

COMMENTARIA IN PRIMUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM

Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences



WILLEM HESSELS VAN EST

GUILLIELMUS ESTIUS — 1542–1613

English translation, from the Douai 1615 edition

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DISTINCTIO I — ON ENJOYMENT AND USE (*DE FRUITIONE ET USU*)

§ 1. "What is there for me in heaven? and with thee what have I desired upon earth?" By "from thee" he means, that is, apart from thee, outside thee. For since our soul, from the fact that it is fashioned to the image of God, is of an infinite capacity, it can be filled by that alone which is infinite, that is, by God alone. Hence, however much the human soul may cling to, or even plunge itself into, the delight of created things, nevertheless it cannot come about that any such delight should fill its capacity, and satisfy its desire, and altogether make it come to rest. Why then does it not comprehend God? Is it of an infinite capacity because no created good can satisfy it, and yet not because it can take in that which is absolutely infinite? And indeed God fills the soul, but is not wholly comprehended: He fills its capacity, but the soul does not contain Him—just as the sea fills the capacity of a water-pot, but the water-pot does not contain the sea. Others say that the human mind is infinite privatively, not positively, which comes to the same. We enjoy God in this life imperfectly, since, at least having and possessing Him in part, we take delight in Him; according to that of Ps. 36: "Delight in the Lord, and He shall give thee the requests of thy heart"; and Ps. 76: "I remembered God, and was delighted."¹

§ 2. But perfect enjoyment of God (*fruitio*) does not belong to this life, but to the future: where our desire will be filled with good things. The reason of which is, because since enjoyment imports delight (*delectatio*), which is in the will (*voluntas*), whereas vision (*visio*) or cognition is in the intellect (*intellectus*), it follows that enjoyment follows upon vision: where therefore there is imperfect vision, there also is imperfect enjoyment; namely in this life, in which "we see through a glass in a dark manner"; but where there is perfect vision, there will also be perfect enjoyment, to wit in the world to come, in which "we shall see God face to face."² St. Augustine teaches this very point.³

§ 3. How, however, vision (*visio*) differs from enjoyment (*fruitio*), and to which power of the soul enjoyment properly pertains, is not the place to discuss here exactly. For that disputation pertains to the Fourth Book (Distinction 49),⁴ upon which, writing on this matter, Soto (q. 1. Augustinum art. 4.) diligently considers both Augustine and St. Thomas.⁵ Briefly, however, it can here be said that, according to those authors, to enjoy (*frui*) is not properly to be delighted, save only in a consequent sense, inasmuch as enjoyment includes delight in its formal character; but properly to enjoy is to have or to possess some thing with delight—which explanation is also very consonant with what has already been said about either signification of that word. Thus, for example, we say that someone enjoys things long desired, because at length he has obtained them, and possesses them with his will.

§ 4. Furthermore, since it is God alone whom we must enjoy (*frui*), it follows that all other things are only to be used (*uti*): as Augustine teaches.⁶ For every creature of God is of such a sort that it can be of assistance to man for knowing and loving God. For in created things there is nothing in which, in some manner, the goodness, power, and wisdom of God do not shine forth. And there are very many which also in other ways come legitimately into our use, when referred to God as our ultimate end, as experience widely teaches. Now then, if we should wish to enjoy the things which are to be used, or conversely, all human duty is perverted;

nor is there any other life of men vicious and blameworthy than the life ill-using and ill-enjoying, says Augustine.⁷

§ 5. It must be noted, however, in this place, that not only the things made by God, but also sins, which are not from God but from the evil will of men, we are able rightly and lawfully to use (*uti*). Our own, indeed, if on the occasion of them we become more humble and more cautious, and rise again to a higher grade of virtue; as happened to David, to Peter, and to other Saints: the sins of others, moreover, inasmuch as by another's fall we are admonished what to fear and to beware of, and for what we ought to give thanks to God on our own behalf, who kept us from like sins, as the Apostle teaches.⁸ Nay more, God also uses the sins of men for various effects, whether for the declaring of His justice, or of His power, or of His wisdom, or of His mercy: as in the apostate Angels, in Pharaoh, in Judas the betrayer, in the Apostle Peter—things which it is easy to prove from the Scriptures.

§ 6. Augustine furthermore asks whether men ought to enjoy (*frui*) themselves or to use (*uti*) themselves; and by reason he concludes that no man ought to enjoy either himself or another man, but only to use: because neither himself nor another man ought one to love for his own sake, but he ought to refer all his love, by which he loves either himself or his neighbor, to the unchangeable good, which is God alone. Whence he is said to be accursed who puts his hope in man.⁹ The Law also and the Gospel command that we love our neighbor as ourselves, but God with our whole heart and with our whole soul, etc. For that also was the pride of the transgressing Angels and of the first men, that, having considered their beauty, they wished to enjoy themselves, and took delight in themselves, rather than refer it to God.

§ III — Whether it is permissible to serve God with a view to reward (An mercedis intuitu Deo servire liceat)

§ 7. From what has been said, that God is to be enjoyed, a question arises: whether it is permissible to worship God and to serve Him with a view to a reward (*merces*). For if a man expects a reward for that service, he now seems not to enjoy God but to use—inasmuch as he does not rest in God as in his ultimate end, but refers his love and service of God further to that thing which he expects as a reward; and so to enjoy (*frui*) God he seems not, but rather to use (*uti*).

§ 8. This question is resolved by a distinction of the reward or recompense which someone is said to expect from the service of God: either that reward is God Himself, or (which comes to the same thing) the operation by which we are joined to God, namely the very vision of God, that is, the beatific vision (*visio beatifica*), or enjoyment, in which our beatitude (*beatitudo*) and eternal life consist; or it is something besides and outside God. If you take the reward in the former sense, it must altogether be granted that with a view to such a reward a man can—indeed ought to—serve God; so far is it from being the case (as the heretics say) that it is the mark of the imperfect to look for such a reward as an end in their good works.

§ 9. Proof: by reason, by Scripture, and by the testimony of the Fathers. By reason: because it is disordered that means should not be referred to their proper and legitimate end; but the end of our service which we render to God in this life is eternal life, by which in the age to come we shall be perfectly joined to God; therefore our service will be inordinate if it is not referred by us to that end—which end, since it is expected from our service, indeed as the recompense of our service, has the formal character (*ratio*) of a retribution or reward: a point which must be more fully proved where the merits (*merita*) of works are treated. Likewise,

just as without faith (*fides*) so without hope (*spes*) it is impossible to please God: but Christian hope brings it about in us that we worship God with a view to future retribution. For hope is the expectation of future goods, from the grace of God and from good works. Nay rather, hope includes this, that those goods be expected under the formal character of a reward, because God has so ordained; and this we must believe by faith; therefore by hope also we must expect it.

§ 10. By Scripture: "I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications for the reward."¹¹ And in Gen. 15, to Abraham: "I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great."¹² Is. 45: "I have not said to the seed of Jacob: Seek ye me in vain."¹³ Heb. 11: God is "a rewarder of those that seek Him."¹⁴ 2 Tim. 4: "There is laid up for me a crown of justice."¹⁵ Col. 1: "For the hope which is laid up for you in heaven."¹⁶ So too Matt. 19: to the Apostles asking, "Behold we have left all things, and have followed thee: what therefore shall be to us?" He promised them a reward more ample than to others.¹⁷ For the name "reward" is frequent in Scripture (as in Matt. 5, 6, and elsewhere), when a copious reward in heaven is promised for pious works.¹⁸ Now that reward is God Himself, or to see God, to enjoy God, to take delight in God, to reign with God. Note moreover that in these Scriptures those are designated to us as worshipers of God on account of retribution who in the same Scriptures are commended as more perfect and more holy than others, and whom it is established to have loved God with sincere love—as are Abraham, Moses, David, Peter, Paul, and the other Apostles: whence it is clearly shown that the regard to the reward, in the sense here understood, does not argue imperfection either of the work or of the worker.

§ 11. Add to these the testimonies of the Fathers, who plainly teach that God is to be worshiped with a view to eternal retribution. For St. Ambrose says: "The very pursuits of virtues grow torpid without reward."¹⁹ St. John Chrysostom exhorts that, "looking to the Lord's reward, let us do all things";²⁰ and he says, "our hope is strengthened by the expectation of retribution."²¹ St. Augustine, after asking by what fruit, by what reward, by what recompense God is to be loved, thus answered: "Let Him be loved freely (*gratis*), so that the price (*pretium*) of the work by which one ministers to Him be to be with Him."²² And: "This is the highest reward, that we should enjoy God."²³ And: "Worship and love the Lord freely (*gratis*), because He Himself will be our entire reward; that in that eternal life we may enjoy His goodness and beauty."²⁴ And in another place: "Briefly, our reward has been defined by the Prophet: 'I will be their God.' Do not will to seek anything from God except God: love freely (*gratis amare*); from Him alone desire."²⁵ The same Augustine, on Ps. 118, so wills that we should worship God freely, that we worship God for nothing except for God, and that His very worship be the reward.²⁶ And on Ps. 134: "This is to love freely (*gratis amare*), and thus you ought to love, that you not cease to desire Him as your reward, who alone will sate you."²⁷ Which same he inculcates most frequently elsewhere. St. Gregory says: "Let the greatness of the rewards delight the mind; but let not the certitude of toils deter it."²⁸ The judgment of all the other Fathers is the same, whom it is not necessary to cite here at length. There is added the authority of the Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 11; can. 31).²⁹ Finally, the authority of the Church in the divine offices, especially concerning the Martyrs: "All the Saints, what torments they have suffered, that they might securely attain to the palm of martyrdom. They delivered up their bodies for God to punishments, that they might become heirs in the house of the Lord. They remain unmoved, by the grace of unending life."³⁰

§ 12. On the other hand, if by the name of reward something outside God is understood, plainly it is not permitted to worship God with a view to reward. For it is a great injury to that highest good whenever something else, as though more excellent and more delectable, is preferred to Him, to the attainment of which

His love is referred. Nor indeed is such love of God praiseworthy but blameworthy, because it is vitiated in respect of the due end: hence we can call it a vicious, perverse, impure, sordid, insincere, and God-unworthy love, and truly mercenary. Scripture of both Testaments reproves such a regard and expectation of reward in worshipping God: as in Matt. 6 concerning the hypocrites who look to human glory: "They have received their reward." Whence He also admonishes us not to do similarly; otherwise we shall not have a reward with our heavenly Father.³¹ Likewise Mal. 1, to the priests: "Who is there among you, that will shut the doors, and will kindle the fire on My altar for nought? I have no will in you." And ch. 3: "You have said, He is vain that serveth God; what profit, because we have kept His precepts?" On which place St. Jerome: "In the present age they demand a reward for the service of God; therefore they do not receive it."³² Such a manner of serving God David removed from himself (Ps. 72), where, after indicating the fluctuation of his soul in these words, "And I said: Therefore without cause have I justified my heart," he subjoined: "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee, what have I desired upon earth?" as if he should say, nothing. But what reward he looked for he teaches in the following verse: "God is the God of my heart, and my portion God for ever."³³ The holy Job also was calumniated by Satan, that he served God not for nothing, that is, not freely, but on account of temporal goods: "Doth Job fear God in vain? Hast not Thou made a hedge about him and about his house," etc.³⁴ Of this kind of reward therefore those places are to be understood that occur everywhere in St. Augustine and the other Fathers, who teach that God is to be loved and worshiped freely, and who seem not to admit a view to reward. Some of which we shall cite in the following chapter.

§ 13. But someone will here ask: whether it is permissible to serve God on account of immortality, glory, perpetual health, and the other goods of the body which we expect in the future life? It is answered: if the works by which we serve God are referred to those goods as to an end properly so called, such service is inordinate; for the end ought to be more excellent than the means which are undertaken for the sake of it: for the end is the best in relation to the means; but the goods of the body, however excellent, are placed far beneath the dignity even of imperfect justice (*iustitia*), by which in this life we serve God: therefore the works of justice one does not rightly refer to bodily goods as to an end. But if the question is not about the end properly so called, but about a certain concomitant and accessory good, which they are wont to call a secondary end—that is, the consideration of which with good reason may move a man to love and worship God, from whom he hopes such a good to accrue to himself—it is lawful, in this sense, to worship God on account of whatever goods diverse from God, whether eternal or temporal, provided they be such as are rightly to be hoped for from God: as are health, daily sustenance, temperate weather, the peace and tranquility of the commonwealth, and other such things, which are to be asked only for God's sake, and, when they are had, to be referred into God. Nor does the intention and expectation of having such things argue an imperfection of justice, except when someone would not love, or would love less, God without them: in which way that ancient people was kept, by promises of temporal goods, in a certain sort of service of God; otherwise they would straightway have turned back from His worship. And about this matter Satan also was backbiting holy Job before God, saying: "But stretch forth Thy hand a little, and touch all that he possesseth; unless he blessed Thee to Thy face." For it is a mark of imperfection to need such incitements; whereas, on the contrary, it is a mark of perfection not to need them—just as we say that he is more perfect who believes not having seen miracles, than he who is brought to believe by the help of miracles, otherwise not going to believe, or going to believe less readily.³⁵

§ 14. For that, simply speaking, it does not conflict with the perfection of justice and of the love of God, to worship God with the hope and expectation of such goods, is clear by the example of Abraham saying to

God, Gen. 15: "Lord God, what wilt Thou give me? I shall go without children," etc.;³⁶ and by the example of the Patriarch Jacob saying, Gen. 28: "If the Lord shall be with me, ... the Lord shall be my God."³⁷ Nay rather by the example of Christ, of whom it is said, Heb. 12, that, "For the joy set before Him, He endured the Cross."³⁸ Whence also to the precept of the love of God above all things and out of the whole heart there is adjoined the promise of temporal life and felicity, Deut. 30; and 1 Par. 28.³⁹

§ IV — Certain arguments to the contrary are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta quaedam in contrarium)

§ 15. From what has been said above it is plain in what sense that is to be taken which is frequently read among the Fathers, that God is to be loved and worshiped gratuitously (*gratis amandum et colendum*), and this sometimes even with the exclusion of any reward (*praemium*) to be asked of God. Thus in St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, book 1, ch. 9; and on Psalm 18, the second exposition, where he interprets the chaste fear as "the one loving gratuitously" (*gratis amantem*); likewise on Psalm 43 at the words "from the face of the enemy and of the pursuer," and on Psalm 52 at the words "They have not called upon God"; in Sermons 72 and 234 (On the Seasons), Sermon 3 (On the Words of the Lord), Homily 38 (among the fifty), in Tracts 3 and 11 on John, and in Epistle 52; likewise in Chrysostom, at the end of book 2 On Compunction of Heart, and Homily 48 on Genesis; and in others here and there.⁴⁰ For we have shown above that, according to the mind of the Fathers themselves, these things are to be taken so that regard for temporal and created reward is excluded, but not regard for the eternal and uncreated. And that this may be more evident, it is further proved more fully from the same Augustine. For in Tractate 3 on John, after he had said, "Do not love God for reward," he immediately subjoined: "He Himself is thy reward." And in the exposition of Psalm 72 he wills that from God no other reward be expected than God Himself. And in Sermon 236 (On the Seasons) he speaks thus: "Let us love gratuitously: for we love the Lord, than whom we find nothing better. Let us love Him for His own sake, and ourselves in Him; yet on account of Him." Thus there. By these words he explains the force of that which is to love gratuitously. For he loves God gratuitously who in the love of God seeks nothing besides and outside God.⁴¹

§ 16. Yet certain other arguments are commonly brought against the foregoing doctrine, to which the solution already given does not seem able to be suitably applied. First. The Apostle in 1 Cor. 13: "Charity (*caritas*), he says, 'seeketh not the things that are her own': therefore she seeks no reward for herself. Second. The Prophet with grave reproof said, "All follow after recompenses" (Is. 1): therefore it is not good to seek a reward. Third. St. Jerome, in the Commentary on the Epistle to Philemon, writes thus: "The saints love Christ, offering to Him charity rather than asking any rewards of charity."⁴² Fourth. St. Bernard (book On Loving God, ch. 3): "For God is not loved without reward, although He is to be loved without a view to reward: for true charity cannot be empty; nor yet is it mercenary, since it seeketh not the things that are her own. And a little after: True love does not require a reward, but merits it. And below: Let us serve God in charity, which casts out fear, feels no toil, does not require a reward, does not regard merit." Nor is different the place in the same Bernard (Sermon 83 on the Song of Songs).⁴³ Fifth. St. Ambrose, book 2 On Abraham, ch. 8: "Let narrow minds be invited by promises, let them be raised by hoped-for rewards": therefore to hope for reward pertains to narrow minds.⁴⁴ Sixth. The author of the Sermon on the Prodigal Son (which is found among the Homilies of the Fathers for the Saturday after the Second Sunday in Lent) distinguishes three kinds of men serving God, of whom some serve God for temporal reward; others for eternal life; others

altogether gratuitously: and these last alone he acknowledges to be endowed with filial love. Almost the same things are found in Bede on Luke 15 and in the sermon on the said Saturday, taken from the Commentary.⁴⁵ Likewise Abbot Gueric (in the moral exposition on the Prodigal Son, at the end) teaches that the sons' reward is the paternal inheritance: yet that there is found another grade more sublime, and an effect more worthy than that; since, the heart having been purified utterly, the soul desires or seeks nothing else but God Himself. "For neither does the soul which is of such a kind desire anything of its own—neither happiness, nor glory, nor any other thing—as though with a private love of itself; but wholly goes on into God."⁴⁶ Eighth. At least it can seem to be of greater perfection, if someone so loves God, that in loving he looks to no reward whatsoever; because the Fathers sometimes speak comparatively, as Chrysostom (in the homily cited above), when he says: "The reward is greater, if you do a thing not from hope of reward." And Augustine, Sermon 3 (On the Words of the Lord), where he signifies that it pertains to a man's imperfection that he must be stirred up by promises to serve God; since otherwise it is better to serve Him of one's own accord. Of which sort of comparison are also the words of Jerome a little above recited. Lastly they argue thus. Charity is essentially a gratuitous love; for it is the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*), as St. Thomas teaches.⁴⁷ Now it is distinguished from the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) in this, that the love of friendship is had toward that to which one wills good, as to a friend; but the love of concupiscence is had toward that good which one wills for oneself or for another—wherefore one is said to love wine or a horse, with which there cannot be friendship: as the same St. Thomas teaches.⁴⁸ Whence he subjoins: that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and in itself; but that which is loved with the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and according to itself, but is loved only for another. And finally he infers that the love by which something is loved that it may have good done to it is love simply; but the love by which something is loved that it may be the good of another is love in a qualified sense. From which it appears that he who loves God with a view to the reward which is God Himself—that is, so as to obtain God as some good for himself—loves God with the love of concupiscence; and therefore does not love God simply, but only in a qualified sense. Nay more, he does not love God with charity; since charity is a certain friendship of man toward God; but with a certain love set below the nature of charity. But he who loves God altogether gratuitously and without respect to reward, loves God with the love of friendship, which is love simply, and by its proper name is called charity.

