge — as in Jer. 17: "The heart of man is wicked and inscrutable; who shall know it? I the Lord search the heart and prove the reins"; in 1 Chr. 6: "Thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men"; in 1 Cor. 2: "What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?" — by which passage even Angels are excluded, as is proved by what precedes: "The Spirit searcheth all things," etc., which is said of the Spirit of God. Similar Scripture passages: 1 Sam. 16, Ps. 7, Ps. 138, Job 16, Wis. 1, Acts 1, Rom. 8, Heb. 4, Rev. 1.[179] Instructed by these Scriptures, the Fathers teach with one accord that to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God, and that Christ demonstrated thereby that He is God — in that the thoughts of men, whether Scribes, Pharisees, His disciples, or others, were known and transparent to Him; which argument would be invalid if this belonged to Angels naturally, or even supernaturally, at least in the ordinary way, by reason of Beatitude.

§ 93. The passages of the Fathers in which they teach this doctrine are the following: Origen on Job 1, "I have gone about the earth and walked through it"; Athanasius in the book *On Questions of Sacred Scripture*;[180] St. Ambrose in the oration *On the death of Theodosius*; and also the commentary on Rom. 8 and on 1 Cor. 2 written under his name; St. Jerome on Matt. 9, on the words "Jesus, knowing their thoughts"; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 30 on Matt., and on John; St. Cyril, book 2 on John, chs. 19, and book 2, chs. 3 and 5 — some of whose words are found in St. Thomas in the *Catena aurea* on Matt. 9; St. John Damascene, book 2 of *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 4; the author of the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, ch. 21; and Theophylact on Lk. 5.[181] That the same is also the opinion of St. Augustine is shown in particular by the fact that in the book *On the Divination of Demons*, ch. 5, he acknowledges no other way in which demons come to know the dispositions of men — not only those uttered by voice but even thoughts conceived in the mind — than when certain signs of these are expressed outwardly from the soul in the body.

§ 94. Finally, the sense of the whole Church on this point is proved by her public prayers, one of which says: "O God, to whom every heart is open and every will speaks, and from whom no secret is hid." For these things are attributed to God as proper to Him. This doctrine is also proved by reason: because if the thoughts of all others — both Angels and men — lay open to all Angels in such a way that, as soon as a thought arose in some mind, all the Angels would instantly and immediately receive the cognition due to them as their reward, there would be vast chaos and confusion among them. This is the example St. Thomas uses to prove the local

separation between Angels, since an inferior Angel does not hear a superior Angel's locution less than his own. Now since God has wrought no miracle upon the soul of Dives to form in it such an inner perception of Abraham's locution as addressed to itself, it seems to follow that the faculty both of speaking and of not hearing is natural to a separate soul.[182]

§ 95. On this question there are various opinions. Some say that affections and thoughts of every kind, even free ones, are naturally knowable by good and evil Angels; but that they are not actually known by them, because God is unwilling to concur by His general assistance with the angelic intellect so that it would know thoughts of this kind, reserving this to Himself alone — and this in order to exclude that confusion of order which would exist in the intellectual realm if each Angel were to know any and every thought of another, or even of a man. So teach Scotus, Ockham, and Gabriel.[183]

§ 96. Others add more, namely that all Angels do in fact know any and every thought and affection of hearts. And Durandus, though he does not affirm this, nevertheless judges it can probably be said.[184]

§ 97. A third opinion, held by some, is that Angels can naturally know thoughts and affections of hearts as regards their very substance, though not as regards the relation (*respectus*) they have to their proper objects; or — as others say — as regards their substance and objects, but not as regards their end or intention; or again — as still others say — as regards their substance and formal objects, but not as regards their material objects and individual circumstances; or finally — as others say — as regards their apprehension, but not as regards their affirmation or negation. The first of these sub-positions is taught by William of Paris; the second by Henry of Ghent, who cites St. Augustine on his behalf;[185] the third by Hervaeus; the fourth by Thomas of Strasbourg.[186]

§ 98. The fourth opinion is that Angels can indeed naturally know the natural and necessary thoughts and affections of others, both of Angels and of men, but that they can neither in fact, nor by nature, know the free thoughts and affections of others. The prior part of this opinion all hold in common, and it is easily proved by this argument: the natural operations of Angels pertain to their natural perfection. Therefore, since each Angel naturally knows not only the essence of another but also everything belonging to it by natural necessity as its natural perfections, it follows that natural affections cannot be excluded from this generality. The posterior part is taught by St. Thomas,[187] and agreed to by Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, Richard of Saint Victor, and most others, as well as by all followers of St. Thomas. And indeed this opinion seems not only more probable than all others but altogether true and to be held, as being most consonant with Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers. For when Scripture and the Fathers (in the passages cited above) make it proper to God to know the secret thoughts of hearts, they in no way seem to admit glosses of the following kinds: either that this is proper to God in the sense that He alone knows not only present thoughts but also all past and future and possible ones (which is how Durandus responds on behalf of the second opinion), or because He alone sees the intentions of thoughts, or because He alone knows their relation to objects, or something similar — by which devices others think they can resolve the Scriptural passages. For Scripture nowhere speaks with any such determination when making it proper to God to know the hidden things of hearts; it always speaks absolutely, and especially of thoughts actually and presently residing in the hearts of men — by which argument Christ proved Himself God in the Gospel. For future thoughts belong to future contingents, knowledge of which resides with God alone, as other special Scriptures teach, such as Dan. 13: "Who knowest all things before they come to pass," etc. Likewise the Fathers speak equally absolutely and without qualification.

§ 99. There is moreover a general argument against those who are comprised under the third opinion: by whatever reasoning, according to them, Angels can know the free thoughts of others, by that same reasoning they could also know their intentions and their objects, both material and formal, and every mode they have in the order of nature — for no solid reason of difference can be found why the latter should be less subject to the natural cognition (*notitia*) of Angels than the former, since both subsist in the order of created nature as things or modes of things.

§ 100. Nor does the opinion of Scotus seem to answer sufficiently to the mind of Scripture or the Fathers, as though they spoke only *de facto* and not of what is possible by nature. For if they are attended to carefully, what they chiefly intend is that to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to the Divine Nature — that is, natural to God alone — just as is that other thing, the knowledge of future contingents; since Scripture and the Fathers speak similarly about both. Moreover, what Scotus says — that God is unwilling to concur with the angelic intellect so that it might know the thoughts of others, lest confusion of order should thereby arise in the republic of Angels — this tells most strongly against his own opinion. For the natural inclination of the Angels themselves does not conflict with the order which the angelic republic requires. Therefore, if knowing the thoughts of others is contrary to their mutual order and introduces confusion, it cannot be said to be natural to Angels. Add that, even if evil Angels were rightly prevented from such cognition, the same would not hold for good Angels — from whom it is certainly both incongruous and in a manner punitive to be barred from knowledge of those things for the knowing of which they have natural faculty and inclination.

§ 101. Furthermore, as to this doctrine — which denies that Angels can by nature know the thoughts of hearts — others adduce various arguments. But the argument which St. Thomas offers in the places already cited seems the best, and it runs thus: Angels can naturally know only those things which belong to the order of nature; but free thoughts and affections of hearts, unless they are spontaneously made manifest by the one thinking them, are not contained under the order of nature, because they have their connexion and dependence not on natural causes alone but on a free cause as such; therefore Angels cannot know them naturally.[188] In this argument it must be noted that free thoughts are withdrawn from the natural cognition of Angels not because they are supernatural operations (for it is established that very many of them do not exceed the faculty of nature) but solely on account of the preternatural mode (*modus praeterturalis*) they have as regards their production — because, namely, a free thought depends on the free will of the one thinking it, in such a way that the free will alone, independently of any natural cause (as natural cause is opposed to free cause), determines this or that thought there. Hence it also follows that the will alone has full dominion over its own operations after God, and accordingly it is in its power alone to manifest its thoughts to others as it wills — by directing them, that is, to the intellect of another Angel and subjecting them to it as objects. By this ordering and subjection, free thoughts themselves are constituted in the mode of nature or natural knowability, so that they can now be known by others in the way in which natural things and actions are known by them.

§ 102. But this doctrine, thus expounded, although it is true and consonant both with Scripture and with the Fathers, nevertheless does not seem to explain their sense fully enough, unless we add that Angels do not even supernaturally, as a matter of fact, know any and every thought of hearts, as if this were theirs by the common law of Beatitude. For if it were so, the general declarations attributing knowledge of hidden thoughts to God alone would not yet have absolute truth — since by the benefit of Beatitude this would be communicated to many others — but they would have to be understood with the qualification: "God alone

knows naturally," etc., or the like. This qualification, however, Scripture nowhere implies should be added, just as it is absolutely true that God alone in fact knows any future contingents whatsoever, notwithstanding that He reveals certain ones to His friends; so likewise it remains absolutely true that God alone in fact knows everywhere any hidden things of hearts — for, as has been said, the authorities speak of both in the same manner. This truth is likewise not impeded by the fact that, if the holy Angels and the spirits of just men are given in the Word to behold those thoughts of men which pertain to them in some way, whether because they are invoked or because they are guardians or for some other reason — these things being thus explained, let us reply to the arguments of the affirmative side.

§ 103. The solution of the first argument is already evident from the argument of St. Thomas, by which a distinction is established between free and non-free actions in relation to angelic cognition. To the second, St. Thomas replies that it does not follow: if an Angel knows what is in the sensitive appetite or imagination (*phantasia*) of a man, that he therefore knows what is in the thought or will — because, he says, the intellect and will do not lie subject to the sensitive appetite and imagination, but the will can use them in diverse ways. But if you press the argument from greater similarity, I shall reply that the other factors are not equal: for here arises liberty, which places thoughts outside the order of nature; whereas the argument proceeds correctly for thoughts and affections that are not free.

§ 104. To the third it is answered that Angels do not enter the hearts of men in such a way as to search through and know all things lying hidden in the hearts of men, but in another sense, which will be explained in the next Distinction, where there will be a special question about this matter. To the fourth it is answered, following the teaching of St. Thomas in his treatment of the present question, that there are two ways in which it can be understood when it is said that the thoughts of the heart are known by another. One way is as thoughts are in the intellect, and affections as they are in the will: in this sense it has already been proved that they are known by God alone. The other way is as they are known in their effects. In this way the thoughts of men can be known not only by a man — as the argument rightly proves — and that the more subtly the more hidden their effects shall have been. For a thought is known not only through utterance of the tongue and other external acts, but also sometimes through change of countenance and other more hidden signs, in so far as these can be naturally known by prudent and sagacious men, or far more perfectly by Angels. Hence St. Augustine writes in his book *On the Divination of Demons*, ch. 5, that demons sometimes learn with the greatest ease the dispositions of men — not only those expressed by voice but even those conceived in thought — when certain signs of them are expressed outwardly from the soul in the body.[182] This, however, he so retracts in *Retractations* II, ch. 30, as to affirm indeed that they do know, while remaining in doubt about the mode of knowing: namely, whether they know by signs of this kind or by some spiritual power.[189]

§ 105. This retractation does not intend to express doubt whether demons know our thoughts as they exist in the intellectual part by natural power. For St. Augustine, following Scripture, did not think this should be doubted; but his doubt is whether the effects by which thoughts are known are sensible to demons and sensible signs, or whether demons by some spiritual and insensible power know thoughts through certain effects. The latter is true, because demons are not endowed with the faculty of sensing but only of understanding, just as good Angels are, being of the same spiritual nature. The reason for St. Augustine's doubt was that he was uncertain whether demons have certain bodies naturally united to them; for if that were so, it seemed to follow that they would also have certain senses in those bodies. But for a fuller account of the second mode of knowing thoughts, let the reader consult St. Thomas in his reply to the third objection,[190]

where he teaches when an Angel can know what is in the sensitive appetite and imaginative apprehension of a man and when he cannot, and furthermore why, from knowing what is in the imagination of a man, he does not straightway know, as from an effect and sign, what is in his cognition or will.

§ 106. To the fifth it is answered that St. Basil has partly in view the incorporeal nature of the heavenly Spirits, by which — as has already been explained — they are most capable of knowing thoughts in their effects and signs; and partly the state of their Beatitude, from which they have the capacity to know all things pertaining to them in any way, even if these be hidden thoughts of hearts. And in accordance with this, the statement of St. Basil must be restricted in scope — especially since St. Gregory somewhere so explains himself when saying something similar, as will be noted in the reply to the following Distinction. As to what is objected last from the same St. Gregory: one must say that those words as recited by St. Thomas are not to be found in Gregory. But since similar things are read in St. Augustine and St. Bernard, we reply with St. Thomas that after the resurrection the brightness of the body will represent the quality of the mind as regards the quantity of grace and glory, and thus each one will be able to see the mind of another.[191] Whether, however, their perfect

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§ 107. — that all thoughts are manifest to all is not altogether certain, even though the Fathers cited seem to be of that opinion. But it can be said that they will not know hidden thoughts; seeing that the will of all the Blessed will be such that their thoughts are open to all, inasmuch as they will have no thoughts which they will not make manifest to others by speaking. But let us now treat of the speech of the Angels.

§ XIII — How Angels speak to one another, or illuminate one another (Quomodo Angeli invicem loquantur, aut illuminent)

§ 108. That there is some form of speech among Angels directed to one another is clear from the Scriptures. For in Is. 6, two Seraphim cry out to one another; in Dan. 8 and Zech. 1, one Angel speaks to another; and Paul, in 1 Cor. 13, acknowledges this speech when he says: "If I speak with the tongues of men and of Angels," etc. But, as St. Gregory says,[193] "when we hear of the tongues of Angels, it is fitting that our mind, exceeding the quality of bodily speech, should be inwardly suspended toward the sublime and unknown modes of speech." It must therefore be understood that, just as someone speaks to himself when his mind turns itself toward the actual consideration of an intelligible thing (for the concept of the mind is called the interior word), so also one speaks to another when he makes manifest to that other the concept of his mind. Now this holds not only in us human beings but also in Angels. For when the concept of the angelic mind is ordered by the will of that Angel to be made manifest to another, by this very act the concept of that Angel's mind becomes known to the other. And it is in this way that one Angel's speaking to another is to be understood. Concerning this matter, all the principal points are briefly to be noted from the teaching of the theologians, and especially of St. Thomas. They are as follows.

§ 109. *First:* Both inferior Angels can speak to superior ones, and superior ones to inferior ones. The reason is that the manifestation of those things which belong to the will is conveyed by the one willing to any others whatsoever, even to superiors. For it does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect of the superior Angels that they should know the free thoughts and affections of the inferior — nor indeed those of human

beings, as is evident from what has been said above — unless the inferior themselves make those thoughts manifest to them through the command of their own will, which is for them to speak.[194]

§ 110. *Second:* An Angel speaks to God, as is evident from Zech. 1 and 2, and elsewhere. The reason is that an Angel orders the concept of his mind through his will toward God — not indeed in order to make something manifest to Him who knows all things most perfectly from eternity, but in order to receive something from Him; in the same way that among human beings a disciple speaks to a master in order to learn from him. An Angel therefore speaks to God when he takes counsel from the Divine Will concerning what is to be done, or when he marvels at His excellence, or when he prays to Him on our behalf. This is how St. Gregory[195] and St. Thomas[196] expound this speech of Angels to God.

§ 111. *Third:* No local distance can impede the speech of one Angel to another. The reason is that the speech of an Angel consists entirely in an intellectual operation, and therefore in no way depends either on place as its condition of existing, or on proximity of place in order that it be perceived by another. Hence, just as local distance does not prevent one Angel from being able to see another, so neither does it prevent one from perceiving what is ordered in another Angel to be manifested to him, which is to hear the one speaking. And this is further proved by the example of souls, of which something will be said a little further on. Thus St. Thomas teaches.[197]

§ 112. *Fourth:* The speech of one Angel to another does not reach all Angels. For if one man can speak to another alone — that is, with others not hearing what he says — much more can Angels do this among themselves. And the reason is manifest, because an Angel can order the concept of his mind toward this or that Angel as he wills. Since therefore the reason for perceiving the concept is precisely this kind of voluntary ordering, it follows that only that Angel perceives it to whom the concept is ordered by the one speaking. This is the teaching of the same St. Thomas.[198]

§ 113. *Fifth:* If one Angel speaks to several or to all Angels, this is heard and perceived by the several or by all. The reason is the same as the preceding one. For the voluntary ordering of the concept to be manifested will be the cause of its being known by all those to whom the Angel has ordered it.

§ 114. *Sixth:* In order that an Angel hear another speaking to him, no act of willing to hear (*voluntas audiendi*) is required on the part of the one hearing — a will by which he would freely incline himself to receiving another's speech — as if without such a will the other would speak to him in vain. The reason is that it is natural to an Angel to perceive the concept of another Angel's mind when ordered toward him. For this pertains to his natural perfection. Hence for this no inclination of the free will is needed — just as God does not freely know our thoughts but by the necessity of His own nature, which cannot fail to know every knowable thing. There is another reason as well: that a will to hear in an Angel would be posited in vain. For either that will would by nature precede the speech of the other, and thus hearing would be prior to speaking, which is absurd; or it would be posterior by nature, which cannot be said, because in that case the other's speech would arouse that will — which arousal could not occur without an impression of the concept upon the intellect of the one hearing, and so the perception of the concept of the one speaking would be in the hearer before he had the will to hear, which is similarly absurd. Nor does it follow from this that one Angel can thrust knowledge of his concept upon another against that other's will — if, that is, the other were unwilling to admit it. For with respect to any act of knowing whatsoever, an Angel cannot be unwilling, since every knowledge of truth perfects his intellect.

§ 115. *Seventh:* If several Angels speak diverse things to one Angel simultaneously, that one Angel will hear — that is, know — several things at once after the manner of one. For in this manner it is possible to understand several things at once, not only for an Angel but even for a human being, as the Philosopher teaches.[199] This matter was spoken of above, where we treated of the cognition of Angels.'[200]

§ 116. *Eighth:* It is probable that separated souls also possess the faculty of speaking to one another in a similar manner to the way Angels speak among themselves, and that no local distance prevents them from perceiving one another's speech. Both points are proved by the example of the rich man in hell and Abraham in Limbo, who are reported to have conversed with one another according to their souls (Lk. 16). St. Thomas makes use of this example to prove that local distance does not prevent an Angel from hearing another Angel speaking.[197] And since God did not work a miracle in the soul of the rich man to form such speech, nor yet to enable him to perceive the speech of Abraham directed to himself, it seems to follow that the faculty both of speaking and of hearing is natural to the separated soul.

§ 117. *Ninth:* Similarly, it is probable that Angels speak to separated souls and these in turn to them. For since the faculty of speaking is present in both, nothing seems to stand in the way of their using it toward one another. See on this matter Altissiodorensis in his *Summa*.[201]

§ 118. *Tenth:* An Angel does not have the natural faculty of speaking to a human being, nor conversely has a human being the faculty of speaking to an Angel — if, that is, the sense be that one imprints the concept of his mind upon another by this alone, that he orders it through the command of his will toward the intellect of the other. The reason for this can be given from the fact that the same mode of knowing does not belong to the soul when conjoined as when separate. For the soul, as conjoined to the body, naturally draws all its cognition through the senses of the body; and speech ought to correspond to cognition, and therefore does not appear to be able to proceed from such a soul except through the instrument or affection of the conjoined body.

§ 119. *Eleventh:* The fact that the Blessed after the resurrection will be able to speak to one another by the mere ordering of the will shall not be a faculty of nature but a gift of the supernatural order.

§ 120. *Twelfth:* Illumination, which is a species of speech, has its place among Angels, when one illuminates another — not indeed by communicating to him the light of nature, or of grace, or of glory, but by strengthening his own natural light and by manifesting to him truth concerning those things which pertain to the state of nature, or of grace and of glory. For to illuminate in spiritual matters is nothing other than to hand over to another the manifestation of a truth that has been known. Thus St. Thomas teaches,[202] and in agreement with him the other theologians following (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, who hands on this doctrine concerning illumination.'[203]

§ 121. *Thirteenth:* Superior Angels are never illuminated by inferior ones, but they do illuminate inferior ones. The reason is that, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius says,[204] the Divinity has immovably fixed this law: that inferior things are led back to God through superior ones. And because the omission of the order that is owed to spiritual substances pertains in no way to the ordering of human beings toward God — in that the operations of Angels are not manifest to us as are the operations of visible things — therefore that order is never omitted by God, as is sometimes done in corporeal things (namely, that God operates something miraculously beyond the order of corporeal nature, in order to order human beings toward the knowledge of Himself). Thus St. Thomas.'[205]

§ 122. *Last:* Superior Angels always illuminate inferior ones concerning all the things they know, yet always remaining in the superior order — that is, retaining a more perfect knowledge of the things they manifest to others, in the way that a teacher understands one and the same thing more perfectly than the disciple who learns from him. Thus St. Thomas teaches,[206] on the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius and St. Gregory. Of these two, (Pseudo-)Dionysius says in his *Celestial Hierarchy*[207] that "each celestial essence communicates to the inferior the understanding given to it by the superior"; while St. Gregory testifies in his thirty-fourth homily,[208] that "in that heavenly Fatherland, though some things are given more excellently, nothing is possessed in exclusion." The reason that St. Thomas adduces for this is that, since the good is communicative of itself, the more something participates in the formal character (*ratio*) of the good, the more it communicates itself to others; and since the holy Angels are in the fullest participation of the Divine Goodness, it must be held that they impart to the subject Angels whatever they receive from God. How it is that what the Master teaches in Dist. 11 below[209] — namely, that the Mystery of the Incarnation of Christ was unknown to the inferior Angels until it was accomplished, but had been known to the superior Angels from of old and from the beginning — is not contrary to this doctrine, must be explained in its proper place.

§ XIV — How widely the knowledge of demons extends (Scientia daemonum quam late pateat)

§ 123. It may be asked whether what was said above concerning the knowledge (*scientia*) of Angels ought also to be extended to demons, whose spiritual nature has been infected by sin. For it is not doubtful that their intellect has been darkened by sin. Now that darkening consists in ignorance of those things which it is fitting or proper to know. Therefore, to whatever degree ignorance has accrued to demons through sin, to that same degree knowledge has diminished — yet it is most certain that not all knowledge has been taken away from them, especially if we understand knowledge in the general sense as the cognition of any truth whatsoever. For if this had been taken away from them entirely, they would not know that they exist, nor that they are miserable, nor that they are condemned to eternal punishments. Hence the punishment of their damnation would either be nothing, or would be far less than Scripture leads us to believe it to be; since it consists especially in this, that the one damned knows with certainty that the punishment of his damnation will never come to an end.

§ 124. Now that demons are endowed with the cognition of many things is shown by many arguments. And first, this is argued by the very name of "demons" (*daemones*), which both Sacred Scripture and profane writers everywhere attribute to malignant spirits. For Lactantius[211] and St. Augustine,[212] — and before them Plato,[213] — attest that demons were called by the Greeks as beings who know and are acquainted with many things (*quasi scientes et gnari multarum rerum*). Yet the same St. Augustine, in the same book,[214] affirms that not only in Sacred Scripture is the word *daemon* always taken in a bad sense, but even in secular authors it is scarcely ever found taken in a good sense. For this reason, the imprudence of Libanius the sophist is censured in Socrates[215] and in Nicephorus,[216] inasmuch as Libanius, wishing to praise Julian the Apostate, said: "O nursling of demons, follower of demons, companion of demons!" — since the word *daemon*, even if it be neutral, is more readily understood in a bad sense. Added to this is the fact that Scripture (Gen. 3; 2 Cor. 2:11, and elsewhere)[217] attributes to the devil and to the rest of the demons a certain astuteness (*calliditas*) which is not usually present without an extensive cognition of things.

§ 125. Furthermore, their many wonderful and apparently miraculous operations, by which they attempt either to seduce or openly to harm human beings, argue the same point. For they accomplish these things by applying active agents to passive subjects and by variously combining natural causes — which they certainly could not do unless they had a thorough knowledge of the natures of things. To these considerations are added three modes by which the Fathers teach that demons receive their knowledge of things. The first is through the subtlety of their nature (*per naturae subtilitatem*). For although they have been deprived of the light of grace, they nonetheless remain endowed with the light of their intellectual nature. The second is through revelation by the holy Angels, who, according to God's will, make known certain secrets both to men and sometimes also to demons. The third is through the experience of a long time — that is, of as many thousands of years as have elapsed since the beginning of the world — which experience is aided by these two things: that they never, not even for a moment, cease from receiving the cognition of things (for they are never wearied so as to need to interpose sleep or rest in their activities, as men do); and that they are able to traverse the entire globe and are hindered by no corporeal obstacles.

§ 126. From these three ways or modes of knowing, the Fathers infer chiefly from the first and the third that demons are endowed with a knowledge of many things: St. Augustine,[218] Isidore,[219] Rupert,[220] and after them St. Thomas,[221] who also explains in that place how what is said of the experience of demons is to be understood, since experience is wont to arise from the senses, whereas the senses are not found in demons. "They know through experience," he says, "not as receiving it from the senses, but because, when the likeness of that intelligible species which they naturally have implanted in themselves is fulfilled in singular things, they come to know as present certain things which they had not foreknown as future." So St. Thomas.

§ 127. On the other side, however, it must be acknowledged that demons not only are ignorant of many things — such as future contingents, the thoughts of hearts, the number of the elect and the reprobate, and many things that are possible (which even the good Angels do not know, except insofar as certain such things are revealed by God) — but also are held fast by ignorance and manifold error concerning many things which ought to be known, especially regarding those things which pertain to the understanding that they ought to serve and be subject to God alone, whom they deny to be just and supremely good; and accordingly they neither believe He is to be loved, reverenced, and honored above all things, but rather hold the contrary of these, hating and blaspheming God as though He punishes them unjustly, and resisting as much as in them lies His dominion and power, and judging that in all these things they act rightly. Hence it is that in the Scriptures they are sometimes designated by the name of darkness: Col. 1: "Who hath delivered us from the power of Darkness"; Lk. 22: "This is your hour and the power of Darkness" — that is, of demons, whom Scripture thus calls because, in the things that pertain to the worship of God, they are by reason of their ignorance as it were pure darkness.

§ 128. Such they became by reason of the first sin; although they neither wish nor are willing to acknowledge even this very fact — that they once sinned and through sin fell into those darknesses, or that they are altogether in darkness — as St. (Pseudo-)Dionysius attests,[222] saying that demons do not see that they have blocked up the faculties of vision that had been benignly granted to them for beholding. An argument for this fact may be drawn from the condition of man. For if man through sin was made not only evil but also blind and ignorant, especially in the things that belong to piety and true wisdom, this must certainly be held even more of demons, who sinned more gravely. Hence, as it is written of man: "When he was in honor he did not understand, but was made like to the senseless beasts" (Ps. 48:13); and of the devil it is said in Ezek. 28:

"Thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty." And St. Jerome interpreted this prophetic passage in that very sense.'[223] Hence too St. Augustine'[224] affirms that the life of demons and of men is most full of errors and miseries; and in the *Enchiridion*[225] he includes error among those evils which are common to demons and to men.

§ 129. There also exists, among the Epistles of Ignatius, one to the Philippians,[226] in which it is written that the devil, because what is good he does not know — being filled with ignorance through disobedience — and though he feigns to know all things, is ignorant of many things; and other matters of the same kind. To these considerations add the fact that many things occur in the world which the natural faculty of demons, even after sin, is capable of knowing; yet that they are often prevented by God or the holy Angels from knowing and seeing them — such as what St. Jerome adduces from the same St. Ignatius (writing on Matt. 1):'[227] that Christ was conceived of one betrothed in order that His birth might be concealed from the devil, who might suppose Him to have been born not of a virgin but of a wife. This was also noted by Origen (writing on Matthew).'[228]

§ 130. Moreover, a great ignorance of the devil is apparent in the fact that he reads the Scriptures and does not understand them, just as the heretics, of whom he is the parent, do likewise. Hence he also tempted Christ by alleging the Scriptures impertinently, just as heretics tempt the children of the Church. Finally, he is often deceived by his own conjectures, being, out of malice, hatred, and eagerness to calumniate, more prone to interpret the deeds of men and external signs badly than rightly. Hence he is called the accuser of the brethren — even an unjust and lying accuser — an example of which we have in the accusation that he made before God concerning Job, viz., that Job did not serve God sincerely but only on account of temporal goods. That he truly thought and suspected this, St. Augustine attests.[229] Hence it follows that the devil does not know which among those who appear to worship God do so with sincere intention, and which do not; and not only does he not know, but is also deceived and led astray by opinion.

§ 131. From all these considerations it also follows that demons are ignorant of what good is being accomplished for them by divine providence while they are permitted variously to tempt, seduce, and afflict the human race — as St. Augustine teaches.[230] These things being so, and it being established that demons both know many things and are ignorant of many things, the following three points, drawn from the teaching of St. Thomas,'[210] whom many follow, are to be noted, so that we may at least probably mark out the limits of their knowledge.

§ 132. First: The knowledge which demons possessed through nature, whether concerning God or concerning creatures, has neither been taken away from them nor diminished. This is proved by the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius[231] (in the place cited above), who says that the angelic gifts conferred upon them have not been changed, but have remained both whole and most bright (*integra et nitidissima*). From which it appears to follow — not only that the natural powers (*potentiae naturales*) have remained whole in demons, as some who hold a different opinion explain the words of (Pseudo-)Dionysius somewhat incompletely — but that all natural knowledge has remained, namely that all the species of natural things impressed from the beginning upon their intellect have remained intact. St. Augustine too seems to be of this opinion when, in *De Civitate Dei* IX,[232] he says that the knowledge of all corporeal and temporal things by which demons are puffed up is of little worth to the good Angels. And in *De Trinitate* III,[233] when he says that no other reason occurs to him why demons were unable to make the very smallest gnats — though they had made frogs and serpents — except that the hand of the Lord was present preventing them; by which he signifies that even the

nature of those very tiny creatures and the method of generating them from hidden seeds were perspicuous to demons, but that they were prevented by God from using that knowledge.

§ 133. This matter also seems to be proved by induction. For just as demons from the beginning had and still have knowledge of the production of serpents and frogs — that is, by what natural causes even these can be suddenly generated — so too they have it concerning gnats and ants, and similarly for others. The formal character (*ratio*) is the same in all cases. For why would they have lost knowledge of the one while retaining it of the other? From this knowledge of the secrets of nature, therefore, they accomplish many things which appear wonderful to us who are ignorant of those same things.

§ 134. St. Thomas proves his position as follows: because that knowledge, he says, follows upon the very nature of the Angel, inasmuch as the Angel is by its nature a certain intellect, from whose nature nothing can be subtracted on account of the simplicity of its substance — in the way that men are punished by the amputation of members, because they are composed of matter. This proof is not to be taken as if it denied that by the absolute power of God all natural cognition could have been taken away from demons; rather, it signifies that such a punishment would not be congruous to their nature, because it would not be effected while the integrity of nature was preserved. Indeed, both the intellectual light and the intelligible species (*species intelligibiles*) belong to the nature of Angels as certain principles of natural cognition.

§ 135. Second: The knowledge which exists through grace, consisting in mere speculation (*nuda speculatione*), has not been totally taken away from demons, but has been diminished to a great extent and is deficient. This is proved because a few things of the divine secrets are revealed and made known to demons, whether through Angels or through effects — as St. Augustine attests.[234]

§ 136. Third: The knowledge which is possessed through grace as effective and productive of divine love (*productiva divini amoris*) is altogether absent in demons, just as is charity (*caritas*) itself, which this knowledge includes. For it belongs properly to the gift of wisdom (*donum sapientiae*), which, according to Ezekiel, the transgressing Angel lost in his beauty. Concerning this kind or mode of the knowledge of God, there are many sentences in the First Epistle of John, and much is discussed by St. Augustine.[235] To this knowledge there is also to be referred that by which the will is inclined toward an imperfect love of God and some degree of detestation of sin, such as is often found in the case of mortal sin. For it is sufficiently clear from what has been said before that not even this kind of knowledge of God can subsist in demons together with the obstinate malice of their will; nor indeed can there be in them any practical cognition (*cognitio practica*) of things to be done, seeing that by sinning they have lost not only all supernatural goodness (*bonitatem supernaturalem*) but consequently also all moral rectitude, those things alone remaining intact which pertain purely to the order of nature. For since the entire moral order depends upon the intention of the end (*intentio finis*), which is utterly depraved in demons, it must be judged that no residue of moral good has remained in them. But nothing prevents them from having retained the natural knowledge and love of God by which they are borne toward Him purely in a natural manner as the author of their nature together with the other natural goods. For all these things are good not with moral but merely with natural goodness (*bonitate naturali*).

§ 137. Furthermore, those objections which are raised against this doctrine — especially in that part which attributes to demons the knowledge of the whole of nature — by those who hold a different view are

not of such weight that they cannot probably be refuted from what has been said both in this section and above concerning the knowledge of Angels.[236]

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§ XV — To what extent future events and the thoughts of men can be known by demons (Quatenus a daemonibus futura, aut hominum cogitationes cognosci queant)

§ 138. That the foreknowledge of contingent future events (*praecognitio futurorum contingentium*) and the inspection of hidden thoughts are proper to God is sufficiently manifest from the foregoing sections, as well as from what was said in the commentary on Dist. 38 of Book I.[238] Hence it is entirely in vain that demons arrogate to themselves knowledge of these things, since not even to the good Angels is it granted to know them, except insofar as God reveals them. That demons are ignorant of future events is sufficiently argued by the obscurity and perplexity of certain oracles put forth by them among the pagans, which were designed either to be unintelligible or to be turned into diverse and contrary senses. Hence St. Augustine writes in Book III,[239] that demons were accustomed to compose their oracles with such art that, however things might fall out, they would appear to have spoken truly. And Lactantius in Book II,[211] says that, being altogether ignorant of God's counsels, they are wont to frame their responses so as to fit ambiguous outcomes. Examples of this are furnished everywhere by histories, including those written by pagans — as by Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, and others — which indeed Cicero openly acknowledges in Book II,[240] where he utterly destroys all credence in the responses of the gods, that is, of the demons, by which they predict future things, affirming that these are partly false, partly true by chance, partly equivocal and obscure so that the interpreter has need of another interpreter and the lot itself must be referred back to the lots, and partly ambiguous and such as must be referred to dialectic — such as that famous oracle: "I say that you, Aeacides, can conquer the Romans."[241]

§ 139. Furthermore, this ignorance is manifestly demonstrated by the fact that diabolical temptations very frequently fail of their purpose. For if the devil had foreknown the future outcome of his temptations, being supremely arrogant as he is, he would never have wished to attack Christ the Lord, nor the holy Job, nor many others, from whom he departed shamefully conquered and confounded. Hence, too, promising himself a false victory over holy Job, he says: "Touch all that he possesses, unless he shall bless thee to thy face" (Job 1:11), and again: "Touch his bone and his flesh, and then thou shalt see that he will bless thee to thy face" (Job 2:5). In this manner reasons St. Ambrose in Book II[242] when treating of the temptation of Christ. Furthermore, the devil did not know that he was to be expelled from men and to lose the tyranny which he exercised over men through Christ and His death. Hence the demons cry out in the Gospel: "Art thou come hither to torment us before the time?" (Matt. 8:29). And Paul, writing to the Corinthians about the wisdom of God hidden in a mystery, says: "Which none of the princes of this world knew. For if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor. 2:8). For, as St. Leo writes in Sermon 9,[243] on the Passion of the Lord, not even the devil himself understood that by raging against Christ he was destroying his own dominion. And in Sermon 11 he says: "If the cruel and proud enemy could have known the counsel of the mercy of God, he would have striven rather to moderate the minds of the Jews by gentleness than to inflame them with unjust hatreds, lest by pursuing the liberty of One who owed him nothing, he should lose the servitude of all his

captives. His own malice therefore deceived him," and so forth. And St. Augustine writes:[244] "If he had known that so great a loss would befall him, he would not have shed upon the ground the price by which the human race was redeemed."

§ 140. Furthermore, if the good Angels who were at that time still holy and sinless were ignorant of their own future fall, how much less must the demons, darkened after their fall by sin, be thought capable of foreknowing future events? These arguments show not only that demons do not have certain foreknowledge of future events, but that they do not have even a probable foreknowledge of very many of them — and this because the counsels of God, and the present thoughts of human hearts (from which the outcomes of future events frequently depend), for the most part remain completely hidden from them. Yet it must be known that, just as to the holy Angels the secrets of both kinds are frequently made known through God's revelation, so through Angels these things are sometimes made known to demons — as St. Augustine testifies[245] — as we have noted above. Nor should this seem very surprising, since even the gift of prophecy is sometimes communicated to evil men who are members of the devil, such as Balaam.

§ 141. Whether the oracles of the Sibyls, and certain oracles of Apollo and of Mercury Trismegistus concerning the future coming, the passion, and the judgment of Christ, and other mysteries of our religion — such as are read in Eusebius, Lactantius, St. Augustine, Metaphrastes, and others — belong to this category; or whether all of these, or some of them, were immediately inspired by God or by the good Angels: this is not altogether certain, although the latter alternative is sufficiently probable.

§ 142. Moreover, since demons possess from the beginning a knowledge of all nature instilled in them, and over and above this an exceedingly great experience of particular things, and since they are able by the power of their spiritual nature to see and know what is done in the most remote places, they can easily from present causes known to them, though hidden from us, either predict certain future things with certainty, or conjecture them with probability, or also foretell what they themselves, having applied natural causes, are about to bring about. None of this pertains to that knowledge of future things which is proper to God. For they know none of these things except according to present causes; and because these causes are not always necessary, it comes about that they themselves are very frequently deceived in their estimates of future events — as St. Augustine testifies in Book IX.[232] And in these ways Antony, according to St. Athanasius, demonstrates that demons foreknow certain future things — for example, the rising of the waters of the Nile, and so forth — namely from natural causes which they do not ignore; and likewise the approach of a friend whom one already sees coming or girded for a journey.

§ 143. Furthermore, they are similarly able, from certain external indications or other more hidden signs — as we said above concerning Angels in general — to know the thoughts and affections of men by a kind of conjectural knowledge. For since men themselves sometimes do this, as the Wise Man witnesses (Prov. 27), much more will demons be able to do it, whose nature is more subtle and whose experience is greater. On this matter, let St. Augustine be consulted[246] as well as St. Jerome in his commentary on that text of Matt. 5,[247] — "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts" — and Gennadius.[248]

§ XVI — On the power that belongs to angels, both good and evil, over corporeal things (Quae potentia competat Angelis tam bonis quam malis circa res corporeas)

§ 144. That the natural power of evil angels over changing corporeal things extends very widely is shown by this argument (*ratio*): that the nature of things has been so established by God that corporeal creation is subject to angelic nature as to something more excellent and more worthy, and is governed by it. But this cannot come about unless there belongs to angels a certain natural power (*potentia*) by which they are able to move or change corporeal things. Such power and superintendency over things in general — both good and evil angels alike — the Fathers attribute to angels: as St. Augustine in his *Eighty-three Questions* (qu. 79), saying that each visible thing in this world has an angelic power set over it;[250] and in his work on the Trinity (Book IV, ch. 4), where he says that all bodies are governed by the rational, that is, intellectual spirit of life;[251] and St. Gregory (Dialogues IV, ch. 5), affirming that in this visible world nothing can be disposed except through an invisible creature.[252] Likewise so teach St. Basil (Homily 9),[253] Epiphanius in his treatment of the Origenist heresy (in words drawn from Methodius),[254] St. John Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 4),[82] and Prudentius in his *Hamartigenia* (near the middle),[255] and the Scholastic Doctors commonly. Nor is this without the authority of Scripture. For in Rev. 7 and 14, and elsewhere, we read that certain angels are set over certain corporeal creatures. And as regards evil angels, of the devil it is said in Job 41: "There is no power upon earth that can be compared to him." This same one the Apostle (Eph. 2) calls "the prince of the power of the air"; and demons (ch. 6) he calls "princes and powers, and rulers of the darkness of this world."

§ 145. For the purpose of explaining more distinctly this angelic power over corporeal things, the following points are to be noted.

The **first** point: neither good angels nor evil ones can produce any body from pre-existing matter (*ex materia praejacente*) at will, that is, immediately by formal transmutation, in such a way that by the command of the will they could change bodies according to essential or accidental forms — as by killing, vivifying, transforming, sending diseases, bestowing health, inducing heat or cold, and the like. This is taught by St. Augustine (On the Trinity III, ch. 8): "It must not be thought," he says, "that this material of visible things serves these transgressor angels at their nod; it serves God alone."[130] Moreover, if good or evil angels could do this, then the working of miracles would no longer be proper to God alone, nor consequently would Christ have rightly demonstrated His Divinity by miracles, since He performed them by the sole command of His will. This is also the doctrine of the Philosopher (Metaphysics), where he shows that forms are not impressed upon matter by any separated substance, but are brought from potency (*potentia*) into act (*actus*) through the action of a form already existing in matter.[256] The same is taught by the Master (in this Distinction),[257] St. Thomas (I, q. 100, a. 2),[258] and the rest of the Scholastics.

§ 146. The **second** point: corporeal matter does not obey angels at their nod, that is, immediately by formal transmutation — in such a way, namely, that by the command of the will they could change bodies according to essential or accidental forms, such as by killing, vivifying, transforming, sending diseases, bestowing health, inducing heat or cold, and so forth. This St. Augustine teaches (On the Trinity III, ch. 8): "It must not be thought," he says, "that this material of visible things serves these transgressor angels at their nod; it serves God alone."[130] Furthermore, if good or evil angels could do this, then the working of miracles would not be proper to God, nor would Christ have rightly confirmed His Divinity thereby, since He

performed them by the sole command of His will. This too is the doctrine of the Philosopher (Metaphysics), where he shows that forms are not impressed upon matter by any separated substance, but are reduced from the potency of matter to act by the action of a form already existing in matter.'[259] The same the Master teaches (in this Distinction), St. Thomas (I, q. 100, a. 2), and the rest of the Scholastics.

§ 147. The **third** point: corporeal nature is apt to be moved locally by spiritual nature, that is, by angels, immediately — in such a way, namely, that by their nod and the sole command of the will they can transfer it from place to place. This is proved by innumerable examples. For the Angel of the Lord transferred Philip from the road leading to Gaza to Azotus (Acts 8), and Habakkuk from Judea to Babylon; and of angels it is said in Ps. 90: "In their hands they shall bear thee up" — where by the hand the power of moving is aptly understood. Likewise, angels move the heavens, at least according to the opinion of many; and whenever they appear in assumed bodies, they move those bodies and their members locally; nor can they gather and compose corporeal seeds (*semina corporalia*) for producing certain effects without local motion. No less is this evident of demons. For they also move bodies assumed by them, and gather seeds of things for producing something. Moreover, Satan shook the four corners of the house of Job's son and overturned it (Job 1); and he carried Simon Magus aloft into the air,[260] and, in the opinion of many, even transported Christ through the air to the mountain and to the Holy City (Matt. 4). Demons likewise locally move the bodies of those whom they possess — as is clear from the Evangelist concerning the demon who cast the boy now into fire, now into water (Matt. 17), and concerning another that cast a man to the ground (Mk. 9), and concerning those that rushed the swine headlong into the sea (Matt. 8). They also move the tongues of the possessed; as one may see how the devil himself moved the tongue of the serpent to human speech (Gen. 3). It is also well established that certain persons obsessed or vexed by demons have climbed walls and the rooftops of houses, which they could not have done of themselves and without the aid of demons. It is likewise well established that certain witches have been conveyed through long stretches of land by flight, although this is stubbornly — and more obstinately than learnedly — denied by some in general terms.

§ 148. Now, angels accomplish this local motion of bodies neither as men do — by the use of hands or any other bodily member, since they are incorporeal — nor by means of some other kind of motion intervening: for local motion is primary, and the others presuppose it, while it itself presupposes no prior motion but is produced in an extrinsic manner. Nor again do they produce it by means of some other necessarily intervening local motion, as if they were moving bodies with the aid of certain instruments; for that would involve an infinite regress, since those instruments too would not move unless they were themselves moved. Rather, they accomplish it after this manner, as the Doctors generally hand down: namely, by understanding actually the movable thing, the agent from which, the place to which, and the space through which; and then by willing, that is, by applying the impulse of the will, to the end that such a body be borne from such a place to such a place through such a space with such local motion and in such a time. For unless we acknowledge a motive power (*virtus motiva*) of this kind in good and evil angels alike, they will be altogether unable to act naturally in this corporeal world, since all other changes presuppose local motion. Nor does it seem to be beyond reason that this force and faculty for moving bodies should be attributed to incorporeal substances, since, as has been said, corporeal nature is by nature subject to them. And this would not be true unless it were capable of being moved by them immediately and primarily by local motion. From all of which it is understood that this motive power (*virtus movendi*) in angels is not diverse from intellect and will. Hence also it is by this same means that the soul, which presides over the body through appetite and will, moves its own body immediately,

primarily, and principally by local motion; indeed even brutes move their bodies through appetite. Yet there are others who attribute to angels a motive power (*vis loco motiva*) really distinct from intellect and will.

§ 149. The **fourth** point: angels are able to move bodies with great and wondrous swiftness and in time that is virtually imperceptible, yet not in an instant. The reason for this is that instantaneous local motion is incompatible with bodies. For by such motion either no space whatsoever would be traversed, or the same body would exist simultaneously in multiple, indeed in infinitely many, places — both of which are naturally impossible. However, how great a swiftness, corresponding to the extremity of their power, they can achieve in moving a body, in proportion to the mass of the body being moved, and whether superior angels can move more swiftly than inferior ones, is uncertain. It is probable, nonetheless, that the swiftness is definite.

§ 150. The **fifth** point: neither one angel nor all of them together, good or evil alike, can arrest the heavens, or by a contrary motion move them more swiftly or more slowly than they are moved according to their natural inclination, or bring down a star from the sky, or move any mountain from its place, or move any body whatsoever from a place with no other body succeeding in its place. The reason for this teaching is the connection and order of the Universe once established by God, which no particular cause can alter. To that order belongs the fixed position and arrangement of the principal parts of the world, such as the heavens and the elements, as well as their motions or rest, and that mutual conjunction of all the parts which admits of no vacuum. So teaches St. Thomas (Against the Gentiles III, chs. 101–102; On Power, q. 6, a. 8; Opusculum 10, a. 16; Opusculum 11, a. 5)[261] and Francisco de Vitoria (Relection 12, On the Magic Art, n. 33).[262] Add that if an angel could arrest the heavens or the sun, it would not have been a proper miracle when, at the petition of Joshua, the sun and the moon stood still (Josh. 10).

§ 151. The **sixth** point: angels, by locally applying active things to passive ones, bring about all other changes — alterations, generations, corruptions, the killing of men.

The **seventh** point: angels, by means of the knowledge of the whole of nature instilled in them by God, are able to bring about many wondrous changes in corporeal things which men cannot bring about through lack of such knowledge; more on this will be said in the following section.[263]

The **eighth** point: evil angels by their natural power are capable absolutely of producing many effects from which they are, however, impeded and prevented by the good angels — such as, for example, stirring up storms, kindling fires, overthrowing houses, killing animals, sending diseases, and so forth. All of these things, though they can do them naturally, they do not do except insofar as they are permitted by God, as is clear from what is contained in Job 1 and 2, Exod. 8, Matt. 8, and elsewhere. Indeed there is no doubt that they could suddenly destroy and kill the entire human race, if they were left to their own power, as St. Augustine indicates in his exposition of Ps. 90.[264]

§ 152. Finally, there is to be noted the sentence of the same St. Augustine (On the Trinity III, ch. 9), who, after saying much about the power of demons to transmute corporeal things, concludes thus: "But what they can do by nature and cannot do because they are prohibited, and what they are not permitted to do by the very condition of their nature, is difficult for a man to explore — nay, truly impossible — except through that gift of God which the Apostle commemorates when he says: *'To another the discernment of spirits'* (1 Cor. 12)" — and what follows.[265]

§ XVII — On the ways in which demons accomplish certain marvellous things (Quibus modis daemones miranda quaedam operentur)

§ 153. Whenever demons produce unusual and marvellous effects in sensible and corporeal things — whether they do so by themselves alone, or whether men skilled in the magic arts, as suppliants and ministers of demons, employ certain signs by which the demons are provoked to act — effects of which some are recorded in Sacred Scripture and very many are read in other sacred and profane authors — these are brought about by those demons in one of approximately three ways.

The first way is by the illusion of the senses, both interior and exterior, upon which they project or inject the images (*species*) and phantasms of things that either exist nowhere, or are not present; in this manner demons are read to have frequently assailed St. Anthony, St. Martin, and other saints by presenting various phantasmal forms of bodies; and in this same manner they commonly delude their own magicians and, through them, others as well. St. Augustine presents several examples of this in his work on the City of God.[267] Now this first mode is false, because through it something appears to exist that does not exist, and something seems to be effected that is not effected.

The second way is when, with supreme and imperceptible swiftness, they remove one body and substitute another in its place, so that what is thus substituted appears to have been freshly and suddenly generated; and in this manner many of those things which the poets fable concerning the transformations of men into the natures of various beasts and other things could have been accomplished. An example of this mode is likewise found in Eusebius.[268] This second mode is also deceptive — not in the sense that something is thought to exist which does not exist, but in the sense that what had already existed somewhere beforehand appears to be newly created or produced.

The third way is when they apply active agents to passive recipients, so that either something new and unusual is generated, or something that is indeed ordinary and common is produced by a new and unaccustomed manner of generation unknown to men. For since demons know the properties and powers of natural things — as is evident from what has been said above — far more exactly and certainly than even men most experienced in such matters, as human condition allows, and since they are not naturally hindered from transferring, collecting, combining, and tempering the hidden seeds of things from their places, the result is that many things seem to be wrought by them beyond the order of nature which in truth are produced naturally — such as their suddenly producing serpents or frogs, as we have in Exod. 7 and 8,[269] or their causing fire to descend from heaven, as in Rev. 13,[270] and other things of this kind. For they themselves are neither the creators of such bodies nor the authors at their own will's command of such transmutations — both of which have been shown above to belong to God alone — but in producing such effects they are ministers of nature itself, serving it through various applications of active to passive agents for the production of such effects, inasmuch as they well know which things, combined together in what proportion, produce which alterations of those things and which new generations of which things. All such effects, moreover, are natural. Nor is it greatly to be wondered at that such things are done by demons, since even men who have thoroughly investigated the secrets of nature can, without any taint of superstition, do many similar things through what is called natural magic. By this art the Patriarch Jacob used it in Gen. 30,[271] causing sheep to be born now of varied colours, now of one colour. This third mode, therefore, is true insofar as what appears to exist and to be done truly exists and is done; but it is deceptive from the intent of the demons, insofar as they wish to appear

to be performing works proper to the Divinity, when in fact they are only serving as instruments for the works of nature.

§ 154. It must be noted, moreover, that under this third mode the first mode is also comprehended, inasmuch as illusion of the senses cannot take place without the external application of certain bodies, or without the internal agitation of the animal spirits or other humours in such a manner as to produce the aforementioned alteration of the senses.

§ 155. Now as to which of the three modes just described the demons employed when they are read in the Sacred Scriptures to have wrought — whether by themselves or through magicians and enchanters — the things recorded in Exodus and in the Book of Job, and in what manner the devil through Antichrist is to accomplish what is read in Rev.,[272] it is not entirely established. Nevertheless it is not doubted that those things were done, or will be done, by one or other of these modes.

On this matter one should consult the Commentaries of the Doctors on those passages, and St. Augustine,[273] who there discourses at length on this whole class of operations which are wrought through demons upon corporeal creation. And although he there speaks only of the operation of demons, it must nonetheless be known that good angels too can use these modes to present to our senses certain unusual things — not in order to delude us thereby, which is proper to demons, but in order to instruct us by signifying something useful. Wherefore they can also use the first mode, insofar as it pertains to altering the senses, both interior and exterior, by projecting or infusing certain sensible forms in the same manner in which demons do so. But that alteration will not be an illusion of the senses, because it will not be a false signification — just as neither was that alteration false by which Christ showed Himself to two disciples under a form not His own (Mk., the last chapter[,274]). For it cannot properly be called an illusion where there is absent the intention of deceiving, whatever alteration is ultimately made either in things or in the senses — an alteration which of itself reports nothing to the intellect other than what is in the sense. Moreover, the sense is naturally moved only by its object. A natural alteration does not of itself deceive the sense, and far less the intellect; rather, the intellect is deceived by itself when it judges that to exist which does not exist, though it is led to make such a judgment by occasion of what is in the sense — as happens in many other cases which are customarily disputed in the second book of the *De Anima*.[275] On this matter some things must also be said in Dist. 12 of Book IV,[,276] where we shall show that in the external species of the Eucharist there is no falsity. It is clear, therefore, that with the intention of deceiving excluded, even the first mode of operation is immune from falsity, and accordingly can be common to the good angels as well. To which of the modes described above the assumption of bodies in which angels, both good and bad, sometimes appear pertains will be explained in the context of the next Distinction.[,277]

§ XVIII — Whether true miracles can be wrought by demons (Utrum per daemones vera fiant miracula)

§ 156. That demons cannot work miracles by their own proper power is most certain, since neither good angels nor holy men are able to do so. For a miracle, in the usage of the Christian schools (for Latin authors use the word more broadly), is every work that exceeds the capacity of the whole of nature and that comes to pass beyond the common course of things — such as the making fruitful of one who is barren, the giving of sight to the blind, the raising of the dead to life, the darkening of the sun, and whatever things have no causes

in nature, provided also that they occur beyond the common course of things as instituted by God. We add this proviso because there are certain things that exceed the capacity of nature and are to be referred principally and properly to God alone, yet are not on that account counted as miracles, because they do not come to pass beyond the common course of things as instituted by God — such as the creation of the world, which was the very establishment of nature itself. Likewise, the creation of souls, the infusion of grace, the transubstantiation of bread and wine, and the effects of the other Sacraments. For what is customary, even if it be above nature, is not called a miracle, as St. Augustine teaches.[278] But since both these and those other things surpass the power of every creature, men or angels are nonetheless said to work miracles — just as they are also said to cause the effects of the Sacraments, through the mode of an instrument or ministry — namely, whenever such things are done by God at their prayers, or whenever God uses some ministry of theirs to accomplish these things, as St. Thomas explains.[279]

§ 157. It is asked, therefore, whether just as God sometimes works a miracle through good angels, so also He works one through demons. For so it may seem. First: because just as miracles sometimes come to pass through holy men, so also at times through evil men who are members of the devil; such are those who will say on that day, "Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and do many mighty works?" — and yet will hear, "I never knew you; depart from me, you workers of iniquity" (Matt. 7).[280] Second: because even false prophets and false Christs, who are in a special sense the ministers of the devil, will work great signs and wonders (Matt. 24).[153] And the coming of Antichrist himself, who will be the most chosen instrument of the devil, will be "with all power and signs and lying wonders" (2 Thess. 2 and Rev. 13).[281] And the Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians, expressly attributes what Antichrist is to do to the operation of Satan; while in the Apocalypse it is said that he will work great signs, and not only will cause fire to come down from heaven, but will also give breath to the image of the beast and cause the image of the beast to speak. Indeed it is further indicated that he will restore himself, once dead, to life. For so some interpret that which John writes — that he saw one of the heads of the beast as though slain unto death, and that the wound of his death was healed, so that on account of this the whole earth marveled after the beast.[270] Nor does it seem to be an objection that the Apostle adds "lying"; for signs and wonders are called lying, as some expound, not because they are to be merely apparent and illusory rather than real, but because they will lead men into lying and error. For so it follows: "and with all wicked deception for those who are perishing, because they did not receive the love of the truth." And again: "Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false," and so forth. And St. Augustine indicates that this exposition does not displease him,[282] where he calls these prodigies "true prodigies, though leading to falsehood." Now these prodigies Antichrist is to perform, as are other false prophets also, with the aid of the devil and his angels. Wherefore both of these operations seem to be attributable to the demons.

§ 158. Third: Lactantius in his *Epitome of the Divine Institutes*[283] says that Antichrist will not only cause fire to come down from heaven and cause the image which he has set up to speak — both of which we have in the Apocalypse — but will also cause the sun to stop in its course, which is established to be impossible except by a miracle properly so called. Fourth: the Fathers everywhere affirm, and histories attest, that true miracles are wrought outside the Church, even by false prophets, heretics, and schismatics — as St. Hilary,[284] St. Augustine,[285] St. Gregory,[286] Sozomen,[287] and Nicephorus[288] testify; which testimonies concern the Donatists, Arians, and Novatians. Now it is not credible that miracles were wrought by these persons without the aid and operation of demons, with whom heretics are in fellowship. Therefore miracles were wrought also through demons. Fifth: it seems moreover to be shown that not just in any manner, but even for the

confirmation of error, true miracles can be wrought by heretics — and consequently also by demons, the masters and cooperators of heretics — because one can use for an evil end and for the gift of miracles those things which are called graces freely given (*gratia gratis datae*), such as the gifts of tongues, of speech, and of exhortation. Sixth: the same is proved by this argument: because intention does not belong to the formal character (*ratio*) of the work. Wherefore, with God cooperating toward a miracle, a man may be able to intend something evil, such as his own glory, and therefore also the confirmation of error — just as in the Sacraments, with God producing the effect, the minister may have his mind intent upon gain or vain glory. Seventh: God can at any time work a miracle; therefore He can also raise the dead at the moment when a heretic prays for such a raising, in order to confirm his heresy by that miracle. Nor can the heretic, by praying, impede God from doing so, inasmuch as no malice of man can impede the work of divine power.

§ 159. Eighth: this very thing seems reasonable and consonant with God's providence regarding His elect — that for the purpose of testing the strength of their faith, He should work something above nature even through evil men and heretics who seek to overthrow the faith of the elect. Ninth: one can prophesy in order to lead men away from the true religion to a false one, according to that text of Deut. 13: "If there arise among you a prophet," and so forth, where Scripture also adds this reason: "Because," it says, "the Lord your God is testing you, to know whether you love Him with all your heart," and so forth; therefore one may also be able, to a similar effect, to work a miracle. For no less divine and supernatural operation seems to be required for a prophetic act than for a miraculous act. Tenth: St. John Chrysostom[289] teaches that, even if they were to raise the dead, one should not believe them, because, he says, God, testing you, has permitted them to be able to do this. Finally, to this opinion — that through certain familiars of the demons, for the purpose of establishing their own divinity, true miracles can be wrought and at some times have been wrought — John Gerson seems to incline in a certain Sermon,[290] where he is also of the opinion that St. Augustine so thought.

§ XIX — A Distinct Reply to the Question (Distincta ad quaestionem responsio)

§ 160. By way of reply, so that both the proposed question and other matters that can be objected may be resolved, certain things must be noted.

First: By the devil and his ministers, both angels and men, certain false miracles resembling true ones can be performed, and have at times been performed and will be performed, even in confirmation of error. The reason is that in these there is nothing that exceeds the capacity of nature. Such is what is narrated in Rev. 13 as a great portent performed by the second beast: that it made fire come down from heaven to earth, which Satan is also read to have done in Job 1. Likewise, that speech was given to the image of the beast — that is, to an idol — which demons also used to do in the idols of the pagans and through the bellies of pythonnesses (*Pythonissarum*); yet neither of these, even if commonly held to be marvelous, exceeds the powers of nature. For certain causes in nature can be arranged by demons, from which these effects naturally follow. That this can be said of those things which will be done by Antichrist, St. Augustine indicates in his work on the City of God.[282] Nor does it conflict with what he there calls them "true portents." For by "true portents" he understands not those which are truly and properly miracles according to the description given above, but — as he himself explains — those which, as they appear to be, are truly brought about without any illusion of the senses.

Second: By heretics and demons, even in confirmation of false doctrine, certain wonders can be performed which the common body of Christians cannot distinguish from true miracles, and which for this reason are sometimes called miracles by the sacred writers. In Scripture, however, they are called signs and portents and powers (*virtutes*): Matt. 24; 2 Thess. 2; Rev. 13.[291] But against this kind of deception Christ forewarned his faithful, saying: "Go not forth, believe it not." It must be noted that he does not say, "Investigate carefully whether the signs are true miracles." For the principal confirmation of the faithful ought to be the teaching of the Church, which was long since confirmed by Apostles through undoubted miracles and handed down to posterity, such that even if an angel from heaven should announce something different, he is not to be believed, Gal. 1. In like manner, therefore, belief would not be warranted even if true miracles were wrought by heretics in support of false doctrine.

Third: Although the discernment of miracles does not pertain to everyone, nevertheless a manifold difference between true and false miracles can be observed. For false miracles either serve only to produce admiration, or serve human curiosity, or are of such a kind that they only do harm to men; or, if they seem to be of benefit, they do so only to the extent that their authors, the demons, refrain from doing harm, or they bind souls with the gravest superstition and impiety in exchange for some bodily benefit, the natural causes of which could nonetheless be discovered by more astute investigators. All these things are found in the contrary manner in true miracles, such as those which we read were performed by Christ and his ministers, the Prophets and Apostles. For of Christ it is said, Acts 10, that "he went about doing good and healing all who were oppressed by the devil." Such things are also said of him frequently throughout the Gospels, as in that passage: "He hath done all things well," and so on. Of Peter, Acts 5, and of Paul, Acts last chapter, it is read that they healed all the sick who were brought to them.[292] Like to these are the things which we read were done by the other Apostles and by the Prophets. Hence St. Augustine writes,[293] that Paul, after the Ascension of the Lord, called to the Apostolate, merited credence because he performed such signs as the Apostles also wrought. For by saying "such," and so on, he wished to indicate that there are certain marks by which true miracles — such as the Apostles performed — are distinguished from false ones — such as Pseudo-prophets perform.

Moreover, God is also accustomed to declare in other ways what the difference is between true and false miracles. For in Exod. 7 and 8, Moses, the servant of God, could with certainty predict what he was about to do, which the magicians of Pharaoh could not do. He could also remove the plagues that had been sent, which they could not; while, on the contrary, the serpent of Moses devoured their serpents, and Moses never attempted any sign without effect, whereas they could go no further. Likewise, Moses performed these things using only the extension of his hand or staff, while they employed magical incantations.

Fourth: True miracles can be performed not only by the wicked, but also by heretics and schismatics, and indeed even by pagans, God thereby approving through them some truth pertaining to faith or morals. For the wicked, the passage is clear: Matt. 7 and 1 Cor. 13. For heretics and schismatics, testimonies have been adduced in the fourth argument. For pagans, who are estranged from the knowledge of God, examples are found in Valerius, Livy, and others, some of which St. Augustine adduces,[294] although not all of those they relate are to be placed in this category. Suetonius also reports that the Emperor Vespasian restored sight to a certain blind man and consolidated the lame leg of another by touch alone. For more on miracles of this kind, see John Gerson in the aforementioned Sermon.[295]

Fifth: It can happen that someone performs a miracle for the attestation of truth, and afterwards abuses it to confirm false doctrine — whether he performed the miracle while still good and sound in the faith, or already wicked or even a heretic. For nothing prevents one who performed a miracle from subsequently sinking to such a depth of perversity that he assumes the authority and testimony of the miracle he performed for the confirmation of error, and contends that he ought to be believed because he has performed a miracle. And indeed Scripture testifies that the Galatians, among whom God had wrought powers (*virtutes*), that is, miracles (Gal. 3), were afterwards drawn away from the truth of the Gospel.[296] St. Jerome, in his Commentary, wishes this example to avail against heretics, who — as he says — think that the proof of their faith consists in having performed some sign. To this point also belong the miracles which the Donatists, Novatians, and Arians twisted, from miracles worked by men of their sect, towards the proof of their error, although they had not been performed for that purpose. To this point also some refer the Scripture of Deut. 13, as if speaking of a true Prophet. Furthermore, regarding this whole class of miracles which are performed or appear to be performed by heretics, see St. Augustine,[297] Likewise St. Cyprian,[298] and Lactantius.[299]

Sixth: It can happen that God, in producing miracles, also employs the ministry of demons. Nor is it incredible that this sometimes occurs, especially in the punishment of the wicked, as St. Augustine seems to indicate in his Exposition of Psalm 77, on the words "missions by evil Angels."[300] Gerson holds this view in the aforementioned passage.

Seventh: Neither demons nor men, by any power whatsoever, can perform a true miracle for the confirmation of error — that is, in other words: God has decreed never to hear the petition of a demon or of a man wishing to employ a miracle for the confirmation of error; indeed, he cannot hear such a petition, if we speak of his ordinary power (*potentia ordinaria*). The reason for this is that God has instituted miracles as certain signs and testimonies of that thing for the verification of which they are produced before men by him who exhibits them. For since God once established the nature of things, he does not depart from its order unless he wishes, by an extraordinary and supernatural work, to speak and signify something to men. Moreover, it is reckoned that he wishes to say what the angel or man says, through whose ministry he displays such a work to men. Therefore, since God who is the First Truth cannot be a witness to falsehood, it follows that, with his ordinance standing, he cannot work a miracle through one who exhibits it in order that something false may be attested before men. And for the purpose of intimating this, miracles are frequently called *signs* in Scripture, as if signifying some truth to men. This is the teaching of St. Thomas,[301] where he says that miracles are always true testimonies of that to which they are directed, and therefore true miracles are never wrought by the wicked who proclaim false doctrine, in confirmation of their doctrine. The same he teaches in his lecture on 2 Thess. 2.[302]

More fully, however, this is proved from Holy Scripture of both the Old and the New Testament, from which it is most clearly established that the proper use of miracles is to prove Divine Truth, or to declare the holiness of some man — which itself also pertains to the confirmation of truth. This proof would indeed be utterly inefficacious if miracles could in any case be exhibited to testify to something false. Thus Joshua, speaking of the miracle of the crossing of the Jordan, ch. 3: "By this," he says, "you shall know that the living God is in the midst of you." And Elijah, about to perform a miracle, 3 Kgs. 18, prays to God thus: "Show this day that thou art the God of Israel, I am thy servant." Christ also and the Apostles used the working of miracles to confirm the truth of their preaching. For thus the Lord says, Jn. 10: "If you do not believe me, believe the works." And Jn. 11, to the Father when he was about to raise Lazarus: "That they may believe," he

says, "that thou hast sent me." Likewise, Matt. 9, he proves by the testimony of a miracle that he has the power to forgive sins, saying: "But that you may know that the Son of Man has power," and so on. Again, John in the last chapter, speaking generally of Christ's miracles, says: "These things are written that you may believe," and so on; and concerning his Apostles, Mark in the last chapter: "But they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs following."

Moreover, in favour of this opinion it is greatly telling that nowhere do we read that a true miracle has been performed for the confirmation of any error. Yea rather, from the histories we learn that Pseudo-prophets sometimes attempted something of the sort, but in vain. For in 3 Kgs. 18, when there was a contest about the true religion between Elijah and the prophets of Baal, and a challenge to a miracle was made, Elijah won, doing what they could not do. Similarly, Simon Magus, when he could not restore a dead man to life, was overcome by Peter who easily accomplished it. And Polychronius the Monothelite, who, in order to confirm his heresy by a miracle, attempted in full council of the Fathers to raise a certain dead man, but since he could effect nothing, was expelled, the Council shouting against him: "Anathema to the new Simon," as is recorded in the proceedings.[303]

It is also publicly known, from the account of trustworthy writers, that the heretics of our age — Luther, Calvin, and certain others — attempted to perform some miracles to commend their doctrine to the common people, but with a very unhappy outcome. On the contrary, concerning St. Bernard, it is read in his Life that, as a Catholic, he blessed bread against the heretics of Henry,[304] and that however many sick persons ate of that bread were healed. Similar things done by St. Anthony of Padua and certain others are attested by the biographies written of them.

Last: If we speak of God's absolute power (*potentia absoluta*), it does not seem impossible that God might perform a miracle while a man or demon is petitioning that through it he should teach or confirm an error — not indeed on account of the petition, as if he were hearing it, but while he is petitioning, or immediately after his petition. The reason is that this involves no contradiction. For it is not necessary that miracles be instituted for the purpose of being signs or testimonies; rather, God can perform them absolutely and without any attestation, just as he performs the works of nature. That this is so is sufficiently proved by the argument adduced in the seventh place.

§ XX — Reply to the objections (Responsio ad objecta)

§ 161. From what has now been said, it is easy to seek a reply to the arguments proposed at the outset. For the first argument rightly proves that true miracles are sometimes performed through wicked men, but not for the confirmation of what is false. God can also do this through demons — as, for instance, if He should wish to punish some notably wicked man in an extraordinary manner through them, in order to show men how greatly sins displease Him. And in this way certain punishments of the impious which Scripture records can be understood to have been brought about. Here, however, it must be noted that it does not follow from this that the demons themselves perform miracles, because neither is a man himself said to perform a miracle as often as a miracle occurs through some person. For, as is recorded in Acts 19, certain persons applied to the sick handkerchiefs carried from the body of Paul, from which infirmities immediately departed.[306] Yet those who carried and applied them were not said to perform miracles, but Paul — from whose body such things were carried and at whose sanctity such miracles were performed as a mode of attestation — was said to

perform them, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited above.'[307] Hence, although it be granted that God sometimes works a miracle through demons, it is not thereby granted that the demons themselves perform miracles, since neither do the demons themselves preach the truth to the declaration of whose sanctity — which is non-existent — any miracles are performed either by themselves or by others. One or the other of these two conditions seems to be required in order that anyone, according to the manner of speaking customary among the faithful, should be said to perform a miracle, as St. Thomas indicates in the same place.

§ 162. The second argument does not prove the case with respect to true miracles, but with respect to certain likenesses of true ones — although some of them are true as regards the thing presented to the senses, as when fire descends from heaven, in which matter the senses are not deceived — yet it is not on that account a true miracle, because it is brought about through natural causes. And in this sense St. Augustine indicates that the Apostle's text can be understood of true prodigies, as has been declared above.[308] Now they are called great signs in Matt. 24 and Rev. 13,'[309] because they will be such in the eyes of men, who will be greatly astonished at them as if they were great miracles. But how Antichrist is to give breath to the image of the beast and cause it to speak has already been said above; although it can also be said that the sense of that passage is figurative and allegorical, as is the case with many other things in the Apocalypse — concerning which, see the Commentators.

§ 163. To the third it is answered: what Lactantius says — that Antichrist will cause the sun to halt in its course — is neither read in the Scriptures nor found in the more authoritative authors.[310] It can, however, be understood that he will do this apparently — that is, by bewitching the eyes of men so that the sun seems to stand still and the day to be longer than usual; in the same way that maleficent women draw down the moon from the sky by diabolical art. Concerning this, see St. Augustine, book ten of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 16, and Vives in his commentary on that same passage.[311]

§ 164. The miracles adduced in the fourth place were indeed performed by certain heretics, not by the agency of demons, but by God's operation — not for the confirmation of heresy, but either for the attestation of some true article of faith which the heretic holds in common with us, or for the commendation of the name of Christ which he invokes, or for the attestation that the sacraments are true even when administered by a heretic. All of these are contained under the attestation of truth. Nor would any of these things occur, however, if the heretic were explicitly to declare that he was performing the miracle on behalf of the error which he preaches.

§ 165. To the fifth it is answered: there is a difference between the gift of miracles and the gift of tongues, and the other gifts of this kind. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the same question,[312] the gift of miracles (*donum miraculorum*) is not some quality habitually abiding in the soul, such that a man could use it at will for whatever he wished — in the way that he uses a habit of art or knowledge — but that man is said to have the gift of miracles whose mind is sometimes moved by divine inspiration to do something from which the effect of a miracle follows, which God brings about by His own power. This gift, therefore, is not a permanent habit but a transient impression which, since it is not within man's power, a man will not be able to receive it at the moment when he wishes to confirm an error, because the divine ordering is opposed to this. But the gift of tongues is a habit once infused, by which a man thereafter uses it whenever and however he wishes without a new miracle; and the same judgment applies to the grace of speech and the other things of this kind.

§ 166. To the sixth, one must say: it is possible for someone to perform a miracle with a depraved intention lying hidden in the mind, or even one outwardly betrayed by some sign — such as for ostentation or for gain — in the manner in which Judas perhaps performed miracles, and those of whom it is said in Matt. 7, to whom it will be said: "I never knew you."[280] But he who acts thus does not thereby prove that the evil he intends is good or pleasing to God, because he does not perform the miracle as a testimony to that thing, nor can he do so, for the reason often stated.

§ 167. The seventh argument proves only what is absolutely possible for God, not what lies within His ordinary power (*potentiam ordinariam*), as has been said above.

§ 168. To the eighth it is answered: such a testing of the elect would not be reasonable, because it is contrary to the ordering of God, by which He willed and established that true miracles should be indubitable testimonies of truth.

§ 169. To the ninth it is answered: the passage of Deuteronomy is more correctly understood of the prophet of the devil — such as soothsayers or diviners — through whom the devil sometimes foretells certain things that are true but known to him by natural means.[313] For as regards a prophet of God, since the gift of prophecy is not a permanent habit but a transient impression (as we were just now saying with respect to the grace of miracles — for it consists in an interior illumination of the mind), it does not seem possible that a Prophet, at the very same instant in which he is moved by God to know something supernaturally, could use that gift to lead others into seduction. He could, however, produce to men a revelation previously received, in order to lead into error those whom he might wish to deceive by means of the truth of his prediction — that is, using it as an instrument for propagating error. In this way it could also have come about that demons disclosed to men certain secrets known through good angels, wishing thereby to draw men to the worship of themselves.

§ 170. To the tenth I reply: St. John Chrysostom speaks in the manner in which the Apostle Paul speaks in Gal. 1, saying: "Even if an angel from heaven should preach to you other than what we have preached, let him be anathema."[314] For both speak under a condition that is impossible — yet, that condition being posited, both deny that belief is to be given either to an angel or to miracles, because in such a case neither would the angel be confirmed in truth, nor would the miracle be, by divine ordering, a certain and infallible testimony of truth; and consequently, with miracles set aside, the confirmation of Catholic truth would then have to be sought from elsewhere — as from the teaching of the Prophets and Apostles and from the perpetual tradition of the Church, which tradition the Apostle there, as frequently elsewhere, urges. That St. John Chrysostom understands an impossible condition is sufficiently indicated by the words preceding, in which he denies that the miracles of heretics performed for seduction are true.'[315]

§ 171. To the last: although we do not wish to be pressed by the authority of Gerson, we reply nonetheless that he does not affirm this absolutely but speaks with hesitation on the matter.[316] For he says that even if God were to work miracles through liars and seducers, He would never so far permit His seal to be counterfeited but that He would protest through the Scriptures and the Prophets, or even otherwise, and contradict the falsehood. It is true, nevertheless, that this author inclines rather strongly to that opinion, because he believes that St. Augustine and many others hold it. In this matter we judge him to be mistaken.

§ XXI — That the magical arts are wholly illicit (Artes magicas esse prorsus illicitas)

§ 172. The term "magical art" (*vocabulum artis magicae*) encompasses every form of knowledge or observance by which something is brought about by a human being with the expectation of some effect proceeding from a demon through a compact — entered into in any manner whatsoever, whether expressly or tacitly — with that demon. The scope of this term is, moreover, very wide. For in the first place the entire genus of divinatory superstition belongs here, under which very many species are contained according to the variety of corporeal things around which or in which this superstition exercises itself; and from these things the individual species have taken their names, as: pyromancy, aeromancy, hydromancy, geomancy, necromancy, chiromancy, sciomancy. Likewise: augury, omen, haruspicy, the pythonic oracle, responses from a tripod, from a cave, from an idol; divination by dream, by mirror, by smoke, by basin, by axe, by mattock, by sieve, by lots, by constellations, by sneezing, by characters, by foreign words, by the inspection of Sacred Scripture, by the Gospel itself, by the observation of the time, day, and hour, and by innumerable other means which are wont to be, or can be, employed by superstitious men through a diabolical compact for divining future things or things otherwise hidden.[318]

§ 173. Next, there belong here all arts or observances by which, through the intervention of a compact with demons or through their knowledge, either understanding is sought or bodily changes are procured or expected — such as the *Ars notoria*[319] and the arts of causing harm (*artes maleficiandi*), by which, that is, injuries are inflicted.[320] Finally, there are reckoned here the ligatures, as they are called, made in a certain manner, or figure, or from matter of a particular kind; and likewise all the other innumerable genera of observances which superstitious persons employ to drive away diseases, to avert misfortunes, and for other effects of this kind.[321] Now this entire genus of arts and observances is wholly illicit, for the reason that it contains some compact or fellowship (*societas*) with a demon.

§ 174. Fellowship with a demon is of two kinds. The one is manifest, which they call explicit (*explicita*), namely when someone expressly consults the demon either in person or through another, or is joined to him by open fellowship in any other manner whatsoever. The other is hidden or tacit, which they call implicit (*implicita*), and it is contracted whenever nothing is done expressly with the demon, yet something is done with the expectation of some effect which cannot reasonably be sought from God or from nature; and of this kind very many things have been devised, in part instituted by demons — rivals of the sacraments of Christ — and handed on to men, and in part invented by men themselves who, whether knowingly or unknowingly, serve diabolical wickedness. On these matters St. Augustine may be consulted.[322]

§ 175. Now, whether a given thing can reasonably be expected from God or from nature, or not, must be judged from reason and from Sacred Scripture and the usage of the Church. If someone is truly in doubt whether such an effect can reasonably be expected from God or from nature, then, that doubt standing, it is not lawful to perform or to practise the thing by which the effect is expected, because no one may lawfully do that of which he doubts whether it be a sin. If, however, he judges a thing to be naturally efficacious, even though it may not actually be so, provided he is moved to think thus with reasonable grounds — as sometimes happens with physicians who attribute to a herb a virtue which it does not possess and accordingly employ it — he is free from the vice of superstition.

§ 176. Furthermore, both kinds of fellowship with the demon — the hidden as well as the manifest — are forbidden by divine law, Deut. 18, in these words: "Let there not be found among you one who consults soothsayers, or who observes dreams and auguries, nor a sorcerer, nor an enchanter, nor one who consults pythons, nor diviners, nor one who seeks the truth from the dead. For all these things the Lord abhors"; and what follows.[323] The same prohibition is in Lev. 19: "Do not turn," it says, "to magicians, nor inquire of soothsayers anything, lest you be defiled by them."[324] And there are other scriptural passages by which the gravity of this sin is indicated, such as: Exod. 22, "You shall not suffer sorcerers to live."[325] 1 Kgs. 15: "It is as the sin of divination to rebel."[326] 1 Paralip. 10: "Saul died for his iniquities, and among other things because he had consulted a pythoness, and had not hoped in the Lord."[327] And 4 Kgs. 1: King Ochozias is gravely rebuked and punished with death because, regarding the outcome of his illness, he had consulted Beelzebub, the god of Accaron.[328] Such also was the counsel of Achab when he said: "The gods of the kings of Syria assist them; I will appease them with sacrifices and they will be with me."[329] Other scriptural passages are Is. 8 and Is. 47,[330] Gal. 5,[331] Rev. 21.[332] Finally, the Apostle has said generally in 1 Cor. 10: "I would not have you become partakers with demons"[333]; and in 2 Cor. 6: "What fellowship has light with darkness? Or what agreement has Christ with Belial?"[334]

§ 177. It must be noted, however, that these scriptural testimonies prove not only that by divine law but also by the natural law this entire genus of diabolical fellowship is forbidden; and therefore this prohibition does not pertain to merely positive laws. For it is a law common to both Testaments, as is evident from the passages of Scripture adduced — just as the whole of the Decalogue is — and this is also clearly taught from the fact that Moses, in the passage of Deuteronomy cited, attests that the Canaanite peoples — who had received no positive law of God — were to be destroyed on account of crimes of this kind (for thus Scripture speaks). Therefore it must without doubt be held, according to the Sacred Scriptures, that every fellowship with the demon, both implicit and explicit, even if it concern a most trifling matter and one immediately useful or even beneficial, is forbidden and illicit — and this not merely by divine positive law or ecclesiastical law, but wholly by the law of nature. A further indication of this is the fact that even among pagans the magical arts were always regarded as illicit and infamous, as is evident from the Roman laws and from historians both Roman and foreign.[310] For this reason the Romans also ordered, by public decree of the Senate, that the books of Numa Pompilius — which dealt with superstitions and the secret compacts with demons — be burned, books which even Numa himself had not dared to publish but had caused to be hidden in his sepulchre; as St. Augustine reports.[335] This is certainly an irrefutable indication of the dictate of natural law.

§ 178. It is asked, however, what is the reason for this prohibition. Most give this reason: that the intention of demons is always evil and directed toward deceiving, and therefore, lest we be deceived and drawn into sin, all fellowship with them must be shunned by us, and no benefit is to be expected from them; because, as St. Leo says in Sermon 19 on the Lord's Nativity, "the benefactions of demons are more harmful than their injuries."[336] But this reason does not seem sufficient. For since the devil can lead no one into sin except a willing person, nothing would on this ground seem to stand in the way of someone, for example, hard pressed by hunger, asking bread from the devil or receiving it when offered. For even if devils are not givers of gifts except with the intention of harming the soul the more grievously, it may nevertheless be the case that, with the firm constancy of a rightly ordered will, a person could frustrate the intention of the devil — just as it is not unlawful to accept bread from a man who is most wicked and beyond correction, and of whom it is

established that with the intention of spiritually harming him he offers bread, provided only that consent is in no way given to his malice.

§ 179. Others adduce this reason: that since it is established that perfect fellowship with the demon is illicit per se (for it cannot be that someone who wills all the same things as the demons and shares with them — which pertains to perfect fellowship, that is, friendship — acts rightly), they hold it to follow that imperfect fellowship is also illicit. They prove this, because in moral matters the beginning, progress, and consummation of the same act share the same formal character (*ratio*), as can be declared in the case of the sins of lust, of fraternal hatred, and the like. Therefore, since imperfect fellowship with the devil — such as occurs when some slight service is sought from him — is a certain beginning of the perfect fellowship with him to be contracted, it is similarly evil and illicit per se. And that it is indeed the beginning of perfect fellowship they prove from this: that through it a man begins at least imperfectly to love the demon as a benefactor. Now imperfect social love is apt to lead finally to perfect friendship.

§ 180. If you object against this that imperfect fellowship is rightly contracted with Turks and with other unbelievers or evil men, with whom nevertheless we ought not to be joined in perfect fellowship, they reply that the case is not similar, on the grounds that these men can be converted to true piety and thus be united with us at last in perfect friendship — something which it is not lawful to hope of demons, with whom accordingly in no other way can perfect fellowship with us subsist, unless we consent to them in every suggestion. For since the demons are by now immutable in their will, no man will be able to be joined with them in perfect fellowship without changing himself to conform to their perverse and incorrigible will.

§ 181. But neither does this reason seem sufficiently solid. For even if we knew that some man living among us was reprobate, so that his perverse will would never, not even for an hour, be changed for the better, provided he had not been declared an enemy of God, it would be permissible for us to confer a temporal benefit upon him and in turn to receive things from him — which would be a kind of imperfect fellowship, nor could it on that account be called the beginning of perfect fellowship; because perfect fellowship, which is called friendship, concerns very many more things that are willed in common than does imperfect fellowship. Nor does it follow that if someone is a partner with another in certain things, he is thereby incipiently his partner in others which are of an entirely different kind.

§ 182. Another reason is suggested by John Gerson (in *Trilogus Astrologiae theologizatae*, proposition 18[337]): "It is not lawful," he says, "to have commerce with evil Angels as with those who are excommunicated from God and from the whole Church." But this reason too does not suffice, unless the notion of a special mode of excommunication of the demons is pressed further — [and the argument continues into the following section].

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 5.

2. Nicetas, Greek scholiast on St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Super Oratione 2. de Paschate* [abbreviation as in source].

3. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 14.

4. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 13.

5. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 11; *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9.

6. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, ch. 35.

7. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi 56*; *Homilia 32*, ch. 5, among the fifty [the reference is to the collection of fifty homilies; in the new edition of the Benedictine Fathers, Sermon 126].
8. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio in Gorgoniam*.
9. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Ezechielem*, Homily 8.
10. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* II, chs. 2–3.
11. St. Bernard, *Sermo 1 de Festo Sancti Michaelis*.
12. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 45. [In the new Benedictine edition, sermon 248.]
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1 [*ibidem*, i.e., the article cited in the preceding section].
14. Theophylact, *In Matthaeum* 18.
15. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogues* IV, ch. 33.
16. St. Jerome, *Super ultimum caput Zachariae* [Commentary on the last chapter of Zechariah].
17. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 6.
18. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 23; *In Joannem*, Homily 14.
19. Theodoret, *Dialogus cui titulus Immutabilis*; Theophylact and Euthymius, *In Joannem* 1 ("No man hath seen God at any time").
20. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 148 [the letter cited; the Latin source reads "Epistola" without specifying number — the reference is to the letter in which Augustine cites Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, and Jerome on this question; commonly identified as *Epistola* 148].
21. St. Bernard, *Sermo 2 in Pentecoste*.
22. Cajetan [Tommaso de Vio], commentary on the relevant article [abbreviation as in source].
23. St. Augustine, *Epistola* cited above (as in §6 of this section).
24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1.
25. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 6: "The angels see God as they are able, and the archangels as they can, the Thrones and Dominions more than these, yet less than is due to God's bounty; the Holy Spirit alone sees as is fitting, and the Son of God knows as is fitting."
26. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 7.
27. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, Homily 14.
28. St. John Chrysostom, *De Incomprehensibili Dei Natura contra Anomoeos*, Homily 5.
29. Theophylact, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios* 3.
30. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 150 (to Elpidius) — or in the alternative enumeration *Epistola* 152, ch. 9; and *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 6.
31. St. Bernard, *Sermo 2 in Pentecoste* [as cited above].
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 8.
33. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, bk. [IV], ch. 4, pt. 4.
34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 8; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 4, a. 4.
35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 5, a. 4.
36. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 7 [commentary on this Distinction].
37. Scotus and Gabriel [Biel] are cited; no more specific reference given in the source.
38. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, chs. 4–5; and *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 13, with several following chapters.
39. Epiphanius, *Epistola ad Joannem Hierosolymitanum* (inserted among the letters of St. Jerome).
40. Epiphanius, *Adversus Haereses* (on the heresy of the Origenists), no. 64.

41. Philastrius, *De Haeresibus* [on the same heresy; abbreviation as in source].

42. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 43.

43. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 57 and 105; *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 7; *De Civitate Dei* XI, chs. 11 and 13; *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9; *De Correptione et Gratia*, chs. 10–11; *Expositio Psalmi* 56, *Homilia* 32, ch. 5 (= Sermon 126 in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers of Saint-Maur).

44. The footnote marker (a) in the source reads: "Seu Sermone 126. in nova PP. Benedictinae edit. Tom. V." — i.e., Sermon 126 in the new Benedictine edition, Vol. V.

45. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 16.

46. St. John Chrysostom (or whoever is the author), *Homiliae in Eliam* [abbreviation as in source].

47. Prosper [of Aquitaine] (note (b) in source: "Seu potius Julianus Pomerius, ut jam notavimus" — i.e., "or rather Julianus Pomerius, as we have already noted"), *De Vita Contemplativa* II, ch. 3.

48. Vincentius Lirinensis, *Commonitorium adversus haereticas novitates* [abbreviation as in source].

49. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, chs. 3 and 23.

50. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezechielem*, Homily 8.

51. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* [abbreviation as in source].

52. Rupertus [of Deutz], *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, ch. 27, and elsewhere.

53. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 7.

54. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, in the place cited above (chs. 3 and 23).

55. St. Jerome, *Apologia adversus Rufinum* [abbreviation as in source], and elsewhere.

56. Nicetas the Greek, *Scholia in Gregorium Nazianzeum* [abbreviation as in source].

57. Jacob Faber [Lefèvre d'Étaples], *De tribus Magdalenis* [abbreviation as in source]; Georgius Venetus [Giorgio Benigno Salviati], *Problemata Sacra* [abbreviation as in source].

58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I (as cited above in the preceding section).

59. Philo, *De Gigantibus*; Tertullian, *De Habitu Mulierum*; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* III and V; Justin Martyr, *Apologia I* and *Apologia II*; Methodius Martyr, sermon *De Resurrectione*; Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* II, chs. 14–15; Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* V, ch. 4; Sulpicius Severus, *Historia Sacra*, at the beginning.

60. St. Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca* I, ch. 4; *De Virginibus* I; *Apologia prophetae David* I, ch. 1.

61. St. John Chrysostom (attributed), Homily 15 on various passages of Matthew.

62. John Cassian, *Collationes* VIII, ch. 13.

63. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* II, on Lk. 2:8 ("There were shepherds in the same region watching"); St. Jerome, *In Michaeam* VI, on Mic. 6 ("Contend in judgment against the mountains"); St. Jerome, *In Matthaeum* XVIII, on Matt. 18 ("Their angels always behold").

64. Origen, *In Numeros Homilia* XX (on Num. 25, "Take all the princes of the people"); *In Numeros Homilia* XXIV; *In Ezechielem Homilia* IV; *In Lucam Homilia* XIII.

65. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Ctesiphontem adversus Pelagium*; St. Jerome, *Dialogus II adversus Pelagianos*, near the beginning; St. Jerome, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios*, ch. 1.

66. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* II.

67. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* III, ch. 19.

68. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, ch. 11.

69. Leo IX, in Gratian, *De Consecratione*, Distinctio I, ch. *Hi duo*.

70. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 22.

71. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, q. 3; *De Civitate Dei* XV, ch. 23.

72. Philastrius, *De Haeresibus*, ch. 108.

73. Sixtus of Siena, [*Bibliotheca Sancta*] V, annotation 77.

74. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XVII, ch. 4; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 8; *In IV Sent.*, dist. 45, q. 3, a. 3 (= *Supplementum*, q. 72, a. 3, ad 3).

75. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Danielem* [abbreviation as in source], on Dan. 10.

76. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei* IX [ch. 27 and elsewhere, as cited above].

77. St. Jerome, *Apologia adversus Rufinum* [abbreviation as in source].

78. Jean Gerson, *De Consolatione Theologiae* I, Prosa 4.

79. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2.

80. Matt. 25; 2 Pet. 2; Epistle of Jude; Rev. 20.

81. See above, Distinctio 6 of this Book II, where the punishment of demons was treated.

82. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 4.

83. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 107.

84. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita Contemplativa* I, ch. 3; *Responsio 6 ad Obiectionem Vincentii*.

85. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.

86. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* II, ch. 4.

87. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei* I, ch. 27.

88. Epiphanius, *Haeresis Origenistarum* (= *Panarion*, haer. 64); Epiphanius, *Epistola ad Ioannem Hierosolymitanum*, preserved in St. Jerome.

89. Philastrius, *De Haeresibus*.

90. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Avitum*; *Commentarium in Danielem*, on ch. 4; *Commentarium in Ionam*, on ch. 3; *Apologia contra Rufinum*.

91. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 17; *De Haeresibus*, n. 43.

92. Sixth General Council (Third Council of Constantinople), Session 21.

93. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* III, q. 13 [abbreviation as in source].

94. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 7 [abbreviation as in source]; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, dist. 7 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Bonaventure and Richard of St. Victor, *ibid.* [abbreviation as in source].

95. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2; *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5.

96. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2 (the passage is quoted verbatim in the body of the text).

97. See the Commentators on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64.

98. See above, Distinctio 6 of this Book II, on the error of Cassian.

99. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Habacuc* I.

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2, ad ultimum.

101. Rupert of Deutz, *In Ioannem* VIII (on Jn. 8:44, "When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own").

102. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, q. 16, a. 5.

103. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 4, in corpore and ad 3.

104. See below, Liber IV, last Distinction, on whether the damned can sin.

105. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2 (as cited above in this distinction).

106. Jas. 2:19.

107. Ps. 150:6.

108. Rom. 14:11; Phil. 2:10–11; Rev. 5:13.

109. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Anima et Resurrectione*.

110. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Ephesios* I (on Eph. 1); II (on Eph. 2); IV (on Eph. 4). Rufinus adduced these passages against St. Jerome.

111. Pope John, as cited in Gratian, *Decretum*, causa 16, q. 2, c. *Visis*.

112. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 13, a. 4, in corpore; III, q. 86, a. 1, in corpore.

113. Ps. 102 (103):22; Dan. 3:57.

114. 1 Cor. 15; St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Ephesios*.

115. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Philosophia* (= *De Anima et Resurrectione*), I, from ch. 3.

116. St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Ruffinum*, Book I.

117. Gratian, *Decretum*, causa 16, q. 2, c. *Visis* (Pope John); the full text reads: "the devil grieves and is ashamed that men hold on earth the charity which he himself was unable to have in heaven; he grieves out of envy, knowing that men will ascend by charity to the place from which he fell."

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2, in corpore and ad 1; and q. 19, a. 3.

119. St. Jerome, *De filio prodigo ad Damasum* (as cited by the Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 7).

120. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 15.

121. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 15 (continued).

122. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* II, ch. 18.

123. St. Anselm, *Dialogus de libero arbitrio*, chs. 1, 13, 14.

124. St. Bernard, *De Gratia et libero arbitrio*.

125. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 105; *De Civitate Dei*, last book, last chapter.

126. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24 (as cited by Estius).

127. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 105.

128. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2 (the article most recently cited).

129. The common opinion of the theologians, *In IV Sent.*, last distinction [abbreviation as in source: *in 4. dist. ultima*].

130. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 8.

131. Estius refers to his treatment at the last distinction of Book I of the *Sentences*.

132. Phil. 2.

133. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae* I, ch. 144.

134. Estius refers to his treatment at Distinction 4 of Book I of the *Sentences*.

135. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1.

136. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, ch. 12.

137. Peter Lombard [the Master], *In II Sent.*, the present distinction [abbreviation as in source].

138. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 23.

139. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Damasum* (on the prodigal son).

140. St. Jerome, *Contra Jovianum* III, ch. 3.

141. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, section on the nature of the soul.

142. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 3 (*ad Simplicianum*).

143. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* III, ch. 18.

144. St. Ambrose, *De Fide* II, ch. 2.

145. St. Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 16.

146. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1 [cited as "S. Thom. ibidem"].

147. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXII, ch. 28.

148. Estius refers to the discussion at its proper place above in this distinction [abbreviation as in source: "suo loco"].

149. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 10.

150. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, qq. 56, 57, 58.

151. Estius refers to the discussion at Dist. 35 and 36, Book I [abbreviation as in source: "ad Distinct. 35. & 36. lib. 1."].

152. Cf. Dan. 8; Zach. 2.

153. Matt. 24.

154. Eph. 3; the fuller discussion is referred to below at Dist. 11 [abbreviation as in source: "ad Distinct. 11."].

155. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 56, a. 1.

156. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 8.

157. St. Augustine, at the same place; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 56 [the cited question], a. 2.

158. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 56 [the cited question], a. 3.

159. Commentators of St. Thomas, on the articles of the questions cited above [abbreviation as in source: "super articulos praedictos"].

160. Other Scholastics, commenting on this distinction [abbreviation as in source: "super hanc distinctionem"].

161. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 1.

162. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57 [the cited question], a. 1.

163. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 55, a. 2.

164. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 7.

165. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 2.

166. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 56 [cited as "cap. 56"], a. 2, ad 4.

167. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 3.

168. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 59, a. 1.

169. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 58 [the cited question], a. 2.

170. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 3; see also Bañez [abbreviation as in source: "vide Banesium"].

171. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 4.

172. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 4, sect. 4.

173. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4.

174. Prov. 17:3 (Vulgate: *Corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus*); Job 21:27 (*Certe novi cogitationes vestras*).

175. St. Basil, *De Vera Virginitate* [book on true virginity]; Matt. 18:10 (*Angeli eorum semper vident faciem Patris*).

176. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, on Job 28 (*Non aequabitur ei aurum vel vitrum*); cited by St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4.

177. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, penultimate chapter of the final book; St. Augustine, Tractate 77 *In Ioannem*; St. Bernard, *Apologia ad Guillelmum Abbatem*.

178. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 33.

179. Jer. 17:9–10; 1 Chr. (Paralip.) 6:30; 1 Cor. 2:11; 1 Sam. (1 Reg.) 16; Ps. 7; Ps. 138; Job 16; Wis. 1; Acts 1; Rom. 8; Heb. 4; Rev. 1.

180. Origen, commentary on Job 1 (*Circuivi terram et lavi eam* [abbreviation as in source]); Athanasius, *Liber de Quaestionibus Sacrae Scripturae* — Estius notes in a marginal scholion (footnote *a* in the source) that this work, found in the Cologne edition of Athanasius's works, vol. 2, p. 331, under the title *Ad Antiochum Principem de variis et necessariis Christianis cognitu utilibus*, is regarded by learned critics as spurious, and that the second and third sets of questions in the same volume (pp. 394 and 436) are collections of excerpts from Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Climacus, and Maximus, as demonstrated by Elias Ludovicus Dupinus (*Bibliotheca Auctorum Ecclesiasticorum*, sec. 4, on Athanasius) and Natalis Alexander (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, tom. 1, sec. 4, ch. 6, art. 8, nos. 4–5).

181. St. Ambrose, oration *De obitu Theodosii*; pseudo-Ambrosian commentary on Rom. 8 and 1 Cor. 2; St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 9 (on "Jesus knowing their thoughts"); St. John Chrysostom, Homily 30 on Matt., and homilies on John; St. Cyril, *In Ioannem* II, ch. 19; II, ch. 3; II, ch. 5 (words cited by St. Thomas in the *Catena aurea* on Matt. 9); St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 4; author of *De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis*, ch. 21; Theophylact, commentary on Lk. 5.

182. St. Augustine, *De Divinatione Daemonum*, ch. 5.

183. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 7 [abbreviation as in source]; Ockham; Gabriel [Biel], *In II Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].

184. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, commentary on this distinction [abbreviation as in source].

185. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* III, q. 13, citing St. Augustine on his behalf.

186. Hervaeus [Natalis]; Thomas of Strasbourg, *In II Sent.* [abbreviation as in source].

187. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4; St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 8, a. 13; St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 16, a. 8; St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* 12, a. 6; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, ch. 64; III, ch. 154.

188. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4, and the other places cited above.

189. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* II, ch. 30.

190. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4, reply to obj. 3.

191. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4, reply to obj. 1.

192. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 106; q. 107.

193. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* II, ch. 5.

194. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 2; Domingo Báñez, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 2.

195. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* II, ch. 2.

196. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 3.

197. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 4.

198. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 5.

199. Aristotle, *De Anima* III.

200. See above, Notabile 16 of the section on the cognition of Angels (in this same Distinctio).

201. Altissiodorensis (William of Auxerre), *Summa* II, tract. 10, ch. 3.

202. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 106, a. 1.

203. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, throughout many chapters; *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 6; *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.

204. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, ch. 5.

205. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 106, a. 3.

206. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 106, a. 4.

207. (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, ch. 4.

208. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34.

209. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 11.

210. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 1.

211. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* II, ch. 14.

212. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 20.

213. Plato, *Cratylus*.

214. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 19.

215. Socrates (the Church historian), *Historia Ecclesiastica* III, ch. 19.

216. Nicephorus Callistus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* X, ch. 36.

217. Gen. 3; 2 Cor. 2:11, and elsewhere.

218. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 17; *De Divinatione Daemonum*, chs. 3, 4, 5, 6.

219. Isidore, *De Summo Bono* I, ch. 12.

220. Rupert, *De Victoria Verbi Dei* I, ch. 26.

221. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 1, ad 5.

222. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.

223. St. Jerome, commentary on Ezek. 28.

224. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XX, ch. 1.

225. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 24–25.

226. Among the Epistles of Ignatius, the Epistle to the Philippians [note: Estius flags this epistle as of doubtful authenticity, noting at length the scholarly debate over which Ignatian epistles are genuine, citing Jerome's *Catalogus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*, Baronius, Bellarmine, Possevinus, Natalis Alexander (*Historia Ecclesiastica*, tom. 3, saec. 1, ch. 12, art. 16, and dissert. 23), and Louis Ellies Dupin (*Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica*, tom. 1, saec. 1, in Ignatio)].

227. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew* 1.

228. Origen, *Commentary on Matthew*.

229. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, sermon 11 and 12 on Ps. 118.

230. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 40.

231. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4 (as cited above).

232. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, ch. 22.

233. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 9.

234. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IX, chs. 21–22; *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 17; *De Consensu Evangelistarum* I, ch. 30.

235. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 112 [as in source], ch. 11 and several following chapters; cf. 1 Jn. (throughout).

236. See above, the sections on the knowledge of Angels in this same Distinctio.

237. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 1; and I, q. 57, aa. 3–4.

238. See the commentary on Dist. 38 of Book I of the *Sentences* (above).

239. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* III, ch. 17.

240. Cicero, *De Divinatione* II.

241. The famous ambiguous oracle concerning Pyrrhus of Epirus and the Romans: *"Aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse"* — capable of meaning either "I say that you, Aeacides, can conquer the Romans" or "I say that the Romans can conquer you, Aeacides."

242. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* II (on Lk. 3).

243. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 9 *De Passione Domini*; Sermon 11 *De Passione Domini*.

244. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 130.

245. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum* II, q. 2; and elsewhere, as noted above.

246. St. Augustine, *De Divinatione Daemonum*; *Contra Academicos* I, chs. 6–7.

247. St. Jerome, commentary on Matt. 5 (on the words "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts").

248. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 81.

249. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, aa. 2–3.

250. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 79.

251. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 4.

252. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum libri IV*, IV, ch. 5.

253. St. Basil, Homily 9.

254. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (on the heresy of the Origenists), no. 64, with words drawn from Methodius.

255. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia* (near the middle).

256. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* [abbreviation as in source: *lib. Metaphysicae*], where he shows that forms are not impressed upon matter by a separated substance, but are reduced from the potency of matter to act through the action of a form existing in matter.

257. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, this Distinction (Dist. 7).

258. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 100, a. 2.

259. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* [same reference as above].

260. On the flight of Simon Magus and the historical questions surrounding it, a lengthy discussion appears in the footnote of Henry de Valois (*Henricus Valesius*) in his annotations on the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of Eusebius of Caesarea (Book II), concerning the contest between Simon and the Apostle Peter, and the account of Simon's fall and death. Valesius expresses doubt about the flight narrative and about the statue reportedly erected to Simon on the Tiber Island with the inscription *SIMONI DEO SANCTO*, arguing (following a suggestion drawn from Suetonius, *Claudius* ch. 12) that Justin mistook a statue dedicated to the Sabine god *Semo Sancus* for one dedicated to Simon Magus. Tillemont (*Mémoires*, Tom. I, Pt. 2, Life of St. Peter, ch. 34), however, carefully defends the historical truth of the narrative on the basis of numerous patristic and historical witnesses — including St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Isidore, Theodoret, and others — and, adducing Cardinal Baronius (*Annales*, Tom. I, ad annum 44), notes that what was discovered in the Tiber Island was not a statue but a small stone-base bearing the inscription *SEMONI SANGO DEO*. Consult, if it please you, the authors cited in their respective places, and Tillemont, note 1 on the same title, where he argues at length and with very strong arguments for the truth of that history and clearly demonstrates the conjectures of Valesius and others to be unsupported by any solid foundation.

261. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, chs. 101–102; *De Potentia*, q. 6, a. 8; *Opusculum* 10, a. 16; *Opusculum* 11, a. 5.

262. Francisco de Vitoria, *Relectio* 12, *De Arte Magica*, n. 33.

263. See the following section (§ XVII) of this Distinction.

264. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 90.

265. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 9; the Apostle's words are from 1 Cor. 12 (on the discernment of spirits).

266. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, a. 4; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 1, ad 2, and a. 2.

267. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, ch. 18.

268. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VII, ch. 13. The footnote in the source refers to a story told by Eusebius concerning Caesarea Philippi, where a victim cast into a certain spring on a set day would disappear, which was regarded by spectators as a prodigy (note *a* in source: "In antiq. editione serm. 126, in nova PP. Benedictin. edit. Tom. V").

269. Exod. 7–8.

270. Rev. 13.

271. Gen. 30.

272. Rev. 13 (and following).

273. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 6, and the three following chapters.

274. Mk. 16 (*Marci ultimo*).

275. Aristotle, *De Anima* II [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. de Anima*].

276. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 12 [cross-reference as in source].

277. The assumption of bodies by angels is to be treated in the following Distinction (Dist. 8 of Book II).

278. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 6.

279. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 1.

280. Matt. 7.

281. 2 Thess. 2; Rev. 13.

282. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XX, ch. 19.

283. Lactantius, *Epitome Divinarum Institutionum*, ch. 8.

284. St. Hilary, *In Matthaeum*, canon 6.

285. St. Augustine, *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 19 (ch. 28 in some editions).

286. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XX, ch. 9 (on Job); and Bk. VII, ch. 17 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 20. Moral. Ecclesiastice capit. 9. & libr. 7. capit. 17*].

287. Sozomen, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I, ch. 13.

288. Nicephorus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* VIII, ch. 41; IX, ch. 18; XI, ch. 42.

289. St. John Chrysostom, homily [abbreviation as in source: *Homilibus*; specific homily reference unclear in OCR; from context a homily warning against false miracle-workers].

290. John Gerson, Sermon on the Gospel of the Nineteenth Sunday after Pentecost (*super Evangelium Dominicae 19. post Pentecosten*).

291. Matt. 24; 2 Thess. 2; Rev. 13.

292. Acts 10; Acts 5; Acts (last chapter).

293. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXVIII, ch. 4.

294. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 16.

295. John Gerson, Sermon on the Gospel of the Nineteenth Sunday after Pentecost (*super Evangelium Dominicae 19. post Pentecosten*), as cited above.

296. Gal. 3; St. Jerome, *Commentary on Galatians* [in loco].

297. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, ch. 18; *Contra Faustum* I, ch. 6, and ch. 13; *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, ch. 16; *De Utilitate Credendi*, ch. 16; and *Quaestiones*, q. 6 [abbreviation as in source: *(a) quest. 6*].

298. St. Cyprian, *De idolorum vanitate*.

299. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* II, ch. 17.

300. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi* 77, on the words "Immissiones per Angelos malos."

301. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 2, in the body and in the reply to the third objection.

302. St. Thomas, *In II Thessalonicenses* II, lectio secunda.

303. Council (Sixth Synod), actio 15 (*actione 15. sextae Synodi*).

304. The heretics of Henry [the heretical sect of Henry of Lausanne], as recounted in the *Vita* of St. Bernard.

305. St. Thomas, at the places cited above [i.e., *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 2, and *In II Thessalonicenses* II, lectio secunda].

306. Acts 19.

307. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 2, in the body of the article.

308. St. Augustine [as cited above, in the preceding sections of this distinction].

309. Matt. 24; Rev. 13.

310. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* II, ch. 14 [abbreviation as in source].

311. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 16; and Juan Luis Vives, *Commentary on De Civitate Dei*, at that locus.

312. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 178 [the same question as cited earlier in the section].

313. Deut. [the passage adduced in the ninth objection, as cited earlier in this distinction].

314. Gal. 1.

315. St. John Chrysostom [as cited above in this distinction].

316. John Gerson [as cited above in this distinction; cf. Sermon on the Gospel of the Nineteenth Sunday after Pentecost].

317. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 95 and q. 96.

318. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 95 (throughout the whole question).

319. The *Ars notoria* was a species of magical art by which angelic or divine knowledge was sought through incantations and figures.

320. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 96, a. 1.

321. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 96, a. 2.

322. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 6; and *De doctrina christiana* II, ch. 20 and the chapters following.

323. Deut. 18.

324. Lev. 19.

325. Exod. 22.

326. 1 Kgs. (Vulgate: 1 Reg.) 15.

327. 1 Paralip. 10.

328. 4 Kgs. (Vulgate: 4 Reg.) 1.

329. 2 Paralip. 28.

330. Is. 8; Is. 47.

331. Gal. 5.

332. Rev. 21.

333. 1 Cor. 10.

334. 2 Cor. 6.

335. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* I, ch. 9 [and lib. 1 (the reference as in the source)].

336. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 19 on the Lord's Nativity [*In Nativitate Domini*, sermo 19].

337. John Gerson, *Trilogus Astrologiae theologizatae*, proposition 18.

DISTINCTIO VIII — ON THE NATURE OF ANGELS: INCORPOREALITY, IMMORTALITY, AND THEIR BODILY APPEARANCES (*DE NATURA ANGELORUM: INCORPOREITATE, IMMORTALITATE, ET APPARITIONIBUS CORPORALIBUS*)

§ 1. More correctly, therefore, the rationale of this doctrine seems to be sought from the fact that the devil is the enemy and foe of God — not in any manner whatsoever, but such a one as professedly and irreconcilably assails the honour and glory of God and of our universal Lord, and strives to seize it and transfer it to himself, converting his every effort to this end — far more so than occurs among men when one pursues another with a capital hatred and at the same time endeavours with all his power to destroy both that person and all who cleave to him, and to obliterate them utterly. Just as, therefore, the law of nature dictates that subjects must have no association with those who have conspired against the King, especially if they do everything out of hatred for and to the harm of the King, so also for us, who are on the side of God, that same law of nature forbids every association, even the least, with the devil and his angels. Hence it was said to the devil in Gen. 3: "I will place enmities between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed." From this it also follows that not even the good angels, who cannot be seduced into sin or drawn into a complete friendship with demons, are permitted even the smallest association with them; but rather they zealously exercise a perfect enmity against them for the glory of their Lord God, whom the demons assail with all their strength — whose zeal and ardour we men ought to imitate, and say that verse from the Psalm:[1] "Have I not hated them, O Lord, that hated thee, and pined away because of thy enemies? I have hated them with a perfect hatred; they have become my enemies."[,2]

§ 2. This reason for the society with demons being utterly forbidden to us is intimated by the Scriptures, when they signify that those who consult demons withdraw from God, abandon the hope and trust that must be placed in God, and seek and expect help from one who is the enemy of God — as though God Himself either could not, or would not, if asked, render help and supply the benefits desired. For in 4 Kgs. 1, Elias spoke thus to King Ochozias: "Thus saith the Lord: Because thou hast sent messengers to consult Beelzebub the god of Accaron, as if there were not a God in Israel of whom thou mightest enquire the word, therefore thou shalt not come down from the bed upon which thou art gone up, but thou shalt surely die."[3] Similarly, Saul is rebuked for having consulted the pythoniss, on the ground that he had not hoped in the Lord (1 Paralip. 10).[,4] The same meaning is found in the Apostle (1 Cor. 10), for when he had said: "I would not that you should be made partakers with devils; you cannot drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of devils," he immediately added: "Do we provoke the Lord?" — that is, do we challenge and exasperate the Lord? For just as some prince is angered when he sees his subjects communicate and have commerce with enemies, so God, of whom it is written (Exod. 34): "*Dominus zelotes* is his name," is provoked to wrath and is moved, as it

were, by jealousy, when he sees us associating in any way with the demons, his enemies. This sense, following St. John Chrysostom, was expressed by Theophylact in his commentary on that passage.[5] Nor does that passage of the same Apostle (2 Cor. 6), "What concord hath Christ with Belial?", aim at anything else; for on account of the extreme enmity that exists between Christ and Belial (which he most aptly declared in the same passage from the contrariety of light and darkness, of justice and iniquity), it signifies that no one who is on the side of Christ is permitted to have any concord with Belial.[6]

§ 3. Finally, to this also pertains what St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 5 *On the Patience of Job*, disputing against those who consult diviners (*vates*), that is, soothsayers, about lost things, affirms: that those who do this act adversely to God and deny their God.[7] For they act adversely to God in this, that they associate with his adversary; and they deny their God because, by the fact that they seek the camp of his enemies in order to obtain a benefit, they charge him, as it were, with being either unable or unwilling to provide benefits. And from this it is that the vice of superstition is, by its whole genus, referred to those sins which are committed against the first precept of the Decalogue, as is taught below (at dist. 37, lib. 3).[8] Moreover, similar sentiments may be found elsewhere in the writings of the Fathers. St. Thomas briefly indicates our present rationale, saying that war has been declared upon men against the demons; hence, he says, it is by no means lawful for a man to use the help of demons through tacit or express pacts.[9] Upon these words Cajetan remarks: "Note the root cause why every association with a demon is from its very genus a mortal sin — namely, because it is with an enemy against whom war has already been declared by the Prince of the Universe between us and the demons."[10] Dominicus Soto eruditely explains the same reason, teaching that every association, pact, and commerce with demons is unlawful for us — not only because their depraved will devises nothing but our harm, but because they are enemies of God. For this reason, to seek or receive any benefit from them would be to defect from God and to pass over to the camp of his enemies.[11] Hence he concludes in the end that every such association is the sin of apostasy, in the same way that in earthly kingdoms one incurs the crime of a deserter or apostate and is guilty of violated loyalty if a soldier has received any gift from the enemy.

§ 4. But from this very comparison someone may perhaps raise an argument to the contrary. For it is not unlawful to seek assistance from an enemy of the kingdom or commonwealth in a case of necessity — for example, bread in extreme famine, or rescue from the peril of fire or water, or a remedy for illness. Therefore it may seem that even we, placed in a similar necessity, are permitted to implore the aid of demons, notwithstanding the hostility that exists between them and God, the ruler of our commonwealth.

Reply: The comparison drawn from an earthly kingdom and human affairs, though apt in some respects, is not perfectly exact and cannot correspond with complete precision to the matter proposed. For no earthly king is a universal Lord, not even with respect to his own subjects, because there are many things in which subjects do not depend upon their prince and in which they are therefore not subject to him — for instance, nature together with the whole genus of natural acts, as well as internal acts, supernatural acts, and other such things. And for this reason there cannot and ought not to be an altogether perfect hostility on the part of such subjects toward the king's enemy, because the enemy will be able to provide them something that the king either cannot, or can only with difficulty, provide; and in that case, if no harm thereby accrues to the king or the commonwealth, it will not be unlawful to receive a necessary benefit from the enemy, nor will the king be able rightly either to forbid such communication with the enemy or to take offence at it. God, however, is the universal Lord in respect of all things without exception, and likewise omnipotent and supremely beneficent — He Himself also supplying that very benefit which seems to be furnished by demons, since not even the

demons themselves can do anything except by His willing and providing it. Therefore there can be no reason whatsoever for seeking assistance or entering into any association with those who set themselves in hostility against this Lord and against his supreme and universal dominion, and who have long since been declared perpetual and irreconcilable enemies. From what has been said it is clear (*perspicuum est*) that not only are the magic arts utterly forbidden, but also that it is lawful for no one to consult the magicians themselves, or sorcerers (*maleficos*), who present themselves as interpreters and intermediaries of demons. Some things were said by us on this matter (at dist. 34, lib. 4), where also the question was treated: whether it is lawful to remove signs of malefice.[12]

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§ I — That Angels are by nature incorporeal (Angelos esse natura incorporeos)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 50, a. 1.[13]

§ 5. It is the common and constant opinion that Angels are by their nature entirely incorporeal and purely spiritual. This is understood of demons no less than of good angels, since the former are distinguished from the latter not by nature but by the malice of the will alone. In proof of this, the following and similar testimonies from the Scriptures are customarily adduced: Ps. 103 (*Ps. 104*): "Who makest thy angels spirits";[14] Heb. 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits?";[15] Eph. 6: "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the spiritualities of wickedness in the heavenly places.",[16] This is certainly said of demons, whom we also read called simply *Spirits* throughout the Gospels, and at other times *evil* and *unclean spirits*.

§ 6. Yet some consider that this proof from the name *Spirit* attributed to angels does not plainly establish that they are incorporeal, because it is clear that the same word in the Scriptures is frequently attributed also to bodies that are finer and more subtle, such as air and wind. To these it must be replied: if on account of this equivocation of the word the proof from Scripture that angels are incorporeal is uncertain, it will follow equally that it is uncertain that the human soul is incorporeal, given that it is frequently called *Spirit* in the Sacred Letters — as in Ps. 30, Ps. 145, Lk. 23, Lk. 24, the last chapter of Ecclesiastes, Dan. 2, 3, 2 Macc. 7, Acts 23, 1 Cor. 2, 1 Thess. 5, and elsewhere.[17] Indeed it will follow that not even the proof from those Scriptures which pronounce God to be Spirit affords a certain demonstration that God is incorporeal. But if we receive as good and solid (as we ought) these proofs from Scripture concerning the rational soul and especially concerning God, it is evident that those adduced concerning angels are likewise to be received by a similar formal character (*ratio*) — especially since from other places of Scripture nothing to the contrary appears, any more than in the case of angels.

§ 7. Moreover, it must be altogether admitted that Scripture calls angels *Spirits* in the same way it calls human souls *Spirits*, and in the same way the Sadducees denied that there was an angel or a spirit in the nature of things (Acts 23).[18] If you say that at least from that passage "Who maketh his angels spirits," which almost all bring in here as proof, a weak argument is drawn, because the genuine sense of that verse is this: "Who maketh winds (*spiritus*), that is the winds, his angels, that is his messengers, sending them wherever he wills, since both the winds obey the sea and the spirits of storms execute his word" — and hence in similar sense the verse continues: "And his ministers a burning fire, since also fire, that is lightning, executes his word" — I reply (*Respondeo*) that the same Scripture admits multiple senses, and therefore nothing prevents that verse from also being rightly understood of angelic Spirits, as the Apostle received and interpreted it (Heb. 1).[19]

§ 8. Another proof is taken from the fact that in Lk. 8 a whole legion of demons is read to have besieged one man.[20] For although a body is infinitely divisible, and therefore nothing prevents the greatest multitude of tiny bodies from being contained and enclosed within one human body, yet because those who make demons corporeal attribute to them not tiny bodies but full bodies as though they were animals, it is here rendered probable, against them, that demons are incorporeal. But since reasons seem to carry greater weight in establishing this doctrine, we will here append some of them, and those the most important.

§ 9. *First:* Since in the universe there is a certain creature that is merely corporeal — such as trees, stones, elements, the heavens, and whatever besides man is corporeal — and a certain creature that is partly corporeal, as man who is composed of body and soul, the perfection of the universe required that there should further be a certain creature that is purely incorporeal and purely spiritual, of which kind no other besides the angelic nature can be assigned. Angels, therefore, are entirely incorporeal. This reason is found in St. Thomas, *prima pars*, q. 50, a. 1; and we used it above (at dist. 2) also to show that angels exist in the nature of things.[21]

Second: Angels are of a more excellent nature than human souls, whether still joined to bodies or already separated from them. But human souls are without controversy immaterial and incorporeal; how much more, therefore, are angels?

Third: If angels were corporeal, then as often as they are sent from heaven to earth, or return to heaven, either heaven would have to be divided or a penetration of dimensions would occur, both of which are naturally impossible. Therefore the motion of angels to heaven or from heaven would never be without a miracle, and thus miracles would be daily and virtually perpetual — which is in no way to be believed, especially because demons too, to whom a miracle is not to be ascribed, move in this way and penetrate the earth even to the underworld.

Fourth: Angels and demons move about in this air without any body yielding to them; for no experience teaches that another body yields to them as they approach. Therefore, similarly, if they were assumed to be corporeal, a penetration of dimensions would follow. And the same proof holds of demons entering human bodies without any distension.

Fifth: Angels move in an instant (*in instanti*); therefore they are incorporeal. The consequent is evident, because no body can be moved in an instant, for it would thus be simultaneously at the middle point and at the terminus. For it cannot be moved from place to place except by passing through the middle. The antecedent is proved because angels carry out God's commands without delay wherever they are sent. For it does not befit God to have messengers who necessarily endure some delay in conveying or executing commands; but there would be delay if they were moved by successive motion. Add to this that if they were moved successively, it would at least have to be admitted that they are moved with a wondrous speed — whence it would necessarily follow that the air through which they pass would be divided at equal speed and would close and come together again, which could not happen without a great noise and whistling; yet we never perceive this, even though the motions of angels and demons are most frequent.

Sixth: Angels preside over the whole of corporeal creation, including even human creation; therefore they are not parts of corporeal creation but are of a nature more excellent than it.

§ 10. The authority of the Fathers also supports these reasons. For (Pseudo-)Dionysius, in his work *On the Divine Names*, ch. 5, and in *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 2, explicitly teaches that angels are entirely free from body and matter.[22] St. Basil agrees, in Homily 9 (*That God is not the author of evils*, and in the *Exposition*

of Psalm 44), adducing in the former place in proof that passage of Eph. 6: "Against the spiritualities of wickedness."[23] And Gregory of Nazianzus in his Oration *On the Nativity of the Lord*, and in Oration 2 *On Theology*.[24] St. John Chrysostom likewise, in Homily 22 *On Genesis*, destroys on this foundation the opinion of those who supposed that angels had intercourse with women, on account of what is read of the sons of God in Gen. 6;[25] and in Homily 16 on 1 Cor., on the words "Know you not that we shall judge angels?", he says that angels are of incorporeal substance.[26] And the same he affirms of the devil in Homily 44 on Matthew.[27] Likewise St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* bk. 4, ch. 9: "An angel is spirit only; but man is spirit and flesh."[28] The same is the opinion of St. Cyril, *In Joannem* bk. 2, ch. 10, writing on the words "I am the bread of life."[29] And of St. John Damascene, *De Fide* bk. 2, ch. 3, and in the *Dialectica*, ch. 49 — where he also cites his authorities (Pseudo-)Dionysius and Gregory the Theologian.[30] Add to these St. Athanasius in the work *On the Common Essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit*;[31] book 3 *Against the Greeks* under Theodosius;[32] Sophronius in his Epistle to the Bishop of Constantinople, which was read at the Sixth Synod, action 11;[33] Bede, *De elementis philosophiae*, bk. 1;[34] Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, bk. 1, pt. 5, ch. 7–8.[35] The Master indicates in the text (§ A) that their opinion, as the more common and catholic, is more acceptable to him.[36]

§ 11. To these was finally added the authority of the Lateran Council held under Innocent III, ch. 1, where it was defined that God created both kinds of creature — the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane — and then the human, constituted as it were midway, from spirit and body.[37] From these words it is sufficiently understood that the angelic creature is called spiritual in the mind of the Council in the same way that the soul, which is a part of man, is spiritual — namely, properly, in the manner in which that which is entirely incorporeal is called spiritual. Moreover, if angels are incorporeal, they are consequently also immaterial (*immateriales*). For every incorporeal being is immaterial, and conversely; for corporeal substances have from matter the fact that they are corporeal. This is proved likewise from the human soul, which is established to be immaterial; wherefore, much more must angels, whose nature is more excellent, be admitted to be immaterial. St. Thomas teaches this (I, q. 50, a. 2).[38]

§ 12. Although St. Bonaventure appears to dissent from him (at q. 1, dist. 3), teaching that angels consist of matter and form, but adding that the matter of angels is not of the same formal character (*ratio*) as the matter of corporeal things.[39] This opinion can be reconciled with the truth if we understand *matter* to be taken metaphorically for receptive potency (*potentia receptiva*). In this sense we acknowledge matter wherever there is a change from form to form, or privation, or the reverse; because such change is not without a subject. And in this sense some understand what St. Augustine says (*Confessions*, bk. 13, ch. 8) — that angels consist of matter.[40] But his opinion will be discussed below.

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§ II — That Angels do not have bodies naturally united to them (Angelos non habere corpora sibi naturaliter unita)

§ 13. It is not the same thing to ask whether angels are corporeal and whether they have bodies naturally united to them, just as it is not the same to ask both these questions about souls. For human souls are by no means corporeal, yet they are naturally united to bodies. The case of angels, however, must be stated differently; for they are neither corporeal, nor do they have any bodies to which they are naturally united. That they are not corporeal has already been proved. That they are not naturally united to bodies — namely

in the way in which the soul is united to the body, with which it constitutes one perfect substance and natural composite, that is, man — is proved as follows: because an angel, in the genus of intellectual beings, is a certain total and perfect substance. For the Scriptures speak of angels not as of a part of a substance, but as of a certain complete intellectual substance — speaking of angels in the way they speak of men, not in the way they speak of human souls or spirits. This is clear from the fact that if they spoke of angels as they speak of souls, they would certainly somewhere explicitly name by its proper name the perfect substance constituted from angel and body, just as they name man (who consists of soul and body) in a thousand places. But that name nowhere exists, neither in the Scriptures nor elsewhere. In the same manner the Fathers also speak of angels. Therefore from their opinion likewise, angels are not only not corporeal but are not naturally united to any bodies either.

§ 14. St. Thomas proves this doctrine (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 1)[41] by the following reason: to have a body naturally united to oneself is a certain accident (*accidens*) of intellectual substance, just as it also happens to an animal as animal to have other things. For the rational soul has a body naturally united to it not because it is imperfect in its genus — that is, of such a nature that it necessarily has to receive its knowledge through the bodily senses from sensible things. But in whatever genus something imperfect is found, something perfect must pre-exist in that same genus, in which the perfection that the other lacks resides, and by the lack of which the other is said to be imperfect. There are therefore some intellectual substances that are perfect, which do not need to acquire knowledge from things, and therefore do not need bodies to be naturally united to them.

§ 15. To this are added other reasons. For if angels had their own bodies, either those bodies would be organized and distinguished by members, as human bodies are, or they would be confused and indistinct, as homogeneous things are. But neither of these can be said. Not the former, because that distinction of members chiefly serves sensitive cognition, through which intellectual cognition is received; but now angels are supposed not to receive cognition through sense. Not the latter, because bodies of that kind would be even less capable of serving angels in their operations — whatever shape you might assign to those bodies; nay, they would rather be an impediment to them in their motion and ministries, since they could not be moved except with the delay of successive motion and the division of the intervening corporeal medium.

Another reason: if someone were to contend that angels receive knowledge from things and therefore maintain that angelic minds need bodies in which both senses and the organs of sense are distinct — so that by means of them they might perceive the cognition of things — it would then follow that angels are certain animals possessed of a sentient faculty (*sensus*) in the same sense as man, which is the definition of man. Angels would therefore be of the same nature as men, and in truth would be men. Nor could they be excluded by the proper formal character (*ratio*) of man: for to have a gross and subtle body, to be mortal and immortal, to need food and not to need it, make no difference in nature.

Another reason: if angels have their own bodies, it will be possible for those bodies to be separated from them, just as the soul is separable from the body. It is asked, therefore, why, on account of sin, angels were not separated from their bodies — just as the souls of men are separated from their bodies through death, especially since those who sinned more gravely sinned. And whether, when an angel is separated from its bodies, it understands more imperfectly than when joined to them. And whether they would wish and be inclined to return to their bodies; and what would happen if they had fewer bodies, and what would happen

altogether if they had none — on account of which they would be judged less prepared than when joined to them, because they would be craving the conjunction of bodies.[42]

Again, another reason: angels are movers of the heavens; therefore they do not have their own bodies naturally united to them; for it would follow that the heavens are moved by the motion of their own bodies. Which would indeed be put forward in vain: for the same motive power that would be attributed to the bodies of angels for moving the heavens could compendiously be attributed to those same heavenly bodies themselves.

Furthermore, let the studious person consider still other reasons in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* bk. 12, ch. 6, 8, and the last chapter, where, speaking of the angelic movers of the heavens under the name of *intelligences*, he proves that they are free from body, because if they were corporeal they could not set the heavens in perpetual motion.[43]

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§ III — On the bodies of angels: the opinions of others are examined (De Angelorum corporibus aliorum sententiae expenduntur)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 50, a. 1; and q. 51, a. 1 and 2.[44]

§ 16. Among the ancient writers of the Church it was not so settled and certain a position, proved by all, as it is today, that angels and demons are incorporeal and have no bodies naturally united to them.

For certain followers of Plato and his school — such as Porphyry and Apuleius — who taught that demons, both good and bad, are certain aerial animals (on which see Apuleius in the work *On the God of Socrates*) handed down this same teaching about angels, and therefore maintained either that they are corporeal or that they have bodies naturally united to them.[45]

§ 17. But certain others have spoken of this whole matter as something doubtful. Among these we may mention above all St. Augustine, even though he is in that camp which attributes bodies to angels — being more pronounced in many passages. For he was imbued with the Platonic discipline and thus commemorates the Platonic opinion about the bodies of angels in certain places in such a way as to seem to approve it: for instance, *De Civitate Dei* bk. 8, ch. 14, 15, 16.[46] Indeed, elsewhere he frequently calls angels animals and attributes bodies to them. The places are: *Contra Academicos* bk. 1, ch. 7; *De Ordine* bk. 2, ch. 9; *De Trinitate* bk. 2, ch. 7 and bk. 3, ch. 1; *In Expositione Psalmi* 85; *De Civitate* bk. 9, ch. 13; and bk. 11, ch. 23; and bk. 21, ch. 3; and *Epistola* 111 (a)[47] and 114; *Sermo* 102; (*b*) *De diversis* ch. 9; and bk. 84, *Quaestionum*.[48]

§ 18. But these passages, being cited so easily from him without the weightier authority of Scripture or of the holy Fathers, are deservedly rejected. There is indeed greater difficulty in the fact that the opinion with corporeal angels is customarily adduced from the Seventh General Synod.[49] In its *actio* 5, certain words are produced from a book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, whose author both denies that angels and our souls are altogether free of body and invisible, and affirms that they exist in a tenuous airy or fiery body, and are in many respects vile in their own body. And this opinion is said to have been held by Basil, Athanasius, and Methodius. And the Fathers of that same Synod appear to have confirmed it by their acclamation, when those who read the Bishop's words aloud were answered after the words of Tharasius the Patriarch: "The Father shows that it is necessary for angels to be painted, and that they may be circumscribed, and that they appear to

men"; and the answer read back was: "Even so, Lord." But we reply that the opinion of John the Bishop, whose words were read in the Synod, was not approved by the Fathers of the Synod themselves; but rather, what follows from it was used as a consequence — namely, that Tharasius the Patriarch then repeating: it is right for angels to be painted. For from the sacred use of images in that Synod, it was argued that angels ought to be depicted in their proper form, namely in such a way that they might correctly be painted. And in proof of this various opinions of the Fathers were advanced, approved only to the extent that they served to establish the use of sacred images. Nor was the Synod on this account employing feeble proof. For it proved its teaching by an argument drawn from the authority and opinions of the preceding Fathers — even if those Fathers, in confirming their own positions, had not everywhere adduced certain and solid arguments, nor always applied true assumptions. For it happens at times that, in order to prove something true, weak arguments are employed from authors who use them. It may also be said that the Synod had recourse to that one argument only as the most extreme part of the proof, by which it is namely said that angels very often appear to men in human form. For it is indeed true and sufficient in itself to prove that in such a form they may rightly be painted, whether it is their corporeal nature or the fact that they are incorporeal.

§ 19. There can further be objected, concerning demons, that since they are tormented by corporeal fire, they seem consequently to be either corporeal or to have certain proper bodies — because a body, acting upon a purely spiritual thing, cannot effect anything. But the proper place for explaining this difficulty is at dist. 44, lib. 4 (a).[50]

Moreover, this is further proved in the following way: for among the Fathers and principal Doctors of the Church, the matter was quite ambiguous — some affirming angels to be incorporeal, not a few denying it, others doubting — so much so that the Master (in this Distinction) considers this variety of opinions and does not dare to define anything. Therefore, since for them the matter was so uncertain as a tradition, it is not likely that the Fathers of the Lateran Council wished to pronounce a definitive sentence on a question not previously expressly debated among themselves.

§ 20. Furthermore, to the words of the Council it can be replied: the intention of the Fathers in establishing that decree was not to define that some creatures are merely spiritual and entirely devoid of body, but only this: that God is the Author and Creator of all things whatsoever that exist in the universe — both of those called corporeal and visible, and of those called spiritual and invisible; or, in a more general sense, spiritual and invisible things — even if they are not entirely devoid of body. Now this declaration is proved, because that decree was clearly made against the heresy of the Manichaeans who at that time were causing considerable trouble, and who denied God to be the true Author of all things. But truly, because the Fathers in that same decree seem to have sufficiently explained the mind of the Church about angels as a purely spiritual creature (*creatura pure spiritualis*), it is therefore rash to attempt to teach otherwise after that decree. And this is also briefly to be noted: that just as in the Sacred Letters the word *spiritus* is sometimes attributed to certain bodies, so also certain bodies are called *invisibilia*. For in Gen. 1 according to the Septuagint version (*sec. vers. 70*), the earth is called *invisibilis*; and in Heb. 11, the whole corporeal creation as it was first constituted with no distinction yet made is called *invisibilia*, in these words: "that the things which are seen were made of things which appear not." It is clear that the argument, drawn from the distinction of the visible and the invisible, to prove that some creature is incorporeal, is not altogether certain according to Sacred Scripture.

§ IV [continued from § III above]

§ 21. [The section continues:] It is established (*constat*), and it pertains to the Faith, that it is so defined by the Church and that those who deny it belong to error. In this opinion are St. Thomas (*de malo*, q. *De Daemonibus*, a. 1)[51] and Sixtus Senensis (*Bibliotheca Sancta*, lib. 5, annotatio 8)[52] — who professes that he ill follows Bernardus Lateranensis's modesty, treating this matter as one not definitively settled; although Bernardus Lateranensis is more ancient than the Lateran Council, and Bartholomaeus Carranza, collector of the *Summa Conciliorum* (in the annotation to *actio* 5 of the Seventh Synod),[53] and Cajetan who does not at all think it a matter of faith — writing on Eph. 2, "According to the prince of the power of this air," he asserts that demons are airy spirits;[54] and finally Dominicus Bannes (*supra* I, q. 51, a. 1)[55] who notes the temerity of the contrary opinion, especially on account of the Lateran decree, but yet frees it from heresy.

§ 22. Moreover, this is further proved in the following way: among the Fathers and principal Doctors of the Church, the matter was quite ambiguous. Proof is offered: the first of their opinions can in no way be approved — namely, of those who say that all the angelic appearances which Scripture commemorates were not truly exhibited outwardly but were purely phantasmal, being produced only by a change of imagination in those to whom angels are read to have appeared — just as John sees things not with bodily eyes in the spirit in the Apocalypse, and Peter in ecstasy saw a vessel full of animals descending from heaven, and the Prophets saw broadly the things revealed to them, not with the body but with the spirit. This opinion conflicts with the manifest testimonies of Scripture, attesting that angels appeared to men and were handled in a corporeal manner, even to the point of the washing of feet — as by Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Tobias, the father and son, B. Mary the Virgin, Zechariah, Mulierius in the Resurrection of the Lord, and by the Apostles in his same Ascension, and very frequently elsewhere. All these things cannot be referred to mere imagination and prophetic vision without any reason.

§ 23. St. Thomas refutes that opinion by this argument (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 2):[56] it seems that what is imaginary vision is seen only in the imagination of the one who sees it, and hence does not appear indifferently to all. But Scripture thus introduces angels appearing sometimes to the whole family of Abraham, and to Lot and all his family, and to the citizens of Sodom. Similarly, the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all indiscriminately. Therefore these things did not happen in imagination alone, but according to corporeal vision, which is evidently the position.

Furthermore, these reasons also serve to refute that opinion which holds that those appearances were wrought by some mutation of the external senses — such that that which is not may appear; in the way that colours in the sky appear which are not there.

§ 24. Therefore one must say (*Dicendum est*), with St. Augustine (as cited above), that such appearances were made in assumed bodies — not of new creation (for all corporeal matter was created at the beginning), nor of those bodies which they were naturally bearing (for it is still to be said that angels do not have their own proper bodies), but from inferior elements or from whatever air, made suitable for the present use into an apt and formed body, and adapted to the assumed actions. For St. Gregory, *Moralia* bk. 27, ch. 2, testifies that angels have been seen in corporeal eyes, having assumed forms from air.[57] And St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* bk. 3, ch. 1 (*cap.* 1), in the other part of this question toward which he later inclined, so asks: "Whether an angel assumes from inferior elements a body coaptated to itself, which it puts on as a garment and turns into whatever corporeal appearances and these true ones."[58] The same in *Sermo* 16 (*De diversis*, ch. 3, *contra*

Manichaeos) says: "The Lord submitted so corporeal a matter to the power of angels."[^59] This manner of speaking is common from the usage of the Doctors.

§ 25. Now regarding the assumed bodies, it is to be held that in those appearances they were converted into nothing (as Calvin rashly affirmed, following Tertullian's opinion that they come from nothing) but that they return to that whence they had been taken — that is, into their prior matter and nature — is to be esteemed.[^60]

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§ V — That angels are immortal (Angelos esse immortales)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 50, a. 5.[^61]

§ 26. In the question of the immortality of angels, first of all according to the Catholic Faith it must be held: all angels, both good and bad, are always going to exist, and will never perish, and are therefore immortal or incorruptible in this sense, that they will never cease to be. The manifest proof is from the eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*) of the good and the eternal misery of the bad. For both we believe by Faith according to the Scriptures. And concerning the bad, the places are: Matt. 25: "Depart into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels";[^62] and in the Epistle of Jude: "Angels who kept not their principality, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains."[^63] Concerning the good, there are proofs whatever promises of eternal life are made to just men. For it is promised to us in the Gospel that there is an equality of angels (Lk. 20);[^64] and the measure of man is the same as that of the angel (Rev. 21).[^65] Therefore the eternal future beatitude of just men is also the beatitude of the holy angels. And although their beatitude would not be perfect if it were to be terminated at some point, yet also from the bad angels the most certain argument is derived in favour of the good. For if the bad are always going to be — which is in any case good in itself and greatly to be desired — then also the good will always be. Then if the bad are always in punishment, the good will always be in glory. For the order of Divine Justice does not permit that the punishments of the wicked be eternal while the rewards of the good are temporal.

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§ VI — In what bodies angels appear to men (In quibus corporibus Angeli hominibus appareant)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 51, a. 2.[^66]

§ 27. Since it is now established that angels truly have no proper bodies of their own, and yet it is clear that they frequently appear to men in a corporeal species, the question arises in which and what sorts of bodies such appearances were made. Nor is there now a place for that doubt which St. Augustine moves (*De Trinitate* bk. 2, ch. 6, and repeated bk. 3, ch. 1):[^67] whether angels assume from the creature a corporeal appearance for the use of their ministry, or whether they themselves turn their own body, when they have one, into the forms suited and adapted to their actions. For this latter part of the question is, by what has been said, now excluded. And St. Augustine himself elsewhere excludes it, when he teaches with certainty removed from doubt that the angels of Abraham and the saints appeared in assumed bodies — as (*De Civitate Dei* bk. 15, ch. 23 and bk. 16, ch. 29).[^68] Indeed, even if angels had their own proper bodies, it would still have to be said

that they appear not in their own but in bodies assumed from elsewhere, nor could the latter part of the question of St. Augustine be sustained; because their own bodies would be of an invisible nature, and could not naturally be formed into visible species. Hence only the question remains for us: how angels, who are neither corporeal nor have their own bodies, nor if they had such would they be able to appear bodily as is read — could appear. But St. Augustine thinks this question difficult to explain (*Enchiridion*, ch. 59), commemorating many examples of the apparitions of souls, which often demonstrate the difficulty of this question.[^69]

§ 28. The first of their opinions can in no way be approved — namely, of those who say that all angelic appearances which Scripture commemorates were not truly exhibited outwardly, but were purely phantasmal, being produced only by a change of imagination in those to whom angels are read to have appeared — as John sees in the spirit in the Apocalypse, and Peter in ecstasy saw a vessel of animals descending from heaven, and the Prophets saw broadly what was revealed to them, not with the body but with the spirit. This opinion conflicts with the manifest testimony of Scripture, attesting that angels appeared to men and were touched in a corporeal manner, even to the washing of feet — as with Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Tobias both father and son, B. Mary the Virgin, Zechariah, Mulierius in the Resurrection of the Lord, and by the Apostles in his Ascension, and very frequently elsewhere. All these cannot be referred to mere imagination and prophetic vision without any reason.

§ 29. St. Thomas refutes that opinion by this argument (q. 51, a. 2):[^70] it seems that imaginary vision is seen only in the imagination of the one who sees, and hence does not appear indifferently to all. But Scripture thus introduces angels appearing sometimes to the whole family of Abraham, and to Lot and all his family, and to the citizens of Sodom. Similarly the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all indiscriminately. Therefore these things did not happen in imagination alone, but according to corporeal vision, which is evidently the position.

It is said (*Dicendum est*) with St. Augustine (*ubi supra*): that such appearances were made in assumed bodies — not of new creation (for all corporeal matter was at the beginning created once) — nor of those bodies which they were naturally bearing (for it is held that angels do not have their own proper bodies); but from air, or from whatever source, suited for the present use into an apt and formed body, and adapted to the assumed actions. For St. Gregory (*Moralia* bk. 27, ch. 2) testifies that angels have been seen in corporeal eyes, having assumed forms from air.[^71] And St. Augustine (*De Trinitate* bk. 3, *cap.* 1), in the other part of the question toward which he inclined, so asks: "Whether an angel from inferior elements assumes a body coaptated to itself, which it puts on like a garment and turns into whatever corporeal appearances and these true ones."[^72] The same in *Sermo* 16 (*De diversis*, *contra Manichaeos*) says that the Lord submitted corporeal matter to the power of angels.[^73] This manner of speaking is common from the usage of the Doctors.

§ 30. Now whether the mode of angelic apparition here explained also applies to demons — which a little before we were supposing — may be asked. *It is answered*: demons too can assume true bodies in which they appear, by the same natural power by which good angels can, and this too happens from time to time. For it is not likely that, when the devil was permitted to tempt Christ, he received such power as to mock his senses or to stir his imagination by whatever phantasms he wished; but rather that he appeared to him in a true assumed body having human form, when he also addressed him, and led him from place to place (Matt. 4).[^74]

The same is proved from what is read about demon incubi and succubi in the authorities of trustworthy authors, attested also by St. Augustine (*De Civitate Dei* bk. 15, ch. 23, and *Quaest.* 3 *in Genesim*, and bk. 3 *de Trinitate*, ch. 8, and by Innocentius VIII in a certain decretal).[^75]

§ 31. However, most appearances of demons seem to be nothing other than illusions of the external senses or internal movements of phantasy, by which they are accustomed to delude human minds in various ways. But you will ask: whether the demon possessing a human body is said to assume that body; and whether he can assume the bodies of witches (*maleficas*). *It is answered* with St. Thomas (in the place cited above, and on this Distinction, q. 1, a. 2 and 3):[^76] a demon can be rightly said to assume a body when it is joined to it not only as a mover but as the body by which it represents itself — as the same Doctor (*ibidem*) well explains. But this does not happen when the demon besieges a man, or conveys a witch to another place. For by that reason stones and clouds and whatever other bodies can be said to assume bodies, when they are moved from one place to another by their own local power. Similarly it should be said that angels assume heavenly bodies, because they move them. Which use of speech is alien from the custom of the Doctors.

Furthermore, regarding assumed bodies: on the one hand, in the dispersed apparitions they are not converted to nothing (as Calvin rashly affirmed, following Tertullian's opinion that they come from nothing); but on the other hand, that they return to that from which they had been taken — that is, into their prior matter and nature — is to be esteemed.

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§ VII — What operations do angels exercise in assumed bodies? (Quales in assumptis corporibus operationes Angeli exerceant?)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 51, a. 3.[^77]

§ 32. It is customarily asked about the operations which angels appear to exercise in assumed bodies — whether they are genuine or merely apparent and imaginary; and if genuine, whether they have been vital operations. *It is to be answered:* just as they truly assumed bodies, so without doubt they performed genuine operations in those bodies, as is manifest from what was said above. But none of those operations were vital, that is, operations of life. The reason is that bodies assumed by angels are not given life (*non vivunt vita prima*); for they are not informed by angels. Therefore not even vital operations can be exercised in them by angels, since life in the secondary sense necessarily presupposes life in the primary sense.

Likewise nothing can exercise vital operations which does not have the potential principle for operations of that kind. But angels, however much they have a principle — that is, the power to move the parts of their bodies locally, and by this motion to arrange figures — it is manifest from what has been said that this is not vital operation.

§ 33. One objection is raised against the aforesaid: that the Fathers sometimes attribute *sensus* to angels and demons, as St. Augustine (*in expositione Psalmi* 96, and *alibi*).[^78] But *sensus* in its potential (*potentiale*) sense is the principle for exercising sensitive operations. From which it seems to follow that at least vital operations can be exercised by angels in bodies. *It is answered*: *sensus*, as it is attributed to angels, signifies in a general sense the faculty of cognising things which can be perceived by sense — whether this happens through the intellect, in whose object also sensible things are comprehended, or properly through sense.

§ VIII — In whose person do angels appearing manage things? (Angeli hominibus apparentes quam personam gesserint?)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 51, a. 2.[^79]

§ 34. For understanding the Scriptures, regarding apparitions which are recounted as made through angels and everything concerning the sensible operations of these angels exhibited to men, it must be noted that these were sometimes made in the person of the angels themselves, sometimes truly in the Person of God. In the person of the angels, as often as they spoke as messengers sent from God — as the angel Raphael addressed both Tobiases, when he disclosed to them both who he was and what he had done (Tob. 12);[^80] and how we also read that Gabriel appeared to Daniel (Dan. 9, 10), and to Zechariah, and to the Blessed Virgin (Lk. 1).[^81] Similarly, in the person of the angels appeared the angels to the boy Elisha, when he said to Elisha: "There are many more with us than with them" (4 Kgs. 6).[^82] Indeed, everywhere in the New Testament where angels are read to have appeared in human form, they are found to have spoken in their own person, not in the person of God. For since God became man and appeared visible among men, and truly ascended to heaven in human nature, he no longer appears through angels in human form as representing God.[^83] And also the apparitions made before the advent of Christ in human form from the Person of God were all certain figures (*figurae*) announcing that God would at some future time be man, and would appear in true human flesh among men — as St. Thomas notes (I, qu. 43 ad 1).[^84] Hence St. Hilarius, writing (*in Psalm.* 68)[^85], says that the faith of the incarnation of the Son of God was prefigured in man's having been adored by Abraham and having been with Jacob in collision.

§ 35. Moreover, from God's Person we have frequent appearances of angels in the Scripture of the Old Testament — namely every time an angel speaking in the name of God is read to have uttered words as though from God himself, although the assumed bodies were those that formed those words. That this is not falsely nor absurdly done, St. Augustine rightly teaches (*De Trinitate* bk. 3, ch. 11):[^86] "Because," he says, "when the herald (*praeco*) of a judge pronounces, it is not written in the records: the herald said this, but rather: the judge said it." Now it must be noted that an angelic apparition or divine address is sometimes made without signification of any definite person in God — as when in Paradise it was said to Adam: "Adam, where art thou?" (Gen. 3);[^87] and when it was said to Abraham: "Get thee out of thy country" (Gen. 12);[^88] and many times elsewhere. Sometimes in such apparitions is signified a distinction of some Persons of God, so that the words addressed through the angel can be referred to some particular Person. And first, to the Person of the Father these words of Exod. 20 are aptly referred: "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt."[^89] For mystically the words of the Father to the Son are signified — calling him out of Egypt, as Hos. 11;[^90] and similarly Jg. 2, where it is recorded that the angel of the Lord ascended from Galgal to the place of weeping and said: "I brought you out of the land of Egypt and brought you into the land," etc.[^91] This is rightly attributed to the Father, where God commands Abraham to immolate his son — the command of which obviously signifies the will of God the Father wishing to deliver the Son to death for the redemption of man.

§ 36. To the Person of the Son is aptly referred what was said by an angel in the Person of God in Exod. 3: "I have seen the affliction of my people in Egypt, and I am come down to deliver them."[^92] For by these words is prefigured the Son of God who would descend from heaven to free the human race. This is also to be

referred to what is read in Dan. 3 — that the Angel of the Lord descended with Azariah and his companions into the furnace.[^93] For of him in the midst of the furnace the ministry of the ministry appears from the same place. For those who heard the voice recognised it, and since they knew it to be the voice of the Father responding, they said: "The angel of the Lord spoke to him." So also Lk. 22: the Angel from heaven, as is credible, speaking the words of the Father, comforted Christ in his agony — as it responds to prayer which was addressed to the Father; as John 12 answers.[^94] Hence there is no reason why we should say that the dove and the same are of the same species, especially as St. Augustine (*De Trinitate* bk. 4, *cap. ultim.*)[^95] considers not only the appearances made before the Incarnation of Christ through Angels, but all those also made after the Incarnation of the Word, to have probably been exhibited not without an intellectual creature.

§ 37. More about this kind of appearances made by the ministry of angels, see in the same St. Augustine, *ejusdem operis* bk. 2, ch. 5, 6, and 7; and bk. 3, ch. 10 and 11.[^96]

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§ IX — How God is recorded as having appeared in a bodily manner (Quomodo Deus corporaliter apparuisse legatur)

St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 12, a. 3.[^97]

§ 38. From what has been said, it is clear how God is recorded as having appeared in a bodily manner — namely, through angels, who formed bodies for themselves as for their ministry, and speaking in the Person of God. But it is most firmly to be held in all appearances in which God is read as appearing in a bodily manner: that it is not the life of God's substance that is seen with bodily eyes, but only that some corporeal thing is exhibited by which, with something sensibly perceived, God might be invisibly represented to the intellect. For God's nature is itself incorporeal and immaterial, is under the object of corporeal vision, and is altogether beyond the interior senses of the external corporeal senses. Nor can organic potency be extended beyond the corporeal. The most certain rationale of this doctrine assigns St. Thomas, I (q. 12, a. 3).[^98]

§ 39. Scriptural testimonies are Jn. 1 and 1 Jn. 4: "No man hath seen God at any time"[^99]; and 1 Tim. 6: "Whom no man hath seen, nor can see"[^100]; and ch. 6: "Whom," it says, "no man among men hath seen." From these and similar Scriptures St. Augustine teaches: God's substance is in no way mutable, and therefore cannot be seen corporally. The places are: *De Trinitate* bk. 2, ch. 16, 17, 18, and bk. 3, ch. 10 and 11;[^101] and *Epistola* 111 (a)[^102] ch. 9, where he expounds: "No man hath seen God" — negating that God can be seen in this life or in the future in the manner of visible bodily things. St. Jerome likewise (*super Isa.* 1) writes: "the face of God, according to the property of his nature, can be seen by no creature, but only by the mind."[^103] And St. John Chrysostom (*Hom.* 39 *in Genesim*) says: "Do not think, with bodily eyes, that divine and incorruptible substance can be seen."[^104] This is the doctrine of all Catholics. Although this — that it *cannot be seen corporally* — is not so peculiar to God, but that it is also common to all incorporeal substances. For whatever is incorporeal can be perceived neither by sense nor by imagination, but only by intellect — as is clear from the reason laid out a little before.

§ 40. As to what we read in Exod. 33: that the Lord spoke with Moses face to face, as a man is accustomed to speak with his friend — this must in no way be taken to mean that Moses perceived the substance of God with bodily eyes. For of the vision of which mention is there made, Moses, a little later, asks the Lord to show

his face to him, and receives the response: "Thou canst not see my face; for man shall not see me and live." And again: "Thou shalt see my back parts; but my face thou canst not see."[^105] Therefore it is not properly to be understood that Moses spoke with God face to face; but the sense is that he was with God in familiar converse, so that he not only perceived the voice of the speaker, but also a certain corporeal species by which God's presence might be signified, and that he beheld and looked upon whatever that species might be. For this Scripture did not express.

§ 41. The "back parts" (*posteriora*) of God Moses saw when in that schema visible to him God exhibited to him what he was going to be in the flesh. For it is the other and much inferior nature of the Son of God in human substance — the later and more inferior nature of the Son of God — in the manner that the same Doctor rightly understands (*ibidem*). And they added also the Scripture Exod. 33, where the Lord promises to Moses this vision, that it seems to confirm by his own words: "I will show thee all good." For this promise, not taken otherwise, can be completed: unless the *essence* of God is shown and exhibited for seeing. Furthermore, there are also diverse opinions among many others and great authors, constantly denying that it is given to any man in this mortal life to intuit God by that vision which is kept with the heart (*corde*) for eternal life, according to the saying of the Lord: "Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God."[^106] Nor do they admit any exception from this rule. So teaches above all Pope Evaristus (*Epistola* 1)[^107] where expounding those words of Paul (1 Tim. 6): "Who inhabiteth light inaccessible," he also denies that any man with a mortal body can ever look upon that light in any measure, and says that Moses and the other Prophets saw God only in enigma and figure.

§ 42. The same is taught by (Pseudo-)Dionysius the disciple of Paul (*de mystica Theologia*, ch. 1);[^108] Gregory of Nazianzus (*de Fide circa finem*, and *lib. 2 Theologiae sub initium*);[^109] likewise his disciple St. Jerome in the Commentary (*super Isa.* 6);[^110] and excluding Moses from this vision by name. Which Jn. 3 (*contra Pelagianos*, ch. 5) also does.[^111] St. John Chrysostom (*Hom.* 14 *super Joannem*) similarly removes this vision from Moses;[^112] who also writing on 2 Cor. 12 sufficiently signifies this same meaning.[^113]

§ III — On the opinions of others regarding the bodies of Angels (De Angelorum corporibus aliorum quorumdam sententiae expenduntur)

§ 43. Among the ancient writers of the Church it was by no means so settled and certain a doctrine — as it is today and has been proved to the satisfaction of all — that Angels and demons are incorporeal and do not naturally have bodies united to them.

For certain followers of Plato and of his school, such as Porphyry and Apuleius, who taught that demons, both good and bad, are certain aerial animals (concerning which see Apuleius in his *De Deo Socratis*)[45], transmitted this same teaching about Angels, and therefore declared them to be either corporeal, or naturally possessed of bodies united to them.

Moreover, some have spoken on this whole matter as though it were doubtful. Among these, we must place first of all St. Augustine — even though he inclines toward the part that attributes bodies to Angels in many passages where he is more explicit on the subject. For he had been steeped in the Platonic discipline and thus, following the opinion of the Platonists concerning the bodies of Angels, he recalls it in some places in such a way as to appear to approve of it — as, for instance, in *De Civitate Dei*, book 8, chapters 14, 15, and 16. [46] Indeed, elsewhere he frequently calls Angels animals and attributes bodies to them. The passages are: *Contra*

Academicos, book 1, chapter 7; *De Ordine*, book 2, chapter 9; *De Trinitate*, book 2, chapter 7, and book 3, chapter 1; *In expositione Psalmi* 85; *De Civitate Dei*, book 9, chapter 13; book 11, chapter 23; book 21, chapter 3; *Epistola* 111 (a)[59] and 114; *Sermo* 102; *De diversis*, chapter 9; and book 84 of the *Quaestiones*.[48]

§ 44. Moreover, the question is rendered still more difficult by the fact that the authority of the Seventh General Synod is commonly adduced in favour of the corporeality of Angels.[49] In its fifth *actio*, certain words are brought forward from a book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica — the author of which words denies both that Angels and our souls are altogether incorporeal and invisible, and says that they subsist in a body that is tenuous and airy, and that they are often seen in their own proper body in a vile form. And this opinion is said to have been held by Basil, Athanasius, and Methodius. Moreover, the Fathers of that same Synod appear to have confirmed this view by their acclamation, inasmuch as, after the words of that Bishop had been read, Tharasius the Patriarch said: "It is shown by the Father that it is proper for Angels to be painted, when they can be depicted in circumscribed form, and so that human beings may see them"; and the reply was read: "Even so, Lord." But we answer that the opinion of John the Bishop, whose words were read in the Synod, is a poor one; the Fathers of the Synod did not themselves approve that opinion, but only this: that from it there follows, as a consequence, the same conclusion that the Patriarch Tharasius was then repeating — namely, that Angels are rightly painted. For the use of sacred images was being discussed in that Synod. And for the proof of this matter various opinions of the Fathers were being adduced, approved only insofar as they were serviceable for establishing the use of sacred images. Nor on that account was the Synod employing weak proof. For it was proving its doctrine by an argument drawn from the authority and opinions of the Fathers who had preceded it — even though those Fathers had not always adduced certain and solid arguments to confirm their opinions, nor had they always employed true suppositions. For it happens sometimes that, in order to prove what is true, authorities are used whose arguments are not very strong. One may also say that the Synod had regard only to the one extreme form of proof — namely, that by which it is expressly stated that Angels have frequently appeared to human beings in human form; for it is true and sufficient in itself to prove that in such form they can rightly be painted, whether their nature be corporeal or not.

§ 45. It is possible, moreover, to raise an objection on behalf of demons from the fact that when they are tormented with corporeal fire, it seems to follow that they are either corporeal, or that they possess certain proper bodies of their own; since a body, by acting upon a thing that is purely spiritual, cannot act upon it to any effect. But the proper place to explain this difficulty is in *Distinctio* 44, book 4.[60]

Furthermore, the matter is proved by this argument: among the ancient Fathers and principal Doctors of the Church, it was a sufficiently ambiguous question — with some affirming that Angels are incorporeal, others no fewer in number denying it, and still others remaining in doubt — so much so that even the Master (in this very *Distinction*)[61], considering this diversity of opinions, does not venture to define anything. Since, therefore, the matter was so uncertain among those authorities of such well-established tradition, it is not probable that the Fathers of the Lateran Council wished to pronounce a definitive sentence on a question not previously aired as a controversy among themselves.