§ 17. But to these objections we answer. To the first, therefore, it is answered that, according to the Apostle, those seek their own who are devoted to private advantages, the common good and the salvation of their neighbors being neglected and postponed. Of whom the same Apostle says in Phil. 2: "All seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's." But this he does not do who loves God, in order to enjoy (*frui*) God. And in this way Augustine expounds it in the Rule.⁴⁹ To the second: by "retributions" the Prophet understands gifts by which justice is perverted; for there precedes, "All love gifts." To the third: Jerome's meaning can be explained of temporal reward; but if anyone thinks that it should rather be understood of the reward of eternal life, let him take its sense from the solution of the last argument.⁴² To the fourth: although the words of Bernard seem to some to have a certain difficulty, yet from the very place it is sufficiently clear that he is speaking of a reward which is different from God and beneath God; for thus he says: "True love is content with itself: it has a reward; but that which is loved. For whatsoever you may seem to love on account of another, that plainly you love to which the end of love stretches, not that by which it tends. Paul does not preach the Gospel in order to eat, but he eats in order to preach the Gospel: because he loves not food, but the Gospel." And below: "The more the soul loves God, it does not require any reward of its love

besides God; or if it requires another, for certain it does not love God"; and what follows. From which it is understood that Bernard thought nothing different, on the point proposed, from Augustine and the other Fathers: for neither does he anywhere deny that God is to be loved with a view to the reward which is God Himself.⁴³ To the fifth it is answered that Ambrose is speaking of temporal reward.⁴⁴ To the sixth it must be said that that division of an uncertain author is not to be accepted, unless perhaps that author thinks that eternal life and God Himself are to be distinguished; so that he be said to serve God altogether gratuitously who looks to nothing else as ultimate end but God Himself, whom he serves; but that he serves "for the sake of eternal life" who, as ultimate end and highest good, looks to his perpetual well-being and happiness as his own, insofar as it is his own, not insofar as it is in God.⁴⁵ As to the words of Guerric, the solution is had from his own words, "as with a private love of himself": otherwise, if all these things are finally referred to the glory of God.⁴⁶ To the eighth: sentences of this kind either contain a comparison spoken improperly, and speak of temporal or created reward, or they are to be taken according to the explanation of the last argument. To which it is answered from St. Bonaventure, on I Sent., dist. 27, art. 2, q. 2. There is a twofold motion in charity (*caritas*) by which we love God: namely, a motion of friendship (*amicitiae*), whereby one desires to please and serve God, looking in all things to God's honor and glory; and a motion of concupiscence (*concupiscentiae*), whereby one desires to have and to see God. If, therefore, the Fathers sometimes say that God is to be loved without a view to reward, including even the uncreated reward, that is to be understood of the love of friendship. For "if by the affection of friendship a man serves a friend and loves him without a view to reward, as the Philosopher says, much more by the love of charity does a man will good to God without a view to any recompense." But by this it is not excluded that charity, by the love of concupiscence, longs for and desires to lay hold of that supreme reward, to the attainment of which it finally intends to come. Thus he. Therefore charity, insofar as it is the love of friendship, does not look to reward; but insofar as at the same time it also includes or admits the motion of concupiscence, it looks to and hopes for reward for itself—but no other than that very thing which it loves by the love of friendship.⁵⁰

§ V — Whether one ought to use or to enjoy the virtues (Utrum Virtutibus utendum sit an fruendum)

§ 18. That the virtues are to be used, not enjoyed—that is, that with them one lives well—is shown first from what was said and proved above, that according to the theological acceptance of "to enjoy" (*frui*), God alone is to be enjoyed, other things to be used (*uti*). Proof: by the authority of Scripture. For in Wisdom 8 it is said of the four cardinal virtues: "Quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus"; since therefore they are things most useful, they are to be used. Likewise by the authority of St. Augustine, who in Book 13 (*De civitate Dei*, ch. 8) teaches that the virtues are to be loved for the sake of beatitude (*beatitudo*) alone; and in Book 4 (*Contra Julianum*, ch. 3) he shows at length that they are not true virtues which either serve no end, or serve an end other than God. Finally, by the testimony of Lactantius, who teaches in many places that virtues are not to be sought for their own sake, but for the sake of eternal and blessed life, which consists in the vision of God: as in Book 3 (*Divinae institutiones*, chs. 12 and 17), Book 5 (chs. 17 and 18), and Book 6 (ch. 9). Hence also among the moral precepts of Cato one reads: "Utere virtute." From these, therefore, the falsity is refuted of the doctrine of the Stoics, who, placing the highest good of man in virtue, taught that it is to be sought for its own sake alone, and not referred to another, more outstanding good; and that in it alone, they said, there is sufficient guarantee for living well and happily.⁵²

§ 19. But as to what the Master (of the Sentences) objects on behalf of this Stoic opinion as though from St. Ambrose (writing on Gal. 5), this is not found in the Ambrosian Commentary, but is had in the Interlinear Gloss, of which Rabanus is believed to be the author; for there it is said that the works of the Spirit are called by the Apostle "fruits" (*fructus*), "quia per se expetenda sunt." But one must say rightly that the virtues also are to be loved and sought for their own sake, yet not for their own sake only, that is, with the exclusion of a further end; nor, moreover, principally for their own sake. For although the virtues are lovable in themselves as great goods of the soul—just as we also confess health to be in itself desirable as a great good of the body—nevertheless it is not lawful to fix our love in the virtues or to set our end in them; rather they must be referred further to God as the ultimate end, that through them we may attain our highest good, which is God, and enjoy Him. Therefore the virtues are like certain healthful potions—not indeed bitter ones, which are taken only for the sake of something else, namely health; but sweet ones, which, besides conducing to health, have also in themselves that which delights. Nor is it contrary to this reply, what we have just cited from St. Augustine, that the virtues are to be loved "for the sake of beatitude alone"; for it does not follow from thence that they are in no way to be sought for their own sake. The sense, as the Master explains, is that they are to be loved for the sake of beatitude alone as the ultimate and highest end, although they also have in themselves that whereby they are loved.⁵³

§ 20. But what Lactantius (in the places already alleged) says and inculcates—that "it is vain and foolish to live according to virtue if no hope of a blessed life be set before us"—does not seem to be rightly said: because, just as vices are in themselves base and evil, and therefore to be shunned, even if there were no God who punishes (as Lactantius speaks), so too the virtues are in themselves honorable and good, and on that account to be embraced, even if no reward were proposed. From the things just said there can also be gathered the sense of certain words of Augustine in the first exposition of Psalm 18, on that text: "In custodiendis illis retributio multa." "Not in some advantage placed without," he says, "but in that very thing wherein the judgments of God are kept, 'much reward' is much, because one rejoices in them." For by an advantage placed without Augustine understands some external good which, although it is sometimes given to those who keep the judgments of God, yet in it there is not "much reward"; for a much greater reward is in the honest and holy delight which the keeping of God's precepts brings with it—because, as it is said above in the same Psalm, "Judicia [Dei], seu praecepta Dei, desiderabilia sunt super aurum et lapidem pretiosum multum, dulciora super mel et favum." But, because they are not more desirable than God Himself, but are rather referred to God as the supremely desirable, hence by those words of Augustine the intention of retribution, which consists in the vision of God, is not excluded but rather included, namely as of the ultimate end.⁵⁴

§ 21. But again someone will object that man's beatitude is situated in perfect virtues, especially those by which through perfect knowledge and love a man is joined to God; and hence that the blessed enjoy perfectly the perfect virtues, and we likewise enjoy imperfectly the imperfect ones, insofar as in this life by them we are imperfectly joined to God. I answer: man's beatitude or ultimate end is said in a twofold way. In one way, as the object, by the attainment or possession of which a man is made blessed; and in this way man's beatitude is situated in God alone, wherefore God alone is to be enjoyed. In another way, as the very attainment or possession of that object, which is a certain created form inhering in the rational soul, and this is also called formal beatitude; and this is the operation of perfect virtue, as the Philosopher also testifies (in the last book of the Ethics). By this beatitude a man is said to enjoy less properly, inasmuch as he exercises the most perfect action by which he attains and apprehends that beatifying object. In which sense it is wont to be said that the blessed enjoy the vision of God, because, namely, they enjoy God through the vision. One could also ask here

whether someone can use virtue badly; but there is place for that question below (at Dist. 27 of Book II) around the definition of virtue delivered there from Augustine, where it is said that virtue is that by which no one uses badly.⁵⁵

§ VI — Concerning the things which use or enjoy (De iis rebus, quae utuntur vel fruuntur)

§ 22. Now it must be briefly set forth what are the things to which the capacity of using or enjoying (to use: *uti*; to enjoy: *frui*) is suited. For it is manifest that it does not belong to all; since to use and to enjoy are acts of the rational or intellectual will, the consequence is that only and every intellectual substance (*substantia intellectualis*) can use or enjoy things. And indeed, concerning Angels and men—what and how they use or enjoy things, well or ill—enough is evident from what was said above. But how God, who is an uncreated substance, may be said to enjoy, or even to use, any thing created, must be more fully explained. And first it must be confessed that God does not enjoy any other thing, but Himself alone; for by Himself He is blessed, and in Himself He comes to rest: He alone, by Himself and in Himself, is—as most perfect—so also most happy. He enjoys Himself, however, not in altogether the same manner in which the creature enjoys Him: for the latter rests in Him as in its ultimate end, using other things to attain this end; but God properly does not have an end, because there is no cause of God. Hence neither is He properly an end to Himself: because neither is He the cause of Himself, nor to Himself the cause of any good. Nor, moreover, in order that He may enjoy Himself, does He use other things; since He has no need of our goods (Ps. 15), and before every creature He was from eternity most perfectly blessed. But He is said to enjoy Himself, because, since He is in Himself perfect, and in every way sufficient to Himself, and always present to Himself, in Himself, as in an infinite good, He delights most perfectly: having nothing outside Himself to which, as to an end, He might refer that supreme good, that is, Himself. He therefore is both the one who enjoys, and that which is enjoyed, and the enjoyment itself (*fruitio*). For none of these, in that most simple nature, ought to be thought as something diverse, one from another.

§ 23. Moreover, that God enjoys Himself St. Gregory attests, saying of Him: "He is truly glorious, who, while He enjoys Himself to the full, has no need of any added praise." Thereupon he subjoins concerning use in this manner: "He is clothed with beauteous garments, because the choirs of holy Angels, whom He created, He has taken up into the use of His adornment." Thus far he.⁵⁷ Therefore, as regards use, God uses all things which are other than Himself; albeit in a far different manner than men use the same things, as St. Augustine rightly teaches: men use things that are advantageous or necessary for attaining their end; but God is said to use them when He ordains them to some end—an end, I say, not of God but of the things themselves.⁵⁸ That this may be made clear by an example: God uses a man when He directs him by His grace to his ultimate end, that is, to God Himself, that he may sometime enjoy Him; and He uses evil men when He ordains them and their actions to the declaring of His justice in their punishment, or to the proving of the patience of the just, or to some other like good. These goods indeed are ends not of God Himself but of men: of the wicked, indeed, as of instruments or means which are preordained by God to such ends; but of the good, because the good obtain those goods as their own. For it is the good of the latter both that the justice of God be declared and that their own patience be proved. A like explanation can be applied in other matters; indeed in every act, whether evil or good.

§ 24. For neither would the supremely good and omnipotent God permit evils—that is, sins—to exist, unless He knew also how to use them well; as St. Augustine teaches, that is, unless He were able and willing to ordain them to some end congruous to man, or to any other creature whatsoever.⁵⁹ Add that if a man can use well his own sins or those of another, as was said above, it follows that God much more can use sins well—not, indeed, His own (for sin does not befall God), but those of others, whether of men or of Angels—especially since this very thing, that He uses sins well, is the work of God; He Himself works it in man. From what has been said it is clear in what sense God is said to operate for an end. For He operates for an uncreated end, when He appoints Himself as the end for all creatures and their operations, of all which He Himself is the author—according to Prov. 16: "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus," that is, He made all things for His own glory. For to this, as to the ultimate end, all things that God does are by Him directed and referred. Nor does Augustine seem to have meant anything else, when he said: We indeed refer the things which we use to this, that we may enjoy the goodness of God; but God refers our use to His own goodness. And below: Therefore that use which is said to be God's, whereby He uses us, is referred not to His utility but to ours; but to His goodness alone: for in both cases, understand the place of "being made manifest," and the declaration and manifestation of the divine goodness is the glory of God.⁵⁸

§ 25. But this too, concerning evils, is true to this extent: that God knows how to ordain evils—which are not from Himself, but from a deficient nature—to His glory; while punishing them, He is glorified in the work of justice, according to that of Prov. 16 (ibid.): "the wicked also to the evil day," namely, "has the Lord made," or has ordained, "for Himself," that is, for His glory. God also operates for the same end, when He establishes in created things that order whereby one is the end of another—for example, man [is] the end of the visible world, [health the end] of a medicinal potion, and so in other cases.

1. Ps. 36: "Delight in the Lord, and He shall give thee the requests of thy heart."; Ps. 76: "I remembered God, and was delighted."

2. 1 Cor. 13.

3. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 30.

4. "ad quantum (distinctio 49.)" [abbreviation as in source].

5. "Super quam scribens rem hanc Dom. secundum Soto (q. 1. Augustinum art. 4.) diligenter & S. Thomam expendit" [abbreviation as in source].

6. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, chs. 1 and 22.

7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, ch. 10.

8. Rom. 11; Gal. 6.

9. Jer. 17.

10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 27, a. 3.

11. Ps. 118 (119): "I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications for the reward."

12. Gen. 15: "I am thy protector, and thy reward exceeding great."

13. Is. 45: "I have not said to the seed of Jacob: Seek ye me in vain."

14. Heb. 11: "For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder of them that seek Him."

15. 2 Tim. 4: "There is laid up for me a crown of justice."

16. Col. 1: "For the hope which is laid up for you in heaven."

17. Matt. 19:27–29.
18. Cf. Matt. 5:12; 6:1.
19. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam* V, on Luke 6.
20. St. John Chrysostom, *In Genesim*, hom. 25.
21. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum*, hom. 63.
22. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* 51.
23. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 32.
24. St. Augustine, *De catechizandis rudibus*, ch. ult.
25. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 100, *De diversis*, ch. 5.
26. St. Augustine, "Conf. 11. in psal. 118" [abbreviation as in source].
27. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 134.
28. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 37.
29. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11; Session 6, canon 31.
30. The Church's divine office, especially for the Martyrs (Latin lines as in the liturgy cited by Estius): "Omnes Sancti quanta passi sunt tormenta, ut securi pervenirent ad palmam martyrii. Tradiderunt corpora sua propter Deum ad supplicia, ut haeredes fierent in domo Domini. Permanent immobiles, vitae perennis gratia."
31. Matt. 6:1–6, 16–18.
32. Mal. 1:10; 3:14; St. Jerome, *In Malachiam*, on 3:14.
33. Ps. 72.
34. Job 1:9–10.
35. Job 1:11; 2:5.
36. Gen. 15:2.
37. Gen. 28:20–21.
38. Heb. 12:2.
39. Deut. 30; 1 Kgs (1 Par.) 28.
40. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* I, ch. 9; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 18 (second exposition); *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 43 (at "a facie inimici et persequentis"); *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 52 (at "Deum non invocaverunt"); *Sermo* 72 (*De tempore*); *Sermo* 234 (*De tempore*); *Sermo* 3 (*De verbis Domini*); *Homily* 38 (among the fifty); *Tractates on the Gospel of John* 3 and 11; *Epistle* 52. St. John Chrysostom, *De compunctione cordis* II (at the end); *Homilies on Genesis*, hom. 48.
41. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* 3; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 72; *Sermo* 236 (*De tempore*).
42. St. Jerome, *Commentarioli in epistulam ad Philemonem*.
43. St. Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, ch. 3; St. Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, *Sermo* 83.
44. St. Ambrose, *De Abraham* II, ch. 8.
45. Anonymous, *Sermo de filio prodigo* (in the *Homiliae Patrum* for the Saturday after the Second Sunday in Lent); St. Bede, *In Lucam*, on Luke 15; and the sermon for the said Saturday, taken from that Commentary.
46. Guerric of Igny, *Moralis expositio de filio prodigo* (at the end).
47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 1.
48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 26, a. 4.
49. St. Augustine, *Regula* (Rule).
50. St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, dist. 27, art. 2, q. 2.

- 51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, qq. 11 and 16.
- 52. Wis. 8: "Quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus."; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 8; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 3; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* III, chs. 12, 17; V, chs. 17, 18; VI, ch. 9; Cato, *Moral Precepts* (Distichs), at "Utere virtute."
- 53. Interlinear Gloss on Galatians 5, attributed to Rabanus Maurus.
- 54. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 18 (first exposition).
- 55. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X; Below, *In II Sent.*, dist. 27, on Augustine's definition "virtutem esse qua nemo male utitur."
- 56. St. Thomas, "ubi sup." [abbreviation as in source].
- 57. St. Gregory (the Great), *Moralia* 32, ch. 7.
- 58. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, chs. 31–32.
- 59. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 11, 27, 100 [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO II — ON THE UNITY OF GOD (*DE UNITATE DEI*)

§ I — That there is one God, and that there are not many (Unum esse Deum; non esse plures)

§ 1. For one approaching to investigate somewhat, before all else it must most certainly be held that God is one, but that many gods neither are nor can be. For in things divine and eternal, to be and to be able are the same; in them potency is never separated from act (potency [*potentia*] ... act [*actus*]). This unity of God Scripture everywhere commemorates, as in Deut. 6: "Hear, Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one," which was repeated by Christ in the Gospel, Mk. 12; likewise Deut. 4: "There is no other besides the One"; 1 Kgs 2: "There is no other besides thee"; Is. 37: "Thou art God alone"; and 44: "I am the first, and I am the last, and besides me there is no God"; and 45: "I am the Lord, and there is no more: besides me there is no God; and again: I am the Lord, there is no other," which below is often repeated. Judith 5, about the Patriarchs: "Leaving the ceremonies which were in the multitude of gods, they worshiped one God of heaven." Sir. 1: "There is one Most High, the almighty Creator." Mk. 10: "No one is good but one, God." Gal. 3: "But God is one." 1 Cor. 8: "There is no God but one. For even if there are those who are called gods, either in heaven or on earth, yet to us there is one God." In which place that parenthesis—"For indeed there are those who are called many gods and many lords"—ought to trouble no one, as if the Apostle admitted that there are many gods, though not to be worshiped by us: for the sense is that, to others who err gravely, there are many gods, but to us, because enlightened by the light of faith, there is but one God; or certainly that which he had said, "who are called," must be repeated in the parenthesis in this sense, "for indeed there are those who are called many gods." To this is added the consent of the whole Catholic Church, both in the Creed of Constantinople and of Athanasius, and in the writings of all the Fathers, as also in the mouth of all the faithful with one voice professing that they believe in one God.² But although with this truth, as with the first foundation of religion, not only all Christians agree, but also Jews and Mahometans, and almost all heretics of all times; and although by natural reason this same truth can be demonstrated, as we shall teach in the next chapter; we must not linger longer over its proof: all the reasons, except the last, more fully set out may be seen in St. Thomas in the third article of the aforesaid question.¹

§ III — Reply to the arguments to the contrary (Responsio ad argumenta in contrarium)

§ 2. Now one must reply to those arguments by which it seems to be shown that God cannot be known, at least demonstratively, from created things. The first is of this sort: The things which are of faith (*fides*) are not demonstrated; for demonstration (*demonstratio*) makes one to know, that is, to cognize certainly and evidently; but faith, according to the Apostle in Heb. 11, is "of things not appearing," as is also more fully

taught at Distinction 24 of Book 3.⁴ But it is of faith that God is, according to that of the Creed: "I believe in God"; and that of the Apostle in the same place above, "It is necessary to believe of God, that He is." To this argument St. Thomas replies in I, q. 2, a. 2, that God is and other things of this sort, which by natural reason can be known about God, as it is said in Rom. 1, are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles. For thus he says: Faith presupposes natural cognition as grace does nature, as perfection (presupposes) the perfectible; nevertheless nothing prevents that that which in itself is demonstrable and knowable be accepted by someone as believable, who does not grasp the demonstration. So much he.

§ 3. But to this reply it seems to be an obstacle, that the faith of this article, God is, is not only required of those who are incapable of natural reasons, but of all Christians, and of those coming to Baptism, however learned and ingenious; which seems sufficiently to be proved both from the Creed and from the sentence of the Apostle alleged, nay also from the custom of the Church requiring that faith. This also is shown thus: for if the faith of that article were required only of those who do not grasp the demonstration, on the ground that others would hold this same thing by demonstration; since faith is a cognition more certain than demonstrative knowledge (*scientia demonstrativa*), it would follow that unlearned and dull men have a more certain cognition of this proposition God is, namely by faith, than other learned and subtle men, and much exercised in the contemplation of divine things, namely as having only demonstrative knowledge of God — which is absurd. It would follow also that he who had faith of the said proposition, if afterwards he were to receive the demonstration of the same, would lose the faith which before he had, and thus on account of the demonstration supervening would exchange a more certain cognition for a less certain one — which is no less absurd. Wherefore it seems one must reply according to those things which we said at Distinction 24 of Book 3, and which in the same place St. Bonaventure hands down (art. 2, q. 1, 2, 3, and on IV, dist. 21, the last question): that although in the full formal character (*ratio*) of faith the obscurity or non-evidence of the thing known is included, namely as regards the mode of knowing, nevertheless, inasmuch as in faith there is considered only the certitude of the cognition received from divine revelation, thus faith can stand together with demonstration; nor is this a wonder, since in the same subject knowledge (*scientia*) and opinion of the same thing stand together, that is, the one a cognition received from necessary premises, the other from probable — as in the said question 2 St. Bonaventure rightly teaches. Accordingly it does not seem to be denied that, of this proposition God is, both knowledge and faith can be in the same person, nor indeed does that stand in the way, that faith is of things not appearing; because although knowledge is a certain and evident cognition, nevertheless it does not equal the certitude of faith nor the evidence of the vision (*visio*), to which faith leads. Hence, once knowledge of some article has been had, the office and formal character of faith does not cease, neither as regards the certitude by which it surpasses knowledge, nor wholly as regards the non-evidence, which knowledge has not so removed as to make it equal to the vision which will be in the Homeland.

§ 4. The second argument: Every demonstration is from necessary things; but nothing is absolutely necessary except God; therefore from effects it will not be able to be demonstrated that God is. It is answered that every demonstration is so far from necessary things, because there must be a necessary connection of the middle with the extremes. For otherwise too from a contingent effect we demonstratively infer a cause likewise contingent, and conversely, provided there be a necessary connection.

§ 5. The third: From an effect a cause is not demonstrated, unless the cause be proportioned to the effect; but no effect is, nor can be, proportioned to God. It is answered that from any effect it can be demonstrated

that there is a cause, although from not just any effect can perfect knowledge of the cause be had: for neither is there any effect through which God can be perfectly known according to His essence (*essentia*).

§ 6. The fourth. Athanasius (in the book *On the Holy Spirit*): "The Deity is not handed down by chains of demonstrations, but by faith and pious handling together with Religion." It is answered that Athanasius is speaking of the Deity as regards the mystery of the Trinity, of which below it will be said.⁵

§ 7. Finally someone objects that the contemplation of creatures is, and always has been, a way to errors and superstitions; since, delighted by their beauty, men thought there was something divine in them. As Wisdom 14 attests, "The creatures of God have been made into hatred, and into temptation to the souls of men, and into a snare to the feet of the foolish." Wherefore, since the same thing is not the cause of contraries, it cannot be that from the same creatures one should come into the cognition of the one true God. It is answered that the opinion of the Wise Man on this matter is most clear (Wis. 13), as above has been shown sufficiently: and to this is added that often in the Scriptures creatures are invited to praise God, notably in Ps. 148 and in the Canticle of the Three Youths, for no other reason than because what is in them affords a sufficient argument to man for knowing and praising God. Therefore what the Wise says, "Creatures into hatred and temptation, and snares," etc., does not signify the end for which they were made and instituted, or to which they lead per se, but an outcome which happens from the blindness and malice of men; for he does not say "of men" generally, but "of the foolish": for men, abusing [their] foolishness with respect to the creatures of God, attributed divinity to them. Therefore the contemplation of creatures is not a way to error, except per accidens; namely, from the vice of a man depraved and addicted to visible things who is unwilling to rise up to the invisible: per se, however, it is a royal way to the cognition of the Creator; because naturally an effect manifests the cause, and a work shows forth the Workman. Hence the Wise is speaking not of just any creatures, but of those which, shaped into certain images by the works of craftsmen, have enticed the minds of the foolish to their veneration and worship.

§ IV — Whether the knowledge of God is in all (Utrum Dei notitia omnibus insit)

§ 8. Since it has been shown that God can be known even demonstratively from sensible things (*res sensibilis*), it rightly occurs to inquire whether the knowledge of God (*notitia Dei*) is in all men; yet understand this of adults and of those who have the use of reason (*usus rationis*). For, without the use of reason, it is established that intellectual knowledge (*notitia intellectualis*) cannot be received from sensibles.

§ 9. There are indeed many things that persuade to the affirmative part. First: because it is self-evident (*per se notum*) to them that God is, as St. Thomas rightly proves from this, that God is His own to-be (*Deus est suum esse*). But things which are self-evident, once the terms are known, are known by all, as that every whole is greater than its part.⁸

§ 10. Second, because St. Augustine says, in Tractate 106 on John, that the name of God, inasmuch as He is God, is known to the whole creation, indeed even to all nations; before they believed in Christ, it could not in every way have been unknown: "For this," he says, "is the power of true divinity, that to a rational creature already using reason it cannot be entirely and utterly hidden," etc. And on Psalm 74: "God is everywhere hidden, everywhere public; whom it is permitted to no one to know as He is, and whom no one is permitted to ignore." To this there seems to pertain also that of the same Augustine, Sermon 8 on Psalm 118: "The

commandments of God, as that one about the love of God with the whole heart, are known not only to the faithful but to very many unbelievers as well." Whence it follows—as Augustine also signifies there, and adds—that God is in some way known to the same unbelievers.⁹

§ 11. Third, St. Jerome, in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, chapter 1, bringing forward that of the Evangelist, "There was the true light which enlightens every man," etc., from which, he says, it becomes evident that the knowledge of God is implanted by nature in all, nor is anyone born without Christ, etc.¹⁰

§ 12. Fourth, St. Hilary, on Psalm 52: "For who, beholding the world, does not manifest God to be?"¹¹

§ 13. Fifth, Prudentius, in the Apotheosis against the pagans, sings thus: "And who, reclining at an idol among a thousand sacred rites, does not think that there is a supreme God and He alone above all things? Although they smoke and consecrate altars to Saturns, to Junos and Cytherae, and to other portents; yet as often as he has looked up to heaven, he determines all right in the One God, to whom the vast reason of virtues, equipped with various precepts, may be subject and serve..." And many other things follow in the same sense.¹²

§ 14. Sixth, the author of the imperfect work ascribed to Chrysostom, Homily 42 on Matthew: "To know one God is almost proper to human nature; but to love God [is proper] to a religious and upright heart."¹³

§ 15. Seventh, Orosius, Book 6 of the History, chapter 1: "Any man can for a time despise God; not to know Him altogether he cannot." And thereafter he teaches that not only philosophers but other pagans too acknowledge one God, to whom they subject the other gods as ministers: "Because," he says, "concerning the one God almost all have one opinion."¹⁴

§ 16. Eighth, St. John Damascene, *De orthodoxa fide*, Book 1, chapter 1: "To all there is naturally and inborn implanted by Him the knowledge that God is." And he repeats this in chapter 3.¹⁵

§ 17. Ninth, Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, Book 1, part 3, chapter 1: "God so tempered from the beginning the knowledge of Himself in man, that just as what He was could never be comprehended as a whole, so that He was could never altogether be able to be unknown." And chapter 2: "If He were wholly hidden, faith indeed would not be helped unto knowledge, but unbelief would be excused by ignorance."¹⁶

§ 18. Tenth, Bede, on Job 34: "All sinners and the impious act against the good of nature implanted in them, as of such the Apostle says: 'Who when they had known God,' etc. But where did they know God, if not in reason, in the judgment of the mind?"¹⁷

§ 19. Eleventh, the Catechism for Parish Priests, in the treatise on the Sacrament of Orders, says: that by natural instinct men recognize that God is to be worshiped; but this they cannot recognize unless they know that God is.¹⁸

§ 20. Twelfth, this is proved by the testimonies of the very pagans. For Cicero says, Book 1 *On the Nature of the Gods*: "It is innate in all, and as it were engraved, that there are gods." And in *On the Responses of the Haruspices*: "Who is so witless that, when he has looked up to heaven, he does not perceive that there are gods?" And Book 1 *On the Laws*: "There is no nation, neither so uncultivated nor so savage, which, even if it is ignorant what sort [of god] it ought to have, yet does not know that it ought to have [a god]." And Book 1 of the *Tusculan Disputations*: "This seems to be brought forward as most firm, why we should believe that there are gods, that there is no nation so savage, no man so inhuman, whose mind the opinion of the gods has

not imbued." And also among Justin, Question 1 To the Greeks, the pagans are introduced asserting that the knowledge of God is common to all men.¹⁹

§ 21. Finally, there is no nation that does not use an oath. For men (as the Apostle says generally, Heb. 6) "swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of every dispute of theirs"; but to swear is to invoke God as witness, and is an act of Religion; therefore the Religion of God touches the souls of all men.

§ 22. Yet for the opposing side it makes, first, that Scripture in many places attributes to certain men ignorance of God, as in the Psalms and elsewhere; whence that of Psalms 13 and 52: "The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God." And that of Psalm 78 and Jeremiah: "Pour out thy wrath upon the nations that have not known thee." And peculiarly concerning the Israelite people it is written: "God is known in Judea." Likewise the Apostle, 1 Cor. 1: "In the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God." And in chapter 15: "Some have the ignorance of God." And 1 Thess. 4: "The Gentiles which know not God." And 2 Thess. 1: "In a flame of fire, giving vengeance to them that know not God." And Wis. ch. 13: "All men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God; and from the things that are seen they could not understand Him who is, nor, attending to the works, did they acknowledge who was the Craftsman," etc. And many other such.

§ 23. Then it is established that there were certain men, and even now there are, who wholly rejected and despised every opinion of deity as empty and false, acknowledging neither one God nor many: as there were among the Greeks Protagoras, Diagoras, Theodorus, called atheists; and among the Latins Pliny, the writer of Natural History, as he himself in Book 2 of that work, chapter [—], professes in not obscure words: so that it is truly wondrous that a man who examined the whole of nature with such diligence did not acknowledge the Workman. O blindness of the human mind!

§ 24. From these things therefore, for the present question, two things can be gathered about which no doubt should be made. One is that the knowledge of the true God in the particular—that is, according to all or the chief properties of the divine nature—is not in all men; indeed, that God in this manner is still by many nations and very many men unknown; and that to very many more He was unknown before the descent of the Son of God to earth, when the true God was known in almost Judea alone, but the worship of false gods flourished throughout the world. And this matter is manifest from the Scriptures.

§ 25. The other, that there have not been lacking in former ages, and are not lacking even today, men who have absolutely no opinion either of the true or of the false god, but simply say in their heart, "There is no God," thinking that nature itself is the first cause of all natural things; but that all human things are administered by human providence only, which, because it cannot extend itself to all things, therefore very many things in human affairs happen by chance and at random, without the providence of a higher cause. Men imbued with this opinion the pagans of old also detested as atheists.

§ 26. Moreover, the positions that have been brought forward to the contrary show in part that the human mind has not been so darkened by sin that there did not remain in it an impressed and innate certain general opinion about God and His providence over the world and human affairs, but which was clouded and deformed by many mists of errors and by stains of superstitions—while that supreme Nature is torn asunder into many gods; while also it is communicated to woods and stones and other inanimate things; while many other unworthy things are foolishly and senselessly ascribed to Him, with things on the contrary taken away

which are proper to Him. And in part indeed they teach that in all there is the light of natural reason, whereby they are able from the contemplation of things to attain even to the cognition of the one true God; nor indeed were there few who advanced so far. For many learned and wise men so confirmed in their souls that general opinion about God, and, by a more diligent consideration of the things that are in the world and happen, cultivated it, that already in particular they thought much about God truly and magnificently.

§ 27. Yet that general opinion about God is not so universally common to all that there is no exception. For since human nature is more depraved in some, less in others, it is not a wonder that some are found in whom the opinion of whatever sort about God seems to have been abolished and utterly blotted out—such as we have already said atheists to be—whom St. Augustine seems to have noted (Tractate 106 on John), when, after the words set above, he subjoined thus: "For except for a few in whom nature is too much depraved, the whole human race confesses God the author of this world," etc. And in Sermon 10 on the words of the Lord: "They are found," he says, "peers in such great impiety, that there is fulfilled in them what is written: 'The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God'; this madness is that of a few. For as great piety is the property of a few, so great impiety likewise is the property of a few." Thus he.

§ 28. For this reason therefore Orosius and the Author of the imperfect work, when they say that almost all men know one God. Whence also that question of Hilary, "For who, beholding the world," etc., and that of Cicero, "Who is so witless," etc., does not require an absolutely negative answer, but signifies that there are few, and those very dull or depraved, who do not perceive this.

§ 29. These things being thus somewhat declared, now it appears how to answer to almost all the things that have been objected on the contrary, so that there is no need to dwell on each: except that to the first we reply that this proposition, "*Deus est*" ("God is"), is indeed self-evident (*per se notum*), yet not as regards us, to whom sensibles are first known, through which therefore we must be led by the hand into the cognition of God, as in that same article St. Thomas himself more fully explains.⁸

§ 30. To the fifth it is answered: Prudentius is looking chiefly to the time of the revealed Gospel, on the occasion of which it came about that to very many pagans—even to those who did not wish to receive the Gospel as to other things—at least it became known, by reason itself in a certain manner compelling them to this, that there is one God by whom this whole universe is administered.

§ 31. To the eighth St. Thomas replies (in the place already cited), that to know that God is, in some common way and under a certain confusion, is naturally implanted in us, inasmuch as God is the beatitude (*beatitudo*) of man. For all naturally desire beatitude, and therefore also naturally know it by a general apprehension of beatitude. But this solution does not seem to be according to the mind of Damascene; wherefore more rightly his opinion is to be explained from those things which we have said a little earlier.

§ 32. To the ninth: Hugh wills nothing else than that God is not altogether unknown to the human race, but can be known by man, partly from the instinct of nature, partly from divine instruction; although the perfect knowledge of God is not of this life, but is reserved for another life.

§ 33. To that which is objected from Justin, the reply is indeed evident also from what has been said. Yet it must be noted that Justin, or whoever is the author of those Questions, does not altogether grant to the pagans what they take up concerning the general knowledge of God among all men, but rather contends that this is false—namely, if it be understood of the distinct knowledge of the true God.

§ 34. To the last it is answered that it does not stand whether absolutely all nations use an oath; but even if all use it—which we do not deny—yet it can happen that there are many men who use it only from custom, not knowing what the name of an oath imports, or what the rite of swearing means for them, except in general—that it is a certain ceremony of words by which one intends to confirm what he asserts.

§ V — *Whether by the sole powers of nature one can arrive at the knowledge of God (An solis naturae viribus in Dei notitiam perveniri possit?)*

§ 35. From what has been said above there arises the question, whether those cognitions which we said the wise men of this age have attained from contemplation of visible things were attained by the sole powers of nature (*vires naturae*), that is, with the assistance of the natural light alone (*lumen naturale*), or whether for that they had need of grace (*gratia*) peculiarly enlightening them—on the ground that the powers of nature do not extend themselves to so great a good. To which question a probable reply is given in this way.

§ 36. First, just as by the guidance of natural reason alone the philosophers, the wise men of this age, and others could achieve some cognition of the duties of human life—something which is sufficiently proved by Aristotle's Ethics, Cicero's Offices, and the writings of other wise men among the Gentiles, especially of the Stoics, such as Epictetus, Seneca, Plutarch—so it seems one should say that the same men, instructed by the natural light alone, could have come to a knowledge of one first cause (*prima causa*) and principle (*principium*) of things, by whom not only were all things made, but also are preserved and governed; and this not by any necessity of nature, but by deliberate intention and will. The Platonists seem to have attained a knowledge of God of this sort.²¹

§ 37. For as regards the cognition of the duties of life, human nature has not been so vitiated by sin that men cannot, by the sole guidance of reason, judge rightly concerning many things to be done and avoided—especially if cultivation of talent and education have been added. For, says St. Augustine, in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 28: "The image of God in the soul is not so rubbed out by the stain of earthly affections that no extreme lineaments remain in it, whence it may deservedly be said that even in the very impiety of his life a man does some things of the law, or is wise, etc."²² Whence the same St. Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*, ch. 2, says that the divine laws are deeply implanted in our nature within our mind.²³ And upon Psalm 57 he says that no one, even before the Law, was ignorant what was just, and that in our hearts there is written by Truth: what you do not will to be done to you, do not do to another; so that even those to whom the Law is not given might have a basis whence they could be judged. He writes similar things in book I, II of *On Free Choice*, ch. 10; in book II of the *Confessions*, ch. 4; in the exposition on Psalm 118, sermon 25; and in the book *On the City of God*, ch. 21.²⁴ St. Ambrose agrees in the book *On Paradise*, ch. 6, ch. 8; St. Jerome, on Isaiah 14 and on Malachi 2, and in the *Epistle to Algasius*, q. 8; Prosper in book III of *On the Contemplative Life*, ch. 11, and in *Against the Collator*, ch. 22; Hugh in book I of *On the Sacraments*, part 3, ch. 3; to which add St. Thomas, q. 95, a. 6.²⁵ These places of the Fathers prove that certain remnants of the law of nature after sin were left in man. And these remnants seem of themselves to have the efficacy and sufficiency not only for some imperfect knowledge of the things that are to be done, but also for knowledge of God Himself as the author and governor of things. And this too is proved by those testimonies of the Fathers cited in the previous chapter, in which they bear witness that God, as the author of the world, could not have been altogether unknown to the Gentiles. For nothing prevents that rude knowledge of God—so to speak

innate to the nature of man—from taking some increase by the powers of the same nature, without a peculiar divine illumination, from diligent contemplation of created things.

§ 38. But just as those same wise men could not attain to an exact cognition of the duties on account of the darkness of the human mind contracted from sin, and much less to know the proper end to which the duties are to be referred, but erred in many ways concerning these matters: so neither is it to be thought that they could, by the natural faculty alone, come to a proper and absolute knowledge of God—that is to say, to know all His attributes, or at least His chief properties, and how He is the cause of things: whether as an artisan from pre-existent matter; or indeed as also the very author of matter itself—which indeed no philosopher knew. And again, whether He governs all things by a certain general plan and providence, or in a particular way; and whether He also immediately cares for individual things: which likewise we read to have been taught by none of the philosophers. For the Platonists, who are thought to have philosophized more exactly and sublimely concerning God than the rest, teach indeed that the world was made by God, but from matter that was pre-existent and coeternal with God; which they testify Plato to have held—St. Ambrose relates this; and St. Augustine in *City of God*, book VIII, ch. 5 and the following, where among other things he writes (ch. 12, and again book X, ch. 1) that Plato and his followers held that sacrifices are to be offered to many gods.²⁶ And again in book XII, ch. 26, he attributes to Plato that he thought indeed that human souls were created by the supreme God, but that bodies were formed by lesser gods. And things of this sort are read in Plato in the books *On the Republic* and *On the Laws*.²⁷

§ 39. It is therefore evident that those wise men, although they knew some great matters concerning God, had their knowledge involved with and mingled with many errors; concerning whom accordingly St. Augustine rightly says, *City of God*, book II, ch. 7: "Some of them discovered certain great things, insofar as they were aided by God; but insofar as they were hindered humanly, they erred." And book XVIII, ch. 41: "Whither does human wretchedness extend itself, if divine authority does not lead?"²⁸ Wherefore the same St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book VIII, ch. 9, distinguishing between faith and that cognition which is had concerning God before faith is received, says: "Faith avails for the cognition and for the love of God, not as though of one altogether unknown, or altogether not loved; but in order that He may be known more manifestly, and loved more firmly."²⁹ And Orosius, book VI, ch. 1—when he had said that the opinion of almost all men agrees in one certain supreme God—adds: "Thus far human scrutiny, albeit with toil, was able; but where ratiocination failed, faith came to the aid: for unless we shall have believed, we shall not understand. From Him Himself do thou hear, and do thou believe God Himself, what thou wishest to know is true concerning God." So he.³⁰

§ 40. Finally it is proved from this, that Adam, by sinning, did not lose his whole knowledge of God—although the Fathers bear witness that he lost faith, a matter which will be treated below at *Distinct.* 23 of book II. For he feared God after sin; whence it follows that he retained some, albeit imperfect, knowledge of God. Therefore nothing prevents that from the powers of nature in Adam when corrupted man likewise can come to a certain imperfect knowledge of God, by ratiocinating, through the things that are made; for the corrupted posterity does not seem to have lost in Adam what Adam himself did not lose when he sinned.