§ 46. Furthermore, to the words of the Council one may reply that the intention of the Fathers in framing that decree was not to define that some creatures are purely spiritual and altogether bereft of body; but only this: that God is the Author and Creator of all things that are in the universe, both of those called corporeal and visible, and of those called spiritual and invisible — whether these latter be entirely free from body, or only called spiritual and invisible in a more general sense. And this explanation is proved, because that decree

was made against the heresy of the Manicheans, who at that time were causing considerable trouble, and who denied that God is the one true Author of all things. But truly, because the Fathers in that same decree seem sufficiently to have explained their mind concerning Angels as a purely spiritual creature — though without intending to make a strict definition — hence it follows that whoever in the future makes use of that decree will be at risk if he ventures to teach otherwise. It is also worth adding this in passing: that just as in Sacred Scripture the word *spiritus* is sometimes attributed to certain bodies, so too some bodies are called *invisibilia*. For in Gen. 1, according to the Seventy, the earth is called *invisibilis*; and in Heb. 11, the entire bodily creation, such as it was when first established without any distinction, is still called *invisibilia*, in these words: "so that from invisible things (*ex invisibilibus*) visible things came to be." Hence the argument drawn from the distinction of visible and invisible, to prove that some creature is altogether incorporeal, is not entirely certain according to Sacred Scripture.

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§ 47. Now follows the continuation of the argument where Estius gives the further arguments in the text above:[62]

[The section continues with Estius's argumentation on pp. 144–145 of the printed edition, as follows:]

If Angels had proper bodies — whether those bodies were organised and furnished with distinct members, as human bodies are, or whether they were confused and indistinct, as homogeneous bodies are — neither of these can be said. Not the former, because the distinction of members most effectively serves the faculty of sensitive cognition, by which intellectual cognition is now understood; but it is supposed that Angels do not receive cognition through sense. Not the latter, because bodies of that kind could serve the operations of Angels much less than whatever bodies might be assigned to them. Indeed, such bodies would be an impediment to their motion and ministry; since they cannot be moved except with the delay caused by the successive division of a medium body.

Another argument: If someone contends that Angels receive knowledge from things and, on that account, perform angelic functions with bodies — in which bodies both senses and the organs of senses are distinct — so as to receive, by the aid of these organs, cognition of things, then it will follow that Angels are certain animals endowed at once with sense (*sensus*) and with mind, which is the definition of man. Angels will therefore be of the same nature as human beings, and in fact will be human beings. For they will not be able to be excluded from the proper formal character (*ratio*) of man: for to have a gross or a subtle body, to be mortal or immortal, to need food or not to need it — these make no difference in nature.

Another argument: If Angels have proper bodies, it will be possible for them to be separated from those bodies, just as the soul is separable from the body. It is asked, therefore, why, on account of sin, Angels were not separated from their bodies, just as the souls of men are separated by death — especially since the Angels sinned more gravely. And it is asked whether Angels, separated from their bodies, would understand more imperfectly than when united to them. And whether they would wish to return to their bodies; and what in every respect they would have less of when separated than when united — on account of which they would desire union with bodies.

Again, another argument: Angels are the movers of the heavens; therefore they do not have proper bodies united to them: for it would follow that they moved the heavens by means of their own bodies. Which would

indeed be posited in vain: for the same motive power that would be attributed to the bodies of Angels for the purpose of moving the heavens could more directly be attributed to the bodies of the heavens themselves. Furthermore, let the studious reader see other arguments in Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, book 12, chapters 6, 8, and the last chapter,[43] where, discussing Angels as movers of the heavens under the name of *intelligentiae*, he proves that they are bereft of bodies from the fact that, if they were corporeal, they could not set the heavens in perpetual motion.

§ III — The opinions of certain others regarding the bodies of Angels are examined (De Angelorum corporibus aliorum quorumdam sententiae expenduntur)

§ 48. Among the ancient writers of the Church, the opinion that Angels and demons are incorporeal and possess no bodies naturally united to themselves was not so certain and universally accepted as it is today. For some, following the opinion of Plato and his disciples — such as Porphyry and Apuleius — who taught that demons, both good and bad, are certain aerial animals (on which see Apuleius in his book *On the God of Socrates*[45]), transmitted this same teaching concerning Angels, and accordingly said that they are either corporeal, or possess bodies naturally united to them. Some others, however, spoke of this entire matter as of something doubtful. Among these we place above all St. Augustine,[63] even though he leaned in many places toward the side which attributes bodies to Angels. For, having been imbued with Platonic learning, he so recalls in certain passages the opinion of the Platonists concerning the bodies of Angels as to appear to approve it — as for instance in *De Civitate Dei*, book 8, chapters 14, 15, and 16.[46] Indeed elsewhere he frequently calls Angels animals and attributes bodies to them.[64] And in his work *On the Divination of Demons*, chapter 3, he gives as the reason why demons surpass men in keener sense and swiftness of movement the fact that they are endowed with an aerial body, that is, a body of a more subtle element.

§ 49. That he did not hold this opinion as certain is shown from other passages, which plainly declare his hesitation on this question as one of difficulty. For in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 59, he calls the question concerning the bodies of Angels most difficult. And in *Retractations*, book 1, chapter 26,[65] he retracts what he had said in question 67 among the *Eighty-Three Questions* — namely, that certain Angels live in an animal manner — as something said more boldly than can be demonstrated. Furthermore, in *De Civitate Dei*, book 9, chapter 10,[66] having said that demons too have their own bodies formed from air, he adds: "But if anyone asserts that demons have no bodies at all, this point ought neither to be laboured with burdensome inquiry nor fought over with contentious disputation." He speaks with the same hesitation concerning the bodies of Angels elsewhere, as in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 3, chapter 10, where he speaks conditionally: "If these things are so, etc." And likewise in *De Civitate Dei*, book 15, chapter 23, and in *Epistola* 157.[67]

§ 50. St. Bernard likewise confesses that he himself hesitated on this same matter, in *De Consideratione*, book 5, chapter 4, and in Sermons 5 and 6 on the *Song of Songs*.[68] For he considers that Angels cannot fulfil their ministries without bodies; but whether those bodies belong to their substance and are naturally united to them, so that they are animals as men are, or whether they take them up and put them down at will — this he professes not to know. Nevertheless, these two authors are not to be thought to have doubted concerning the rational soul, but rather that it is incorporeal; this can be clearly shown from their writings, as we shall teach elsewhere, namely at Distinction 17.[69] From this no slight argument is drawn that, according to the

mind of these same authors, Angels are by their own nature incorporeal — even though those authors supposed bodies of some kind to be joined to them.

§ 51. Furthermore, certain others taught that not only Angels but also human souls, and indeed every creature universally, is corporeal, and that nothing besides God alone is altogether incorporeal. Such is the view of Origen, *Peri Archon*, book 2, chapters 2–3;[70] of Cassian, *Conferences*, collation 7, chapter 13;[71] of Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*;[72] and of the author of the book *De Spiritu et Anima*, chapter 18[73] — which book circulates among the works of St. Augustine. But the authority of these writers is not of great weight. For many of Origen's doctrines have been condemned by the Church. The three authors next mentioned are ill-reputed on account of the Pelagian error. The last is an unknown author; on this matter see Trithemius in his chapter on St. Augustine.[74] Although certain others as well, whose words are cited by Burchard in book 20 of his *Decretum*, chapters 41 and 42,[75] transmitted the same opinion. This opinion, however, can bear a true sense, as is explained in the same book *De Spiritu et Anima* — namely, that every creature is corporeal, not absolutely speaking, but by comparison with God, who alone is so incorporeal as to be infinite, uncircumscribed, and wholly simple, and entirely free from all composition.

§ 52. In this sense certain of the foremost Fathers among those whom we have cited above for the contrary opinion sometimes acknowledge that Angels are corporeal and circumscribed — as St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, chapter 16;[76] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes*, book 2, *On Theology*, towards the end;[77] St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, book 2, chapter 8;[78] and St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book 2, chapter 12, and book 1, chapter 17[79] — where he also assigns to Angels an intelligible place and says that they exist in a place intelligibly, because they are circumscribed, explaining this as meaning that while they are in heaven they are not on earth.

§ 53. There are also certain others who attributed to Angels not just any kind of bodies, but bodies such as would allow the works of the flesh to be exercised in them, on the ground that Gen. 6 reads of the sons of God having loved the daughters of men and having mingled carnally with them. But this erroneous and far too coarse opinion concerning Angels we have refuted elsewhere, at the preceding Distinction.[80]

§ 54. There is furthermore a peculiar opinion of Rupert concerning the bodies of Angels and demons. For in *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, book 1, chapter 26,[81] he says that demons before their transgression bore celestial bodies, but that, having fallen through pride, they were transformed into an aerial quality. And in chapter 28 he proves that Angels were not made before heaven and earth, because they are local and circumscribed, and therefore ought to have been created in a corporeal place. He then adds there that all Angels were made from the substance of air: "For they have," he says, "aerial bodies, which are nevertheless also celestial bodies." And further, the apostate Angels, fallen from that felicity, were once again converted into an aerial quality. So he writes, and other things that follow. He transmits similar views in *In Genesim*, book 1, chapter 11, and *De Trinitate*, book 1.[82] But what is asserted by him with such facility, without weighty authority of Scripture or the holy Fathers, is deservedly rejected with equal facility.

§ 55. More difficulty, however, is presented by what is customarily adduced from the Seventh General Synod on behalf of the bodies of Angels. In its fifth session, from the book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, certain words are read out, in which that author denies that either Angels or our souls are altogether destitute of body and invisible; but rather asserts them to be endowed with a tenuous aerial or fiery body, and to have been seen many times in their own body. And he holds that St. Basil, Athanasius, and Methodius were of the

same opinion. The Fathers of the same Synod also seem to have approved this with their acclamation, as those who, after the words of that bishop had been read out and Patriarch Tarasius had said: "The Father has shown that Angels too ought to be painted, since they can be circumscribed and have appeared as men" — are recorded to have responded: "Even so, Lord."

§ 56. But we reply: however the opinion of Bishop John may stand — whose words were read out in the Synod — the Fathers of the Synod did not approve the opinion itself, but what that same Bishop was drawing out from it as a consequence, and what Patriarch Tarasius was then in turn repeating — namely, that Angels may rightly be painted. For it was the use of sacred images that was being treated in that Synod. And to prove that point, various opinions of the Fathers were being adduced, approved only insofar as they served to establish the use of sacred images. Nor for that reason was the Synod using a weak proof. For it was proving its doctrine by an argument drawn from the authority and opinions of the Fathers who had preceded, even if those Fathers had not always adduced certain and solid arguments in support of their own positions, nor had always employed true assumptions. For it sometimes happens that authors, in proving something true, employ arguments that are not very firm. One may also say that the Synod had in view one point only, and that the furthest point of the proof — namely, that Angels have very frequently appeared to men in human form. For this is both true and in itself sufficient to prove that in such a form they are rightly painted, whether they are corporeal by their own nature or incorporeal.

§ 57. It can moreover be objected concerning demons that, since they are tormented by corporeal fire, it seems to follow that they are either corporeal or possess certain proper bodies in which they suffer from fire, given that a body cannot act upon a thing that is purely spiritual. But the proper place for explaining this difficulty is at Distinction 44, book 4.[60]

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§ IV — Whether it belongs to faith that Angels are incorporeal (Utrum ad fidem pertineat Angelos esse incorporeos)

§ 58. To some it seems that it belongs to faith, and indeed to the doctrine handed down above, that Angels are incorporeal and do not naturally possess bodies united to themselves, and that therefore the contrary cannot be asserted without error against the faith. Their chief argument is drawn from the decree of the Lateran Council, in which it is stated and defined that God created a spiritual creature, that is, the Angels, and a corporeal creature, that is, the world. For if the term "spiritual creature" were extended even to more subtle bodies, such as air, the distinction which the Council there intends between a spiritual and a corporeal creature would not hold; for in either member air would be contained — in the former, because of the supposition made, and in the latter, because air, being one of the four elements, belongs beyond doubt by the intention of the Council to the corporeal, that is, the worldly creature, just as fire and the others do.[84]

§ 59. The same interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the angelic creature is there called *spiritual* in the same way as the rational soul is called *spirit*, since the text immediately subjoins: "and then the human, constituted as it were of both, from spirit and body." Furthermore, from the fact that in the same decree bodily and spiritual things are called visible and invisible alike — just as in the Constantinopolitan Creed. Now in Sacred Scripture those things are principally understood as *invisible* which are purely spiritual and incorporeal, as in Rom. 1: "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world," and Col. 1: "Who is

the image of the invisible God," and 1 Tim. 1: "To the King invisible, immortal, the only God, be honour and glory," and Tob. 12: "I use invisible food and drink." To these they add the Scriptures in which both good and bad Angels are called Spirits, just as God Himself is called Spirit.[85]

§ 60. But others judge more moderately and more correctly that these arguments do indeed establish that one cannot without some temerity, after the Lateran decree, affirm that Angels are corporeal or possess bodies. For it appears sufficiently evidently from the decree that it was the mind of the Fathers of that Council that the angelic creature is spiritual in the same way as the human soul is a spirit; and hence no one has dared after the decree to teach otherwise. And this must be added in passing: just as in Sacred Scripture the word *spirit* is sometimes attributed to certain bodies, so also certain bodies are said to be *invisible*. For in Gen. 1, according to the version of the Seventy, the earth is called *invisible*. And in Heb. 11 the whole corporeal creation, as it was first made before any distinction had yet been introduced, is called *invisible* by these words: "that from invisible things visible things might be made." Hence it is clear that the argument drawn from the distinction of visible and invisible things, to prove that some creature is altogether incorporeal, is not entirely certain according to Sacred Scripture.[86]

§ 61. However, others deny that this has been defined by the Church and therefore pertains to faith. Among those of this opinion are St. Thomas[87] and Sixtus of Siena,[88] who declares that, notwithstanding the Lateran decree, he willingly follows the modesty of St. Bernard, who defined nothing with certainty on this matter — though St. Bernard is older than the Lateran Council. Likewise Bartholomew Carranza, collector of the *Summa Conciliorum*,[89] and Cajetan, who so far from thinking it a matter of faith that, writing on Eph. 2, "According to the prince of the power of the air of this world," he affirms that demons are airy spirits.[90] And finally Dominic Bannes[91] notes the opposing opinion as temerity, principally on account of the Lateran decree, but nevertheless frees it from the charge of heresy.

§ 62. Moreover, this is proved in the following manner. For among the Fathers and the chief Doctors of the Church the matter was altogether ambiguous: some affirming that Angels are incorporeal, others no fewer in number denying it, others doubting — so much so that the Master[92] (in this Distinction), considering this variety of opinions, does not dare to speak definitively on anything. Therefore, concerning a matter which was of so uncertain a tradition among them, it is not probable that the Fathers of the Lateran Council wished to pronounce a defined sentence, especially since this question had not been previously debated among them in a formal way.

§ 63. Furthermore, with respect to the words of the Council, it can be replied that the intention of the Fathers in establishing that decree was not to define that certain creatures are purely spiritual and altogether without any body, but only this: that God is the Author and Creator of all things that are in the universe, both those called corporeal and visible and those that are spiritual and invisible — whether these latter are wholly without body or are called spiritual and invisible in some more general sense. This declaration is proved because that decree seems to have been made against the heresy of the Manichees, which was no little rampant at that time and which denied one true God as the Author of all things. Yet because the Fathers in the same decree seem sufficiently to have explained their mind concerning Angels as a purely spiritual creature — though without the intention of defining — it follows from this that no one has dared after the decree to teach otherwise.

§ 64. Now among the ancient Fathers and ecclesiastical writers it was in no way an equally certain and settled opinion, proved to all, that Angels and demons are incorporeal and do not naturally have bodies united to themselves.

For some, following Plato and his school — such as Porphyry and Apuleius — who taught that demons, both good and bad, are certain airy animals (on which see Apuleius in the *Book on the God of Socrates*), handed down this very teaching about Angels, and therefore held them to be either corporeal or to have bodies naturally united to them.[45]

§ 65. Some indeed spoke on the whole matter as doubtful. Among these St. Augustine is principally reckoned, though in that part which attributes bodies to Angels he has priority in many places. For he was imbued with Platonic learning and so commemorates the Platonic opinion concerning the bodies of Angels that he seems in some places to approve it — for example, in *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 8, ch. 14, 15, 16 — and indeed elsewhere he frequently calls Angels animals and attributes bodies to them.[46] These passages are to be found in lib. 1 (*contra Academicos*, ch. 7), lib. 2 (*de Ordine*, ch. 9), lib. 2 (*de Trinitate*, ch. 7), lib. 3 (*de Trinitate*, ch. 1), *In Expositionem Psalmi 85*, lib. 9 (*de Civitate Dei*, ch. 13), lib. 11 (*de Civitate Dei*, ch. 23), lib. 21 (*de Civitate Dei*, ch. 3), *Epistola* 111 (a),[93] lib. 114, *Sermo* 102 (b),[94] *de diversis*, ch. 9, lib. 84, *Quaestio* —

§ 66. But these things are said by him without weightier authority of Scripture or of the holy Fathers, and are therefore rightly rejected on the same ground. And moreover the difficulty increases from the fact that from the Seventh General Council the corporeal nature of Angels is sometimes urged. In its fifth session, from the book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, certain words are produced, by which author both Angels and our souls are denied to be altogether without body and invisible, and are said to be endowed with a tenuous airy or fiery body, and frequently to appear in their own body as vile. These things, he says, were the opinion of Basil, Athanasius, and Methodius. And the Fathers of that same Synod appear to have confirmed these words by their acclamation, in that after the words of that Bishop were read through, Tharasius the Patriarch said: "The Father shows that it is fitting to paint Angels, and that men can depict them and that men appear asleep." They are reported to have answered: "Even so, O Lord." But we reply that the opinion of John the Bishop, whose words were read in the Synod, is an opinion; the Fathers of the Synod did not approve that opinion itself but rather what follows from it as a consequence — namely the same Bishop's conclusion — as is clear from the acts of that Synod in the Greek edition (Roman edition, p. 11).[95]

§ 67. Moreover there can be urged on behalf of demons the fact that, since they are tormented by corporeal fire, they consequently seem to be either corporeal themselves or to possess certain bodies of their own, given that a body cannot suffer from a thing that is merely spiritual. But the more proper place for explaining this difficulty is in dist. 44, lib. 4.[60]

§ 68. Furthermore, that the ancient Fathers held it sufficiently as a common opinion that Angels are corporeal or have bodies, is abundantly demonstrated by the author; for among them not a few who do not even attribute to the name of Angel any body whatsoever are counted. First in rank, beyond those already praised, is Justin in the *Dialogue with Trypho* and in the *Apology*, as reported by Photius (cod. 125). The opinion of Origen is not consistent: for although in the book (*de Principiis*) he assigns bodies to Angels, and by that arrangement his opinion is to be condemned as entirely erroneous and demented, yet in the sixth book (*contra Celsum*) he says that Angels are without body. Theognustus, *apud Photium* (cod. 106), ranks among those who say it is not established that Angels are corporeal; and among them one must also number the

Fathers who assert in the passages adduced by the author, and in lib. 4 (*contra Eunomium*) clearly, that Angels are without body. Macarius, *Homilia 4*, presents Cyril of Alexandria — whom the author adduces for the contrary opinion — as holding, by the evidence of his words in lib. 9 (*in Joannem*), that Angels have bodies. For the same affirmative opinion regarding Angels having bodies stand Severianus (*Homil.* p. 4, *de Mundi Opificio*), Caesarius (*Dialog.* p. *Interrogat.* 58), Anastasius Sinaita (*quaest. in Scriptur.*). From the Latins in turn are reckoned Tertullian (*de Carne Christi* and lib. 2, c. *Marcionem*, ch. 3) and Hilarius (*in Matt.* ch. 5). St. Ambrose (lib. 2, *de Abraham*, ch. 9) — though in ch. 12 of *Luc.* he seems to hold otherwise — and Claudianus (lib. 3, *de Statu animae*). St. Jerome's opinion of holding this view is found to be *in Commentariis in Job* on those words of Job 13, "The stars are not clean in His sight." Faustus of Riez at the beginning of his book *de Creaturis* formerly contended that bodies had been attributed to Angels, not as their own but so that they might think those bodies belonged to them; but it is all one thing, whatever is defined by certain region and place and circumscribed by substance under that name — of which some are bodies most subtle and others of which those ethereal bodies have fixed limits. Truly those Fathers who believed Angels to be corporeal, beyond body, attributed something more excellent than body and of a purely spiritual nature to them, so that they were constituted of both body and spirit, which they thought fit to call the soul —[96]

§ 69. Furthermore, for the opinion denying bodies to Angels, from the Greeks there are named: Ignatius in the Epistle to the Trallians; Gregory the Wonderworker, or whoever is the author of the *Homily* (among the works of the Greek edition); Titus of Bostra, lib. 1 (*contra Manichaeos*), and in the Epistle on the Trinity to Eustachius (*Medisima* in the list); Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 1 (*contra Eunomium*), and in the Epistle concerning the Trinity (which is number eighty among St. Basil's epistles); Socrates, lib. 3, ch. 18, and in lib. 4 (*de Dominica*) at the place cited by the author, and then (*qu. 20, in lib. de Paradiso*, pp. 16 and 17); Moses Maimonides the Jew (*de Lege*, Part 2) and Aben Ezra seem to have favoured the opinion that demons of a lower condition and nature than the good Angels are: of those who assign bodies to both, some assign to Angels subtler bodies drawn from pure celestial matter, and to demons grosser and denser bodies drawn from air. And from the Latins are likewise enumerated: Lactantius (lib. 7, ch. 21) — though Julius Africanus, Bishop of Africa, lib. 2, ch. — Gregory, Richard of St. Victor (*in 4*). To these must be added: Moses Maimonides the Jew (already cited above), and the remarkable passage of Justin (from the first *Apology*) in which the most ancient theological opinion concerning demons is contained. Justin himself writes in that place that those Angels whom he calls demons, after their sin, since they had wholly given themselves over to passions and perturbations, had need of sacrificial acts, odours and fumigations, and had subsequently been the authors of crimes to the human race and had filled everything with murders, wars, adulteries, and outrages.[97]

§ 70. Those Greeks at the Council of Florence who said that the devil and his satellites had in some manner changed their nature and substance after their sin are certainly to be rejected and refuted, as is clear from the acts of that Synod in the Greek edition (Roman edition, p. 11). These are the matters which, concerning the opinions of the Fathers on this question, have seemed worthy of note for the present purpose. For the rest, if you desire both the places and the very words of these Fathers, consult Dionysius Petavius (*Dogmatum Theologicorum*, tom. 3, lib. 1, *de Angelis*, ch. 2, 3, and lib. 3, ch. 1)[98] and Fernando Vellosillo, Bishop of Lugo (*Advertentiarum Theologicarum Scholasticarum*, etc., *ad senten. August.*, *Quaest.* 1 and *ad p. 1, 30*).[99]

§ V — That Angels are immortal (Angelos esse immortales)

§ 71. On the question of the immortality (*immortalitas*) of Angels, this must be held first of all according to the Catholic Faith: that all Angels, both good and evil, will always exist, and will never perish, and are therefore immortal or incorruptible in this sense, that they will never cease to be. The proof is manifest from the eternal beatitude (*beatitudo*) of the good and the eternal misery of the evil. For both of these we believe by Faith according to the Scriptures. Concerning the evil, the relevant passages are Matt. 25: "Depart into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels"; and in the Epistle of Jude: "Angels," he says, "who did not keep their own principality, He has reserved under eternal chains in darkness."[101] Concerning the good, whatever texts promise eternal life to righteous men serve as proof. For in the Gospel the equality of angels is promised to us (Lk. 20), and "the measure of a man is the same as that of an angel" (Rev. 21). Therefore, if the beatitude of righteous men is to be eternal, so too is that of the holy Angels. Indeed, their beatitude would not even be perfect if it were at some point to come to an end. Moreover, a most certain argument on behalf of the good is drawn even from the evil Angels. For if the evil will always exist — which is surely good in itself and greatly to be desired — then so also will the good. Furthermore, if the evil are always in punishment, then the good are always in glory. For the order of Divine Justice does not permit that the punishments of the evil be eternal while the rewards of the good are but temporary.

§ 72. Additionally, it would follow that if the Angels were to perish, the Kingdom of Christ would in some way be diminished. For not only men but also Angels belong to the kingdom of Christ, as the Apostle teaches (1 Col. and Heb. 12).[102] Second: concerning Angels in general, this is proved by the following reasoning: because it is necessary to believe that human souls are immortal, according to the mind of the Church and the definition of the Council of the Lateran under Leo X (Session 8);[103] but Angels surpass even human souls in perfection (2 Pet. and Heb. 2).[104] Therefore, they too must be believed to be immortal. Third: (Pseudo-)Dionysius (in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chapters 3, 4, and 6)[105] attributes to Angels a life that is unceasing and exempt from death. And this is the mind of all the holy Fathers and of all the faithful, which Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, expressed in the Epistle that was read at the Sixth Synod (act. 11) and approved by the Fathers of that same Synod (add. 13).[106] For in that Epistle he teaches that both Angels and the souls of men are incorruptible and immortal.

§ 73. But once this has been established, it is asked: whether Angels are incorruptible by their own nature or from some other source. For Plato's opinion in the *Timaeus* is that the lesser gods — that is, Angels — are by nature dissoluble, that is, corruptible. But that through God's beneficence they will live forever, and are by that reasoning immortal. To this opinion Gabriel (in his commentary on dist. 2 of this book)[107] assents to the extent of teaching that Angels, corruptible by their own nature, are perpetually conserved in existence through God's sustaining power. They hold the same view, on the same grounds, with respect to human souls. They prove this: first, through the Apostle, who says of God (1 Tim. 6): "who alone has immortality" — namely, by nature. Then by the authority of St. Gregory, lib. 16 (*Moralium*, ch. 18),[108] who says that all things would tend toward nothingness if the hand of the Almighty did not conserve them. Third: by the testimonies of the Fathers openly stating that Angels are not immortal by nature but by grace. For St. Ambrose, lib. 3 (*De Fide ad Gratianum*, ch. 2),[109] says: "Nor is an Angel naturally immortal, whose immortality is in the will of the Creator." And below, speaking generally of every creature: "Therefore every creature is liable to corruption and death; it is capable of death, though it does not die or sin. Nor does it change from an immortal nature to vices for some. There is therefore one immortality which is given, another which always exists without the

capacity for mutability." So he. And St. Jerome, lib. 2 (*Contra Pelagianos*, ch. 3),[110] having cited the words of the Apostle just quoted, writes thus: "And certainly we read of Angels as immortal, Thrones, Dominions, and the other Virtues as immortal. But God alone is immortal, because He possesses it not by grace as do the others, but by nature." The same author, writing on Tit. 1,[111] says that God alone is naturally immortal and true, while others — such as Angels and souls — receive immortality and truth from the bounty of God. The same was the opinion of Origen, as reported by Epiphanius (*in Haeresi Origenistarum*).[112] The same is found in St. John Damascene, lib. 2 (*De Fide*, ch. 3),[113] in Theophylact (*on that passage of Heb. 12: "the translation of things that cannot be shaken"*),[114] and finally the same view is found in explicit words in the Sixth Synod, act. 11, namely in the Epistle of Sophronius mentioned above. For it reads thus: "Intellectual and invisible beings do not indeed die nor are they corrupted, yet they are not immortal by nature, nor do they pass over into incorruptible essence; but God has bestowed upon them a grace that restrains them from corruption and death. As the souls of men remain incorrupt, so Angels persevere immortal — not having a nature truly incorrupt or an essence properly immortal, but having received grace from God, which grants them immortality and provides for their incorruption." So it reads there. To this also pertains what the Fathers sometimes say: that whatever has been made is corruptible by its very nature — and from this they prove that the Son of God was not made, since it is established that He is not subject to corruption. Hence that verse of Prudentius in the *Apotheosis*, against the Jews:[115]

> *Quod fieri recipit, recipit quandoque perire.* ("What admits of being made admits at some time of perishing.")

§ 74. Notwithstanding all these considerations, it must be acknowledged that it is truly and rightly said that Angels are by nature immortal and incorruptible. St. Thomas proves this[100] by the following perspicuous reasoning: because Angels are not composed of matter (*materia*) and form (*forma*), but are certain forms (*formae*) subsisting through themselves (*per se*). Now nothing is corrupted except by the separation of its form from its matter. For the separation of these parts is the corruption of composites. For other proofs of the same author tending to the same conclusion, see the same work and lib. 2 *Contra Gentes*, chapters 54 and 55.[116]

§ 75. Furthermore, a more general argument is that which is taken from the removal of a contrary. For nothing is corrupted except by a contrary. But there is nothing contrary to Angels by whose action they could be corrupted or disposed toward corruption. I call this argument the more general one, because it also holds good in the case of the celestial bodies and proves their incorruptibility; whereas the prior argument pertains only to incorporeal substances. For this reason, with still stronger grounds, Angels and rational souls are incorruptible rather than the heavens. For Angels and souls, being simple and immaterial forms (*formae simplices et immateriales*), are incorruptible in such a way that they cannot be destroyed even by divine power except by annihilation. The heavens, however, since they consist of matter and form, can be destroyed by God through the dissolution of their parts, with the matter remaining. Hence one may conclude: if the heavens are incorruptible by nature, as natural philosophers teach, much more are Angels immortal by nature — that is, incorruptible. And this is the doctrine of Aristotle concerning Angels or Intelligences, in lib. 2 (*De Caelo*) and lib. 12 (*Metaphysicae*),[117] to which all who philosophize rightly give assent. That Plato thought otherwise is not surprising, since he attributed bodies to Angels, composed from the element of fire. But more correctly does (Pseudo-)Dionysius — himself both philosopher and theologian — who in lib. (*De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4)[118] teaches that intellectual substances have a life that is sempiternal and unceasing, and that they are loosed and freed from all perishing, death, matter, and generation, and that unstable and transient change

does not befall them. For by these words he refers the immortality of Angels to their own immaterial nature, not to an accessory gift of God. He does the same in the other passages cited above. So too Methodius (as reported by Epiphanius, *in Haeresi Origenistarum*)[119] when he contradicts Origen in the latter's assertion that Angels are immortal not by nature but by grace — although we shall say in a moment in what sense this can be defended. Likewise Gennadius, lib. (*de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 13),[120] says: "We believe intellectual natures to be immortal, because they lack flesh and have nothing whereby they might fall, so as to need resurrection after ruin."

§ 76. To the arguments brought forward on the other side, we reply briefly as follows. Paul attributes immortality to God alone, either in this sense: because perfect and all-encompassing immutability (*immutabilitas*) belongs to God alone — which immutability the Apostle signified under the name of immortality, since all mutability is, as St. Augustine says (lib. 3 *Contra Maximinum*, ch. 12)[121] and St. Bernard (Sermon 81 *In Cantica*)[122] and before them (Pseudo-)Dionysius (*De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 6)[123] and St. Ambrose, lib. 3 (*De Fide*, ch. 12)[124] — or because God alone is essentially life, while all other things live by participation. In the same manner the same Apostle calls God alone wise; and it was said by Christ: "No one is good but God alone." Now nothing prevents an Angel from being immortal both by participation and by nature, since its nature's immortality depends upon another cause, that is, upon God, who alone is independently immortal, wise, and good. St. Ambrose, lib. 3 (*De Fide ad Gratianum*, ch. 2),[125] favours this interpretation.

§ 77. To St. Gregory it is replied, with St. Thomas (in his reply to the third objection),[126] that his words do not signify that there is in Angels any principle of corruption (*corruptionis principium*), but that the *esse* of Angels depends upon God as upon a cause, and that if this cause were to cease causing, the thing would collapse into nothingness. "Now," says St. Thomas, "a thing is not said to be corruptible by reason of the fact that God can reduce it to non-being by withdrawing His conservation; but by reason of the fact that it has within itself some principle of corruption — either contrariety, or at least the potency (*potentia*) of matter." So he.

§ 78. Finally, to those testimonies of the Fathers which attribute the immortality of Angels to God's grace (*gratia*): it is answered that by the name of grace they mean neither sanctifying grace (*gratia iustificans*) nor any gift whatsoever of the supernatural order (*ordo supernaturalis*). This is evident from the fact that they make that grace common to evil Angels together with the good, and likewise to the souls of wicked men, in whom it is established that no supernatural gift remains. Rather, they mean God's good pleasure and free will (*libera voluntas*), by which He willed to make Angels and to conserve them perpetually as immortal. This will is indeed called grace, because it is a benefit of God unowed to the creature (*beneficium Dei creaturae indebitum*); by which reasoning the whole benefit of creation can be called grace. From these considerations it is also clear in what sense the Fathers sometimes say that everything which has been made is corruptible: namely, just as it was made and is conserved by God, so if He were to withdraw His conserving hand, it could perish.

§ VI — In what bodies Angels appear to men (In quibus corporibus Angeli hominibus appareant)

§ 79. Since Angels, as has rightly been said, have no bodies of their own, and yet it is established that they have frequently appeared to men in bodily form, it remains for us to inquire in what kind of bodies, and of what sort, such apparitions were made. Nor is there now room for that doubt which St. Augustine raises in *De Trinitate* (lib. 2, cap. 6) and repeats in lib. 3 (cap. 1): whether Angels assume a corporeal appearance from created matter for the exercise of their ministry, or whether they themselves sustain and transform their own body into the appearances best suited and adapted to their actions.[128] For this latter part of the question is, by what we have already said, now excluded. And St. Augustine elsewhere excludes it as well, when, removing the uncertainty, he teaches without qualification that Angels appeared to Abraham and the other Saints in assumed bodies — as in lib. 15 (*De Civitate Dei*, cap. 23) and lib. 16 (cap. 29).[129] And even if Angels did have bodies of their own, it would still have to be said that they appeared not in their own but in bodies assumed from elsewhere; nor could the latter part of St. Augustine's question be sustained, as Dominicus Bannes rightly teaches: for their own bodies, by their very nature, would be invisible and could not be formed into visible appearances naturally. Therefore all that now remains for us to inquire is how Angels, who are incorporeal and possess no bodies of their own — nor, if they had such, could they be seen — are corporally found to appear. But even this question St. Augustine considers difficult to explain (in *Enchiridion*, cap. 59),[130] recounting many examples of angelic apparitions, by which he sets forth the difficulty of this question.

§ 80. First of all, however, the opinion of those can by no means be sustained who say that all the angelic apparitions which Scripture records were not truly exhibited outwardly, but were only phantastic, brought about solely by an alteration effected within the imagination of those to whom Angels are read to have appeared — just as John beheld the Apocalypse not with bodily but with spiritual eyes (Rev. 1), and Peter in ecstasy saw a vessel full of animals descending from heaven (Acts 10), and almost all the Prophets beheld what was revealed to them not in body but in spirit. This opinion conflicts with the manifest testimonies of Scripture, which attest that Angels were seen and handled bodily by men, even to the washing of feet — as by Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Tobias the father and the son, the Blessed Virgin, Zacharias, the women and others at the Resurrection of the Lord, and the Apostles at His Ascension, and on very many other occasions.[131] All these things cannot by any means be referred to imagination alone and to prophetic vision.

§ 81. St. Thomas refutes this same opinion by the following argument:[127] that which is seen as an imaginary vision exists only in the imagination of the one seeing it, and therefore is not seen indifferently by all. But Scripture thus introduces Angels appearing, so as to be commonly seen by all. For the Angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by his entire household, and by Lot and his entire household, and by the citizens of Sodom. Likewise the Angel who appeared to Tobias was seen everywhere by all. These things, therefore, did not take place in imagination alone, but according to corporeal vision, by which that which is placed outside the beholder is seen.

Furthermore, these same arguments are valid also for refuting that opinion which holds that the said apparitions were made through a certain alteration of the external senses, whereby what does not exist appears, just as colours appear in the sky and in a cloud which are not really there.

§ 82. It must therefore be said, with St. Augustine (*ubi supra*), that apparitions of this kind were made neither in bodies newly created (for all corporeal matter was created once at the beginning), nor in bodies truly

possessing the nature of those forms which they bore — as Tertullianus supposed (for they were not true human beings, those bodies in which Angels appeared in human form) — but in bodies made from air or from any other matter suitable and formable for the present use, and assumed for that use. For St. Gregory testifies that Angels were seen with bodily eyes, having assumed forms from air.[132] And St. Augustine, in his treatment of the alternative part of his question toward which he later inclined, inquires whether Angels assume from the lower and more corporeal elements that which, fitted to themselves, they change and transform as a kind of garment into whatever corporeal appearances, and those true ones.'[133] The same author, in Sermon 16 *De Diversis* (which is *Tractate 3 against the Manicheans*), says that the Lord gave creation to the power of Angels so that they might fit it to themselves at will, and thence assume a true body which they might convert from whatever appearance into whatever other appearance, according to the formal character (*ratio*) of their ministry and office.[134]

§ 83. Now what is read in Bede (lib. *De Natura Rerum*, cap. 7) — that Angels assume ethereal bodies — either does not seem to be true, or does not seem to be properly understood by him, that is to say: for if by "ethereal" he means "celestial," it is plain that these are not fitted for this use. But if by "ethereal" he means taken from the higher and purer air, this can be conceded, though it is not necessary. For nothing forbids — and it is indeed more credible — that Angels assume bodies from the air near to us, in which to appear to men. Hence the glossator Bede, moderating the author's words, adds "or aërial" — though this addition is ill made by him as regards demons, who assume only aërial bodies; for between good and bad Angels, as to the elements from which they assume bodies, no difference seems to be posited.

§ 84. Moreover, this formation of bodies to be assumed pertains to the third of the three modes (mentioned in the preceding distinction) by which we said Angels accomplish certain wondrous things.[135] For they make use of natural causes to form bodies of this kind. Although it can not unreasonably be doubted whether a miracle intervenes in this matter or not. In favour of a miracle, the words of St. Thomas speak (in his reply to objection 3),'[136] which were to this effect: Angels do not assume bodies from earth or water, because these would not suddenly disappear; nor from fire, because they would burn whatever they touched; nor from air, because air is insusceptible of shape and colour; therefore they do not assume bodies. To which he replies: although air, remaining in its rarity, retains neither shape nor colour, yet when it is condensed it can be both shaped and coloured, as is evident in clouds. And thus, he says, Angels assume bodies from air, by condensing it by divine power (*virtute divina*), as much as is necessary for the formation of the body to be assumed. Here it must be noted that he adds "by divine power." The same he had also added in his reply to objection 2, as if signifying that the natural power of an Angel does not suffice for this. And reason supports this: for air does not seem to be capable of being reduced naturally — its essence remaining intact — to that degree of density and solidity which exists in human bodies and which appears in the assumed bodies of Angels. Nor does it seem capable of receiving colour naturally. But neither does it seem to be without miracle that bodies of this kind suddenly appear and again suddenly disappear, and that their formation and dissolution are as it were instantaneous — unless one says that their formation precedes the apparition by some little time, and that they are not immediately dissolved when they disappear, but only that the sight of them is suddenly both given and withdrawn from human eyes.

§ 85. To this point also seems relevant what St. Augustine (lib. 5, *De Trinitate*, cap. 1) illustrates this transformation of an element into a corporeal appearance by the example of the change by which Christ turned water into wine.[137] But to this it can be said that St. Augustine in that example is not regarding the

supernatural character of the work, but only pressing the truth of the conversion of one thing into another. For he says that the elements are converted into true corporeal appearances, just as true water was converted into true wine. For otherwise the same St. Augustine (in the same place, and lib. 2, cap. 7, and Sermon 16 *De Diversis*)[138] sufficiently indicates his opinion that this transformation of bodies is accomplished by Angels according to the power attributed to them by the Creator. And certainly, were it not so, demons could not appear in assumed bodies, because it is not verisimilar that God cooperates with them in this matter by a miracle. Now that demons assume true bodies is proved below.

§ 86. It seems, however, that one of the following must be said. For if bodies of this kind are formed from air alone — which St. Thomas indicates to be their substance — their formation does not seem possible without a miracle, given the standing nature of air, for the reason stated above. But if we grant also an admixture and composition of other coarser bodies, no miracle seems to be required. For Angels by their natural power are able swiftly to gather together diverse bodies affected by diverse qualities, from the combination of which a single body is made that resembles a living human body — namely, compact, solid, heavy, warm, and in some measure fleshy and osseous, with distinct quasi-members and the properties of members. Yet this body would be one not by nature but by a certain composition, and therefore not of one species, but of several, to which the composing bodies belong. For if it were of one species, it would be seen to pertain most of all to the nature of a human body, to which it is most similar.

This opinion is more consonant with the sayings of St. Augustine, who, beyond what he indicates that these bodies are formed from air alone, also plainly indicates something different in lib. 3 (*De Trinitate*, cap. 1), where, speaking of assumed bodies, he makes their matter consist of inferior and more corporeal elements. [133] Nor does Scotus depart far from this opinion, when he says that bodies of this kind are formed from air imperfectly mixed, because otherwise they could not have shape and colour.

§ 87. Whether the mode of angelic apparition just explained applies also to demons — which we supposed a little before — can be asked. It is answered that demons too assume true bodies in which to appear, namely by the same natural power by which the good Angels can do this, and that this is also sometimes done by them. For it is not verisimilar that the devil, when he was permitted to tempt Christ, had received over Him such power as to delude His senses, or to move His imagination with whatever images he wished; but rather that he appeared in an assumed body having human form, when he both addressed Him and led Him from place to place (Matt. 4). The same is proved from what is read concerning the demons called incubi and succubi in authors of worthy credence, attested also by St. Augustine (lib. 15, *De Civitate Dei*, cap. 23, and *Quaestiones in Genesim*, quest. 3, and lib. 3, *De Trinitate*, cap. 8) and by Innocent VIII (in a certain decretal). [139], [140]

§ 88. For the most part, however, the apparitions of demons seem to be nothing other than illusions of the external senses, or commotions of the interior phantasy — since it is their proper work to delude human minds in various ways.

But someone will here ask: Whether a demon possessing a human body is to be said to assume that body; and whether it can assume the bodies of animals. It is answered with St. Thomas in the passage already cited, in the first part, quest. 51, art. 2, and in his commentary on this Distinction, quest. 1, art. 3:[141] that a body is then rightly considered to be assumed by an Angel or a demon when it is joined to him not merely as to a mover, but as to a mover represented through that very body itself — as the same Doctor (*ibidem*) finely

explains. But this does not happen when a demon possesses a man, or transports a sorceress to another place. For by that argument he would be said to assume stones and clouds and any other bodies whatsoever, when he moves them locally by his power. Similarly it would likewise have to be admitted that Angels assume the celestial bodies, because they move them. Such a manner of speaking is foreign to the usage of the Doctors.

§ 89. Furthermore, as regards assumed bodies: when Angels have disappeared, these bodies are not converted into nothing (as Calvin rashly affirmed, responding in his own way to the other part of Tertullian's opinion, who said they were made from nothing), but they are to be considered as returning to that from which they were taken, that is, into their prior matter and nature.

§ VII — What operations Angels exercise in assumed bodies (Quales in assumptis corporibus operationes Angeli exerceant)

§ 90. It is customarily asked concerning the operations which Angels, as they have been seen, exercise in assumed bodies: whether those operations were genuine, or merely apparent and imaginary; and if genuine, whether they were vital operations. It is answered: just as they assumed genuine bodies, so without doubt the operations which they exercised in those bodies were genuine, as is evident from what was said above. Yet none of those operations was vital — that is, none was a work of life (*opera vitae*). The reason (*ratio*) for this is that bodies assumed by Angels do not live with primary life (*vita prima*), for they are not informed by Angels. Therefore, neither can works of life be exercised in them by Angels; for secondary life (*vita secunda*) necessarily presupposes primary life.

§ 91. Likewise, nothing can exercise works of life that does not have a potential principle (*principium potentiale*) for operations of that kind. But Angels, although they have a principle — that is, a power (*virtus*) by which they can move bodies, or parts thereof, locally, and by this motion can shape them and affect them with certain qualities; indeed can even exercise in them certain operations having something in common with, and very closely resembling, the works of bodily life — nonetheless do not have a potential principle for the true and properly so-called actions of this kind, because they have neither sensation, nor locomotive power, nor digestive power, nor generative power, and so forth. Therefore they cannot exercise those operations.

§ 92. Hence, whenever Scripture testifies that Angels spoke, ate, drank, walked, or did something similar in assumed bodies, it speaks not properly but metaphorically, ascribing these things to them by reason of the resemblance of such operations to the true works of life — as Theodoretus rightly teaches.[143] Hence also the Philosopher says,[144] that voice is the act of an animate body, whereas a lyre or a flute emits sound only in a metaphorical sense.

§ 93. Nevertheless, it must be known that whatever is found in operations of this kind that can be common to an animate body, all of that can be exercised by Angels through assumed bodies: for example, to stir up articulate sound in the air such as we produce when we speak; to break and grind food; to pour in liquid; and to convey both food and drink into the inner parts and even to consume them, which is what men do when eating and drinking. Likewise to move a body in the manner in which walking men are moved. For these reasons they are read in the Scriptures to have spoken, eaten, drunk, and walked.

§ 94. But that such eating and drinking was not so in the proper sense of those names is attested by the Angel Raphael in these words to Tobias (Tob. 12): "I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you, but I use

invisible food and drink, which cannot be seen by men."[145] For although some refer these words of the Angel to the effect of nutrition (*effectus nutritionis*), they seem nonetheless to be taken simply, of eating and drinking in the proper sense. And what he says of these must be understood similarly of the other works of bodily life. Nor is anything different to be thought concerning the operations which demons exercise in assumed bodies.

§ 95. Hence also that which is read at times in certain authors — that they have begotten offspring — is to be understood in this sense: that seed received from a man they have poured, as though by intercourse, into the feminine vessel for the generation of a human being; just as they also take seed from other bodies for the effecting of various things. St. Thomas explains this from St. Augustine,[146] noting that for this reason, as the same St. Augustine says,[147] "he who is born of such intercourse is not to be called the son of the demon, but rather of the man from whom the seed was received."

§ 96. Furthermore, it must be noted that even if an Angel were to assume a living body — for it is possible, St. Thomas acknowledges in the same place,[148] that he assume a true living man, though he concedes this would be less fitting — and were to set in motion the vital operations of the senses and of the other powers; not even in that case would he properly be said, for example, to see, hear, speak, eat, drink, or walk, but only to arouse those actions by moving the body or the man toward them. The reason is that operations expressed by such words import this: that they proceed from the internal principle of him to whom they are attributed. Hence it is also the case that, even though God is most properly the Author of all vital operations both in brute animals and in men, those operations, expressed by their proper names, are nevertheless not attributed to God. For God is not said to walk, eat, fly, and so forth — namely, for an analogous reason, because these words signify the internal operation of the one acting. For one is said to walk not whoever produces true walking, but whoever produces it in himself. And similarly of the rest.

§ 97. But truly, since God made man exercised vital operations in Himself as man, it follows that for this reason God properly ate, drank, walked, and performed the other human acts which the Evangelists write of Him as true man. Hence also after the Resurrection He truly and properly ate, so as to show that He was not a phantom but a true and living man. Nor does it detract from the truth or propriety of the eating that He was not nourished by the food then taken. For it is certain that true eating (*comestio*) can exist without nutrition (*nutritio*). For eating is prior to nutrition and is sometimes separated from it, as in the sick and in those who vomit what they have eaten. Now in Christ after the Resurrection there was true eating, both because it proceeded from an internal potential principle ordered to that operation, and because the nutritive power (*vis nutritiva*) — to which the alimentary faculty (*facultas comestiva*) is subservient — was not lacking. For the body of Christ was of such a nature, even after the Resurrection, that food could be converted into it, as St. Thomas teaches.[149]

§ 98. It is objected against the foregoing: the Fathers sometimes attribute sense (*sensus*) to Angels and demons, as does St. Augustine.[150] But sense is a potential principle for exercising sensitive operations. From which it seems to follow that at least these vital operations can be exercised by Angels in bodies. It is answered (*respondetur*): sense, as it is attributed to Angels, signifies in general the faculty of knowing or perceiving sensible things, whether this comes about through the intellect — in whose object sensible things are also comprehended — or through sense properly so-called.

§ VIII — What persona did Angels bear when appearing to men? (Angeli hominibus apparentes quam personam gesserint?)

§ 99. For the understanding of the Scriptures, with regard to apparitions wrought by Angels, and in general with regard to their sensible operations exhibited to men, it must be noted that these were sometimes performed in the very persons of the Angels themselves, and sometimes in the Person of God. In the person of the Angels, indeed, whenever they spoke as messengers sent by God — in the manner in which the Angel Raphael addressed both Tobias, when he declared himself to them and revealed who he was (Tob. 12); and in the manner in which we likewise read that Gabriel appeared or spoke to Daniel (Dan. 9, 10), to Zachariah, and to the Blessed Virgin (Lk. 1). In the person of Angels, likewise, Angels appeared to the young man of Elisha, when Elisha said to him: "Those who are with us are more than those who are with them" (4 Kgs. 6). Indeed, wherever in the New Testament Angels are read to have appeared in human form, they are found to have spoken in their own proper person alone, and not in the Person of God. For from the time that God made man appeared visibly among men and ascended into heaven in the truth of human nature, it was no longer necessary for the Person of God to be represented through Angels appearing in human form. For indeed the apparitions performed in human form from the Person of God before the coming of Christ were all of them certain figures foretelling that God would one day become man and appear among men in true human flesh,[151] as St. Hilary, writing on Ps. 68, says: "The Son of God, in order to confirm faith in the flesh to be assumed, was adored by Abraham in the form of a man, and wrestled with Jacob.",[152]

§ 100. Moreover, from the Person of God we have frequent apparitions of Angels in the Scripture of the Old Testament — namely, whenever they are read to have spoken in words uttered as if by God, even though they themselves, having assumed bodies, formed those words. That this was done neither falsely nor absurdly St. Augustine teaches,[153] saying: "Because, when the herald pronounces the words of the judge, the record does not write: 'The herald said this,' but 'the judge said this.'" It must further be noted that the angelic apparition or address made from the Person of God was sometimes performed without signifying any particular person in God — as when it was said in Paradise to Adam: "Adam, where are you?" (Gen. 3), and when it was said to Abraham: "Go forth from your land" (Gen. 12), and often at other times. But sometimes in apparitions of this kind a certain distinction of the Divine Persons was signified, in such a way, namely, that the words uttered by the Angel could be referred peculiarly to one particular Person.

§ 101. And first, to the Person of the Father these words of Exod. 20 are aptly referred: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt." For the words of the Father to the Son are mystically signified, whom He called out of Egypt (Hos. 11). Similar is the passage in Judg. 2, where, after Scripture had said that the Angel of the Lord went up from Gilgal to the place of weeping, it records that he said: "I brought you out of the land of Egypt and led you into the land," etc. Likewise Gen. 22 is rightly accommodated to the Father, where God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son — which commandment, without doubt, signified the will of God the Father, who willed to deliver the Son to death for the redemption of man.

§ 102. To the Person of the Son is aptly referred what is said by the Angel in the Person of God in Exod. 3: "I have seen the affliction of my people in Egypt, and I have come down to deliver them." By which words it was prefigured that the Son of God would descend from heaven to liberate the human race. To this passage must also be referred what is read in Dan. 3, that the Angel of the Lord descended with Azariah and his

companions into the furnace. For concerning him who was seen in the midst of the furnace, Nebuchadnezzar afterward says: "And the appearance of the fourth is like the Son of God."

§ 103. Indeed, there is a not implausible opinion held by some, that all angelic apparitions made in human form before the coming of Christ were exhibited in the same bodily shape and form in which Christ himself afterward appeared in the flesh — because, as we said above, they bore the figure of the Son of God about to come in the flesh. This is roughly the view of Eusebius, Theodoret, and other Greeks.[154] To this view also tend the above-cited words of St. Hilary; and that which is sung in the Church's Office: "O Adonai, who appeared to Moses in the flame of the bush and gave him the law on Sinai, come to redeem us with an outstretched arm." And likewise: "Christ is risen from the sepulchre, who delivered the three youths from the burning furnace." Hence too the author of the Questions on the Old Testament (found in St. Augustine, Part 2, question 18) says: "Nebuchadnezzar, by the merit of his kingdom, saw Christ in the furnace."[,155]

§ 104. To the Person of the Holy Spirit seems peculiarly to belong the apparition, or rather the exhibition, of the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night — and this on account of the operations appropriated to the Holy Spirit; just as, beyond any doubt, the apparition of the dove descending upon Christ, and of the tongues of fire upon the Apostles, properly pertained to the representation of his Person. Lastly, we read of a certain apparition in which the three Divine Persons were distinctly signified, namely Gen. 18, where Scripture relates that three men appeared to Abraham, in whom, though there were three, he adored one — as the Church sings of this event.

§ 105. There is also a case where the Angel seems to have represented neither the person of God nor of an Angel, but of a certain man, as when Raphael said: "I am Azariah, the son of the great Ananias" (Tob. 5). Unless one prefers to take this also as spoken in the person of the Angel himself, though Tobias did not understand it, so that he called himself Azariah son of the great Ananias on account of the etymological meanings of these names, as some interpret.

§ 106. To this class seem also to be referred the apparitions of holy men already dead — such as Felix, Bishop of Nola, concerning whom St. Augustine writes,[156] and indeed also of Nicholas and of St. Augustine himself while still living — apparitions which St. Augustine believes were performed by Angels bearing the persons of those men.

§ 107. That similar things were exhibited through the ministry of Angels, Sacred Scripture shows in many places. First, the most obvious passage is Judg. 2, cited a little above, where the words of God are attributed both before and after the speech to the Angel. Likewise Gen. 22, where it is said that now the Lord, now the Angel spoke to Abraham, yet always in the words of God — except that in the latter passage the Angel also indicates his own person, when he says: "By myself I have sworn, says the Lord." So too in Gen. 16, both the Angel and the Lord are said to have appeared to Hagar while she was fleeing. So also in Gen. 32, Jacob is written to have wrestled with the Lord, who is nevertheless shown by Hos. 12 to have been an Angel. And again in Judg. 13, he who appeared to the parents of Samson is called now an Angel, now the Lord. And in Daniel 3 as well, Nebuchadnezzar calls him who had descended into the furnace with the three youths now the Son of God, now an Angel sent by God. And to this may also be reduced what is read at the end of Deuteronomy: that Moses was buried by the Lord. For Jude in his Epistle signifies that this was done by Michael the Archangel.[157]

§ 108. For regarding the vision of Moses shown in the bush (Exod. 3), and the law delivered to him on the mountain (Exod. 20), in which passages he himself is said to have spoken, and those things were said which could only be said in the Person of God — it is established that the same formal character (*ratio*) applies. For Stephen testifies in his speech in Acts 7, that an Angel appeared to Moses in the bush, and that the children of Israel received the law in the disposition of Angels. The same thing concerning the law given through Angels is confirmed by the Apostle (Gal. 3 and Heb. 2).

§ 109. Whether also the voice of the Father heard from heaven over Christ, both at the Jordan (Matt. 3) and on the mountain (Matt. 17), saying "This is my beloved Son," and the appearance of the dove descending upon him, representing the Holy Spirit, and again the voice of the Father answering him: "I have both glorified it and will glorify it again" (Jn. 12), were effected by angelic ministry — Scripture does not expressly say; yet it is more than probable that the same judgment should be made concerning these as concerning the examples mentioned above. This notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Domingo de Soto concerning the form of the dove, which he holds to have been produced immediately by God alone to represent the Holy Spirit, and this, as he says, by reason of the dignity of Christ.[158] This argument, however, seems to prove no more in the case of the form of the dove than in the case of the voice of the Father and other similar instances, as is evident. For those who understood the voice, and thus knew it had been uttered from the Person of the Father responding to the Son, nonetheless said: "An angel spoke to him." So also in Lk. 22, an Angel from heaven — in words that were, as one may believe, those of the Father — comforted Christ placed in his agony, responding as it were to his prayer which was directed to the Father; just as the Father responded in Jn. 12.

§ 110. Therefore, no reason stands in the way of our saying the same concerning the form of the dove, especially since St. Augustine,[159] not only holds that the apparitions made before Christ's Incarnation were performed through Angels, but also considers it more probable that even all those made after the Incarnation of the Word were exhibited not without an intellectual creature. For more on angelic apparitions of this kind made through the ministry of Angels, see the same St. Augustine.,[160]

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§ IX — How God is read to have appeared corporally (Quomodo Deus corporaliter apparuisse legatur)

§ 111. From what has been said, it is clear how God is read to have sometimes appeared corporally — namely, through Angels forming bodies for themselves in the manner described above for such ministry, and speaking in the Person of God. Moreover, it must be held most firmly in all the apparitions in which God is read to have appeared corporally, that it is not the substance of God (*substantia Dei*) that was seen by bodily eyes, but only something corporeal that was exhibited, through which — when it was visibly beheld or sensibly perceived — God was invisibly represented to the intellect. For the very nature of God (*natura Dei*), being incorporeal and immaterial, is not contained under the object of corporeal sight, nor under any corporeal senses whatsoever, whether interior or exterior. For an organic power (*potentia organica*) cannot extend beyond corporeal things. St. Thomas assigns this as the most certain reason for this doctrine.[161] The Scriptural testimonies are Jn. 1 and 1 Jn. 4: "No man hath seen God at any time." And 1 Tim. 1, where the Apostle calls God invisible. And chapter 6: "Whom," he says, "no man hath seen.",[162]

From such scriptures, St. Augustine teaches that the substance of God, as it is in no way mutable, so also is in no way corporally visible. The relevant passages are found in *De Trinitate* lib. 2, caps. 16, 17, 18, and lib. 3, caps. 10 and 11.[163] The same author, in Epistle 112, chapter 9,[164] expounding the text "No man hath seen God at any time," denies that God is seen either in this life or in the next in the same manner in which those visible things are discerned by corporeal vision. St. Jerome likewise, commenting on Is. 1,[165] writes that the face of God, according to the property of His nature, can be seen by no creature, but is perceived by the mind alone. And St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 39 on Gen.,[166] says: "Do not suppose that that divine and incorruptible substance is seen with fleshly eyes." This is the common teaching of all Catholics.

Although this property of not being able to be seen corporally is not so peculiar to God that it is not also common to all incorporeal substances. For whatever is incorporeal can be perceived neither by sense nor by imagination, but only by the intellect alone, as is established from the reason brought forward a little earlier. Therefore what we read in Exod. 33 — that the Lord spoke with Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend — ought by no means to be taken in the sense that Moses is understood to have beheld the substance of God with bodily eyes. For in that vision of which mention is made there, Moses, not being satisfied, shortly thereafter asks the Lord to show him His face, and receives this response: "Thou canst not see my face; for man shall not see me and live." And again: "Thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen." Therefore it cannot properly be understood that Moses spoke with God face to face; but the sense is that he spoke with God in a familiar manner, so that he not only perceived the voice of the one speaking, but also beheld some corporeal form (*species corporea*) by which the presence of God would be signified — whatever that form ultimately was; for Scripture did not express this. But "the back parts" (*posteriora*) of God he saw when God showed Himself to him in that figure (*schema*) in which He was going to come in the flesh; for human substance is another and a later nature of the Son of God, and far inferior to it. In the same manner what Jacob says is rightly understood, as well as what Isaiah testifies in chapter 6, that he saw the Lord of hosts with his own eyes — namely, both that Jacob spoke face to face, and that Isaiah saw the vision in this way.

§ 112. But an objection is raised from a passage of St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* lib. 22, cap. 29,[167] where he says that the power of glorified eyes will be more excellent than that of mortal eyes, so that they will see not only corporeal things but also incorporeal ones, and the incorporeal nature of God Himself. To this St. Thomas rightly replies,[161] drawing on St. Augustine's opinion, that glorified corporeal eyes will see God in the manner in which our eyes do not see the life of any man. "But life," he says, "is not seen by a corporeal eye as something visible in itself (*per se visibile*), but as something sensible by accident (*sensibile per accidens*), which indeed is not cognized by the sense itself, but immediately together with the sense by some other cognitive power." For thus, in all corporeal things perceived by sense, God Himself will immediately present Himself to the mind in that state of beatitude (*beatitudo*). And this, as the same St. Thomas attests, will come about both from the perspicuity of the intellect and from the refulgence of the divine brightness radiating upon the renewed corporeal world. And that this is the sense of Augustine's words is evident from his own subsequent declaration, in which he plainly and expressly explains the question he himself raised on this matter.

§ 113. Whether by some similar interpretation the teaching of a certain ancient ecclesiastical writer, by the name of *Servus Dei*, can be excused — of whom Gennadius reports (in his *Catalogus*, cap. 87)[168] that he published a book teaching that Christ, from the very moment of His conception, always saw both the Father and the Holy Spirit with the eyes of His flesh, by reason of the special and united fellowship (*societas*) of God and man — and this against certain persons who said that Christ, while living in this life, did not see the

Father with His fleshly eyes, but only after His resurrection and ascension into heaven — this is difficult for us to judge, since that book is no longer extant; although Gennadius records the matter in such a way that he condemns the author for this teaching as guilty of no error, but rather seems to commend him as writing against certain persons in error.

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§ X — Whether anyone in this life has seen the essence of God (An essentiam Dei viderit aliquis in hac vita)

§ 114. On the occasion of the corporeal apparitions properly treated here, a further question is usually raised: whether it was granted to anyone in this life to see the essence of God (*essentia Dei*) — not indeed with the eyes of the body, which we have said is altogether impossible, but with the eyes of the mind (*oculi mentis*).

On the side of the affirmative, the authority of St. Augustine makes a case, who in *De Genesi ad litteram* lib. 12, caps. 26 and 27,[170] thinks that what was denied to Moses in Exod. 33, when it was said to him "Thou canst not see my face," etc., was at other times granted to him, and that this is signified by the words of the Lord in Num. 12, where speaking of Moses He says: "With him I speak mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he behold the Lord." From this St. Augustine infers that God was seen by Moses in that substance by which God is, with no corporeal creature assumed that would be presented to the senses of mortal flesh. And he holds the same opinion about the Apostle Paul, when he was caught up to the third heaven, as is evident in the same passage through to the end of the book. He discusses similar matters concerning Moses and Paul in Epistle 112, cap. 3, *On Seeing God*, addressed to Paulina.[171] Furthermore, concerning Paul alone, the same opinion is transmitted in the work attributed to St. Augustine, *Liber 65 Quaestionum*, addressed to Orosius, question 63.[172] And finally, concerning both of them, a certain sermon from those attributed to him (*Ad Fratres in Eremo*)[173] speaks in very plain and open words — though it is fully agreed among the learned that these sermons are not genuine works of Augustine.

To the same effect are adduced: St. Basil, in Homily 1 of the *Hexaemeron*,[174] attributing to Moses the same vision of God as to the Angels; and St. Ambrose, in his work of the same title, lib. 1, cap. 2,[175] saying something similar about Moses; likewise the Ambrosian Commentary on 2 Cor. 12,[176] and Bede and St. Anselm in their commentaries on the same passage,[177] and Hugh of St. Victor, question 34 on the same Epistle,[178] all affirming the same thing of Paul. To these are added Titelmann (*Titanus*) and Burgensis. Among the Scholastics, St. Thomas, moved by the authority of St. Augustine, holds the same opinion about both Moses and Paul,[179] and teaches that they saw God through His essence (*per essentiam*), indeed while still in this mortal life, but — as he puts it — withdrawn (*abreptos*) from the bodily senses, so that their souls at that same time were not separated from their bodies. For this is what St. Augustine himself sufficiently indicates in *De Genesi ad litteram* lib. 12, cap. 27.[180] St. Thomas in this is followed by Cajetan and the rest of his school. Likewise Durandus.[181]

§ 115. The chief foundation of all these authors rests on two Scriptural passages: the first is the one speaking of Moses in Num. 12. The sense of this passage in their favour seems to be confirmed by the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13, 12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." These words are very similar to those found in Num. 12. But it is certain that the Apostle speaks here of the vision of God through His essence (*per essentiam*) when he says "face to face." The other is the passage concerning Paul

in 2 Cor. 12, where he himself writes that he was caught up to the third heaven and into paradise, and "heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter." For the third heaven is the abode of the Blessed, fruiting (*fruentium*) in the vision of God (*visio Dei*), and paradise is the place of the Blessed promised to the thief by Christ in Lk. 23. And "the secret and ineffable words" seem most fittingly to be understood as none other than the mysteries visible only to the Blessed in their spiritual state.

Furthermore, the Lord seems to have promised this vision to Moses by these words: "I will show thee all good." For this promise does not seem capable of being fulfilled unless the essence of God is shown and presented to be seen.

§ 116. On the other side, the contrary opinion has many great authors, who constantly deny that anyone placed in this mortal life can behold God with that vision which is reserved for eternal life for the pure of heart, as the Lord says: "Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God." And they admit no exception whatsoever from this rule. So teaches first and foremost Pope Evaristus (in his first decretal Epistle),[182] where, expounding those words of Paul in 1 Tim. 6: "Who inhabits inaccessible light," he also denies that any man in this mortal body can contemplate that light even in any slight degree, and says that Moses and the other Prophets saw God only in riddle and figure.

The same is taught by (Pseudo-)Dionysius, disciple of Paul, in *De Mystica Theologia*, cap. 1,[183] and Gregory Nazianzen, *On Faith* toward the end, and in *Theologia* lib. 2 under the beginning.[184] Likewise his disciple St. Jerome, in his Commentary on Is. 6,[185] explicitly excluding Moses from this kind of vision; which he also does in lib. 3 *Contra Pelagianos*, cap. 5.[186] St. John Chrysostom, Homily 14 on John,[187] likewise removing this vision from Moses; who also, writing on 2 Cor. 12, sufficiently signifies this same thing concerning Paul.[188] Leo, in a Sermon on the Transfiguration of the Lord.[189] St. Cyril, in *In Joannem* lib. 1, cap. 22 and lib. 4, cap. 8.[190] St. Gregory the Great, *Moralium* lib. 5, cap. 20, and lib. 18, caps. 37 and 83,[191] in which passages he denies it of both Moses and Paul. Also Homily 8 on Ezekiel,[192] where he likewise denies this vision even to Paul, though caught up to the third heaven, and dissolves the objection about Isaiah who "saw the glory of God." Also Angelomus, on the *Song of Songs* at the words of cap. 5 "But he had turned aside,"[193] and Franco, *De Gratia Dei* (tome 12),[194] explicitly denying it of Paul. Prudentius, in his *Apotheosis* (against the Patripassians),[195] signifying that this did not befall even Moses despite his request. And in his Hymn before sleep he sings: "Be present, O supreme Father, whom no one hath ever seen."[196] Add to these the Glossator on Exod. 33: "Man shall not see me, etc."[197]

From these authors we think St. Ambrose ought by no means to be separated, although he was cited on the opposing side. For in *De Fide ad Gratianum* lib. 5, cap. ultimum,[198] he plainly denies that Moses and Paul saw God face to face in this life, and proves it from Scripture concerning both. Also St. Basil, in Homily 1 *De jejunio*,[199] saying that Elijah in the cave merited to see God "as much as is permitted to man" (*quantum fas est homini*), seems to indicate that the perfect vision of God is granted to no one in this life. For that phrase "as much as is permitted to man" seems to require the supplement "to mortal man" — unless perhaps someone thinks that Basil spoke absolutely when he said "as much as is permitted to man," and thus attributed this kind of vision as a benefit not only to Moses but also to Elijah. Moreover, even Cajetan, in his Commentary on Num. 12,[200] recedes from his earlier opinion, affirming that in that passage not even the Hebrew signifies a vision of God through His essence (*per essentiam*). And nor does he mention such a vision in his Commentary on 2 Cor. 12.

§ 117. Now the Fathers employ, for the proof of this opinion, these Scriptural passages, pertaining partly in particular to Moses and Paul and partly in general to all other mortals: Exod. 33: "Thou canst not see my face; for man shall not see me and live." And below: "But my face thou canst not see." And 1 Cor. 13: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part," and a little before: "But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." They also use these Scriptural texts: Jn. 1: "No man hath seen God at any time." And 1 Tim. 6: "Who inhabits inaccessible light, whom no man hath seen, nor indeed can see." And although these passages, because they speak absolutely and not of a particular time, others prefer to understand of the vision that takes place with bodily eyes (in which sense we also adduced them above), yet the primary sense is of the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*), as is shown in the Commentary on 1 Tim. 6.[201]

There are added further Scriptural texts which promise the vision of God to the just as a reward to be bestowed after this life: as Matt. 5, 1 Jn. 3, Rev. 22 (the last chapter), Ps. 16, and elsewhere. It does not therefore appear that this is granted to anyone during this life in which one is still striving for the reward.

§ 118. Finally, if Moses and Paul saw the essence of God (*essentia Dei*), then they ceased to have faith (*fides*), since faith is not consistent with clear vision, as is evident from the Apostle himself in 1 Cor. 13 — and consequently they ceased to be wayfarers (*viatores*). Nor does the reply of St. Thomas seem sufficient — namely, that the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*) in them did not have a permanent character but was given to them after the manner of something transient.[202] For not even in transit, not even in an instant, do faith and the light of glory simultaneously coexist, any more than clear and obscure light can simultaneously coexist in the same being. Moreover, from the same position it will follow as a consequence that Moses and Paul could not even have had an act of faith while that vision was in progress. For just as one who has seen Rome and thereafter remembers it does not have faith but evident knowledge (*evidentia*) of what he saw, so one who has seen God through His essence (*per essentiam*), if he afterwards recalls that vision (as Moses and Paul doubtless did recall it, granted that they had it), possesses not faith but evident knowledge of the thing itself.

§ 119. Reply to the question. It is said first: it is not impossible that it be granted by God to anyone in this mortal life to see God through His essence (*per essentiam*); especially in the manner which St. Augustine and St. Thomas posit, namely through an abstraction (*abstractio*) of the soul not from the body but from the bodily senses and from the use of this mortal life. Nor is it absurd that such a vision should not make one absolutely (*simpliciter*) blessed (*beatus*), because it does not confer blessedness except for the time during which it lasts. Hence it is not impossible that one who today saw God should afterwards sin and be damned.

It is said second: nor is it simply impossible that someone, while using the senses (*sensibus utens*), should see God through His essence (*per essentiam*); for an example of this is found in Christ, whose soul perfectly and continually saw God from the very beginning of His conception, while He lived in mortal flesh. For to see God while in a mortal body and yet using the bodily senses will be the state of all the Blessed.

It is said third: although these things are not impossible, the more probable opinion (*probabilior sententia*) is nevertheless that it was granted to none among mortals — not even to Paul, nor to Moses, much less to Elijah, Stephen, Benedict, or anyone else — to see God through His essence (*per essentiam*) in this life. This is proved by the arguments adduced on behalf of that side. Nor does Scripture prove the contrary. For what is said in Num. 12 — that Moses sees the Lord plainly and not in a riddle, and speaks with Him mouth to mouth — is a comparison with the other Prophets, to whom the images of God were not exhibited in so

illustrious and manifest a manner nor did God speak with them in such great familiarity as with Moses. For this is what that expression signifies: "to speak mouth to mouth." Nor is anything else said there than what is said in Exod. 33 by the Scripture: "And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend" — yet to him it was afterwards said: "Thou canst not see my face." It is therefore sufficiently evident that those words of Num. 12 speak of the ordinary and persisting manner in which God dealt with Moses beyond all other Prophets, not of some singular and momentary vision of which Scripture nowhere speaks. This Cajetan also learnedly observed in his Commentary on that passage.[200]

From which it is understood that this passage ought not to be compared with the one found in the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13. For in that passage the Apostle compares the knowledge of God and divine things that can be had in this life with that which is expected as a reward in the other life; and by reason of this comparison, we now see "through a glass in a dark manner," because then we shall see "face to face," that is, altogether openly, with the soul directly beholding God.

§ 120. But what is said in Exod. 33, where the Lord says to Moses: "I will show thee all good" — this must be understood with the restriction subsequently joined to it, and is stated in the Hebrew manner (*phrasi hebraica*): "I will grant thee whatsoever thou desirest in this" — but that which thou askest, namely that I show thee my glory and thou seest my face, this I cannot grant,

§ IX — How God is read to have appeared bodily (Quomodo Deus corporaliter apparuisse legatur)

§ 121. by bodily means I cannot — that is to say, according to ordinary power: "For he shall not see me and live."[203] Hence, in place of this favour, God at once bestowed upon his friend another great gift, showing him his "posterior parts,"[,] [204] that is, the form of the humanity of Christ.

§ 122. Nor does the passage of 2 Cor. 12 establish anything concerning Paul.[205] For there is in that place no mention whatever of a vision of God, but only of a rapture into heaven and into Paradise, where he had heard secret and ineffable words. None of which establishes that God was seen by him through his essence. For in the empyrean heaven the angels were created, yet they were not thereby immediately beatified by the clear vision of God. And Paradise, moreover, is identified by the Apostle with the third heaven. Furthermore, to hear is a lesser thing than to see, and pertains more to faith than to the evidence of cognition. For faith comes from hearing, not from evidence. Since, therefore, Paul declares himself to have been rapt not to seeing but to hearing certain secrets — and this while his soul remained, more probably, within the body, as St. Thomas himself also thinks,[,] [202] rather than separated from it — it is evident that from that passage it cannot be made at all probable that he saw God through his essence. Nor does it constitute an obstacle that he had said a little earlier: "I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord."[,] [206] For the term "vision" is generic in the Scriptures, as also is "revelation." Indeed, in Num. 12 a "vision" is counted among the more obscure kinds of revelations.[,] [207] And the Apostle in that passage does not understand "visions and revelations of the Lord" as though the Lord were the object, but as though he were the one revealing — namely, Christ the Lord. For otherwise he would have said "a vision of God." And again, what kind of visions he means he shows when, as if by way of explanation, he says that he had heard secret words — signifying by the very word "hearing" that in those visions of his there was still something lacking with respect to evidence. Certainly, since the Apostle in

that passage recounts his glorious experiences on account of the pseudo-apostles, had he seen God through his essence he would surely have expressed it clearly enough to be understood.

§ 123. Nor does the argument drawn from the Thief conclude anything — to whom it was said: "Today you will be with me in Paradise."[208]

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1. Ps. 138 (139):21–22.
2. Ps. 138 (139):21–22 (Vulgate).
3. 4 Kgs. (2 Kgs.) 1:3–4.
4. 1 Paralip. (1 Chr.) 10.
5. Theophylact, *Commentary on 1 Cor.* 10; following St. John Chrysostom.
6. 2 Cor. 6:15.
7. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia* 5 *de patientia Job*.
8. Estius, *In III Sent.*, dist. 37.
9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 96, a. 2–3.
10. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 96, a. 2–3.
11. Soto (Domingo de), *De Iustitia et Iure*, lib. 8, q. 3, a. 3.
12. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 34.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1.
14. Ps. 103 (104):4.
15. Heb. 1:14.
16. Eph. 6:12.
17. Ps. 30; Ps. 145; Lk. 23; Lk. 24; Eccl. (last chapter); Dan. 2–3; 2 Macc. 7; Acts 23; 1 Cor. 2; 1 Thess. 5.
18. Acts 23:8–9.
19. Heb. 1:7, citing Ps. 103:4.
20. Lk. 8:30.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1. See above, dist. 2.
22. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 5; *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, ch. 2.
23. St. Basil, *Homilia* 9 (*Quod Deus non est auctor malorum*); *In expositione Psalmi* 44.
24. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio in Natalem Domini*; *Oratio* 2 *de Theologia*.
25. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia* 22 *in Genesim*.
26. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia* 16 *super* 1 Cor.
27. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia* 44 *super Matth.*
28. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, lib. 4, ch. 9.
29. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, lib. 2, ch. 10.
30. St. John Damascene, *De Fide orthodoxa*, lib. 2, ch. 3; *Dialectica*, ch. 49.
31. St. Athanasius, *De communi essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti*.
32. [St. Athanasius], *Contra Graecos*, lib. 3, under Theodosius.

33. Sophronius, *Epistola ad Episcopum Constantinopolitanum*, read at the Sixth Synod (Third Council of Constantinople), actio 11.

34. Bede, *De elementis philosophiae*, lib. 1.

35. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, lib. 1, pt. 5, ch. 7–8.

36. Peter Lombard [the Master], *In II Sent.*, dist. 8, text § A.

37. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), under Innocent III, ch. 1 (*Firmiter credimus*).

38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 2.

39. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1.

40. St. Augustine, *Confessiones*, lib. 13, ch. 8.

41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 1.

42. The argument about angels separated from their bodies is drawn from the general Thomistic argument at *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 1.

43. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, lib. 12, ch. 6, 8, and the last chapter (*ultimo*).

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1; q. 51, a. 1 and 2.

45. Apuleius, *De Deo Socratis*.

46. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 8, ch. 14, 15, 16.

47. *Epistola* 111 (a): centesima quadragesima octava et nona in novissima Patrum Benedicti editione [as noted in the source].

48. St. Augustine: *Contra Academicos*, lib. 1, ch. 7; *De Ordine*, lib. 2, ch. 9; *De Trinitate*, lib. 2, ch. 7 and lib. 3, ch. 1; *In expositione Psalmi* 85; *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 9, ch. 13; lib. 11, ch. 23; lib. 21, ch. 3; *Epistola* 111 and 114; *Sermo* 102; *De diversis*, ch. 9; lib. 84, *Quaestionum*.

49. The Seventh General Synod (Second Council of Nicaea, 787), actio 5.

50. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 44.

51. St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. *De Daemonibus*, a. 1.

52. Sixtus Senensis, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, lib. 5, annotatio 8.

53. Bartholomaeus Carranza, *Summa Conciliorum*, annotation to actio 5 of the Seventh Synod.

54. Cajetan, commentary on Eph. 2 (*Secundum principem potestatis aeris hujus*).

55. Dominicus Bannes, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 1.

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, a. 2.

57. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, lib. 27, ch. 2.

58. St. Augustine

59. *Epistola* 111: the one-hundred-and-forty-eighth and one-hundred-and-forty-ninth in the most recent edition of the Fathers by the Benedictines [as noted in the source].

60. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 44, lib. 4.

61. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, dist. 8.

62. The argument continues from the preceding chunk and is here rendered in continuity with the Latin text on pp. 144–145 of the edition.

63. St. Augustine is placed first among those who spoke of this matter as doubtful.

64. St. Augustine: *Contra Academicos*, lib. 1, ch. 7; *De Ordine*, lib. 2, ch. 9; *De Trinitate*, lib. 2, ch. 7 and lib. 3, ch. 1; *In Expositione Psalmi* 85 and 145; *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 9, ch. 13; lib. 11, ch. 23; lib. 21, ch. 3; *Epistola* 111 (the one-hundred-and-forty-eighth in the most recent Benedictine edition of the Fathers) and 114 (the two-hundred-and-fifty-seventh in that edition); *Sermo* 102 *De Diversis*, ch. 9; lib. 84, *Quaestionum*. Also *De Divinatione Daemonum*, ch. 3.

65. St. Augustine, *Retractationum*, lib. 1, ch. 26.

66. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 9, ch. 10.

67. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. 3, ch. 10; *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 15, ch. 23; *Epistola* 157.

68. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione*, lib. 5, ch. 4; *Sermones super Cantica*, Sermones 5 and 6.

69. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17 (see below in this commentary).

70. Origen, *Peri Archon* (*De Principiis*), lib. 2, ch. 2–3.

71. Cassian, *Collationes*, collatio 7, ch. 13.

72. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* [chapter number as in source]; also his *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* mentioning the special book on this subject.

73. Pseudo-Augustine [unknown author], *De Spiritu et Anima*, ch. 18.

74. Trithemius, *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, in the chapter on St. Augustine.

75. Burchard of Worms, *Decretum*, lib. 20, ch. 41, 42.

76. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 16.

77. Gregory of Nazianzus (*Nazianzenus*), *Orationes*, lib. 2, *De Theologia*, towards the end.

78. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, lib. 2, ch. 8.

79. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, lib. 2, ch. 12; lib. 1, ch. 17.

80. Estius, *In II Sent.*, the preceding Distinction (dist. 7, on the fall of the angels and interpretation of Gen. 6).

81. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, lib. 1, ch. 26 and ch. 28.

82. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim*, lib. 1, ch. 11; *De Trinitate*, lib. 1.

83. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, art. 1 and q. 51.

84. The reference is to the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), *Firmiter credimus*, which defines God as "Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who by His almighty power from the beginning of time created both orders of creatures in the same way out of nothing, the spiritual or angelic world and the corporeal or visible universe."

85. Rom. 1:20; Col. 1:15; 1 Tim. 1:17; Tob. 12:19.

86. Gen. 1:2 (LXX); Heb. 11:3.

87. St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. *de Daemonibus*, art. 1.

88. Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, lib. 5, *annotatio* 8.

89. Bartholomew Carranza, *Summa Conciliorum*, in the annotation on *actio* 5 of the Seventh Synod.

90. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, ch. 2 (*Secundum principem potestatis aeris hujus*).

91. Dominic Bannes, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 1.

92. Peter Lombard (the Master of the Sentences), *In II Sent.*, dist. 8.

93. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 111 (= Epistola 149 in the Benedictine edition, 111th in the Novissima edition).

94. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 102 (*de diversis*, ch. 9); lib. 84, *Quaestio* [number as in source].

95. Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council (Second Council of Nicaea, 787), Greek edition, Roman edition, p. 11.

96. The sources named in this passage include: (pseudo-)Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Homilia in Theophania* (in the Greek edition among the works of Chrysostom); Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 1 *contra Eunomium*; the Epistle on the Trinity to Eustachius (no. 80 among Basil's epistles); Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, lib. 3, ch. 18 and lib. 4, *de Dominica*; Moses Maimonides (*Moreh Nevuchim*), Part 2; Aben Ezra; Lactantius, lib. 7, ch. 21; Richard of St. Victor, *In IV Sent.*; Rupert of Deutz (*de Victoria Verbi Dei*); Gregory, *Moralia*; Isidore, *de Differentiis*, ch. 12; Faustus of Riez, *de Creaturis*.

97. Justin Martyr, *Apologia* I (*prima*); *Dialogus cum Tryphone* (as reported by Photius, *Bibliotheca*, cod. 125).

98. Dionysius Petavius (*Denis Pétau*), *Dogmata Theologica*, tom. 3, lib. 1 (*de Angelis*), ch. 2–3, and lib. 3, ch. 1.

99. Fernando Vellosillo, Bishop of Lugo, *Advertentiarum Theologicarum Scholasticarum*, on the opinion of St. Augustine, *Quaestio* 1 and *ad p. 1, 30*.

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, art. 5.

101. Matt. 25:41; Jude 6.

102. Col. 1 and Heb. 12 [abbreviation as in source: "1. Coloff. & Heb. 12"].

103. Fifth Lateran Council, Session 8, under Leo X.

104. 2 Pet. 2 and Heb. 2 [abbreviation as in source].

105. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chs. 3, 4, and 6.

106. Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Third Council of Constantinople), act. 11 (Epistle of Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem); approved in addition 13 of the same Synod.

107. Gabriel Biel, commentary on *In II Sent.*, dist. 2 [abbreviation as in source: "q. per Distinct. 2. hujus libri"].

108. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, lib. 16, ch. 18.

109. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, lib. 3, ch. 2 (also cited at ch. 12 below).

110. St. Jerome, *Contra Pelagianos*, lib. 2, ch. 3.

111. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Titum*, ch. 1.

112. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (*Adversus Haereses*), in the heresy of the Origenists.

113. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, lib. 2, ch. 3.

114. Theophylact, commentary on Heb. 12 ("the declaration of the translation of immovable things").

115. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, verse against the Jews [exact line reference as in source].

116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, art. 5; and *Summa contra Gentiles* II, chs. 54–55.

117. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, lib. 2; and *Metaphysica*, lib. 12.

118. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.

119. Epiphanius, *Panarion*, in the heresy of the Origenists (reporting Methodius).

120. Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 13.

121. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, lib. 3, ch. 12.

122. St. Bernard, *In Cantica Canticorum*, Sermon 81.

123. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 6.

124. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, lib. 3, ch. 12.

125. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, lib. 3, ch. 2.

126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 50, art. 5, reply to objection 3.

127. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 2.

128. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 2, cap. 6; lib. 3, cap. 1.

129. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 15, cap. 23; lib. 16, cap. 29.

130. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cap. 59.

131. Scripture testimonies referenced: Gen. 18–19 (Abraham, Lot); Gen. 32 (Jacob); Tob. 5–12 (Tobias father and son); Lk. 1 (Blessed Virgin, Zacharias); the accounts of the Resurrection (Matt. 28; Mk. 16; Lk. 24; Jn. 20); and the Ascension (Acts 1).

132. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job*, lib. 27, cap. 2.

133. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 3, cap. 1.

134. St. Augustine, Sermon 16 *De Diversis* (= Tractate 3 *Contra Manichaeos*).

135. Reference to the preceding Distinction (Dist. 7), where three modes by which Angels accomplish wondrous things were enumerated.

136. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 2, reply to objection 3; and reply to objection 2.

137. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 5, cap. 1 (also lib. 3, cap. 1).

138. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 5, cap. 1; lib. 2, cap. 7; Sermon 16 *De Diversis*.

139. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 15, cap. 23; *Quaestiones in Genesim*, quest. 3; *De Trinitate*, lib. 3, cap. 8.

140. Innocent VIII, decretal beginning *Summis desiderantes affectibus*, ed. Rome 1585, published 1484 (cited as in the note at foot of source page: "Edita anno 1448" [as in source], apud Eymericum post *Directorium*, p. 106, Editionis Romanae); in which it is ordained that Inquisitors of the Faith should take notice of sorceresses who carry on shamefully with demons.

141. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 2, ad 2; and St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 8, quest. 1, art. 3.

142. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 3.

143. Theodoretus, *In Genesim*, quest. 4.

144. Aristotle, *De Anima*, lib. 2.

145. Tob. 12.

146. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 3, ad ultimum; citing St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 15, cap. 23.

147. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 3, cap. 8.

148. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 3, ad primum.

149. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 3, ad 5.

150. St. Augustine, *In expositione Psalmi 96*, and elsewhere.

151. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 51, art. 2, ad 1.

152. St. Hilary, *In Psalmum* 68.

153. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 3, cap. 11.

154. Eusebius, Theodoret, and other Greek writers [sources as cited in text; specific works not specified by Estius here].

155. Author of the *Quaestiones Veteris Testamenti*, in St. Augustine, Part 2, question 18.

156. St. Augustine, *De Cura pro Mortuis gerenda* [book cited without chapter number in source].

157. Jude, Epistle of Jude (referring to the dispute over the body of Moses).

158. Soto (Domingo de), opinion cited without specific work reference in this passage.

159. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 4, cap. ultimum.

160. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 2, cap. 5, 6, 7; and lib. 3, cap. 10, 11.

161. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, art. 3.

162. Jn. 1; 1 Jn. 4; 1 Tim. 1; 1 Tim. 6.

163. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. 2, caps. 16, 17, 18; lib. 3, caps. 10, 11.

164. St. Augustine, Epistle 112 (i.e., Epistle 147 in modern editions, *De videndo Deo* ad Paulinam), cap. 9. [The source cites it as Ep. 112, which corresponds to the older Maurist numeration; in the most recent critical edition it is Ep. 147.]

165. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Is.* 1.

166. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 39.

167. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 22, cap. 29.

168. Gennadius, *Catalogus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*, cap. 87.

169. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, art. 11; II-II, q. 94, art. 1; q. 175, art. 3.

170. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. 12, caps. 26–27.

171. St. Augustine, Epistle 112 (=147 modern), *De videndo Deo* ad Paulinam, cap. 3.

172. Work attributed to St. Augustine, *Liber 65 Quaestionum ad Orosium*, q. 63.

173. Sermon attributed to St. Augustine (*Ad Fratres in Eremo*) [Estius notes that the learned are agreed these are not genuine works of Augustine].

174. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 1.

175. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, lib. 1, cap. 2.

176. Ambrosian Commentary (*Ambrosiaster*), *In 2 Cor.* 12.

177. Bede and St. Anselm, *Commentary on 2 Cor.* 12.

178. Hugh of St. Victor, question 34 on 2 Cor.

179. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, art. 11; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, art. 2; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 175, arts. 3, 4, 5; also *In I Sent.*, dist. 4 [as cited in source without further specification]; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 23 [abbreviation as in source].

180. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. 12, cap. 27.

181. Cajetan, *Commentary* [on the relevant articles of the *Summa*]; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 6.

182. Pope Evaristus, First Decretal Epistle, expounding 1 Tim. 6. [Estius here adds a lengthy note — reproduced in the footnote below — on the disputed authenticity of certain papal epistles in the Decretals attributed to early popes up to Siricius, which have been judged spurious by most erudite scholars; his note refers to Isidore Mercator's Collection, and cites Petrus Annatus, *Apparatus ad Positivam Theologiam*, lib. 6, art. 5, and Ambrosius Gardebosc, *Synopsis Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, tom. 2, p. 2, lib. 2, *Dissertatio* 3, questio unica, as treating the matter.]

183. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Mystica Theologia*, cap. 1.

184. Gregory Nazianzen, *On Faith* (toward the end); *Theologia*, lib. 2 (under the beginning).

185. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Is.* 6.

186. St. Jerome, *Contra Pelagianos*, lib. 3, cap. 5.

187. St. John Chrysostom, *In Joannem*, Homily 14.

188. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentary on 2 Cor.* 12.

189. Leo the Great, Sermon on the Transfiguration of the Lord.

190. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, lib. 1, cap. 22; lib. 4, cap. 8.

191. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, lib. 5, cap. 20; lib. 18, caps. 37 and 83.

192. St. Gregory the Great, Homily 8 on Ezekiel.

193. Angelomus [monk of Luxeuil, 9th century, as Estius notes], *Commentary on the Song of Songs* at cap. 5 ("But he had turned aside").

194. Franco, *De Gratia Dei*, tome 12.

195. Prudentius, *Apotheosis* (against the Patripassians).

196. Prudentius, Hymn before sleep (*ante somnum*): "Adest pater supreme, quem nemo vidit unquam."

197. Glossator on Exod. 33: "Man shall not see me, etc."

198. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, lib. 5, cap. ultimum.

199. St. Basil, Homily 1 *De jejunio*.

200. Cajetan, *Commentary on Num.* 12.

201. Commentary on 1 Tim. 6 [Estius's own or another standard commentary; abbreviation as in source].

202. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 175, art. 3, ad 2.

203. Exod. 33:20.

204. Exod. 33:23: *posteriora mea* — "my posterior parts," interpreted as a figure (*species*) of the humanity of Christ.

205. 2 Cor. 12.

206. 2 Cor. 12:1.

207. Num. 12.

208. Lk. 23:43.

DISTINCTIO IX — ON THE ORDERS OF THE ANGELS, DEMONIC OBSESSION, AND THE RESTORATION OF THE ANGELIC RUIN (*DE ORDINIBUS ANGELORUM, OBSESSIONE DAEMONUM, ET INSTAURATIONE RUINAE ANGELICAE*)

§ 1. [Continuation from the preceding distinction, concluding remarks on Paul's rapture and the Fathers] The thief was received into Paradise as a citizen destined to remain there permanently, and accordingly as a partaker of the Kingdom and of all its goods together with Christ. Paul, however, was admitted thither only for a moment, as a pilgrim to whom it was granted to hear certain secrets of that place, but not to see them — that is, not to attain to the perfect cognition and participation of those things, but only an imperfect one, though more excellent than that which the other faithful perceive by hearing, as it were, from afar. Hence Paul does not say that he was with Christ, but as though this had not yet befallen him, he says afterward: "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."[1] To the thief, however, it is said: "With me thou shalt be in Paradise."[,2]

§ 2. As for the Fathers, and whatever may be said of the opinion of St. Basil — who is found to have spoken in like manner of Moses and Elias — it has already been shown sufficiently from another passage that St. Ambrose certainly did not hold that Moses saw God face to face in that mode of which St. Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 13,[3] inasmuch as he openly denies it of both of them in that other passage. Wherefore what he says in the *Hexameron* — that Moses was deemed worthy of a clear and perspicuous cognition of the divine presence — is said only by way of distinction from the other Prophets, to whom God was accustomed to show less clear manifestations of Himself, as is sufficiently understood from that very passage. Hence, although St. Ambrose imitates St. Basil in that work and often renders him almost word for word, he nevertheless did not think it necessary to add here: "in the same manner as the Angels" — words that are found in St. Basil.[4] Furthermore, the Ambrosian commentary says nothing other than that Paul was caught up into Paradise, concerning which the Lord had made promise to the thief; but of the vision of God it makes no mention. The commentary of Bede does not differ from St. Augustine, being as it is composed from the words of St. Augustine. Anselm and Hugh followed the same authority in this matter, as in most others.[,5]

§ VI — How demons besiege men corporeally (Quomodo daemones obsideant homines corporaliter)

§ 3. Since demons are incorporeal, there is nothing to prevent them — provided they are permitted by divine dispensation — from entering into the bodies of men. For all Angels, both good and evil, possess by their very nature the power of transmuting human bodies, and likewise other natural bodies, as has been stated elsewhere.[7]

Now, since according to the testimony of St. John Damascene, wherever they operate, there they are,[8] it follows that they are said to enter into bodies, or to penetrate bodies and to be within them, when they operate within them — namely, by transmuting them as well. For in virtue of that operation, the angels themselves or the demons are truly said to be in bodies *substantially* (*substantialiter*) — that is, according to their substance — though not in such a manner according to substance as to be of the substance of man and to move the body after the manner of a substantial form or internal principle, as the soul moves it; but rather after the manner of an external mover, in the way that the intelligence of the heavens and a helmsman moves a ship.

§ 4. And first of all, demons can produce purely bodily changes in human bodies, such as transporting them from place to place, inflicting diseases, rendering a man mute, deaf, or blind; casting him into fire or water; making his body bent so that he cannot look upward; and similar things. Examples of these we have in the Gospel. Next, by means of that same motive power, they can operate variously upon the external senses of men and alter them: either by placing internally an impediment in the organ, or by externally presenting alien appearances (*species alienas*), or by deceiving men in some other way, so that they do not perceive things actually present and seem to see things that are not there. To this belongs the transformation of men into beasts, according to outward and apparent appearance only. Certain examples of this are related by St. Augustine.[9] Now all these things and things like them are certain kinds of diabolical obsession, but imperfect and secondary only. Hence those who suffer such things are not customarily called simply obsessed, but "vexed by the devil." And by these means demons can also obsess beasts, with God's permission. An example of this regarding the swine we have in the Gospel, and regarding the serpent in Genesis.[10]

§ 5. The perfect and principal kind of diabolical obsession, however, is when the demon so disturbs and agitates the imagination of a man that the use of reason is impeded. This it accomplishes either by variously stirring up the humors in the body — whence naturally follows the disturbance of the interior senses, as also happens in those who suffer phrenitis without any vexation by a demon — or by operating more immediately upon the interior senses, now mixing together and confusing the appearances (*species*) of things present or inexistent, now presenting alien appearances. Here it must be noted that, since phrenetics and demoniacs are similar to one another in many respects, so that in this matter error frequently occurs — when either those who are merely phrenetic are judged to be demoniacs, or conversely — those who are truly obsessed by a demon are to be recognized by the following sign: if they do or say things that could not be done by a man without the operation of a separated substance, such as revealing secret words or deeds of others neither seen nor heard; telling what is happening in remote places; speaking a language they never learned; reading or writing letters they never learned; and other things of this kind. None of these things can be done either by those who are merely phrenetic or by those who only pretend to be demoniacs.

§ 6. Those, moreover, who are thus afflicted by the devil according to this perfect mode are properly called obsessed and possessed (*obsessi et possessi*) by the devil, and demoniacs. Nor do we here distinguish between the obsessed and the possessed, as certain writers do, as though being possessed by a demon were something more than being obsessed. For Scripture indeed has neither of these words; but the Fathers use either one indifferently. These same persons are also called by the Greek term *energumeni*, meaning, as it were, those worked upon — that is, those acted upon by an operating spirit. Concerning this kind, then, the Gospel repeatedly testifies: not only that they were vexed by demons, but also that demons entered into them — namely, by reason of their more efficacious and fuller power of operating within them. Because the demons also overturn in them the use of reason, so that they do not know what they do or say when the demon acts or speaks in them; just as neither the serpent in whom the devil tempted Eve, nor the she-ass through whom the Angel spoke to Balaam, knew what was happening — as St. Thomas writes.[11]

§ 7. It must finally be noted that demoniacs, even though they have certain intervals during which the actual diabolical operation ceases in them, are nonetheless said to be obsessed by the demon for as long as the power of operating in them has not been taken away from the demon; which removal comes about through the casting out of the demon, which is nothing other than the removal of the power which the demon held over the obsessed person.

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§ XII — Whether demons enter (illabantur) into the minds of men (Utrum daemones illabantur mentibus hominum)

§ 8. The Master asks: whether demons enter (*illabantur*) into the souls or minds of men according to their substance (*secundum substantiam*). On this matter Didymus discusses certain things in his books *On the Holy Spirit*. For in Book I (not far from the beginning) he teaches that the Holy Spirit fills (*implere*) the souls of men, but that this in no way belongs to the Angels. By this argument he concludes that the Holy Spirit is God, not a creature.[13] Furthermore (toward the end of Book II), he explains how Satan is sometimes said not merely to enter into the heart of man, but also to fill it — namely, not by moving the mind itself, which is the power of the Trinity alone, but by suggesting the manifold incentives to vice, of which he himself is full.[14] From Didymus, Gennadius appears to have taken his opinion.[15] From the same source Bede drew not only the opinion but the very words themselves into his commentary.[16] And whereas Didymus denies that demons enter the soul substantially, Bede says that the Trinity alone can fill the mind of man according to substance; the words of both authors are found in the Master.[17] The contemporary of the Master, St. Bernard, teaches the same thing in other words.[18] There also exists among the works of St. Augustine a book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, of which chapter 27 states that God alone fills the mind of man, though Satan may also in some sense be said to fill it.[19]

§ 9. In order that this teaching of these authors may be more fully understood, it must be known that there are many ways in which it belongs to God alone either to fill the minds of men or to enter into them.

First, it must be confessed (as is handed down by the authors already mentioned) that God alone fills the mind of man *according to substance* (*secundum substantiam*) — that is, that God alone, by the presence of His own nature, is intimately present to the whole soul inwardly, containing it, preserving it, governing it, and operating within it. A certain image of this is found in the soul with respect to the body. For the soul itself fills

the whole body in a certain manner *according to substance*, inasmuch as by its presence it gives and preserves life to the body, governs it, and operates within it.

Second: God alone fills the heart of man as regards the capacity of its desire. This indeed comes about when the desire of the rational creature is satisfied by the vision of His substance. Hence it is written in Ps. 102: "Who filleth thy desire with good things"; and in Ps. 16: "I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear."[20]

Third: God alone fills the heart of man through cognition (*cognitio*), because all the inmost recesses and hidden depths of the heart — that is, whatever most secret thoughts, affections, and intentions of the heart there may be — He alone searches and knows with His intimate power. Hence John, in 1 Jn. 3: "God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things."[21]

Fourth: By a certain particular formal character (*ratio*), God is said to enter (*illabi*) into the minds of men when He sanctifies them by the presence of His grace (*Gratia*) and makes them His dwelling and temple. He is also said by this same formal character to fill them with the infusion of more abundant grace, according to that of Acts 2: "They were all filled with the Holy Spirit";[22] and that of the Ecclesiastical prayer: "Fill the hearts of thy faithful."

§ 10. Of all these things that have been said, none can belong to Angels — not even to the good ones; but both good and evil Angels can only move the mind from without, by presenting to the senses, both interior and exterior, images of those things which incline toward the choice of good or evil, and by thus proposing such things to the intellect and will — but by no means by efficaciously producing the consent of the will, which belongs to God alone. Hence they can only be said to persuade and suggest, whether good or evil things.

Moreover, when those who consent to the suggestions of demons have consented, the devil is said to enter into them and sometimes also to fill them — not according to substance in the manner explained above, which we have called proper to God, but according to the effect of the suggestion applied from without, and according to the power of domination. Thus we read in Lk. 22 that the devil entered into Judas when he began to take counsel to betray the Lord.[23] For the same reason, John 13 says that the devil put it into the heart of Judas to betray the Lord.,[24] Likewise, again in John (in the same chapter further on), we read that Satan entered into Judas after the morsel, when he rose from the sacred supper and went out to accomplish the crime of betrayal.,[25] So also in Acts 5 we read what Peter said to Ananias: "Why hath Satan filled thy heart?",[26] — in which reading, as attested by the Greek manuscripts, the Latin authors Fulgentius,[27] and Bede,[28] also read; in which manner St. Jerome also translated it from Didymus.,[29]

§ 11. That the devil is said to enter into the heart of man — this St. Gregory so fully proves,[30] that he says one who denies it falls into the Pelagian heresy; for he is speaking against certain persons who said that the soul of Adam was not dead in sin, on the ground that the devil does not enter into the heart of man. This is Pelagian doctrine, contrary to the first canon of the Council of Arausica.,[31]

Now what has been said of demons is to be understood, conformably, of the good Angels, who are likewise rightly said to enter into the heart of man and to operate therein according to the effects of holy suggestions, according to that of Zach. 1: "The Angel spoke in me."[32] This Scripture text is used for this purpose by St. Bernard,[33] where he expressly teaches this same thing of the good Angels and lucidly expounds how this belongs differently to Angels and differently to God.[34]

§ I — How many and which are the orders of angels (Quot et qui sint Angelorum ordines)

§ 12. Concerning the orders of the Angels — how many and which they are, and by what proper characteristics they are distinguished from one another — we must discourse in such a way as to remember that knowledge of these matters is most remote from the senses and experience of mortals, and that accordingly one must not pronounce upon them from human reasonings, but only affirm as much as the sacred Scriptures and the authority of the Fathers illuminate for us here. For the Fathers too thought that they ought to touch upon this matter with sobriety. Hence St. Hilary, expounding Ps. 129, says: "Who can perceive the offices and functions of the Angels and Powers and Dominations, Thrones and Principalities?"[36] Similarly, St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 58, candidly confesses that he does not know how that most blessed and supernal society is constituted, nor what are the differences of persons therein.[37] And in the book to Orosius (*Against the Priscillianists and Origenists*, ch. 11), he says that he firmly believes and holds by undoubted faith

§ 13. — that there are in the heavens Seats, Dominations, and the like, and that they differ from one another, but what they are and how they differ among themselves, he does not know, and that in this ignorance there is no danger. Likewise St. Bernard, in Book V (*On Consideration*, ch. 4),[38] after having enumerated certain things about the Angels which he had come to know through reading, and declaring them to be held by faith (among which he sets down that they are distinct as persons, disposed in dignities, and standing from the beginning in their own order), teaches at last that it is a matter of opinion, not of faith, by what offices, merits, degrees, and orders they are distinguished among themselves, whose several names are expressed in the Scriptures. And in the sermon *On St. Martin*, after having enumerated the orders of the Angels, he says: "I have well named the names — perhaps that is all there is to it."[39] Nay, (Pseudo-)Dionysius himself, in his book *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 6, where he undertakes the exposition of the doctrine concerning the orders of the Angels, prefaces it by saying that God alone and the Angels themselves know with certainty how many orders there are, and which are the orders of the celestial natures.[40]

§ 14. That we may therefore follow Scripture above all as our guide in this matter: from the Apostle Paul we gather six or seven distinct orders of Angels. For in Col. 1, he expressly named four angelic order-names: Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers.[41] And although St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion* (at the passage already cited) is of the opinion that the Apostle comprised the entire celestial Society under those four words, yet from other passages of the Apostle something different appears. For in the Epistle to the Ephesians 1, he adds Virtues.[42] And lest we should think that even with this number of orders the whole multitude of heavenly Spirits had been comprehended by him, he adds in the same place this general clause: "and every name that is named, not only in this world but also in that which is to come.",[43] To the orders already mentioned, then, the same Apostle adds Angels in Rom. 8,[44] evidently as an order distinct from Principalities and Virtues; even though the name "Angel" is elsewhere throughout all of Scripture commonly attributed to all the supernal Spirits. To these is added the name of Archangels, which the same Apostle expressed in 1 Thess. 4,[45] as did also Jude in his Epistle.[46] Although they did not distinguish this name from the others, it is nonetheless beyond doubt that by this very name some pre-eminence and superiority above the other Angels, whether all of them or some, is signified. And this indeed from the Apostle Paul.

§ 15. Furthermore, in Is. 6, the Seraphim are named as a kind of peculiar order of Angels,[47] as also in the preface of the Canon of the Mass. And if we attend to the interpretation of the name, the Psalmist in Ps. 103 calls certain ministers of God a "burning fire" — or, as it is cited in Heb. 1 from the Apostle, "a flame of fire."[48]

The name Cherubim, or in the singular number Cherub, placed for an Angel or Angels of a certain order, we have in Gen. 3, Ezek. 10, and Ezek. 28.[49] To which add the *Canticum Ecclesiasticum* (*Te Deum*), in which Cherubim and Seraphim are joined together. For in other scriptural passages, such as Exod. 25, 3 Kgs. 6,[50] 2 Par. 3,[51] and wherever in the Psalms or elsewhere the Lord is said to sit upon the Cherubim, that name is understood literally as referring to certain images placed in the Sanctuary above the Propitiatory and covering it with extended wings, as is clear from the passages mentioned. We therefore have received nine words naming angelic orders collected from the Scriptures — though it is not entirely established from those same Scriptures that all the orders signified by these words are distinct from one another. For one might say that several words have been imposed to signify the same order, or that one is contained within another. For the name Archangel is found in Scripture only in the singular number, and moreover attributed to Michael, who, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, is not from the penultimate order of the Angels, but is first in the highest order, as will be stated in the next distinction.[52] Hence the name Archangel, as signifying the penultimate order of the Angels, does not appear to be found in Scripture, except according to those who say that Michael is from the penultimate order of the Angels — an opinion of how little probability we shall teach below.

§ 16. Therefore I am surprised at St. Gregory, Homily 44,[53] who says that the pages of Sacred Scripture testify to almost all the Angels and Archangels, since mention of Archangels is rare in Scripture — nay, found in no place except two, in the singular number, where it is almost certain that it does not signify a peculiar order but the Prince of all the Angels. Furthermore, St. Jerome, Book II (*Against the Pelagians*, ch. 3), makes the name Virtues a general one, when he says: "We read of Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the remaining Virtues."[54] And also in 2 Pet. 2 and in the Epistle of Jude we read *doxas* — that is, glories or splendors — which many and with probability interpret of Angels.[55] From which some might suspect that this tenth order must be added, for the sake of completeness, to the nine aforesaid.

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§ 17. Nevertheless, it has been handed down by the consensus of many Fathers that the Orders of the Angels are nine — neither more nor fewer — distinguished from one another in rank and dignity. For Ignatius, in his Epistle to the Trallians (which St. Jerome acknowledges in his *Catalogue* as genuinely belonging to that author), enumerates nine orders, placing the Militias (*Militiae*) in the position of the Principalities.[56] Dionysius, a contemporary of Ignatius, recensed the same number in his work on the celestial hierarchy,[40] where, treating the matter methodically, he establishes three Hierarchies of Angels, and then subdivides each of these in turn into three Orders, which together make nine. Moreover, St. Gregory and St. John Damascene cite Dionysius as their authority in this matter and follow him.[57] The same number is transmitted by St. Jerome,[58] St. John Chrysostom,[59] Eucherius,[60] St. Bernard,[61] Rupert,[62] the author of the *Altercation of the Church and the Synagogue*,[63] and the author of the sermon ascribed to St. Athanasius on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin.[64] Gregory of Nazianzus does not disagree, inasmuch as in the fourth book of his *Theological Orations*,[65] near the end, he enumerates the same orders and the same number, though he exchanges the Hebrew names *Cherubim* and *Seraphim* for Greek equivalents signifying splendours and flames. To these authorities is added the Ecclesiastical Office, which in the Feast of St. Michael and again in the Feast of All Saints enumerates all those same Orders.

§ 18. There is, however, some diversity of enumeration among the authorities just mentioned. For St. Gregory and St. Bernard differ from Dionysius and St. John Damascene in the placement of one Order: they set the Virtues in the third place, ascending from the lower to the higher, whereas Dionysius and Damascene place them in the middle position of the second Hierarchy — that is, in the fifth and middle place among all nine — where Gregory and Bernard situate the Principalities. And indeed the order of enumeration found in the Apostle, at Eph. 1, would seem to favour Dionysius, since there Virtue is placed between Power (*Potestas*) and Domination.[42] But the other Apostolic passage, at Col. 1, would seem to favour Gregory, since there Principalities are named between Dominations and Powers.'[41] St. Thomas carefully explains the congruence of both arrangements,'[66] and in the end thinks both opinions can be reconciled if we say that what Gregory calls Principalities are what Dionysius calls Virtues, and what Gregory calls Virtues are what Dionysius calls Principalities — for this can be gathered from St. Gregory's own explanation.

§ 19. Furthermore, other writers do not appear to have observed any fixed principle of arrangement in their enumeration of the orders. For St. Jerome, writing against Rufinus, begins with the Cherubim and places the Virtues in the fourth position from the end, and in certain other respects diverges from Dionysius and Gregory. The same may be observed in the Ecclesiastical Office of the Feasts of St. Michael and of All Saints according to Roman usage.

§ 20. Now, besides the authors already mentioned, there are others who enumerate fewer Angelic Orders, yet not with the intention of excluding a larger number. For — to pass over Maximinus the heretic, who, in the words cited by St. Augustine in his second book written against him, enumerates eight orders[67] — Methodius, as found in Epiphanius in the heresy of Origen, recensed only seven.'[68] And St. Jerome, in the second book against Jovinian, likewise recensed seven, yet adding these words: "and every name," and so forth, by which he signifies that he had not enumerated them all.'[69] He completes the number, however, when writing against Rufinus, as has been said. St. Ambrose, in the second book *On the Faith*, enumerates only four,[70] as does St. Cyril of Jerusalem in the sixth Catechesis.'[71] But these Fathers, as I have said, did not propose to recensy all the Angelic Orders, nor to hand down their definite number and their differences among themselves — just as the Church did not propose this in the Preface of the Canon of the Mass, or in the hymn *Te Deum laudamus*, or in certain other parts of the Divine Office, in which she has been content to name by their proper names only some of the Orders, now more, now fewer. And yet in all these cases it must be noted that names passed over in silence by some, or in one place, were expressed by others, or in another place; so that even among those who appear to have posited a smaller number, if the various passages are collated, it is not difficult to find the number nine.

§ 21. And indeed St. Gregory holds that this number of the Angelic Orders is signified to us in Scripture by the nine precious stones which Ezekiel enumerates in his description of the Prince of Tyre (Ezek. 28).[72]

From these opinions of the Fathers, therefore, later theologians have not undeservedly taught with one accord that there are nine Orders of Angels distinct from one another. Their teaching is unjustly criticised by the heretics of this age as curious and rash. For it is not a rash or curious inquiry, but a pious one and worthy of a theologian, to ask what things are signified by the names set forth in Sacred Scripture, and what is the distinction among the things signified — provided this is done in a moderate fashion, and that boldness in asserting with certainty what cannot be plainly proved is absent. For, as St. Bernard says,[73] "To what end did the names of heavenly beings become known, if it is not even permitted, with faith preserved, to form some opinion about the things whose names they are?"

§ 22. But here one or two objections must briefly be removed. For Pope Leo IX, as found in Gratian, appears to acknowledge ten Orders of Angels, when he says that a tenth Order fell through pride; whereon a certain Gloss says: "we do not have the name of the tenth Order."[74] But another Gloss there answers aptly and consistently: "Nor can we have it, since there were only nine." The sense therefore is, as that same Gloss explains, that as many angels fell as could have constituted an order — understand this with respect to number. Hence it is also said that from among human beings the tenth order is being restored — of which more below.[75]

§ 23. The other objection was raised above, from the Epistles of Peter and Jude, which appear to attribute *doxas* — that is, glories or majesties — to Angels as the name of a certain Order.[55] But it can be said that this does not signify an Order distinct from those already mentioned, but that which Gregory of Nazianzus in the fourth book of his *Theological Orations* calls splendours — what we, in the Hebrew name, call Cherubim, which signifies a multitude of knowledge. Although it can also be answered otherwise: namely, that by the name *doxai* all the heavenly Spirits are designated in general, on account of the excellence of their intellectual nature, or also on account of the glory of beatitude — for the Apostles do not number the *doxai* alongside the other orders as an order distinct from them, but name them alone. An easier answer, however (though I know not whether it is the truer one), is that given by those who understand *doxai* to refer not to Angels but to men pre-eminent in power and glory. On which matter the Commentaries may be consulted.[76]

§ II — What are the distinctive properties of the individual orders? (Quae singulorum ordinum proprietates?)

§ 24. The properties by which the Angelic Orders are distinguished from one another with probability are drawn from their very names. For names are customarily given to things on account of their properties, and this ought to hold especially in the case of the Angels, whose names serve no other purpose than that through them the Angels themselves become known to us. Now what properties are signified by the names of the Orders has been learnedly set forth by (Pseudo-)Dionysius,[78] and by St. Gregory,[79] and by St. Bernard.[80] Following the first two of these, St. Thomas[77] declares the meaning of the Angelic names and degrees with sufficient lucidity.

§ 25. Now according to (Pseudo-)Dionysius, Gregory of Nazianzus, and St. John Damascene — Greek authors — the arrangement of the heavenly hosts into three Hierarchies and nine Orders is as follows: the first, that is the highest, Hierarchy comprises the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; the second, the Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; the third, the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. According to the Latin writers, however — St. Gregory, St. Bernard, the Master [of the Sentences], and the Scholastics — the first Hierarchy is similarly arranged; but the middle one contains the Dominations, Principalities, and Powers, and the lowest contains the Virtues, Archangels, and Angels. We have said above that the former order of enumeration appears to be founded on Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians (Eph. 1:21), and the latter on the same Apostle's Epistle to the Colossians (Col. 1:16). Following this order as received by the Latin writers, and using the reasonings set out above, we can give a rational account of the names of the individual orders as follows.

§ 26. *Angels* are so called either because they announce lesser things, as St. Gregory expounds, or because they are assigned as guardians to individual human beings, as St. Bernard holds. *Archangels*, according to both authorities, are those who announce greater things; according to others, those who have charge not over

individual human beings but over multitudes — such as those who in Dan. 10 are called the Princes of kingdoms. *Virtues*, according to both, are those through whom signs and miracles are wrought. It must be noted, however, that the Church, in the Divine Office, calls this order the *Virtutes caelorum* ("Virtues of the heavens"), looking to the passage in the Gospel, Matt. 24 and Lk. 21, where it is said that when Christ comes to judgment the "Virtues of the heavens" (*virtutes caelorum*) shall be moved. To this St. Bernard also looked. Hence it might seem that all the Intelligences that move the heavens belong to this order. If that were so, the number of Angels comprised in this order would be very small, being only as many as there are heavens to be moved. It must therefore be said rather that the Virtues of the heavens are so called not because they move the heavens but because they dwell in the heavens as their abode — as if one were to say "the celestial armies." For we find this name attributed to the Angels in 3 Kgs., last chapter, and in 2 Para. 18, just as in Lk. 2 they are called the "heavenly militia" (*militia caelestis*). That the Virtues are called an army is shown from the fact that in Scripture we read God called indifferently now "God of Virtues" (*Deus Virtutum*) and now "God of Armies" (*Deus Exercituum*). Nevertheless, the operation of miracles is not improperly ascribed to the Virtues as the name of the third order, because the Lord was speaking of signs and prodigies that would appear in heaven and on earth when He said that the "Virtues of the heavens" shall be moved — as St. Bernard likewise observed.

§ 27. *Powers*, according to both the aforesaid authors, are those by whose ministry the power of the Prince of Darkness is restrained, lest he do as much harm as he wills. *Principalities* are those who rule over the Angels subject to them for carrying out the divine ministries, ordering what is to be done by each individual, as St. Gregory interprets; or, according to St. Bernard, those by whose governance every principality on earth is established, ruled, and changed. *Dominations*, according to the same authors, are those who so excel the aforesaid orders that in relation to them all others appear to be ministering spirits, and all their service is referred to the Dominations as to lords. *Thrones* — that is, seats in which God is said to sit — are so called, according to St. Gregory, because through them He determines His judgments; and, as St. Bernard says, "judges all things with tranquillity"; or, according to St. Thomas, because they surpass the orders subject to them in this excellence, that they know the reasons of God's works immediately in God Himself. *Cherubim* are named from knowledge (*scientia*), because they possess such fullness of knowledge and wisdom that they pour it out, as it were, upon the orders subject to them. *Seraphim* are named from burning (*ardor*), because being wholly enkindled with divine love they enkindle others to love God ardently.

§ 28. In these Angelic Orders it must further be observed that every excellence of any lower order is contained within the excellence of any higher order, but not conversely. For although all spiritual perfections are common to all Angels, they are not common equally; for the higher orders, being by the condition of their nature more capacious than the rest, participate more fully and perfectly in the gifts of God; and since even among the perfections themselves there is a certain gradation, the higher perfection is attributed to the higher order by way of property, and to the lower order by way of participation. Conversely, the lower perfection is attributed to the lower order by way of property, and to the higher order by way of eminence. And thus it comes about that a higher order takes its name from a higher perfection, as St. Thomas teaches.[81] And although the greatest gift of God, and therefore the greatest perfection, is to see God as He is — since therein consists the supreme felicity of the intellectual creature — yet it is not Cherubim, which is named from knowledge, but Seraphim, which is named from burning, that is, from love, that bears the name of the first order; because, as the Master rightly teaches, charity is a greater gift than knowledge. Understand this of the state of this present life; for in the beatific state (*status beatificus*) the vision of God (*visio Dei*) surpasses all

other gifts. Moreover, the names given to Angels and the Angelic Orders were given not for their own sake but for ours, to whom charity, as the most excellent gift of God among those we can attain in this life, is commended by the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13.

§ 29. Finally, it must be known that not every distinction of the degrees and offices of the Angels is known to us. For since we have received a very imperfect knowledge of the Angels, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius testifies,[40] we can distinguish their orders and offices only in a general way; and in this fashion many Angels are contained under a single order — since, moreover, even within one and the same order there are first, middle, and last, namely according to approach toward or recession from the order above, as the same St. (Pseudo-)Dionysius teaches.›[82] To this pertains also what the Master teaches in his text and fittingly proves: that not all Angels of the same order were or have been from the beginning equal to one another, inasmuch as Lucifer, though he was in the first order, nevertheless surpassed all others of the same order. If we were to know perfectly the offices and distinctions of the Angels, we should know perfectly that each individual Angel has his own proper office and his own proper place in the order of things, just as each individual star has its own, as St. Thomas says.›[83] Therefore, although all Angels of the same order agree in a certain common office proper to that order, it must by no means be thought that they are all simply equal in nature. Indeed, it is altogether more in keeping with the order of the whole Universe that in the whole of the universe there be no two things so alike that the one does not surpass the other in the endowments of both nature and grace — as we have said here and elsewhere. And this must altogether be maintained according to that opinion which holds that all Angels differ from one another in species, since diverse species are like diverse numbers, of which one always exceeds another by a unit or by more.›[84]

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§ III — That the orders of the Angels were distinguished from the beginning (Ordines Angelorum ab initio distinctos fuisse)

§ 30. To the question whether Angels were distributed into Hierarchies and Orders from the beginning of their creation, and whether they have this distinction from their nature, it must be answered affirmatively in accordance with the common doctrine of theologians, which St. Thomas also hands down.[86] The reason for this doctrine is that, according to the opinion of all, Angels received diverse endowments of nature at their creation, and they obtained grace also — whether given at creation or bestowed afterward — in greater or lesser degree according to the capacity of their nature, as was said above (at Dist. III). Through these differences, then, both of natural and gratuitous gifts, the Hierarchies and Orders are distinguished in the Republic of Angels, in such a way that they were constituted through nature and perfected through grace, inasmuch as grace is perfective of nature. Hence, although the fallen angels have lost grace, yet since, as (Pseudo-)Dionysius says, "the natural endowments remain intact in them," it comes about that even in them a certain order of relation and subjection is still discerned, as was explained above (at Dist. VI) where the question of the rule of the demons was treated. This fact is a certain proof that the Angelic Orders are distinct by nature and therefore from the beginning. To this point also tend the arguments by which, at the same Distinction, it was shown that some Angels fell from each of the individual orders. For from this it at least follows that before the fall and confirmation of good and evil this distribution of orders existed.

§ 31. Finally, St. Bernard was so certain that Angels stood in their order from the beginning that he numbers this among the things he knows about the Angels on faith.[87] It is therefore not without error that Rupert,[88] denies that the Angelic Orders were distinct from the beginning, and says that the good Angels received them as a reward for not having sinned but having been willing to be subject to their Creator. In the same opinion is found also the Author of the *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae*,[63] who maintains that the orders of the Angels were not constituted before they were confirmed, and attempts to prove this from the very names of the Seraphim, Thrones, and so forth. This argument has been answered by us above (at the place just cited). In the same opinion the Master also may seem to have been when, at section G. of the present question, he answers in the negative. But if his opinion be carefully examined, it will be found in reality to agree with ours. For he means nothing other than that the Angels were distinguished from the beginning according to natural gifts alone, to which the distinction according to gratuitous gifts was subsequently added. This is indeed asserted by the Master in conformity with that opinion which holds that Angels were not created in grace. Perhaps in this way the opinions of Rupert and of the other unnamed author may also be excused. For some of the Scholastics, among whom even St. Bonaventure, speak in a similar fashion.[89]

§ IV — In what sense the tenth order is said to be filled from human beings (Quomodo decimus ordo ex hominibus compleri dicatur)

§ 32. What is found in the Master at section G. — that the tenth order is to be filled from human beings, and that Scripture attests this — is not to be understood of Sacred Scripture, which nowhere says this, but of the writings of the holy Fathers, although not even among them is this so expressly stated. The Master, however, cites St. Gregory as his authority, in whose Homily 34 (*Super Evangelia*) this sentence is read: "The woman had ten coins, because there are nine orders of Angels; but so that the number of the elect might be completed, man the tenth was created," and so forth.[91] From this passage the Gloss ordinary draws its text on the parable of the lost drachma (Lk. 15), which reads: "To the nine orders of Angels man was added, so that the number of the elect might be completed," and so forth. Something similar is indicated by Leo IX,[92] when he says that the tenth order fell through pride and is to be supplied from human beings. Thereupon the Gloss adduces also the authority of Isidore to the same effect.

§ 33. Now this opinion is first not to be taken as though the number of the human elect constitutes a society and a kingdom distinct and separate from the Angels. That interpretation is false and contrary to Scripture, since the Apostle in Heb. 12 makes one City and one Church of men and Angels.[93] Hence St. Augustine also teaches,[94] that there are not two but one Society of Angels and men, inasmuch as they have in common the same Supreme Good, end and beatitude — just as there is one evil society and, by consequence, a common damnation of demons and reprobate men. The same is proved by the prayers of the Church, in which we ask to be led to the society of the heavenly citizens. On this account the good Angels acknowledge us, even while placed here on earth, as their fellow-citizens, as St. Gregory attests.[95] Add that, since we acknowledge nine distinct orders among the Angels and yet one society and Kingdom of all, it is clear that the tenth order to be assumed from human beings must not be understood as if it constitutes some separate City of God distinct from the rest.

§ 34. With this interpretation removed, some have thought that just as the elect among men cannot attain to the natural perfection of the Angels — since the distinction of human nature from angelic will always remain — so neither will they ever attain, whether all or any of them, to the perfection of grace and glory of the Angels; and therefore of necessity in the Kingdom of Heaven men will constitute a tenth order of the elect distinct from the nine Angelic Orders and inferior to all of them. In favour of this opinion the following argument appears: All Angels received grace according to the capacity of their natural powers; therefore in them the capacity of nature is fulfilled; but the capacity of men is less, because theirs is an inferior nature; therefore men cannot receive as much grace as the Angels have. Hence it is necessary that all men fall below the dignity of the Angelic Orders.

§ 35. But this opinion too St. Thomas rejects as erroneous, both in his *Commentary on the Sentences*[96] and in the *Summa*.[97] "For it is repugnant," he says, "to the promise of Christ, who says in Lk. 20 that the sons of the resurrection will be equal to the Angels in heaven." Yet this proof does not seem sufficiently conclusive. For the Lord there is not speaking of an equal degree of glory, but of perfect immortality, which excludes both the need for food and drink and the generation of children. To the argument made in favour of the opinion it is answered with St. Bonaventure,[98] that grace and glory have indeed been given to the Angels according to the proportion of their natural endowments, and in some sense according to their capacity, as was said above (at Dist. III), yet not in such a way that they cannot absolutely receive more. For absolutely, God could, while their nature remained, have conferred upon them greater grace and glory. Therefore nothing prevents men from attaining to equality of glory with that which the Angels now have.

§ 36. The opinion of others is that not all but only certain men are to be assumed into the orders of the Angels — namely, either virgins alone, as some have said, whom St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure rightly refute on the ground that many non-virgins are more eminent than many virgins; or, according to others, only the perfect. They say that the tenth order is made up of all those who are so imperfect in holiness and so small in merits that they cannot attain to any of the nine Angelic Orders. And they wish this to be signified by the tenth drachma in the evangelical parable. By this argument St. Bonaventure was also led to embrace this opinion. But in truth this argument has little probability; for the tenth drachma which is described as lost and found signifies not only men of imperfect holiness, but the whole human race which, lost in Adam, was so restored in Christ that from it, even according to the said opinion, many attain to the dignity of the Angels and are associated with the various choirs of the Angels — indeed, above all of them the Blessed Virgin Mother of God has borne off the summit of merits, as St. Gregory attests.[99]

§ 37. Nor is it necessary for the imperfect to constitute a separate order distinct from the higher orders. For since all men of the elect are to be assumed into the society of the Angels, it is not improbably said that the lowest order of the Angels extends widely enough to be able to comprehend even the lowest of the elect. What therefore is said — that the tenth order, signified by the tenth drachma, is to be filled from human beings — means nothing other than that, besides the nine orders of the Angels, there is also a certain further number of the elect, consisting namely of human beings whose nature is diverse from that of the Angels, who do not therefore constitute any order by themselves — if we look at their merits — but, according to the diversity of their merits, are mingled with the diverse Angelic Choirs, as St. Gregory holds.[79] Hence the Gloss cited above does not say that the tenth order is composed of human beings, but that the tenth number of the elect is completed from them.'[100]

§ V — How the ruin of the angels is said to be restored from among human beings (Quomodo ex hominibus instaurari dicatur Angelica ruina)

§ 38. It is frequent among ecclesiastical writers to say that the repair or restoration (*instauratio*) of the angelic ruin is brought about from among the elect of mankind. This is found in St. Augustine in very many places, as in *De Civitate Dei* bk. 22, ch. 1, in the *Enchiridion* chs. 29, 61, and 62, and elsewhere.[102] St. Gregory likewise holds it in bk. 31 of the *Moralia*, ch. 35, and in Homilies 21 and 34 on the Gospels.[103] So too Isidore in bk. 1 of *De Officiis*,[104] St. Bernard in Sermon 1 on the Advent of the Lord and in Sermon 1 on St. Michael,[105] Leo IX as cited by Gratian in the place cited above,[106] and others. Some rather impertinently adduce in this connection that text of Ps. 109, "He shall fill up the ruins" (*Implebit ruinas*), although it is established that this passage has a far different sense — even though Lyranus, moralising, wrests it hither. It appears rather that the Fathers had in view the text of the Apostle in Eph. 1, where he says that all things in Christ are restored, both those that are in the heavens and those that are on earth.[107]

§ 39. For St. Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 62), after reciting these words of the Apostle, says: "In Him are restored the things that are in the heavens, when what had there fallen in the angels is rendered back from among human beings. But the things that are on earth are restored, when those very human beings who are predestined to eternal life are renewed from the oldness of corruption." So he. Yet St. Jerome shows (*in Commentario*) that this is not properly what the Apostle's words signify; for Jerome holds that one should not read "restore" (*instaurare*) but "recapitulate" (*recapitulare*), according to the proper signification of the Greek word. And the sense of this, he says, is: that all things which are in the heavens and which are on earth — that is, angels and human beings who had been divided from God by sin — are recalled to one Head, Christ, through that same Christ. This sense is also produced by the Greek commentators, such as St. John Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others.[108] It is therefore impertinent to the Apostle's words to raise the question whether the human race was created or repaired for this purpose, that by it the angelic ruin should be supplied; just as the other question is equally impertinent: whether human beings are assumed to the heavenly society according to the number of the angels who stood, or of those who fell. Yet we shall reply briefly to these minor questions, inasmuch as they bear on understanding what we are now inquiring, that is, in what sense the Fathers say that the angelic ruin is being restored from among human beings.

§ 40. Reply to the first: it is answered that the human being was created and repaired not principally but secondarily, so that through him there might be a restoration of the angelic ruin — as was said above at Dist. 1 of this book.[109] The reason is this: that from the creation and repair of man, this good thing indeed followed by God's ordering, namely that a certain restoration of the preceding angelic ruin came about; yet man was not principally made for this purpose, but in order that he might enjoy God as his highest good. Hence even if the angel had not sinned, man would nonetheless have been created and, after the Fall, repaired — as the Master too testifies in text §. G. of this Distinction. And because the glorification of Christ the man is a greater good than the repair of the angelic ruin, it is on this account that Rupert in bk. 3 of *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, chs. 20 and 21,[110] teaches that the angels themselves were created not so much for the sake of human beings (that is, in order to supply their ruin) as rather for the sake of the one man Christ. Although even this must not be taken in such a sense that we should suppose the Son of God would not have been incarnate had the angelic nature not been created; but rather that, as things now stand, God's ordering is such that the angelic nature and the whole universe serves the glory of Christ the man — an ordering that would not have obtained if man had not sinned. This matter is treated more fully at Dist. 1, 16, and 30.

§ 41. As regards the second question: St. Gregory (Hom. 34 on the Gospels)[79] is of the opinion that as many from the human race ascend to the heavenly city as there were angels who happened to remain there, on the ground that it is written: "He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God" (*Statuit terminos gentium secundum numerum Angelorum Dei*) — for so the Seventy read at Deut. 32, in place of what we read from the Hebrew: "According to the number of the sons of God" (*Juxta numerum filiorum Dei*).[111] This opinion appears also to have pleased the Master. The Gloss likewise holds it (on ch. 4 of *Hi duo*),[112] but is there corrected by another Gloss drawing on Isidore — and not without reason, since a restoration is made in order to supply what was lost, not to double what remained. The authors cited above, and among them expressly Gregory, speak of restoration and supplementation. Moreover, if one considers the immense multitude of the blessed angels which the Scriptures proclaim to us, as we showed at Dist. 3,[113] it does not seem possible for the multitude of the elect among human beings to equal them — especially since the human race perishes in its greater part, for few are those who are saved, whereas among the angels the fallen are the smaller part. Furthermore, the scripture of Deuteronomy which Gregory cites, examined according to the Hebrew truth, bears a far different sense: namely, that God so distributed to the other peoples their territories for habitation that a certain chosen portion of the land, that is, a good and ample possession, was reserved for the people of Israel. Rupert also responds to this scripture passage (in the last chapter of the aforementioned book),[114] but does not appear to have grasped the genuine sense, even though he rejects the said opinion of Gregory (in the same place and in ch. 20).

§ 42. Therefore the opinion of others is that as many from among human beings are assumed to the restoration of the heavenly city as angels fell from it. The reasons already stated favour this opinion. So hold Isidore, bk. 1 (*De Officiis*, ch. 10),[104] and St. Anselm, bk. 1 (*Cur Deus homo*, ch. 16).[115] St. Augustine, however (*Enchiridion*, chs. 29 and 116, and *De Civitate* bk. 2, ch. 1),[116] speaks of this question in such a way as to think that the heavenly City is to be defrauded of none of its proper citizens — the number of those who had fallen being indeed completed, and perhaps also reigning with an even more abundant supply, that is, with certain ones added beyond the number of those who fell.[117] The same Augustine (*Enchiridion*, ch. 62) says: "The holy angels, taught by God, know what number of supplementation the integrity of that City awaits from the human race" — as if to say that human beings do not know this. Yet whether the angels know what Augustine says may rightly be doubted. For, as the prayer of the Church has it, the number of the elect is known to God alone. Moreover, if the angels knew that number, they would consequently also know the nearness of the Day of Judgement, which Christ in the Gospel denies.[118] Wherefore it seems one must say that none of these things is certain — not even that which Augustine in two places seems to affirm, namely that the entire number of those who fell is to be supplied. For since the restoration of the angelic ruin is only a secondary and, as it were, accidental end of the repair of the human race, it is not necessary that the number of the elect among human beings should reach the number of the fallen angels. It is therefore better to leave this whole question under doubt; although we do not deny that the latter part of the question is more probably held, on account of the reasons stated above.

§ 43. It is also not rashly said — indeed it is asserted with great probability — that human beings, in supplementation of the angelic ruin which occurred in all the Orders, are assumed to all the Orders, as St. Gregory teaches at length in Homily 34,[79] with whom St. Thomas agrees,[119] and the rest of the Scholastics. This is also proved by reason, namely from the very great diversity of holiness and justice among human beings, to which accordingly the distribution of rewards through the various Orders ought to correspond. Yet it will not be contrary to this opinion, nor will anyone hold an improbable view, if someone were to say that

all the elect among human beings are to be associated with the lowest Hierarchy of the angels, with the exception of a few of outstanding holiness and perfection, who are to be associated with the higher Orders. For there are very few human beings in this life possessed of as great a charity as was present in the angels who were placed on the way of merit (*in via merendi*). Wherefore only very few can equal their glory. And altogether, the higher a given Order is, the fewer elect from among human beings will it contain. But you will say: by the same reasoning, it would come about that even to the lowest Hierarchy or Order only a few would be joined. It can be answered — as we have already indicated above — that the lowest Hierarchy, because there is no other after it, will by a certain extension receive all those who do not attain to the perfection of the highest or middle rank.

§ I — That the guardian angels are not the servants of men but of God (Angelos custodes non esse hominum ministros, sed Dei)

§ 44. In this distinction and the one immediately following, the subject treated is the mission or legation of the holy Angels to men, and in general the angelic governance of human beings. From this very mission the Angels have also received their name. For "Angel," says St. Gregory in his homily,[79] "is not a name of nature but of office, signifying a messenger or legate." This is true if one looks to the etymology of the word; for otherwise, by the usage of Scripture and the Church, it signifies the nature itself of the intellectual creature, as was said above.[121]

§ 45. But before we come to the principal question of this distinction, two things must be noted in general concerning the mission of the Angels. The first of these is the following: when we say that Angels are sent into ministry (*ministerium*), in accordance with what the Apostle says in Heb. 1 — "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth for ministry on behalf of those who," etc.[122] — one must not suppose that the Angels are the servants of men. For since they are far superior to men dwelling on earth in gifts both of nature and of grace, they are no more to be called servants of men than men are to be called lords of Angels. For servants are subject to lords; but Angels are not subject to men, but to the one man who is God, Christ Jesus. Hence the Apostle does not say that they are sent into the ministry *of* men, but that they are sent into ministry *on account of* men — namely, those who are heirs of salvation, that is, on account of the Elect. For, as St. John Chrysostom says in his commentary on that passage, "the office of the Angels is to minister to God for our salvation."[123]

§ 46. For this reason, too, the Angel in Rev. 19 and 22 calls himself not the servant of a man but his fellow-servant (*conservus*) — and not of all men, but of John and his brethren, that is, of Christians.[124] Moreover, Raphael did not present himself to Tobias's son as his servant (*minister*) but as his guide (*ductor*). And in Dan. 10 the Angels are not called the servants (*ministri*) of kingdoms but their princes (*principes*).[125] Finally, while the Angels are very frequently called the ministers of God in Scripture, they are nowhere to be read as having been called the ministers of men.

§ 47. Proof: The same point is proved from St. Leo, who, in his sermon,[126] argues from the fact that the Angels are read to have ministered to Christ (Matt. 4)[127] that —

1. Phil. 1:23: "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."
2. Lk. 23:43: "With me thou shalt be in Paradise."
3. 1 Cor. 13.
4. St. Basil, *Hexameron* (referred to by Estius in the context of St. Ambrose's imitation of it); the phrase "in the same manner as the Angels" (*perinde ut Angeli*) is found in St. Basil but was not added by St. Ambrose in his own *Hexameron*.
5. St. Anselm and Hugh (of St. Victor) followed St. Augustine's position on Paul's rapture.
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 111, a. 2 and 3; II-II, q. 105, a. 3; and again III, q. 44, a. 3, ad 3 and ad 4.
7. The reference to "as has been stated elsewhere" (*alibi dictum est*) refers to earlier distinctions in this commentary.
8. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 3 (the principle that wherever angels operate, there they are).
9. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, ch. 18.
10. The swine: Matt. 8:30–32, Mk. 5:11–13, Lk. 8:32–33. The serpent: Gen. 3.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 36, a. 5 [note: Estius cites this as "quest. 36. art. 5" but the correct reference per the page image is II-II, q. 36, a. 5; this may be a misprint in the original for another locus, likely II-II, q. 172, a. 6 or similar; rendered as cited in the source].
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 111, a. 2.
13. Didymus of Alexandria, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book I (not far from the beginning).
14. Didymus of Alexandria, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book II (toward the end).
15. Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 82.
16. Bede, *Commentary on Acts*, ch. 5 (compiled from Didymus's words).
17. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, the relevant distinction (the words of Didymus and Bede are quoted in the Master).
18. St. Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica*, Sermon 5.
19. [Pseudo-]Augustine, *De Spiritu et Anima*, ch. 27.
20. Ps. 102:5 ("Who filleth thy desire with good things") and Ps. 16:15 ("I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall appear").
21. 1 Jn. 3:20.
22. Acts 2:4.
23. Lk. 22:3.
24. Jn. 13:2.
25. Jn. 13:27 (Satan entered into Judas after the morsel).
26. Acts 5:3.
27. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Epistola* I, ch. 8.
28. Bede, *Commentary on Acts* (the same passage).
29. St. Jerome, translating from Didymus, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Book III.
30. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistolarum* VI, Epistle 31.
31. Council of Arausica (Orange I, 441), Canon 1.
32. Zach. 1:9 (the Angel speaking "in" the prophet).
33. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 5 (where he treats the good Angels' operation in human minds).

34. See footnote (a) in the source: Jean Mabillon, *Notis ad tomum tertium Operum Sancti Bernardi, in sermonem quintum in Cantica*, n. 10, nota 139, p. 46, praises Estius's exposition of St. Bernard's meaning at that place, noting that Estius is so highly esteemed that even the most eminent scholars copy out nearly entire paragraphs of his work for the adornment of their own lucubrations.

35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 5.

36. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Psalmum* 129.

37. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 58.

38. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 4.

39. St. Bernard, Sermon *On St. Martin* (with the words: "I have well named the names — perhaps this is all there is to it").

40. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, ch. 6.

41. Col. 1:16.

42. Eph. 1:21.

43. Eph. 1:21: "and every name that is named, not only in this world but also in that which is to come."

44. Rom. 8:38.

45. 1 Thess. 4:16.

46. Jude 9.

47. Is. 6:2.

48. Ps. 103:4; cited also in Heb. 1:7.

49. Gen. 3:24; Ezek. 10; Ezek. 28:14–16.

50. Exod. 25:18–22; 3 Kgs. 6:23–28.

51. 2 Par. 3:10–13.

52. The next distinction (Dist. X) will treat the question of Michael's order.

53. St. Gregory the Great, *Homilia* 44 (*super Evangelia*).

54. St. Jerome, *Adversus Pelagianos* II, ch. 3.

55. 2 Pet. 2:10; Jude 8 (*doxas*, "glories").

56. St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistle to the Trallians*; cited by St. Jerome, *De Viris Illustribus* (*Catalogus*).

57. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 24; St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, ch. 3.

58. St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Rufinum* II.

59. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 4.

60. Eucherius, *Formulae Spirituales*, ch. 11.

61. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 4; *Sermo de Sancto Martino*; *In Canticum Canticorum*, hom. 18.

62. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* III, ch. 16.

63. Author of the *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, ch. 3.

64. Author of the sermon on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin attributed to St. Athanasius.

65. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes Theologicae* IV (*Oratio* 28), near the end.

66. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 6, in the body and in the reply to the last objection.

67. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* I (words cited by Augustine from Maximinus).

68. Methodius, as cited by Epiphanius, *Panarion* (in the heresy of Origen).

69. St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* II; citing "Et omne nomen, &c." by which he signifies he had not enumerated them all. He completes the number in his writing *Contra Rufinum*.

70. St. Ambrose, *De Fide* I, ch. 1.

71. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechesis* 6.

72. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34; *Moralium* XXXII, ch. 18.

73. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 5.

74. Leo IX, in Gratian, *De Consecratione*, dist. 1, ch. *Hi duo*; with the Gloss thereon.

75. The question of the restoration of the tenth order from human beings is treated below (Dist. X).

76. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes Theologicae* IV (*Oratio* 28) (*splendores*). The reference to "Commentaries" (*Commentarii*) is Estius's own cross-reference to his scriptural commentaries on the relevant Epistles of Peter and Jude.

77. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, aa. 5–6.

78. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chs. 7, 8, 9.

79. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34.

80. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 5 (the place cited immediately above).

81. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 5, in the body of the article.

82. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chs. 4 and 10.

83. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 3.

84. The allusion is to the opinion (associated with St. Thomas) that each Angel constitutes its own species, as different species are like different numbers, in which one always exceeds another by unity or by more.

85. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 4.

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 4; and in his commentary *In II Sententiarum*, on this Distinction, a. 7.

87. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione* V, ch. 5 (the place cited above).

88. Rupert, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, bk. 3, ch. 17.

89. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sententiarum*, on this Distinction.

90. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, last article.

91. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34. The Gloss ordinary is on the parable of the lost drachma, Lk. 15.

92. Leo IX, in Gratian, *De Consecratione*, dist. 1, ch. *Hi duo*; with the Gloss thereon adducing also the authority of Isidore.

93. Heb. 12.

94. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X, ch. 7; *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 1 and ch. 9; and elsewhere.

95. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 21.

96. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, on this Distinction, a. 8.

97. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 8.

98. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sententiarum*, on this Distinction, q. 5, ad ult.

99. St. Gregory the Great, *Commentary on 1 Kings* (*Super 1 Reg.*), bk. 1. [See the note in the source regarding the authenticity of this commentary: the Benedictine editors of St. Gregory's works (*Opera*, tom. 3) judge that this commentary was compiled from St. Gregory's homilies and put together by a disciple, Claudius, and in some places diverges from his sense and style; cf. *Epistolarum*, fifth indiction, epistle 24, where St. Gregory complains that Claudius transmitted in writing what he himself could not set down owing to infirmity, and had in many places altered the sense of his words. Estius judges this commentary to be broadly Gregorian in substance even if not entirely so in style.]

100. The Gloss ordinary (cited above, on Lk. 15) does not say that the tenth *order* is composed of human beings, but that the tenth *number of the elect* is completed from them.

101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 108, a. 8 (the article immediately cited above).

102. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 1; *Enchiridion*, chs. 29, 61, and 62; and elsewhere.

103. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXI, ch. 35; *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 21 and hom. 34.

104. Isidore of Seville, *De Officiis* I, ch. 10.

105. St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *De Adventu Domini*; Sermon 1 *De S. Michaele*.

106. Leo IX, cited in Gratian, at the place cited above (*loco saepe citato*) [abbreviation as in source].

107. Eph. 1.

108. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Ephesios* [*in Commentario*]; St. John Chrysostom; Theophylact; and others [commentators on Eph. 1].

109. Estius, *In II Sententiarum*, Dist. 1 of this book (*ad Distinctionem 1. hujus libri*).

110. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, bk. 3, chs. 20 and 21.

111. Deut. 32 (LXX and Hebrew versions compared).

112. Gloss ordinary on *Hi duo*, ch. 4 [abbreviation as in source].

113. Estius, *In II Sententiarum*, Dist. 3.

114. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, last chapter of bk. 3.

115. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, ch. 16.

116. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 29 and 116; *De Civitate Dei* II, ch. 1.

117. The long footnote in the source (*a*) concerning the authenticity of the commentary on 1 Kings attributed to St. Gregory reads as follows: The commentary on the second book of Kings inscribed under the name of Gregory the Great, Supreme Pontiff, and attributed to him for a space of 150 years, was first contested by Petrus Gussanvillaeus from the censure of the operations of St. Gregory, the other learned men of the Benedictine Congregation of St. Maur objecting. The Benedictine Fathers in their own edition of the works of the same holy Pontiff (tom. 3), in the preface to the aforementioned commentary, judge that a middle course is to be taken: they assert namely that the commentary on the second book of Kings was gathered from homilies delivered by St. Gregory and compiled by his disciple Claudius, afterwards Abbot of the monastery of Classe; but that in some places it deviated, in sense, from the holy Father's own style. Indeed the same holy Pontiff himself (bk. 10 of the *Epistolae*, fifth indiction, epistle 24, or bk. 12 of the *Epistolae*, fifth indiction, epistle 24, according to the ordering maintained in the Benedictine Fathers' edition) writes to John the subdeacon, inquiring of the said Claudius, who had heard him speaking about the books of Kings, that he had transmitted in writing what he himself could not set down owing to infirmity, but had in many places altered the sense of his words. Many learned men incline to this same view, among whom Ludovicus Thomassinus is counted: *Disciplina Ecclesiastica*, pt. 2, bk. 2, ch. 29, n. 2. Yet at that place Thomassinus has not a word about this matter; he mentions it at pt. 2, bk. 2, *Pastoralis* S. Gregorii, and at the same place, ch. 16, nn. 9 and 11, and pt. 3, lib. 1, ch. 60, n. 10 — this Commentary on the Penitential Psalms, which he there strips from the same Pontiff and judges should be attributed to Gregory VII or the Abbot of Carnutum, but in Thomassinus's work there is no mention of this Gregory commentary on 1 Kings of which we speak, as far as memory supplies and the constraints of time permit to inquire. The learned Benedictine Fathers judge therefore that the commentary is to be attributed to Gregory as the author of the principal and nearly all — with few exceptions — of its sentiments. The same Father Guillaume Cave (*Historia Literaria Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*, *Eutychia*, or the sixth year 590, p. 354) notes that it should appear strange, given the aforementioned Gregory, that his pre-reviewed work was not written. Natalis Alexander, who to. 5, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, sec. 6, ch. 4, art. 16, n. 8, in the Arguments which Gussanvillaeus adduces for his position, is not to be heard; and the solution of Natalis at the same place in the prefatory commendation of the Fathers will be found most clearly.

118. Cf. Matt. 24 (Christ's denial that the angels know the day of judgement).

119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 9, ad 3.

120. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 112, a. 1, ad 4.

121. Cf. the distinction immediately preceding (dist. 8), where the meaning of "angel" as designating nature rather than office was treated.

122. Heb. 1:14.

123. St. John Chrysostom, commentary on Heb. 1 [abbreviation as in source].

124. Rev. 19:10; Rev. 22:9.

125. Dan. 10:13, 20–21.

126. St. Leo the Great, *Sermo de Quadragesima* [abbreviation as in source]; the argument is drawn from Matt. 4:11.

127. Matt. 4:11.

DISTINCTIO X — ON THE MINISTRY OF ANGELS, THEIR BEATITUDE, AND WHETHER ALL ANGELS ARE SENT (*DE MINISTERIO ANGELORUM, EORUM BEATITUDINE, ET UTRUM OMNES MITTANTUR*)

§ 1. — [Continuation of the preceding discussion, against heretics, on the divinity of Christ as demonstrated by the ministry of Angels] — "Through the hunger of the body," he says, "perfect humanity was demonstrated; through the ministering Angels, perfect Divinity was demonstrated." And rightly so, because Angels are subject in respect of service to God alone. Hence they did not properly minister to Elijah, nor to any of the just among men, nor to the Blessed Virgin Mary herself. St. Gregory confirms this very point, who in Homily 16 (*on the Gospels*)[1] treating the same evangelical narrative says: "Let us venerate in Him His own Divinity, because unless He existed as God above all things, the Angels would in no wise minister to Him."[,2]

§ 2. Add that the same St. Gregory in Homily 10 of the same work[3] regards it as absurd that a human being should be subject to the ministrations of the Angels. By this argument he also excludes fate, because the stars, of course, were created for the service of men (Deut. 4). From this it is also proved that the stars are not to be worshipped. Yet man is subject to the Angels, because he is governed through them and by them, and venerates them in some manner; therefore the Angels are not servants of men — for in that case man would be subject to his own servants. It is established, therefore, that Angels minister properly not to men but to God, even though they do so for the use, governance, protection, and salvation of men; just as a shepherd, though he is the guardian of sheep, is nevertheless not the servant of the sheep but the servant of his master for the task of guarding the sheep.

§ 3. For the rest, it is sometimes said in an improper sense that Angels have been deputed, ordained, and indeed created by God for the service of men — in the manner that Thomas à Kempis speaks in Book III (*of the Imitation of Christ*, ch. 11)[4] — in the same way that the Holy Father the Pope calls himself "the servant of the servants of God," and our Lord Christ Himself said: "He came not to be ministered unto, but to minister" (Matt. 20) — that is, to do and to procure those things that pertain to the salvation of others. For he who does this, in a manner ministers, even though those upon whom he bestows such office are his subjects. Hence in a certain prayer to the Guardian Angel it is said that God has made the Angel a servant, as it were, of man.

§ II — That Angels are not hindered from beatitude by their ministries (Angelos per sua ministeria non impediri a beatitudine)

§ 4. A further point must be noted here: that Angels, through those ministries which they render to God on our behalf, are not only not hindered from continuously beholding the Essence of God and being always blessed by that vision, but are not hindered from beholding it as perfectly as if they were performing no such ministry at all. For just as even while they are on earth and occupied about the protection of men, they always and without interruption behold the face of the Father (Matt. 18) — as we showed above (at Dist. 7)[6] — so too they behold those things as perfectly as if they were in heaven. For God they have present everywhere, even on earth, no less than when they are in heaven. For this reason, even while they are on earth, they are said by Christ to be in heaven (Matt. 18), and by the Church in the prayer *de Angelis*. Nor indeed is it to be supposed that the angelic minds are in any way retarded or distracted from the perfect contemplation of the Supreme Good by such management of human affairs, nor that love of Him is in any degree diminished in them thereby. For, as St. Gregory testifies, "they proceed to exterior things in such a way that they never depart from their inmost depths."[7] Nor is this surprising, since the perfect love of God, which the perfect contemplation of God produces, is the cause of eternal obedience and compliance, and in the Angels there is no obstacle to prevent this external activity from perfectly coexisting with that internal one. For the reason that mortal men, when they are occupied about the necessities of their neighbours and the duties of humanity, feel themselves hindered from a freer contemplation of divine things, arises in part from the fact that they have not yet attained the perfect vision of God, and in part from the fact that, owing to the corruption of human nature, the actual perception of sensible things draws the mind's attention away from the contemplation of spiritual things. But this was not the case in Christ, nor will it be so in us after the resurrection.

§ 5. If it is asked whether through this ministry the accidental beatitude (*beatitudo accidentalis*) of the Angels is in any part and for a time diminished — to some it will perhaps seem that this cannot be denied, both because heaven is a place more congenial to their nature and felicity than earth, and because in heaven there is the society of the Saints and the Blessed, from which they are absent for a time. Yet such diminution of beatitude, whatever it may be, is held to be compensated by the pleasure they take both from the salvation of men which they procure and from the fact that they are employed in the service of God, whom they love above all things. But I consider the truer response to be the negative one.

§ 6. For since Angels are in a place only through their operation, it seems to follow that the Angels who are guardians of men neither truly depart from heaven nor from the society of the Blessed — as was said above (at Dist. 2)[8] — and consequently that through such guardianship nothing is taken away from their accidental beatitude. Whatever objections can be raised against what has just been said have an easy solution from what we taught above (at Dist. 7),[9] concerning the beatitude of the Angels.

§ III — Whether all Angels are sent into ministry (Utrum omnes Angeli mittantur in ministerium)

§ 7. The question proper to this Distinction, debated by the Master from both sides but not decided — namely, whether all the holy Angels are at some time sent into ministry — we consider the affirmative response to be the more probable, as being the one more favoured by Scripture.

First, because the Apostle says in Heb. 1, speaking of the Angels: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth for service on behalf of those who are to receive the inheritance of salvation?"[11] This testimony is so clear that it seems it can be rejected by no evasion. For since the Apostle in that passage intends to show that Christ is greater not merely than some but than all the Angels, the proof would not be complete if we exempt even one Angel from this apostolic declaration.

§ 8. To this argument the Master, disputing on behalf of the negative side (§ F),[12] adduces two responses, but neither of them is adequate. The first is that, since the highest Angels transmit the commandment of God to the middle Angels, and the middle to the lowest, and these to men, all the Angels may rightly be said by the Apostle to have proclaimed it. This response is refuted, because an Angel is not considered to have been effectively sent into ministry by the mere fact of notifying another Angel of the work enjoined. The second is that by "all Angels" the Apostle did not mean individual members of every Order, but individual Angels of the lower Orders. But this response has already been refuted from the intention and scope of the Apostle.

§ 9. Another scriptural passage is Is. 6, where we read that one of the Seraphim — who constitute the highest Order — was sent to the Prophet, to touch his lips with a burning coal and cleanse him from sin. Therefore it is probable that other Angels of the same Order are at times sent, and all the more so the Angels of the lower Orders. What others attempt to reply to this argument will be stated below.

§ 10. Third: Michael, who is supreme over all the Angels, as will be proved a little later, is found in Dan. 10 to have been sent into ministry.[13] This is also sufficiently established by his contention with the devil over the body of Moses, which Jude mentions in his Epistle.›[14] Similarly Gabriel, who is also very probably one of the highest, was the messenger of those things that pertain to the coming, nativity, and death of Christ, as may be seen in Dan. 9 and Lk. 1.›[15] Not to speak of Raphael, sent on certain definite ministries, when he was one of the seven who stand before the Lord (Tob. 12).›[16] This argument I do not press on account of the uncertain interpretation of that passage, concerning which see below.

§ 11. Fourth: in Matt. 25 all the Angels are said to come with the Son of Man to judgment, namely on account of their service of honour. Hence the Church sings: "Behold, the Lord shall come, and all His saints with Him." So too it is credible that all the Angels went forth to meet Christ ascending into heaven, for the sake of honour, and rendered their homage. To these considerations is added the argument from reason found in the Master and St. Bonaventure, disputing on behalf of the affirmative side, namely that it ought not to seem unworthy if even the superior Angels are sent; since also the Son of God, who is the Creator of all things, was sent from the Father and descended to these lower regions. Hence He Himself is called "the Angel of Great Counsel."[17]

§ 12. There is likewise an argument from the name. For since all are called Angels, that is, messengers, it seems to follow that all should at some time in actual fact — that is, by announcing and ministering — fulfil this name of their office. The fact that those who are of the lowest Order are called Angels by their peculiar

name does not derive from the circumstance that they alone are sent into ministry, but because, since they have nothing singular by which they excel the rest, the common name is in a manner appropriated to them.

§ 13. Nor indeed are testimonies of the Fathers lacking on this side. For St. Augustine (*writing on Ps. 56*)[18] says: "All Angels are a creature serving Christ. Angels could be sent in obedience, Angels could be sent in service — not in assistance, etc." St. Bernard likewise in Sermon 1 (*on St. Michael*)[19] indicates that Angels of all Orders are at times sent. Furthermore, St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact interpret that passage of Matt. 18 — "their Angels in heaven" — as spoken of certain primary Angels of the higher Orders, as those nearest to God and honoured with a singular privilege in God's sight. The same doctrine can be gathered from the words of those who have commented on Heb. 1, especially of the Greeks, who make no exception whatsoever: as St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius.[20]

§ IV — Reply to the arguments of the contrary opinion (Responsio ad argumenta contrariae opinionis)

§ 14. From this doctrine some weighty authors dissent. For (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, in chapter 7 of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, holds that the higher angels — that is, those who belong to the first Hierarchy — so uninterruptedly attend upon God that they are never sent outward to external ministries, and in particular to those which are to be carried out among men. St. Gregory follows his opinion.[22] Although in this last passage Gregory denies that he wishes to assert as certain what he cannot prove by clear testimonies. St. Thomas and his followers subscribe to the opinion of these authors.[23] The principal argument of (Pseudo-)Dionysius and St. Gregory, drawn from those cited places, is taken from Dan. 7, where it is said of the angels: "A thousand thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." In these words there appears to be posited such a distinction among the angels that some are sent outward to ministries, while others always attend inwardly upon God.

§ 15. But the solution of this argument is easy. For these two things — to minister and to attend (*assistere*) — are not opposed to one another; indeed, they signify nearly the same thing by these words. For it is the duty of ministers to stand before their Lord as it were in readiness to minister to him and to await his commands. All the angels, therefore, always attend upon God, because they are always ready to carry out his commands; but while they carry them out, they minister. Hence, in the same chapter, Daniel writes that he approached one of those who stood by (*assistentibus*), and was taught by him the interpretation of the words: yet to teach a man is an external ministry and requires a sending. The same is shown by the testimony of the angels themselves. For Gabriel (Lk. 1) and Raphael (Tob. 12), though sent on ministry, nevertheless declared that they stand before the Lord.[24] Elsewhere again, as in Rev. 7 and in 3 Kgs. (the last chapter), all the angels without exception are said to stand or to attend before God.[25] And the ecclesiastical prayer makes manifest that those who minister and those who attend are the same persons, for we read in it: "May we be guarded on earth in our life by those through whom you are always attended upon in heaven by those ministering to you." This appears to be drawn from the Lord's saying at Matt. 18: "Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father." For even those who exercise care over us on earth are said to be in heaven and there to attend upon God always and to see his face always, because they lose nothing of their heavenly beatitude by reason of being occupied about us on earth — as we have said above.[26] For just as the demons carry their hell about with them everywhere, so the angels, wherever they are, abide in heaven.

§ 16. Furthermore, some interpret the opinion of (Pseudo-)Dionysius in such a way as to say that he does not deny that the higher angels are ever sent, but that his meaning was that they very rarely proceed to external tasks. But that this interpretation does not accord with the mind of the author is evident from the fact that (Pseudo-)Dionysius does not admit even a single example of a sending of this kind. For what is read in Is. 6 — that one of the Seraphim was sent to the Prophet — he attempts to resolve by saying that that angel was of some lower Order, but was called a Seraph by reason of the office he was then performing, since he was being sent to consume the sins of the Prophet with a burning coal. This, however, is easily refuted. For the word *Seraphim* is not taken differently by the Prophet in the latter passage than in the former, where he had said that the Seraphim cried out one to another: "Holy, holy, holy." Indeed, the sense of the Prophet is: "One of the Seraphim flew to me" — that is, one of the aforesaid Seraphim. But if you also deny that in the former passage the supreme Order is to be understood, then it will have to be admitted that the word *Seraphim* is found nowhere in Sacred Scripture placed in such a way as to designate a definite angelic Order, since this name is read nowhere else. This is against (Pseudo-)Dionysius himself, who gathers the names of all the Orders from the Scriptures; and against the Church, which in the preface to the canon of the Mass and in the canticle *Te Deum*, naming this Order, looks to the passage of Isaiah — as is plain from the fact that it immediately subjoins the *Trisagion* itself. We therefore acknowledge that (Pseudo-)Dionysius held what his words sound, namely that the higher angels are never sent into ministry; but we say that this his opinion seems less probable.

§ 17. Meanwhile, we do not deny — indeed, we embrace it as true — what (Pseudo-)Dionysius and his followers transmit, namely that the angels of the lower Orders carry out their ministries only after being illuminated and instructed by the superior ones. For we read in Zech. 2 of one angel going out to meet another and intimating to him what he was to say to the Prophet.[27] Treating this passage, St. Gregory says that the angelic ministries are so ordered and divinely distinguished by the arrangement of ranks that, in proportion to the dignity of each, some serve under others. "Hence," he says, "an angel sends an angel to the Prophet, and teaches and directs one whom he sees rejoicing together with him in God; for he excels him both by superior knowledge in the power of cognition, and by more excellent grace in the height of authority."[,28] To the same point is what Daniel (ch. 8) shows: one angel says to another, "Make this vision understood."[,29] And in Rev. 7, a certain angel forbids four other angels to harm the earth and the sea until the servants of God are sealed.[,30] Similar is what is found in Rev. 14. But these things do not prove that the higher angels are never sent into ministry, or that they do nothing immediately about us — for by that reasoning it would follow that only angels of the lowest Order are sent to these ministries — but they only teach that the lower angels are moved and directed to their ministries by a certain illumination from the higher ones, as can be understood from what has been said concerning the speech and illumination of angels, above (at dist. 7).[,31]

§ 18. But someone will here still object that there are certain angels who move the celestial spheres and never depart from them; for otherwise it would come about that the heavens would rest, and consequently it would be impossible for those angels to be sent into ministry for those who inherit salvation, as the Apostle says at Heb. 1.[11] It can be replied that their sending is their appointment to that work of moving the heavens, and this precisely for the sake of men. For God created the stars of heaven for the service of all the peoples that are under heaven (Deut. 4) — indeed, for the sake of the Elect. For "all things are for the sake of the Elect," as the same Apostle says; and "those who will inherit salvation" is a periphrasis for the Elect. Add to this that the teaching which posits intelligences perpetually presiding over the celestial spheres is founded not so much on the Scriptures as on Aristotelian philosophy,[,32] and that must yield to the teaching of the Scriptures.

§ V — That Michael is the supreme angel of all and the Prince set over the custody of the Church (Michaelem esse omnium Angelorum supremum, & Ecclesiae custodiae Principem)

§ 19. What we said above — that Michael is the supreme of all the Angels — although it is not altogether certain, nevertheless has very great probability from Sacred Scripture. For in Rev. 12 we read thus: "Michael and his angels fought with the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels, and they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven."[34] Now that the dragon is to be understood as he who is supreme among the demons is manifest. For it follows: "And that great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world, and his angels were sent with him."[35] Concerning whom also the Lord speaks in a similar manner in Matt. 25, when He says that fire was prepared for the devil and his angels.[36] Therefore it follows as a consequence that Michael also is the supreme and the prince among the holy Angels, since in like manner these are called his angels. And if we should wish to exempt from the number of these Angels the Orders of the highest Hierarchy, it would surely appear absurd that the inferior Orders fight with the dragon and his angels for the glory of God, while the highest are left without a share in this most glorious combat and victory alike.

§ 20. To this is added the fact that in the Epistle of Jude, Michael the Archangel is opposed to the devil — who is the supreme of the demons — as the Prince of all the Angels, and is said to contend with him.[37] For he is not called Archangel as if he were merely one of the Order of Archangels, but because he holds the principate above all the Angels of all Orders. This Didymus wished to express more explicitly (writing on that Epistle) when he calls Michael the greatest Archangel. For the same opinion it also serves that in Dan. 10, Michael is called the Prince of the people of God, and in chapter 12 he is called the great Prince who stands for the sons of the people of Israel.[38] For rightly and fittingly is the custody and principate of that people — which was chosen before all others by God, as indeed the people of Israel then was, and as now is the Church of Christ — committed to the supreme Angel. And consequently it is believed with more than sufficient probability that he is now set over the Church of Christ. Hence also the Church celebrates the feast-day of all the Angels under the name of St. Michael as the Prince of them all, and in the divine Office calls Michael the primate of the heavenly host, the prince of the angelic militia, and the prefect of Paradise. Concerning him it is also read in the feast of his apparition that him whom the Synagogue of the Jews formerly venerated, the Church now venerates as her guardian and patron of God.

§ 21. There also fits the very name of Michael, which is interpreted: "Who is as God?" For this name was most fittingly owed to him who, more than all others, was zealous against the pride of Lucifer for the glory of God. Finally, St. Jerome and Theodoret (writing on chapter 12 of Daniel)[39] hold this view concerning the primacy of Michael. And it is today the common and, I may say, the ecclesiastical opinion.

§ 22. Furthermore, Rupert (in *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, book 1, chapter 18)[40] says that Michael, by the combat which he waged with the devil, merited the principate over Angels and men. Something similar is read in the Order of Commendation of the Soul according to Roman usage, namely that Michael the Archangel merited the principate of the heavenly militia of God. This, however, must be understood of the principate which he holds, not as regards the natural gifts whereby he excels the other blessed Angels, nor as regards the gratuitous gifts received at creation. For it is established that with respect to these gifts no merit can be posited in the first Angel, any more than in the others; but as regards gratuitous gifts received or augmented at

confirmation. For just as grace was given to the Angels according to the measure of their natural endowments, so also to those who persevered it was augmented in the same proportion, and this in merit of that same perseverance.

§ VI — The arguments of the contrary opinion are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta diversae opinionis)

§ 23. Certain authors hold the opinion contrary to the one set forth above, moved by the authority of (Pseudo-)Dionysius, who, in book nine of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, reports that Michael belonged to the supreme Order of the lowest Hierarchy, namely those called Principalities.[41] For he is of the opinion that it is from the Order of Principalities that those are drawn who are set over Gentiles, kingdoms, and provinces. Now that Michael was set over the Hebrew people is sufficiently established from Daniel, although St. Jerome, writing on Habakkuk chapter 3, seems to be in doubt whether the care of the Jewish people was entrusted to Gabriel or to Michael,[42] Perhaps this is on account of what is written in Dan. 10, where Michael is joined to Gabriel and employed as his helper in securing the liberation of the Jewish people,[43] Yet he is understood to be joined as the greater and more powerful, and therefore the prince in that undertaking.

St. Thomas, in the *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 3, is uncertain whether to assign Michael to the Order of the Archangels or to that of the Principalities, because he thinks the guardianship of a multitude of human beings ought to be attributed to one or the other of these orders.[44] Those who hold virtually this same view are all who deny that the Angels of the supreme Hierarchy are ever sent on mission. For it is manifest from Daniel that Michael was sent. A similar doubt arises concerning Gabriel, whom some indeed hold to have been among the supreme Angels, while others (since it is admitted that he was sent) assign him to the lowest Hierarchy, whether among the Principalities or among the Archangels. This is what Athanasius — or whoever is the author of the sermon ascribed to Athanasius — does in the discourse *On the Assumption of the Blessed Mary*,[45] as do St. Gregory in Homily 32 on the Gospels[46] and St. Bernard in book 5 of *De Consideratione*, chapter 4,[47] both of whom place Gabriel in the Order of the Archangels, whose office it is to announce great tidings. St. Thomas agrees with them at *Summa theologiae* III, q. 30, a. 2, ad 4, adding that it is sufficiently credible that Gabriel is the supreme within the Order of the Archangels.[48] Hence gather that Michael, in the opinion of the same St. Thomas, ought rather to be assigned to the Order of the Principalities than to that of the Archangels. For otherwise he would be inferior to Gabriel, as the foremost of all the Archangels — which St. Thomas by no means held.

§ 24. As for Raphael, there is less difficulty. For since he is read to have been the guardian of a single man, nothing prevents him from being assigned to the lowest order, which is that of the Angels. For the guardianship of individual human beings pertains to the lowest order, as was said above in the preceding distinction.[49] Nor does it stand in the way that Raphael says he is one of the seven who stand before the Lord,[50] because this number seven is rightly understood to signify the totality of the Angels.

But it is necessary here to reply briefly to those who deny that Michael is the supreme of all. Their principal argument is drawn from Dan. 10, where Michael is called "one of the first princes," as if he himself were not the prince of all the others, but just one of their number. It is answered, however, that this testimony of Daniel rather confirms our opinion. For the sense is that Michael was the first and highest among the first princes, in the same way that it is written in Gen. 1: "There was made *day one*" — that is, the first day[51] — and

in the same way that one reads in Lk. 24 and 1 Cor. 16, *una sabbati* for *prima sabbati*, "the first day of the week."[52] For another Evangelist thus expounds that phrase for us. Indeed, in Daniel himself at chapter 9 we read: "In *year one* of the reign of Darius" — that is, the first year[53] — for this had preceded in the same context. And that turn of phrase is sufficiently familiar in Scripture.

§ 25. Another argument: the penultimate Order, which is that of the Archangels, is inferred from the name "Archangel" attributed to Michael in the Apostle Jude.[37] For otherwise there will be no place in Scripture from which it can be gathered. It is answered that it is not gathered from that passage, but rather from the fact that certain Angels are said in Dan. 10 to guard kingdoms and peoples.[54] You will say: But among them Michael is numbered as the guardian and prince of the people of God; therefore, according to the solution just given, he is to be assigned to the Order of the Archangels, or according to others to that of the Principalities. For this, as we indicated above, is the argument of (Pseudo-)Dionysius and St. Thomas. It is answered that it was granted to the people of God as a singular privilege above all other nations that they should have the Prince of Angels as their own prince and guardian, inasmuch as the Angels and the elect among men are finally destined to form a single Blessed Society and a single Kingdom. For God did not deal similarly with every nation as He dealt with His own people, by sending His supreme Angel for their guardianship and governance.

§ I — That each and every man has a Guardian Angel (Unumquemque hominem habere Angelum custodem)

§ 26. It belongs to the order of Divine Providence (*ordo Providentiae Divinae*) concerning created things, that lower things, as mobile and variable, should be ruled, moved, and directed toward their ends by higher things, as less subject to motion and change. Wherefore it was fitting that not only the lower bodies should be governed by the higher bodies, but also the entire corporeal world, and above all the human race — subject as it is to many changes both of soul and of body, and yet created for a most excellent end, that is, for eternal beatitude (*beatitudo aeterna*), which consists in the vision of God — should be ruled and governed through spiritual substances, that is, through Angels, as St. Thomas well proves.[56] And indeed that the corporeal world is governed through Angels the Apostle indicates in Heb. 2, when he says: "For God did not subject to Angels the future world of which we speak"; for by these words he intimates that God did subject to the Angels the governance of this present world or age. Hence St. Augustine also testifies,[57] that all bodies are ruled by a rational, that is, intellectual, spirit of life. St. Gregory,[58] says that in this visible world nothing can be disposed except through an invisible creature.

§ 27. Moreover, that the human race is governed by the ministry of Angels, the Scriptures of both the Old and New Testament teach in many places, as in Daniel and in the Apocalypse of John and elsewhere, wherever we read that certain more notable deeds concerning all men or very many have been performed through Angels. Certainly St. Basil, writing on Is. 8,[59] testifies that the care of the human race has been entrusted by God to Angels as provident guardians, for the protection and salvation of men. Nor indeed is there any doubt that God has committed the particular care and custody of His Church to Angels — a care so much greater than that over other assemblies of men, as He has chosen the Church for greater goods above others. This is sufficiently evident from the fact that He appointed the Prince of all Angels as the guardian of His Church, as

is gathered from Dan. 10 and 12,[60] and is sufficiently signified in the Ecclesiastical Office of the Angels, and has been proved more fully in the preceding distinction.[61]

§ 28. But beyond this general governance, by which God rules and directs the whole world, or more specifically His Church, through Angels, it is very probable that each and every man — above all the faithful and the elect — has a particular good Angel (for we speak here of good Angels only) assigned to him by God as a guardian, guide, and director amid so many dangers both of soul and of body with which this life is full. For this is altogether consonant with the Scriptures and celebrated in the opinions of the Fathers.

§ 29. The Scriptural passages are the following. Matt. 18: the Lord assigns an Angel to each little one in these words: "Their Angels in heaven always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven." Likewise Acts 12: when Peter knocked at the door, the faithful said, "It is his Angel" — from which saying it is gathered that it was then the common persuasion of the faithful that individual men, at least the faithful, have their own Angel. To this also belongs what Jacob says, Gen. 48: "The Angel who delivered me from all evils, bless these children." And what is said of each of the elect, Ps. 90: "He has given his Angels charge over you, to keep you in all your ways. In their hands they shall bear you up, lest you dash your foot against a stone" — which words surely express a special care of the Angels on behalf of man.

§ 30. Moreover, this is more manifestly asserted by the Fathers. First, well known is the opinion of St. Jerome, commenting on Matt. 18 (at the words "Their Angels," etc.):[62] "Great," he says, "is the dignity of souls, that each one from the moment of birth has an Angel assigned to its custody." The same Doctor, writing on Hab. 1,[63] again teaches from the same passage of Matt. that individual men have an Angel. And on that passage from Eccl. 5 — "Do not say before the Angel: there is no providence" — he says that words spoken are not carried away into the wind, but are at each moment borne to the Lord by the Angel who cleaves to each one as a companion. St. Basil likewise, in his book *Against Eunomius*, book 3,[64] and in his exposition of Ps. 48 cited above, uses the testimony of Matt. to teach that an Angel attends each of the faithful as a pedagogue and shepherd to guide them to life. He also, in the book *On True Virginity*,[65] wishes the virgin to regard the Angel guardian as standing by her side, just as the Apostle also enjoined (1 Cor. 11) that women veil their heads in the churches on account of the Angels. St. John Chrysostom,[66] in his commentary on Matt. 18 and in Homily 3 on Josh. 1, expressly affirms that the number of Angels as guardians corresponds to the number of the faithful. Likewise in the homily *On the Praises of Paul*, he says: "If Angels are assigned by God to private individuals, how much more to those upon whom the care of the whole world is laid." St. Ambrose,[67] both in his commentary on Ps. 38 and again in his commentary on Ps. 118 at the verse "Blessed are they who search his testimonies," sufficiently indicates that not only the faithful but all men have been divinely given Angels as guardians. To the same effect write (Pseudo-)Dionysius in the letter to Demophilus;[68] Origen, Homily 5 on Luke and Homily 1 on Ps. 37,[69] citing to this purpose the book of the Shepherd; Didymus on 2 Pet. 2;[70] St. Augustine, ch. 12 of the *Meditations* and Sermon 7 *On the Seasons*;[71] Cassian, Collation 7, ch. 17 and Collation 13, ch. 12;[72] Theodoret, question 3 on Genesis,[73] adducing the proof from Matt. 18; St. Gregory, Homily 34 on the Gospels;[74] Bede on Acts 12,[75] where he also cites the book of the Shepherd; St. Bernard, book 5 of *On Consideration*, ch. 4 and Sermon 12 on Ps. 90 (*Qui habitat*).[76] Finally, this is the common opinion of all later theologians, from which it is not rash to depart.[77]

§ 31. Nor ought it to seem absurd that Angels are assigned as guardians even to the reprobate and to unbelievers. For although they do not lead them to faith and salvation, they nevertheless render other benefits. First, that they do not sin as often and as grievously as they would otherwise sin. Second, that they are

exercised in offices of probity and honour and are thereby the less evil — such as may be said of those ancient Romans praised under the name of virtue and uprightness. Finally, that they avert many bodily evils from them. That Angels are assigned even to unbelievers as guardians, Sacred Scripture declares in Dan. 10,[13] where we read of the Angels of the Persians and of the Greeks; and although this is not to be understood of individual men but of kingdoms, which were at that time alien to the worship of the true God, nonetheless nothing prevents us from thinking the same even of individual evil and unbelieving men — especially since the inestimable multitude of Angels is such that there is no need to fear that their number may not suffice for so great a multitude of men to be guarded individually. On this see St. Basil, book 3 *Against Eunomius*,[78] and St. Gregory, book 17 of the *Moralia*, ch. 7, on Job 35.[79]

§ 32. And so that we may extend Angelic custody through individual guardians to absolutely all men, including the unbelievers and reprobate, the argument drawn from reason which St. Thomas adduces in support of this conclusion is as follows.[80] Men are incorruptible not only as regards the common species but also as regards the proper forms of individuals, which are the rational souls. This cannot be said of other corruptible things. Now since the providence of God is principally concerned with things perpetual and incorruptible, it follows that it is related to individual men just as it is related to individual genera or species of corruptible things — or indeed even more so. For the species of those corruptible things will at some time perish, but the souls of men will never perish. But it is probable that different Angels are set over different species of things, namely one each to each species — the probability of which assumption St. Thomas himself establishes in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, a. 1,[81] adducing the opinions of St. Augustine,[82] St. John Damascene,[83] and Origen writing on Num. 22 ("When he saw the Angel assigned" etc.).[84] By the same reasoning, therefore, it is probable that individual Angels are assigned as guardians to individual men — and this the more so in that one man is of greater worth before God than any other corruptible thing, however incorruptible and however particular, since each individual man is perpetual and immortal, more so than anything else among corruptible things, even according to species.[85]

§ II — Several reasons for angelic guardianship (Aliquot rationes Angelicae custodiae)

§ 33. Besides the reason which has just been adduced, certain other reasons for angelic guardianship — drawn from the final cause — can be gathered from the Scriptures, especially for that guardianship which is bestowed upon the elect. One of these is that good angels are given to a man as guardians in order that they may suggest good thoughts to him and furnish occasions for good works, which we read that Raphael did for Tobias in the book of Tobias.[87]

§ 34. The second reason is that the angels may defend and support against the assaults of evil spirits a man who is otherwise weak, weaker still in his powers, and prone to ruin. Hence Hilary (writing on Ps. 134)[88] says that our weakness against diabolical temptations stands in need of the assistance of a more powerful nature, that is, the angelic nature, and he proves this from Scripture.

§ 35. The third reason is that they may drive away bodily evils from man and rescue him from dangers. In this way we read that Elisha was protected by the guardianship of angels against the Syrians, in 4 Kgs. 6.[89] To both kinds of evils, however — as much spiritual as bodily — seems to pertain what Jacob says in Gen. 48, that the angel delivered him from all evils; and what is said in Ps. 90: "He has given his angels charge over thee,

to keep thee in all thy ways," etc.; likewise what was said to Moses from Ex. 32: "My angel shall go before thee"; and also the things which are read in Tobias concerning the binding of Asmodaeus.[90]

§ 36. The fourth reason is that the angels may present before the sight of God the prayers, pious desires, and good works of a man, and commend them by their intercession. Hence in Tob. 12, these are the words of Raphael to Tobias: "When thou didst pray with tears, and didst bury the dead," etc., "I offered thy prayer to the Lord."[16] Hilary also attests this (writing on Matt. 18),[91] and St. Bernard treats the matter more fully in Sermon 8 and Sermon 39 on the Song of Songs,[92] and he likewise touches upon it in Sermon 1 on St. Michael[93] and in other places cited above.

§ 37. Finally, the guardianship of good angels is necessary for man for this reason as well: that evil angels do all things contrary to those just mentioned. For they both suggest evil thoughts and furnish occasions for sins, and they strive to strip man bare of every divine protection, and drive him into bodily evils as well, and accuse him before God as much as they are able, and slander all his good deeds — as is evident from the Scriptures: Rev. 12, and Job 1 and 2, and elsewhere.[94]

§ III — Objections against the singular guardianship of angels are resolved (Solvuntur objectiones quae sunt contra custodiam Angelorum singularem)

§ 38. Against the doctrine set forth above — namely, that to individual human beings without exception individual guardian angels are assigned — there are objections that can be raised.

First: what is said in Ps. 90 was said in a special way to one who is just: "He hath given his angels charge over thee," etc.;[95] therefore this guardianship is not common to the wicked.

Second: that in Heb. 1 all angels are called "ministering spirits sent for service on behalf of those who are to inherit salvation,"[11] that is, on behalf of the Elect — for these alone will inherit salvation. From which it follows evidently that guardian angels are sent only to elect human beings.

Third: St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 3 on Col. 1,[96] attributes angels to the faithful alone. "Formerly," he says, "the angels were congruent in number with the Gentiles; but now they are congruent in number with the Faithful." And, having interposed the testimony of Christ from Matt. 18, he adds: "For each of the faithful has an angel. For even from the beginning each upright man had an angel, as Jacob says: 'The angel who feedeth me,' etc."[97] Likewise, in Homily 60 on Matthew,[98] he says it is manifest from the words of the Lord that all the saints have angels.

Fourth: In the prayers of the Church which are solemnly offered, even according to the Roman Rite, over one about to be baptized, it is said: "We beseech Thee that Thou wouldst deign to send Thy holy angel from heaven, to guard this Thy servant." Hence it likewise appears to follow that guardian angels are appointed by God for the faithful alone, and not before they are baptized.

Fifth: One angel suffices to guard many human beings. For even a man, who is by nature and power far inferior to an angel, is often sufficient, one man, to govern many; therefore it is in vain that individual angels are assigned to individual persons.

To this last objection the Master (in this Distinction) adds the further point that he places not individual angels over individual persons, but one and the same angel over many human beings, and concludes that it

must be said this way, by the following argument: since the elect human beings are as many as the good angels, it is established that all good and bad human beings together are more numerous than the good angels; wherefore it cannot be the case that individual human beings — both bad and good alike — each have their own individual good angel.

§ 39. But these arguments are not convincing. For what is objected in the first place proves nothing other than that the angels, as guardians of just and elect human beings, have received from God not just any mandate of guarding, but a certain singular one — namely, such as has not been given to the guardians of reprobate human beings, viz., to guard them in all their ways, lest they so offend as to fall away from God in the end.

To the second: It is said that the Apostle says notably "on behalf of those" (*propter eos*), not "for those" (*ad eos*); because clearly all things that are done even concerning the reprobate serve the elect, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 3.[99] Furthermore it can be said that by those words the principal end of the mission of angels to earth is indicated in general — which was also the end of the mission of Christ — while there can be other ends that are less principal or less excellent.

To the third, some reply that the words of St. John Chrysostom are to be understood of a particular and efficacious guardianship — namely, that by which men are directed to eternal life. This reply does not seem objectionable: both because St. John Chrysostom nowhere explicitly denies that unbelievers or wicked men have angels, and because, when commenting on the passage in Matt. 18, he says that Christ there speaks of excellent angels — by which he seems to imply that to other men too angels have been given, but less excellent ones. If anyone, however, maintains that St. John Chrysostom's opinion is that only the faithful and the good have angels, since St. Basil also (in his exposition of Ps. 48[100] and in Book 3 against Eunomius[101]) names only the faithful, we do not much resist. For it is not a certain, but a very probable and commonly received doctrine, that guardian angels are assigned also to individual unbelievers.

To the fourth, it seems one must reply that the Church there speaks of a certain particular effect of angelic guardianship. For it adds: "And lead him to the grace of Thy baptism."

To the fifth, St. Thomas replies that one angel is assigned to one human being for guardianship insofar as he is a member of a particular community (*Collegium*) — in the same way that even one man is sometimes assigned to guard one individual, even though he would suffice to guard many others. To this reply is added the point that, since the power of an angel is finite, it follows that his operation is less perfect with respect to many than with respect to one. Furthermore, even if one could guard many as well as one, God nevertheless willed to honor the human race in this manner, by adding individual guardian angels to individual persons. Hence St. Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls," etc.[102]

To the last objection it is answered that the Master's opinion rests on a false foundation — namely, that the number of good angels is not greater than the number of elect human beings. This has been sufficiently refuted elsewhere (at Dist. 3).[103] Although, even if that were granted, nothing else could be concluded than that one and the same good angel ought to be assigned to guard several human beings, at least at different times — while, as they die and are born, some men give place to others and succeed them. Which the Master himself confesses to be sufficient for his opinion.

§ IV — Whether each and every human being has an evil angel (An unusquisque homo habeat Angelum malum)

§ 40. There is indeed a perpetual struggle for just and devout human beings against adversarial Powers, as is manifest from Eph. 6[105] and many other passages of Scripture. But whether, just as to each human being his own good angel has been given for guardianship, so also to each individual a bad angel is assigned by God for exercise (which is the opinion of certain writers, which St. Bonaventure and St. Bernard[106] also seem to hold), is uncertain; indeed it is very probable that it is not so.

First, because there are many human beings for whom exercise — that is, exercise unto the proof and increase of virtue — has no place: such are those who voluntarily serve the devil and, according to the Apostle in 2 Tim. 2,[107] are held captive by him and have no pursuit of any virtue whatsoever. Hence this opinion would have some degree of probability if it spoke only of the elect, and those making use of reason. For to these alone does diabolical temptation profit unto some exercise of virtue and unto salvation.

But that not even concerning these can this be said with sufficient probability, certain writers prove by the following arguments.

First, because it would be in vain for God to assign individual demon-tempters to individual human beings, since the demons themselves are most ready of their own accord to tempt human beings.

Second, because frequently not one demon, but many attack a single man — as is evident from the example of one who, taking seven other spirits more wicked than himself, returned to the house from which he had been cast out (Lk. 11).[108] For St. Antony also, as is read in his life, was attacked by an immense multitude of demons, both spiritually and bodily. This is likewise read concerning certain other persons, and is proved by the analogy and likeness of bodily possession, as of Mary Magdalene, who was possessed by seven demons and freed (Lk. 8; Mk. 16),[109] and of him whom a legion of demons had occupied (Lk. 8),[110] and of others of this kind. But it would seem in vain that one demon were assigned to one person for exercise, if, with that arrangement disrupted, several attack one.

Third, because since God tempts no one and cannot be the author of any sin to anyone, it is not probable that through His providence this is brought about — that each and every human being should have a demon as tempter and impeller to sin. For just as God is not the author of sin, even when appointing it to a good end, so it does not belong to His goodness to provide man with a tempter and solicitor to evil, even though this turns out for the good of some.

They say, therefore, that God either only makes use of the malice of demons for the proving of the elect, or that He is said to send and destine them to temptation inasmuch as that temptation bears the character of a just punishment for the preceding sins of those who are tempted.

§ 41. But these arguments do not seem sufficient for discovering what is true in this question.

For the first does not convince. For good angels too are most ready of their own accord to guard human beings, and yet it is not therefore in vain that individual angels are assigned to individuals by God's ordinance and command. If you reply that good angels, however ready they are to do good for human beings, do nothing except what God commands them, whereas bad angels do not await God's command — it can be

objected that bad demons await the command of their own Prince in evil, and thus it can be ordained by the devil, with God's permission, that each man has one evil angel assigned to him, by whom he is tempted to sins.

The second likewise does not conclude, by a parallel reasoning. For often also many good angels guard and protect one man, as is evident from the example of Elisha.[111] Nor is the order established by God thereby disturbed, because this too is ordained by God — that sometimes many guard one.

The third argument, however, proves well that evil angels have no mandate from God to tempt human beings. For as Ecclesiasticus ch. 15 says, "God hath commanded no man to deal wickedly."[112] It also proves well that through God's providence this is not brought about — that men be tempted by demons — because diabolical temptation, being aimed at evil, properly does not fall under divine providence, since it is not, nor can be, its effect. But it does not prove that demons are not assigned by God to human beings for the exercise of those same human beings. For this exercise is good and includes nothing of evil in its proper character (*ratio*), just as temptation does — and therefore, insofar as it is such, it falls under the order of divine providence. Wherefore, although God does not intend the temptation but the devil does, yet the exercise itself is intended by God, whenever men are exercised unto virtue — whether this comes about through diabolical temptation, or through temptation of the flesh, or by whatever other means God has wished to use for the exercising of men.

Hence we read that God, through Satan, exercised the patience of holy Job;[113] nor does it seem to be denied that for that time Satan was assigned by God to Job for exercise. This appears more clearly in the case of Paul, who testifies in 2 Cor. 12,[114] that, for the preservation of his humility, there had been given to him a thorn of his flesh, an angel of Satan to buffet him. Add that since all order is from God, that order too which is in the kingdom of demons — when some are sent to tempt others — must necessarily be referred back to God as its author. For although temptation is not from God, yet the order of temptation and assault is from God, who in an orderly manner knows how to make use of evils, by directing them to good ends, as St. Thomas says.[115] Hence the same Doctor also says that the ordering of demons, considered on the part of God who orders, is sacred.[116] From all of which it is evident that the opinion of those who say that a bad angel is assigned to each individual human being is not to be called impious or contrary to sound doctrine.

§ 42. However, it cannot be received as true, not only for the reason stated at the outset — namely, that the exercise of virtue in many cases finds no place, as in the reprobate and in unbelievers — but even if we restrict the opinion to the Elect. For infants, before they attain the use of reason, cannot be exercised unto virtue. Therefore it would be in vain that from birth (which these opinion-holders wish, in a manner conformable to the good angel given for guardianship) a bad angel for exercise should be given to them — and this all the more if they are to depart in infancy. The same judgment applies absolutely to those who suffer from perpetual madness.

Furthermore, since very many of the elect are extremely weak and prone to falling through their own nature, on account of the law of sin which is in their members, it is not probable that God ordains or permits that there should always be present to each of them a demon by whom he is attacked; rather, the good angel often turns away the demon's assault — just as it likewise sometimes prevents the demon from knowing what is going on concerning the man, as St. Jerome reports from Ignatius (in his commentary on Matt. 1):[117] that the birth of the Virgin was concealed from the devil, so that he believed Jesus had been conceived not of a Virgin but of a man. From this it appears that a demon is not always present to a man with the faculty of

tempting, as the good angel is always present guarding — which St. Thomas rightly teaches.[118] And for our consolation a precedent for this matter has been set in Christ our head, from whom, after the threefold temptation, the devil is said to have withdrawn for a time (Lk. 4).[119]

Finally, it is uncertain whether each of the elect is always tempted and exercised by one and the same demon, or whether sometimes by one and sometimes by another, as the Divine Wisdom may have permitted and ordained. For concerning good angels, Scripture speaks in this definite manner: "His angel" (*Angelus ejus*), and "their angels always behold" (*Angeli eorum semper vident*), and "the angels who will be with me from all evils"[120] — as though one and the same always remained assigned as the guardian of each individual man, and is therefore properly called that person's angel. But concerning bad angels, nothing of this kind is read. Nor indeed is it fitting that it should be so. For if this were held in the divine ordering, as it is held concerning the good, then demons thus assigned would already be certain that, for the duration of the life of the man to whom they had been given for exercise, they would not be sent into the abyss of hell — a certainty which by no means accords with their damnation.

§ 43. Furthermore, certain authors are customarily adduced in support of the aforementioned opinion, but their authority is not of great weight. For Origen, who transmits that opinion in Homilies 12 and 35 on Luke,[121] was the parent of many errors, and notoriously in that same 35th Homily teaches many other absurdities. Likewise this opinion is found in Cassian (Collation 8, ch. 17, and Collation 13, ch. 12).[122] But Prosper reproaches this writer, both in other matters and in this doctrine, in the book he published against him, ch. 27.[123] (a) Both, namely Origen in the later passage and Cassian in the earlier passage, cite the *Book of the Shepherd* (*librum Pastoris*), in which it is claimed to be written that two angels cling to each man, one good and one bad. But since St. Jerome (in the *Prologus Galeatus*)[124] and Pope Gelasius (in the Council of 70 Bishops, whose decree is extant in Gratian, Dist. 15, ch. *Sancta Romana Ecclesia*)[125] placed that book among the apocrypha, and indeed the same decree places the writings both of Origen and Cassian among those same apocrypha — the testimony of these authors is of no great weight.

Furthermore, this opinion is found in Homily 5 of the *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum*.[126] But the author of that work, being uncertain, is certainly shown to Origenize and Arianize in many places.

As to the authority of St. Gregory which the Master puts forward in support of this position — it is not found in St. Gregory, but is contained in the *Book of Sentences* of Hugh of St. Victor,[127] whose authority is not to be compared with that of St. Gregory.

Finally, it can rightly seem that this opinion flowed from the error of the pagans, who attributed to individual human beings at their very birth two attendant spirits (*genios*) as it were connate — one good and one bad — ascribing to the good spirit all the good things that the man either did or suffered, and to the evil spirit all evil things. Not altogether unlike this is that fiction of Mohammedan superstition which is read in the book entitled *Doctrina Mahometi* (*The Doctrine of Muhammad*): that two angels assist each and every man, one on the right, one on the left — one of whom writes down the man's good deeds, the other his evil deeds, etc. From all of which it is evident that this which is said about an evil angel always adhering to each individual man belongs more to the fables of false religions than has any solid foundation in Christian doctrine.

§ V — Whether the Angels had foreknowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ (Utrum Angeli praecognoverint mysterium incarnationis Christi)

§ 44. What the Master asks — whether the mystery of the Incarnate Word was foreknown by the Angels — must be understood not of natural cognition but of supernatural cognition. For it is sufficiently established that the Angels could not by their nature attain to cognition of supernatural mysteries, above all before those mysteries came to pass or came into existence in the order of things. This indeed is the opinion of all the Scholastics, even though concerning mysteries already accomplished or already existing almost Scotus alone dissents.[129]

§ 45. This being supposed, there are several opinions regarding the present question. One is that of the Master (in the text), teaching that to the higher Angels the mysteries of Grace were already known of old and from ages past, inasmuch as it was through their ministry that these same mysteries were to be announced to men; but that they remained unknown to the lower Angels until they were fulfilled and proclaimed through the Church, and that only then were they perfectly known to all the Angels. This teaching the Master received from Haimo (writing on Eph. 3), as he himself acknowledges.[130]

§ 46. Another opinion is that the mystery of the Incarnation lay hidden from all the Angels up to the time when it was completed and proclaimed. This seems to have been the view of very many of the Fathers. For St. Ambrose says (on Lk. 5): "For it was not easy to know the mystery hidden from ages in God, which not even the higher Powers were able to know."[131] And in the book *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 5, he says: "The Angels were ignorant of Christ's Resurrection," which the verses signify: *"Lift up your gates, O ye princes,"* etc.; after which he finally concludes: "How then could a man know the divine secret which the Angels did not know?" — where he speaks of the conception of the Virgin.[132] Moreover, to St. Bernard (*In Ep.* 67) it is doubtful whether any Angel besides Gabriel had knowledge of this mystery before it came to pass.[133] In support of this opinion there write further Origen, Hom. 15 (*on Matt.*), St. Jerome (*on Is.* 63), St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 14 (*on Jn.*), and Theodoretus, book *De immutabilitate*.[134] These same authors, together with Theophylact and Oecumenius (*In Expos. Eph.* 3), rely above all on the aforesaid passage of the Apostle, Eph. 3, where he says that grace was given to him to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men as to what is the dispensation of the mystery hidden from ages in God; and then he adds: "That the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the Principalities and Powers in the heavenly places through the Church, according to the eternal purpose which He accomplished in Christ Jesus our Lord."[135] From these words of the Apostle they further add something more — namely, that the Apostles preached these mysteries to the Angels. So indeed Origen, St. Jerome, and St. John Chrysostom, specifically from the fact that the Apostle says this mystery became known to the Angels through the Church, that is, as they explain it, through the preaching of the Church.

§ 47. Another passage of the same Apostle is 1 Tim. 3, where he says of this same mystery of godliness: *"It was manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, appeared to Angels, was preached among the Gentiles,"* etc.[136] For all those things seem to be referred to the same time of the New Testament. The Angels are adduced as though ignorant, as St. Ambrose says (*In Institutione Virginis*), asking and saying: *"Who is this King of Glory?"*[137] A similar passage is Is. 63, where again, on the authority of St. Ambrose, the voice is that of Angels

asking concerning Christ either rising or ascending into heaven: *"Who is this who comes from Edom?"* etc.[138] And St. Jerome and almost all the others explain these two latter passages in the same sense.

§ 48. The third opinion, moreover, is that all the Angels, from the beginning at which they were made blessed, knew the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ as regards its substance, but not however as regards its particular formal characters (*rationes*) and circumstances; but that they received this cognition only when the mystery itself was actually completed and proclaimed through the Apostles. This is what St. Thomas teaches,[139] and very many others follow him. It must be noted, however, what St. Thomas says in the body of the article at the aforesaid place — that the Angels by supernatural cognition knew the mysteries of Grace in the Word, yet not all of them, nor all equally, but according as God willed to reveal them to each; in such a way, however, that the higher Angels, contemplating the Divine Wisdom more clearly, know in that very vision more mysteries and loftier ones, and manifest these to the lower Angels by illuminating them. "And of these mysteries too," he says, "they knew certain ones from the beginning, while others they are taught subsequently, according as it suits their offices." This likewise pertains to the higher Angels themselves, as St. Thomas himself clearly explains below. The reason he assigns for the general cognition which all possessed from the beginning of their beatitude is this: because the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ is a certain general principle to which all the offices of the Angels are ordered. "For they are all ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation" — salvation, namely, to be given through Christ (Heb. 1).[11] Therefore they could not have been ignorant of this mystery — above all those Angels through whom that very mystery was to be revealed to the Patriarchs and Prophets, and those who had been given as princes and guardians to the people of Israel, generally and individually, for procuring their salvation, and indeed also to others outside that people.

§ 49. There is also another reason: for Christ was constituted Head not only of men but also of the Angels (Eph. 1).[140] Therefore the mystery of Christ — that is, of the Word to be incarnate — pertained in some way to the beatific cognition of the Angels. To this there further contributes the fact that the Scriptures in general attribute to the Angels a greater knowledge of mysteries than to men, so that if something lies hidden from the Angels, it would seem that it should consequently not be disclosed to men either. For in Matt. 24, when the disciples had questioned Christ too curiously about the time of His coming, He checked them with this answer: *"Of that day and hour no one knows, not even the Angels of heaven"*[141] — as if to say: what the Angels do not know, you ought not to seek to know. Hence it appears that nothing of such mysteries was ever revealed to men which the Angels did not know. At the same time, the opinion of certain persons is refuted — that the Angels were instructed concerning certain mysteries by men; on which question see St. Thomas.[142] Indeed, if someone were to interpret the aforesaid scripture in this way — that the Angels do not know the day and hour of that judgment because, though knowing, they "know not," that is, know in such a way that they cannot nonetheless reveal it to men — he would not seem to do violence to the scripture; since in the same context there is added in Mk. 13: *"Nor the Son"*[143] — which cannot be understood otherwise than that the Son, though He knows, is as one not knowing because He does not reveal it.

§ 50. From what has been said it is clear that this third opinion has no slight foundation in the scriptures — as in Heb. 1, Eph. 1, Matt. 24, and moreover wherever revelations concerning Christ are read to have been made to men through Angels, as in Daniel and elsewhere. Nor is there wanting the authority of the Fathers for this opinion. For (Pseudo-)Dionysius[144] teaches that the divine mysteries become known to men in no other way than through Angels, just as they become known to the lower Angels in no other way than through the

higher. Which St. Augustine also teaches.[145] Moreover, in St. Augustine[146] one reads that the mystery of Grace was hidden from ages in God in such a way as nevertheless to be made known to the Principalities and Powers of heaven. Bede follows St. Augustine in the exposition of Eph. 3.[147] And the opinion of Maximus in a certain sermon is open: that it ought not to be doubted that the Angels knew the future Incarnation; which St. Thomas cites.[148]

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1. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 16.
2. The Latin quotation from Gregory: *"Veneremur in illo Divinitatem suam, quia nisi super omnia Deus exsisteret, ei nullo modo Angeli ministrarent."*
3. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 10.
4. Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione Christi*, Book III, ch. 11.
5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 111, a. 2.
6. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 7 (cross-reference to earlier discussion in this commentary).
7. St. Gregory the Great [abbreviation as in source; the exact locus is not specified by Estius here, but the sentiment is characteristic of Gregory's *Homiliae in Evangelia*].
8. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 2 (cross-reference).
9. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 7, § III (cross-reference).
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 112, a. 2.
11. Heb. 1:14.
12. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 10 (the Master's own discussion, § F).
13. Dan. 10.
14. Jude, Epistle (the contention over the body of Moses).
15. Dan. 9; Lk. 1.
16. Tob. 12.
17. Is. 9:6 (Vulgate: *magni consilii Angelus*).
18. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 56.
19. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 1 *de Sancto Michaele*.
20. St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, *Commentaries on Heb.* 1.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 112, a. 2 (*ibidem* — same article as cited in the preceding section).
22. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XVI, c. 9; *Homiliae in Hiezechihelem* Hom. 8; *Homiliae in Evangelia* Hom. 34.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 112, a. 2 (with his followers).
24. Lk. 1 (Gabriel); Tob. 12 (Raphael).
25. Rev. 7; 3 Kgs. (last chapter, i.e. 1 Kgs. 22:19 in modern numbering / 3 Reg. ult. in Vulgate).
26. Matt. 18:10. The cross-reference "as we said above" (*ut supra diximus*) refers to Estius's discussion in Dist. 7 of this Book.
27. Zech. 2 (one angel meeting another and revealing what the Prophet was to be told).
28. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXVIII, c. 2.
29. Dan. 8.
30. Rev. 7.

31. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 7, on the speech and illumination of angels.

32. Deut. 4; the allusion is to Aristotelian-Averroistic cosmology of separated intelligences as movers of the spheres.

33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 3, in the body.

34. Rev. 12:7–8.

35. Rev. 12:9.

36. Matt. 25:41.

37. Jude 9.

38. Dan. 10:21; Dan. 12:1.

39. St. Jerome and Theodoret, *Commentarii in Danielem*, ch. 12.

40. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, bk. 1, ch. 18.

41. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 9.

42. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Habakkuk*, ch. 3.

43. Dan. 10:21.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 3.

45. Ps.-Athanasius, *Sermo de Assumptione Beatae Mariae*.

46. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 32.

47. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione*, bk. 5, ch. 4.

48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 30, a. 2, ad 4.

49. Cf. the preceding distinction (dist. 9), as noted above.

50. Tob. 12:15.

51. Gen. 1:5.

52. Lk. 24:1; 1 Cor. 16:2.

53. Dan. 9:1.

54. Dan. 10:13, 20–21.

55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 4.

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, a. 1; q. 113, a. 1.

57. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4.

58. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 5.

59. St. Basil, *Commentary on Isaiah*, ch. 8.

60. Dan. 10:12; 12.

61. Preceding distinction (dist. 9), as noted above.

62. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew*, on Matt. 18 (at "Their Angels," etc.).

63. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Habakkuk*, ch. 1.

64. St. Basil, *Against Eunomius*, bk. 3; and *Exposition of Ps. 48*.

65. St. Basil, *De vera virginitate*.

66. St. John Chrysostom, *Commentary on Matthew*, on Matt. 18; and *Homiliae in Josue*, hom. 3, on Josh. 1; and *Homily on the Praises of Paul*.

67. St. Ambrose, *Commentary on Ps. 38*; and *Commentary on Ps. 118*, at the verse "Blessed are they who search his testimonies."

68. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Epistola ad Demophilum*.

69. Origen, *Homiliae in Lucam*, hom. 5; *Homiliae in Psalmos*, hom. 1 on Ps. 37.

70. Didymus, *Commentary on 2 Peter*, ch. 2.

71. St. Augustine, *Meditationes*, ch. 12 [regarded by modern scholars as spurious; see the footnote in the source]; *Sermo* 7 *de Tempore* [likewise considered inauthentic by the Benedictine editors].

72. Cassian, *Collationes*, Collation 7, ch. 17; Collation 13, ch. 12.

73. Theodoret, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, q. 3.

74. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 34.

75. Bede, *Commentary on Acts*, ch. 12.

76. St. Bernard, *De Consideratione*, bk. 5, ch. 4; *Sermones in Psalmum 90 (Qui habitat)*, serm. 12.

77. The lengthy footnote in the source (marked *(a)*) observes: note and admire here the author's acumen and careful method in presenting theological doctrine. He had explained sufficiently and perspicuously, with the clearest testimonies drawn from Scripture, that it pertains to the dogmas of faith that the proposition is absolutely taught, namely that blessed Angels are assigned by God to the custody of men; he then calls the opinion most common among Catholics — by which it is decreed that individual Angels are destined for individual men, above all the Faithful — "very probable": which is not to be taken in the sense in which modern moral theologians who go by the name of Probabilists commonly explain "probable," so that the matter may be disputed in either direction; but in the sense in which St. Augustine and St. Thomas not once received this name "probable," namely, to signify a thing proved and concerning which one cannot prudently doubt. Certainly Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, tom. 3, *de Angelis*, lib. 2, ch. 4, did not hesitate to call it a Christian dogma, and at num. 7 a decree of Christian theologians. And if we hear St. Bernard, Sermon 12 on Ps. 90, num. 6 in the Mabillon edition, we shall judge this opinion worthy not merely of probability but in some degree of faith: for the holy Father there speaks so as to intimate that it pertains at least in some measure to Faith — "If you consult Faith," he says, "it assures you that Angelic presence is not absent from you." He says this because Faith proves it, inasmuch as the Apostle defines faith to be the argument of things not appearing. "The Angels are present," he says, "and they are present with you not only on your behalf but also for you. They are present to protect you, they are present to profit you." Therefore the author rightly considers, and with him all other Catholics, that those who dare to instil into ears of the faithful the opinion concerning the custody of individual Angels for individual men, above all for the Faithful, deserve at minimum the mark of rashness. Much more could be noted here for establishing this theological dogma and for refuting Calvin's error — who in more than one place lyingly asserts, faithless wretch, that it was invented as an enemy of Divine Grace; but one must forbear, since the testimonies of those who dispute the matter at length are to be left aside, and the volumes in which this matter is treated are obvious to theologians; and the brevity of time presses upon us too greatly. See nonetheless Seraphinus a Porrecta on art. 2, q. 113, *prima pars* of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas in the Appendix, where he treats the matter concisely indeed, but learnedly and with great care.

78. St. Basil, *Against Eunomius*, bk. 3.

79. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 17, ch. 7, on Job 35.

80. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 2.

81. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, a. 1.

82. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 79.

83. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 4 [lib. 2, cap. 4].

84. Origen, *Commentary on Numbers*, on Num. 22 ("When he saw the Angel assigned," etc.).

85. The source carries a further footnote *(a)* at the close of this section (partially overlapping the preceding note), whose substance is incorporated above in footnote [77].

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 110, a. 1; q. 113, aa. 1, 3, 4.

87. Tob. 12 (the whole narrative of Raphael's ministry).

88. St. Hilary, *Commentary on Ps. 134* (*scribens in Psalmum 134*).

89. 4 Kgs. 6 (i.e., 2 Kgs. 6 in modern numbering).

90. Gen. 48; Ps. 90; Ex. 32 (*Angelus meus praecédet te*); Tob. (the passage on the binding of Asmodaeus).

91. St. Hilary, *Commentary on Matt. 18* (*scribens in Matthaeum 18*).

92. St. Bernard, *In Canticum Canticorum*, Sermons 8 and 39.

93. St. Bernard, *Sermon 1 on St. Michael* (*Sermo 1 de S. Michaele*).

94. Rev. 12; Job 1 and 2.

95. Ps. 90:11.

96. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistulam ad Colossenses*, Hom. 3 (on Col. 1).

97. Gen. 48:16.

98. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, Hom. 60.

99. 1 Cor. 3.

100. St. Basil, *Expositio in Psalmum 48*.

101. St. Basil, *Adversus Eunomium*, lib. 3.

102. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matt.* 18 [the phrase "Magna dignitas animarum," etc.].

103. Estius refers to his commentary at Dist. 3 of Book II.

104. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 1, in the body and ad 3.

105. Eph. 6:12.

106. The letters "§. B. & C." in the source denote St. Bonaventure and St. Bernard [abbreviation as in source].

107. 2 Tim. 2:26.

108. Lk. 11:26.

109. Lk. 8:2; Mk. 16:9.

110. Lk. 8:30.

111. 4 Kgs. 6 (i.e., 2 Kgs. 6 in modern numbering), the account of Elisha.

112. Sir. 15:20.

113. Job 1–2.

114. 2 Cor. 12:7.

115. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 1.

116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 109, aa. 1–2.

117. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matt.* 1 (citing Ignatius).

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 113, a. 6.

119. Lk. 4:13.

120. These phrases echo Matt. 18:10 ("their angels always behold the face of my Father") and Ps. 90, and the phrase "the angels who will be with me from all evils" [abbreviation as in source].

121. Origen, *In Lucam*, Homiliae 12 and 35.

122. Cassian, *Collationes*, Collation 8, ch. 17, and Collation 13, ch. 12.

123. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Liber contra Collatorem* (book against Cassian), ch. 27.

124. St. Jerome, *Prologus Galeatus* (preface to the Vulgate Old Testament).

125. Pope Gelasius I, decree in the Council of 70 Bishops; extant in Gratian, *Decretum*, Dist. 15, ch. *Sancta Romana Ecclesia*.

126. *Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum*, Hom. 5 (author uncertain; the work Origenizes and Arianizes in many places).

127. Hugh of St. Victor, *Liber Sententiarum*.

128. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, last article, and q. 117, a. 2, ad 1.

129. Scotus's dissent concerns mysteries already accomplished or existent; for pre-existent mysteries, the consensus among Scholastics is universal.

130. Haimo of Auxerre (or Haimo of Halberstadt), *Commentary on Eph.* 3; cited by the Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, in the text of this distinction.

131. St. Ambrose, *Commentary on Lk.*, bk. 5.

132. St. Ambrose, *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 5; the verse cited is Ps. 24:7 (*"Tollite portas principes vestras"*).

133. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 67.

134. Origen, *In Matthaeum*, hom. 15; St. Jerome, *Commentary on Is.* 63; St. John Chrysostom, *In Ioannem*, hom. 14; Theodoretus, *De immutabilitate* (book on the immutability of God).

135. Eph. 3:8–11.

136. 1 Tim. 3:16.

137. Ps. 24:7–10; St. Ambrose, *De Institutione Virginis*.

138. Is. 63:1; St. Ambrose, *ibid.*

139. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 5, especially in the reply to the first objection; q. 64, a. 2, ad 4; *Commentary on Eph.* 3; and several other places.

140. Eph. 1:22.

141. Matt. 24:36.

142. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 116, a. 2, and *Commentary on Eph.* 3.

143. Mk. 13:32.

144. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Caelestis Hierarchia*, ch. 4 and ch. 7.

145. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VII, ch. 32.

146. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, ch. 19.

147. Bede, *Commentary on Eph.* 3.

148. Maximus, sermon (title not further specified in source); cited by St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3.

DISTINCTIO XI — ON THE FIVE AGES OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION (*DE QUINQUE TEMPORIBUS COGNITIONIS ANGELICAE MYSTERII INCARNATIONIS*)

§ 1. In order that this matter may be set out clearly, five periods of time must be distinguished with respect to the Angels. The first extends from the beginning of creation up to their confirmation. During this period, although they possessed supernatural cognition (*cognitio supernaturalis*), which is that which is through Faith (*Fides*), they do not appear to have known the mystery of the Word to be incarnated. For this belonged in no way to that state of the Angels, since they were not to be saved through Christ. Moreover, if the elect had known it, by the same reasoning the reprobate would also have known it — who, consequently, when afterwards they saw Christ appearing in the flesh, would not have doubted that He was the Son of God. For even though they had lost faith by sinning, nevertheless the memory of what they had once believed would not have been lost to them. That they were in doubt even at the time when they saw Him working miracles is attested by St. Augustine.[1] And no Father asserts that the demons knew from of old — that is, before their fall — what they then did not know, namely that God and man came together in one and the same person.

§ 2. Nor does it stand in the way, as some object, that faith must precede vision — that is, so that the reward of vision may be rendered to the merit of faith. For this is not required in the case of all things of which they receive the vision in the Word. For many things they there see which they had never previously believed. The Angels, however, did possess faith in the Trinity, to whose glory they sang from the beginning of their creation, according to that text of Sirach: "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. As it was in the beginning." And as the reward of this faith they received the vision of that same Trinity. They put forward other arguments as well, but to these we have already replied above.[2]

§ 3. The second period extends from the confirmation up to the fall of man. During this period it is highly probable that the Angels possessed cognition of the said mystery as regards its substance and excellence, as has now been proved. For indeed even to man before the fall this had been revealed (Gen. 2). Revelations, however, as was said above, are made to men only through the ministry of the Angels.

§ 4. The third period extends from the fall of man up to Christ. From which time the Angels straightway began to know certain particular details of this mystery — and above all this: that through Christ, who was to be born of the posterity of Adam, the human race itself would be freed from the servitude of sin. For in Gen. 3 it is declared by God through the Angel to the serpent: "I will put enmity between your seed and her seed: She shall crush your head."[3] And as thereafter successive revelations of this mystery were made to men, it was fitting that the Angels also, as ministers of those revelations, should become more and more acquainted with

the mystery itself according to its various circumstances. This is what the reasoning and the declaration of St. Thomas, set out above, requires.

§ 5. The fourth period extends from Christ to the end of the age. During which time there is no doubt that, just as men, so also and much more the Angels received a fuller and more ample knowledge (*notitia*) of the said mystery, with respect to many particular details previously unknown. For just as the things which are spoken obscurely in the Prophets are the same things which are clearly explained in the Gospels, so the Angels knew previously the same things which they afterwards came to know fully and distinctly — in accordance with that perfection by which they were now completed — and they knew them with so much greater perfection than men, by as much as a more perfect knowledge of completed things is commensurate with their nature and glory. And yet it must be acknowledged that they continued to advance, even up to the end of the age, in their knowledge of the mysteries of our redemption, because up to that time the very redemption itself was still being accomplished according to its effects. To this class belong also the revelations described in Revelation (Rev.), and other things which concerning Christ's Church and its members daily become known. Thus the Master rightly teaches in the text, and Rupertus likewise.[4]

§ 6. The fifth period extends from the consummation of the age into eternity, when the knowledge of all the blessed concerning the mysteries of Christ will be completely full and perfect in every respect, so that no room for further advance in it can exist. But if anyone should ask whether the advance in the knowledge of mysteries which is attributed to the Angels during the present age is to be understood of the knowledge which they have in the Word, I answer that it can be understood of that knowledge without absurdity. For that knowledge is not, as some suppose, so invariable that, with respect to the objects to be known, no addition whatsoever can be made to it. For it is highly probable that the saints know our prayers in the Word — not from the beginning of their beatitude (*beatitudo*), but from the time when those prayers are directed to them, as will be said elsewhere.

§ 7. These things having been thus set out, it must finally be noted that the Fathers adduced for the second opinion can, all or some of them, be so understood as not to deny altogether that the Angels had any knowledge of the mystery of Christ and of the calling of the Gentiles before they saw it already being brought to completion — but that they remove from them only the perfect and distinct knowledge according to its particular circumstances, such namely as they received when the things were accomplished. For in this way St. Jerome expounds his own opinion,[5] saying that the mystery of Christ had been unknown to the Angels in the manner in which it was afterwards known to the Apostles; and yet it had been less unknown to them than to the Patriarchs and Prophets, who predicted it. This response he draws from these words of the Apostle: "Which mystery was not made known to the sons of men in other generations, as it is now revealed to His holy Apostles" — that is, it was not formerly known to men perfectly and distinctly, as it is now known, God revealing it, by the Apostles. And he wishes this likewise to be understood of the Angels. For if this mystery was in some way known to the Prophets, how much more to the Angels? This consequence St. Jerome openly indicates.

§ 8. There remains, lastly, one objection to be removed, which the Master proposes to himself at the end of the distinction, on the basis of Isidore and Gregory. For Isidore[6] says that the Angels know all things in the Word of God before they come to pass; and Gregory[7] says: "What is it that they do not know there, where they know Him who knows all things?" From these testimonies it appears that the Angels had, from the beginning of their beatitude, a perfect knowledge of all mysteries — which is contrary to all the opinions set

out above. I answer that in these words of the Fathers an absolute universality cannot be understood. For it is certain, from what has been said at the appropriate distinctions,[8] that the Angels do not know all things without exception. But these Fathers are speaking about all those things which pertain to the state of the Angels and of which ignorance would be a fault. For that this is Gregory's meaning is clear from another passage,[9] where he restricts his own assertion to those things which are to be known, and at the same time indicates that the Angels do not know all the things which God knows. "For," he says, "what among the things that are to be known do they not know, they who know Him who knows all things? Their knowledge, therefore, in comparison with ours is greatly enlarged; yet in comparison with the Divine Knowledge it is narrow." So he.

§ VI — Whether the Angels advance in merit and reward (Utrum Angeli in merito et praemio proficiant)

§ 9. It has been shown (at Dist. 5) that the Angels, through the offices which they exercise on our behalf, do not merit the beatitude already long since received — as the Master supposed — but that they received it by the merit of a preceding perseverance. Not unlike that opinion is the one which (at this Distinction) the same Master embraces as more probable, namely that the Angels advance, up to the Day of Judgement, simultaneously in merit and in reward; and that reward he interprets as the knowledge and love of God. Hence it would follow that not only accidental but also essential beatitude (*beatitudo*) increases in them. This opinion, which is in truth absurd and to be rejected — and which has deservedly been noted among selected errors — he establishes by no other argument than that the Angels advance in the knowledge of certain mysteries, as we have already shown above. But from that it by no means follows that their happiness, which consists in a perfect knowledge of God, is increased. For no degree of perfection is added to this knowledge by the fact that they learn certain other mysteries in the course of time or advance in the knowledge of them; just as nothing would be taken away from it if they knew something less, or indeed nothing at all, about the mysteries of human redemption. For this knowledge is merely a knowledge of the works of God, not of God Himself according to His essence.

§ 10. One must say, therefore, that the Angels, after their confirmation, advance neither in merit nor in essential reward. First, because through confirmation they have attained their term, beyond which there is no place for meriting; since to merit belongs only to those who, still placed on the way (*in via*), are tending toward the term. Then, too, if the Angels were to merit, through their offices toward us, an increase of their beatitude, it would follow that holy men also accrue merits after death. For even the souls of holy men promote our salvation by their intercession and by other offices which they sometimes render. But that merit or reward should grow in blessed souls, the Master himself does not hold; and it is contrary to Scripture, which says in Eccl. 11: "In whatever place the tree shall fall, there it shall be"; and in Jn. 9: "The night cometh, when no man can work." Therefore, in confirmed Angels also we do not acknowledge this — for confirmation does them what death does for men.

§ 11. Moreover, if the multiplication of good works necessarily entailed a corresponding multiplication of merits, it would follow by the same reasoning that the Angels would never make an end of meriting — not even at the last Day of Judgement — because they will never, through all eternity, cease from the praise of God and from the love of Him and of all the blessed, which are without doubt good actions. Yet no one would say

these are meritorious; for not every good work has the formal character (*ratio*) of merit, but only that which proceeds from the charity of the way (*charitas viae*), not that which proceeds from the charity of the fatherland (*charitas Patriae*), such as are the works of the Blessed, whether performed by them before or after the Day of Judgement — they who in this respect are like unto God. For just as God, being most blessed, does not confer benefits upon men so that some portion of happiness might accrue to Himself, but so that it might be well for men: so also the blessed, both Angels and men, assist us by their offices toward us, not that any happiness might thereby increase for themselves, but that we might become sharers in their happiness.

§ 12. But someone will say: the Angels do advance in accidental reward; therefore also in merit. It is answered: that this is no more consequential in the case of Angels than in the case of blessed souls. For both the Angels before confirmation and men before death acquired for themselves all their merit — not only of the essential reward, but also of the accessory reward, which they afterwards receive on whatever occasion. And the same holds similarly in the case of the damned, for whom accidental punishment increases daily — not from any new merit of their present works, even though all those works are evil and perverse, but from the merit of the works which preceded their damnation.

§ I — Certain preliminary notes for the correct understanding of the history of the creation of things (Prænotanda quædam ad rectam intelligentiam historiæ creationis rerum)

§ 13. Concerning the creation of the corporeal world and its parts, which is described in Gen. 1, and concerning the manner and order of creation — lest we believe or hold anything alien to the truth — first of all we must take care that, on account of any experience of the senses or any chain of reasoning of the human mind, however certain and firm it may appear in outward semblance, we detract nothing from the authority of Scripture as it describes these matters, so as to think that something false or uncertain is contained therein; nor, on account of the rude simplicity of its language and style, should we be less reverently disposed toward it; but we must hold its truth as divine and in every respect unshaken, and receive its words, as dictated by the Holy Spirit, with all veneration. St. Augustine gives this warning[12] on account of those who, imbued with the specious opinions of the philosophers of this age, either hold something different regarding the origin of things from what the truth of Scripture maintains, or are scarcely able to accommodate their assent and judgment to the plain sense of Scripture.

Next, we must also beware lest we so constrain words of Scripture that admit of various interpretations to a single meaning as to exclude and reject the others. For those who do this are not so much seen to be expounding Scripture as laboring on behalf of an opinion preconceived from other principles of their own. St. Augustine himself warns us to flee this fault of interpretation.[13]

Nor is it any less necessary to beware that, on account of whatever celebrated and received opinions of the philosophers — if they have not been demonstrated by the most certain reasoning — we abandon the sense which presents itself to readers in the plain narrative and convert the words of Scripture into another and different sense. In this matter an error was once committed by Origen, who interpreted Moses according to Plato, and so established his allegories as to abolish the literal sense. An error was committed likewise by certain later writers who attempted to interpret the sacred history according to the standard of Aristotelian philosophy.

Finally, concerning this same history, it must also be noted that, since a miracle is properly so called only when it occurs outside the established course of nature, the events narrated in Gen. 1 ought not to be regarded as miracles, but as the works of God by which the nature of corporeal things was first established; and accordingly that operation of God was neither miraculous nor natural, but the primeval institution of nature itself.

§ II — Whether all things were created simultaneously, or on distinct days (Utrum omnia simul, an distinctis diebus creata sint)

§ 14. The opinion of certain persons, who say that the things which Gen. 1 describes as made were all made not across intervals of six days but simultaneously from the beginning of time, appears to depart not a little from the plain and simple narrative of Sacred Scripture. That Philo the Jew held this view is manifest. For at the beginning of book I of the *Allegories of the Law*[15] he says: "It is the mark of rustic simplicity to think that the world was made in six days, etc.," after which he expounds the six days allegorically as the perfect number six. But those who have written about the life and works of Philo, including St. Jerome and others, testify that he followed Plato in many things.

That St. Augustine also held the same opinion is sufficiently evident from certain of his writings, namely from book I of the *Commentary on Genesis according to the Letter*, chapter 15; book IV, chapters 8, 22, 32, 33, 34, and the chapters following; book V, chapters 4, 5, and 23; book VI;[16] likewise from book XII of *The City of God*, chapters 7, 9, 30, and 31.[17] To these add question 26 of book 65 of the *Questions*, under the title of the *Dialogue between St. Augustine and Orosius* — although it is established that it is the work of neither.[18] From the passages just mentioned, this is the opinion of St. Augustine as it may be gathered: that heaven, earth, light, the firmament dividing the waters from the waters, the dry land, the seas, and the luminaries of heaven were all made simultaneously at the beginning. The six days described at the opening of Genesis and distinguished by their numbers do not, moreover, designate the customary intervals of time, but the cognition of the Angelic spirits, by which they know the degrees and perfection of created things; and this same cognition is called now evening (*vespera*), now morning (*mane*), for different reasons. For "the knowledge of the creature," he says, "in comparison with the knowledge of the Creator, as it were grows dark toward evening; but it brightens and becomes morning when it is referred to the praise and love of the Creator itself"[19] — and the other things that follow.

§ 15. But other Fathers, adhering to the plain narrative of Scripture, consider that the various genera and species of things which that same Scripture records as having been produced were brought forth not all together on one day or in one moment, but on six distinct days, as the words of Scripture sound — such as St. Basil in Homily 2 of the *Hexaemeron*,[20] Epiphanius in the Epistle translated by St. Jerome and written against the error of Origen,[21] St. Ambrose in book I of the *Hexaemeron*,[22] St. John Chrysostom in Homily 3 on Genesis,[23] St. Gregory in book 32 of the *Moralia*, chapter 10,[24] and St. John Damascene in book II of *On the Faith*.[25] Likewise Bede, Rabanus, Strabo, whom the *Glossa Ordinaria* on Gen. 1 records,[26] and a great many others both of more recent times and of antiquity.

Furthermore, St. Thomas,[14] suspending his own judgment and having declared that he wished to prejudge neither side, resolves the arguments of each. Although elsewhere[27] he appears more inclined toward the opinion of St. Augustine. For he says that the opinion which holds that the Angels were created

simultaneously with the corporeal world fits well enough with that opinion which holds that in the creation of things there was no temporal order. And he indeed holds and teaches that the Angels were created simultaneously with the corporeal world. Wherefore he also considers probable that opinion which he asserts fits well enough with this. Cajetan, the follower of St. Thomas, although in his commentary on the *Summa*[28] he does not declare his own opinion, nevertheless openly agrees with St. Augustine in his exposition of Gen. 1.[29] Canus likewise subscribes to this opinion.

Yet the common opinion, which acknowledges the distinction and succession of days and works of creation, is by far the more probable. This is shown first and foremost from the plain and simple narrative of Scripture, in which the days of the creation of things are distinguished by their own numbers, and it is recorded what was done on each day. Now, just as in that narrative by "heaven" we understand heaven, by "earth" earth, by "water" water, and similarly for the other things there narrated as made — so by "day" we ought to understand a day, and by "six days" nothing other than six days succeeding one another in order.

This is likewise proved by the Law of the Sabbath; for the Lawgiver the Lord Himself renders this precise account of it in Exod. 20: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, and rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it." This reason will appear of little weight if the work of the creation of the world was not in reality completed by God in six distinct days, with the seventh day of the Lord's rest following upon them. Add to these considerations that no necessity of reason compels those Scriptures, which speak of six distinct days and are clear in themselves, to be wrested into another sense — since it is no less possible for God, indeed no less

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1. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIX, ch. 21.
2. The reply to other arguments was given above: see Dist. 6.
3. Gen. 3, where it is said by God through the Angel to the serpent: "I will put enmity between your seed and her seed: She shall crush your head."
4. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 11 (in the text); Rupertus, *De Victoria Verbi Dei* I, ch. 29.
5. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Ephesios* III (on Eph. 3).
6. Isidore, *De summo Bono* I, ch. 12.
7. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 33.
8. See dist. 38 of the second book, and dist. 7 of this book.
9. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* II, ch. 3.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 9.
11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74.
12. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 20.
13. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, chs. 18–19; and *Confessions* XII, ch. 18 and the chapters following.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74, a. 2.
15. Philo Judaeus, *Allegoriae Legum*, book I, init.
16. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 15; IV, chs. 8, 22, 32, 33, 34, and following; V, chs. 4, 5, and 23; VI.
17. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XII, chs. 7, 9, 30, 31.

18. Question 26, book 65 of the *Quaestiones*, under the title of the *Dialogus inter S. Augustinum et Orosium* — although it is established to be the work of neither.

19. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, ch. 7.

20. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 2.

21. Epiphanius, Epistle translated by St. Jerome and written against the error of Origen.

22. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, book I, ch. 7; and book VI, ch. 2 [abbreviation as in source: *Hexæmeron ca-*; text cut off at page turn, continuing with *pit. 7. & lib. 6. capit. 2.*].

23. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 3.

24. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, book 32, ch. 10.

25. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, book 2.

26. Bede, Rabanus, Strabo, as recorded in the *Glossa Ordinaria* on Gen. 1.

27. St. Thomas, *Opuscula* 15 and 17.

28. Cajetan, *Commentary on the Summa theologiae*.

29. Cajetan, *Expositio in Genesim*, ch. 1.

DISTINCTIO XII — ON THE FITTING ORDER OF CREATION AND THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST SIMULTANEOUS CREATION (*DE ORDINE CREATIONIS ET OBJECTIONIBUS CONTRA CREATIONEM SIMULTANEAM*)

§ 1. — that it is fitting, if the causes of what was done are weighed, to bring forth the natures of things in distinct intervals of time rather than to make all things simultaneously. For Christ too performed miracles at times not in a single moment but successively, as in Mk. 8, when He first illuminated a blind man imperfectly, and then perfectly.[1] It must be shown, moreover, that it was fitting that in the creation of things God should proceed from the imperfect to the perfect — a point we shall demonstrate in the distinction immediately following.[2]

§ 2. There are also other arguments that can be urged against the contrary opinion, and especially that part of it which holds that all things written in Gen. 1 as made over six days were made in one and the same instant. For darkness and light could not have existed, nor have been able to exist, at the same time; but, as Scripture testifies, darkness was first upon the face of the deep, and then, at the Lord's command, light was made — to wit, succeeding the darkness in that same transparent medium. Hence the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 4: "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness," etc.[3] For if light had been created in the first instant together with heaven and earth, no darkness would have preceded it, but only a pure negation.

§ 3. Reply: St. Augustine answers this argument by saying that darkness precedes light not in the order of time but in the order of nature, or rather of our understanding, because we conceive of an unformed thing prior to a formed one, even if the thing never in fact lacked form.[4] Yet that reply does not seem to give satisfaction to Scripture, which asserts that darkness truly existed. A similar argument holds for the waters in their confused state and then divided by the interposition of the firmament; for the earth covered by waters and then uncovered; for the parts of the day, evening and morning. All of these necessarily require an order of time, just as do the several days which Scripture numbers in sequence as six. For several periods of time cannot run simultaneously. For although St. Augustine interprets the six days of creation as the angelic cognition (*cognitio angelica*) according to the various degrees of created things, this may indeed be accepted as an allegorical sense, but not in such a way that thereby the real distinction of things and the distinct creation of works distributed over days is abolished as the literal sense.

§ 4. Again, one might object to St. Augustine himself that — as he himself both grants and teaches — the angel did not sin immediately at the beginning but was good for some time, as may be seen in Distinction 3.[5] Yet on the same St. Augustine's account the Devil sinned before man was created, or at least at the very moment when man was created. The saying "He was a murderer from the beginning" (*Ille erat homicida ab*

initio) he expounds as referring to the beginning of man's creation.[6] Therefore, not even according to St. Augustine himself can it stand that the angel and man were created in the same instant.

§ 5. There is added to this the plain witness of Scripture signifying that man did not exist from the beginning, nor even at the time when plants were created. For it is said in Gen. 2 that on the day God made heaven and earth, no shrub of the field was yet on earth and no herb of the region, because there was no man to till the ground.[7] But this objection does not press St. Augustine, inasmuch as he, in explaining his own opinion in book 5 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapters 4 and 5 (a point St. Thomas also noted),[8] does not place the production of plants and animals — among which man is included — in the works of the six days according to act, but only according to potency (*potentia*). For causally and potentially, as he himself puts it, earth and water on the third, fifth, and sixth day brought forth these kinds of things, because they received the power (*virtutem*) of producing them; and he thinks this is signified by those words of Gen. 2 in which it is said that on the day the Lord made heaven and earth He also made every shrub of the field before it sprang up on the earth, and every herb of the region before it germinated — as though it were said: before they existed in act, they were already in the earth in potency.[9] Such, then, is St. Augustine's view.

§ 6. Others, however, who hold that even those things which St. Augustine excepts were in act produced simultaneously with the angels and the world, would perhaps reply that it is not absurd to say that the angels sinned after the creation of man. Nor does it appear that this can be refuted by any certain argument or by the testimony of Scripture.

§ 7. It is possible, nonetheless, to object still further against the said explanation of St. Augustine: that even if many plants and animals are in the earth and water potentially, not all are so. For earth and water did not receive the power (*virtutem*) of producing the more perfect animals, which nature never produces otherwise than by generation from male and female — such as horses, lions, and elephants. In the case of man this is most certain, even according to Scripture, the Apostle saying in Acts 17 that God made from one man (*ex uno homine*) every race of mankind.[10] Moreover, it is not said of man "Let the earth bring forth man" as it is said of beasts and plants; rather, to a body composed of the slime of the earth God breathed a soul. Therefore at least as regards man, St. Augustine's reply about potent production (*productione potentiali*) cannot hold — and that reply involves no small difficulty. For this reason we may also apply to this matter his general retractation, which he makes of the books entitled *De Genesi ad litteram* in book 2 of the *Retractationes*, chapter 24[11] — namely, that in that work more was left as questioned than was found as settled, and many things were set forth as still requiring further inquiry. Elsewhere he evidently simply follows the common opinion. For in *De catechizandis rudibus*, chapter 17,[12] having said that God worked for six days and rested on the seventh, he added: "For the Omnipotent could have made all things in one moment of time" — as if to say: for a certain reason He did not do so, although He could have.

§ III — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 8. The arguments of the contrary opinion must now be resolved. Of these, the first is from the Ecclesiasticus, saying in chapter 18: "He who lives for ever created all things simultaneously" (*Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*).[14] For St. Augustine uses this to establish his own opinion in book 4 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 33.[15] Reply: in that text, the word *simul* does not determine the verb *creavit*, and

neither does the name *omnia* refer to time, but to the generality of things. For the Greek word signifies *pariter*, *consequenter*, *sine exceptione* — that is, that nothing in the nature of things fails to be something created by God. Hence the Ecclesiastic wished to say nothing other than what John said of the Word of God: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made" (*Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil*)[16] — and what Moses said, that God created heaven and earth and all things that are in them.'[17] Furthermore, even if the sense of *simul* were "all things at one instant were created," it still would not follow that the six days' works should be confused; for things that were made after the first day are said to be properly created at that time, not as if they were immediately produced from nothing, but from pre-existent matter which had been created all at once. Reply: *simul* is here used in a loose acceptation (*acceptione confusa*), so that not one and the same day is understood but one day after another.[18] And what is said there consequently is appended concerning shrubs and herbs: "before they sprang up, or germinated" — this is not said because they did not yet exist in act, but because potentially they were already in the earth on the first day of creation; yet this has the sense: when He created the whole of shrub and herb, they did not yet exist before.

§ 9. The second argument: Gen. 2 places the creation of heaven and earth together with the creation of plants on the same day by these words: "On the day that God made heaven and earth, and every shrub of the field," etc.[9] But in other works the same judgment applies. Reply: Scripture uses *day* (*diem*) in place of *time* (*tempore*; so that *day* can also be understood more broadly (*pro*) as any distinct period however intelligible — not in a strictly proper sense as a single and the same day, but as another day and yet another intelligible. And what is said there consequently follows: "before they sprang up, or germinated" — this is not said because they did not yet exist in act, though potentially they were already in the earth on the first day of creation; yet this carries the meaning: when He created every shrub and herb, they did not then yet exist beforehand.

§ 10. Third: Exod. 31 has Moses say: "In six days God created heaven and earth" (*Sex diebus creavit Deus caelum et terram*).[19] Yet Gen. 1 says God created heaven and earth in the beginning and on the first day. Therefore, according to Moses, six days are a single day. Reply: interpret Exod. 31 from the other text, which is Exod. 20,'[20] by adding this clause: "And all things that are in them" (*Et omnia quae in eis sunt*).

§ 11. Fourth: the works of God are perfect (Deut. 32).[21] Therefore the world was constituted by God in its perfection immediately from the beginning. Reply: "perfect" is said in that place not in the sense that everything on its part is absolutely complete and formed, but in the sense that there is nothing in it for which it is justly to be blamed — such as, without doubt, all God's works are, however imperfect they may be in some other respect.

§ 12. Fifth: St. Gregory in Homily 26 on the Gospels says that God created all things from nothing simultaneously.[22] Reply: this is rightly said in respect of the matter (*ratione materiae*), which was all at once created at the beginning.

§ 13. Sixth: to the aforesaid doctrine, which establishes that all things were created simultaneously, there conforms beautifully that view which holds that the angelic intellects were concreated with the species of all natural things — that is, that all things from the beginning were simultaneously present both in reality and in the cognition of the angels. And on that account St. Thomas has in some measure this opinion,[23] since his teaching is chiefly about the species of all things concreated with the angel — a point we showed (in Distinction 7).'[24] Nor does this conflict with the opinion of those who hold all things made simultaneously. However, Reply: one ought not to proceed from cognition even by natural reason to the actual (*existentiam*)

existence of the thing cognized. For just as the whole nature of things was established by God so that it was in the mind of God before it was in itself — so also the inferior creature, that is corporeal things, existed prior in the intellect of the superior creature than in itself. This must be understood with respect to the whole genus of corporeal creature; we ought not therefore by this argument to say that the angelic nature was created before the corporeal world. This reply is suggested by St. Thomas.[25]

§ III — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 14. The arguments on the contrary side of the opinion are now to be resolved. The first of these is from Sirach, chapter 18, where it says: "He who lives for ever created all things at once (*simul*)."[14] For it is from this that St. Augustine establishes his opinion in book 4 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 33.[15] But it is answered that in that sentence the adverb *simul* does not qualify the verb "created" (*creavit*) but the noun "all things" (*omnia*); nor ought it to be referred to time, but to the generality of things. For the Greek word signifies *pariter*, *consequenter*, *sine exceptione* — that is, "equally," "in sequence," "without exception" — so that the sense is: there is nothing in the nature of things that has not been created by God. Hence the Ecclesiasticus wished to say no other thing than what John said of the Word of God: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made"[16] — and what Moses said: that God created heaven and earth and all things that are in them.'[26] Furthermore, even if the sense were *simul*, that is, that all things were created in one instant, the works of the six days would not for that reason be confounded; because the things made after the first day are not said to be created so properly as those things which were made on the first day — since they were not produced immediately from nothing, but from pre-existing matter, which had all been created at once on the first day.

§ 15. The second argument: In Gen. 2, the creation of heaven and earth is assigned together with the creation of plants to one day, in these words: "In the day in which God created heaven and earth, and every shrub of the field," etc.[9] And the same judgment holds for the remaining works. I answer, following the usage of Scripture, that the word "day" is there put in place of "time"; although one can also understand "day" in the proper sense, provided the same day is understood now in one sense and now in another. Now what is subsequently added there concerning shrubs and herbs — "before they had sprung up or had germinated",[7] — is not said on the ground that even if they did not yet exist in act they were nonetheless in the earth potentially from the first day of creation; but it has this sense: "when He created every shrub and herb, when beforehand they did not exist."

§ 16. The third argument: In Exod. 31, Moses says: "In six days God created heaven and earth."[19] But the same Moses says in Gen. 1 that God created heaven and earth in the beginning and on the first day;'[27] therefore, according to Moses, six days are one day. I answer that the text of Exod. 31 is to be supplied from the other passage, which is Exod. 20,'[20] by adding this clause: "and all things that are in them."',[28]

§ 17. The fourth argument: The works of God are perfect (Deut. 32);[21] therefore the world was established by God from the very beginning in its perfection. I answer that "perfect" in that passage is not said in the sense that something is complete, whole, and fully formed in every respect, but rather in the sense that there is in it nothing that could with reason be blamed — such as, without doubt, all the works of God are, however imperfect they may otherwise be.

§ 18. The fifth argument: St. Gregory, Homily 26 (*Super Evangelia*), says that God created all things from nothing at once (*simul*).[22] It is answered that this is correctly said with respect to matter, which was all created at once at the beginning.

§ 19. The sixth argument: With that doctrine which holds that all things were created at once there harmonises beautifully the teaching which holds that the intelligible species (*species intelligibiles*) of all natural things were concreated with the angels — namely, so that all things might simultaneously from the beginning exist both in reality and in the cognition of the angels. And perhaps for this reason St. Thomas — whose opinion on the species of all things being co-innate with the angels is chiefly this, as we showed at Distinction 7[29] — does not recoil from the opinion of those who hold that all things were made at once. Nevertheless (*Verumtamen*) it is answered that one does not rightly proceed from even a natural cognition to the existence of the thing cognised. For in this way the nature of things has been established by God: just as the whole of creation existed first in the mind of God before it existed in itself, so inferior creation — that is, corporeal creation — was prior in the intellect of the superior creature than in itself. Understand this according to the whole genus (*totum genus*) of corporeal creation; lest otherwise by this reasoning we be compelled to say that the angelic nature was created before the corporeal world. This reply is suggested by St. Thomas in his discussion,[30] with words drawn from St. Augustine.[31]

§ IV — Whether matter preceded the forms of things in time (Utrum materia formas rerum tempore antecesserit)

§ 20. It is further customarily asked, concerning the creation of things in general, whether the matter of things was created before their forms — that is, whether matter at some point existed without form (*informis*). We presuppose, from what was said above (at Distinction 1), that matter is not coeval with God but was created by God when previously it did not exist.[33] The occasion for the question was furnished by certain passages of Scripture, such as that of Gen. 1: "The earth was without form and void" — for which the Septuagint has: *"invisible and unordered"* (*invisibilis et incomposita*). And what is read in Wis. 11: that God created the world from matter unseen, or, as it is in Greek, *unformed* (*informi*) — in which way St. Augustine also reads it.[34] Likewise that Heb. 11 says that "the ages were fitted together by the word of God, so that from invisible things visible things might come to be." For all these seem to signify that a rude, undigested matter, empty of forms, from which the specific natures of things were to be shaped, existed beforehand.

§ 21. In favour of this opinion the Fathers are adduced: St. Basil, in Homily 2 of the *Hexaemeron*;[35] St. Ambrose, in Book 1 of the same subject, chapter 8;[36] and St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 2 on Genesis,[37] and several others besides — all of whom say that matter was created at the beginning without form, and was subsequently given form through the intervals of the days. St. Augustine also, in Book 12 of the *Confessions*, chapters 3 through 12,[38] teaches at length that matter was made without form (*informem*) — that is, lacking all form — so that it was almost nothing; and that it was signified in Gen. 1 both by the word "earth" and, as he himself reads from the Septuagint, by the phrase "invisible and unordered." In the same manner he writes in Book 2 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 11, and elsewhere.[39] Bede likewise, expounding the aforementioned passage of Wisdom, infers from it that matter existed prior to form. And more ancient than these, Lactantius, in Book 2 of the *Divine Institutes*, chapter 8,[40] writes that God prepared matter before He made the world.

§ 22. On the contrary, there are most weighty authorities and arguments, as will presently be clear. This question is, however, to be explained by means of a distinction. For if it is understood to concern matter that is entirely naked and empty of every form whatsoever, we answer that such matter did not exist prior to the things themselves — those things, namely, that consist of matter and form. This is proved most plainly from the beginning of Genesis, where we read that it was not matter but heaven and earth that God created first — that is, first of all things. For the names "heaven" and "earth" cannot be understood to mean matter that is wholly without form, since these two names signify diverse things; but diversity is introduced not by matter but by form. St. Augustine writes to this effect in Book 1 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 15:[41] "Formless matter," he says, "is not prior in time to the formed things, since both were in some fashion created simultaneously — that from which something was made and that which was made from it — just as the voice is the material of words, while words indicate a formed voice. For the speaker does not first emit a formless voice that he might then gather it and shape it into words." And what follows. Hence it is perspicuously clear, from St. Augustine's opinion, that when matter was created it was not altogether without form, but — as he himself concludes in the same place — was already formed. He repeats this in Book 1, *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets*, chapter 9, and in Book 12 of the *Confessions*, chapter 29.[42]

§ 23. To this opinion subscribe not only the Latin Fathers who came after St. Augustine but also the entire School of theologians. Many indeed, of whom the chief is St. Thomas, judge the contrary opinion to be not merely false but simply impossible, inasmuch as they deny that matter can exist even for a moment without form. St. Thomas teaches this in Part I, question 66, article 1, where he treats this question expressly.[32] Also in the same part, question 44, article 2, *ad* 3; in the *De Potentia*, question 4, article 1; in the *Quodlibet*, question 3, article 1; and in the present Distinction, article 4.[43] His principal argument is as follows. If matter existed without form, it would simultaneously exist and not exist — which is a manifest contradiction. The inference is proved: it would exist, because it is posited as existing; it would not exist, because it is posited as lacking form. But nothing exists without form, for form gives *esse* to a thing. Nor can anything whatsoever exist in act without form, which is the act (*actus*) of a thing. Therefore to say that matter exists without form is to say "a being in act, without act."

Likewise, matter without form is being only in potency (*potentia*). Hence the natural philosophers rightly teach that matter considered in itself and without form is nothing, or almost nothing. Therefore it is incompatible with matter to exist in act unless it receives such existence from elsewhere — that is, from form.

There are also other arguments, which may be seen in Cajetan, *Super Tractatu Sancti Thomae de Ente et Essentia*, question 8, where he also refutes the arguments of Scotus, who holds the contrary opinion.[44]

§ 24. Yet whatever may be the case regarding what is possible (for the arguments that are brought forward in favour of Scotus's opinion, whether by himself or by others, are not to be despised), it ought to be sufficiently established for us from the plain words of Scripture that, as a matter of fact, matter was not created by God at the beginning without all form. Furthermore, since there is a certain other kind of formlessness which does not simply exclude form but only the form of a more excellent thing, or the adornment and beauty proper to the same thing, the question as proposed can still be understood in two ways.

§ 25. One way: whether at the beginning God made a certain chaos in which heaven and earth together with the other elements were present only virtually (*virtute*) and as it were in seed, but not according to their substantial forms (*formae substantiales*) — yet in such a way that that chaos itself would subsist through some

form appropriate to that disordered matter. For St. Augustine himself does not seem to have held this anywhere, as in Book 1, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, chapters 3, 4, and 7, and Book 12 of the *Confessions*, chapter 18.[45] Gennadius likewise, in *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, chapter 10,[46] does not hold this. Yet more manifestly some pagan philosophers and poets held it, whose opinion Ovid expounds in verse in Book 1 of the *Metamorphoses*.[47] Erasmus, imbued with the writings of these authors, in his *Commentary on the Hymn of Prudentius on the Epiphany of the Lord*,[48] asserts that chaos existed before the world was founded.

But against this opinion there stands again what is said at the beginning of Genesis: that God in the beginning made heaven and earth — not some confused chaos from which heaven and earth would afterwards be produced. Moreover, if you assign to the matter created at the beginning some common form, upon which diverse special forms would subsequently supervene whereby that matter would be differentiated, you will thereby return to the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who posited primary matter as a being of some kind in act. From this it would follow that the generation of things from it is nothing but alteration — as St. Thomas argues from the Philosopher in the *Summa*.[49]

§ 26. The other way of understanding the proposed question is: whether from the beginning heaven and earth and the other elements truly existed according to their substantial forms, but in such a condition that they lacked the arrangement, adornment, and beauty that they subsequently received. To a question thus explained, the answer must be altogether in the affirmative. For heaven too lacked at the beginning the adornment of stars; and the earth, covered on all sides by water and plunged in darkness, was far from the beauty and appearance in which it is now beheld. And it is in this sense that what is said at the beginning of Genesis is to be taken: "The earth, however, was without form and void" — for which in Hebrew is *"solitude and emptiness"* (*solitudo et inanitas*). By this is signified that the earth was uncultivated and empty of plants and living creatures. And in the same way, according to the Septuagint, it was "invisible and unordered": *invisible* indeed on account of the darkness and the water with which it was covered on every side; *unordered* because it was uncultivated, as has just been said. This explanation of the formlessness is demanded in the first place by the context of Scripture itself. For it continues: "And darkness was upon the face of the deep," etc. Next, the great majority of the Fathers who have expounded the creation of the world — St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others — imagined no other formlessness here than the one we have described: understanding by "heaven" heaven itself, and by "earth" earth itself, but each still without form and lacking adornment. Here too it must be noted that, according to some, the remaining three elements are understood to be comprehended under the designation of the most material and sensible element; while according to others, only the element of water, akin to earth, is comprehended together with it, while the remaining two are understood in the heavens. The latter opinion is more pleasing. For it is very common in Sacred Scripture that air and whatever is above is comprehended under the name of heaven. But of this matter below.

§ 27. In the same manner is to be understood what was objected from Wis. 11. For the author of Wisdom means that God created the world — or, as it is in Greek, *κόσμον* (*kosmon*), that is, the ordered universe (for this Greek word is derived from "adornment") — from formless matter, that is, from those first bodies not yet possessing the kind of adornment from which they could be called a *κόσμος*. Therefore according to the author of Wisdom, formless matter preceded the world as we now see it, even in time — because that formlessness already explained preceded this adornment. In this sense, besides the Fathers just named, whom it is established spoke concerning this kind of formlessness, Bede and Lactantius also can be interpreted.

§ 28. As to what the Apostle says in Heb. 11, that the visible things were made from invisible things, St. Thomas in Part I, question 65, article 4, *ad* 1, expounds this of the ideas of things which are in the Divine Mind.[50] Others interpret it thus: that the things which are seen were made from invisible things, or from things not previously existing, because all things were made from nothing. But it is more correct, unless I am mistaken, that we expound also this Scripture passage conformably with the preceding ones — because the earth according to the Septuagint (whose version the writer of that Epistle customarily follows throughout) is said at the beginning to have been *ἀόρατος* (*aoratos*), that is, invisible.

§ 29. What reply must be made to certain passages of St. Augustine is already sufficiently clear from what has been said. For he himself has interpreted his own meaning most plainly in Book 1 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 15, and in Book 12 of the *Confessions*, chapters 27 through 29, and elsewhere.[51] For his intention is that the formlessness of matter did not precede its formation in time, but only in the order of nature, or of origin, and of our understanding (*intelligentia*) — in the manner in which, as has been stated above from him, the voice is prior to the word.

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§ V — Exposition of the Beginning of Genesis (Expositio principii Geneseos)

§ 30. In order that the things said above may become clearer, we shall add a brief explanation of the opening of Genesis. "In the beginning," says Moses, "God created heaven and earth." That is: first of all, and without any matter having been created beforehand, God made whatever is above us (which we have said is all called "heaven" in the manner of Sacred Scripture) and whatever is below us, that is, the earth together with the waters, from which it was not yet separated. All this, I say, with the exception only of the adornment of heaven and earth, which they afterwards received. There follows: "But the earth was void and empty." That is, it was not yet adorned with that variety and beauty of things springing from it or dwelling in it, which it now possesses. There follows: "And darkness was upon the face of the deep." Darkness signifies the absence of light in a transparent body, such as air and water. The Master therefore rightly teaches, following St. Augustine,[53] to which a similar passage belongs,[54] that darkness is here named not as some creature made from the beginning (for it was not said, "let darkness be made," but "let there be light"), but as the privation of that perfection which the created body lacked and which was shortly afterward to be produced; yet in so far God can be said to have created darkness, inasmuch as He made a transparent body without light. For which reason darkness is also reckoned among creatures in the hymn of the three youths: "Bless the Lord, O nights and days; bless the Lord, O light and darkness." And in Ps. 73: "Thine is the day, and thine is the night," that is, creatures of thine — hence it follows: "Thou hast made the dawn and the sun." And in Is. 45, in the person of God: "I form the light and create darkness."

§ 31. Now the "deep" (*abyssus*) can be understood as the immense depth of the waters; or, as others prefer, as that immense and most profound mass composed of earth and water together, whose surface, because no light had yet been created, was covered by the densest darkness, occupying, that is, the whole of the air. There follows: "And the Spirit of the Lord moved upon the waters." By the Spirit of the Lord some among the Hebrews understand a wind stirred up by the Lord, as in Ps. 147: "His spirit shall blow, and the waters shall flow." Others take it to mean a great wind, by a Hebrew idiom; in the same way that Scripture elsewhere calls mountains of God and cedars of God. But Ecclesiastical writers prefer to understand it as the Holy Spirit

(*Spiritus Sanctus*), the third Person of the Trinity, albeit with an allusion to a bodily breath, so that the sense is: the Spirit of God was borne over, or — as St. Jerome notes it can be rendered from the Hebrew[55] — was brooding over the waters, keeping them and the earth beneath them warm; He kept them warm, I say, for the future germination of things, namely that which took place on the third day, and which is wont to come about through the mingling of moisture with earthly matter.

§ 32. Moreover, according to St. Augustine,[56] the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters just as the will of an artificer is borne over the things to be fashioned. And according to the same author,[57] He was borne over them not by local movement, but by a power surpassing and excelling all things. What follows in Genesis will be expounded in the subsequent distinctions.

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§ I — What was the nature of the light made on the first day (Lux primo die facta cujusmodi fuerit)

§ 33. That heaven and earth belong to the work of the first day, having been made before the first day itself, as some are of opinion, we here presuppose: we shall demonstrate this below, where we shall treat of the order of day and night. Now on the same day there followed a certain operation of distinction, that is, because what had been made without form began to be distinguished and adorned. For God made light and separated it from the darkness and called it day. Concerning this light a question immediately arises: in what sense it is said to have been made on the first day, since the same Scripture testifies that the luminaries — the sun, the moon, and the stars — were made only on the fourth day? If these are different from that first light, one must explain what that light was, and whither it at length departed.

§ 34. Certain Hebrews answer that the sun and moon were created on the first day, and that this is sufficiently indicated by the distinction of day and night made on that day. And they hold that the account in the fourth day's narrative of the sun and moon is due to a kind of repetition. For since, as they say, the stars were formed on the fourth day, Moses added mention of the greater luminaries as well, so as to show that the full celestial adornment was completed on that day, when the stars are added to the sun and moon already created before. But this exposition is forced. For the work of the fourth day was signified by those words: "God said: let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven," etc. — this is certain and beyond doubt. Now Scripture, interpreting itself, says that God with this very word made the great luminaries and the stars, so that it ascribes the creation of the sun and moon to the fourth day more explicitly (for these are distinctly interpreted as "luminaries") than the creation of the stars, which it does not expressly call by that name, although it leaves us to understand that the stars are also luminaries, and the lesser ones at that, from the fact that it had called the sun and moon the great luminaries.

§ 35. The opinion of certain Greeks is that the light created on the first day existed without a subject until the fourth day, on which were made those bodies called luminaries, the primal light having been received into them. This is found in St. Basil,[59] and St. John Damascene.[60] But this too is improbable. For it is not credible that in the very institution of nature God should have done something contrary to the nature He was instituting, such as would be an accident existing without a subject. Nevertheless — and let us note this at least in passing — it can be understood from this very point how it was not absurd to those Fathers, what the

sectarians of today reject as absurd and impossible, namely that by divine power an accident can exist without a subject, as the Church teaches comes to pass in the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

§ 36. Now it is far more probable that by that light is to be understood either some luminous body, or rather the quality itself, diffused through the water. That luminous part of the heavens was at that time like a material from which, afterwards distributed into parts and condensed as it were into fiery globes, the sun, the moon, and the other stars were made. Passages consonant with this opinion are read in (Pseudo-)Dionysius,[61] whom St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure follow, together with very many others. St. Augustine disputes about the same matter,[62] but in such a way as to define nothing.

§ 37. It is confirmed: The said exposition is confirmed by this, that in the other works too God proceeded from confused things to distinct, and altogether from imperfect to perfect (*perfecta*). Hence just as the earth was first confused, then separated from the waters, and thirdly received the adornment of things springing from it: so at first things were in darkness; then, light being created, God divided between night and day; and finally He adorned the world with luminaries. For, as certain writers rightly teach, the light created on the first day and diffused through the heavens was not of so great a brightness as the brightness of the sun, but much more subdued — such as exists in the dawn or twilight of the day. For it is easy to prove, by the example of light, which becomes more intense whenever rays reflected back are folded upon themselves, that light when gathered and collected becomes brighter.

§ II — Why God proceeded from the imperfect to the perfect (Cur Deus ab imperfecto ad perfectum processerit)

§ 38. Why God willed to observe this order in the institution of things — producing first something rough and confused, and then distinguishing and adorning that same thing — when He could undoubtedly have made light and earth, just as the other things, thus distinct and perfect from the beginning, even as He at length perfected them: the will of the Creator alone, declared to us in the Scriptures, ought rightly to suffice for all, even if no reason be added. Yet because the will of God is rational, nothing prevents some reason for His action from being assigned by us, pertaining to our instruction.

One reason, therefore, is this: that we may learn that all things depend upon God and have God as their author, both as regards their beginning and as regards their advancement and perfection, and that nothing in created things is so imperfect — provided only that it is some thing — of which God is not the author.

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1. Mk. 8: the two-stage healing of the blind man at Bethsaida.
2. Reference to the distinction immediately following (Distinctio XIII).
3. 2 Cor. 4:6.
4. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* [reference to his general position on simultaneous creation].
5. Reference to Distinctio 3, on the sin of the angels.
6. Jn. 8:44: "He was a murderer from the beginning (*Ille erat homicida ab initio*)," which St. Augustine expounds as referring to the beginning of man's creation.
7. Gen. 2:5.

8. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, chs. 4–5; noted also by St. Thomas [cross-reference as in source].
9. Gen. 2:4–5.
10. Acts 17:26.
11. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 24.
12. St. Augustine, *De catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 17.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I [*loco praeallegato* — at the place cited above].
14. Sir. 18:1.
15. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 33.
16. Jn. 1:3.
17. Gen. 1 and Exod. 20:11.
18. Exod. 20:11; the argument concerns the use of *simul* in Sir. 18:1.
19. Exod. 31:17.
20. Exod. 20:11.
21. Deut. 32:4.
22. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 26.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I [cross-reference as in source]; cf. reference to Distinctio 7 above.
24. Reference to Distinctio 7 above (*ad Distinct. 7*).
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 55, a. 2, in *corpore* and *ad* 1, with texts drawn from St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 8.
26. Gen. 1; cf. Exod. 20:11.
27. Gen. 1:1.
28. The clause to be added is: *Et omnia quae in eis sunt* — "and all things that are in them."
29. Reference to Distinction 7 above (*ad Distinct. 7*).
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 55, a. 2, in *corpore* and *ad* 1.
31. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 8.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 66, a. 1.
33. Reference to Distinction 1 above (*ad Distinctionem 1*).
34. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 14.
35. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 2.
36. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 8.
37. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 2.
38. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XII, chs. 3–12.
39. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 11.
40. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* II, ch. 8.
41. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 15.
42. St. Augustine, *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* I, ch. 9; and *Confessiones* XII, ch. 29.
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 44, a. 2, *ad* 3; *De Potentia*, q. 4, a. 1; *Quodlibeta*, q. 3, a. 1; and *In II Sent.*, dist. [*in praesentem Distinctionem*], a. 4.

44. Cajetan, *Super Tractatu Sancti Thomae de Ente et Essentia*, q. 8.

45. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, chs. 3, 4, and 7; *Confessiones* XII, ch. 18.

46. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 10.

47. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* I.

48. Erasmus, *Commentary on the Hymn of Prudentius on the Epiphany of the Lord* (*Commentarius hymni Prudentiani de Epiphania Domini*).

49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* [*in Summa* — at the place cited therein; reference to the argument from Aristotle].

50. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 65, a. 4, *ad* 1.

51. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 15; *Confessiones* XII, chs. 27–29.

52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 3.

53. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 4.

54. St. Augustine, *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 30.

55. St. Jerome, *Traditiones Hebraicae* (*Hebraicae Quaestiones in Genesim*).

56. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 5 and ch. 7.

57. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 7.

58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 67.

59. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 6.

60. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 7.

61. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, part I, ch. 4.

62. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, chs. 10–11.

DISTINCTIO XIII — ON THE WORK OF THE FIRST DAY: LIGHT, AND ITS SEPARATION FROM DARKNESS (*DE OPERE PRIMI DIEI: LUCE ET SEPARATIONE EIUS A TENEBRIS*)

§ 1. There is another reason given by St. Ambrose[2]: lest, if all things were read as perfect from the beginning, they should be thought to have been created already perfect. Again, another reason is given in the same place:[,2] that we might imitate the order of the divine work in our own working, tending from the imperfect to the perfect. Something similar is indicated by St. Augustine.[,3] Moreover, the same St. Augustine,[,4] through the fact that light succeeded darkness, teaches that what takes place spiritually in man is mystically signified. This signification is grounded in the Apostle, writing in 2 Cor. 4: "God, who commanded light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts" — driving out, that is, the darkness of error and sin in which we formerly dwelt. Hence also that word of the same Apostle, Rom. 13: "The night is passed, and the day is at hand; let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and put on the armour of light."

§ III — How God is said to have divided the light from the darkness (Quomodo dicatur Deus divisisse lucem a tenebris)

§ 2. The division of light from darkness, which is named in the work of the first day, is not to be understood as though light and darkness had previously been mingled together in the same body and were then separated from one another. For it cannot come about that some form should be mixed with its own privation, inasmuch as from that there would follow a manifest contradiction — namely, that in the same part of a subject the form should both be and not be, as that light should inhere and not inhere. For privation entails negation. Rather, God is said to have divided the light from the darkness: first, indeed, according to their respective causes; for the cause of light or illumination (*luminis*) is one thing, and the cause of darkness another. Light, that is, existed in the heavenly and luminous body, and from it illumination was diffused into the lower regions — which illumination is here comprehended together under the name of light, as is evident from the fact that light is called day. Nor is this surprising, since both the Greeks and the Hebrews signify both by one word, while the Latins acknowledge no great distinction between *lux* and *lumen*. Opaque bodies interposed before luminous ones produce darkness — bodies of which the earth is the chief example — they produce it, I say, after the manner of a cause that removes what prevents. For, properly speaking, there is no efficient cause of darkness, just as there is none of other privations.

§ 3. Second, He divided them as to place (*quoad locum*), because while in one hemisphere of the world there is light and day, in the other there is darkness and night; nor can both be in one and the same place at once. Third, as to time (*quoad tempus*): for in the same hemisphere light and darkness, night and day, succeed

one another in turn at different times. Now it must be understood that the day which is opposed to night is the artificial day, not the natural day, as is evident.

Now, if someone should ask what motion of light produced day and night successively alternating during the first three days, when the Sun had not yet been created — St. Augustine replies[6] that this is remote from our senses and cannot be understood by us as it actually is. St. Basil, however, in his second homily of the *Hexaemeron*,[7] thinks that day was produced by the diffusion of that light and night by its contraction. St. John Damascene also holds this view.[8] But because a diffusion and contraction of this kind appears to be contrary to nature, and therefore less consonant with the first institution of nature, others more probably judge that that primordial light, by its circular motion whereby it was borne along together with the heavens, produced day by its presence and night by its absence — in the same manner, that is, by which the Sun, subsequently generated from that light, distinguished day from night. See St. Thomas.[9]

§ IV — In what sense God is said to have spoken something, and to have given names to things (Quomodo Deus dixisse aliquid & res nominasse dicatur)

§ 4. What Scripture says — "God said: Let there be light," and again: "And He called the light day, and the darkness night" — and similar statements that follow concerning other things to be created or already created: all this is not to be understood as meaning that God employed the sound of a voice for the creation of things. For man had not yet been created, to whom He might thus speak, and for whose sake alone that vocal utterance would have any purpose. Rather, He is said to have spoken because He commanded and willed that what He had from eternity and immutably ordained to come to pass at that time should then come to pass. Moreover, Scripture employs the word *dixit* ("He said") to intimate the ease of the divine operation. For just as it is easy for a man to utter what he has conceived in his mind, so was it easy for God — indeed, far easier — to create the entire universe. Which ease the Psalmist also signified when he said: "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created."[11]

§ 5. But if someone should ask why Scripture did not similarly say "God said: let there be heaven and earth," I reply that God did say this — and not only concerning heaven and earth, but concerning every work He made, as the aforementioned verse of the Psalm sufficiently proves. For if for God "to say" that something should come to be is the same as to decree by the command of His will that it should come to be, there is no doubt that He said "let it be" concerning every work of His, even if Scripture does not everywhere speak in this way.

Now why Scripture did not speak in this way concerning the first work — that is, heaven and earth — when it is found to have employed this mode of expression for everything thereafter, right to the end of the six days: this reason is assigned by St. Basil in Homily 3 of his *Hexaemeron*,[12] namely, that it was fitting that a creature should first be brought forth which would obey God, before mention was made of the divine command signified by the phrase "God said." This reasoning is not disapproved by St. Thomas.[13]

Nor will the reasoning be dissimilar if we reply that Scripture ought not to have introduced God as saying something unless after a creature had already been made that could hear and understand Him speaking — namely, the angelic creature, which was indeed made before light, but not before heaven and earth. Add to this that Moses would have written ineptly in this manner: "In the beginning God said: let there be heaven and earth" — for from that it would follow that God said nothing before the creation of heaven and earth. For

just as it follows well: "In the beginning He made heaven and earth; therefore He made nothing before that" — so too would this seem to follow. Hence the further consequence would seem to follow that the Son of God, that is, the Word of the Father, did not exist before heaven and earth — because the Word is not prior to being spoken. For His being (*esse*) is identical with His being spoken (*dici*).

§ 6. Furthermore, what the Master,[14] following St. Augustine, interprets — namely, that God spoke so that it might come to be, because in the Word, that is, in the Son, He made all that He made — we think this should be referred to the mystical rather than the literal sense of this Scripture. For no argument compels us to acknowledge several literal senses of the same Scripture. Hence the question is also irrelevant to this passage: in what sense the Father is said to operate in the Son, or through the Son, or also in the Holy Spirit. An explanation of this matter must be sought from what has been said above.'[15]

Here we say only briefly: from this manner of speaking no diversity of operation in the Divine Persons (*in Personis Divinis*) is to be conceived; since according to the Catholic Faith it must be confessed that the three Persons are the one principle and cause of all creation, producing and conserving all things, that is, by one and the same operation. Wherefore what is said — that the Father operates through the Son, or in the Son — has this meaning: the Father produces the Son, who operates all the same things in the same way together with Him; or, what comes to the same thing: the Father operates together with the Son, to whom in producing Him He gave this very thing — that He should operate the same things with Him; and similarly concerning the Holy Spirit.

§ 7. Now as regards the other point — where God is said to have called by certain names the things made by Him, such as calling the light "day," the darkness "night," and the dry land "earth" — St. Augustine explains this in the following way:[16] "He called them," he says, "by the eternal and inward principles (*rationibus*) of His immutable wisdom." This is understood to mean that He endowed individual things with their proper properties (*proprietates*), by which they would be distinguished from all others. Hence also of the stars it is said in Ps. 146: "And He calleth them all by their names"[17] — because He both created them all and knows them exactly, each distinguished from the others by its properties.

Nor is the other exposition, found in the same St. Augustine,[16] very different from this one — namely, that God called things by names because He caused them to be called, that is, He so created them, distinguished by their own properties, that they could be told apart by men and called by their proper names. To this sense the verse of the ecclesiastical Hymn seems to allude: "Who dost ordain that morning joined to evening be called day (*Qui mane junctum vesperi diem vocari praecipis*)."

§ V — Whether day preceded night at the beginning, or the contrary (Utrum dies nocte prior fuerit an contra)

§ 8. The question is no small one among the interpreters of the history of Genesis: whether at the beginning of the world day preceded night, or the contrary. In this question, since day is opposed to night, it is clear that the artificial day (*dies artificialis*) is to be understood — the one of which it was said, "And He called the light day." Here the opinions of the Philosophers, who were ignorant of the true Genesis of the world, must be set aside. Among these, Thales of Miletus, when asked at some time whether day had preceded night or the contrary, replied that night had preceded day — looking, that is, to the chaos and the perpetual darkness which the Poets and some among the Philosophers posited as a kind of long night before the arising of things.

Since it is established that this is fabulous, and since on that opinion night did not make the beginning of the world but preceded the creation of the world — which is not merely controversial but plainly false — the present question must be examined by us from the Scriptures and from their probable interpretation.

§ 9. And indeed arguments are not lacking on either side. That day was prior to night can seem to follow, first, from the fact that Scripture placed the name of day before that of night, saying: "And He called the light day, and the darkness night." Then from the fact that what immediately follows: "And there was evening and there was morning, one day" — that is, the first. For evening is the end of the preceding day, just as morning is the end of the preceding night. Hence by synecdoche they think that day and night are signified by *evening* and *morning* — day, that is, preceding, and night following, as the parts from which one natural day is constituted. This opinion is supported by weighty authorities: St. Basil, Homily 2 of the *Hexaemeron*;[7] St. Ambrose, book 1 of the same argument, last chapter;[19] St. John Chrysostom, Homilies 3 and 5 *On Genesis*;[20] St. Augustine, book 1 *Against the Manichaeans on Genesis*, ch. 10, and the book *On the Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, ch. 7, and likewise book 4 *On the City of God*, ch. 6, and book 12 of the *Confessions*, chs. 8, 9, 12, and 16,[21] where he teaches that heaven and earth were made before every day. Their opinion is followed by Hugh of St. Victor in his *Annotations on Genesis*, ch. 6,[22] and by the Master in this Distinction, letters B, D, E.[23] For the Master holds that before the light which is read to have been made after heaven and earth, and which received the name of day, there was neither day nor night, although there was then time. Hence, according to his teaching as well, heaven and earth existed before the first day. The same opinion is found in the *Glossa ordinaria* on the words "And there was evening and there was morning, one day";[24] the words of this Gloss the Master cites under the title of Bede *On Genesis*,[25] although in the Gloss itself they are ascribed to St. Augustine — though in my judgment they are found to survive in neither.

§ 10. Moreover, these same Fathers teach that it came about not without the significance of a great mystery that, although at the beginning of the world day preceded night, afterwards — when the order was reversed from the institution of the Mosaic Law — night preceded day in the reckoning of the natural day: namely, to signify that man, created in the light of Grace (*Gratia*) and Justice (*Justitia*), fell by transgression from that light into the darkness of sins, but was afterwards recalled by Christ from darkness to light — according to that word of the Apostle, Eph. 5: "You were at one time darkness, but now you are light in the Lord."[26] This reasoning is to be seen in St. Ambrose at the place cited a little above,[27] and in St. Augustine, book 4 *On the City of God*, ch. 6,[28] as well as in the Master, letter E.

§ 11. On the contrary, that night was prior to day at the beginning of the world was the view of certain other Fathers. And first of all, Hilary, in his book *On the Synods*, not far from the end,[29] expressly transmits this opinion. St. Jerome likewise gave his assent to it, in his *Commentary on Jonah*, on ch. 2: "And Jonas was in the belly of the fish three days and three nights."[30] For, showing how Christ was three days and three nights in the sepulchre, he adds: "For in Genesis too, night belongs not to the preceding day but to the following — that is, it is the beginning of what is to come, not the end of what is past." Among more recent writers these are joined by Tostatus writing *On Genesis*,[31] Eugubinus in the *Cosmopoeia*,[32] and Hesselius *On this Distinction*.[33] Therefore, according to the opinion of these authors, nothing was changed by man's sin with respect to the original institution and reckoning of days and nights. And this opinion, although resting upon fewer patrons from antiquity, nevertheless has very great probability from the Scriptures carefully weighed.

§ 12. First, it is agreed that in the time of the Mosaic Law night was always held to be the prior part of the natural day. This is clear from Lev. 25, where the Lord commands that the Sabbath be observed from evening

until evening.[34] It is clear also from the Gospel of Mk. 15,[35] and Jn. 19,[36] where we read that those who were burying Christ hastened the matter because the Sabbath was imminent — namely, evening being at hand, from which the observance of the Sabbath took its beginning. Hence also the holy women did not dare to buy spices to embalm the body of the Lord until, when the Sabbath was past, another evening had arrived as the beginning of the following day.

§ 13. Moreover, unless we acknowledge that night was then the beginning of the day, it cannot be taught how Christ was three days in the sepulchre, even synecdochically. For He rose by night; and if night is the end of the preceding day and not the beginning of the following one, then He lay in the tomb for no part of the third day. Now, that this same reckoning for beginning and ending the Sabbath which we have described did not have its origin from the Mosaic Law but belonged to the original institution of days is shown from this: because God, in Exod. 20, commanded the observance of the Sabbath in imitation of that rest by which He Himself, after the work of six days, had rested from all work on the seventh day.[37] The rest of the seventh day pertained beyond doubt to the original institution, because it preceded not only the promulgation of the Mosaic Law but also the first transgression of man. Therefore, just as the Sabbath had its beginning from night, so also did the seventh day of the Lord's rest. This is proved by another argument as well. For man was created on the sixth day of light, as the last work of the Genesis of the world; therefore the night following made the beginning of the Lord's rest — that is, of the seventh day on which the Lord is said to have rested from all His work. This being granted, it is then a consequence that the six preceding days also proceeded with a similar beginning; for otherwise one will have to admit that one of those days was without a night, and accordingly only a half-day. But this is consonant neither with reason nor with Scripture. For of each of the six days it is said: "There was evening and there was morning, one day."

§ 14. Furthermore, Scripture clearly testifies, in Exod. 20 and 21, that in six days God made heaven and earth and all things that are in them;[38] therefore heaven and earth were made on the first day — since it is established that they were not made after some one of the subsequent five days. But heaven and earth were made before the light; therefore the light was not the beginning of the first day, but the darkness was — that darkness which, covering the face of the deep before all light, made the most obscure night. Now this argument from Scripture is most evident, and it utterly destroys the opinion of the Master and of others who say that before the first light there was neither day nor night, and that the time preceding the light was altogether not a part of the first day but a kind of preamble to it.

§ 15. Finally, the same opinion is refuted from the very history of Genesis. For the darkness of which it is said "Darkness was upon the face of the deep" — these, a little afterwards, are called by the name of night; just as the light made after the darkness is called by the name of day. For when Scripture says "And He called the light day, and the darkness night," it refers beyond doubt to the light and the darkness of which it had already spoken — so that what St. Basil says in Homily 2 of the *Hexaemeron*,[7] namely that the first state of the world which preceded the primordial light was called not night but darkness, cannot stand. For Scripture testifies that those very darknesses (for no mention of other darknesses had yet been made) were called night by God. From these considerations, moreover, it is shown against the calumnious heretics that the Church does not imitate the rites of the Jews when in the celebration of the Divine Office, or also in the observance of feast days (as is prescribed in the Council held at Compiègne, cited in the *Decretales* under *de feriis*, ch. *Omnes*),[39] she takes her beginning from evening — but that she does what is consonant with the original institution of days; although that which the canon prescribes concerning the observance of feasts is not now so universally kept;

rather, the custom has prevailed that the common people begin the sanctification of feast days from midnight and extend it to the following midnight, insofar as abstinence from servile works is concerned. For the Church also commits this matter to the custom of places and regions, as may be seen in the canon immediately following in the same title, ch. *Quantum*,[40] from Alexander III.

§ VI — The objections advanced on the contrary side are resolved (Quae in contrarium objecta sunt, dissolvuntur)

§ 16. From the Scripture of Genesis two arguments were brought forward on the contrary side — that is, for the view that night preceded day — but their solution is easy. The solution to the first is this: that Moses named day before night, saying "He called the light day and the darkness night," because he had described the creation of light in the preceding words. For elsewhere too, even before the Mosaic Law — as in Gen. 8 — night is named before day, scripture saying: "Night and day shall not fail." Likewise in the Canticle of the Three Young Men it is said: "Bless the Lord, O nights and days." And indeed elsewhere night is very often read as placed before day — in the order, that is, of time or of generation — so that from this very fact one may draw an argument in favour of that opinion which we are establishing as true. Although, besides, there could also be other reasons why day, even if posterior in generation, was named before night: both because light is more worthy, and because Moses, on the occasion of the first light and the first darkness, was setting forth a general statement concerning day and night, light and darkness, when he said "He called, etc."; and when we speak of these two in general, we are accustomed to put day first as the more worthy.

§ 17. The second argument, moreover, assists our own opinion even more, if the phrasing of scripture is carefully considered. For *vespere* (evening) signifies night — of which it is the beginning — by synecdoche, according to Hebrew usage, just as *mane* (morning) signifies day. And hence it is that Moses, preserving the same custom of the Hebrew idiom, called those first darknesses which no light had preceded *evening* (*vesperam*); just as he called the light that followed — even though at its very beginning it was perfect after its own manner — *morning* (*mane*) by a similar formal character (*ratio*), because all other nights begin from evening, and days from dawn. That this is the Hebrew phrasing is shown by the fact that *vespere* in the scriptures is always used either for the night or for a part of the night, but never for a part of the day; and similarly *mane* always signifies a part of the day and not of the night, and is sometimes even taken for the whole day. Examples are: Mk. 1, "When evening had come and the sun had set"; and at the very end of the same Gospel, "Very early in the morning," where it is added, "when the sun was now risen"; Ps. 91, "To announce in the morning Thy mercy and Thy truth through the night."[42] There are innumerable other passages by which it is shown more clearly than light that *mane* among the Jews is a part of the day and not of the night, and conversely that *vespere* is not of the day but of the night; as in Ps. 129: "From the morning watch even until night."[43]

§ I — What the firmament is and between which waters it divides (Quid firmamentum, et inter quas aquas dividat)

§ 18. In the work of the second day, in which God is said to have spoken "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters," it is not doubtful that by the name of the firmament heaven is to be understood. For what follows is: "And God called the firmament heaven." Now by the name and signification of heaven, as was said above in the exposition of the work of the first day, is comprehended whatever is spread out above us, whether it be an elementary body or what is properly called heaven by us Latins, that is, the fifth simple body. This general sense of "heaven" was familiar not only to the Hebrews but also to the pagans; for among them one speaks of a clear sky, a rainy sky, a temperate sky. And Pliny, in book 2 of the *Natural History*, chapter 28,[45] expressly teaches that air too was called heaven by the ancients. Wherefore they also seem not to think rightly who say that on the second day a certain heaven was made different from what was made on the first day, as St. Basil holds in Homily 3 of the *Hexaemeron*.[12] For scripture signifies nothing other than that on the second day the interposition of heaven between the waters and the waters was made — that is, that it was given to heaven to be a certain interstice dividing the waters from the waters.

§ 19. Now, the opinion of some is that this air differs from the celestial body in which the stars are, not in nature, but only in rarity, subtlety, purity, and other such accidents, which are more perfect in heaven. According to these, also, the Sun, Moon, and Stars are not carried around in orbit together with heaven as if fixed therein, but are moved in heaven by its continuous division, as fish in water and birds in the air — with this sole exception, that the motion of the heavenly bodies is regular and always behaves in the same manner, which is not the case with the motion of animals. But since that opinion has no foundation from Sacred Theology and is not a little at variance with the very principles of natural science, I do not see how it can be received among probable opinions. For even if perhaps scripture nowhere indicates a distinction of nature between air and the heaven in which the stars are, it is not therefore to be thought to stand for that opinion which abolishes a distinction of this kind. For there are many natural things which we know of which scripture says nothing, since it was not written to instruct us about the nature of things, but to show the way of eternal salvation. Hence St. Augustine, in book 1 of the *Acts with Felix the Manichaean*, chapter 10,[46] says: "The Lord did not say: I will send you the Paraclete who shall teach you about the course of the Sun and Moon; for He wished to make Christians, not mathematicians. It suffices that men know about these things what they have learned in school, to the extent needed for human uses." So he. Wherefore here natural philosophy must be followed by us where scripture does not stand against it.

§ 20. Furthermore, by the name of "waters" we take nothing other than the waters known to us, that is, waters of an elementary nature — both those that are above the firmament and those that are below the firmament — which, as scripture testifies, God divided from one another by interposing the firmament. But the difficulty concerns the waters that are above the firmament. For above the stellar heaven, which most understand here by the name of the firmament, no sense and no experience reports to us that waters exist; and reason itself also protests, since it is against the nature of a heavy body that it should exist above the heavens outside the elementary world and remain there perpetually. For neither can anything violent and contrary to nature be perpetual; and it is altogether impossible by nature that anything elementary or compound should be outside the limits of the elementary sphere. Nor does there seem to be any sufficiently apt reason that can be rendered why God would have wished to place waters there. For what has been handed down by some —

that that immense force of waters was brought near to the heavens by God's providence in order to temper the celestial fires — is rightly rejected by all who philosophise correctly, inasmuch as they are persuaded that the celestial luminaries are fiery or hot not in act but only in effect and in power (*virtute*), and that if they were hot by nature they would have no need of the tempering of waters.

§ 21. Wherefore others have recourse to the divine power, to which nothing is impossible. And to those who ask the reason for the fact — that is, the use of an element subsisting in so elevated a place — they reply that this is hidden from us, and that we ought not to investigate it curiously; although they also endeavour to declare this by adducing certain examples. Thus write about this matter St. Basil, Homily 3 of the *Hexaemeron*,[12] and St. Ambrose at the beginning of book 2 of the *Hexaemeron*.[47] St. John Chrysostom also, writing on Genesis in Homilies 9 and 10 to the people of Antioch,[48] interprets that true waters are placed above the lofty heaven and attributes it to a miracle that they do not fall upon the earth. The opinion of these, insofar as they place true waters above the stellar heaven, is followed by very many others. And some of them think that those waters are that azure which appears to us looking upward in a clear sky — just as the sea also, as water that is below the firmament, displays an azure colour, and is called by that epithet by the poets. And in this way they suppose they teach that those supernal waters are not remote from the perception of our senses.

§ 22. If you object to these that God in the first institution of things did not make anything against the nature of things, especially what was to remain so perpetually, they reply to this with the words of St. Augustine from book 26, *Against Faustus*, chapter 3:[49] "God," he says, "the founder and creator of all natures, does nothing against nature; for that will be natural to any thing which He has done, from whom comes all measure, number, and order of nature." So he. When, therefore, God ordered certain waters from the beginning to be above heaven and to remain there, they say that a celestial place is not contrary to the nature of those waters, but altogether natural — that is, befitting their own nature. Hence they are also compelled to grant that it is not absurd that bodies of the same nature should have diverse and even contrary natural qualities and inclinations. But whether this is rightly said, especially concerning nature as it is instituted by God, requires more diligent investigation; for the matter does not seem capable of being confirmed by any other example of either an element or a compound body. Certainly this seems to conflict with specific identity (*identitas specifica*) — that natural inclinations should be diverse. For those are called natural properties or inclinations which are common to the whole nature and species, such as heaviness and lightness.

§ 23. Therefore, certain more recent writers, in order to avoid this whole difficulty, say that the supracelestial waters are so called only equivocally, but are in reality of a celestial nature, and constitute that heaven which by natural philosophers is called the watery or crystalline heaven on account of the supreme transparency of all its parts. But in truth this reply is far too forced, and does not sufficiently correspond to the simplicity of the language of scripture, which assuredly, through the word "waters" in the historical description of the Genesis of the world, wished nothing other than waters to be understood — just as by "earth" nothing other than earth, and so of the other things named in that description. And indeed that no other waters are to be understood is proved in three ways.

§ 24. Proof: First, because the waters below the firmament are understood to be true waters by universal consent; therefore also those above the firmament. For they are named at the same time by the same word in the same sentence, which says: "And let it divide the waters from the waters." And again: "And He divided the

waters that were below the firmament from the waters that were above the firmament."[50] For in both places the name of "waters" (*aquarum*) is found in the Hebrew.

Second, because there was no reason to say that the stellar heaven divides the heaven placed above it from the elementary waters placed among us — no more than from air, or earth, or some lower heaven.

Third, because the name "watery" applied to the heaven next above the stellar heaven is a recent appellation. Hence it could not have occurred to any of the ancient interpreters either before Christ or after, to understand by "waters" in this passage[51]

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1. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 7.
2. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, ibid.
3. St. Augustine, *De catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 17.
4. St. Augustine, *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* I, ch. 8.
5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 67, a. 1.
6. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, ch. 7.
7. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, hom. 2.
8. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 7.
9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74, a. 3.
11. Ps. 148:5.
12. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, hom. 3.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74, a. 3, ad 1.
14. The Master (of the Sentences), *In II Sent.*, dist. 13 [abbreviation as in source].
15. Above, at dist. 20 and dist. 36 of Book I, and at dist. 1 of this Book II [abbreviation as in source: *ad Distinct. 20. 36. lib. 1. & ad Distinct. 1. hujus libri*].
16. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, chs. 9–10.
17. Ps. 146:4.
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2; and q. 74, a. 3, ad 6.
19. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, last chapter.
20. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 3 and 5.
21. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 10; *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, ch. 7; *De Civitate Dei* IV, ch. 6; *Confessiones* XII, chs. 8, 9, 12, 16.
22. Hugh of St. Victor, *Adnotationes super Genesim*, ch. 6.
23. The Master (of the Sentences), *In II Sent.*, dist. 13, letters B, D, E.
24. *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 1:5 ("Et factum est vespere et mane dies unus").
25. Bede, *Super Genesim* [as cited by the Master; the words are ascribed to St. Augustine in the Gloss itself].
26. Eph. 5:8.
27. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, last chapter (as cited above).

28. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IV, ch. 6.

29. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Synodis*, near the end.

30. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Ionam*, on ch. 2 (Jonas in the belly of the fish three days and three nights).

31. Tostatus (Alfonso Tostado), *In Genesim*.

32. Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco), *Cosmopoeia*.

33. Hesselius, *Super hanc Distinctionem* [abbreviation as in source].

34. Lev. 25 (the Sabbath observed from evening to evening).

35. Mk. 15:35 [as cited in source: *Marci 35*; contextually Mk. 15, referring to the approaching Sabbath at the burial of Christ].

36. Jn. 19 (those burying Christ hastened because the Sabbath was imminent).

37. Exod. 20 (the commandment of Sabbath observance in imitation of God's rest).

38. Exod. 20 and 21 (in six days God made heaven and earth and all things therein).

39. Council held at Compiègne (*Concilium apud Compendium habitum*), cited in the *Decretales*, *de feriis*, ch. *Omnes*.

40. *Decretales*, same title (*de feriis*), ch. *Quantum*, from Alexander III.

41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as cited above (i.e., at the reference given in the preceding section).

42. Mk. 1:32 ("When evening had come, when the sun had set"); Mk. 16:2 ("Very early in the morning, the sun having now risen"); Ps. 91:2 (Vulg.: "Ad annuntiandum mane misericordiam tuam, et veritatem tuam per noctem").

43. Ps. 129:6 (Vulg.: "A custodia matutina usque ad noctem").

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 68, a. 3.

45. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* II, ch. 28.

46. St. Augustine, *De actis cum Felice Manichaeo* I, ch. 10.

47. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* II, near the beginning.

48. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 9 and 10 (to the people of Antioch).

49. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXVI, ch. 3.

50. Gen. 1:7 (Vulgate).

51. The section breaks off here in the source chunk; the argument continues in the following chunk.

DISTINCTIO XIV — ON THE WATERS ABOVE THE FIRMAMENT, THE WORKS OF THE SECOND THROUGH SIXTH DAYS, AND RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE AQUIS SUPER FIRMAMENTUM, OPERIBUS DIEI SECUNDAE AD SEXTAM, ET QUAESTIONIBUS ANNEXIS*)

§ 1. — that a certain heaven is to be understood, a heaven whose nature is wholly distinct from the waters known to us, so that it is in no way probable that Moses, when writing of waters, intended such a body.

Add a fourth argument: that, although certain things are called waters equivocally — as rose-water and the like — yet this name is not customarily applied to any solid and constant body, to such a degree that not even ice, although it is of the same specific nature as true water, is called water absolutely speaking, and that solely on account of the deficiency of actual moisture, which is more necessary for a thing to be called by this name than the principal quality of water, that is, coldness. For warm water is called water absolutely, but water constricted by frost is not. Therefore, much less can a heaven that is perfectly and immutably solid, and wholly different in nature from water, be called water.

§ 2. There is, accordingly, another opinion held by certain persons, who understand by "the waters that are above the firmament" the clouds elevated above this lowest air — and in general the entire humid and watery constitution of the middle region of the air, gathered from vapours raised on high.[1] This opinion is by no means improbable. For it contains nothing incredible; nay rather, it agrees excellently with both nature and Scripture. Concerning nature there is no doubt; concerning Scripture it is proved.

First: because it has been shown sufficiently above that the name "heaven" in the Scriptures comprehends the air. Therefore there is nothing absurd in the waters being said to be above the heaven or firmament, by synecdoche, because they are above the part of heaven most commonly known to all — that is, above the lowest portion of the air, in which birds move and through which smoke and vapours pass and infect it.

Second: because the name *firmamentum* in this passage does not signify some firm and solid body, such as the starry heaven, but a body spread far and wide, which applies also to our air. For in Hebrew, the word rendered "firmament" signifies "expansion," although the Seventy rendered it *στερέωμα*, that is, "firmament" or "stabilimentum" — not so called on account of the solidity of its body, but because it is a stable and perpetual interval between the things it divides.[2]

Third: it is proved from the same passage in Genesis, where a little later the Lord says: "Let the waters that are under the heaven be gathered into one place."[3] For the waters of the middle region of the air are not

gathered into one place, but wander throughout that entire region; therefore they are not the waters under heaven, and consequently they are the waters above heaven or the firmament.

§ 3. Fourth: the interpretation is confirmed by the fact that in Gen. 7 the floodgates of heaven are said to have been opened when the deluge occurred[4] — which certainly can be understood of none other than the waters of the middle region of the air, which, collected at that time in great abundance and poured out all at once and continuously, inundated the whole earth; whereas otherwise they are not accustomed to be collected in so great a quantity, nor to be poured out all at once, but are retained for the purpose of irrigating the earth, according to that which is said of God in Job 26: "who bindeth up the waters in his clouds, so that they break not out downward together" — that is to say, in the manner in which they did break out at the time of the deluge.[5]

Fifth: the interpretation is confirmed by Ps. 103, where, after it had been said "stretching out the heaven like a tent; who coverest its upper parts with waters," there is immediately added: "who makest the clouds thy chariot" — namely, to signify that by the waters above the heaven are to be understood the clouds suspended above this air.[6]

Sixth: it is further confirmed by what follows a little later in the same Psalm: "watering the mountains from his upper chambers."[7] For this phrase declares what those "upper chambers" are of which it had said "who coverest its upper parts with waters" — namely, the elevated places of the air from which falling waters irrigate the mountains; these places are called in Hebrew *cenacula* ("upper rooms") in both passages, St. Jerome interpreting it thus. Now it is vain to wish to interpret *cenacula* differently in the later passage than in the earlier one, since in both places there is speech of the supernal waters.

Seventh: In Ps. 145 it is similarly said: "who covereth the heaven with clouds and prepareth rain for the earth."[8] Behold the super-celestial waters — that is, the waters covering the heaven — from which rain is prepared for the earth.

Eighth: Similar is that of Jer. 10: "At his voice he giveth a multitude of waters in the heaven; he lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth."[9] And ch. 15 [i.e., Jer. 51:16]: "when God uttereth his voice, the waters are multiplied in the heaven; he lifteth up the mist from the ends of the earth." In both passages, which waters are to be understood in the first part of the sentence is manifestly clear from the latter part.

Ninth: Contributing to this is Ps. 148: "the waters that are above the heavens" are, after the Sun, Moon, and stars — as being lower than they — and just before those things that are around the earth, invited to praise the Lord.[10] And in that passage clouds are not named for this reason — because they had already been signified.

Tenth: Pertinent to this is the fact that in the Scriptures God is said to give rains, and the land of promise is described by Moses as a land that expects its rains from heaven, and again in Deut. 28 it is said: "The Lord will open for thee his good treasure, the heaven, to give the rain of thy land."[11] For what else are the rains from heaven than super-celestial waters?

Eleventh: To demonstrate this point other Scriptures also contribute, in which clouds are described as equal to heaven or above it, as in Ps. 35: "O Lord, thy mercy is in the heaven, and thy truth unto the clouds."[12] The same sentiment is found in Ps. 56 and 107, and a similar one in Jer. 15, where it is said: "her judgment reacheth up unto the heavens, and is lifted up even to the clouds." And Isa. 14: "I will ascend into heaven, I

will exalt my throne above the stars of God," to which there is presently added: "I will ascend above the height of the clouds."[13]

Twelfth: No small support accrues to this interpretation from the fact that it is by no means probable that Moses wished to describe to us the creation of a thing unknown to men; just as he mentioned nothing about the creation of fire — as we have remarked elsewhere — both because the common people are unaware of it as an element, though it is acknowledged by the learned, and because he knew he ought to present himself as suited to a rude and carnal people. Now it is established that waters properly placed above the heaven, that is, above the starry heaven, are truly unknown to the common multitude for whose grasp Moses here adjusts himself; whereas, on the contrary, waters in heaven — that is, suspended on high — which we call clouds, are known to all who philosophize at all about natural things. St. Thomas assigns this same reason[14] for why Moses made no mention of fire: "Because it is not so manifest to the rude folk to whom he was speaking, that such a body exists, as it is manifest in the case of earth and water." The same reason for fire and air not being named by Moses is handed down elsewhere.[15] Hence in turn a question may be raised from this, on what ground Moses should have named waters that are above the heavens — not only naturally unknown, but unknown even to the educated. It is therefore clear that they are not things hidden from sense.

§ 4. This doctrine will emerge still more clearly from the resolution of the arguments that are customarily brought against it.

§ II — Objections are resolved (Objectiones Solvuntur)

§ 5. The first objection is from the name "firmament." Although most interpreters render the Hebrew word as "expansion," nevertheless St. Jerome and the Seventy translated it *firmamentum*. For this is what the Greek word *στερέωμα*, which is found in the Seventy, signifies. But this word does not seem applicable to air — a body, that is to say, thinner than all others, unstable, penetrable, fluid, and according to natural philosophers supremely moist; and finally, if we may so speak, so infirm that it resists no body but most readily yields to all, so that nothing can be repelled or retained by it as an obstacle.

It is answered: that although heaven may be called "expansion" by Moses, it may nonetheless rightly also be called "firmament" — not in the sense that it is a firm and solid body, excluding and entirely demarcating the waters, in the manner in which embankments and shores of seas keep water away from land, and in the manner in which the sea bottom itself sustains the waters; but in the sense that it is an interval and boundary interposed between the upper and lower waters — an interval and boundary that is perpetual and impassable, not by natural solidity but by divine ordinance, as St. Augustine says.[17] The same view of the name "firmament" is held by Rupert.[18] Nor, however, is this division or demarcation of waters by means of the interposed air to be thought as occurring outside or contrary to nature — in the manner in which the waters of the Red Sea, contrary to nature, stood divided to afford passage to the children of Israel. For the lowest air, by its own heat and by the heat it receives from the rays of the Sun reflected from the earth, naturally sustains the upper waters — that is, the clouds — and whatever watery constitution there is in the heights.

§ 6. The second objection: The waters of the middle region of the air, whenever it rains or snows or hails, are mixed with the lower waters; therefore the division between these waters does not stand firm, which division Scripture attributes to the firmament.

It is answered: the division is established sufficiently well. For those waters are not so mixed with these as that the intervening space is taken away and the mixture and confusion of the water element occurs in such a way that they constitute one body of waters — as it was before the separation, when a place had not yet been assigned for the generation of clouds and rains — as it perhaps also was at the time of the universal deluge, the boundaries of the upper and lower waters having been confounded; but this was done extraordinarily, with God punishing the sins of the human race by a universal destruction. Nor is it surprising, given that the sea also sometimes transgresses the bounds set for it from the beginning, when God punishes the crimes of men by unusual means. Therefore Scripture intends nothing other than that the waters are so distinct from waters by the heaven interposed between them that by a perpetual law some are generated in the heights and there remain, suspended above this air, until they gradually and slowly flow down for the use of men; while others remain stationed below this air.

§ 7. The third objection: In describing the work of the fourth day, Moses relates that God said: "Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven,"[19] and then immediately subjoins that God placed them in the firmament of the heaven. But this cannot in any way be understood of the element of air, especially in that part in which it sustains the clouds. But the solution is ready at hand from what we said at the beginning: that by the name "firmament" heaven is to be understood, and that heaven by its signification embraces both this air nearest to the earth and whatever extends far and wide above it — without taking account of the distinction of the elements of air and fire, or indeed of the various celestial orbs, about which Scripture has handed down nothing distinctly, as not having been composed for the purpose of teaching us such things. But in various passages of Scripture the application is made for the various parts of the whole body expanded above us, according to the subject matter, now for the air and its lowest part, now for the starry heaven, now for the empyrean heaven. The stars, therefore, are in the firmament — that is, in the heaven according to its upper part; the waters, however, are above the firmament, and as Scripture says elsewhere, above the heaven, according to its lower part. And indeed in this manner St. Thomas also resolves this objection about the firmament.,[20] There is also another not improbable solution to this argument: for what is said — "Let there be lights in the firmament of the heaven" — can be understood thus: Let there be lights so that they may shine in the firmament of the heaven. For Scripture itself seems to expound itself, since it immediately adds: "that they may shine in the firmament of heaven and may give light upon the earth.",[21] For it is evident that Moses wished to teach us not so much where the lights are fixed, as where, by shining for us — for whose sake the corporeal world was made — they furnish their service: namely, in the air near the earth.

§ 8. The fourth objection: For the work of the fifth day, God said: "Let the waters bring forth the moving creature that hath life above the earth under the firmament of heaven"[22] — he did not say "in the firmament of heaven"; yet that is how he would have had to speak, if the air in which birds move were comprehended under the name of the firmament.

It is answered: for what our version has — "under the firmament" — the Seventy read "according to" or "alongside the firmament," that is, "in the firmament." In Hebrew, moreover, the text runs: "above the earth, above the face of the firmament of heaven." In the Chaldean: "above the earth, above the face of the air of the firmament of heaven." This Scripture, therefore, when brought back to its source, manifestly supports our position. In our version, moreover, "under" can readily be taken for "in," unless someone prefers to take "the firmament of heaven" in that passage as referring to the upper part of heaven; which, however, is not necessary according to the Hebrew truth and other versions.

§ 9. The fifth objection: The waters placed above the firmament are elsewhere called "the waters that are above the heavens," as in Ps. 148.[10] Therefore those waters are above not one heaven but several heavens.

The reply is easy: "heavens" is used for "heaven" both in that passage and very frequently elsewhere throughout the Scriptures. For in Hebrew, "heaven" lacks the singular number, whether one or many are spoken of; although translators have rendered it sometimes in the plural, sometimes in the singular.

§ 10. The sixth objection: From the same Psalm in which there is this verse — "Praise the Lord, ye heavens of heavens, and ye waters that are above the heavens, let them praise the name of the Lord"[23] — by "heavens of heavens," or "heaven of heaven," as the Translator rendered it in Ps. 113, is understood the chief and most excellent heaven, by the Hebrew idiom — by which also "Holy of Holies" and "Song of Songs" are said, with a similar signification of excellence. Therefore what follows — "and ye waters that are above the heavens" — is to be understood of the same heaven, inasmuch as it was the one just named. But this is not air, but either the starry heaven or the empyrean heaven.

It is answered that it does not follow that the latter part of the verse is to be understood of the same heaven as the former part. Nay rather, by the very words themselves it is intimated that the latter differs from the former, since in the former place "heaven of heaven" is named, while in the latter "heaven" simply is used — which for the most part is taken for air.

§ 11. The seventh objection: In the Hymn of the Three Children, Dan. 3, the works of God are commemorated in the appropriate order of descending from higher to lower things.[24] For first the Angels are commemorated, then the heavens and the stars, then the meteors, and finally the earth and the things upon it. But there the waters that are above the heavens are placed before the Sun, Moon, and Stars. Therefore they hold such a place in the universe as to be superior to these.

It is to be answered — and let us go through each of the works of God enumerated in that Canticle — that it is readily noticed (as Euthymius also observed in his exposition of it[25]) that no certain order has been observed among them. For as regards the order of location, it is established that the starry heaven is above the Sun and Moon, and yet the stars are named after these. And that in what follows this order has not been maintained throughout is likewise evident. Add to this that the same waters which this Canticle commemorates before the Sun and Moon, Ps. 148, in a similar context of divine praise, named after the Sun, Moon, and stars.[26] Whence it is sufficiently apparent that no certain argument can be drawn from an order of this kind, since it is found diverse and inverted in different passages.

§ 12. The eighth objection: In the same Canticle, the super-celestial waters are named separately, and separately — with certain intervening items — rain, dew, frost, snow, and clouds are named; but these latter pertain to the waters generated in the middle region of the air. Therefore these waters are different from those super-celestial ones.

The consequence is to be denied; for Scripture wished first to name the upper waters universally and in general, and then a little later to explain them specifically and in detail by their parts, although properly speaking among these parts only clouds are waters above the heaven. For the rest are not there, but draw their origin either immediately or mediately from the waters having their proper place there. Wherefore it can also be answered that mention is made of clouds afterward because lightnings were being named, which burst forth from clouds.

§ 13. The ninth objection: In the Hymn which the Church sings at Vespers on Monday (*Feria II*), God is said to have placed the heaven as a boundary between the celestial and terrestrial waters, for this purpose: "that the wave might temper the flames, lest they scatter the soil of earth" — therefore the Church holds that the waters above the starry heaven are placed there to temper it, lest it be harmful.

This consequence also is denied. For the words of that hymn are true of the waters clinging to the upper air; for by reason of them descending gradually, or by overshadowing the heaven and offering us shade, the heat of the stars — and especially of the Sun — is tempered, lest it scorch and scatter the earth with its rays.

§ 14. The tenth and last objection is that this exposition of Scripture — by which we interpret the super-celestial waters as the waters of the middle region of the air — is novel, in that it is found nowhere among theologians of any antiquity, and therefore is rightly to be rejected. Whence a certain Franciscus Fevardentius, moved by an argument of this kind, advances so far in his *Appendix to the Work of Alphonsus de Castro on Heresies*, under the heading "Water," as to count it among heresies to deny waters above the starry firmament and to interpret Scripture as speaking of waters suspended above this our air, that is, of clouds.[27]

It is answered, first, that this exposition cannot appear novel, confirmed as it is by so many other passages of Scripture in which mention is made of the supernal waters. Second: no novel exposition of Scripture is rightly condemned, provided it is not against the Faith or against piety, or against the concordant interpretation of the Fathers; and this exposition, it is established, is not such — since it is conformable both to the testimony of the senses and to very many other Scriptures, and since there is no other interpretation of the same Scripture on which all the Fathers agree, nor does any one of the Fathers so establish his own exposition as to condemn a different one.

Third, and more fully: it is answered that the said exposition is so far from being novel that it has great commendation both from the Fathers and from the Scholastics. For St. Augustine, in *De Genesi ad literam* II, ch. 4, not only records this opinion, but affirms that he judges the diligence and consideration of its author (whom he does not name) most worthy of praise, adding this reason: "For what he said," says he, "is neither against the Faith, and can be believed on the basis of an evidence ready to hand."[28] The same author in *Confessions* XIII, ch. 32, adduces two expositions of the firmament placed between the waters, of which the latter is this very one we are approving. "We see," he says, "the firmament of heaven — whether it is the first body of the world placed between the upper spiritual waters and the lower corporeal ones, or this space of air (for this also is called heaven, through which the birds of heaven wander) — between the waters that are borne vapourously above it and descend in rain even on serene nights, and these that heavy flow upon the earth."[29] Thus St. Augustine.

And a somewhat similar view seems to have been held by Epiphanius, from the fact that in his Letter to John of Jerusalem, translated into Latin by St. Jerome, he says that the waters that are above the heavens were those which, with the floodgates of heaven opened, inundated the whole earth.[30] For that these fell not from the ethereal heaven but from the aerial one is acknowledged among the learned. Furthermore, the opinion is most clearly transmitted at the beginning of Book II of *De Elementis Philosophiae* — whether by Bede or by whoever else is the author of that work — which opinion he also approves, and disproves the contrary view, with learned arguments, which the studious reader may seek from that source.[31] St. Thomas also, in I, q. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3, treats this opinion and exposition in such a way that he appears to prefer it to the others, and says that it is commended by St. Augustine, and that according to it all the arguments raised by the super-celestial

waters are more easily resolved.[32] St. Bonaventure, treating this very Distinction, recounts this opinion in the first place and does not altogether resist it — though he determines nothing. For he says: "But this above all is to be attended to: that in an uncertain matter nothing ought to be asserted with certainty. For it is better to hold pious doubt than to define something rashly."[33] Moreover, Durandus openly and without ambiguity embraces this opinion in his commentary on this same Distinction.[34] The same opinion is subscribed to by the author of *De Alteratione Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, ch. 3; by Augustinus Eugubinus in his *Cosmopeia*; by Antonius Fonseca in *Notes on Cajetan on Gen. 1*; by Jacobus Faber in *Super 2 Petri 3*; by Franciscus Vatablus in *Gen. 1*; by Benedictus Pereirus in *Gen. and Dan. 3*; by M. Bajus in *this Distinction*; by Domingo de Bannes in I, Part 1, q. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3; each adducing their own authors, and confirming this opinion with many good arguments; and others of more recent date, to whom accede, from the Hebrews, the Rabbis Moses and Kimhi.[35] From all which it is manifestly established that the above-mentioned author of the Church was rash and incompetent in condemning this opinion as a novelty, or in wishing in any way to render it suspect as contrary to the Faith.

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§ 15. According to this opinion, moreover, all the arguments which are raised concerning the waters above the heavens are more easily resolved. St. Bonaventure, treating of this matter in his commentary on the present Distinction,[36] recounts this opinion in the first place and does not resist it with any great force — although he defines nothing. "But this above all," he says, "is to be attended to: that in an uncertain matter nothing ought to be asserted with certainty. For it is better to hold pious doubt than to define something rashly (*Melius est enim pie dubitare, quam aliquid temerarie definire*)." Furthermore, Durandus openly and without ambiguity embraces this opinion in his commentary on this same Distinction.[34] Subscribing to the same opinion are: the Author of the *Altercation of the Church and the Synagogue*, ch. 3;[37] Augustinus Eugubinus in the *Cosmopoeia*;[38] Antonius Fonseca in his marginal notes on Cajetan's commentary on Gen. 1;[39] Jacobus Faber on 2 Pet. 3;[40] Franciscus Vatablus on Gen. 1;[41] Benedictus Pereirus on Genesis and Daniel 3;[42] M. Bajus on this same Distinction;[43] and Domingo de Bannes in his commentary on the First Part, qq. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3,[44] who also adduces his own authorities and establishes this opinion with many cogent arguments — as do others among more recent writers, to whom are added, from among the Hebrew rabbis, Moses (Maimonides) and Kimhi. From all of which it is manifest how rashly and incompetently the above-mentioned author condemned this opinion under the name of novelty, or sought in any way whatever to render it suspect of error contrary to the Faith.

§ III — Why concerning the second day it is not said: "God saw," etc. (Quare de secundo die non fit dictum: Vidit Deus, &c.)

§ 16. Although among the Seventy interpreters, in the description of the work of the second day immediately after those words, "And God called the firmament heaven," we read added: "And God saw that it was good" — and St. Basil in his third Homily (*Hexaemeron*),[46] St. Ambrose in the second book of the same subject (ch. 5),[47] St. John Chrysostom in the fourth Homily (*In Genesim*),[48] and St. Augustine in his second book (*De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 1)[49] follow their version and read those same words — nevertheless it must be known that in the Hebrew they are not found, nor among the other Translators of Sacred Scripture from the Hebrew source, namely Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, as St. Jerome testifies, partly in his second book (*Contra*

Jovinianum, ch. 9)[50] and partly from the Apologia of the same work (*Ad Pammachium*, ch. 8).[51] Hence he himself did not render those words for us in his version. It is asked, therefore, since in the description of the remaining days these words were added, why on this one day alone were they omitted by Moses?

§ 17. To this, various answers are given by various authors. The first is the answer of St. Jerome, who in both places already cited adduces this reason, suited to his own proposition and disputation: that this was not written concerning the second day because the number two does not have a good signification, since it is the first number that divides from unity. The Master in his text adduces the same reason, though with hesitation: "Perhaps," he says, "it was not said, because the number two is the beginning of otherness and a sign of division." But this reason is not of great weight, since elsewhere this same number is frequently employed to signify something good, such as friendship, concord, and the twofold charity (*geminae caritatis*). Hence the two tablets of the decalogue, the twin offspring of sheep in the *Song* (of Songs), and the Apostles sent by Christ in pairs to preach.[52]

§ 18. The second answer is that of the Glossa Ordinaria, of Lyra, and of Rabbi Solomon: that nothing of the kind was added in the description of the second day because on that day the separation of the waters was begun but not yet completed. For on the second day waters were separated from waters, on the third day they were also separated from the earth and gathered together separately in one place. Then, therefore, when the work of the separation of the waters was now finished and completed, there followed: "God saw that it was good." But this reason likewise does not carry great weight. For if it seemed good to God to distribute these two separations across two days, why should it not have been said for each one: "God saw that it was good"? Indeed, the light created on the first day received its perfection only on the fourth day, and yet even on the first day it was said: "God saw the light, that it was good."

§ 19. There is therefore a third answer, which pleases certain learned men above the others. For what is said in the description of the third day — "God saw that it was good" — they refer to all three works of division or separation that have been mentioned, namely the separation of light from darkness, which was accomplished on the first day; of waters from waters, which was accomplished on the second day; and of waters from the earth, which was accomplished on the third day. For it had not been said either concerning the first or concerning the second division: "God saw," etc., but before the first division the same is read to have been said concerning the light alone. Hence they consider that Moses wished to commend these three divisions accomplished over three days with a single clause of approbation. But even in this reasoning there seems to be more subtlety than solidity. For by this account, that said clause would be referred not to the work of the single day most recently described — as in all the other days — but to the works of three days. Nor was there need for this commendation of goodness to be specially ascribed to the division of light from darkness. For after the creation of light there was not made a division of light from darkness as some new and distinct work — as happens in the case of the division of waters from waters or from the earth, which undoubtedly followed upon the creation of the waters — but the very creation of light itself brought with it its own division from darkness. Hence it was sufficient to have been said concerning the light: "God saw that it was good."

§ 20. The fourth answer is that of those who adjoin the gathering of the waters into one place — the description of which immediately follows — to the work of the second day, and say that what is added after that description, "And God saw that it was good," must be referred to the entire work of that same day. And accordingly, they connect what Scripture has: "And God said, Let the waters be gathered," etc., with the

preceding words "Evening was made and morning, the second day," in the following manner: the second day was made; and on that same day God said further: "Let the waters be gathered," etc. Furthermore, they say that the description of the work of the third day begins from the place where it says: "And He said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb," etc.

§ 21. This exposition is not without weight, and it is supported by several reasons. First, because the gathering of the waters into one place was a certain continuation and completion of the work whose description preceded, namely the division of waters from waters. For it is credible that by a single continuous local motion, consequent upon the condensation of the lower waters, the whole thing was accomplished, so that they were both separated from the upper waters, and by seeking out the lower places they left the surface of the earth, and constituted the seas. Therefore this separation was not to be divided across two days. Then, because it would otherwise have to be admitted that on the third day "God saw that it was good" was said twice. For that phrase still follows after the description of that same day, as in the other days; but no reason is apparent why on the third day that should be said twice, which in all the other days is read to have been said only once. For if you refer it to the mystery of the Trinity on account of the third day, it would have been more fitting that it be said three times. Lastly, because according to this exposition we shall not labour in seeking the reason why on the second day "God saw," etc., was not said — which reason, one that might satisfy the inquiring mind, is exceedingly difficult to find. But according to this exposition it is shown that it truly was said, and that it was sought from a false hypothesis why it was not said.

§ 22. Nor does it stand in the way what someone might object from 4 Esdras 6, where the gathering of the waters into one place is expressly ascribed to the third day.[53] For it is established that that book is apocryphal and contains many other things that carry no authority among Catholics.

§ IV — An annotation on the work of the third day (De opere tertii diei adnotatio)

§ 23. Two works are ascribed to the third day according to the more common opinion: namely, the gathering together of the waters (*congregatio aquarum*) and the production of the things that grow from the earth (*productio terrae nascentium*). The latter of these was brought about for the sake of the former: for the earth was stripped of its waters so that it might first be able to germinate and bring forth fruit, and thereafter also be fitted for the generation and habitation of animals. Concerning the first work, it must be noted that the waters were not commanded to gather into one place in such a way as though all of them together were bound to occupy one and the same place, and were not to withdraw into the several lower and more depressed regions of the earth. For this is both contrary to what we observe and contrary to Scripture, which — both elsewhere throughout and in this very description of the separation of the waters — acknowledges several seas and consequently several places of gathered waters; for it says in the plural number: "And the gatherings of the waters He called seas." Hence it is clearly given to be understood that, by this separation of the waters from the earth, several gatherings of the waters were made — namely those received into diverse regions of the earth and withdrawn from the surface of the higher ground, and so enclosed within their own shores as if by boundaries, that they should in no way hinder the earth from its proper offices, which consist chiefly in the generation, nourishment, and preservation of living things and plants. These seas are therefore many in number, but each of them, divided from the land, has its own place. For in what is said, "Let the waters be

gathered into one place," it is easy for the dialectician to understand that "place" is taken not in a determinate but in a confused sense, by reason of the plural number "waters" — just as we say that all men have one head and two hands. Since this explanation is both plain and very consonant with the text, the disputation of those who ask whether it must be admitted that all seas and rivers flow together into one great sea, that is, into the Ocean — on the ground that the waters were commanded to be gathered into one place — is by now impertinent to the divine work here described. For it is already evident that this cannot be established from this passage of Scripture, even though nearly all profane and ecclesiastical writers alike are of the opinion that all seas are connected with the Ocean; except that concerning the Caspian Sea weighty authorities — Aristotle, Ptolemy, Herodotus, and others — are of a different mind. But the treatment of that controversy does not pertain here.