§ 41. Therefore, that we may conclude the question, it will be permissible to establish a fourfold difference between that knowledge which men, aided by the natural light of reason alone, can attain of God, and that which Christians receive by faith divinely infused. The first is that the knowledge acquired by faith can be had at once; whereas the philosophical one requires the delay of a long time with great study. The second, that the

knowledge of Christians concerning God is most certain, as resting upon divine revelation; but that of the philosophers is neither altogether certain nor stable, but rather merits the name of opinion than of science. For although it can be demonstrative, as was shown above, nevertheless, on account of the slowness and darkness of the human mind, it comes about that it is not always received by the intellect with that certainty and firmness of assenting which demonstration is by nature apt to produce; for either there is a sticking in the principles, or the inference is not sufficiently evident from them. And even if that cognition has been demonstrated, still its certitude will be less than that of faith. The third, that our knowledge which we have received of God divinely is pure and free from every error; whereas that philosophical knowledge is mixed and stained with many errors. The last, because this divine gift of faith brings it about that the knowledge of God is more common and reaches very many more persons; whereas, on the contrary, there have been few both more ingenious and more studious, who, devoting themselves to the contemplation of things, could know certain great matters concerning God. On this manifold difference let St. Thomas be consulted, where he teaches that even those dogmas of religion which can be proved by natural reason are to be received by faith; and this on account of the greater certitude of faith than of that cognition which can be received from natural reason.³¹

§ VI — Explanation of a certain difficulty concerning the foregoing (Explicatio cujusdam difficultatis circa praedicta)

§ 42. A difficulty arises about the foregoing doctrine from the fact that both Scripture and the Fathers seem to ascribe every true knowledge which we have of God to the benefit and grace (*gratia*) of God. For the Apostle in Rom. 1, speaking about the worldly wise, for whom what is known of God was manifest: "For God, he says, manifested [it] to them"; and again: "Because, when they had known God, they did not glorify [him] as God, or give thanks"; and immediately after: "For saying that they were wise," that is, attributing [it] to their own powers.³³

§ 43. Especially since all the sounder Philosophers are also found to have thought thus, although they did not dare in express words to condemn the common error, such as Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and others. For of Pythagoras thus Boethius speaks, book 1 (Consolation of Philosophy): "Day by day you were instilling into my ears and thoughts that Pythagorean saying, ἕπς Θεω, to one God, not to gods."³⁴

§ 44. Of Plato indeed, that he acknowledged one God, Cyprian bears witness (in the book On the Vanity of Idols), and from Cyprian St. Augustine at the end of book 6 (Against the Donatists). Likewise Eusebius, book 11 (Preparation for the Gospel, ch. 9), very clearly from Plato himself.³⁵ But that Aristotle reduced all things to one First Mover, unmoved, infinite, indivisible, eternal, which is none other than one God, is known to those who have read his Physics and Metaphysics. Hermes too Trismegistus speaks of one God, and confesses him incomprehensible and inestimable, as Augustine has there from Cyprian.³⁶

§ 45. From what has been said it is easy to judge what place must be assigned to these propositions, "there are many gods," "there is not one God"; for since they manifestly and in their very terms are opposed to this proposition, "there is one God," and the latter one also contradicts that [proposition], there is no doubt that they are heretical and impious. And although Alphonsus de Castro, book 1 (On the Punishment of Heretics, ch. 3), says that this proposition, "there are three gods," savors of heresy, because by the force of the words it is, as he says, ready to yield a heretical sense; nevertheless I truly believe nothing hinders but that it be simply

judged heretical, as the words stand, no less than these, "there are two gods," "there are four gods," "there are many gods"; although someone could give to it this Catholic sense, "there are three having divinity." But this sense does not correspond to that proposition, nor on account of this sense is that proposition in any way to be admitted, as will become more manifest from what is to be said below.³⁷

§ II — How it is to be understood that God is one (Quomodo intelligendum esse Deum sit unum)

§ 46. The unity of the divine nature (*unitas divinae naturae*), which the Christian faith confesses, excludes not only many gods in species, but also many in number. In species many were feigned and worshiped by blind paganism; which error in part the Manichees followed, establishing two gods as it were two principles, the good and the evil; the one, the God of the New Testament; the other, of the Old—not only different in nature, but also contrary—than which figment nothing is more absurd. For both he whose nature is evil cannot be God, since God is understood only in good; and he whose nature is good, if he is assailed by a contrary evil nature and is continually overcome, as they taught, is imperfect and miserable, and therefore not God. For this name signifies a thing supremely perfect and blessed. With these arguments St. Augustine refutes that error everywhere in the books written against the Manichees.

§ 47. But that there cannot be gods distinct in number is shown by the following reasons; the first of which, easy and accommodated to the common sense, is this. If there are many gods in number, either they all are subject to one supreme God, or to none, but are endowed with equal power: if they are subject to one, it follows that that one alone is God. For, as St. Augustine says in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 7, all agree that this is God which they set before all other things.³⁹ Whence is evident the absurdity of certain philosophers who posit many gods sprung from one, and by him endowed with immortality and subject to him. In which manner also Plato sometimes speaks (as in the *Timaeus*, and in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*; and St. Thomas, I, q. 103, a. 3).⁴⁰ But if, acknowledging no God above themselves, each one reigns with equal power, it follows that this whole universe is not governed by that mode of rule which is best. For it is established both by the judgment of the common people and by the sentence of those who hand down political science, that monarchical government—namely, where one rules the others—is best and most excellent, as being the preserver of concord and as providing best for perpetuity. Hence it is that Christ also, wishing to provide for the unity and perpetuity of His Church, appointed for her one shepherd, His vicar on earth.

§ 48. The second reason is taken from the simplicity (*simplicitas*) of the divine nature (*natura divina*). For that simplicity excludes every composition—whether from matter and form; or from members as it were integral parts; or from subject and accident (*accidens*); or finally from nature (*natura*) and supposit (*suppositum*). The reason is that God is the most perfect substance (*substantia*); now the more perfect a thing is, the more simple it is: one must therefore attribute to God the most perfect simplicity. From this further it follows that in God the nature is not one thing, and the supposit which has the nature another thing, but the very same thing. These positions being laid down, thus it will be permitted to reason: Wherever there is some common species which is said of many individuals, one thing is the nature, another the supposit; for example, Peter is a man by one thing, by another he is this man distinct from John; but it has been shown that in divine things the nature is not one thing, the supposit another; therefore there are not there to be acknowledged

individuals of one species distinguished in number; and accordingly one must not suppose that God is predicated of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, as a species of individuals. Therefore God has neither the formal character (*ratio*) of a species, because it does not signify a common nature after the mode of a universal, that is, one capable of multiplication; nor is it an individual of some species, because in every such individual one thing is the nature, another the supposit—which two we have already shown are not diverse in God.

§ 49. Indeed the divine nature is communicated to the three persons (*personae*), but in them it is not multiplied. For it is not communicated to them according to some common notion, but according to a thing one in number. Whence the three divine Persons cannot be called three Gods, just as three supposits of human nature are called, and really are, three men, but only one God. For here one and the same singular nature is in each single one; whereas there the nature is only common, while the singular—also particular—is diverse in each individual.

§ 50. The third reason is taken from the infinite perfection (*perfectio*) of God; for since God is the most perfect being, He necessarily contains in Himself every perfection of being; therefore it cannot be that there be many gods. For if there were, they would have to differ among themselves, and hence something would belong to one which would not belong to the other; and thus he to whom the perfection of the other was lacking would not be God; because he would not be, absolutely speaking, perfect in every way.

§ 51. The fourth [reason is] from the unity of the whole universe (*universum*). For all things that exist, even if most diverse, have a certain order among themselves, by reason of which order they constitute one world; which could not happen unless they were ordered by some one [being], because what is one through itself has one cause; therefore one God is the creator and governor of the whole world.

§ 52. The fifth [reason is] from the omnipotence (*omnipotentia*) of God. For if God is omnipotent, therefore He can take away all power different from His own, and hinder all its action: therefore beside one there is no omnipotent, and hence no God. These and other such reasons are handed down by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other Doctors (on the present distinction).⁴¹ Likewise St. Thomas (I, q. 11, a. 3; q. 103, a. 3; and elsewhere).⁴²

§ 53. And indeed St. Bonaventure affirms that, if the signification of this name God be rightly taken, it is not only impossible, but also not intelligible, that there be many gods: for the word God signifies simply the highest in the right estimation of the one thinking. Whence, he says, those who feigned many gods did not understand God according to divine nobility.⁴³ To this pertains also that which in Prudentius, in the *Romanus*, a Christian boy says: "Est quicquid illud, quod ferunt homines Deum; unum esse oportet, et quod uni est, unicum; genera Deorum multa, nec pueri putant." The same poet (at the beginning of the *Hamartigenia*) with reasons not unlike those adduced above against the Marcionites proves that God is one.⁴⁴

§ III — That there are three Persons in the Divinity is summarily shown from the Scriptures (Tres esse Personas in Divinis summarie ostenditur ex Scripturis)

§ 54. To show in God the plurality and distinction of persons (*personae*), one must use only the divine testimonies and rely on divine authority alone; because this mystery of the Trinity (*Trinitas*) is so far removed

from the light of our intellect that by no human reason can it even probably be shown. The divine testimonies are set partly in the sacred writings, partly in the tradition and doctrine of the Church. And indeed the Church's faith concerning this mystery, after Scripture, shines forth especially in the three Symbols, namely the Apostolic, the Constantinopolitan, and that which is called Athanasius'. For these are most frequently used in the Church. Next, in the Ecumenical Councils, Nicaea, Constantinople, Chalcedon, Lateran; and finally in the consensus of all the Fathers and of all the faithful.

§ 55. But the chief places of Scripture, by which the Trinity of persons in God is shown, are these. Matt. ultimo: "Baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, Spiritus Sancti." 1 Jn. 5: "Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, Verbum, et Spiritus Sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt." Gal. 4: "Misit Deus Spiritum filii sui in corda nostra clamantem: Abba, Pater." Rom. 8: "Si Spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis." Jn. 15: "Cum venerit Paracletus, quem ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritus veritatis, qui a Patre procedit." Which Scripture not only indicates the Trinity of persons, but also, among them, according to the mode of procession, their order: for it openly pronounces that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and it insinuates that the same also proceeds from the Son, when it says: "Quem ego mittam vobis." It also signifies that the Son is from the Father by this, that the Son is said to be about to send the Spirit "a Patre."

§ 56. Again, concerning the Father and the Son, Jn. 10: "Ego et Pater unum sumus." And Jn. 16: "Omnia, quae habet Pater, mea sunt." And Phil. 2: "Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo"; and many others.

§ 57. And although the Scripture of the Old Testament spoke more sparingly of so great a mystery; nevertheless even there are not lacking places which, even more obscurely, indicate the distinction of persons in God. And first, of the Father and the Son, as Ps. 2: "Dominus dixit ad me, Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te." And again, for what is in the Vulgate version "Apprehendite disciplinam," in Hebrew it is "Osculamini filium." And Ps. 109: "Dixit Dominus Domino meo: Sede a dextris meis": which two places are to be understood of the Father and the Son, as the Scripture of the New Testament teaches, Matt. 22 and Acts 2 and 13 and Heb. 2 and 5. To the same pertains that 2 Kgs 7: "Ego ero illi in Filium," as the Apostle Paul interprets, Heb. 1. And that of Micah 5 concerning the Nativity of the Son: "Egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis": which place Matt. 2 the priests and scribes of the Jewish people too referred to Christ, although ignorant of the mystery of His divinity. Likewise Prov. 30, of God the Wise Man thus asks: "Quod nomen est eius et quod nomen filii eius, si nosti?" where it is hinted that the nature of both the Son and the Father is incomprehensible. But Ecclesiasticus (last chapter): "Invocavi," he says, "Dominum Patrem Domini mei." With whom also (ch. 24) the Wisdom of God says of itself: "Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi, primogenita ante omnem creaturam."

§ 58. Concerning the Holy Spirit there are these testimonies and the like. Is. 61: "Spiritus Domini super me." And Ps. 138: "Quo ibo a Spiritu tuo?" which sentence, since it testifies that the Holy Spirit is everywhere, openly declares His divinity; as does also that of Wis. 1: "Spiritus Domini replevit orbem terrarum"; and many other things which (in chs. 7 and 8) of the same book are read as written concerning the Spirit of God. Likewise that ch. 9: "Sensus autem tuus quis sciat, nisi tu dederis sapientiam, et miseris Spiritum Sanctum tuum de altissimis." Finally, David embraced the three Persons in the Deity in one sentence (Ps. 32), when he said: "Verbo Domini caeli firmati sunt, et Spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum."

§ 59. To these moreover is added that immediately at the beginning of Genesis, and afterwards in the same book, and elsewhere through the whole of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, most frequently God is called in the plural number, Elohim: which thing does not seem to be without the mystery of signifying the Trinity. For although this may rightly be referred to the peculiar phraseology of Sacred Scripture or of the Hebrew tongue, nevertheless the reason of that phrase, used from the beginning, does not seem able to be brought back more fittingly to any other account than that it was divinely provided that by such a manner of speaking the mystery of the Trinity might be silently insinuated to us through almost the whole of Scripture in the original language. Whence too it is that all the names of God in the Scriptures, with the exception of the one name Tetragrammaton, in which above all the unity of the divine essence (*essentia*) is commended, are found sometimes set in the plural number. Likewise that the singular name of God in the Scriptures sometimes has the verb or adjective of the plural number joined to it, as Eccl. 12: "Memento Creatoris tui," and in Job 35: "Ubi est Deus factor meus": in which places in the Hebrew it is "factors, creators"; and elsewhere not rarely in the Psalms and Prophets; just as, on the contrary, often the plural name of God has a singular verb joined to it, as in the beginning of the book of Genesis: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram." By these modes of speaking it seems suitably that both the plurality of persons in God and the unity of essence are signified, while in the same sentence the plural number is joined with the singular; and with this sort of argument too, which is taken from the name of God put in the plural in the Scriptures, the Master in the text and many others make use.⁴⁶ If, however, it seems to some that all this must be referred to the bare phrase of the Hebrew speech without the signification of a mystery; and therefore they contend that the argument which is sought from there is of little solidity; one need not labor much about that matter, since very many and solid proofs, from the Scriptures of the Old Testament also, can be brought forward for the proof of this mystery; of which kind, besides those which have been adduced above, is especially that first of all which is in Gen. 1: God is said to have said: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram." For those words "faciamus" and "nostram" indicate a certain number of persons in God; just as these words "imaginem" and "similitudinem," set in the singular, designate the unity of nature. Nor indeed can it be said (as certain Hebrews wish) that there God turns His speech to the Angels; both because the Angels did not make man but God alone; and because man is nowhere read to have been made to the image and likeness of the Angels but of God alone, to whose image and likeness even the Angels themselves were made. Truly the Fathers referred this place to the mystery of the Trinity—Hilary in books 3 and 4 On the Trinity; Augustine at the end of the book On Genesis to the letter imperfect; and in book 12 On the Trinity, ch. 6 and 14 and the last chapter; and Fulgentius, On the Faith to Peter, ch. 1; and others.⁴⁷

§ 60. Likewise it is not without its signification for indicating plurality in God, that God says in Gen. 3: "Ecce quasi unus ex nobis factus est"; because he had listened to the one saying: "Eritis sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum." In which place in the Hebrew there is the word which, referred to the one true God, could have been translated: "Eritis sicut Deus, bonum et malum"; especially since it is not likely that the tempter straightway at the first wished to persuade man of a plurality of gods. Similar is the Scripture Gen. 11 with the Lord saying: "Venite, descendamus, confundamus ibi linguam eorum." In these words plurality, nay the Trinity of persons, is contained—plurality indeed, because He says to Himself, "venite" and "descendamus"; the Trinity, however, because it is not said to one, "venite," but to many. If therefore one speaks to many, there must be three at least; nor is there any reason why in such a case one should take refuge in the phrase of Scripture; for in Scripture we nowhere read it said: "venite, faciamus," in a place where one alone speaks to himself; but rather he turns his speech to others, as in this same chapter of Genesis: "Faciamus lateres"; and

again: "Venite, faciamus nobis civitatem." And ch. 37: "Venite, occidamus eum." Likewise Exod. 1: "Venite, sapienter opprimamus eum." And in the Psalm: "Venite, exsultemus Domino."

§ 61. But perhaps someone will think that at least this is not absurd, if we say that God spoke those words to the Angels, according to the opinion of the Hebrews. I answer that we never find that He thus spoke to the Angels, in such a way that God would say, "Faciamus this or that": God commands the Angels as His ministers that they do [something], but He does not say "faciamus" as to companions. Besides, those things also serve to signify this mystery, that Abraham in Gen. 18 saw three and adored one; as the Church [sings] concerning this. That in Gen. 19 it is said, "pluisse Dominum a Domino," that is, [that it rained from] the Son from the Father; for the Fathers wish that place to be understood (the Sirmian Council, apud Hilary in book 6 On the Synods), and indeed under anathema.⁴⁸ And that which is written Hos. 1: the Lord says: "Salvabo eos in Domino Deo suo"; and that in Zech.: "Dixit Dominus ad Satan: increpet te Dominus"; and other things of this sort.

§ 62. Some also bring forward that in Gen. 1: "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram," namely, insisting on the Hebrew word which our translator renders "in principio," but they think ought to be turned to the Son, and to be read thus: "In Filio creavit Deus," etc. Thus indeed Tertullian in the book Against Praxeas; and Hilary (on Ps. 2); and others indeed were of this opinion, as St. Jerome relates (at the beginning of the Hebraic Questions [on Genesis]). But, as the same Jerome attests, they thought this falsely: not knowing that the Hebrew word signifies nothing other than head, beginning, and that which is first of anything. Others indeed, as St. Augustine remembers (City of God XI, ch. 32), retain the word "beginning" and its signification, but yet think that of the Son it is said, "In principio," since the Son Himself in Jn. 8 says that He is "principium." Therefore they wish the faith of the Trinity to have been commended to us at the very beginning of all Sacred Scripture, since straightway of the third person it follows: "Spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas," etc. But these also depart from the simple understanding of Scripture, in which "in principio" is said either of that which was made before which nothing was, or of that which was made first. Thus also the Word itself was "in principio," because nothing was before; therefore if the Son is the beginning (*principium*), where it is said "In principio creavit," etc., here likewise the beginning will be the Son, where it is said "In principio erat Verbum," with the speech being similarly turned; and thus the sense of this will be "in Filio fuisse Verbum," that is, that the Son was in Himself—which sense in no way suits the Evangelist's purpose. Add that although the Son truly is a beginning, nevertheless we nowhere read the word "beginning" appropriated to the Son, since it more, and more fully, befits the Father, as will be taught (at distinction 29).

§ 63. But as regards that sentence "Spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas," although the Hebrews interpret "spirit" as a corporeal breath, that is, wind, as it is said in the Psalm, "Flabit Spiritus eius et fluent aquae"; yet St. Jerome, in the place mentioned, teaches that the Holy Spirit is signified; and to this understanding the greater part of Catholic writers also consent; but in such a way that what is said be understood with an allusion to a corporeal breath, with like sense: "Spiritus Domini incubabat aquis," that is, He was warming the waters together with the earth subject to them (for as yet no separation of the waters had been made) for the future germination of things, which indeed was to be wrought by the mixture of moisture with earthly matter. Therefore, if someone should require the Trinity of Persons in this beginning of Genesis, let him have recourse to the Hebrew word Elohim, which is of the plural number, and although it makes one in the number, yet it embraces at least two; let him join the third person immediately afterwards signified by name, when it is said "Spiritus Domini," etc.

§ 64. And let these things concerning the Trinity from the Scriptures of both Testaments have been said summarily. For for the divinity of the Son, separately (dist. 9), and for the divinity of the Holy Spirit (dist. 10), many proper testimonies will be brought forward from the same Scriptures. Furthermore, the writings of the ancient Fathers about this matter are very many, everywhere obvious to all readers. But whether this mystery can be demonstrated by reason, and in which creatures its image or vestige is found, must be set forth in the next distinction.

§ 65. Now in order that at this place at least in general it may be admonished with what caution one must proceed, if people wish to speak of this most holy mystery of the Trinity, lest by incautious expression someone divide the unity of the nature (*natura*) or confound the distinction of the persons (*personae*), one must diligently consider and retain the things which we have prescribed in the Athanasian Symbol and in the little book of Fulgentius (On the Faith to Peter, ch. 1).⁴⁹ The remaining things pertaining to the same are to be sought from those which we shall say around distinction 4.

§ IV — Which principal errors concerning the Trinity have arisen (Qui praecipui errores circa Trinitatem extiterint)

§ 66. Concerning the mystery of the Trinity (*Trinitas*), there have not been lacking almost these principal errors, already long ago condemned by the consent of the whole Church. The first is that of the Jews, who flatly denied the Trinity of persons (*personae*) in God. In this matter the Mohammedans agree with them, and certain heretics of our own day, impiously blaspheming against the most holy Trinity, on that account called Trinitarians, or Anti-trinitarians.