§ 24. From the said explanation, there is also refuted as something stated beside the point that which has been handed down by some in the exposition of this passage of Scripture, namely that the waters were gathered into one place in such a way that, raised up to the greatest height, they towered above the whole earth. Hence arose the inquiry of certain persons: whether, on account of the waters having been heaped separately into one place, a proper centre both of gravity (*gravitatis*) and of magnitude ought to be assigned to that element, distinct, that is, from the centre of the world and from the element of earth — as Paulus Burgensis opines in his addition upon the exposition of Gen. 1.[55] This opinion, besides resting upon a weak foundation — derived from a false understanding of this passage of Scripture, as has now been shown — also conflicts with the principles of natural philosophy (*Philosophiae naturalis placitis*) and clashes with experience itself. For from the fact that we see the parts of water and of earth alike tending downward along the same straight and perpendicular line, it follows by certain demonstration that both elements have one and the same centre of gravity (*gravitatis centrum*). And from the fact that the waters do not occupy a single side of the earth but diverse and even diametrically opposite regions of land, as is most evident from the description of the globe, it is also demonstrated that not even a centre of magnitude other than that of the earth need be assigned to water, but that absolutely one and the same centre belongs to each — namely as to a single globe composed of water and earth.

§ 25. It must be noted, however, for a fuller understanding of the present divine work, that by the power of the divine command there were made in the earth — which from its creation had been perfectly round and spherical — certain hollows (*cavitates*), that is, lower and more depressed places into which the waters, commanded to gather separately, should flow down, while many other parts of the earth rose up in the contrary direction to a greater or lesser height, which we call mountains and hills. Therefore it is said with great reason — even though Scripture has not expressed it — that mountains were made on the same day as the work of the gathering of the waters into the lower and more depressed places of the earth. I say made as regards figure (*quoad figuram*), not as regards substance (*quoad substantiam*); for the whole earth, just as water also, was made on the first day.

§ 26. Concerning the latter work of this day, by which there was implanted in the earth the power of bringing forth all those things that are called the growths of the earth (*terrae nascentia*), together with the actual effect of such production — of which it is said: "And the earth brought forth green herb," etc. — we add only this: that it was said of each kind of plant, "whose seed is in itself upon the earth," which was not said afterwards of animals, because herbs, trees, and other plants do not require a distinct sex in order to reproduce

their like, as animals do, but for that purpose their own seed, received into the bosom of the earth as of a mother, suffices them.

§ V — An annotation on the work of the fourth day (De opere quarti diei adnotatio)

§ 27. On the fourth day its own adornment was added to the heaven, when the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars were created. Now it is most probable that the heaven in which both the planets and the remaining multitude of stars are said to have been established or placed is the same as that which is read to have been created in the beginning. For, as we noted above, what was said on the second day — "Let there be a firmament," etc. — does not signify the new creation of some heaven, as certain thinkers suppose, but indicates the use which the heaven began from that point to have by reason of a definite part of itself, namely that it should be the interval by which the waters were divided from the waters. Now the Sun, the Moon, and the stars alike are said to have been made and placed in the firmament of heaven (*firmamento caeli*), not because all the heavenly bodies are in that one heaven which the common people call the firmament — for it is established that all the planets are lower than it, and each is moved by its own proper motions — but either because they are in the heaven which, taken as a whole, is rightly called the firmament (*firmamentum*), that is, the expansion (*expansio*); or because they diffuse their light into this heaven nearest to us, which a little before had been called the firmament, and thence onto the earth. For it appears that for the purpose of signifying this same thing there was added: "That they may shine in the firmament of heaven and illuminate the earth" — as we explained more fully above, when we were treating of the waters above the heavens.[57]

§ 28. Nor indeed was Moses at pains to distribute the heavens into their several spheres for us, or to teach which star was fixed in which and how many a heavenly sphere — matters which our natural philosophers set forth as a formal undertaking. It sufficed him, in a plain style, to describe the creation of the most familiar parts of the world as they fall within the perception of men. Hence it comes about that in the whole of Scripture, apart from the Sun, the Moon, and Lucifer — which profane writers call Venus — no other planet is anywhere read to be mentioned by name; because the common people are not accustomed to designate others by their own names, inasmuch as they are less conspicuous.

§ 29. It was also for this same reason that neither Moses nor Scripture anywhere else signifies that the Sun, Moon, and stars are fixed in their heavens or their spheres, nor that they are moved otherwise than as parts within their wholes; because nothing of that kind appears to the senses, and the common people are more persuaded that the stars move through the heaven on their own — just as birds move in the heaven, that is, in the air, and fish in the waters. Scripture therefore left that more exact and subtle cognition (*cognitio*) of celestial bodies and lights to be sought from those who have applied their intellect to knowing these things more profoundly.

§ 30. Furthermore, that all the lights of heaven were made from that part of the heaven which the light made on the first day had occupied, and by whose circular motion the alternation of days and nights was carried out before the creation of the Sun — this we said above, when we were treating of that light, to be probable.[58] St. Augustine mentions this opinion,[59] though elsewhere he also records the contrary opinion, which says that the Sun was added to a light that remained permanent.[60] This latter opinion appears to have been held by St. Ambrose[61] and St. John Chrysostom.[62] But it is refuted by this argument: that apart from

the light of the Sun and the stars there is no other light throughout the entire heaven. For the Moon and the Milky Way, which are luminous, by universal agreement draw their light from the Sun, or indeed from other stars as well.

§ 31. There are, however, those who attack the opinion which we set forth as the truer one, on the following ground: that if on the fourth day the luminaries were made from that part of the heaven which had been made luminous on the first day, it will follow that that part, in order to be formed into stars, must have been condensed. For a star is the denser part of its sphere; but heaven was made incorruptible from the beginning, and therefore altogether incapable of such changes. Moreover, given condensation, lest a void be left, it would further follow that the whole heaven would become smaller than it had been at its beginning — in the same way as, according to extension, water becomes less when it itself or some part of it is condensed.

It is answered (*Quibus respondetur*) that the condensation of certain parts of the heaven is not absurdly posited in the creation of the stars — indeed, not even that can be said with probability according to the simple text of Scripture. For those who hold that the stars were made according to their figure, magnitude, and density from the beginning, but that light came to them only on the fourth day, divide the creation of the stars into two days; which appears to be against Scripture, which records them as made on no other day than the fourth. Furthermore, if on the first day the stars already existed according to their figure, magnitude, and density, and on that same day light was made — was the vicissitude of days and nights from the motion of that light implanted in the stars, that is, in the parts of heaven already fitted to receive it? Or why was it rather infused into some other part of heaven where there was no such proportion? Now as to the objection that when condensation of parts occurs, the heaven necessarily becomes smaller — this would be rightly said only if it were not conversely posited that at the same time other parts of the heaven were rarefied by exactly as much as others were condensed. To posit this in heaven by the omnipotence of God — even though it be an incorruptible body — for that time during which its adornment was not yet complete involves no inconvenience; especially since even now the argument from the Milky Way teaches us that not all parts of the heaven, even setting aside the stars, are equal in rarity. This diversity is also apparent to the senses in the Moon itself.

§ 32. Now as to what Scripture subjoins concerning the luminaries — "And let them divide the day and the night" — that this is not to be taken as though the distinction of day from night were made for the first time at that point is clear from what precedes. For on the first day it had been said: "And He divided the light from the darkness; and He called the light day and the darkness night." And indeed, as the same Scripture testifies, three nights and three days together with a fourth night had already passed before the work of this fourth day. But let it be understood in this sense: that the division which the light established on the first day performed by its motion, the luminaries of heaven on the fourth day began to effect more perfectly and more distinctly, and thenceforward shall always effect it. For they so partition day and night between them that the Sun shines through the day, and that with a light far more abundant than the first light shone during the first three days — for that light was collected and united in the Sun through condensation — while the Moon and the stars shine through the night. This matter is further declared by what is said a little later: that God made the greater luminary to rule over the day, and the lesser luminary and moreover the stars to rule over the night. The same thing the Psalmist expressed in these words, Ps. 135:[63] "Who made the Sun for the dominion of the day, the Moon and the stars for the dominion of the night."

§ 33. But this prefectship or dominion is not to be understood alike in both cases. For the Sun always rules over the day, since its presence makes day, as its absence makes night. The Moon, however, rules most over the night when it is full; for then it both more brightly illuminates the night and does so for a longer time. But the further it is from the full, the less and for a shorter time can it illuminate the night. And although it happens that the Moon is visible even during the day, yet because it does not add light to the day — indeed, it is rather itself diminished by the light of day — it is therefore not said to rule over the day, just as neither do the stars, although they also are sometimes seen during the day. The stars, however, always rule over the night, inasmuch as they shine throughout every whole night and illuminate it to some degree, even though the same individual stars do not always do so.

§ 34. Finally, it must be noted (*notandum est*) that Moses calls the Sun and the Moon the great luminaries — the one greater, the other lesser — not because they are in mass and bulk truly greater than the other stars. For even if this be true of the Sun, by the consensus of all astronomers, it is held as so certain that this is not true of the Moon according to those same astronomers, that they believe they can show by certain demonstration that the Moon is the smallest of all the stars with the sole exception of Mercury. Nor is it because, when we look at them, they appear to us greater than the other stars — for on that account the Moon would not be the lesser luminary compared to the Sun, since to the judgment of the eyes the Moon does not appear smaller than the Sun — but on account of the greater abundance of light poured out upon the earth. For in this respect, as the Sun surpasses the Moon, so the Moon surpasses the other stars.

§ VI — Whether all the stars receive their light from the Sun (Utrum omnes stellae lumen a sole accipiant)

§ 35. This question — whether all the stars receive their light from the Sun — is not inopportunely raised in this place, where the creation of the celestial luminaries is under discussion. Concerning the Moon, indeed, it is certain that she shines not by her own but by an alien, that is, solar, light. For this is demonstrated by the waxings and wanings of her light, arising from her recession from the Sun or her approach to the Sun, for the reason that she shines only on that side by which she faces the Sun, as one receiving light from him. It is demonstrated also by the eclipse which she suffers when the earth is interposed between herself and the Sun. But concerning the other stars the matter is doubtful and controverted.

§ 36. For many have held the same judgement concerning the other stars as concerning the Moon. Pliny affirms that the Sun lends its light to the other heavenly bodies.[64] Avicenna, Albert the Great, Bede, and not a few others, both astronomers and theologians, hold the same view; and among these, Hugh,[65] and Titelmans,[66] who also cites Aristotle in favour of this opinion. They are moved by the following arguments.

First: because, since the nature of all the stars is similar, if the Moon does not shine by its own light, the same conclusion appears to follow for the whole multitude of the stars.

Second: because the Sun is so placed in the world that by its light it bears a certain likeness to God, who is the Father of lights (Jas. 1),[67] therefore, just as every spiritual light is from God, so every corporeal light is drawn from the Sun as from its source.

Third: because whenever something is found in many things, it is necessary that it belong to one of them primarily and through itself, and to the rest through that one; but light is found in many things; therefore

there is some body to which it primarily belongs and through which it is shared out to the rest. But this can be nothing other than the Sun, inasmuch as it is the most luminous of all bodies.

§ 37. But these arguments are not especially compelling. Not the first: because if, from the fact that the nature of all the stars is similar, it is rightly inferred that all receive their light from elsewhere, then the same will have to be said of the Sun itself; for it too is numbered among the stars no less than the Moon. For both belong to the class of the wandering stars which we call planets. It does not therefore pertain to the nature of the stars universally that they shine from elsewhere; rather, their nature would seem to require rather that, in the likeness of the Sun, they should have their own proper light, unless the Moon were to constitute an exception to this general rule. Nor is the second compelling: because the likeness of the Sun to God with respect to light is observed in this respect only — that just as all the light of day comes from the Sun, so all the light of truth and virtue comes from God. But that there is no absolute comparison even as regards corporeal light is plainly evident in many things that have their own proper light, such as fire, and whatever among us shines even in darkness, none of which shines by virtue of the light of the Sun projected upon it. Nor is the third compelling: because, although that which is found in many things may belong to some one of them more excellently than to the rest — so that in this respect that one thing may be said to be the measure of the others in its class, in the way in which heat belongs to fire — it is nevertheless not necessary that that one thing should be the cause of a similar quality in the rest. For not all things are hot by virtue of fire; and therefore neither is it necessary that all things that shine should receive their light from the Sun.

§ 38. Moreover, the opposite opinion seems to many learned men far more probable, for the following reasons.

First: if the stars were to receive their light from the Sun just as the Moon does, then each of them would have to undergo increases and decreases of light in precisely the same manner as the Moon does, which is plainly contrary to experience. For all of them exhibit their full light whether near to the Sun or opposite to it; and notably the planets Mercury and Venus, which, although placed below the Sun, yet however closely they approach the Sun, appear to lose nothing either of their light or of the roundness of their figure — which would necessarily happen to them for the same reason that it happens to the Moon.

Second: because the Sun, according to astronomers, is very far distant from the starry heaven, and this is also self-evident if we compare its position to those stars which are above us at midnight. Wherefore it is not credible that stars of this kind should possess that exceedingly brilliant light with which they are seen to shine and even to scintillate in the middle of the night, only through the reflection of the Sun's rays falling upon them as though upon bodies that are of themselves opaque and devoid of light.

Third: because the stars shine in the manner in which fire shines among us, wherefore they are also called celestial fires. But fire shines by its own proper light.

Fourth: it is proved by the analogy of Comets, which it is established shine by their own proper light. For they are certain fiery and ignited exhalations. And yet the light of the stars is very similar to the light of these, to such a degree that the one light cannot be distinguished from the other by sight alone.

Fifth: because if certain corruptible bodies among us — such as fire, and certain earth-worms, and the eyes of certain animals, and certain woods — have their own proper brightness which they emit of themselves in the darkness, why should not also the stars, those celestial and incorruptible bodies placed by God in the heaven for this purpose, that they should shine by night, likewise have their own proper light?

Lastly: the eighth heaven, in which there is an innumerable multitude of stars, is higher than the heaven of the Sun, and therefore more noble; wherefore it is not credible that the stars shining with wonderful beauty in that heaven should borrow all their light from a body placed below them.

§ 39. These arguments indeed confirm not a little the negative part of the question. If nevertheless you should ask what ought more properly to be said according to the Scriptures, I answer that neither conclusion can be drawn from them, not even probably. For that which the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15 — "There is one glory of the Sun, and another glory of the Moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory" — establishes nothing in favour of either side. For, just as by those words a glory different from the glory of the Sun is ascribed to the stars, so also to the Moon — which nevertheless all learned men are agreed in conceding receives its glory from the Sun. Moreover, "another glory" is said when a glory is diverse according to more and less, whether it be received the one from the other or not.[68]

§ VII — In what sense the stars are said to be for signs (Quomodo stellæ dicantur esse in signa)

§ 40. What Scripture says concerning the luminaries of heaven — that they should divide the day and the night, and be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years — shows to what use they were made. For their most well-known use is to divide the day and the night, in the manner explained above. How they are for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years, is not equally clear; yet they are rightly and fittingly understood to have been made for signs.

First: because their motion produces various divisions and differences of times, such as days, months, years, or summer, autumn, and winter, so that the meaning of this passage of Scripture is that the luminaries of heaven are signs of days, months, years, and other periods of this kind. That the moon is a sign of the month and of the new moon, the author of Ecclesiasticus attests at Sir. 43. Next, because the seasons for planting, sowing, reaping, sailing, and other like activities are taken from the rising and setting of those bodies. And lastly, because fair weather, storms, frost, rain, winds, and other similar changes of the sky can be foretold from the stars or from certain of their aspects — not indeed long before they come to pass, but as it were from proximate signs. For thus a pale moon is wont to presage rain, a reddish moon wind; and the Sun, ruddy in the morning, is wont to betoken a rainbow and impending rain — although such appearances belong less to the stars themselves than to the sky or the air interposed between the stars and our sight, whence it comes about that the stars appear affected in such a manner.

And this prognostication derived from the stars or from the sky Christ Himself approves in the Gospel. For He says thus in Matt. 16: "When evening is come, you say: It will be fair weather, for the sky is red. And in the morning: It will be stormy today, for the sky is red and lowering." "The face of the sky therefore you know how to discern." And in Lk. 12: "When you see a cloud rising from the west, immediately you say: A shower is coming, and so it is; and when you see the south wind blow, you say: There will be heat, and it comes to pass. You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the earth and of the sky." Moreover, St. Basil enumerates many such signs in Homily 6 (*Hexaemeron*) and says that the significations of the celestial luminaries are necessary and useful in human life, and that their observations, confirmed by long experience, are found beneficial.[70] St. Ambrose writes to the same effect,[71] as does St. John Chrysostom.[72] Likewise St. Augustine states:[73] "It does not speak of those signs which it is vanity to observe, but certainly of useful signs, necessary

for the purposes of this life, such as sailors observe in navigation, or as all men observe for foreseeing the qualities of the atmosphere through summer, winter, and the autumnal and vernal temperate seasons." These are his words.

§ 41. There are, however, some who refer the aforesaid text of Scripture to prognostic signs of future events and human actions — as though Moses had wished to signify in this place that the future outcomes of events and the actions of men can be certainly foreknown and foretold from the stars, whether as bare signs or even as causes. This interpretation is willingly embraced by those who profess astrological divination, whom we today call judicial astrologers, called in earlier times by various names: astrologers, genethliaci, Chaldaeans, mathematicians.

But this interpretation, as false and perverse, is plainly refuted by other passages of Scripture, in which the divination practised from the stars is condemned as impious; as in Jer. 10: "According to the way of the Gentiles," he says, "be not afraid, and be not dismayed at the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear; for the laws of the peoples are vain." And Is. 41: "Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods." And things similar to these in the same Prophet, chapters 44 and 47, in which latter place he speaks thus universally of this kind of foreknowledge: "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this hath deceived thee."

The Fathers also explicitly excluded this interpretation — in particular St. Basil, who in Homily 6 (*in the treatment of this Scripture*), after delivering the interpretation we gave from it a little above, confutes with a long and weighty discourse the genethliaci and the devotees of astrology.[70] Likewise St. Augustine:[74] in book 1 (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, ch. 14), where he calls such astrological observations "signs of vanity"; and in ch. 17, where he says they are to be rejected by the soundness of our faith; again, in book 2 (*De Doctrina Christiana*, ch. 21, and in several following chapters);[75] in book 5 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 1, and several following chapters);[76] in book 7 of the *Confessions*, ch. 6;[77] in the *Epistle to Januarius*, chs. 7–8;[78] in the book *De Haeresibus*, heresy 80, which is that of the Priscillianists;[79] and in nearly innumerable other places — in all of which, under the name of mathematicians, he condemns and refutes this class of astrologers. Among other passages there is a memorable one at the end of his *Enarratio on Ps. 61*,[80] where he presents to the people a mathematician doing penance and publicly seeking pardon and carrying books to be burned, after the example of those of whom Luke writes in Acts 19 — that when they had followed curious arts, "they brought their books together and burned them before all"; and St. Augustine declares in that same place that those books pertained to matters of astrological divination, calling therein that kind of doctrine nefarious and sacrilegious.

The aforesaid interpretation and doctrine are likewise refuted by other Fathers: St. Ambrose,[81] St. John Chrysostom,[82] St. Gregory,[83] Eusebius,[84] who adduces a remarkable disputation of Origen against the astrologers, and in book 14, ch. 4 of the same work;[85] after these, St. John Damascene;[86] John Gerson in a special treatise composed by him on this subject;[87] and most recently Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who in thirteen books pursued the vanity of this kind of prognostic arts.[88] Let also whoever wishes read Aulus Gellius,[89] who reports a most elegant disputation of the philosopher Favorinus on this matter. And beyond all these, there stand against this class of astrological predictions the decrees of the Church found in Gratian (*in the second part of the* Decretals, *through the first five questions*)[90] — by which the whole of this vanity and impiety is condemned — as also in the Council of Braga I, chs. 9 and 10,[91] and in a certain Profession of Faith against the Priscillianists, which is found in the First Council of Toledo.[92] Moreover such decrees have been

renewed from time to time by the Supreme Pontiffs, as also by Sixtus V in his Bull against judicial astrology.[93] Pertinent here also is what Epiphanius reports in his book *De Mensuris et Ponderibus*:[94] that Aquila of Pontus, the interpreter of the Old Testament from the Hebrew, was expelled from the Church chiefly on this account, that he assiduously devoted himself to the observation of nativities and other astrological divinations. But let this be abundantly sufficient for refuting the erroneous interpretation of that text of Scripture which says the luminaries of heaven were made for signs.

§ 42. One thing I add: that since this signification, even if it were true, is altogether recondite and can be grasped by few, it is not to be supposed that it is attributed to the stars in this place — seeing that, as we said before, Moses's purpose in this history of Genesis was not to disclose certain hidden secrets of nature, but to describe the creation of things commonly known, and at the same time to show that the use of those things, a use that is commonly known, was assigned to them at their very creation. Just as, therefore, the things whose creation is here described are themselves commonly known — namely the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars — and just as their most commonly known use, which consists in giving light and in distinguishing days, nights, and other periods by their motions, is commonly known: so also the use that consists in signifying must be commonly known. And this use we have above assigned to be threefold.

Hence it is equally clear that those persons do not hit the mark of Scripture either who interpret this passage of the twelve signs of the Zodiac. For those signs too are very remote from the sense and knowledge of ordinary people, and perhaps had not yet been discovered in the time of Moses. And although they have their own use, not to be censured, in astronomical science, insofar as that science considers the motions, positions, distances, oppositions, and conjunctions of the stars, they have nonetheless been transferred by the genethliaci even themselves to vain and superstitious significations. For this reason St. Augustine, in the heresy of the Priscillianists mentioned above,[95] reckons among their errors this: that they assert our body is composed according to the twelve signs of heaven, placing Aries at the head, etc. A similar censure of these signs is to be seen in St. Jerome,[96] in St. John Chrysostom,[97] and in Leo in his *Epistle* against the Priscillianists.[98]

§ VIII — Whether the celestial bodies are animated (An caelestia corpora sint animata)

§ 43. Another question belonging to this place is: whether the heaven and the stars are animated. This is to be understood chiefly with respect to the rational soul (*anima intellectiva*); for concerning the vegetative and sensitive soul there is less reason for doubt. We answer briefly: both the heaven and all its parts (which, by the judgment of all learned men, are the stars) are inanimate bodies, inasmuch as they possess neither a rational soul (for in that case they would not differ from man in their substantial form) nor are they endowed with intellect or mind at all — which latter belongs, beyond man, to the angels alone.

§ 44. This position is, in the first place, wholly consonant with Sacred Scripture, in which we read, at Gen. 1, Deut. 4, and elsewhere, that the celestial bodies were created for the service of the human race.[100] For this cannot be said of an intellectual creature, since such a creature is not, by the fact of its creation, a servant of another creature, being by its own nature free and naturally subject to God alone — since servitude of this kind for a creature takes its origin only from sin. It is then proved, in the second place, by the authority of the Fathers. St. Basil hands it down openly in Homily 3 of the *Hexaemeron*,[46] where he also shows, among other things, in what sense the stars are said in Scripture to praise God. Likewise St. John Chrysostom in Homily 18

on the Epistle to the Romans,[101] in a moral digression, where he asserts this doctrine concerning the heaven, the Sun, and the other stars most clearly, adducing as his argument what we have already stated — that all these things were made for our sake. He teaches the same things in Homilies 15 and 35 of the *Ad populum Antiochenum*.[102] Nor does St. Jerome hold otherwise; for in the *Epistle to Avitus*[103] he counts among the errors of Origen this one as well, that he said the heaven is animated. The same Jerome, in his exposition of chapter 43 of Isaiah,[104] resolves a certain argument which, as he himself testifies, had given some persons occasion to think that the stars are rational and possess soul and sense. These passages in St. Jerome are to be carefully observed on account of certain other things from his writings that are customarily adduced to the contrary — of which more below. The same is the judgment of Fulgentius in his book *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 3,[105] where he says that the intellectual nature exists in the souls of men and the spirits of angels alone, and that God has instilled in angels and men alone the capacity to know and to love Him. He repeats this same point in chapter 24.[106] Moreover, he appears to speak of this matter as though it were a dogma of faith.

§ 45. Likewise Peter Chrysologus, in Sermon 120, says: "The heaven is not moved of its own accord, it acts not by will, it does nothing by judgment, but serves always by bare necessity alone, because it was once commanded to serve."[107] Likewise St. Gregory, in Homily 10 on the Gospels,[83] numbers the heaven and the Sun among the insensible elements and among those that have known God only in an improper manner of speaking. In the same passage he calls the stars the servants of men, saying thus: "For man was not made for the sake of the stars, but the stars for the sake of man; and if the star is said to be man's fate, man is held to be subject to his own servants." Finally, this is the express doctrine of St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, chapter 6:[108] "Let no one," he says, "consider the heaven or the luminaries to be animated, for they are inanimate and without sense." And he then declares in what sense those Scriptures are to be understood that appear to attribute soul and mind to the celestial bodies.

§ 46. Following the judgment of these Fathers, all the Scholastic Doctors determine the question — whether the celestial bodies are animated — in the negative; although not all adhere to it equally firmly, as we shall show presently. The arguments by which this position is established are roughly as follows. The first: the soul (*anima*) is the act (*actus*) of an organic body — that is, a body composed of parts which the soul uses as instruments, diverse in position and shape, for diverse functions. But the celestial bodies are not organic. For they do not consist of parts of this kind; therefore they do not have souls. The second: the soul requires a body tempered according to the primary and secondary qualities; but the heaven is incapable of these qualities. These two arguments conclude with respect to the soul properly so called. With respect to mind or intellect in general, there are the following further arguments. The third: if the heaven and the stars were endowed with intellect, they would have free will (*liberum arbitrium*), and consequently would exercise some free actions. But this appears in them in no way at all. For they have no motions other than natural ones, recurring in one and the same perpetual law, and therefore necessarily. For according to the Philosopher (*philosophum*), those things happen necessarily which always happen in the same manner. But it is established that their influences and hidden operations upon these lower things are purely natural, and therefore also necessary.

§ 47. The fourth argument — which the OCR places somewhat imperfectly — runs as follows: union of form with matter is not required on account of the matter, but on account of the form, namely in order that the form may exercise its operation through it. But the intellectual form has two actions — to understand and to move; the former is perfected in the intellectual principle itself and requires no matter; the latter is indeed received in matter, but for it the union of form with matter is not necessary, but only conjunction by virtual

contact (*contactum virtualem*) — in which manner every mover is joined to the movable. Therefore it must not be said that the heaven is animated by a mind forming it from within, but it suffices that it be moved by a mind or intelligence that is present to it as an external mover. St. Thomas develops this argument learnedly in the *Summa*, I, q. 70, a. 3,[99] where he treats this question with particular care. The fifth: if the heavens were endowed with soul or mind, they would be blessed (*beati*) just as the holy angels are. For they ought not to be supposed either miserable or still existing in the state of meriting (*in via merendi*). For then both the heavens themselves or their souls could sin and be eternally damned; for it would follow either that the animated heavens themselves must be tormented, or that their souls alone, torn away from the heavens, in which case other souls would have to be given to the heavens. All of which conclusions are utterly absurd.

§ 48. And if you grant that they are blessed, it follows that they belong to the same society of the Church as the blessed angels and ourselves, and consequently that they pray to God for us and that they themselves can be invoked by us, just as the holy angels are invoked. But this is utterly foreign to the mind and custom of the Church. And rightly so. For in Deut. 4 and other places Scripture condemns all honour and worship that is shown to the stars.[109] Nor would the Church in any way tolerate it if someone were to say: "Holy Sun," or "Holy Moon, pray for us." These arguments indeed appear not a little efficacious toward demonstrating that the heavens are neither animated nor endowed with mind.

§ 49. Therefore it may be asked: whether this is to be held so certainly that the contrary opinion would be erroneous in faith (*erronea in Fide*). For some Doctors appear to hold this — such as St. Jerome in the *Epistle to Avitus*,[103] when he counts that opinion among the errors of Origen; likewise Fulgentius in the places cited above, and especially in chapter 24 of *De Fide ad Petrum*,[106] where he wishes the dogma — that among all creatures only the angelic spirits and humans have the faculty of understanding — to be held most firmly and doubted in no way whatsoever. Likewise Rupert in *De Glorificatione Trinitatis*, book 9, chapter 4,[110] after mentioning that the stars perhaps live, adds: "This the Church of God was not willing and ought not to receive." Likewise St. Bonaventure, in his commentary on this very Distinction,[111] did not hesitate to call this opinion false and erroneous. To these is added John Gerson, in the *Trilogus Astrologiae*, proposition 13,[112] where he says that angels or intelligences do not animate but govern the heaven with its stars and planets according to the will of glorious God; and he says this proposition is "to be held with certain faith."

§ 50. But on the contrary: first, there is St. Augustine's doubt on this question, which he never appears to have set aside. For in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 2, final chapter,[113] he raises this question and leaves it unresolved — whether the luminaries of heaven have only presiding governors, that is, intelligences, assisting them, or whether these are so united to them that they are vitally inspired by them. And in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 59,[114] he doubts whether the Sun, Moon, and all the stars belong to the society of the blessed, although, he says, to some they do not appear to be luminous bodies with sense or intelligence. Again, he leaves the same question in suspense in *Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas*, chapter 11.[115] And finally, in *Retractationes*, book 2, chapter 7,[116] he does retract certain things said in the books against Faustus about the celestial bodies as endowed with sense, yet he defines nothing certain — even though he wrote that work toward the very end of his life. A similar retractation occurs in chapters 5 and 11 of the same book.[117] For he had said that the world is animated and a certain great animal. This he retracts not as false but as rashly said, denying that he knows whether it is so or not. Hence also in *De Civitate Dei*, book 13, chapter 16,[118] although he does not think that Plato ought to be conceded the claim that the stars are living things endowed

with intelligence and blessedness, and that the world is a certain great animal, he nevertheless does not reject that opinion as false, but considers the question to be discussed in another place.

§ 51. Perhaps someone will say that St. Augustine elsewhere delivered a certain judgment on this matter, as in the book *De Cognitione Verae Vitae*, chapter 7,[119] where it reads: "Those who consider the stars to be rational, or at least sensible bodies, are rightly reckoned without sense among the irrational." But the answer is easy and certain: that book is not by St. Augustine — on which ground Scotus rejects that authority.[120] Of greater weight, however, is what is said in the book *De Duabus Animabus* — which is established to be by St. Augustine — in chapter 4:[121] that the soul of a fly is more excellent than the light of the Sun. For he would not say this if the Sun had a soul, and indeed an intellectual one, or if he at least doubted this. But this too can be dissolved. For St. Augustine does not there compare the fly with the Sun, nor the soul of the fly with the soul of the Sun, but compares it with the light of the Sun — which light is a certain quality perceptible to the senses and accidental to the Sun, for which reason it is not surprising that it is said to be less noble than the soul of a fly and of any animate creature. St. Augustine's doubt therefore remains.

§ 52. Furthermore, St. Thomas also appears at times not to have been averse to the opinion that posits the heavens as animated. For in *Contra Gentiles*, book 2, chapters 69–70, and in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, article 8, and in the *Opusculum de Angelis*, chapter 2,[122] he adduces arguments by which it is demonstrated that the heavens are animated by an intellectual soul (*anima intellectiva*), and to these arguments — drawn chiefly from Aristotelian philosophy — he himself appears to assent. Although in the *Summa*, as we have already shown, he holds and demonstrates the negative position, with his opinion changed for the better, his earlier writings nonetheless sufficiently prove that this question is not one of faith but of opinion. Hence also in *Quodlibetum* 12, article 9,[123] when the question is raised whether the heaven is animated, he answers that the Doctors of the Church have held various views on the matter — that St. Jerome affirmed it, that St. John Damascene denied it, and that the same variety is found among the philosophers. "But I say," he states, "following St. Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 2, that it does not pertain to faith whether it is so or otherwise." Hence he does not determine this in the *Enchiridion*, adding that if we posit the celestial bodies to be animated, there will not on that account be three orders of those to be judged at the judgment — namely angels, men, and the souls of the heavens — since the souls of the heavens would be reckoned together with the angels. And this seems to have been the view of him who composed the Preface where he says: "the heavens and the powers of the heavens (*caeli caelorum que virtutes*)." Thus St. Thomas.

§ 53. And Scotus likewise speaks hesitatingly in his commentary on this Distinction, question 1.[120] For he diligently shows that St. Augustine asserted nothing here, and he attacks with an argument the reason adduced by St. Thomas for the negative part, and finally concludes thus: "If the heavens are not animated, this is believed and not concluded by reason, because there is no condition in that body, so perfect, that manifestly appears to repugn its animation." So he. His hesitation has been followed by certain other Scotists. Aureolus moreover even thought it probable that the stars are animated, as Capreolus and Argentína report concerning him in their commentaries on this Distinction.[124] Cajetan, although in the *Summa* he speaks with St. Thomas[125] and acknowledges that the latter corrected his earlier opinion, elsewhere nonetheless wavers. For in his exposition of Psalm 135 on the verse "Who made the heavens in understanding" (*Qui fecit caelos in intellectu*),[126] he says that these words can be taken to signify that the heavens were made with understanding — that is, as intellectual — as he says the philosophers reasonably opined.

§ 54. The doubt or variety of opinion of all these, therefore, manifestly declares that what we have said — that the celestial bodies are not animated — is not a matter of faith; especially since no definition of the Church on this matter is found to exist, and since St. Augustine and St. Thomas, the foremost authorities, expressly affirm that it has not been defined by the Church — even though, on account of the arguments drawn from Scripture and from reason, which truly press most urgently, it seems that anyone who teaches the contrary will act rashly.[127]

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§ IX — Whether celestial bodies are animated (An caelestia corpora sint animata)

§ 55. That St. Augustine persevered in that doubt unto the very end of his life — as to whether celestial bodies are animated or not (which this Author appears to assert) — is by no means proved by the most celebrated writers of our age. Dionysius Petavius, in *Theologia Dogmatica*, tom. 3, bk. 1, *De Opificio Sex Dierum*, ch. 12, n. 10, asserts without hesitation that it is evident that St. Augustine maintains that the celestial bodies are devoid of soul and sense — of which matter Cardinal Henry de Noris, in *Vindiciae Augustinianae*, ch. 4, § 2, says that St. Augustine more than once taught that the heavens are better constituted without a soul of their own. Natalis Alexander, in *Historia Ecclesiastica*, Saeculum 5, ch. 4, a. 3, § 10 (sub "Tertium Naevum"), refuting Dallaeus, who had reproached St. Augustine for having doubted whether the stars are endowed with reason and intellect, argues that St. Augustine inclines rather to the opinion which denies the stars a soul; and what is more remarkable, to prove his assertion he adduces the very passage which our Author cites for maintaining the perpetual doubt of St. Augustine — namely from *De Civitate Dei* bk. 13, ch. 16 — in whose commentary Ludovicus Vives says that St. Augustine never dared to resolve this question; but Ludovicus Vives is commended for his learning, not for his theology. A clearer passage for the assertion of the aforesaid Authors is from *De Civitate Dei* bk. 10.[129]

§ IX — Reply to the arguments of the affirmative side (Respondetur ad argumenta tis affirmantis)

§ 56. The heavens and stars can be seen to be animate by those arguments. In the passage from *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 29,[131] where St. Augustine treats this as an alien and foreign opinion, let the passage itself be read. What he says in the book *Against the Priscillianists*,[132] in the chapter which alone our Author cites from it, and the passage from bk. 2 of the *Retractations*[133] — these show St. Augustine to be retracting certain things regarding celestial bodies as endowed with sense, yet not definitively establishing their rational life. Behold Augustine's own retracting words: "In the fourteenth book," he says, "concerning the Sun and Moon, whose vain adorers" — though he used a figure of speech called in Greek *Metonymy*, wishing to say that the Mother, in her desire to advance, as the circumstances intimate, never intended" — it was certainly never Augustine's mind to have said what he had formerly said? Indeed he so explains himself: what he had written was to be understood metaphorically. Now what our Author further adds concerning that same book is not so easily admitted. In the eleventh book of the second, as our Author cites — in those passages Augustine does not intimate that he ever affirmed the sky to be some kind of animal, but that he wrote certain things which he now retracts: retracting, in the one place, what he had said in ch. 15 of the book *De Immortalitate Animae*,[134]

thus: "That also was rashly said: that a body subsists through the soul by virtue of the highest essence, which gives form. For through the soul the body subsists and exists, inasmuch as it is animated — whether universally, so that the World itself is an animal, or in particular, so that each animal within the World is an animal. All this was said altogether rashly." In the latter passage, retracting what he had said in ch. 14 of bk. 6 of *De Musica*,[135] he writes: "If, however, that supreme beauty is understood to be present in all corporeal things, that opinion compels us to believe that even the World itself is an animal, and that what imitates it in constancy is maintained through the soul by the highest God — as Plato thought, and many other philosophers — and I have not been able to ascertain this by certain reasoning, nor could I be persuaded of it by the authority of the Divine Scriptures. Hence something of this kind was said by me, which I have noted as having been rashly said — not because I know that the World is not an animal, but because I cannot grasp that it is." These very final words do indeed present such difficulty as to seem to force the conclusion that Augustine never laid aside his doubt concerning this Platonic opinion about the World-Soul; yet to anyone weighing carefully both the words and the intention of St. Augustine, it will be clear that the holy Doctor was not doubting, but only not yet in a position to have arrived at a fully investigated perception of its falsity by a sharp scrutiny of truth.

§ 57. Moreover, St. Augustine, in many places — chiefly in bk. 6 *Against Faustus*,[136] ch. 4 — attacks as stupid and abominable the foolish opinion of various heretics who indiscriminately attribute soul and sense to earth, water, air, stones, and other such things. Regarding the position of St. Thomas — whom our Author considers to have at some point not been averse to the opinion that places the heavens as animate, and who afterwards maintained the denying position as his final view, with his opinion changed for the better — I do not think it should be declared so unhesitatingly as our Author supposes. For St. Thomas, to be sure, in bk. 2 *Against the Gentiles*, ch. 70,[137] and in the disputed *Questions on the Soul*, art. 8, and in the opuscule *On the Separate Substances, or On the Nature of Angels*, ch. 2,[138] treating of other matters and speaking from the viewpoint of the Philosopher — especially of Aristotle — sets forth that opinion, yet by no means assents to it himself. And in ch. 70 of that second book of *Against the Gentiles* he openly professes the contrary. Furthermore, in the article cited from Quodlibet 12, q. 6,[139] where he treats this question expressly, he defines nothing, but only asserts that this question does not pertain to the Faith. And likewise in the *Disputed Questions*, q. 6 of *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, art. 1,[140] on the question whether a spiritual substance is united to a celestial body — to this inquiry he responds with the following conclusion, which he proves at greater length in the body of the article: "From among spiritual substances, those things" — and so forth, as he proves there at length. See therefore how St. Thomas, even before writing the *Summa*, propounded that opinion which dismisses soul from celestial bodies. I freely acknowledge, however, that St. Thomas then, in the lauded passages, clearly asserted — including in the first part of the *Summa*, q. 70, art. 3[128] — something which other Doctors also did not hesitate to assert, and which he intimated as well — namely, that the decision of this question does not touch the Faith. Among those who say so, beyond those cited by our Author, is numbered Petrus Aureolus of the Order of Minors, the singular ornament of the second book of the *Sentences*, dist. 14, q. 2, art. 2.[141] Who here would not mock the boldness of a certain modern writer — to speak most mildly — who counts among the errors the ancient doubt of St. Augustine that he is rejecting?

§ 58. Regarding the position of Aristotle, a lengthy inquiry would here be required; but this is not the time and place that demands such a spectacle. Moreover, Dionysius Petavius, in the lauded place, num. 23,[142] did not hesitate to write that the Platonic opinion on the souls of the heavens was destitute of any patronage from all Catholic antiquity, and was not lightly to be insinuated among Christians, nor to be defended — and

rightly so, since in the letter which Justinian addressed to the Fifth Synod against the errors of Origen, the Sixth in order Anathematism is thus conceived: "If anyone says that the Heaven, the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, as well as the waters which are above the heavens, are animated and certain material spiritual powers, let him be anathema." That these letters of Justinian were approved by Pope Vigilius together with the universal Catholic Church is attested by the distinguished Carthaginian Deacon Liberatus, ch. 23 of his *Breviarium*.[143] Indeed, that the said anathematism was approved in the same Fifth Ecumenical Synod celebrated in the year 553 is recorded by Nicephorus Callistus, bk. 17, ch. 17,[144] a fact which the learned Christian Lupus has further illuminated with erudite notes and scholia. But whether by that canon the opinion of the souls of the heavens was condemned as Origen understood it — of which St. Jerome writes in his Letter 61 *Against John of Jerusalem*,[145] that Origen had held the Sun, Moon, and all the stars, as well as the choir of incorporeal rational creatures subjected to fiery bodies, to be souls ultimately to be liberated from the servitude of corruption into the freedom of the sons of God — I leave to others to judge. Meanwhile Petavius asserts in the place already praised that St. Thomas said the Church had pronounced nothing against either part, because the acts and decrees of the Fifth Synod concerning Origen are not extant. Concerning whose authority and judgment on this matter I do not think doubt is now possible; though not to the extent that one who defends the affirmative opinion should be held as a heretic. After so long a silence imposed by necessity, would anyone take amiss a more lengthy annotation?

§ 59. Now let us reply to the arguments already set forth. To the first it is answered: there is a *prosopopoeia* (rhetorical personification) in that passage where the stars are said to have praised God.[146] This figure is also elsewhere not rarely used by Scripture when speaking of heaven and the stars, as in Ps. 28, 103, and 149,[147] likewise Dan. 3 in the Hymn of the Three Youths.[148] That a figure is to be recognised there is evident, because in the aforesaid passages not only the heavens and stars but also certain other things are invited to praise and bless God which are beyond all doubt devoid of mind and even of sense — as fire, hail, mountains, hills, and so forth. All these things are therefore said to praise and bless God insofar as, being contemplated by rational creatures, they provide the most ample material for divine praise. Nor does the other part of the sentence in Job present an obstacle, whereby the sons of God — that is, the Angels — are said properly to praise God; for each element must be expounded according to the subject matter at hand. For even in Ps. 148 and in the Hymn of the Three Youths there are included among those invited to praise God even those to whom it properly belongs, such as Angels and men.

§ 60. What is objected in the second place has no authority of Sacred Scripture. For these are the words of Eliphaz, Job's friend, the truth of whose statements we are not obliged to defend. Nevertheless it can be said that by "heavens" he signifies the celestial spirits; for of these he had just spoken: "Behold, none among His saints is unchangeable." And thus the sense will be that the angelic nature is not free from the impurity of sin — which is evident in the evil angels. Notwithstanding this, it can also be understood of the corporeal heavens in this sense: that the heavens are not altogether perfect before God, for every creature is defectible. But if under the name of heavens he also comprehends, in the manner of Scripture, this lower air, then the reply will be still easier; for we habitually call the air impure and foul if it is infected with noxious qualities.

§ 61. To the third the reply is evident from what immediately precedes in that same place: "And Thou dost give life to all these things." For this is said of the heaven, the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, since these had been enumerated just before. Just as, therefore, these are vivified improperly, insofar as they have within themselves some principle of motion, or insofar as they are conserved in existence — so likewise the

host of heaven adores God (as the Hebrew has it), that is, bows down before God, insofar as it serves Him at His nod, just as if it acknowledged His sovereignty and received it with reverence, as obedient servants are wont to do.

§ 62. To the fourth I reply: the meaning of Isaiah's words is this — the Lord will visit upon the host of heaven, destroying from the earth their idols and the worship of them; for what follows is: "And the moon shall be confounded and the sun ashamed" (Is. 24),[149] which is undoubtedly figurative, signifying that it shall come to pass that the worshippers of the stars, having understood the vanity of such worship, will be seized with the greatest shame. St. Jerome, however, in the course of his commentary there interpolated another's opinion — that is, the opinion of Origen — but what he himself thinks he expressed in the same commentary, on ch. 45.'[150]

§ 63. What was objected in the fifth place has this meaning: the luminaries of heaven "in the words of the Holy One" — that is, at God's command — "shall stand according to judgment" (so it is in the Greek), that is, shall maintain their order, which God by a certain judgment and reason prescribed to them. For it is a metaphor taken from the order and discipline of the military. Hence what follows: "And they shall not fail in their watches" — that is, their vigils or guard-duties — meaning they shall keep their stations by a perpetual law. Similar is Hab. 2: "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation."[151]

§ 64. To the sixth it is answered that the expression is figurative, of the kind used when it is said: "He called a famine upon the land" (Ps. 104),[152] "the winds and the sea obey Him" (Matt. 8).'[153]

§ 65. To the seventh one could reply as to the first; but a better solution is from the Greek, where it is read thus: "All in heaven blessed the Lord."[154]

§ 66. To the eighth: although St. Thomas (in the *Quodlibet*)[155] says that the author of the Preface seems to have held that the heavens are animate, yet since the universal Church solemnly employs those words, it must rather be said that by "the heavens" are signified the celestial Spirits or Intelligences, by that figure of speech whereby the container is taken for the contained — just as "earth" is frequently put for the men who are on the earth. If you say that in both places the heavens are manifestly distinguished from the Angels and the celestial virtues, especially in that phrase which says "the Heavens and the virtues of the heavens" — I reply that this can be expounded thus: "the heavens," that is, "the virtues of the heavens." Hence in another Preface the corresponding phrase is: "Together with all the host of the celestial army" — which the Church undoubtedly understands of the Angels, according to what is said in Lk. 2, that a multitude of the heavenly host sang to the newborn Christ: "Glory to God in the highest."'[156]

§ 67. To the ninth it is answered, likewise, that the expression is improper; for the meaning is that Christ the Spouse is so beautiful that those things which are the most beautiful in creatures yield to Him, and even if they had a mind, they would look up to and admire His beauty as incomparably superior to their own.

§ 68. To the tenth I reply that St. Jerome there adduces two reasons why the Sun can be understood to be called "spirit." If either one of these is true, it suffices for the commentator. The true one, however, is the one he placed first.[157]

§ 69. To the eleventh it seems one must reply as to the first — namely, that there is a *prosopopoeia* in the words of St. Augustine, which he himself sufficiently indicates when, after those words "the Sun knows that Christ is its Lord and Creator," he immediately adds: "and if it can be indignant, it is more bitterly indignant

against the one who falsely honours it than against the one who insults it."[158] For while he doubts whether the luminaries of heaven can be indignant against men who sin against God, he consequently doubts whether they are endowed with intellect, and therefore leaves us to understand the preceding words in a figurative sense. He employed this figure, however, all the more readily because he at least doubted whether such things could properly be said of them. Add further that even if he had so thought at that time, that opinion of his would be subject to the retractation of which we have spoken above.

§ 70. To the twelfth it is answered that in the words of St. Cyprian likewise there is a rhetorical personification of a character.[159]

§ 71. To the thirteenth I reply: Philo writes in this way not as a Jew but as a Platonist;[160] for this dogma of Plato's was, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas have declared. Therefore the opinion of Philo in this matter is no more to be received than that of Origen, who drew his doctrine from the same source.

§ 72. As for the position of Aristotle — whose authority was last urged against us — the interpretations of his opinion are various. Some say that the form of the heaven is called by him a soul only by a certain likeness, because just as a soul moves the various parts of an animated body in diverse ways, according as it receives from it diverse virtues and inclinations, so likewise the form of the heaven moves the diverse parts of the heaven not all in one way, but some more swiftly, some more slowly, some nearer, some farther from the poles — such as is found in no way in other corporeal things. But this response seems to be refuted by the very passages of the Philosopher cited in the argument, in which he speaks of the soul and the animated body properly; and especially from that passage where he attributes an intellective soul to the heaven.[161] Others explain his statements concerning the intellect as being said with a motivating intelligence assisting from without. But against this, not only are the Philosopher's own passages cited in the argument indicative of motion from an internal principle, but it is also significant that he calls the heaven *empsychon* (as it were soul-bearing in itself) — bk. 2 *De Caelo*, ch. 2[162] — which seems to be taken not of an external mover but of an internal one. Others therefore hold that the Philosopher truly held that the form of the heaven is at once a motive and intellective soul. But not even this do those things which bk. 8 of the *Physics*[163] records fully establish.

§ IX (continued) — On the mind of Aristotle regarding the soul of the heaven (De mente Aristotelis circa animam caeli)

§ 73. To the thirteenth objection it is answered that Philo writes thus not as a Jew but as a Platonist; for that this was Plato's dogma has been stated above on the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.[164] Therefore the opinion of Philo in this matter is no more to be received than that of Origen, who drew his doctrine from the same source. Furthermore, concerning the mind of Aristotle — whose authority was adduced in the last place as an objection — the interpretations of his commentators are various. Some say that the form of the heaven is called by him a soul by a certain likeness, because just as the soul moves the diverse parts of an animated body in diverse ways, inasmuch as those parts receive from it diverse powers and inclinations (*virtutes et inclinationes*), so also the form of the heaven moves the diverse parts of the heaven not in one way but some more swiftly, others more slowly, according as they are farther or less far from the poles; yet such a thing is found in no other bodies. But this response seems to be refuted by the very passages cited, in which the Philosopher indicates that he is speaking properly of a soul and of an animated body; and most especially

by that passage in which he attributes an intellective soul to the heaven. Others interpret his statements as being about an assisting motive intelligence. But against this there stand not only the passages of the Philosopher himself indicated in the argument, which attribute the motion of the heaven to an internal principle, but also the fact that he calls the heaven *ἔμψυχον*, as if having a soul within itself[165] — which seems ought to be taken not of an external moving principle but of an internal one. Others therefore acknowledge that the Philosopher truly so thought: that the form of the heaven is a certain soul that is both motive and intellective. But neither is this proved to be so by what he teaches in Book VIII of the *Physics*.[166]

§ 74. — those passages teach that the motive intelligences of the heavens are perfect substances, which move the heavens in such a way that they themselves are moved neither essentially (*per se*) nor accidentally (*per accidens*), and whose proper doctrine belongs to metaphysics, which considers things altogether separated from matter. These things, however, could not be said of those intelligences if they were the forms of the heavens. For the forms of natural bodies are neither perfect substances but parts of perfect substances, nor are they the subject of metaphysical but of physical consideration, and they are moved accidentally (*per accidens*) by the motion of the composites. Some think that the soul or assisting intelligence is said by the Philosopher to be within the heaven, and to have a certain formal character (*rationem*) of an internal principle — not because it assists from without, as if it were outside the heaven, but because it is truly in it, not indeed in the manner in which a form is in matter, but in the manner in which that which moves and that which is moved must necessarily be together. This point holds most truly in the case of an incorporeal mover. Hence it is most truly said of Angels that they are where they operate; and accordingly they do not so much assist (*assistunt*) the heavens which they move as they inhere in them (*inexsistunt*), so that in this way they are in some manner internal principles. For in this same manner some think, not rashly, that, in Aristotle's view, the intellective soul inheres in man. For in Book II of the *De Anima*, chapter 1,[167] he says that it is not yet clear whether the soul is the act of the body in the way that the helmsman is the act of the ship — that is, as an assisting and directing, indeed inhering, principle, but one that does not inform.

§ 75. To this also pertains the fact that the same Philosopher elsewhere makes the intellect something coming from without, as being divine, eternal, and immortal. For this, on his account, does not seem to be able to be said of an informing principle. For an informing principle seems to him to be inseparable and mortal, because it is the act of some body.[168] To this is added that the Philosopher located the intellect or intellective soul not in the whole but in a certain part, namely in the heart, just as Plato located it in the brain; which cannot be said of an informing act. And in the manner we have described, St. Thomas has explained the doctrine of the Philosopher concerning the soul of the heaven in a sufficiently probable way in the *Summa*.[99] For in the reply to the first objection he says: "One must say that the heaven is said to move itself inasmuch as it is composed of mover and moved, not as of form and matter, but according to contact of power (*contactum virtutis*); and this also" — [continuing:] "as an intrinsic principle, so that in this way also the motion of the heaven can be called natural on the part of the active principle, just as voluntary motion is said to be natural to an animated being insofar as it is an animal, as is said in Book VIII of the *Physics*."[169] Thus he. Regarding these words, Cajetan,[170] raises a difficulty as to how that to which a mover is united only as mover can be said to be moved from within, and gives no answer. But the answer seems to be, as has already been said, and the words of the Doctor are to be noted: "inasmuch as it is composed of mover and moved." For to this composite the mover is internal, and accordingly it moves as an internal principle.

§ X — A note on the work of the fifth day (De Opere quintae diei adnotatio)

§ 76. Concerning the work of the fifth day, on which the creation of aquatic creatures and winged creatures is related: it must be noted first, regarding the words "Let the waters bring forth the creeping thing having a living soul" (*Producant aquae reptile animae viventis*), that by the name of "creeping things" (*reptilia*) in the Hebrew idiom every species of fish is comprehended — as the subsequent words of Scripture make sufficiently clear. For among the Hebrews those animals are called creeping things (*reptilia*) that either lack feet altogether, or whose feet are so short that they afford use not for walking but only for crawling. Now most aquatic creatures lack feet; and if any have feet, they use them not for walking but only for crawling and swimming.

§ 77. It must be noted next that among the class of fish, the sea-monsters (*cete*) are mentioned by Moses with particular distinction in these words: "And God created great sea-monsters (*cete grandia*)," because those creatures, on account of the immense bulk of their bodies — whereby they are equalled even to certain mountains and islands (as St. Basil writes[172] and Theodoret[173] and likewise Pliny[174]) — excite the greatest wonder. Indeed, Moses's purpose was, in this account of the creation of the world in Genesis, to name specifically only those things which are most eminent and most memorable among the works of God.

§ 78. It must be noted thirdly that by "sea-monsters" (*cete*) in this place is to be understood not one single species of fish, but all fish of the greatest magnitude, of whatever species they may be. For the Hebrew word signifies dragons (*dracones*); but in such a way that by the same name fish of immense size

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1. This opinion — that the "waters above the firmament" are the clouds of the middle region of the air — is the view Estius now sets out to defend with twelve positive arguments from Scripture, followed by resolution of ten objections.
2. The Hebrew word for "firmament" (*rāqîaʿ*) signifies expansion; the Septuagint renders it *στερέωμα* (firmamentum / stabilimentum).
3. Gen. 1:9.
4. Gen. 7:11.
5. Job 26:8: "who bindeth up the waters in his clouds, so that they break not out downward together."
6. Ps. 103 (104):2–3: "stretching out the heaven like a tent; who coverest its upper parts with waters... who makest the clouds thy chariot."
7. Ps. 103 (104):13: "watering the mountains from his upper chambers (*de superioribus suis*)." St. Jerome interprets the Hebrew term as *cenacula* ("upper rooms") in both this verse and the earlier one.
8. Ps. 146 (147):8: "who covereth the heaven with clouds and prepareth rain for the earth."
9. Jer. 10:13; Jer. 51:16: "At his voice he giveth a multitude of waters in the heaven; he lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth. ... When God uttereth his voice, the waters are multiplied in the heaven; he lifteth up the mist from the ends of the earth."
10. Ps. 148:4: "the waters that are above the heavens."
11. Deut. 28:12: "The Lord will open for thee his good treasure, the heaven, to give the rain of thy land."
12. Ps. 35 (36):6: "O Lord, thy mercy is in the heaven, and thy truth unto the clouds." The same sentiment appears in Ps. 56 (57):11 and Ps. 107 (108):5; and Jer. 15 [Jer. 51:9]: "her judgment reacheth up unto the heavens, and is lifted up even to the clouds."
13. Is. 14:13–14: "I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God... I will ascend above the height of the clouds."
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 66, a. 1, ad 1.

15. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 2 (commentary on this Distinction, super hanc Distinctionem 2).

16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 68, a. 2, and following articles.

17. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad literam* II, ch. 10.

18. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim* I, ch. 22.

19. Gen. 1:14.

20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, a. 1.

21. Gen. 1:15: "that they may shine in the firmament of heaven and may give light upon the earth."

22. Gen. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the moving creature that hath life above the earth under (*sub*) the firmament of heaven." The Septuagint reads "according to" or "alongside" (*secundum / juxta*) the firmament; the Hebrew reads "above the face of the firmament of heaven"; the Chaldean Targum reads "above the face of the air of the firmament of heaven."

23. Ps. 148:1, 4. The rendering "heaven of heaven" (*caelum caeli*) appears in Ps. 113 (114) in the Interpreter's version.

24. Dan. 3:57–88 (the Canticle of the Three Children, *Benedicite*).

25. Euthymius Zigabenus, exposition of the Canticle of the Three Children.

26. Ps. 148:3–4.

27. Franciscus Fevardentius, *Appendix* to Alphonsus de Castro, *De haeresibus*, s.v. "Aqua."

28. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad literam* II, ch. 4.

29. St. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, ch. 32.

30. Epiphanius of Salamis, *Epistola ad Ioannem Hierosolymitanum*, translated into Latin by St. Jerome.

31. Pseudo-Bede (or Bede), *De Elementis Philosophiae*, Book II, beginning.

32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3.

33. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sententiarum*, on the present Distinction: "But this above all is to be attended to: that in an uncertain matter nothing ought to be asserted with certainty. For it is better to hold pious doubt than to define something rashly (*Melius est enim pie dubitare, quam aliquid temerarie definire*)."

34. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sententiarum*, on this same Distinction.

35. The following authors are cited by Estius as subscribing to the same opinion: the author of *De Alteratione Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, ch. 3; Augustinus Eugubinus (Augustino Steuco), *Cosmopeia*; Antonius Fonseca, *Notae marginales ad Cajetanum super Gen. 1*; Jacobus Faber, *Super 2 Petri 3*; Franciscus Vatablus, *In Gen. 1*; Benedictus Pereirus, *In Gen. et Dan. 3*; M. Bajus, *In hanc Distinctionem*; Domingo de Bannes, *In I parte*, q. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3; and, from the Hebrew tradition, Rabbis Moses (Maimonides) and Kimhi.

36. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sententiarum*, on the present Distinction.

37. Author of *Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae*, ch. 3.

38. Augustinus Eugubinus (Augustino Steuco), *Cosmopoeia*.

39. Antonius Fonseca, *Notae marginales ad Cajetanum super Genesim*, ch. 1.

40. Jacobus Faber, *Super 2 Petri*, ch. 3.

41. Franciscus Vatablus, *In Genesim*, ch. 1.

42. Benedictus Pereirus, *In Genesim et Danielem*, ch. 3.

43. M. Bajus, commentary on this same Distinction.

44. Domingo de Bannes, *In I partem* [i.e., commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I], q. 68, aa. 1, 2, 3.

45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74, a. 1, ad 3.

46. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 3.

47. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron*, bk. 2, ch. 5.

48. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 4.

49. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 2, ch. 1.

50. St. Jerome, *Contra Jovinianum*, bk. 1, ch. 9.

51. St. Jerome, *Apologia adversus libros Rufini* (= Apologia ad Pammachium), ch. 8.

52. Cf. Song 4:2; Mk. 6:7; Lk. 10:1.

53. 4 Esdras (= 2 Esdras), ch. 6.

54. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 69.

55. Paulus Burgensis (Paul of Burgos), *Additiones super expositionem Geneseos*, ch. 1 [abbreviation as in source: *in additione sua ad Lirani expositionem super Genes. 1.*].

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70.

57. The reference is to the discussion of the waters above the heavens earlier in this same distinction.

58. The reference is to the earlier treatment of the first day's light in this distinction.

59. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 7.

60. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, ch. 11.

61. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, ch. 9.

62. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 6.

63. Ps. 135 (Vulgate numbering).

64. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* II, ch. 6.

65. Hugh (of St. Victor), *Adnotationes in Genesim*, annot. 6.

66. Titelmans, *Physicae* VII, ch. 23.

67. Jas. 1 (the Father of lights).

68. 1 Cor. 15.

69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 95, a. 5; and I, q. 70, a. 1.

70. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 6.

71. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* IV, ch. 7.

72. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 1.

73. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 14; and *De Genesi ad litteram* II, ch. 14.

74. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 14; and ch. 17.

75. St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, ch. 21, and several following chapters.

76. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* V, ch. 1, and several following chapters.

77. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* VII, ch. 6.

78. St. Augustine, *Epistola ad Januarium*, chs. 7–8.

79. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 80 (the Priscillianists).

80. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 61, at the end.

81. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* IV, ch. 6.

82. St. John Chrysostom, *Super Genesim* 1.

83. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 10.

84. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* VI, ch. 9.

85. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XIV, ch. 4.

86. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 7.

87. John Gerson, special treatise on astrological divination [abbreviation as in source].

88. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem*, in thirteen books.

89. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* XIV, ch. 1.

90. Gratian, *Decretum*, Part II, through the first five questions [abbreviation as in source].

91. Council of Braga I, chs. 9 and 10.

92. First Council of Toledo, Professio fidei contra Priscillianistas.

93. Sixtus V, Bull against judicial astrology [abbreviation as in source].

94. Epiphanius, *De Mensuris et Ponderibus*.

95. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 80.

96. St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* I.

97. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Homily 3.

98. Pope Leo I, *Epistola* 93, against the Priscillianists, ch. 13.

99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, a. 3.

100. Gen. 1; Deut. 4.

101. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Homily 18.

102. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad populum Antiochenum*, Homilies 15 and 35.

103. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Avitum*.

104. St. Jerome, *Expositio in Isaiam*, ch. 43.

105. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.

106. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 24.

107. Peter Chrysologus, Sermon 120.

108. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 6.

109. Deut. 4.

110. Rupert of Deutz, *De Glorificatione Trinitatis*, bk. 9, ch. 4.

111. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 14.

112. John Gerson, *Trilogus Astrologiae*, proposition 13.

113. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, final chapter.

114. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 59.

115. St. Augustine, *Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas*, ch. 11.

116. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 7.

117. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, chs. 5 and 11.

118. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 16.

119. Ps.-Augustine, *De Cognitione Verae Vitae*, ch. 7 [Estius notes this work is not genuinely by St. Augustine].

120. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 14, q. 1.

121. St. Augustine, *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 4.

122. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II, chs. 69–70; *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, a. 8; *Opusculum de Angelis*, ch. 2.

123. St. Thomas, *Quodlibetum* 12, a. 9.

124. Capreolus and Argentína, *In II Sent.*, dist. 14 [abbreviation as in source].

125. Cajetan, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70.

126. Cajetan, *Expositio Psalmi 135*, on the verse *Qui fecit caelos in intellectu*.

127. The footnote appended by Estius at (a) reads as follows: That St. Augustine persevered in this doubt right to the end of his life — as to whether celestial bodies are animated (which this Author appears to assert) — is by no means proved by the most celebrated writers of our age. Dionysius Petavius, in *Theologia Dogmatica*, tom. 3, bk. 1, *De Opificio Sex Dierum*, ch. 12, n. 10, asserts, without hesitation, that it is evident that St. Augustine maintains that the celestial bodies are devoid of soul and sense — of which matter Cardinal Henry de Noris, in *Vindiciae Augustinianae*, ch. 4, §. 2, says that St. Augustine more than once taught that the heavens are better constituted without a soul of their own. Natalis Alexander, in *Historia Ecclesiastica Saeculi* 5, ch. 4, a. 3, §. 10 (sub "Tertium Naevum"), refuting Dallaeus, who had reproached St. Augustine for doubting whether the stars are endowed with reason and intellect, argues that St. Augustine inclines rather to the opinion which denies the stars a soul; and what is more remarkable, to prove his assertion he adduces the very passage which our Author cites for maintaining the perpetual doubt of St. Augustine — namely from *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 16 — in whose commentary Ludovicus Vives says that St. Augustine never dared to resolve this question; but Ludovicus Vives is commended for his learning, not for his theology. A clearer passage for the assertion of the aforesaid Authors is from *De Civitate Dei* bk. 10 [abbreviation as in source].

128. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, art. 3.

129. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* X [chapter as in source; abbreviation partially illegible in the source].

130. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, art. 3 [and the passages cited throughout this section].

131. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 13, ch. 16 [as cited by Estius in the preceding section; the reference to ch. 29 is as in the source].

132. St. Augustine, *Contra Priscillianistas* [chapter as in source].

133. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk. 2 [chapter as in source].

134. St. Augustine, *De Immortalitate Animae*, ch. 15 [as in source].

135. St. Augustine, *De Musica*, bk. 6, ch. 14.

136. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, bk. 6, ch. 4; also bk. 14 [as in source].

137. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, bk. 2, ch. 70.

138. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Anima*, art. 8; *Opusculum de Substantiis Separatis seu de Natura Angelorum*, ch. 2.

139. St. Thomas, *Quodlibetum* 12, q. 6 [as cited in source].

140. St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, q. 6 (or art. 6), on whether a spiritual substance is united to a celestial body.

141. Petrus Aureolus (Peter Auriol), O.F.M., *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 14, q. 2, art. 2.

142. Dionysius Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, tom. 3, bk. 1, *De Opificio Sex Dierum*, ch. 12, n. 23 [the source reads "num. 23"].

143. Liberatus of Carthage, Deacon, *Breviarium*, ch. 23.

144. Nicephorus Callistus, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, bk. 17, ch. 17.

145. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 61, *Contra Joannem Hierosolymitanum* [as in source].

146. Job 38: "When the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody."

147. Ps. 28; Ps. 103; Ps. 149.

148. Dan. 3 (the Hymn of the Three Youths, *Benedicite*).

149. Is. 24: "The Lord will visit upon the host of heaven on high"; cf. Is. 24 on moon confounded and sun ashamed.

150. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Isaiam*, ch. 24; and ch. 45 [as in source].

151. Hab. 2 [3]:11: "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation."

152. Ps. 104 [105]:16: "He called a famine upon the land."

153. Matt. 8:27: "The winds and the sea obey Him."

154. 3 Macc. (end): in the Greek, "All in heaven blessed the Lord" [as cited in source].

155. St. Thomas, *Quodlibetum* 12, q. 6 [as in source: "in quodlib."].

156. Lk. 2:14: "Glory to God in the highest."

157. St. Jerome, *Commentarius super Ecclesiasten* I, on the words "The spirit goeth forward in its circuit."

158. St. Augustine, *In Psalmum* 93 (Praefatio) [as cited in source].

159. St. Cyprian, *De Bono Patientiae* [as cited in source].

160. Philo of Alexandria, *De Opificio Mundi*; *De Somniis*; *De Gigantibus* [as cited in source].

161. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, bk. 2, ch. 2; bk. 2, ch. 3; bk. 2, ch. 12; *Metaphysica*, bk. 12, ch. 12 [as cited in source].

162. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, bk. 2, ch. 2 [Greek term *empsychon* as discussed in source].

163. Aristotle, *Physica*, bk. 8 [ch. 4, and bk. 2, ch. 1; bk. 1, *De Caelo*, ch. 2; bk. 2, ch. 2, as cited in source].

164. The Platonic origin of the doctrine of celestial souls was discussed above with citations from St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

165. Aristotle, *De Caelo*, bk. 2, ch. 2: the Greek term *ἔμψυχον* ("ensouled," "having a soul within").

166. Aristotle, *Physica*, bk. 8.

167. Aristotle, *De Anima*, bk. 2, ch. 1.

168. Aristotle, *De Anima*, bk. 1.

169. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, a. 3, ad 1; citing Aristotle, *Physica*, bk. 8.

170. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 70, a. 3 [as in source].

171. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 71.

172. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, hom. 7.

173. Theodoret, *In Genesim* [as cited in source].

174. Pliny, *Historia Naturalis*, bk. 9, ch. 30; and bk. 32, ch. 1.

DISTINCTIO XV — ON THE CREATION OF AQUATIC AND OTHER ANIMALS, AND THE WORKS OF THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH DAYS (*DE CREATIONE ANIMALIUM AQUATILIUM ALIORUMQUE, ET DE OPERIBUS DIEI SEXTAE AC SEPTIMAE*)

§ 1. This is indeed clear from other passages of Scripture. For it is said in Ps. 73: "Thou didst crush the heads of the dragons in the waters."[1] And in Ps. 148: "Dragons and all deeps."[2] And in Ezek. 32, he is likened "to the dragon that is in the sea."[3] And in ch. 29,[4] and in Is. 27.[5] But if you ask why it is that, just as among aquatic creatures, so also among plants and land animals, certain ones remarkable for the bulk of their bodies were not specifically named by Moses — the answer would seem to be that the reason is this: creatures possessing so vast and scarcely credible a mass of body are not found among other kinds as they are among aquatic creatures, as can be sufficiently understood from what we said a little earlier concerning the prodigious size of certain fish.

§ II — Whether fish and birds were made from the same element of water (Utrum pisces & aves ex eodem aquae elemento facti)

§ 2. It is further commonly asked in this place by what reason it came about that from the same element of water animals of diverse genus and nature — namely birds and fish — were produced, since it seems far more consonant with the very nature of things that, just as fish are from water, so birds should be made from air, each kind of animal from its own proper element in which it moves. To this question St. Augustine[7] and Rupert[8] and certain others reply that by the name "waters" there is here comprehended not only the element of water but also that thick and vaporous air which is nearest to earth or water. But according to this exposition, birds not only received their origin from the waters but also dwell, move, and fly within those same waters. This account is not consonant with Scripture, which both in this passage of Genesis and elsewhere frequently says that birds fly not in water but in the air and sky and above the earth. It is likewise contradicted by the Ambrosian hymn which the Church sings: "That race which sprang from the waters, Thou dost send back in part to the deep, in part Thou dost raise into the air," and the verses that follow.[9] Consonant with these are the passages in St. Ambrose himself.[10] And there now accrues the further point that the same St. Ambrose,[11] following St. Basil,[12] and likewise Epiphanius in the letter translated by St. Jerome against the allegorisings of Origen,[13] wish Scripture to be accepted in its simple sense, so that by "water" water is understood, and likewise for the rest. Certainly if we allow the word "water," when it is said "Let the waters bring forth," to be extended so as to comprehend the air in which birds move, it will no longer be certain from Scripture that the fish themselves were made from water properly and specifically so called — which is against the opinion of all the learned.

§ 3. Others accordingly say that, although what Scripture narrates may seem alien to natural philosophy, it must nonetheless be received and believed without hesitation; yet it is not to be doubted that there was a great reason why it was done thus, even if that reason is perhaps hidden from us. Certain ones, indeed, investigating a probable reason for this fact, think that birds were made from thinner water that somewhat approaches the nature of air yet is true water, such as that of springs and of rivers near to springs, but that fish were made from the thicker water, such as sea-water. And it is known to natural philosophers that there is a ready and easy mutual transmutation of the elements of air and water through the medium of vapour. Others, moreover, devise other reasons why it was fitting that birds also should be made from the waters.

§ 4. But against the response of all these, and equally against Scripture itself — which appears to attribute the origin of birds to the waters, and in the investigation of the reason and meaning of which they labour — there can be objected what is said in ch. 2, namely that from the ground (*humus*), that is from earth, were formed not only all the living creatures of the earth but also all the flying creatures of the sky. To this some reply that the flying creatures are said to have been made from moistened ground. This is perhaps what the translator had in mind when in that place he preferred to render not "earth" but "ground" (*humus*); for "ground" (*humus*) is thought to be named from "moisture" (*humiditas*). But that reply is empty, because Scripture speaks in the same way in that passage about birds and about the beasts of the earth. In the Hebrew, moreover, the word for "earth" or "ground" is *adama*, not *ares*; yet both properly signify "earth," from which man also is described as having been made. For what is read as "man made from the dust of the earth," or "dust from the earth," is in Hebrew *adama*.

§ 5. Others think this is said for the reason that both birds and quadrupeds receive their food from the earth. Others reply that the phrase "from the ground" is to be referred only to the former part of the sentence, not also to the latter — that is, it pertains only to the living creatures of the earth, not to the flying creatures of the sky. There is yet another reply not to be rejected: namely that in the name "earth" there is comprehended also water as nourishment, which together with earth constitutes one thing, and this not contrary to Scripture. For in this sense "earth" is taken where it is said: "In the beginning God created the earth."[14]

§ 6. But although these two last replies are more probable than the others, it must nonetheless be known — and this is the principal point for briefly and easily resolving the whole question — that the sentence "Let the waters bring forth the living soul and the flying creature above the earth," etc., reads more fully in Hebrew as follows: "Let the waters cause to creep, or bring forth creeping things, the living soul; the flying creature, let it fly over the earth according to the face of the firmament of the heavens." According to this reading, therefore, Moses does not signify by these words that birds were produced, but only reptiles, that is fish. As for what pertains to birds, he describes where they are to fly and move when he says: "And let the flying creature fly above, according to the firmament of the sky" — that is, in the air. As for the element from which they were made, since he had passed this by, he declares it in the next chapter with those words which, according to our reading (*lectio*), seemed contrary to the present passage.[15] This apparent contradiction can, however, easily be removed if in the words of our reading (*lectio*) the word *volatile* is taken in the nominative case, as it is in the Hebrew, and some verb is added to it — after this manner: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping thing of the living soul, and let the flying creature fly, or let it fly (*volitet*) above the earth."

§ 7. Now if anyone is moved by the question why birds were not rather made from air, just as fish from water and quadrupeds from earth — so that each kind should be in its element connaturally suited to it — the answer is ready: that earth is connaturally suited to birds in the same way as to quadrupeds and to man, since

all birds take their food from the earth, and can neither rest, nor nest, nor dwell at all except on land, just as men and the other terrestrial creatures. Nor does it obstruct the argument that birds move through the air, since men and quadrupeds cannot move or live at all except in the air. For the sole difference among birds and terrestrial creatures is this: that birds, by the aid of their wings, can raise themselves higher in the air and towards the sky, whereas the others do not move unless their feet press the ground — although even among birds there are some which in this respect hardly differ from terrestrial creatures, such as swans, geese, ducks, and hens.

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§ III — Why it was not said to the beasts of the earth: "Increase and multiply" (Quare bestiis terrae non fit dictum crescite & multiplicamini)

§ 8. The work of the sixth day is the creation of quadrupeds and of the other beasts of the earth — and among these therefore also of those which in proper Latin are called *reptilia*, of which kind is the entire genus of serpents — and lastly the creation of man. In this connection the question arises why, in the account of the creation of quadrupeds and of the other beasts of the earth, Scripture does not say that God said: "Increase and multiply"; since this was said on the fifth day in the creation of fish and birds, and there is no doubt that just as to these so also to the terrestrial animals a fecundity of propagating their kind was implanted from their very creation, by which they would increase and multiply.

§ 9. The Hebrews reply that for this reason it was omitted in the description of the creation of terrestrial creatures: that among them was the serpent, upon which God was shortly afterwards to pronounce a curse. But by the same reasoning it should not initially have been said to men either: "Increase and multiply," since they too, shortly afterwards on account of the transgression, were to be subject to a curse. And what is more, the whole of creation, as the Apostle witnesses in Rom. 8, was on account of man's sin subjected to vanity and to the bondage of corruption, and accordingly was made a partaker of the curse. Furthermore, since the serpent retained thereafter — and still retains — the fecundity bestowed upon it at creation, whereby it would multiply according to its kind, the blessing thus given at the beginning so as always to remain, ought not to have been passed over in silence on account of the curse that followed.

§ 10. More rightly therefore does St. Augustine reply[16] that what is expressed in the one is understood in the other. Perhaps moreover the reason why this is expressed in the case of fish and birds, and passed over in silence in the others, is that fish have a greater fecundity than other animals, and then birds. A proof of this is that fish and birds are oviparous animals, and fish lay small eggs and shed them in almost innumerable numbers in a single spawning. For indeed the element of water in which they move, by reason of its moist quality, serves fecundity in the highest degree. Although it is not read that "Increase and multiply" was said to the beasts of the earth, yet it is read that to man, created on the same day as they, it was said — either because by the wonderful providence of God it was to come about that the human race would be spread abroad through all lands and regions, whereas of the other living creatures some naturally flee certain lands in such a way that they either do not come to birth in those lands, or, brought there from elsewhere, immediately languish and die within a short time; or because to man there was given together with this blessing also another one, by which he received dominion over all brute animals. Hence, since this latter blessing was to be expressed, the former also had to be expressed with it.

§ IV — Whether noxious animals were created from the beginning; likewise concerning thorns and thistles (Animalia noxia utrum initio creata: item de herbis, spinis, tribulis)

§ 11. Concerning noxious animals — that is, those which are harmful to men by ferocity, or by venom, or in some other way, such as lions, bears, wolves, serpents, griffins, hawks — one must altogether hold that they were created not after man's transgression, as some have thought, but together with the other animals of the same kind on the fifth and sixth days.

§ 12. Proof: First, because in six days — as Scripture witnesses in Exod. 20 — "God made heaven and earth and sea and all things that are in them."[18] Then, because in Gen. 2 all the living creatures of the earth and all the flying creatures of the sky are read to have been brought to Adam before he had sinned, so that he might impose names upon them. Third, because in Gen. 1 among the things we read were made on the fifth day, sea-monsters (*cete*) are named, which yet by their voracity are as harmful as any terrestrial creatures to men. An example can be that immense fish which, as it is written in Tob. 6, came out of the river Tigris to devour young Tobias.[19] Fourth, because that the serpent, which is a venomous animal and enemy of man, existed before man had sinned, is established from the history of Gen. 3.

§ 13. It must further be known that these same animals were not at the outset noxious or hostile to man, but became so only from the time when man, through disobedience, withdrew from God. For by the desert of sin it came about that man, to a great extent, lost the dominion over beasts which he had received. Hence, just as it now happens that even tame and domestic animals sometimes become fierce towards men, so at that time, as soon as man sinned against God, certain ones of the whole genus of animals put on a perpetual ferocity and enmity against man. That before the sin no animal was harmful to man is shown, first, from the fact that when the animals were brought to Adam, he fled from none of them as noxious or hostile, but with great security imposed upon each one severally its own proper name. Nor could that security be attributed to ignorance, as in children, since he himself perfectly knew the natures of each, as that apt imposition of names sufficiently argues. It is shown likewise from the fact that Eve did not shrink in terror at the sight of the serpent, but conversed with it even without horror. Third, from the fact that enmities between the serpent and man were constituted by divine command only after man's sin — which is similarly to be understood of the other noxious animals, though in unequal degree and in dissimilar manner. For then indeed there began to be accomplished in part that which the Wise Man says in ch. 5 will at some time come to pass, when he says: "The whole world shall fight against the unwise."[20] These words also signify that creatures, otherwise harmless, stirred as it were by a certain zeal for their Creator, rise up against sinners as enemies of God and their Lord.

§ 14. This doctrine concerning noxious animals is taught by St. Augustine,[21] where he also recalls the words of St. John Chrysostom in favour of this opinion. The same author likewise, in a further passage,[22] teaches similar things concerning noxious plants. For the reasoning is entirely the same. And in this sense it appears to have been written by Hilary[23] that venoms and similar noxious things have their beginning from the wickedness of men. All the Scholastic Doctors likewise concur.

§ 15. Now what has been said of noxious animals is also to be said of unclean animals, such as the pig, the he-goat, the dog, etc. For nothing would have been unclean to man in such a way as to offend him in any fashion, had he not sinned.

§ 16. Since these things are so, it is improbable what St. Basil says in Homily 5 of the *Hexaemeron*,[24] that roses were made at the beginning without thorns, and that thorns grew on them only after man sinned; and what Alcuin says — as reported by St. Thomas[25] — that thorns and thistles would not at all have come forth from the earth had man not sinned. For not even St. Ambrose followed St. Basil in that opinion, although he imitates most of his views. St. Thomas sets St. Augustine above Alcuin, writing thus: "The earth would have germinated thorns and thistles even if man had not sinned, for the food of animals, but not for the punishment of man; because on account of their growth no labour or punishment would have befallen man working in the earth, as St. Augustine says (*Super Gen. ad literam*), although Alcuin says that before the sin the earth would not at all have germinated thorns and thistles. But the former is better."[26] So he. It is confirmed moreover from the very words of Scripture. For it was not said simply to Adam after the sin: "The earth shall germinate thorns and thistles," but there was added "to thee (*tibi*)," that is, as a punishment for thee. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, the earth would have germinated thorns and thistles — but not as a punishment for man, rather for the use of animals and also of man himself, who would have known how to make opportune use of all creatures subject to him, even those which are now noxious, much more certainly and thoroughly than he now uses them, whether for medicine or in other ways.

§ 17. There is indeed also in St. Augustine[27] the opinion that thorns and poisonous plants were created as a punishment on account of sin. But understand this thus: on account of sin they were made penal for man; and especially those which had previously been harmless — in the same way that it is said in Sir. 39 that fire, hail, the teeth of beasts, and scorpions and serpents were created for vengeance.[28] Likewise all those things by which God avenges the sins of men were created for vengeance as the end to which God willed to use them from eternity. If, however, man had not sinned, God would not have made those things for this use, that is, for vengeance, but for others, as is clear in the case of fire. Or else you should know that this position was retracted by its author in his later writings, which we cited above.

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§ V — Whether beasts were noxious to other beasts from the beginning (Utrum bestiae bestiis ab initio noxiae fuerint)

§ 18. It is further asked whether, even if man had not sinned, beasts would have been noxious to one another, whether by natural enmity, or from the necessity of seeking food; and neither is this sufficiently clear, nor was it sufficiently explored by St. Augustine. For in lib. 3 (*De Genesi ad literam cap.* 16)[30] he holds that, even if man had not sinned, beasts would mutually have been noxious and hostile in the future, as wolves to sheep, hawks to doves, and so that some others would yield to still others as food. And something similar is found in lib. 1 (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos cap.* 20).[31] This opinion of St. Augustine is also pleasing to St. Thomas in 1 (*quaest.* 96, *art.* 1, *ad* 2),[32] and seems consonant with the same reasoning. For just as the mortality of beasts has its origin not from man's sin but from the primary institution of nature, so too this enmity by which some bring death to others is to be referred to the same nature. For, as St. Thomas says there, "by man's sin the nature of animals was not changed, so that those whose nature it now is to eat the flesh of other animals

would then have lived on plants, as lions and falcons; therefore," he says, "*naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia* would have existed." Cajetan agrees with St. Thomas (*Super Genesim*).[33]

§ 19. But this can also be proved hence, that even if all plants had been harmless to men, they were not however all harmless to beasts, but some of them would have been mortal to beasts, just as they now are; nothing therefore prevents beasts from having also inflicted noxiousness on other beasts. For beasts and plants began to be noxious to men — even men began to assail other men — as was immediately shown by the example of Cain, who killed his brother Abel.

§ 20. But truly St. Augustine in lib. 1 of the *Retractationes* (*cap.* 10),[34] retracting what he had said in the work *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, affirms that it pertained to the primary institution of nature that herbs and the fruits of trees that grow from the earth should be the food of all animals, so that all beasts would feed on plants, just as it is said to man in Gen. 1: "Behold I have given you every herb and all the trees, that they may be food for you and for all the living creatures of the earth, and for every bird of the sky, and for all those which move upon the earth, that they may have food for their feeding."[35] He says moreover that this came to pass after man's disobedience, that the others would be in their food. The same opinion he had already indicated beforehand (*in quaest.* 7, *super Genesim*).[36]

§ 21. St. Bede subscribes to St. Augustine (*in Genesim*),[37] saying that living creatures were fed on herbs and the fruits of trees, and that this is established by the authority of Scripture Gen. 1, which openly asserts this very thing. From which passage the words of Bede are taken up in the ordinary Gloss, signifying this; so that St. Thomas, in the place cited a little before, says that the Gloss of Bede speaks not of all animals but only of some.

§ 22. There accrues moreover an argument not to be despised: from the fact that in the ark of Noah all the animals were kept for an entire year, at which time however none of them fed on the flesh of the others — in the manner of those which are described in cap. 6 of Genesis as brought into the ark together with food, their number being such that not more than two of the unclean and not more than seven of the clean were brought into the ark. And indeed these were kept there not for the use of food but for the purpose of sacrifice.

§ 23. But others reply to this that it happened by divine miracle beyond nature, just as that also, that all the savage and hostile animals, with Noah going before and directing the way, entered into the ark. But against this reply it can in turn be objected that this obedience pertained to the primary institution of nature, from which man had a dominion over other animals complete and perfect; and that it also pertained to that same institution that animals should feed on plants — and both ceased after sin. Yet it seems sufficiently evident that they are not one and the same reason. For it does not pertain to the punishment of man that beasts bear enmity among themselves and mutually harm one another; but it does pertain to what is owed to man that they should not harm him, and that the rights of natural dominion which man had received over them should be in force. Indeed, far more is that dominion in God's authority over all, in which authority it is wondrous that fierce and hostile animals, with Noah going before, entered the ark — as it was also declared elsewhere among other things, that at times wolves yielded to sheep, lions to cattle, hawks to doves, contrary to their natural inclination, at the command of certain holy men.

§ 24. As for the objection from Gen. 1 ch., which causes those who hold this opinion to give their answer, so that they say the universal address is to be accommodated to the understanding of all animals which naturally arise from the earth — since both what precedes: "Behold I have given you every herb and all the

trees," etc., demands a similar interpretation — not every herb, nor is every tree useful for food; but it is to be expounded accommodately thus: I have given you for food every herb and every tree suited to nourishment. It is clear therefore that this response is a sufficiently ready one, and that the reasoning of Rupert mentioned above is not so much to be pressed, although others oppose it not rashly; but rather on account of the reason more broadly adduced, namely that in those genera of things which were made at the beginning the seminal principles (*rationes seminales*) were present.

§ VI — Animals which are not born from their own genus: when were they made? (Animalia quae non ex suo nascuntur genere quando facta)

§ 25. There is moreover this question: animals which are generated from putrefying matter — whether of earth, or water, or air, or plants, or fruit, or dead animals, or from sweat, or from any other evaporation, or from the corruption of any bodies whatsoever, and in general those which come to birth otherwise than from their own genus — whether they were made in the beginning of the world together with the other aquatic, flying, or terrestrial animals, namely on the fifth and sixth days. For so it can seem from the general Scripture which hands on that all things which are in the sky, the earth, and the sea were created in the first six days, Exod. 20.[39] Then by this argument, because God made the world perfect from the beginning, it rightly deserved to be called "the whole universe" (*universum*); but it would not be such if not all species of animals had been produced at the beginning.

§ 26. There accrues the authority of St. Basil, who in Homily 7 of the *Hexaemeron*,[40] rehearsing the work of the fifth day, even reckons those things under the command of God saying "Let the waters bring forth," etc., which spontaneously arise at that time, whose generation is wont to be from marshy and muddy places — such as frogs, toads, gnats, and things of this kind.

§ 27. In the contrary direction is the opinion of St. Augustine in lib. 3 (*De Genesi ad literam cap.* 14),[41] where, having raised this question, he replies that it seems absurd that things generated from dead animals should be in the first creation of animals, when at that point no dead animal yet existed — nor a corrupt one. As for those which are generated from the vice and corruption of other things, he says they can without absurdity be called initially created. The same is the view of St. Thomas in 1 (*quaest.* 72, *ad* 5).[42]

§ 28. The fuller opinion of others on this point, however, is that there is one and the same reason for the corruption of plants and animals, and that therefore it is no more verisimilar that those things generated from animal corruption were initially made than that those generated from the corruption of plants or from the putrefaction of other things were initially made. For it is not to be believed that such corruption, or the spontaneous putrefaction of some things, existed immediately from the beginning, as soon as they were created. Add to this that perfect animals, which were to be generated from the propagation of animals of the same species, would never have afterwards been born — as horses, cattle, sheep, lions, etc. — whereas those which are born from putrid matter would not have needed to be created at the outset, since they can always come to birth from matter so disposed, even if the whole species had utterly ceased to exist.

§ 29. Of all such things, therefore, it can be said — as St. Augustine says — that they were not initially created in act (*actu*), but only causally and potentially, that is by virtue and in the seminal principles (*rationes*

seminales), because the genera of things from whose corruption these animals will afterwards arise were initially made. And in this sense it is true that in the first six days all things were made, and the world was made perfect, and deservedly ought to be called "the whole universe," since already thus the institutions of things were fixed by God, so that the rest of the species which were not yet in act were nevertheless potentially and in their own proper time from those seminal principles about to arise. For otherwise not even now would the world be perfect, indeed it could never truly be perfect. For new and new species can always be elicited from the contemplation of things previously existing, as is most well known to natural philosophers and physicians.

§ 30. The same moreover appears to be held concerning those animals that are generated from the intermixture of animals of diverse species, such as the mule, the hinny or burdo, the leopard, the *canis arabicus* which the Greeks call the *leontoniger*, and if there are any similar things. So holds Rupert, lib. 1 (*Super Genesim cap.* 57).[43] It seems, I say, that one should hold this — not so much on account of the reasons which Rupert adduces in that place, which others by no means rashly oppose — but on account of the reason more broadly adduced above, namely that in those genera of things which were made at the beginning the seminal principles of things were present.

§ VII — How God is said to have rested on the seventh day, and to have completed His work (Quomodo Deus die septimo requievisse, & opus suum complevisse dicatur)

§ 31. Concerning the seventh day Scripture speaks thus in Gen. 2: "And God completed on the seventh day His work which He had done, and He rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done, and He blessed the seventh day," etc.[45] God is said to have rested from all His work not because He operated strenuously and, as it were, returned weary — in the manner in which men are said to rest from their labours — but because on that day He ceased to create a new creature; as St. Augustine rightly explains this in lib. 4 (*De Genesi ad literam cap.* 12),[46] and St. John Chrysostom in Homilia 10 (*in Genesim*).[47] Chrysostom however indicates the same form of speech is taken from men who rest from a great work having been completely finished. But just as it is necessary to remove all weariness from God, so also all true change, by which He is understood to operate alternately, calling upon one thing and then another entirely, and to have things go differently — as is learnedly noted by St. Augustine in lib. 12 (*De Civitate Dei cap.* 17).[48]

§ 32. There is moreover greater difficulty in how one should understand what Scripture premits: that God completed His work on the seventh day. For from this it seems to follow that He then did some work, and thus did not entirely rest from work on that day.

§ 33. And indeed there is no difficulty if we follow the version of the Seventy translators. For they have *sixth* instead of *seventh day*. Hence some of these, accommodating themselves to the Hebrew truth, render this sense: that God under the seventh day — and at the very moment already of the seventh day — that is, at the end of the sixth day, completed what He had done. And those who say that God completed His work on the sixth day inclusive, but on the seventh exclusively, wish to imagine that God spent all days from the beginning up to the end of each day in the work of each day — the works of creation being instantaneous, accomplished by the sole command of the divine will. Others expound it thus: "He completed His work," meaning that He added to things created from Him a new condition, since He began to preserve and govern

them, so that the things once created might be able permanently to remain and multiply. But this exposition also seems less correct, since it is not on the seventh day but immediately from the very moment of the creation of individual works that God began to preserve and govern things.

§ 34. Others expound it: "He completed His work," meaning that He exhibited it as a completed work to Himself. These two last expositions are to be seen in the Master (*in sextu*),[49] nor are there lacking arguments by which those views are refuted. The simplest exposition of all seems to us to be that of those who say that God completed His work on the seventh day in this sense: that on that day, as from a work absolutely finished, He added nothing new. This sense St. Thomas hands on in 1 (*quaest.* 73, *art.* 1, *ad* 2),[50] and Scripture itself sufficiently indicates this when, for the sake of declaring it, it adds: "And He rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done."

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§ VIII — Reply to certain objections (Responsio ad quasdam objectiones)

§ 35. Against what has been said — that God completed the whole of His work on the seventh day, so that from the seventh day and thereafter He ceased from operating — there are certain objections.

The first: Christ says in Jn.: "My Father worketh until now, and I work";[52] therefore God never ceased from work.

The second: On the seventh day woman was created, as appears from the history of cap. 2 of Gen.[53]

The third: Certain new species of things arose subsequently, and are still arising from time to time, both in animals and in other mixed bodies. Concerning which matter, see what innumerable things art or human industry admits of being produced, such as bread, beer, glass, tiles, various liquors.

The fourth: Every day God creates new souls from nothing.

The fifth: The work of the Incarnation of the Son of God was entirely new, according to that of Jer. 31: "The Lord shall create a new thing upon the earth."[54]

The sixth: The miracles which Christ and the Apostles and Prophets performed were new things, for which reason even miracles are called new things, as it were exciting wonder by their novelty.

The seventh: God will in the end of the world renew all things, as He Himself says in Rev. 21: "Behold I make all things new."[55] Toward the renewal of the world this pertains: the glorification of the Elect through the resurrection.

§ 36. That these and similar objections may be dissolved, one must see in what sense Scripture says that God completed or perfected the whole of His work. For it is not said simply by Moses that God ceased from all work, but with the qualification: from all work which He had made (*quod fecerat*). For this is again repeated at the beginning of the second chapter. The sense is that God completed the entire fabric of the world and the institution of all the natures of things in six days, so that nothing which pertained to the integrity and ornament of the world, that is to the constitution of the entire order of things, should afterwards be made as something quasi-new — but all things whatsoever that would afterwards arise are contained causally, or potentially, or virtually in the primordial world. From which declaration it is already easy to dissolve the objections. For the operation of which Christ speaks in the Gospel is not the institution of new

things but the conservation and governance of nature once instituted, which if it ceased, the whole of nature would collapse into nothing — as St. Augustine teaches, explaining the aforesaid Scripture in lib. 4 (*De Genesi ad literam cap.* 12).[46] Whatever new species of things afterwards arose, they are contained causally and according to certain seminal principles (*rationes seminales*) in those things which were initially made, as we said above sufficiently.

§ 37. Moreover, the daily creation of souls pertains to the original institution of things, because God willed and ordained it that just as He breathed a soul into the first man, so, not at all derived from the potency of matter, by this perpetual law in all persons born from that first man it should be created.

§ 38. Reply to the second objection: St. Thomas answers (*quaest.* 73, *art.* 1, *ad* 3)[56] that Eve pre-existed materially in the works of the six days, by reason of the rib of Adam from which she was formed. But this reply does not seem sufficient. For at this rate, materially all the works of the five preceding days are contained in the one work of the first day. And thus one would have to say that not on the seventh or the sixth day, but on the first or second, God completed the whole of His work. Rightly therefore others deny that Eve is to be said to have been formed on the seventh day. For in the work of the sixth day concerning the creation of man it is read: "Male and female He created them, and He blessed them, and said: Increase and multiply," etc. And lastly it is said: "And there was made evening and morning, the sixth day."[57, 58] This is also proved from the fact that the creation of either sex belongs equally to the sixth day, and it was fitting that both man and woman should be made at the same time. Those things therefore which are written in Gen. 2 concerning the formation of woman are to be referred to a recapitulation of the history of the work of the sixth day — as Bede treated this in his *Hexaemeron*, concerning which we shall speak again in Dist. 18.[59]

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§ IX — How God sanctified the seventh day (Quomodo septimum diem Deus sanctificaverit)

§ 39. Scripture adds that God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it — which is expounded in more than one way by everyone.

§ 40. Among these St. Thomas in 1 (*quaestio 73, art.* 3)[60] distinguishes benediction from sanctification and understands both as follows: as that which the things created on the preceding days began to multiply. For benediction in the Scriptures often signifies fecundity and multiplication. And it is well known that the benediction which was said to men by God created from them is said — but God is not said to have given the blessing to them on this account, because the same words are repeated in Exod. 20 in the institution of the Sabbath; and since fecundity was bestowed upon things before the seventh day, and it would be much more rightly that others understand the benediction of the seventh day to consist in its very sanctification; and the benediction is generally a collation of some good. It is said moreover that God sanctified the seventh day not because He created some new quality in it, by which it would be more sacred and more dignified than the other days — in the manner in which an intellectual creature is sanctified from within by an internal quality through which it is joined to God; one is more holy than another — but because, since He had destined the remaining days for work, He peculiarly assigned this day to rest and quiet, or vacation from works, and willed that it be dedicated to His worship and commanded it. For *sanctificare* in the Scriptures is nearly the same as separating from impurity and profane use, and applying to the worship of God. For thus in the law the

firstborn were sanctified, the vessels of the temple, the sacred vestments, and the Priests and Levites themselves.

§ 41. But when was this sanctification of the seventh day accomplished? Certain ones, among them Catharinus (*Super Genesim*),[61] think it was accomplished on that very seventh day which was the seventh from the creation of the world. For the words of Scripture seem to sound this: that these four things, as it were simultaneously and on the same day — God resting from work, completing His work, blessing the seventh day, and sanctifying it — were done. Those who hold this say that God then already established a law for men about observing the Sabbath, of such a kind as Moses afterwards handed down.

§ 42. But others refute this opinion by these arguments. First: because if the law of observing the Sabbath was the closest to the works of creation, it was a law; not however after man's sin when he heard: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread,"[62] but before that, in the state of innocence. But in the state of innocence such a precept would have been superfluous, since man was not going to be occupied on any one day of the seven with external labour, but was going to be at leisure for the contemplation of divine things on all days. For not by external works (which are performed with bodily labour and toil) would a man in the state of innocence have needed such a law for the sake of more liberal meditation on divine things, but rather for the sake of external cult of God in the offering of sacrifices and in other corporeal actions, which a man — as is established — necessarily needed even then, since man consists of soul and body: so in whatever state he may be, a twofold service to God was owing, an internal service of the soul and an external service of the body.

§ 43. But perhaps this argument does not altogether convince. For it can be replied that in the state of innocence there was need of such a law, not so much on account of more liberal meditation on divine things, as on account of external cult of God, which is sustained by the oblation of sacrifices and other corporeal actions — which a man as is established necessarily needed even then.

§ 44. Second, and by this the stronger argument they refute it: because it is the common opinion of the Fathers that God gave no purely positive law to the first parents before they sinned, other than that they should not taste from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; nothing therefore was prescribed about the Sabbath.

§ 45. Third: if the Sabbath law pertained to the primary institution of nature, it was not to be abrogated by Christ.

§ 46. Fourth: if it had been given as a precept to the first parents, it would have restrained without doubt the whole human race, at least until it was revoked by God. But pertaining to it equally as to the posterity of the first man: yet we read neither among the Gentiles, nor among the holy Patriarchs, nor among all others before the Mosaic law, that the Sabbath was at all in observance.

§ 47. Finally: if this precept had been handed down from the beginning, and been observed at least by pious men, Moses in the law which he prescribed for the Israelites about the observation of the Sabbath would have moved their minds to observing the Sabbath by some mention of those ancient and saintly institutions; yet nowhere did he do so, but only brought forward as a cause for its institution, namely that after six days' work God rested on the seventh day.

§ 48. This opinion having therefore been refuted, it seems altogether the case with those who say that what Moses here commemorates about the blessing and sanctification of the seventh day is said as an

anticipation (*per anticipationem*), and that nothing else is signified than that God afterwards, when He gave the law to the Hebrews, sanctified the seventh day — namely by prescribing that on it they should cease from all profane work and be at leisure for divine worship. Which seems not improbable, and these writings are by Moses at that time when the law was already handed over to the Hebrew people by him for the first time; namely that in it the name "earth" (*terra*) also comprehended water, as something thick nourishment, which together with earth constitutes one single thing, and this not beyond the manner of Scripture. For thus "earth" is taken where it is said: "In the beginning God created the earth."

§ 49. It was therefore altogether fitting that the mention of the sanctification of the seventh day be made after coming to the description of that day in his narrative — most especially because it contained the cause of that sanctification, namely the rest and cessation of God from the works of creation.

§ 50. The words of the law of Exod. 20 manifestly favour this understanding, which run thus: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth," etc., "and He rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it" — as if He were saying: Because on the seventh day He rested from all His work, therefore He now willed by law to make that same seventh day sacred — that is, free from all profane work and from one's own labour, and dedicated to His worship. Which meaning neither the words of this place resist — indeed they readily admit it — because of what follows: "because *in ipso cessaverat ab omni opere suo ut faceret*." For this was the reason for the seventh day thereafter among the people of God being a day of sanctification. And this genuine sense appears to be handed down by Bede (*in Hexaemeron*)[63] and by the more ancient Tertullian and Cyprian and Justin in the *Dialogus* (*contra Tryphonem*)[64] and Eusebius lib. 1 (*Historiae Ecclesiasticae cap.* 4).[65] If however anyone were to contend that that thing means rather that God had already sanctified the seventh day from the beginning, it can be said in this sense that the reason was then present, why subsequently the seventh day would be more specially applied to divine worship. That reason, as we have said, is the rest and cessation of God from the works of creation — which reason Scripture expressed openly in both places now mentioned.

§ 51. What moreover this sanctification of the seventh day teaches us morally is indicated by the Apostle in Heb. 4.[66] St. John Chrysostom declares this more fully (*Super Genesim, in hujus loci tractatione*).[67] St. Augustine also (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos cap.* 13, *and De Catechizandis rudibus cap.* 17)[68] treats this mystical understanding of this passage learnedly. Bede does likewise (*in fine sui Hexaemeri*),[69] where he finally expounds beautifully in the mystical sense why no "evening and morning" is added here as in the preceding ones: "It was made evening and morning, the seventh day" — because namely the rest of the saints, which is present before the resurrection of bodies, is signified by the Sabbath, and is signified as one not troubled by any grief, tribulation, or sin — but the eighth day of resurrection and perfect felicity is described as its own day of resurrection.

§ V — Whether beasts were harmful to beasts from the beginning (Utrum bestiæ bestiis ab initio noxiæ fuerint)

§ 52. What is further asked — whether, had man not sinned, other beasts would have been harmful to one another, whether by natural enmity or by the necessity of seeking food — is neither equally clear, nor was it sufficiently explored by St. Augustine. For in his third book he is of the opinion that, even if man had not sinned, beasts would have been mutually harmful and hostile to one another: as wolves to sheep, hawks to

doves, so that some would fall as food to others.[30] And something similar he holds in another work.[31] This opinion also commended itself to St. Thomas,[32] and it appears consonant with reason. For just as the mortality of beasts takes its origin not from man's sin but from the original constitution of nature, so also that enmity by which some bring death to others is to be referred to that same nature. For, as St. Thomas there says, by the sin of man the nature of animals was not changed, so that those for whom it is now natural to eat the flesh of other animals would then have lived on herbs — such as lions and falcons; there would therefore have been, he says, a natural discord among certain animals. Cajetan agrees with St. Thomas.[33] Moreover, this can also be proved from the fact that, although all plants might have been harmless to human beings, they would not have been harmless to all beasts, but certain ones would have been deadly to them, just as they now are; nothing therefore prevents beasts from having been likewise harmful to beasts. For from the moment that beasts and plants began to be harmful to human beings, human beings also began to rise up against human beings, as was immediately made plain by the example of Cain, who killed his brother Abel.

§ 53. But the same St. Augustine, in his *Retractations*, retracting what he had said in the work *On Genesis against the Manichees* in favour of the former opinion, affirms that it pertained to the original constitution of nature that all living things should feed on herbs and fruits — in accordance with what is said in Gen. 1 to man: "Behold, I have given you every herb and all the trees to be food for you and for every living creature of the earth, and for every bird of heaven, and for all that move upon the earth, to have for food."[70] He asserts, moreover, that it came about after man's disobedience that some fed upon others. He had already indicated this same opinion beforehand in another work.[71] Bede subscribes to St. Augustine in his *Hexaemeron*, stating that all animals without exception fed on green herbs and on the fruits of trees, and he establishes this from the authority of Scripture, Gen. 1, which openly affirms this very thing.[63] From this passage of Bede the words signifying this same meaning were transferred into the Glossa ordinaria; so that it is surprising whence St. Thomas, in the place cited a little above, says that Bede's gloss does not speak of all animals but only of certain ones.[72]

§ 54. There is added a not inconsiderable argument from the fact that in Noah's ark all the animals were together for a whole year, during which time nonetheless none of them fed on flesh, as is clear from what is written in Gen. 6 — both regarding the provisions of the animals brought into the ark, and regarding their number, since no more than two of the unclean and no more than seven of the clean were brought into the ark.[73] And these latter were in such greater numbers than the former not for the purpose of food but of sacrifice. But to this others reply that this was brought about by divine miracle, beyond the course of nature, just as that also was miraculous — that all the animals, even the fierce and those hostile to man, entered the ark so obediently at Noah's leading or direction.

§ 55. But against this reply it can in turn be objected: just as this obedience pertained to the original constitution of nature, from which perfect dominion over the other animals was due to man, so also it pertained to that same constitution that animals should feed on herbs; and both of these ceased after sin. Nevertheless it is sufficiently apparent that the formal character (*ratio*) of the two cases is not the same. For it does not pertain to the punishment of man that beasts should carry on enmities among themselves and mutually harm one another; but it does pertain thereto that they should harm man and violate the rights of that natural dominion which man had received over them. Indeed, that dominion and empire over them was so great that at man's command wolves would have spared sheep, lions herds, hawks doves, against their natural inclination — as we read was sometimes done at the command of certain holy men. As for the

objection taken from Gen. 1 by those to whom this opinion is pleasing, it is resolved as follows: they say that the universal expression is to be understood in an accommodated sense, namely as applying to all living creatures for which it is natural to feed on what grows from the earth. For even the preceding clause — "Behold, I have given you every herb and all the trees to be food for you," etc. — demands a similar interpretation. For not every herb nor every tree is useful as food; but it must be expounded in an accommodated sense thus: "I have given you for food every herb and every tree suitable for sustenance."

§ VI — Animals that are not born from their own kind: when were they made? (Animalia quæ non ex suo nascuntur genere quando facta)

§ 56. There is asked further: animals which are generated from putrefying matter — whether of earth, water, air, plants, fruits, dead animals, sweat, or any other kind of evaporation, or from the corruption of whatever bodies — and altogether those which are born in a manner other than from their own kind: whether they were made at the beginning of the world, simultaneously with the other aquatic, winged, or terrestrial creatures — namely on the fifth or sixth day. This indeed may seem to follow from the general statement of Scripture, which records that all things whatsoever are in the heaven, earth, and sea were established in the first six days (Exod. 20).[39] Then there is this argument: because God made the world perfect at the beginning, such that it deserved to be called a universe; but it would not have been such if all species of animals had not been produced from the beginning. There is added the authority of St. Basil, who, in expounding the work of the fifth day, also enumerates among those things that sprang up at once at God's command "Let the waters bring forth," etc., those whose generation is wont to occur in marshy and muddy places — such as frogs, mosquitoes, gnats, and others of that kind.'[40]

§ 57. The opinion of St. Augustine is contrary, in his third book, where he considers it absurd that things generated from dead animals should have been made in the first creation of animals, when as yet no animal had been born or had perished; but he says that those generated from the corruption and decay of other things can without absurdity be said to have been made at the beginning.[41] St. Thomas holds precisely the same view.'[42] But the fuller opinion of others on this point is that the formal character of the corruption of plants and of animals is one and the same; and therefore, just as it is not probable that those born from the corruption of animals were made at the beginning, so neither are those whose generation arises from the corruption of plants or from the putrefaction of other things. For it is not to be believed that any such spontaneous corruption or putrefaction of certain things occurred immediately at the beginning, after they had been created. Add that more perfect animals, which were to be propagated by generation within the same species — such as horses, cattle, sheep, lions, etc. — could never afterwards have come to be, had they not been created by God at the beginning; whereas those born from putrid matter had no need to be created at the beginning, for they can always be born from matter disposed in that way, even if the entire species had completely died out.

§ 58. Of all things of this kind, therefore, one may say what St. Augustine says of those born from the corruption of animals — namely, that they were not created at the beginning except causally and potentially, that is, by power and in the seminal principle (*rationem seminalem*), because to wit those kinds of things were made at the beginning from whose corruption, putrefaction, or whatever other transformation these animals

were afterwards naturally to arise. And in this sense it is true that all things were made in the first six days, that the world was made perfect, and that it deserved to be called a universe — because things were so then ordered by God that the remaining species of things which were not yet in act were nevertheless in those things in potency (*potentia*), and at their proper time were naturally to arise from them according to seminal principles (*rationes seminales*). For otherwise the world would not yet even now be perfect — indeed it could never be perfect. For ever yet other and different species can always be elicited from various combinations of pre-existing things, as is most familiar to natural philosophers and physicians.

§ 59. The same is moreover to be thought about those animals that are generated from the mixing of diverse species, such as the mule, the hinny or burdo, the leopard, the Arabian dog which the Greeks call *leontopiges*, and any similar creatures. So thinks Rupert.[43] It seems, I say, that this must be thought — not so much on account of the reasons which Rupert adduces in that place, which others, not rashly, contest — but on account of the reason advanced above, namely that according to the seminal principles (*rationes seminales*) they were in those kinds of things which were made at the beginning.

§ VII — How God is said to have rested on the seventh day and to have completed His work (Quomodo Deus die septimo requievisse, & opus suum complevisse dicatur)

§ 60. Concerning the seventh day, Scripture speaks thus in Gen. 2: "And God completed on the seventh day His work which He had made, and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had wrought, and He blessed the seventh day," etc. God is said to have rested from all His work on the seventh day — not as though He had sat down, wearied by working, in the manner in which men are said to rest from their labours — but in this sense only: that He ceased to make any new creature. This is rightly expounded by St. Augustine[75] and by St. John Chrysostom.[47] Yet the same St. John Chrysostom indicates that the form of expression is derived from human beings who, having completed a great task, rest in exhaustion. But just as weariness must of necessity be removed from God, so also must every true change be removed — that change, namely, by which He is understood to be differently disposed when working and when ceasing from work, or to be altogether otherwise and otherwise constituted — as has been learnedly noted by St. Augustine.[48]

§ 61. Greater difficulty attaches to the question of how that which Scripture premits is to be understood, namely that God completed on the seventh day His work which He had made. For it seems to follow therefrom that He also performed some work at that time, and thus did not wholly rest from work on that day. And indeed there is no difficulty if we follow the version of the seventy interpreters. For they have *sixth* in place of *seventh day*. Hence certain persons, accommodating the Hebrew truth to this version, render the sense as follows: that God, on the eve of the seventh day and at the very onset of the seventh day — that is, at the end of the sixth day — completed and finished His work, so that on the seventh day He ceased from all work. Those who say that God completed His work on the sixth day inclusively and on the seventh day exclusively intend the same thing. But these persons seem to imagine that God spent entire days from beginning to end on the work of each respective day — which is in no way to be supposed, since the works of creation were instantaneous, being accomplished by the sole command of the divine will.

§ 62. Others expound it thus: "He completed His work" — that is, He added a new condition to the things He had founded, because He began, namely, to conserve and govern them, so that, once created, they

might be able to endure and multiply. But this exposition also seems less correct, because God began to conserve and govern each individual thing not on the seventh day but immediately from the very moment of the creation of the several works. Still others understand the completion in the sanctification of the seventh day — as does St. Jerome in his *Hebrew Traditions*.[76] Others again expound it in this manner: "He completed" — that is, God saw His work as completed, or presented it as completed. These two last-mentioned expositions may be found in the Master (*in textu*);[77] nor are arguments lacking by which they are refuted.

§ 63. To us the simplest seems to be the exposition of those who say that in this sense God completed His work on the seventh day: that on that day, as on a day when His work was now finished, He added nothing new. This sense is conveyed by St. Thomas.[50] And indeed Scripture itself sufficiently indicates this sense when, by way of declaration, it subjoins: "And He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had wrought."

§ VIII — Reply to certain objections (Responsio ad quasdam objectiones)

§ 64. Against what has been said — that God completed His entire work in such a way that on the seventh day and thereafter He ceased from working — certain objections arise. The first: Christ says in Jn. 5: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work"; therefore God never ceased from work. The second: On the seventh day woman was created, as appears from the history of Gen. 2. The third: Certain new species of things afterwards arose, and still from time to time continue to arise, both in animals and in other mixed bodies — to which pertains the innumerable multitude of things that are produced with the assistance of art or human labour, such as bread, ale, glass, bricks, and various liquors. The fourth: Every day God creates new souls from nothing. The fifth: The work of the Incarnation of the Son of God was altogether new, according to that of Jer. 31: "The Lord shall create a new thing upon the earth." The sixth: The miracles which Christ, the Apostles, and the Prophets performed were new works, for which reason they are also called miracles (*miracula*), as it were things that excite wonder by their novelty. The seventh: God at the end of the age will renew all things, as He Himself says in Rev. 21: "Behold, I make all things new." To which renewal of the world there also belongs the glorification of the Elect through the resurrection.

§ 65. In order that these and similar objections may be dissolved, one must consider in what sense Scripture says that God completed or perfected His entire work. For Moses did not say absolutely that God ceased from every work, but with the addition: "from all His work which He had made." For this is repeated a second and a third time at the beginning of the second chapter. Now the sense is this: that God finished the entire fabric of the world and the institution of universal nature in six days, in such a way that nothing which pertained to the integrity and adornment of the world — that is, of the entire nature of things — was afterwards made as something new; but all things whatsoever that were afterwards to arise were contained causally (*causaliter*), or potentially (*potentialiter*), or virtually (*virtualiter*) in the primordial world. From this declaration it is now easy to resolve the objections. For that operation of which Christ speaks in the Gospel is not the institution of new things, but the conservation and governance of nature once instituted — which, if it were to cease, all nature would fall into nothing; as St. Augustine teaches, expounding the aforesaid passage of Scripture.[46] Moreover, whatever new species of things afterwards arose were contained causally and according to certain seminal principles (*rationes seminales*) in those things which were made in the beginning, as we have shown sufficiently above.

§ 66. Furthermore, the daily creation of souls pertains to the first institution of things in so far as God so willed and ordained that, just as He breathed a soul into the first man — a soul in no way drawn out of the potency (*potentia*) of matter — so by a perpetual law He would do the same for all who were to be born from that first man. The work of the Incarnation of the Son of God, however, and the performance of miracles, and the renewal of the world, and the glorification of the elect — these are above nature, and through them accordingly nothing is added to the primeval institution of nature as though it were incomplete, but something is done that surpasses the order of nature; although through miracles there arise no new species of things, but things of the same species as the original ones, yet in a new and supernatural manner.

§ 67. To the second objection St. Thomas replies[56] that Eve pre-existed materially in the works of the six days, on the ground that she was formed from Adam's rib. But this reply does not seem sufficient. For at that rate — that is, materially — all the works of the last five days were contained in the one work of the first day. For all things were made from prime matter (*materia prima*), which was wholly created on the first day. And thus it would have to be said that God completed His entire work not on the sixth, or the seventh, day, but on the first or second. More correctly, therefore, others think it must be denied that what is assumed is true — namely, that Eve was formed on the seventh day. For in the work of the sixth day, concerning the creation of man, we read: "Male and female He created them, and He blessed them and said: Increase and multiply," etc. And at last it is subjoined: "And there was evening and morning, the sixth day." This is further proved by the fact that in the case of other animals both sexes were made on the same day; wherefore it was fitting that the same should hold for man as well. Those things, therefore, which are written in Gen. 2 about the formation of woman from the rib of the man, are to be referred — as spoken by way of recapitulation — to the history of the work of the sixth day; as was done by Bede in his *Hexaemeron*, of which matter we shall speak again.[79]

§ IX — How God sanctified the seventh day (Quomodo septimum diem Deus sanctificaverit)

§ 68. What Scripture adds — that God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it — is not expounded in one way by all. Some, among whom is St. Thomas,[60] distinguish the blessing from the sanctification and understand by it that the things created on the preceding days began to multiply. For blessing (*benedictio*) in Scripture frequently signifies fecundity and multiplication; and, not to seek an example far afield, it was written a little above that God blessed the human beings He had created. But since in this passage God is not said to have blessed the things themselves but the day — and since this is repeated in the same words in Exod. 20 at the institution of the Sabbath — and since fecundity had been bestowed upon things before the seventh day, namely when it was said to them: "Increase and multiply"; others, therefore, much more correctly understand the blessing of the seventh day as residing in its very sanctification, especially since blessing in the general sense signifies the conferring of any good whatsoever.

§ 69. Now, God is said to sanctify the seventh day, not because He infused into it some created quality by which it would be holier and more excellent than the other days — in the way that an intellectual creature is holier than others by reason of the interior quality by which it is joined to God — but because, having assigned the remaining days to work, He appointed this one in a special manner to rest and quiet, that is, to cessation from work, and willed and commanded that it be devoted to His worship. For *sanctificare* in the Scriptures is nearly equivalent to separating from impurity and profane use and applying to the worship of

God. Thus in the Law the first-born were sanctified, the vessels of the Temple, the priestly vestments, and the Priests and Levites themselves.

§ 70. But when did this sanctification of the seventh day take place? Some, among whom is Catharinus,[80] think it was accomplished on that very day which was the seventh from the creation of the world. For the words of Scripture seem to say this, since they join these four things together as done simultaneously and on the same day: that God rested from His work, completed His work, blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it. Those who think thus say that God even then laid down a law for human beings concerning the observance of the Sabbath, such as He afterwards promulgated through Moses.

§ 71. But others refute this opinion with the following arguments. First: if the law of observing the Sabbath on the seventh day, which was the nearest after the work of creation, had been promulgated, it would not have been instituted after the sin of man when he heard: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread"; rather it would have been instituted before. But in the state of innocence (*status innocentiae*) such a precept would have been superfluous, since man was going to devote himself to the contemplation of divine things not on one day out of seven but on all days. For there would have been no distraction drawing him away from meditating on divine matters. But perhaps this argument does not altogether compel. For it can be answered that in the state of innocence there was need of such a law, not so much for the freer meditation on divine things as on account of the external worship of God subsisting in the offering of sacrifices and other bodily actions, which would necessarily have claimed for itself a certain fixed time even then. For just as man is composed of soul and body, so in whatever state he owes to God a twofold worship — the interior worship of the soul and the exterior worship of the body.

§ 72. Second, and by a more cogent argument, they refute it: because it is the common opinion of the Fathers that God gave to the first parents before they sinned no other purely positive law than that they should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; therefore He prescribed nothing concerning the Sabbath. Third: if the law of the Sabbath belonged to the primeval institution, it was not to be abrogated by Christ. Fourth: if this precept had been given to the first parents, it would have bound the entire human race, at least until it was again recalled by God. For it would have pertained equally to all the descendants of the first human beings. But we read neither among the Gentiles, nor among the holy Patriarchs, nor indeed among any others before the Mosaic Law, that the Sabbath was in observance. Finally: if this precept had been handed down from the beginning and observed at least by pious men, Moses, in the law by which he prescribed the observance of the Sabbath to the Israelites, would — in order to move their minds with greater religious feeling to observe the Sabbath — have made some mention of that institution so ancient and holy; but he made no such mention anywhere; he only set forth the cause of the institution, namely that after the works of six days God had rested on the seventh day.

§ 73. This opinion, therefore, having been refuted, it seems altogether right to side with those who say that what Moses here records concerning the blessing and sanctification of the seventh day was said by way of anticipation (*per anticipationem*), and that nothing else is signified than that God afterwards, when He gave the Law to the Hebrews, sanctified the seventh day — namely by commanding that on it they should cease from all work and give themselves solely to divine worship. And lest this seem too improbable, it must be borne in mind that these things were written by Moses at the time when the Law had already been given by him to the Hebrew people, and that it was accordingly very opportune to make mention then of the sanctification of the seventh day as performed by him, after he had arrived in his narrative at the description of

that same day, chiefly because that description contains the cause of its sanctification — namely, the rest and cessation of God after the works of six days.

§ 74. The words of the law in Exod. 20 manifestly favour this understanding; they read as follows: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and He rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it" — as if to say: Because God rested on the seventh day from all His work, therefore by a law now enacted He willed that same seventh day to be holy; that is, free from all profane work and appointed to His worship. This sense is not repudiated by the words of this passage either, but rather easily admitted them on account of what follows: "because in it He had rested from all His work which God created to make." For this was the reason for the subsequent sanctification of the seventh day in God's people. And this indeed appears to be the genuine sense of this passage, and it is transmitted by Bede[63] and, much older than he, by Tertullian and Cyprian,[81] by Justin in his *Dialogue*,[82] and by Eusebius.[65]

§ 75. If, however, someone contends that what is rather signified is that God sanctified the seventh day from the very beginning, this can be said in the following sense: that there then preceded the formal character (*ratio*) on account of which the seventh day was afterwards, in preference to the others, applied to divine worship. That formal character, as we have said, is the rest and cessation of God from the work of the creation of the world. This formal character Scripture has explicitly expressed in both passages already mentioned.

§ 76. Furthermore, what this sanctification of the seventh day teaches us morally is indicated by the Apostle in Heb. 4. St. John Chrysostom[83] sets it forth more fully. St. Augustine[84] likewise diligently pursues the mystical understanding of this passage. Bede does the same,[85] where at last, according to the mystical sense, he beautifully expounds why here, unlike in the foregoing days, it is not added: "And there was evening and morning, the seventh day" — because, namely, it signifies the rest of the saints which is after this life before the resurrection of bodies, and is signified by the Sabbath, for no night of tribulation or of sin interrupts it; but the eighth day is the day of resurrection and of perfect happiness.

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§ I — The excellence of man shown from the history of his creation (Hominis praestantia ex historia creationis ejus ostenditur)

§ 77. Among the works of the six days commemorated by Moses, the most eminent and the last is man, concerning whose creation, nature, state of first condition, and subsequent fall we must treat together with the Master through several Distinctions. First of all, however, the dignity and excellence of man above all other bodily creatures — for it is these alone that Moses comprised in his narrative — is commended from the fact that he was made not only more beautiful and more excellent than the rest according to his nature, but also such as to be capable of knowing his own beauty and excellence himself: not in order that he might take pleasure in it and rest in himself as in some great good, but so that through this he might be moved to the knowledge and love of his Author, who is the Supreme Good. Although the knowledge of his natural condition and his primal dignity now has also another use in man, namely that he may understand into what great misery and baseness he has cast himself down by sinning, and to what he ought through the grace of Christ to strive and aspire again.

§ 78. This dignity of the human creature, moreover, the history of Genesis insinuates and commends to us in various ways. First, in that, whereas the other things are reported to have been made by a simple command of God — God saying, "let there be light," "let there be a firmament," "let the earth bring forth" (*germinet terra*), and so of the others — when it comes to the creation of man, it is no longer said "let man be made" or "let the earth produce man," but, as by one who is about to undertake a great and arduous work and deliberates beforehand about doing it, it is said: "Let us make man," etc. For to great and arduous undertakings we are accustomed to preface counsel and deliberation. St. Basil,[87] St. Gregory,[88] Rupertus,[89] and before them Tertullian[90] have observed this.

§ 79. Second, man's dignity is commended by the fact that he is described as made in the last place, as being, so to speak, the end for the sake of whose sake the other things were made. For just as a prince is introduced into a palace prepared for him, and a bridegroom into a bridal chamber adorned for him, and a guest into a banquet set out for him: so man, created last of all, was through that very creation introduced into this bodily world as into a most richly adorned house, furnished and prepared for him with every furnishing. The Fathers use such comparisons: Basil,[87] Gregory of Nyssa,[91] Chrysostom,[92] and Ambrose.[93] That man is the end of the other things of this world and that for the sake of which they exist is also affirmed by Aristotle.[94]

§ 80. Third, in that dominion and sovereignty over all other things is attributed to man — not only over inanimate things, but also over animate and sentient ones — when it is said: "That he may be over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and the beasts and all the earth." And not only over perishable and earthly things, but also over heavenly ones; since even the stars of heaven were made for the service of all nations (Deut. 4). For this also had been signified in the description of the fourth day by those words: "That they might be for signs and for seasons and for days and years." St. Bernard noted this particularly,[95] showing that not only this lower world but also the celestial elements were created for the use of men.

§ 81. Fourth, in that man is said to have been made to the image and likeness (*imago et similitudo*) of God. For it was not, as pagan writers called man *mikrokosmos* — a little world, as it were a certain image and likeness of the world — that Moses so named him; but what is greater by infinitely many parts, the image and likeness of God, so that for this reason man may now, not undeservedly nor inaptly, be called *mikrotheos*, as it were a certain little God (*quasi parvus quidam Deus*), and this in language not altogether foreign to Sacred Scripture. For in Ps. 8, for what the Seventy translated "Thou hast diminished him a little less than the angels," the Hebrew according to the version of St. Jerome and of certain others has: "Thou hast made him a little less than God" — that is, thou hast made him slightly less than God and, as it were, a little God. The formal character (*ratio*) of this is thereupon subjoined in the same place from the dominion that was given to man over the other creatures: "Thou hast set him," it says, "over the works of Thy hands."[96]

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1. Ps. 73 (Vulgate): "Contribulasti capita draconum in aquis."

2. Ps. 148 (Vulgate): "Dracones et omnes abyssi."

3. Ezek. 32 (Vulgate): "Draconi qui est in mari assimilatus est."

4. Ezek. 29.

5. Is. 27.

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 71.
7. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, ch. 3.
8. Rupert, *In Genesim* I, ch. 50.
9. The Ambrosian hymn: "Qui ex aquis ortum genus, partim remittis gurgiti, partim levas in aera," and the verses that follow; cited from the liturgical hymn of St. Ambrose.
10. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* V, chs. 1, 2, 3.
11. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* VI, ch. 2.
12. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron* (referenced implicitly via Ambrose).
13. Epiphanius, letter translated by St. Jerome, *contra Origenis allegorismos*.
14. Gen. 1:1.
15. (a) Most expert scholars of the Hebrew language translate this verse from the Hebrew Samaritan codex with the twenty-first verse of the first Genesis as follows: "Afterwards God said: Let the waters bring forth reptiles, the living soul, and the flying creature above, and over the firmament of the sky let it fly." They note that the common translator rendered it differently, because he believed the verb *Ichopheph*, "let it fly," to be in the imperative rather than in the indicative, but supplied the voice *Aleph*, understanding: "Let the waters bring forth the reptile of the living soul, and the flying creature." They add further that it is not sufficiently evident which interpretation is more correct, since the relative pronoun is to be understood in both.
16. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, ch. 13.
17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 72, in reply to arts. 5 and 6; likewise q. 96, art. 1, ad 2.
18. Exod. 20 (Vulgate): "Fecit Deus caelum et terram et mare et omnia quae in eis sunt."
19. Tob. 6.
20. Wis. 5: "Pugnabit cum eo orbis terrarum contra insensatos."
21. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 15; *Tractatus 1 in Joannem*; *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 6.
22. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 18.
23. Hilary, *In Expositione Psalmorum* 68.
24. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 5.
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 164, art. 2, ad 1.
26. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 164, art. 2, ad 1, citing St. Augustine, *Super Genesim ad litteram*.
27. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 13.
28. Sir. 39.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 69, art. 1, ad 2.
30. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, ch. 16.
31. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 20.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 96, art. 1, ad 2.
33. Cajetan, *Super Genesim*.
34. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 10.
35. Gen. 1: "Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam et universa ligna ut sint vobis in escam et cunctis animantibus terrae, omnique volucri caeli, et universis quae moventur in terra, ut habeant ad vescendum."
36. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, q. 7.
37. Bede, *In Genesim* (*Hexaemeron*).
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 72, in reply to art. 5.

39. Exod. 20.

40. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 7.

41. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, ch. 14.

42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 72, ad 5.

43. Rupert, *Super Genesim* I, ch. 57.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, art. 2.

45. Gen. 2: "Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum quod fecerat, et requievit die septimo ab universo opere quod patrarat, et benedixit diei septimo," etc.

46. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 12.

47. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 10.

48. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 17.

49. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In Sent.* II, dist. 15 (in sextu).

50. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, art. 1, ad 2.

51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, ibidem.

52. Jn. 5:17: "Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor."

53. Gen. 2.

54. Jer. 31: "Novum faciet Dominus super terram."

55. Rev. 21: "Ecce nova facio omnia."

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, art. 1, ad 3.

57. Gen. 1: "Masculum et feminam creavit eos, benedixitque illis, et ait: Crescite et multiplicamini," etc.

58. Gen. 1: "Et factum est vespere et mane dies sextus."

59. Bede, *Hexaemeron* (ad Dist. 18).

60. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, art. 3.

61. Catharinus, *Super Genesim*.

62. Gen. 3: "In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane tuo."

63. Bede, *Hexaemeron*.

64. Tertullian; Cyprian; Justin, *Dialogus contra Tryphonem*.

65. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I, ch. 4.

66. Heb. 4.

67. St. John Chrysostom, *Super Genesim*, tractatio on this passage.

68. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 13; *De Catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 17.

69. Bede, *in fine sui Hexaemeri*.

70. Gen. 1: "Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam universa ligna ut sint vobis in escam, et cunctis animantibus terrae, omnique volucri caeli, universisque quae moventur in terra, ut habeant ad vescendum."

71. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones super Genesim*, q. 7.

72. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 96, art. 1, ad 2 (the passage cited just above); cf. the Glossa ordinaria.

73. Gen. 6.

74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 72, in reply to art. 5 (*in responsione ad* 5).

75. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, chs. 8 and 12.

76. St. Jerome, *Traditiones Hebraicae* (i.e., *Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim*).

77. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 15 (*in textu*).

78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 73, art. 2 (*ibidem*).

79. Bede, *Hexaemeron*; see below at Dist. 18.

80. Catharinus (Ambrosius), *Super Genesim*.

81. Tertullian and Cyprian, *Contra Judaeos*.

82. Justin, *Dialogus contra Tryphonem*.

83. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim* (in the treatment of this passage).

84. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 13; and *De Catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 17.

85. Bede, *Hexaemeron* (at the end).

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 74, art. 1; also q. 96, art. 1 and art. 2.

87. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 10.

88. St. Gregory (the Great), *Moralia* II, ch. 27.

89. Rupertus, *In Genesim*, Exordium of Book II (*Super Genesim*).

90. Tertullian, *Contra Marcionem* II.

91. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Creatione hominis* I, ch. 2 and 3.

92. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 8.

93. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 48 (*ad Horuntianum*).

94. Aristotle, *Physica* I, ch. 2.

95. St. Bernard, *In Psalmum 90*, Sermon 14.

96. Ps. 8, cited according to St. Jerome's version of the Hebrew.

DISTINCTIO XVI — ON THE CREATION OF MAN IN THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS OF GOD (*DE HOMINE AD IMAGINEM ET SIMILITUDINEM DEI CREATO*)

§ 1. For it is altogether apparent that the Psalmist alluded to this entire passage of Genesis, in which it is written that man was created in the image and likeness of God, and that he should have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the rest. Finally, through the fact that the supreme mystery of our Faith — that is, of the Most Holy Trinity — was first of all indicated and set forth in the creation of man, albeit read in somewhat obscure words: for those words, "Let us make" and "our," signify a multitude and a distinction of Persons; whereas the words "in the image and likeness" signify the unity of the Divine Nature; as likewise does that which precedes — "God said" — and that which follows — "God made in his own image and likeness." It was moreover fitting that this mystery should have been intimated in the formation of man, seeing that it was at last to be openly declared in the reformation or regeneration of that same man, which is brought about through baptism.

§ II — In what sense it is said: "to the image" and "likeness" (Quo sensu dictum sit: ad imaginem, similitudinem)

§ 2. Before we teach in what the formal character (*ratio*) of the image and of the likeness consists, the phraseology of Scripture — which says that man was made to the image and likeness of God — must be explained. For this can be understood in two ways. In one way, if we interpret "image" improperly, in the sense of an exemplar, yet retaining the proper force of the preposition that is joined to it, so that the sense is: "Let us make man to our image" — that is, to ourselves as an exemplar to be represented in man. According to this exposition, Scripture signifies that the three Divine Persons are one image, that is, one exemplar to which man was fashioned. The ancients followed this sense more or less, wishing to show that the nature and essence of the three Persons is one — as St. Augustine,[2] St. Basil,[3] St. John Chrysostom,[4] St. Hilary,[5] Fulgentius,[6] and Bede — the last cited by the Master in his text.[7] The very verse of the ecclesiastical hymn expresses the same: *Cui re* — as may also be seen in the Master.[8]

In another way it can be expounded in this sense: "Let us make man who shall be our image and likeness." In this exposition "image" is taken properly, but the proper force of the preposition is not retained. For it is, as the grammarians say, a transitive locution used in place of an intransitive one; and the preposition itself designates the circumstance of the terminus toward which the formation of man was tending. For man was made for this: that he should bear in his own nature the expressed image and likeness of his Creator — that is, that he himself should be the image and likeness of his Creator.

Now both expositions converge upon the same meaning. For since exemplar and image mutually correspond to one another as correlatives, in either exposition it is signified both that man is the image of God and that God is the exemplar to which man was fashioned.

Nevertheless, if it be asked which exposition is the better, it seems to me that one must altogether say that the latter is more in accord with the mind of Scripture. First, because the name of "image," used for exemplar or prototype, is not customary in the Scriptures, nor indeed among other writers. Then, because it sounds harsher still to say that God is called a "likeness" to which man was made — which would, however, have to be conceded equally with regard to "image" according to the former exposition; for similarly it was said: "To our image and likeness." Moreover, "likeness" alone is sometimes named in this phrase, as in Jas. 3. Third, because Paul in 1 Cor. 11 says that man is the image of God; where without doubt he has in view this passage of Genesis. Wherefore according to the Apostle, "image" is said of man, not of God. So also in Wis. 2, according to the Greek reading, it is said that God made man the image of his likeness (*imaginem suae similitudinis*), without the addition of the preposition *ad*. Finally, because other passages of Scripture similar to this one demand a similar interpretation — as when the same Apostle says in Rom. 8 that God predestined us to be conformed to the image of his Son, he signifies that we are to be so conformed to the Son of God that we become a certain image of him; and when he says in 1 Cor. 15, "As we have borne the image of the earthly man, so let us also bear the image of the heavenly," he means that just as in ourselves we represent the earthly man as being his image, so we should represent the heavenly man as being his image. But concerning these things, somewhat more will be said below.[9]

§ III — What things are required for the formal character of an image (Ad rationem imaginis quae requirantur)

§ 3. What is signified by the name of image we have already shown in the preceding Book (at Dist. 37), where the discussion concerned the Son of God as the image of the Father. In this place, for the sake of a fuller explanation, it must be added that three things are required for the formal character (*ratio*) of an image — as may be gathered from what St. Augustine writes.[11] The first is that the image be similar to that of which it is said to be the image. The second is that it exist from (*exsistat*) that of which it is called the image — whether naturally, in the manner in which the image of a human face results in a mirror, and in the manner in which Seth, in Gen. 5, is said to have been begotten to (*ad*) the image of Adam, or by art, as in paintings. The third is that it properly and particularly represent that thing of which it is called the image. For a painting will not be called the image of a king if it does not properly represent the king but represents the human form only in a general way; yet it would rightly be called an image of a human being.

§ 4. Here it must also be noted that, although not every image is naturally formed according to that of which it is the image — as we were just saying — nevertheless it always naturally represents to our intellect the thing of which it is the image. For the image of a king painted by art on a panel is similar to the king not by convention but by nature; whence it comes about that all who have seen the king recognize his image in the painted panel. For this reason, signs that signify by convention are not images.

§ 5. Furthermore, for the formal character of a perfect image it is required that it correspond exactly and in all respects to its exemplar. From these considerations it is evident, in the first place, that the Father in the Divine Persons (*in Divinis*) is not the image of the Son, but the Son is the image of the Father, as was shown

in the preceding Book. For although the similarity between them is supreme, nevertheless the Father does not exist from the Son, but the Son from the Father. Likewise, it is evident that creatures devoid of reason (*rationes expertes*) are not to be called images of God, as St. Augustine also teaches in the aforementioned place.[12] For although they bear some likeness (*similitudo*) to God, they do not properly and in a particular manner represent Him. For the character of the divine excellence is not impressed upon them. This excellence is understood especially in the wisdom and freedom of the Divine Nature. Hence irrational creatures are more rightly called vestiges — inasmuch as they represent God to us only in a general manner, as an effect represents its cause — as St. Thomas rightly teaches.[13]

§ 6. Finally, it is clear — as was also demonstrated more fully in the preceding Book — that the perfect and absolutely complete image of God is not man nor angel, but the Son of God alone, inasmuch as He, being most perfectly similar to His Father, also proceeds from Him by way of likeness (*per modum similitudinis*).[14]

§ IV — In what respect man was made to the image of God (Secundum quid homo ad imaginem Dei factus?)

§ 7. That man was made to the image of God (*ad imaginem Dei*) not according to the body but according to the soul (*anima*) is the unanimous judgment of all the Doctors. Nor is this surprising, since the very words of Scripture that immediately follow make this openly clear: "that he may have dominion over the fishes of the sea," and so on. For it is established that man is superior to beasts and has dominion over them and rules them not by the bulk of the body, by strength, or by swiftness, but by the powers of the soul. St. Augustine employs this proof for the matter at hand.[16] Add to this that the Apostle, in Eph. 4 and Col. 3, attributes the renewal to the image of God in man according to the mind (*mens*), not according to the body. Therefore the creation of man to the image of God is similarly to be understood. St. Augustine employs this same argument.[17]

Now, since it is agreed that man was made to the image of God according to the soul by which he is man, and there is no need of many proofs to establish this, there is nevertheless a certain diversity found among the Doctors as they endeavour to explain in which faculty of the soul the formal character (*ratio*) of this divine image is located. For St. Augustine, in the places just cited, seems to situate the formal character of the image in the mind (*mens*) or in the intellect, as also in the same place[18] — where, having said that man was made to the image of God not according to that which is exterior but according to that which is interior, he adds: "That is," he says, "inasmuch as he has a rational mind by which he may know God; and for this reason he is set above all irrational beings by that same excellence of reason."

Others refer the image to free will (*liberum arbitrium*), such as St. Basil,[19] St. Ambrose,[20] St. Jerome,[21] and St. Bernard.[22] Others again situate it in the dominion which man received over other creatures, such as St. John Chrysostom.[23]

§ 8. Yet these seemingly diverse declarations are not at all in conflict with one another. For the freedom of will also depends upon the intellect as upon its root; dominion is a certain effect of the same intellect and will, and, as it were, their proper passion flowing from them. Hence the image of God is found and shines forth first in the intellective power (*potentia intellectiva*), then in the freedom of will, and thirdly in that which emanates from these two — that is, in the power of ruling other things and governing them.

From this it came about that certain of the Fathers conjoined either the two former or all three of these together when they wished to explain the formal character of the image of God in man, such as St. Gregory of Nyssa[24] and after him St. John Damascene,[25] and indeed St. Augustine himself.[26] And this is perhaps the reason why Epiphanius says that it cannot be defined in what respect man was made to the image and likeness of God. He states this in the heresy of the Audians, and in the *Ancoratus*, and in the *Letter to John of Jerusalem*.[27] The reason, I say, is this: because since there are several things in man according to which he can rightly be understood as made to the image of God, as has now been shown from the Fathers, it seems rash to settle definitively upon one of them to the exclusion of the rest.

Yet this is not rashly defined but is asserted with probability: if one asks which of the three above-mentioned things Scripture principally had in view when it records God as having said, "Let us make man to our image," it principally had in view the third of those things mentioned — that is, the dominion given to man over other things. For this is immediately subjoined by way of a reason: "that he may have dominion over the fishes of the sea," and so on — not indeed to signify that this is the principal formal character of the divine image in man, but that in such dominion it is made apparent that man was made to the image of God. For it must be remembered that Moses, in the history of the creation of things, wished to lead the simple people of the Hebrews from visible and commonly known things toward invisible ones, as if by the hand. Now David in Ps. 8 and Sirach in Sir. 17 had in view this same formal character, as is evident from those very passages. Already it is clear that those, such as Gennadius,[28] who situate the image in eternity, are by no means explaining its true and proper formal character. For both the heavens and matter and the body of man after the resurrection participate in eternity, and yet no orthodox person acknowledges the image of God in these. From what has been said it follows that not only man but also the angel was made to the image of God, and indeed this is all the more fittingly attributed to the angel the more perfect the intellectual nature is in him than in man. For this reason St. Gregory says[29] that the angel is called by Ezekiel (Ezek. 28) "a seal of likeness" — because, clearly, the more refined his nature is, the more expressly is the image of God instilled and impressed in him. Yet St. Thomas rightly shows[30] that by a certain secondary consideration the image of God is found more in man than in the angel.

§ 9. Furthermore, although, as was said, man was not made to the image of God according to the body, the body nevertheless bears a certain property that signifies that he was made to the image of God, so that it may rightly be said that in the human body there is to be found some participation in the image of God — as St. Augustine rightly teaches.[31] That property is the upright stature, granted by nature to no other living being, according to the well-known line of the Poet:

And while the other animals are prone, bending their gaze toward the earth, He gave to man a lofty countenance, and bade him look upon the sky, And raise his upright face toward the stars.

Now this stature signifies both man's power over beasts, and moreover the principal duty of the human mind to contemplate heavenly, that is, divine things. For St. Augustine himself sometimes situates the formal character of the divine image in man in this matter as well.[32]

§ V — Whether woman also was made to the image of God (Utrum & mulier ad imaginem Dei facta sit?)

§ 10. From the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 11 — "The man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of man" — certain persons have taken occasion to teach that man alone, and not also woman, was made to the image of God. The author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament* ascribed to St. Augustine[34] transmits this view, as does the author of the *Commentaries on Paul* under the title of Ambrose on 1 Cor. 11.[35] Indeed even St. Ambrose himself may appear to have thought so, inasmuch as he says, writing on Lk. 4 concerning Adam and Eve: "of whom the one was made to the image of God, the other receiving the virtue of her husband." But that this doctrine is false is easy to show.

First, from the authority of Scripture, which in Gen. 1, having said of man "To the image of God He created him," adds: "Male and female He created them." Similarly in Gen. 5, having said "To the likeness of God He made him," it again appends: "Male and female He created them." Moreover in Gen. 9, to the law "Whosoever shall shed human blood, his blood shall be shed," it subjoins this reason: "For man was made to the image of God." From this it is with certainty gathered — since that law comprehends both sexes — that the reason appended likewise pertains to both sexes.

The same can be shown from the formal character of the image as explained above. For whether the formal character of the image be situated in the intellect, or in free will, or in the power of dominion, according to the different declarations of the Fathers, it is clear that all these belong in common to the female sex as well, according to the judgment of those Fathers. To these are added the clear testimonies of the holy Fathers: of St. Basil,[3] of St. Ambrose,[20] and of St. Augustine.[17] Likewise the words of St. Julitta as recited by St. Basil.[36]

§ 11. Nor does the Apostle mean anything different. For when he said that man is the image of God, he did not intend simply to exclude woman from that dignity, but he signified that man is called the image of God with greater formal character (*ratione*) than woman. For although both are endowed with mind and the freedom of will, nevertheless the formal character of image is stronger in man, if we regard the whole female sex universally. For this reason dominion and superintendence over the things subject to man belongs more to man than to woman — which is clear from the fact that man is by nature set over woman, and not the contrary. And, as the Apostle says in the same place, "Not man is from woman, but woman from man; and man was not created on account of woman, but woman on account of man." By these words it is certainly signified that man is the principle and end of woman, just as God is the principle and end of the whole of creation, as St. Thomas rightly noted.[37]

Others reply that man is called in a special way by the Apostle the image and glory of God because he comes from God immediately, with no other intervenient whose image he might bear; whereas woman, since she comes from God by the mediation of man from whom she was formed, is more fittingly called not the image and glory of God but of man. In this way Adam in Gen. 5 is said to have begotten a son to his image and likeness: yet his wife also — no less than his son — is consequently and mediately the image of God. This latter response illuminates the former one the more, and each sufficiently agrees with the apostolic text, so that there is no need for us to interpret "image" in the Apostle's words differently than in Genesis. This seems to be what St. John Chrysostom did, inasmuch as, expounding the Apostle's passage, he understands by "image" the principate of man over woman. But St. Cyril, treating the same passage of the Apostle,[38] manifestly situates the formal character of the image in that which is common to woman as well. St. Augustine, on the other

hand,[17] adduces a certain mystical understanding of the Apostle's words, so that by "woman" is signified the lower reason (*ratio inferior*) which attends to temporal things, and by "man" the higher reason (*ratio superior*) which is intent upon eternal things — and he says that the image of God shines forth most principally in this latter part, which he repeats.[39]

Furthermore, rejecting the authority of the two books of which one falsely bears the title of St. Augustine and the other of St. Ambrose — both being the works of an unknown author — in reply to the true St. Ambrose it must be said that he means nothing other in that passage than what the Apostle himself means, according to the second solution already given; and that there can be no doubt of his judgment, which he expressed clearly in the *Hexaemeron* in the passage cited by us.[40]

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§ VI — In what respect man was made to the likeness of God (Secundum quid factus sit homo ad similitudinem Dei)

§ 12. Likeness (*similitudo*) taken in a general sense is the genus of image, in the way that St. Augustine teaches[42] that every image is a likeness but not conversely. In this manner the Master in the present distinction seems to have understood "likeness" in the saying that man was made to the likeness of God — for he writes that "image" pertains to form (*forma*), "likeness" to nature (*natura*). St. Bernard also speaks according to this view.[43]

Yet this interpretation of "likeness" does not easily admit the words of Scripture that say man was made to the image and likeness of God. For if likeness as a genus is included within image, what reason was there for "likeness" to be named in addition, after "image"?

Therefore it pleases others more to hold that "likeness" insinuates to us a certain determination and perfection of the image, and that the sense of Scripture is as follows: God made man to His image — not just any image, but one most similar and beautifully corresponding to its exemplar. They think that Wis. 2, "He made him to the image of His likeness," is relevant here, so that the Hebrew phrase "image of likeness" stands for an image that is very similar — just as in the Apostle (Col. 2) "son of love" stands for a much beloved son. Now this likeness, according to St. John Damascene,[25] consists in justice, piety, wisdom, and the other virtues and gifts by which men are made sons of God.

§ 13. This explanation of likeness is confirmed by the opinions of many Fathers: of Irenaeus,[44] of Cyprian,[45] of Origen,[46] of Gregory of Nyssa,[47] of St. Ambrose,[48] of St. Jerome,[49] and of his teacher Victorinus the African,[50] of St. John Chrysostom,[51] of Theodoret,[52] of Eucherius of Lyon,[53] and of Rupert.[54]

St. Bernard, however, though he speaks otherwise elsewhere, yet in the book *De Gratia et libero Arbitrio* distinguishes them so as to say that the image consists in the freedom of will (*libertas arbitrii*), while the likeness consists in the freedom from sin (*libertas ad non peccandum*). And the Master also put forward this exposition of "likeness" in the first place when he said that man was made to the likeness of God according to innocence and justice. In this matter the Master is followed by St. Thomas and the other later theologians, almost universally. They say that in the description of the creation of man the reason why it was not said the second time "And God created man to His image and likeness" but only "to His image," is that Moses wished

to repeat the second time only what had remained in man, while keeping silent about that which perished through sin.

§ 14. Now St. Augustine does indeed mention this opinion[55] but in such a way that he does not appear to approve it — since he subsequently corrects the said reason for the likeness not being repeated, by adducing a better reason. For he writes thus: "But the fact that he did not add 'and likeness' has seemed to some to mean that likeness is something more than image, which was to be preserved for man to be formed through the grace of Christ. But I wonder whether the reason he did not wish to mention the image alone afterwards was simply because where there is an image, there is immediately also a likeness." So he writes. Yet neither in that place nor in question 51 of the *Eighty-Three Questions* does he plainly express his own view, except that he seems, as was said at the outset, to make "likeness" the genus of "image" — which, however, for the reason stated above, is not probable.

Certainly the view of those who maintain that it is vain to seek a distinction between "image" and "likeness" here, on the grounds that Moses wished to signify the same thing by both terms — and that this would be sufficiently apparent from the collation of different scriptural passages, in which now "image," now "likeness," now both terms are used indiscriminately — does not seem to be disapprovable. To demonstrate this, the text of Gen. 1 furnishes evidence above all: where, having said "Let us make man to our image and likeness," a little later only "image" is named — clearly leaving us to understand, in accordance with the inference of St. Augustine, that where there is image there is immediately also likeness. So in Gen. 5, "likeness" alone is named first, but afterwards both. In which passage the above-stated distinction cannot at all be maintained — namely, in the sense that at Gen. 5:3, Adam is said to have begotten a son "to his image and likeness." Again in Gen. 9 only "image" is put, just as also in Sir. 17; but both terms in Wis. 2, yet in such a way that one is joined to the other in the genitive, saying "image of likeness." Finally in Jas. 3, "likeness" alone is named — a thing surprising if it is not, as I would again use the conjecture of St. Augustine, because where there is likeness, there is also immediately image. Nor is it infrequent among the Hebrews to hammer home the same thing by repetition of different words or even sentences — to which the Psalms of David above all bear witness.

§ 15. To this is added the fact that the word "image" (*imago*) is employed by Paul in the sense of likeness consisting in justice and the other virtues, as in 1 Cor. 15 when he says: "As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly"; and in Col. 3: "Putting on the new man who is renewed according to the image of Him who created him." All of which seems sufficiently to show that both words have the same force and meaning — nor is both terms placed together at times therefore inept. For this was done for the sake of greater expressiveness, as is customary in other cases as well. By this response the argument of St. Basil is easily resolved; he strives to prove that "image" and "likeness" are of diverse signification on the grounds that it would be impious to think that any word in Scripture is idle and superfluous. For if a repetition of the same word is not idle when it serves the purpose of greater vehemence — as when one says "Lord, Lord," "Amen, Amen," "Martha, Martha" — neither is a repetition of the same thing under different words to be considered idle when it is done for the reason we have stated.

§ VIII — Whether by sin the image or likeness of God has perished in man (Utrum per peccatum in homine perierit imago vel similitudo Dei)

§ 16. From the things that have been said, it is manifest that man by sinning has not lost the image (*imago*) of God. For the intellectual nature (*natura intellectualis*) remained in him, according to which we have shown it to belong to man that he is made to the image of God. Wherefore one must confess that the image of God perseveres not only in fallen and sinful man, but even in damned souls and in demons; indeed, that it can never be blotted out. Hence St. Bernard, Sermon 1 (*On the Annunciation of the Lord*), says: "The image can be burned in hell itself, but not burned away; it can be tormented, but it does not chance to come thence. And whithersoever the soul arrives, it will be there together with it."[57] And indeed it is clear from Scripture that the image of God remained in man after sin — from Gen. 9 and from 1 Cor. 11. Wherefore Epiphanius in his letter (*to John of Jerusalem*) and St. Jerome in his letter (*to Pammachius*), written against the errors of that same John, ch. 3, numbered among the erroneous dogmas of Origen this also: that he had taught that through sin the image of God in the soul of man was utterly extinguished.[58] One locus among others on this matter is in Homily 2 (*on Leviticus*), where he says that when sin intervenes the image of God does not subsist.[59] Now Epiphanius refutes this from the scriptural passages already indicated, in which it is certain that the discourse concerns man whether fallen, or restored, or still lying in his fall. To these he adds a third testimony from Ps. 38: "Yet in an image man passes through." But this locus proves nothing of the sort. For it does not say *in the image of God*, but only *in an image*. Nor is anything else signified by those words than that man, like a vain shadow (which is the image of a thing, not the thing itself), passes through the course of this life — according to that of Wis. 2: "A shadow is the passing of our time."

§ 17. Now it must be known that what is rebuked in Origen by these two Fathers is found not infrequently in other Fathers as well, with whom Origen surely deserves an equal indulgence, if he said this in an equal sense. For the Fathers often speak of the image (*imago*) in such a way as to involve in it simultaneously that likeness (*similitudo*) according to supernatural gifts — that is, understanding by "image" that which is supremely similar and correspondent to its exemplar. Thus St. Ambrose, expounding the last verse of Ps. 118, interprets the image of God as: the image of justice, of wisdom, of virtue.[60] This observation being made, we shall not wonder if we read in them from time to time that the image of God has been through sin not only obscured and deformed, but even blotted out and obliterated, and that it is renewed, restored, and reformed through Christ. In this manner speak St. Basil, *On the Holy Spirit* ch. 9, and in his *Commentary on Psalm 148*, on the words: "Man, when he was in honour, did not understand; he was compared to the senseless beasts and made like unto them" — to wit: he was made like to beasts, not by losing the rational nature, but by losing the ornaments of grace.[61] St. Ambrose, Book 7 (*On Luke*, on the passage about living riotously), and Book 10, on ch. 22 (*A dispute arose among the disciples*), and the Commentary of the same title on Paul, on 1 Cor. 15: "Let us bear the image of the heavenly."[62] St. Augustine, Book 6 (*On Genesis to the Letter*, chs. 24, 27, 28), *On the Spirit and the Letter* chs. 27, 28, Book 2 (*Against Adimantus*) ch. 5, *Eighty-three Questions* question 67, in the Expositions of Ps. 57, 70, 94, and in Sermon 50 (*a*).[63] St. Cyril, Book 4 of the *Thesaurus* ch. 1, Book 13 ch. 2, *On John* Book 2 ch. 3, Book 10 ch. 56, Book 11 ch. 26.[64] Leo, Sermon 1 (*on the fast of the tenth month*),[65] and Theophylact (*on Nahum 2*).[66] All these consider the image of God in a certain perfection of its own. Which perfection is, in the attached name of "likeness" (*similitudo*), signified — according to the opinion of many Fathers likewise — as we taught above. The Church herself followed this manner of speaking, when in the secret prayer for petitioning charity she prays thus: "O God,

who renewest us unto thy image by sacraments and precepts." Nevertheless, that this signification of the image of God is not congruent with that Scripture which testifies that we were made to the image of God — this St. Augustine also understood, after Epiphanius and St. Jerome; and therefore, retracting several of the above passages in Book 1 (*of the Retractions* ch. 26, and Book 2 ch. 24), he explains in what sense he wishes his words to be understood: "What I said" — he declares in the later passage — "that Adam by sin lost the image of God according to which he was made, is not to be taken as meaning that none of it remained in him, but that it was so deformed as to stand in need of reformation."[67] So he. Now the Fathers who speak in that manner appear to have had in view not so much the Scripture of Genesis as certain Pauline sentences, such as these and the like: 1 Cor. 15: "Let us bear the image of the heavenly"; Eph. 4: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man who was created according to God in justice and the holiness of truth"; Col. 3: "Put on the new man who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of him who created him."[68] But in these passages the Apostle speaks not of that image to which man was first created, but of that to which he is to be re-created and reformed through the grace of Christ. The exemplar and prototype of which image is Christ himself — not as he is God, nor as he is man if only his nature is regarded alone, but as he is man adorned with every kind of virtue in his soul, and as regards his body now endowed with blessed immortality. For it is to this kind of exemplar that Christians are reformed through that exemplar himself, Christ Jesus. And so much concerning the image (*imago*).

§ 18. Now if it be asked whether the likeness (*similitudo*) of God perished in man through sin, the reply is easy from what has been said above concerning the signification of likeness. For if by the name of likeness, as most do, you understand the perfection of the image according to the virtues by which we are made God-formed (*Deiformes*), it is plain that the likeness of God perished through sin. But if likeness is the same as image, then the same answer will be given as was given concerning the image — namely, that it did not entirely perish, but that being deformed by sin it stands in need of reformation. For that it did not perish we learn from the testimony of the Apostle James, who in ch. 3, speaking of the tongue, says: "By it we bless God and the Father, and by it we curse men, who are made to the likeness of God."[69] For he does not signify that the likeness of God was lost in the first man, but that it still permanently abides in man, and that therefore it is unworthy for man to curse man.

§ I — What is the bodily formation of man (Quae hominis formatio secundum corpus)

§ 19. The creation (*creatio*) of man according to body (*corpus*) and soul (*anima*) Scripture describes briefly in Gen. 2 thus: "The Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life." These words teach that man is composed of a twofold principle — corporeal, that is, and incorporeal — as a kind of intermediary between both natures, and, as St. John Damascene says,[25] as a bond of visible and invisible nature. Concerning the formation of the body four things are to be considered: matter (*materia*), temperament (*temperamentum*), age (*aetas*), and stature (*statura*). For concerning figure (*figura*) something has already been said in the preceding distinction.[71]

§ 20. As regards matter (*materia*), Scripture openly says that man was made *from the slime of the earth* — or, as the Hebrew and Chaldaean have it, with the seventy also consenting, *from the dust of the earth*. Which

word even St. John Chrysostom urges with special emphasis in his Commentary.[72] Nor indeed are these two things inconsistent — that man was made from slime and from dust — since slime is made from dust mixed with water. Wherefore our translator, rendering *pulvere* ("dust") as *limo* ("slime"), wished to signify that the matter from which the body of man was made was not pure dust — as pure dust, owing to its tenuousness and dryness, is not formable into a single solid body — but dust mixed with water, that is, mud or earthy slime, such as potters are wont to use for their craft. To this pertains also the fact that both the Hebrew word and the Greek word each signify *to form*, and *figulus* ("potter") is the proper term — for which we have *formavit* ("he formed"). For Moses here introduces God as a kind of potter forming and fashioning the body of man from mud.

§ 21. Now there are three reasons that can be adduced why man was formed from matter of this kind. The first (*Una*), that by this the admirable Wisdom of the Creator might be shown, who was able to make a noble creature from a base thing. For earth is the basest and lowest of all bodies. The second (*Altera*), to repress human elation, should man ever be excessively pleased with himself either on account of the excellence of his nature or for any other reason. The consideration of this origin brings great momentum toward humility. Hence Abraham said (Gen. 18): "I will speak to my Lord, when I am but dust and ashes." And Ecclesiasticus cries out against the pride of man, ch. 10: "Why is earth and ashes proud?" Similarly also Isaiah, ch. 45: "Woe to him who contradicts his maker, a potsherd of the shards of the earth." And finally to the first man and through him to all the human race it was said (Gen. 3): "Dust you are, and unto dust you shall return." The third reason (*Tertia*) is that the matter should correspond to his form (*forma*). For since the rational soul (*anima rationalis*) is in potency (*potentia*) toward manifold operations, it was necessary that matter tractable and formable be subjected to it — which above all else is mud. Though this is not stated in Genesis where the creation is written, Scripture nonetheless designates the matter of the human body elsewhere, as in Job 10, Is. 33, Is. 64, and Jer. 18.[73]

§ 22. Furthermore, just as the body of man was formed from earth not without water — as we have said — so it is probable that the remaining two elements also entered into this mixture of matter from which the body of man was to be fashioned, inasmuch as the human body is composed of the four elements, as are also the other perfectly mixed bodies. But it is called "slime" or "mud" — which is from earth and water — alone, because these two elements excel the others in the composition of the human body according to bulk, and are also the more perceptible to the senses. Now as for what has been reported by some, that something was also taken from the fifth essence (*quinta essentia*), that is, from the celestial nature, which was to be mingled with the matter of the human body so that it might be as a middle bond of sorts through which the soul — whose nature is incorporeal — might be joined to the body: this is rightly rejected by theologians versed in natural philosophy as a fiction wholly inconsistent with true philosophy. For the nature of celestial bodies is incorruptible and unalterable. Wherefore it is impossible that anything from thence should be drawn off into the composition of the human body.

§ 23. Now as regards the temperament (*temperamentum*) of the human body — which they call complexion (*complexio*) — it is indeed, in comparison with the other animate beings, most excellent, inasmuch as it subsists in a mixed body that is most excellent of all according to nature. For in man the approach to equality and due proportion is closer than in the others, and man is further removed from excess in the primary qualities (*qualitates primae*). Now this perfection of temperament in man is argued from the excellence of touch (*tactus*), which sense, with the whole body as its instrument, resides through it, and

consists precisely in the due-proportion of the primary qualities, inasmuch as it is perceptive of those same qualities. Hence there follows in the human body, above all other bodies, the pre-eminence both of the interior senses and of the remaining four exterior senses. For where the temperament is most excellent, there also are the sense-organs; and consequently the senses themselves must be at their best. And of the interior senses this is beyond controversy. Concerning the exterior senses this same thing can be shown from what the Philosopher (*philosophus*) transmits in Book 5 (*On the Generation of Animals*, ch. 1),[74] which we here omit for the sake of brevity.

§ 24. Concerning age (*aetas*) — which was the third point — St. Augustine raises the question in Book 6 (*On Genesis to the Letter*, ch. 13): namely, whether Adam was formed in the perfect age, that is, in youth or manhood, or in such a state as would correspond to our boyhood or infancy, and from which he would have progressed to more perfect ages.[75] Although St. Augustine defines nothing expressly, he indicates sufficiently that the first part of the question pleases him more — and rightly so. For it was fitting that those first works of God, which he fashioned in the beginning, should all be perfect. Hence, just as the other animals were from the beginning made perfect in the size of their bodies and in age, so concerning man, who was immediately about to receive dominion over all the rest, it must all the more be thought. This is even openly shown from the fact that as soon as Adam and Eve were created, they heard from the Lord: "Increase and multiply." From which it is established that both were created in an already firm age, being fit for generation. For generating belongs to those animals that have already attained the full growth of their bodies — and this is the common opinion both of the Master (in this Distinction),[76] and of all the Scholastics.

§ 25. If you ask to what age precisely — that is, to what number of years — they were created as corresponding, most rightly think that they were created at that age which Christ had when he died and rose again, which corresponds, namely, to about the thirty-fourth year of age. For that age is held to be full and perfect. It must be known, however, that this age could not have been adapted to the same number of years at the beginning of the human race. For just as men then lived for a very long time, so they arrived at perfect age later — perhaps around the sixtieth or seventieth year, or even later. Since indeed, before the flood, no one is read to have begotten children before the sixtieth year of age, as may be seen from Gen. 5, where the series of generations is woven from Adam to Noah, with the enumeration of the years at which each begat. From which it is now also gathered that the first man had the longest life reckoned from perfect age, beyond all those whose longevity Scripture has expressed. For Adam lived 930 years, while Methuselah, who surpassed the others in number of years, lived 969 years; from which, if you subtract the first sixty years preceding perfect age, you may easily conjecture thence how much longer was the life of Adam than that of Methuselah, if the years of each are reckoned from perfect age. By this reasoning, if anyone says that Adam lived longest of all mortals — with the exception only of those who, translated from human fellowship, have not yet tasted death — he will seem to be saying nothing improbable.

§ 26. The last point was stature (*statura*) and bodily bulk (*moles corporis*), of which we say briefly, as of age, that the first man was made in perfect bodily size according to every dimension. For perfect age brings that magnitude as the term of the natural growth of bodies. Nor indeed would a woman have been apt enough for carrying a fetus in the womb had she not had a body of due magnitude. Although this same point we have already noted above as rightly shown also from the example of the other animals.

§ 27. Now there are some who are of the opinion that Adam, as regards bodily bulk, was a giant — and indeed the greatest of all who ever lived. They endeavour to prove this from Josh. 14, where it is read: "The

name of Hebron was formerly called Kiriath-Arba; Adam, the greatest among the Anakim, was laid there."[77] For St. Jerome interprets this of Adam the first man (*in the Commentary on Matt. 27*): that Adam was the greatest among the Anakim; and indeed the Anakim were famous giants above all others, as is established from Num. 13, Deut. 1, 2, and 9. Therefore it plainly appears that Adam surpassed also all other mortals in bodily bulk. But this opinion is easily refuted. First, because gigantic size is monstrous and contrary to nature, as the naturalists teach. For which reason it is by no means to be attributed to the first man, who was created perfect. That it is monstrous is proved, because in magnitude there is excess just as there is defect. Defect is seen in dwarfs; therefore excess in giants. For there are no others in whom excess of just magnitude can be noted. Second, because Scripture testifies (Gen. 6) that giants first arose only when the human race was corrupted by many and most grievous vices — on account of which the flood was afterward brought upon the world — that is, long after the death of Adam. Third, because Scripture never speaks of giants in a good sense, but almost always in a bad sense. Indeed the poets of the Gentiles speak of them almost always in a bad sense as well — as of those who attempted to drive Jupiter from heaven, and at Virgil concerning the Cyclopes. Likewise Scripture speaks of them as proud and trusting in their own virtue and strength: see Bar. 3. Nor does that of Ps. 18 stand in the way: "He exulted as a giant" — for there in Hebrew it is not *gigas* but *potens* ("the powerful one").

§ 28. Fourth, because Christ, whose bodily size was as perfect as his age, was not of gigantic but of middling stature. Finally, because the said opinion rests on no authority. For what is adduced from the book of Joshua has a far different meaning. For Adam in that place is not a proper name, but a common noun, meaning "man"; and the sense is: that the town of Hebron was formerly called Kiriath-Arba, that is, the town of Arba, who was the greatest man among the Anakim — that is, the giants so called. This sense is confirmed by what is said in the immediately following chapter: that Caleb took possession of Kiriath-Arba the father of Anak. Therefore Arba was the father of Anak the giant, whose sons likewise, being giants, were called after the name of their father "Anakim"; and these giants themselves generated giants from themselves, whom Scripture calls the sons of the Anakim. Of all of these, Arba was the greatest — either in stature and bodily bulk, or in the renown of his name and deeds — although in Hebrew it is not *maximus* ("greatest") but *magnus* ("great").

§ II — The formation of man according to the soul is expounded (Exponitur hominis formatio secundum animam)

§ 29. Concerning the other and more excellent part of man, Moses adds in sequence: "And he breathed into his face the breath of life (*spiraculum vitae*)." In which statement, although some — among whom are St. Ambrose (*in the exposition of Psalm 128, Sermon 10*) and St. Cyril (*On John*, Book 2, ch. 3) — understand by "the breath of life" the Holy Spirit infused into man for the living of life in a holy and spiritual manner; in the same way as the same Holy Spirit is read to have been given to the Apostles through insufflation (Jn. 20): nevertheless, since in this passage there is added as if by way of explanation, "And man became a living soul," the truer interpretation is that which St. Augustine transmits in Book 13 (*On the City of God*, ch. 24) and which most follow: that by "the breath of life" the soul (*anima*) itself is to be understood, which is designated not infrequently by the name "spirit" (*spiritus*) in the Scriptures.[79] It is called "breath of life" (*spiraculum vitae*) in the Hebrew manner of speaking for what is the vital or vivifying breath, because through the soul man lives. Now in what sense God is said to have breathed this breath of life into the face of man, St. Augustine

expounds in Book 7 (*On Genesis to the Letter*, chs. 2–3):[80] For he breathed not as though emitting something from his own substance into man — as this...

§ 30. — those perverse Gnostics, and after them the Manichees, understood it, teaching that the soul is a part of the substance of God (to whose opinion certain words of Lactantius, written by him in book 2 of the *Divinarum Institutionum*, are not a little close)[81] — but rather "He breathed into," because He made a spirit or breath, that is, a soul, in man. For to breathe (*spirare*) is to make or produce a spirit (*spiritum facere seu producere*). The reason, moreover, why God is said to have breathed peculiarly into the face of man — even though there is no doubt that this inspiration of the soul was accomplished into the whole body — is twofold: first, because in the face, above all other members of the human body, the senses are vigorous; and second, because the human face, naturally looking upward, is the sign of a soul not of just any kind, but of that which is proper to man, that is, the rational soul (*anima rationalis*) — and thus, according to our version, the expression is fittingly used.

It must not, however, be passed over that certain interpreters prefer to render the word not as "face" but as "nostrils" (*nares*) from the Hebrew, and they think that Moses used this word because the nostrils are the instrument of breathing, and breathing is a certain and infallible sign of life. Hence, according to this version, one would have to say that to breathe into the nostrils the breath of life is to breathe into someone the spirit by which we breathe, and consequently life itself, or the soul, which is most aptly signified by a spirit of this kind. Hence in the Greek not *πνεῦμα* but *πνοή* is read, a word which signifies a breath and an inspiration — a point also noted by St. Augustine.[82]

Furthermore, in what sense that which follows is to be understood — "And man was made into a living soul" (*Et factus est homo in animam viventem*) — will be explained below.[83]

§ III — Whether the body of Adam was made before the soul (An corpus Adae fuerit factum ante animam)

§ 31. From the words of Scripture, in which it is said that God formed man from the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, it can appear that in the formation of man this order was observed: that the body was first formed in time, and that thereafter the soul was breathed into it. This is indeed not obscurely indicated in 4 Ezra, ch. 3, by these words: "Thou, O Lord, gavest unto Adam a dead body; yet it was itself the work of Thy hands, and Thou didst breathe into him the spirit of life."[85] For he calls the body "dead" in respect of that time during which it lacked a soul.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93.

2. St. Augustine, *De Divinitate* VII, ch. 6; *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, ch. 16; *De Genesi ad litteram* III, ch. 19; and *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 6.

3. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 10.

4. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 8.

5. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* III (not far after the beginning), bk. 3 near the end, and bk. 4 around the middle.

6. Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1.

7. Bede, cited by the Master in his text.
8. The Master, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, §§ D, E, and dist. 28, at the end.
9. Cf. below, at Distinctio 27, bk. 1.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 9.
11. St. Augustine, *Liber octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 51.
12. St. Augustine, *Liber octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 51 (the same place cited above).
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 6, in the body of the article.
14. Cf. the preceding Book (Bk. I), at Dist. 27.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, aa. 6 and 7.
16. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 17.
17. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 7.
18. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, ch. 12; and *Contra Faustum* XXIV, ch. 2.
19. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 9.
20. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* VI, ch. 8.
21. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Damasum de Filio prodigo*.
22. St. Bernard, *Sermo de Annuntiatione Dominica*.
23. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homilies 8 and 9; *Homilia 7 ad populum Antiochenum*.
24. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Creatione Hominis*, ch. 17.
25. St. John Damascene, *De Fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 12.
26. St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, ch. 18; and *Tractatus 8 super Epistolam I Joannis*.
27. Epiphanius, in the heresy of the Audians; in the *Ancoratus*; and in the *Epistola ad Joannem Hierosolymitanum*.
28. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, last chapter.
29. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, Homily 35.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 3.
31. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, ch. 12; *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 17; *Liber octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 51.
32. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 7; ibid. XIII, ch. 3.
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 4.
34. Author of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* attributed to St. Augustine, qq. 21 and 24.
35. Author of the *Commentarii in Paulum* under the title of Ambrose (*Ambrosiaster*), on 1 Cor. 11.
36. Words of St. Julitta as recited by St. Basil, Homily 5.
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 1, ad 1.
38. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus* XIII, ch. 3.
39. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 2.
40. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* VI (the passage cited above by us).
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 6.
42. St. Augustine, *Liber octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 51; and *Quaestiones super Deuteronomium*, q. 4.
43. St. Bernard, *Super Cantica*, Homilies 80 and 81.
44. Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses* III, ch. 20.

45. Cyprian, *Tractatus de Patientia*.

46. Origen, *Periarchon* (De Principiis) III, ch. 6.

47. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Creatione Hominis* (Hexaemeron).

48. St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* VI, ch. 7 and 8; *De Dignitate hominis*, ch. 3.

49. St. Jerome, *Super Ezechielem*, ch. 28.

50. Victorinus Afer, *Adversus Arium* I.

51. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 9.

52. Theodoret, *Quaestiones super Genesim*, q. 20.

53. Eucherius of Lyon, *Super Genesim* I.

54. Rupert, *In Genesim* II, ch. 3 and 5.

55. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones super Deuteronomium*, q. 4.

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 4, ad 3.

57. St. Bernard, Sermon 1 *On the Annunciation of the Lord*.

58. Epiphanius, *Epistle to John of Jerusalem*; St. Jerome, *Epistle to Pammachius* (written against the errors of John of Jerusalem), ch. 3.

59. Origen, *Homiliae in Leviticum*, Homily 2.

60. St. Ambrose, *Exposition of Psalm 118* (final verse).

61. St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 9; and *Commentary on Psalm 148*, on the verse: "Man when he was in honour did not understand."

62. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* VII (on the passage about riotous living); *In Lucam* X, on ch. 22 (on the dispute among the disciples); Commentary on Paul, on 1 Cor. 15 ("Let us bear the image of the heavenly").

63. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, chs. 24, 27, 28; *De Spiritu et littera*, chs. 27, 28; *Contra Adimantum* II, ch. 5; *Liber octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 67; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 57, 70, 94; Sermon 50 (or, as noted by the editors, Sermon 142, ch. 4, in the Benedictine edition, vol. V, on the words "man unto the image").

64. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus* IV, ch. 1; *Thesaurus* XIII, ch. 2; *In Ioannem* II, ch. 3; *In Ioannem* X, ch. 56; *In Ioannem* XI, ch. 26.

65. Pope Leo I, Sermon 1 *On the fast of the tenth month*.

66. Theophylact, *On Nahum* 2.

67. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 26; and *Retractationes* II, ch. 24.

68. 1 Cor. 15; Eph. 4; Col. 3.

69. Jas. 3.

70. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91 (whole).

71. The preceding Distinction (Dist. 16, § I).

72. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim* (Commentary).

73. Job 10; Is. 33; Is. 64; Jer. 18.

74. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium* V, ch. 1.

75. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, ch. 13.

76. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, dist. 17.

77. Josh. 14; St. Jerome, *Commentary on Matt.* 27; Num. 13; Deut. 1, 2, 9; Bar. 3; Ps. 18.

78. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90 (whole).

79. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 24; Jn. 20.

80. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, chs. 2–3.

81. Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum* II [abbreviation as in source].

82. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 24.

83. Below, at Dist. 19.

84. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91, a. 4.

85. 4 Ezra (2 Esdras), ch. 3.

DISTINCTIO XVII — ON THE FORMATION OF THE HUMAN BODY AND THE NATURE OF THE RATIONAL SOUL (*DE FORMATIONE CORPORIS HUMANI ET NATURA ANIMAE RATIONALIS*)

§ 1. To the same effect are the very clear words of St. John Chrysostom in Homilies 12 and 13 on Genesis.[1] St. Augustine also appears to have held this view when, in *The City of God*, book 13, chapter 24,[2] he shows in what manner that body made from clay and not yet animated is rightly called a man — namely, by that manner of speaking whereby a part sometimes claims for itself the name of the whole. There is added also the argument from the natural generation of man, which proceeds in the following order: that the body is first formed in time in the mother's womb, and thereafter the soul is infused into the body thus formed. There is nothing to prevent this same order from having been observed also in the first creation of man, since Scripture does not stand in the way but rather favours this opinion.

§ 2. But on the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa, in his book *On Man*, chapters 29 and 30,[3] and St. John Damascene, book 2, *On the Orthodox Faith*, chapter 12,[4] teach something different. Their opinion is that the body of the first man was not made before the soul, nor the soul before the body, but that both were made simultaneously — that is, man constituted from both together. St. Augustine also hints at something of this kind in his book *On Genesis against the Manichees*, chapter 8.[5]

§ 3. Concerning this matter, St. Thomas writes as follows:[6] "Some," he says, "have understood that the body of man was first formed in time, and that afterwards God infused the soul into the body already formed. But it is contrary to the perfection of the first institution of things that God should have made either a body without a soul or a soul without a body, since both are parts of human nature; and what is also more incongruous with respect to the body, which depends on the soul, and not conversely." So he. By these words he indicates the argument that the perfection of a part depends on the whole, and therefore a part outside the whole is always imperfect. Now this imperfection is repugnant to the first institution of things.

§ 4. Moreover, the points adduced on the contrary side, if they be rightly understood, will be found not to be opposed to this opinion. For those who hold that the body was made simultaneously with the soul do not deny that prime matter, earth, and clay, preceded in time the infusion of the soul. Nor can they deny that the shaping of the clay — which is a successive motion — and certain other prior dispositions of matter, were temporally prior to the infusion of the soul; but they deny that the human body, that is, one having the ultimate disposition of this kind of body whereby it was already apt to be informed by the soul, existed even for a single moment of time without the soul. For the instant of the ultimate disposition of the body towards receiving the soul and the instant of the infusion of the soul itself are one and the same — and this is true not only of the first man but also of all others. For the ultimate disposition towards a form is always simultaneous

in time with the form itself, in those things that pertain to nature. But if you understand by "the human body" that which is being prepared by certain prior alterations to receive the soul of man, even though the ultimate disposition is still lacking, then it is truly and rightly said, in this sense, that the body of the first man, no less than that of all others, exists in time prior to the infusion of the soul into it.

§ 5. With this consideration in view, it is easy to reconcile the opinions that appear to be in conflict. For some speak of the body as already perfectly formed, and others of the body as it is still in the process of formation and is on the way toward the ultimate disposing form. Although in what Scripture narrates — that God made man from the clay of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life — it is not necessary to understand a temporal order, as if He first formed man from the clay and afterwards breathed a soul into him. For as St. Thomas says at the place cited above,[7] what comes later can be taken as an exposition of what comes before, because the soul is the form of the body — even though Scripture does not say that God formed the body of man but that He formed man; namely, to signify that the terminus of the formation was not a body void of soul, into which the soul was afterwards to be infused, but rather a man, who is not without a soul. As for what has been adduced from 4 Esdras,[8] it is either to be understood according to the aforesaid reconciliation, of a body not yet perfectly formed — which can indeed improperly be called dead insofar as it does not yet possess the soul of which it is receptive — or it is to be rejected as apocryphal.

§ IV — That the rational soul is incorporeal (Animam rationalem esse incorpoream)

§ 6. Concerning the soul, which is the nobler part of man, we must now treat more fully. Regarding it, this above all is to be held as certain: that it is incorporeal (*incorporea*) and immaterial (*immaterialis*) — that is, such as undergoes extension (*extensionem*) neither through itself, as bodies do, nor through accident, as the accidents of bodies do, and which in no way depends according to its substance upon matter. By this formal character (*ratio*) the rational soul is distinguished even from all other substantial forms (*formis substantialibus*), and therefore also from the sensitive and vegetative soul. All of these, because they inhere through matter, are corporeal and material. Although, therefore, the rational soul has this in common with the other forms of bodies — that it is not itself a body (for no form is a body; otherwise there would be two bodies simultaneously — by which argument the Philosopher proves in Book II of *De Anima* that no soul is a body, a proof that is common to every form existing in a body)[10] — yet this is proper and peculiar to the rational soul among all forms of corporeal things: that it is incorporeal and immaterial.

§ 7. The first proof of this doctrine is from Sacred Scripture, in which the human soul is very often called *spirit*, as at Ps. 30, Ps. 145, the last chapter of Eccl., Dan. 3, 2 Macc. 7, likewise Lk. 23, Acts 24,[11] 1 Cor. 2, 1 Thess. 5, Heb. 4:12, and other places. Nor is this proof to be thought weak on the ground that in the Scriptures the souls of beasts are also sometimes called *spirit*, as at Eccl. 3 in these words: "Who knows whether the spirit of the sons of Adam ascends upward and the spirit of beasts descends downward?" For it is exceedingly rare that this name is attributed to the souls of beasts. Hence it is understood that the term is not applied to them in as proper a sense as to human souls. And to signify this, Scripture sometimes distinguishes between the *soul* of man and the *spirit* of man — as in the Canticle of the Three Young Men, and in 1 Thess. 5, and in Heb. 4 — which it never does in the case of beasts. From this it is gathered that there is something proper to the soul of man on account of which it can and ought to be called *spirit* in preference to the souls of

brute animals, and that the soul of man is so truly a soul that it is also a spirit — that is, a spiritual and incorporeal form — whereas the soul of a brute is not.

§ 8. Moreover, Paul in 1 Cor. 2 sufficiently shows that in a special manner the soul of man is a spirit, when he speaks of the spirit of man and the Spirit of God in analogous fashion: "For who among men knows the things that are of man, except the spirit of man which is in him? So also the things that are of God no one knows except the Spirit of God." If you object that the spirit of man is similarly joined with the spirit of beasts in the Scripture adduced above: I answer that they are indeed joined together, but not in the same way — indeed not so much joined as set apart. For in the Apostle a certain comparison is drawn between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man in respect of knowing what is within each; whereas in Ecclesiastes a manifest diversity is signified between the spirit of man and the spirit of beasts — namely, that the former ascends upward, that is, is immortal, while the latter descends downward, that is, perishes together with the body — though Ecclesiastes by his interrogative formulation wished to indicate that this distinction is known to but few mortals.

§ 9. But if, as some maintain, the proof of this doctrine from those Scriptures which call the soul of man a *spirit* is therefore of little certainty, on the ground that that name is also read as attributed to corporeal things: then neither will there be a certain proof from Scripture that God is incorporeal from those Scriptures which declare God to be spirit. Yet no one would say this, since the Fathers everywhere employ that proof as most firm. And finally, in this way the proof from a term which always bears the same meaning in Scripture would always be uncertain. But to say this is quite absurd. Therefore we say that a proof of this kind is good and valid, provided that it is evident — whether from the manner of speaking of Scripture, or from the circumstances of the passages, or from some other formal character — in which sense the term from which the argument is drawn is to be taken. Hence also we showed above (at Dist. 8)[12] that a solid proof is obtained from Scripture that the Angels are incorporeal, from the fact that they are called *Spirits* in Scripture. Yet it must be admitted that the argument for the soul of man from the fact that it is called at Gen. 2 "the breath of life" (*spiraculum vitae*) is not equally solid. For there both in the Hebrew and in the Greek the word is different from the one which signifies *spirit* in the sense in which that word is customarily attributed to God and the Angels in Scripture. Hence our [Latin] translator (*interpres noster*) also did not render it as *spiritus* but as *spiraculum* — that is, breath. This same fact St. Augustine likewise observed, though only as regards the Greek term, in Book XIII of *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 24.[2]

§ 10. The second proof, and one far more evident, is from the doctrine of the Fathers and indeed of the Church herself, whose perpetual tradition it is that the soul which we have — that is, the intellective or rational soul — is incorporeal. Not even those who suspended judgment concerning the Angels, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, doubted this — such as St. Augustine and St. Bernard. For indeed St. Augustine in *De Haeresibus* 86[13] attributes to Tertullian the error of saying that the soul is corporeal. And although he denies that Tertullian was made a heretic on this account, he nonetheless condemns the opinion, both in that place and more openly in Book II of *De Anima et ejus Origine*, ch. 9,[14] where he says that this opinion belongs among the ravings of Tertullian (*deliramenta Tertulliani*). And he argues against it at length in Book IV of the same work, chs. 12 and following.[15] The same St. Augustine in Epistle 100 to Evodius,[16] says: "I by no means believe that the soul departs from the body together with the body." See also his Epistle 28 to St. Jerome,[17] and Epistle 157 to Optatus,[18] in which he affirms that he believes this. Likewise in his *Exposition of Psalm 118* and in *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 16,[19] where he proves it by reason. St. Bernard moreover in Sermon 40

on the *Cantica*[20] attributes to the soul an incorporeal substance and a spiritual essence; likewise in the book *De Interiori Domo*, ch. 67,[21] (a) he compares the soul to God, in that just as God is wholly everywhere, so the soul is wholly in every part of its body. And in Sermon 5 *in variis*[22] he says that, because the soul is incorporeal, it cannot be in a bodily place — even though the soul itself may err to the extent of not knowing how to think of itself except as corporeal.

§ 11. Furthermore, the testimonies of the other Fathers, which are very numerous, there is no need to rehearse, since there is less reason to doubt in their case — and least of all in the case of the Scholastics, among all of whom the concurring judgment (*concors sententia*) is that the rational soul, like the angelic nature, is incorporeal and immaterial. Nor is this surprising, since at the time of the nascent Scholastic Theology, under Innocent III, in the great Lateran Council, can. 1,[23] a decree of this kind was issued: that "God created both kinds of creature from nothing — the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane — and then the human, as it were common to both, constituted of spirit and body." By these words it is most plainly signified that the spirit of which man is composed together with a body is so properly a spirit that it pertains to the genus of spiritual, not corporeal, creature. On this matter more was said above at Dist. 8.[12]

§ 12. The third proof contains arguments from reason, and those of multiple kinds.

First: The rational soul can know and understand immaterial things — such as God and the Angelic Spirits — both when separated from the body and when conjoined to it; therefore its own nature must also be immaterial. This argument belongs not only to the Philosopher and the Scholastic Theologians, but also to St. Augustine himself, in the book *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 14.[24]

Second: The soul is whole in the whole body, and no less whole in any part of the body, as the Fathers teach, expressly St. Augustine in Book VI of *De Trinitate*, ch. 6,[25] and St. Bernard as cited above. Hence it cannot be divided even by accident through the division of the body — but this is the property of no corporeal form; indeed it cannot be the property of any corporeal form. For it is contrary to the formal character (*ratio*) of an extended form. This is the reasoning of St. Augustine in *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 16.[26]

Third: The intellect, which is the proper power (*potentia*) of the rational soul, is altogether incorporeal and immaterial; for which reason it also has no bodily organ or instrument (*organum seu instrumentum corporeum*): therefore the soul itself is incorporeal and immaterial, for an immaterial power cannot inhere in the essence of a material and corporeal form. Now that the intellect has no instrument, this is the doctrine of Aristotle in Book III of *De Anima*, ch. 4,[27] received by all both Theologians and sound philosophers.

Fourth: The rational soul according to the Catholic Faith is separable from the body — and this indeed by its own nature, given the mortality of the body; whence its immortality is also proved. This matter will be treated formally at Dist. 43 of Book IV.[28] But no corporeal form is separable. For that which has extension (*extensionem*) can in no way subsist outside of matter without a miracle: therefore the rational soul is not corporeal.

Fifth: The rational soul is not from traduction (*ex traduce*), as the ancient doctrine of the Church holds; therefore it is incorporeal. For if it were corporeal, nothing prevents it from being from traduction, after the manner of irrational souls. Hence, whatever arguments prove that the soul of man is not from traduction (which topic will be treated below in its proper place)[29] — those same arguments consequently avail to prove that it is incorporeal. Indeed, the Fathers, in refuting the traduction of souls, used this argument above all

others: that the soul is incorporeal. For this they held as something certain and indubitable — even those who doubted about the soul's traduction, as we showed above concerning St. Augustine.

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§ V — Certain objections to the contrary are resolved (Solvuntur quaedam in contrarium objectiones)

§ 13. Against the foregoing doctrine certain objections are raised.

First: Scripture at Lk. 16 attributes members to separated souls — namely, eyes and a tongue to the soul of Dives, and a finger to the soul of Lazarus. And from that evangelical passage Haimo in his Homily for the Second Sunday after the Octave of Pentecost[31] says that the question is resolved whether souls have members in the likeness of a body — clearly indicating that the answer is to be given affirmatively, on account of the words of the Gospel which sound to that effect. But a thing cannot have members unless it is itself some kind of integral whole consisting of members, and therefore a corporeal thing.

Second: The soul is in the whole body as a form informing it, and not merely as a mover — as an Angel is where it operates — nor merely as efficient or conserving cause — as God is in all things. But that which is in matter as informing it seems necessarily to be extended together with the matter, if it occupies several parts of matter, as is evident with other forms that are in matter: therefore the soul too is extended throughout the body.

Third: The soul suffers from corporeal fire: therefore it is corporeal. The consequence is proved because a pure spirit cannot suffer from a body.

Fourth: From the fact that the parts of a divided animal have vital motion and operation, as we see in earthworms and other such creatures, it is inferred that the soul too is divided and remains divided in the parts. But something of this kind also occurs in the head, or arm, or hand of a man severed from the body. Indeed it is read of St. Denis and certain other Saints that after their heads were cut off they still spoke and walked some distance. This seems to be a certain sign of a soul divided into parts.

Fifth: Lactantius in *De Opificio Dei*, ch. 11,[32] writes that the soul is nourished through the pipe that leads to the lung, just as through the one that leads to the stomach the body is nourished; and indeed he calls the soul in the same passage an incorporeal spirit, but in the same sense in which air is called incorporeal — that is, thin and subtle — and he describes it as sustained by the humor of blood as a flame is by oil. But that which needs corporeal nourishment must necessarily be corporeal.

Sixth: John Cassian in *Collationes*, conference 7, ch. 13,[33] and Gennadius in *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 11,[34] expressly deny that the soul is incorporeal, on the ground that God alone is incorporeal.

Seventh: The Seventh Universal Council (session 5)[35] approves the words of a certain John, Bishop of Thessalonica, among which was contained, among other things, that human souls are not wholly incorporeal, but endowed with a certain subtle body, as it were aerial or fiery; and there similarly the same reason is adduced, namely that God alone is incorporeal.

§ 14. But to these we reply:

To the first, that Scripture attributes members to separated souls in the same way as it everywhere attributes them to God — namely metaphorically, to signify certain actions or spiritual passions otherwise unknown to us through the senses. How, moreover, the evangelical narrative concerning Dives and Lazarus is to be understood will be said at the last distinction of Book IV.[36] In that same place also what Haimo means when he says that from that narrative the question is resolved whether souls have members will be explained.

To the second, it is answered that the rational soul is indeed in the body as a form informing it — yet not as other forms, but as a form that is purely spiritual and does not need matter in order to subsist; and therefore it does not follow that it is extended through matter after the manner of other forms. This can be explained as follows: if God were to make an Angel inform a body that it moves, the Angel would not on that account need to be extended, but would be wholly in each part.

To the third, the reply is to be sought from what was said at Dist. 44 of Book IV,[37] where it is disputed whether the fire of hell is corporeal.

To the fourth, one must say that in the parts of a dismembered man there is no progressive local motion (*motus localis progressionis*) such as we see in the parts of an earthworm, but only a certain motion of contraction and extension of the veins, which is produced by the vital spirits still remaining there after the soul's departure, on account of the vital heat (*calorem vitalem*) persisting for a while. Or else it would have to be said, with Scotus and some others, that the rational soul is indeed not divided, but that the sensitive soul in man can be divided, as in other animals, inasmuch as it is in reality distinct from the rational soul.[38] As for what is read to have occurred in the Saints, it was a miracle. For God can miraculously bring it about that, just as the soul was previously in the conjoined parts, so the same and undivided soul remains in the separated parts — just as He can bring it about that the same Angel operates simultaneously in the East and the West, and, what is more, that one and the same soul simultaneously informs diverse and spatially separated integral bodies. Although perhaps it is not necessary to have recourse to this. For by angelic ministry such a thing could have been exhibited in a body or its part without the presence of the soul, as happens in assumed bodies. It could also be that, with the rational soul absent, progressive motion was produced by the sensitive soul alone, according to those who hold the sensitive soul to be in reality distinct from the rational.

To the fifth, it is answered that Lactantius is not very consistent with himself. For in ch. 19 of the same book[39] he denies that the soul is born from traduction, precisely because it is not a body. Therefore if he said otherwise elsewhere, or expressed himself otherwise, his authority on this point is to be disregarded by us — as also that of those cited in the sixth argument. For we have already spoken accurately in general concerning the opinion of those who acknowledge nothing incorporeal besides God (at Dist. 3).[40]

As for what is to be replied to the last, let it be sought from the same place. For it is an argument common against both doctrines alike — both concerning the Angels and concerning souls.[41]

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§ VI — Whether it is of faith that the soul is incorporeal (An sit fidei animam esse incorpoream)

§ 15. It is asked whether it is to be held by faith that the rational soul is incorporeal. For this might seem to follow from certain of the things said above. First: because it appears to have been defined in the Fourth

Lateran Council. Second: because this doctrine belongs to the perpetual tradition of the Church. Third: because St. Augustine, in Epistle 157 (to Optatus), seems to speak of it as a dogma of faith.[43] But on the contrary, the first consideration working against this is that it has not yet been defined in the Church that Angels are incorporeal — and yet the nature of Angels is far more excellent than that of souls; wherefore it does not seem that this has been established for souls either. We therefore assert the proposition as probable.

§ 16. Those who have attributed to the soul a corporeal nature are never read to have been condemned by the Fathers for an error contrary to Catholic faith on that account; so much so that it has been expressly written by St. Augustine, and repeated, that Tertullian did not become a heretic on account of his having said that the soul is corporeal.[44] Third: if this had been a dogma of faith before the time of the Seventh Synod, that Synod would never, having heard words from the book of John, Bishop of Thessalonica — in which he denies not only Angels but souls also to be wholly incorporeal — have passed over so grave a matter with its silence, nor would it have admitted a proof of a Catholic dogma from words in which a heresy was intermixed. Therefore it seems one must say that, at least at that time, this had not yet been a dogma of faith. This will appear even more clearly if anyone examines more carefully that entire passage at the beginning of the fifth session.'[45] But neither, after that time, is anything defined on this matter to be found, except that which is objected from the Lateran Council. However, the same objection can equally be made with respect to Angels. And how that objection can be answered we stated when we treated the similar question concerning Angels.'[12] For not everything that is in any manner stated in the decrees of Councils is to be held as defined, but only those things to which the intention of those enacting and defining properly tends. This is known from the circumstances of the matters and from the causes or occasions for issuing the decrees.

§ 17. To the second objection it is answered that not every ecclesiastical tradition constitutes a dogma of faith, but only that which is established to be apostolic, or to which a definition of the Church has been added. For there are doctrines of ecclesiastical tradition by reason of having been handed down of old in the Church with the consent of many, yet not of all, or not in such a way that they were thought to belong to the dogmas of faith — as was also the case with the doctrine that souls are not born by propagation (*ex traduce*). But we have already shown from St. Augustine and from the Seventh Synod that this doctrine had not at that time been so received that the contrary position would be judged heretical. Nor did St. Augustine mean this in the Epistle to Optatus, which was the source of the third objection. For there he merely enumerates certain things of which he affirms that he believes them — that is, holds them as so certain that he thinks no one should doubt them. But whether he holds all those things in that passage as dogmas of faith he does not explain, nor can that be gathered from his words.

§ 18. Although, therefore, it would be great rashness and ignorance to deny that human souls are incorporeal, especially at this time when this doctrine is most widely received — and those eminent theologians who do not shrink from condemning it as erroneous and indeed heretical judge the author of that contrary opinion to have shown himself too lenient — the temerity and ignorance are indeed merited; since it cannot stand against the clearest testimonies of Scripture, the definitions of the Church, and the most certain principles of faith. Now in this matter, if by "body" (*corpus*) you understand that which has parts into which it can be divided, then to place a corporeal nature in souls and Angels and all created beings is altogether erroneous and heretical. For by comparison with God, nothing is incorporeal which requires a body, nor is it circumscribed by place and enclosed within no boundaries — it exists everywhere and fills all things; whereas created things, however spiritual, exist in certain places in which they are, yet in such a mode that they are in

those determinate places, as our author [i.e., Peter Lombard] has discussed above diffusely and learnedly.[46] This also Sixtus of Siena teaches,[47] and is maintained by theologians generally (*passim Theologi*).

§ 19. Now that we have said this position — which places souls as corporeal — is contrary to the clearest texts of Scripture and to the definitions of the Church, and cannot stand with the most certain principles of faith, is easy to demonstrate. First: the Apostle speaks of the flesh and the Spirit warring against the flesh (Gal. 5), where clearly the Apostle by *Spiritus* understands the soul there, as is the common interpretation of all; the Apostle sets the soul in opposition to the body, calling it *Spiritus*. Our Lord Jesus Christ also, commending his soul to the Father at Lk. 23, calls it *Spiritus*, saying: "Into thy hands I commend my spirit (*spiritum meum*)."[48] Not once but many times our Saviour Jesus Christ most clearly indicates the distinction between body and soul: in those places, that is, where he warns that we are not to fear those who can kill the body but not the soul, but to fear God who is able to cast both body and soul into Gehenna (Matt. 10); and where the soul is declared to be chiefly that which is rational and which belongs entirely to the corruption of the body,[49] Moreover, at Lk. 24, Christ appearing to the disciples after the resurrection says that he is a Spirit (*Spiritum*), saying: "Handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have (*Palpate et videte quia Spiritus carnem et ossa non habet sicut me videtis habere*)":[50] by which words Christ instructs the Apostles that by *Spiritus* something is understood which excludes the nature of body; for it is clear from this confession of the Lord that if something is body it is not Spirit, and if it is Spirit it is not body. The testimony of the *Constitutiones Apostolicae*, Book 6, chapter 11,[51] by which the soul is asserted from apostolic teaching to be incorporeal, immortal, exempt from destruction, and endowed with free will — this we do not here adduce, since we know that the authority of those constitutions is too dubious for very many. To this is added the definition of the Sixth Session [of a Synod], where it is gathered from the Word made flesh that God assumed flesh and a rational soul, that Christ's soul is of the same species as human souls. No small argument is furnished by Isidore, Book 8 of the *Etymologiae*, chapter 5, as cited by Gratian (canon 24, question 3),[52] who reckons among heretics those of the Tertullianists who say that the soul is not immortal but corporeal.

§ 20. St. Thomas, however, expressly teaches that it is not of faith that souls are altogether incorporeal.[53] He says that it would be heretical to say that the intellective soul is propagated with the seed (*traduci cum semine*), which conclusion he proves from the fact that it is impossible for any power present in matter to extend its action to produce an immaterial effect. He sees this collection to argue, from that principle, that these two cannot stand together: that the soul is immaterial and that it is propagated — of which the second is heretical according to the judgment of St. Thomas. Come then: is it not the case that the asserting of an assertion which destroys the first and most certain principle of faith is in the vicinity of heresy?

§ 21. But indeed St. Augustine, Book 10 of the *De Genesi ad Litteram*,[54] says that it is so necessary a consequence that, given belief that the soul is immortal, one would be driven to grant that it cannot be corporeal — just as the same Doctor reports happened to Tertullian (in the same place, chapter 25):,[55] that the soul's being immortal is a dogma of faith; but if that soul were corporeal — which was the opinion of some among the first ancients — that might still be possible. But I cannot admire enough that the author has not yet accounted those who ascribed corporeity to the soul as heretics, at the time of the Seventh Synod, even in the passage at the beginning of the fifth session from the testimony of John, Bishop of Thessalonica — that such a thing was not reproved by the Sacred Synod. I marvel, moreover, that in the testimony it is asserted that the very Catholic Church was accustomed to believe that souls are altogether exempt from body. I ask: is it

credible that the Fathers of the Seventh Synod approved this, or passed over it with silence by their silence? Indeed, whoever would deny this would seem to say nothing contrary to defined faith.'[56]

§ 22. It must be considered too lenient a thing in the author, when he attributes a corporeal character to the human soul: the note of temerity alone seems warranted — indeed eminent theologians judge it worthy of more severe and sharper censure, and they do not hesitate to condemn it as error and heresy — and deservedly; since it cannot stand against the clearest texts of Scripture, and against the definitions of the Church, nor with the most certain principles of faith. If now in this matter you understand by *corpus* that which has parts which can be divided, which is the true nature of body, then to say that souls and Angels and all created beings are corporeal in this sense is altogether erroneous, indeed heretical. For by comparison with God, nothing is incorporeal except God — who needs no body, nor is circumscribed by place and shut in by no boundaries, existing everywhere and filling all things; whereas created things, however spiritual, exist in certain determined places in which they are, in that mode however — as our author has discussed above diffusely and learnedly.[12] Thus the Fathers and ancients, in explaining and understanding the intelligible (*Intelligibilia*), Sixtus of Siena teaches, Book 5 of the *Bibliotheca Sancta*, annotation 112, and Book 6, annotation 39,[57] and after him theologians generally. Now what we have said, that the position which makes souls corporeal is contrary to the clearest texts of Scripture and to the definitions of the Church, so that it cannot stand with the most certain principles of faith, is easy to demonstrate. First: the Apostle at Gal. 5 says: "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh (*Caro concupiscit adversus Spiritum, et Spiritus adversus carnem*)"; in which place, as is clear, the Apostle sets the soul in opposition to the body, calling it *Spiritus* — for by *Spiritus* is understood the soul there in the common interpretation of all. Our Lord Jesus Christ also, at Lk. 23, commending his soul to the Father, calls it *Spirit*, saying: "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." Not once did our Saviour Jesus Christ most clearly indicate the distinction between body and soul: in those places, that is, where he warns that we are not to fear those who can kill the body but the soul, and who are not able to cast into Gehenna, but to fear God who is able to send both body and soul into Gehenna (Matt. 10); and where he declares that the soul's being rational is chiefly to be had: for the body is not of the soul, rather the body is entirely to be corrupted. Moreover at Lk. 24, appearing to the disciples as they supposed him to be a Spirit, Christ says after his resurrection: "Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have"; by which words Christ the Lord instructs the Apostles that by the name *Spiritus* something is understood which excludes the nature of body; for it is clear from this confession of the Lord that if something is body, it is not Spirit; and if it is Spirit, it is not body. The testimony of the *Constitutiones Apostolicae*, Book 6, ch. 11,[51] by which, from apostolic teaching, the soul is asserted to be incorporeal, immortal, exempt from destruction, and endowed with free will — this we do not here set forth, since we know the authority of those constitutions to be too dubious for very many. To this is added the definition of the Sixth Session (of the Synod), where from the Divine Word's having assumed flesh and a rational soul it is gathered that Christ's soul is of the same species as human souls, and is a dogma of faith that Christ assumed the soul incorporeal. No small argument is furnished also by Isidore, Book 8 (*Etymologiae*, ch. 5, as cited by Gratian, canon 24, question 3),[58] who reckons among heretics those Tertullianists who preach that the soul is not immortal but corporeal. St. Thomas, however, expressly teaches that it is not of faith that souls are altogether incorporeal.'[53] At 1, q. 118, art. 2, he says it is heretical (*haereticum esse*) to say that the intellective soul is propagated with seed (*traduci cum semine*), which conclusion St. Thomas proves from the fact that it is impossible for any power present in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. See the collection of St. Thomas which, he says, belongs to looking at faith, which is drawn from the principle that these two cannot

stand together: that the soul is immaterial, and that it is generated from seed. Therefore St. Thomas regards it as heretical according to the second. One must therefore say accordingly. Come then: is it not the case that the asserting of an assertion is in the vicinity of faith, which first destroys the most certain and primary principle of faith altogether?

§ 23. But indeed St. Augustine, Book 10 of the *De Genesi ad Litteram*, ch. 24,[59] says: "Nothing is so consequent, as that, given the belief that the soul is immortal, even God should be believed to be its body (*tam consequens, quam ut credito quod anima corporea sit etiam Deus corpus esse credatur*)"; and that the same happened to Tertullian the same Doctor relates (in the same place, ch. 25).[55] That the soul is immortal is a dogma of faith; but if that soul were corporeal — which was the opinion of some among the first ancients of an earlier age, now antiquated and reduced to the rank of error — it might still be possible. Yet I cannot sufficiently marvel that at the time of the Seventh Synod those who attributed corporeity to the soul had not yet been reckoned among heretics, even when in the Synod (at the beginning of the fifth session) the testimony of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, containing something to that effect, was referred — and was not reproved by the Sacred Synod. I marvel, moreover, when it is asserted in that testimony that the very Catholic Church so believed, as to hold souls altogether exempt from body. I ask: is it credible that the Fathers of the Seventh Synod approved this, or — by their silence — let it pass? Indeed, whoever would deny this would seem to say something contrary to nothing of defined faith.[60]

§ VII — That the rational soul is incorporeal (Animam rationalem esse incorpoream)

§ 24. It must be noted that those eminent theologians who do not hesitate to condemn that opinion which attributes to the human soul the formal character (*ratio*) of a body judge it worthy only of a mark of rashness — indeed, they do not hesitate to condemn it with a greater and sharper censure as an error and a heresy. And rightly does it conflict with them; for I think it must be shown to be inconsistent with the unshakeable principles of faith. If you take "soul is corporeal" to mean that it has parts into which it can be divided — which is the true formal character of body — I would wish it to be understood as altogether erroneous, and indeed heretical. For this reason I would wish it said: since certain of the ancient Fathers declared angels and souls and all created things to be corporeal in relation (*ratione*) by comparison with God — inasmuch as God cannot by any comparison be called corporeal — He who exists everywhere and fills all things is bounded by neither bodily place nor circumscribing limits. Created things, however spiritual they may be, are applied to the bodies which they animate, or to the corporeal places in which spiritual substances are said to be in a place; on which account the Fathers and ancients are to be explained and understood in this manner, as our author Sixtus of Siena teaches.[62] And after him, all theologians have taught that the position which holds souls to be corporeal can easily be shown to be contrary to the clearest passages of Scripture and to the definitions of the Church, and to be inconsistent with the most certain principles of faith.

§ 25. Proof of this is easy. First, the Apostle to the Galatians says: "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh"[63] — from which it is clearly apparent that the Apostle opposes the soul to the body; for by the name "Spirit" in this context the Apostle understands the soul. Our Lord Jesus Christ also, when commending His soul, calls it Spirit, saying: "Into thy hands I commend my spirit."[48] Moreover, our Lord Jesus Christ most clearly declared the distinction between body and soul when He said that those are

not to be feared who can kill the body but not the soul, but rather Him who can cast both body and soul into hell,[49] — thereby declaring the soul to be the more excellent part of man, and not a part of the body, which is entirely to be destroyed. Furthermore, in Lk. 24, when the disciples supposed that the Lord, entering through closed doors after the resurrection, was a spirit, Jesus said: "Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have."[50] Here Christ our Lord admonished the Apostles that by the word "spirit" nothing pertaining to the formal character of body should be understood; for it is clear from this confession of the Lord that a spirit is indeed a spirit, and if a spirit, then not a body.

§ 26. The testimony of the *Apostolic Constitutions*[51] asserts from the teaching of the Apostles that the soul is incorporeal, immortal, and perpetually enduring, inasmuch as it is a participant of reason and endowed with freedom — though we do not adduce this here without qualification, since we know that the authority of these constitutions is widely disputed. To this is added the definition of the Sixth Synod, session 11,[64] where it is laid down that the true Word of God assumed a rational and incorporeal soul: that Christ assumed a human soul of the same species and kind as human souls is a dogma of faith. No slight argument is also provided by Isidore,[52] cited by Gratian in canon 24, question 3, where certain heretics — the "Tertullianists" (these are the words of the canon) — are said to preach that the soul is immortal but corporeal. St. Thomas, however,[65] though he does not expressly define as of faith that souls are altogether incorporeal, nevertheless states in I, q. 118, a. 12, that it is heretical to say that the intellective soul is conveyed along with the seed — a conclusion which St. Thomas proves from this, that it is impossible for a power active in matter to extend its action to produce an immaterial effect. See St. Thomas's collection of things which he teaches pertain to faith — namely, that the soul is immaterial. The holy Doctor therefore holds that it is material and is conveyed from the seed: thus if this is heretical according to his judgment, then certainly the first point pertains to faith according to the same judgment, and if you say that position which holds the soul to be corporeal clearly conflicts with the most certain principles of faith, you will be destroying and demolishing the nearest and most certain principle of all faith.

§ 27. But St. Augustine, in *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, ch. 24,[54] says: "Nothing is more proximate, or perhaps nothing more consequential, than that if you hold the soul to be a body, God himself must also be believed to be a body" — which Tertullian also demonstrates in the same place, chapter 25.[55] Furthermore, it should be believed that the soul is immortal not from God's special gift alone, which was the old opinion of certain early Fathers, now long since antiquated and reduced to order. I cannot accept what the author adds — that at the time of the Seventh Synod heretics had not yet been censured for attributing to the soul the formal character of a body — since there is referred in that Synod (at the beginning of session 5)[60] a testimony of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, containing something of that kind which had been approved by the holy Synod. I am astonished, I say, that this was said by the author, seeing that the testimony itself asserts that the Catholic Church had understood souls to be altogether without bodily admixture. I consider it wholly incredible that the Fathers of the Seventh Synod approved this, or tacitly acquiesced in it.

§ VII — That the rational soul is the substantial form of man (Animam rationalem esse formam hominis substantialem)

§ 28. It was the opinion of certain philosophers, most notably the Platonists, that the rational soul has been added to the human body as a pilot to a ship — that is, as some external principle moving and governing it, in the way that Intelligences assist the heavens which they move, but not as a form substantially informing them. Aristotle mentions this opinion in Book II, *De Anima*, ch. 1.[66] Indeed, that this was Aristotle's own opinion is not rashly inferred by some from his other writings, as we indicated above at Dist. 14,[67] where we were investigating the same Philosopher's view concerning the soul of the heaven. Certain Christians, whether following Plato or Aristotle, dogmatized this same opinion some three hundred years ago; but Clement V, in the Council of Vienne, judged them to be condemned as heretics — his decree on this matter is found in the *Clementina* (the single canon *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*) — and likewise Leo X, in the Lateran Council, session 8.[68]

§ 29. This Catholic truth is proved first of all from the faith of the resurrection. For from the resurrection it is established that it is the natural good of the soul to be in the body, just as it is an evil and contrary to the soul's natural appetite to be separated from the body. Hence it is manifest that the soul has not merely been assigned to the body as mover and governor, but inheres in it as form united to its matter. Then it is demonstrated from the faith of the Incarnation of Christ. For in the very act of believing that Christ assumed human nature, we believe that He assumed a soul.

§ 30. This would not be a necessary consequence if the soul were not an essential part of man but only a kind of assisting governor of the human body, or of man himself; for the Divinity of Christ could abundantly suffice for such governance. Wherefore Apollinaris, who denied to Christ the rational soul, saying that the Word Himself amply supplied the functions of the soul in Him, was condemned as a heretic — because by the removal of the soul he abolished the truth of human nature in Christ. To this add that if the soul is not an essential part of man but only a kind of assisting form, it will follow that man is not essentially a rational animal, but that what is rational belongs to him only by way of an assisting form. By the same reasoning it could be said that the heavens are animated or intellectual because a soul or intelligence assists them. But what absurdities follow from this — that man, no differently from a brute, would be capable neither of rewards nor of punishments, neither of merit nor of recompense, nor indeed of religion itself, but that all these things would belong solely to the rational soul arriving and assisting from without — in the way Origen fabled that the souls which assist the heavens are brought before God's tribunal and judgment, but not the heavens themselves — what need is there to enumerate? To this point pertain all those statements of the Fathers in which they so often affirm that man consists of soul and body, evidently understanding these as the substantial parts of man. Indeed, this very thing the Church openly professes in the Athanasian Creed, in which it is said, not less properly than truly, that a rational soul and flesh are one man — namely by unity of nature — just as God and man are one Christ by unity of Person.

§ 31. Moreover, that in each individual man there is a single soul by which he is informed — and not several rational souls in one man, nor a single soul common to all men, as certain bad philosophers held — has been defined in the Eighth Ecumenical Synod, held at Constantinople, canon 11,[69] and also in the Lateran Council held under Leo X, session 8.[70]

§ VIII — That souls did not exist before bodies, nor are they sent into them as into prisons (Animas non extitisse ante corpora nec in ea mitti ut in carceres)

§ 32. Among pagan philosophers as well as among those who have professed the name of Christ, there have been various opinions concerning the state and origin of souls. Among these, there spread from the teachings of Plato the view according to which certain thinkers taught that all souls were created together from the beginning before they were sent into bodies, and that on account of sins committed during that time when they were free from bodies, they were banished into bodies as into prisons, there to pay the penalties owed to their sins. Among Christians, the champion of this opinion was Origen, and after him Priscillian. Moreover, Rufinus, imbued with Origenist teaching, mentions the same opinion as a problematic one in his letter to Pope Anastasius (which is found among the works of St. Jerome).[72] But the Catholic Church long ago condemned this opinion together with its authors, teaching that no souls existed at all before they were infused into bodies, and therefore that they did not sin, nor could they have sinned, prior to their entry into bodies.

§ 33. This is proved, first of all, by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For the Apostle says in Rom. 9, concerning the two twins: "For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil," etc.[73] Therefore souls sinned nothing before the birth of men; indeed, they did not even exist before it: for had souls existed before bodies, they would not have been idle; they would have done something good or evil. Likewise, David in Ps. 32 says: "Who fashioneth their hearts one by one" — that is, their souls.[74] Therefore all souls were not made simultaneously from the beginning, but individual souls are fashioned — that is, created — with and in individual bodies. Add to this that Scripture everywhere reproaches men for the sins of the present life but nowhere for the sins of any prior life. Indeed, Scripture acknowledges the sin of the first parents — committed by them while in the body — as the very first of all sins, through which death entered into the human race (Rom. 5).[75] And in truth, if men at some time were in a state of innocence before they were sent into bodies — which the whole Church most firmly holds according to Scripture — then according to the opinion of these thinkers, from the very beginning of their existence they were in a state of punishment on account of the prior sins of their souls. Finally, if all souls sinned before they came into bodies, one would have to admit that the soul of Christ, which was at some point united to a body in the womb of the Virgin, also sinned — which is impious to hold.

§ 34. Moreover, what these thinkers say — that souls are thrust into bodies as into prisons — is equally opposed to the Scriptures. Certainly the Apostle in 2 Cor. 5 calls the human body not a prison but a garment, to which the soul is bound by so close a bond of association that it does not wish to be separated from it, but desires that the heavenly habitation — that is, blessed immortality — be put on over it.[76] Hence also in Rev. 6, the souls of the saints, stripped of their bodies, long with great desire for reunion with those very bodies — which they would by no means do; rather, with every effort they would pray against and flee from that union, if they were to be shut up in bodies as in prisons.[77] For this reason, this opinion utterly destroys the resurrection of the saints, which we profess in the Creed. For according to it, the resuscitation of a dead man is nothing other than the return of a soul to a prison once left behind. If this is so, then either there will be no resurrection of the just, or it will be a penal one. Furthermore, if the body is a prison for the soul, then the blessing spoken to the first human beings — "Increase and multiply" — was not a blessing but a curse, by which souls are dragged down from heaven into these earthly prisons.

§ 35. It is clear from these considerations not only that bodies are not prisons for souls, but rather on the contrary that each soul has a natural inclination toward the body, such that without it the soul is not entirely well-off, but in some respect badly and miserably placed. Therefore, if the soul was made before the body and outside the body, it would follow that the establishment of rational nature began from misery — namely, from that which is contrary to its nature. And this will be understood more fully and more correctly if we recall that the rational soul is the substantial form (*forma substantialis*) of man, as was shown above.[67] For the natural union of substantial form with matter; whereas separation is violent and contrary to nature. Nor indeed is there any doubt about this matter among the holy Fathers.

§ 36. For those who speak in concord against Origen consistently teach that souls did not exist at all before bodies, whether liable to sins or even innocent; but that the soul of the first man was created by that very same act of inspiration by which it was infused into the body. So teach St. Jerome, Ep. 27 (to St. Augustine, and in the Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 9, and more fully in the Epistle to Pammachius written against the errors of John of Jerusalem);[78] St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 5 (*On Genesis*);[79] St. Cyril (on those words of Jn. 1: "The true light which enlightens every man," etc.);[80] Leo, Ep. 11 (again Ep. 93, ch. 10), where he says that this opinion pertains to the Catholic Faith;[81] St. John Damascene, Book 2 (*De Fide*, ch. 12);[4] St. Bernard, Serm. 2 (*On the Nativity of the Lord*);[82] and others, both Greek and Latin, with all later theologians agreeing in the same teaching. And lest anyone, on the basis of the words of the Master [of the Sentences], suspect that St. Augustine's opinion on this matter was different from these, or be moved by what Durandus in Book 4 (dist. 43, q. 1)[83] imputes to St. Augustine — namely, that he held that the soul of the first man, produced simultaneously with the angels, was united to the body only on the sixth day when man was formed — let him read St. Augustine in Book 12 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 13), Book 12 (*De Trinitate*, ch. 15), also the book *Against the Sermon of the Arians*, ch. 8, and finally Book 1 of the *Retractations*, ch. 1, 4, and 8.[84] St. Augustine proves his position chiefly from the Apostle, Rom. 9.[73] As for what the Master adduces from the contrary in Book 7 (*De Genesi ad Litteram*, ch. 24, 25, and 27),[85] that was said by St. Augustine only by way of disputation and inquiry, as was many other things in those same books — as he himself acknowledges in the *Retractations*. For otherwise, in that very same work he sufficiently indicated the truer opinion, namely (Book 12, ch. 3, 5),[86] where he teaches that it is natural for the soul to be in the body; so much so that even the souls reigning with Christ do not enjoy beatitude (*beatitudo*) perfectly, on account of the desire by which they are borne toward the bodies not yet restored to them. Moreover, that souls are not cast into bodies on account of sins of a prior life is asserted everywhere as a Catholic dogma by the ancient writers — Epiphanius, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Theophilus of Alexandria, and others — against the Origenist and Priscillianist heretics. Against these, moreover, canon 6 of the First Council of Braga was issued with anathema.[87]

§ 37. It is clear from these considerations that those also fall into this condemned error who teach that the soul of Christ was created before the body from the beginning. This indeed, as St. Jerome witnesses in his *Apology against Rufinus*, ch. 3,[88] Origen held. But this same error — insofar as it concerns the soul of Christ — has in our own century been revived, along with many other errors, by Guilielmus Postel. In truth, this error concerning the soul of Christ is more dangerous and more detestable than that concerning other souls. For if the soul of Christ was created before the Incarnation of the Word, then not only is it posited as made outside a body — which is contrary to its natural desire — but also without the Word, and therefore as having a certain personality of its own, distinct from the personality of the Divine Word; which pertains to the heresy of Nestorius.

§ 38. But at last someone will ask: whether God could have created souls before bodies, or without bodies. For St. Thomas, writing on this distinction (q. 2, art. 2, in the body and ad 4),[89] and also on dist. 3 of this book (q. 1, art. 4, ad 1),[90] seems to deny this, where he adduces St. Augustine saying that the position of those who said that many souls were created before bodies is impossible. His reason is the same as applies to several angels of the same species, since it is impossible for immaterial forms to be multiplied within the same species as long as they exist outside matter. But it must without doubt be held that God can do this, because it involves no contradiction. For by this very reasoning, St. Thomas himself in Opusculum 16 (which is *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*, ch. 5)[91] proves that although it is not in the nature of the intellect to be multiplied, God is not therefore unable to multiply it.

§ 39. It is confirmed, moreover, because although the Fathers always disapproved of the opinion that souls were created before bodies as false and erroneous, they never rejected it as impossible. What St. Thomas adduces from St. Augustine is nowhere to be read in him. Rather, the opposite is gathered from his writings, since he sometimes appears to be uncertain whether souls were in fact created before bodies — for this question presupposes the question of what is possible. What is to be said in reply to the argument of St. Thomas we stated at dist. 3.[40] For it is a reason common to angels and separated souls.

Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 40. It remains to reply to those things which seem contrary to the teaching above. Such, first of all, is the statement of Wis. 8, where Solomon is introduced as saying that he — that is, his soul, of which he had already said: "I was allotted a good soul" — came to an undefiled body.[93] For if it *came* to the body, then it existed before it was in the body. Moreover, that he wishes the body to be a prison for the soul is apparent from those words of ch. 9: "For the corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly habitation presses down the mind that muses on many things."[94] For to weigh down and to press down are the properties of a prison, of chains and fetters. Second: David in Ps. 141 more openly signifies this: "Bring my soul out of prison."[95] Third: In the last chapter of Ecclesiastes it is said that the spirit will return to God who gave it;[96] therefore at some time it was with God outside the body. Fourth: In Jn. 9, the disciples ask: "Who sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind?"[97] From this it can appear that the disciples were of the opinion that men — that is, the souls of men — in a prior life contract by sinning the merits of punishments with which and in which they are born. And this opinion Christ did not correct; whence it appears that it is either true or tolerable. Fifth: St. Jerome, writing on the Epistle to the Ephesians, on the words of ch. 1 "He chose us before the foundation of the world," and on the words "Unto the praise of his glory," and again on "Who before hoped in Christ,"[98] seems to hold that the souls of men in another life long ago did certain things whereby they were pleasing or displeasing to God, and that the Apostle's already cited words pertain to intimating this. Sixth: Lactantius, Book 2 (*Divine Institutions*, ch. 8),[99] says that man is kept shut in the body as in a kind of custody, lest he perceive all things with a free and unbound sense; and in Book 7, ch. 5,[100] that although soul and body are joined together, yet they are contrary and fight one against the other. Seventh: Prudentius, in the hymn *Before Sleep*, says that our mind has its origin from heaven — which he also states in the hymn *For the Burial of the Dead* and in Book 1 of the *Hamartigenia*, not far from the end.[101] The same at the end of the *Psychomachia* says that the soul is made by the inspiration of God.

§ 41. Eighth: St. Augustine, Book 1 (*De libero arbitrio*, ch. 12),[102] says: "Whether the mind lived some other life before its fellowship with this body, and whether it ever lived wisely, is a great question and a great mystery." And on Ps. 118, Sermon 8,'[103] where he falls upon mention of this question, he says: "About this most profound question I dare to define nothing," etc. It appears therefore that for St. Augustine, just as for Rufinus, this question was doubtful and problematic. Indeed, elsewhere he seems to speak more on the affirmative side, as when in Book 2 (*Against the Academics*, ch. 9),[104] and in the exposition of Ps. 7,'[105] he says that men — that is, according to their souls — return and make their way back to heaven; and when he teaches that our knowledge is a recollection, Book 2 (*Soliloquia*, ch. 20),[106] and that the soul brought all the arts with it, in the book *On the Magnitude of the Soul*, ch. 20.[107] Lastly, there can be adduced here the testimony of the Philosopher, writing in Book 2 (*On the Generation of Animals*, ch. 3),[108] that the mind — that is, the rational soul — comes to the body from outside, as if it previously existed somewhere. And this he indicates still more by the preceding division he makes of the souls by which the human fetus is successively informed.

§ 42. To these things we reply as follows. To the first: The soul of Solomon is said to have come to the body not as if it previously existed before it was in the body, but because simultaneously as it began to be, it came to the body or into the body — not by successive movement, but by instantaneous creation; in the same way that men who are born are said to come into the world, because by being born they begin to exist in the world, though they were never outside the world or before the world. Thus sin entered into the world when before it was not; thus the Psalmist says, "Fear and trembling came upon me"; thus in that same book, Wis. 7: "All good things came to me along with her" — namely, with wisdom. Moreover, the body is said to weigh down the soul not absolutely, but with the qualification "which is corruptible" — that is, insofar as it is subject to corruption and miseries. For in this way the body becomes in some fashion a prison for the soul. And this is what the Psalmist intended in asking that his soul be led out of prison. For he asks nothing other than what the Apostle asks in Rom. 7: "Unhappy man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death?" — that is, from the mortal body.[109] Hence the solution to the second objection is clear.

§ 43. To the third, one must say that when Scripture and the Fathers say that souls return to God or to heaven from whence they have their origin, they mean nothing other than that souls are not from earth or from any matter, as the body is, but that they are certain immaterial forms produced immediately and from nothing by God. For this reason God is also called the Father of spirits in Heb. 12.[110] In this sense St. Augustine explains himself in Book 1 (*Retractations*, ch. 1),[111] and shows that he spoke correctly, both from the already explained text of Ecclesiastes and from the words of St. Cyprian saying: "Since we possess a body from earth and a spirit from heaven, we ourselves are both earth and heaven."

§ 44. To the fourth, it is answered that the disciples of Christ, being still unlearned, put a confused question to their Master, one which they were asking him to explain; and that Christ, in answering the question, did not adduce all the things that would bear on its explanation, but only those which served his present purpose. For he left many things to the teaching of the Holy Spirit, whom he was about to send to them; and many things also he himself taught his disciples which are not written.

§ 45. To the fifth, it is answered that St. Jerome frequently introduces the opinions of others into his commentaries. For what he himself thinks is manifestly clear from the places cited above.

§ 46. To what is adduced in the sixth and seventh place from Lactantius and Prudentius, one must say that although perhaps those authors savored something Platonic as regards the natural opposition between soul and body, yet they nowhere say that the soul existed before the body. Indeed, Prudentius elsewhere — as in the *Apotheosis* (in the chapter on the nature of the soul, and in the Hymn for Epiphany)[112] — says that souls are infused into individuals as new and fresh, and are not created before they come into bodies. And how we are to understand his ascribing a heavenly origin to our minds has already been said in the solution to the third objection.

§ 47. To the eighth, it is answered that St. Augustine did indeed at some time doubt about this matter, but that he afterwards laid aside that doubt, as is plainly evident from the other places adduced above in the contrary sense, and most of all from the *Retractations*. For what he had said in Book 2 (*Against the Academics*) he retracts and explains in Book 1 (*Retractations*, ch. 1).[111] And what he had said in the *Soliloquia* he retracts in the same work, ch. 4.[113] And what he had said in the book *On the Magnitude of the Soul* he retracts in ch. 8.[114]

§ 48. To the last I reply that it is highly uncertain what the Philosopher held on this matter. But just as he seems to have held, along with Plato, that the mind is not a form informing but only assisting man — as we said above[115] — so there are not a few conjectures from which it appears that he held that the mind or rational soul pre-exists the body: both on account of what was adduced from Book 2 (*On the Generation of Animals*),[108] and because elsewhere he calls the intellect eternal — and for Aristotle nothing is eternal that at some time began. And lastly, because the intellect or intellective soul cannot begin to be except through creation — a mode of production unknown to Aristotle. But if this is indeed what he held, the Christian school does not follow his teaching.

§ X — The question concerning the transmission of souls is set forth and explained (Proponitur & explicatur quaestio de traduce animarum)

§ 49. With those matters now established which have already been stated — namely, that souls were made neither from God's substance nor existed anywhere before they were sent into bodies — a celebrated question was debated among the Fathers: whether souls exist by transmission (*ex traduce*), or whether they are individually infused into each body by creation. By "transmission" (*traducem*) they mean the propagation and, as it were, the drawing-across of souls; and the sense of the question is whether, just as the body of a son is generated by seed from the body of the parent, so too the soul of a son is propagated from the soul of the parent — or whether God even now creates each individual soul from nothing (*ex nihilo*) in each individual body, just as in the beginning He made heaven and earth from nothing, and just as He created the soul of the first man in his body and infused it by creating and created it by infusing.

§ 50. It must certainly be observed that in the first part of the question there is no inquiry as to whether, just as the body of a son is generated from the generator by the severing of seed, so also the soul of a son is brought about and, as it were, generated by the severing of some part from the soul of the parent. For this is manifestly absurd and contrary to what was shown above,[117] namely that the rational soul is incorporeal and therefore indivisible. For this entire disputation is undertaken concerning the rational soul, not concerning the sensitive and vegetative souls, which it is agreed among all the learned both exist by transmission (*ex traduce*) and are drawn out from the potency (*potentia*) of matter. These latter, although they are material and

corporeal, are not produced by the severing of a part from the soul of the generator, but only by the severing of seed, in which the soul does not exist in act (*actu*).

§ 51. But the question is whether the soul of a son — with the soul of the parent remaining whole and undivided — is received into disposed matter, that is, into the body, having proceeded from and been left behind in the seed, in that manner, namely, by which through natural operations other forms both substantial and accidental, and among these also the sensitive and vegetative souls, are produced by the forms of the agents in prepared matter — which is to be drawn out from the potency of matter; or, to use the similitude of St. Augustine, which he employs in Epistle 157 (to Optatus),[118] in that manner by which we see a lamp lit from a lamp without any diminution of its light.

§ 52. Now, that we may treat this question in an orderly fashion: First, that opinion which holds that the souls of individuals are infused into their bodies by creation must be set forth, together with the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers upon which it relies. Next, it must be seen which authors have either held the opposite view, or at any rate have doubted. Third, it must be asked whether one or the other part is to be held by Faith. Fourth, whether the same part can be taught by certain argument. Finally, the arguments of the contrary opinion must be refuted.

§ XI — That souls are created individually, as shown from the Scriptures (Animas in singulis creari ex Scripturis ostenditur)

§ 53. That part of the question which maintains the creation from nothing of the individual souls of each person in their respective bodies rests upon great probability, whether we consult the Scriptures or the testimonies of the Fathers. The Scriptural passages which the Fathers commonly employ to confirm this opinion are approximately the following.

The first locus is Ps. 32: "Who fashioneth their hearts severally" (*Qui finxit sigillatim corda eorum*).[74] For it is manifest that by the word *heart* the soul is frequently signified in the Scriptures, as when it is said: "Create a clean heart in me, O God" (Ps. 50); "Blessed are the pure in heart" (Matt. 5); "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Matt. 22; Deut. 6); "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God" (Ps. 83); and many things of this kind.

The second is in Is. 42: "Who formeth the spirit of man within him."[120] This is not found, to be sure, in our version, but is read in the Septuagint. Something similar, however, our text has at Zach. 12, for it is read there thus: "Saith the Lord who stretcheth forth heaven and layeth the foundation of the earth and formeth the spirit of man within him."

The third is Eccl. 11: "Before the dust return to its earth whence it was" — and what follows: "and the spirit return to God who gave it."[121]

The fourth is Heb. 12: "We have had fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced them; shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, and live?"[110]

§ 54. Finally, they sometimes also adduce that saying of Jn. 5: "My Father worketh until now, and I work."[122] But this Scripture, since it is general, comprehending not only the works of creation but the entire work of the conservation and governance of nature once established, does not demonstrate the proposed

matter; nor would it be any less true if there were no souls in the universe, or if all souls were from propagation (*ex traduce*).

Furthermore, St. Augustine, in Epistle 28 (to St. Jerome), and in *On the Origin of the Soul*, book 1, ch. 14, and in *On Genesis to the Letter*, book 10, ch. 6,[123] thinks that even the first two testimonies can be dissolved, for the reason that God fashioneth not only souls individually but also eyes and hands and the other members of a man, which He nevertheless produces neither from nothing nor immediately. It can also be objected against the first argument that, in place of the word *sigillatim* (severally), the Hebrew has a term signifying the equivalent of *pariter* (equally, alike). Hence St. Jerome himself, translating from the Hebrew, rendered it: "Who fashioneth their hearts alike" (*Fingens pariter cor eorum*). Now this reading seems openly to favour those who hold the opinion that all souls were made together at the beginning.

§ 55. Nevertheless, to the objection of St. Augustine it could be replied that Scripture, in saying that souls or spirits of men are fashioned by God in a special manner — but not bodies, nor likewise the souls of beasts — wishes to intimate something peculiar to us regarding human souls with respect to their production by God. And accordingly, from testimonies of this kind it is gathered with sufficient probability that human souls are not brought forth by any propagation as bodies and corporeal forms are, but that each individual soul is made by a new creation by God. The probability of this inference is augmented by two other testimonies,[124] as being those which expressly make an antithesis between body and spirit, and thus refer the body or flesh to the parents as its authors, or send it back to the earth as its source, while attributing the spirit to God as its author and giver.

To the second objection it is answered that God, according to the Hebrew reading, fashioned the hearts of men *alike* (*pariter*) because He fashioned all things without exception. This meaning is indicated by what follows: "Who understandeth all their works" — and so also what precedes is to be taken as if it were said: "Who fashioned all their hearts." In this same sense, as we have demonstrated elsewhere,[125] that saying of Sir. 18 is to be understood: "He who liveth for ever created all things at once."

But you will say: at least according to the truth of the Hebrew, the aforementioned verse of the Psalm contributes nothing towards the daily creation of souls in each person who is born. I reply: it does not indeed do so by virtue of the word *sigillatim*; yet it is of force by reason of the argument explained a little before.

§ XII — The same doctrine confirmed from the Fathers (Eadem doctrina confirmatur ex Patribus)

§ 56. But let us now pass chiefly to the Fathers, among whom the foremost champion of this opinion was St. Jerome, as may be seen most clearly in his letters — in the one addressed to Pammachius against the errors of John of Jerusalem — where he calls this doctrine "ecclesiastical," that is, handed down and received by those who were celebrated in the Church; just as the contrary opinion is found to have been received by those who earned ill repute for their teaching, as we shall show afterwards.[127]

§ 57. The same St. Jerome establishes the same opinion in the letter addressed to Marcellinus, numbered 82, in the second volume, and in the Commentary on the last chapter of Ecclesiastes, and also in Book III of the *Apologia against Rufinus*, and in the Letter to St. Augustine, and elsewhere.[128] Before St. Jerome, St. Hilary held the same view in Book X of *On the Trinity* (not far from the beginning), in that he said that the

soul of man is the work of God, whereas the flesh is from flesh.[129] For this antithesis does not hold if the soul too were from a soul and not immediately from God in each individual; since otherwise it is equally established that flesh is also the work of God. See the same author likewise on Ps. 62.'[130]

§ 58. So too St. Ambrose thought, in more than one place and more than one book. For he says (in *De Paradiso*, ch. 11) that the soul was taken when Eve was formed — but bone from bone and flesh from flesh, in accordance with what Adam, moved by the impulse of the Divine Spirit, is recorded to have said in Gen. 2: "This now is bone," etc.[131] This Scripture passage, therefore, can not inconveniently be adduced here as well. Likewise, in the book *De Noe et Arca*, chapters 4 and 15, he testifies that the manner in which the soul existed in the first man is common to the souls of all men, and that it cannot come about at all that a man[132] — [here a lacuna in the running text continues] — as also in *De Bono Mortis*, ch. 9, and in Letter 21.[133]

§ 59. St. Cyril of Alexandria concurs as well, in Book I of his Commentary on John, ch. 9, where, expounding that saying of Jn. 1 — "He enlighteneth every man," etc. — he affirms that every man is made from nothing according to his soul.[134] The same Cyril also teaches in Letter 1 that the Blessed Virgin is not for that reason to be denied the title of Mother of God — that she did not give birth to the Deity — since other women are truly called mothers of their sons even though they did not generate their souls.'[135]

§ 60. These two passages show that St. Cyril is falsely placed by Gennadius in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, ch. 14, among those who teach the transmission (*traducen*) of souls — if, that is, Gennadius meant this Cyril of Alexandria.[136]

§ 61. To the foregoing must be added St. Athanasius in Book I *Against the Gentiles*, St. Gregory of Nyssa in his book *On the Soul*, ch. 6, St. John Chrysostom in Homily 23 among the collected homilies on Matthew, Gennadius in the passage just cited, and the author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament*, question 23.[137] And it is clear that Lactantius held no different view, from his book *On the Workmanship of God*, ch. 9; so that St. Jerome rightly noted Rufinus for mendacity in the *Apologia*, Book III, because in a certain profession of his faith sent to Pope Anastasius, Rufinus had numbered Lactantius among those who posit the transmission of souls.[138]

§ 62. Prudentius expressed the same opinion in his poem *On the Nature of the Soul*, writing as follows: "Souls do not beget souls" — and what follows.[139] He also indicates it in the *Hymn for Epiphany* and in the *Hymn for All Saints*.[140] And to descend to later writers: St. John Damascene in Book II of *On the Faith*, ch. 12, transmits this opinion,[141] as does Haimo writing on that text of Heb. 12: "We have had fathers of our flesh," etc.,'[142] and St. Bernard in Sermon 2 *On the Nativity of the Lord*,[143] and Peter Lombard in this very distinction,'[144] and Hugh of St. Victor in question 105 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, where from the Apostle's aforementioned words he asserts that it is manifestly proved that souls do not come from transmission,'[145] and also in Book I of *On the Sacraments*, Part 7, ch. 30, where he delivers this doctrine expressly.[146] The entire school of subsequent theologians has followed these masters with great consensus.

§ XIII — Which writers have held a different or doubtful opinion (Qui scriptores vel diversam vel dubiam habuerint sententiam)

§ 63. Those who have taught that souls come by traduction are neither equal in number nor in authority to those whose testimonies concerning the creation of souls we have just cited. Writing about them, St. Jerome,

in a letter (to Marcellinus and Anapsychia, question 82 of volume 2 — and it is also found among St. Augustine's letters as number 27)[148] speaks thus: "Or indeed by traduction, as Tertullian, Apollinaris, and the greater part of the Westerns have supposed." The authority of Tertullian, for his part, ought to be given no weight in this matter, since he not only defected from the Catholic Church but also held that souls are corporeal — as we showed above from St. Augustine. Nor is it surprising that Tertullian dreamed up such a notion, as the same St. Augustine says (in his letter to Optatus, Epistle 157),[149] seeing that he even judges God the Creator himself to be nothing but a body. And from these foundations it was easy for him to construct the traduction of souls. Moreover, it is well established that Apollinaris too was a heretic.

§ 64. When St. Jerome adds that the greater part of the Westerns hold this view, he does not mean the Western Church — he who elsewhere calls his own opinion the ecclesiastical one (though St. Augustine, in the letter already mentioned, interpreted St. Jerome as speaking of the Western Church) — but rather the western writers, and those more obscure ones who lived before his own time. These Gennadius also indicates (in the place cited above),[150] adding: "and certain among the Latins who are presumptuous." That those who were celebrated by name in the West as Catholics — Hilary and Ambrose — did not hold this view is manifest from what we have said above. Gennadius attributes the same opinion to the Luciferians; and St. Augustine likewise testifies that he found it ascribed to them in a certain book (in *De Haeresibus*).[151] No greater number of ancient writers is found to have held this opinion. And since these were both very few and all heretics, it is easy to see how little probability this view acquires from its own supporters.

§ 65. It is reported, moreover, that the Ethiopian Christians who live under the rule of Prester John hold the same view — namely, that all souls are propagated from the soul of the first man, just as bodies come from a body. For this is what Damianus Goezius reports of them in the book he published (*On the Customs and Religion of the Ethiopians*).[152] But in that book he also attributes to them many other things that are by no means to be approved, such as circumcision and similar practices.

§ 66. Now, among those who considered that neither side of the question was to be asserted by them, the foremost is St. Augustine, whose voluntary hesitation on this matter lasted until his death, to such a degree that he judged rash those who would embrace either side without more thorough instruction. This is declared by various of his writings, and especially by books 1 and 2 of *De Anima et eius Origine*,[153] in which he defends his own hesitation against those who reproach him for it. This same fact is clear from his Epistle 28 (to St. Jerome),[154] and Epistle 157 (to Optatus),[149] as well as from book 2 of *De Peccatorum Meritis*, chapter 26, book 3, chapter 10, book 5 *Contra Iulianum*, chapter 9, from the end of the book against the Priscillianists addressed to Orosius, and finally from book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 1, and book 2, chapters 45 and 56.[155] To these add the whole of book 10 of *De Genesi ad Litteram*,[156] in which he examines this question so thoroughly that he defines nothing.

§ 67. Now, in defense of his hesitation, he customarily cites among other things that passage from the mother of the Maccabees in 2 Macc. 7, who says to her sons: "I do not know how you appeared in my womb," and so on — as in the place already alleged against Julian.[157] Following St. Augustine's hesitation, St. Gregory (in book 7, Epistle 53),[158] says that this question is insoluble and cannot be comprehended by man. The same position was followed by Eucherius of Lyons, writing on that passage of Gen. 2: "He breathed into his face," etc.,[159] by Cassiodorus in his book *De Anima*, chapter 14,[160] and by Rabanus Maurus in book 2 of *De Institutione Clericorum*, chapter 57.[161] To these appears to be added Salvianus, who in the preface to his

sermons *On the Cardinal Works of Christ* (which were falsely believed to be by Cyprian) confesses that he does not know the origin of his own soul.[162]

§ 68. Rufinus might also be joined to these. For he declares his doubt on this question in a letter to Pope Anastasius.[163] But his doubt is not to be given great weight, both because in the same letter he also doubts whether all souls were created simultaneously at the beginning of the world — which is established to have been condemned by the Church.

§ 69. But to return to St. Augustine: the reason for his doubting was that the Pelagians were attempting, from the very head of argument that the soul does not come by traduction, to overturn the most firmly grounded faith of the Church concerning original sin, which children draw from their parents according to the soul. This reason he expressly indicated in several places, and specifically in Epistle 157 (and in book 3 of *De Peccatorum Meritis*, chapter 10).[164] Indeed, moved by this argument, he sometimes appeared to incline somewhat toward the opinion that posits traduction — as in book 10 of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, chapter 13.[165] Although afterwards he sufficiently understood that this argument was not valid, as in Epistle 157 and in book 2 of *De Peccatorum Meritis*, chapter 26 — so much so that in his later writings he sometimes seems to lean more toward that opinion which teaches a new creation of souls in individual persons, as in book 5 *Contra Iulianum*, chapter 3.[166] And he declares this opinion to be also his own desire when writing to St. Jerome (Epistle 28),[154] provided it does not conflict with the Catholic Faith by which original sin is asserted. That it does not conflict was afterwards defined by Pope Zosimus in his letter to the Bishops of the World,[167] in which he condemned that inference by which Pelagius was thus reasoning: "The soul does not come by traduction; therefore it does not contract sin from its parents." Hence it appears that St. Augustine, once he understood the condemnation of that inference, would have willingly assented to St. Jerome and to others who maintained the creation of souls. Therefore, if St. Augustine were to be placed on either side of the question, he should rather be joined to those who say that souls are newly created in individual persons than to those who wish them to be propagated.

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§ XIV — Whether it belongs to the Faith that souls are infused by creation (An sit Fidei animas per creationem infundi)

§ 70. There are some who so assert the opinion about the creation of souls as to think that it belongs to the dogmas of the Faith. This appears to have been the view of Gennadius first, in *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, chapter 14,[136] where he numbers it among the rules of Faith — namely, that the soul is created and infused into the body already formed. Relying on his authority, the Master (of the Sentences), in the body of this very Distinction, says that it is most certainly to be held concerning souls that they are created in the body.[169] And in the preceding section (§ H of this Distinction)[170] he says that the Catholic Church teaches that souls are infused into formed bodies and are created in the act of infusing, citing also the authority of St. Jerome as though he were condemning with anathema those who say souls come from traduction.

§ 71. The Interlinear Gloss also (on that passage of Ps. 32: "Who fashioneth their hearts one by one," etc.) says: "Here is destroyed the heresy of certain persons who said that all souls were created at once in Adam." For the phrase "in Adam" seems to indicate that they are contained in him as in a seminal root. For no such heresy is in fact found on record that would say all souls were actually created in Adam; but it is altogether apparent

that that Gloss is derived from St. Jerome's commentary on Ps. 32,[171] where it is referred to one and the same error: namely, to think that a soul is begotten from a soul, and that all souls are contained in Adam.

§ 72. To this is customarily added Leo the Pope (Epistle 93, chapter 10),[172] who says that the Catholic Faith proclaims that the souls of men did not exist before they were breathed into their bodies. From this they think it may be gathered that it belongs to the Faith that souls are breathed into the body; especially since the Pontiff adds that they are not "embodied" by any other than by God the Maker. Prudentius also pursues the opinion of traduction as though it were erroneous, in the *Apotheosis* (chapter *On the Nature of the Soul, To Be Shunned*), singing thus:

Yet this shall be an error, to believe that the fount of souls is transfused into offspring by the traduction of the flesh.[173]

§ 73. Finally, it seems that St. Thomas was moved partly by the authority of Gennadius and the Master, and partly by philosophical arguments, to conclude (in question 118, article 2)[174] that it is heretical to say that the intellectual soul is propagated with the seed. John Gerson also (in the *Trilogus Astrologiae*, proposition 15)[175] calls heretics those who hold that rational souls arise by traduction.

§ 74. But on the contrary: the very fact that St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and the other Fathers mentioned above would never have chosen to doubt about this question if they had thought it pertained to the dogmas of the Faith — since not only those who hold a dogma of the Faith contrary to truth are judged to err, but even those who doubt about such a dogma — is decisive. Hence St. Augustine condemned that doubt of Caelestius who, concerning little children dying without baptism, said: "Where they go, I do not know; where they do not go, I dare not say."[176] Moreover, the same St. Augustine expressly denies, when refuting the Luciferians, that the Luciferians are to be called heretics because they assert the traduction of souls.[177] And he indicates the same thing nearly everywhere he encounters this question: that there is no danger of heresy in this question — as may be seen in the places already cited. Hugh of St. Victor also (in book 1 of *De Sacramentis*, part 7, chapter 35)[178] establishes the opinion of the creation of souls in such a way that he is nonetheless unwilling to condemn the contrary view. Alfonso de Castro agrees with him (*De Haeresibus*, title *De Anima*),[179] where he cites St. Thomas in his own favor from *Contra Gentiles*, book 2, chapter 86,[180] and praises the fact that St. Thomas called that opinion of traduction an "error," not a "heresy" — and would have praised it still more had he seen St. Thomas's written work on this Distinction 18 of this book, question 1, article 1,[181] where on this question he says nothing other than that the creation of souls is commonly granted by both theologians and philosophers.

§ 75. Moreover, reason also teaches that this is not a question of Faith. For although many have preferred the former view as more probable, yet since it could be shown neither by clear testimonies of Scripture nor proved from certain tradition (not to mention that this kind of tradition lay hidden from St. Augustine and St. Gregory), it is nowhere found to have been promulgated among the dogmas by a decree of the Church, nor conversely has the contrary opinion been condemned anywhere. For as to the things brought forward that seemed to imply condemnation, it is easy to reply. Gennadius deserves little credit in the face of St. Augustine; and since he showed himself rather too vehement in asserting that doctrine concerning which St. Augustine perpetually hesitated (as is clear from his catalogue of ecclesiastical writers), he was not able to make a rule of Faith out of what he had not received as such from his predecessors. What he cites from St. Jerome is nowhere found in his writings.

§ 76. For that passage is derived from the commentary attributed to him (on Ps. 32), those who cite it referring to that verse of that Psalm — "Who fashioneth their hearts one by one" — to the effect that St. Jerome there considers it an error to think that a soul is generated from a soul. But there is no mention there of anathema. Indeed, from St. Jerome's own writings it is sufficiently clear that he did not consider this question to belong to the Faith. For in a letter to St. Augustine (which among St. Augustine's letters is number 30),[182] he testifies that in two of Augustine's letters sent to him (one of which contained a discussion of the origin of souls) there was nothing blameworthy, adding that Apostolic saying: "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind" (Rom. 14:5).'[183]

§ 77. What was cited from the Gloss is not drawn to the traduction of souls but to another opinion — one that is not unlike the heresy of Origen — which some hold to pertain to the view that souls were created before bodies. But since it is sufficiently clear that the Gloss is alluding to the words of the aforesaid commentary (which speaks expressly of traduction), certain others respond that the Gloss, in that it names a "heresy" — a word not found in that Commentary — is corrupted. Even granting this, however, there is a ready response available: that the Gloss, being an anonymous work, carries no great authority by itself.

§ 78. The words of Prudentius present no difficulty: for he names it an "error," not a "heresy." Nor does that passage adduced from Leo carry conviction. For the Pontiff there condemns those who affirmed that souls existed before they came to bodies. Now, "to come to" bodies he calls "to be breathed into," which means to be produced into something as a spirit — though he does not thereby deny that this takes place either by propagation or by new creation. Nor is weight to be given to what follows in Leo: that souls are "embodied" by no other than by God. For he adds: "who is their creator and the creator of bodies" — plainly signifying that he understands a creation such as is also common to bodies. For Leo's discourse and censure in that place are directed against the Priscillianists, who had transmitted certain fables after the manner of Origen and the Manichaeans. And it seems Leo was speaking of that mode of "breathing-in" (*inspiratio*) by which souls are produced in individual bodies by God — as the soul of the first man was produced in his body when Scripture says: "And he breathed into his face the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7) — yet from his words it does not follow that this is contained under the Faith. For when he says the Catholic Faith proclaims that the souls of men did not exist before they were breathed into their bodies, he is placing that alone as contrary to the Catholic Faith: namely, that souls existed before they came to bodies. But how they came — whether by traduction or by new creation — he does not determine from the Faith; although he may perhaps be interposing his own opinion, shared by many, in saying "before they are breathed into," etc. Had this been certain to Leo according to Catholic Faith, St. Gregory would certainly not have doubted it a hundred and fifty years later.

§ 79. Reply to the final objection, which is drawn from St. Thomas: St. Thomas spoke more moderately on this matter elsewhere, as we showed a little while above. And it must be noted that St. Thomas's inference, which concludes "And therefore it is heretical to say," etc. — saving the reverence owed to so great a Doctor — is not valid. For in what precedes, he had adduced neither Scripture nor the doctrine of the Church, but only arguments from reason. Now from however certain and manifest rational arguments, nothing can be proved to be a matter of Faith. For the Christian Faith rests not on human reason but on divine revelation. If you say that something is also rightly condemned as heretical when something contrary to the Faith follows from it, and that it is on this principle that St. Thomas's proof is grounded, it is answered that that premise does not hold true unless the consequence is so evident that it is easily clear to everyone; and a consequence of this kind is assuredly not apparent in the arguments adduced by St. Thomas.

§ 80. Add that if St. Thomas's arguments proved that the said dogma is heretical, it would follow that the very same dogma was already long ago — in the time of St. Augustine and St. Gregory — heretical, since the arguments are the same in every age. But from what has been said above it is manifest that in their time nothing whatsoever had been established in the Church on that dogma.[184]

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§ XV — By what arguments it is proved that souls are not transmitted by traduction but are created (Quibus rationibus probetur animas non traduci, sed creari)

§ 81. Against the traduction of souls — and in favor of their creation, which necessarily follows once traduction has been refuted — there exist in the writings of the learned arguments so firm and certain that it would be rash to resist them or to refuse to assent to them. Above all others, Hugh of St. Victor (in book 1 of *De Sacramentis*, part 7, chapter 30)[146] and St. Thomas (in many places, but especially in the commentary on Distinction 18 of this book, questions 1 and 2; in *De Potentia*, question 3, article 9; in *Contra Gentiles*, book 2, chapters 86, 87, 88, and 89; and in the *Summa*, question 90, article 2, and question 118, article 2)[186] expound them learnedly and perspicuously. We shall briefly set out a few of the most important from among the many.

§ 82. The first argument: It is impossible for a vegetative power (*virtus*) that resides in matter to extend its action to the producing of an immaterial effect. But the rational soul is such an effect. For it has an operation in which the body does not share. Therefore it is impossible for it to be produced by a vegetative power residing in matter.

§ XIII — That the rational soul is incorporeal (Animam rationalem esse incorpoream) (continued)

§ 83. The second argument is this: the rational soul, since it performs some operation without the body, is a certain self-subsisting thing (*quid subsistens*); and therefore it belongs to it to be and to come into being in the same way as to other self-subsisting things — that is, not through another thing, as is the case with vegetative and sensitive souls and other material forms; and consequently the proper mode of production of those material forms cannot be attributed to it. But only bodies follow bodies in generation — and therefore traduction belongs, assuredly, not to spirits but to bodies. What could be said more perversely? (Does this not amount to a denial of the first part?) Certainly, unless we are blind, we must acknowledge that the rational soul cannot be traduced; and in this sense Scholastic theologians commonly also reject the opinion of the Traduction of Souls as erroneous and contrary to the Faith. In the same manner St. Augustine, in the epistle in which he refutes the mode of Tertullian's traducing of souls (Gen. ch. 15), refuted and denounced it; and in the same epistle he asks whether the incorporeal substance proceeding from the Father might run into the Mother — in which discussion he deduces, from natural principles, conclusions from which the stable principles of Faith are established: so that the testimony of God alone suffices; and from the principles of Faith this very dogma of the Faith — that the soul is incorporeal, immortal — can be deduced, than which nothing

more evident can be deduced from the principles of Faith, with respect to the traducing of the intellectual soul from the seed. See what Cardinal Bellarmine concedes.[187]

§ 84. Third argument: if the rational soul begins to exist through traduction from the seed, this happens either because it actually is in the seed, as if cut off and divided along with the seed from the soul of the one begetting — in the manner in which the sensitive soul is divided in those animals that live when divided — or because it is there in potency (*virtute*), inasmuch as in the seed there is left a power for producing the rational soul. But neither of these can be said. Not the former, because the intellectual soul (*anima intellectiva*), being immaterial, can be divided neither in itself nor by accident. Not the latter, because it would then follow that the soul's *esse* depends upon matter after the manner of other forms, and is therefore corruptible, which is contrary to the Faith.[188]

§ 85. Fourth argument: no active power (*virtus activa*) acts beyond its own genus; but the intellectual soul exceeds the whole corporeal genus; therefore no corporeal power can produce it. Hence it is impossible for it to be produced by the power of the seed.

§ 86. Fifth argument: the corruption of the body is not the cause of the rational soul's ceasing to be. Therefore neither can the generation of the body be the cause of its beginning to be. Therefore the soul is not from the traduction of the seed by which the body is generated.

§ 87. Sixth argument, which is Hugh's:[146] Whoever says that the soul is born by traduction makes the soul of the parent the cause of the soul of the child — either the efficient cause, or the material cause, or both — in the manner in which we admit the body of the parent to be the cause of the body of the child. That the soul of the parent is not the formal nor the final cause of the soul of the child is conceded by all; and even if it were, that mode of causation is not what is now under discussion. But it cannot be said to be the material cause; for the soul of the father does not pass, either wholly or in part, into the constitution of the soul of the child. For it remains wholly in the father, and cannot cleave off a part from itself and transmit it into what is generated, since it is immaterial and therefore without parts. Nor can it have the character (*rationem*) of an efficient cause; for the soul, like no other created power, can make anything without pre-existing matter. For this — since it is nothing other than creation — is proper to the Divinity. This argument presupposes that the rational soul is something self-subsisting (*quid per se subsistens*); hence it will not be permissible to argue in the same manner about the vegetative or sensitive soul, which subsist only in the composite. For although it happens that these are divided by accident, it is nevertheless true that no part is cut off from them to remain in the seed.[189]

§ 88. The last argument is as follows: man is a creature midway between purely immaterial and purely material creatures. But purely immaterial creatures are not generated at all and cannot be generated. Material creatures, however, such as animals devoid of reason, are generated in a perfect sense, inasmuch as even the generative power extends to their forms. Therefore man, who participates in both natures, has this in common with purely immaterial creatures — that is, with the Angels — that the generative power does not extend to his form, as being immaterial and similar to angelic nature. But he has this in common with other animals, that everything in him that is generable — that is, the body — is reached by the generative power: since the begetter both furnishes matter from itself to the body and produces in it all the prior dispositions up to the substantial form exclusively, to which, being immaterial, it cannot extend.

§ 89. Furthermore, it must be noted that all the arguments already stated rest principally on this proposition: that the rational soul is incorporeal. Hence, all who have posited the traduction of souls seem in some way to have thought them corporeal; as St. Augustine reports of Tertullian and the Luciferian schismatics. And those who opposed traduction judged that to destroy it, this above all was of force: to teach that the soul is not corporeal — as before Hugh and St. Thomas did St. Ambrose (*De Paradiso*, ch. 11),[190] Lactantius (*De Opificio Dei*, ch. 19),[39] and the author of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (quest. 36).[191] Hence by a similar argument St. Thomas elsewhere shows that the angelic substance cannot generate another from itself, though it can affect it according to qualities. Because also Aristotle, equipped with the natural light of reason alone, from the fact that he recognized in the intellectual soul an operation which was not the act of any body, taught that the mind comes from without and is not produced by the power of the one generating — as the sensitive and vegetative souls are — in book 2 of *De Generatione Animalium*, ch. 3.[192] For he held it certain that the form which was immaterial and did not depend on the body could not be traduced from the generator and eduited from the potency of matter, though he did not thence further conclude, as he should have, that it is created by God, but rather seems to have attributed eternity to it, as has been said elsewhere.

§ 90. Moreover, as regards St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and the other orthodox Fathers who doubted about the question of the traduction of souls — since these same Fathers, as has been proved in its proper place, believed without doubt that souls are incorporeal — why they did not determine their assent to the one side of the question, namely that which follows as a consequence from that proposition, we can offer no other reason than that they either did not consider that consequence, firm and certain as it is in itself, or did not weigh its force sufficiently, at a time when that question had not yet been agitated among Christian writers by means of arguments. Now, however, after so many most weighty disputations of Scholastic theologians on the matter, once the matter has been diligently examined and all are going without doubt to one and the same opinion, he will surely not be able to escape the mark of the greatest rashness who hereafter either chooses a different opinion or thinks that the matter is still to be held in doubt.[193]

§ XVI — The arguments of the contrary opinion are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta diversae opinionis)

§ 91. The arguments which appear to prove that the soul is not created but is transmitted (*traducta*) from parents are drawn partly from Scripture and partly from reason.

To the first, then: Scripture testifies in Gen. 2 and Exod. 20 that God completed the whole work of creation in the first six days and thereafter rested from all His work.[195] Therefore souls are not now newly created, but are produced through the seminal principles (*rationes seminales*) implanted in creatures at the beginning. Second: in the formation of Eve from Adam it is not said, "He breathed into her face the breath of life," as had been said of Adam; therefore her soul was not created as Adam's soul was, but was taken from him from whom her body also came. Third: in Gen. 5 it is said that Adam begat a son in his own image and likeness; but the son is the image and likeness of the father according to the soul; therefore Adam begat according to the soul.[196] Fourth: in Gen. 12, Abraham and Lot are said to have taken with them all the souls they had made in Haran; but "to have made" can be understood in no other way than by generating.[197] Fifth: in Gen. 46, seventy souls are said to have gone out from the thigh of Jacob, which is nothing other than being

transmitted by the propagation of seed.'[198] Sixth: in Lev. 17, the Lord says, "The soul of all flesh is in the blood"; but blood is transmitted with the seed; therefore the soul also.'[199] Seventh: in Jn. 3, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." But man by nature is flesh — that is, carnal — because sin is primarily in the soul; therefore he is born of the flesh according to the soul. Eighth: in Rom. 5, "In Adam all have sinned"; but only the soul is capable of sin; therefore all were in Adam according to the soul, because to have sinned presupposes to have existed. Ninth: for what in Ps. 32 is said, "Who fashions them one by one," in the Hebrew reads, "Who fashioned their hearts together" — that is, their souls; therefore all souls are in Adam according to the seminal principle (*seminalem rationem*).[200] Tenth: original sin is transmitted; therefore also the soul which is the subject of that sin; for an accident cannot be transmitted without its subject. Eleventh: if the soul of a man is not produced by the power of the seed, then man does not generate man but only his body, which is the lower and less noble part of man; hence he could not truly be called the parent of a man, but only of a body. Twelfth: if by generating a man does not produce a rational soul, then he is of worse condition than brute animals and plants, which produce their own proper souls — namely the sensitive and vegetative. Thirteenth: if God creates individual souls in men, then at the very instant of creation they are good and free of original sin; for God cannot create a sinful soul. Fourteenth: in man the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective soul are really one and the same; but the vegetative and sensitive soul of man is produced from seed; therefore so also is the intellective. Fifteenth: man begets what is like himself in species; but the human species is constituted by the rational soul; therefore the rational soul comes from the begetter. Finally: if God individually creates the souls of all who are begotten in whatever manner, then He cooperates in fornications and adulteries from which men are begotten. This argument was that of Apollinaris, as St. Gregory of Nyssa reports in the book *De Anima*, ch. 6.[201] There are also other objections which may be raised, which whoever wishes may seek out in St. Thomas.'[202] In that latter place he sets forth twenty-nine objections in number, which he also resolves in the same order. But let us now reply to those which we have adduced.

§ 92. Reply to the first, then: it is answered that God created all things — that is, all the species of things — in the first six days, and established nature as a whole, which He was thereafter to preserve by His governance. To that preservation it pertains that human souls, after the example of the soul of the first man, should be infused into bodies prepared to receive them, as it were by a divine inspiration. We have said more about this matter above.[203] And St. Augustine himself supplies this solution.'[204]

To the second: although in the creation of the woman we do not read the words, "And He breathed," etc., it is nonetheless to be understood that God did this; and this is sufficiently indicated by the very words of Adam himself, when, saying "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh," he did not add "and soul from my soul" — which he would most especially have had to add if the soul of the woman had been from the soul of the man, just as bone was from bone and flesh from flesh.

§ 93. To the third it is answered that the meaning is that Adam begat a son bearing the image and likeness of his father as a man; though he did not beget that in which that likeness most principally consists. To the fourth and fifth, one and the same reply is given: that souls are placed synecdochically (*synedochice*) in the place of men, as happens also frequently elsewhere in Scripture — as when in Jer. 40 a soul is said to be struck down when a man is killed — although even what is attributed to the soul may apply to man not according to the soul but according to the body. This reply is found in St. Augustine.[205] However, it is also possible in those passages to understand by the word "soul" life in general, and so through "soul" — that is, life — to understand further the living animal itself, whether the application be made for a man or for any other animal.

For it seems that "soul" must be taken in this general sense in Gen. 12, for in that passage not only men but also cattle are signified as having gone out with Abraham and Lot into Haran in the land of Canaan.

§ 94. To the sixth: the soul is said in the manner of Scripture to be in the blood, because — as St. Augustine explains — the animal life (*vita animalis*) which consists in the union of the soul with the body, is contained in the body chiefly and most powerfully by means of the blood.[206] St. Thomas gives the reason for this: because the qualities of life are heat and moisture, which are preserved in the animal by means of the blood, in which these same qualities are pre-eminent.'[207] Hence, however, it does not follow that the soul is transmitted with the blood, but only that certain qualities in the body are required for the infusion and reception of the soul.

To the seventh it is answered that those words of the Lord are to be understood of the whole man. For the meaning is that from man who, by the vice of his origin, is flesh — that is, carnal — as the Apostle says in Rom. 7, "But I am carnal" — it is not possible for a spiritual man to be born, but only a carnal one, and therefore, in order to become spiritual, he must be reborn of the Spirit, in accordance with what follows: "That which is born of the Spirit is spirit." But although man is flesh according to the soul — that is, carnal — it does not therefore follow that the soul is transmitted whence the vice is contracted by which man is called carnal, even if that vice is in the soul, as will be declared presently.

§ 95. To the eighth: all are said to have sinned in Adam, because from Adam all contracted sin. But how this comes about — namely, that sin is transmitted from Adam while the soul, which is the subject of sin, is not — the reply is as follows. Some say that sin is in the seed radically, in such a way, namely, that the seed has the power of corrupting and infecting human nature with sin, and that it thus comes about that the soul, by reason of its association with the body which is transmitted from the seed and with which it, as the other essential part of man, constitutes him, contracts sin at the very moment of its creation and infusion. This opinion appears to be that of St. Augustine.[208] Others reply differently. But this matter will be treated expressly below,'[209] where the manner of the transmission of original sin will be investigated.

The solution to the ninth argument has already been indicated above, in that section where we established the creation of souls from the Scriptures.

§ 96. To the tenth it is answered that it is common for an accident to be transmitted — that is, to pass by a certain disposition or infection into another — without the subject passing over. For knowledge passes from the master to the disciple without the soul, which is the subject of knowledge, passing over; similarly heresies, errors, vices. Likewise heat passes from fire to the person standing near and is diffused into the surrounding air without the subject being transmitted. In this way leprosy and plague are contracted, and other contagions of morals and diseases; but these pass over not as the same in number but in species. Therefore nothing prevents original sin from likewise passing over and being transmitted without its subject, which is the soul, by some analogous process (*simili quadam ratione*).

To the eleventh: man is said to generate man, not because by his generative power the essential form of man is introduced into matter as though drawn out from the potency (*potentia*) of matter, but because he is the cause of the union of the essential parts — inasmuch as the disposition which is produced in matter by the power of the generator is necessarily and infallibly followed, by the primeval institution of God, by the union of those parts, namely of the soul with the body.

§ 97. To the twelfth it is answered that man is of better condition even in the office of generating than brute animals and plants, in that his generative power extends not only to the vegetative and sensitive soul but moreover to that disposition in matter which, as has been said, is necessarily followed by the coming of the rational soul. Add that this very thing pertains to great dignity — to have such a soul that God alone, and not nature, can attain to producing it. For this reason neither do the angels, whose nature is more excellent than that of men, possess any power of generating.

To the thirteenth: the reply is evident from the solution of the eighth. For the soul according to its substance is from God and accordingly good, because every creature of God is good; but the sin is from the begetter, inasmuch as that which is born of the flesh is flesh; therefore God does not create a sinful soul, but creates a soul which, that it is sinful at the very moment of its creation, it contracts from another cause.

§ 98. To the fourteenth: St. Thomas replies that the vegetative and sensitive soul, to which the generative power of man extends, does not remain in the fetus but is expelled and perishes when the more perfect soul — namely the intellective — supervenes.[210] According to him, therefore, one must say that the intellective soul, which alone remains, is virtually both vegetative and sensitive, inasmuch as it contains within itself every perfection of the lower souls. To certain others, however — such as Scotus and his followers — it is more pleasing that the vegetative and sensitive soul remain in man simultaneously with the intellective, as really distinct (*reipsa distinctas*). According to them one must say that those indeed are transmitted by the power of the seed, but not the intellective. Which reply also has its own probability.

To the fifteenth: St. Thomas replies in the *Summa* that man generates what is like himself, inasmuch as through the power of his seed the matter is disposed for the reception of such a form.[210]

§ 99. To the last: one must say that God, in creating the souls of those who are born of fornications and adulteries, does not cooperate in these sins, but in nature. This same holds also in other sins, in which it is necessary to distinguish the deformity of the act from the act itself and from the natural operation, and from the natural effect of that same operation. For of these God is the cause, but the cause of the deformity adhering to them is the created will that is defective (*voluntas creata deficiens*).

§ XVII — That Paradise was a corporeal place (Paradisum fuisse locum corporeum)

§ 100. Concerning Paradise, into which man is read to have been transferred and placed by God after he was created — what sort of place it was — there is great variety of opinion among interpreters. In this variety, however, what must above all be held as a matter of faith is that Paradise was a corporeal place (*locus corporeus*). For since the name of paradise is found in the Scriptures taken in two ways — in one way for a corporeal place, that is, a garden remarkably pleasant and arranged also for man's delight, in which sense it is taken at Gen. 2,[212] Song 4,[213] Ezek. 13 and 28,[214] Sir. 24,[215] and also Eccl. 2 according to the Hebrew reading and the version of the Seventy; and in another way for spiritual delights and pleasure, especially that which is promised to the Saints as their reward, as at Lk. 23, where the Lord says to the thief: "Today thou shalt be with me in Paradise"; and Rev. 2: "To him that overcometh I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the Paradise of my God" — concerning which Paul also speaks at 2 Cor. 12,[216] saying that he was caught up into Paradise, which he immediately interprets as the third heaven, that is, the place of the felicity of the Saints, which St. Augustine, in book 12 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 34,[217] calls the Paradise of paradises — it must be known that the

paradise of which we now treat is to be understood not in the latter but in the former sense, that is, that it was a certain most pleasant place, most beautifully planted with trees and other plants, into which God introduced man whom He had created, as into a dwelling most fitting to the dignity of his nature.

§ 101. This position is proved first from the fact that Paradise is described by Moses as the place of habitation not of an Angel, who is incorporeal, but of man, who consists of a body and therefore stood in need of a corporeal and material dwelling. Hence that place must be understood to be corporeal. The same is proved by the whole description of Paradise that is contained in Gen. 2.[212] For since that description is a historical narrative, no less than those of the other things which Scripture had previously recorded, its true and genuine and literal sense ought certainly to be reckoned as none other than that which the words of Scripture convey to us according to their customary signification. And indeed the parts of the narrative plainly show and require this sense — as, for instance, that Paradise is said to have been planted and situated in the region of Eden toward its eastern side, as the Seventy render from the Hebrew; that man was placed in it in order that he might guard and till it; that in it there was produced from the moisture every tree beautiful to the sight and sweet for food; that the place was watered by a certain river afterward divided into four heads, whose proper names, not unknown, are rehearsed; that man was permitted to eat of every tree that was in it, with the exception of one only; that Eve saw the fruit of a tree and desired it as beautiful and delectable, plucked it, ate it, and gave it also to her husband to eat; that both were expelled from that place on account of the transgression of the commandment; and that Cherubim with a turning sword were set before it to bar man from entrance. Finally, that in chapter 4, Cain is said to have dwelt toward the eastern side of Eden, that is, not far from Paradise. All of which, unless they are violently dragged off into allegory departing from the literal sense, plainly prove that Paradise was a corporeal and earthly place. It is again proved from Gen. 13,[218] where a comparison to other corporeal pleasant places is drawn from this Paradise. For it is said of Sodom and Gomorrah that before they were overthrown, "they were as the paradise of the Lord, and as Egypt as one comes to Segor."

§ 102. And this was beyond all doubt the constant doctrine of all the Fathers; so much so that those who noted Origen — who interpreted the history of Paradise allegorically and thereby excluded the obvious sense of Scripture which we have mentioned — as a corrupter of the simplicity of Sacred Scripture, branded him with the note of heresy: as Epiphanius in his letter to John of Jerusalem and in the *Ancoratus*,[219] and Methodius in the same Epiphanius in the heresy of the Origenists,[220] Likewise St. Jerome in his letter against the errors of the aforesaid John, chapter 3, and in his *Commentaries on Daniel*, chapter 10.[221] St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, book 23, chapter 21; book 14, chapter 11; and book 12, chapter 17; as well as in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 8, chapter 1, and book 12, chapter 34.[222] The errors of the Seleucians and Hermians are also noted by the same St. Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, 59,[223] in that they denied the visible paradise. In that same book one may also see the heresy of Origen. The same is taught by St. Basil, Homily 11 of the *Hexaemeron*;[224] St. John Chrysostom, Homily 13 on Genesis;[225] Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, in the letter that was recited at the sixth general Synod, session 11, and approved by the same Synod at session 13;[226] and after these, St. John Damascene, book 2 of *De Fide Orthodoxa*, chapter 11.[227] By the combined reckoning of all these, the teaching of Origen, which destroys the corporeal paradise, is rejected as contrary to the doctrine of the Church.

§ 103. To this is added the fact that Hebrew writers and expositors understood the paradise described by Moses in Genesis according to the letter as none other than a corporeal one, as Josephus, book 1 of the

Antiquities,[228] and the Rabbis. I except one, Philo, who, being excessively given to allegorical expositions of Scripture, at the end of his book *De opificio mundi* and in his book *De allegoriis legis Mosaicae*,[229] will have the paradise described by Moses understood in no other way than according to the spiritual sense.

§ 104. Among the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, however, there is one — St. Ambrose — who in the book he wrote *De Paradiso*[230] appears to share in this respect the opinion of Origen. He also in Letter 42, written to Sabinus,[231] having adduced the various opinions of others concerning Paradise, concludes in the end as more probable to himself that Paradise was not a terrestrial place but something spiritual and intelligible, pertaining to the delight of the mind and spirit of man and to his beatitude in some manner even in this life. But this opinion of St. Ambrose, as discrepant from the concordant opinion of the remaining Fathers, is not to be received; though it must be entirely vindicated from heresy, for the reason that such an opinion in his age had not yet been sufficiently examined, nor had it been condemned by the judgment of the Church.

§ 105. Someone might suspect that St. Jerome also had fallen into a similar error, on account of what he says in his book *Traditiones Hebraicae*,[232] that Paradise was established by God before heaven and earth — which Bede also reported in his questions on Genesis, under the heading *De plantatione Paradisi*.[233] But this cannot apply to the terrestrial paradise, inasmuch as it belongs to the corporeal world, whose primordial parts were heaven and earth. Yet what the undoubted opinion of St. Jerome concerning Paradise is, is clear from one and another of the places cited above. Wherefore if there is any error in these words of St. Jerome, it does not pertain to the substance of Paradise, but to the time of its creation. For even in the dogmas of the Kabbalists it is found that Paradise was created before heaven and earth — which is without doubt false and contrary to Scripture, which says: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." And perhaps it is from their opinion that St. Jerome there speaks. Or if he truly thought so, he was moved by what is written — that God planted Paradise "from the beginning" (*a principio*). From this it appears to follow as a consequence that Paradise was made either before heaven and earth, or at least together with those things which were created in the beginning, that is, together with heaven and earth. This argument, however, is resolved if we say that "from the beginning" (*a principio*) refers not to time but to place — that it was planted in the eastern quarter of the world, or as the Seventy interpreted, "toward the east."

§ 106. If someone asks when Paradise was made, nothing more probable can be answered than that it was made on the third day, on which the earth was commanded to produce herbs and trees and the other kinds of plants. For what is read in 4 Ezra 3 — that Paradise was planted by the right hand of God before the earth was formed — we reject without hesitation as apocryphal, and indeed as manifestly repugnant to Scripture's declaration: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

§ XVIII — Where Paradise is or was (Ubi fit aut fuerit Paradisus)

§ 107. Having established that it is a corporeal paradise that Moses described for us, a great question is debated among interpreters of Scripture: where in the world that Paradise is, or formerly was. The principal difficulty of this question consists in the fact that it seems impossible to find and identify the rivers which Moses records as going out of Paradise from one river divided into four heads. For of these four rivers, two indeed are sufficiently well known and celebrated — the Tigris and the Euphrates — but the remaining two,

Phison and Gehon, appear unknown both to sacred and to profane writers. Josephus, to be sure, in book 1 of the *Antiquities*, chapter 2,[235] where he describes Paradise from Moses in his own words, interprets Phison as the Ganges, the river of the Indians celebrated by profane writers, and Gehon as the Nile of Egypt, the mightiest of all rivers. Nor does St. Jerome dissent from this opinion in his book *Traditiones Hebraicae*.[232] But against this interpretation it is strongly urged that the sources and origins of these rivers are most diverse and located in regions and places most distant from one another, so that it cannot be that they proceed from one and the same river. And if those to whom this opinion perchance is pleasing should reply that through the long course of time, and especially through that change of the world wrought by the flood, the origins of rivers have been altered, it is again objected to them that Moses describes these rivers long after the flood as if in his own time these four rivers still retained the same origin as they had formerly. And indeed, if the source of some river were so altered that it now arose in a region most different from that in which it formerly arose, manifest reason would prove that this river is not the same but simply a different one from the former — no less certainly than two rivers are different whose sources are shown at the same time to be diverse.

§ 108. Therefore, that we may come to the treatment of the present question, it must first be noted that it is not among those questions which pertain to faith, as St. Augustine openly testifies in *De Peccato originali*, chapter 23.[236] Hence it is that even Catholic expositors have held varying opinions concerning the location of Paradise. The opinion of certain more recent scholars was that Paradise was not any one particular region of the world, but the whole earth, in that from the beginning when it began to germinate and produce the things called the growths of the earth, it was all, as it were, one most beautiful and pleasant garden. Hugh of St. Victor also mentions this opinion in his annotation on Genesis.[237] Those who hold this opinion rely on the argument that before sin the first humans were told: "Fill the earth." But if — as we have already argued against Origen — we must persist in the simple narrative of Scripture, this opinion is easily and in manifold ways refuted. First, because the whole earth has not merely four rivers but many others very great and celebrated. Second, because four rivers are described as going out of Paradise; but no river goes out from the whole globe of the earth. Third, because man was created outside Paradise and then placed in Paradise, and after sin was expelled therefrom; but these things can by no means be said of the whole earth. Besides, Moses expressly designates a particular place when he says that Paradise was in the region of Eden toward the eastern side. To the argument, however, it is answered that the reason why the first humans were told "Fill the earth" is that their posterity, that is, the human race, even if it had not sinned, would not have been enclosed within the confines of Paradise, but was to be spread out and multiplied throughout the whole earth. And that earth, although it would not have had fertility and pleasantness entirely equal to Paradise, would nonetheless have been subject to no curse, but would have been wholly blessed by God for the convenient habitation of the human race, though not equally in all its parts. For just as the degrees of heavenly beatitude are diverse, so too would the degrees of earthly felicity have been diverse.

§ 109. Furthermore, the opinion of many and indeed of nearly all is that Paradise is a certain place very far removed and distant from the regions inhabited by men, to which men have no access — a place, I say, wondrously fertile and pleasant by reason of a perpetual and supreme mildness of air. But this opinion, since it is general, is divided into many branches. Some think that certain inaccessible lands lie between Paradise and the regions inhabited by us, as Tertullian in the *Apologeticus adversus Gentes*,[238] where he says that Paradise is separated from the knowledge of the common world by a sort of matter of fiery zone. Others say that a most vast ocean sea is poured out between Paradise and our land, and that for this reason access to Paradise is barred to us. So teaches Moses bar Cepha in his book *De Paradiso*,[239] and that from the authority of Ephrem the

Deacon, whose *Commentaries on Genesis* he cites for this purpose — commentaries which no longer survive today. Into this opinion certain words are cited by some under the title of St. Augustine *ad Orosium*, and by others under the title of Bede, though they are found in neither of them. Yet the *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 2[240] ascribes certain words of this kind to Bede, and again ascribes certain others of the same import to Strabo, who is also considered the compiler of the *Glossa ordinaria*. And it is likely that the Master had his eye on these passages, since at the end of the present distinction he says: "Hence some will have Paradise to be situated in the eastern part, a long intervening space of sea or land, etc." Others locate Paradise under the equinoctial line or not far thence, for the reason that they judge that in that climate, by reason of the perpetual equality of day and night, there is the greatest mildness of sky. So think St. Bonaventure and Durandus writing on the present distinction.[241] St. Thomas and Scotus, however, dissent,[242] though relying on arguments not so solid, since it is now established that land situated under the equinoctial, notwithstanding the great proximity of the sun, is in many places temperate. For St. Thomas writes in question 102, article 1, ad 3,[243] that the place of Paradise is excluded from our habitation by certain obstacles — whether of mountains, or of seas, or of some torrid region that cannot be crossed — and he prefers this last reason above the others, namely the vehemence of the heat in the intermediate places by reason of the nearness of the sun, and that this was signified by the flaming and turning sword which is said to have been set before Paradise. In this respect St. Thomas agrees with the opinion of Tertullian cited a little before.

§ 110. Now as for the height of Paradise, some attribute to it so great an altitude that no part of it admits darkness, but is always illumined by the splendour of the rising heavenly bodies. For these are the very words of St. Basil in his *Homilia de Paradiso*.[244] Following him, St. John Damascene, book 2 of *De Fide*, chapter 11, [227] says that Paradise is higher than all the earth. Rupert, book 1 on Genesis, chapter 37,[245] makes Paradise next to heaven. There is also read in Abdias, in the life of Matthew the Apostle,[246] that Paradise towers above all mountains and is close to heaven. Furthermore, the Master, reporting the opinion of some — at the place cited above — says: "Some will have Paradise to be situated on high, reaching up to the lunar circle; hence the waters of the flood did not reach thither." These same words are found affirmed under the name of Strabo in the *Glossa ordinaria*,[247] for he says: "We know," etc.

§ 111. But this opinion exceeds the bounds of credibility. For it is not possible that any part of the earth should rise to so great a height. Moreover, it is contrary to Sacred Scripture, which testifies that the whole earth and all the mountains were covered by the waters of the flood, which would not be true if any part of the earth reached to the sphere of the moon. Certainly, if Paradise were of such great height, Adam and Eve would be said not to have been expelled from it but to have been cast down headlong from on high; nor would there have been any need of the guard of Cherubim and the flaming sword to bar access, since that immense and precipitous height would of itself sufficiently make the place inaccessible to men. Furthermore, a mountain so lofty would be visible from some part of the world even from afar, and would cast a vast shadow with the sun opposite. And why say more? — since a place of this kind would be not now in the air but in the element of fire, which is by no means suited to human habitation; to say nothing of the fact that the element of fire, especially in that part nearest to heaven, together with the neighboring heaven, is perpetually moved with such velocity that it traverses the entire globe of the earth in the space of twenty-four or twenty-five hours. How, then, could Paradise — a place, I say, for Adam and Eve — have remained fixed in so great an agitation of the element, or how could Adam and Eve for even a moment have endured there in so swift a movement of the element? Rightly, therefore, is this opinion, so absurd, not to say ridiculous, exploded by all the learned. Hence St. Thomas also does not approve of it, but interprets it conveniently in question 102, article 1, ad 1.[248]

§ 112. Some, however, receding from the absurdity of that opinion, locate Paradise immediately above the middle region of the air, that is, in that place which is the boundary of the exhalations and vapours with which this our air is perpetually mingled and disturbed. So think Alexander of Hales and Tostatus.[249] But this opinion too is destroyed by two principal considerations. The first, that such a place would not, by reason of the excessive thinness of the air there, be fitted for the life and habitation of men. The second, that Scripture testifies that the waters of the flood covered the whole earth, which would not be so if the place of Paradise were above the middle region of the air, to which no waters can reach.

§ 113. Besides the opinions thus far mentioned, there is the view of certain Doctors — not in truth to be disapproved — who place the Paradise described by Moses in an eastern region around the parts of Mesopotamia and Babylonia, and situate it not on a mountain but on level ground. This they prove from the names of the rivers which Moses mentions in describing Paradise. The Euphrates is a river of Babylonia, between which and the Tigris, the other river, the intercepted region is called by the Greek name Mesopotamia, as being contained in the middle between the rivers. And this region is situated to the east with respect to the Holy Land, as well as with respect to the desert of Arabia in which Moses was writing these things. Hence what we have in our version — that Paradise was planted "from the beginning" (*a principio*) — the Seventy interpreters rendered as "toward the east" (*ad Orientem*), which was also observed by the Master. In the same region is Eden, which Hebrew word, although Jerome translated as *voluptas* ("delight"), yet more correctly, unless I am mistaken, the Seventy retained as the proper name of the place. This can be shown from other passages of Scripture. For in Gen. 4, Cain is said to have dwelt toward the eastern side of Eden. And 4 Kgs. 19,[250] the children of Eden are reckoned among the orientals. And elsewhere in Scripture mention is made of the same region as situated toward the east, as Is. 37 and Ezek. 27.'[251] Now it must in general be noted that by the name of the Orient, that is, the eastern land, nearly always in Sacred Letters there are understood the regions that are within the Persian Gulf — namely Persia, Armenia, Arabia, and Mesopotamia — also the Red Sea and the salt sea, whose coastal inhabitants or peoples are called orientals, because they were so regarded by the Jews. Also Hus and Job who dwelt in the land of Hus, in the borders of Idumaea, or as others hold in Idumaea itself, are numbered among the orientals at Job 1. And the three Magi who came from Persia or Chaldaea or Arabia into Judaea, to adore the King born there, are narrated to have come from the East. Finally, even the Scripture sometimes simply calls Mesopotamia the eastern land, as Gen. 29 and Num. 23.'[252]

§ 114. Since therefore Paradise according to the Hebrew truth — with the Seventy interpreters' version also consenting — was in its situation at Eden toward the East, and since from other passages of Scripture it is established that Eden is a region situated in the Orient, that is, in the parts of Mesopotamia, and since as certain Geographers show it is situated between Babylon and the Persian Sea, and since the Tigris and Euphrates both flow through Mesopotamia on either side — nothing more probable appears than what is said, that Paradise was in those same parts of Mesopotamia. In support of which it is advanced as an argument that, as Quintus Curtius records in book 5 of his *Deeds of Alexander*,[253] all Mesopotamia is so rich and fertile that the cattle are driven away from the fields lest satiety befall them.

§ 115. As for the rivers from which Moses thought fit to describe Paradise so studiously, what must first of all be observed are the words of the Hebrew text, which read thus: "And a river went out from Eden to water Paradise, and thence it is divided and becomes four heads." Therefore it is not signified that the river goes out of Paradise as if its source (*fons*) and spring of the river were in Paradise itself and thence outflowing it were afterward divided into four streams; but that the river flows out from the region of Eden into Paradise to

water it, and afterwards is divided into four rivers. It seems that by this one river is signified the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates into one channel — where (although arising from diverse sources) they come together in the manner of one river until, by the parting of the waters, they again separate and go away into their own channels; from which derive then also the two other rivers, Phison and Gehon. One of these, flowing through Armenia, is called Phison, whose name is also mentioned in Sir. 24.[254] Which name is also found among profane writers —

§ 116. Through faith, Persia, Armenia, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, together with the Red Sea and the Salt Sea, and the inhabitants of these regions — or those who dwell in their vicinity — are called Orientals, because such lands lay to the east with respect to Judaea. For this reason also Job, who dwelt in the land of Hus, on the borders of Idumaea — or, as others prefer, in Idumaea itself — is numbered among the Orientals (Job 1). And the three Magi who came from Persia, or Chaldaea, or Arabia into Judaea to adore the newborn King, are narrated to have come from the East. Finally, Mesopotamia is sometimes called by Scripture simply "the eastern land," as in Gen. 29 and Num. 23.[252]

Since, therefore, Paradise, according to the Hebrew truth — with the Septuagint translation likewise concurring — was situated in Eden to the East, and it is established from other passages of Scripture that Eden is a region situated in the East, that is, in the parts of Mesopotamia; and indeed, as it appears to certain Geographers, between Babylon and the Persian Sea; and since the Tigris and Euphrates flow around Mesopotamia on either side — nothing appears more probable than what is said, namely that Paradise was situated in those same parts of Mesopotamia. In support of this, they adduce as evidence what Quintus Curtius reports in book 5 of his *De Rebus gestis Alexandri*:[255] that all of Mesopotamia is so fertile and rich in soil that cattle are said to be driven away from their pasture lest satiety destroy them.

§ 117. Now, as regards the rivers by which Moses thought it worthwhile to describe Paradise so carefully, the words of Scripture must first be observed, which in the Hebrew read thus: "And a river went out of Eden to water Paradise, and from thence it is divided, and becomes into four heads," etc.[256] Therefore it is not signified that the river goes forth *from* Paradise, as some have thought — as if the source and spring of the river were in Paradise itself, whence it flowed and was afterward divided into four streams — but rather that the river flows from the region of Eden *into* Paradise, and having gone out from thence is afterward divided into several rivers. Now it seems that by that one river is signified the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates into a single channel, where (although they rise from different sources) they are like a single river, until they are again separated by a parting of the waters and go their separate ways into their own channels; from which two other rivers — Phison and Gehon — are in turn derived. For the one which traverses Armenia is called Phison, and Ecclesiasticus likewise makes mention of it (Sir. 24).[254] Though that name is not found among them exactly as written, it nevertheless appears to exist among them in a somewhat altered form. For Quintus Curtius in book 5 testifies that the Euphrates and Tigris are called *Phasis* by the local inhabitants, and Pliny (lib. 6, cap. 21)[257] records that the Tigris splits into two channels, and where they rejoin is called the Pasitigris. Moreover, these names Phison and Phasis have a certain affinity with one another. Indeed, in this very century a certain river in Armenia bears the name Phison — and thus retains that most ancient name handed down by Moses — as William, Bishop of Tournai, attests in the book which he wrote in French about a hundred years ago (*De Vellere aureo*).[258]

§ 118. What land of Havilah, which Phison is said to encircle, may be gathered from Gen. 25 and 1 Kgs. 15.[259] Certainly the Geographer Strabo places that region on the borders of Arabia and Mesopotamia. Hence

those are clearly refuted who identify Phison with the Ganges, the river of India, which is exceedingly remote from those places.

The other river, which makes its way toward the desert of Arabia, is called Gehon, and Ecclesiasticus likewise makes mention of it in the passage already cited (Sir. 24).[254] It is said to encircle the land of Ethiopia — not that southern or western Ethiopia which the Nile waters, but the eastern Ethiopia which is adjacent to Arabia and Mesopotamia. For it is easy to show from Sacred Scripture that there is an Ethiopia in the vicinity of Syria and Palestine: for the Midianites were called Ethiopians (Num. 12). Hence in the Canticle of Habacuc it is read: "I saw the tents of Ethiopia, the curtains of the land of Midian shall be troubled."[260] To which add the passages of 2 Par. 14 and 21, Ps. 71 and 86.[261] Moreover, it is plain that by the name Gehon the Nile is not to be understood; since the Nile has absolutely no connection with the Tigris and Euphrates, just as neither does the Ganges — a fact most familiar to Geographers.

§ 119. Finally, this entire view concerning Paradise is confirmed above all by that one most probable argument: that Moses must be thought to have wished to describe Paradise by means of the circumstances of places and rivers that would be familiar to the Hebrews for whom he was writing. Now, of this character especially are the regions and rivers enumerated according to the interpretation we have given. Hence neither was it unknown in the time of Moses in which region of the world Paradise had been situated; and accordingly it is credible and very consonant with truth that the ancient men before the Flood, and afterward Noah and his sons after the Flood, inhabited places near to Paradise — both out of love for it (for Adam was created not far from Paradise, so as to be at once introduced into it) and on account of the singular goodness of that land, of which we have spoken above from Quintus Curtius.[262] And this same thing regarding Noah and his sons is shown sufficiently clearly from the fact that the ark is said to have rested upon certain mountains of Armenia.[263] From thence, moreover, as the race multiplied, and also on the occasion of the Babylonian confusion of tongues, men were dispersed from that land into all other regions whatsoever. All of which is sufficiently gathered from Gen. 10 and 11.

This aforementioned view concerning the location of Paradise is handed down by St. Augustine, by Steuchus (in his *Cosmopoeia* and in his annotations on Gen. 2, concerning Paradise),[264] by Vatablus (in his Scholia on the same passage),[265] by Johannes Hesselius (in his commentary on this Distinction),[266] and by B. Pererius in his Commentary on Genesis.[267]

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§ XIX — Whether Paradise still survives (Utrum Paradisus adhuc supersit)

§ 120. Finally, it is asked whether Paradise still exists even now, or whether, as is the condition of earthly things, it has at last been scattered and destroyed by the injury of time and the elements, and has thereby lost that pleasantness of its original condition and consequently ceased to be Paradise. That Paradise still exists seems to be shown from Scripture, namely Sir. 44, which testifies that Enoch was translated into Paradise, so that he might preach repentance to the nations.[269] For from this it appears to follow as a consequence that he still dwells in Paradise until he returns thence to us to preach repentance to the nations. And the same view concerning Elijah, who was similarly translated, is held by the common opinion of the faithful and has likewise been handed down by many Fathers. For St. Justin Martyr, *ad Orthodoxos* (questions 75, 76, and 85),[270] and St. Irenaeus, book 5 (*Adversus Haereses*),[271] write that Enoch and Elijah are dwelling in that Paradise

from which Adam was expelled, and that they will remain there until the end of the age. Tertullian, in his *Apologeticum* (*contra Gentes*) and at the end of his *De Anima*,[272] likewise speaks of Paradise as still enduring and as destined to persist until the day of judgement. Isidore, book (*De Vita et Obitu Patriarcharum*),[273] treating of Enoch, subscribes to the same opinion. And, to pass over others, the Master (in this Distinction),[274] holds it, and he is followed by the majority of the Scholastic Doctors.

§ 121. Indeed, St. Augustine, in book (*De Peccato Originali*, cap. 23),[275] having said that it is possible, without prejudice to the Faith, to doubt and be ignorant where Paradise is — that Paradise in which God placed man — added these words: "Although Christian Faith does not doubt that Paradise still exists." Therefore, according to St. Augustine, it seems that, without prejudice to the Faith, one cannot doubt whether Paradise still exists in the nature of things. On the other hand, if what we have said above concerning the location of Paradise is true, no light argument is drawn from those considerations that Paradise no longer exists. For if, as we have shown, Paradise was in the vicinity of Mesopotamia or Armenia, and since those places were of old, and even today are, not only traversable in every direction by men but also cultivated and inhabited, and since Paradise is nowhere to be found in them, nor can anyone reasonably say that Paradise has been transported elsewhere, it follows that it no longer exists.

§ 122. There is added an argument from Sacred Scripture, which records in Gen. 7 that the entire globe of the earth was covered by the waters of the flood, to such a degree that the waters surpassed even the highest mountains by fifteen cubits.[276] Therefore it was necessary that Paradise, together with all the other gardens and cultivated places of the whole earth, should have perished by being inundated in that flood. And if you join this argument to the foregoing, it will have still more force. For if Paradise was in the regions of Armenia or Mesopotamia, and if Scripture says that Noah's ark, as the waters receded, came to rest upon the mountains of Armenia,[263] it is plainly consequent that Paradise, situated in those regions and not higher than the mountains, was overwhelmed by the same waters which overwhelmed the mountains as well. Nor is there any reason that compels us to think that Paradise remained as it was when it is read to have been first made; but it is more credible that that place, in the manner of perishable and corruptible things, was gradually changed for the worse, and that, with the guard of the Cherubim and the flaming sword at length withdrawn, it was made accessible even to men, at least after the flood. For the guard placed over it needed to endure only so long as that place could remain whole and uncorrupted and retain its original fertility and beauty.

§ 123. And indeed it is probable that the soil of Paradise was made, together with the rest of the earth, subject to the curse on account of the transgression of man perpetrated in Paradise itself — just as plain experience sufficiently establishes that the land of Canaan, which according to the faith of Sacred Scripture was at one time a land flowing with milk and honey, degenerated greatly from that fertility in later ages on account of the sins of the Jews. This view, as a probable one, is handed down — besides the authors cited in the foregoing section — by Jansenius (*Commentarii in Concordiam Evangelicam*, cap. 143)[277] and by Cardinal Bellarmine (*De Beatitudine Sanctorum*, lib., cap. 3).[278]

§ 124. Therefore we respond to what has been urged on the other side. In the Greek codex of Sirach, Paradise is not named; mention is made only of the translation of Enoch, without indication of the place to which he was translated. And the teaching of St. Augustine is clear in the passage cited above from his book *De Peccato Originali*: that it is uncertain and does not pertain to the Faith whether Enoch and Elijah are in Paradise or elsewhere.[279] Hence also St. Thomas did not venture simply to affirm that Enoch and Elijah dwell in that Paradise from which Adam was expelled, but nearly always adds "as it is said" or "as it is believed," as is

clear from I (q. 102, art. 2) and II-II (q. 64, art. 2).[280] He also, in part III (q. 49, art. 2), when he teaches that Paradise, even though inhabited by no one, is not therefore useless, sufficiently indicates that it is not certain to him that Enoch and Elijah dwell in it.[281] And indeed Rupert, book 3 (*In Genesim*, cap. 33),[282] expressly denies that Scripture signifies that Enoch and Elijah were translated into that Paradise in which Adam had been placed. St. Gregory likewise, Homily 29 (*In Evangelia*),[283] writes that Elijah was carried up into the air so that he might be brought suddenly to some secret region of the earth; he makes no mention of Paradise. Although whatever that place is in which Enoch and Elijah happily dwell, it is most fittingly called Paradise — for that name is a common one, even in Sacred Scripture, as we indicated at the outset. Therefore, even if "into Paradise" were added in Sirach, that would in no way obstruct our view.

§ 125. To the opinion of Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, we reply that those same authors, in those same passages, add certain other things which the Church does not receive — for example, that the thief was led into that earthly Paradise, and that the souls of all the just dwell in it until the day of judgement. Accordingly, we do not act rashly if we likewise depart from them also in this, their contention that Paradise still exists. For they base this their opinion upon

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1. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 12 and hom. 13.
2. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 24.
3. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio*, chs. 29 and 30.
4. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 12.
5. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, ch. 8.
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91, a. 4, ad 3.
7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91, a. 4 (at the place cited above).
8. 4 Esdras (treated as apocryphal by Estius).
9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 1.
10. Aristotle, *De Anima* II.
11. The OCR reads "Act. 23" but the page image confirms this as Acts 24 (i.e. Acts, the verse concerning the spirit; the citation string in the source reads "Luc. 23. 24. Act. 23. 1. Corinth. 2."). The reference to Acts 23 may be an alternate citation in the source.
12. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 8 (above).
13. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, heresy 86.
14. St. Augustine, *De Anima et ejus Origine* II, ch. 9.
15. St. Augustine, *De Anima et ejus Origine* IV, chs. 12 and following.
16. St. Augustine, Epistle 100 (to Evodius).
17. St. Augustine, Epistle 28 (to St. Jerome).
18. St. Augustine, Epistle 157 (to Optatus).
19. St. Augustine, *Expositio Psalmi 118*; and *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 16.
20. St. Bernard, *Super Cantica*, Sermon 40.
21. St. Bernard, *De Interiori Domo*, ch. 67. (a) The treatise or book *De Interiori Domo* is judged by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine to be among the doubtful works of St. Bernard, though worthy of praise; Philippe Labbé, in his dissertation on the dubious and

spurious works of the same author, records that the book *De Interiori Domo*, or *De Conscientia Aedificanda*, is among the four works attributed to Hugh of St. Victor.

22. St. Bernard, Sermon 5 *in variis*.

23. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), canon 1.

24. St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 14.

25. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 6.

26. St. Augustine, *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 16.

27. Aristotle, *De Anima* III, ch. 4.

28. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 43.

29. Estius, *In II Sent.* (below, in its proper place).

30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 1 (as above).

31. Haimo, Homily for the Second Sunday after the Octave of Pentecost.

32. Lactantius, *De Opificio Dei*, ch. 11.

33. John Cassian, *Collationes*, conference 7, ch. 13.

34. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 11.

35. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Council), session 5.

36. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, last distinction.

37. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 44.

38. Scotus, *In II Sent.* (relevant distinction).

39. Lactantius, *De Opificio Dei*, ch. 19.

40. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3 (above).

41. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3 (above), where the reply common to Angels and separated souls is given.

42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 1 (as cited above).

43. St. Augustine, Epistle 157 (*ad Optatum*).

44. St. Augustine, *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, ch. 16 (as above); cf. Epistle 190 (*ad Optatum*, also numbered 157).

45. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Council), session 5, beginning (as above).

46. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, relevant distinction (above).

47. Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, Book 5, annotation 112; also Book 6, annotation 39.

48. Lk. 23:46.

49. Matt. 10:28.

50. Lk. 24:39.

51. *Constitutiones Apostolicae*, Book 6, ch. 11.

52. Isidore, *Etymologiae*, Book 8, ch. 5; cited in Gratian, canon 24, question 3.

53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2.

54. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, ch. 24.

55. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, ch. 25.

56. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Council), session 5, beginning; testimony of John, Bishop of Thessalonica.

57. Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, Book 5, annotation 112; Book 6, annotation 39.

58. Isidore, *Etymologiae*, Book 8, ch. 5; cited in Gratian, canon 24, question 3 [abbreviation as in source: *Gratiano relatus can.*].

59. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, ch. 24 [source abbreviation: *lib. 10. de Genesi ad literam cap. 24.*].

60. Second Council of Nicaea (Seventh Ecumenical Council), session 5, beginning (*actionis quintae initio*); testimony of John, Bishop of Thessalonica.

61. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 1.

62. Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta*, Book 5, annotation 112; and Book 6, annotation 39.

63. Gal. 5:17.

64. Sixth Ecumenical Synod (Third Council of Constantinople), session 11.

65. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 12.

66. Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book II, ch. 1.

67. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 14 (above).

68. Clement V, Council of Vienne, *Clementina*, single canon *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*; Leo X, Fifth Lateran Council, session 8.

69. Eighth Ecumenical Council (Fourth Council of Constantinople), canon 11.

70. Fifth Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8.

71. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90, a. 4.

72. Rufinus, *Epistola ad Anastasium Papam* (found among the works of St. Jerome).

73. Rom. 9:11.

74. Ps. 32:15.

75. Rom. 5:12.

76. 2 Cor. 5:2–4.

77. Rev. 6:9–10.

78. St. Jerome, Ep. 27 (to St. Augustine); *Epistola ad Demetriadem*, ch. 9; *Epistola ad Pammachium contra errores Joannis Hierosolymitani*.

79. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 5.

80. St. Cyril, commentary on Jn. 1:9 ("The true light which enlightens every man").

81. Pope Leo I, Ep. 11; Ep. 93, ch. 10.

82. St. Bernard, *Sermones de Nativitate Domini*, serm. 2.

83. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 43, q. 1.

84. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, ch. 13; *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 15; *Contra sermonem Arianorum*, ch. 8; *Retractationes* I, ch. 1, 4, and 8.

85. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* VII, ch. 24, 25, and 27.

86. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII, ch. 3 and 5.

87. First Council of Braga, canon 6 (with anathema, against Origenists and Priscillianists).

88. St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Rufinum*, ch. 3.

89. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 2, in corpore and ad 4.

90. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

91. St. Thomas, *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*, ch. 5 (= Opusculum 16).

92. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* (as cited above, q. 90, a. 4).

93. Wis. 8:19–20.

94. Wis. 9:15.

95. Ps. 141:8 (Vulgate).

96. Eccl. 12:7.

97. Jn. 9:2.

98. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Ephesios*, on Eph. 1:4; Eph. 1:12; Eph. 1:12 ("who before hoped in Christ").

99. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* II, ch. 8.

100. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* VII, ch. 5.

101. Prudentius, *Cathemerinon*, Hymnus ante somnum; Hymnus ad Exsequias Defunctorum; *Hamartigenia* I, near the end.

102. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 12.

103. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 118, concio 8.

104. St. Augustine, *Contra Academicos* II, ch. 9.

105. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 7.

106. St. Augustine, *Soliloquia* II, ch. 20.

107. St. Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae*, ch. 20.

108. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium* II, ch. 3.

109. Rom. 7:24.

110. Heb. 12:9.

111. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 1.

112. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, chapter on the nature of the soul; *Cathemerinon*, Hymnus Epiphaniae.

113. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 4.

114. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 8.

115. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17 (above, on the soul as form).

116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118, a. 2.

117. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17 (above, on the soul as incorporeal and indivisible).

118. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 157 (to Optatus); in the Benedictine edition, Epistle 190.

119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90.

120. Is. 42:5 (reading of the Septuagint); cf. Zach. 12:1.

121. Eccl. 11:7 (combined with Eccl. 12:7: "and the spirit return to God who gave it").

122. Jn. 5:17.

123. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 28 (to St. Jerome) [= Ep. 166 in the most recent Benedictine edition]; *De origine animae* I, ch. 14; *De Genesi ad litteram* X, ch. 6.

124. That is, Heb. 12:9 and Zach. 12:1, which explicitly contrast the "Father of spirits" and the "fathers of our flesh," or God as former of the spirit over against the earth as the ground of the body.

125. Estius refers to his earlier discussion of Sir. 18:1 (*Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*) elsewhere in this commentary.

126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90 (as cited above).

127. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Pammachium contra errores Joannis Hierosolymitani* [= Ep. 51 in standard editions].

128. St. Jerome, *Epistola* 82 (to Marcellinus), vol. 2; *Commentarius in ultimum caput Ecclesiastae*; *Apologia adversus Rufinum*, lib. III; *Epistola ad Augustinum*.

129. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, lib. X (near the beginning).

130. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *In Psalmum* 62.

131. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 11; Gen. 2:23.

132. The printed text at this point passes to a citation of *De Noe et Arca*, chs. 4 and 15, which testifies that the manner of the soul's presence in the first man is common to all human souls, and that it is wholly impossible for a man to [the text continues with the following references].

133. St. Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, chs. 4 and 15; *De Bono Mortis*, ch. 9; *Epistola* 21.

134. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem*, lib. I, ch. 9; Jn. 1:9.

135. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Epistola* 1.

136. Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 14.

137. St. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*, lib. I; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Anima*, ch. 6; St. John Chrysostom, Homily 23 among the collected homilies on Matthew; Gennadius, *loc. cit.*; Pseudo-Augustine [or the anonymous author], *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 23.

138. Lactantius, *De Opificio Dei*, ch. 9; St. Jerome, *Apologia adversus Rufinum*, lib. III.

139. Prudentius, *Carmen de Natura Animae* (*Hamartigenia*?): "Non animas animae pariunt" — and what follows.

140. Prudentius, *Hymnus Epiphaniae*; *Hymnus ante somnum* (or *Hymnus omnium sanctorum*).

141. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, lib. II, ch. 12.

142. Haimo [of Auxerre or Halberstadt], commentary on Heb. 12 ("*Patres quidem carnis nostrae*," etc.).

143. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 2 *de Nativitate Domini*.

144. Peter Lombard, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 17 (this very distinction).

145. Hugh of St. Victor, *Quaestio* 105 *in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*.

146. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, lib. I, Pars 7, ch. 30.

147. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, as cited above (cf. the section reference in the source).

148. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Marcellinum et Anapsychiam*, q. 82 (vol. 2); also found among St. Augustine's letters as Ep. 27 (in the Benedictine edition, Ep. 165).

149. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 157 *ad Optatum*.

150. Gennadius of Marseilles, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, loc. cit.

151. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*.

152. Damianus Goezius (Damião de Góis), *De Moribus ac Religione Aethiopum*.

153. St. Augustine, *De Anima et eius Origine*, lib. I and II.

154. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 28 *ad Hieronymum*.

155. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, lib. II, ch. 26; lib. III, ch. 10; *Contra Iulianum*, lib. V, ch. 9; *Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas*; *Retractationum* lib. I, ch. 1; lib. II, chs. 45 and 56.

156. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, lib. X.

157. 2 Macc. 7; St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, lib. V, ch. 9.

158. St. Gregory the Great, *Epistola* 53, lib. VII.

159. Eucherius of Lyons, commentary on Gen. 2:7 ("*Inspiravit in faciem ejus*," etc.).

160. Cassiodorus, *De Anima*, ch. 14.

161. Rabanus Maurus, *De Institutione Clericorum*, lib. II, ch. 57.

162. Salvianus, Preface to *Sermones de Operibus Christi Cardinalibus* (falsely attributed to Cyprian).

163. Rufinus, *Epistola ad Anastasium Papam*.

164. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 157; *De Peccatorum Meritis*, lib. III, ch. 10.

165. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, lib. X, ch. 13.

166. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, lib. V, ch. 3.

167. Pope Zosimus, *Epistola ad Orbis Episcopos*.

168. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II (=I-II?), q. 90, art. 4 [abbreviation as in source: "S. Thom. 2. p. qu. 90. art. 4."].

169. Peter Lombard, *In II Sententiarum*, body of this Distinction (Dist. 17).

170. Peter Lombard, *In II Sententiarum*, Dist. 17, § H (preceding section).

171. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Psalmum* 32.

172. Pope Leo the Great, *Epistola* 93, ch. 10.

173. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, ch. *De Natura Animae* (*Vitandus*): "Vitandus tamen error erit, ne traduce carnis / Transfundi in sobolem credatur fons animarum."

174. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, art. 2.

175. John Gerson, *Trilogus Astrologiae*, proposition 15.

176. St. Augustine [source as in text; reference to Caelestius's doubt concerning children dying without baptism].

177. St. Augustine [refutation of the Luciferians; loc. cit. in the source].

178. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, lib. I, pars 7, ch. 35.

179. Alfonso de Castro, *De Haeresibus*, title *De Anima*.

180. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. II, ch. 86.

181. St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, Dist. 18, q. 1, art. 1.

182. St. Jerome, *Epistola ad Augustinum* (= St. Augustine, *Epistola* 30, in the Benedictine edition).

183. Rom. 14:5.

184. The long footnote of the source (marked "(a)") reads as follows: A lengthy question would have to be undertaken here in order to set the matter before readers more fully. But we judge it wholly wrong to exceed the proper limits; for annotations are not commentaries, and it is our intent to write concisely. Meanwhile several theologians who treat this material as it deserves may be read; among these the principal ones to be consulted are Robert Bellarmine, lib. 4 (*De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*, ch. 11, §. *Quarta sententia*, and following), where he affirms that the opinion asserting the propagation of souls by traduction is rejected and refuted as an explored error by all Scholastic theologians; and Cardinal Henry Noris in *Vindiciis Augustinianis*, ch. 4, §. 3, where he treats the matter fully and at length; and Natalis Alexander, tom. 5 of *Historia Ecclesiastica*, saec. 5, ch. 4, art. 3, §. 10, where he has the following: "The ancient doubt (sc. concerning the mode of propagation of souls) does not prevent souls from being asserted by all Catholics to be created by God and to be infused in the act of creating into bodies, as is held among the decrees of the Fifth Lateran Council" — and he also commends Cardinal Bellarmine in the place cited. Certainly the Fifth Lateran Council, held under the Supreme Pontiff Leo X on the 17th of June 1513, so decreed: "With the sacred Council approving, we condemn and reprobate all who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal, or is one and the same in all men, and those who call this into doubt; since it not only truly, in itself and essentially, exists as the form of the human body — as is contained in the Canon of Clement V issued in the General Council of Vienne — but is also immortal, and, for the multitude of bodies into which it is infused, is singularly multipliable, and has been multiplied, and is to be multiplied." By which decree, although the Council does not directly settle the dispute and does not determine the question — for the intention of the Council was directed to the condemnation of those Heretics and Philosophers who placed the soul as mortal and as one in all men — nevertheless it clearly sets forth the opinion asserting that souls are created from nothing by God in individual men, duly formed and disposed bodies: for this is evidently expressed in the words *into which it is infused* ("*quibus infunditur*"): for "infusion" connotes creation by God, not propagation by traduction. But what the Author says — that St. Thomas's inference, which concludes "And therefore it is heretical to say," etc., is not valid — must not be passed over; for to one attending to the sense, both St. Thomas's words and the inference itself will be plainly evident, and it is altogether clear that St. Thomas's inference is conclusive and necessary, and that in it he was imitating St. Augustine, who in the place that St. Thomas there cites similarly notes that opinion with a similar censure. Do not be surprised, reader, and do not read these things with a censorious brow. I say

therefore that St. Augustine similarly noted with censure the very opinion that St. Thomas there rejects. For St. Augustine in Epistle 190 (*ad Optatum*, alias 157) reproaches Tertullian for placing the traduction of souls — not in the mode about which both Augustine himself and others at that time were uncertain, but for the reason that Tertullian thought the soul to be corporeal and thence deduced it to be transmitted; for those too, he says in that letter, who assert that souls are propagated from one (sc. the soul that God gave to the first man), and say that they are thus transmitted from parents, if they follow Tertullian's opinion — [the footnote continues but is cut off in the source].

185. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, as cited above (cf. the section reference in the source: "S. Thom. ubi supra").

186. St. Thomas: *In II Sententiarum*, Dist. 18, qq. 1–2; *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 9; *Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, chs. 86–89; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90, art. 2; I, q. 118, art. 2.

187. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2; *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 9; *Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, chs. 86–89. Cardinal Bellarmine is cited here as conceding the argument from incorporeality.

188. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 90, a. 2.

189. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2; *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 9; *Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, chs. 86–89.

190. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 11.

191. Pseudo-Augustine [Ambrosiaster], *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, quest. 36.

192. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, lib. II, ch. 3.

193. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 190 (*ad Optatum*, alias 157); St. Gregory the Great, cited as one of those who doubted the question of traduction while never doubting the incorporeality of the soul.

194. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2 [cited as "S. Thom. ibidem" — same reference as the preceding section].

195. Gen. 2; Exod. 20.

196. Gen. 5.

197. Gen. 12.

198. Gen. 46.

199. Lev. 17.

200. Ps. 32 (Vulgate); the Hebrew reads *Qui finxit pariter corda eorum*.

201. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Anima*, ch. 6.

202. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, ch. 88; *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 9.

203. Above, at Dist. 15.

204. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. X, ch. 3.

205. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones super Genesim*, quest. 250.

206. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones super Leviticum* [abbreviation as in source: *qu. super Levit.*].

207. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 3.

208. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis*, lib. II, ch. 26; *Contra Julianum*, lib. IV, ch. 3.

209. Below, at Dist. 31.

210. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 118, a. 2 [cited as "in Summa"].

211. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 1.

212. Gen. 2.

213. Song 4.

214. Ezek. 13 and 28.

215. Sir. 24; Eccl. 2.

216. 2 Cor. 12.

217. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. XII, ch. 34.

218. Gen. 13.

219. St. Epiphanius, *Epistola ad Joannem Hierosolymitanum*; *Ancoratus*.

220. Methodius, in St. Epiphanius, *De Haeresi Origenistarum*.

221. St. Jerome, *Epistola contra errores Joannis Hierosolymitani*, ch. 3; *Commentarii super Danielem*, ch. 10.

222. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. XXIII, ch. 21; lib. XIV, ch. 11; lib. XII, ch. 17; *De Genesi ad litteram*, lib. VIII, ch. 1; lib. XII, ch. 34.

223. St. Augustine, *De Haeresibus*, 59.

224. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 11.

225. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homily 13.

226. Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, Epistola, recited at the Sixth General Synod (Third Council of Constantinople), session 11, approved at session 13.

227. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, lib. II, ch. 11.

228. Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae*, lib. I.

229. Philo, *De opificio mundi* (sub finem); *De allegoriis legis Mosaicae*.

230. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*.

231. St. Ambrose, *Epistola* 42 (*ad Sabinum*).

232. St. Jerome, *Traditiones Hebraicae* [i.e. *Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim*].

233. Bede, *Quaestiones super Genesim*, titulus *De plantatione Paradisi*.

234. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 2 ad 1; a. 4 ad 1; also q. 63 [abbreviation as in source: "1. p. Item 102.2.ad qu. art. art. 4.1.ad 2. 63."].

235. Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae*, lib. I, ch. 2.

236. St. Augustine, *De Peccato originali*, ch. 23.

237. Hugh of St. Victor, *Adnotationes super Genesim*.

238. Tertullian, *Apologeticus adversus Gentes*.

239. Moses bar Cepha, *De Paradiso*; citing Ephrem the Deacon, *Commentarii super Genesim*.

240. *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 2; attributed there to Strabo (Walafrid Strabo).

241. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17.

242. St. Thomas and Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 17.

243. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 1, ad 3.

244. St. Basil, *Homilia de Paradiso* (= *Hexaemeron*, Homily 11).

245. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim*, lib. I, ch. 37.

246. Abdias [pseudo-Abdias], *Vita Matthaei Apostoli*.

247. *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 2 (attributed to Strabo).

248. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 1, ad 1.

249. Alexander of Hales; Tostatus (Alfonso Tostado).

250. 4 Kgs. 19 (Vulgate) [= 2 Kgs. 19 in modern numbering].

251. Is. 37; Ezek. 27.

252. Gen. 29; Num. 23.

253. Quintus Curtius, *De rebus gestis Alexandri*, lib. V.

254. Sir. 24.

255. Quintus Curtius Rufus, *De Rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, lib. V.

256. Gen. 2:10.

257. Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia*, lib. VI, cap. 21.

258. William, Bishop of Tournai, *De Vellere aureo* [written in French approximately a hundred years before Estius's time].

259. Gen. 25; 1 Kgs. 15 (Vulgate numbering).

260. Hab. 3:7.

261. 2 Par. 14; 2 Par. 21; Ps. 71; Ps. 86.

262. Quintus Curtius Rufus, *De Rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, lib. V (as cited above).

263. Gen. 8:4.

264. Augustinus Steuchus (Eugubinus), *Cosmopoeia*; and *Adnotationes in Genesim*, cap. 2, de Paradiso.

265. Franciscus Vatablus, *Scholia in Genesim*, ad Gen. 2.

266. Johannes Hesselius, commentary on this Distinction (*In hanc Distinctionem*).

267. Benedictus Pererius, *Commentarii in Genesim*.

268. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 2, ad 3; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3–4.

269. Sir. 44.

270. St. Justin Martyr, *Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos*, qq. 75, 76, 85.

271. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, lib. V.