§ 67. From this Jewish error the second differs by the least little, which is said, in Epiphanius, Philastrius, and St. Augustine writing on the heresies of the Noetians and Sabellians, to be that of the Noetians and Sabellians.⁵¹ For these, just as in nature (*natura*) so also in person (*persona*) in God, acknowledge only one; teaching that the very same is the Father who is the Son and who is the Holy Spirit, namely three names of the same reality, which signify only a certain diversity of reason, so that one and the same person is called Father in one respect, in another respect Son, in another Holy Spirit; as one may see more fully in Epiphanius (Heresy 42).⁵² The same heretics, consequently, affirmed that the Father was incarnate and suffered; whence they were also called Patropassians, and they were asserting the same of the Holy Spirit.

§ 68. But this error is briefly and clearly refuted: because since the Father is he who begot, but the Son he who is begotten, it would follow, if the Father were the same as the Son, that the same one begot himself and is begotten of himself; which is most absurd. Therefore it must be that the Father and the Son are not the same; which proof is also accommodated to the Holy Spirit, whom it is impossible to proceed from himself.

§ 69. The third error is that of the Arians, who, just as they divided the persons, so also the natures in the Father and the Son, denying the Son to be to the Father homoousion, that is, coessential, or consubstantial; whence they were saying that the Son is a creature, and that He did not always exist, and that He is by nature changeable, and therefore that He is God not properly but by a certain participation; as one may see more at large in the writers of ecclesiastical history. This heresy Alexander of Alexandria, the Patriarch, was the first most learnedly to confute in an epistle to Alexander of Constantinople, and another to all the Churches.⁵³ Soon thereafter the Catholic Church condemned the same in the great Council of Nicaea.⁵⁴

§ 70. The fourth is that of the Macedonians, which flowed from the Arian spring; for what Arius taught concerning the Son, the same concerning the Holy Spirit Macedonius affirmed; namely, that the Holy Spirit is not of the same substance (*substantia*) with the Father and the Son, but a creature, less than the Father and the Son, and the minister of both; but this wicked error also, once it was made known, the Church condemned with anathema in the Council of Constantinople.⁵⁵

§ 71. The fifth is that of those who, although they say that neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is a creature, nor that they are from nothing, nor that they proceeded in time, but from eternity and from the Father's substance—in all which things they depart from Arius and Macedonius—yet teach that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three eternal spirits, differing by essential number, and not equal among themselves, but that the Father is by far more eminent than the rest. Thus in this age the new Arians taught this, with a certain Valentino Gentili as author: I say "new Arians," for that opinion agrees enough with the doctrine which the later Arians of old handed down, such as Maximinus, against whom St. Augustine and others dispute;⁵⁶ and with the dogma of the Peratae, of whom Theodoret makes mention (Book 1, Heretical Fables, ch. 18), who used to say that the Trinity is three Gods, three minds;⁵⁷ nor does it seem to depart from that opinion which Abbot Joachim taught, that the three persons are not a thing, that is, an essence (*essentia*) numerically one, but a [collective unity], like the Church. Which doctrine of his was condemned in the great Lateran Council under Innocent III.⁵⁸

§ 72. Moreover, by what arguments the errors are to be refuted and the Catholic doctrine confirmed may partly be taken from the things said in the preceding chapter; but partly indeed, and more fully, it will be evident below, each in its own places.

§ V — A reply to certain general objections against the foregoing (Ad generales quasdam contra praedicta objectiones responsio)

§ 73. The difficulty which arises from human ratiocination concerning the mystery of Unity (*unitas*) and Trinity (*Trinitas*) in God is, for the most part, removed by this consideration: if we think that, in a certain ineffable and incomprehensible way, one and the same singular thing, that is, the Deity (*Deitas*), is communicated—or the divine Nature (*natura divina*) is communicated—to three supposita, or persons (*suppositum, persona*); whence it comes about that, under the plurality of persons, the thing or nature must be thought absolutely the same. This consideration being posited, the reply to the objections which are wont to be raised here will not be so difficult; of which kind are the following, and the first indeed is against perfect unity.

§ 74. The first: If the Father is God, and if the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, therefore there are three Gods; for it rightly follows, Peter is a man, Andrew is a man, Philip is a man, therefore there are three men. It is answered that it is not similar, because "God" is said of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit on account of the same singular and individual nature; whereas "man" is said of Peter and Andrew and Philip only on account of the same specific nature, since the singular nature in each individual is different.

§ 75. The second: God is the Father; God is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son—and similarly of the Holy Spirit; which consequence seems to have force by an expository syllogism relying on this rule: "Whatever things are the same with one and the same third are the same among themselves." It is answered that it does not rightly follow by a syllogism of that sort; for the "third" is understood to be a singular; but "God" is not an

out-and-out singular name: for it signifies a singular nature, but one which can be communicated to three supposita. But how Hilary denies there to be singularity in the divine things will be set forth around Distinct. 13.

§ 76. The third: The rule just stated holds in creatures, on account of unity, or perfect identity, which is numerical; but now unity or identity most perfectly befits God, therefore in God it ought by much more reason to hold, and hence the preceding argumentation will remain firm. It is answered that the rule holds in creatures, not on account of the most perfect unity, but on account of singular and incommunicable unity. Whence, although the unity of the divine nature is most perfect, as being most simple, nevertheless, because it is communicable, the rule does not hold there.

§ 77. The fourth: The one and the indivisible are the same, according to the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics*; therefore where there is most perfect unity, there is no division into a plurality. I reply that it is well inferred: for there is no division of the divine Nature into a plurality, since it is an absolutely individual nature; but "one" and "incommunicable" are not the same. For this is peculiar to the divine Nature—that, although it is most perfectly one and individual, nevertheless it exists as common to several supposita, which in creatures neither happens nor can happen.⁶⁰

§ 78. The last: When one of those things which are one and the same in reality is multiplied, it is necessary that the other also be multiplied; therefore, when the persons are multiplied, which are not in reality distinct from the divine Nature, the consequence will be that the nature of God also is multiplied. It is answered by denial of the antecedent; for although that, understood in a certain way, has perpetual truth in created things, nevertheless not in the divine things, where one and the same thing in number subsists in three persons; properly, however, in the divine things there is to be understood not multiplication but multitude—not of things, but of persons.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 11, a. 3.

2. Symbol of Constantinople (the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed) [abbreviation as in source]; Athanasian Creed [abbreviation as in source].

3. S. Thom. ubi sup. [abbreviation as in source].

4. ad dist. 24. lib. 3. [abbreviation as in source].

5. Athanasius, *De Spiritu sancto* [abbreviation as in source].

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2.

7. S. Bonavent. (art. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. & super 4. distinct. 21. quaest. ult.) [abbreviation as in source].

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 1.

9. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 106; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 74; St. Augustine, *Sermo* 8 super Psalmum 118 [abbreviation as in source].

10. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in epistolam ad Galatas*, c. 1 [abbreviation as in source].

11. St. Hilary, *In Psalmos* 52.

12. Prudentius, *Apotheosis* [abbreviation as in source].

13. Pseudo-Chrysostom, *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, hom. 42.

14. Orosius, *Historiae adversus paganos* VI, c. 1.

15. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 1; see also I, ch. 3.
16. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* I, part 3, ch. 1–2.
17. Bede, *Super Iob* 34.
18. Roman Catechism (*Catechismus ad Parochos*), treatise on the Sacrament of Orders.
19. Cicero, *De natura deorum* I; Cicero, *De responsis haruspicum*; Cicero, *De legibus* I; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* I; Justin, *Quaestio 1 ad Gentes* [abbreviation as in source].
20. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 13; I-II, q. 109, a. 1; a. 3.
21. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*; Cicero, *De officiis*; Epictetus (works) [abbreviation as in source]; Seneca (works) [abbreviation as in source]; Plutarch (works) [abbreviation as in source].
22. St. Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 28.
23. St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos*, ch. 2.
24. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 57; St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I–II, ch. 10 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, ch. 4; St. Augustine, *In expositione Psalmi 118*, 25 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, book and chapter as in source, ch. 21 [abbreviation as in source].
25. St. Ambrose, *De paradiso*, ch. 6; ch. 8 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Jerome, *In Isaiam*, ch. 14 [abbreviation as in source]; *In Malachiam*, ch. 2 [abbreviation as in source]; *Epistola ad Algasiam*, q. 8; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vita contemplativa* III, ch. 11; Prosper, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 22; Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* I, part 3, ch. 3; St. Thomas, "mque 95. art. 6" [abbreviation as in source].
26. St. Ambrose, [work unspecified in source] [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 5 and following; VIII, ch. 12; X, ch. 1.
27. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XII, ch. 26; Plato, *Republic*; Plato, *Laws*.
28. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* II, ch. 7; XVIII, ch. 41.
29. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 9.
30. Orosius, *Historiae adversus paganos* VI, ch. 1.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 1; II-II, q. 2, a. 4.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 12; I-II, q. 109, a. 1.
33. Rom. 1: "Deus enim illis manifestavit"; "Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt"; "Dicentes enim se esse sapientes."
34. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae* I.
35. St. Cyprian, *De idolorum vanitate*; St. Augustine, in fine libri 6 (*Contra Donatistas*) [as in source]; Eusebius, *De praeparatione evangelica* XI, ch. 9.
36. St. Augustine, *ibidem ex Cypriano* [as in source].
37. Alphonsus de Castro, *De punitione haereticorum* I, ch. 3.
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 11, a. 3–4.
39. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 7.
40. Plato, *Timaeus*; *Republic*; *Laws*; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 3.
41. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other Doctors, *super praes. dist.* [abbreviation as in source].
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 11, a. 3; I, q. 103, a. 3; and elsewhere.
43. St. Bonaventure, [as in source; locus super praes. dist.].
44. Prudentius, in *Romano* [abbreviation as in source]; Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*, proemium [abbreviation as in source].
45. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 30, a. 1–2; q. 31, a. 1; q. 41, a. 6.

46. The Master (of the Sentences), in the text; and many others [abbreviation as in source].
47. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* III–IV; St. Augustine, at the end of *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus*; and *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 6 and 14 and the last chapter; St. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1.
48. The Sirmian Council, apud St. Hilary, *De synodis*, book 6.
49. The Athanasian Creed; St. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1.
50. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 2.
51. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion*; St. Philastrius, *De haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* [abbreviation as in source].
52. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion*, Haer. 42.
53. Alexander of Alexandria, Patriarch, Epistle to Alexander of Constantinople; and another to all the Churches [as in source].
54. The Council of Nicaea I.
55. The Council of Constantinople I.
56. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum Arianum episcopum*; and others.
57. Theodoret, *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* I, ch. 18.
58. The Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III.
59. St. Thomas, as above [abbreviation as in source].
60. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*.

DISTINCTIO III — ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD FROM CREATED THINGS

§ I — That God can be known from created things (Deum ex rebus creatis cognosci posse)

§ 1. That God can be known from created things, and that by contemplation of the frame of the world one comes into the knowledge (*cognitio*) of God, sufficient to worship and glorify Him, is attested by the Apostle Paul in Rom. 1, where, speaking thus of the wise of this age: "What is known of God is manifest in them; for God has manifested it to them. For His invisibles, since the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, are clearly seen; His eternal power also and Godhead: so that they are inexcusable, because, when they had known God, they did not glorify Him as God or give thanks." To this pertains also that saying of the same Apostle in Acts 14 about God: "And indeed," he says, "He left not Himself without testimony, doing good, giving rains from heaven and fruitful seasons," etc. And in ch. 17: "To seek God, if happily they may feel after Him or find Him"—namely in created things, as is declared there. The same is clearly taught in Ps. 18 according to the letter, with this exordium: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of His hands," etc. Job 12: "Ask the beasts," etc.; "Who is ignorant that all these things the hand of the Lord has made?" And the Sage in ch. 13, gravely and expressly exposing the ignorance of those who did not know the Artificer from His works, where that which he says, "For from the greatness and beauty of the creature, the Creator of these may be seen by way of knowledge," has this sense: from the greatness and beauty, that is, the comeliness, of created things their author can be beheld analogically (*analogia*), that is, by a certain likeness of formal character (*ratio*), and come into our knowledge. This sense is required both by the Greek codices and by the allegations of the Fathers, as of Hilary, book 1 (On the Trinity, near the beginning), St. John Chrysostom (hom. 4 on Genesis and hom. 9 to the people of Antioch), and St. Gregory there, book 26 (Moralia, ch. 8).¹

§ 2. Now God is known from creatures by a general line of reasoning drawn from effects to the cause, which indeed can be done by three chief modes: either (1) by simply inferring the existence of God, as in this way: the world exists, and it is clear that it has not been made by itself; therefore there exists some Maker of it. To this point make those arguments by which, in the previous distinction, it was being taught that there is one God, and others by which, from St. Thomas in the next chapter, it will be demonstrated that God is;² or (2) from the analogy of stable things, by which not only that God is but also what His attributes (*attributa*) are known; as the Sage in the place cited teaches from the greatness, beauty, power, and wisdom which are found in created things, how much more great, more beautiful, more powerful, and wiser He is who made them; or finally (3) from the removal of imperfection, by which mode of reasoning likewise the attributes, that is, the divine perfections (*perfectiones*), become known to us. For it is necessary that whatever imperfection there is in creatures be removed from the Creator, since it is certain that the efficient cause is more perfect than the effected things—especially that cause which is the first and highest cause. This mode Scripture insinuates for

us in those places in which it commends the excellence of the divine Nature (*natura*), not from what it is but from what it is not; whence it is often read in the Scriptures, as in Ps. 15 and 49, Is. 1, Acts 17, and elsewhere, that God needs nothing—neither food nor drink nor dwelling nor sacrifice nor any service or ministry of the creature at all. The author of the sermons *On the Chief Works of Christ* (in the preface, among Cyprian's works) beautifully declares from this mode the perfection of the divine Nature.³

§ 3. Now the attributes, or properties (*proprietas*), which by the second and third mode are proved from creatures to belong most perfectly to God, are of this sort: goodness, knowledge, wisdom, justice, power, truth, beauty, immutability, eternity, the simplicity of nature, freedom of action, and the like—which, because all are found in created things but with a certain imperfection, must be found in the Creator in that mode which excludes every imperfection. Moreover, that by these modes God is known from created things, besides the Scriptures already alleged, the Fathers teach in many places, as Dionysius, book *On the Divine Names*, ch. 7; Hilary (where above, and on Ps. 51, and in book 12 of *On the Trinity*, not far from the end); St. John Chrysostom (hom. 2 on John, and in the other two places cited above); Prudentius (in the *Apotheosis*); St. Augustine, book 7 of the *Confessions*, ch. 17; and book 8 of the *City of God*, ch. 6; and book 11, ch. 2 and 4; Orosius, book 6 of the *Histories*, ch. 1; Prosper, book 1 *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, ch. 5, and book 2, ch. 4; Fulgentius, *On the Faith to Peter*, ch. 3; and the Commentary ascribed to Ambrose on Rom. 1.⁴ But that this preaching of creatures invites and instructs man also to worship, love, and glorify God, after the Apostle in Rom. 1, Prosper bears witness in the place cited, book 2; St. Augustine also bears witness, book 10 of the *Confessions*, ch. 6. Speaking to God, these are his words: "Heaven and earth and all things that are in them, behold, on every side say to me that I should love Thee; nor do they cease to say it to all, that they may be inexcusable."⁵

§ 4. Finally, it must be noted that not only the whole universe and the most beautiful order of its parts, with their motions and operations, bear witness to their Maker (on account of which order it was said in Gen. 1: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good," as if He were saying: the individual things were good on account of their individual natures, but all things together very good on account of the most apt and most fitting order of all the natures in the universe), but also the individual creatures taken and considered by themselves—so much so that there is none of them so small and so despised that it does not in some way proclaim its author and be born to lead the human intellect to the knowledge of the first cause. For in every creature, however slight and base, if rightly considered, at least these three properties of God—goodness, power, and wisdom—shine forth, and immediately present themselves to the mind of the contemplative.

§ II — Whether it is possible to be taught by demonstration that God is (Deum esse an demonstratione doceri possit)

§ 5. Since with the dialecticians there is a twofold demonstration (*demonstratio*), one which from causes shows the effect, the other which contrariwise from effects shows the cause, it is manifest that by the former mode of demonstration it is not possible to teach that God is, since of neither God nor His existence can a cause in any genus be put forward. It can, however, be demonstrated in the latter mode, as rightly St. Thomas [says], and, in general, the scholastics hand down concerning this distinction.⁷ For one must not think that the arguments by which it is shown that God is are merely probable and which only persuade but do not also

convince. For unless it could be proved by necessary and per se evident reason that God is, the Apostle would not call inexcusable those wise men who from the visibles of this world either had not known God, or, having known, had not glorified [Him] (Rom. 1). Which St. Augustine extends also to other men.⁸ Hence also Wisdom 13 teaches that it is "easier to find the Lord of the world than to estimate the world itself," that is, to know God from creatures than to attain by cognition the natures of the very things, the creatures. Since therefore many things in creatures are known by demonstration, it follows that the author of things Himself can also be known demonstratively. And on that account the Wise Man in the same place denies that pardon is owed to those who, being conversant and exercised in the knowledge of things, were ignorant of God. Then this matter is proved by the example of the philosophers, especially of Plato and Aristotle, who from creatures demonstratively knew that God is. The Apostle in Rom. 1 seems to have chiefly noticed Plato and his followers. For it is not without reason believed by many that among the philosophers none approached nearer than Plato to the knowledge of the eternal power and divinity of the Creator. But Aristotle, it is agreed, by a demonstration taken from motion, the movable, and the mover, in Physics 8 and Metaphysics 12, arrived at the knowledge of one first cause, immobile, incorporeal, infinite, and eternal, which cause of things we call God.⁹ There is also reported a book of the same philosopher, On the World to Alexander, in which this very thing is clearly and demonstratively asserted,¹⁰ so that most true is that statement (in Augustine, Ep. 246) of Evodius writing to Augustine himself: "That God is, reason demonstrates";¹¹ nor was it rashly said by Orosius, book 6 (History, ch. 1), that "with reason as guide all even the pagans, and not only the philosophers, acknowledge one God, the author of all things," etc.¹² From these things therefore it is clear that by the way of demonstration one arrives at knowledge of God, by which we learn not only that God is, but also perceive His properties, either all or most. For both the Apostle (Rom. 1) and Wisdom ch. 13 named certain properties, such as eternity and power; and Aristotle in the places mentioned, by demonstrating, gathered several notable properties of the first mover and principle.

§ 6. Now for this matter there is a manifold way of demonstrating. The first, which is taken on the part of motion and of the things that are moved, in which it is necessary to come at length to some first unmoved mover, as the Philosopher rightly infers. The second, from the formal character (*ratio*) of efficient cause; for it is necessary in efficient causes to arrive at a first cause. The third, from the possible and the necessary; for it cannot be that all things are contingent, but there must be something necessary in things; and among necessary things there must be something which is such of itself, and does not have from another the cause of its necessity. The fourth, from the grades of things according to more and less in good and in true, etc.; in which order it is necessary that something first be found, which is both most of all such and therefore is cause to the others of such perfections. The fifth, from the governance of things. For all things act for an end, even those which lack cognition; therefore there is some mind which orders all things to their ends. The last, from the formal character of end itself; for it is necessary that all things at length be ordered to some one thing, to which the formal character of end most of all befits, and that is the simply best. On account of these [things], "saying that they were wise," that is, attributing to themselves the wisdom which they had attained, "they became fools."