272. Tertullian, *Apologeticum* (*contra Gentes*); and *De Anima*, at the end.

273. Isidore, *De Vita et Obitu Patriarcharum*.

274. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 17.

275. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, lib., cap. 23.

276. Gen. 7.

277. Jansenius (of Ghent), *Commentarii in Concordiam Evangelicam*, cap. 143.

278. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, *De Beatitudine Sanctorum*, lib., cap. 3.

279. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originali*, as cited above.

280. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 2; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 2.

281. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 49, a. 2.

282. Rupert (of Deutz), *In Genesim*, lib. III, cap. 33.

283. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, hom. 29.

DISTINCTIO XVIII — ON THE FORMATION OF WOMAN FROM MAN, AND RELATED QUESTIONS (*DE FORMATIONE MULIERIS EX VIRO*)

§ 1. Other Fathers and Scholastic Doctors set forth their opinion not as certain, but as probable in their own estimation, and also — as we acknowledge — as commonly received; from which, accordingly, one ought not to depart without reason. St. Augustine, however, does not hold it to be certain according to the Faith that Paradise now exists, but only that it exists according to some difference of time, namely that which its description in Genesis demands. Now that description demands that Paradise once existed — not that it still exists at the present time. For St. Augustine is speaking against Origen, who by his allegorical interpretation was removing the terrestrial Paradise from consideration, as though it had never existed. Hence he does not say that Christian Faith has no doubt that Paradise *exists*, but that it *is* — for *esse* abstracts from present or past existence. If, however, anyone should think that the present tense as it stands in St. Augustine must absolutely be pressed, we shall reply to him that for St. Augustine it is certain and beyond doubt that that Paradise exists in which God placed man — that is, that there is, or at least there was, a place on earth where that Paradise is or was; and this equally against Origen. And this solution is substantially in agreement with the former one.

§ I — How the formation of woman from man is to be understood (Formatio mulieris ex viro quomodo sit intelligenda)

§ 2. What we have shown above concerning Paradise, the same must likewise be held by us concerning the formation of woman from man: namely, that it was not effected only spiritually and in mystery, as Origen of old — and among more recent writers Cajetan in his *Commentaries on Genesis*[2] — maintained; but that, as the words of Scripture sound, it was accomplished corporeally and according to the letter, in just the manner in which it is narrated to have been done. The manifest proof of this consists not only in the historical narrative by which Moses describes the origin of things and, among them, the formation of woman, with the addition even of the words which Adam then spoke: "This now is bone of my bones," etc.,[3] — which proof alone the Fathers used almost exclusively against Origen — but also from other passages of Scripture. For Sir. 17 historically commemorates both, as much the creation of woman from man as the creation of man from the earth.[4] And the Apostle in Acts 17 speaks thus to the Athenians concerning God: "And he made of one all the race of men to dwell upon the whole face of the earth."[5] The same Apostle in 1 Cor. 11 draws from the fact that woman was made from man, and not conversely, the argument for the subjection of woman under the power of man.[6] And in 1 Tim. 2 he writes, for no other reason than that according to the Scripture of Genesis the latter was made from the former, that Adam was formed first, then Eve, and that accordingly she ought to be subject to him.[7]

§ 3. Therefore St. Augustine, writing in *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 13,[8] says that it must not be doubted that these things which Scripture records concerning the formation of woman both were done and cannot be foolish, since they were done for the purpose of signifying something. And St. John Chrysostom, treating of that passage in his *Commentary on Genesis*,[9] wishes us, even though we do not know the manner in which these things were done, nevertheless to believe that all things obeyed the will of God.

§ 4. Likewise, St. Jerome, writing his commentary on Paul's Epistle to Philemon,[10] among the many other things which he says must be believed by all, also adduces this: that Eve was fashioned from the rib and side of the man. Nor indeed is any of the other Fathers read to have held otherwise in this matter. Hence also Innocent III, in his decretal *On Divorces*, ch. *Gaudemus*,[11] draws from the fact that at the beginning one rib of the man was converted into one woman an argument to prove that polygamy — by which several women are joined to one man — is forbidden by divine law.

§ II — The arguments of Cajetan resolved (Solvuntur argumenta Cajetani)

§ 5. The first and principal argument of Cajetan in favour of his own divergent opinion is this: if the production of the woman from the rib of the man is to be understood literally, one of the following must necessarily follow — either that rib was superfluous to the man from the beginning, and therefore he was created as a monstrosity, as if one who had been made with six fingers on one hand; or it was one of the necessary ribs, and so by its removal the man was left mutilated, maimed, and imperfect, as one lacking a part or member necessary for integrity, as if one of the natural number of fingers had been taken away. For just as a man naturally has ten fingers on his hands and the same number of toes on his feet, so the body of a man is by nature put together and compacted from twenty-four ribs disposed equally on either side. From this natural number if one is wanting, there is no preservation of the natural integrity of the body — no more than in the case of fingers.

§ 6. To this argument, the reply given is roughly as follows: the first man was made by God as was fitting; nor in the first institution of things could anything have been noted as monstrous, when nature had not yet fixed itself according to a determined manner — even though what was done might be different from the manner and condition of things as they now exist according to nature. Moreover, when the rib from which Eve was made was removed, nothing was taken away from the integrity and beauty of the man. For both things are to be granted: that from the beginning the man was created together with that rib, and that a little afterwards, at its own due time, he lost the same rib for the purpose to which it had been given — just as a thing is to be returned. Which matter is comparable to the likeness of seed in the male body, and of the foetus existing in the womb of the mother, both of which are separated from the parent's body at the fitting time, without any mutilation or lasting detriment to its perfection. Therefore they say that the instance of these things shows: that rib was indeed superfluous to Adam insofar as he is considered as an individual man, but it was necessary insofar as he was the first man and the future parent of the entire race, from which — not naturally, indeed, but according to God's ordination — even that woman herself, who was necessary to him for the procreation of the race, was to be formed. Now that which is necessary to someone for a certain use cannot be said to be superfluous to him absolutely. This solution, besides others, is brought forward by St. Thomas[13] — though he does not explain it quite so plainly. And this solution is good and one which ought to have sufficed for Cajetan.

§ 7. For the rest, it pleases certain persons more to say that that rib was simply one of the necessary ones, and yet that by its removal Adam was not left mutilated and imperfect, because in the place of the rib removed another similar one was shortly afterwards put back. For what Scripture says — that God filled the flesh in its place — they do not understand as though flesh alone were substituted in the place of the rib, but a rib, that is, a rib clothed and covered with flesh. In the same way they argue that the woman was made not from the rib alone but also from flesh; inasmuch as Adam himself says: "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh" (Gen. 2:23) — although the rib was certainly the specific cause of the mystery, of which (in the next chapter)[14] he would speak differently with regard to the formation of the woman. This answer is supported not a little by the Hebrew text, in which one does not read *replevit* [he filled] but *clausit carnem pro ea* — so that the sense is: the flesh of Adam, laid open and gaping by the removal of the rib, was again closed and knit together by God. And so according to this interpretation it is not signified that flesh was placed back in the position of the rib, but only that it was closed up. What was placed back in the position of the rib is not stated. Yet it is rightly understood that not flesh but a rib was put back for the rib, and therefore that the one which was removed was not superfluous but necessary.

§ 8. This is proved also by the following argument: if that rib had been superfluous to Adam as an individual man and had not belonged to his nature, it could not rightly be said that Eve was formed from Adam himself. And again, if that rib was not a natural and proper bone of Adam, but something added beyond nature, Adam could not suitably have said of it: "This now is bone of my bones." For a superfluous member, which one would rather have absent than present as regards one's own proper nature, one does not reckon as one's own. Add to this that the most intimate union of Adam and Eve, and the natural origin and dependence of the latter from the former, is far more fittingly signified by the formation of Eve from a rib that was natural and necessary to the man, than from one that was superfluous.

§ 9. This solution has pleased not only Catharinus and Pererius, but also certain more ancient authors, as is gathered from Tostatus, who attacks it but with arguments that are not sufficiently pressing.[15] Indeed Hugh of St. Victor also (*In quaestionibus super Genesim*)[16] seems to be of this opinion, inasmuch as he shows that the rib was not superfluous — because the teeth of children which are afterwards changed are not called superfluous. For this comparison requires that for the rib removed another rib was put back, just as children receive other teeth in place of the ones they have lost. From this same comparison also that question which is commonly asked is easily resolved, namely: whether that rib is to be restored to Adam or to Eve at the resurrection? For just as the teeth for which others have grown are not restored to a man at the resurrection, so neither will that rib be restored to Adam, who has already received another one in its place — and with it he also died. It will be restored to Eve, however, whose body was principally formed and composed from it. But this matter is treated at length elsewhere.[17]

§ 10. Another argument of Cajetan: Moses writes that God brought Eve to Adam from a different and distant place, as he had earlier brought all the living creatures — therefore Eve was not formed from the side of the man, as the letter reads. Reply: She is said to have been *brought* (*adducta*), because as soon as she had been formed she was presented to the man when he awoke from his sleep. Scripture uses the word *adducing* to signify this, because the woman had been made to be the companion of the man and subject to him; for which reason it is not said that Adam was brought to Eve, but Eve to Adam.

§ 11. Another argument: Moses signifies that Adam and Eve were created at the same time by these words of Gen. 1: "God created man in His own image, male and female He created them" — therefore the female

was not made from the male. Reply: Moses does not say that He created them at the same time, that is, at the same point of time, even though he comprises their creation together in one sentence. For the rest, what he there says briefly and concisely — that woman was created by God — he subsequently explains in a distinct and orderly fashion, both the manner and the order in which it was done.

§ III — What the formation of the woman from the man signifies (Formatio mulieris ex viro quid significet)

§ 12. Since there is no reason to doubt that the individual things which are described by Moses as done in connexion with the formation of the woman have their own, and indeed sacred and mystical, significance — and indeed of such a kind as pertains to Christ and the Church, as St. Augustine[8] testifies following the Apostle (Eph. 5) — we must briefly explain that significance to ourselves.

§ 13. First, by Adam Christ is signified, and by Eve the Church. Adam seized by the sleep divinely sent upon him signifies Christ dead on the cross by the will of God the Father. For that sleep of Adam was not an ordinary slumber but a prophetic ecstasy (*ecstasis*), as is sufficiently apparent from his own prophetic words which he uttered immediately after that sleep, as though received by divine revelation in a dream. This St. Augustine also teaches in the same book,[19] and St. John Chrysostom likewise.[20] The Seventy Translators too signified this, when they rendered *sopor* [sleep] as *ecstasis*.

§ 14. The formation of Eve from the side of the sleeping man signifies the origin and growth of the Church from the side of Christ dead on the cross. For from it blood and water flowed forth, to signify the sacraments by which we are washed and cleansed from sins, and the Church itself received its birth and increase from these same sacraments. Now because the weakness of Christ is the strength of the Church, it is not flesh but a rib that is named in the description of the formation of the woman from the man — to signify this very thing. Moreover, when the rib is removed, it is not another rib but flesh that is said to have been restored, which is the weaker — and this especially according to the common text and the version of the Seventy Translators. Furthermore, by the fact that Moses says "The Lord God *built* the rib into a woman" (*aedificavit*) — and not "shaped" or "made" — it is signified that the Church is the house of God, which is daily built up from living stones out of Christ; as the same Apostle teaches in several places. Besides these things, the formation of the woman from the man also has another signification pertaining to the conjugal society of man and woman — a signification which the Apostle indicated in three places: Eph. 5, 1 Cor. 11,[6] and 1 Tim. 2.[7] Yet that very same union of man and woman, according to the authority of the same Apostle at Eph. 5, ought further to be referred to the signification of Christ and the Church, of which it is also a singular sacrament.

§ 15. Concerning both significations, one may consult St. Augustine[21] and St. Ambrose.[22] With regard particularly to the latter signification, Cajetan may be read (*in Genesim*),[23] where he explains it not without learning.

§ IV — When and where was Eve formed? (Eva quo tempore & loco formata?)

§ 16. Concerning the time of Eve's creation, this above all must be held, in accordance with what has been said above: that she was not created simultaneously with the man, but that he was made first and she afterwards. For the Apostle expressly affirms this in 1 Tim. 2: "Adam," he says, "was first created, then Eve." The author likewise of the book of Wisdom, ch. 10, writes that Adam was first formed by God and created alone.[25] The same is most fully evident from the historical narrative of the formation of woman in Gen. 2. For when Adam had been made, God said: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like unto himself." There was therefore some period of time in which the man was alone and without a companion, and had no helper like unto himself. Hence, when all the living creatures had been brought to him, Scripture goes on to say that no helper similar to him was found — which was the reason immediately following for the creation of woman, as Scripture there consequently declares.

Cajetan is therefore wrong when he holds that Adam and Eve were created simultaneously, in the same way as it is believed that both sexes were simultaneously present in the other kinds of animals. The case of man and that of the other animals is not the same. For among human beings, as rational animals, an order of superiority and governance had to be established, which properly speaking has no place among beasts. Furthermore, there was also a mystery to be signified (of which above).[26]

§ 17. Since it is established that Eve was made after Adam, it is asked whether she was created on the same day — that is, the sixth — or on the seventh. Catharinus, writing on Genesis, holds that she was created on the seventh.[27] But we have already said (at dist. 15),[28] that the woman was created not on the seventh but on the sixth day: both because the account of the work of the sixth day contains the creation of woman, and because in Gen. 2 and Exod. 20 Scripture openly testifies that God rested and ceased from all his work on the seventh day — namely from that work which pertains to the establishment of the world and of the whole of creation. To that establishment there certainly belonged the bringing forth of woman in the human kind, much more so than in the other kinds of animals. In these latter there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the female sex was created within the first six days. To these arguments is added the authority of the Fathers, who are of this opinion in common.

§ 18. The second question is about place. That the man was created outside Paradise admits, it seems, of no doubt, since Scripture says that God placed in Paradise the man whom he had formed, and says again: "Therefore the Lord God took the man and placed him in the garden of Eden." These words manifestly signify that Adam (for that is what the name means in those passages in Hebrew) was made outside Paradise so as to be transported into it. But concerning the woman, Scripture does not speak similarly or so clearly. Hence different authorities hold different views about her. Josephus in bk. 1 of the *Antiquities*, ch. 1, and Tertullian in bk. 2 (*Against Marcion*), and Rupert in bk. 2 (*In Genesim*, ch. 32), consider that the woman was created outside Paradise, just like the man.[29] But on the other side, St. Basil in Homily 11 (*On the Hexaemeron*), St. Thomas in I, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3, and the other Scholastics (on this Distinction)[30] judge that the woman was made in Paradise. And this is indeed more consistent with the narrative of Scripture. For just as Adam was introduced into Paradise, and the animals were brought to him there, so Eve was subsequently formed from his side therein. Nor is it credible that Adam, having once entered Paradise, then went back out of it in order for Eve to be formed from him outside Paradise; since neither Scripture nor the Fathers acknowledge any other departure of the first man from Paradise than that by which he went out, driven thence on account of sin,

together with the woman who was his partner in sin. Add to this that neither Scripture nor the Fathers say that Eve was brought and placed in Paradise. Hence, since it is established that she was in Paradise (for she sinned there and was expelled from thence), it is consequently understood that she was also formed in Paradise.

Nor does this objection stand: if the woman was made in Paradise, then much more ought the man, who is worthier than the woman, to have been made in Paradise. For St. Thomas answers well (in the passage just cited)[31] that the woman was made in Paradise not on account of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. "For in like manner," he says, "the children would have been born in Paradise, in which their parents were placed."

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§ V — How woman is companion and subject to man (Quomodo mulier viro sit socia & subjecta?)

§ 19. That the woman was made as companion to the man is shown first of all by these words of the Lord God: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like unto himself." This is repeated also in Sir. 17. Then it is further declared from the fact that the woman was made not from the head, nor from the feet, but from the side of the man. For by this, beyond that mystery of Christ and the Church, it was signified that woman was given to man neither as a mistress nor as a handmaid, but as a companion — as the Master rightly noted after Hugh of St. Victor.[33]

§ 20. But there are very many other testimonies of Scripture that most plainly teach that woman ought to be subject to man, such as 1 Cor. 11 and 14, Eph. 4 [i.e., ch. 5], Col. 3, 1 Tim. 2, and 1 Pet. 3.[34] What sort this subjection ought to be, the Apostle teaches in these words to the Ephesians: "Wives," he says, "be subject to your own husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." And again: "But as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands in all things." And below: "Let each one love his own wife as himself, but let the wife fear her husband." This law is so universal that St. Augustine in Sermon 63 (*De diversis*, ch. 11)[35] says that by this law of marriage even the Blessed Virgin Mary was subject to her husband Joseph.

§ 21. In another place Scripture appears to attribute dominion over woman to the man. For in Gen. 3, to the first woman, speaking in the person of all women who would have husbands, it was said by God: "You shall be under the power of your husband, and he shall have dominion over you." Paul likewise in 1 Tim. 2, while not permitting a woman to have dominion over a man, conversely suggests the man's right of dominion over the woman — clearly looking back to that sentence of God: "And he shall have dominion over you" — by which sentence St. Augustine testifies, in bk. 11 (*De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 27)[36], that the right of dominion over woman was conferred on man. Hence also Sarah is praised by the Apostle Peter in his first Epistle, ch. 3, for not being unmindful of her condition and having called her husband her lord, as is recorded in Gen. 18. By this example Jean Gerson, in his Sermon (*De Nativitate beatae Mariae*, consideration 4)[37], says that even the Blessed Virgin herself was not ashamed to call Joseph, whom she acknowledged as her husband by reason of the truth of the marriage, her lord.

§ 22. To these testimonies are added the ancient laws of the Romans and of other peoples, by which it was established that men should preside over women. Of this we have an illustrious example in Esther 1, where Ahasuerus, King of the Persians and Medes, decreed by inviolable law that men should be princes and chiefs in their own homes, and that wives of both the great and the humble should show honour to their husbands; and he commanded this law to be promulgated among all the peoples subject to him, that is, through one hundred and twenty provinces.

§ 23. To designate, moreover, this pre-eminence of man over woman, in that dream which was divinely sent to the patriarch Joseph in Gen. 37, the man was signified by the sun and the woman by the moon — as though he were in the household the greater light and she the lesser light. Nor must this be passed over: that this pre-eminence of man over woman was designated in the very formation of woman — partly in the fact that the woman was made after the man (which the Apostle considered in 1 Tim. 2), and partly in the fact that she was made from man as from her own principle. For the same Apostle presses this in 1 Cor. 11, where for this reason he calls the man the head of the woman.

§ 24. From all this it is also understood that it was not merely after sin that woman was reduced to the power of man, but that even in the state of innocence it would have been the case that woman was subject to man — as St. Augustine expressly teaches in bk. 19 (*De Civitate Dei*, chs. 14 and 15).[38] With him St. Thomas also agrees,[39] saying that even before sin the man would have been the head of the woman and her governor. This is also proved from the fact that nature attributes greater prudence to man than to woman — to omit other reasons pointing to the same conclusion, which the Philosopher adduces (in the *Ethics* and the *Economics*).[40]

§ 25. These things being so, it is now asked how these two facts are consistent: that woman is both companion to man and subject to him — since companionship (*societas*) seems to import a certain equality. It is answered that these by no means conflict; for companionship properly speaking does not import equality, but a sharing of activities, which indeed can also subsist among unequals — as when activities are so communicated among certain persons that one directs and another is directed, as between father and daughter, teacher and pupil, leader and soldier. Hence that saying of Aeneas to his companions in Virgil: "O comrades," etc. Indeed, Scripture acknowledges a companionship between God and men, as is clear from 1 Jn. 1. Similarly therefore nothing prevents the woman, who by divine and natural law is subject to the man, from being his companion. Now she is companion to the man in the generation of offspring and its education, as well as in the governance of the household; so that to her also belongs the rule and administration of the family, and a wife ought not to be held in the place of a handmaid, but as a helper like unto the man, as Scripture speaks — yet in such a way that in all these matters she ought to obey and be subject to the man as the primary governor and director (excepting the right of the conjugal debt, in which both are equal, as is taught at dist. 32, bk. 4).[41] For what the Apostle says without exception, "in all things," understand this of all those things to which the authority of a husband extends — just as children are bidden to obey their parents in all things, namely those things that fall under paternal authority.

§ 26. Although this subjection of the woman had its place even before sin, as has been well proved, that which must be referred to the punishment of sin is that this authority is burdensome and grievous to the woman, whereas it would have been pleasant and agreeable to her had the corruption of sin not intervened — just as the same thing happened in the matter of her childbearing. For just as the woman now gives birth in pain, who would have given birth without pain, so now she is subject to the man with suffering, who would

willingly and without difficulty have accepted the power of the man over herself. Hence the authority which before sin would have been merely authority became after sin, as much for the woman as for the man, a dominion — that is, a power harsh and imperious. This is signified by that sentence of the Lord to the woman: "You shall be under the power of your husband, and he shall have dominion over you." Thus St. Augustine teaches concerning this authority in bk. 11 (*De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 27)[36], saying among other things that a husband's having dominion over his wife is the result not of nature but of fault (*culpa*). "Yet," he says, "if this is not observed, nature will be further corrupted and fault will be increased."

§ 27. To this pertains also what St. Gregory writes in *Pastoral Rule*, pt. 2, ch. 6[42], that man is set by nature not over other men but over brute animals — namely, over the animals — and therefore it was said to him that he should be feared by animals, not that he should be feared by men. For thus it is said in Gen. 8 [i.e., Gen. 9]: "Terror and dread shall be upon all the animals of the earth." Since this is naturally fitting to man, after sin it was also given to him over men, as Gregory adds in the same passage.

§ 28. Nevertheless it must be known that not even by such dominion is the woman to be said to be servilely subject, if the man uses it rightly — namely, not out of the heat of lust or zeal for his own advantage, but in the office of consultation, as St. Augustine expresses it in bk. 19 (*De Civitate Dei*, ch. 14)[43] — that is, after the manner in which parents exercise authority over their children, and other superiors over their subjects, consulting their welfare and safety, and sometimes showing severity towards them when they judge it expedient. For servile subjection is quite another thing; that is the subjection whereby a slave is so subjected that not the slave's welfare but only the master's advantage is sought from the slave's service and labour. This kind of subjection, as something far from Christian custom, was abolished by the Christian commonwealth.

§ 29. Therefore, for the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that there is a threefold kind of authority (*praefectura*). The first, bringing no suffering. The second, troublesome indeed, but one whereby care is taken for the one who is subject. The third, which brings suffering to the one subjected, yet is useful not to him but only to the one commanding. The first pertains to the state of innocence. The second pertains to the good who have authority in this corruptible life — both secular and ecclesiastical. For every good person who is set over others aims at this: that he should benefit those over whom he is set. The third belongs to the wicked who look only to their own advantage and private gain. This mode and manner of authority Christ condemns when he says: "The kings of the Gentiles have dominion over them," etc. (Lk. 22); and Peter in 1 Pet. 5: "Not as lording it over the clergy." On this matter more may be read in St. Augustine, bk. 19 (*De Civitate Dei*, chs. 14 and 15).[38]

§ VI — Whether and what authority would have existed in the first state (Utrum & quae praefectura fuisset in primo statu?)

§ 30. Some hold it in doubt whether in the state of innocence there would have been any authority or, as they phrase it, any superiority of some over others at all. That nothing of the sort would have occurred if man had not sinned, they think can be argued from the fact that in that state all would have been upright and wise; and therefore no one would have needed to be taught on account of ignorance, no one governed on account of imprudence, no one punished on account of malice — since these vices are either sins or are contracted from

sin, and are therefore alien to that state of rectitude. Nor does it appear what other use of authority in that state we can imagine.

§ 31. But the contrary view is persuaded, first, by what has been said in the preceding section and confirmed by the testimonies of Scripture concerning the authority of man over woman even in the state of innocence. It is confirmed, secondly, from the comparison with the good Angels, among whom some are superior to others — so that some are called Principalities, others Powers, others also Dominations, and others finally, in the Apostle Jude, Majesties; and one is called Archangel as prince of all. Hence in Daniel, ch. 8 (*Dan. 10*)[45], and in Ezech. 2 (*Ezek. 9*)[46], Angels are depicted as enjoining upon other Angels certain things to be done. Therefore even among men, even had they not sinned, some would have been set over others — as men over women, and parents over children. They would have been set over them, I say, by a certain order of nature; to which, however, an order of grace would also have corresponded, just as is the case also with the Angels.

§ 32. Again, although in the state of innocence there would have been no malice, no imprudence, no vicious ignorance, yet since not all would have been equal in wisdom, knowledge, and justice, it was possible — nay, it would have come to pass — that they should make progress in these; and the order of things required that some should be subordinate to and defer to others, namely to those wiser, more learned, and better, by whom they might be more fully instructed, and promoted to a more perfect worship of God both by example and by teaching; and even in that state there would have occurred what Peter says in 1 Pet. 4: "As each one has received grace, administering it to one another." Something of this sort St. Augustine considered in bk. (*De Catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 18)[47] with regard to the authority which man naturally has over woman.

§ 33. Add to these that not even in the state of perfect beatitude, where no increase in justice is to be expected, will all authority cease. For besides the supreme and perpetual Monarchy of God over every rational creature — which, as it now exists, will always remain — so also the authority of Angels over Angels will endure; and similarly nothing forbids there being in some manner also an authority of men over men. Wherefore authority is not incompatible with the state of innocence either.

§ 34. St. Thomas moreover adduces another argument[48] drawn from the social life of men, which cannot subsist without the authority of one who is intent on the common good — which is one and certain — while the many have many and varied concerns.

§ 35. But that dominion which respects servitude, as we have already said above, was utterly remote from that blessed state of innocence; as likewise was all authority that could not be exercised without suffering either of those in authority or of those subject. Thus St. Augustine teaches (in the passages mentioned above). [38] Thus it has already been indicated before that this kind of authority — namely one pressing down and inducing terror — was what St. Gregory (*Pastoral Rule*)[42] meant when he said that man was set by nature not over men but over brute animals.

§ VII — How woman was made from the rib of man (Quomodo mulier ex costa viri facta sit)

§ 36. The opinion of the Master is that woman was made from the rib of man without the addition of any external matter; namely, by the very substance of the rib itself being multiplied within itself to the size

required for a female body. And in support of this he adduces the example of the few loaves of bread by which several thousands of men are recorded to have been satisfied by Christ, for he thinks that those loaves were multiplied in a similar manner. In this opinion he is furthermore consistent with himself when below[50] he teaches that no nourishment passes into the substance of human nature, but that only that which was transmitted from the first man, increased and multiplied within itself, pertains to the truth of human nature. The same opinion, both concerning the loaves and concerning the woman, pleased Hugh of St. Victor in his book *De Sacramentis* and in his *Adnotationes super Genesim*.[51] And Durandus and Gabriel, writing on this distinction, follow it.'[52] Indeed, Innocent III also, in a sermon on the fourth Sunday of Lent, is found to hold the same view — namely, that the increase of those things was wrought without addition.'[53] What moved these authors most of all was this consideration: that if matter had been taken from elsewhere to supply what was lacking in the rib, then that external matter would have been far greater than the rib; and therefore Eve would more properly be said to have been made from that external matter than from the rib. The same opinion is held by Nicholas of Lyra, who attempts to show it possible by this reasoning: because if God was able to make matter from nothing, He was also able to make more from less — which is the same argument as Hugh's.

§ 37. But this opinion is rightly rejected by most others, and by name by St. Thomas, who rejects it[49] not only as improbable but also as impossible. For it cannot be understood how something smaller should become greater, unless either by extension of quantity, as happens by rarefaction, or by the accession of external matter, as happens in growth. Therefore, since the matter of the rib was not increased — that is, made greater by rarefaction (for in that case the body of Eve would not have had the solidity and firmness that the nature of the human body requires) — St. Thomas concludes that it was increased by the addition of other matter. Similarly, he holds that the very same thing must be said altogether concerning the loaves. He furthermore thinks that this matter, created from the beginning, acceded to the substance either of the rib or of the woman by the conversion of that body in which it previously existed — whether of earth, or of surrounding air, or of whatever else. And this is the common and truer opinion.

§ 38. The reason is that all matter was created simultaneously at the beginning, and no necessity compels us to admit that that primordial matter was afterwards increased by some new creation. For it is entirely credible that God created at the beginning as much matter as would suffice for all works thereafter to be accomplished. I said, moreover, "either of the rib or of the woman," because there is also this doubt: whether that external matter was converted mediately or immediately into the body of the woman. Mediately, that is, so that it was first converted into the rib, and the rib thereafter into the woman. Immediately, however, so that from the rib together with that external addition, as from several parts of matter, with no other intermediate conversion, the body of the woman was formed — just as the body of man had been formed immediately from the earth. This latter mode has greater probability for two reasons: first, because two conversions seem superfluous when one suffices; and second, because it is contrary to nature that a single rib should have grown to so great a size as the whole human body — which therefore ought not to be posited without necessity.

§ 39. But you will say: according to the former mode, the objection brought against the addition of matter is easily resolved. For it will be replied that Eve is said to have been made from the rib rather than from the added matter (even if the latter was greater), because the woman was made immediately from the rib alone.

It is answered: according to the latter mode also, the objection brought against the addition of matter can be resolved without great difficulty; namely, if we say that woman is said to have been made from the rib rather

than from the remaining matter, because the rib was chosen and assumed first and principally by God to form the body of the woman from it, and this because of the mystery signified by it; whereas the remaining matter was something accessory, serving in the manner of a supplement and contributing nothing to the mystery signified in that formation. A sign of this is the fact that not the rib was brought to that matter, but that matter was brought locally to the rib, so that from both together the body of the woman might be made.

§ 40. In this manner also, concerning the loaves of bread, the reply to the objection brought against the multiplication is well answered. For although the matter added to the five loaves was without doubt much greater than the pre-existing substance of the loaves, nevertheless the thousands of men are truly and fittingly said to have been fed from the five loaves, because those five loaves were assumed first and principally, so that with alien matter accruing to their substance, so great an increase of them should be produced as would suffice to feed so great a multitude of men. But as in the miracle of the loaves it was peculiar that the external matter was so added to the loaves as to be converted into their substance, and not so as to be transmuted together with the loaves into some third thing — as the rib together with the added matter was transformed into the woman — so also in the work of the formation of the woman something similar can be considered. For the rib was a part of the human body, chosen so that the whole body of another human being might be made from it. Nor is it altogether improbable, according to the opinion of those who hold that in man the sensitive soul is a thing distinct from the intellective, that a part of the sensitive soul was simultaneously taken from the man together with the rib, to pass over to the woman. For God formed into a woman not a dead rib and dead flesh, but what was taken from the man alive. Therefore, although the remaining matter did not pass into the nature of the rib — as there the added matter passed into the nature of the bread — yet it passed into the nature of an animated and human body, of which kind the rib was a part or a bodily member. Therefore also by this reasoning the woman ought to be said to have been made more from the rib than from the remaining matter, just as there the satisfaction of so many thousands is rightly said to have been from the five loaves.

§ 41. Furthermore, certain authors, not content with the aforesaid solution, add besides that woman is said to have been made from the rib and not from the added matter, because by the power of the rib taken from the man the remaining matter was converted into a human body — just as offspring is truly said to be born of the substance of the parents and not from the matter of nourishment, even though the latter must be present in far greater quantity in order for the human body to be formed in the mother's womb (though the Master thinks otherwise concerning this, as we shall see at Distinction 30).[54] Therefore, just as here the whole substance of the offspring is referred to the parents on account of the principle received from them, by whose power whatever is added is converted into a like substance — and the same can be said similarly of wine growing in the vine and of many other things — so they think the same must be said in the case of the woman.

§ 42. Indeed, concerning the loaves this very thing is highly probable; namely, that their multiplication was brought about by matter added from elsewhere, so that by the power of the prior portion, as of a seminal principle, it should be transmuted into a like nature. St. Augustine indicates this in his Tractate 24 on John,[55] when he says that those five loaves were as it were seeds — not committed to the earth, but multiplied by Him who made the earth. Therefore, just as seeds are multiplied not in themselves but by the accession of external matter into a copious harvest, and this through a certain power existing in the seeds themselves — for without such power they would not truly be called seeds — so the same appears to be the case with those loaves. Nor do the earlier words of the same St. Augustine stand in the way, where he says: "For from the same source from which He multiplies harvests from a few grains, from thence He multiplied the five loaves in His hands;

for the power was in the hands of Christ." For just as the power of God does not exclude the power that is in the grains, but produces it and uses it as an instrument for their multiplication, so the divine power that was in the hands of Christ did not exclude the power that is held to have been in the loaves, but produced it and used it for their multiplication.

§ 43. Now what the Master disputes in sections F., E., and G. — whether woman was made from the rib according to the rational principles (*rationes*) implanted in things from the beginning, or rather according to rational principles pre-existing only in the divine mind — this is explained sufficiently and fully from St. Augustine by the Master himself. For one must say that it was not part of the first institution of nature that woman should be made from the rib, just as neither was it part of the first institution of nature that a greater multiplication of bread should come from the five loaves; but that God, beyond the first institution of nature, willed that the rib of man, as a kind of seminal principle, should serve to form another human body — just as those five loaves, according to St. Augustine, served as seeds for the provision of so great a supply of bread as would suffice to feed so many thousands of men.

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§ I — That man, had he not sinned, would not have been destined to die (Hominem nisi peccasset moriturum non fuisse)

§ 44. Concerning the mortality or immortality of the first man according to the body, the Master treats in this distinction, where the first question that arises is: whether man would have been destined to die if he had not sinned. To this question, according to the rule of the Catholic Faith, the answer must be given: that no man, whether the first or any of his descendants, would have been destined to die in the body, if either the first man or any of his descendants had not offended God by sinning. For the Catholic Faith teaches that bodily death does not befall men by the necessity of nature as it does brute animals, but that it entered the human race by the merit of sin, which is the death of the soul. And this indeed is the manifest teaching of Sacred Scripture, which everywhere refers the cause of death to sin.

§ 45. First, indeed, in Gen. 2, it was said to man concerning the forbidden tree: "In whatsoever day thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death" — that is, as St. Jerome testifies and as Symmachus translated it, "thou shalt be mortal," that is, subject to the necessity of dying.[57] For that sentence is not to be taken of the death of the soul, as the Pelagians wished, but of the death of the body, as is clear from the fact that after the transgression the following was laid upon man as a curse, the Lord saying: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the earth from which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." By which argument, besides others, St. Augustine presses the Pelagians.[58]

§ 46. Likewise it is written in Wis. 1: "God made not death" — namely, human death, that is, He did not so institute man that he should die as He instituted the nature of beasts — "but the ungodly with their hands and words have called it to them" — namely, by sinning and heaping sins upon sins. For not the transgression of the first man alone merited death, but all the wicked merit it by their own sins. And in Wis. 2 ch. 3: "God created man indestructible" — that is, immortal — "but by the envy of the devil, death came into the world"; for the devil, inflamed with envy against man, led him into temptation and thus drew death in through sin.

§ 47. No less clear is the teaching of the Apostle in Rom. 5: "By one man," he says, "sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned." And what follows in the same chapter. Likewise in Rom. 6: "The wages of sin is death." And in Rom. 8: "The body indeed is dead" — that is, subject to the necessity of death — "because of sin: but the spirit liveth because of justification." In which passage, both because the body is named and because the spirit is said to live through righteousness, it is plainly evident that the Apostle is speaking of the death of the body, not of the soul. The words of the same Apostle are in 1 Cor. 15: "By a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead; and as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." And later in the same chapter: "The sting of death is sin" — that is, the goad by which death was inflicted on man is sin.

§ 48. With these and like testimonies of Scripture, the Fathers contended against the Pelagians, who referred the death of the body to nature and not to sin, and therefore said that Adam would have been destined to die even had he not sinned. The Fathers employed these testimonies, and above all St. Augustine in various places, as in *De Peccatorum meritis* lib. 1, chs. 2 through 9, and again ch. 16; *De Civitate Dei* lib. 13, chs. 5 and 23; and Ench. chs. 25 and 26, and elsewhere.[59] Also Prosper, *Sententiae* 148 (*Responsio ad 5 objectionem Vincenti*).[60] St. Gregory, lib. 4 *Moralium* ch. 26.[61] And likewise other Fathers, especially in those passages where they illuminate with their commentaries the Scriptures already cited.

§ 49. Finally, this same doctrine was defined as a Catholic dogma in the two councils gathered against the Pelagians — the Carthaginian and the Milevitan — at which St. Augustine himself also was present. These were held in the time of Innocent I. and were confirmed by the same Pontiff, as is clear from his epistles 25 to the Carthaginian council and 26 to the Milevitan council.[62] Then it was again confirmed by Pope Celestine I in his epistle to the bishops of Gaul.,[63] The words of canon 1 of the Milevitan council are as follows: "Whosoever says that Adam, the first man, was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or whether he did not sin he would have died in the body, that is, would have departed from the body, not by the merit of sin, but by the necessity of nature, let him be anathema." To this there was afterwards added the definition of the Second Council of Orange, canon 2, as well as that of the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 2.,[64] (a)

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§ II — Whether man, standing in innocence, could have died (An homo stante innocentia potuisset mori)

§ 50. What has been said and proved — that death derived its origin from sin — is understood by some to refer only to the necessity of death: so that they teach that man by the merit of sin was made subject to the necessity of dying, to which he had not been subject before sin; yet they say that he, persevering in innocence, could have died, if the violence of death were brought upon his body in some manner — by iron, fire, or any other means — by some other person who had forsaken his original innocence. Nothing of the sort, however, would ever have come to pass, because God through His providence would have averted every danger. And Scotus adds that the first man and all his descendants would inevitably have died at last by the necessity of nature — namely, on account of the conflict of the elements of which the human body is composed — unless God, before that should happen, had transferred them to the state of immortality; and that such a death, had it occurred, would no more have been a punishment for man than for beasts, but would have been natural to both.

§ 51. But with this opinion it is difficult to reconcile the Scriptures and the decrees of the councils, by which we have already shown that man, had he not sinned, would not have been destined to die. For these testimonies do not merely signify what would not have come to pass in fact, but also what — according to the order of things once instituted by God — ought not to have come to pass; namely, that an innocent man should die.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 92.
2. Cajetan, *Commentarii super Genesim* [abbreviation as in source].
3. Gen. 2:23.
4. Sir. 17 [*Ecclesiasticus* cap. 17].
5. Acts 17:26.
6. 1 Cor. 11.
7. 1 Tim. 2.
8. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 13.
9. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim* [*super Gen.*], on the relevant passage.
10. St. Jerome, commentary on Paul's Epistle to Philemon (*scribens in Epistolam Pauli ad Philemonem*).
11. Innocent III, *Decretales*, *De divortiis*, ch. *Gaudemus* [*extra de divortiis, Cap. Gaudemus*].
12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91, a. 3.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 92, a. 3, ad 2.
14. The reference is to the immediately following chapter of the commentary (the *proximus caput* of the distinction).
15. Tostatus [Alphonsus Tostatus], *In Genesim* [abbreviation as in source], who attacks this solution but with arguments insufficiently pressing.
16. Hugh of St. Victor, *Quaestiones in Genesim* [*in quaestionibus super Genesim*].
17. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 44, lib. 4 (*ad Distinct. 44. lib. 4.*).
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 92, a. 3 [*S. Thom. 1. p. qu. 92. art. 3.*].
19. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, last chapter (*cap. ult.*).
20. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 15 (*Super Genesim*, hom. 15).
21. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, chs. 13 and 15.
22. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* II, on ch. 12 (*lib. 2. in Luc. ad cap. 12.*).
23. Cajetan, *Commentarii in Genesim* [*in Genef.*].
24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 4.
25. Wis. 10.
26. The reference is to the preceding section (§ III above), concerning the mystery of Christ and the Church signified in the formation of woman.
27. Catharinus, *In Genesim* [*super Gef. scribens*].
28. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 15.
29. Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* I, ch. 1; Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* II; Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim* II, ch. 32.

30. St. Basil, *Homiliae in Hexaemeron*, hom. 11; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3; the other Scholastics on this Distinction.

31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3.

32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 92, aa. 3 and 4 [*S. Thom. 1. p. qu. 69. art. 3. 4*; noting the reference in the OCR reads q. 69 but the page image reads q. 92 — the page image is followed].

33. Hugh of St. Victor; Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, the Master's note on this passage.

34. 1 Cor. 11 and 14; Eph. 5; Col. 3; 1 Tim. 2; 1 Pet. 3.

35. St. Augustine, *Sermones de diversis*, Sermon 63 (or, in other editions, Sermon 51 of the first class), ch. 11. (Note: the footnote at the foot of p. 277 of the printed text reads: *Seu Sermone quinquagesimo primo ... Sermonum primae classis cap. 11. num. 18. in editione PP. Bedicti tom. 5.*)

36. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 27.

37. Jean Gerson, *Sermo de Nativitate beatae Mariae*, consideration 4.

38. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIX, chs. 14 and 15.

39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165, a. 2, ad 1.

40. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Oeconomics*.

41. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 32.

42. St. Gregory the Great, *Regula Pastoralis*, pt. 2, ch. 6.

43. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIX, ch. 14.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 96 [*S. Thom. 1. p. q. 69* as in OCR; the page image gives q. 96, a. 4 in the body — q. 96 is followed].

45. Dan. 10 (the OCR reads *cap. 8*; reading from the page image: *Dan. 10* is the more natural reference, but the printed text cites *cap. 8*; the text as printed is retained: Daniel, ch. 8).

46. Ezek. 9 (the printed text cites *Ezech. 2*; retained as printed).

47. St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis rudibus*, ch. 18.

48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 96, a. 4.

49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 92, a. 3.

50. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30, § N.

51. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, lib. 1; and *Adnotationes super Genesim*.

52. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain and Gabriel Biel, *In II Sent.*, dist. 18.

53. Pope Innocent III, *Sermo in Dominica IV Quadragesimae*.

54. The Master, *In II Sent.*, dist. 30.

55. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, Tractatus 24.

56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, a. 1; also *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 164, a. 1.

57. St. Jerome, as cited; Symmachus's version of Gen. 2.

58. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, lib. 1, ch. 2.

59. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione*, lib. 1, chs. 2–9 and ch. 16; *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 13, chs. 5 and 23; *Enchiridion*, chs. 25 and 26.

60. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae*, 148 (*Responsio ad 5 objectionem Vincenti*).

61. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, lib. 4, ch. 26.

62. Pope Innocent I, Epistola 25 (*ad Concilium Carthaginense*) and Epistola 26 (*ad Concilium Milevitanum*).

63. Pope Celestine I, Epistola *ad Episcopos Galliae*.

64. Second Council of Orange, canon 2; Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 2. — (a) The author seems to have associated the Second Arausican [Orange] Synod with the time of Leo I, since he implies it was celebrated under the same Supreme Pontiff; but we think an error has crept in. For the celebrated Second Council of Orange was held under Boniface II, who had as approver, as appears from the letter of the same [Pope] to Caesar Arelatensis preserved by Jacob Sirmondus. The Arausican Synod I was held under Leo I, Supreme Pontiff, in the year 441; but in that synod nothing of the sort is found that pertains to the matter of which the author here treats. As for whether the author wrote that Leo I also was a promoter of the decision of which he treats — or its author (as it truly was) — this we confess is not known to us. Perhaps one should read: "To this there was afterwards added the definition of the Second Council of Orange, canon 2; then the authority of Leo I; and finally [the definition of] the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 2."

65. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, a. 1 (as above cited).

DISTINCTIO XIX — ON THE MORTALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE FIRST MAN (*DE MORTALITATE ET IMMORTALITATE PRIMI HOMINIS*)

§ 1. It seems altogether to be said that man, standing in innocence, could not die. For the understanding of this matter, it must be known that man was not established by God as a merely servile creature, as the nature of brute animals was established — which accordingly are by nature both subject to death, and can be slain for the utility of men; indeed other animals pass by death into the use of others as nourishment. But God made man, just as He made the angels, free by his own nature and lord of other things, and moreover, by grace and justice, as it were a companion and friend of God Himself. Hence it is sufficiently understood that man was established such that nothing adverse would befall him so long as he remained in God's friendship; but that these two things would always be conjoined and would mutually follow one upon the other: to be good, and to be blessed; and likewise to be innocent, and to be exempt from misery. For St. Augustine wills this law to be so perpetual[1] that, were it removed, the order of the universe would be disfigured. Hence also he says[2] that it is unjust for death to be propagated into posterity without sin. And he repeats this[3]. This judgment is confirmed by the Council of Arausica, canon 2, asserting that he attributes injustice to God who affirms that death was transmitted into the human race without sin.[4] Although these things are to be understood, as we have just said, according to the order once instituted. For if we speak of the absolute power of God, there is no doubt that He could, as Lord of all creation and without any injury to human nature, have established human nature in such a way that, even though man preserved innocence in his soul, yet as regards the condition of his body he would be like the brute animals, no less subject to death and other miseries than they. But now Scripture testifies that man was constituted according to his body in a far more excellent degree of dignity; so that by the mortality which he contracted for himself by sinning he is said to have been cast down far beneath the honour of his first condition, and to have been compared to senseless beasts of burden. Moreover, that it could not even have come to pass that man should die while standing in innocence is openly attested by the Wise Man, when he says that man was made by God incorruptible (*inexterminabilem*); for what cannot be destroyed is called incorruptible. Thus Methodius says:[5] "By the immortal God was made His image, in which He had expressed His likeness."

But incorruptible (*incorruptibile*) is said of that which cannot be corrupted. This view was expressed with sufficient clarity by the Master in Distinction 5 (*§. D.*), when he says that man was so made immortal that he could not die if he did not sin — words taken, that is, from the *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 1, "Let us make man in our image," etc.[6] The same view is held among the Scholastics by Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Durandus, and most openly of all St. Bonaventure, who in article 2 on this Distinction says it is impossible that innocence and the punishment of corruption should simultaneously coexist, because the order of divine justice suffers no disorder in the universe.[7] Which likewise is to be understood of the order once instituted, according to which created things are governed.

§ III — How the first man was mortal or immortal (Quomodo primus homo fuerit mortalis vel immortalis)

§ 2. From what has been said it is possible to understand in what sense the first man in the state of integrity could be called mortal, and in what sense immortal. For mortal can be said in two ways, and immortal in just as many ways. In one way, mortal is he who must necessarily die; in another way, he who is able to die. And again, in one way immortal is he who cannot die; in another way, he whom it is not necessary to die. Therefore in the former way Adam in his first state was not mortal, but only in the latter way; and that only in the divided sense (*sensu diviso*). For he could not die so long as he kept innocence; but because he was able to sin, he was also able to die. By sin, however, both he and his entire posterity became mortal in the former way — that is, with that mortality which is common and natural to all beasts. Hence also Rom. 7 and 8: "the body indeed is dead because of sin."[9] Likewise, immortal in the former way man was not in the state of integrity, except only in the conjoined sense (*sensu conjuncto*); but in the latter way he was simply (*simpliciter*) immortal. Moreover, the saints after the resurrection, of whom Lk. 20 says absolutely that "they cannot die any more,"[10] will be mortal in neither way; but immortal even in the former way, and that simply, because they will no longer be able to incur death or mortality by sinning.

And indeed regarding the first statement of the Wise Man, in which he says that man was made incorruptible, that is immortal — for *exterminatio* (destruction) signifies death, whence in the Law it is repeatedly said that whoever does this or that shall be cut off (*exterminabitur*) from the people, that is, shall be punished with death — even though the incorruptible (*inexterminabilis*) in the Wise Man can be understood as immortal in the latter way, yet it is more rightly understood, as we have said above, in the former way; not indeed simply, but, as has been said, in the conjoined sense. For Scripture wills that it could not have come to pass that man was destroyed by death, if he had not admitted sin. In which sense also Methodius said that man was made incorruptible by God. Wherefore the word *immortale* also in those same words of Methodius seems to be expounded in the same way.

§ 3. Now therefore from these considerations it is easy to see what the difference is between the mortality of the state of integrity and that of the corrupted state; and again between the immortality of the first state and that which we expect after the resurrection. Both distinctions have been diligently expounded by St. Augustine[11] and by St. Gregory.[12] The same is taught by the Author of the *Questions on the Old and New Testament* (quest. 19), and furthermore by St. John Chrysostom,[13] St. Cyril,[14] St. John Damascene,[15] and the *Glossa ordinaria*.[16]

§ 4. Now because among pagan authors only he is called mortal whom it is necessary to die, and he immortal who cannot die — the other two modes, one of mortality, the other of immortality, being unknown to them (which indeed held not only in the Latin and Greek languages but also in the vernacular tongues) — hence it is that certain ancient writers, following this manner of speaking and retaining the propriety of Latin usage, said that Adam in his first state was neither mortal nor immortal. For thus spoke Petrus Diaconus in the former book *De Gratia Christi*, ch. 6, and Fulgentius in the latter, ch. 13, and likewise Maxentius in his *Professio Fidei*, ch. 28.[17] If however we look to certain other words used among pagan authors, we shall find that this manner of speaking is not alien to their custom — for mortal (*mortale*) is said among them of that which can die, even though it is also able not to die. For thus among them *vulnerabile* (vulnerable), *fragile* (fragile), *divisibile* (divisible), *combustibile* (combustible) is said of that which can be wounded, broken,

divided, burned, even though it may also be able not to undergo such a passion; as has been noted by St. Augustine.[18]

§ IV — Reply to the objections against the first man's immortality (Responsio ad ea, quae contra primi hominis immortalitatem objiciuntur)

§ 5. For the greater declaration of that immortality in which man was created, certain arguments by which it is opposed must be adduced and resolved.

The first, already indicated above, is this: the body of the first man was composed of four elements, whose contrary and mutually conflicting qualities, wherever they are found in bodies, lead at last by natural necessity to corruption and destruction; therefore the same would have come to pass in the body of the first man. To this it can indeed be replied that, even if the nature of the elements is such that in every mixed body they excite by their contrary qualities a conflict tending toward the dissolution of the mixture, yet the human body, by God's will and power, would have been immune from the danger of that corruption and death — as St. Augustine replies,[20] adducing the parallel of the garments and shoes of the Israelites which did not wear out for forty years; and likewise St. Cyril.[21]

§ 6. But it remains to be explained in what way it would have come about through God's will that a body composed of contraries would not at last be corrupted. Some say that those contrary qualities, though contrary, would nonetheless not have fought among themselves, because such would have been their proportion and blending (*contemperatio*) in the human body that none would destroy another, or in any way harm or diminish another; and this on account of the best and perfectly tempered constitution of the body — without mutual action and conflict. This manner seems to be pleasing to St. Augustine[22] and to St. Bonaventure.[7] Now that there would have been no conflict of qualities therein, St. Augustine proves because no evil could be in man before sin; but conflict is not without evil, since it is either between good and evil, or between two evils; for good is not contrary to good.

St. Thomas refers the cause of immortality to the soul. For the body of man, he says, was not indissoluble by reason of some power of immortality existing in it, but there was in the soul a certain power supernaturally given by God, through which it could preserve the body from all corruption, so long as the soul itself remained subject to God, etc.[23] This view is defended against Scotus's attack by Cajetan in his commentary on the same place.[24] To confirm the same view there serves that text of St. Augustine:[25] "God made the soul of such powerful nature that from its beatitude there flows into the body the fullness of health and the vigour of incorruption." Although this was written by St. Augustine of the perfect beatitude of the soul, and similarly of the perfect incorruption of the body — that is, of that which we shall have after the resurrection — yet it can, preserving the analogy, be applied to the beatitude and immortality of the first state.

§ 7. Now this view is not to be understood as if it excluded altogether every conflict of contraries from the body of integral man. For that some conflict must necessarily be acknowledged therein is evident, because in man even as an adult, having attained the full measure of his body, nutrition would have had its place. For in that animal life the necessity of taking food would always have endured. Now nutrition always adds something to the body; and therefore, lest the body grow immoderately, something always had to depart. Nor again would the body itself have suffered any defect through such recession, but would have been preserved in its state, because as much as the conflict consumed, so much did nutrition supply. For nutrition and

consumption (*absumptio*) are simultaneous. This matter can be illustrated by the example of mortal man existing in a state of health, though the parallel does not hold in all respects.

Hence it also follows that the prior view — insofar as it excludes all conflict altogether — is to be moderated by the objection concerning evil: for even if conflict is not without evil with respect to that particular part which is corrupted, yet it can be without evil with respect to the whole body, which remains whole and indeficient, in the manner just explained.

§ 8. Another argument is taken from external force: that by an external force assailing him the body of man could have been harmed, as by iron or fire. But it is replied that, given God's ordinance by which He established that the evil of punishment would not come to pass in a rational nature without the evil of fault, it could not have come to pass that any external force whatsoever should be inflicted upon man. Although even such a body of man was of such a kind that it could suffer and be harmed by fire, iron, and other such injuries, if any of them should befall — yet by God's Providence the innocence of man was so protected that none of these things would ever befall him while remaining in innocence. For if the poet sang of mortal man, in some manner whole in this state of corruption:

Integer vitae scelerisque purus, Non eget Mauri jaculis, nec arcu.

("The man of upright life and free from guilt needs not the Moorish javelins nor the bow.")[26]

how much more to man constituted in that integrity in which he was created would God's Providence have been so present that no evil would draw near him.

§ 9. In the third place, it can be objected that it is said in 4 Esdras 3: "And Thou gavest Adam a mortal body" — that is, from the beginning and before sin, as appears from the context. Now "dead" seems to mean mortal, in the sense in which it is taken by the Apostle in Rom. 8. It is replied that that book has no authority in the Church, and that the Apostle speaks differently when he says: "The body indeed is dead because of sin."[27] Although here the following sense of the statement can be given: Thou gavest him a dead body, that is, an inanimate body, into which Thou afterward breathed a soul, according to the Scripture of Gen. 1.,[28]

§ 10. Fourth objection: the first man would not have been able to live in eternity without the tree of life; therefore his body was no more immortal before sin than after it, when he was driven from Paradise lest, eating of the tree of life, he should live forever. But the solution of this argument will be clear below, when we treat of the tree of life and its power.[29]

§ 11. Fifth objection: St. Ambrose in the book *De fide resurrectionis*, ch. 6, says that death is natural to us, and was given not as a punishment but as a remedy. And he speaks similarly in book 7 on Luke.[30] Therefore, according to St. Ambrose, death is not a consequence of the merit of sin; and therefore man would have been about to die even if he had not sinned. I reply that death is rightly called natural because it befalls from natural causes, and that necessarily, so that it cannot be avoided in this state of corruption. For that St. Ambrose does not hold death to be natural in the sense that man's nature was established with the necessity of dying, these words of his in ch. 9 of the same book clearly teach: "Death," he says, "was not in nature, but has been turned into nature" — that is, by sin and from the merit of sin. By which reasoning even sin itself was turned into nature, according to that of the Apostle, Eph. 2: "We were by nature children of wrath.",[31] "For how by nature," says St. Augustine,[32] "unless because vice has grown into nature?" Moreover St. Ambrose says that death is for a remedy, not for a punishment, because it is such a punishment as becomes a remedy and the end

of all the punishments and miseries of this life. This sense his own following words expressly state. But whether death can also in that sense be called natural, because it would be natural to man even in innocence, constituted in the goods of nature alone, will be considered afterward.

§ V — How the first man is said to have been made into a living soul (Quomodo primus homo factus dicatur in animam viventem)

§ 12. Against the immortality of the first man there can still be objected what Moses writes in Gen. 2, that Adam was made into a living soul — thereby attributing to him a certain life that he shared in common with the beasts, and consequently, as it appears, a mortal one. For the Apostle seems to understand and expound that sentence in just this way in 1 Cor. 15, writing thus: "It is sown an animal body (*corpus animale*), it rises a spiritual body (*corpus spiritale*). If there is an animal body, there is also a spiritual one, as it is written: the first man Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a life-giving spirit. But that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is animal; then that which is spiritual. The first man is from the earth, earthly; the second man is from heaven, heavenly. As is the earthly man, so also are the earthly; etc." By these words the Apostle seems to indicate that the first man was described by Moses as he was — namely, as having had an animal and earthly body, which, dissolved by death, was one day to be transformed through the resurrection into a spiritual body. For St. Augustine also, in Epistle 145 (to Consentius),[34] understood that passage as spoken by the Apostle concerning the animal body on account of the dissolution wrought by death.

§ 13. Reply: The passages of Scripture cited do not signify that mortality of the first man by which it was necessary for him to die, but rather they confirm the distinction given above between the immortality of the first man and that of those who will share in the blessed resurrection. In order that this may be understood, the words of both passages of Scripture must be briefly expounded. The first Adam is said to have been made into a living soul because he had a body that needed nourishment and was capable of dying; but the last Adam is said to have been made into a life-giving spirit, because He has a body that neither requires nourishment nor is capable of dying. How both expressions are rightly expounded — following St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 23[35] — the Master sets forth in his text. Now in each member of the sentence there is partly a Hebraism (*Hebraica proprietas*) and partly a synecdoche. For in that Hebraism it is said "He was made into a living soul" in place of what would be said as "He was made a living soul" — in the same way as it is said elsewhere, "I will be to him a father," that is, I will be their father. The synecdoche, on the other hand, consists in the fact that "soul" (*anima*) is put in place of "living creature" (*animal*), so that the meaning is that Adam was made a living creature (*animal vivens*) — a creature, of course, possessed of vegetative life, which it was necessary to sustain by the nourishment of foods.

§ 14. Yet although by these words man is not distinguished from brute animals, but rather what he has in common with brutes is attributed to him, he is nonetheless sufficiently distinguished from them by other surrounding passages, both preceding and following — and especially (as far as the present matter is concerned) by that: "In whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death," and by that: "until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are dust," etc. For these passages show that he was not made into a living soul in such a way that it was necessary for him to die, whether he sinned or not; but rather so that he could not die if he did not sin.

§ 15. Furthermore, by a similar locution the last Adam is said to have been made into a life-giving spirit; because Christ, who insofar as He is the restorer of the human race is another Adam, was made life-giving — that is, having a soul, or as others interpret it, having the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) — which supplies perpetual life to the body, so that it neither needs food nor can die. For thus also the Apostle said in Rom. 8: "If the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies, on account of His Spirit who dwells in you."[27] Although St. Hilary seems to have preferred the former interpretation — by which "spirit" is understood as the soul belonging to the nature of man — when in his exposition of Ps. 67 (near the end) he says that the nature of the blessed is such as to nourish and preserve itself, so that it has no need of anything external by which to be preserved.'[36]

§ 16. Now indeed the "animal body" and the "spiritual body" (*corpus spirituale*) must be expounded in precisely the same way. For the animal body is so called from the living soul (*anima vivens*), and the spiritual body from the life-giving spirit (*spiritus vivificans*), in accordance with the exposition already given. Then the first man is said to be "from the earth, earthly" — not on account of sin, for whose sake he heard: "You are earth and to earth you shall go," but because, having been formed from the earth according to his body, he could also return to the earth if he sinned — as St. Augustine expounds in the place cited above.[37] Christ, on the other hand, is "from heaven, heavenly," because He has a body formed from heaven — that is, by heavenly power in the womb of the Virgin — or rather because He Himself, having His origin from heaven, that is, a heavenly and divine origin, is also heavenly in body, on account of heavenly qualities; inasmuch as, through the Holy Spirit, His body has been so reformed by the resurrection that it can no longer return to the earth. Hence the Apostle rightly subjoins: "As is the earthly man, so also are the earthly; and as is the heavenly man, so also are the heavenly" — the former on account of the mortality by which one can die; the latter on account of the immortality by which one cannot die.

§ 17. To the passage of St. Augustine it is replied that he is speaking not of the body of the first man but of our own body, which is so animal that it cannot be transformed into a spiritual body except through the dissolution of death — in accordance with what the Apostle says: "It is sown an animal body, it shall rise a spiritual body." For concerning the first man, St. Augustine subjoins in the same place that, had he not sinned, he would have received a spiritual body without the intervention of death.[38]

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§ VI — Whence did man have immortality in the first state (Unde homini immortalitas in primo statu)

§ 18. Concerning the immortality of the first state there is still the question of whence it came to man — whether from an internal cause alone, or from an external cause alone, namely the tree of life (*lignum vitae*), or indeed from both simultaneously. For there are different opinions on this matter.

§ 19. Some, whose view the Master reports in §§ B and C,[40] thought that man was made immortal in such a way that he could always live even without using the tree of life, if it had not been commanded to him to eat of it. For he would sin, they say, if he did not eat of it, and by sinning he would lose his immortality. They prove that there was a precept, because it was said to man: "Of every tree of Paradise eat." But this proof is ineffectual — both because those words are not so much those of one commanding as of one granting the use of all the trees, with one exception; and because there was no need for such a thing to be enjoined upon the

first man by positive law, just as there is no need for us either of a positive precept to take food. Therefore, if the law of nature together with the natural instinct of appetite suffices for us to take nourishment, without which we cannot live, much more did man in his integrity understand by the same law and instinct that he was bound to eat at some point of that tree without which he knew his life could not be perpetually preserved — so that there was no need for a positive law to that effect.

§ 20. Others placed the cause of immortality in the tree of life alone; to such a degree that they think that even if man had sinned, he would nonetheless always have lived, had he always had access to the use of that tree. For this reason, they say, man upon his expulsion from Paradise was removed from that tree, lest by eating of its fruit he live forever. The words of the Lord driving Adam from Paradise in Gen. 3 seem to favour this view: "But now, lest perhaps he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever."[41] This is thought to have been the opinion of most of the ancient writers, such as Irenaeus,[42] Hilary,[43] Methodius as reported by Epiphanius,[44] St. John Chrysostom,[45] St. Augustine,[46] St. Cyril,[47] and the author of the *Questions on the Old Testament*.[48] To these there also accrues the sentence of St. Augustine in the same work — that the immortality of that state arose from the tree of life, not from the condition of nature. This view among the Scholastics is held by Durandus.[49]

§ 21. But others teach that immortality belonged to the first man from both simultaneously — namely from an internal good quality and from the tree of life — just as even now the preservation of man's life depends partly on the internal temperament of the body and partly on nourishment. Although there is this difference: that good constitution of the body in the first man derived from the good constitution of the soul, that is, from justice (*iustitia*) — which is not the case for man now. Therefore, since that good bodily quality has been lost through sin, they deny that the tree of life alone could keep death away from man, just as even now the best food cannot rescue a man afflicted by a lethal disease from the danger of death — not, however, in such a way that the man would not die from that disease. This opinion is made probable especially by what the Apostle says, that the body is dead on account of sin (Rom. 7 and 8).[9] For by this it is signified that in the body itself there now resides a cause of corruption and death that was not there before sin — namely, a certain morbid and death-bearing quality, or rather the privation of that good constitution and temperament which was present before sin, by the lack of which the body is now said to be dead.

§ 22. To this there is added a manifest proof from the Second Council of Orange (canon 2) and the Council of Trent (Session 5, canon 1),[50] in which it is defined that the whole man, both according to body and soul, was changed for the worse through sin. From this it follows that in the body, before sin, there was some quality by which it was so well-disposed that it could not die. And this is the teaching of St. Augustine in many places, as in *De peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 16;[51] *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 10, and XI, ch. 32;[52] and *De Civitate Dei* XIII, chs. 3 and 23.[53] Even Pope Leo seems to have wished the same thing when he said that man, endowed with the gift of immortality (*dos immortalitatis*), underwent the harsh subjection of death.[54] For the gift (*dos*) of immortality to man regards the body — not something external.

§ 23. To this view subscribe most of the Scholastic Doctors; which view also we embrace as the more probable. To what is objected from Genesis, the answer is easy. Those words of God — as well as the immediately preceding ones, in which He says: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us" — were spoken ironically (*ironice*). For Adam had not truly become like God by knowing good and evil; rather, through sin and the ignorance contracted through sin, he had receded very far from Him. In the same way, neither would it truly have come to pass that, with an abundance of the tree of life at hand, man would live forever. But he

was removed from it, with a flaming and turning sword placed there as well, lest he foolishly promise himself immortality from the use of that tree. This is the sense according to St. Cyril,[47] and it is hinted at by St. John Chrysostom.'[45]

§ 24. Others, however, such as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure (on this Distinction)[55] and Nicholas of Lyra (on Gen.),'[56] do not interpret these words as ironic, but in this sense: that man could have lived for a very long time — in aeternum, that is, for a very great while — if he had not been deprived of the tree of life; just as even now by a certain dietary regimen a man's life can be prolonged for many years, though not perpetuated. However, for the matter to stand thus concerning the tree of life is not necessary; since even now, the food that is most wholesome for a healthy man is very often harmful and deadly for a sick man. So also the tree of life, which provided immortality for man in his integrity, could, for the same man once corrupted, have hastened death — precisely on account of the diversity of the subject.

§ 25. As regards the passages cited from the Fathers — with the single exception of Methodius, whose opinion is plainly open on its face — all of them can be understood as having spoken in the sense in which, according to either of the expositions already given, Scripture itself speaks. As for what was lastly adduced from St. Augustine, it will need to be explained in this manner: the immortality of the first state did not arise from the condition of nature alone but also from the tree of life. For as we have already shown from St. Augustine himself, the condition of nature without the tree of life did not suffice for it. This is what — stripping away the redundancy — he wished to say: the immortality of the first man was not from the condition of nature alone, but also from the tree of life.[57]

§ VII — Whether the aforesaid power of the tree of life was natural (An praedicta virtus ligni vitae fuerit naturalis)

§ 26. Concerning the tree of life, the Doctors inquire what kind of power (*virtus*) it was by which it could furnish immortality to man — whether that power was natural to it or supernatural. The latter part of the question seems to be favoured by St. Augustine. For in book 8 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 5,[60] he explains and renders credible the power of that tree by two examples: one, the unleavened bread baked under ashes, in the strength of which food Elijah walked forty days and forty nights (1 Kgs 19); the other, the flour and oil that did not run out (1 Kgs 17). Now in these instances it is established that a divine and supernatural power was at work. The same St. Augustine, in book 11 of the same work, ch. 40,'[61] says that after Adam had sinned, he had to be separated from the tree of life — either because that happy condition of the body subsisted from it through a visible thing by an invisible power (*virtute invisibili*), or because in it there was a visible sacrament (*sacramentum*) of invisible wisdom (*sapientiae*). By these words St. Augustine does not signify that he is in doubt whether that invisible power — that is, a power exceeding the visible nature of the body — existed, as some have understood this passage; but rather he records two causes on account of which it was necessary that sinful man be separated from the tree of life. Although what he says, that in that tree there was a visible sacrament of invisible wisdom, does not avail to prove a supernatural power. For it is called a sacrament not on account of a supernatural operation, but only on account of its signification of a sacred reality, just as the brazen serpent and many other things are commonly called sacraments — as there is occasion to note in book 13 of *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 20.[62] There St. Augustine says that the condition of immortality was furnished to

the first human beings from the tree of life by the wonderful grace of God (*mirabili Dei gratia*). To this is added the opinion of the Venerable Bede (in his *Super Genesim*),[63] who affirms that the tree of life was so called because it had received from God the power that whoever ate from it would have his body confirmed in stable health.

§ 27. This opinion is most openly set forth by St. Bonaventure, writing on the present Distinction,[64] where among other things he proves it by this argument: because since that tree was in itself corruptible (*per se corruptibile*), it could not have within itself a natural power of conferring immortality upon man. He then concludes in these words: "Therefore, just as our Sacraments do not create Grace, but the divine power assisting in their lawful reception infuses Grace: so also the fruit of that tree did not give immortality of itself, but by the divine power, when that fruit was eaten, it lavished immortality upon man." So he.

§ 28. On the other side, however, there are other authors who teach that this power was natural — such as Strabo (in his commentary on Genesis)[65] and Hugh of St. Victor (in his questions on Genesis).[66] And that this was St. Thomas's opinion is plainly gathered from what he writes in the first part, q. 97, art. 4 (the last article),[39] where he proves that the tree of life could not have furnished the human body with any disposition of immortality such that it could never be dissolved, for the reason that the power of any body whatsoever is finite. This proof of his would be altogether invalid if the power of the tree of life were said to have been supernatural. He therefore presupposes that it was natural.

§ 29. To this same conclusion tends the opinion of all those who think that the tree of life, by that power of its by which it could furnish immortal life to an integral man, could also have profited man already fallen, at least to the extent of prolonging life for a very long time. For they would assert this without reason if a power natural to that tree did not exist for sinful man — since a divine and supernatural power neither would have assisted nor does now assist those who approach the Sacraments unworthily.

§ 30. This opinion, therefore, appears to us more probable; especially because a supernatural power is not to be posited in a natural body without necessity or manifest authority. For to the argument of St. Bonaventure it is easily replied that nothing prevents us from attributing a natural cause to a corporeal effect that consists of nothing but a certain perpetual succession — such as bodily life in the state of innocence (*status innocentiae*) — especially since the cause itself, that is, the tree of life, though not as an individual, was yet going to be perpetual according to its species, which sufficed for its perpetual use. This solution is also suggested by St. Thomas in the passage cited just above.[67]

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§ VIII — Whether the tree of life was to be used once or repeatedly (Utrum semel an saepius fuerit ligno vitae utendum)

§ 31. From what has been said there emerges another question: whether it would have sufficed, for attaining that effect of immortality, to eat of the tree of life once; or whether it would have been necessary to make use of it more frequently. On this question there are different opinions. For the *Glossa ordinaria* holds that the tree of life was given for this purpose: that each person should partake of it once only, namely at the time of reaching full maturity of age, by which partaking he would become so perfectly immortal as to require no further assistance of food thereafter.[68] The Master also recounts this opinion in the present Distinction, §§ D

and E, drawn from question 19 of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*.[69] Moreover, the words of St. John Chrysostom in Homily 18 on Genesis,[45] seem to say something of this kind. And Rupert openly teaches the same in book 3 on Genesis, ch. 30.[70]

§ 32. But the opinion of others — and that one indeed more conformable to Sacred Scripture — is that the fruit of that tree had to be used more frequently, against the deficiency brought on by aging. This is indicated by St. Augustine in several places. He also says in book 1 of *Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, ch. 15,[71] that it is not to be denied that Adam ate from that tree before he sinned. And in book 2 of *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 21,[72] he says: "They are rightly understood to have abstained from the forbidden food before the evil persuasion of the Devil, and to have made use of what was permitted, and therefore also of the rest and especially of the tree of life." Nor is what the same St. Augustine says in book 1 of *De Peccatorum meritis*, ch. 3, and in book 8 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 5,[73] to be understood otherwise — namely, that the tree of life would have given stability against aging (*stabilitatem contra vetustatem*). For by a single partaking of it man was not going to attain stable, that is, perpetual, health; rather, he would have had need to eat of the tree of life repeatedly and frequently in order to preserve the vigour of full maturity.

§ 33. And indeed this must necessarily be said if, as we have declared more probable, we acknowledge the power of that tree to have been natural. For by a power of this kind — especially a power existing in a corruptible subject — immortality could not have been conferred upon man unless that power were perpetually applied to man at fixed times. If, however, it be supposed that the power was supernatural, it could have sufficed for that effect when applied once — provided that God had so ordained. But concerning this ordinance of God nothing definite can be brought forward either from Scripture or from any other source. Therefore, even if that power be said to have been supernatural, as St. Augustine seems to have thought, it is still rightly said, in agreement with the same St. Augustine, that man needed the repeated and frequent eating of that life-giving fruit in order to perpetuate his life.

§ IX — Whether the immortality of the original state was natural to man (Utrum immortalitas primi status fuerit homini naturalis)

§ 34. Since "natural" and "supernatural" are said not in one way but in various ways, a fuller and more precise answer will be given to the question whether the immortality of the body was natural or supernatural to the first man by means of a distinction. For it was natural to him in one respect, and above nature in another respect; just as death also is, to fallen man, natural in one respect and contrary to nature in another. If "natural" be understood as that which is present from the first constitution of nature — in the way that St. Cyril said, in the manner in which God established each individual thing, that is its nature[75] — then in this sense immortality was natural to the first man, and death, both to man in his integrity and to fallen man, was contrary to nature, as is clear from what has been said above. For it has been shown that man was established in the beginning as immortal, that is, free from the necessity of dying.

§ 35. Likewise, if "natural" denotes that towards which the appetite of each being naturally tends, then in this way too immortality is natural to man and death is contrary to nature. For all men by nature desire immortality and flee death; so much so that even Christ, in order to declare the reality of the nature He had assumed, willed to manifest this natural desire in Himself when He was saddened at the approach of death. But if you take "natural" to mean that which belongs to each being from birth — whether it be a good and

fitting thing agreeable to the natural appetite or not — then in this sense too immortality was natural to the first man. For he was created immortal, whereas we are born subject to death. In this manner, in Wis. 12, the natural malice of certain peoples is noted,[76] and in Eph. 2, we are all said to be "by nature children of wrath."[77] So also, in this sense, original sin itself is natural to all the descendants of Adam, which is why it is called by the Doctors the sin of nature. In this way St. Ambrose, in his book *On Faith in the Resurrection*,[78] interprets death as natural to us, saying: "Death was not in nature, but has been turned into nature."

§ 36. Again, if "natural" means that which has its cause in nature itself, then also in this fashion immortality was in a certain manner natural to the first man. For the immortality of man consisted in the excellent temperament of the human body as an internal cause, and in the tree of life as an external cause — both of which were natural causes contributing to that effect. And in this manner St. Cyril speaks of man's immortality[79] and so does the Master in the final paragraph of this Distinction.[80]

§ 37. However, in another respect, that same immortality was supernatural to man: partly by reason of the justice upon which that good constitution of the body and, as a consequence, immortality itself depended. For that justice was supernatural inasmuch as through it the soul was subjected to God and cleaved to Him as to its supernatural good and end. While that subjection endured, there resided in the soul a certain supernatural power by which it was able to preserve the body from all corruption, as St. Thomas says.[23] Partly also by reason of the body or matter from which man was made, which, being earthly, had in itself not the cause of immortality but rather of mortality. Hence man after sin heard: "Until you return to the earth from which you were taken, for you are dust and to dust you shall return" (Gen. 3). Which words certainly signify that by reason of the earthly and elemental matter from which he had been made, once the supernatural gift of immortality had been withdrawn, he was subject to corruption and death. This is also signified by that general sentence of Sir. 4: "All things that are from the earth shall return to the earth."[81] Although therefore the first man had within nature itself a certain cause of immortality, it was nevertheless not a full and total one. Indeed, if we were to separate by thought the supernatural gifts from him and consider only the natural things in him, he was mortal in such a way that it would have been necessary for him to die. For he was composed of contraries, and from the conflict of contraries there necessarily follows in the end the corruption of the composite. According to this manner, therefore, immortality was supernatural to the first man. And in this way St. Cyril speaks[82] when he says that man had attained immortality above his nature, and again when he says that man, born of a corruptible nature, was immortal by the will of God.[83]

§ 38. Now since the supernatural is properly opposed not to what is called natural in the first, second, or third of the modes already enumerated, but only to what is natural in the fourth mode — according to which, however, immortality cannot be called simply natural to the first man, because, as we have said, natural causes alone were not sufficient to confer it upon him — for this reason immortality is more properly to be called absolutely supernatural to man in his integrity than natural. Hence that proposition[84] which states that the immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace but a natural condition has been deservedly condemned by the Apostolic See; especially if its meaning is that immortality was so owed to human nature that God could not have created man mortal — for this is established to be utterly false.

§ 39. Moreover, that immortality was supernatural to man appears to be concluded, beyond the arguments already indicated, also by the following reasoning. If immortality were natural to man, then men constituted in a state of pure nature (*in puris naturalibus*) would never be destined to die, especially if they remained in natural justice, which they might have received either at creation or acquired through good acts.

Since therefore in that state the propagation of mankind would never have ceased — lest the natural faculty of generation in the human race should at any time be fruitless — it would necessarily have come about that men would multiply more and more without end, so that in time the whole surface of the earth would not have sufficed for their habitation. Therefore, in order to remove this absurdity from that purely natural state of men, it is necessary to allow a place for death therein, through which some yield to others succeeding them. Nor can this inconvenience be avoided by a translation of men to some happier state. For that translation and that happier state would have been beyond and above the order of nature. But our discussion here is solely about the order of nature. This doctrine, together with the Master,[85] is transmitted by most Scholastic Doctors, and in particular by St. Thomas,[86] who, in replying to the first objection — which ran thus: "Matter ought to be proportioned to form; but the intellective soul is an incorruptible form; therefore it is not fittingly united to a corruptible body" — rejects as insufficient the solution that the body of man before sin was incorruptible. "Because," he says, "the body of man before sin was immortal not by nature, but by the gift of Divine Grace. Otherwise his immortality would not have been taken away by sin, just as neither is the immortality of demons." For this reason he goes on to supply another solution to the argument, which the studious reader may examine there. He teaches the same thing[87] where he discusses whether death and other defects are natural to man, and again[88] where he disputes whether death is a punishment for sin. And in his Commentary on Rom. 5,[89] and again in the same place,[90] where, speaking of that power which he attributes to the soul of man in his integrity for preserving the body from all corruption, he says it was not natural to it but was given supernaturally by God. And he teaches that this was done reasonably, "because," he says, "since the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that in the beginning there should be given to it a power by which it could preserve the body above the nature of corporeal matter." So he says.

§ 40. Nor does St. Augustine seem to have thought otherwise. For in Book VI of *De Genesi ad litteram*,[91] having said that immortality was given to man from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature, he shortly afterwards adds: "He was mortal therefore by the condition of his animal body, but immortal by the beneficence of his Creator." And in Book XIV of *De Civitate Dei*,[92] speaking of the immortality of the first men: "That condition," he says, "was furnished to them from the tree of life which was in the midst of Paradise, by the wonderful Grace of God." The same author in Book I of *De peccatorum meritis*[18] adduces comparisons to illustrate the immortality of the first men, drawn from those things which have remained incorrupt for a time not by their own nature but by divine miracle.

§ X — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 41. Against the above doctrine the following objections are commonly raised. First: Scripture always refers death back to sin as its cause, as is clear from Gen. 2 and 3, Wis. 1 and 2, Rom. 5, 6, 8, and elsewhere; but it nowhere refers it to nature. Therefore it is not death but immortality that is natural to man. Second: the Council of Milevis, canon 1, declares anathema on whoever refers death to the necessity of nature. Third: the Second Council of Orange, canon 2, affirms that those who say that bodily death without death of the soul — that is, without sin — passed upon the whole human race, do injustice to God.[94] Therefore death cannot be called natural. For in that case God would not be unjust if He had permitted man, even without sinning, to undergo death, as something accruing to him naturally. Fourth: St. Augustine[95] says: "It is established among Christians who truly hold the Catholic Faith that even bodily death itself has been inflicted upon us not by

the law of nature but by the merit of sin." Fifth: the rational soul is by nature immortal; therefore it befits it to have a body naturally immortal. Sixth: the rational soul naturally desires always to be in the body; therefore it can naturally attain that condition, and therefore immortality naturally belongs to the body. Seventh: if immortality of the body does not naturally belong to man, then it must follow that something belongs to the soul beyond its nature and is something to be most intensely fled by it, as violently repugnant to its natural inclination — namely, that it should be in the body for only a brief time and then remain outside the body for eternity. For the resurrection, by which the soul is restored to the body, is beyond and above the order of nature. Eighth: it seems alien to the wisdom of God to make such a substantial composite whose one part is immortal and the other mortal, since neither can naturally be perfect without the other; and indeed no other such composite is found in the nature of things. Ninth: man created in a state of pure nature could have attained a certain natural beatitude as his ultimate end. But true beatitude could not have belonged to him if he were placed in perpetual dread and expectation of death, by which he would even lose that very beatitude without hope of recovering it eternally. For the soul, separated by death, either would not have had that beatitude, or would certainly have had it less on account of the absence of the body to which it is naturally inclined and without which it remains imperfect. Tenth: if immortality is not natural to man but supernatural, then God could not satisfy His own justice in punishing the sins of men with eternal punishment except by supernaturally making them immortal. For God's justice requires that the whole man who sinned — that is, composed of body and soul — should be punished eternally.

§ 42. To these objections, though most of them present no small difficulty, we reply as follows with probability. To the first, it is said that the reason why Sacred Scripture refers death and mortality not to nature as cause but to sin is this: because, since the benefit of immortality had been conferred upon man supernaturally, by sinning he deprived himself of it, and thus the lack of that benefit — which in a man established with natural gifts alone would have been merely a natural privation or defect — became a punishment for man's sin. This, moreover, is what Scripture diligently strives to impress upon us, that we may understand how great a good we lost by sinning. St. Thomas explains the matter in this way.[88] Nor indeed has Scripture been altogether silent about death being natural to man. For this was signified in those words of the Lord to Adam: "Until you return to the earth from which you were taken, for you are dust and to dust you shall return." And in Wis. 9: "The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling oppresses the mind."[96] Hence, if one says the body is corrupted because it is an earthly dwelling, that is, made from earth, there may also be adduced here the word of the Apostle: "The first man is from the earth, earthly; as is the earthly man, such also are those who are earthly" (1 Cor. 15).[97] For there the Apostle is treating of the immortality and corruptibility of man with respect to the body.

§ 43. To the second it is answered that the canon of Milevis condemns nothing other than the claim that the first man was made such that whether he sinned or not he was going to die, not by the merit of sin but by the necessity of nature. It does not, however, deny that men after sin and from the merit of sin die by the necessity of nature, being now stripped of the gift of immortality. Furthermore, when it says "by the necessity of nature," this can be taken as spoken of nature as it was instituted in the first man. For thus the Pelagians understood it, saying that what is nature for man as constituted is what, according to the Catholic Faith, is the punishment of the condemned. It can also be understood as meaning: by the necessity of nature alone.

§ 44. To the third I reply that there is no doubt that God, as Lord of all creation, could have created man such that even if he had not sinned he would have been going to die. For since God owes nothing to His

creature except insofar as He obliges Himself by promising, He cannot be charged with injustice if He destroys His creature when and how He wills. Therefore, what the canon of Orange says — that those who say death entered the human race without sin do injustice to God — must be understood on the presupposition of God's ordinance by which He had so established man that if he did not sin he would never die. And that such was God's ordinance is plainly taught us by Scripture.

§ 45. To the fourth argument the reply is the same as to the second. To the fifth it is answered that to the soul inasmuch as it is immortal an immortal body is indeed most fittingly congruent. But because the same soul required a body apt and fitted for exercising certain functions, which functions it could not perform unless the body were composed and tempered from contrary humors and qualities — from which composition the corruption of the composite naturally follows in the end — hence a body naturally mortal belonged to it per accidens (*per accidens*). But what was lacking on the side of the body the goodness and power of the Creator supplied, when He gave the first man an immortal body by the gift of Grace, which was not such by the condition of nature. This reply is that of St. Thomas in the places noted above.[98]

§ 46. To the sixth it is answered that the intellectual creature is so constituted as to naturally desire certain things to which, nevertheless, it cannot attain except by a supernatural way — such as to know God perfectly. For whatever we know in any manner through nature, the perfect knowledge of that same thing we also desire, impelled by the same nature. Such also is the fact that the souls of the Blessed naturally desire the resurrection of their bodies, which nevertheless can be bestowed upon them only by supernatural power. So therefore the soul naturally desires the eternity of its body, even though it could not attain it naturally.

§ 47. To the seventh it seems one must say that, staying within the limits of nature, it is rightly concluded that it befalls the soul, beyond its nature, that is, beyond its natural inclination, to remain perpetually separated from the body. But this defect of nature is supplied by the supernatural divine power through the resurrection of the dead.

§ 48. To the eighth nearly the same reply is to be given as to the fifth argument. Nor is it surprising that no other similar composite is found in the nature of things, since man alone is such a composite in which a spiritual and immortal nature is joined with a corporeal and material nature.

§ 49. To the ninth it seems one must say that the purely natural beatitude of man could not have been perfect, and therefore there is nothing absurd if it were conjoined with the certain expectation of death along with many other miseries of this life which not even a prudent man instructed in all the virtues could forestall and ward off — though he could, by patience and equanimity, as well as by the compensation of the best operations according to nature, greatly mitigate them and render them lighter for himself.

§ 50. To the last objection it is replied with probability that the fact that God cannot satisfy His justice in punishing men's sins with the eternal punishment of those very men unless He makes them supernaturally immortal does not arise from any impotence of God but from His voluntary ordinance by which He established human nature to consist of two parts — one naturally immortal, the other naturally mortal — although He could certainly, if we speak of His absolute power (*de potentia ejus absoluta*), have established both as naturally immortal.

§ XI — In what manner man in the state of integrity would have been capable of passion (Quomodo passibilis fuisset homo in statu integro)

§ 51. To the question connected with the preceding one — namely, whether man in the state of integrity would have been capable of passion (*passibilis*) — a brief answer must be given in agreement with St. Thomas,[100] who writes that since one kind of passion is corruptive and another perfective, only the latter kind of passion could have had a place in that state: such as are the passions of the senses when they receive impressions from objects, in which sense even the act of understanding is a kind of undergoing. Hence man in his integrity would have been capable of passion in this manner not only according to the body but also according to the soul. Corruptive passion, however, was altogether foreign to that state — for the same reason as the corruption which is called death, since whatever is capable of passion in this way is also corruptible. Therefore man in his integrity was capable of corruptive passion in no other way than that in which, as we said above, he was mortal. For just as innocence was incompatible with death, so also was it incompatible with passion of this kind. But because that man could sin, he could also die; and thus similarly he could also suffer corruptively.

§ 52. Furthermore, lest the upright man be constantly afflicted, external passion of the body was warded off partly by the prudence of man himself, and partly by the special protection of God — namely, in those things which could escape human prudence, such as many contingent events. Internal passion, however, was warded off by the interior good constitution of the soul. But understand all this of passion disposing to and preparing the way for the corruption of the whole. For it is not to be denied that some parts of the body, those which are called material parts, would have perished under the internal action of the primary qualities, as we showed above. But because through continual nutrition other parts were in turn to take their place, such passion was not disposed toward the corruption of the whole body. Whether from what has been said it follows that hunger, thirst, and sleep are to be removed from that state will be explained at the next Distinction.

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§ I — What was the mode of generation of children in the original state (Quis in primo statu modus generationis filiorum)

§ 53. Concerning the procreation of children in the original state, the question is usually raised whether it would have taken place through the intercourse of male and female, or in some other way. Nor is this inquiry useless. For among other purposes this investigation serves so that we may know how to distinguish that which is corrupt in human nature from that which is right and instituted by God. The opinion of some is that there would have been no mingling of the sexes in the state of innocence, on the grounds that the mingling of the sexes, even if it takes place for the sole purpose of generation, can neither occur without corruption of the flesh by which virginity is violated, nor be without shameful lust — both of which ought to have been far removed from that happy state. They also adduce Scripture, Lk. 20: "The children of this world marry and are given in marriage."[10] From which they conclude that nothing of the sort would have occurred in the state of original felicity, just as it will not occur in the state of perfect beatitude, because neither state pertains to the children of this world.

§ 54. In this opinion are found some among the ancients, as Gregory of Nyssa,[102] and also Procopius (in his commentary on Gen. 4, on the words "Adam knew his wife"),[103] and Euthymius (on Ps. 50: "Behold, I was conceived in iniquities").[104] The same opinion is also attributed to St. John Chrysostom on account of certain of his words in Homilies 18 and 20 on Genesis.[105] Although to others it seems that Chrysostom intends nothing other than that in the original state there would not have been so intense a preoccupation with propagating posterity — by which parents render their memory immortal — as we now see among men; and for this reason, because parents were then to have been immortal, who now, since they are mortal, studiously devote themselves to whatever bears the shadow and likeness of the immortality of offspring and species and other such modes.

§ 55. such as we now observe among human beings; and this for the reason that those parents were then destined to be immortal, who now, being mortal, studiously pursue whatever shadow and semblance of immortality they can, through the procreation of children and by other means. But this reply can indeed be accommodated to the latter passage. The former passage, however, is so plain that it does not admit of any such interpretation. There is likewise, in the same author, a passage in his book *On Virginity*, chapters 16 and 17,[106] where he expressly affirms that there would have been no marriage among human beings if Adam had remained in obedience. Moreover, it is established that St. Augustine himself at one time held this view, as appears from his second book *Against the Manichaeans on Genesis*, chapter 19, and his book *On True Religion*, chapter 46, and his second book *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*, chapter 25.[107] However, the same author speaks hesitatingly on this matter in his book *On the Good of Marriage*, chapter 2,[108] as does St. Jerome in his disputation against Jovinian.[109] This same opinion is reckoned among the peculiar opinions of the Armenians. Furthermore, among more recent authors, Judocus Clichtoveus followed this opinion in the Commentaries he wrote on St. John Damascene (at the places cited above),[110] and again in his *Annotations on the sixth book of Richard of St. Victor's On the Trinity*, proposition 18,[111] where, departing from the opinion of the author he is expounding, he devises a new account of the procreation of children in that first state, and indeed a twofold one. The first alternative is that, without mutual intercourse, both man and woman should be fertile of themselves — in the way that the earth, without receiving seed, was, as he says, going to bring forth fruit of its own accord; the second alternative is that a woman should conceive from the breath alone of her husband, in the manner in which the Blessed Virgin conceived from the Holy Spirit.

§ 56. Yet others, to whom the same opinion was agreeable, either held that no other human beings were to be procreated in that state (which St. Augustine says in *The City of God*, book 14, chapter 21),[112] or that the rest were to be procreated in the manner in which the first man was made — which Damascene appears to have thought;[113] or in the manner in which the angels were multiplied by the operation of divine power, as Gregory of Nyssa holds;[114] or at any rate that they were going to be born in some manner unknown to us but transparent to Divine Wisdom alone — as St. John Chrysostom says in the passages cited from his book *On Virginity*.[115]

§ 57. But Sacred Scripture manifestly refutes all these conjectures — or more truly, inventions. First, because it testifies that God created the first human beings male and female,[116] that is, differing in sex. The only use of this difference is the union of the members for the propagation of offspring, as is likewise indicated by the words immediately following: "And God blessed them and said: Increase and multiply."[117] These words, spoken to the first parents before sin, were repeated after sin to Noah and his sons;[118] whence we understand that the same bodily union was common to both states.

§ 58. More clearly still are these things declared by the prophetic words of Adam, who before sin, and indeed without foreknowledge of the future, said: "They shall be two in one flesh."[119] For our Lord shows that this too is common to both states in Matt. 19, where, recalling the law of matrimony to its original institution, He cites both that text, "He made them male and female,",[120] and this one, "They shall be two in one flesh.",[121] The Apostle also shows this in 1 Cor. 6, where he proves that one who cleaves to a harlot is made one body with her, because it is written: "They shall be two in one flesh.",[122]

§ 59. This opinion, the former one having been repudiated and retracted in his later writings, St. Augustine constantly maintained, as in *The City of God*, book 14, chapters 21 through 27; *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book 9, chapters 3, 4, 6, and 10; the book *On Original Sin*, chapters 35 and 36; *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, book 2, chapter 31, and the following chapters to the end; *Against Julian*, book 3, chapter 7; book 4, chapter 40; book 6, chapter 9; and finally in his *Retractions*, book 1, chapters 10, 13, and 19, and book 2, chapter 22.[123] Richard of St. Victor follows St. Augustine (at the place noted above),[124] as does the Master (in this Distinction).[125] And all the Scholastic Doctors have concordantly followed him as well. A physical argument is added. For if, as the Philosopher testifies, the most natural work of a living being[126] is the first and most perfect in the genus of living things, it is necessary that this work also be found in man according to nature, and indeed to be accomplished in the manner which the natural disposition of the members requires. Therefore, even in the state of innocence, man — who had been made into a living soul, and according to the Apostle had an animal body (*corpus animale*), that is, one needing vital actions for the preservation of himself and his species — ought to have given attention to generation, by which the species is preserved, just as to nourishment, by which the individual is preserved.

§ 60. Now as to what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene reply to the argument drawn from the distinction of sex in which the first human beings were created — namely, that God, as foreknowing future sin, created human beings male and female with that distinction, and would not have created them so had they not been going to sin — this reply has no probability by reason, as is easy to understand from what has just been said; nor is it sufficiently consonant with our Faith. For if the diversity of sex arises from foreknown sin, then it will not be present in the blessed after the resurrection, by which all the effects of sin are to be entirely abolished. But St. Jerome writes that this is contrary to the Catholic Faith, in the letter in which he combats the errors of John of Jerusalem,[127] and we too have refuted it (at Distinction 44 of Book IV).[128]

§ 61. As for the objection they bring against shameful lust, it is perspicuously resolved by St. Augustine in most of the places already cited: for it ought not to seem incredible that, because the bodily union for generation cannot now take place without base lust and the disordered movement of the members, it would therefore have occurred without such evil in the state of integrity. Otherwise, that too would seem incredible which Scripture says: "And they were both naked and were not ashamed."[129] So likewise that which we showed above according to Scripture — that if human beings had not sinned, they would have been immortal — since no examples of such things exist in this mortal life to make them credible to us. Just as, therefore, death entered into human nature through sin, so also marriage, holy by its institution, was affected and dishonoured by a certain shameful baseness that arose from sin — as the same Scripture attests, saying: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked.",[130]

§ 62. To that sentence of our Lord which is found in Luke, chapter 20,[131] the ready reply is that those spoken of by our Lord as "the children of this age" (*filii hujus saeculi*) are those who lived as Adam lived in Paradise, and these are opposed to "the children of the resurrection," who, according to the Apostle in 1 Cor.

15,[132] will be made into a life-giving spirit (*spiritum vivificantem*). To these latter, just as it will not be fitting to marry, so neither will it be fitting to eat or drink — yet both of these are attributed as it were proper to the children of this age.

§ II — Whether generation could have taken place in the original state while preserving virginity (Utrum salva virginitate fieret in primo statu generatio)

§ 63. The argument by which the doctrine set forth above is attacked carries some difficulty, arising from the fact that a woman can neither be known by a man nor bring forth a conceived child without the corruption of the flesh, by which that bodily integrity which we call virginity is lost. Certain thinkers hold that there is nothing absurd in saying that through the conjugal act in that state the integrity of the female body would have been violated and that virginity — insofar as it signifies bodily integrity — would have been lost. Such is the opinion of St. Thomas[134] and of St. Bonaventure,[135] and of the Master of Altissidorus[136] and of certain others. Epiphanius also seems to favour this opinion,[137] in the place where he says that Eve, while she was still a virgin, transgressed the commandment of God — wishing to indicate that she had not yet been known by a man when she sinned. Accordingly, on his view, had she been known by a man before her sin, she would not have been a virgin.

§ 64. But the formal character (*ratio*) of that original state strongly resists this opinion. For if in that state there was to be, in the female body, a violation of integrity and a loss of virginity through intercourse or childbirth, then consequently there would also have been corruption, corrupting passion, and pain — because the violent destruction of bodily parts cannot naturally take place without pain. But it is certain that there would have been no pain there, since the words "In pain you shall bring forth children" pertain to the curse and punishment of sin.[138] Therefore neither corruption, nor fracture, nor violent tearing apart of bodily parts would have taken place there. Add to this that all these things are evils of punishment, and accordingly are to be entirely removed from that state of integrity. To say that there would have been no pain in childbirth because God would miraculously have prevented that punishment in the act of birth is not rightly said; for in that state there was no need of miracles. In this way, moreover, miracles would have been daily occurrences, inasmuch as they would have had to be applied to each individual birth of a woman.

§ 65. More rightly, therefore, St. Augustine[139] teaches that in that state intercourse would have occurred in such a way that the husband would pour seed into his wife's womb without any corruption of her integrity. For in that way the male seed could then have been introduced into the womb of the wife while the integrity of the female genital remained uninjured — just as it is now possible, with that same integrity preserved, for the flow of menstrual blood to be discharged from the womb of a virgin; for the same passage, he argues, by which the latter can be expelled can also receive the former. "For the bringing forth," he says, "not the groan of pain but the impulse of maturity (*maturitatis impulsus*) would have relaxed the female organs." Here it is to be noted that St. Augustine does not posit a miracle in the conception or birth of a woman — which he says would have occurred in the state of innocence while virginity remained intact — but signifies that what would then have taken place was a natural opening and relaxation of the female organs, which accordingly ought to be called neither corruption nor violation, and would not have brought pain, no more than the natural opening of the mouth or of any other member that can by nature both contract and relax. But because this has ceased in the female body after sin, and indeed as a punishment of sin, it has come about that a woman can

now neither be known by a man without a certain breaking of the virginal enclosure, nor give birth without a violent tearing apart of the organs through which the child bursts forth, bringing the most grievous pain.

§ 66. St. Augustine repeats this his opinion in the book *De Peccato Originis*.[140] Haimo agrees with him in his sermon *De Vigilia Nativitatis Domini*,[141] explicitly affirming that in the state of innocence the multiplication of the human race would have been accomplished without any detriment to virginity. The Master likewise says that men in Paradise would have begotten children without corruption.[142] St. Thomas was brought to this same opinion, setting aside his earlier view. For in the *Summa theologiae*,[143] when he had finally raised the argument concerning the corruption without which there is no intercourse between man and woman, he replies in the very words of St. Augustine which we have set down above. In those words, moreover, it is to be noted that for the phrase "the impulse of maturity" (*maturitatis impulsus*) he reads "the impulse of nature" (*naturalis impulsus*). Durandus also agrees,[144] writing on this distinction, but only to this extent: that he removes from that state the division or lesion by which the integrity of the flesh would be dissolved, while positing, with St. Augustine, a relaxation or dilation free from violence — with which integrity is, of course, compatible — although he does not think that such integrity is sufficient for the formal character of virginity, inasmuch as he holds that the name "virginity" signifies the privation of the act of generation. But if this were true, it would follow that not even God could bring it about that virginity is not lost through the act of generation, because this would imply a contradiction.

§ 67. Furthermore, from St. Augustine's opinion it follows that the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, even if — as some have supposed — she had not given birth with the womb closed by the miracle of the penetration of dimensions (in the way in which Christ entered through closed doors to his disciples), would nonetheless have remained a virgin in childbirth: just as women in the time of innocence would have remained virgins in childbirth without such a miracle — provided that no violation of integrity is posited, but only either a miraculous, as in the case of the Blessed Virgin, or a natural, as in the first state, opening of the virginal enclosure. Although without doubt it is a far greater miracle to have given birth with the womb closed.

§ 68. To the words of Epiphanius it can be replied that he speaks in this way following the custom whereby we now speak in this state of corruption and sin, because now women who are known by men are not virgins.

§ III — Continence less praiseworthy than marriage in the first state (Conjugium continentia laudabilius in primo statu)

§ 69. From what has been said it is gathered that, in the state of innocence, continence — that is, abstention from the conjugal act — would not have been more praiseworthy than marriage; indeed, it would not have been praiseworthy at all, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), as St. Thomas rightly gathers[146] in the same place. For in the act of marriage there would have been no turpitude and nothing disordered; the integrity of the flesh would also have remained. There would have been no distress in marriage itself — that which the Apostle in 1 Cor. 7 calls the "tribulation of the flesh" — and, moreover, there would have been in it the perpetual good of fruitfulness, and the most chaste love of the spouses toward one another, and their inviolate fidelity. From all these conjugal goods continence would have been deprived, without any compensation from any other good whatsoever. Indeed, marriage would have been more praiseworthy than continence: for every

good that continence possesses would have existed in that marriage, and something further besides — namely, fruitfulness together with perfect chastity of soul, without any temptation of lust. From this it also follows that there would have been no one in that state who would have cultivated the said continence; since it would there not be a virtue but a vice, and therefore unlawful, as Durandus says.'[147] Hence also the males and females would have been in equal number in that state, so that, just as God in the beginning made one male and one female and established that the two should become one flesh, so thereafter, with innocence continuing, by the same law all human beings would be joined in marriage — which could not come about unless the number in each sex were equal.

§ 70. From this, some have even held the opinion that at each birth in that state a male and a female would have been brought into the light together. But this is not a necessary consequence, because that equality of number in each sex could have been achieved from different births, whether of the same woman or of different women. For that equality is not to be posited in such a way that whenever a male was born, a female was always born at the same moment. For Eve was not created simultaneously with Adam, but was made after him. Moreover, it is natural that more years are required for marriage in the man than in the woman. Therefore it is rather to be thought that that equality of number between women and men would have come about, by God's providence, at the fitting time, in accordance with the natural aptitude of each sex for marriage.

§ IV — Of what quality, in body and soul, would the children born in the first state have been? (Quales in primo statu nati fuissent filii?)

§ 71. It is further asked what kind of children the first human beings and their posterity would have procreated, both in body and in soul, had they persisted in innocence. With respect to the body: whether they would have been large in stature or small, and whether they would have been weak or in possession of the use of their members. With respect to the soul: whether they would have been infants also in sense and feeble in mind, or whether they would have had a sufficiently developed use of reason (*usus rationis*) for discerning good and evil. In treating this question it must first be established that the children who were to be born would have been free from sin and likewise free from all misery; and consequently, whatever pertains to misery must be removed from that state. But this too is true, as they say: that nature is to be followed where Divine Authority does not interpose. The children, therefore, were to be born such as they are born now, with the exception of those things which Divine Authority removes from that state — namely sin and misery. Hence it is not to be denied that they would have been born small, on account of the narrowness of the mother's womb, just as they are born now; and likewise with that tenderness of body which would not yet have been suited to useful actions. For although all things were created perfect by God from the beginning, yet those things which arise from them, whether by birth or by another mode of generation, we see to be imperfect at their origin, and then with the passage of time to take on increases both of strength and of size, and at length to attain their proper perfection. Nevertheless it is probable that the same infants would have had the use of all their members for those actions necessary to that little body and befitting that age — as is sufficiently apparent from what St. Augustine discusses.[149] This opinion is found expressed plainly in Alexander of Hales,'[150] although St. Thomas does not altogether follow it,'[151] as one who acknowledges in that state the defects of childhood. Therefore, from the opinion of St. Augustine it seems to follow, as Alexander of Hales and certain others deduce, that newborn children would have had the use of their hands for grasping and holding

something, and of their feet for walking, and of their tongue for speaking; and hence, strictly speaking, there would have been no infants (*infantes*) at all in that state.

§ 72. Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that in that state not only males but also females would have been born, just as in the beginning a male and a female were created. For just as the diverse grades of things pertain to the perfection of the universe, so the diversity of sex is required for the perfection of human nature — indeed, for its necessity, since without it nature could not be propagated. Nor does it stand in the way that, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, the female is an imperfect animal and one generated, as it were, by occasion and contrary to the intention of nature,[152] for although in the generation of a female the particular nature does not attain its intention — which is that an animal be born perfect in its species and like the begetter even according to sex — nevertheless the intention of nature

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1. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 6; *ibid.* III, ch. 9.
2. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* IV, ch. 4.
3. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* VI, ch. 2.
4. Council of Arausica (Orange), canon 2.
5. Methodius, as cited by Epiphanius, *In Haeresi Origenis*.
6. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 5; *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 1 ("Faciamus hominem ad imaginem," etc.).
7. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, on this Distinction, art. 2.
8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 1 [cited as "ubi supra"].
9. Rom. 7 and 8.
10. Lk. 20.
11. St. Augustine, *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 11 and following; *De Peccatorum meritis* I, chs. 3 and 5; *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, chs. 20, 25, and 26.
12. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 26.
13. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 15.
14. St. Cyril, *Contra Iulianum* IV.
15. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, ch. 12.
16. *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 1 ("Faciamus hominem," etc.).
17. Petrus Diaconus, *De Gratia Christi* I, ch. 6; Fulgentius, *De Gratia Christi* II, ch. 13; Maxentius, *Professio Fidei*, ch. 28.
18. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 3.
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 1 [cited as "locis praeallegatis"].
20. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 3, adducing the parallel of the garments and shoes of the Israelites not wearing out for forty years; *Contra Iulianum* V, chs. 9 and 10.
21. St. Cyril, *Contra Iulianum Augustum* III, arguing from the authority of Plato the Philosopher, who attributes to the lower gods immortality from the will and counsel of the highest God — which they did not have from nature — showing it is not incredible that man, though born of corruptible nature, would not have been about to die, God willing, if he had not sinned.
22. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* V, ch. 5.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 1.
24. Cajetan, *Commentary on* St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 1.

25. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 56 (or CCV in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers), to Doscorus [Consentius]: "God made the soul of such powerful nature that from its beatitude there flows into the body the fullness of health and the vigour of incorruption."

26. Horace, *Odes* I, 22, 1–2: "Integer vitae scelerisque purus / Non eget Mauri jaculis, nec arcu."

27. Rom. 8.

28. Gen. 1.

29. The solution of this argument will be given below in the subsequent Distinction treating of the tree of life.

30. St. Ambrose, *De fide resurrectionis*, ch. 6; *In Lucam*, bk. 7.

31. Eph. 2:3.

32. St. Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tract. 4.

33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 91, art. 4, ad 4; likewise q. 94; q. 95, art. 1, ad 1.

34. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 145 (or CCV in the edition of the Benedictine Fathers), to Consentius.

35. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 23.

36. St. Hilary, *Expositio Psalmi 67*, near the end.

37. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 23 (as cited above).

38. St. Augustine, ibid.

39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 4.

40. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, on this Distinction, §§ B and C.

41. Gen. 3.

42. Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses* III, ch. 37.

43. Hilary, *Expositio Psalmi 68*.

44. Methodius, as reported by Epiphanius, *In Haeresi Origenis*.

45. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 18.

46. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, ch. 25; *Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, ch. 15.

47. St. Cyril, *Contra Iulianum* III.

48. Author of the *Quaestiones Veteris Testamenti*, quest. 10.

49. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sent.*, on this Distinction.

50. Second Council of Orange, canon 2; Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 1.

51. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 16.

52. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 10; XI, ch. 32.

53. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, chs. 3 and 23.

54. Pope Leo (the Great), sermon [abbreviation as in source].

55. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, on this Distinction.

56. Nicholas of Lyra (*Liranus*), *Super Genesim*.

57. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* [abbreviation as in source], on the condition of nature and the tree of life.

58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 4, in the body of the article.

59. St. Thomas, at the locations just cited.

60. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 5.

61. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 40.

62. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 20.

63. Venerable Bede, *Super Genesim*.

64. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, on this Distinction.

65. Strabo (Walafrid), *In Genesim*.

66. Hugh of St. Victor, *Quaestiones Super Genesim*.

67. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 4 (as cited just above).

68. *Glossa ordinaria*, on Genesis [abbreviation as in source].

69. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, this Distinction, §§ D and E, from *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, quest. 19.

70. Rupert (of Deutz), *In Genesim* III, ch. 30.

71. St. Augustine, *Contra adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* I, ch. 15.

72. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* II, ch. 21.

73. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis* I, ch. 3; *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 5.

74. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 1, ad 3; *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 6; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 164, art. 1.

75. St. Cyril (of Alexandria), *Contra Julianum*, book III.

76. Wis. 12.

77. Eph. 2.

78. St. Ambrose, *De Fide resurrectionis*, ch. 9.

79. St. Cyril (of Alexandria), *Contra Julianum*, book III; the Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, final paragraph of this Distinction.

80. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, final paragraph (§ ult.) of this Distinction.

81. Sir. 40 (the OCR reads "Ecclesiastici 4" but the text cites "Omnia quae de terra sunt in terram convertentur," which is Sir. 40:11).

82. St. Cyril (of Alexandria), *In Ioannem*, book I, ch. 15.

83. St. Cyril (of Alexandria), *Contra Julianum*, book IV.

84. This is proposition seventy-eighth among those condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs St. Pius V and Gregory XIII, the condemnations of which were renewed and confirmed by Urban VIII in his Diploma beginning *In Eminenti*, edited in the year 1641.

85. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, this Distinction.

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 86 [recte q. 76], art. 5, reply to arg. 1.

87. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85, art. 6.

88. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 164, art. 1.

89. St. Thomas, *Commentary on Romans*, ch. 5.

90. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97 [recte; source reads "1. quaest. 37. art. 1. in corpore & ad 3"], art. 1, in the body of the article and reply to obj. 3.

91. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, ch. 25.

92. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 20.

93. St. Thomas, at the places most recently cited.

94. Council of Orange II, canon 2.

95. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 15.

96. Wis. 9.

97. 1 Cor. 15.

98. St. Thomas, at the places noted in the preceding section.

99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, art. 2.

100. St. Thomas, *In hanc Distinctionem* [i.e., *In II Sent.*, dist. 19]; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 95 [recte q. 97], art. 2.

101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 98, art. 1.

102. Gregory of Nyssa [the OCR reads "Gregorius Nyssemascenus" — the author is Gregory of Nyssa], book cited as *De Opificio hominis*, chs. 17 and 18; and St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book II, ch. 30, and book IV, ch. 25.

103. Procopius, *In Genesim*, on Gen. 4 (the words "Adam knew his wife").

104. Euthymius, on Ps. 50: "Behold, I was conceived in iniquities."

105. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, Homilies 18 and 20.

106. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Virginitate*, chs. 16 and 17.

107. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 19; *De Vera Religione*, ch. 46; *De Sermone Domini in Monte* I, ch. 25.

108. St. Augustine, *De Bono Conjugali*, ch. 2.

109. St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum*.

110. Judocus Clichtoveus, *Commentarii in Damascenum*, at the places cited above.

111. Judocus Clichtoveus, *Annotationes ad librum 6 Richardi Victorini de Trinitate*, proposition 18.

112. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 21.

113. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 30, and IV, ch. 25 [as cited above].

114. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Opificio Hominis*, chs. 17 and 18.

115. St. John Chrysostom, *De Virginitate*, at the places cited.

116. Gen. 1:27.

117. Gen. 1:28.

118. Gen. 9:1.

119. Gen. 2:24.

120. Matt. 19:4; Gen. 1:27.

121. Matt. 19:5; Gen. 2:24.

122. 1 Cor. 6:16; Gen. 2:24.

123. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, chs. 21–27; *De Genesi ad Litteram* IX, chs. 3, 4, 6, and 10; *De Peccato Originis*, chs. 35–36; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* II, ch. 31 and following chapters to the end; *Contra Julianum* III, ch. 7; IV, ch. 40; VI, ch. 9; *Retractationes* I, chs. 10, 13, and 19; II, ch. 22.

124. Richard of St. Victor, at the place noted above.

125. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 19.

126. Aristotle [the Philosopher], on the most natural work of a living being [cf. *De Anima* and *Politics* I].

127. St. Jerome, *Epistola adversus errores Joannis Hierosolymitani*.

128. Estius, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 44.

129. Gen. 2:25.

130. Gen. 3:7.

131. Lk. 20:34–35.

132. 1 Cor. 15:45.

133. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 98, a. 3, ad 4.

134. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; and *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 5, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1, ad 3.

135. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 4.

136. William of Auxerre (*Altissiodorensis*), *Summa Aurea*, Bk. II, Tractate 10, ch. 2, q. 4.

137. Epiphanius, *Panarion (Adversus Haereses)*, heresy 78 (*Contra Antidicomarianitas*).

138. Gen. 3:16.

139. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 26.

140. St. Augustine, *De Peccato Originis*, ch. 35.

141. Haimo, *Sermo De Vigilia Nativitatis Domini*.

142. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 19 [§ A].

143. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 98, a. 2.

144. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sent.*, dist. 19 [commentary on this distinction].

145. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 98.

146. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3.

147. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sent.*, dist. 19.

148. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, qq. 99, 100, 101.

149. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, chs. 37–38.

150. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, Part II.

151. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 99, a. 1.

152. Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* II, ch. 3; IV, chs. 2, 3, 6.

DISTINCTIO XX — ON THE STATE OF ORIGINAL INTEGRITY: GENERATION, REASON, AND THE CONDITION OF NEWBORNS (*DE STATU INTEGRITATIS ORIGINALIS: GENERATIONE, RATIONE, ET CONDITIONE NASCENTIUM*)

§ 1. — of the sex which is necessary for generation. Nor would there have arisen in that state the generation of a female from the weakness of the generative power, as now for the most part comes to pass; but from other causes, and most especially from the will of the generator himself, as St. Thomas[1] and St. Bonaventure[2] explain in the places cited.

§ 2. Now, as regards the offices of the mind: although ignorance of those things which ought not to be known is not to be reckoned a fault, there are nonetheless certain things the knowledge of which so befits every age of mankind that it cannot but seem blameworthy in any age whatsoever if they remain unknown. Hence it is rightly and fittingly said that in that state of rectitude (*rectitudinis statu*) even infants would have had some use of reason (*rationis usum*) from the very beginning of their birth; so that, in accordance with the condition of that age, they would have distinguished between good and evil, between harmful and harmless, between the lawful and the unlawful; would have had some knowledge of God and of themselves; and would already have begun at that very time to be capable of receiving precepts and instruction. And perhaps even in the maternal womb they would have known God, at least by some slender acquaintance, to be gradually perfected thereafter.

§ 3. All these things are probable from what St. Augustine writes in his *De peccatorum meritis*, Book I, chapters 36 and 37, and Book II, chapter 29; likewise in Book I of the *Confessions*, chapter 7, and in Book XXII of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 22.[3] For that in those places he speaks not merely of habitual knowledge (*habituali scientia*) but of the act and use of knowledge (*actu et usu scientiae*), will be readily apparent to the diligent reader.

§ 4. Moreover, that the state of human beings so born — both in body and in soul — would at that time have been such, can also be established by the very examples of beasts: for very many of them, immediately upon being brought into the light, both walk about and run of their own accord to their mother's teats, and seek nourishment, and emit a voice proper to their own kind, and recognize and pursue the other things that are necessary and advantageous for their life; just as, on the other hand, those things which are harmful they flee and shun, led and impelled by nature. All of which it was far more fitting that man, the lord of all other animals, should possess from birth — except that through sin he has been changed for the worse according to both soul and body, as the Councils declare,[4] and rendered not only like unto the senseless beasts, as the Psalmist sings,[5] but even, in many respects, below their condition, as experience attests.

§ V — Whether children would have been born just and confirmed in justice (Utrum nati fuissent justi atque in justitia confirmati)

§ 5. In the first state, children were to be born endowed not only with the use of reason but also adorned with the gift of justice. For just as the first man received from God dominion over every bodily creature (Gen. 1), which dominion, according to that perfection with which it was given to man at the beginning, was an effect of justice, so he was going to beget children as partakers of the same dominion, and accordingly as just persons. Furthermore, the children would have been born immortal — that is, destined to live forever — provided they did not sin. But as death is owed to sin, so eternal life is owed to justice alone, as Scripture teaches (Wis. 1). Besides, now children are born unjust for no other reason than that they contract original injustice from Adam: therefore, if neither Adam nor any of his posterity had sinned, all their children would have contracted original justice from their parents; for there is a parallel formal character (*ratio*) governing both sin and justice as contracted from the first parent. For just as he infected the whole of his posterity by his sin, so he had received justice on behalf of all.

§ 6. But whether children would have been born confirmed in justice, so that they could not thereafter fall away from it, is a different question. Treating this question, St. Anselm,[7] in the affirmative part, strives to establish it by the following argument: The first human beings, succumbing to the temptation of the devil, subjected the entire human race that was to be born from them to the necessity of sin. Therefore, had they overcome that temptation, they themselves would straightway, by the merit of that victory, have been confirmed in justice, and would have transmitted the same benefit of confirmed justice to the whole of their posterity.

§ 7. In support of the same opinion, the words of St. Gregory[8] seem to tell, where he says: "If the corruption of sin had not tainted the first parent, he would by no means have begotten children of hell; but those alone who are now to be saved through redemption would have been born from him as the elect." So he.

§ 8. The negative position is confirmed by the words of St. Augustine,[9] where he speaks of children together with their parents being transferred to the state of perfect felicity, saying: "If all lived justly and obediently, and no one of their stock committed iniquity deserving damnation." The same Doctor transmits similar things elsewhere.[10] Reason also favours this opinion. For the first human beings would not have procreated children in a better condition than that in which they themselves had been created by God; they would therefore have begotten children who were indeed just, but not confirmed in justice. And these in turn would have procreated children of the same kind as they themselves had been born from their parents, and so thereafter their children and grandchildren, for as long as they remained in their original innocence.

§ 9. Add to this that, just as the angels and the first human beings, by divine ordination, were not to arrive at beatitude (*beatitudo*) except through the merit of free will (*voluntas libera*) directed to good and evil, so also must the same be thought of the entire posterity of mankind by equal formal character (*ratio*). For they were not to be established in the final end before they had completed the course of this journey, which is the time of meriting. To this point pertains what Hugh[11] and after him the Master[12] say: that God had set before those human beings invisible and eternal goods to be sought by their merits, and had so ordained that they should come to their reward through merit. St. Thomas[13] transmits this opinion and approves it so strongly that he says it does not seem possible that children in the state of innocence should be born confirmed in justice.

§ 10. Furthermore, from this opinion it follows as a consequence that it could have come about that of the descendants of Adam some would remain in obedience to God, while others would rise up against God in pride; and again, that the just would be solicited by the devil not merely once but many times to transgress the divine law; nay, that even with respect to temptation they could, by the sole choice of their own will, turn aside toward sin — in the very manner in which angelic nature sinned. And indeed, St. Anselm's argument concludes nothing to the contrary: partly because the way to the necessity of evil is more ready than to that of good — as, for example, to incurable disease rather than to stable health; for evil arises from individual defects, whereas good is only born and established from an integral cause. Partly also because those who are now born from Adam are not so subjected to the necessity of sin but that, through free will (*liberum arbitrium*) anticipated by the grace of God, they can be turned to good when they have come to adult age. But all who are confirmed in good are not able any longer to choose evil.

§ 11. Nor, moreover, is it to be conceded that — at least immediately after the first temptation had been overcome — the first human beings and the rest of those of that state would have received the grace of confirmation, whereby it would come about that they could no longer sin, as Scotus seems to hold.[14] For during the continuance of this animal life, the time of merit lasted, and during that time the possibility of sinning remained. And besides, it would follow that throughout all the rest of their life they would have merited nothing by their good works — which is absurd.

§ 12. Reply to the words of Gregory: it is one thing to be elect, another to be confirmed in justice. For many in this life are elect, of whom nevertheless no one is so confirmed that he cannot fall further; though it is indeed true and most certain that all the elect will at some point be confirmed in the love of God. Furthermore, in those same words, under "the first man not sinning" are to be understood also the other parents who, in that state of innocence, were to be non-sinners. And lastly, those words must be taken as if of one looking to the cause now actually posited, not to that which might have been posited or have occurred. In the same way it is said of parents in Sir. 7: "Remember that but for them thou wouldst not have been born" — even though someone could indeed have been born of other parents, had God so ordained. Yet now each person has no other origin of birth than those persons who begot him, so that it is rightly said to each one: "Without them thou wouldst not be." In the same manner, the damnation of reprobate men now has no other origin than the sin of the first parents. Therefore, attending to this origin, Gregory not improperly nor inaptly said: "If Adam had not sinned, no one would be damned, but only the elect would have been born from him." Just as it is also rightly said that, unless Christ had died, no one would be saved — even though God could also have repaired man unto salvation by another way than through the death of Christ.

§ 13. But that it is not to be said absolutely that, if Adam had not sinned, all those born from him would be elect or predestined — this being posited on the ground that, as has now been sufficiently shown, they would not have been born confirmed in justice — is proved by the following argument. Because predestination (*Praedestinatio*) is rashly posited for the entire race unless confirmation is likewise posited and sin excluded by means of it. For if the two first parents, though created in grace and in the full use of reason, were overcome at the first temptation, and unless — since they were predestinated by the accompanying grace of Christ — so many born with an abundance of grace from the angels fell by sinning: there is truly no plausible reason to say that all men whatsoever who were to be born from Adam, notwithstanding the mutability of their free will, would have been predestined and would never have sinned. And therefore, St.

Augustine prudently dared to assert no such thing, but rather insinuated the contrary of it in the two passages cited above.[15]

§ VI — Whether hunger and thirst would have existed in the state of first innocence (Utrum fames & sitis in primo statu fuissent)

§ 14. Since all punishment and misery is to be excluded from the state of first innocence (*status primae innocentiae*), it follows that in that state neither hunger nor thirst would have existed, insofar as by these words something defective or disordered is signified; for these terms are not taken in one sense only.

First, and most commonly, hunger and thirst are spoken of as the appetite for food and drink for the purpose of restoring something that has already been taken away from nature through the internal conflict of qualities; which appetite has a certain accompanying distress of sense, by which the animal is, as it were, warned and pressed to take up that which is necessary for repairing that deficiency. In this sense, hunger and thirst would not have existed in the state of first innocence — both because there was no deficiency there, and because all distress was absent. Thus St. Augustine, in his work on the City of God, says that food was at hand for the first man so that he would not hunger, and drink, so that he would not thirst[17] — namely, that he might forestall a deficiency that would otherwise have come, just as the tree of life was also at hand so that old age might have no access to him.

§ 15. Second, by these words there can be signified an immoderate and disordered appetite for eating and drinking, in the sense in which the Master takes them (in the text, § G).[18] Hunger and thirst thus understood belong rather to gluttony than to necessity, having as their end the pleasure that is perceived from food and drink, and not the preservation of nature itself or the health of the body. This kind of appetite, therefore, would have been far more alien to the state of innocence than the first kind — inasmuch as it is conjoined with sin. The same reasoning applies if by those words you understand a merely natural desire for food and drink: for such an appetite, even though it lacks sin, is without doubt nevertheless disordered, since it disturbs the order of right reason. But perhaps the usage of those who speak Latin does not allow hunger and thirst to be taken in this second sense, if nothing further is added.

§ 16. Third, by hunger and thirst there can be signified in general the natural appetite for eating and drinking. Hunger and thirst thus understood would undoubtedly have existed in the state of first innocence — namely, rousing man with the greatest tranquillity and without any distress: not indeed toward restoring a deficiency of nature already contracted, but toward meeting in timely fashion a deficiency that would otherwise supervene, through the moderate taking of food and drink.

Therefore, what we sometimes read in the Fathers — as in St. Basil, Homily 2 on Fasting, and in St. Ambrose in his book on Elijah and Fasting[19] — that the first parents fasted in Paradise and preserved their innocence for so long as they observed the fast, is to be understood not of the fasting that afflicts the flesh, such as is now required of man after he has sinned, but of a mere abstinence from food and drink, which would not yet have had conjoined to it any hunger or thirst of this last-mentioned kind. Nor indeed did they abstain for any other reason than because they were not yet prompted by any natural desire to take nourishment — though St. Augustine, as we noted in connection with the preceding Distinction,[20] is unwilling to agree with those who affirm that the first man did not make use of the tree of life before his sin.

§ 17. Furthermore, what has been said of the appetite for food and drink is to be understood similarly of every work, both of nature and of free action: namely, that in the state of first innocence whatever of this kind was to occur would have been without all distress, and indeed conjoined with great and wholesome delight — as St. Augustine beautifully declares, in his work on Genesis according to the letter, treating that text of Gen. 2: "God placed man in Paradise of pleasure, that he might work it."[21]

§ VII — Whether man would have needed sleep in the state of first innocence (Utrum homo indiguisset somno in primo statu)

§ 18. Concerning sleep, a special inquiry must be made, on account of the opinion of Alexander of Hales,[23] who holds as the more probable view that in the state of first innocence man would neither have needed sleep nor would ever have slept. He proves this by arguments. First: because the necessity of sleep, according to the Philosopher, is languor and weariness of the senses, which are things removed from the state of first innocence. Second: because, according to the same Philosopher, sleep is caused by a smoky vapour ascending from the stomach to the brain and then descending again into the organs of the senses and oppressing them, especially the eyes. Now this oppression of the organs is a punishment, and therefore alien to that state. Third: because even if other causes of sleep are brought forward, all are similarly penal — as, according to Avicenna, the obstruction of the channels of the sensitive power proceeding from the heart, and according to Galen, the withdrawal of natural heat from the organs of the senses into the interior parts; likewise labour, illness, and childhood age — causes which the Philosopher enumerates in his book *On Sleep and Waking*.[24] Fourth: because in that state the soul enjoyed God, as St. Augustine writes,[25] — and it contemplated God as present, not indeed by the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*), but by a cognition that was nonetheless greater and more certain than the knowledge of faith which we now possess, as Hugh teaches.[26] Hence Alexander concludes that it is not credible that the soul, elevated by such a cognition and made blessed by such great joy, would have wished to surrender itself to sleep, whereby it would be deprived, even for an hour, of so great a good.

§ 19. Finally, Alexander cites authorities: Isidore and Gregory. The former, in his book *On the Order of Creatures*,[27] refers to the deficiencies of this life, among other things, the fact that the senses stand in need of sleep. The latter, in Book 8 of his *Moralia*, ch. 29,[28] among the miseries of the flesh into which we have fallen through the sin of Adam, sets down the fact that the health of our body is sustained by labour lest it be tormented by rest, and is refreshed by rest lest it succumb to the exertion of labour; when wearied by wakefulness it is restored by sleep, when oppressed by sleep it is shaken off by wakefulness. One may add what the same Gregory, in chapter 6 of the same book,[29] says of man having fallen: "He who now, because he is not fixed in the solidity of his original condition, is varied by the motion of desire ever alternating, so that when at rest he longs for activity, and when occupied he yearns for leisure. For because a steadfast mind was unwilling to stand firm when it could, it is now unable to stand firm even when it wills." Thus far Gregory.

§ 20. But notwithstanding these arguments, the opinion of St. Thomas and of others seems to us more probable — the opinion of those who admit sleep in the state of innocence and posit it as necessary. This is proved by the following arguments.

First: because the life of that state was animal life, as the Apostle testifies (1 Cor. 15). Therefore, just as the body then needed food lest it fail, so also the senses needed rest lest they grow weary. Hence it would have been provided by nature — as it was provided from food, which forestalled the body's deficiency before it occurred

— that vapours or fumes should be raised up, by which, occupying the instruments of the senses, the senses' own weariness and failure should likewise be forestalled before they occurred. Indeed, the philosophers and physicians also teach that sleep is beneficial to the nutritive power (*potentia nutritiva*).

Second: because in that state there was an alternation of days and nights; and night is given by nature to all animals for sleep and rest, just as the day is appointed for work.

Third: because Scripture expressly states (Gen. 2) that God cast a deep sleep (*sopor*) upon Adam, which sleep was truly a sleep, though conjoined with a mental ecstasy. For the Hebrew word signifies a deep and profound sleep, such as is likewise signified by the same word in Gen. 15, 1 Kgs. 26, and Is. 29.[30] From which passages it is clear that there is no inclusion in that word of a mental ecstasy or an intensification of the rational powers, as Alexander imagines in the case of that deep sleep. Nor indeed should it be estimated that God, while man was still unimpaired, cast upon him something that was in itself a cause of misery. Finally, this opinion is sufficiently indicated by St. Augustine,[25] — and no one among the ancient Fathers is read to have held the contrary.

§ 21. It is easy to reply to the arguments of Alexander. For just as in that state man was going to forestall the body's deficiency by taking food before it occurred, so also by the voluntary taking of sleep he was going to forestall all languor and weariness of the senses. Now to sleep is not in itself something that removes man from his natural good disposition, but rather is ordered toward the good of nature — as St. Thomas says.[31] Hence neither is the oppression of the senses by sleep to be called a punishment, but a certain natural vacation (*vacatio*) of the senses. The same reply applies to the causes of sleep assigned by Avicenna and Galen. If, moreover, the causes of sleep are now truly penal, they were not going to be such in the state of first innocence. From these considerations, therefore, it is clear what is to be replied to the first three arguments.

To the fourth it can be said that for sleep's formal character (*ratio*) it suffices that there be rest of the animal powers, and therefore contemplation is not incompatible with sleep — according to that text: "I sleep, but my heart watches" (Song 5:2). Such indeed was the contemplation in the sleeping Christ, and such also in Adam when, pressed by deep sleep, he received the prophetic revelation concerning Christ and the Church. And such contemplation would have been accorded to the first man in place of the dreams and illusions which we suffer. As for what and of what kind the first man's cognition of God was, see St. Augustine[32] and St. Thomas,[33] where he interprets the opinion of Hugh.

To the objections drawn from Isidore and Gregory, it must be replied that they are speaking not of the sleep that forestalls weariness, but of that which weariness anticipates — as is easily gathered from their own words. For Gregory also speaks similarly about food. He says that man is now refreshed by food in order to subsist. Yet it is certain that the use of food and drink was going to exist in the state of first innocence. Nor did Gregory mean to exclude from that state every alternation of action and cessation. For in that case man would never at any time have had to eat, drink, beget, till the ground, or go anywhere. These are not works to be performed perpetually, but at fixed times. He means, therefore, that the alternation which the present and impending inconvenience of defect or excess or weariness demands was not going to exist there.

§ VIII — When and how men would have been translated to another life (Quando et quomodo translati fuissent homines ad aliam vitam)

§ 22. The state of perfect felicity (*perfectae felicitatis*) according to both body and soul — which we mortals await through the resurrection from the dead — was what the first men and their posterity were going to receive without an intervening death, had they persevered in justice; that is, through a transformation of body and soul, being translated at last to perfect immortality and to that heavenly beatitude for which they had been created. It is asked, moreover, when and how this was going to come about.

§ 23. As regards the time: St. Augustine[35] and, following St. Augustine, the Master[36] leave it doubtful whether all would be translated simultaneously, upon the completion of human generation and the number of the elect, or rather one after another in succession. The former opinion is found in the Interlinear Gloss[37] — in the following words: "When the number of the elect had been filled up, they were going to taste of the tree of life, and so migrate to the state of blessedness." The latter opinion, however, the majority of the Scholastic Doctors embrace. Nor without reason.

§ 24. First, because unless those born earlier had also been translated earlier, there would have been an excessive inequality in the length of this animal life (*vita animalis*) among different men, especially between the first and the last. Second, because if the translation of all had to be deferred until the end, the human race would doubtless have multiplied upon the earth to such a degree that the world could not at last contain them all. This is evident from the fact that if all the men who have existed from the beginning of the world were living simultaneously at one and the same time, the whole earth would not suffice for their comfortable habitation. Nor is there reason to say that in that state there would have been fewer men than there are now. For how could they have been fewer, seeing that no one would have abstained from marriage, and no one — man or woman — would have been sterile, and no casting of seed would have been fruitless, as St. Augustine says?[38] Third, because the whole time of animal life was a time of merit, and this time would in all likelihood have been defined by a fixed number of years. Once that time had expired, they would at once have received the reward of heavenly beatitude — just as now holy souls do not wait for the number of the elect to be filled up, but those who have completed the time of merit sooner are also admitted to glory sooner, unless something stands in the way. Hence that imagination of certain persons is also improbable, who posit a twofold translation: an earlier one, by which those who had spent the whole time appointed for meriting justly and holily would be translated to the state of confirmation in good — just as Enoch and Elias have now been translated. Since the time of merit follows upon this translation, they hold that it would not have occurred for all simultaneously but for some after others. And then a later, second translation, by which all would finally be transferred together to perfect beatitude. This, I say, is improbable, because once the time of merit had been completed, the beatitude of men ought no more to have been deferred at that point than the beatitude of holy souls is now deferred. Fourth, because there is no reason why the first men should have remained so long in animal life. For in their posterity there would have been sufficient knowledge (*scientia*) and prudence (*prudentia*) for conducting life well, whether as regards the use of corporeal things or as regards the worship of God.

§ 25. Now as regards the manner of that translation: certain persons are of the opinion that the tree of life had such power that, once tasted, it rendered a man perfectly immortal — that is, such as one now becomes through the resurrection. Hence they say that no one would have tasted of it before he was about to be

translated to the state of perfect felicity, inasmuch as he was going to obtain perfect immortality of body through that very act of eating. This seems to be the view of the author of the Interlinear Gloss[39] in the words cited above. Likewise the Ordinary Gloss,[40] (on the words "Let us make man to our image," etc.) says that the first man, having multiplied his progeny, would, at God's command, have partaken also of the tree of life, and so, made perfectly immortal, would no longer have required the assistance of food. The same opinion seems to have pleased St. John Chrysostom and Theodoret:[41] the former in Homily 18 on Genesis, the latter in Question 26 on Genesis, say that the tree of life was placed in the midst of Paradise as a reward of obedience. From which it seems to follow that through its use men were to be transferred to that immortality which was to be expected by them as the reward of justice.

§ 26. But on the contrary, the common opinion of the Scholastics, drawn from the teaching of St. Augustine which he delivers in various places — as we showed in the preceding distinction — holds that the tree of life was instituted for warding off death, which is wont to come from old age, and that for this reason it was to be used frequently, until the time arrived when man was to be transferred to a life of perfect immortality.[42] There is also a clear argument against the aforementioned opinion. For just as now the perfect immortality of bodies is not expected from the tree of life or from any other external cause — that is, a cause placed outside man — but its cause will be the perfect beatitude of the soul itself overflowing into the body subject to it: so also it was going to be then. And therefore a power of that sort in the tree of life is posited in vain, since the beatitude and glory of the soul alone would suffice for the effect of perfect immortality and glory of the body.

§ 27. It is sufficiently apparent, therefore, that no other manner of that translation need be sought than this: that man, after the time of merit had been completed, was, by divine power, to be glorified according to soul, and consequently and simultaneously also glorified in body — the glory of the soul, to be sure, overflowing into the body and producing in it the gifts (*dotes*) of blessed immortality, just as will happen to our bodies when through the resurrection they shall be joined to beatified souls.

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§ I — Of the serpent of which the Scripture of Genesis speaks (De quo serpente loquatur scriptura Genesis)

§ 28. After having explained the condition of integral man — with the exception only of those matters which pertain to the treatise on Grace, of which more below in their proper places — we must now see how the same man, through sin, was cast down from that state and was hurled into the misery of this present mortality. This is what Scripture records as having been accomplished by the fraudulent persuasion of the serpent. Concerning which narrative a first question arises: whether what Moses writes in Gen. 3 about the serpent is to be understood of a corporeal serpent and a true animal, or of an incorporeal one — that is, the devil.

§ 29. For Origen indeed — just as he drew to allegory most other things which Moses writes about Paradise and about the formation of the first men, so as to exclude the historical sense — did the same with the serpent and with the whole of its conversation with the woman; understanding by the serpent, namely, the devil, who by hidden and interior suggestion led the woman to the transgression of the divine precept. On this point Cajetan agrees with Origen, in his commentary on the beginning of chapter 3 of Genesis.[44] In that place

he strives to confirm his opinion with many arguments, which we shall pass over because they are not very pressing and can easily be dissolved from what we are about to say next.

§ 30. To the question, however, we say that the answer must be given without any doubt: that Scripture speaks according to the letter of a true, corporeal, and natural serpent. First, because the very words of Scripture — by which the serpent is said to have been more cunning than all the animals of the earth — manifestly signify that the serpent was one of the animals of the earth. For this is said in the same way as we are accustomed to say that the lion is the strongest of animals, and as Scripture says that Moses was the meekest man above all men dwelling upon the earth (Num. 12). Then, the very words of the curse pronounced against the serpent declare the same thing. For it is known from experience that the corporeal serpent moves upon its breast along the ground,[45]

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 99, a. 2 [cited in the source as "ubi supra artic. 2"].
2. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 20, q. 6 [cited in the source as "in 2. ad Dist. qu. 6"].
3. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, chs. 36–37; II, ch. 29; *Confessionum* I, ch. 7; *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 22.
4. Reference to the Councils (here the general language of conciliar decrees on the effects of original sin on soul and body; cf. Council of Trent, Session 5).
5. Cf. Ps. 48 (49):13, 21: *"similis factus est iumentis insipientibus."*
6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 100, a. 1–2.
7. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo* I, ch. 18.
8. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 36 (on the verse "Now if I were asleep I should be silent").
9. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 10.
10. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 3.
11. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, part 2, ch. 6.
12. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, at the end of this Distinction.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 100, a. 2.
14. Scotus [implied reference to Scotus's commentary on the *Sentences*, on this distinction].
15. The two passages cited above: St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 10; *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, ch. 3.
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97, a. 3.
17. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 25.
18. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, text of § G of this Distinction.
19. St. Basil, *De Jejunio*, Homily 2; St. Ambrose, *De Elia et Jejunio*.
20. See the note to the preceding Distinction, above.
21. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 8; treating Gen. 2: "God placed man in Paradise of pleasure, that he might work it."
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 97.
23. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae* Part II, q. 89, member 3.
24. Aristotle, *De Somno et Vigilia*.
25. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 26.

26. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* Part 6, ch. 14.

27. Isidore, *De Ordine Creaturarum*.

28. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* VIII, ch. 29.

29. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* VIII, ch. 6.

30. Gen. 15; 1 Kgs. 26; Is. 29.

31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 2.

32. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 33.

33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 2; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 1.

34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 96.

35. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, chs. 3 and 6.

36. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, this Distinction, § C.

37. Glossa interlinearis on Gen. 3 (on the words "Lest perhaps he take of the tree of life," etc.).

38. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX [as cited above].

39. Glossa interlinearis, on the words cited above (Gen. 3).

40. Glossa ordinaria on Gen. 1 (on "Let us make man to our image," etc.).

41. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 18; Theodoret, *Quaestiones in Genesim*, q. 26.

42. Cf. St. Augustine, as shown in the preceding Distinction (Distinctio XX).

43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165, a. 5 [abbreviation as in source: "S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 25. 5."].

44. Cajetan, *Commentarius in Genesim*, ad initium cap. 3.

45. Num. 12 (cited in the body).

DISTINCTIO XXI — ON THE TEMPTATION OF THE FIRST PARENTS, THE SERPENT, AND ORIGINAL SIN (*DE TENTATIONE PRIMORUM PARENTUM, SERPENTE, ET PECCATO ORIGINALI*)

§ 1. — to eat earth and to lie in wait for the heel of men.[1] To this is added that argument which is drawn from the manner of the temptation: for it does not seem fitting that the devil should have been permitted to assail a man still innocent by means of an internal temptation operating through the imagination stirred within him, just as he was not permitted to tempt Christ in that manner — as will be proved more fully by us below.'[2] Therefore the temptation by which he tempted the woman was a certain external suggestion of sin; and accordingly the serpent through whom Scripture attests that this was done was a bodily one. Indeed, from the fact that the devil tempted Christ in an outward visible form, an argument can also be drawn that the first parents were tempted in like manner.

§ 2. Furthermore, this doctrine concerning the true and natural serpent, against the allegorizations of Origen, the Fathers hand down in agreement: St. Basil,[3] St. Ambrose,'[4] Epiphanius,'[5] — that is, of those who worshipped the serpent as the author of the knowledge of good and evil — St. John Chrysostom,'[6] Theodoret,'[7] St. John Damascene,'[8] and likewise St. Augustine in very many places, but chiefly in the eleventh book of his *On Genesis according to the Letter*.[9] Whom Bede, Rupertus, the Master of the Sentences, and all the Scholastics follow. Moreover, the same St. Augustine adduces testimony and argument for this matter from experience in the aforesaid work,'[10] namely in the fact that we observe even today that the diabolical power appears far more conspicuously in the charming of serpents than in other living creatures — and this surely because through this animal the devil first prepared for himself the way of deceiving man.

§ 3. For the same reason it also becomes apparent why even now far more women than men are generally led by the devil into the magical arts and into every kind of superstition, and are likewise mocked through empty spectres resembling the spirits of dead men: because this sex was the first to be tempted and seduced by him — God, that is to say, permitting these things in order to commend the memory of that first deed, as St. Augustine says.[11]

§ 4. From all these considerations it is now also evident that in the bodily serpent there was a spiritual serpent — that is, the devil — lurking within. This indeed is clear from the Scriptures, whatever passages attest that the devil was the seducer and deceiver of the human race, as Wis. 2: "Through the envy of the devil death entered into the world," and Jn. 8: "he was a murderer from the beginning." And in particular those passages which call the devil a serpent or dragon, from the fact that he deceived man through the serpent, as 2 Cor. 11: "I fear lest, as the serpent deceived Eve by his cunning," etc.; Rev. 12: "And that great dragon was cast out, that

ancient serpent, who is called the devil and Satan"; and ch. 20: "And he seized the dragon, the ancient serpent, who is the devil and Satan."[12]

§ 5. From this designation of "dragon" Eugubinus is also refuted, who in his *Cosmopœia* holds that the serpent of which the devil made use to supplant man was the basilisk, as being the king of the whole serpent kind.[13] Likewise Pererius is refuted, who in book six of his *Commentary on Genesis* suspects that the serpent was the scytale, on the ground that it is a handsome creature which captivates and holds the gaze of those who look upon it by its beauty.[14] For neither of these two kinds is suited to the designation of "dragon." For a dragon is properly a serpent of immense size, into which it grows when fully mature. Moreover, that serpent must be understood to be one upon which the parts of the curse pronounced against it are fitting, namely: to go upon the breast, to eat earth, and to lie in wait for the heel of man.[15]

§ II — How the devil spoke through the serpent (Quomodo per serpentem locutus fuerit diabolus)

§ 6. It remains to be explained how the devil spoke through the serpent, given that the serpent does not possess the organs suited to forming a human voice. For what Josephus in his second book writes of the serpent — speaking of it as an animal endowed with reason and possessing a faculty of speech implanted in it from creation, which God afterwards took from it as a punishment for the malice it employed against man — is rightly rejected as resembling the fables of the poets.[17] Nor is that view to be received which Barcephas, following the opinion of the Blessed Ephrem, records: that the faculty of speaking, and likewise of understanding, was granted by God to the serpent for a time, so that through it the obedience of the first human beings might be tested — as though from a brute animal it were to become a rational animal. But a faculty of speaking would be possessed in vain if it could not pass into act without the organs necessary for speech. And indeed these authors attribute the whole business of the seduction not so much to the devil as to the serpent itself; except that this latter writer records that Satan had petitioned God to grant the serpent the faculty of speaking.[18]

§ 7. But we have already shown above that it was not so much the serpent as the devil speaking in the serpent who was the one who persuaded man to sin. St. Augustine, therefore, discussing this matter more correctly, says that the devil spoke through the serpent in the same way as he is recorded to have spoken frequently through the Prophets, and through the Pythonnesses, and through others possessed by him, using them as certain instruments for signifying what he wished.[11] But because human beings, through whom a demon speaks, possess natural organs suited to forming human sounds, which the demon makes use of for the purpose of speech — just as he makes use of their hands for grasping and their feet for walking — whereas the serpent, as has been said, lacks those organs, it follows that this comparison drawn from demoniacs does not sufficiently explain the matter. The matter is, however, most excellently explained by the example of Balaam's ass, through which Holy Scripture testifies that a good Angel spoke (Num. 22). This very example, as most apt to the present subject, is adduced by the same St. Augustine.[19] The devil is therefore said to have spoken through the serpent because he formed in the serpent's mouth a sound resembling human speech, with which to address Eve; just as the Angel of the Lord spoke through the ass because he formed in its mouth the words

with which to address Balaam. Both effected this by that power whereby Angels are naturally capable of producing various and wondrous effects through the setting in motion of hidden causes.

§ 8. Now, lest this matter should seem incredible — as it seemed to Julian the Apostate, who, from the fact that the serpent is written to have spoken, accuses the books of the Christians of fabulous vanity — there are available examples of this very thing even in approved histories of the pagans. For Pliny, among prodigies, records that in the year in which Tarquinius was driven from his kingdom a serpent barked; and Valerius Maximus records examples of beasts that spoke with a human voice.[20] And many further examples of this kind are to be found in Julius Obsequens in his book *On Prodigies*.[21] All of which must be judged to have been brought about through Angels, whether good or evil, in the manner we have described.

§ 9. St. Cyril writes on this same matter and, producing examples from paganism itself, learnedly refutes the calumnies of the Apostate.[22] Yet there is in Cyril's opinion one thing less to be approved: his assertion that that serpent was not a true and natural one but merely the appearance of a serpent assumed by the devil, under which he might address the woman — in the manner that Angels have frequently addressed men in human form. This opinion Procopius, writing on Genesis, attributes to certain others as well.[23] It is, however, easily refuted, both from what was said in the preceding section and by this argument: for if it had not been a true serpent but only an assumed appearance, the devil would have laid that appearance aside as soon as the temptation was accomplished — which did not happen. For the serpent remained in Paradise after the sin committed first by the woman and then by the man; and the curse was pronounced upon it by the Lord not as upon a simulacrum of a serpent but as upon a true serpent, in these words: "Because thou hast done this, cursed art thou," and so forth.

§ 10. If you ask in what language the serpent spoke, there is no doubt that it was in the language which the first human beings used, and in which God Himself addressed them (Gen. 1; 2:19; 3). Now that language was Hebrew is the common opinion of almost all. That this is true is shown with sufficient clarity both by the names given to the first human beings and to their children, whose etymology is Hebrew; and it is argued above all by the fact that Scripture, in Gen. 2, where it treats of the imposition of names upon the animals, speaks thus: "For whatsoever Adam called any living creature, that is the name thereof" — that is, the animals are still called today by us by those names which Adam imposed upon them. For those are the words of Moses writing in Hebrew and addressed to those for whom the Hebrew language was native.

§ III — In what sense the serpent is said to be more cunning than all the animals (Quo sensu serpens callidior cunctis animalibus)

§ 11. What Scripture says — that the serpent was more cunning (*callidior*) than all living creatures, or, as the Seventy rendered it, more prudent (*prudentior*) — can be understood in two ways. In the first way, this may be attributed to it on account of the serpent's own inherent natural cunning (*calliditas naturalis*), by which it truly excelled among the animals — in the same way that we ascribe craftiness to the fox, and foresight to bees and ants; not a foresight proceeding from mind and reason (*mens et ratio*), which all beasts lack, but one placed in the sole instinct of nature and imagination, by which they are driven to certain operations. In favour of this interpretation is that saying of Christ by which He exhorts His disciples to imitate the prudence of the serpent, saying: "Be ye prudent as serpents" (Matt. 10).[25] Now this prudence, or cunning, of the serpent

appears most especially in three things. First, in the fact that, as is commonly known, when it is in danger — as when it is attacked by a man with a stone or iron — it immediately conceals its head, either thrusting it into the earth or wrapping it round with the coils of its body, and thus, for the sake of preserving it, exposes the rest of its body to blows and to peril. Second, that when about to drink, it first spits out and lays aside its venom, lest by drinking with it it should infect and corrupt the waters, and thereby render them useless and harmful to itself for drinking afterwards. Epiphanius reports this.[26] Third, that lest it be captured upon hearing the charms of enchanters, it applies one ear to the earth or to a stone, and stops up the other with its tail. To this pertains that passage of David, Ps. 57: "Like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers." On which passage see St. Augustine and the commentaries of others.[27] Moreover, more examples of the natural cunning and prudence of serpents may be read in Pliny.[28] Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure may also be consulted.[29]

§ 12. Now Epiphanius thinks that the primary cunning of the serpent, which it had received by condition of its nature, was for the most part diminished after the pronouncing of the curse upon it, so that it is no wonder that the serpent is now surpassed in natural prudence by certain other animals, such as the dog, the fox, and the elephant. Although, if this cunning was not diminished — nor was it ever greater (which view pleases others more) — it is still rightly said that the serpent is more prudent than all the animals, not in all respects, but with respect to its natural instincts and — to use such an expression — the arts of preserving its life against dangers. This ought to be deemed the chief domain of prudence. To this, however, there also accrues another capacity whereby it is naturally suited to harm man secretly and by ambush, with whom it is in natural enmity — for Scripture frequently makes mention of this as well.

§ 13. The other interpretation, moreover, is that cunning is attributed to the serpent on account of the devil speaking in it, whose cunning and craftiness is most well known to us from Sacred Scripture — just as we speak of a deceitful tongue, not because deceit is inherent in the tongue itself, but because it is moved by a deceitful mind. This sense is transmitted by St. Augustine[19] and the Master (in his Text, §. B.). But most embrace the former interpretation: besides Epiphanius, St. John Chrysostom,[30] and the Author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament,[31] and nearly all more recent writers. St. Augustine, however, in the same chapter of the aforementioned book,[32] has conjoined both senses. It is indeed most probable that Moses also had regard to the latter sense, wishing to indicate that the devil — crafty and subtle of mind — had approached, through the serpent (an animal naturally cunning and therefore suited to his schemes) in order to tempt man: whether the devil chose this of his own accord, as St. John Chrysostom thinks,[33] or whether he assumed the serpent because he was not permitted to make use of any other instrument — for he would, as it seems to St. Augustine,[34] have preferred to assume another animal, such as a sheep or a dove, so as to abuse the simplicity of such a creature to deceive the woman more easily.

§ IV — Why the woman did not recoil in horror at the serpent and at its speaking (Cur mulier serpentem eumque loquentem non horruerit)

§ 14. It is not difficult to give an account of why the woman did not recoil in horror and flee from the sight of the serpent, as we read that Moses fled from it in horror in Ex. 4. For man was lord of the beasts and had not yet, through sin, fallen from the perfect exercise of that lordship. Moreover, the beasts revered man as their lord by natural instinct, and therefore no animal was at that time harmful to man — as we showed above at

Distinction 15.[36] There was accordingly no cause for horror in that state, such as there now is, when both we have lost the greater part of our dominion over beasts and have moreover experienced many of them as hostile and harmful to us. Thus St. John Chrysostom teaches.'[30]

§ 15. St. Augustine, however,[37] remarks: "That presents a difficulty — why the woman neither recoiled in horror nor at least was struck with wonder upon hearing the serpent speak, seeing that she was not unaware that it was contrary to nature for a brute animal to speak." The Master answers (in *Textus* § B.) that, since she knew the serpent had been created, she supposed that it had also received from God itself the office of speaking. But against that reply an objection stands ready: that in the first state there could have been no error whatsoever, as we shall show at Distinction 23.[38] In answer to this objection, St. Thomas'[39] says that the woman supposed that the serpent had received this office of speaking not through its nature but through some supernatural operation. By "supernatural operation," however, he understands not what surpasses nature absolutely, but what surpasses the nature of the serpent; for what took place in the serpent through the devil was not a miracle.

§ 16. St. Thomas adds that it is not necessary to follow the authority of the Master in this matter. But since the same reply is found in St. Cyril,[40] the position can also be defended in another way — namely, if we say that Eve held what the Master says not by assenting to it or judging that this was in fact so, but by entertaining the thought of whether it might perhaps be so and reckoning it might be the case. Cyril expressed this sense clearly enough; and according to that interpretation, the thought in the woman's mind was not an error but a prudent estimation of a thing concealed. In the same sense must also be taken what the Apostle says in Phil. 2: "esteeming one another superior" (*superiores invicem arbitrantes*).[41] For this does not require from us a certain assent to the proposition that any given neighbour surpasses us in virtue or grace before God, but at least a suspended judgement, by which we entertain the thought that things might perhaps be so.

§ 17. Now that St. Thomas — both in the passage already cited and in writing on this present Distinction[42] — and likewise St. Bonaventure in the same place,'[43] should have supposed that Eve believed it was an angelic spirit that was speaking to her through the serpent, does not appear probable, for two reasons. First, because, with the prudence she possessed, she would in that case have reflected within herself why that spirit should wish to speak to her through the serpent, and thus would have examined the serpent's speech more carefully, as coming from a higher nature, and would have immediately conceived a suspicion of treachery from its words. Then, because in that case she could be said to have been deceived by that spirit speaking through the serpent, and she would not have said "The serpent deceived me" but "An evil angel deceived me."

§ 18. Therefore it appears more probable that what St. Cyril and the Master hold is the case — namely, that Eve supposed (with suspended judgement, as has been said) that the serpent possessed the faculty of speaking by nature. For she did not know that that faculty was proper to man alone. Since she had only recently been created — indeed, after Adam had already assigned names to all the beasts brought before him, as is clear from the account in Gen. 2[44] — she did not yet have experience of the nature of things and in particular of the beasts. Nor did the perfection of the female condition require that she should have congenital knowledge of all natural things, in the way that the perfection of the first-created man required this. This opinion seems all the more to be held, in that through it the whole of Moses's narrative concerning the serpent is expounded according to the historical sense and holds together properly within itself — which is not the

case if one posits that the woman believed she was holding converse not so much with the serpent as with an angel, whether good or evil.

§ V — What meaning is to be given to the serpent's question (Quem sensum habeat interrogatio serpentis)

§ 19. The serpent's question, "Why hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of Paradise?" (Gen. 3:1), is expounded by the more ancient writers in approximately this sense: "What is the reason that God hath commanded you to eat of no tree of Paradise at all?" According to this exposition, the devil, the father of lies, presupposes a lie in this question — namely, that God had forbidden the first human beings to eat of any tree of Paradise whatsoever — and at the same time tacitly accuses God as cruel and envious, and as dealing with man beyond all reason, in that He forbids him to touch anything amid so great an abundance of fruit-bearing trees. Thus expound St. Ambrose,[46] St. John Chrysostom,[33] St. Augustine,[47] St. Cyril,[48] and Rupert.[49]

§ 20. The words of the question can, however, also be understood in this sense: "Why hath God forbidden you to eat of every tree of Paradise?" — making an exception, that is, from some particular tree, namely the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which you are to abstain from — so that the expression "not every tree" (*non omne*) yields not a universal but a particular negating sense, and this according to the rules of the dialecticians. This exposition belongs to many of the more recent writers. Yet the former sense is more strongly supported both by the precept that had been given — "Of every tree of Paradise thou shalt eat," etc. (Gen. 2:16) — and by the woman's subsequent reply, as though correcting the serpent's question, when she says: "We eat of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise," etc. (Gen. 3:2) — as if to say: it is not as you suppose. For God did not command us to eat of no tree of Paradise at all, but forbade only the eating of one. Indeed, according to the latter sense, the woman's reply appears superfluous, for she replies to that which the question had already presupposed.

§ 21. Nor does the locution "of every tree" (*ex omni*) stand in the way of the former sense; for it is not true in the Scriptures that "not every" (*non omne*) is the same as "none" (*nullum*). Examples are: Dan. 3 — "that they should not adore every god except their own God"; Ps. 143 — "every living man shall not be justified in thy sight" (Ps. 143:2); in the Gospel of Matt. and Mk. — "not every flesh would be saved" (Matt. 24:22; Mk. 13:20); the Apostle in Rom. and Gal. — "not every flesh is justified by the works of the law" (Rom. 3:20; Gal. 2:16).

§ 22. Now as regards the manner of the question, some are pleased to find a certain irony in the serpent's words, which they interpret as follows: "You foolishly suppose that God hath commanded you not to eat of every tree of Paradise." Favour is lent to this interpretation by the Chaldean version, which reads: "Is it true what God said: You shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" — that is, Do you really think God said this to you? Hence, also what is afterwards said by the serpent — "For God doth know," etc. (Gen. 3:5) — in place of which the Chaldean translator has *manifest before God* — is explained by the same authors in this manner: "God is my witness that as soon as you shall eat thereof your eyes shall be opened," etc. — so that these are the words of one affirming under oath. According to this exposition, the serpent's words contain no accusation of God, but rather praise and reverence. They say the serpent spoke thus so that the woman might more readily be induced to consent to his persuasion under the appearance of good. For this is the artifice which the devil

customarily employs to deceive men, who, as the Apostle testifies (2 Cor. 11:14), transfigures himself into an angel of light — following whose example false apostles and ministers of Satan transfigure themselves into apostles of Christ and ministers of justice. Hence the same Apostle compares the seduction of the Corinthians by false apostles to the serpent's deception of the woman.[50] From this it may appear that the serpent approached this temptation of the woman under the guise of honour and commendation of the divine name, and not with an accusation of envy and cruelty — since the woman would have immediately recoiled in horror from such blasphemy. This interpretation is also rendered probable by the words of Epiphanius (in the *Heresy of the Cainites*[51]), who says that the devil showed his friendship with the Creator through falsehood.

§ 23. But although these views rest on some probability, the sense that is simpler and more accommodated both to our own [Vulgate] version and to the Septuagint is that the serpent, having as it were understood that God had forbidden men to eat of any tree of Paradise, interrogated the woman as to the cause of this. For, apart from the fact that the woman's reply fits this interrogation most aptly, as we showed above, the devil also in this way more thoroughly concealed his own deceit: since from the very outset he does not wish openly to persuade an outright lie — such as that God had given no command at all concerning not eating the fruit of any tree — but, feigning ignorance, indeed error, concerning the precept, he inquires after its cause, so as by this means to draw the woman into conversation; knowing, as he did not doubt, that she would gladly correct the error of the questioner.

§ 24. But what some think — namely, that the question which Moses records the serpent as asking is abrupt, as though, after many other things said to the woman which Moses passed over, with the devil reviling God, the serpent finally added this as well: "Is it even true that He hath commanded you," etc. — does not sufficiently accord with the state of integrity and innocence of the woman. For she could not have patiently listened without sin to a long speech containing an accusation of God as dealing maliciously with man in having deprived him of many good things — since it is established among almost all theologians that the woman did not sin before that interrogation which Moses expressly records.

§ VI — What was the first sin of the woman? (Quod fuerit primum mulieris peccatum?)

§ 25. Concerning the first sin of the woman, and what it was, there is no single opinion held by all. Rupert,[53] in his third book on Genesis (chapter 5), thinks that the woman sinned before the serpent spoke with her. Her sin, moreover, they make to consist in the fact that, wandering with her body and eyes and looking about in every direction, she gave the serpent the occasion of entering into conversation with her. But this opinion is rightly rejected by all others. For it is contrary to the purpose of Moses in writing, who certainly wished to show by what way sin, and through sin death, had its entrance into the human race — namely, through the suggestion of the serpent; and it is opposed to other Scriptures, which teach that the devil was the first author of sin for mankind. Furthermore, the Master,[54] following Hugh of St. Victor, places the first sin of the woman in the fact that she doubted concerning the threat of death appended to the divine precept. He proves this from the circumstance that what God had said by way of affirmation — "You shall surely die" — the woman reported as though with hesitation, saying: "Lest perhaps we die." Upon hearing which, the serpent added by way of denial: "You shall not die at all." She, therefore, who doubted, says the Master following Hugh, receded from the one who affirmed and drew near to the one who denied. Now, in truth, this is not a sufficiently firm

proof. For the word *forte* ("perhaps") does not always signify doubt in Sacred Scripture, as is clear from the same chapter, where the Lord Himself, who assuredly did not doubt, says: "Lest perhaps he put forth his hand," etc.[55] Then, even granting that some doubt is signified by that word in the woman's speech, it does not consequently follow that she doubted concerning what God had affirmed — namely, that they would die if they ate of the tree. For the doubt could most rightly be understood as pertaining to the outcome of the threatened event, and that on account of the uncertainty of the transgression. For since they were endowed with free will and were not confirmed in good, it was uncertain to them whether they would eat of the forbidden tree and thus die. A similar mode of expression is to be found elsewhere in Sacred Scripture as well: at Dan. 4, Amos 5, and Acts 8.[56] Add to this that the Seventy Interpreters had not added "perhaps." For which reason also the Ancients who used the version of the Seventy — such as St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom, St. Augustine, and others — make no mention of this doubt. It must therefore be held as altogether evident that the woman straightforwardly and in good faith reported the words of the precept given by God.

§ 26. Other writers find fault with something else in the woman. St. Ambrose,[46] in his book on Paradise (chapter 12), reproaches her for having added to the precept — namely, that phrase: "Nor shall we touch it." For this is not read as having been said in the precept. But St. John Chrysostom,[33] in Homily 16 on Genesis, reproaches her for having entered into conversation with the serpent; for having answered when questioned by him; for having disclosed the precept; and finally for not having immediately turned away from the one who was tempting and suggesting things false against the word and command of God. Yet truly these Fathers seem to have wished to teach, taking occasion from the action of this woman, not so much what was in reality blameworthy in Eve as what is rightly wont and ought to be reproached in fallen man, who is easily stirred even by a slight temptation. For Eve, in adding "nor shall we touch it," changed nothing of the sense of the precept; indeed she rather confirmed it the more. For she understood "touch" to mean that by which the fruit is plucked from the tree and taken for eating — a touch which no one doubts was forbidden by the same precept by which eating was forbidden. Again, since the woman was still in the state of integrity and therefore sufficiently strong to resist temptation, especially that which was brought to bear only from without, it follows that not even in the fact that she listened to the serpent and replied to him does any sin properly speaking seem to be attributable to her — just as nowadays, if someone sufficiently prudent and learned undertakes the contest of disputation with a heretic and is perverted by occasion of his words and becomes a heretic, that person will not properly be reproached for having undertaken the disputation with the heretic, but because, though he was sufficiently equipped against his adversary, he allowed himself to be seduced. One may rightly say, however, both of him and of the woman, that they are worthy of reproach for having done neither what befits the weak — that is, avoided the encounter with the adversary — nor what the strong ought to do — that is, heard and then refuted and rejected what was said. Certainly if the woman had firmly resisted the temptation of the serpent, no one would readily judge her blameworthy on account of the words of the serpent heard and admitted to her ears — just as no learned and prudent man is blameworthy for a disputation undertaken with a heretic, if he overcomes him in the disputing.

§ 27. Now, that the first sin of the woman is not to be located in any of the things already mentioned is demonstrated by that Scripture which teaches that pride is the beginning of all sin (Sir. 10 and Tob. 4).[57] For this reason, the first sin of the woman is to be believed to have been nothing other than pride. St. Augustine[47] speaks thus: "When the woman believed the serpent's words, that they had been divinely prohibited from a good and useful thing, was there not already present in her mind that love of her own power, a certain proud

presumption concerning herself?" These words are to be noted against the sectarians, who maintain that infidelity, not pride, was the first sin of man. This St. Augustine here expressly denies, teaching that infidelity could not have found a place in the mind of the woman unless pride had first been present. See the same St. Augustine,[58] pursuing the same opinion more broadly, and St. Gregory,[59] in Book 4 of the *Moralia*, chapter 9, as well as others whom we shall cite at the next Distinction, where the first sin of Adam will be discussed.[60] The same is the opinion of St. Thomas,[61] and likewise of the other Scholastics writing on this Distinction. Although what St. Thomas says in the aforesaid question 79 (article 3, reply to objection 2),[62] — that the woman, at the very mention of the precept made by the serpent in those words "Why hath He commanded you," etc., immediately broke forth into elation — this is not probable, since St. Augustine and the other Fathers, as we shall show below, interpret the first parents as having been elevated into pride only when they heard that serpentine declaration: "You shall be as gods" — Eve indeed from the mouth of the serpent, but Adam through the report of his wife. And this alone was afterwards reproached to Adam himself by God when He said: "Behold, Adam is become as one of us," etc.[63]

§ III — Whether the first sin of man could have been venial (An primum hominis peccatum potuerit esse veniale)

§ 28. Although it is agreed among theologians that the first sin of the woman, as also of the man, was mortal, it is nonetheless not unprofitable to ask whether it could have been venial, and altogether whether, in the state of innocence, man could have sinned venially. And indeed on this point also all are agreed that man in that state could not have sinned venially by that sin which arises from passion or subreption. The formal character (*ratio*) of this is that sensuality in that state was so perfectly subject to his governance that it did not resist him, and that reason itself was so ordered that it would not proceed to any act except a fully deliberate one.

§ 29. But the doubt concerns a certain third kind of venial sin — namely, that which is venial by its very genus on account of the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, even if it be committed with full deliberation; of which kind are immoderate laughter, an idle word, a jesting or officious lie. Concerning this genus of venial sin, Scotus[65] says that he does not see why it should be denied that in the state of innocence it could not have been committed. For if, he says, the gift of innocence or of original justice (*justitiae originalis*) did not prevent man from being able to sin mortally, much less would it have prevented venial sin. For the admission of such sin does not argue any disordering of the higher or lower part of man, nor does it posit any other disordering than that which consists in the very act of venial sin. The same is the opinion of the Master of Auxerre,[66] who says that by deliberate consent man could have loved his wife or children more than was due, yet still short of God — though not from an impulse arising apart from the will, since there was no tinder of sin (*fomes*) in him. Francis of Meyronnes[67] holds the same view.

§ 30. In support of this opinion there is commonly adduced that passage of St. Augustine[68] where he says that man, inexperienced in divine severity, could have been deceived in this matter, so as to believe what was committed to be venial. There may also be adduced what he says,[69] — that the first men would have remained in the state of their happiness if neither they themselves nor anyone of their stock committed an iniquity that would receive condemnation. For this seems to be said as if they could have committed some iniquity that would not receive condemnation — that is, one which would only be venial.

§ 31. But a very different opinion has been handed down by far more and weightier theologians: Alexander of Hales in the *Summa*,[70] St. Thomas,[71] Albert the Great, Aegidius of Rome, St. Bonaventure, Richard, Durandus, and others writing on this distinction.[72] And indeed St. Bonaventure calls this the common opinion, as does St. Thomas likewise.[73] All of these hold that absolutely no venial sin could have been committed in the state of innocence. From which it follows that the first sin could not have been venial — nor would man have fallen from that state, because he would not have fallen from grace; and thus if the first sin had been venial, it would have been committed with the state of innocence preserved.

§ 32. This opinion is proved. First, because even venial sins of the third genus are not committed except from some disordered affection (*inordinato affectu*) of the mind toward created things. For this is why even now such sins are sometimes committed by the Saints — because reason is not in them perfectly ordered, and this on account of the vice of concupiscence. Second, because punishment (*poena*) was incompatible with that state; therefore fault (*culpa*), even venial, was also incompatible with it. This inference is proved in three ways: first, because every fault merits punishment and brings it in its train — hence, given a fault, punishment is given also in that state; second, because man ought to grieve for sin committed; and third, finally, because fault is a greater evil than any punishment whatsoever. If therefore punishment was incompatible with that state, much more so was fault. Third, the same is proved from the other effects of sin, even venial sin. For it diminishes the fervour of charity (*charitatis*), begets difficulty in doing good, leaves after itself — at least when multiplied — sorrow and the sting of conscience, obscures the mind in some degree, and indeed cannot be chosen and committed without some error of practical judgement. All of which things are alien to the integrity and perfection of that state. Fourth: so great was the health of body in that state that it could not be affected by any disease, however slight — therefore so great also was the rectitude of soul that it admitted not even the slightest obliquity of fault.

§ 33. Lastly, St. Augustine not obscurely teaches this opinion[69] when, discoursing on the first state of man, he says: "There was nothing which offended the flesh or the mind of the man living happily; there was a tranquil avoidance of sin; and while that endured, no evil from any other source rushed in to make him sad. Did they perhaps desire to touch the forbidden tree for food, yet feared to die? And on this account did the motion of desire even then disturb those persons in that place? God forbid that we should think this to have been so, where there was no sin whatsoever." And in chapter 26: "The highest health was in the flesh, in the mind entire tranquillity. Just as in Paradise there was neither heat nor cold, so in its inhabitant there came no offence of good will from desire or fear. Nothing at all was sorrowful, nothing was vain."[74]

§ 34. Since this opinion is the most probable one, a brief reply must be given to the arguments of the former opinion. And to the argument which we adduced as the principal one from Scotus, St. Bonaventure replies by saying that those things which are venial by their genus — such as an idle word and the like — would have been mortal for integral man on account of the perfection of his state. Hence, he says, what is commonly said — that something is a sin venial by its genus — is to be understood with respect to fallen nature (*naturae lapsae*). But this solution is rejected by St. Thomas in the place cited above,[75] because, he says, the dignity of the person is indeed a circumstance aggravating sin, but it does not transfer it into another species; hence what is venial of itself could not be transferred into mortal sin on account of the dignity of the first state. So he says.

§ 35. Accordingly, following him, one must reply — as we have already indicated in the first argument — that every venial sin, even that which is such by genus, arises on account of some defect of order, namely from

the fact that the inferior is not firmly contained under the superior; just as St. Thomas learnedly explains in the same place. In the state of innocence, however, there was an infallible firmness of order, so that the inferior was always contained under the superior, so long as that which was supreme in man was contained under God — as St. Augustine teaches.[76]

§ 36. To what is objected from St. Augustine in the first passage, St. Thomas replies in the same place[77] that "venial" is not used there in the way we now speak of venial sin distinguishing it from mortal, but as that for which pardon can easily be obtained (*cujus facile potest impetrari venia*). For in this sense "venial" is sometimes taken in the writings of the Fathers. Hence St. Gregory,[78] speaking against the presumption of mercy, says: "Let no one say, 'because I am pious I sin venially,' that is, I shall easily obtain pardon of my sin." But the true solution is to be sought from St. Augustine himself, who in chapter 13 of the same book speaks of the first parents, Adam and Eve, as follows: "If the will had remained stable in the love of the higher immutable Good by which it was illumined to see and inflamed to love, it would not have turned aside from this to please itself, and would not through that darkening and cooling have either believed the serpent to have spoken the truth, or set his wife's will before the commandment of God, thinking himself to commit only a venial transgression of the precept — so as not to abandon the companion of his life even in fellowship of sin."[76] From these words it is understood that man had sinned by pleasing himself too much before he was so darkened by the merit of that sin as to think it venial if he transgressed the commandment of God in order to obey his wife. This is also shown from the fact that man could not have erred and been deceived so as to think that venial which was mortal, unless he had first been corrupted by sin — because in the state of integrity there could have been no error. Hence the first sin could not have been committed from error or ignorance, even though it involved an error of practical judgement.

§ 37. To the second passage of St. Augustine, one must say that the phrase "which would receive condemnation" is not a restrictive but an explicative determination. For the sense is that the first men together with all their stock would have remained in the state of happiness if none of them had committed an iniquity. For if they committed one, it would also come about that they were cast down from that state and incurred condemnation. Further arguments with their solutions may be seen in Cajetan writing upon St. Thomas in the place long since cited.[79]

§ VIII — The various modes and degrees of temptation explained (Varii modi ac gradus tentationis explicantur)

§ 38. On the occasion of that temptation by which the devil solicited our first parents to sin, something must here be said in general about the various modes of temptation (*tentatio*) and about the degrees by which it customarily reaches its completion — understanding by the name of temptation a solicitation to sin (*sollicitationem ad peccandum*). The modes or causes of temptation are manifold; St. Augustine enumerates some of them in his exposition of Ps. 106.[81] Indeed, since every temptation of which we now speak is a certain persecution aimed at the soul's salvation, there are as many kinds of temptation as there are kinds of such persecution. Hence where blessed Job says, "The life of man upon earth is a warfare" (Job 7:1),[82] many have written *temptation* in place of *warfare*. Yet all that multiplicity can be reduced to the general division by which the Master, following St. Gregory, Hom. 16 in the Gospels,[83] divides temptation into interior and exterior.

Under this division is also comprehended the familiar tripartite division into that which comes from the world, from the flesh, and from the devil.'[84]

§ 39. For of these three, the first is exterior; the second is interior; the third is sometimes exterior, as in the case of the temptation of Christ and of the first human beings. It must be known, however, that temptation from the world, as distinguished from that which comes from the flesh — that is, from concupiscence — is that temptation alone whereby someone is tempted by evil men through persuasion, flattery, incitement, compulsion, or terror, inducing or impelling him to sin. For those temptations that arise from other things which are either badly coveted or badly feared — such as gold and silver, food and drink, the beauty of a woman, death, hunger, poverty — and likewise the inclinations said to come from the stars, from wine and strong drink (*sicera*), and from other things that so alter the human body as to make a man more prone to certain sins or vices, are in truth temptations of the flesh (*tentationes carnis*). For it must not be supposed that God's creatures, in which there is nothing that God has not made, themselves solicit or incline toward evil. For if they did, God Himself would be a tempter to evil, contrary to that word of Jas. 1: "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils, and He Himself tempts no one."[85] Rather, all that temptation proceeds from the tinder of sin (*fomes peccati*) which is in man, which, roused by an occasion taken from things that are good in themselves, conceives wicked desires. Concerning this, James continues in the same place: "But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured" (Jas. 1:14).[86]

§ 40. Now as regards the degrees by which temptation reaches its completion, St. Gregory teaches in Hom. 16 in the Gospels[87] that it is completed by three stages: suggestion (*suggestione*), delectation (*delectatione*), and consent (*consensu*). This same teaching St. Augustine had handed down before Gregory, in Book 2 of *On Genesis against the Manicheans*, ch. 14, in Book 1 of *The Lord's Sermon on the Mount* on the words "Whosoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her," etc., and in Sermon 44 on the Words of the Lord.[88] And after both of them, Bede, writing on Jas. 1 at the words "Concupiscence, when it has conceived," etc.'[89] Although the Apostle in that passage does not mention suggestion, but rather seems to posit these degrees of temptation as follows: the first, the movement of concupiscence that is not sin, when he says "But every man is tempted," etc.; the second, the movement by which the will is now stirred and enticed — which movement therefore is not without sin — when he says "Then, when concupiscence has conceived, it brings forth sin"; the deliberate consent of the will, by which one now sins mortally, when he says "But sin, when it is completed, generates death" (Jas. 1:15).'[90]

§ IX — How Christ and the first parents were tempted (Christus et primi parentes qua ratione tentati)

§ 41. Against the aforesaid degrees of temptation, it must be noted that neither Christ nor human beings in the state of innocence could be tempted by internal temptation — that is, by such temptation as would proceed through an interior suggestion of the devil moving the phantasy (*phantasia*) from within. For the reason (*ratio*) in that state of rectitude, in which it was perfectly subject to God, would have received no phantasm (*phantasma*) of disordered passion except from a deliberate judgment of the rational faculty; nor indeed in that state of rectitude, in which reason was perfectly subjected to God, could there have been any movement or operation of the lower faculty that did not comply with the nod of the dominant reason —

much less could this occur in Christ. But an alteration of the phantasy by means of phantasms does not come about without the operation of the phantasy itself. Nor does it stand in the way that dreams would befall human beings even in the state of integrity; for there was always at least a habitual attentiveness of reason to the senses, because those dreams were good, and were as it were divine ecstasies.[92]

§ 42. St. Thomas proves the same doctrine in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165, a. 2, ad 2,[93] by this reasoning: that the devil had the least power over man before sin. But through interior suggestion the phantasy of the man is altered by the devil from within; through exterior suggestion, however, only the exterior creature is altered. Therefore the devil could not tempt him by interior suggestion, but only by exterior suggestion. Finally, the same is expressly taught by the author writing under the title of St. Ambrose (in the *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, ch. 1),[94] in these words: "Before the transgression and before man had given himself over to death, the demon had no power to approach the interior of man, to inject contrary thoughts. But after he had circumvented him, he received power over him, so as to assail the interior man, knocking at his mind," and so on.

It is therefore clear that exterior temptation alone had place not only in Christ but also in human beings while in the state of integrity. In us, however, in whom, by the contagion of original sin, the flesh lusts against the spirit and the dominion of reason over the lower faculties is impaired, and in whom moreover the devil rightly received power over us at the first transgression, both of the aforesaid modes of interior temptation arise: so that we are sometimes tempted by the demon, sometimes by the flesh, sometimes by both together. Of these temptations, just as that which comes from the flesh is more grievous than that which comes from the demon — because, as the Master says following St. Gregory, the enemy assailing us from within is strengthened against us from our own resources[83] — so that which comes from both at once is the most grievous of all.

§ X — Certain objections are resolved (Quaedam obiectiones solvuntur)

§ 43. Against what has been said, certain persons first object that St. Gregory, in Homily 16 on the Gospels,[87] says that Christ could be tempted by suggestion. But the reply is easy: St. Gregory is speaking of exterior suggestion, as is plain from that very passage. For he adds: "And therefore all that diabolical temptation was from without, not from within."

You will say: St. Gregory in the same Homily 16 on the Gospels[87] says of Christ, "It was just that he should overcome our temptations by his own temptations, just as he had come to overcome our death by his own death; therefore it was also just that by his own temptation of the flesh he should overcome our temptation of the flesh." It is denied that the consequence follows; because temptation of the flesh has something repugnant to satisfaction and to the appeasement of God, whereas the other temptations, on the part of Christ, contained nothing evil at variance with the divine law.

§ 44. A second objection can be drawn from the opinion of Theophylact and certain others, who say that Christ was tempted by the devil not in any exterior visible form, but by the devil's presenting to his phantasy images of those things by means of which and concerning which he tempted him. Some persons similarly hold that he was tempted by the devil while hanging on the cross, according to what Luke says in chapter 4,[96] that the devil departed from him until a time — namely, the time of the Passion.

But one must say that both temptations of Christ — both that which is narrated as having taken place after his baptism by the three Evangelists, and that which he suffered on the cross — occurred only externally: the former immediately by the devil, the latter by wicked men at the devil's instigation, as is manifest from the Gospels. Of this same character was also that temptation of which he himself speaks to those who were tempting him, saying: "Why do you tempt me, you hypocrites?" (Matt. 22:18). Furthermore, the authority of those who hold otherwise — as also that of Rupert,[97] who says that the first parents were tempted and overcome by temptation through the devil before they were tempted outwardly through the serpent, and likewise that of Cajetan,[98] who draws the entire narrative of the serpentine colloquy to an interior suggestion of sin by the devil — the authority of these, we say, is not to be received in this matter.

§ 45. A third objection can be drawn from what St. Augustine says in book 32 *Against Faustus* toward the end,[99] that the flesh of Christ was tempted by the devil. But by these words St. Augustine does not mean that the devil stirred up any temptation of the flesh or sensuality in Christ. Rather, the sense is that Christ *in the flesh*, that is, Christ as man, was tempted by the devil. This sense is evident from the context.

§ 46. Lastly, someone might object against the argument drawn from St. Thomas that not only through interior suggestion but also through that which is made from outside is the phantasy of the one to whom something is suggested altered — inasmuch as exterior suggestion penetrates through hearing to the interior sense and even to the intellect itself. I reply that it belongs to the natural condition of man that he should see or hear objects presented or proposed from without, and thereafter perceive them by the interior sense and intellect; but it does not belong to his original condition that, with the exterior senses closed, his imagination should be moved by some other external mover — except by God, or at God's command by a good angel.[100]

§ XI — Whether all sins are committed through the temptation of the devil (An omnia peccata committantur tentante diabolo)

§ 47. It is sufficiently established that the first sin of the first Angel had its origin in no temptation. For before there was sin in the world, there was nothing exterior by which the Angel could be tempted to sin. Nor had he within himself anything by which he could be solicited to sin, since he was wholly upright and created in an abundance of grace. He sinned, therefore, not when tempted, but by his sole and entirely free will.

The remaining angels who fell, however, were tempted by temptation of an exterior kind alone, namely by the first Angel soliciting them to a similar sin, as we showed above.[102] Likewise, the first sin of the first human beings had its origin solely from an exterior temptation: that of the woman, indeed, by the devil speaking through the serpent; that of the man, by the woman.

§ 48. Now the question is asked concerning the subsequent sins of human beings — whether all of them are committed through the instinct, suggestion, and temptation of the devil or of the demons who serve under him. For certain heretics of our age assert that no temptation properly proceeds from the devil, and they hold that those whom we call demons and the tempters of men are nothing other than the evil impulses and instincts of corrupt nature. How alien this position is from Catholic truth and manifestly contrary to the Scriptures, we have stated elsewhere.[103]

§ 49. Now that all sins are committed with the devil or his subject demons instigating and tempting, seems possible to hold for the following reasons.

First: because sinners are on that account said to be of their father the devil, whose desires they do, as Jn. 8 says — that is, because they comply with his suggestions. Hence the Lord says to the Jews in the same passage: "What I have seen with my Father I speak, and you do what you have seen with your father." Now this vision cannot be except through inspiration. Yet Christ speaks nothing except what He has seen with the Father; therefore evil men as such do nothing except what they have seen at their father the devil — that is, what the devil has suggested to them.

Second: Peter in Acts 5, saying to Ananias: "Why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?" etc., seems to presuppose that all sins are committed with Satan tempting. Similarly Paul, in 1 Thess. 3: "Lest perhaps he who tempts should have tempted you." And the Church in a certain morning Hymn, singing: "Whatever things through the fraud of demons men sin in the nights," etc.

Third: The same thing seems presupposed by the Canon: "If anyone, at the devil's instigation," which is found at Causa 17, quaestio 4. For if someone were to say that he had struck a cleric or a monk not at the devil's instigation but by his own will alone, that exception would not be admitted.

Fourth: (Pseudo-)Dionysius[104] says that the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils both for themselves and for others. And St. Augustine,[105] calls the devil the author and prince of all sins. And in another work,[106] he says that no faithful person is ignorant of the fact that the devil is the first author of all sins. St. John Damascene likewise says that all human malice and every impurity has been devised by the devil.[107]

Fifth: There is adduced that text of St. Ambrose[8]: "The soul would not be overcome by the body, unless it were first tempted by the devil."

Sixth: St. Jerome[109] (writing on Jer. 16) says: "Whatever we sin, we do it carrying out the command of the demons."

Seventh: St. Gregory[110], in Hom. 18 (*In Evangelia*), speaking of the Jews who reviled Christ, says: "Unless they had been filled with a demon, they could not have uttered such perverse things about God."

Finally, this argument is adduced: Just as good angels are appointed to our guardianship, so evil ones are appointed to our assault. But we do nothing good except from the suggestion of good angels, because divine things are conveyed to us only through the mediation of angels; therefore neither do we do anything evil except from the suggestion of demons.

§ 50. St. Thomas treats this question[111] and teaches that not all sins are committed at the instigation of the devil, but some arise from the sole freedom of the will and from the corruption of the flesh. He proves the same from Origen, who says,[112] that even if the devil did not exist, men would nevertheless have appetites for those things which are delectable to the senses. Concerning these things, manifold disorder can arise, especially given the corruption of nature. Hence he concludes that there is no reason why we should say that all the sins of human beings proceed from the instinct of the devil. And rightly so. For if the first Angel, having in himself no inclination to evil but created entirely upright by God, sinned with no one instigating him, it is no wonder if a man — conceived in iniquity and carrying about a domestic enemy, that is, the flesh, always — is often moved to sin among so many occasions of sins with no other impulse.

§ 51. This teaching is supported above all by that text of Jas. 1: "Each one is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and enticed." And Jas. 4: "Whence are wars and quarrels among you? Is it

not from your concupiscences that war in your members?" And that text of Paul about concupiscence in Rom. 7: "Sin through the commandment wrought in me all concupiscence" — that is, all kinds of depraved desires. And other things which (in the same chapter) are said about the law of sin which is in our members. For such passages of Scripture signify that concupiscence is by itself a sufficient cause of committing every kind of sin.

To this also belongs Gen. 8: "The thoughts and imagination of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth." Hence too in Dan. 13, speaking to the old man who had burned with love for Susanna, it does not say "the devil deceived you," but "Beauty deceived you, and concupiscence subverted your heart." Gennadius openly hands down this sentence[13]: "Not all our evil thoughts are aroused by the devil, but sometimes they emerge from the movement of our own free will." And Prudentius (*in Hamartigenia*) in these verses: "But why do I attribute all evil, and the wickedness of the world and of men, to the envy of the malign Enemy? — when our evils, grown together with our own souls, take their kind, their head, and their force from the parent heart."

St. Augustine also[114] reproves those who, when they have sinned, say "the devil made me do it." Add to these the fact that it is not to be thought that demons always have access to men for the purpose of tempting them. For, as we have said elsewhere, they are often driven back by good angels lest they approach more closely to those whose guardians those angels are — especially in the case of just and holy men. And yet it is certain that no one can live without frequent and daily sins; therefore such sins cannot all be referred to diabolical temptation.

§ 52. Finally, the reason why men cannot live without sins is nowhere given by the Fathers as being that demons who tempt are always present to men, but rather because, on account of the vice of original origin, there is no one who lacks concupiscence always inclining toward evil.

Let us now therefore reply to the things that were brought forward in the other direction.

Reply to the first: It is answered that all sinners are of their father the devil, because in their sinning they imitate him as the first author of sin, and by imitating him they do his desires. For it is the general and perpetual desire of the devil that all men should share with him in sin and consequently in punishment. They are said, then, to have seen their father the devil — not in the sense that each individual has drawn his sin from the devil's individual inspiration, but because from the devil as their teacher they have received a certain general discipline, so to speak, of evil-doing. Nor is the parallel with Christ — who in all things and in every individual matter hears the Father speaking within Him — to be pressed, because the paternity is not of the same kind. Hence God the Father speaks to the Son in a far different manner than any creature speaks to another. Moreover, even granted that this argument has some force concerning the sins of evil men such as the Jews to whom the Lord was speaking, it nonetheless has no bearing on the sins of the just, who have God as their Father, not the devil.

Reply to the second: I reply that Peter, who knew by God's revelation the sin of Ananias, had learned by the same revelation through whose temptation he sinned. Although even without a revelation it is rightly presumed, when someone has sinned very gravely, that he was tempted by the devil to this end. From this presumption is also resolved what was objected from Paul.

The same resolution also applies to the third argument.

§ 53. To what is objected in fourth place from (Pseudo-)Dionysius, St. Augustine, and St. John Damascene, the one reply is that all the sins of human beings are rightly referred to the devil as their author — not in the sense that each individual sin is suggested to each individual sinner by the devil himself or by his angels, but for two reasons: either because the devil suggested the first sin of man, from which thereafter all others arose; or because there is no kind of sin which is not disseminated in the human race through the suggestions of demons. St. Augustine is to be understood in the former sense, as is plainly clear from the passage in *De Natura et Gratia*[115]; the other two authors spoke in the latter sense.

Reply to the fifth: I reply that those words can be understood of the temptation of the first human beings, who, unless they had first been tempted by the devil and had succumbed to that temptation, would neither they themselves nor we have suffered temptation from the flesh, because the rebellion of the lower part against the higher has its origin only in that sin.

To the sixth: St. Jerome understands by "command" the general dominion or kingship which the devil holds over sinners. This does not consist in the fact that he gives individual commands or suggestions to each individual subject to his dominion regarding what is to be done, but in the fact that he leads those whom he governs to his own end by whatever means — whether they do of their own accord what is congruent with that end, or do it induced and impelled by his admonitions, suggestions, orders, or other means, just as is the case in human kingdoms. All the sins, then, at least of those who are in the kingdom of the devil, occur at his command insofar as they tend toward the end proposed by them, which is to be turned away from God. St. Thomas explains this matter in substantially this way.[116]

§ 54. The seventh argument is resolved from presumption, in the same way as the second and third. For it is not easy for anyone to burst forth into blasphemy against Christ unless the devil is instigating him to such a crime — although it must be noted that St. Gregory does not say "unless they had been instigated by a demon" but "unless they had been filled with a demon." Now it is not necessary that one who is filled with a demon should do everything at his instigation. For he can, while the devil is urging an act of avarice, choose an act of prodigality or of lust, or the contrary. This is a certain argument that not all things done by sinners, even the greatest, are done at the instinct of demons.

To the last: St. Thomas[117] replies that the parallel does not hold; "because," he says, "a man can by himself slide into sin, but he cannot advance toward merit except by divine assistance, which is shown to man through the mediation of the ministry of angels. And therefore angels cooperate in all our good works; yet not all our sins proceed from the suggestion of demons." So he.

According to others, one can reply differently — namely by denying that all good things we do arise from the suggestion of good angels, since human nature does not appear to be so subject to angelic nature that it does nothing good except on the direction of an angel, but rather has freedom, just as the angel also has it, immediately under God.

§ XII — Whether the temptation of the flesh can exist without sin (Tentatio carnis utrum esse possit sine peccato)

§ 55. That the temptation which comes from an enemy — whether suggesting what is evil externally or even internally — can occur without sin on the part of the one tempted, is beyond controversy. But it is asked

whether the temptation that comes from the flesh, inwardly moving a man to sin, can exist without sin. Now the temptation of the flesh is called not only that by which someone is tempted to venereal lust, or even to whatever other sin toward which the sensitive appetite (*appetitus sensitivus*) inclines, but in general every temptation which concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) stirs up in good people, whose seat is not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the rational will (*voluntas rationalis*) — as the Apostle sufficiently shows in Gal. 5, where, having said "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, etc.," he immediately thereafter enumerates many spiritual sins among the works of the flesh.[119] Therefore, as often as we are tempted to any sin whatsoever through the vice of corrupted nature, it is a temptation of the flesh. This is also evident from the fact that such temptation, as such, is neither from the world — since the temptation of the world is only external — nor from the devil, since, as such, it does not proceed from the suggestion of the devil, but from ourselves. It follows, therefore, by a sufficient division, that this entire genus of temptations belongs to the temptation of the flesh, which may also be called by another name the temptation of concupiscence.

§ 56. This having been declared, it is answered to the question first of all that no act has the true and proper formal character (*ratio*) of sin if it is not in some way voluntary. This is what the Fathers long ago diligently impressed upon the Manichaeans, and St. Augustine teaches expressly in many places.[120] Hence it follows that the movements of the flesh inwardly tempting a man, so long as they are not voluntary — that is, so long as the will in no way consents to them — are not sins. This is also easily confirmed by the testimonies of Scripture. For in the Gospel, the Lord teaches that only those things which proceed from the heart, that is from the will, defile a man (Mk. 15),[121] speaking certainly of the defilement of sin. And the Apostle in Rom. 7, disputing about the movements of concupiscence that anticipate reason and are therefore involuntary, having said among other things "For what I will not, that I do — now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," finally concludes thus: "There is therefore now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh" — that is, no condemnation, meaning either what is properly called punishment, or at least guilt, that is, the obligation to punishment, which is the effect that inseparably follows every sin.

§ 57. Furthermore, Jas. 1 openly distinguishes concupiscence as tempting from that which conceives and brings forth sin.[122] Hence it plainly follows that the temptation of concupiscence, before it conceives and brings forth, is without sin. The reasoning is also manifest: because it is not in our power that concupiscence should not be aroused, or that the temptation of the flesh should not arise; but every act of sin is in the power of any man whatsoever. For sin, as St. Augustine defines it,[123] is the will to retain or to obtain what justice forbids, whence one is free to abstain. Likewise, while the temptation of the flesh endures, the faithful pray that they may not be led into temptation, and they grieve and are displeased that they are tempted, and they resist the temptation: therefore at that time they do not sin. Nor indeed are Benedict and Francis to be said to have sinned when, suffering the itching of the flesh, the one rolled himself in snow and the other in briars, until the temptation ceased.

§ 58. This moreover is the undoubted doctrine of the holy Fathers. And first, St. Augustine in many places.[124] With him also frequent is this: that on account of those movements of concupiscence to which the will does not consent, one is not to say "Forgive us our debts."[125] The same St. Augustine denies that any defect is culpable which is not voluntary.[126] This must be noted against those who, although they do not call involuntary movements of concupiscence sins, yet acknowledge fault (*culpa*) in them — as if there could be fault without sin. Similar things are written by Hilary, whose words are found in St. Augustine;[127] by

Methodius (cited by Epiphanius in his refutation of Origen's heresy); by St. John Chrysostom;[128] by St. Cyril;[129] by Prosper.[130]

§ 59. This is likewise the doctrine of St. Thomas[131] where, replying to certain words of St. Augustine,[132] he says: "It must be said that concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit, when reason resists it duly, is not sin, but matter for exercising virtue." And in II-II he says[133] that the pleasure of the flesh that follows pollution can happen without sin, if it occurs contrary to the intention of the mind — where, however, he is speaking of the temptation of the flesh. And in q. 154, a. 5, in the body, he speaks thus: "Every sin depends on the judgment of reason; because even the first movement of sensuality has the character of sin only insofar as it can be repressed by the judgment of reason; and therefore when the judgment of reason is removed, the character of sin is removed."

§ 60. Also St. Bonaventure[134] says that, just as in the case of other temptations, so also in the case of the temptation of the flesh, there follows an approval or disapproval of the man through assent or dissent. "For from the flesh," he says, "or from the concupiscence of the flesh, a man is impelled, as it were touched; if he consents to this touch or impulse he is tested and found wanting; but if he dissents he is tested and found praiseworthy." And in Dist. 23, a. 1, q. 3, where he answers in the second manner the question whether temptation ought to be desired by a just man, he says that temptation considered as an impulse to what is unlawful is not to be desired but to be fled; but considered as matter for exercising virtue, it can be desired by more perfect just persons.[135] He speaks moreover of temptation generally, as comprising also the temptation of the flesh, as is clear from the question and arguments. Which doctrine would be false if the temptation of the flesh could not exist without sin.

§ 61. Henry of Ghent holds the same view,[136] as do other earlier Scholastics. To these is added finally the definition of the Church in the Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5, in which it is defined that the concupiscence or tinder (*fomes*) remaining in the baptized cannot harm those who do not consent but manfully resist through the grace of Jesus Christ.[137] But it would undoubtedly harm them if its movements could not exist without sin.

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§ XIII — Reply to certain authorities to the contrary (Ad quasdam in contrarium auctoritates responsio)

§ 62. With the foregoing doctrine there seem to conflict first of all the express words of the Master of the Sentences, affirming that the temptation which is from the flesh cannot occur without sin, whereas that which comes from the enemy, unless one consents to it, has not the character of sin, but is matter for exercising virtue. It appears that the Master took this from St. Gregory, who (in his last Epistle, which is to Augustine, Bishop of the English) writes that the pleasure of the flesh even in conjugal intercourse can in no way be without fault.[139]

§ 63. Then certain passages from St. Augustine are adduced. For in *De Civitate Dei* bk. 4,[140] he says: "Neither is it no sin for that which the law of God forbids, to be concupiscent." And in bk. 19, ch. 4: "Neither is it no vice, when, as the Apostle says, 'the flesh lusteth against the spirit.' To this vice the contrary virtue is opposed, when, as the same says, 'the spirit lusteth against the flesh.'" The same in *De Nuptiis et*

Concupiscentia bk. 1, ch. 23,[141] says that the commandment "Thou shalt not covet" (*Non concupisces*) is not fulfilled by us, on account of the movements of concupiscence; although that other, "Thou shalt not go after thy concupiscences," is fulfilled. And in ch. 27, he signifies that involuntary movements are forbidden by the law of God; for citing that apostolic word "the evil which I will not, that I do," and granting that the law is good, he adds: "Because both this and that which also I do not will, it wills not. It wills not that I should concupisce, which it says, 'Thou shalt not covet,' and I do not will to concupisce. In this they agree — my will and the will of the law. Yet she was unwilling to covet, but still coveted; but to the same concupiscence she served by no means by consenting"; and he added: "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." Now the will of the law is the precept and prohibition of the law. Therefore if involuntary movements are forbidden by the law of God, it follows that they are sins. For whatever is forbidden by the law of God is a sin, or is so by the very fact that it is forbidden.

§ 64. Moreover St. Thomas is adduced here,[142] writing that the temptation of the devil is therefore not a sin in us, because the sin of one does not consist in the act of another, but in one's own act, according to that word: "The soul that sinneth, the same shall die." But in the temptation of the flesh, the illicit appetite itself, according to which someone is said to be tempted, is his own act. "For," he says, "not the flesh alone concupisceth, but the composite being." And therefore such temptation is a sin in the one tempted. And he repeats this in the reply to the second objection. The same in the third part of his *Summa*, q. 51, a. 1,[143] teaches from this that Christ could not have been tempted by the flesh, because the temptation of the flesh is not without sin. And in I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2,[144] he teaches how such movements are subject to the rational will and are therefore voluntary. And ad 3, that the movement of sensuality that anticipates reason is a venial sin. And the same seems to be his intention in a. 4 of the same question, teaching that in sensuality there can be venial sin, but not mortal sin. For his arguments also tend toward this — that sin is in sensuality without consent.

§ 65. Item: the express opinion of St. Bonaventure is objected, who, on the question raised at the text of the Master — why the temptation from an enemy can be without sin sooner than the temptation from the flesh — resolves it in much the same manner as St. Thomas, and concludes that the temptation of the flesh is never in us without at least some venial fault.[145] And on Dist. 24, a. 2, q. 2, he says that the pleasure of sensuality consequent upon the apprehension of something pleasurable, before reason adverts to it, is without doubt a venial sin. And a little after he says: "While temptation begins from sensuality, it is plainly venial." And again: "When pleasure is perceived, if it is immediately repelled, then it is a light sin." Finally, in a. 3, q. 1, he teaches as a matter of formal doctrine (*ex professo*) that in the first movements of sensuality there is venial sin.

§ 66. Furthermore, Durandus, q. 1 on this distinction, openly resolves that the temptation of the flesh is always a sin; not so the temptation of the demon or of the world, unless consent or pleasure supervenes. And he proves it because the temptation of the flesh is never without our consent and cooperation; for, he says, the mind does not forbid as it is able to forbid.[146] He repeats the same doctrine on Dist. 24, q. 5. Altisiodorensis teaches the very same thing.[147] With them agrees Cajetan, writing on I-II, q. 74, aa. 3 and 4.[148] For he teaches that every movement of sensuality by which a man is tempted to what is illicit has the formal character of an imperfect sin, that is, of a venial sin; which he proves in this way: because all evil movements which the will can and ought to have anticipated, if it has not anticipated them, are sins. Now the will can and ought to anticipate each such movement individually, speaking of the imperfect formal character of potency and

obligation — which evidently suffices for the commission of an imperfect, that is venial, sin. And this imperfect potency he locates in the fact that a man can repress and forestall individual evil movements, though not all of them, because while he attends to repressing one, another arises. This same explanation is also found in Durandus and Altisiodorensis at the places cited.

§ 67. But let us reply to these objections. The authority of the Master in this matter is rejected by some, who number this his opinion among those in which his teaching is not binding. But because the Master speaks in like manner together with St. Gregory, it is consistent that we explain the opinion of both in the same way. They say therefore that the temptation and pleasure of the flesh cannot be without sin or fault — not that such a movement is properly a sin, but because by its own nature it inclines and solicits to sin, and nothing is lacking to it for the proper formal character of sin except the consent of the will. For in this sense does St. Augustine interpret the movements of concupiscence as sins.[149] Which interpretation the Council of Trent approved,[150] explaining how the concupiscence remaining after baptism is called sin by the Apostle in Rom. 7. And indeed the passage of Gregory, carefully examined, seems altogether to demand this understanding of his meaning.

§ 68. To the first passage drawn from St. Augustine the reply is easy. For after the cited words he immediately adds: "And to abstain from these through fear of punishment, not through love of justice." Hence it is clear that he is speaking of voluntary concupiscence — that which is restrained from its act only by fear of punishment. To the second passage from St. Augustine it is answered that vice (*vitium*) is one thing, sin another. For concupiscence remaining after baptism, although it is indeed vicious (*vitiosa*), is nevertheless not sin — as we shall teach more fully below, at Dist. 30.[151] And the same judgment holds concerning its involuntary movements. St. Thomas in I-II, q. 80, a. 3, resolves it differently — because for "vice" he reads "sin," perhaps by a slip of memory, or confusing the former passage with the latter.[152]

§ 69. To the third passage I reply: that on account of the movements of concupiscence, the commandment "Thou shalt not covet" (*Non concupisces*) is not fulfilled by us — in the mind of St. Augustine — because it is not perfectly fulfilled. For in this general prohibition there is also contained the precept by which we are commanded to strive toward that and tend toward that perfection that we should be utterly without any movement of concupiscence. This, however, is not fulfilled in this life. To the fourth passage a similar reply is given. For the law is said to will that we should not concupisce altogether, or by the flesh alone, because it not only forbids consent, but also commands that we suppress and mortify the movements of concupiscence in us, and pursue concupiscence itself, and strive to extinguish it and at last be freed from it. All of which is not fulfilled except after this life.

§ 70. As to what is objected from St. Thomas, one must say either that he tacitly retracted in the *Summa* what he had said in the *Commentary on the Master* and changed his opinion — which is how Medina replies[153] — or that he had spoken of sin in a more general manner, in the same way in which we have said St. Gregory and the Master spoke. The latter reply appears the more true from the fact that even in the *Summa* he is found to have spoken similarly. That which, however, is adduced from the third part, can also be understood in this way: that the temptation of the flesh is not without sin — not because the movement of the flesh itself is always a sin, but because in whoever that temptation exists it at some time stirs up sin, and because on account of it we do not live without sin. If, therefore, Christ had had it, He would not have lived without sin. Medina offers a different solution: because, he says, the movement of the flesh in Christ could not have anticipated reason, and so would always have been in Him with the consent of the will, and would therefore be a sin. But

this solution does not seem true, because St. Thomas gives a general reason why Christ was not tempted by the flesh — namely that that temptation is not without sin, that is, does not occur in a man without sin. For otherwise he ought to have said that Christ was not tempted by the flesh because in Him specifically such temptation could not exist without sin, on account of the perfect dominion of His reason over the lower powers.

§ 71. Neither is it to be conceded — as some concede — that St. Bonaventure was of a different opinion. For in the first passage he says that the temptation of the flesh is not without sin because it is not without some disorder, in that through it sensuality is moved in a disordered manner — that is, contrary to the order of reason, as he himself explains. But this is not sin except in the general sense stated above. He refers the reader to Dist. 24, as if he were going to treat the matter more expressly there. In that place indeed, in a. 3, q. 1, he finally at the end openly discloses his opinion, saying that the temptation of the flesh is not without sin insofar as sin is considered as it has the formal character of a vice (*vitium*), but not as it has the formal character of a fault (*culpa*). "For as a vice," he says, "it denotes the disorder of some power with respect to the act due to it according to its natural institution; and because such disorder exists in sensuality, so that that disorder is the path to an act worthy of reproach, in this sense sin is posited as being in sensuality." These are his words. This reply plainly agrees with the solution we have already given to the words of the other Doctors.

§ 72. Since, however, Durandus, Altisiodorensis, and Cajetan manifestly profess a different opinion, their argument must be resolved — taken from the claim that the first movements of sensuality are in our power, at least to the extent that reason, if it vigilantly attend, can prevent individual ones even if not all. It is resolved by denying what is assumed; because however much a devout man may be vigilant, nevertheless movements of this kind frequently arise in him which he cannot prevent or avert even individually, although once they have arisen he can immediately repress them. For it is one thing to repress immediately an arisen temptation of the flesh — which we admit to be possible with respect to each individual one — and quite another to prevent and prohibit it from arising — which we deny to be possible. Medina explains this matter well,[154] explaining in what sense it was said by St. Thomas that a man can by rational will repress individual inordinate movements of sensuality if he anticipate them, though not all — and that this alone suffices for the formal character of voluntary sin. Furthermore, that it is impossible for individual movements to be prevented is proved: because a man cannot prevent from the sudden sight, or hearing, or touch of a pleasurable thing, or even from an internal bodily change, there arising in sensuality a disordered movement.

§ XII — Whether a carnal temptation can exist without sin (Tentatio carnis utrum esse possit sine peccato)

§ 73. — that it is to be repressed by reason as soon as it is perceived, but whose first perception, together with the temptation thereby aroused, is not within the power of the person. This is manifest in those who are suddenly awakened when their sensuality has been stirred during sleep: at that moment they certainly do not have it in their power that such a motion should not occur, but only that they should not consent to it. Then, even if it be granted as possible — which those authors maintain — namely that individual motions of concupiscence can each be anticipated by reason before they arise, it will not yet follow from this that every motion of this kind is voluntary; for not even the sins of human beings are voluntary with respect to God, although He could prevent them, but rather it is the permitting of them that is voluntary. In this way,

therefore, there can exist a just reason — as in the case of married persons, and of those who are occupied with hearing confessions, or who for the salvation of their neighbours are bound to teach or preach or give counsel in response to questions on matter of this kind — why such persons permit such motions to arise within themselves: provided, however, that they be diligent to repress and suppress those same motions before they draw them toward consent. For if this were illicit and sinful, it would follow, among other things, that the conjugal act could not be exercised without sin — which is contrary to the teaching of St. Augustine and the other Fathers.[156] Concerning this matter (in Dist. 31 of Book IV).[157]

§ 74. Someone will ask how Cajetan's opinion differs from the doctrine condemned at the Council of Trent.[150] It is answered: it differs to this extent, in that he does not say that concupiscence itself, or the tinder of sin (*fomes*) which remains after baptism, is sin, nor that its motions, if they are involuntary, are sins; but he holds that all motions of concupiscence are in some manner voluntary, and therefore sins. In this matter he does not entirely depart from the error condemned by the Fathers.[148]

§ XIV — Against whom was the curse directed? (In quem serpentem prolata sit maledictio?)

§ 75. It remains, lastly, to explain what meaning the curse pronounced by God against the serpent in these words is to have: "Because thou hast done this, cursed art thou among all cattle and beasts of the earth," etc. Here one must first see whether that curse belongs to the true and natural serpent, or to the devil who spoke in the serpent. For there are those who hold that it belongs only to the devil under the name and figure of the serpent — as St. Augustine[158], Bede[159], Hugh (of St. Victor)[160], Rupert[161], Lyranus[162], and Cajetan[163] in the same passage. Others, however — such as St. John Chrysostom[164], Epiphanius[165] (citing the words of Methodius), St. Basil[166], Ephraem the Deacon as recorded by Moses Bar Cepha[167] — refer this curse to both serpents, the corporeal and the incorporeal. Hence the opinion of certain authors is that it belongs literally to both serpents. This is indeed sufficiently probable, granted that the same passage of Scripture sometimes has more than one literal sense. But because this is rightly called into doubt — on the ground that a plurality of literal senses in the same Scripture appears to be posited needlessly, since the mystical sense is no less truly intended by the Holy Spirit than the literal — it must therefore be said that the words of the curse pertain according to the letter to the corporeal serpent, and according to allegory to the incorporeal and mystical serpent, that is, to the devil.

§ 76. That they pertain to the corporeal serpent is evident from the context of the narrative. For the Lord cursed that very serpent of which Eve had said: "The serpent deceived me, and I ate." Hence it immediately follows that the Lord said to the serpent: "Because thou hast done this," etc. The words of the curse prove the same: in them the serpent is compared with the other beasts of the earth, and God imprecates upon him those things which we now observe in the race of serpents. The general argument also supports this. For since Moses's narrative concerning the cursing of the serpent is no less historical than all that precedes it, and no less so than what is immediately subjoined concerning the cursing of the woman and the man, it is necessary that it be understood similarly according to the proper signification of the words by which it is described.

§ 77. A difficulty arises, however: how this curse can rightly be referred to the true serpent, since the things which God imprecates upon the serpent — such as that he shall eat dust and shall go upon his breast — are natural to the true serpent, belonging to him already before the temptation of man and from the very

beginning of his creation, and therefore could not have been inflicted upon him as a punishment. For what is natural to any creature, since it is a good of that creature's nature, is not inflicted upon it as a punishment.

This is the argument of those who refer the words of the curse only to the devil. Concerning this matter, see in particular Rupert.[168]

§ 78. But on the contrary, a similar difficulty can be raised against the mystical serpent as well. For the devil did not first become liable to the curse at the moment when he deceived the woman by tempting her; he had been subject to it from the time when through pride he turned away from God. From that time he was consigned to eternal punishments, nor did he merit any augmentation of his penalties when he led Eve into sin — no more than he would merit a new punishment from the so many subsequent and daily temptations of men. Wherefore if this argument were to be trusted, the words of the curse could be verified of neither serpent.

§ 79. Certain authors, referring the curse to the true serpent in order to evade the said difficulty, say that the serpent was originally of the genus of quadrupeds and ate herbs after their manner, but that after the devil had used him as his instrument for the temptation of man, by the sentence of the divine curse he was deprived of his feet, began to creep on the ground, and received earth for his food. This is the opinion of Josephus[17], St. Basil,[166], St. John Chrysostom,[164], Ephraem the Deacon as recorded by Moses Bar Cepha,[169], and of Paul of Burgos together with certain others. And lest it seem incredible that the serpent once had feet, Pliny is cited,[170] as reporting that serpents with the feet of geese have sometimes been seen. Others, however, do not say that the serpent once had feet, but hold that he walked erect on his anterior part and on his whole breast, just as the basilisk still walks, according to the authority of Pliny.,[171] In this opinion are Bede,[172] and the Master of the *Historia Scholastica*,[173] who adds besides that the Pharean serpent, as is reported, still walks erect. Prudentius also,[174] indicates that he shares this view.

§ 80. That these opinions ought not to appear absurd or improbable, certain authors endeavour to show from the fact that, since all living creatures were created for the sake of man, it is no wonder if some species of creature was somewhat altered in its exterior form and members on account of man — seeing that the whole earth itself was changed on account of man. It is no wonder, they say, if the serpent is said to have been deprived of his feet on account of man, given that among men themselves there are many who are lame, blind, and maimed, yet of whom individually it is beyond doubt that each is by nature more excellent than any entire species of irrational animal. They add the example of the Dead Sea perpetually exhaling smoke, which is established to have become such on account of the sins of men.

§ 81. To others, on the contrary, it seems that through this curse nothing in the nature and form of the serpent was changed. For if God took away nothing natural from either angel or man on account of their own sin, then neither did He take anything from the serpent on account of another's sin. And, they say, granting that that particular serpent which was the instrument of the devil was so punished by God that something natural was taken from him, there was no reason why the entire genus of serpents — even those which were not to be descended from that one — should be stricken with the same punishment. For the cases of the accursed earth and the Dead Sea, they deny, are analogous, since in neither was the nature of the element changed; only worse qualities were introduced — qualities which, according to the nature originally established, each was capable of receiving — although it does not appear that the Dead Sea had existed at all beforehand, since that place was occupied by the cities and fields of the Pentapolis.

§ 82. The opinion of these authors, therefore, is that the curses of the serpent, absolutely speaking, were natural to the serpent, but that in a certain manner, after that temptation and the consequent transgression of the first human beings, they became as it were punishments and afflictions for him — not indeed with respect to the serpent, who felt no punishment from them, but with respect to man. For those things which had previously been natural to the serpent, after the transgression of man (procured through him as an instrument) ceased in the eyes of men to be natural and became instead an eternal reproach, hatred, and execration. For whereas before he would not have been hateful and execrable to man, after the sin he became hateful and execrable to man on account of those same things. And there is a kind of punishment for the serpent in this: that from that time man, above all other animals, hates him, shudders at him, abhors him, and strives by every means to harm and destroy him.

§ 83. This point is illustrated by the example of death, which came upon man on account of sin. For death is natural to man, if only his own nature is considered, abstracting from the gift of immortality (*donum immortalitatis*); and yet that same death became for man the punishment of sin after the transgression, once he had been stripped of that gift and left to his own nature. Just as death, then, became a punishment for man, so did creeping on the ground become a punishment for the serpent, which had previously been its nature. They add a parallel case: the rainbow, which, although it appeared naturally in the sky before the Flood, God after the Flood instituted as a sign that the flooding of the earth would never occur again. In this manner the Author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament[175] indicates that the curse is fittingly applied to the true serpent. Many of the more recent authors follow him.

§ 84. But whether the true serpent be understood to have been cursed by God in this way or in some other, it can still be asked: why was the serpent punished who did not sin and could not sin at all? For this argument is urged by Lyranus and others against this interpretation. But it is easily answered: this was done not for the sake of the serpent, but for the sake of man, inasmuch as all living creatures, along with other corporeal things, were obliged to serve man's use — whether this was for their good or ill. For to the use of men animals are slaughtered and subjected to hard labours. Therefore it is no wonder if the serpent who did not sin was made liable to the curse on account of man who did sin, and that for these causes:

First, in detestation of the devil who had used this instrument to tempt and to destroy man.

Second, in abomination of the instrument itself — that is, the serpent through whom man was induced to sin, and with whom the woman herself had sinned. For so also in the Law (Lev. 20) the beast with which anyone has sinned is ordered to be slain.

Third, so that whenever man looked upon the serpent he would be reminded of his fall. This cause is indicated by Prudentius.[176]

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§ XV — What is the sense of the curse pronounced upon the serpent? (Quis sensus maledictionis in serpentem latæ?)

§ 85. Let us now expound the very words of the curse as referred to both serpents. And first, indeed, in that sense in which they were spoken to the bodily serpent. Now it is not absurd, as Lyranus supposes, that the Lord should speak to a brute and unintelligent serpent; for neither absurdly did Christ become silent before

one incapable of understanding. For these things are done for the sake of the understanding human being, as was said above. And nevertheless, utterances of this kind always have their own effect in those things to which they are directed. For it cannot be that the word of God is frustrated of its effect — Is. 55.[177] Moreover, the Lord does not first interrogate the serpent by saying, "Why have you done this?" as He had interrogated the man and the woman beforehand; partly because, after the devil had ceased to use the serpent once his business was accomplished, no response was any longer expected from a mute and irrational serpent; and partly because the devil himself, who had spoken through the serpent, could neither confess his own sin nor had any ground whatsoever on which to excuse himself, as St. Augustine says.[178]

§ 86. God therefore says to the serpent: "Because you have done this, cursed are you among all living things and beasts of the earth" — that is: because you were the instrument for deceiving the woman and for inducing her to transgress my commandment, therefore among the entire race of terrestrial creatures you shall be most of all despised and vile, and to man himself most hateful and execrable. This curse is unfolded in three parts.

The *first* is: "Upon your breast" — and, as the Seventy add, "upon your belly" — "shall you go." For whereas all the other creatures of the earth are either borne aloft on wings, or walk on feet, whether for walking or for leaping, the serpent race alone, as the most abject of all, without feet, with its breast pressed down upon the earth, moves forward: the vileness of which motion is shown by this argument, that a man makes himself more vile if he wishes to imitate such creeping by casting himself upon the ground, than if he were to imitate flight, or leaping, or the gait of four-footed beasts.

The *second*: "Earth shall you eat all the days of your life." Than which kind of food nothing is more vile. For earth is the lowest and most contemptible element. And the serpent is said to draw its venom from it. Hence some hold that serpents enclosed in lead caskets and provided with some other food are thereby rendered harmless, inasmuch as they are deprived of venom.

The *third*: "I will put enmities between you and the woman, between your seed and her seed; she shall crush your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel." This enmity, according to the literal sense, is the irreconcilable hatred between Eve and her posterity — that is, the human race — and the race of serpents. For man naturally hates the serpent and strives wherever he can to slay and destroy it; and to accomplish this he crushes its head, without which it cannot survive, since other members, once cut off, are accustomed even so to move together with the rest of the body. Now that certain persons are read to have loved the company of serpents — such as what Suetonius recounts of the Emperor Tiberius, that he had a certain serpent so much as a pet that it took food from his hand — must be judged to have proceeded from some unnatural affection, either of body or of mind, just as it is likewise with those who take pleasure in eating charcoal. The serpent, too, in turn hates man equally and desires to destroy him; and since it cannot raise itself up to strike at his head or belly, it lies in wait for his heel — that is, it strives secretly and unexpectedly to fix a bite in his foot or the sole of his foot.

§ 87. Now in what manner these same things mystically fit the incorporeal serpent — that is, the devil — must be stated briefly. The devil is cursed among all the living creatures of the earth: either because, on account of his pride, being consigned to eternal malediction, he has been made more vile than every creature; or because whatever appears in beasts as corporally filthy, foul, and deceitful, all that is found in the devil spiritually and to a far greater degree; or finally, because he alone surpasses in malice all beasts — that is, all

men who are like beasts, namely sinners. He goes upon his breast and belly, as St. Augustine expounds,[178] because he tempts men to be led astray by two ways, namely through pride, which the breast signifies, and through lust, which is signified by the belly. Or, according to St. Gregory,[179] because he both suggests the thought of evil and impels to the consummation of the same — so that by the belly is signified the execution of the work of lust, and by the breast the desire and will for the same. Furthermore, St. Ambrose[180] and St. Jerome[181] interpret this part of the curse as referring to the cunning and deceits of the devil, as signified by that winding and tortuous creeping of the serpent upon the earth.

§ 88. The devil eats earth, as St. Augustine[182] and St. Gregory[183] interpret it, because men caught up in earthly desires are the devil's food, which he both most avidly snatches and strives to devour and consume. Hence Peter speaks of him in 1 Pet. 5: "who, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour." The enmities between the serpent and the woman and between the seed of both signify the enmities and perpetual warfare between the devil and his seed — who are the children of wickedness (Matt. 13), that is, the children of the devil (for he is called *wicked* and *evil* par excellence, both in that passage and elsewhere) — and between the woman and her seed, that is, the elect. For God is not here speaking, according to the mystical sense, of any seed whatsoever of the woman — that is, of human beings of any kind — but of that which is set in opposition to the seed of the devil, namely reprobate men. Now God foretells these enmities between both seeds as future, yet at the same time promises victory to the seed of the woman against the mystical serpent and his seed, namely in those words: "She shall crush your head; you shall lie in wait for her heel." For the sense is: although it shall come to pass that you shall perpetually lie in wait for the heel of the woman and of her seed, yet she herself with her seed shall carry off the victory by crushing your head.

§ 89. But what is mystically signified by the head of the serpent and by the heel of man is not a matter of one opinion among all. Yet those who explain the matter most fittingly appear to be those who by the head of the serpent understand the dominion of the devil, namely that which consists in this: that he subjects man to himself through sin. Likewise, by the heel of man they understand something worse and lower within man himself, such as his external and bodily goods, and the body itself in relation to the soul, and in the parts of the soul the sensitive appetite. Therefore the seed of the woman — that is, the elect — crush the head of the serpent, because they combat and overcome the dominion and tyranny of the devil over themselves, in that by penance and a new life they destroy their former sins and no longer give consent to his suggestions toward new sins. To this the Apostle looked when he wrote in Rom. c. ult.: "And the God of peace shall crush Satan under your feet speedily." And this the Psalmist sings of the just man: "You shall walk upon the asp and the basilisk, and you shall trample underfoot the lion and the dragon."[184]

§ 90. But the serpent himself — that is, the devil — lies in wait for the heel of man, or, as it stands in the Hebrew, crushes his heel, because, so far as the elect are concerned, he prevails only against that which in them is innermost and inferior — namely against their external goods, which he is often permitted to take away from the elect either directly or through evil men as his seed; likewise against the body, which he is permitted to afflict in various ways and sometimes to kill, yet without harm to the soul, indeed with great profit to the soul, as in the holy Martyrs, in holy Job, and in very many others, who through these same bodily and temporal losses were made victors over the devil. He also crushes, or bites, and infects with his venom the heel of man through this: that he holds the lower part of the soul — that is, the sensitive appetite, and even the will in its undeliberated acts — still to some degree captive under sin on account of the vice of concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), by which those parts remain infected until man is set free from the body of this death, as the

Apostle says in Rom. 7. Yet this captivity does not render man simply subject to the devil. For, as immediately follows in ch. 8: "There is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ has freed them from the law of sin and of death" — and thus also from the power of the devil, who assuredly does not reign in us except through sin.

§ XV [continued] — What was the first sin of Adam? (Quod fuerit primum Adæ peccatum?)

§ 91. That the first man's sin was not one but many — into which he fell through the devil's temptation — is taught by St. Ambrose,[185] St. Augustine,[186] and St. Gregory[187] — whose words the Master records in the preceding Distinction, § D.[187] Now these authors enumerate several sins which they say are found in that single transgression of our first parent. All of these can be reduced to the following eight: pride, inordinate love of his wife, curiosity to experience the forbidden fruit, doubt concerning the meaning of the divine precept, the opinion that transgression of it would be venial, the sin of gluttony, the sin of disobedience, and the excusing of the sin he had committed — in which last is contained also the accusation of God.

§ 92. It is asked, therefore, which of these sins was the first in that transgression. Some think it was unbelief (*infidelitas*), first because this is what the serpent first endeavored to persuade — as is gathered from the various Scriptural testimonies by which the devil is called the seducer of the human race and its deceiver, such as Wis. 2: *"By the envy of the devil death entered into the world"*; Jn. 8: *"He was a murderer from the beginning."* And to name those which call the devil the serpent: Rev. 12: *"And that great dragon was cast out, that ancient serpent, who is called the devil and Satan"*; and Rev. 20: *"And he laid hold of the dragon, the ancient serpent, which is the devil and Satan."* From which *draconis* appellation St. Augustine infers — writing in his *Cosmopœia*, as he calls it — that the serpent of which the devil made use for supplanting man had been, as it were, the king of the whole race of serpents.[188] Likewise Perez, who in lib. 6 of his *Commentary on Genesis* conjectures that the serpent was a scaly one, both because it is an animal of handsome form and because it attracts those looking upon it by its beauty. For in these two genera the name of dragon does not fit: for a dragon is properly a serpent of enormous size, in which it has reached full growth. On the whole, then, one must understand by the serpent that one to which the parts of the curse pronounced upon it apply: namely to go upon the breast, to eat earth, and to lie in wait for the heel of man.

1. The chunk begins in mid-sentence, continuing an argument from the preceding distinction concerning the terms of the curse on the serpent in Gen. 3:14–15.
2. The proof that Christ was not tempted by internal imagination is promised below in the commentary.
3. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, final homily, and *Homily: That God is not the author of evil*.
4. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 2.
5. Epiphanius, *Against the Heresy of the Ophites* (*In Haeresi Ophitarum*).
6. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, homilies 16 and 17.
7. Theodoret, *Questions on Genesis*, qq. 31 and 32.
8. St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* II, ch. 10.

9. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 2 and following chapters, and again ch. 27 and following; and *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11.
10. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 28.
11. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 27.
12. Wis. 2:24; Jn. 8:44; 2 Cor. 11:3; Rev. 12:9; Rev. 20:2.
13. Eugubinus (Agostino Steuco), *Cosmopœia* [abbreviation as in source].
14. Pererius (Benedictus Pererius), *Commentaria in Genesim*, lib. 6.
15. Cf. Gen. 3:14–15.
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the place cited above (*ubi supra*).
17. Josephus, *Antiquitates Judaicae* I, ch. 1.
18. Moses bar Cephas (Barcephas), *De Paradiso*, ch. 27, citing the opinion of the Blessed Ephrem.
19. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 29.
20. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* VIII, ch. 41; Valerius Maximus, lib. 1, *De Miraculis*.
21. Julius Obsequens, *De Prodigiis*.
22. St. Cyril, *Contra Iulianum* III.
23. Procopius, *Commentary on Genesis*.
24. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165, a. 2, ad 4.
25. Matt. 10:16.
26. Epiphanius, *Adversus Haereses* (on the heresy of the Ophites).
27. Ps. 57:5–6 (Vulgate). See St. Augustine and other commentators on this verse.
28. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* VIII, ch. 17.
29. Hugh of St. Victor, *De bestiis et aliis rebus* III, ch. 53; St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, at the present Distinction.
30. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 16 and 17.
31. Author of *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 31.
32. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 2.
33. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 16.
34. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 3.
35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2.
36. Estius refers to his commentary on Distinction 15 of this same Book II, where he demonstrated that no animal was harmful to man in the state of innocence.
37. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* I, ch. 6 [abbreviation as in source: *libr. 1. Contra Julianum cap. 6.*].
38. Estius refers forward to his commentary on Distinction 23 of Book II.
39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4.
40. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum* III [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 3. Contra Julian.*].
41. Phil. 2:3.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; and *In II Sent.*, at the present Distinction.
43. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, at the present Distinction.
44. Gen. 2:19–20.

45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165; and *Summa theologiae* III, q. 4, a. 4.

46. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 12.

47. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 30.

48. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum* III.

49. Rupert, *In Genesim* III, ch. 4.

50. 2 Cor. 11:14–15.

51. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (Heresy of the Cainites) [abbreviation as in source: *in Heresi Cainanorum*].

52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1.

53. Rupert, *In Genesim* III, ch. 5.

54. The Master (of the Sentences), *In II Sent.*, dist. 21 (present distinction); Hugh of St. Victor, *ad loc.*

55. Gen. 3:22.

56. Dan. 4; Amos 5; Acts 8.

57. Sir. 10; Tob. 4.

58. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, chs. 5, 35.

59. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 9.

60. Prosper, *De Vita contemplativa* II, ch. 19.

61. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 2, reply to obj. 2; and *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1.

62. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 3, reply to obj. 2.

63. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 19; Gen. 3:22.

64. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 3.

65. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, dist. 21, q. 1.

66. Alexander of Hales (*Altisiodorensis*), *Summa* II, tract. 10, ch. 3, q. 4.

67. Francis of Meyronnes (*Franciscus Mayronis*), *In II Sent.*, dist. 21.

68. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11.

69. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 10.

70. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* II, q. 104, n. 6.

71. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 3; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 21 (present distinction).

72. Albert the Great, Aegidius of Rome, St. Bonaventure, Richard (of St. Victor), Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), and others writing on the present distinction.

73. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* (as cited above).

74. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 26.

75. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 3.

76. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13.

77. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 3 (same place).

78. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXIII, ch. 10.

79. Cajetan, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 89, a. 3 (place long since cited).

80. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114; and II-II, q. 165.

81. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 106 [abbreviation as in source].

82. Job 7:1 (Vulgate: *Militia est vita hominis super terram*).

83. The Master (of the Sentences) [i.e. Peter Lombard], following St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Hom. 16.

84. Cf. 1 Jn. 2:16.

85. Jas. 1:13.

86. Jas. 1:14.

87. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Hom. 16.

88. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 14; *De Sermone Domini in monte* I, on Matt. 5:28; *Sermo* 44 *de verbis Domini*.

89. Bede, *In Epistolam Jacobi*, on Jas. 1 (*Concupiscentia cum conceperit*, etc.).

90. Jas. 1:15.

91. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 41; and II-II, q. 165.

92. The preceding argument concerning dreams in the state of integrity continues the discussion from § VIII above.

93. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 165, a. 2, ad 2.

94. Ps.-Ambrose (Ambrosiaster), *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos*, ch. 1. Estius notes that the authorship of these commentaries is disputed; they are printed under the name of St. Ambrose but are ascribed by many scholars to a different author — variously identified as Hilarius the Deacon (a Roman Deacon connected with the Luciferian schism), and distinguished from St. Ambrose of Milan. Philip Labbe, Natalis Alexander, and Dionysius Petavius are among those cited in the editorial note appended in the source as supporting Hilarius the Deacon as the true author; the Benedictines of the Congregation of St. Maur likewise address the question in their edition.

95. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* as above (III, q. 41; II-II, q. 165).

96. Lk. 4:13.

97. Rupert [of Deutz], *In Genesim* [abbreviation as in source].

98. Cajetan [Thomas de Vio], commentary on Genesis [abbreviation as in source].

99. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, bk. 32, toward the end.

100. This concludes the argument of § IX–X. The reply is that it pertains to man's natural condition to receive exterior objects through the senses; but it does not pertain to his original (pre-lapsarian) condition that his imagination should be altered by any external agent other than God or a good angel acting by God's command — and therefore interior diabolical suggestion had no place in Christ or in the first parents.

101. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 3; I-II, q. 80, a. 4.

102. The Master (of the Sentences) [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, dist. 6.

103. Estius refers back to Distinctio 3 of the present book (*ad Distinct. 3. hujus lib.*).

104. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, bk. (ch. 4, part 4).

105. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, bk. 3.

106. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 28.

107. St. John Damascene [abbreviation as in source — *lib. de fide*].

108. St. Ambrose [or Ambrosiaster], *In Lucam*, bk. 4 (on Lk. 4).

109. St. Jerome, *In Hieremiam*, on Jer. 16.

110. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia*, Hom. 18.

111. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 3; and I-II, q. 80, a. 4.

112. Origen, *Periarchon* (De Principiis), bk. 3, ch. 2.

113. Gennadius, *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, ch. 82.

114. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 3 *de diversis*.

115. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia* [passage cited above].

116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 7, in the body and ad 2.

117. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 114, a. 3 (as cited above).

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3; and q. 80, a. 3, ad 3; likewise II-II, q. 152, a. 1, ad 2; and again III, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3.

119. Gal. 5.

120. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 1, ch. 1; bk. 3, ch. 17; *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, bk. 2, ch. 28; *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14; *Retractationum*, bk. 1, chs. 13 and 15.

121. Mk. 7:15 (Estius cites "Mk. 15" following the Vulgate chapter numbering of his edition, but the reference is to Mk. 7:15).

122. Jas. 1.

123. St. Augustine, *Retractationum*, bk. 1, ch. 15.

124. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, bk. 2, ch. 14; *De Peccatorum Meritis*, bk. 1, ch. 35; bk. 2, ch. 4; and elsewhere.

125. St. Augustine, *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, near the end; Ep. 100 (or Ep. 16 in the Benedictine edition) to Asellicus; *Expositio Psalmi* 110, Conc. 3; and the last homily among the Ten Homilies (= *Sermo* 361 in the class-4 sermons of the Benedictine edition).

126. St. Augustine, *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum*, ch. 15.

127. Hilary, whose words are cited in St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 2, ch. 8.

128. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, Hom. 52.

129. St. Cyril, *In Joannem*, bk. 4, ch. 51 [i.e. on Jn. 6].

130. Prosper, bk. 3, *De Vita Contemplativa*, ch. 19 [abbreviation as in source].

131. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3.

132. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 19, ch. 4.

133. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 152, a. 1, ad 2.

134. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, this Dist. (21), a. 2, q. 2.

135. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 23, a. 1, q. 3.

136. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta*, bk. 6, q. 22 [abbreviation as in source].

137. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5. Estius also notes in the margin (footnote c in the source) the censure of propositions 50, 51, and 75 proscribed by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII, and the propositions of Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

138. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, at the places cited above.

139. St. Gregory the Great, last Epistle (to Augustine, Bishop of the English) [abbreviation as in source — *in ult. Ep. quae est ad Augustinum Anglorum Episcopum*].

140. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 4, ch. 10; and bk. 19, ch. 4 (second citation below in the text).

141. St. Augustine, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, bk. 1, ch. 23; and ch. 27.

142. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.* (Commentary on the Master), this Dist.; the citations refer to his commentary on the *Sentences*, not the *Summa*.

143. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 51, a. 1.

144. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2; and ad 3; and a. 4 of the same question.

145. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 21 (on the text of the Master); and Dist. 24, a. 2, q. 2; and a. 3, q. 1.

146. Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain), *In II Sent.*, q. 1, on this Dist. (21); and on Dist. 24, q. 5.

147. Altisiodorensis (William of Auxerre), *Summa*, bk. 2, tract. 28, qq. 1 and 2.

148. Cajetan, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 74, aa. 3 and 4.

149. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 2; bk. 6, ch. 5 and ch. 8; *Sermo* 5 (= *Sermo* de Verbis Apostoli, or in the Benedictine edition as noted).

150. Council of Trent, Session 5, canon 5.

151. Estius refers forward to Dist. 30 of this book.

152. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 80, a. 3.

153. Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3.

154. Medina, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, at the end of his commentary on that article.

155. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, and q. 80, a. 3; likewise I-II, q. 152, a. 1, ad 2; and again I-II, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3.

156. Estius refers to the teaching, treated more fully below, that conjugal intercourse can be exercised without sin; see St. Augustine and the other Fathers on this point, discussed at Dist. 31 of Book IV.

157. Estius refers forward to *In IV Sent.*, Dist. 31.

158. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 36 [abbreviation as in source: *lib. 2. de Gen. ad literam cap. 36*; reading the page image confirms *lib. 11. de Gen. ad lit. cap. 36*].

159. Bede, *In Hexaemeron* [abbreviation as in source].

160. Hugh (of St. Victor), *Quaestiones super Genesim* [abbreviation as in source].

161. Rupert, *In Genesim*, Book 3, ch. 18; and *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, Book 2, ch. 15.

162. Lyranus, *Super Genesim* 3 [abbreviation as in source].

163. Cajetan, commentary on Gen. 3 [abbreviation as in source].

164. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim* [abbreviation as in source].

165. Epiphanius, *Adversus haeresin Origenis* [abbreviation as in source: *in Haeresi Origenis*], citing the words of Methodius.

166. St. Basil, *Hexaemeron*, Homily 9.

167. Ephraem the Deacon, as recorded in Moses Bar Cepha, *De Paradiso*, ch. 27.

168. Rupert, *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, Book 2, ch. 15.

169. Ephraem the Deacon, as recorded in Moses Bar Cepha, *De Paradiso*, ch. 27 [the same passage cited above at note 11].

170. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* XI, ch. 46.

171. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* VIII, ch. 21.

172. Bede, commentary on Genesis [abbreviation as in source].

173. The Master of the *Historia Scholastica* [i.e. Peter Comestor, *Historia Scholastica*, on Genesis].

174. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia* [abbreviation as in source: *in Hamart.*].

175. Author of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, quest. 51 [a work attributed in the tradition to St. Augustine, now generally assigned to Ambrosiaster].

176. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia* [abbreviation as in source: *in Hamartigenia*].

177. Is. 55 (the word of God shall not return to Him void).

178. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 17.

179. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXI, ch. 2; and *Regula Pastoralis*, Part III, Admonition 20.

180. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 15; *De Fuga saeculi*, ch. 7.

181. St. Jerome, *Quaestiones super Genesim* [abbreviation as in source: *in Quaestionibus super Genes.*].

182. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 17 (*ubi supra*).

183. St. Gregory the Great, *Expositio Psalmi 4 poenitentialis* [abbreviation as in source].

184. Ps. 90 (91):13.

185. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* IV (on the temptation of the Lord).

186. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 45.

187. The Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, the preceding Distinction, § D.

188. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* [the reference to *Cosmopœia* is the title Augustine uses for part of this work; cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* XI].

DISTINCTIO XXII — ON THE FIRST SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS, PRIDE, AND THE REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS (*DE PRIMO PECCATO PRIMORUM PARENTUM, SUPERBIA, ET RESPONSIO AD OBJECTIONES*)

§ 1. Just as faith is the beginning and root of justice, so infidelity appears to be the beginning and root of injustice and transgression. Thus indeed certain heretics of our time argue, namely in order to defend their dogma that grace of God is lost by infidelity alone. But among Catholics, St. Bonaventure and Scotus are of the opinion that the first sin of Adam was a disordered love toward his wife — not, indeed, a love of carnal concupiscence, which had not yet been stirred up in his members, but of social life and human friendship; led on by this love, so as not to grieve his wife, he made light of the commandment of God, in the manner that often happens to us, that we offend God so as not to offend a friend.[1] St. Augustine might seem to someone to be the author of this opinion. For in his work on the City of God he says: "We must believe that that man did not believe the woman as speaking the truth and was not so seduced, but yielded to a kind of social compulsion."[2] And in the same work on Genesis according to the letter he says: "Adam did not wish to grieve Eve — not, indeed, overcome by the concupiscence of the flesh, which he had not yet felt in his members, but by a certain friendly benevolence, by which it commonly happens that God is offended lest a man become an enemy from a friend."[3] So he says.

§ 2. Yet to this question an answer has in part already been given (at the preceding distinction), where we were treating of the first sin of the woman. For just as in the woman, so also in the man, a hidden elation of mind preceded, before they broke out into open transgression of the divine commandment. Nor indeed is it credible that a man established in such great excellence of justice and wisdom would have been disobedient to God his Creator in a matter so trifling as to abstain from one tree among so many others that were permitted, especially since he was moved toward that tree by no inclination of sense or appetite, had he not first withdrawn from God through pride. This must be thought to have happened not before the external temptation that proceeded from the devil, but after those words of the tempter were heard: "You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." For although Scripture does not say that the words of the serpent were addressed to the man, it must nevertheless not be doubted that the woman reported them to her husband when she invited him to eat of the forbidden fruit. Scripture, narrating the matter most briefly, leaves many things to be understood; and yet it appears clearly enough from what follows that God afterwards reproves Adam, in that he willed to be like God knowing good and evil. For how did he will this, unless the suggestion of the serpent had reached him through the woman?

§ 3. Thus, therefore, it must be settled that Adam, hearing through his wife the words of the serpent by which he had said "You shall be as gods," etc., before he consented to her for the transgression of the divine commandment, conceived pride in his heart. For by those words, led to consideration of his own excellence, he was so turned back upon himself that his heart withdrew from God — as Ecclesiasticus testifies in chapter 10, saying: "The beginning of the pride of man is to apostatize from God: because his heart has departed from him who made him, since the beginning of all sin is pride."[4] Tobias also signifies this in chapter 4 with these words: "In pride all perdition took its beginning."[5] And the Wise Man in Prov. 16: "Before ruin the heart is exalted."[6] St. Augustine uses this text for the present matter.[7]

§ 4. Moreover, Paul in Rom. 5, when he calls the sin of Adam disobedience, saying: "As by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just,"[8] signifies that that sin was pride, because the first act of pride is to be unwilling to submit to another's authority, which is properly called disobedience. Wherefore also St. Augustine in the same work treats pride and disobedience, and likewise humility and obedience, as equivalent.[9] Now the Apostle speaks there of Adam's first sin, because he is dealing with that sin through which justice was lost and the whole of posterity infected with sin. These, moreover, are the effects of the first sin. But the pride of Adam was reproved by God with particular force, and not without sarcasm, when, expelling him from paradise, He said: "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil."[10] From these words it is plainly established that Adam had desired what the serpent had promised — namely, to be like God, knowing good and evil. That this was his first sin appears sufficiently, both from the fact that no other temptation is read to have preceded that of so great a promise, and because whatever other sin of his may be named is more naturally suited to follow from pride than the reverse, as we shall soon show.

§ 5. This opinion the Fathers hand down constantly, and St. Augustine above all in many places, in which he demonstrates by learned reasoning that in man as in the demon there could have been no beginning of an evil will other than pride.[11] He repeats this also in the same work,[12] where, enumerating the sins of the first transgression of man, he assigns the first place to pride. The following are the words of St. Augustine: "The first humans, deceived and cast down by the serpent, would not have fallen, unless they had wished to have more than they had received, to be more than they had been made. For this was what he had promised, saying: 'You shall be as gods.'"[13] Similar things he transmits in his Commentaries on the Psalms.[14] Moreover, it is the general opinion of St. Augustine that "in the will of man an appetite for his own power precedes, so that he becomes disobedient through pride."[15]

§ 6. The same doctrine concerning the first man is that of St. Basil in his homily on the proposition that God is not the author of evils,[16] and of St. Ambrose in his commentary on Lk. 4,[17] where he says that man was deceived not by appetite for food, nor by forgetfulness of the precept, but by alluring ambition for the promised honour. Also that of St. John Chrysostom,[18] of Leo in his fifth sermon on the Nativity of the Lord,[19] of Prosper in his work on the contemplative life,[20] where he says of the first human beings: "They would not have forsaken God unless they had grown proud and damnably desired the likeness of God." Also of Fulgentius,[21] of Eucherius,[22] of St. Gregory,[23] of St. John Damascene,[24] of St. Bernard,[25] of Rupert,[26] and finally of the Master (in this distinction)[27] and of all the Scholastics, and especially of St. Thomas[28] and Cajetan[29] defending the common opinion against Scotus.

§ 7. Now their most powerful argument is this: Among evil acts, internal ones are prior to external ones, both with regard to spiritual objects and sensible ones. But there could not be in the soul a disordered appetite

for a sensible good, unless the soul itself had first been turned away from God. For as long as it remained subject to God, the lower part also remained perfectly subject to the higher; and the lower part could not fail in subjection to the higher before the higher had first failed in its subjection to God. Now among internal acts, those which concern the end are prior to those which concern the means. For means are desired on account of the end; but the end of man in evil things is his own excellence, which is the proper object of pride; therefore it is necessary that pride was the first sin of the first human beings. This argument is found in St. Thomas,[28] and it is consonant with the doctrine which St. Augustine transmits at greater length concerning the first sin of man.[7]

§ 8. Another argument: The first human beings were above all tempted by the sin of pride through those words, "You shall be as gods"; therefore by that sin they first fell. Another argument: The devil wished to draw man into ruin through that sin through which he himself had first fallen; but he fell through pride, as has been shown (at Distinction 6);[30] therefore through pride man was precipitated into his fall. This argument is contained in the words of St. Basil (in the homily cited above)[31] and of St. Gregory.[32] Another argument: Christ restored and raised the human race from the state of sin to the state of grace through humility and obedience; therefore Adam through pride and disobedience cast the human race down from the state of first innocence into the state of sin. St. Augustine points to this argument,[33] which is grounded in many Scriptures commending above all the humility and obedience of Christ in the work of our restoration, as in Rom. 5, Phil. 2, and elsewhere. Also in the prayers of the Church, such as: "O God, who by the humility of Thy Son didst raise up a world lying prostrate," etc.

§ II — Reply to the objections (Responsio ad objectiones)

§ 9. The arguments of those who make not pride but some other thing the first sin of man must now be resolved. And indeed to those two that were adduced for infidelity we reply as follows. To the first: that in the words of the serpent the statement "You shall not die" is indeed heard before "You shall be as gods," etc.; but that in the intention of the one tempting it was the prior purpose that man, upon hearing this latter statement, should be moved to a disordered love of his own excellence, rather than that he should believe what was said first — and that this in fact came to pass. For upon hearing the whole proposition of the serpent, the thought of both man and woman dwelt upon the final words, which contained the promise of some signal excellence. Hence, pride being conceived from this, they were immediately so blinded by it that they also believed to be true that which was first in the tempter's words, namely "You shall not die." To the second objection: that the inference is vitiated and that rather the opposite of the consequent follows from that antecedent. For what is first in generation is usually last in dissolution. For in an animal the heart lives first and dies last, as does the root in plants. So in a building the foundation is laid first but overturned last; and so in other things. Wherefore, if faith is the beginning and foundation of justice, it follows that in the destruction of justice it is not the first but rather the last thing to be removed. Therefore infidelity, by which faith dies and is overturned as it were, will be not the beginning but rather the end and consummation of injustice. This is also consistent with Holy Scripture, which teaches that the faithful sink at last through an evil life to the point that they also lose faith itself. Hence the Apostle in 1 Tim. 1 says: "Having faith and a good conscience, which some, having rejected, have made shipwreck concerning the faith."[35] And in chapter 6: "The root of all evils is covetousness, which some coveting have erred from the faith."[36] Hence Prosper says that it comes about by the just judgment of God that he who was unwilling to exercise charity loses a useless faith. Therefore St.

Augustine rightly testifies that it is not pride that is born of infidelity, but that infidelity itself is the mother of pride.'[37]

§ 10. Furthermore, to the texts of St. Augustine adduced by those who think that a disordered love of his wife was the first sin of Adam, the answer is ready from St. Augustine himself. For he indeed holds that a love of this kind was prior to the open disobedience by which Adam transgressed the divine commandment. And he holds this rightly; for Scripture itself sufficiently signifies it, where it records God's saying to Adam: "because you listened to the voice of your wife and ate of the tree," etc. Yet St. Augustine does not wish that this sin was the very first in the man. On the contrary, he openly teaches that a hidden pride had already preceded in him: "Unless," he says (among other things),[38] "he had been turned away from the superior immutable good to please himself, he would not have come to the point of preferring the word of his wife to the commandment of God; nor would he have obeyed his wife to the point of transgressing the precept, if he were not unwilling to forsake even the companion of his life, though she went along into the companionship of sin." Nor does it stand in the way that St. Augustine says in the same work on Genesis according to the letter,[39] that Adam, when he consented to his wife for eating the forbidden fruit, did not yet feel concupiscence in his members — as if it were a consequence of this that he had not yet lost his first innocence before this consent; to which, without any doubt, the stirring and law of the members immediately succeeded upon the loss of innocence. For St. Augustine did not say that he did not yet have concupiscence in his members, but that he did not yet feel it. For concupiscence is present even when it is not felt.

§ 11. Moreover, it could come to pass that, although concupiscence was present in him, that rebellion which afterwards made itself manifest did not immediately break out in his members, when, after the transgression was consummated — as Scripture says — the eyes of both were opened and they knew that they were naked. Indeed, this very thing was greatly congruent with divine justice, that when man sinned inwardly, he should also be punished inwardly through the vice of concupiscence assailing the powers of the soul; but when he broke out into the external act of transgression, he should also be punished through the open and conspicuous rebellion of the members, of which it is said: "And the eyes of both were opened," etc.[40]

§ III — What was the pride of the first human beings? (Quae fuerit primorum hominum superbia?)

§ 12. Certain persons attempt to show by the following argument that pride was not the first sin of the human being. If pride had been the first sin of the human being, he would have committed it by desiring that excellence which the serpent was promising when he said "You shall be as Gods" — that is, Divinity. But the human being, before he sinned, knew that this was impossible for him, inasmuch as he had not yet been affected by any error; therefore he could not have desired it either. It is therefore necessary to posit some other sin as the first — such as unbelief, or something similar. This argument raises the question wherein precisely the pride of the first human beings consisted, that is, what excellence they desired.

§ 13. To explain this difficulty, certain persons posit certain degrees in the sin of pride of the first human beings. They say that both in the transgressing angels and in the first parents there was an inception, a progress, and a consummation of pride. The inception lay in an excessive and disordered regard for their own excellence; the progress in rebellion against God; the consummation in the appetite for equality with God —

not in the sense that they would simply be God, but that they would be like God in this respect, that they would be subject to no one but would be solely of their own will. To teach this they adduce St. Augustine from the place already frequently cited[42] — where, having defined pride as the appetite for a perverse loftiness, he expounds this very point and adds: "For perverse loftiness is this: to desert that principle to which the mind ought to cleave, and to become in some fashion and to be a principle to oneself. This happens when one is too well pleased with oneself." And below: "It was pleasing that it was said: 'You shall be as Gods.' They could have been better by cleaving to the supreme and true principle through obedience, rather than becoming their own principle through pride." And again: "The human being, by desiring more, becomes less — for while he chose to be self-sufficient, he fell away from him who was truly sufficient for him." And so on with what follows.[43] The same St. Augustine, in Sermon 21 on Psalm 118,[44] says that what the human being wished to be his own — that is, to be his own master — was the first and greatest evil of disobedience. The same author, in Tractate 4 on the Epistle of John,[45] places the pride of the human being in his wishing to be of his own power and not to be subject to the will of God. Similar things are to be read in him in the exposition of Ps. 68, in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 8, ch. 13, and in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, book 2, ch. 15,[46] and in Prosper in the Letter to Demetrias.[47]

§ 14. From these and other similar statements of the Fathers they gather that the first parents desired equality with God to this extent: that just as God is subject to no other and depends on none but is himself sufficient for all things and is the first principle of all his own actions, so they no longer wished to have God as their illuminator and their ruler; pleased with their own excellence to such a degree that they thought themselves sufficient for a happy life. For indeed those who think and desire this lay claim for themselves to the divine property — namely, to be of one's own right and power and to have no superior. Hence such persons interpretatively and consequently truly desire Divinity itself, since they desire that excellence which is proper to God alone, so that it is impossible for it to be communicated to creatures.

§ 15. To others, however, it seems that the pride of the human being went so far that he properly and expressly desired Divinity and wished to be God. This appears to be proved in the first place by the example of Satan his tempter, of whom we showed at Distinction 6[48] that it is probable he properly desired Divinity. And it is plausible that by him the same poison was infused into the human being that he himself had drunk — so that by what he himself had fallen, he might drag the human being also into a fall. Finally, because the Fathers, in assigning the reason why God willed to restore fallen humanity and not the fallen angel, nowhere say that this was done because the human being had desired a lesser excellence than the angel, but rather because the angel sinned without being tempted while the human being sinned when tempted, or at any rate they adduce other reasons.

§ 16. To this is added what St. Augustine says in Sermon 24 on the Seasons, ch. 2:[49] "When you were human, you willed to be God; He, when He was God, willed to be human." This antithesis seems to demand that, just as God truly and properly willed to be human, so it should be signified that the human being truly and properly willed to be God. Likewise, in the exposition of Ps. 68, on the verse "What I had not taken away, then I restored,"[50] St. Augustine says that the first human beings willed to seize (*rapere*) Divinity. He speaks similarly in Tractate 17 on John.[51] So also Rupert, in book 3 on Genesis, chs. 7, 8, and book 10, on Matt. 26,[52] writes that the first human beings desired Divinity. This is likewise read in other Fathers, as in Irenaeus, book 3 against the Heresies, ch. 22; in Prosper, book 2 of the *Contemplative Life*, ch. 19; and in St. Cyril, book 3 *Against Julian*.[53]

§ 17. Yet it seems that one must say: even if it were not impossible for the human being to desire Divinity properly and by essence, so as truly to will to be God in the manner in which we have shown it probable that the first angel desired Divinity — as was argued at Distinction 6[54] — and therefore the same thing that was said there of the angel could with some probability be said of the human being too, nevertheless the *ratio* of the two is not altogether the same. First: because the nature of the angel is much nobler and more excellent than that of the human being, and therefore could far more readily be an occasion of much greater pride. Second: because the angel sinned without being tempted, and for that reason was deservedly permitted to fall into a pride far greater. Third: because Scripture does not speak similarly of both. For the angel, under the figure of the King of Tyre, said "I am God," and likewise he wished to be adored by Christ as God; whereas to the human being God reproaches only this: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil."[10] Fourth: because the Fathers likewise do not speak similarly of both, as can be gathered from comparing their testimonies cited at Distinction 6[55] with those we have adduced in this place. Fifth: because greater pride ought not to be ascribed to the human being than that to which we read he was tempted by the devil through the serpent. But the serpent did not say "You shall be Gods" but "You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil" — or "as God," for so too it can be rendered from the Hebrew. Therefore in tempting he did not promise Divinity but likeness to God; therefore neither ought we to say that the human being desired more. Finally, this distinction is explicitly set forth among the Scholastics by the Master of Auxerre, in book 2 of his *Summa*, Tract 10, ch. 3, qq. 1 and 2.[56]

§ 18. It seems therefore that those are rightly minded who say that the pride of the first human beings consisted in this: that they wished to be as Gods — that is, that they desired a certain likeness to God, not any sort of likeness (for all of us too are commanded to strive toward likeness to God, namely through the imitation of virtues, according to that saying: "Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"[57]), but one that was forbidden and impossible for the human being: so, namely, that just as God possesses knowledge of all things and needs no ruler and is subject to the power of no one, so they too might know all things, be ruled by no one, be subject to no other, and might live independently by their own right and will. Although, as has been said above, those who will this do consequently desire Divinity itself, for these things are proper to God. This explanation of the pride of the human being St. Augustine conveys sufficiently clearly in the passages adduced at the beginning.[58] And that the seeds of that same pride were left in the human race from that first sin is beyond doubt, especially in those who, wishing to establish their own justice, are unwilling to be subject to the justice of God.[59] Such was certainly the pride of the Philosophers, of the Pharisees, and of the Pelagians. This was also signified by the Parable of the Prodigal Son, who, leaving his father, wished to be of his own right and power.[60]

§ 19. To those things which have been set forth in favour of the other opinion, one can reply as follows. To the first: that Satan tempted the human being through pride, since he himself had fallen through pride — yet he did not wish to tempt him through the same pride by which he himself had fallen, but through that to which he hoped the human being could more easily be induced, as being less alien from the condition of human nature. To the second: that the Fathers therefore do not assign that reason why the human being rather than the angel was restored — namely, that in both they perceived the common crime of pride — since they judged that the subtle distinction of the crime would require more thorough investigation. To those things brought forward from the Fathers: their words must be interpreted as spoken with a degree of amplification, in accordance with the sense which they convey elsewhere. For the human being wished to be God interpretatively or consequently, on account of that appetite for divine likeness — that is, for that

excellence which in reality cannot be found except in God. For this reason he is not incongruously said to have desired Divinity and equality with God and to have wished to seize it. For indeed of the restored human being the Fathers sometimes speak in such a way as to say that God was made human so that the human being might become God — that is, like to God through grace and the works of virtues.

§ 20. Moreover, in what manner the contemplation of his own excellence led the human being away from God and drew him into pride against God can be understood more fully from what has been said at Distinction 6 concerning the origin of pride in the angels.[61]

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§ IV — Whether Adam believed the words of the serpent (Utrum Adam crediderit verbis serpentis)

§ 21. [The Master holds] that not the man but the woman alone believed that what the devil promised through the serpent was true. Now these promises were three in number. The first: that even if they ate of the forbidden tree, they would not die. The second: that if they ate of the tree, they would become like God. The third: that they would receive knowledge of good and evil. The Master bases his position partly on the words of the Apostle, who in 1 Tim. 2 openly denies that Adam was seduced, and partly on the authority of St. Augustine,[63] who denies that the man believed to be true what the serpent was promising, even though the woman believed it. The Master then judges and supposes that the serpent accused God of envying man that excellence which they were to have obtained by eating the forbidden fruit — in which sense the words of the serpent were understood before the Master by St. Augustine,[64] St. Cyril,[65] Rabanus, and not a few others commenting on Genesis. Moreover, the Master, following St. Augustine, holds it probable that the man was not persuaded that God had forbidden the eating of the tree out of envy toward man. To this is added the argument from the fact that the woman confessed in Gen. 3 that the serpent had deceived her, saying: "The serpent deceived me"; whereas the man acknowledges nothing of the kind — which he would willingly have acknowledged and said in his own defense, had he truly been induced to believe the words of the serpent. Furthermore, from those words of the Apostle in 2 Cor. 11, "lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his cunning, so your senses should be corrupted," it follows — since the Apostle is silent about the man — that the man also was not seduced.[66]

§ 22. But the authority of almost all the Fathers resists this opinion, for they clearly teach that Adam gave credence to the words of the serpent and was deceived and seduced by him. Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Trallians,[67] says: "The devil led our first father astray through the woman." Irenaeus[68] says: "Adam, on the occasion of immortality, was at once seized." Hilary[69] says that Adam, pondering the matter, had been beguiled and led into error. Epiphanius, in the heresy of the Cainites,[70] says: "The devil through the woman deceived Eve and Adam." St. Ambrose[71] says: "The woman was deceived, and she herself deceived the man." In the same opinion concur St. John Chrysostom,[72] Cyril,[65] Leo in Sermons 2 and 3 on the Nativity of the Lord,[73] Prosper,[74] Fulgentius,[75] St. Gregory,[76] Prudentius in the *Hamartigenia*,[77] and again St. Ambrose[78] in his works on the subject. And in Genesis they say that the serpent despoiled him.

§ 23. Moreover, St. Augustine himself, although cited by the Master for the contrary view, appears to hold nothing different from the aforementioned Fathers. For writing on Ps. 68, on the verse "What I did not take away I was then paying back,"[50] he says: "Who seized the Divinity? Adam. Who first seized it? He himself who

seduced Adam." And in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 45, he says that in the first sin of Adam there was sacrilege, because he did not believe God.[79] Likewise in book eleven of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chs. 21 and 24,[80] he ascribes to both parents the fact that they believed the serpent. And in book fourteen of *De Civitate Dei*, ch. 17,[81] he notes in both of them the infidelity by which they did not believe God. He says the same again in Sermon 11 on Psalm 118 (*Tractatus de Cantico novo*, ch. 8),[82] having cited the words of the devil — "You shall not die by death, but you shall be as gods" — and then adding concerning Adam: "Despising God he was seduced, believed the serpent, and lost what he had received."

§ 24. Nor indeed is this opinion of the Fathers destitute of scriptural testimony. For in Gen. 3 God reproaches Adam for this sort of credulity with these words: "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil."[10] For by this ironic mode of speaking God signifies what Adam hoped to obtain from tasting the fruit of the tree and yet did not obtain — namely that he would be like God, knowing good and evil. In this sense that passage was understood by St. Ambrose,[83] and Prosper.,[84] Finally: if the woman, who herself also had been created upright and integral and spiritual by God, could through pride — conceived from the serpent's suggestion — be so blinded that she believed the promise of that same serpent, it ought not to seem incredible that the man's mind also, darkened by a similar pride, could have been brought to believe those same words of the serpent.

§ 25. Therefore, from all these considerations it clearly appears that one must say that Adam, just as Eve, gave credence to the promises of the serpent recounted above — since the Fathers make no exception in any case. This will become plainer from what will be taught in the next Distinction: that Adam, by sinning, lost faith in God.[85]

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§ V — How the Apostle can say that Adam was not seduced (Quomodo dicat Apostolus Adamum non esse seductum)

§ 26. What seems contrary to the foregoing doctrine is chiefly that which was alleged from the Apostle, saying in 1 Tim. 2: "Adam was not seduced, but the woman was seduced and was in the transgression." But these words of the Apostle receive various interpretations among the Fathers.

Some understand it thus: Adam was not the first to be seduced, but the woman was. For this was expressed in the preceding sentence: "Adam was first formed, then Eve." So St. Ambrose.[87]

Some understand it in this way: Adam was not seduced by the serpent speaking with him, as Eve was.

Others offer this sense: Scripture does not record that Adam was seduced — in the same sense, namely, as Heb. 7 says that Melchizedek was without father, without mother, etc.

The author of the Commentary inscribed to St. Ambrose (*in Paulum*)[88] interprets it as: Adam was not seduced into transgression — that is, in such a way that he should have been the author of transgression for the woman, in the way the woman seduced was the author of transgression for the man. For in that Commentary the Apostle's words, expressed more precisely from the Greek, read thus: "But the woman was seduced and became the author of transgression."

§ 27. Furthermore, some explain it thus: Adam did not sin being seduced, but the woman sinned being seduced; that is, the man was not persuaded that God had not commanded him not to eat of the tree, but, knowing and deliberately, he transgressed the commandment of God; whereas the woman was persuaded of this by the serpent — since knowledge of the commandment had not come to her immediately from God but through the man, whence it came about that she more easily believed the serpent suggesting that it was not to be thought that God forbade them from eating of that tree. With this, however, it is consistent that the man believed the serpent in what he said: "You shall not die," and "You shall be as gods."

§ 28. Others finally hold that the Apostle's words, taken properly and formally, possess truth; yet from this it does not follow that the man did not believe to be true what the serpent had said. For we believe many false things without being properly seduced and deceived by someone, but led to belief by some other means whatsoever. For properly speaking, he is said to deceive someone who with the intention of deceiving persuades him of a falsehood. In this way the serpent deceived the woman, not the woman the man. For the serpent wished to deceive; but the woman, even though she persuaded the man of a falsehood, did this as one deceived, not as one deceiving; seduced, not seducing — because she did not act with the intention of deceiving, for she thought what she was persuading to be true. But neither did the serpent properly seduce the man, because his speech was not with the man but with the woman. Wherefore it seems one must not say that by any persuasion or exhortation of the serpent the man was induced to believe the words directed to the woman; but rather by love of his own excellence — the sin by which he had first sinned. For everyone willingly believes what he loves. Therefore, properly speaking, the woman did not seduce the man, because she was capable of deceiving; and the serpent likewise did not seduce the man, who applied no persuasion to the man. Hence it is concluded that the man was not seduced.

§ 29. None of these six expositions forces us to understand that Adam did not believe to be true what the serpent had promised. If you ask which of these expositions is the best, this seems to be decided from the purpose of the Apostle, whose aim was to show that a woman ought neither to teach nor to bear rule over a man. That she ought not to bear rule over the man but be subject to him, he proves because Adam was first formed, then Eve. That she ought not to teach but rather learn, he proves hence: because "Adam was not seduced, but the woman was seduced and was in the transgression." This argument aims to show that the woman does not excel in judgment and vigor of mind as the man does, but is of simpler nature and lesser prudence, by reason of which she can more easily be seduced and deceived, and therefore the devil approached not the man but the woman in order to deceive her. To this intention of the Apostle, the last exposition alone seems aptly to correspond. For according to this exposition it is shown that the man was not properly seduced, at least not immediately, but only the woman. The other expositions, however, acknowledge seduction even in the man, because they do not speak of seduction quite so strictly. For the Fathers among whom those expositions are followed, as also the others cited in the preceding section who say openly that Adam was deceived and seduced either by the woman or by the serpent, understood seduction in a material sense — namely as being brought to believe a falsehood, whether this happens by the agency of one who speaks falsehood with the intention of deceiving and by the force of his persuasion, or simply and by occasion only, mediately or immediately.

§ VI — Replies to the remaining objections (Ad cetera objecta responsio)

§ 30. From this bare and simple understanding of the Apostle's words it is now clear that no argument can be drawn from the passages adduced from 2 Cor. 11, in which places it is likewise said of the woman that she was deceived.[90] For it has already been shown that Adam was not properly seduced, and yet that he did give credence to the words of the serpent. As for the passage of St. Augustine (which is in *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 42),[39] it must be replied that St. Augustine in that place does not deny that Adam believed the promises of the serpent, but only says that he believed in such a way as the Apostle speaks of. But if that passage itself be examined, it will appear that St. Augustine wished to say something more. For he brings forward as his reason the fact that Adam was already endowed with a spiritual mind, as though by reason of this he could not be led to believe that God had forbidden the eating of that tree out of envy — for it would follow from that reasoning that he could not have been led to believe the other things either. Moreover, this reasoning is undoubtedly shared by the woman as well, for she too before the fall was endowed with a spiritual mind. Hence it would follow that the woman believed the serpent — which is either what St. Augustine means, or something else. Others therefore answer more correctly, that in that work St. Augustine made many statements by way of disputation rather than of definition, which he himself acknowledges in the *Retractations*. Just as, therefore, he speaks differently elsewhere about the woman, acknowledging in her before the fall a mind perfectly upright — which it is altogether necessary to acknowledge — so also with regard to his denial that the man gave credence to the words of the serpent, the same must be thought. And this is clear from the other passages of St. Augustine himself adduced to the contrary (in the section above).[91]

§ 31. And certainly, if the woman was able — which St. Augustine thinks — to believe and persuade herself in her mind that God had forbidden the eating of the fruit of that tree out of envy, so also was the mind of the man able, through pride, to become so blinded as to believe the same thing. For if pride caused him to say, "The woman whom thou gavest me as a companion, she gave to me of the tree and I did eat" — thereby attributing the blame not merely to the woman but obliquely even to God — he could equally by the impulse of envy have attributed the same thing to God. Moreover, the same St. Augustine, in *De Civitate*, bk. 14, ch. 11,[92] bringing forward the example of Aaron and Solomon, teaches that Adam did not believe his wife as one speaking the truth and was not seduced by her, but yielded out of the social bond of companionship. This is to be understood as referring to that seduction by which it might be thought that God had not commanded them not to eat of the tree. For it is only in this sense that not the man but the woman was seduced — and this corresponds to the fifth interpretation of the Apostle's saying.[93] St. Augustine in the same place places this very distinction between the man and the woman who was seduced: namely, that the man sinned knowingly and deliberately, that is, he transgressed the commandment given to him, whereas the woman did not; and there he adds these words: "Those are to be understood as seduced who do not think that what they do is a sin; but he knew it." Yet, according to the last interpretation of the Apostle's saying, the words of St. Augustine present no difficulty. For he denies not that the man was seduced, but only that he did not believe the things the serpent had said to be true.

§ 32. Indeed, St. Augustine rather affirms this (in the same book, ch. 17),[81] reproving Adam in the fact that he did not believe God — and this precisely because he had believed the serpent, at least in what the serpent had said: "You shall not die." For if he had not believed this, he would not have cast himself into the certain necessity of dying by eating the forbidden fruit.

§ VII — Whether the man or the woman sinned more grievously (Utrum vir an mulier gravius peccaverit)

§ 33. From the preceding question there depends to some extent the determination of the present question: which of the two sinned more grievously, the man or the woman. Although certain knowledge of this matter is to be referred not to human but to the hidden judgment of God, yet something can probably be said about it from those things that have been revealed to us through Scripture.

§ 34. The Master,[95] presupposing, as was said above, that the woman alone gave credence to the serpent's promise of divine likeness from eating the forbidden fruit, consequently thinks that the woman sinned more grievously, because she alone wished to usurp either the likeness or the equality of the Divinity. He cites for this those same passages from St. Augustine that he had already produced to prove this point, and likewise — as in many other instances — Hugh of St. Victor teaching the same things in the *Summa Sententiarum*.[96] Before these, the same opinion had been held by St. John Chrysostom in Homily 7 (*Ad Populum Antiochenum*),[97] where among those three — the serpent, the woman, and the man — he makes the man's sin the least. And in Homily 25 (*In Epistolam ad Romanos*, in the moral exposition),[98] he says that the woman was punished more than the man, because she was the cause of the man's destruction, just as Jezebel also received greater punishment than Ahab the seizer of the vineyard, for the reason that she herself had woven the whole affair and had given the king the occasion for his fall. Rupert also, in book 3 (*In Genesim*, ch. 22, treating those words of Scripture: "To the woman also he said: I will multiply," etc.),[99] says: "The woman is punished with a triple penalty, because her sin was threefold greater than Adam's. First, because, believing the serpent more than God, she was seduced. Second, because she desired with delight the beauty and sweetness of the forbidden tree. Third, because, not content with her own transgression, she induced the man also to transgress. Therefore, by merit of threefold sin, a triple punishment was returned to her over and above the death common to her and to the man." So he says, and much more to the same effect. St. Thomas agrees with this opinion in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 4,[100] and so do both he and most other Scholastics writing on this Distinction. But on the contrary, St. Ambrose, in *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 4,[101] discussing this matter at length as his express subject, adduces many arguments to show that the sin of the man was more grievous. He says the same in his commentary on Luke, on the passage in ch. 4 ("But Simon's mother-in-law was taken with a great fever"):[102] that Eve sinned more through instability of mind than through wickedness. These words are read in the Ecclesiastical Office once and again throughout the year, namely in Lent and on the Saturday after Pentecost. Add to this Isidore, who in *De Summo Bono*, bk. 2, ch. 17,[103] says it is a graver thing to sin by deliberate design, as Adam sinned, than through ignorance, as Eve sinned. The words of Isidore are quoted by the Master (in the text, § H.) and by Hugh (in the place cited above),[104] and they attempt to resolve them lest they appear to be adverse to their own opinion. Cajetan agrees with these, writing on Gen. 3,[105] where he extenuates the sin of Eve with five arguments and teaches it was the least, though in what he had written on St. Thomas he seems to have thought otherwise, following his own author.

§ 35. Furthermore, St. Augustine, in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, ch. 35,[106] speaking of the first sin of each of the parents, that is, pride, says that Eve sinned *impari sexu, pari fastu* — "with an unlike sex but with equal arrogance." And in *De Civitate*, bk. 14, ch. 11,[92] he says that Adam, although he was not seduced, was no less guilty than the woman. From which it can appear that St. Augustine's opinion is that the man and the woman sinned equally.

§ 36. That we may see, in this variety of opinions, which is more to be held: it must be noted that the gravity of sin, greater or lesser, can be estimated from many factors — principally indeed from its object and end, then from circumstances, whether of person, or of the intensity of the act, or of frequency, or of the magnitude of the harm that follows from the sin, or from those circumstances which the Master (in the text) enumerates from Isidore, namely: ignorance, infirmity, and deliberate design. If therefore we consider the sin of the first human beings with respect to object and end, the sin of each was equal, because each believed the serpent, each wished to be like God, each ate of the forbidden tree, and finally each excused his own sin. And this was not only a circumstance of the prior sin, but was also in itself a new sin. In this way is correctly understood what St. Augustine says, that Eve sinned *pari fastu* ("with equal arrogance") with the man — namely with respect to the formal character (*ratio*) of the object; for each wished to be like God.

§ 37. But when the circumstances are weighed, the sin of the man seems absolutely to have been more grievous.

First, from the consideration of the person. For reason (*ratio*) was more vigorous in the man, through which he ought to have resisted the temptation to sin more strongly.

Second: because he yielded to a simple woman who was already seduced; whereas, on the contrary, the woman had to deal with a most cunning enemy.

Third: because the man had received the commandment immediately from God, not the woman. Hence he knowingly and deliberately acted against the commandment of God, whereas she sinned through ignorance in that she transgressed the commandment — as was shown above from St. Augustine and Isidore — even though the woman had fallen into that ignorance through pride; yet she was excused by it to the extent that there were diminishing causes present, because she had not received so certain a knowledge of the commandment, nor had she been endowed with a rational excellence equal to the man's.

Fourth: because the man is the head of the woman, not the reverse. For this reason it was a grave sin on the man's part that he yielded to his wife as her companion, when he ought rather to have been her protector and guide, restraining her from sin and leading her to repentance for the sin committed.

§ 38. Fifth: there is added the fact that in the defence or excuse of his sin the man also sinned more gravely. For this very thing argues that the transgression of the commandment itself was the more grievous, just as St. Bernard teaches generally of those who excuse their sins.[107] And that the man sinned more gravely in excusing himself is sufficiently shown by the very words of the one making excuses, by which he so far failed to acknowledge his fault that he even obliquely cast it back upon God, saying: "The woman whom thou gavest me as a companion, she gave me of the tree and I did eat." On this defence of his sin see St. Ambrose, *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 4,[101] St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, ch. 25,[108] and St. Bernard, both in the place just cited and in Sermon 1 (*De omnibus Sanctis*).[109]

Sixth: because the man was punished more severely than the woman, on the authority of the same St. Ambrose, against whom St. John Chrysostom, Rupert, the Master, Thomas, and Bonaventure have held the contrary opinion, judging that the woman's punishment is the greater, since it was said to her: "In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children," etc. Indeed the greater punishment is to be tormented by the perpetual care and anxiety of raising and educating sons — especially after they have grown up — which care falls chiefly upon the father, than to endure the brief pain of childbirth and the trouble of the early upbringing of children. Other additional arguments may be seen in St. Ambrose and Cajetan (in the places cited above).[110]

§ 39. Moreover, beyond these considerations, there is perhaps also an argument of the following kind by which it may be shown that Adam sinned more grievously. For the angels received grace in proportion to their nature, and according to the measure of each the transgressors sinned more or less, as we have shown with probability from the mind of St. Thomas (at Distinction 6) when we were treating of the principalities of the demons.[111] And this is confirmed by the saying of the Philosopher: "The corruptions of better things are worse."[112] Hence he who was supreme and best among all the angels is now the worst of all the demons. Therefore the first human beings also are to be thought to have sinned according to this proportion, since in them nature had not yet been corrupted. Now the man excelled the woman both in natural endowments and in gifts of grace; therefore the sin of the man was correspondingly the graver, as being the corruption of something better and more excellent.

§ 40. Furthermore, although there can also be adduced certain circumstances that increase the sin and transgression of the woman — such as that she was the cause of the man's sinning, not the reverse; that she believed the serpent more readily; that she cast herself into a baser concupiscence, namely gluttony — yet all things being considered and weighed on both sides, it is easily apparent that the sin of the man was absolutely more grievous than that of the woman.

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§ VIII — Whether, if the woman alone had sinned, sin would pass to posterity (Utrum si sola mulier peccasset peccatum in posteros transiret)

§ 41. Some endeavour from this consideration to extenuate the woman's sin in comparison with the man's sin, because, if the woman alone had sinned, sin and death would not on that account have passed from her and Adam to posterity; which, they say, would have occurred, however, had the man alone sinned. For this reason they think that the origin of the sin in which we are now born must be referred to Adam alone — even though the woman also sinned — making use to prove this of the testimony of the Apostle who says, Rom. 5: "Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death."[114] For without controversy that one man is Adam, whom the Apostle immediately afterwards designates by name, saying: "But death reigned from Adam unto Moses," etc.[115] — whom he also, both in that place and in 1 Cor. 15,[116] opposes to Christ as the first man to the second, the old to the new, and the author of sin and death to the author of justice and life. That the Apostle names one man in such a way as to exclude several others — evidently placing the force of the argument in the man — seems to be shown by the comparison of Adam with Christ. For Christ is one and sole restorer of the human race; therefore Adam too is signified to be the one and sole destroyer of his kind. Likewise, from what he says, "from one unto all," just as he also says in Acts that "God hath made of one the whole human race to dwell upon the face of the earth."[117]

§ 42. To this is added the following argument: Adam alone had received justice for himself and for all his posterity; therefore, through his sin alone justice perished for all posterity. Hence if the woman alone had sinned, posterity would have felt no loss of justice.

§ 43. Likewise, sin is transmitted from the first parent inasmuch as he is the moving and efficient cause in the generation of his children; hence, if by a miracle someone were generated merely materially from human flesh, that person would not contract original sin, as St. Thomas teaches,[118] and many others likewise. But, according to the natural philosophers, the active principle is from the father, for the mother supplies only the

matter. The Philosopher teaches this expressly.'[119] Therefore original sin is not contracted from the mother but from the father alone, and consequently, if the woman alone had sinned, sin would not have been transmitted to us; but it would have been transmitted had the man alone sinned. This is the argument of St. Thomas.'[113] See him also in two other places,'[120] where he draws this distinction: that original corruption as regards guilt is contracted from the father, as regards punishment from the mother; because, he says, the mother supplies the matter, the father is the efficient cause. But this he properly retracts in the *Summa* (at the place already cited, ad 2), for the reason that the immortality of the primal state was not from the condition of matter but from original justice. Hence if, when the woman sinned, justice had not been destroyed in posterity, neither would the punishment of mortality have passed to them.

§ 44. Finally, the Master is here adduced, whose words in this distinction are these: "Even though the woman had sinned, if the man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins."[121] But many things seem to oppose that opinion.

§ 45. First, Scripture sometimes also transfers to the woman the cause of original sin and death. For Sirach 25 says: "From a woman was the beginning of sin, and through her we all die."[122] And David, Ps. 50: "In sins did my mother conceive me."'[123]

§ 46. Next, the opinions of the Fathers seem very much inclined to this side. For Irenaeus writes:[124] "As the human race was bound to death through a virgin, so let it be loosed through a virgin." St. Augustine cites this.'[125] Epiphanius'[126] says: "She became for men the cause of death; for through her death entered into the world." And likewise: "Christ came to exclude the death introduced through the woman." Nor does Epiphanius speak merely of the enticement, as if he were saying that sin entered into the world through the woman only in this sense — namely, by way of the suggestion through which she induced the man, through whom sin was then transmitted to posterity — in the same way that one might also say sin entered into the world through the devil who was the first to tempt; but he speaks of the transgression itself of the divine commandment, whereby the woman introduced death into the human race, as is evident to anyone examining the passage. For he speaks of the woman in the same manner as the Apostle speaks of the man in Rom. 5.

§ 47. St. Ambrose, in the book *De Tobia*, as cited by St. Augustine,[127] says: "Eve, stained by sin, corrupted the whole human race with the interest of a guilty succession." And in book 5 *De Fide ad Gratianum*, chapter 3:[128] "Consider the inheritance of that first woman Eve, diffused into all, slipping into ruin through the succession of immoderate desire." And he concludes: "By hereditary error therefore did the woman sin." The same author, in the *Exhortatio ad virgines*, says: "Christ came through a virgin and by the birth of a virgin cancelled the fall of the woman." He calls the sins of the human race corrupted through the woman "the fall of the woman."

§ 48. The author of the Commentary on Paul written under the title of St. Ambrose,[129] commenting on that passage of Rom. 5, "Through one man," etc., so favours this opinion that he understands by "man" in that place not Adam but Eve. Epiphanius too seems to intend this at the place cited a little earlier.'[130]

§ 49. St. Augustine transmits the same opinion clearly in very many places:[131] in *De Peccatorum Meritis* I, ch. 16, and II, ch. 25; in Question 40 on Leviticus; in the exposition of Ps. 50 on the words "Deliver me from blood-guiltiness"; in Tract. 2 on John, on the words "Who are born not of blood"; and likewise in *Opus Imperfectum contra Iulianum* II — in words cited by Bede in his repeated exposition of the Apostle's statement in Rom. 5: "As through one man."[132] The same St. Augustine in *Contra Iulianum* I, ch. 3, cites

certain words of St. Ambrose from *Apologia David* ch. 11 and from the book *De Tobia* ch. 9 and ch. 23.[133] And again in *Contra Iulianum* II, ch. 6, he cites words of the same St. Ambrose from the book *De Sacramento Regenerationis*, which does not survive today.[134] In all these places the propagation of sin is attributed to the woman.

§ 50. The words of the same St. Augustine are found in *De Symbolo* II, ch. 4: "Through a woman death, through a woman life; through Eve ruin, through Mary salvation," etc.[135] And in bk. IV, ch. 1, speaking of the Church: "She has loosed what that woman had bound; she redeems through her obedience those whom that woman had condemned to death through her disobedience, and she restores to life."[136]

§ 51. St. Gregory, in *Moralia* XVII, ch. 10:[137] "Because man is born subject to guilt through a woman, the weakness of the original transgression is propagated in offspring."

§ 52. St. Bernard, in the Sermon whose opening is "Signum magnum":[138] "One man and one woman have grievously harmed us."

§ 53. To these add St. Anselm and Hugh commenting on Rom. 5, Bede and Theophylact on Jn. 1.[139]

§ 54. Moreover, the opinion of those who say that the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the *fomes* of sin, whether before the conception of the Son of God or in that very conception, because Christ was to be born from her without sin — this opinion also bears on the point. Hence it seems to follow as a consequence that sin is propagated even from the mother alone when she has not been purified from the *fomes*. This is asserted by St. Augustine in *De Peccatorum Meritis* II, ch. 25, by St. John Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* III, chs. 2 and 12, and by others who are customarily cited at Distinction 3 of Book III.[140]

§ 55. It is confirmed (*Confirmatur*) also by this argument: If some pure man were to be born by miracle from a mother alone, or had even been born from Eve alone, he would contract original sin, because he would receive from her a human nature that is not integral — for it is not such in the mother — and therefore corrupted and infected by sin. But this is to contract original sin. The same argument is confirmed from Scripture. For the Lord says in Jn. 3: "What is born of the flesh is flesh."[141] But one who were to be born from a mother alone not purified from the *fomes* would be born of flesh, because every human being, inasmuch as he is infected by the vice of concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), is flesh. Therefore one so born would be flesh, and hence infected by the same vice of concupiscence.

§ 56. Again, the Fathers say that original sin is contracted through the concupiscence and lust that intervene in the act of generation. Hence St. Augustine says (*Enchiridion*, ch. 26): "Whatsoever is born through carnal concupiscence draws original sin."[142] But if the woman alone had sinned, children would be born through carnal concupiscence on the woman's part; therefore on her part they would draw original sin. Strength is also added to this argument from Scripture: for in Jn. 1, not only is birth from the will of man (*voluntate viri*) condemned, but also birth from the will of the flesh (*voluntate carnis*).[143] This latter phrase can be understood as applying to the woman's side alone, if she alone had sinned. And the same point is proved more forcefully from the other Scripture text, Jn. 3: "What is born of the flesh is flesh" — for a man would be born of flesh, that is, of carnal concupiscence, even if only the mother were corrupted by sin.

§ 57. Those who hold this view likewise say that original sin is contracted not only from unjust parents but also from just and holy ones — understanding under the name of parents both father and mother. This will need to be demonstrated at greater length at Distinction 31.[144]

§ 58. Finally, this opinion is confirmed not a little by the fact that, although so much is to be read among the ancients in its favour, nothing written expressly against it is found in any of them. These arguments render the affirmative part of the question very probable; yet even granting it, there remains this further doubt: Whether the corruption of nature in posterity would have been equal if the woman alone had sinned, or even the man alone, to that which now exists after both have sinned. But the resolution of this doubt seems to depend on the question asking what original sin is. For if it is nothing other than the privation of original justice (*iustitia originalis*), it appears that the corruption would be equal; but if it be said to consist in the very vice of concupiscence, then it does not seem that the corruption from one sinning parent would be as great as from two.

§ IX — The objections are resolved (Objecta dissolvuntur)

§ 59. It remains for us to see how a reply can be made to the arguments of the opposing side. To that which was adduced from the Apostle, Rom. 5, the answer given by some — that the "one man" is to be understood as the woman who sinned first — is not a good one. Nor is the exposition of the unnamed Author who comments on Paul, cited above, to be received on this point: both because of the reasons adduced in the argument, and because it would consequently seem, on the basis of the same Apostle who lays emphasis on "one," that sin was propagated through the woman alone — in the same manner in which, from the same Apostle, others contend that it was propagated through the man alone. Therefore a better reply is that the unity which the Apostle presses is to be understood on both sides, each in its own way: on the side of Christ, absolutely (*simpliciter*), because Christ needed no cooperation from another person of a different sex for the repair or regeneration of mankind; on the side of Adam, however, only in the sense that Adam was in some fashion one with his wife, according to that word: "They shall be two in one flesh"[146] — hence the Lord concludes in the Gospel: "Therefore they are no longer two, but one flesh."[147] For Adam alone was not sufficient for the generation of the human race; he needed the woman as a helpmate like to himself, as Scripture says,[148] with whom he might constitute one, primary generative principle (*principium*) of the whole human race.

§ 60. From this declaration the earlier argument is also to be resolved. For when it is said that Adam alone had received justice for himself and for the whole of his posterity, this is to be understood insofar as he was the principle (*principium*) of the race; and accordingly Eve is not excluded, since she constituted one principle of the race together with Adam, as has just been said. To the latter argument the reply is that in truth each parent is an effective and properly generative principle of children, although the male is the principal and more powerful agent, while the female contributes more of the matter. For otherwise the woman would not seem to be truly the mother and progenitrix of a child — names which signify an efficient cause — but would be only a receptive and material principle, which is absurd. And this is the opinion of Galen and of all physicians, certainly far more probable than what Aristotle seems to hand down, and which St. Thomas derived from him.[149] Although for this reason the origin of sin and corruption is customarily attributed more in the Scriptures to the man than to the woman, because the beginning of generation is from the man as from the more principal agent — as Bede and St. Anselm noted from St. Augustine in their comments on Rom. 1.[150]

§ 61. The words of the Master, which were objected in the last place, can, in accordance with the exposition of St. Bonaventure (on the text),[151] be taken in this sense: if the woman had sinned while the man had not sinned, it would not have come about that the man, out of her who was now corrupted by her sin, would have wished to raise up offspring whom he knew would be born subject to corruption and sin; rather, he would have awaited a sign of the Divine Will regarding the procreation of children.

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§ X — What ignorance is a sin (Quae ignorantia sit peccatum)

§ 62. The Master teaches, in § II of this distinction, that sin is committed in three ways, namely through ignorance, through weakness, and through deliberate design (*industria*), and that it is graver when sin is committed through weakness than through ignorance, and graver still when committed through deliberate design than through weakness. As the authority for this teaching he cites Isidore, who has this in book 2 (*De Summo Bono*, ch. 17),[153] although before him St. Gregory too taught the same in book 25 (*Moralia*, ch. 16).[154] On this occasion, it is customary to dispute somewhat more fully around this distinction, not only concerning ignorance and the sins of ignorance (about which the Master himself subjoins some remarks), but also concerning sins committed through weakness and those committed through deliberate design. As regards ignorance, which is nothing other than a privation of knowledge (*scientia*) — that is, when someone lacks knowledge of those things which he is fitted by nature to know, as St. Thomas says[155] — in the first place it must be shown that not only are certain sins committed out of ignorance, but that ignorance itself is sometimes a sin. This indeed St. Jerome teaches at length from the Scriptures, in book 1, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, from the beginning of ch. 50 to the end of book 1, prefacing it thus at the end of ch. 9:[156] "Now I must traverse the very wide plains of the Scriptures, in order to teach that error and ignorance are sin." So he says.

§ 63. However, before entering upon this matter, we must first set out a manifold division of ignorance, for the understanding of the whole subject. For ignorance is either voluntary or involuntary; either vincible (*vincibilis*) or invincible (*invincibilis*). Likewise it is either of law (*juris*) or of fact (*facti*); and that which concerns law is either of divine law or of human law. Again, that which concerns divine law is either of positive divine law or of natural law. Finally, ignorance is either privative (*privativa*) — such as imports a bare privation — or positive (*positiva*), which they call of evil disposition (*pravae dispositionis*), and which is properly called error (*error*). The explanation of each of these individual members will be clear from what follows.

§ 64. These things having been premised, we say that every ignorance, and only that ignorance, is a sin whereby a person is ignorant of what he is bound to know. For whenever knowledge is a matter of precept, the ignorance opposed to it is consequently deemed to be prohibited — and not otherwise. For just as to omit what one is bound to do is a sin of omission, so not to know what one is bound to know is a sin of ignorance. Now there are many testimonies of Scripture which teach that knowledge is a matter of precept, some of which St. Augustine enumerates in *Epistola* 95[157] and in book 2 (*De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, ch. 5)[158] and in the book *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chs. 2 and 3.[159] Such is that of Deut. 32: "Understand, ye foolish among the people; be wise at last";[160] and Hos. 4: "There is no knowledge of God in the land."[161] And wherever Scripture commands us to know God and His will, and to believe His word, whether He speaks to

us through Himself, or through the prophets, or the Apostles, or altogether through His Church — all these are precepts of knowledge. It follows, therefore, that ignorance of these same things, being contrary to the precepts of God, is a sin. This is indeed shown no less plainly by the testimonies of Scripture, as in 1 Cor. 14: "If any man know not, he shall not be known";[162] Ps. 24: "Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances";[163] Ps. 79 and Jer. 10: "Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee";[164] 2 Thess. 1: "To render vengeance to them that know not God."[165] So too in Jer. 5 those who are ignorant of the way of God are rebuked.[166] Similar passages occur at Rom. 1, Eph. 4, Wis. 13, and elsewhere throughout.[167]

§ 65. But one must know that, just as it is required for the formal character (*ratio*) of sin that it be voluntary, so no ignorance is a sin unless it be in some manner voluntary. For it has been most truly said by St. Augustine that what one involuntarily does not know is not imputed as fault.[168] Concerning the same matter, see St. Gregory and Isidore at the places cited above.[169] Now ignorance is voluntary either directly or indirectly. That which is directly voluntary — called affected ignorance (*ignorantia affectata*) — is that toward which the will is directly borne, choosing to remain ignorant, whether in order to sin more freely and without remorse, or for any other end whatsoever. Of this it was said in Ps. 35: "He would not understand that he might do good";[170] and in Job 21: "Who said to God, 'Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of thy ways'";[171] and in Prov. 1: "The imprudent shall hate knowledge."[172] So are they ignorant who say to those who wish to advise them well: "I do not want you to make me scrupulous." Indirectly voluntary is the ignorance of those who either flee from the labour of learning or certainly, engaged in other matters, neglect to learn those things which they are bound to know. Scripture not infrequently makes mention of this kind of ignorance, as in the passages already cited at Ps. 24, Ps. 69, and 1 Cor. 14.[173] On this ignorance there is a pertinent passage in St. Augustine,[174] where he says that it is justly imputed to the soul as a fault that it has not taken pains to know, and that it has not devoted fitting effort to acquiring the capacity to act rightly.

§ 66. Now in order that we may understand what are those things knowledge of which is a matter of precept, it must be noted that the things which are commanded fall into a twofold genus. For some things are commanded by the law of nature, such as this: "Do not do to another what you would not wish done to yourself"; and in general the precepts comprised in the Decalogue. Others are commanded by positive law alone, whether divine or human, such as: that one must be baptized; that one must believe in Christ as mediator; that one must sanctify the Lord's Day; that one must observe the prescribed days of fasting; that one must pay tribute; and countless other things. Now between natural law and positive law the difference is this: that natural law binds every man insofar as he participates in the use of reason, without any further obligation; whereas positive law, whether divine or human, does not bind unless it has been positively promulgated, because it does not have the character of law without promulgation.

§ 67. From these things it is clear that ignorance of the natural law is always a sin, whether or not external teaching and instruction has been added — as, for example, ignorance whereby one does not know that one God is to be worshipped, that fornication, drunkenness, and all lying are to be avoided. But ignorance of positive law, even divine positive law, is not a sin for those to whom it has not been promulgated. Therefore that infidelity whereby those who have not had Christ announced to them do not believe in Christ — or, as Scripture speaks, those to whom nothing has been announced concerning Him — is not a sin. Which the Lord's own words signify at Jn. 15: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin"[175] — that is, of infidelity, whereby they do not believe in me; that is, not to believe in me would not be a sin for them. Hence St. Augustine, expounding this passage,[176] testifies that those to whom the preaching of the Gospel has

not reached are excused from the sin of not having believed in Christ; but they are to be condemned on account of other sins for which they have no excuse, being committed against the law of nature. Similar things are found in the same St. Augustine.'[177] And St. Bernard treats this matter at length and from first principles.'[178] See also St. Jerome,'[179] where he teaches from the Scriptures that ignorance is a sin.

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§ XI — Replies to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 68. Now certain arguments to the contrary must be set forth, so that from their resolution what has been said may become more plain. The first is as follows: Sin, as St. Augustine defines it,[181] is something said, done, or desired against the law of God. But ignorance is none of these things; therefore it is not a sin.

§ 69. The second: If any ignorance in us is a sin, it is not original sin — for original sin has been remitted in baptism — therefore it is an actual sin. But this does not seem capable of being said, because every actual sin is an act elicited or commanded by the will, and ignorance is neither of these.

§ 70. The third: Sin is opposed only to virtue or to an act of virtue. But ignorance is opposed not to virtue but to knowledge; therefore it is not a sin. Or, more briefly stated: Knowledge of things to be done is not a virtue; therefore ignorance is not a sin.

§ 71. The fourth: Privation of grace is not a sin; therefore neither is privation of knowledge, which is ignorance, a sin.

§ 72. The fifth: Just as many sins are committed out of ignorance, so too are they committed out of weakness or passion. Yet weakness and passion are not for that reason sins; therefore neither is ignorance.

§ 73. The sixth: Sin is removed by penance. But ignorance is often not removed but remains in the penitent; therefore it is not a sin.

§ 74. The seventh: If ignorance were a sin, then while it endures a man would be sinning continuously — which is absurd.

§ 75. The eighth: All ignorance in some respect excuses sin; therefore ignorance itself is never a sin. For a sin joined to a sin rather aggravates than diminishes it.

§ 76. The ninth: No ignorance is simply (*simpliciter*) voluntary; therefore no ignorance is a sin. The antecedent is proved, because — as the Philosopher rightly holds — all men by nature desire to know; for just as the will naturally tends toward the good, so the intellect naturally tends toward the true.

§ 77. The tenth: Death and diseases and other such miseries are not sins, even though men contract them through their own fault — namely, through intemperance or otherwise — and even when negligence in avoiding them is present; therefore neither is ignorance a sin, even though it is incurred through sin or even when negligence or contempt in the matter of acquiring knowledge is present.

§ 78. The last: St. Augustine,[182] in treating sins of ignorance, holds that they are sins only in an improper sense, in the way that speech is improperly called "tongue."

§ 79. To each of these we reply. To the first: In the terms "said, done, or desired," the opposing negations must be understood. Hence, just as the omission of what ought to be done is truly a sin, so too is ignorance of what ought to be known — namely, insofar as someone neglects to learn the things he is bound to know.

§ 80. To the second, reply is made in a similar manner. For ignorance pertains to the genus of actual sin, inasmuch as under "act" is comprehended the negation or omission of a due act. Moreover, the ignorance we call a sin is commanded by the will, at least indirectly or interpretatively, as has been explained above.

§ 81. To the third it is answered that the knowledge which is a matter of precept is a virtue, or an act of virtue — not indeed of a moral but of an intellectual virtue, which after its own manner also perfects man, just as faith, which resides in the intellect, does so. And just as man is commanded not only to acquire knowledge of things to be done but also actually to know them — according to that text: "Know the Lord"[183] — so also he is forbidden to be ignorant of them.

§ 82. To the fourth, St. Thomas replies[184] that although privation of grace is not in itself a sin, it can nonetheless have the character (*rationem*) of sin by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, just as ignorance can — although there is a dissimilarity in that a man can acquire knowledge through his own acts, but not grace itself. Moreover, grace is a habit, whereas the knowledge that is a matter of precept is an act.

§ 83. To the fifth it can similarly be said that insofar as weakness of this kind and passion are subject to our power, so that we can remove or avoid them, to that same extent they also become a sin. Hence, the firmness opposed to that weakness, and the absence of the passions by which we are tempted to sin, is to some extent a matter of precept.

§ 84. To the sixth it must be said with St. Thomas[185] that although ignorance remains after its guilt has been taken away by penance, the negligence of the will does not remain — without which negligence ignorance does not have the character of sin, because it ceases to be voluntary. And briefly: ignorance does not remain in respect of the character (*rationem*) of sin, just as concupiscence, which is a sin in the unbaptized, after baptism remains the same yet with the character of sin removed.

§ 85. To the seventh: Just as in other sins of omission a person sins by act only at that time for which an affirmative precept is binding, so too is it to be understood regarding the sin of ignorance. Accordingly, one who is ignorant does not sin continuously for the whole duration of his ignorance, but only at that time when it is the moment for acquiring the knowledge he is bound to have.

§ 86. To the eighth: Ignorance excuses sin not by the formal character (*ratione*) by which it is itself a sin, but insofar as it removes something of voluntariness, as will be said below. And in this way it is not absurd that a sin joined to a sin diminishes it.

§ 87. To the ninth it is answered that men, impelled by other affections, often act against what they naturally desire. For a mother naturally loves her son, whom she can nonetheless hate for some cause; and everyone naturally loves life, which some nevertheless take from themselves. So therefore men by nature love knowledge, which they nonetheless sometimes repel in order to sin more freely — just as a stone naturally moves downward, yet when hurled upward it moves in that direction.

§ 88. To the tenth it is answered that ignorance is forbidden by the law of God, whereas death, diseases, and such miseries are not forbidden — only intemperance and other vices, by which a man brings such miseries upon himself, are forbidden; just as by the law of nature the preservation of health and life is

enjoined. Therefore a man sins when he falls into disease or death through his own fault; but he does not sin by being sick or by dying. In the case of ignorance, however, it is the ignorance itself that is forbidden, and therefore while it endures the sin remains, unless the preceding evil will by which the man contracted it is corrected by penance.

§ 89. If you ask why ignorance is forbidden rather than disease: I reply, because knowledge is a matter of precept, but health is not. The reason for this is that knowledge is an act of the mind, good in itself (*per se*) and necessary for other good actions, and also in some manner subject to the will. Hence the ignorance opposed to it is in itself evil and an impediment to good actions. Health, however, is not an act of ours but a certain disposition of the body which absolutely speaking is not subject to the command of the will; and therefore the character of a precept cannot extend to it. This resolution is suggested by St. Thomas,[186] where he says that a defect of the apprehensive power, if it were in no way subject to the will, would not be a sin — as is clear in those who labor under invincible ignorance.

§ 90. To the last: St. Augustine in that passage does not properly oppose "improperly" or "figuratively" to "properly," but rather to "less properly." For he holds that to be called sin in the most proper sense which is committed knowingly and with full willingness, without any prior weakness, passion, or necessity impelling the man. Hence he adds by way of reason: "For it is not committed by a free will with full knowledge" — that is, it is committed with less freedom, on account of its being done not by one who knows but by one who is ignorant. Moreover, he speaks not of ignorance but of *sins of ignorance* — that is, sins committed out of ignorance.

§ XII — What ignorance entirely excuses from sin (Quae ignorantia in totum excuset a peccato)

§ 91. In order that it may be understood what ignorance excuses from sin (*peccatum*) either wholly or in part, it is again necessary to call to mind that what belongs to the definition of sin is the voluntary (*voluntarium*), as St. Augustine says — "so far is every sin voluntary, that it is in no way a sin if it is not voluntary."[188] Hence it follows that in the degree in which ignorance removes the voluntary, in that same degree it excuses from sin. Accordingly, that ignorance by which it comes about that an act which would otherwise be a sin is rendered wholly involuntary — that is to say, such that it is chosen by the will neither directly nor indirectly, neither in act nor virtually — excuses entirely from sin. Of this kind is, first of all, invincible ignorance, which is also called by one name "just" and by another "probable." Then also vincible ignorance of those things which one is not bound to know likewise entirely excuses — I say entirely — each of these two kinds of ignorance, provided it be antecedent, that is, causing the act of sin: meaning, evidently, that if it were absent, the act itself would not be done, since the knowledge opposed to it would impede and prevent such an act. For ignorance is said to cause the act of sin by way of a cause that removes what was impeding it — in the manner in which one who withdraws the column supporting a wall was the cause that was preventing the collapse.

§ 92. But if ignorance does indeed cause the act of sin, yet is in some measure voluntary with respect to those things which one is bound to know, it is certain that it does not wholly excuse the act from sin. For to the degree that it is voluntary, to that same degree it transmits to the act consequently arising from it the character (*ratio*) of the voluntary. Hence affected ignorance (*ignorantia affectata*), which we said above to be directly voluntary — since it is assumed in order that one may sin more freely — is so far from excusing wholly

from sin that, speaking absolutely (*simpliciter loquendo*), it does not even diminish the sin but rather increases it; although, as we shall say below, it does diminish it in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*). But that which is indirectly voluntary, even if it does not wholly exclude sin from the act consequent upon it, nevertheless diminishes it, as will be said below.

§ 93. Moreover, not every ignorance that is a cause of the act and is wholly involuntary excuses entirely from sin — for instance, if it be ignorance of something that does not pertain to the formal character (*ratio*) of the sin: as if someone strikes another, not about to strike him if he had foreknown that the other would strike back; or if someone kills a man without knowing what temporal evil would befall himself from that killing, which, had he foreknown, he would not have committed. For such a person, although he sins on account of his ignorance, is nevertheless not wholly excused from sin, because cognition of the sin still remains to him, as St. Thomas teaches.[189]

§ 94. To this some add the case of ignorance that is involuntary indeed, yet is accompanied by a will that seeks knowledge for an evil end — as, for instance, if someone grieves at not knowing something because he wishes to abuse knowledge for vain glory. For since such a person neither seeks nor wills knowledge in order to avoid sin through it, or in general in order to use it well, even though, once he has it, he is unwilling to commit the act of sin — it is the opinion of some that the ignorance opposed to that knowledge does not at all excuse from sin. But whether this is rightly said can be understood from the explanation of the question that will be appended below.[190]

§ XIII — Whether concomitant ignorance excuses from sin (Utrum ignorantia concomitans excuset a peccato)

§ 95. Concomitant ignorance (*ignorantia concomitans*) is said to be that which is so joined to an act that, even were it absent, the act would nonetheless be performed — as when someone, wishing to shoot a wild beast, kills his enemy, though he would have done so equally had he known the other to be his enemy. For such ignorance does not induce a will that this should come about; rather, it happens that the act is performed and simultaneously is unknown. Hence it does not render the act voluntary (*voluntarium*), because it does not produce anything repugnant to the voluntary, but it does make what is done non-voluntary (*non voluntarium*), and makes the man himself a non-willing agent, because that which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Hence neither is one who is ignorant in this manner said to act from ignorance or through ignorance, as one who labours under antecedent or even consequent ignorance is said to act; rather, he is only to be called one who acts while ignorant (*ignorans*). So St. Thomas teaches,[192] citing in those same places the Philosopher from Book III of the *Ethics*.[193]

§ 96. Concerning this ignorance it is asked whether it excuses from sin — that is, whether on its account the act to which it is conjoined is either not a sin at all, or is a lesser sin than it would be without it. Some think it does not excuse. They prove this, first, by the authority of St. Thomas, who expressly affirms[189] that concomitant ignorance does not excuse from sin, and for this reason: because it does not cause the involuntary. For ignorance does not excuse except by reason of the fact that it causes the involuntary, which this sort of ignorance certainly does not effect. Second: because the same Doctor says,[194] that one who acts with such ignorance, though he does not sin through ignorance, nevertheless sins while ignorant (*ignorans*); therefore he acknowledges that such a person does sin. Third: they prove it because this ignorance does not

prevent the act from being still virtually voluntary (*virtute voluntarius*); above all in one who had an actual will — for example, to kill his enemy — and stands ready to kill him wherever he finds him; who, accordingly, if he kills him while ignorant, seems virtually to have willed this very act of killing his enemy. Wherefore this act is a sin for him and is rightly imputed. Fourth: they prove it from St. Augustine, who in his letter to Sixtus[195] indicates that those are not excused on account of ignorance who, thinking that the knowledge of God's commandments alone suffices them for fulfilling those commandments, are unwillingly and involuntarily ignorant. The reason for this is no other than that they have the act and the disposition of sin. Wherefore the ignorance that consequently is opposed to such knowledge is not a cause removing that which would have prohibited the act. Fifth: they prove it because Jacob, sleeping with Leah whom he supposed to be Rachel his betrothed, is excused from the crime of adultery for no other reason than that he did this in such ignorance that, had he known, he would by no means have been willing to do it; therefore one who did the same thing in ignorance, yet would have done it even had he known, would not be excused. Their position in the end is that all and only that ignorance excuses absolutely which, being wholly involuntary, is so the cause of acting that, were the contrary knowledge present, the forbidden act would neither be performed nor be pleasing.

§ 97. Now Cajetan and Medina, writing on the aforementioned article,[196] hold the opposite opinion. And first they indeed concede that concomitant ignorance does not *excuse* — for thus both St. Thomas and Aristotle have spoken, and this is sufficiently proper. For ignorance is said to excuse the act that proceeds from ignorance, just as passion (*passio*) excuses the act that proceeds from passion. But ignorance is not said to excuse an act of which it is in no way the cause, and towards which it stands only indifferently; it therefore does not excuse because it does not render the act involuntary. However, these authors add that concomitant ignorance does not *accuse* either. From which they conclude that homicide, or any other forbidden act performed with such ignorance, is not imputed as fault and is therefore not a sin. They prove this with the following arguments.

First: in order for any act to be a sin it is necessary that it be voluntary (*voluntarium*). But concomitant ignorance, as has been said above and proved from both the Philosopher and St. Thomas, renders the act non-voluntary (*non voluntarium*); therefore it does not accuse.

Second: the preceding will by which someone willed to kill his enemy, which is supposed still to remain virtually, in no way causes this act whereby he accidentally kills his enemy while ignorant — any more than if the enemy were killed by another while he himself was entirely ignorant of it; therefore this act cannot be said to be virtually voluntary from the preceding actual will.

Third: if his enemy were killed by another, that act would not be imputed to him, nor would it be a sin for him, even if afterwards, when told of the deed, it pleased him and he rejoiced in it. The same, therefore, must hold for the one who kills while ignorant. The consequence is proved because his will is disposed in the same way towards each event.

Fourth: the will by which one wills to kill a wild beast, without any actual will to kill a man, is not evil; therefore neither is the external act proceeding from that will — by which he kills a man while willing to kill the beast — evil. For the external act could add nothing of malice to the internal act, since the external act receives its entire goodness or malice from nowhere other than the internal act.

Fifth: one who, having exercised due caution, wills to kill a wild beast and kills his friend, does not sin, even if previously he had the will to kill his enemy. For all things are on a par in both cases, with the sole exception that the one who is killed happens to be a friend or an enemy — and this could not be known by him.

Sixth: one who, having the will for a good work, afterwards does it entirely without knowledge or deliberation — as, for instance, if someone, by a shout uttered for another purpose, frightens an enemy who is otherwise secretly and treacherously occupying a city — such a person would be neither praised nor would merit anything before God on account of this act; rather, only the good will by which he desired to free his homeland in whatever way would be praiseworthy and worthy of reward. Similarly, therefore, one who, having the will for an evil work — such as killing his enemy — afterwards does it while ignorant and without that intention, ought not to be judged worthy of blame and punishment on account of such a deed; rather, only his evil will, by which he desired to kill his enemy wherever found, is to be censured and punished by God as just judge. These arguments seem to conclude well that an act which one does while ignorant with concomitant ignorance is not culpable nor imputable as sin.

§ 98. Medina adds certain other arguments, or as he himself calls them, demonstrations, but which do not seem to establish the matter proposed, nor do they pertain to the present question — because he is speaking of one who truly did not have a will for the evil he does while ignorant, nor ever thought of doing it, yet is of such weakness of soul in those matters that concern virtue — for example, justice, chastity, fortitude — that, were occasion of committing sin offered to him, such as theft, fornication, denial of Christ, he would succumb, overcome by a stronger temptation, and sin: occasion makes the thief. But the reasoning in his case is far different, because, since it is supposed that he never had a will to commit such a sin, it cannot with any probability be said that the act which he perhaps performs while ignorant is voluntary for him. But in the case posited above, one is supposed to have had previously an affective will that he would perpetrate, say, this homicide if he could; wherein it is justly doubted whether this act done while he is ignorant is imputed to him as fault on account of the preceding will. And indeed for the reasons already adduced it seems to us that it is not imputed.

§ 99. To the arguments that were adduced on the contrary side we reply as follows.

To the first: the reply is clear from what has been said. For concomitant ignorance neither excuses nor accuses; and, as the same St. Thomas says[185] in the same place, it neither diminishes nor increases. But the act thus unknown is for that reason not a sin because it is not willed. For this is included in the formal character (*ratio*) of sin.

To the second: I reply that one who performs such an act of which he is ignorant is said to sin while ignorant (*ignorans*), not because he truly sins, but because he does a work that is evil in itself — as St. Thomas says[197] — that is, a work to which nothing is lacking for the formal character of sin save the voluntary; in the way that Jacob is said to have committed adultery while ignorant, which was indeed adultery and sin materially, not formally.

To the third: it is answered that an act cannot be said to be virtually voluntary from a will by which it is in no way caused. Now it is established that the preceding will has no causal order directed toward producing this act, as was said in the second argument. Hence this act can be said to be neither directly nor indirectly, neither actually nor virtually willed from that preceding will — as Medina well explains.[198]

To what is cited in the fourth place from St. Augustine: one must say that he is speaking of ignorance of the divine natural law, not of purely concomitant ignorance, which is ignorance of fact (*ignorantia facti*). From this reply one may also understand what is to be said to the doubt raised at the end of the preceding section. For the ignorance about which the question was there asked does not render the act blameless, because it is not ignorance of the act but of the law (*juris*) — not of any law, but of the natural law. More on this point will be said below.

§ 100. For it has now been said that concomitant ignorance does not excuse, because it does not render the act involuntary. Yet from this it does not follow that the act is a sin, because, although ignorance does not excuse it, nevertheless on account of the defect of the voluntary (*voluntarium*) such an act cannot be imputed as sin.

§ XIV — What ignorance partly excuses sin (Quae ignorantia ex parte peccatum excuset)

§ 101. We have said that ignorance which is indirectly voluntary (*indirecte voluntaria*), though not altogether, nevertheless partly excuses sin. The reason for this is that such ignorance diminishes something of the voluntary (*voluntarium*), inasmuch as, being itself only indirectly voluntary, it similarly renders the sin only indirectly voluntary. For in those things which are done out of ignorance, the act is not voluntary except insofar as the ignorance that is its cause was voluntary; therefore no more of the character (*ratio*) of the voluntary can be found in the act itself than was present in the ignorance that is its cause.

§ 102. Indeed, even affected ignorance (*ignorantia affectata*), although it is directly and per se voluntary — being assumed by the will precisely in order that one may sin more freely — and therefore absolutely speaking augments the sin, nevertheless in some respect diminishes and excuses it, because it plainly brings it about that the sin committed from it is not actually voluntary, in that it is not actually known, either as an act or as a sin. And universally, every ignorance, insofar as it removes knowledge and thereby takes away something of the character of the voluntary, in some measure diminishes the sin that is committed from it or through it; although it may happen that from another quarter it augments the same sin, as has now been said of affected ignorance.

§ 103. This also must be noted: it sometimes happens that in one and the same deed one thing is known and another is not known — whether through vincible or through invincible ignorance — and yet both pertain to the character (*ratio*) of sin. In such a case, a deed of this kind will be excused only in part, namely in that part which is not known: as, for example, if someone unjustly strikes another whom he knows to be a man but does not know to be his father, and would not have struck him had he known — such a person is indeed excused from the sin of parricide, but not from that of homicide. So likewise Judah in Gen. 38, consorting with a woman not his own, whom he did not know to be his daughter-in-law, is excused from the sin of fornication, but not from that of incest — provided, however, as is supposed, that he had exercised due diligence.[199]

§ XV — What ignorance of law excuses (Quae juris ignorantia excuset)

§ 104. From what has been said above it is established that invincible ignorance entirely excuses from sin that act which is committed from such ignorance. This holds universally in the case of ignorance of fact, and likewise of positive law, both divine and human. But it is asked whether the same judgment is to be held concerning ignorance of the natural law: for example, if someone supposes that an officious lie, or simple fornication, or usury is not a sin; or if someone knows indeed that usury or simony, for example, is a sin, but invincibly does not know that this or that particular contract is usurious or simoniacal. It is asked, then, whether invincible ignorance of these matters excuses entirely.

To some it seems that it does excuse. Their reason (*ratio*) is that antecedent and invincible ignorance has it from its own kind (*ex genere suo*) that it renders an act involuntary. Hence St. Thomas[189] says in general that ignorance, if it is altogether involuntary — whether because it is invincible or because it concerns what one is not bound to know — entirely excuses from sin.

§ 105. To others, on the contrary, it seems that ignorance of the natural law excuses no one at all. For they judge that the formal character (*ratio*) of natural law stands very far apart from that of fact, or even of positive law, with respect to ignorance. For ignorance of fact, if it is invincible, renders an act altogether involuntary. He who kills a friend while wishing to kill a beast in no way wills that act which is the killing of a friend. Similarly, ignorance of positive law renders an act involuntary as regards the formal character of sin; for he who performs such an act does not know it to be prohibited; and such an act is not a sin except insofar as it is prohibited. Therefore, if the ignorance by which he does not know it to be prohibited is altogether involuntary, the act itself will also be altogether involuntary with respect to the formal character of sin. But ignorance of the natural law never renders an act altogether involuntary, even with respect to the aspect under which it is a sin, but always permits it to be known in some manner. For although he who labours under this ignorance does not know this evil he is doing under the formal character of its genus — that is, does not know it to be a sin — he nonetheless knows it under the formal character of the species, to which such a genus belongs naturally and essentially. For example, he who lies officiously, thinking such a lie to be licit, does not know that such a lie pertains to the genus of sin, and therefore thinks it is not a sin; yet he knows that he is lying; and consequently commits voluntarily an act that is essentially evil. The same reasoning applies in fornication, usury, simony, and the rest of things evil in themselves (*per se mala*) — that is, whatever things are evil not because they are prohibited, but are prohibited and illicit because they are evil.

§ 106. This appears to be the opinion of Cajetan,[201] where he says that such acts, although they are done from ignorance, are voluntary in themselves, directly and in their own right (*per se et directe*), not only materially but formally according to the conversion toward the object. "For the Gentiles," he says, "not knowing that simple fornication is a sin, were voluntarily consenting to the act of carnal knowledge of a woman not their own, from which the species of fornication is taken — although perhaps some of them, had they known it to be a sin, would not have done it." So he.

To this pertains the fact that Innocent III[202] pronounces him a simoniac who did not know that what he had done was simoniacal, taking no account of his ignorance.

§ 107. This doctrine is proved from St. Augustine, who[203] says that through the ignorance left after baptism many sins are still committed by men. And[204] he says those are sins which are done illicitly according to concupiscence or ignorance, treating of the ignorance left over from original sin, which is established to be

impossible to overcome entirely in this life. The same[205] says that he who sinned not knowing, yet acted willingly, does not know indeed that what he did is a sin, yet willed that which is a sin — namely by its own nature. Conformable to these things further is what Adrianus teaches[206] — that he sins mortally who invincibly does not know that the act he performs is mortally evil.

§ 108. What is to be said in reply to the opposing argument is sufficiently apparent from what has been said. Namely, that in things evil in themselves (*per se*) under that aspect — that is, in the species of those acts that are essentially evil — the will is in play voluntarily, because ignorance of the natural law never renders the act altogether involuntary even with respect to the aspect under which it is a sin, but always permits it to be known in some manner. For although he who labours under this ignorance does not know the evil he commits under the formal character of its genus — that is, does not know it to be a sin — he nonetheless knows it under the formal character of the species, to which such a genus belongs naturally and essentially; and consequently commits voluntarily that which is essentially evil. The same reasoning applies in fornication, usury, simony, and the rest of things evil in themselves — that is, whatever things are not evil because they are prohibited, but are prohibited and illicit because they are evil.

[The extended marginal annotation (a) appended to the text of § XV is an editorial gloss by a later hand, treating with great subtlety and at considerable length the genuine sense of Cajetan's position, the teaching of Cornelius Jansenius of Ghent in his *Augustinus*, and the propositions condemned by Popes Innocent X and Alexander VIII. Because this gloss exceeds the limits of the main commentary and is addressed to advanced readers, it is reproduced here in summary faithful to its argument:]

§ 109. The doctrine transmitted here by the author is set forth in a place somewhat involved and obscure, so that it can scarcely be perceived, amid such subtlety and ambiguity of words, what is the genuine opinion of the author in this matter. For Cajetan speaks — at the place cited by the author[201] — as a most learned Cardinal, yet with such difficulty of expression that one can scarcely make out what his opinion is. In any case, Cajetan certainly treats invincible ignorance — and that which is only the effect or punishment (*poena*) of sin — as making it an indirect cause of sin, not as excusing from sin; for Cajetan denies that it makes the act indirectly willed, as is seen upon careful inspection of that passage. Cajetan distinguishes between precepts that belong to natural law and those of positive divine or human law, and indicates that he finds greater difficulty around the ignorance of the former, since it is not easy to find that such ignorance excuses. The examples Cajetan adduces, moreover, clearly indicate that he speaks of ignorance of the natural law that is vincible — inasmuch as he adduces the example of ignorance of the prohibition of fornication, which is forbidden by nature itself, and the example of St. Paul, who had persecuted the name of Jesus Christ. In these matters, according to the more accepted opinion which holds that the malice of fornication is so manifest by the very light of nature that only a negligent and remiss person could be ignorant of it — since writers universally count this precept among those that are either immediately or nearly immediately deduced from the primary precepts of natural law — it is therefore evident that Cajetan's mind was not about ignorance that is altogether invincible and in no way voluntary. Further, our author, seeking to prove that the opinion which holds that invincible ignorance of the natural law does not excuse from sin is Cajetan's opinion, presses upon those words of Cajetan in which he asserts that the Gentiles would perhaps not have fornicated had they recognised the malice of fornication; but these words imply no such thing, for they do not prevent a person from being culpably remiss in inquiring into a truth which, as writers commonly teach and as Cajetan himself well teaches in his *Summa casuum* regarding the choice among opinions, insofar as he can, so that the right

rule of morals not be deflected. "God does not require of a man more than the condition of man allows," he says, and "God by His divine goodness excuses the person who has not attained the truth, if he was not remiss in inquiry" — as is sufficiently evident from the passage.