§ 7. Which individual statements plainly signify that the knowledge which the philosophers received about God was a gift of God; for which reason they ought not to glory in themselves but in God, and to give thanks to God. Then this is proved by general sentences of Scripture, which testify that all wisdom and all knowledge are from God. As in Sirach 1: "All wisdom is from the Lord God." In Ps. 93: "He who teaches man knowledge." In 1 Kgs 2: "The Lord is the God of knowledges." Likewise general sentences which testify that

every good is from God: as Jas. 1, "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." 1 Cor. 4: "What have you that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?" 2 Cor. 10: "He that glories, let him glory in the Lord"; and many other such. To which there is added also that general sentence of the Council of Orange (canon 22): "No one has anything of his own, except falsehood and sin."¹³ And that "Ecclesiasticus": "Without Thy Spirit, there is nothing in man: nothing is in man: nothing is harmless." And indeed Augustine and others seem thus to have understood the passage of the Apostle in Rom. 1, that, besides the external preaching of visible creature, it is signified to be necessary that there be an internal aid of God for receiving the knowledge of God from created things. For thus says Augustine (in the Sermon on the Kalends of January, recited by Bede on that text of Rom. 1, "For, saying that they were wise, they became fools"): "For they ought not to have arrogated to themselves what He had given, nor to have boasted from that which they had not from themselves but had from Him: which indeed ought to have been rendered to God: that, for holding fast to this which they were able to see, they might be healed by Him who had given that they should see. For if they had done this, they would have kept humility," etc.¹⁴ And in Sermon 55 (On the Words of the Lord): "Saying that they were wise, that is, attributing to themselves the gift of God, they became fools."¹⁵ And in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter* (ch. 12): "Saying that they were wise; which is not to be understood otherwise than as attributing this very thing to themselves."¹⁶ Similar things are read in the exposition of Psalm 47; likewise in Epistle 112 (ch. 11); and in Tractate 2 on John; and in Haymo on the Epistle to the Romans.¹⁷ Again Augustine (*Confessions*, book 10, ch. 6), when he had said that heaven and earth preach to all, that they may love God, added: "But more deeply Thou wilt have mercy, upon whom Thou wilt have mercy; otherwise heaven and earth speak Thy praises to the deaf."¹⁸ Wherefore also in the *City [of God]*, chapter seven, [he says that] certain persons have found certain great things, in proportion as they were helped by God;¹⁸ and in book 15 (chapter six): that all preaching of truth, even with God speaking through creatures, profits nothing unless internal grace is added.¹⁹ But also in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints* (ch. 19, and very often elsewhere) from due thanksgiving he infers a gratuitous gift.²⁰ In the same sense Prosper now and again speaks in both books *On the Vocation of the Gentiles*, but most openly in book 1, chapter 4: "For when certain men," he says, "not only to the institutions of the most useful arts, and to the teachings of the liberal disciplines, but even to the investigation of the highest good, have directed the keenness of their mind; and have looked upon the invisible things of God, understood from the things that have been made; yet not giving thanks to God, nor confessing Him to be to them the author of this capacity, but saying that they were wise, that is, not in God but in themselves glorying, as if by their own studies and arguments they had drawn near to the contemplation of truth, they became vain in their cogitations: what they found by the illuminating grace of God they lost by the darkening of pride, relapsing from the supernal light to their own darkness, that is, from the unchangeable and eternal good to a changeable and corruptible nature," etc.²¹ He writes things of the same sort also in the *Epistle to Demetrias*, denying that the contemplation of creatures can profit anything for the knowledge of God, just as neither any other external aids whatsoever for persuading the truth, unless that highest and true husbandman apply the power of His work—according to that of the Apostle, "Neither he that plants is anything, nor he that waters, but God who gives the increase."²² Bede also (on Job 34): "Unless God Himself," he says, "has deigned to reveal Himself to man, who is there who can by his own powers behold Him or by searching approach to His majesty?"²³

§ 8. If therefore these things are true, it does not appear how by the powers of nature alone a man can attain to any knowledge of God, even imperfect. Whence some, moved by these arguments, have thought that

nothing at all can be known about God from creatures, even by the highest geniuses with whatever labor and study, unless by a special illumination received from God; because without it the powers of nature would not suffice for such knowledge.

§ 9. We, meanwhile, replying to the proposed difficulty, say that most true is that which the Scriptures clearly teach, that all wisdom and all knowledge, and generally every good of man, is a gift of God, as having proceeded from the author God and been given to man; whether the powers of corrupted nature suffice for attaining that good, or not. For God is the author and bestower of all goods, and the first cause of all things, who works all things in all; to whom therefore for all things and in all things thanks are to be given, as the Apostle admonishes (1 Thess. 5 [the last chapter]); and in whom alone one must glory, as elsewhere the same Apostle often teaches. Not, however, for every knowledge is there need of a special illumination or revelation, such as is the revelation of Faith; because for receiving the knowledge of many things, and even some sort of knowledge of God Himself from creatures, the powers of human nature, not yet repaired through Christ, are still proportioned—just as without the grace of God through Christ a man can do many things in human offices, not furthering the salvation of eternal life, but only conducing to the honorable conduct of this temporal life; which very things nevertheless, inasmuch as they are good, are all to be referred to God as author. Whence Augustine (Epistle 130), concerning that Polemon the Athenian, who, not only a drunkard, but even drunk, entered the school of Xenocrates, and at his discourse was suddenly converted to other morals: "This very thing," he says, "which was made better in him, I would not ascribe to human work, but to Divine." Which also he proves by the words that follow.²⁴ And Bede (book 1 on the Canticles) attributes the virtues and good works of unbelievers to grace, that is, to the gift and favor of God.²⁵ On which matter disputing, St. Thomas (De veritate, q. 24, a. 14) teaches in general that no good—neither supernatural, nor natural, nor moral—can man [achieve] without God. But the things which pertain to salvation man cannot do without the grace of God, that is, the mercy of God, by which he is directed to salvation; and that indeed is the grace of God through Christ.²⁶

§ 10. One must say, therefore, that the Apostle to the Romans, ch. 1, is not speaking of a special revelation, such as was made to the prophets, and such as also is made to us by Faith; but of a manifestation which is made through visible creatures, with God nonetheless at work within, granting to them cognition and that contemplation of Himself through visible things—which the Apostle's words, "God has manifested [it] to them," and the sentences of the Fathers set forth above, signify. Therefore he rightly reproves the philosophers, because of a manifestation made in such a manner, that they did not give thanks to God, but attributed that wisdom of theirs to themselves and to their own genius—just as he is rightly blameworthy who attributes victory to himself and not to God, although won by his own strength, industry, [and] counsel; which also Scripture teaches us in Deut. 8 and 32, and elsewhere; and which, from Scripture, St. Thomas in the book On the Government of Princes, ch. 8, learnedly pursues.²⁷

§ 11. But if any sayings of the Fathers perchance seem to demand special grace and illumination, to them we can reply in the very words of Prosper, who, book 2 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, ch. 17, writes that human nature has been wounded by so bitter a wound that "to the knowledge of God spontaneous contemplation is able to instruct no one fully, unless the true light scatter the shadowing of the heart." In that, therefore, which he says, "fully," he signifies that some can be instructed in some measure by spontaneous contemplation to the knowledge of God without that special and supernatural divine illumination. Wherefore, if anywhere the Fathers deny that knowledge of God can be had without a special illumination

divinely received, they can be understood of full and certain knowledge, such as is that which is had through Faith; or such as could be had by the powers of integral nature. Although properly he is not to be said to know God wholly and absolutely who takes away from Him some property without which He is not God; or attributes to Him [a property] which cannot befit God—as, that God is corporeal; that, as foreknowing, He acts of necessity; or that He does not have providence of all things; that He is not the author of all things; and the like. For which reason Scripture everywhere pronounces simply of the Gentiles that they have been ignorant of God, as in Tob. 8 and 13; Gal. 4; 1 Thess. 4; and in other places cited above.

§ 12. Moreover, for a fuller declaration of the things said above, the doctrine of St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a. 1) must be considered, where he teaches that for the cognition of any truth man needs divine help, that the intellect be moved by God to its act; but that he does not need, for cognizing the truth in all things, a new illumination superadded to the natural illumination; but [he does] in certain things which exceed the natural cognition of man. In corrupted nature full cognition about God exceeds [our powers]; not, however, imperfect [cognition], such as the philosophers had. Whence the same Doctor says in the same question (a. 2, ad 3) that human nature is more corrupted by sin as regards the appetite for good than as regards the cognition of truth.²⁹

§ VII — That the mystery of the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by reason (Trinitatis Mysterium ratione demonstrari non posse)

§ 13. That by no natural reasoning the distinction of persons in God (whether of three or even of only two) can be demonstrated, is the common and most received doctrine of the theologians. And indeed that it cannot be by that demonstration which proceeds from causes is manifest from this, that the Trinity (*Trinitas*) in divine things has no cause. But that neither can it be demonstrated from effects, that is, from creatures, is shown by a demonstration of this sort: because in creatures one cannot attain to the cognition of the Creator, except as of a cause and principle in relation to them; but the formal character of a cause with respect to all creatures is altogether equally and indifferently common to the three persons (*personae*), because, as a most certain theological axiom has it: the works of the Trinity are undivided and inseparable, so that no one person does in creatures anything which the others do not do the same in precisely the same way, namely by one and the same power and operation, which is the divine essence (*essentia*), as such common to all three: whence neither can the three persons be called three principles of things, but a single principle, simple and indivisible. Therefore no diversity can exist among the persons of the Trinity in the works of God, as there is wont to be in the works of men from the diversity of the workman, who do not do the same or in the same way. It is consequent, therefore, that from the works of God no demonstration can be gathered of the distinction of persons in God; since, even if it were impossible that there be several persons in God and there were only one, nonetheless the whole creature would have proceeded, or could have proceeded, from God entirely the same and in the same way.

§ 14. Hence it is that the Fathers have always professed this mystery to be inscrutable, and that the Church on the Feast of the Most Holy Trinity makes use of those words of the Apostle in Rom. 11: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God," etc. Therefore Athanasius, in the book *On the Holy Spirit*, speaking of this mystery of the Deity (*Deitas*) in three persons, says: "The Deity is not delivered by a demonstration of reasons, but by pious thought with religion."³¹ And Hilary, book 1 *On the Trinity*: "That a

man cannot by his own intelligence attain the secret of the generation."³² Add to these that it is most difficult to believe the Trinity of persons, even though revealed by God; wherefore much less will the human genius be able to penetrate to the knowing of it from natural reason.

§ 15. Yet although it cannot be demonstrated by reason, once faith is posited, certain congruences can be adduced, by which it may be taught that what we believe is not absurd nor against reason. The first congruence is: because it belongs to the highest and infinite Good to communicate itself supremely and infinitely, which neither is nor can be done in creatures: therefore it is congruous that it be done in the production of a person or of persons in the divine. The second: perfect beatitude (*beatitudo*) comprehends all goods. Now there is a certain signal good, the companionship of equal persons: therefore that must be attributed to God, as to one most perfectly blessed. The third: friendship, which indeed does not consist except between those who love, is a chief good for felicity; and, as Gregory bears witness, it cannot exist among fewer than two; therefore neither ought that good to be removed from God, who is supreme felicity. The fourth: to beget one like to oneself is a great perfection, which therefore is not to be removed from God, who is in every respect perfect: therefore God begets a Son in all respects like to Himself. The fifth: because it is better that God from eternity should have produced something and have been in act a principle, than only in potency, and thus have been idle; therefore from eternity He produced from Himself one person, or more, equal to Himself. And this argument will have more weight if we posit—which is very probable—that no creature could have been made by God from eternity. The last: because many vestiges of the Trinity have been imprinted upon creatures, as we shall teach below.

§ VIII — Certain arguments to the contrary are resolved (Quaedam in contrarium argumenta solvuntur)

§ 16. Against the foregoing doctrine certain arguments are brought. The first: that upon all creatures, as we have just said, are impressed vestiges of the Trinity, indeed upon some is impressed the image of the Trinity, as will be said later: and from a vestige, as from an almost sensible mark, he is known and detected; and from an image, he whose image it is, is recognized; therefore it will be permissible likewise to know the most holy Trinity in a similar mode of demonstration from creatures. This inference seems to be confirmed by St. Augustine, book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 10, when, from the fact that a vestige of the Trinity appears in creatures, he teaches that by those things that have been made we understand not only the Creator but also the Trinity.³⁴ The second: in Isaiah, at the end, the Lord by natural reason proves that He begets, and therefore has a Son, saying: "Shall I, who make others to bring forth, myself not bring forth? Or if I, who grant generation to others, shall I be barren?"³⁵ The third: by natural reason we can know that cognition and love proceed from God, and that these two are not other than God, but one and the same with His essence. For by natural reason it is known that there is no accident in God, but that whatever is in Him is His essence: therefore the procession of the Son by way of love can be naturally understood and demonstrated. And in this way of reasoning St. Thomas teaches (I, q. 27, a. 1, in the body, ad 3) that there is procession in the divine, and that twofold, from which the Trinity of persons follows.³⁶ The fourth: the Highest Truth is of itself most knowable; but God, Three and One, is the Highest Truth: therefore He is of Himself most knowable, and hence into the cognition of Him it will be possible to arrive by natural reason. The fifth: such a demonstration is produced: The world was made by highest power—therefore the Father is; by highest wisdom—therefore the Son is; and by highest goodness—therefore the Holy Spirit is. The sixth: Richard of St. Victor, book 1 On

the Trinity, chapter 4: "For all things which it is fitting to believe, there is not lacking a reason not only probable but necessary."³⁷ The seventh: in the History of St. Cecilia, Tiburtius gives thanks to the virgin because she had quickly and openly proved to him by reasons that there is one God in three persons. The eighth: a certain Gloss on that Rom. 1, "The invisible things of God," etc., as St. Thomas attests on the same place, says that by "the invisible things of God" is understood the person of the Father, and by "His eternal power" the person of the Son, by "divinity" the person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore they signify that the philosophers, from the contemplation of things visible, had come into the cognition of the three persons.³⁸ Lastly, this very thing is proved of the philosophers from St. Augustine, who in book 10 of the City of God, chapter 23, attests that Porphyry and Plotinus, Platonists, recognized in divine things the Father and the Son; which indeed they seem to have received from book 6 of Plato's Republic, where to the Good, as to a father, he attributes a Son most like to him. In the same place Augustine seems to attribute to the same philosophers a certain knowledge of the Holy Spirit. And in his commentary on that place Ludovicus Vives, among other things, records a certain oracle of Serapis, in which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are expressly named. And again Augustine, book 7 of the Confessions, chapter 9, writes that he had read in the books of the Platonists that beginning of the Gospel according to John, "In the beginning was the Word," etc., not indeed in these words, but the very same thing altogether to be persuaded by many and multiple reasons as that "In the beginning was the Word," and what follows. Concerning which beginning the same Augustine testifies in book 10 of the City of God, chapter 29, that a certain Platonist was wont to say that it was worthy to be written in golden letters and to be set forth to be read in the most eminent places through all the churches. And in Tractate 2 on John he says that many philosophers have seen that which is "The Word in the beginning," which others only believe and do not see.³⁹ Moreover Suidas reports of Hermes Trismegistus that he acknowledged and wrote the Trinity in one Divinity. Lactantius also, book 4 of the Divine Institutes, chapter 6, records certain testimonies about the Son of God from the books of the same Hermes, and from the verses of the Sibyls. And in chapter 9 he confirms that the Word of God was not unknown even to philosophers, by the example of the philosopher Zeno.⁴⁰

§ 17. But to these we answer thus. As to the first: since a vestige and an image are only likenesses of things, one cannot from them demonstrate that of which they are the likenesses. For a likeness does indeed make clear, but it does not prove; that is, if the thing is first known or believed, then, when a likeness is adjoined, it will be more illustrated; but if it is altogether unknown, that thing cannot fall into our cognition through a likeness; just as if someone had never seen a king or a lion, nor read or heard anything about them, he could never from a mere track recognize a lion or from a mere image a king; nor would he know at all that these very things are likenesses of certain realities. In the same way, he who entirely ignores the Trinity cannot be led into its cognition from creatures as from signs; but if he has already beforehand been imbued with faith in the Trinity, he will detect in things some image and vestiges of it, through which the preconceived faith may be strengthened and increased.

§ 18. To the second: the Lord speaks in the Prophet about the generation of sons by adoption, and about the multiplication of the sons of the Church. Nor is it firm of natural generation, although it is sometimes accommodated to that by the Fathers; because, even if, by an impossible supposition, God should not have a Son, still by His omnipotence He could produce things and grant fecundity to things. It is, however, a wonder that in solving this argument the Antisiodorensis should labor, since nothing else than a certain congruence—of which in the preceding chapter—can be concluded from it.

§ 19. The third argument proves nothing else than the same essence of divine cognition and love with God Himself, because it can be demonstrated that there is no accident in God: but from this there does not follow demonstratively the distinction of Persons. For both the Son knows and loves, and the Holy Spirit; yet the Son is not the son of the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit the son, nor is the Holy Spirit [the Son].

§ 20. To the fourth: the Highest Truth, indeed of itself, and therefore to the supreme intellect, that is, the divine, is most knowable; not, however, in the order of a created intellect, especially the human. But of the Highest Truth, as to the unity of the Deity, a cognition can be had by us from creatures; as to the Trinity, however, only by revelation.

§ 21. What is set forth in the fifth place does not at all demonstrate, because these three—Power, Wisdom, Goodness—although in a certain way each is appropriated to each of the Persons (about which matter we shall speak in its place), are really common to the three Persons, nor are they found any less perfectly in one of them than in another.

§ 22. To the sixth St. Thomas answers (De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 1): the opinion of Richard is to be understood of every believable that is not self-evident (*per se notum*). For of every such there is had a reason not only probable but also necessary, although it may happen that this reason escapes our present notice, as Richard adds in the same place. Whence (says St. Thomas) the reasons of the credibles are unknown to us, but known to God and to the blessed, who concerning these have not faith but vision.⁴¹ But the truer reply is that Richard did indeed so think, as is clear from what follows, and especially from the third book and onward, but not without error. For he attempts by human reasons to demonstrate a plurality of Persons in the Divinity, but truly he does not demonstrate it.

§ 23. To the seventh: the proof which St. Cecilia had employed to set forth the mystery of the Trinity was taken from a certain ternary—art, memory, and intelligence—which are in the same soul of a man, and it was not employed for anything else than that, by that certain likeness, it might be persuaded that what the Christian religion delivers about the Trinity of persons in God is not absurd.

§ 24. What in the eighth place is objected does not stand today in the Gloss; yet it is easily answered with St. Thomas, that by those words it is not signified that the philosophers, under the guidance of reason, could have come, through the things that are made, into a knowledge of the Persons as to their properties, which do not signify a habitude of cause to creatures; but according to the appropriations, which indeed are common to all the Persons.⁴²

§ 25. To the last we answer: that the philosophers in their writings perhaps sometimes spoke similarly to the way Sacred Scripture speaks, but in a sense far different. For what the Christian Faith proclaims, that three distinct Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—are one God, not several, could not have come into their thought from natural reason alone, indeed much less than the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word of God and the Redemption of the human race, which, as the Apostle testifies in 1 Cor. 2, "has not ascended into the heart of man," but is revealed by the Spirit of God alone. Therefore those philosophers, by the Son of God, did not understand a person distinct from the Father and begotten of His substance, but an intelligence, or operative reason, in God, originating from God, and the artificer of things—just as in man, and in his soul, there is reason; and from it proceeds practical reason as a principle of the operations of man, which, however, is not a supposit (*suppositum*) consubstantial to the soul itself; nor does it flow from it by generation properly so called; whether they imagined that operative reason to be accidental to God (as practical reason is an

accident of man and of the intellectual soul), or even were able to rise so far as to think that it was not really distinct from the essence of God. Nor for any other reason is the beginning of the Gospel of John so highly praised by them than that, by the "Word," they understood signified such a reason, through which all things were made by God. But if they knew anything of the plurality of persons in the one God, there is no doubt that to such a cognition they attained by a peculiar assistance of God; indeed not even an exact and error-free cognition of one God could they have attained without such aid, as was shown above. The same must be said of Trismegistus and of the Sibyls, inasmuch as they seem to have consigned to writing certain divine mysteries more by a prophetic spirit than by human ingenuity—namely, like Balaam, who, although a Gentile and an idolater, yet is known from Sacred Scripture to have prophesied certain things about Christ by the Divine Spirit.

§ IX — In which things, and how, the vestige of the Trinity is found? (In quibus rebus, & quomodo, vestigium Trinitatis inveniatur?)