§ 110. Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent, in his *Augustinus*,[207] claiming this doctrine as his own and presenting it as a hidden and recondite teaching revealed from heaven — first of all setting it forth as it were as the dogma of St. Augustine — actually dared to assert, with bitter contentiousness of spirit, but in a futile effort, that ignorance of the natural law, however invincible, since it is undue to man and only the punishment (*poena*) of original sin, does not lack sin and is not excused from sin by it — following his own system and that of Baius, who professed that for merit and demerit in the state of fallen nature no freedom from coercion was required, but that freedom from coercion alone sufficed; which is nevertheless the third of the Jansenian propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiff Innocent X and Alexander VIII. And Jansenius did not hesitate to assert that even the damnable action of one who acts necessarily is a sin — which is the 46th among the proscribed propositions of Baius enumerated above,[208] condemned by the Vatican. Indeed in his system, for sin it sufficed to have that will which was in the first sinning man; so that all sins which are committed from however invincible an ignorance adverse to the natural law are imputable to men for this reason alone, that they were voluntary in the will of Adam sinning. His opinion, so perverse and injurious to the Divine Goodness — denying that invincible ignorance excuses from formal sin — he entitled as if it were a dogma of faith transmitted by the Ancients, inscribing it in his book as follows: "Ignorance also which is of necessity does not lack sin." Good God! How far does human wit go astray once it has been pre-occupied by prejudice! The same error a certain theologian writing under the fictitious name of Guillelmus Wendrochius, lurking under the cover of a Salzburg theologian,[209] attempted to persuade in a particular dissertation *On Probability* appended to the fifth of the letters of Louis de Montalte. Were this the place and were more words to be spent on the matter, we would not go beyond the limits of our undertaken task; we refer the reader to distinguished theologians of our own age especially who have treated these matters thoroughly and soundly and according to the standard of the Catholic Faith in their books. New readers are merely to be advised that the second of these condemned propositions — set forth as if it were the dogma of the Ancients — that invincible ignorance of the natural law excuses from formal sin, is the proposition twice expressed in the letters of the Church as most probable. Let this also be kept in mind: that, as is evident from St. Thomas's teaching,[210] although invincible ignorance of the primary precepts of the natural law cannot exist, nor of those things which can easily be deduced by anyone using reason, there can nonetheless be invincible ignorance of the precepts of the natural law that are, as it were, conclusions of the primary ones, and are to be deduced from them. Should one not say that a woman could be invincibly ignorant, for example, that an officious and venial lie was a sin? Lest you be thought the most serious of theologians, consider that even concerning the precepts of the second class there can exist some — some Decalogue precepts considered in some circumstance or condition — such as not to kill, not to steal, to give alms, not to lie for the protection of one's own or another's life when one is near death, as the anguish of final agony testifies. And Gabriel Vásquez[211] teaches this, and we ourselves confess it has happened to us more than once: for we were persuading a certain woman not to administer to a dying youth a deadly drug from which his death was feared, since she thought it was piety in that case to free him from torments by hastening death; and we confess that we learned with difficulty that she had done so in good conscience.

§ XVI — Who are said to sin from weakness (Ex infirmitate peccare qui dicantur)

§ 111. In the division according to the Master from Isidore, the second member was those who sin from weakness (*ex infirmitate*). Here first it must be noted what the name "weakness" (*infirmitas*) signifies. Weakness translated to the soul has in Sacred Scripture sometimes the signification of sin and of fault. In this way St. Paul in Rom. 5 says that "when we were yet weak (*infirmi*), Christ died for the ungodly;" which he thereafter repeats, saying that "while we were yet sinners (*peccatores*) He died for us" — in which he indicates that the same are for the Apostle "weak" and "sinners." Likewise Christ in Matt. 9 says: "Those who are well (*valentes*) have no need of a physician, but those who are ill (*male habentes*)" — that is, the infirm — clearly understanding those who are ill or weak to be sinners, according to what He adds in the same place: "For I came not to call the righteous but sinners." St. Augustine used "weakness" in this signification[213] and again in the *Enchiridion*.[214]

§ 112. In other instances this name is attributed to those who are indeed of good will, but not of will so firm as to be capable of resisting passion and external temptation. In this sense weakness is spoken of by the Lord: "The spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak" (*Matt. 26*). And to Peter in Jn. 21: "You cannot yet follow me" — as if to say, "You are not yet firm and strong enough to follow me." And Ps. 6: "Have mercy upon me, O Lord, for I am weak." To the same pertains what is signified in Matt. 13, in the parable of the sower, by the rocky ground: namely those who hear the word and receive it with joy but have no root, that is, no firmness of good will, and therefore through weakness fall away in the time of temptation. In this signification St. Augustine speaks of the weak,[213] in which place he distinguishes the weak man from the proud. Therefore according to the former acceptation every sin is weakness; but according to the latter, weakness itself is not sin, but certain sins are said to be committed from it.

§ 113. He sins from weakness, then, for whom weakness is the cause of sinning — that is, who, being of good will, yields and succumbs to a temptation that supervenes as if stronger than himself. Such was the sin of Peter denying Christ, and such are many sins committed from anger, fear, the temptation of the flesh, and other passions. Hence such sins are attributed to passion as their cause and are said to be committed from passion. Now passion is their cause in this way: because when it is more vehement, it so occupies the mind of a man that he cannot give attention to the duty of virtue as is required, and therefore judges that the particular act toward which passion inclines him is to be done. For when a man placed in temptation ought to consider two things as the principles of a conclusion — namely, that nothing which is against the law of God is to be done, and that this act is against the law of God, from which the conclusion is to be inferred that this act is not to be done — passion itself either darkens both premises or the one by which the particular is subsumed under the universal, so that it is either regarded as false or certainly not actually considered. The result is that the reason, darkened and corrupted, determines that what is contrary to that conclusion is to be done and toward which passion inclined as toward some useful or pleasant good. For this whole argument see St. Thomas,[215] where he teaches how the will is moved by the passion of the sensitive appetite. And in art. 2, where he teaches in what ways it happens that reason is overcome by passion against its own knowledge. And in art. 3, where he shows that all sins which proceed from passion are committed from a certain weakness of soul. Likewise in art. 6, 7, and 8,[216] where he teaches whether and to what extent sin is excused by passion.

§ XVII — Whether one sins more gravely from weakness or from ignorance (Utrum gravius ex infirmitate peccetur, an ex ignorantia)

§ 114. Sin committed from weakness or from passion is, all other things being equal, more grave than sin committed from ignorance, as the Master rightly asserts following Isidore.[218] The reason for this is that the former is more voluntary than the latter. For he who sins from passion knows the whole act which he chooses, though on account of the vehemence of the passion he is impeded, as has been said, from considering in particular what he knows in the universal. But he who sins from ignorance does not know his whole act, since some circumstance of it lies hidden from him. Insofar, therefore, as he is ignorant, to that extent he has less of the voluntary, and accordingly he offends more lightly than one who sins from passion. Furthermore, a certain ignorance excuses entirely from sin, because it happens that it altogether removes the voluntary even while the use of reason (*usus rationis*) remains; whereas passion or weakness, even when it is causative and stands antecedently to the act of sin, because it never removes the voluntary so long as the use of reason remains, never excuses entirely.[219]

§ 115. Next, it has been said concerning concomitant ignorance that, although it neither excuses nor accuses, nevertheless the act to which it is conjoined cannot be imputed as fault, for the reason that it renders the act not voluntary; but passion never accompanies an act in such a way that it can render it not voluntary, because it does not remove knowledge. Hence the act to which such passion is conjoined is a sin, whether the passion be present or absent, though not equally grave. Finally, although it is common to both — that is, to both ignorance and passion — that when affected (*affectata*) it does not excuse the sin but aggravates it, nevertheless sin arising from affected passion seems to be judged as more grave in itself than sin proceeding from affected ignorance: both because ignorance, even when affected, insofar as it removes the contrary knowledge, diminishes the voluntary more than passion does, which, as we have said, does not remove knowledge; and because ignorance is often assumed and affected out of passion, whereas passion is assumed not out of passion but out of malice. Hence those who sin by means of affected passion are to be said to sin not so much from passion as from malice.

§ XVIII — Who are said to sin from malice (Qui peccare dicantur ex malitia)

§ 116. The third member was that of those who sin from deliberate intent (*ex industria*); or, as the Scholastics more commonly say, from malice (*ex malitia*), or, as others express it, from certain malice (*ex certa malitia*). In this way are said to sin those for whom neither ignorance nor passion is the cause of sinning, but rather a will depraved by habit, or by hatred, or by pride, or by envy, or by some other similar disposition — and, in sum, those who sin with certain knowledge (*ex certa scientia*). Hence they are also called in Heb. 10 "those who sin willingly," because in them neither ignorance nor passion diminishes the voluntary, as happens in sins that are committed from ignorance or from weakness. In this class are found, first and foremost, all the sins of demons. Next, the first sin of the human being — of both the woman and the man — and then the sins of those who persevere for a long time in the evil disposition of some sin, since passion is a transitory affect (*affectus transitorius*). And indeed it is established that the first sin, whether of the human being or of the Angel, could not have proceeded from passion or from ignorance.

§ 117. It is asked whether the division of sins ought not to be referred to the sins of this class — that is, those that are said to be committed by deliberate intent or with certain knowledge — even if the sin did not proceed from a habit. For although, as St. Thomas rightly teaches,[221] whoever sins from habit also sins from certain malice, nevertheless the converse does not hold: whoever sins from certain malice is not on that account to be said to sin from habit, as is taught in the same place.[222]

§ 118. Moreover, in the Scriptures and outside them there are frequent examples of this kind of sin: as in Pharaoh, in the Pharisees and Scribes who persecuted Christ, in heretics, schismatics, Jews, usurers, and concubinaries. And although those who sin in this manner generally sin knowingly and with full awareness — by which reason they are said to sin from deliberate intent and knowledge — it nevertheless happens that even those who think they are doing well and rendering service to God can sin from malice; in which way sinned those Jews of whom the Gospel speaks frequently, and many heretics and other persecutors of the Church in every age, in whom the malice of the will has blinded the mind. Concerning this class it is said in Wis. 2: "These things they thought, and they erred; for their own malice blinded them."[223]

§ XIX — That not every sin is committed from ignorance (Non omne peccatum committi ex ignorantia)

§ 119. Those who attack the threefold division of sin endeavour to show that every sin belongs to the first member of that division, because no sin is committed that does not proceed from ignorance. This they prove as follows. First: because it is said generally in Prov. 14: "They err who work evil."[225] And in Prov. 21: "Every way of a man seems right to himself."[226] Then, from this maxim of the Philosopher, approved by the philosophical schools: "Every wicked man is ignorant," which is found in Aristotle.[193] To these is added what (Pseudo-)Dionysius says:[227] "No one, looking to evil, acts."

Item, St. Augustine says:[228] "As darkness closes the eyes, so sins close the mind, and suffer it to see neither the light nor itself." And in his second exposition of the same Psalm: "Whenever anyone commits a sin, he does not see the sin."

Item, St. Gregory, writing on 1 Kgs 15:[229] "They cannot become proud except those who first lose the eyes of the heart," and so forth. To these they add a confirmation from reason. For the will, which is the rational appetite, always and necessarily depends in its operation upon the judgment of reason; therefore it will never choose sin unless a corrupted reason judges it to be to be chosen. But this judgment is an erroneous one.

Item: The object of the will is either a true good or an apparent good; if a true good, the will choosing it does not sin; if merely apparent: therefore there is an error in the intellect by which that which is truly evil appears good. Indeed it was said above that he who sins from passion, while he sins, judges erroneously concerning the particular act.

§ 120. But without any doubt it must be said that not all sins are committed from ignorance, speaking now of ignorance as we are speaking of sins of ignorance. For those alone are said to sin from ignorance who know neither actually nor habitually all the circumstances of their act. And these are ignorant not only in the performance of the sin but also before the sin. Those, however, who sin from passion know at least habitually the whole of their act; indeed they know it actually even before the passion. But in the passion itself, while it is already prevailing, they labour under a certain ignorance concerning the particular thing to be done, until the

passion passes. Furthermore, those who sin from certain malice both know their whole act and know it to be a sin; nor, however, are they in what they sin entirely without ignorance. For they do not know in particular that this act, which they know to be a sin, ought not to be done in pursuit of that good which they intend. This matter St. Thomas explains learnedly and briefly[230] in these words: "Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone simply knows that what he does is evil: and then he is said to sin from ignorance; but sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which he fully knows that this is now evil, as when one sins from passion; and sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that this evil ought not to be done for the sake of obtaining that good: yet he knows simply that this is evil: thus he is said to be ignorant who sins from certain malice." These are his words.

§ 121. But that many sin without such ignorance — so that it cannot be said that all sins are committed through ignorance — is easily shown from the Scriptures. For the Lord says in Lk. 12: "That servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not do it shall be beaten with many stripes."[231] And James in Jas. 4: "To him who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin."[,232] Nor would Paul say in 1 Tim. 1 that he had obtained mercy from God because he had acted ignorantly, that is, had sinned through ignorance,[233] if there were not many others who sin knowingly. The same Apostle in Rom. 2 gravely rebukes the Jew because, though he had knowledge of the law and boasted of teaching others and of this knowledge of the law, he nevertheless dishonoured God by transgressing the law.[234] And in Rom. 7 he teaches that knowledge of the law without grace renders a man even more guilty of sins.[235] To which likewise belongs that saying of the Poet: "I see and approve the better things; I follow the worse."[,236] Certainly it is established that both the Angel and the first humans, when they first sinned, did not sin from ignorance. For ignorance of what was to be done could not have preceded the sin. For in that way the Angel and man would have been wretched before they were wicked — which is contrary to the original constitution of the intellectual creature.

§ 122. As for those things which have been adduced on the contrary side: they sufficiently show indeed that every sinner, by the very fact that he sins, errs or is ignorant in some manner — concerning which we shall say more shortly — but it does not follow from them that every sinner sins from error or ignorance, as has already been explained. Although, as regards the two Scripture texts adduced from Proverbs, if they are weighed carefully, they do not seem to pertain to what we have just said. For the sense of the first is: "They who work evil go astray from future goods and fall into many evils," as men are wont to go astray from the right road. This meaning is required by the other member of the sentence: "Mercy and truth prepare good things."[237] The second sentence, however, signifies that most men are well pleased with their own opinions and actions.

Hence it follows: "But the Lord weighs the hearts" — that is, God, the searcher of hearts, sees and perfectly knows the works and intentions of individuals.[238]

§ XX — Whether it is necessary that every sinner err (An necesse sit omnem peccantem errare)

§ 123. On the occasion of the foregoing question, a further inquiry is made: whether it is necessary that everyone who sins, in the very act of sinning, err — that is, err by a false practical judgment whereby he judges that this thing is now to be chosen and done. For the opinions of the Doctors vary on this matter.

§ 124. In favour of the negative position the following arguments are advanced.

First: The will, by reason of its freedom, is mistress of all the other powers, including even the intellectual power (*virtus intellectiva*). This is clear, because it often commands the intellect not only to think, or to understand, or to reason, but even to give its assent — as is manifest in the articles of Faith. For this reason man is said to "take his intellect captive in obedience to the Faith,"[240] inasmuch as the will commands the intellect to assent to things that are above reason. Therefore, even if reason judges most correctly concerning some particular action and all its circumstances, the will can nevertheless, by its own freedom and dominion over the intellect, choose something and command it to be done contrary to the dictate of reason.

Second: The will is compared to a king, reason to a senate of counsellors. Therefore, just as a king, after hearing the opinions of all the senators, can refuse to assent to them and can choose something different or contrary, so too the will can act against reason. St. Bonaventure points to this comparison,[241] saying: "The will in the soul is as it were the one that commands; reason is as it were the one that teaches." And again: "The will, informed by reason, consents to its counsel as a will that wills the good."[242]

Third: No error of practical judgment could have preceded the first sin of the Angel or of man. For otherwise, as has been said above, each would have been wretched before being evil. Therefore sin does not necessarily presuppose an error of judgment.

Fourth: If every sinner errs, then no one sins against conscience; for he is said to sin against conscience who does something contrary to the judgment of the practical intellect concerning something to be done or not done here and now in the particular case.

Fifth: If some error of judgment is always conjoined with every sin, then whoever sins is, while sinning, a heretic; for example, if a fornicator holds this judgment — "fornication is now to be committed by me" — or if one who breaks the fast in Lent judges thus: "I am now to eat"; or if someone sinning against obedience to the Pope judges thus: "I am now not to obey the Pope," and so forth in other cases. For judgments of this kind appear to be contrary to the faith.

Sixth: For an act of the will's choice, it suffices that reason propose something to the will as delightful or useful, and reason does not err in this even if what is proposed is not morally upright nor simply (*simpliciter*) good. Therefore sin does not necessarily presuppose error in practical reason.

Seventh: Someone can command himself to say what he most certainly knows to be false, and concerning which he in no way errs in the particular case. Therefore someone can command himself to do what he most certainly knows to be evil, and concerning which, as a particular thing to be done, he in no way errs.

Eighth: Demons and the damned, although they hate God, do not nevertheless acquiesce in this as something true: "God is to be hated." For otherwise that word of Is. 66 would not be true: "Their worm shall not die."[243] For they would hate God simply and with delight, without remorse, if their mind were to dictate this to them as a good.

Finally: St. Augustine, in his exposition of Ps. 68 on the words "Let their table become a snare before them,"[244] says that there are some who know their own iniquity and persist in it most obstinately, and who consent to sins although they know they ought not to consent to them; and of such he subjoins: "Behold, they know the snare and put their foot in it, and thrust their necks to be caught," etc. He writes similar things on Ps. 23 on the words "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive."[245] The same view belongs to St.

Augustine writing on Ps. 118, Sermon 8:[246] "The intellect flies ahead, but the effect follows slowly or not at all."

§ 125. Scotus holds this side as the more probable, and sets it forth in many places.[247] He does so expressly in his commentary on Book III,[247] where he adduces many arguments in favour of this position and says, among other things, that an article condemned at Paris as erroneous is this: "That with knowledge present both in universal and in particular, the will cannot will the opposite." Likewise in the same book,[248] where he again cites the condemned article against the opinion holding that the will cannot will anything except under the character of a true or apparent good, and on the contrary affirms that the will can be borne toward evil under the character (*ratio*) of evil, because, he says, it can will hatred of God before reason is blinded. Although the same author, writing in Book IV,[249] moderates his position, saying it is doubtful whether the good is the per se object of the will. In the same opinion are Henry of Ghent,[250] Francis of Meyronnes,[251] William of Ockham, and Gabriel Biel.[252]

§ 126. On the contrary, the doctrine of St. Thomas is found in very many places.[253] For in the *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8, he calls the ignorance of an evil choice that state in which someone actually does not consider what he can and ought to consider, and in this light he explains the objection he had put to himself — that every sin occurs with ignorance, according to Prov. 14: "They who work evil go astray." Likewise, at q. 58, a. 2, he says that the principle of all human actions in man is reason.[254] And that Socratic saying — "With knowledge present there is no sin" — is true, if knowledge be extended to the use of right reason in what is to be chosen in the particular case. And then more clearly at q. 77, a. 2, where he says that Socrates, in positing all virtues to be forms of knowledge (*scientiae*) and all sins to be forms of ignorance, spoke rightly to this extent: that since the will is of the good or the apparent good, it would never be moved toward evil unless that which is not good appeared in some way good to reason; "and on this account," he says, "the will would never tend toward evil except with some ignorance or error of reason, in accordance with Scripture, Prov. 14."[255] Again, in art. 1 of the same question, he affirms that the movement of the will is by its nature always apt to follow the judgment of reason.[215] From this it manifestly follows that the will cannot choose evil unless reason errs. Likewise, at q. 76, a. 1, ad 1, and at q. 78, a. 1, ad 1, he acknowledges that there is a certain ignorance in every sin, namely that ignorance by which every evil man is ignorant, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* III.[256] Likewise, at II-II, q. 10, a. 3, he says that in evil persons — that is, sinners — judgment is always corrupted with respect to the particular thing to be done.[257] He repeats this at q. 51, a. 3, ad 3.[258] Again, at q. 53, a. 2, he says that no sin can occur unless there is some defect in an act of reason directing it.[259] He writes similar things in the *Disputed Questions*.[260] Finally, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*,[261] he proves that God cannot will sin by this argument: that sin does not occur without error concerning its object, at least in the particular case, and error cannot befall God.

§ 127. This opinion is embraced by very many other theologians: Durandus in his commentary on Book IV,[262] Capreolus in his commentary on Book III,[263] Adrianus,[264] and Cajetan,[265] together with the other disciples of St. Thomas. Among these, Medina, commenting on the same article, establishes this doctrine as a most certain truth.[266]

Nor indeed can it be doubted that this was Aristotle's view. For beyond the passage cited shortly above — "Every evil man is ignorant" — he says in *Ethics* VI[267] that with right prudence present in the particular case, there cannot be sin; and in *Ethics* VII,[268] treating this matter expressly, after recalling the Socratic view described above, he teaches that incontinent persons do not have a true opinion about the particular thing —

namely what is to be done here and now — even if they affirm that they hold such an opinion in accordance with what right reason dictates; and he compares them to drunkards reciting verses of Empedocles which they do not understand. He teaches the same in the *De Motu Animalium*.[269]

§ 128. This doctrine is greatly favoured by Sacred Scripture, in which we read everywhere that sins are called "ignorances," as though without ignorance and error there were no sin. The relevant passages are Lev. 4 and 5, Num. 15, Ps. 24, Sir. 23, 1 Macc. 13, and others.[270] Hence the title of chapter 3 of the Prophet Habakkuk is "A prayer for ignorances" — that is, for sins. Hence too the Apostle says at Heb. 9 that the high priest was accustomed to offer sacrifice for his own ignorance and that of the people.'[271] According to the most open teaching of Scripture in Lev. 16, to which the Apostle refers back, this must be understood as applying to absolutely all the sins of the priest and the people — as St. Thomas also expressly expounds that passage in his commentary on the same Epistle.'[272] Pertinent to the same point are these Scripture passages: Ps. 58: "They have gone astray from the womb" — that is, they have sinned; Ps. 119: "From thy commandments I have not gone astray" — that is, I have not sinned; Is. 53: "All we like sheep have gone astray" — that is, we have sinned; Rom. 3: "There is none that understands" — that is, all have sinned, as the same passage continues.'[273]

Hence St. Ambrose says:[274] "The cross of the Lord abolishes and hides all errors" — that is, sins. For it is from this that righteous men are everywhere called wise in Scripture, and unrighteous men are called foolish.

§ 129. Proof is also drawn from Scripture at Lk. 23, where Christ, praying for his enemies, says: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."[275] For although he prayed only for the elect, as he himself testifies in Jn. 17: "I pray not for the world," etc.,'[276] nevertheless he cannot be said to have prayed only for those who sinned out of ignorance, but also for some of those who said: "This is the heir; come, let us kill him.",'[277] Certainly Christ prescribed for us a form of prayer for enemies. But he did not wish us to pray only for sinners acting out of ignorance, but also for those who sin from settled malice. Therefore those who sin even in this way are, in the very act of sinning, ignorant. For in accordance with the form prescribed by the Lord, we shall pray: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."

This argument is confirmed by the fact that Peter says at Acts 3 to the Jews who killed Christ: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers,"[278] even though those rulers were the ones who said: "This is the heir," etc. To these add the statement made several times in the book of Judges about men living without law and without a king: "Every man did what was good in his own eyes."'[279] From this it appears that sinners in all they do are doing what seems good to them. They are therefore always deceived with respect to the apparent good.

§ 130. This is further confirmed from St. Augustine saying:[280] "God, whom no one loses except by being deceived." By the loss of God he understands sin. These considerations assist those arguments that were adduced in the previous chapter for the affirmative part of our question. For although they did not avail to prove that question directly, they do avail — as we explained there — to teach that sin does not occur without some error. And most of all that saying of (Pseudo-)Dionysius: "No one acts with an eye to evil,"'[227] as well as the arguments adduced in the same place.

Together with these, the following further arguments have nearly the same force.

First: The object of the will is the good; for nothing can be sought (*appeti*) except under the formal character (*ratio*) of the good. Therefore, unless something is proposed to the will by reason as good, the will

will not be able to be borne toward it in appetite (*appetendo*). Wherefore, if the thing chosen is not truly good, there is error in reason, which proposes apparent good as true good.

Second: The choice of the will arises from the efficacious command (*imperium*) of the intellect, by which it commands the will to choose this or that. Therefore if the choice is evil, there was falsehood in the command.

Third: The will is rational appetite (*appetitus rationalis*). Therefore it cannot choose except what reason has judged to be choiceworthy. For if it can choose otherwise, the choice will not be rational but plainly reckless and blind. The will therefore never sins in choosing without reason erring in judging.

Fourth: If sin can co-exist with a judgment of reason that is altogether right, it will also be possible for the same man to be most prudent and most corrupt in his morals, so that in him prudence is separated from the other virtues — which is contrary to moral philosophy, which connects all the virtues in prudence, and contrary to the teaching of Aristotle in *Ethics* VI and in the *Politics*.[281]

§ 131. From all these considerations, therefore, it is sufficiently clear (*satis liquet*) that every person who sins errs, in the very act of sinning, by a false dictate of reason.

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§ XXI — The arguments brought forward on the contrary side are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta in contrarium adducta)

§ 132. That from this doctrine it does not follow that all sins are committed out of ignorance, we have already shown above. Therefore let us now reply to the remaining arguments brought forward on the contrary side.

To the first it is answered: that the will is mistress of the lower powers, but that it is not rightly said to be mistress of reason itself, except on the presupposition of some act of the intellect efficaciously commanding the will to choose or to will this or that act of reason. For command (*imperium*) belongs more properly to the intellect as the principal power of the soul than to the will. Likewise, the natural freedom of the will does not require that, while the judgment of practical reason stands, the will should be able to choose otherwise; but it consists in this, that the will can choose diverse things according as reason is able to propose diverse things — as must be declared more fully elsewhere. For freedom depends originally upon the intellect.

§ 133. To the second it is answered: that comparison holds correctly, insofar as in reason there is considered a universal knowledge, as it were, of such propositions as these: "no evil is to be chosen," "nothing unjust is to be done," "no adultery is to be committed"; and likewise of these propositions held in habit: "theft, perjury, adultery are not to be committed." But the will, inclined toward the contrary by some contrary habit or passion or otherwise, in some manner extorts from reason a false actual judgment about this particular matter — in the same way that it also happens that counsellors, regarding particular actions to be taken, are inclined toward the perverse will of the King.

§ 134. The difficulty of the third argument, which is singular, we have dealt with as best we could above (at Dist. 6.), and we shall also say something about it in the next section. To the fourth it is answered: that he sins against his conscience who has knowledge or opinion contrary to his deed — that is, who knows or thinks that what he does is illicit — whether he so judges in a universal proposition or even in a particular one

regarding this act, but only by habitual judgment. For his actual judgment is that by which he judges here and now that what he does is to be done.

§ 135. To the fifth I respond: since a universal judgment uncorrupted — such as that all fornication is sin and that no fornication is to be committed — is compatible with corrupted particular judgments, it is not heresy to judge that this action is now to be done by oneself. Nor is the sense that this is now licit for oneself. For a practical and particular judgment is not properly about what is licit, but about what is to be done, whether it judges the act to be licit or not. A man thus judges and concludes that a thing is to be done by a judgment of reason disturbed on account of the vehemence of passion or out of a depraved habit, etc. For the understanding of this solution, see St. Thomas,[283] where he teaches how one who despairs is not an unbeliever, when faith holds that every sinner, so long as he is still on the way, can be saved. On the same matter see St. Bonaventure.'[284]

§ 136. To the sixth it is answered: it does not suffice for the will's choice that something be proposed to it as useful or delectable, unless reason altogether judges it to be such — in which judgment it errs, if what it decrees to be chosen is against God's law.

The inference of the seventh argument is to be denied. For he who commands himself to say something that he certainly knows to be false, chooses by his will and executes the saying of it as a certain good proposed by erring reason. It is otherwise with what a person knows to be so evil that — [the text is here imperfect in the source, but the argument continues in what follows].

§ 137. To the eighth: the damned, hating God, judge that this is to be done by them — namely by a practical judgment following upon the apprehension by which they apprehend God as the author of the most grievous evil of the punishment they bear. These same persons, however, suffer the worm of conscience, insofar as they possess within themselves a certain universal knowledge of things to be done, which reproves them and in some manner murmurs against what they do contrary to that knowledge. On this matter see St. Thomas.[285]

§ 138. As to the objections drawn from St. Augustine, one must say that the same author's statements prove nothing other than that there are some who sin not out of ignorance but out of certain knowledge. How, however, those who sin in this manner are also ignorant in the very thing in which they sin — this has been declared above, where we were teaching that not every sin is committed out of ignorance.

Finally, the article of Paris is not contrary to this doctrine.[286] For it is true that, with knowledge standing both in the universal and even in the particular, the will can will the opposite — if the particular knowledge is not in act but only in habit; or even if it is also in act, yet not such knowledge as that by which a person actually knows that this evil is not to be admitted on account of the obtaining of that good. Of this knowledge he is destitute who sins from malice, as St. Thomas teaches.'[287]

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§ XXII — Whence was the origin of sin in Man? (Unde fuerit origo peccati in Homine?)

§ 139. Besides what has been said (at Dist. 6.) concerning the origin of sin in the Angels, it must generally be noted that every created nature, insofar as it is created — that is, made from nothing — is imperfectly and not

supremely good, but good only by participation, and therefore can fall away from the goodness it possesses. Irrational nature can indeed fall away through actions or passions contrary to its proper good; rational nature, however, as such, only through an act of its own will.

Moreover, since evil is nothing but a certain defect and privation of good, it is clear that evil has no proper efficient cause but only a deficient one. And the man who is falling away and receding from what is good acquires no thing, but loses some good and incurs its defect and privation. For seeking good, but in pursuing it not using the order of divine laws — to thus fall away is to sin.

§ 140. Wherefore (Pseudo-)Dionysius rightly said[289] that the formal character (*ratio*) of evil always consists in some particular thing. And St. Ambrose[290] says: "What is malice but the want of good?" St. Augustine, citing this sentence together with some following words, teaches,[291] that the origin of evil — that is, of sin — cannot be other than from a good that is, however, imperfect and defectible — that is, from the will of an intellectual creature. And on the same matter the same St. Augustine discourses at length.'[292] Therefore, to one asking the cause and origin of sin in man, or indeed in any intellectual creature at all, the plain answer is that there is no other cause than the will of that creature falling short in its operation. But this matter is to be treated by design (at Dist. 34.) of this book.

§ 141. It now remains to explain how the will of the first human beings could fall short in its action and thereby sin, if it is true, as we have taught above, that everyone who sins errs in the very thing in which he sins, and that sin cannot exist without ignorance or error of the intellect. For it is established that neither in man nor in the Angel was there room for error or ignorance of things to be done — whether in the universal or in the particular — before they sinned; lest, which would have been contrary to God's ordering, they should be wretched before they were wicked.

Although, however, this question has been treated (at Dist. 6.) where the origin of sin in the Angels was being investigated, yet because at this place, after the disputation on ignorance, a similar question about man arises, and at the same time in order that we may give satisfaction to the third argument brought forward above, something must also be said about it briefly here.

§ 142. In response to this difficulty, St. Thomas teaches[293] that sin in an act of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) comes about in two ways. In one way, because some evil is chosen — and sin of this kind he says always proceeds from some ignorance or error. In another way, when something is chosen that is good in itself, but is not chosen with the due order, measure, or rule. And sin of this kind, he says, does not require ignorance beforehand, but only the absence of consideration of those things which ought to accompany the act. And the same judgment holds for the first sin of the first human beings. To this can be referred what the Psalmist says: "Man, when he was in honour, did not understand" — that is, did not consider what he ought to have considered (Ps. 48).[294]

§ 143. But lest this response of St. Thomas seem contrary to many other passages in which he teaches that every sin is accompanied by ignorance, Cajetan — both in that same place and in his commentary on the *Summa*[265] — warns that in this general doctrine which teaches that every sin is accompanied by ignorance, the name of ignorance is extended to the actual non-consideration of that which ought to be considered in the action. Medina and Bannez give the same reply. And that reply is consonant with what St. Thomas teaches elsewhere; for in the *Summa*[253] he calls it ignorance of bad choice when a person actually does not consider what he can and ought to consider. But against this reply it can be objected that non-consideration of this

kind truly and properly is actual ignorance, and therefore there is no need of an extension of the word "ignorance" to comprehend that non-consideration within it.

Proof of the antecedent: because consideration of what ought to be considered is the absence of actual consideration, as St. Thomas himself acknowledges. But actual consideration is actual cognition; therefore its absence is the privation of such cognition, which is the definition of ignorance — especially with the addition that it is ignorance of what ought actually to be considered or known.

§ 144. This difficulty is heightened by the fact that this non-consideration (*inconsideratio*) — whether of the Angel or of the human being — is not only shown to be true ignorance, but also appears truly to be a sin. For if such consideration was absent, and yet ought to have been present — inasmuch as it is posited as the consideration of what ought to have been considered, as St. Thomas says in the passages just cited — therefore the very absence of consideration was a sin, just as the absence of actual attention to that to which we are able and bound to attend is sin for us. Hence the same Doctor[295] calls this kind of non-consideration a "defect of attention" (*defectus intentionis*). Elsewhere, however,[296] he openly pronounces that non-consideration itself is a sin. And in the *Summa*[297] he places it among the vices and makes it a species of imprudence, insofar as it is a defect of judgment.

This same point is confirmed by the doctrine long since handed down, by which we were teaching that ignorance of what can and ought to be known is a sin. For if non-consideration is ignorance of this kind, as has now been proved, it follows that it is a sin.

§ 145. Now what still further heightens the present difficulty is this: whether the said non-consideration be posited in the first sin of the first human beings or not, it nevertheless — according to the doctrine of St. Thomas — seems impossible to deny that the act of the will which was the first sin was commanded by practical reason judging that act to be to be done. And that judgment was gravely erroneous. Therefore it is necessary to acknowledge not any kind of ignorance merely, but error, even in the first sin of human beings, just as in all other sins whatever. And Medina ingenuously acknowledges and affirms this,[266] adding that the same can be said of the sin of the Angels. Nor unreasonably, since St. Thomas himself, writing on this book,[298] acknowledges in the sinning Angels an error of choice (*error electionis*). And indeed this necessarily follows from the general doctrine by which it has been proved above that everyone who sins errs in the very thing in which he sins, and not merely in some manner ignorant. Hence the same St. Thomas calls that ignorance according to which every sinner is ignorant now "deception" (*modus deceptionis*), now "error," in the passage already cited and in other passages drawn from him above for this doctrine.

§ 146. Moreover, if — as Cajetan requires — for a free act of the will, besides the judgment of reason by which such an act is judged to be to be done, there is further required a command (*imperium*) as an act of that same reason distinct from that judgment, by which, namely, reason efficaciously commands the will to perform the act it has judged to be to be done; it would follow that sin cannot exist in the will unless the intellect sins doubly — namely by false judgment and by unjust command. But perhaps it would more correctly be said that the efficacious command which Cajetan requires over and above the practical judgment for the election of the will is nothing other than the last and — as they say — the most particular practical judgment, by which, namely, the particular act here and now is judged, dictated, decreed, commanded to be done. For St. Thomas requires nothing beyond this judgment in order that the act of the will necessarily follow; since according to him the act of the will is by nature always apt to follow the judgment of reason.[215]

On what side of the argument the command is to be other than this judgment — [the text here breaks off and the next argument follows].

§ 147. Furthermore, to explain the difficulty of the present passage, Cajetan[265] (whom certain others follow) in his commentary on article 2 of the question mentioned, seems to teach that in a sinful act the act of the will precedes the judgment of the intellect. For he says that the intellect is determined by the will to judge that one of two opposed alternatives is to be done — though in different ways in the case of good and evil acts, as he himself goes on to explain and carefully distinguishes. But since his doctrine and distinction is more subtle than solid — for it in no way appears how it can come about that the will determines the intellect to judge and command some act, if every choice of the will must by nature be preceded by a judgment of reason by which the very choice of the will is commanded — for this reason that response seems to us more probable which we indicated (at Dist. 6.), namely that that ignorance, or non-consideration, or error according to which every sinner is ignorant and errs, is properly not a cause of sin, but rather something of sin. For a man sins by the very fact that reason judges perversely: he sins, I say, incipiently (*inchoative*), just as he sins in a consummated manner (*consummative*) in the fact that the will chooses badly. For every sin consists of and is consummated by, as it were, those two parts — false judgment and bad choice — and both occur freely in their own manner, because the root and origin of freedom is in the intellect, and its terminus and perfection is in the will. Therefore, just as the act of the intellect is not to be separated from the act of the will (for the former is as it were part of the formal character (*ratio*) of the latter), so the error of judgment is not to be separated from sin, but is included within its full formal character. And although the error of judgment is by nature prior to the bad choice, yet in time it is simultaneous with it. Therefore, as regards the internal act, the whole sin is consummated in an instant.

§ 148. That this response is consonant with the mind of St. Thomas is sufficiently apparent from the fact that he teaches that ignorance, according to which every wicked person is ignorant, is not a cause of sin — and therefore that not every sin is committed out of ignorance, even though in every sin there is a certain ignorance.[299] Nor does he anywhere teach that the same ignorance stands accidentally (*per accidens*) in relation to sin. It is also established that this ignorance is not by its own nature an effect of sin; for that which was present in the first sin arose from no sin.

One must say that it is something of sin itself, as if belonging to its formal character. Furthermore, because he does not deny that this ignorance is a sin, but rather acknowledges and teaches that it is a sin, as is evident from what has been said. Nor, however, does he want there to be two sins — ignorance and bad choice. Hence it is further gathered that he involves the ignorance of bad choice under the sin of bad choice itself as something intrinsic to it. Wherefore it is correctly and properly said that everyone who sins, by the very fact that he sins, errs; but it is improper and less correct to say that every sinner sins from error.

§ 149. According to this response the way lies open to resolve the difficulties proposed. It is true that the non-consideration which St. Thomas posits in the first sin can properly be called ignorance; we also grant that in the first sin there was error of judgment. Nor, however, does it follow from these points that there was room for error or ignorance in man or the Angel before they sinned, or that they were wretched before they were wicked; because this — whether non-consideration, or ignorance, or error — which is called the error of bad choice, did not precede the sin, but was something of the sin, and was a voluntary act or defect and therefore culpable, and in its own way truly sin, as has been sufficiently proved in the foregoing. And therefore

by it the intellectual creature was already not only wretched but wicked, and wretched precisely because wicked.

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§ XXII [continued] — Why God either made man or permitted him to be tempted, whom He knew would sin (Cur fecerit, aut tentari permiserit Deus hominem, quem peccaturum sciebat?)

§ 150. The Master (at the opening of Dist. 23.) raises and briefly explains five little questions drawn from St. Augustine, of which the first is: Why did God permit man to be tempted, whom He knew would be overcome by the tempter? The second: why did He create him at all, whom He foresaw would sin? The third: why did He not make him such as would have no wish to sin at all? The fourth: why did He not will to preserve man in good? The fifth: why did He not turn man's will to good when he was being tempted? These questions, mutually connected and cohering, St. Augustine treats and resolves.[301] From this passage the Master excerpted his own material.

§ 151. Akin to these is the question: why did God give man a precept which He knew he would not observe? Which question St. Jerome writes[302] was objected to Catholics by the Marcionite heretics, who blamed the God of the Old Testament. But the solution of this is to be sought from that general question treated (at Dist. 47. of Book I.): Why did God command things He does not will to be done?

§ 152. First, however, the false responses to these and similar questions are to be removed. Such is that of Rupert, who teaches[303] that God permits no one to be tempted with that temptation by which He knows the person will fall into sin, unless that person has first by some sin tempted or offended God. And writing elsewhere,[304] in response to those who ask why God permitted the causes to come about on account of which it was necessary for Him to become man and be crucified, and why He did not rather arrange that neither man nor Angel should fall, he recalls a certain argument from St. Augustine,[305] which is found in these words: "For who would dare believe or say that it was not in God's power that neither Angel nor man should fall? But He preferred not to deprive them of this power, and thus to show both how great the evil of their pride, and how great the good of His own grace, could be." This response of St. Augustine Rupert censures as insufficient, or rather as false, and puts forward his own, different from it — by which he seems to indicate that God could not have prevented the sin of man and Angel, because it is written in Jn. 5: "I can of myself do nothing: but as I hear, I judge." This, he says, is impossible for God — to judge otherwise than He hears or understands. Hence He could not communicate Himself to that creature which dared to will to be self-sufficient. But this opinion of Rupert is little sound, indeed altogether erroneous, because it contradicts the Divine Omnipotence. What Scripture means, which he wrests to his own purpose, has been stated elsewhere.

§ 153. More correctly does the same author respond elsewhere[306] to this question — why God created the Angel whom He knew would become evil — in those words with which Paul speaks of Pharaoh (Rom. 9): "For this very purpose I have raised thee up, etc."; and of the reprobate Jews (Rom. 11): "O the depth of the riches."

§ XXI — (continued)

§ 154. Nor, moreover, can what is read in St. Jerome, writing on the Epistle to Philemon, be proved true. There, in response to the question why God did not make man incapable of sinning, he answers: "Because otherwise his goodness would not be voluntary but necessary, and he would not be like God." For it is established that this, taken as the words sound, is not true. For the ability to sin, as will be taught in its proper place, does not belong to the formal character (*ratio*) of the will or of free choice; and an intellectual creature that cannot sin — as are the Blessed — is most like God.[307]

But perhaps St. Jerome wrote this from another's opinion. There are those who think that the first human beings, before the temptation, were secretly raised up in a certain pride and sinned, and that by the merit of this sin they were permitted to be tempted. And they endeavor to prove this by the testimonies of St. Augustine and Prosper.[308]

§ 155. For St. Augustine says that the woman would not have believed the words of the serpent, unless there had already been in her mind a certain proud presumption of herself, which was to be convicted and humbled through that temptation.[309] And Prosper says: "They would not have been tempted, unless they had been forsaken, nor would they have been forsaken, unless they themselves had first forsaken God."[20]

The falsity of this opinion and its reasoning is easy to demonstrate: both from the fact that Scripture (Jn. 8) testifies that the devil was a murderer from the beginning — which would not be true if the human beings themselves had killed themselves by hidden pride before the devil's temptation — and also because the occasion for taking pride was received by the first human beings from nowhere other than from that promise of the tempter: "You will be as gods." Concerning this matter, a fuller account has been given in its proper place,[310] against Rupert and certain others who hold this view.

§ 156. For as regards St. Augustine and Prosper, they do not speak of the temptation absolutely, but of the temptation that was fitting for and that cast down the first human beings into the sin of manifest disobedience. For the sense is that they were not to be led into the transgression of the divine precept concerning the forbidden tree, unless they had first sinned secretly through pride. This is clear from St. Augustine himself in the same passage.[311]

Therefore, the false arguments having been rejected, those which the Master derives from St. Augustine are to be received. This, however, must be noted throughout this entire disputation: that the arguments, whether of the Master or of St. Augustine, are of force only to show that God did not act or permit irrationally in so acting or permitting — but not to show that He could not have done otherwise.

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1. St. Bonaventure and Scotus; cf. the preceding distinction of this commentary for the first sin of the woman.

2. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11: *"Credendum est illum virum suae feminae, uni unum, hominem homini, conjugem conjugi ad Dei legem transgrediendam, non tamquam verum loquenti credidisse seductum, sed sociali necessitudine paruisse."*

3. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 42: *"Noluit Adam Evam contristare, non quidem carnis victus concupiscentia, quam nondum in membris suis senserat, sed amicali quadam benevolentia qua plerumque fit, ut offendatur Deus ne homo ex amico fiat inimicus."*

4. Sir. 10:14–15 (Vulgate): *"Initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo: quoniam ab eo qui fecit illum, recessit cor ejus; quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia."*

5. Tob. 4:14 (Vulgate): *"In superbia sumpsit initium omnis perditio."*
6. Prov. 16:18 (Vulgate): *"Ante ruinam exaltabitur cor."*
7. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13.
8. Rom. 5:19 (Vulgate): *"Sicut per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi: ita et per unius obeditionem justi constituentur multi."*
9. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13; and *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 14.
10. Gen. 3:22 (Vulgate): *"Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est sciens bonum et malum."*
11. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 13 and 14; XI, ch. 5, 30, 39, 42; *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 23.
12. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 15; and *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Conc. 45 [as cited in the source].
13. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Conc. 11 super Ps. 118 [*Concio 11 super Psalmum 118*].
14. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Conc. 9 and 21 super eundem Psalmum 118; also *Enarrationes in Ps.* 18, 68, 70, 82; and *Dialogi 65 Quaestionum*, q. 4.
15. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 19: *"Praecedit in voluntate hominis appetitus quidam propriae potestatis, ut fiat inobediens per superbiam."*
16. St. Basil, *Homilia quod Deus non est auctor malorum*.
17. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* IV.
18. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 16; *Ad Populum Antiochenum*, hom. 11; *De Providentia* I.
19. Pope Leo the Great, *Sermo* 5 *de Nativitate Domini*.
20. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa* II, ch. 19.
21. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et gratia Christi*, ch. 22 [book number as in source].
22. Eucherius, *In Genesim* I.
23. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* IV, ch. 9; XIII, ch. 17; XXIV, ch. 17.
24. St. John Damascene, *De Fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 10.
25. St. Bernard, *Sermo* 1 *de Adventu*.
26. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim* III; *In Genesim* X; *In Matthaeum* XXVI.
27. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 22.
28. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1.
29. Cajetan, commentary *in eundem locum* (i.e., on *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1).
30. Above, at Distinction 6 of this book.
31. St. Basil, *Homilia quod Deus non est auctor malorum* (cited above).
32. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* XXXIV, ch. 17.
33. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13; cf. Rom. 5; Phil. 2.
34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1 (as referenced above, *ubi supra*).
35. 1 Tim. 1:19 (Vulgate): *"Habens fidem et bonam conscientiam, quam quidam repellentes circa fidem naufragaverunt."*
36. 1 Tim. 6:10 (Vulgate): *"Radix omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidam appetentes erraverunt a fide."*
37. St. Augustine, *De Pastoribus*, ch. 8.
38. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13: *"Nisi enim ad sibi placendum averteretur a superiori immutabili bono, non Dei mandato uxoris praeponeret; nec ille praevaricator praeceprti, si vitae suae sociam non sequeretur etiam in societate peccati."*
39. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 42.

40. Gen. 3:7 (Vulgate): *"Et aperti sunt oculi amborum, et cognoverunt se esse nudos."*

41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 2.

42. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV (the place frequently cited above in this distinction).

43. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13: the three quotations follow in sequence from that chapter.

44. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 118, Sermon 21 (Concio 21).

45. St. Augustine, *In Epistolam Joannis*, Tractate 4.

46. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 68; *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 13; *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 15.

47. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Demetriadem*.

48. Above, at Distinction 6 of this book (*ad Dist. 6*).

49. St. Augustine, Sermon 24 *de Tempore*, ch. 2 (= Sermon CLXXXVII in the Benedictine edition, among the Sermons in class 5).

50. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 68, on the verse "Quae non rapui tunc exsolvebam."

51. St. Augustine, *In Joannem*, Tractate 17.

52. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim* III, chs. 7, 8; *In Matthaeum* X, ch. 26 (book 10 on Matt. 26).

53. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* III, ch. 22; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa* II, ch. 19; St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum* III.

54. Above, Distinction 6 of this book (*ad sextam Dist.*).

55. Testimonies cited at Distinction 6 of this book.

56. Master of Auxerre (Guilielmus Altissiodorensis), *Summa aurea* II, Tract 10, ch. 3, qq. 1–2.

57. Matt. 5:48 (Vulgate): *"Estote perfecti sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est."*

58. St. Augustine, in the passages adduced at the beginning of this section (*locis initio allatis*), i.e., *De Civitate Dei* XIV and the other texts cited above.

59. Cf. Rom. 10:3.

60. Cf. Lk. 15:11–32 (the Parable of the Prodigal Son).

61. Above, Distinction 6 of this book, on the origin of pride in the angels.

62. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4.

63. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 42; *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11.

64. St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ch. 15.

65. St. Cyril, *Contra Julianum* III.

66. 2 Cor. 11:3.

67. Ignatius, *Epistola ad Trallianos* [abbreviation as in source: "ad Trallianos"].

68. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* III (ch. 35 as cited in source; cf. *Adv. Haer.* III, ch. 23).

69. Hilary, *In Matthaeum*, canon 3.

70. Epiphanius, *Haereses*, heresy of the Cainites.

71. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 4 (also *De Elia et jejunio*, ch. 4).

72. St. John Chrysostom, *In I Tim.*, hom. 9; *In Joannem*, book 2, ch. 3; also cited against Julian.

73. Leo the Great, Sermon 2 and Sermon 3 on the Nativity of the Lord.

74. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa* II, ch. 19; *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 19 and 21.

75. Fulgentius, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 22 [abbreviation as in source].

76. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralium* XXIX, ch. 6 [as cited in source].

77. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*.

78. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 21; *De Elia et jejunio*, ch. 4.

79. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 45.

80. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, chs. 21 and 24.

81. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 17.

82. St. Augustine, Sermon 11 on Ps. 118 (*Tractatus de Cantico novo*, ch. 8) — i.e. Sermon CLXXXVII (or *Sermo de Cantico novo*) in the Benedictine edition, as noted in source: "Seu Sermone olxxxviii. Inter Serm. in classe 5 in editione PP. Bened. Tom. v." The editors note that this sermon (*Liber de Cantico Novo*) is judged spurious by the Benedictine Fathers in the Lyon edition of 1552, though orthodox writers cited by Estius raise no objection to it.

83. St. Ambrose, *De Elia et jejunio*, ch. 4.

84. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 21.

85. This will be taught at the next Distinction of this book.

86. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 4; a. 4, ad 1.

87. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 4.

88. Ambrosiaster, *Commentary on Paul* (Commentary on 1 Tim. 2), inscribed to St. Ambrose.

89. St. Thomas, as cited above — *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 4; a. 4, ad 1 [as in preceding section].

90. 2 Cor. 11.

91. Passages cited in the earlier part of this Distinction (above).

92. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 11.

93. That is, the fifth interpretation of the Apostolic text (*Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricationem fuit*) set out in the preceding section (§ V).

94. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 163, a. 4.

95. Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.*, dist. 22 (in the text of the Master).

96. Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, Tract. 3, ch. 6.

97. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Populum Antiochenum*, Homily 7.

98. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, Homily 25 (moral exposition).

99. Rupert of Deutz, *In Genesim*, bk. 3, ch. 22.

100. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 4.

101. St. Ambrose, *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 4.

102. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, on Lk. 4 ("Socrus autem Simonis tenebatur magnis febribus").

103. Isidore of Seville, *De Summo Bono* (= *Sententiae*), bk. 2, ch. 17.

104. Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum*, Tract. 3, ch. 6 (as cited above).

105. Cajetan, *Commentarium in Genesim*, ch. 3.

106. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 35.

107. St. Bernard, *De Praecepto et Dispensatione*.

108. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 25.

109. St. Bernard, *De Praecepto et Dispensatione* (place cited above); and Sermon 1 *De omnibus Sanctis*.

110. St. Ambrose, *De Institutione Virginis*, ch. 4; Cajetan, *Commentarium in Genesim*, ch. 3 (places cited above).

111. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; II-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 4; a. 4, ad 1 — and Estius's own discussion at Distinction 6 of this book.

112. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (or *Topics*) — the Philosopher's maxim: *Rerum meliorum pejores sunt corruptiones*.

113. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 5.

114. Rom. 5:12.

115. Rom. 5:14.

116. 1 Cor. 15:45–47.

117. Acts 17:26.

118. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 4.

119. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, bk. 2, ch. 4.

120. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2; and *In III Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1.

121. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 22, § G.

122. Sir. 25:33 (Vulgate: *A muliere initium factum est peccati, et per illam omnes morimur*).

123. Ps. 50:7 (Vulgate).

124. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses*, bk. 3 [the OCR reads "lib. 2"; page image confirms "lib. 3"], ch. 19 [as cited in source; Estius reads "lib. 2, cap. 19" following the older numbering].

125. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 1, ch. 3.

126. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (Haer. 78).

127. St. Ambrose, *De Tobia* [book cited], as quoted by St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 1, ch. 2.

128. St. Ambrose, *De Fide ad Gratianum*, bk. 5, ch. 3 [as cited by Estius; cf. also the citation structure in source].

129. Ambrosiaster, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 5 ("Per unum hominem," etc.).

130. Epiphanius, *Panarion*, Haer. 78 (place cited above).

131. St. Augustine: *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, bk. 1, ch. 16; bk. 2, ch. 25; *Quaestio* 40 *super Leviticum*; *Expositio Psalmi* 50, on "Libera me de sanguinibus"; *Tractatus* 2 *in Ioannem*, on "Qui non ex sanguinibus"; *Opus Imperfectum contra Iulianum*, bk. 2 — cited by Bede in his exposition of Rom. 5.

132. Bede, repeated exposition of Rom. 5:12 ("Sicut per unum hominem").

133. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 1, ch. 3, citing St. Ambrose, *Apologia David*, ch. 11, and *De Tobia*, chs. 9 and 23.

134. St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 2, ch. 6, citing St. Ambrose, *De Sacramento Regenerationis* (a work no longer extant).

135. St. Augustine, *De Symbolo*, bk. 2, ch. 4 (*Per feminam mors, et per feminam vita; per Evam interitus, per Mariam salus*, etc.).

136. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, bk. 4 [as cited in source], ch. 1.

137. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 17, ch. 10.

138. St. Bernard, Sermon beginning "Signum magnum" (*Vehementer nobis vir unus et mulier una nocuere*).

139. St. Anselm and Hugh (of St. Victor), commentaries on Rom. 5; Bede and Theophylact on Jn. 1.

140. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, bk. 2, ch. 25; St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, bk. 3, chs. 2 and 12; and others cited at Distinction 3 of Book III of this commentary.

141. Jn. 3:6.

142. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 26 (*Quicquid per carnalem concupiscentiam nascitur, trahit originale peccatum*).

143. Jn. 1:13.

144. Estius, *In II Sent.*, dist. 31 (below).

145. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* at the place cited above [i.e. as referenced in the preceding section].

146. Gen. 2:24.

147. Matt. 19:6.

148. Gen. 2:18.

149. The opinion of Galen and the physicians (that both parents are effectively generative causes) versus the Aristotelian position (that the woman contributes only matter), derived by St. Thomas from Aristotle.

150. Bede and St. Anselm, commentaries on Rom. 1, noting (from St. Augustine) that the origin of sin is attributed more to the man because generation begins from the man as the more principal agent.

151. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 22, on the text of the Master.

152. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 2.

153. Isidore, *De Summo Bono*, bk. 2, ch. 17.

154. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, bk. 25, ch. 16.

155. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 2.

156. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, bk. 1, from the beginning of ch. 50 to the end of bk. 1 (prefaced at the end of ch. 9).

157. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 95 (Epistle 177 in the Benedictine edition, as noted in the margin of the source).

158. St. Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, bk. 2, ch. 5.

159. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, chs. 2 and 3.

160. Deut. 32:29 (Vulgate: *Intellige insipiens in populo, et stulti aliquando sapite*).

161. Hos. 4:1.

162. 1 Cor. 14:38.

163. Ps. 24:7.

164. Ps. 79:6 and Jer. 10:25.

165. 2 Thess. 1:8.

166. Jer. 5 (those ignorant of the way of God are rebuked).

167. Rom. 1; Eph. 4; Wis. 13.

168. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 19, and *De Duabus Animabus*, ch. 12.

169. St. Gregory the Great and Isidore, at the places cited above (i.e. *Moralia* bk. 25, ch. 16, and *De Summo Bono* bk. 2, ch. 17).

170. Ps. 35:4 (Vulgate: *Noluit intelligere ut bene ageret*).

171. Job 21:14.

172. Prov. 1:22.

173. Ps. 24:7; Ps. 69:6 (Vulgate numbering); 1 Cor. 14:38.

174. St. Augustine, *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 17; and *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 22.

175. Jn. 15:22.

176. St. Augustine, *Tractatus* 89 *in Ioannem*.

177. St. Augustine, *Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 3, ch. 3.

178. St. Bernard, *Epistola* 77.

179. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, bk. 1, from ch. 10 to the end, where he teaches from the Scriptures that ignorance is a sin.

180. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* at the place cited above (i.e., I-II, q. 76, aa. 1–4).

181. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, bk. 22, ch. 27.

182. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 19.

183. The text alluded to is "Know the Lord" (*Cognosce Dominum*): cf. Hos. 4:1 and the general scriptural precept to know God.

184. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 4 (reply to objections); cf. also I-II, q. 79.

185. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 4.

186. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 4, ad 2 (where he states that a defect of the apprehensive power, if in no way subject to the will, would not be a sin, as is evident in those afflicted with invincible ignorance).

187. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 3.

188. St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione*, ch. 14.

189. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

190. The discussion is continued in the following section (§ XIII) on concomitant ignorance.

191. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 6, aa. 8–9; I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

192. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 76, aa. 1, 3.

193. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1.

194. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 1.

195. St. Augustine, *Epistola* 105 (*ad Sixtum*) [cited as Ep. 105 in the source; numbered Ep. exciv in the Benedictine edition, PP. Bened.].

196. Cajetan and Medina, writing on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 3.

197. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 1 (ibidem).

198. Medina, commenting on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

199. Gen. 38.

200. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 70, a. 3.

201. Cajetan, *In Summam theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 4.

202. Innocent III, *Decretales*, Extra *de Simonia*, cap. *Per tuas*.

203. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 5.

204. St. Augustine, *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, ch. 13.

205. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 15.

206. Adrianus, *Quodlibeta* 4.

207. Cornelius Jansenius of Ghent, *Augustinus*, vol. 2, *De Natura Lapsa*, ch. 2 through ch. 6 (and the whole of the sixth book), with the chapter heading: *Ignorantia etiam quae necessitatis est non voluntatis, hoc est invincibilis, non caret peccato*.

208. The 67th proposition among the proscribed propositions of Baius, condemned by the Vatican [i.e. by Pius V's bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*, 1567].

209. The theologian writing under the fictitious name of Guillelmus Wendrochius, concealed under the name of a Salzburg theologian, in a particular dissertation *De Probabilitate* appended to the fifth of the letters of Louis de Montalte [i.e. the *Provinciales* of Blaise Pascal].

210. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

211. Gabriel Vásquez, *In primam secundae*, disp. 122, ch. 1.

212. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77.

213. St. Augustine, *De Gratia et Libero arbitrio*, ch. 17; *De Natura et Gratia*, ch. 29.

214. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 81.

215. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 1.

216. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, aa. 6, 7, 8.

217. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76 and q. 77.

218. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], *In II Sent.*, dist. 22, citing Isidore [of Seville]. Cf. also St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 1–2.

219. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 1–2.

220. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 78, aa. 1, 2, 3.

221. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 78, a. 2.

222. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 78, a. 3.

223. Wis. 2:21–22 (Vulgate).

224. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 78.

225. Prov. 14:22.

226. Prov. 21:2.

227. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.

228. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 18, first exposition; and second exposition of the same Psalm.

229. St. Gregory, writing on 1 Kgs 15 [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 1. Regum"].

230. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1.

231. Lk. 12:47.

232. Jas. 4:17.

233. 1 Tim. 1:13.

234. Rom. 2:17–24.

235. Rom. 7:7–11.

236. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* VII, 20–21.

237. Prov. 14:22b (Vulgate).

238. Prov. 21:2b (Vulgate).

239. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8 and q. 77, a. 2.

240. 2 Cor. 10:5.

241. St. Bonaventure, *De Profectu Religiosorum*, Book I, ch. 7.

242. St. Bonaventure, *De Profectu Religiosorum*, Book I, ch. 23.

243. Is. 66:24.

244. St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 68, on the verse "Let their table become a snare before them" (Ps. 68:23).

245. St. Augustine, commentary on Ps. 23, on the verse "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive."

246. St. Augustine, commentary on Ps. 118, Sermon 8.

247. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 36, a. 2, dub. 1.

248. Scotus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 1, ad 1.

249. Scotus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 4.

250. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* I, q. 16 and, expressly, q. 17.

251. Francis of Meyronnes, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24.

252. William of Ockham and Gabriel Biel [no further reference given in source].

253. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 6, a. 8.

254. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 58, a. 2.

255. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 2; Prov. 14:22.

256. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 1, ad 1 and q. 78, a. 1, ad 1; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, ch. 1.

257. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 3.

258. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 51, a. 3, ad 3.

259. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 53, a. 2.

260. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 2 and a. 8; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 30, q. 1, a. [number as in source], ad 1 and ad 4.

261. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book III, ch. 95.

262. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 39, q. 1.

263. Capreolus, *In III Sent.*, dist. 36.

264. Adrianus, *Quodlibeta* VI, q. 4, a. 1 [abbreviation as in source: "Quodlib. 6. q. 4. ar. 1."].

265. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 2.

266. Medina, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 2.

267. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, ch. 15.

268. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, chs. 2–3.

269. Aristotle, *De Motu Animalium* [chapter as in source].

270. Lev. 4–5; Num. 15; Ps. 24; Sir. 23; 1 Macc. 13.

271. Heb. 9:7.

272. Lev. 16; St. Thomas, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, on ch. 9.

273. Ps. 58:4; Ps. 119:110; Is. 53:6; Rom. 3:11–12.

274. St. Ambrose, *Apologia David*, Book I, ch. 6.

275. Lk. 23:34.

276. Jn. 17:9.

277. Matt. 21:38; cf. Mk. 12:7; Lk. 20:14.

278. Acts 3:17.

279. Judg. 17:6; 21:25.

280. St. Augustine, *Soliloquia*, Book I, ch. 1.

281. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI; *Politics* [book and chapter as in source].

282. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* at the places most recently cited.

283. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 20, a. 2, in the body, and again in the reply to obj. 2 and 3.

284. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 42, ad textum.

285. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 79, aa. 12–13.

286. The article condemned at Paris: "Quod stante scientia in universali et in particulari non potest voluntas oppositum."

287. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1.

288. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4; and *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77.

289. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4, part 4.

290. St. Ambrose, *De Isaac et anima*, ch. 7.

291. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, Book I, final chapter.

292. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XII, chs. 2 and 6 and several following; *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 13; *Enchiridion*, chs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24; and passim in the books written against the Manichees.

293. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4.

294. Ps. 48 (Vulg. Ps. 48:13 / 49:12): "Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit."

295. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 77, a. 2.

296. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 2, ad 3.

297. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 53, a. 1.

298. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1.

299. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 4, ad 1.

300. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 24 [as in source: "2. 2. 24."]; q. 165.

301. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book XI, from ch. 4 to ch. 10.

302. St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*, Book III, ch. 2.

303. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Book III, ch. 10; and *In Matthaeum*, Book XIII [as in source].

304. Rupert of Deutz, *In Matthaeum*, Book XIII [as in source].

305. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Book XIV, ch. 27.

306. Rupert of Deutz, *De Victoria Verbi Dei*, Book I, ch. 24.

307. St. Jerome's text is here cited as writing on the Epistle to Philemon; the specific chapter reference is as in source.

308. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book XI, ch. 30; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vita contemplativa*, Book II, ch. 19.

309. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 30.

310. The reference is to Dist. 21 of this Book, where the discussion against Rupert of Deutz and others is conducted.

311. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 3 [as in source].

DISTINCTIO XXIII — ON THE REASONS WHY GOD PERMITTED ANGELS AND MEN, EVEN THOSE HE FOREKNEW WOULD SIN, TO BE CREATED (*DE RATIONIBUS CUR DEUS ANGELOS ET HOMINES ETIAM PECCATUROS CREARE PERMISERIT*)

§ 1. — that it was absolutely necessary for it to be done in this way. Hence, in questions of this kind and similar ones, that admonition of Sir. 3 has its place: "Seek not the things that are higher than thee." And likewise that text of Rom. 11: "O the depth of the riches," etc.[1] And again that text of Eccl. 8: "Whatsoever he will, he shall do, neither can any man say to him: Why dost thou so?",[2] St. Augustine, understanding this (in ch. 4 of the book already cited[3]), prefaces his discussion as follows: "The depth of his counsel I cannot penetrate," etc. And in ch. 10, answering the fifth question, "Why, then, did he not make him?" he says: "Because he did not will it. Why did he not will it? That is his own concern. We ought not to be wiser than we should be.",[4] Hence also in Letter 106 (to Paulinus),[5] raising for himself a question similar to the foregoing — why God created men whom he foreknew with certainty would sin in such a way as to be condemned to eternal fire — he answers that God did this because he willed it. "But why did he will it? 'O man,' says he, 'who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?'" etc., from the Apostle, Rom. 9.[6]

§ 2. For the rest, because God does nothing irrationally (*irrationabiliter*), it is not amiss that reasons are sought and assigned by the Doctors by which it is shown to be reasonable that something has been done or permitted by God. In order, therefore, that this may be understood, it must be noted that it belongs to the adornment and perfection and, as it were, to the very substance of the Universe that there should be in it various grades of things differing in perfection and imperfection. For some things have motion without life; others live yet are devoid of sense; others have sense yet lack intellect; and still others, finally, have received the power of understanding together with freedom of choice (*libertas arbitrii*). And among these latter, some are corporeal and others incorporeal. But if all things were in the most perfect grade, nothing would thereby be added to the perfection of the Universe except perhaps in number; there would be wanting to it, however, the grades of inferior things. Wherefore the Universe could not rightly be called such as it now is; for it would indeed be a universe — outside of which nothing exists — but not such a one as would embrace within itself various genera and grades of things, which is properly and absolutely what a Universe is.

§ 3. To this variety there pertained furthermore this: that God should create not only those intellectual substances (*substantias intellectuales*) which he knew would not sin — namely, through his preventing gift — but also those which he foresaw would sin, namely through free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) left to themselves. This reasoning is drawn from the perfection of the Universe — not in the sense that sin of itself contributes

anything to the perfection or adornment of the Universe, but inasmuch as creatures that sin and creatures that do not sin obtain a different place and order in the Universe. For sinning creatures are inferior and are ordered to punishment; non-sinning creatures are superior and are ordered to glory. St. Augustine transmits this reasoning.[7]

§ 4. There is another reasoning derived from the goodness (*bonitas*) of God, which St. John Damascene assigns.[8] For if God were unwilling to create those whom he foresees will be evil, then evil would overcome the goodness of God — evil, I say, of sin as conditionally foreseen — from overcoming the goodness of God to be declared in the work of creation.

§ 5. There is yet another reasoning from the side of Divine Providence (*Providentia Dei*), to which it is fitting to govern each thing according to the principles implanted in things at their creation. Therefore those creatures to which God gave free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), by which they could either sin or not sin, he governs in such a way that he permits some of them to fail and to be deflected toward sin through free choice — just as among those things that are corruptible he permits various particular accidents, otherwise avoidable, by which they are harmed and corrupted. For all these things serve to demonstrate Divine Providence (*Divina Providentia*) governing things according to the mode of their nature. In support of this reasoning the statements of (Pseudo-)Dionysius[9] and of St. Augustine,[10] have weight — statements which we have adduced above, where we were treating of the Providence of God.,[11]

§ 6. There is likewise another reasoning from the side of the Omnipotence (*Omnipotentia*) of God; for God willed to permit sin in order to show that he is so powerful as to be able to elicit good even out of evils. This reasoning St. Augustine transmits in many places.[12]

§ 7. Again, there is another reasoning from the side of the goodness (*bonitas*) of God. For he is so good that he permits no evil from which he does not elicit good, as St. Thomas attests.[13] Indeed, he is so good that he permits no evil at all except with the compensation of a greater good than that good whose privation he permits. This St. Thomas affirms.,[14]

§ 8. Hence there follows yet another reasoning from the side of the justice (*justitia*) and mercy (*misericordia*) of God. For these are the principal goods for the sake of whose declaration and exercise God permitted sin both in angelic and in human nature. For in the angels the good of Divine justice, punishing and avenging their sin, was declared. In men, on the other hand, justice and mercy were declared in part each: while from the condemned mass some are justly punished, others are mercifully set free. St. Augustine frequently recalls this reasoning, as — besides the places already cited — in the following works.[15] To this also belongs what St. Ambrose says,[16] where, the question having been raised why God gave a wife to the man, through whom the man himself and his posterity would sin, he answers in these words: "For he preferred that there be more whom he could save and to whom he might grant the forgiveness of sin, than that Adam alone should be free from fault."

§ 9. There is likewise another reasoning which is drawn from the side of man himself. For, as St. Augustine says,[17] "Man would not be deserving of great praise if he were able to live well only because no one urged him to live ill." It was therefore fitting that he should be permitted to be tempted. Moreover, he was permitted to fall for the sake of caution and the instruction of the saints, as St. Augustine teaches in the same chapter; just as the devil was permitted to fall, and other reprobates both angels and men, for the exercise of the elect, as St. Augustine likewise teaches in the same work.,[18]

§ 10. Let there be added, finally, this reasoning, the most powerful of all: that from the occasion of man's sin there followed, according to the eternal counsel of God, that great good which otherwise would not have come to pass, namely that the Son of God became man (*Dei Filius homo fieret*). For to this good — God made man — God by a definite counsel ordered the permission of the sin of the first men. In this matter he declared wonderfully his Power, his Wisdom, his Justice, and his Mercy. Hence the Church rightly sings: "O happy fault, that merited to have so great and so glorious a Redeemer."

§ 11. Moreover, the aforesaid reasonings are to be received not merely as probable but as simply true. For whenever some end is obtained through a means — provided only among goods — there is no room for doubt that such a means was ordained by God unto such an end; and whenever from any good or evil something good follows, there is no room for doubt that it was ordained by God that this should follow from that. Nevertheless it must be known that all reasonings of this kind are ultimately to be resolved into the most free will and good pleasure (*beneplacitum*) of God, as the supreme Lord of his own actions, as has been said elsewhere.

§ 12. Now from the fact that man was permitted to sin, it does not follow either that God was frustrated in his intention — if, as the truth of the matter holds, he established man with a view to remaining in the good, even though this did not come about — or that man was established by God in order that he might sin, which Calvin does not truthfully assert. For when God is said to do something *for the sake of an end*, it is not the final cause of God himself, or of his action insofar as it is in God, that is to be understood, but the final cause of the work, that is, of the creature, to which God has appointed an end as its perfection and good toward which it should tend. Yet this end the creature itself, because it is defectible (*defectibilis*), does not always attain. Therefore, when man sins, it is not God who is frustrated in his end, but man himself who has strayed from the end for which he was established. And what we have said of the first man must also be said of all other men, even those who are not restored to salvation, and likewise of the transgressing angels. So St. Thomas teaches.[19] Whether, however, there is or can be any creature impeccable by nature (*natura impeccabilis*) — a question which St. Thomas discusses in the same place — has been disputed by us around Dist. 7 of this book,[20] where it was shown from the fact that every creature is from nothing that no intellectual creature (*creatura intellectualis*) can by nature be such that it is incapable of sinning, but that this is proper to God alone.

§ II — Whether it is lawful to desire temptation (An licitum sit appetere tentationem)

§ 13. St. Bonaventure raises a question at this place: whether temptation is to be desired by a just man. In favour of the affirmative the following arguments are offered.

The first: The Apostle James, ch. 1, says: "Count it all joy, brethren, when you fall into various temptations."[22]

The second: In Ps. 25, the Prophet says: "Prove me, O Lord, and try me; burn my reins and my heart."[23]

The third: St. Augustine,[24] from the two testimonies of Scripture just cited, teaches how just and steadfast men rightly desire to be tempted and rejoice in temptations.

The fourth: St. Gregory somewhere speaks thus: "A holy man desires to be tempted after his virtuous deeds, lest through confidence in his virtues he grow sluggish."[25]

The fifth: Whatever advances our salvation is deservedly desired; but such is temptation, for through it virtues are exercised, increased, and confirmed, and victory is gained against the devil, the flesh, and the world.

The sixth: St. Antony and other saints are recorded to have provoked the devil to combat; therefore they desired temptation, which comes from the devil.

The seventh: Martyrdom is rightly desired; but this is not without the temptation of the world and of the devil. Hence St. Ignatius said in his Epistle to the Romans: "Would that I might enjoy the beasts that are prepared for me." And again: "Fire, the cross, beasts, the breaking of bones, the dismemberment of limbs, the crushing of the whole body, and the torments of the devil — let all these come upon me, so long as I enjoy Christ."[26]

§ 14. On the contrary, the following considerations tell against it.

The first: Nothing may be desired except what is good; but temptation is not good, because every good is from God, whereas temptation is not from God. For James says, ch. 1: "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God; for God is not a tempter of evils, and He Himself tempts no man."[27]

The second: Nothing is to be desired that is ordered of itself toward sin; but such is temptation, inasmuch as it is nothing other than a solicitation and incitement to sin, whether it proceed from the devil, from the flesh, or from the world.

The third: A certain Gloss (upon Matt. 4, "Jesus was led into the desert") speaks thus: "It records that Jesus was led, in order to instruct us that one ought not of one's own accord to rush headlong into temptation."[28]

The fourth: Occasions of sin are not to be sought but to be fled; therefore, much more are temptations to be fled. The inference holds, because temptations have their own causality proper to sin — namely, in the genus of efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) — whereas occasions do not.

§ 15. Concerning this question, St. Thomas,[29] in his Commentary on 2 Cor. 12, upon the words "There was given to me a sting of the flesh," writes as follows: "It happens that what is in itself evil and to be avoided becomes, in its ordering to something else, to be desired; just as a bitter potion, inasmuch as it is bitter in itself, is to be avoided, and yet one who considers it in its ordering to health desires it: therefore also the sting of the flesh is in itself to be avoided as afflicting, but inasmuch as it is a path toward virtue and the exercise of virtue, it is to be desired." These are his words. He had, however, interpreted the sting of the flesh in an alternative sense as the movement of concupiscence (*motus concupiscentiae*) arising from the flesh.

§ 16. St. Bonaventure sets forth a twofold path of responding to the question. One is: the temptation that comes from God is simply to be desired, because God's temptation tends only toward good; the temptation that comes from the flesh is simply to be fled, because that temptation, he says, cannot exist without sin — how this is to be understood we have explained above.[30] The temptation that comes from the devil (under which he seems to include also that which comes from the world, that is, from wicked men as members of the devil) is, for some, to be fled, and for others, to be desired — to be fled by the weak, to be desired by the strong. And he proves this from St. Augustine, who in the passage cited above says that the citizens of the holy City of God, according as their weakness or their steadfastness may be, fear to be tempted and desire to be tempted; they grieve in temptations and they rejoice in temptations.[31]

The alternative path is: to speak of temptation in two ways — either formally and under its proper formal character (*ratio*); for thus temptation, as we are now speaking of it, is an impulse toward what is illicit. In this sense it is not lawful to desire temptation, but we ought altogether to flee it. Or materially, that is, according to the underlying subject-matter (*secundum rem subiectam*); of this kind are affliction, sickness, torment, death, hunger, want, and the like, which are not in themselves evils and can be the matter of the exercise of virtue. In this sense, therefore, just men burning with charity rightly desire temptation, because in this desire there is nothing of evil and much of good.

§ 17. These things having been set forth from St. Bonaventure by way of preamble, I reply to the question with five propositions.

The first: The temptation by which God tempts can be desired by just men; for it is good in itself and profits the one tempted, as is evident from the examples of Abraham, Job, Tobias, the Apostles, and the Martyrs. Of this temptation David speaks in Ps. 21, Ps. 25, Ps. 138, and elsewhere.[32] Not only lawfully therefore, but also holily, is such temptation desired, with confidence and prayer, that God may bring it about with the temptation a prosperous issue.

The second: The temptation of sin absolutely and formally is not to be desired; because it is evil in itself, as the first and second arguments of the denying side rightly prove, together with the argument drawn from St. Bonaventure.

The third: The temptation of sin that is inflicted by the demon and by the world can, when considered materially, rightly be desired by just men strong in virtue — as the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Gregory sufficiently prove, as well as those things which we have drawn from St. Bonaventure. And to this belong the desires of the saints who desired martyrdom and provoked the devil to combat. For they do not desire the evil acts of the devil or of wicked men — whether those who solicit them to sins by internal suggestions or by external persecutions, threats, terrors, and torments — but, presupposing the malice of those persons, they desire the afflictions themselves, which as such are from God and are accordingly good.

The fourth: The temptation of sin that comes from the flesh is not to be desired even materially; because the movement of concupiscence is in itself evil, inasmuch as it is contrary to the spirit and repugnant to the law of God, as the Apostle testifies in Rom. 7,[33] and it lacks nothing for the nature of sin except voluntariness; if therefore you desire it, this perverse movement will become voluntary for you, and consequently sinful. And this is what the above-cited words of St. Bonaventure intend, in which he teaches that the temptation of the flesh is simply to be fled, because it cannot exist without sin. He also, in his book on the progress of the religious life,[34] having taught that to desire temptations and to thrust oneself into them is incautious, especially for the weak and imperfect — although for certain persons it is sometimes useful to stir themselves to battle against spiritual vices — subjoins these words: "But concerning carnal vices this is dangerous and foolish; rather, their battles are to be fled, excluded from memory, and their occasions removed. Hence the Lord was unwilling to allow Himself to be tempted regarding lust, in order to teach us that we ought not to thrust ourselves into this temptation even with hope of triumph and reward. For since this temptation has a great admixture of pleasure, and in this vice all of us were conceived, and not only the mind but also the body takes delight, therefore the entry into it is perilously conceded." It must be known, however — as we have said elsewhere — that the temptation of the flesh regards not only carnal sins but also spiritual ones, because concupiscence is a general vice, although its rebellion against the spirit appears more in carnal matters.

This fourth proposition does not conflict, I judge, with what St. Thomas says — that the sting of the flesh can be desired in its ordering to the exercise of virtue. For since he explains the sting of the flesh in two ways — namely, as either bodily pain or the movement of concupiscence — either his aforesaid words are to be referred only to the former explanation, and in that sense they will be valid (for according to that explanation that temptation was from a demon, not from the flesh), or, in the part where they are said of the movement of concupiscence, they are to be understood in accordance with the following proposition.

The fifth and last proposition: Just as the good that is drawn forth from evil — that is, from sin — through God's providence can simply and in itself be desired, even though the sin itself is in no way to be desired; so also the good that comes to a man from the temptation of sin — not only that which comes from the demon and from the world, but also that which comes from the flesh — is rightly desired; even if the temptation of the flesh, or the movement of concupiscence, as has already been said, is in no way to be desired in any ordering whatsoever.

§ 18. These things having been thus set forth, it is now easy to see how far the arguments adduced on both sides conclude. Furthermore, this is to be noted from St. Augustine:[35] that one ought not easily to presume of oneself, but rather to fear the example of Peter, whom temptation immediately cast down when he was over-confident; and the examples of certain persons of whom Eusebius writes,[36] that, having thrust themselves voluntarily upon persecutors, they shamefully failed in the contest of suffering. Therefore neither those who appear strong and experienced in the battle against the devil and the world ought, without necessity or evident utility both for themselves and for others, to expose themselves to temptation — above all, to that which comes from wicked men — because this cannot happen without a new sin on the part of those who tempt them and a graver danger of their damnation.

§ III — With what knowledge was the first man created? (Cum qua scientia creatus primus homo?)

§ 19. The teaching both of the ancient Fathers and of the Scholastics is settled that the first man was created by God with a great perfection of knowledge. On this matter there write expressly Hugh of St. Victor,[38] the Master (in the present Distinction), who borrows his words almost wholly from Hugh; St. Thomas;,[39] and likewise, upon the same Distinction, the rest of the Scholastics. Moreover, this teaching is no less consonant with Scripture than with reason. For in Gen. 2 it is said that Adam imposed names upon all individual living creatures — something he could not have done had he not been endowed with great and perfect knowledge of things. Hence the Philosopher (in the *Cratylus*) does not hesitate to affirm that the one who first of all mortals imposed names on things was the wisest of men; and before him Pythagoras — as Cicero attests[40] — judged this very same thing to belong to the highest wisdom.

§ 20. To the same point the Scripture of Eccl. 7 appears to refer: "God made man upright, but he himself became entangled in an infinity of questions" — for the infinite multitude of questions arises from the ignorance into which man fell through sin. Likewise Sir. 17, where it is said of the first men: "He filled them with the discipline of understanding. He created in them the knowledge of the spirit, he filled their heart with understanding, and showed them both good and evil. He added to them instruction and the law of life he gave them as a heritage" — though both of these passages, and especially the latter, some refer universally to the human race as a whole, which is equipped by God with manifold knowledge of things.[41]

§ 21. There is also the passage in Prov. 30, where Solomon — or Agur[42] — says: "I have not the understanding of Adam." For so can the Hebrew be rendered for what stands in our version as "The wisdom of men is not with me." This statement, thus rendered from the Hebrew, pertains to the eminent commendation of the knowledge and wisdom that was in Adam.

§ 22. Moreover, reason too persuades us to think thus of the first man. For, as St. Thomas says,[43] since the first man was instituted by God as the principle (*principium*) of the remaining men, not only by way of bodily generation but also by way of instruction and governance, it was necessary that, just as he was created in the state of perfection with respect to the body, so also that he was straightway able to generate, so also he was straightway able to instruct and govern others. Therefore he possessed knowledge (*scientia*) in all those matters in which man is fitted to be instructed by man.

§ 23. Now that knowledge is partly natural, and partly exceeds natural cognition (*cognitio*). Let us first speak of the natural knowledge. The following are approximately what the learned hand down on this subject.

The first point: Adam in his creation received the knowledge of all natural things. Proof: by the reason just cited from St. Thomas — for man is fitted to be instructed in all natural knowledge; therefore all of it had to be present in the first man for the purpose of instructing his race. Furthermore, this is with sufficient certainty gathered from Scripture, Gen. 2; for if Adam had acquaintance with the natures of all living creatures, so as to be able to assign to each its apt and proper name, by parity of reasoning he also knew the natures of the remaining things. And Hugh (in the passage cited above) seems to understand it thus.[44] The same is stated by Suidas, in words cited by Molanus,[45] so that not without reason does the same Molanus make Adam the protoplast the inventor of the art of medicine.

§ 24. The second point: He likewise possessed in his creation all moral knowledge (*scientia moralis*). This too is proved by the same reason, for in the whole genus of things pertaining to morals, men are to be instructed and governed through that kind of knowledge. Hence for this reason as well, Hugh and the Master attribute to the first man this kind of knowledge, which they call knowledge of himself (*cognitio sui*) — namely that whereby he might know what he owed to his superior, what to his equal, what to his inferior, and in general what was to be done.[46] Here it must be noted, by the way, that moral knowledge, even though by a certain division it is distinguished against (*contra*) natural knowledge, can nevertheless, insofar as it is by its nature capable of being acquired by the light of natural reason, rightly be called natural — that is, distinguished against supernatural knowledge. For even by the testimony of the Philosopher,[47] prudence and the habits pertaining to the cognition of things to be done by us are more natural to us than the sciences of other things.

§ 25. The third point: From the things whose knowledge Adam received in his creation, the elements are by no means to be excluded, nor the celestial bodies and their parts, that is the stars. This is asserted against the singular opinion of Cajetan,[48] who denies that knowledge of these was given to Adam from the beginning. For commenting upon that passage of Gen. 2, "And Adam called all the living creatures by their proper names, etc.," he holds this to have been said by way of distinction from the stars, whose names, he says, are reserved to God, according to that text "Who numbers the multitude of the stars and calls them all by their names" (Ps. 146:4), and by way of distinction from the heavens — both the first heaven and the rest — and from the earth and sea, which are said to have received their names from God in Gen. 1. But this opinion is refuted by the general reason adduced above, by which St. Thomas proves that the first man was so instituted by God as to

have knowledge of all things in which man is fitted by nature to be instructed. These things, he says, are all those which exist virtually (*virtualiter*) in the first self-evident (*per se notis*) principles — that is, whatsoever things men can naturally know. Now these are not only living creatures and things more imperfect than these, such as plants, stones, and metals — which even Cajetan himself wishes to be comprehended under those more perfect things — but also the simple bodies both celestial and elementary; which St. Thomas manifestly holds,[49] when he says that Adam in the knowledge of natural knowable things would not have advanced as regards the number of things known. He also affirms,[50] that Adam habitually knew whatever any man has attained by human genius. Nor does Cajetan, writing upon St. Thomas, contradict this teaching; rather he confirms it by his own commentary.

§ 26. There is besides this clear argument: a perfect acquaintance with living creatures and the rest of the mixed bodies cannot consist without knowledge of the elements of which they are composed; nor can perfect knowledge of things of the lower world be had without knowledge of the heavens and stars, upon which, as upon certain efficient and conserving and moving causes, these lower things depend. For since to know (*scire*) is to know the cause (*causam cognoscere*), it cannot be that one who is ignorant of their causes possesses perfect knowledge of those things — and I say perfect knowledge of the kind that can naturally be had.

§ 27. To the argument of Cajetan it is answered: that it was not so said by the Psalmist of God — "he numbers them etc." — as if only to God were known the number of the stars together with the individual properties of each, which are signified by the term "names" in the manner of Scripture. For it is established that both the number and the natures of the individual stars are known also to the Angels. Moreover, in the person of Solomon the Author of the book of Wis. 7 writes that there had been given him by God the knowledge whereby he might know the disposition of the globe of the earth and the powers of the elements, the course of the year and the dispositions of the stars, and in general whatsoever things are hidden and unforeseen or abstruse — that is, in the nature of things.[51] Therefore the verse of the Psalm is to be expounded either of the most perfect knowledge of the stars — for that belongs to God alone — or of knowledge conjoined with dominion and lordship. For God so knows the number and properties of the stars that, as Lord, he rules them, and makes them, summoned as it were by their own names, obedient to his nod, according to that text of Bar. 3: "They were called, and they said: Here we are."

§ 28. The fourth point: The natural knowledge of the first man, which he had from the beginning, extended beyond doubt also to God. This likewise follows from the general reason stated above. For God can be known by man by the natural route, and that by various demonstrations from created things, as we showed at length.[52] Nor would man have been in any way perfect in his creation if he had not had knowledge of God his Creator and Governor; nor would he have been endowed with perfect knowledge of other things if he had been ignorant of the first and supreme cause of them.

§ 29. The fifth point: Whether the natural knowledge of the first man also comprehended the separate intelligences (*intelligentiae separatae*), that is the Angels, is not certain, but only probable, according to what was said above;[53] where it was asked whether it can be proved by reason that Angels exist. Yet it need not therefore be doubted that the first man had knowledge of the Intelligences from the beginning — for since such knowledge cannot be obtained through nature, it must be believed that he received it through supernatural revelation.

§ 30. The sixth point: All the aforementioned knowledge was received by man through species (*species*) infused by God in the very act of his creation. Proof: by sufficient division, since he could not have acquired it by abstraction from phantasms — for the experience that causes such knowledge was something man could not have had at the moment of his creation. Nor could it have been through connate species (*species connaturales*), because that mode of cognition is proper to the Angelic nature, since — the human soul being otherwise constituted (and in the first man it was of the same nature as ours) — the soul is of itself as it were a blank tablet (*tabula rasa*), as the Philosopher attests.[54] St. Thomas teaches this in the place already mentioned.

§ 31. The seventh point: The knowledge of natural things implanted in the first man did not differ in species (*specie*) from our knowledge of the same things. For although the former was infused and ours is acquired, yet both are contained within the same species by reason of their object — just as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind are of the same species and formal character (*rationis*) as the eyes which nature produces, as St. Thomas says in the same place.[55] For Adam's knowledge does not differ from the knowledge of another man — supposing someone to have acquired knowledge brought to a perfection as great as Adam's — except that his was infused, whereas the other's would be acquired. And that difference alone does not suffice for specific distinction, as Cajetan rightly teaches.[56]

§ 32. The eighth point: The first man had neither knowledge of future contingents, nor of the hidden thoughts of hearts, nor of all present individuals of any given species. This is what St. Thomas says,[57] tacitly correcting what he had said to the contrary earlier,[58] namely that Adam knew the thoughts of hearts in that state, and certain future contingents — yet not by natural power, but by divine revelation. The reason he gives in the *Summa* for why this is not so is that these things can neither be known by man's natural study, nor are they necessary for the governance of human life, so that one would need to have recourse to revelation on their account. It is also easily proved from the matter itself: for Adam did not know the thought of Eve when she spoke with the serpent and consented to the sin of pride and the transgression of the divine precept; indeed he did not even know the outward conversation and the outward violation of the precept, that is the eating of the forbidden fruit — for without doubt this would have displeased him and he would have rebuked his wife, being still upright. Much less did he know what the devil was contriving against him.

§ 33. The ninth point: Adam was able to advance in knowledge — namely in knowing new species of things that would arise in the course of time from the various mingling of different things; then as regards the number of individuals in each species; and thirdly as regards the mode of knowing. For, as St. Thomas says,[49] "The things he knew intellectually, he would subsequently have known through experience, which is a different mode of knowing." And it is for this last reason also that Christ advanced in knowledge.

§ 34. The tenth point: The first man knew by conversion to phantasms (*per conversionem ad phantasmata*), just as the rest of men in the state of innocence would have known — that is, in the same manner in which we know. The reason is that this mode of understanding belongs to the human soul insofar as it is united to a body, and is therefore natural to it. So teaches St. Thomas,[59] although Scotus dissents,[60] writing that it is a punishment of original sin (*peccati originalis*) that man now requires conversion to phantasms for understanding; and he attempts to prove this by the testimony of St. Augustine,[61] where Augustine refers the reason why man cannot see the light itself with a fixed gaze to the infirmity contracted from sin. But the proof is weak. For St. Augustine by those words means nothing other than that it is a punishment of sin that man does not now have or attain so clear and perfect a cognition of things as he would

have had if he had not sinned. Nor indeed would the phantasms necessary for understanding have impeded man from such perfect cognition of things as they now impede — and the cause of this impediment is sin.

§ 35. The eleventh point: The soul of the first man neither saw nor could naturally see Angels through their essence; yet it had a more excellent mode of cognition of them than we have. The first part of this point follows from the immediately preceding one — for a phantasm cannot represent the essence of an Angel, which is incorporeal. The second part is proved because the cognition of the first man was more certain and steady regarding interior intelligibles than our cognition is. On this matter see St. Thomas in the same article,[59] where he also replies to the authority of St. Gregory,[62] which seemed to say something different.

§ 36. The twelfth point: Adam was the wisest of all men, with the exception of Christ, who is God and man. This is contrary to what the Hebrews think, who, indulging as is their wont in trifling in the exposition of Sacred Scripture, pretend that Adam and Eve were created utterly simple, barely yet using reason, and almost like infants — which is rightly rejected by all Christian theologians. Moreover, in our present proposition we take wisdom (*sapientia*) according to the signification of that term customary among philosophers and theologians, for the perfect and consummate knowledge of all things; which comprehends the other human disciplines and arts, and above all Metaphysics, which, beyond all other sciences, Aristotle teaches deserves the name of wisdom.[63]

§ 37. This assertion is proved from the three ways in which Adam excelled other men in wisdom. First, by the breadth of knowledge (*amplitudine scientiae*). For, as we have taught above, he had knowledge of all things that can naturally be known by man — something that happens to no other person. Second, by the excellence of the mode of knowing (*praestantia modi sciendi*). Many too know many things, but for the most part only by probable reason, or only from effects and not from causes, or not from all and the first and immediate causes, these being certainly and evidently known. Many likewise know things not by ostensive demonstration but by the reductive method (*ad impossibile*). But the first man had perfect knowledge of each thing, derived from its proper and all its causes certainly and evidently known. Third, by the firmness and immobility of his knowledge (*firmitate et immobilitate scientiae*). For during the state of innocence he could not have lost the knowledge once received, because there was no place there for forgetfulness, nor for the ignorance that corrupts knowledge, nor for disease through which it sometimes happens that knowledge is lost, nor would there have been that necessary cessation from the act of knowing which could cause its loss, as happens with us.

§ IV — Certain objections are resolved (Quaedam objectiones solvuntur)

§ 38. Against the doctrine which we have set forth above in general — namely, that the first of men was created by God with a great perfection of knowledge — there are certain objections which must be briefly resolved by us.

The **first** objection is drawn from Gen. 3, where the serpent promises the man knowledge of good and evil: this promise would be foolish and ridiculous, and in no way suited to deceive, if the man already possessed all knowledge.[65] For although this was said to the woman, yet it was said with that intention and purpose that through her the promise might reach the man. Hence it was subsequently reproached to Adam himself as well: "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil."

The **second** objection: In the same chapter it is said of Adam and Eve: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked."[65]

The **third** objection: St. John Chrysostom, in a homily on Adam and Eve which is found in the first tome of his works, ascribes rudeness (*ruditatem*) to the first man: "So great," he says, "was the grace shining in the rudeness of the first man," and so on. And below he asks whether God was ignorant that the rude man could fall through the commandment. Yet rudeness is greatly contrary to learning and to a perfect knowledge of all things.[66]

The **fourth** objection: "What need was there," they say, "for the first man to know all the conclusions of Geometry, Arithmetic, Music, and the other arts?"

The **fifth** objection: The sons and grandchildren of Adam discovered many branches of knowledge and arts; therefore Adam did not possess all the sciences and arts — otherwise he himself would have transmitted them to his children, inasmuch as they had been received in creation for that very purpose, as was said above. The antecedent is evident both from Gen. 4, where certain arts, such as the smith's craft, music, pastoral work, and tent-making, are attributed to specific inventors,[67] and from Gen. 9, where Noah is presented as the originator of planting the vine and pressing wine;[68] as also from the histories of all ages. On this matter one may consult Polydore Vergil in his book *De Inventoribus Rerum*.[69]

The **sixth** objection: St. Augustine, in *De Libero Arbitrio* book III, chapter 24, says that the first man was created neither wise nor foolish.[70] This is very far from saying that he was created supremely wise.

The **last** objection: Of Solomon it is written in 4 Kgs. 4 that he was wiser than all men.[71] And this is confirmed by the words of the divine promise in the preceding chapter 3: "Behold, I have given thee a wise and understanding heart, and so much so that none like thee hath been before thee, nor shall arise after thee."[72] Certainly in Wis. 7 so great a knowledge of natural and human things is attributed to Solomon that nothing seems capable of being added to him. For after the enumeration of the various things whose knowledge he is said to have had, this universal clause is subjoined: "And whatsoever things are hidden and unforeseen, I have learned"; to which this reason is also appended: "For wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me."[73] Therefore it appears that this praise of supreme wisdom is falsely transferred to Adam.

§ 39. To these objections we reply one by one.

To the first: The knowledge of good and evil which the serpent promised to the man is not to be understood as human knowledge — that is, the knowledge which can be acquired by human study and talent — but as something far surpassing what is human, namely, divine knowledge. This is evident from the very words: "You shall be," he says, "as Gods, knowing good and evil."[74] That the man aspired to such knowledge, though already corrupted beforehand by pride, is shown by those derisive words of God: "Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil."[75]

To the second objection: What is urged in the second place was not said of any new knowledge of a thing, but of the experience of a certain evil and of the shame straightway following upon it. For this is set in opposition to what had been said before: "They were both naked and were not ashamed."[76] Hence the meaning is: that then for the first time — namely, after the sin had been committed — they perceived that the nakedness of the body was base and shameful to them, on account of the disordered and obscene motions of

lust rising up in the flesh, and for this reason they were ashamed. St. Augustine expounds this sense at greater length.'[77]

§ 40. To the third objection I reply first that that homily is falsely attributed to St. John Chrysostom, since it is established that it was written in Latin and indeed after Chrysostom's age. Next, whoever its author may be, he did not intend to signify that the man was rude — that is, ignorant of things in the world — but used "rudeness" to mean either simplicity free from guile, that is, innocence, as some expound it, or rather newness; and the man himself "rude," that is, newly or recently created. For this latter sense is evident from the context.

To the fourth objection the reply is general. For although the mathematical sciences and the other speculative sciences do not in themselves directly conduce to the ordering of life and the regulating of conduct, they nevertheless perfect the intellect, and are arts worthy of a free man, and afford assistance toward a fuller knowledge of God. For this reason they were neither superfluous nor unworthy as instruments wherewith Adam might instruct the human race. Moreover, the same objection could be raised regarding the Angels, to whom nonetheless it is not doubted that such knowledge belongs.

§ 41. To the fifth objection it is replied first that the knowledge of all things was implanted in Adam so that, remaining in justice, he might communicate it by teaching to his justly-born children, as a kind of master of the human race. But because, corrupted by sin, he corrupted his race, he was not permitted by God to communicate that universal knowledge to all his posterity — and this as a punishment for sin — so that, as was fitting for sinners, the many sciences and arts should be discovered by men not easily nor immediately but gradually and with difficulty, with labour and toil, and once discovered should be cultivated further. Furthermore, it is not improbable, as some hold, that that original knowledge of Adam was in great part diminished, obscured, and obliterated by sin — a matter on which we shall speak below.[78]

To this is added the consideration that it is one thing to know the entire nature of things, and another to know all arts, whether liberal or mechanical, of whatever kind can be found, even those that are merely servile and that would be subservient to the misery and weakness of the human condition — a condition for which Adam, the prince of our race, was certainly not created.

§ 42. As to what is adduced in the sixth place from St. Augustine: St. Augustine himself dissolved it by retracting it, in *Retractationum* book I, chapter 14, where he retracts the book *De Utilitate Credendi*, and says that at that time it was not yet apparent how we could call wise a man who could be seduced.[79] But more on this will be said at Dist. 25, where it is disputed whether man was created in grace.'[80]

To the last objection some reply by acknowledging an exception in Solomon alone, whom they consider to have been, among mere men and without exception, the wisest of all mortals — and this on account of the Scripture alleged, which seems to affirm it — but after him they assign the first place in wisdom to Adam. Yet there is no necessity for saying this, nor does Scripture compel it. For Scripture is not speaking of wisdom in the sense of speculative knowledge of natural and divine things, but of political knowledge, which is the prudence of governing kingdoms, cities, and peoples well. It was this wisdom that Solomon had asked of God.[81] Although it is not to be denied that, just as God from his abundance and beyond what Solomon had asked added to him riches and glory, so also he added speculative knowledge of other things. For this is openly conveyed in 4 Kgs. 4 and in Wis. 7.'[82] But it is not probable that the first parent of the human race excelled in

this kind of knowledge, which was as it were bestowed upon Solomon only as a kind of addition over and above.

§ V — What supernatural knowledge was conferred upon man at creation (Quae scientia supernaturalis homini in creatione collata?)

§ 43. Beyond the natural knowledge of things, it must absolutely be acknowledged that a certain supernatural knowledge or awareness (*scientia sive notitia supernaturalis*) was infused by God into the first man at his creation; for he had been fashioned for a supernatural end, which it was impossible to attain through that knowledge alone which is acquired by the powers of nature. But this matter must again be set out for us through several propositions, of which let the first be this:

Adam was not created with that knowledge by which he would see God through His essence. This is proved first from a comparison with the Angels. For man was not created more perfect in intellect than the Angels; and that the Angels were not created with knowledge of this kind is clear from what has been discussed concerning Angels in this book, especially in the treatment of Distinctions 3, 4, and 5.[84] It is further proved by the following argument: because no one who sees God through His essence can turn away from God by the will, which is to sin; but Adam did sin; therefore he was not so created as to see the essence of God. This proof is St. Thomas's.[85]

§ 44. The **second** proposition: Adam in the state of innocence (*status innocentiae*) did not see God through His essence, not even in rapture (*in raptu*). The first part of this, beyond the argument already given, is proved by the common opinion of theologians. For all agree on this point, that the first man did not see God by way of habit (*per modum habitus*), that is, permanently — namely in that manner in which God is seen by the Blessed in the Fatherland. For that vision is necessarily followed by impeccability in the soul, and by perfect immortality flowing from the soul into the body; neither of which was present in Adam, as is certain. But whether he saw God in rapture, or by way of a transient act (*per modum transeuntis*), as they say — that is, in the manner in which some think Moses and Paul saw God — is a matter of some question; regarding which St. Thomas, in the place already cited in the *Summa*, makes no determination, saying only that the first man did not see God through His essence according to the common condition of that life. "Unless perhaps," he says, "it be said that he saw Him in rapture, when God cast a deep sleep upon Adam, as is recorded in Gen. 2."[86]

§ 45. There are those who maintain the affirmative position on the strength of St. Augustine, who writes in the following manner: "That ecstasy which God cast upon Adam, so that he fell into a deep sleep, is rightly understood to have been sent for this purpose, that his mind, through the ecstasy, might become partaker, as it were, of the angelic court, and within the sanctuary of God might understand the last things."[87] Also on the strength of St. Bernard, who says of Adam: "To me he seems to have fallen asleep, his bodily senses transcended, by nothing other than the contemplation of mutable truth in the abyss of the Divine Wisdom."[88] Indeed St. Thomas himself elsewhere holds this opinion as probable,[89] as do also certain others: Durandus[90] and Richard of St. Victor.[91]

§ 46. Yet the negative position is far more probable. For above, in the treatment of Distinction 11, we showed in general terms that no man in this life — which is traversed as a way (*via*) toward the Heavenly Fatherland — has seen God through His essence; and that the exception some make concerning Moses and

Paul is not to be admitted.[92] And certainly the exception concerning Adam seems even less admissible — both because he sinned so gravely shortly afterwards against God and against all his posterity, and because this exception is nowhere found among the Fathers. Hence Dionysius the Carthusian, in his questions on the present Distinction, declares that he has never read in any authoritative Doctor that Adam in that sleep saw the essence of God.[93] And indeed if we grant this, nothing will prevent our saying the same of those Angels who fell — namely that they saw God through His essence in rapture while they were still on the way (*in via*) and in the state of meriting (*status merendi*) — which, however, is unheard of. Nor do the cited words of St. Augustine prove anything different; for there is no mention in them of a vision of God, and they signify nothing other than that certain hidden heavenly things were revealed to Adam in the ecstasy. Indeed St. Augustine rather indicates the contrary in that very place: for he immediately adds that Adam arose from that sleep as one filled with prophecy — he does not therefore hold that Adam saw the essence of God, but only that he received a prophetic vision. Now that belongs to the imperfect mode of cognition according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13: "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Nor does St. Bernard name a vision of God; he means nothing more than that Adam in that ecstasy contemplated the divine truth in some excellent manner befitting the perfection of his state.

§ 47. The third proposition: The first man, though he had evident knowledge of those things concerning God that can be known naturally — such as that God exists, that He is one, incorporeal, supremely good, most wise, the first cause of all things, and the like — yet did not have evident knowledge of those things that properly pertain to Faith, that is, those which can be known only by divine revelation because they exceed the capacity of reason and natural light, such as that God is triune, that God has a Son, that God would become man, and so forth. The first part of this is clear from what has been said concerning the natural knowledge of the first man in the fourth proposition. And it is easily proved, since certain philosophers, by natural light alone, attained to such a knowledge of God, though not equally certain, full, and perfect — as was shown in the treatment of Distinction 3.[94] The second part will be clear from the fourth proposition, which runs as follows:

§ 48. The first man at his creation and throughout the state of innocence had faith in those mysteries which exceed natural cognition. This is proved first of all by those testimonies of the Fathers in which they affirm that Adam by sinning lost faith — which will be brought forward below in its proper place. For if he lost it, he undoubtedly had it previously. It is proved also by this argument: because the first man was a wayfarer (*viator*); therefore he walked by faith, as 2 Cor. 5 says, and he saw "in a glass darkly," as 1 Cor. 13 says. Also because in the Angels there was faith before they were confirmed in the good. Finally, the general and explicit sentences of the Apostle are at hand: Heb. 10, "The just man lives by faith"; and Heb. 11, "Without faith it is impossible to please God." And from this it follows, as we were just saying, that the first man did not have even abstractive evident knowledge of mysteries exceeding natural cognition; for evidence (*evidentia*) destroys faith. For faith is of "things that appear not," as Heb. 11 says. On this account the opinion of Scotus must be rejected, which attributes to the first man an evident knowledge of mysteries of this kind.[95]

§ 49. The fifth proposition: The first man before the fall, and the Angel before confirmation, knew certain things by evident and manifest cognition that now we know only by faith. St. Thomas affirms this.[96] This holds true, however, only in those things that pertain to faith *per accidens*; for these can be known scientifically even in this life. For now also certain things divinely revealed to us are known by the learned and believed by the unlearned, as St. Thomas explains in the same place.

§ 50. The sixth proposition: The first man knew by faith the ultimate supernatural end of human and also of angelic nature; and therefore he also knew that the rewards of that eternal beatitude are laid up for the good and just and those who serve God; for, as the Apostle says in Heb. 11, "He who draws near to God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him." This is also proved from the fact that through the grace (*gratia*) in which he was created, he was bound at once and continuously to tend toward that end. Moreover, to know that eternal punishments are prepared by God the just judge for sinners does not pertain *per se* to supernatural knowledge; because the eternal and immutable law of God demands that justice, and would demand it even if man had not been created for a supernatural end.

§ 51. The seventh proposition: He knew by faith those things that are absolutely and at all times simply necessary for man to attain that end, and that are properly ordered toward it; such as sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), the theological virtues (*virtutes Theologicae*) — Faith (*Fides*), Hope (*Spes*), Charity (*Charitas*) — and whatever else is of this kind.

§ 52. The eighth proposition: He had a distinct and explicit faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity (*mysterium Sanctissimae Trinitatis*). This is the common opinion of the Doctors, which Epiphanius expresses explicitly in the beginning of the work he wrote against the heresies.[97] It is proved both because he had received a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of God than we have received, and because the clear vision of the Trinity (*clara visio Trinitatis*) is the whole reward of faith, as St. Augustine says — whence it is in no way credible that Adam lacked this part of faith.

§ 53. The ninth proposition: It is very probable that it was revealed to the first man that certain Angels, cleaving to God, were blessed, while others, having turned away from God through pride, were wretched for eternity. The Fathers sufficiently intimate this when they say that Adam was a participant in the heavenly court and was present among the spirits of the blessed Angels — in the manner in which St. Augustine[87] and St. Gregory,[62] speak.

§ 54. The tenth proposition: Adam learned by revelation the future Incarnation of the Son of God — and not those who reason rashly on the basis of the passage in Gen. 2, where Adam is read to have spoken by a prophetic spirit: "This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; wherefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh" — which mystery the Apostle interprets of Christ and the Church in Eph. 5.[98] Nor indeed does it seem to be doubted that Adam himself knew that he had prophesied this very mystery. For otherwise he would not properly have been a prophet with respect to it, had he not been in some manner illuminated to know what he was proclaiming — but would have prophesied only in the manner of Caiaphas, who neither knew nor understood the mystery of his own words. This is the opinion of St. Thomas,[99] of St. Bonaventure on the present Distinction,[100] and of others.

§ 55. The same teaching is transmitted by Prosper — or whoever is the author — of the book *On the Promises and Predictions*.[101] Yet what is added there, that Adam foresaw the Church to be formed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross, from which it would follow that he foresaw the Passion and death of Christ in that sleep, is not probable; nor does St. Thomas accept it in the place just cited. For the Passion and death of Christ, being in themselves a kind of evil, would not have been revealed to Adam while he was still innocent, except in relation to a good — namely in relation to the liberation of the human race from the captivity of sin, and thus he would have had foreknowledge of his own fall. This is denied by all theologians, together with the Master of the Sentences in this Distinction, following Hugh of St. Victor.[102] And indeed it

must by no means be affirmed — as we also taught concerning the Angels on the same certain ground — that by such foreknowledge they would have been wretched before they were wicked. Nor does it follow that, if the first man foresaw the Incarnation, he therefore foresaw his own fall. For an effect can be revealed to someone without the cause or occasion of it being revealed, just as happened in the case of Joseph the Patriarch, who foresaw in a dream his future exaltation, yet not the selling of himself nor his imprisonment. Hence St. Thomas says, in the place cited above, that man before the sin had explicit faith in the Incarnation of Christ as it was ordered toward the consummation of glory (*consummatio Gloriae*), but not as it was ordered toward liberation from sin through the Passion — lest by this he should have had foreknowledge of his own sin.[103]

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§ VI — What is the difference between the faith of the first man and our own (Quod discrimen inter fidem primi hominis et nostram?)

§ 56. Although the first man did not have evident knowledge of the revealed mysteries, but held them by that cognition which belongs to faith, just as we do, yet a manifold difference between his faith and ours must be acknowledged.

The first difference: that the gift of faith was in a certain manner natural to the first man, insofar as he received it simultaneously with his very nature at creation — excepting only the faith of the Incarnation of Christ, which he received after his creation, though still in a state of justice. For us, however, this gift is neither given simultaneously with our nature, nor to the just or already justified prior to their justification; but rather in order that through it we may attain to justice. Hence it is in a particular sense gratuitous for us, inasmuch as it is conferred through the grace of Christ upon those who are unworthy and ill-deserving. This distinction was noted by the Fathers of the Council of Orange[105] and by Prosper.[106]

§ 57. The second difference: that the first man from the very beginning had a firm and robust faith, unmingled with any error or ignorance; whereas we both commonly suffer the weakness of faith in many things (whence in the Scriptures some are rebuked for little faith, and some are called weak in faith), and we advance only gradually from ignorance to actual and explicit faith — and that not without admixture of errors and false images which the weakness of the human senses fashions for itself concerning divine things, as we see happening to those who are recently instructed in the faith, and also to other more unlearned Christians. St. Augustine indicates this difference.[107]

§ 58. The third difference: the first man knew God by a certain higher cognition than that by which we know Him; so much so that his cognition, though encompassed within the limits of faith, was in a certain manner intermediate between the cognition of the present state and the cognition of the Fatherland, by which God is seen through His essence. St. Thomas teaches this explicitly.[108] The ground of this must be sought not in the evidence of the cognition — for in that case faith would be destroyed, as was declared above — but in the very perfection of faith in the first man. For that faith was most perfect within the formal character (*ratio*) of faith, chiefly for two reasons: both because the first man did not receive faith through external hearing, as we do for whom faith comes from hearing, as the Apostle witnesses in Rom. 10, but through an internal revelation of God, as the Prophets and Apostles received it; and because his cognition was in itself far more perfect than ours. For he knew, not through sensible effects, but through intelligible ones, and that without any retardation or impediment from the body, as St. Thomas explains more fully.

§ 59. And this plainly seems to be the opinion of the Master of the Sentences in this Distinction[109] and of Hugh of St. Victor,[110] from whom the Master drew his own teaching — when they say that the first man knew God not by hearing alone, in the manner in which God is sought by believers in His absence, but by a certain interior inspiration by which he contemplated the presence of God, yet not so excellently as the Saints after this life, nor yet in so obscure a manner as we see in this present life. For by such words they do not deny that faith was present in the first man — though some draw that conclusion from them — but attribute to him that excellence of faith-cognition which we have just explained, though Hugh admits that the manner of that cognition is difficult to explain. Furthermore, what Alexander of Hales[111] and St. Bonaventure[112] write on this matter seem to be taken in the same sense. For they do not simply deny that faith was in Adam.

§ 60. As for natural knowledge of God, though it is fitting for both the first man and ourselves to know God through sensible things and to contemplate Him in creatures — as St. Thomas rightly proves[113] — yet not in altogether the same manner. For the first man in the state of innocence, with a gaze of the mind fixed as it were continuously and without impediment upon all created things on which he turned his attention, contemplated God as in a mirror, so that the consideration of creatures was for him a continual kind of nourishment and sustenance for that knowledge by which he knew God. We, however, from the consideration of even the most beautiful created things, are lifted up only tardily and feebly, and very imperfectly, to the contemplation of God, and that very often entangled in many errors. The cause of this impediment and difficulty is the corruption of the flesh, which depresses the senses toward earthly things and withdraws them from thinking on divine things, according to the saying of Wis. 9: "The body which is corrupted weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the mind that museth upon many things." This difference can be gathered in part from St. Basil[114] and in part from St. Augustine,[115] and also from Prosper.[116] To this point also belong what the Master of the Sentences and Hugh say in the places already cited concerning the knowledge of the first man; for they do not distinguish between natural and supernatural cognition of God.

§ 61. A final difference between the faith of Adam and our own is established by some in this: that we have faith not only with respect to the object revealed, but also with respect to God revealing, or the very revelation made by God. For it is not evidently known to us that the mysteries which we hold by faith have been revealed by God. But the first man, though he did not have evident cognition of the object of faith — that is, of the mysteries revealed by God — yet had, as they say, evident knowledge of the very revelation made by God. For he knew evidently that those mysteries had been revealed to him by God. For he perceived his mind to have been interiorly illuminated for the cognition of those things whose cognition surpasses human reason, and that without any reference to phantasms (*phantasmata*). This could be effected only by God alone, since He alone can penetrate (*illabi*) into the human mind. And this evidence of revelation they call "evidence in the attesting agent" (*evidentia in attestante*) — by which, namely, it is evidently known that God testifies to the truth of a certain proposition. Thus Cajetan teaches,[117] and he affirms this not only of the first man and of the Angels, but also of the Prophets and Apostles.

§ 62. Yet others do not acknowledge this difference. For they do not think it possible that evidence regarding the articles of faith in the attesting agent can subsist simultaneously with faith in those same articles, which faith is established to be an obscure and non-evident knowledge (*notitia*). For it cannot be that the same knowledge is both evident and non-evident. Therefore, if it has evidence on the part of the testifying or revealing God, it cannot be called simply non-evident. Nor does the response seem valid if it be said that this

evidence is placed with respect to the revelation, not with respect to the thing revealed. For if the revelation is evidently established to have been made by God, and hence to be true, neither can the truth of the revealed proposition itself fail to be now evidently known — this being accomplished by subsuming this likewise evident proposition: "Whatever God reveals is true": for every conclusion is evidently known that is gathered from evidently known premises through an evident consequence.

§ 63. To this argument is added a further consideration: if the first man had evidence of the mysteries in the attesting agent, then his intellect was necessitated to assent to the mysteries; but this necessity excludes faith and the merit of faith (*fidei meritum*). For faith is the free assent of the will (*voluntatis libere assentientis*). Finally, it would follow that we believe more concerning the mysteries of faith — even setting aside the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God — than did the Angels and the first man; because we believe that God revealed those mysteries, whereas they, according to the said opinion, did not believe this but knew it evidently. Let the studious reader see the further arguments against this kind of evidence in Domingo Báñez.[118] The negative opinion of Báñez also seems to us more probable.

§ VII — Whether ignorance and error had any place in the original state (Utrum ignorantiae & erroris locus fuerit in primo statu)

§ 64. In reply to the question asking whether ignorance could have had any place in the original state, it is answered that a threefold ignorance must be distinguished. The first is that of pure negation (*purae negationis*), by which, namely, something is not known that there is no need to know. The second is that of privation (*privationis*), that is, the ignorance by which something is not known that, given the place and time, ought to or fittingly should be known. The third is that of depraved disposition (*pravae dispositionis*), which by another name is called error or deception — namely, that by which we assent to falsehoods as though they were truths, whether this occurs by firm judgment or merely by way of opinion.

§ 65. Concerning the first kind of ignorance there is no question. For it is established from what has been said above that the first human beings in the state of innocence were ignorant of many things: such as each other's inward thoughts, the thoughts of angels, their own future fall, and other future contingent events; the number and particular properties of all individuals of whatever species, even those present before them; and finally the hidden counsels of Divine Wisdom and Providence. Indeed, even children in that state would for a long time have been ignorant of many things, which they would have come to learn through experience and instruction in the course of time.

§ 66. But it is especially the second and third kinds of ignorance that tend to be called into question. For it seems that neither of these two kinds was foreign to the original state, and this is shown by the following arguments. First: because the woman did not know the deceitfulness of the serpent, yet it was to her advantage to know this, so that she might not be deceived but might be on her guard against him. Second: because the woman was deceived before she sinned — for the Apostle says, in 1 Tim. 2, that "the woman, having been seduced, fell into transgression."[120] Indeed, sin cannot be committed except from a false judgment of the practical reason (*rationis practicae*). Hence it follows also that Adam, before he sinned, had been deceived by some such false judgment. Third: the woman did not recoil at the serpent speaking, as the Master says,[121] because she supposed that he had received from God the office of speaking — which supposition was false. Fourth: the first man supposed that he would persevere in justice and never die; likewise that he would beget

innocent children, and similar things of this sort, which did not come to pass; therefore in all such matters he was mistaken in his opinion. The antecedent is proved because he hoped for all these things, and hope moves and determines the intellect toward the thing hoped for. Hence those who do not attain what they hope for are said to be deceived in their hope. Fifth: in that state children would have been instructed by their parents in matters to be done; for they would have received from them moral knowledge along with the other branches of knowledge concerning natural things, as was said above; therefore, before such instruction, there would have been in them an ignorance of privation, inasmuch as they would have lacked knowledge of things to be done. Sixth: in the state of innocence there would have been sleep, as we showed,[122] and therefore also dreams, which naturally accompany sleep, would have been present there; and consequently also deception — namely, by reason of the fact that a man, while dreaming, would adhere to phantasmal images of things as if they were the things themselves. Seventh: it is natural that the sense errs at least concerning the common and per-accidens sensible, whatever be the case with the proper sensible: as when it judges about figure, motion and rest, and the magnitude of things otherwise than the truth of the matter has it, whether on account of distance, or on account of some disposition of the medium, or on account of some other cause; therefore also in the original state there would have been this kind of deception.

§ 67. Notwithstanding all these arguments, however, it must be answered without hesitation that neither the ignorance of privation nor the ignorance of depraved disposition — that is, error and deception — had any place in the original state.

The reason for this is that each of these two kinds of ignorance is an evil and a great defect, entirely contrary to the perfection of that state. For it is not a bodily evil but a defect of the soul according to its intellectual part. For not to know what should be known, given the place and time, and still more to approve of false things as true, is a defect and deformity of the intellect, just as cognition of the true is its great good. Wherefore, if no evil or defect or deformity of body could exist in that state of rectitude, much less could this which pertains to the soul. Moreover, it is the general opinion of St. Augustine[123] that in the original state of man, so long as the avoidance of sin was maintained, no evil whatsoever could have existed — precisely because every penal evil in the human race arises from sin. Hence the same St. Augustine teaches throughout that, among other evils, ignorance and error also — by which we embrace falsehoods for truths or uncertainties for certainties — do not belong to the nature of man as instituted, but to the punishment of man as condemned,[124] as he teaches in *De Libero Arbitrio* III, chs. 18–20, *Enchiridion* chs. 17, 19, 21, and frequently elsewhere. Similarly, the Master[125] also removes from the little children who were to be born in the original state that ignorance by which what ought to be known and ought not to be unknown is not known — removing it as a punishment of sin. To these considerations add the fact that error or deception, once detected, is naturally followed by sadness. But in the original state there was nothing that could cause sadness, as St. Augustine says;[123] therefore neither could there have been any place for deception.

§ 68. St. Thomas moreover adduces another reason drawn from the rectitude of that state.[126] For so long as the soul remained subject to its superiors, it would follow that the higher faculties would not be impeded by the lower ones. Therefore, this subjection being maintained, the intellect could not be deceived. For since it is always true with respect to its proper object, it can never be deceived by itself; rather, every deception of it proceeds from something lower, such as the imagination (*phantasia*) or something of that kind. But this reason presents no small difficulty, an explanation of which is to be sought in the commentators on St.

Thomas, Cajetan and Báñez.[127] See also the same Doctor, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 6,[128] where he handles this question with great lucidity.

§ 69. Furthermore, from this teaching it follows as a consequence that in the original state the judgment of the mind concerning any given thing would always either have been true — with respect to things that were known — or suspended — with respect to things that were indeed presented to the mind but were uncertain or ambiguous.

§ 70. To the first argument it is answered: the woman indeed did not know the deceitfulness of the serpent, but not in the sense that she was ignorant of something she ought to have known in order to avoid deception; for the serpent did not speak to her openly and visibly as a deceiver, but cunningly, using guile. It was, however, to her advantage not to give assent rashly to the one speaking to her, even without recognizing him as a deceiver — as indeed the rule of prudence, and a certain general caution toward everything of doubtful origin, would have required. Nor therefore would it follow that there was in her a privative ignorance with respect to the means required to avoid deception, but only a negation of knowledge concerning the particular deceitfulness of that particular serpent — which knowledge there was no necessity for her to have, provided she observed right reason in her conduct.

§ 71. To the second argument it is answered: the deception of the woman preceded her formal and completed sin, but it was itself already a sin — or at least the beginning and proximate occasion of sin. It is one thing to be deceived in the sense that one adheres to some false judgment on a matter, and quite another to be overcome by that deception and to consent to what one falsely judges to be good. The former can indeed occur without sin, provided one has not been negligent or rash in admitting the false impression; the latter, however, cannot occur without sin. Now the woman was at fault in the very reception of the false judgment — for she ought not so readily to have given credence to the serpent's suggestion against the plain commandment of God. Hence her deception, however it is understood, either was itself already a sin, or arose from sin; and therefore it does not establish that deception was possible in the original state without sin.

§ 72. To the third argument it is answered: the woman's supposition that the serpent had received from God the faculty of speech was not a case of privative ignorance but of rashly formed opinion, and moreover arose from a prior negligence or inattentiveness — which itself was already a defect incompatible with the original state's integrity. In that state, therefore, one would not have formed such a rash judgment, but would rather have suspended judgment or inquired more carefully.

§ 73. To the fourth argument it is answered: hope does not of itself produce a false judgment; rather, the person who hopes judges only that a thing is possible and fitting and to be striven for, while remaining in suspense about whether it will actually come to pass. Nor does it follow that one who does not attain what one hopes for was deceived, except in a loose and popular sense. The first man therefore could have hoped for the goods mentioned without forming any false or erroneous judgment concerning them.

§ 74. To the fifth argument it is answered: children in that state would have been born with the use of reason, and with a knowledge suited to the age of a small child, as we said;[122] but then the instruction of parents concerning things to be known and done would have supervened. And since the necessity and occasion of acting would always have preceded the parental instruction providently, it would never have come to pass that, before such instruction, there was in children an ignorance of privation.

§ 75. To the sixth argument St. Thomas answers,[129] at the place cited, that what happens in sleep does not properly belong to man — since he who sleeps does not have the use of reason, which is the proper act of man. But this solution does not seem to satisfy the argument. For the question is not whether error or deception in sleep would have been counted as sin to the man, but whether it would have occurred at all. Now it is certain that men are often deceived without any fault of their own. Others answer that the man in that state would have passed entirely through sleep in placid quiet without any disturbance from dreams; or that reason, always watchful, would have judged those things to be nothing other than what they were — images occurring during sleep — as indeed St. Thomas himself testifies happens sometimes.[129] Still others in this fashion remove dreams altogether from the first human beings' sleep, so that in their stead they attribute divine revelations to them — such as Adam received while sleeping (Gen. 2), and certainly also contemplations of God and divine things. This is made probable by those things we said above about sleep in the original state.[122] Although it can also be said that in the imagination proper there is no deception; since composition and division have no place in it, but only in the intellect alone. Wherefore the man in the integral state would never have adhered to the similitudes of things presented in sleep as if to the things themselves; because a man is not considered to adhere to something except by means of what is proper to man — namely, the intellect or the will. And this is perhaps what St. Thomas intended in his solution mentioned above.

Hence there is also gathered the reply to the last argument. For error and deception properly do not have their place in sense; since sense neither approves false things for true ones nor receives uncertain things for certain ones — as St. Augustine defines error in the *Enchiridion*[130] — but naturally apprehends its object as it is presented to it. In us, however, it happens that from such apprehension of the senses error of the intellect concerning sensibles arises. But in the original state this would not at all have occurred: partly because of the science of natural causes, from which such apparent defects in sense arise; partly because of the prudence with which the first man, endowed with this gift, would not rashly have given assent to things that could appear otherwise according to the external senses.

§ VIII — Reply to the objections (Ad objecta responsio)

§ 76. It remains to reply to the arguments advanced on the contrary side. To the first, therefore, it is answered that it was not necessary for the woman to have known the cunning or deceitfulness of the serpent, whether we speak of the bodily serpent or of the incorporeal one — just as it is not our concern to know the fraudulence of men, provided that there be in us sufficient prudence to avoid it, as there was without doubt in the first woman.

§ 77. To the second I reply that the woman was not deceived before she sinned. For the seduction of which the Apostle speaks,[120] although it preceded the sin of that transgression by which she ate of the forbidden tree, nevertheless followed upon the sin of inward pride — as we showed from St. Augustine[132] above, where we treated of the first sin of the woman.[133] But why ignorance of a depraved choice — from which all sin proceeds — is not to be acknowledged in the first human beings before the sin, the reason must be sought from what was disputed in the preceding distinction (in the final chapter).[134]

§ 78. To the third argument satisfaction was given above,[133] where that doubt — why the woman did not recoil in horror from the speaking serpent — was treated at length.

§ 79. To the fourth it is answered that the first man did not think or hold an opinion, strictly speaking, about any of those things, but only hoped for them. Hope, however, does not entail an opinion or an assent to the thing hoped for. For when I am commanded to hope for eternal life, I am not thereby bound to assent to this proposition as true: "I shall obtain eternal life." Wherefore it must be denied that hope determines the intellect with respect to the thing hoped for in such a way, namely, that the intellect should declare that what is hoped for will come to pass. For hope, on the part of the intellect, requires only that some good be apprehended as at once arduous and possible; and when the will, through desire, tends toward a good thus apprehended, that thing is said to be hoped for. Hence it is established that one who does not obtain what he hopes for is not, properly speaking, deceived — unless perhaps something else is added, such as a false promise from another, or a false opinion of the ease of attaining what is hoped for, or something of that kind.

§ 80. To the fifth it must be replied that in that state children would have been born with the use of reason and with that knowledge which is fitting for an age lacking the ways of childhood, as we said above;[122] but instruction from parents concerning those things which had to be known and done in more mature age would subsequently have been added — in such a way, of course, that provident parental instruction always preceded the time and necessity of acting. Wherefore it would never have come about that, before receiving such instruction, there should be in the children an ignorance of privation.

§ 81. To the sixth, St. Thomas replies[135] that what happens to a man in sleep is not imputed to him, because he lacks the use of reason, which is the proper act of man. But this solution does not seem to satisfy the argument. For the question is not whether an error or deception occurring to a man in sleep would have been imputed to him as a sin, but whether it would have occurred to him at all. For it is certain that men are often deceived without any fault on their part. Others respond that the man would either have had no dreams at all, but would have taken wholly peaceful rest without any interruption of dreams; or that reason, always wakeful, would have judged those dreams to be nothing other than dreams — which even now happens to certain persons from time to time, as St. Thomas himself testifies.[129] Still others dispose of the dreams of the first man in such a way as to substitute in their place divine revelations; such as Adam received when oppressed by sleep (Gen. 2), or certainly contemplations of God and divine things. That this is probable is evident from what we said about the sleep of the first state.[122]

§ 82. Moreover, it can also be said that in a phantasm there is not properly any deception, since composition and division — in which error has its proper seat — do not properly belong to the phantasm but to the intellect alone. For this reason the man himself in the state of integrity would never have adhered to the likenesses of things represented in sleep as though they were the things themselves; for a man is not reckoned to adhere to something unless he does so through what is proper to man, namely through the intellect or the will. And this is what St. Thomas intended in the aforementioned solution.[136]

§ 83. Hence is also gathered the reply to the last argument. For error and deception properly have no place in the senses, because the sense neither approves false things as true nor receives uncertain things as certain — in which manner St. Augustine (in the *Enchiridion*) defines error[130] — but naturally apprehends the object as it is represented to it. In us, however, from this there arises an error of the intellect concerning sensibles. But in the original state this would not at all have occurred: partly because of the science of natural causes, from which such apparent defects in sense arise; partly because of the prudence with which the first man, endowed with this gift, would not rashly have given assent to things that could appear otherwise according to the external senses.

§ IX — What knowledge did man lose through sin? (Quam scientiam homo per peccatum amiserit?)

§ 84. Man, created by God with such manifold knowledge as we have expounded above, neither lost it all by sinning nor retained it all. For as the Fathers St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Bede, and others teach — whom we shall cite in the next distinction,[138] where the corruption of our nature through sin will be treated — when man sinned, he was wounded in his natural endowments and stripped of his gratuitous gifts, that is, of his supernatural ones. He therefore retained the knowledge of those things necessary for this temporal life. For if he had wholly lost this knowledge, the human race would have been not merely wounded and corrupted by sin but utterly extinguished shortly after the transgression in the very first man himself — namely through ignorance of those things necessary for the preservation of life, such as foods and the like.

§ 85. But even that knowledge of such things which remained in man did not remain intact; rather, by reason of sin it was diminished and obscured not a little, so much so that the toil of which it was said to man after sin, "Cursed is the earth in thy work; in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee"[139] and so on, is to be understood not only of the hardship of working and tilling the soil, but also of the difficulty that arises from ignorance: in that the opportune seasons for ploughing, sowing, reaping, and gathering fruits are not known with sufficient precision; nor in crops, herbs, and the other things created for human use are the harmless and wholesome things distinguished with sufficient exactness from the harmful and those contrary to health. For this toil, arising from that curse, Adam transmitted to his posterity.

§ 86. Moreover, the speculative sciences also do not seem to have remained intact in man after sin. Evidence for this is that the first man is not read to have transmitted those disciplines to his posterity. Rather, individuals afterwards had their own discoverers of various arts — as certain arts are described from Scripture (Gen. 4).[140] Furthermore, as regards moral knowledge — which concerns the ordering of life according to right reason — there is no doubt that it suffered very great damage from sin, since man by sinning incurred a great blindness and ignorance of the soul regarding what is to be done, even though the law of nature could not be wholly blotted out from his mind.

§ 87. Therefore, speaking universally, it must be admitted that the natural knowledge which man received at his creation was partly diminished and partly obscured through sin — which the general effect that followed in the entire posterity of man proves to be so. For it is on account of this that we experience such great difficulty and tardiness in learning the disciplines, and a certain resistance of nature, and such great imperfection in the disciplines themselves, with uncertainty in many of them mingled with errors: because ignorance, insofar as we are born of Adam, has become natural to us. And while this holds true in the other sciences, it is most conspicuously seen in that science which, in the celebrated testimony of Socrates, pertains to us most of all — that is, the science which informs our character and our life. For Aristotle himself testifies that young men are less fitted to receive this than the other sciences.[141] This is indeed the contrary of what would have been the case in the state of innocence. For from man in his integrity, children would have been born most apt and most ready to receive arts and disciplines of every kind.

§ 88. Furthermore, supernatural knowledge man lost entirely through sin, because — as has been said — he was wholly stripped and despoiled of gratuitous gifts. Now since supernatural knowledge is faith (*Fides*)

itself, by which we believe God revealing mysteries that exceed natural cognition, it is manifest that supernatural knowledge perished for man, if we show that by sinning and through sin he lost faith. This is shown by three arguments drawn from Scripture (Gen. 3).[65]

§ 89. The first is that man wished to be like God, and hoped to achieve this from God through the transgression of the commandment laid down by God — as it was afterwards reproached to him by the Lord, who said: "Behold, Adam has become as one of us, knowing good and evil."[142] The second: because he turned his sin back upon God as its author, saying: "The woman whom thou gavest me as a companion gave me of the tree.",[143] So St. Augustine,[144] and St. Gregory.[145] And St. Gregory likewise testifies that not only the man but also the woman turned her fault obliquely upon God.[146] The third: because he thought he could hide himself from the face of the all-seeing One. For in the fact that Scripture says, "Adam and his wife hid themselves from the face of the Lord,",[147] there is described not the effect of hiding, says St. Gregory in the same place, but the disposition is noted — that is, the foolish persuasion of a man thinking he could hide himself from God so as not to be seen.

§ 90. To these are added the testimonies of the Fathers, by which they openly declare that Adam lost faith. St. Ambrose, writing on Luke chapter 10,[148] says that he was stripped of the garment of faith; and in Letter 33 to his sister Marcellina,[149] he introduces God addressing Adam thus: "Thou recognizest that thou art naked, because thou hast lost the good garments of faith." St. Augustine, in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, chapter 17,[150] ascribes infidelity to the first parents; and in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 45,[151] he denies that they believed God. There are likewise in St. Augustine (Book I, *Contra Julianum*, chapter 3)[152] the words of a certain Bishop Olympius, who denies that faith remained uncorrupted in the first-formed man. At the same place is cited the testimony of St. Ambrose which we have just quoted from his commentary on Luke. Prosper, in Response 1 to the Excerpts of the Genoese, and in *Contra Collatorem*, chapters 19, 20, and 21,[153] disputing against those who denied faith to be a gift of God, teaches among other things that the first man first lost faith and the knowledge of good, and fell into infidelity; and from these points he proves that it also perished in his posterity, nor can it be recovered except through the grace of Christ. Fulgentius, in his book *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, chapter 13,[154] says that Adam was stripped of the garment of faith; and in chapter 22,[155] he affirms that he lost faith — which he likewise indicates not obscurely in his book *Manifesta de Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 3.[156]

§ 91. Note, however, that these authors speak absolutely of faith and not restrictively of formed faith (*Fides formata*). For one who lacks formed faith is not thereby immediately an unbeliever. But St. Augustine and Prosper explicitly ascribe infidelity to the first man. Moreover, Prosper in the passage cited against the Genoese says that Adam lost the faith which we must receive as our first possession — and that is unformed faith (*fides informis*). And Prosper likewise (*Contra Collatorem*, chapter 19)[157] distinguishes faith from charity, saying: "He lost faith; he lost charity."

§ 92. It is confirmed by Tertullian, who in Book II *Contra Marcionem*, chapter 2,[158] pronounces the transgression of Adam to have been heresy. Now to these considerations are also pertinent the points by which we showed above,[159] in the preceding distinction, that Adam believed the words of the serpent — which certainly could not have happened without infidelity toward God, since the words of the serpent were contrary to the word of God.

§ 93. Finally, this can be taught by an argument from the effect left in the posterity. For just as the Fathers, from the fact that Adam by sinning lost faith, show against the Pelagians that faith perished in his posterity and cannot be restored except by the gift of God — concerning which matter there are express words of Prosper (*Contra Genuenses*)[160] — so conversely we can gather that, since faith is not in us by nature nor can be, but only through grace, it perished for us in our first parent.

§ X — Reply to the objections raised against the foregoing teaching (Respondetur ad ea quae dictis contraria videntur)

§ 94. Against that part of the doctrine set forth above which holds that man, through sin, lost faith and the knowledge of God, to the point of falling into unbelief, the following arguments are advanced by some.

The first: Man can naturally, without the grace of Christ, arrive at a knowledge of God from the contemplation of creatures, as Scripture teaches — Rom. 1, Ps. 18, Wis. 13, and elsewhere.[162] Experience also confirms this. For many men have arrived at knowledge of the one God without the grace of Christ, being destitute of the Christian Faith and making use only of the aid of the light of nature, or of the teaching imparted by non-Christian masters; as formerly the Philosophers did, and as today the Mohammedans do. Therefore the knowledge of God did not perish for the first man through sin; for if it had perished for him, it would also have perished for us. For, as Prosper says, what Adam lost, all have lost; but whatever perished for us in Adam cannot be had by us unless it be recovered through the grace of Christ, as Prosper teaches in the same place.[163]

The second: The knowledge of things subservient to temporal life did not perish in the first man; therefore neither did the knowledge of God perish, since both kinds of knowledge can be acquired by the light of natural intelligence alone.

The third: The fear of God remained in the first man. For he himself says to the Lord, Gen. 3: "I heard Thy voice in Paradise and I was afraid."[164] Therefore the knowledge of God likewise remained; for fear presupposes knowledge.

The fourth: The prophet Jonah, when he fled from the Lord, did not lose faith, nor did he become an unbeliever. For he is not rebuked by the Lord on this account; and he himself, while in flight, professes his faith, saying: "I fear the Lord God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land."[165] Therefore, from the fact that Adam hid himself from the face of the Lord, it is not rightly concluded that he lost faith or knowledge of the true God.

The fifth: Even now, through the gravest sins, faith is not lost; on the contrary, from faith that is retained, repentance is conceived — as is established to have occurred in the case of David, Peter, and other sinners.[166] Therefore neither did faith perish in Adam through the sin of pride or the transgression of the divine commandment, especially since that commandment concerned no article of faith, but only something that had no connection with faith whatsoever.

The sixth: Christ, in Lk. 12, speaking of those things that pertain to faith and piety, says to the Jews: "Why even of yourselves do ye not judge what is just?"[167] Therefore there remains in us a faculty and, as it were, a root capable of acquiring knowledge of this kind; and hence this knowledge did not perish in Adam.

The last: Demons, by sinning, did not lose the knowledge of God and faith. For, as James testifies, "They believe and tremble."[168] And in the Evangelists they confess the Son of God.'[169] Therefore neither did the first parents, whose sin was less grave than that of the demons, lose faith by sinning.

§ 95. In order to reply to these arguments, three points from what has been said above must be noted.

The first: The knowledge of God in the first man was partly natural, partly supernatural: natural, indeed, as regards those things which do not exceed the capacity of the light of nature — such as that God exists, that He is one, that He is the first cause of all things, and the like; but supernatural as regards those things that exceed natural cognition, such as that God is triune in Persons.

The second: All supernatural knowledge of God was extinguished by sin, because man through sin was despoiled of the gratuitous gifts, that is, of those things that are above nature.

The third: Natural knowledge of God partly perished, and partly indeed remained but was obscured by sin. The reason for this we gave above: namely, that man was wounded in his natural capacities. Hence Prosper writes that human nature was stricken with so bitter a wound that no spontaneous contemplation can suffice to bring anyone to full knowledge of God unless the true light has dispelled the overshadowing of the heart.[170]

§ 96. To these three we add a **fourth** point: The first man also had, regarding those things which he knew of God by natural light — such as that He is one, that He is the cause of all things, that He governs the world — a certain supernatural knowledge and a knowledge of faith; not indeed as regards obscurity, which natural knowledge sufficiently removed, since it carries with it its own evidence; but as regards that certitude which is obtained from revelation. This is briefly proved as follows: unless we attribute such certitude to the first man with respect to the said articles, it would follow that some rude and unlettered man, who holds those articles by faith, would have greater certitude of them than the first man had. For it is established that the certitude of faith is greater than that of demonstration. For this reason also, even now, a greater certitude accrues through faith to the philosopher who demonstratively knows that God is one, when he becomes a Christian. On this matter we have spoken above.[171] Inasmuch, therefore, as man had received a certitude greater than demonstrative certitude regarding such things, to that same degree he was also despoiled of the knowledge of those things through sin, in accordance with the second notable point.

§ 97. These preliminaries having been set out, **reply is made to the first argument.** Just as man can naturally and without the grace of the Redeemer arrive at some knowledge of the true God, but an imperfect one only and entangled with errors — as has been fully declared above[172] — so it can probably be said that some such imperfect knowledge of God remained in the first man after sin; but that faith, properly so called, remained in him in no respect whatsoever, because it is a supernatural gift.

Reply to the second: The knowledge of things subservient to temporal life did not entirely perish through sin, but was left in nature in such a way that now it can neither be acquired perfectly nor without toil and difficulty. Nor, however, is the same account to be given of the knowledge of God, even as regards that part of it which is natural. For nature was more gravely wounded in the knowledge of higher things, and especially of God, than in the knowledge of lower things. For man was turned away from God by sin and turned chiefly toward those things that are sensible and temporal. To this pertains what the Master says, in the text of this distinction, that man did not lose the knowledge by which the needs of the flesh are provided for; and that for this reason man is not instructed in the Scriptures about such things, but about the knowledge of the soul which he lost by sinning.[173]

§ 98. Reply to the third: Some reply that Adam indeed feared God, yet not as God, but as one more powerful than himself, by whom he could be punished for the sin committed — in the same way that malefactors fear a judge, and in the same way as Pharaoh and his servants (Ex. 8)[174] and the Philistines (1 Kgs. 4),[175] are said to have feared God, men who nevertheless cannot properly be said to have had knowledge of the true God, since they worshipped false gods. Moreover, the fear of God, which is a gift of God and which under the Law also was given, is shown by the Apostle (Rom. 8) to be born from the knowledge of God seeing all things and justly punishing sins.[176] Such fear, therefore, after sin they do not acknowledge in Adam, relying on the testimony of Prosper, who, after enumerating the virtues that Adam lost by sinning, denies that even fear was left remaining to him.[157]

But others find more pleasing the reply that Adam retained natural but imperfect knowledge of God, obscured by sin; and that corresponding to this knowledge he had a fear of God: so that in proportion as he still knew God, to that extent he feared God — namely, knowing Him to be the Lord of all things, from whom the sins of men are not hidden, and who is the just avenger of sins. For nothing prevents one from recognizing in him after sin a servile fear of God, which does not pertain to the benefits of restoring grace, and which can be conceived from that knowledge of God which can be had without the supernatural gift of faith.[177] (a) Now Prosper seems to speak of salutary fear, such as can exist in fallen man only through the grace of Christ.

§ 99. This latter reply is moreover confirmed by **the fourth argument.** For neither did the prophet Jonah, when he fled from the face of the Lord, simply lose the knowledge of God; rather, he seems to have suffered something human: in that he did not consider that he could not escape the presence of God. This was signified by St. Jerome in his commentary, who also compares the flight of the Prophet with the flight of Cain, who in Gen. 4 is read to have said to God: "I shall be hidden from Thy face," and of whom it is afterwards said: "And Cain went out from the face of the Lord and dwelt as a fugitive in the land."[178] Others interpret Jonah's flight from the face of the Lord as consisting in his having declined the office of prophesying and of announcing divine wrath to the Ninevites — a task exceedingly odious and fraught with danger — and for this reason departing to another place. For Prophets, while they discharge their office, are said to stand before the presence of the Lord. Hence Elijah in 3 Kgs. 17 and Elisha in 4 Kgs. 5 speak thus: "The Lord liveth in whose sight I stand.",[179] And this interpretation of the fugitive Jonah was expressed by the Chaldean Paraphrast in these words: "So that he might flee to the sea rather than prophesy in the name of the Lord." In accordance with this very probable interpretation, reply is made to the argument: that it is not said in the same sense that Adam hid himself from the face of the Lord and that Jonah fled from the face of the Lord. For the former hid himself wishing to lie hidden; the latter fled wishing not to obey.

§ 100. Reply to the fifth: This is to be ascribed to the mercy of God, that He does not now utterly cast off the man sinning within himself and entirely deprive him of the gifts bestowed. This He could do justly, and He sometimes does. Of this we have a certain example in Saul, who, fearing, prays: "Cast me not away from Thy face."[180] That he who has faith, by sinning, deserves the withdrawal of faith itself, the Apostle attests in 1 Tim. 1, saying that certain men, because they had put away a good conscience, made shipwreck concerning faith.[181] And in ch. 6, speaking of covetousness, that is, avarice, he says: "Which some coveting have erred from the faith.",[182] To this pertains also the evangelical saying: "He that hath not, even that which he hath shall be taken away from him.",[183] Thus St. Augustine, in *De Libero Arbitrio* III, ch. 18, teaches that it is just before God that one who knowingly refuses to do what is right should lose the very knowledge of right.[184]

§ 101. Reply to the sixth: One must say that man is able to judge by himself what is just and right even in the matter of Religion and piety, yet not as if by himself; in the sense that the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 3, that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.[185] For in those matters that pertain to piety, the power of human reason avails nothing without the grace of God through Christ.

§ 102. Reply to the last: Demons believe that God is one, and in the Gospel confessed Christ to be the Son of God — not through the gift of infused faith, but through that knowledge of God which they were able to retain residually in their nature after sin, and which the very experience of His power in working miracles and expelling demons extorted from them concerning Christ himself. On this matter we shall treat fully in the appropriate place.[186] But such a knowledge of God as this we do not deny to have remained in the first man after sin.[187]

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1. Sir. 3:22; Rom. 11:33.
2. Eccl. 8:3–4.
3. St. Augustine, chapter 4 of the book already cited [abbreviation as in source; likely *De libero arbitrio* or *De Genesi ad litteram*].
4. St. Augustine, same work, ch. 10, on the fifth question.
5. St. Augustine, *Epistula* 106 (to Paulinus) [also cited in editions as Letter 186 in the Benedictine edition; a footnote in the source reads: "Seu CLXXXVI in Editione PP. Benedictinorum"].
6. Rom. 9:20.
7. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 7.
8. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* IV, ch. 22.
9. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 4.
10. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* VII, ch. 30.
11. Estius, above, at Dist. 38 of Book I.
12. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XXII, ch. 1; *Enchiridion*, ch. 11; *De Correptione et Gratia*, ch. 10; and elsewhere.
13. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 73, a. 4, ad 3.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* [reference as in source; specific locus not fully given].
15. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 27; *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 6 and ch. 9; *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 9 and ch. 11.
16. St. Ambrose, *De Paradiso*, ch. 10.
17. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 4.
18. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 6.
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 5.
20. Estius, above, around Dist. 7 of this Book II.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 41, a. 2, ad 2.
22. Jas. 1:2.
23. Ps. 25:2.
24. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 9 [as cited in source].

25. St. Gregory the Great [exact locus not specified in source; cited as "alicubi"].

26. St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistola ad Romanos* [the two passages quoted].

27. Jas. 1:13.

28. Glossa ordinaria on Matt. 4 ("Ductus est Jesus in desertum").

29. St. Thomas, *In II Epistolam ad Corinthios*, ch. 12, on the words "Datus est mihi stimulus carnis."

30. St. Bonaventure's position; cf. Dist. 21 of this Book II [as cited by Estius].

31. St. Augustine [locus cited above in the prior section of this Distinctio].

32. Ps. 21; Ps. 25; Ps. 138.

33. Rom. 7.

34. St. Bonaventure, *De Profectu Religiosorum* II, ch. 5.

35. St. Augustine, *De Sancta Virginitate*, ch. 44 and ch. 47.

36. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica* IV, ch. 15.

37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, aa. 2–3.

38. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, part 6, ch. 12 and the three chapters following.

39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94; and St. Thomas, *In II Sententiarum*, on the present Distinction.

40. Plato, *Cratylus* [on the wisdom of the name-giver]; Cicero, *Tusculanae Quaestiones* I [on Pythagoras and the highest wisdom].

41. Eccl. 7:29; Sir. 17:5–9 (Vulgate).

42. Prov. 30:1–3 (the speaker being Solomon or Agur son of Jakeh). The author notes that the Hebrew text of Prov. 30 reads "the words of a man with whom God is," and that Agur son of Jakeh is identified by some as a Jew instructed in the Divine Law, who delivered a parenetic prophecy; for fuller detail see Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca Sancta* II, s.v. *Agur*; and the works of Salmeron, Salianus, and other interpreters of Sacred Scripture.

43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3.

44. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, loc. cit.; also Suidas, as cited by Molanus, *De Diario Medicorum*, ch. 13.

45. Molanus, *De Diario Medicorum*, ch. 13.

46. Hugh of St. Victor and the Master [Peter Lombard], *In II Sententiarum*, this Distinction.

47. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI [on prudence and practical habits as more natural to us].

48. Cajetan, commentary on Gen. 2 ("*Appellavitque Adam nominibus suis cuncta animantia*"); cf. Ps. 146:4 ("*Qui numerat multitudinem stellarum et omnibus eis nomina vocat*"); Gen. 1.

49. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3, ad 3.

50. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 4.

51. Wis. 7 (the author of the book writes in the person of Solomon, describing the knowledge given him by God of the disposition of the globe, the powers of the elements, the course of the year, the dispositions of the stars, and all things hidden and abstruse in the nature of things); Bar. 3:35 ("*Vocatae sunt, dixerunt: adsumus*").

52. Above, at Distinctio 3, Book I [Estius's own earlier discussion of the natural knowability of God from creatures].

53. Above, at Distinctio 2 of this Book II [where it was asked whether the existence of Angels can be proved by reason].

54. Aristotle, *De Anima* III [the soul as *tabula rasa*].

55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3, ad 1 [on the eyes given to the man born blind].

56. Cajetan, commentary on St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3.

57. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3, in the body of the article.

58. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 4 [where he had said that Adam knew the thoughts of hearts and certain future contingents, not by natural power but by divine revelation].

59. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 2.

60. Scotus, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 3, a. 2, dubium 2.

61. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, penultimate chapter [on why man cannot see the light itself with a fixed gaze, which Augustine refers to the infirmity contracted from sin].

62. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogorum* IV, ch. 1.

63. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I [on Metaphysics as the science that above all others deserves the name of wisdom].

64. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 3 (*ibidem*).

65. Gen. 3.

66. St. John Chrysostom (or rather Pseudo-Chrysostom), *Homilia de Adam et Eva*, found in Tome I of his *Opera* [Estius notes this homily was written in Latin and postdates Chrysostom].

67. Gen. 4.

68. Gen. 9 [Estius writes "Gen. 2" in the OCR but the page image shows "Gen. 9"; Noah and the vine belongs to Gen. 9].

69. Polydore Vergil, *De Inventoribus Rerum*.

70. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* III, ch. 24.

71. 4 Kgs. 4 (Vulgate numbering).

72. 4 Kgs. 3 (the preceding chapter), containing the words of the divine promise: "Ecce dedi tibi cor sapiens et intelligens, et in tantum, ut nullus ante te similis tui fuerit, nec post te surrecturus sit."

73. Wis. 7: "Et quaecumque sunt abscondita et improvisa didici"; and: "Omnium enim Artifex sapientia me docuit."

74. Gen. 3: "Eritis sicut Dii scientes bonum et malum."

75. Gen. 3: "Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est sciens bonum et malum."

76. Gen. 2: "Erant autem uterque nudi... et non erubescebant."

77. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 17; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, ch. 31.

78. Estius's own later discussion, below in this same distinction.

79. St. Augustine, *Retractationum* I, ch. 14 [retracting the *De Utilitate Credendi*].

80. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 25 [on whether man was created in grace].

81. 3 Kgs. 3; 2 Par. 1; Wis. 9.

82. 4 Kgs. 4; Wis. 7.

83. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 1; *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 2, a. 7; q. 5, a. 1.

84. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 3, 4, 5 (earlier in this same book).

85. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 1; St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 1.

86. Gen. 2.

87. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* IX, final chapter.

88. St. Bernard, Sermon 2 for Septuagesima.

89. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 1, ad 13.

90. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, *In II Sent.*, present Dist., q. 2.

91. Richard of St. Victor, on the same Distinction, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2.

92. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 11 (above in this book).

93. Dionysius the Carthusian, questions on the present Distinction, q. 2.
94. Estius, *In II Sent.*, Dist. 3 (above in this book).
95. Scotus, *In II Sent.*, present Distinction.
96. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 1.
97. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (= *Opus contra haereses*), exordium.
98. Eph. 5.
99. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7.
100. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, present Distinction, exposition of the text.
101. Prosper (or Pseudo-Prosper), *De Promissionibus et Praedictionibus* I, ch. 1.
102. The Master (Peter Lombard), present Distinction; Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, part 6, ch. 15.
103. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7 (place cited above).
104. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 1.
105. Council of Orange, canons 5 and 25.
106. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum*, Response 8.
107. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, ch. 33 and ch. 34.
108. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 1; *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 2; *In II Sent.*, dist. [present], q. 2, a. 1.
109. Peter Lombard (the Master), present Distinction.
110. Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, part 6, ch. 14.
111. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* II, q. 98, member 2, a. 1.
112. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, present Distinction, a. 2, q. 3.
113. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 2.
114. St. Basil, Homily 9, *On the fact that God is not the author of evils*.
115. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* X, ch. 6; *De Civitate Dei* XXII, penultimate chapter; *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 27.
116. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Omnium Gentium* II, ch. 4.
117. Cajetan, *In Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 4; q. 5, a. 1; q. 171, a. 5.
118. Domingo Báñez, *In Summa theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 1; and *In Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 5, a. 1.
119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; and q. 101.
120. 1 Tim. 2:14.
121. The Master (Peter Lombard), *In II Sent.*, dist. 21.
122. Estius, above, *In II Sent.*, dist. 20.
123. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 10.
124. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* III, chs. 18–20; *Enchiridion*, chs. 17, 19, 21; and frequently elsewhere.
125. Peter Lombard (the Master), *In II Sent.*, dist. 20, § 1.
126. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4.
127. Cajetan, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; Domingo Báñez, commentary on *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4 (place cited above).
128. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 6.
129. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2.

130. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* [abbreviation as in source].

131. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 94, a. 4; and q. 101 (as cited above for this section).

132. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 30.

133. Estius, above, *In II Sent.*, dist. 21.

134. Estius, above, *In II Sent.*, dist. 23 (final chapter of the preceding section).

135. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2 (place cited above).

136. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2 (the solution cited above).

137. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85.

138. Estius, below, *In II Sent.*, next distinction (on the corruption of our nature through sin): St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Bede, and others, to be cited there.

139. Gen. 3:17–18.

140. Gen. 4 (on the inventors of various arts).

141. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, ch. 3.

142. Gen. 3:22.

143. Gen. 3:12.

144. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 35.

145. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXII, ch. 13.

146. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Job* XXII, ch. 13 (same location).

147. Gen. 3:8.

148. St. Ambrose, *Commentary on Luke*, ch. 10.

149. St. Ambrose, *Epistula* 33 (to his sister Marcellina).

150. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 17.

151. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 45.

152. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* I, ch. 3 (with words of Bishop Olympius).

153. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsio ad excerpta Genuensium*, Response 1; and *Contra Collatorem*, chs. 19, 20, 21.

154. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 13.

155. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi*, ch. 22.

156. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De Fide ad Petrum* (*Manifesta de Fide ad Petrum*), ch. 3.

157. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 19.

158. Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem* II, ch. 2.

159. Estius, above, *In II Sent.*, preceding distinction (dist. 22 or 23, on Adam's belief in the serpent's words).

160. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsio ad excerpta Genuensium* (place cited above).

161. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85 [as given in the heading; source also cites *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 85 on what man lost through sin].

162. Rom. 1:19–20; Ps. 18:2; Wis. 13:1–5.

163. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsio ad excerpta Genuensium*, Response 1.

164. Gen. 3:10.

165. Jon. 1:9.

166. 2 Sam. (2 Kgs.) ch. 12 (David); Lk. 22:61–62 (Peter).

167. Lk. 12:57.

168. Jas. 2:19.

169. Cf. Matt. 8:29; Mk. 1:24; Lk. 4:41.

170. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De Vocatione Omnium Gentium* II, ch. 47.

171. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, and *In I Sent.*, dist. 24, § 3.

172. Estius, *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, Book I.

173. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* II, dist. 23, the text at § E.

174. Ex. 8:19 (and context: Pharaoh and his servants).

175. 1 Kgs. 4:7–8 (Vulgate numbering; the Philistines' fear of the God of Israel).

176. Rom. 8:15.

177. Marginal note (a) in the source: The author is to be understood of fear that is merely natural, and which follows natural knowledge of God; not of the fear of Gehenna, which is supernatural, and whose goodness is established both from the Council of Trent and from the rescript of Alexander VIII condemning the proposition that is among the propositions condemned by him as no. 14. The fear of Gehenna is not supernatural — this corresponds to proposition 5, as we noted in the Second Book.

178. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Jonah* (on Jon. 1:3); Gen. 4:14, 16.

179. 3 Kgs. 17:1 (Elijah); 4 Kgs. 5:16 (Elisha).

180. Ps. 50:13 (Vulgate): "Cast me not away from Thy face" — spoken by David (Saul is mentioned by Estius as an analogous example; the actual text cited is from the psalm of David; Estius seems to allude to 1 Kgs. [1 Sam.] 15–16 for Saul and the prayer comes from Ps. 50:13).

181. 1 Tim. 1:19.

182. 1 Tim. 6:10.

183. Lk. 19:26 (cf. Matt. 25:29).

184. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio* III, ch. 18.

185. 2 Cor. 3:5.

186. Estius, *In III Sent.*, dist. 23.

187. The Latin text concludes mid-sentence at this point (*...in primo homine re-*), the remainder being cut off by the end of the printed gathering.