§ 26. Theologians distinguish the image and the vestige of the Trinity (*imago* and *vestigium Trinitatis*) from each other thus: by the vestige they understand a certain obscure and very slight representation of the Trinity; by the image, however, a more express likeness of it, a certain proper representation of the thing signified. The vestige of the Trinity is found in absolutely every creature: which is made clear thus: In every thing there are these three, Unity, Species, and Order. For each thing is one, according to its nature bounded by certain limits; it has a species, that is, the configuration which its own form bestows, whether essential or accidental. Finally, it has order, that is, a fitting composition of its parts, or qualities, or affections. Now as unity corresponds to the Father—since unity is the principle and foundation of species and of order—so in the divine the Father is the principle of the other Persons. Species corresponds to the Son, because just as each thing is known by its form or species, so the Father is known by the Son, inasmuch as He is the image of the Father (Col. 1) and the figure, or character, of His substance (Heb. 1). Whence He Himself says in John 14: "If you had known me, you would indeed have known my Father also"; and again: "He who sees me, sees the Father also." Order corresponds to the Holy Spirit, to whom are ascribed love, goodness, and concord, by which it comes about that, among several things and among the parts of the same thing, a becoming order is established. St. Augustine treats this matter in book 5 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 9, and in the book *De vera religione*, chapters 7, 43, and 55.⁴⁴

§ 27. Furthermore, another vestige of the Trinity is intimated to us in that which is said in Wisdom 11, that God "has disposed all things in measure, and number, and weight." How these three are in God, and are found in all the works of God, Augustine beautifully teaches in book 4 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapters 3, 4, and 5.⁴⁵ Likewise, another vestige can be constituted in this, that in all things there are these three: to be, to be able, and to act. Again, another in this, that there are only three properties common to all things, the one, the true, the good—these being the passions (*passiones*) common to every being. Other vestiges of the Trinity of this sort can also be assigned in things; about which in general, and how they are found in creatures, Augustine discourses at length in the books on the Trinity, namely from book 9 through 15.⁴⁶

§ X — Where and how the image of the Trinity is found (*Imago Trinitatis in quibus & quomodo reperitur*)

§ 28. A certain proper representation of the Trinity is found not in every creature, but only in the intellectual creature, that is, in man and in the angel—a matter which St. Augustine more fully explains in several places cited by the Master, but especially in book 14 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 7 and the following, and in book 15, chapter 20 and the following; but it can briefly be explained by us as follows.⁴⁸ In every intellectual creature there are these three: memory, intelligence, will (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*). Where memory, according to St. Augustine in book 14 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 11, is not taken only for the recollection of things past, but in general signifies the actual cogitation by which the mind, by contemplating, is present to itself.⁴⁹ Therefore by memory we think, by intelligence we comprehend, by will we love. Now then, just as cogitation is the origin of the other two actions (for about each and every thing we first think, before we either comprehend it by intelligence or love it by will), so the Father is the origin and principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; then, just as comprehension precedes love (for we first comprehend the nature and the manner of a thing before we are borne toward it by love), so the Son is prior to the Holy Spirit. Finally, just as from the prior cogitation and the subsequent comprehension of the thing, or concept—which is a certain word of the mind—love arises, so from the Father, who is the first principle, and from the Son, who is truly the Word of the Father (*verbum Patris*), the Holy Spirit proceeds, to whom love is ascribed in a peculiar way.

§ 29. Again, just as these three classes of powers or actions are indeed distinct among themselves, yet meet together in the one nature of the human or angelic mind, so the distinction of the three persons in God does not divide the unity of the Divine Nature. Moreover, this is also worthy of consideration, that these three powers mutually contain one another and, by a certain reflection or recovery, enter into one another through their operations. For we think, or we remember, that we understand and are willing, or love; we understand that we have remembered and are willing; and we are willing to remember and to understand: for thus too the Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and the Son in the Father and in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit in the Father and in the Son. St. Augustine declares the same thing in book 9 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 4, from these three—mind, knowledge, and love—but it seems the same likeness is proposed in different words: for it pertains to the mind to remember, that is, to think, whence it also seems to have received its name; but knowledge is nothing other than intelligence; and love is a movement of the will toward the thing willed.⁵⁰ A similar exposition is found in St. Augustine's *Confessions*, book 13, chapter 11, from these three attributes of the mind: to be, to know, to will (*esse, nosse, velle*); and he also explains this image of the Trinity in more words in book 11 of the *City of God*, chapter 23, and in the five following.⁵¹

§ 30. Moreover, anyone easily understands that likenesses of this sort do not in every respect correspond to the reality to which they are accommodated. For neither is the angelic or the human mind itself memory, intelligence, and love, although these belong to it; whereas there, one and the same God is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit: but here the mind is the subject (*subjectum*), while those three are its accidents (*accidentia*). For as to what St. Augustine says in book 9 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 4—that these three exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject, like color in a body—which words the Master, at the letter o, cites from him, he intends nothing other than that these three belong naturally and per se to every intelligent nature, and not as accidents which can be altogether separated and absent without the corruption of the subject; in which way color does not at all pertain to the nature of a body considered in general.⁵⁰ Therefore these things which we have said, and in which Augustine establishes the image of the Trinity, are certain

natural accidents referred to the mind or soul, and are not one and the same thing with it. Whence it is evident that neither does the image perfectly correspond to the Trinity, of which it is the image, and much less the vestige; indeed, there is absolutely nothing in created things so like so great a reality that it is not in turn unlike it in infinite respects—as Augustine also admits in those places in which he assigns certain images from created things to the Trinity. Finally it must be noted that both the image of God and of the Trinity in man and in the angel, whether good or even evil, and its vestige in other things, are so deeply impressed that they can never be blotted out and obliterated without the destruction of the things themselves. But more on the image below, at Distinction 16 of Book 2.

§ XI — *The mystery of the Trinity is declared from the perfection of the number three (Trinitatis Mysteriorum ex ternarii numeri perfectione declaratur)*

§ 31. Besides the things which have thus far been said for insinuating into our minds in some way the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity (*SS. Trinitas*), it contributes not a little to the declaration of the same mystery that in all ages among all peoples the number three has had great veneration; as being, before the other numbers (which indeed are infinite in number), by a peculiar account held always perfect and sacred. Perfect indeed, because with this number first we name "all things," whereas with two one does not say "all things," but "both," or "each of the two," as the Philosopher noted in *De caelo* I, ch. 1.⁵³ Next, wishing to signify a perfect quality, we add this number, as when we say someone is "thrice blessed," "thrice greatest." By which figure of speech something more is signified than if you were to say "ten times," or "a hundred times blessed, greatest": thus we call the Sacrament of the Eucharist thrice most august.

Sacred and divine, moreover, it has always been held to be; because not only in the mysteries of Christians, but also in the sacred rites of the Gentiles, ceremonies are wont to be defined and brought to completion by this number. Whence also that saying about the ternary in the Poet: "Numero deus impare gaudet."⁵⁴ Nor is there any other cause why the Devil has prescribed that this number be assiduously employed in incantations, as Virgil's Sorceress sufficiently teaches; in that, a rival of divine honor, he desires that those things which are owed to God be expended upon himself. Nay more, the Pythagoreans handed down that all things are encompassed by the number three, and that without it nothing can be brought about or preserved. For which causes Aristotle (in the place cited above) affirmed that "three is," and that "thrice" itself obtains in every respect, and he referred this to the very law of nature; wherefore this number, as perfect and pure, is held among all, and he observes this in the celebration of their sacrifices.⁵⁵ Wherefore, not without reason it is thought that, by a certain hidden instinct of nature, honor has always been attributed by men to the number three; because either it, or rather a certain character of the uncreated Trinity, would cling as imprinted upon men, although by them it was not known of how great a reality the character, or vestige, was.

Now this number signifies, precisely in that it is recognized to have a place in divine things, a singular and in some way supereminent excellence of the divine Nature (*divina Natura*): for all created natures are so contained within their own bounds that each particular nature exists in a single hypostasis (*hypostasis*), and cannot exist in several; whereas such is the excellence and perfection of the Divine, and above the created Nature, that it is not sufficient for It to subsist in one hypostasis, but necessarily requires three hypostases, or persons (*personae*), in which It so subsists that the Nature itself is those three persons; since there, on account

of supreme simplicity, nature is not one thing and supposit (*suppositum*) another, as happens in created things, but one and the same. Furthermore, on the perfection of the number three's mystery it is possible to see St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* II, ch. 16; likewise *De sermone Domini in monte* II, q. 9, ch. 19; and in the exposition of the Sixth Psalm.⁵⁶

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1. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* I (near the beginning); St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 4 in Genesim*; Id., *Hom. 9 ad populum Antiochenum*; St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXVI, ch. 8.
 2. On the previous distinction's arguments for the unity of God, see above; on the demonstrations that God is according to St. Thomas, see St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2.
 3. *Sermones de operibus Christi cardinalibus*, praefatio (printed among the works of St. Cyprian).
 4. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 7; St. Hilary, as above; Id., *In Psalmum* 51; Id., *De Trinitate* XII (near the end); St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 2 in Ioannem*; Prudentius, *Apotheosis*; St. Augustine, *Confessiones* VII, ch. 17; Id., *De civitate Dei* VIII, ch. 6; Id., *De civitate Dei* XI, chs. 2, 4; Orosius, *Historiae adversus paganos* VI, ch. 1; Prosper, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 5; II, ch. 4; Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3; Ambrosiaster (commentary ascribed to Ambrose), *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 1.
 5. Prosper, *De vocatione gentium* II, ch. 4; St. Augustine, *Confessiones* X, ch. 6: "Caelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt ut te amet; nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles."
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2–3.
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2–3; and generally the scholastics on this distinction [abbreviation as in source].
 8. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* X, ch. 6.
 9. Aristotle, *Physica* VIII; *Metaphysica* XII.
 10. [Ps.-]Aristotle, *De mundo ad Alexandrum*.
 11. St. Augustine, *Epistula* 246 (Evodius to Augustine).
 12. Orosius, *Historiae adversus paganos* VI, ch. 1.
 13. Council of Orange (Arausicanum), canon 22.
 14. St. Augustine, *Sermo de Kalendis Ianuarii* (as cited by Bede on Rom. 1: "Dicentes enim se sapientes, stulti facti sunt") [abbreviation as in source].
 15. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 55, *De verbis Domini*.
 16. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 12.
 17. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmum* 47; St. Augustine, *Epistula* 112, ch. 11; St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem* 2; Haymo of Halberstadt, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*.
 18. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, ch. 7 [book unspecified in source; abbreviation as in source].
 19. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XV, ch. 6.
 20. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 19.
 21. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 4.
 22. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Demetriadem*.
 23. Bede, *In Iob*, on ch. 34.
 24. St. Augustine, *Epistula* 130.
 25. Bede, *In Canticum canticorum* I.
 26. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 24, a. 14.

27. St. Thomas Aquinas, *De regimine principum* I, ch. 8.
28. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium* II, ch. 17.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 1.
31. Athanasius, *De Spiritu Sancto* [as in source].
32. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* I.
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 32 ["eodem" as in source].
34. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 10.
35. Is. 66:9.
36. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1, body, ad 3.
37. Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 4.
38. Gloss on Rom. 1: "Invisibilia Dei..." as cited by St. Thomas, In *Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 1.
39. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* X, ch. 23; Plato, *Republic* VI; Ludovicus Vives, *Commentary on De civitate Dei* X, ch. 23; St. Augustine, *Confessiones* VII, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* X, ch. 29; St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem* 2.
40. Suidas, on *Hermes Trismegistus*; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* IV, ch. 6; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* IV, ch. 9.
41. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 1.
42. St. Thomas, In *Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 1.
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1.
44. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *De vera religione*, chs. 7, 43, 55.
45. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, chs. 3–5.
46. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX–XV.
47. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 5; a. 8.
48. The Master [i.e. Peter Lombard], as cited by Estius [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, chs. 7ff; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, chs. 20ff.
49. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, ch. 11.
50. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, ch. 4; The Master [Peter Lombard], letter o [abbreviation as in source].
51. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* XIII, ch. 11; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, ch. 23 and the five following.
52. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 1.
53. Aristotle, *De caelo* I, ch. 1.
54. Virgil, *Eclogue* 8 ("Pharmaceutria"): "Numero deus impare gaudet."
55. Aristotle, *De caelo* I, ch. 1 [ubi supra].
56. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* II, ch. 16; *De sermone Domini in monte* II, q. 9, ch. 19; *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 6.

DISTINCTIO IV — ON THE VARIETY OF WORDS WHICH WE USE WHEN SPEAKING ABOUT GOD (*DE VARIETATE VOCUM, QUIBUS UTIMUR DE DEO LOQUENTES*)

§ 1. After the generation of God from God, which in this distinction the Master undertakes to explain, the variety of words—namely those which are attributed to God or to the Persons—is to be set forth, so that, having their force and property known, we may be aware how it is fittingly and without offense to speak concerning this Mystery, and that we may labor less in resolving the arguments which are wont to be brought against this Mystery.

§ 2. Therefore, of the names which we use when speaking about God, some are absolute and essential, namely those which signify the nature of God plainly, without insinuation of the persons; of this sort are: God, the Deity, being, wise, good, essence, wisdom, goodness. Others are relative, or rather personal only, that is, which signify the relation of the Persons among themselves, such as Father, Son, paternity, filiation. Besides these there are certain notional terms, which designate the so-called notional acts: they are called notional acts by which the going-forth of one Person from another according to origin is signified; for by them the very Persons are made known. Words of this sort are: generation, spiration; to beget, to be begotten; to proceed, procession; and the like.

§ 3. Furthermore, to this division there must be subjoined another. Of the names which we use when speaking about God, some are abstract, as Deity, paternity, generation, wisdom; others concrete, as God, Father, begetting, wise; and of these, some are what the grammarians call substantives, as God, Father; others adjectives, as begetting, wise. But among all these there is one thing which demands a peculiar consideration, namely this name God; for it has certain things in common with other concrete names, but also certain things proper to itself, beyond the usage of other concrete names.

§ 4. First of all, this name signifies the Divine nature, and that which has it; just as this word man signifies the human nature, and that which has it. Accordingly, just as man is sometimes taken for some definite singular in which the human nature exists—as when we say that a man walks or sits—at other times, however, for the nature of man, indeed signified concretely, but without regard to singular supposit, as when we say that man is a divine and most excellent animal, or that man is the nobler species of animal: so too the word God is sometimes taken for that which has the Divine nature, as for some definite person or supposit, as when we say that God begets, that God is born, that God proceeds; at other times, however, it designates that same nature indeed concretely, yet without account taken of any person, as when we say that there is one God, and that He is triune; for these things cannot truly be attributed to any definite person. Finally, as the word man, so sometimes it is taken according to the whole species, yet in such a way that it can also be referred to individuals, as when in general we say that man is an animal endowed with mind, formed to the image of God; for these can in like manner be attributed to individual men. So too the word God very often signifies the

Divine Nature thus concretely, yet in such a way that Its attribute also can be referred to the individual persons; as when we say that God is the author of all things and their preserver, wise, just, merciful. Now if you ask whence it can be clear to us whether in the first, or in the second, or in the third of the modes that have been mentioned, the word God is taken, I answer that it must be judged from the attributes or other circumstances; as the examples adjoined to each of the modes show in common.

§ 5. Moreover, now conversely it must be seen how great a difference there is between those same two words, God and man, arising from this: that man, after the manner of other concrete names, does indeed signify one common nature, but many particulars according to the multitude of suppositis; but God signifies one and individual nature, which, although it is common to the three Persons, is nevertheless not multiplied according to the number of persons, but according to reality is altogether the same in each. Hence it comes about that God is always taken for that which has the Divine Nature, without restriction to any definite person, unless there be added to it something whereby it is determined to a person; just as St. Thomas teaches, giving the reason why it is true to say, God begets, and yet it is not true to say, God does not beget, since in God there is one person begetting and another not begetting.² For in the former proposition the word God is determined by the verb attached to the person of the Father; but in the latter there is nothing whereby it is determined to a definite person; and therefore its sense is that generation does not absolutely belong to God—which sense is manifestly false. Nor does the negation placed after the name stand in the way; for this name God, although it is common to the three Persons, nevertheless, by reason of the nature signified, which is a form not multipliable, constitutes rather a singular proposition than an indefinite one; whereas the word man, for the contrary reason—namely because it signifies a form that is multipliable—is always taken for that which has the human nature with reference to a supposit, unless an attached word regard a definite supposit. Whence it is absolutely true to say, man does not walk; for since that is said indefinitely, it suffices that the truth be found in some supposit of man. And these things indeed, in part, concerning the words attributed to God. For concerning the same and others, both in general and in particular, it will still be said below in their places, as in Dist. 9, 22, 23, and elsewhere.

§ II — How concrete names are to be used in divine matters (Quomodo concretis nominibus utendum fit in divinis)

§ 6. Moreover, besides the things that have been said about the variety of words which we use when speaking of God, it must be particularly observed in this place, concerning the concrete names (*nomina concreta*) which are attributed to God, that there is such a distinction among them, namely, that substantives (*substantiva*), if they are spoken in the plural number, introduce not only a number of persons (*personae*), but also of natures (*naturae*). This also comes to pass in created things by usage, as when I say, Peter and Andrew are men. Adjectives (*adjectiva*), however, introduce only a multitude of persons, not necessarily of natures; although this multitude of natures follows per accidens in creatures.

§ 7. From which distinction it is shown that this proposition is false, "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three Gods, three Lords, three Creators"; for those words, since they are substantives, when enunciated in the plural number, import a multitude not only of suppositis (*supposita*), but also of natures. But one must say, as in the Athanasian Creed the whole Church confesses, "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, one Lord," and likewise "one Creator."

§ 8. Truly, however, you would say rightly, "the Father and the Son are two spirating"; "the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three creating, three sanctifying, three beatifying"; for by words of this sort number is introduced only with respect to the persons, not also with respect to the nature.

§ 9. But whether it can be conceded that there are three eternal, uncreated, immense, omnipotent—which likewise seems to be denied in the Athanasian Creed— will be weighed around Distinction Nine.

§ 10. This, however, ought to be held as certain and indubitable: that these propositions, "three persons are Gods," or "there are three Gods," are on no account to be conceded; although, when those are twisted to a Catholic sense, some Catholics are found not to abhor them: for, as in the same Athanasian Creed the Church openly professes, just as we are compelled by Christian truth to confess each person severally to be God and Lord, so by the Catholic religion we are forbidden to say "three Gods" or "three Lords."

§ 11. Furthermore, just as we rightly say that the three persons are one God, so conversely nothing hinders our saying that one God is three persons, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; which, besides the authority of St. Augustine adduced by the Master (of the Sentences), can easily be taught by dialectical conversion, as a most evident argumentation.

§ III — That it is rightly said that God has begotten God (Quod recte dicitur Deus Deum genuisse)

§ 12. To the question which in this distinction the Master (of the Sentences) proposes to himself: Whether God has begotten God, and whether God has been begotten of God, the sound and Catholic answer, together with the Master, is affirmative. For this evidently follows from these propositions to be held with most certain faith: the Father has begotten the Son, and the Son is begotten of the Father, with this subsumption likewise most certain from faith, the Father is God, and the Son is God. And the Fathers of both the Council of Nicaea and the Council of Constantinople have professed this faith, proclaiming in the Creed the Son of God: God from God, light from light, true God from true God.⁵ But the selfsame thing is proved by all those Scriptures which teach that the Father is God and that the Son is God, and that this one is begotten from that one. But in a special way those Scriptures, and the like, prove that manner of speaking which double the name of God or of Lord in such a way that it must necessarily be referred to one person and another person, as in Sirach at the end: "I called upon the Lord, the Father of my Lord." For it is the same as if he had said: God, the Father of my God. And in Ps. 109: "The Lord said to my Lord." For this too is such as if he had said: God to my God. Likewise in Gen. 19: "The Lord rained from the Lord," that is, God from God. For in Hebrew there is the name of God, the Tetragrammaton. If therefore these things of this sort are rightly and soundly said, one must admit that it is likewise rightly said that God begot God, and that He is begotten of God. Whence also St. Augustine everywhere in the books On the Trinity, and other Fathers, thus speak and teach that one must thus speak.⁶

§ 13. For which reason too it has been said by Prudentius (in the Apotheosis against the Patripassians): that God the Father is the fount of God, namely of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.⁷ Furthermore, for precisely the same reason one must admit that God proceeds from God, because the Son also says, "I proceeded from the Father" (Jn. 8), and the Catholic Faith teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. In like manner too one must admit that God sends God, namely the Father the Son, and both the Holy Spirit;

and that God is sent by God, namely the Son by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by both—and this according to the authority of Holy Scripture, in many places.

§ IV — Reply to the arguments on the contrary (Responsio ad argumenta in contrarium)

§ 14. The argument of the contrary of this sort already stated: If it be objected, "God begot," therefore either He begot Himself as God, or another God—just as it rightly follows concerning a man, "he begot a man," therefore either himself or another man; and again, if God is begotten of God, therefore either He is begotten of Himself as God, or of another God—both of which are said most absurdly. The former indeed, because nature does not admit, and reason utterly abhors, that the same should beget itself, or be begotten of itself, or be born. Whence St. Augustine, book 1 (On the Trinity, ch. 1): "He who thinks it to belong to the power of God that He begot Himself, errs the more, because not only is God not so, but neither is a spiritual nor a bodily creature so: for there is absolutely no thing which begets itself so that it may be." These are his words.⁹ And deservedly: for that opinion includes a contradiction—namely this—that something be, and not be, the principle (*principium*) of the same. But the other [absurdity] is equally absurd, because from it there evidently follows that there are many Gods.

§ 15. But it is answered that neither follows. For, in order that this proposition be true, "God begot God," the distinction of persons (*personae*) concurring in the same nature (*natura*) suffices; and therefore it is not like to that which was alleged as like about a man. For in created things many supposita (*supposita*) have many singular natures, not however in God. Wherefore, although difference, or distinction of persons in human nature argues one man and another, yet in the divine nature it does not [argue] one God and another. For he who says "another God" signifies not only a person but also another nature, at least numerically distinct, just as he who says "another man." Much less does it follow that He begot Himself as God, since here too the same person is signified; but from the antecedent said it ought to have been distinctly inferred in this way: therefore God begot him who is another divine person from the begetter.

§ 16. Whence also St. Augustine, when (in the Soliloquies, book one, ch. 17) he had said of the Father and the Son: "He who begets and he whom he begets is one" (Latin: "qui gignit et quem gignit, unum est"), from which it seemed to be seen that the same had begotten Himself, retracts that locution in book 1 (of the Retractions, ch. 4), and says that it ought to have been said: "they are one" (Latin: "unum sunt"), so that the plurality and distinction of persons might be signified; just as the Truth Himself speaks openly, saying: "I and the Father are one" (Jn. 10).¹⁰

§ 17. The other argument (which, as also the former, is adduced by the Master) is of this sort: If God begot God, then either He begot God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father; if [He begot] God who is the Father, then the Father begot the Father, that is, Himself. But if [He begot] God who is not the Father, therefore there is some God who is not God the Father. Of this argument's latter member one must concede. For God the Father begot God the Son, who is not the Father. But what is then subjoined—that there is some God who is not God the Father—although the expression is improper, since into the name "God" a particular sign does not properly fall, can nevertheless be conceded in this sense: There is some person who is God and is not the Father; although, absolutely speaking, this expression is to be avoided, whereby it is said that some God is not the Father, or, without a sign, that God is not the Father. For the prior proposition,

by reason of the sign, indicates that the divine nature is a form that can be multiplied; the latter, since it is singular, absolutely removes paternity from God—which both is false and absurd.

§ V — In what sense indeed they said that God is begotten of Himself (Quo sensu quidem dixerint Deum a se genitum)

§ 18. On the occasion of the foregoing argument, it seemed to be concluded that God is begotten of Himself, if God is begotten of God, since there is not, except one God; lest perchance to someone that proposition, whereby God is said to be begotten of Himself, not seem altogether false, because certain ancient writers used it, let us say what they said and in what sense they said it. St. Augustine, therefore—so the Master is citing in the text (in the last section, in the letter to Maxim., which is 66)—says: "The Father so begot of Himself another self, that He remained wholly in Himself." Lactantius, book 1 (Divine Institutions, ch. 7): "God was procreated of Himself." And from Seneca: "God made Himself." And in book 4, ch. 8, he alleges Hermes Trismegistus as saying that God is *αὐτοπάτωρ* and *αὐτομήτωρ*, that is, Himself the Father of Himself and the Mother of Himself. A view of this sort is also found in Seneca the philosopher. Likewise by Orpheus the poet God is called *αὐτογενής*, as if begotten of Himself. And by Aristotle in the Politics, *αὐτόφυτος*, that is, born of Himself, or one who has his nature of himself. Similar names attributed to God are read in the verses of the Sibyl recited by Lactantius in book 1 (ch. 7). Such also is that old oracle brought forward by Justin the Martyr in the Exhortation: "The Chaldeans alone, the Hebrews, have found wisdom, reverencing chastely the king begotten of Himself." Furthermore, Dionysius the Areopagite, in the book On the Divine Names, says that God is of Himself. For some interpret the Greek word *αὐτοεἶναι*, similar to the foregoing, as though it signified that God is to Himself the author and principle of His own essence (*essentia*). Nonnus also, a Greek and likewise a Christian poet, in a certain poem, calls the Son and the Holy Spirit *αὐτόγονον*, that is, having their origin of themselves or from themselves. Epiphanius, near the end of book 2 (Against Heresies), in the heresy of the Arians, says that the Son is called *αὐτόθεον*, as if God through Himself and of Himself. And Maximus, the Scholiast of Dionysius, attributes the same word, substantivated, to the divine persons (*personae*). To this, finally, is added the doctrine of Richard of St. Victor, book 1 (On the Trinity), attempting to show that the first and principal substance (*substantia*) is of itself. For this he teaches in that book (ch. 5 and many following), and in the other books of the same work he often repeats it as a thing confessed and certain. Likewise of St. Anselm in the book (On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 4), where thus he says: "No person (*persona*) can exist of himself, except that of the Father alone." But it must be explained in what way all these things are either rightly said, or, in order to be rightly said, can be taken. For it is fair to interpret benignly the views of Christians and Catholics, insofar as they admit some convenient true sense. But as for the views of the Gentiles, if they perhaps sound something alien from the right faith, there is no reason why we should labor much, since it is sufficiently established that they did not have perfect knowledge of the true God.¹³

§ 19. We answer, therefore, that—as is commonly said—an intimate friend of someone is "another self," in the way in which we call him whom we compare to Cicero in eloquence "another Cicero." By which locutions is signified the highest likeness, or agreement, of two with one another. Thus God is said to have begotten of Himself, because He begot a Son most like, as being of the same nature (*natura*) with Himself. This St. Augustine himself explains. For in the tract (On the New Song, 7) he says of the Father: "He so begot of Himself another such as Himself, that He remained wholly Himself." Although one can also reply with the

Master, that God the Father begot "another Himself," that is, He begot another, that which He Himself is, namely true and one God; and yet He is not Himself, that is, the Father. That Augustine does not mean in proper speech that God begot Himself is manifest from his words, book 1 (On the Trinity, ch. 1), which we set above.¹⁴

§ 20. But many accuse Lactantius of an absurd error: that he thought truly and properly that God was begotten of Himself and made. It would, however, be more fitting to vindicate a Christian writer, though less circumspect, speaking elsewhere too about so great a mystery, from so great an absurdity of opinion; for neither does Lactantius seem to have wished anything other than to render Greek words—not only used by the Gentiles, but also by Christians—which are attributed either to the divine persons; namely, that God is so, as to have His essence from no other, a sense which seems negative rather than affirmative, and referred to that, "of Himself": for this has this force, as if you were to say: "not from elsewhere," or "from another." Which indeed is asserted simply of God; but of the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit, not simply, with this declaration: "from no other essentially, or substantially, distinct." It must be noted on account of the Autothean heretics, who abuse the above-cited views of the Fathers in patronage of their error: they teach that the Son is so αὐτόθεος, that He has received the divine essence from no other. Therefore it is the same thing, if we speak properly: God is through Himself, God is of Himself. The one is most true and is properly signified by those expressions composed, as it were, of gold; the other, however, is false, unless some impropriety, a catachresis of speech, be brought in to excuse it. A similar exposition is to be applied to Richard's words, by which the divine essence is said to be "of itself." Whence also his commentator admonishes that it would have been better, if he had enunciated such a discourse without the prepositions "a, ab, ex"; lest he seem to signify, against reason, that God is to Himself the cause of His being: since therefore of God there is no cause, and there is absolutely nothing which can effect itself. Wherefore in this matter, if we wish to speak properly and without offense, these propositions and the like, according to the rule of sound faith, most of all declared in the Creed of St. Athanasius, are to be retained and employed: "The Father is of none; neither of another, nor of Himself, neither made, nor begotten, nor proceeding. The Son is not of none, nor of Himself, but of another, namely of the Father, not made, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is not of none, nor of Himself, neither made, nor begotten, but proceeding. God is neither of Himself, nor of another, either made, or begotten, or proceeding." Nor, however, are these propositions true: "God is not begotten"; "God is not proceeding." They are contrary, indeed, to these truths: "God is begotten"; "God is proceeding," to wit, God of God; whence it is necessary that the former be false. By the same reasoning it seems one must admit this to be false: "God is of none"; for it contradicts this true one: "God is of someone." For the sense of the former is: "God is not of someone," and accordingly it seems false, as these are: "God does not beget"; "God is not begotten": which propositions we have shown above in this Distinction, ch. 1, to be false. If, however, that, "God is of none," have an affirmative sense signifying "God is unbegotten," it will be true by reason of the person of the Father. And it will be true if it be taken in this sense: "God is of no other." For this proposition signifies that God is not of someone who, or which, is "another" or "other," that is, "different," or "a different thing" from God.¹⁵

§ VI — That these are rightly predicated of the person of the essence, and conversely; with a solution of the arguments (Quod haec recte per personam de essentia praedicentur, et contra; cum solutione argumentorum)

§ 21. For since in the Divine there is no real difference of the nature to the persons, but only of the persons among themselves—as from those things which below and in their places must be said will plainly be evident—it follows that both each person and all together can truly be enunciated by words of the essence (*essentia*), and conversely that the essence can be enunciated by words of the persons, whether of single ones or of all together, in these modes: "The Father is the divine essence"; "the Son is the divine essence," etc. "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the divine essence," and conversely: "the divine essence is the Father," etc. But the arguments which are usually objected in the contrary by the subtile, in the form of syllogisms, as leading to an inconvenience from such conceded propositions, can be solved from those things which partly in this Distinction, partly in Distinction 2, were said about the various use of words in the Divine. The syllogisms, however, are of this sort: "Every divine essence is the Father; the Son is the divine essence; therefore the Son is the Father." Likewise: "No divine essence begot the Son; but the Father is the divine essence; therefore the Father did not beget the Son." They prove the major propositions of these syllogisms thus: because, since the divine essence is one and individual, if anything is said of it, or removed, that must be said or removed of it universally. But one must say that, although those propositions are affected with a universal sign, they are not plainly universal. For as the word "God" (*Deus*) is not altogether singular, on account of the plurality of the persons to whom it is proper, so, if you add a universal sign to this expression "the divine essence" (*divina essentia*), you will not at once make a perfectly universal proposition, namely on account of the singular unity of the nature signified. Whence it comes about that the proposition is true when related to one person, and it stands just as if it lacked the sign. But if you wish to effect the full universality of the said propositions, you can do that by the addition of some sign which has a fuller power of distributing, namely for the very suppositis, as if you were to say: "Everything which is the divine essence is the Father," the sense of which is: "Whatever can be subsumed under the divine essence is the Father." Likewise: "Nothing which is the divine essence has begotten," that is, "Nothing of which the divine essence is predicated has begotten." Which propositions, now fully universal in this way, are found false, namely with the subsumptions of the syllogisms added. And similar vicious examples can be adduced from created things, as "father of Micalus the Musician and of Aristomenes the intelligible," in the Philosopher, book 1 of the Prior Analytics, ch. 25.¹⁷

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13 (entire); I, q. 39, a. 3–5.

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3.

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 3–5.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3–5.

5. The Council of Nicaea and the Council of Constantinople, the Creed: "Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero."

6. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, passim.

7. Prudentius, *Apotheosis* (against the Patripassians).

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 4, arg. 4.

9. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, ch. 1.
10. St. Augustine, Soliloquia I, ch. 17; St. Augustine, Retractationes I, ch. 4.
11. The Master (of the Sentences) [as in source].
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, "ubi sup." [abbreviation as in source].
13. St. Augustine, Epistola ad Maximum (Ep. 66), cited by the Master in the text [abbreviation as in source]; Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones I, ch. 7; Seneca, as cited by Lactantius, and Seneca, De beneficiis IV, ch. 8 (attributed); Hermes Trismegistus, as cited in Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones I, ch. 7; Orpheus, fragments as cited by patristic authors (cf. *ᾠτογενής*) [abbreviation as in source]; Aristotle, Politics (on *αὐτόφυτος*); Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones I, ch. 7 (Sibylline verses); Justin Martyr, Cohortatio ad Graecos (the "Paraneticum") [abbreviation as in source]; Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus; Nonnus of Panopolis, Christian poet (as cited) [abbreviation as in source]; Epiphanius, Panarion (Contra haereses), end of book II (on the Arian heresy); Maximus the Confessor, Scholia on Dionysius [as in source]; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate I, esp. ch. 5 and following; St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, ch. 4.
14. St. Augustine, Enarrationes or Tractatus in Psalmum "Canticum novum" (De Cantico novo), tract 7 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, ch. 1.
15. Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult); Above in this Distinctio, ch. 1 [abbreviation as in source].
16. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 6.
17. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, ch. 25.

DISTINCTIO V — WHETHER THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS TO BE SAID TO BEGET OR TO BE BEGOTTEN; AND ON THE ERROR OF ABBOT JOACHIM

§ I — Whether the Divine essence is to be said to beget or to be begotten (Utrum essentia Divina dicenda sit gignere vel gigni)

§ 1. From the foregoing there arises a question, whether it is truly said that in the Divine realities the essence (*essentia*) begot essence, or essence was begotten of essence; or that the Father begot the essence, or the essence begot the Son; and, in general, whether it befits the essence to beget or to be begotten. For thus it can seem from this, that God is not other than the Divine Essence. But that it is truly said that God begot God, and that God is begotten of God, we have already shown in the preceding distinction.²

§ 2. To this question one must reply, with the Master (of the Sentences), both here in this distinction where he treats it at length, and in Distinction 5 of Book 3 where he takes it up again, and at the same time in accord with the common judgment of the theologians, that the Divine essence neither begets nor is begotten, nor in any way produces or proceeds ad intra, whether you compare essence with essence or with person. For although God and Divinity are absolutely the same thing, and therefore there is no real distinction in God between nature and persons which would prevent nature being said of the persons and conversely: nevertheless we, imbued with human usage of speaking, apprehend the thing signified differently according to the variety of words—one way when we hear "Deity," "essence," "goodness," namely, by abstract words; another way when "God," "being," "good," by concrete words. And these indeed, namely, nature and suppositum (*suppositum*), are in creatures distinct in reality, whence also the diversity of words has been introduced. In the Divine realities, however, where they do not differ in reality, that diversity of words nevertheless ought to be retained, congruent to our concepts.

§ 3. Therefore, since in creatures acts are of supposita (*supposita*), while essence does not act but is the principle of the act in the suppositum, and hence acts are said not of the essence but of supposita, the usage of speaking observes something similar also in the Divine realities. In which, although in reality essence is not different from the suppositum, yet it differs in reason and as to the mode of signifying: the suppositum in the Divine realities is distinct, essence however is common. And therefore (as St. Thomas says on this distinction) whatever things are predicated of the suppositum, in such wise that, according to the mode of signifying, they do not differ from the essence, are also predicated of the essence. For we say, for instance, that the essence governs suchlike things; but an act which is said of the suppositum according to a mode which, in its mode of signifying, differs from the essence, cannot be said of the essence; and an act of this kind is "to beget" (*generare*), which is predicated of the suppositum of the Father, since it is that which is distinct from

the suppositum. Hence it is not to be conceded that "the essence begets," but that "the Father begets by virtue of the essence, or nature." Thus he.³

§ 4. Furthermore, this reply is grounded in reason: For if the essence begot essence, then that same essence would beget itself, because the essence in God is one and numerically the same. But that anything should beget itself, we showed in the preceding distinction to be an absurdity. Or else the individual and most simple unity of the Divine essence would have to be denied, and it would have to be admitted that there are in God several essences by number—a thing no less absurd and contrary to the Catholic faith.

§ 5. Nor, however, do the same inconveniences follow if it be said that "God has begotten," because "essence" signifies a thing purely and in the abstract; but "God" signifies a thing together with a suppositum, especially if to it there be joined a notional word (*verbum notionale*), that is, a signifying of a notional act: and therefore, when it is said that "God has begotten," a real distinction is indeed signified, yet one of supposita, not of natures.

§ 6. Again, if the person begot the essence, or the essence the person, since generation necessarily requires a real distinction of begetter and begotten, consequently the person would be really distinct from the essence; which is altogether absurd. Hence it would follow that neither "essence of person" nor "person of essence" could truly be said; just as, for that reason, neither would the Father be said of the Son, nor conversely. It would further follow that there is a quaternity in God, that is, four things really distinct, namely, the persons and the Divine essence distinct from them. For just as the essence would be different from the Father if it were begotten by the Father, so also would it be different from the Son if it begot the Son, and from the Holy Spirit if the Holy Spirit proceeded from it.

§ 7. The Master also argues thus: "By 'of the essence' (*de essentia*), that is, 'by His essence' (*per essentiam suam*), someone is named 'begetting.' Therefore, if God begot the essence, it follows that God begot that by which He is; that He has being by that which He begot." Thus indeed, because St. Augustine in Book 6 On the Trinity, ch. 1, and likewise Book 7, ch. 1, proves that the Father is not wise by the wisdom which He begot; because if He is wise by it, therefore He is that wisdom. He therefore has being by that which He begot. Which is absurd.⁴

§ 8. Finally, for a clarification of this doctrine, the words of St. Augustine in Book 7 On the Trinity, ch. 6, have force. For thus he says: "We say that there are three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons 'out of the same essence,' as though there were there one thing which is essence, another which is person." Thus Augustine, clearly enough explaining that that form of speech, by which it is said that a person is "of the essence," signifies that the person is from an essence distinct in reality. More expressly, however, this doctrine is defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, concerning which Council's definition we shall speak a little more below.⁵

§ II — Reply to the things objected from the sayings of the Fathers (Responsio ad ea, quae ex Patrum dictis objiciuntur)

§ 9. The Master cites certain sayings of the Fathers which seem to be contrary to the foregoing doctrine, such as these: that "God begot of Himself that which He Himself is." That "the Son is wisdom from wisdom, counsel from counsel, will from will, substance from substance, essence from essence." That "the Son's

Divinity is born from the nature of the Father." That "He has nothing unless what is born," since "the Son received birth from the nature of the Father"; that "the nature in Himself begetting had the nature begotten; remaining in the form of the begetting nature, He took the form of bodily nature." That "from the unbegotten God the only-begotten nativity subsists." Of these, the first is found in St. Augustine's work *On Faith and the Creed*, ch. 3; the second in the same Augustine, *Book 7 On the Trinity*, ch. 5; the third in Fulgentius, *On the Faith to Peter*, ch. 2; the fourth in St. Hilary, *Book 4 On the Trinity*; the fifth also in the same, *Book 5*; the sixth and seventh in the same, *Book 9*. When these have been recited by the Master, other similar things are found elsewhere. Such is that in the Athanasian Creed: "God, begotten of the substance of the Father before the ages." Which manner of speaking is frequent enough among the ancients. St. Jerome too (at the beginning of his *Commentary on Matthew*) calls the nativity of the Son of God "the generation of the Divinity." And Augustine, besides what has already been said (*Sermon 63 De diversis*, ch. 12), says that "God the Father is the Father of the Word, of His Wisdom and of His Power." And he likewise in *Book 7 On the Trinity*, ch. 2, and in *Book 15*, ch. 14, affirms that "the Son is the fount of to-be from the fount of to-be." So too it is read in Prudentius (in the *Apotheosis against the Patropassians*) that "the Father is the fount of the Deity." Again Augustine, *Book 15 On the Trinity*, chs. 15 and 20: he said that "the Word is the Son of the substance of the Father." Whence also Ludovicus Vives, at the beginning of his exposition on the Lord's Prayer, dared to say that Christ is "the Son of the omnipotent essence and nature of God the Father." To these add that in Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, ch. 2, and in Pachymeres his interpreter, and in Eusebius, *Book 1 of the Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 4, the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be "essentiated" (*essentiati*); which word seems to signify the production of the essence itself. On account of authorities of this kind among the Fathers, Richard of St. Victor contends most vehemently in *Book 6 On the Trinity*, chs. 22–23, that it must simply be asserted that "Substance begot Substance," and he bitterly and falsely reproves those who do not dare to say this, as though they were denying what is affirmed everywhere by the holy Fathers.⁷

§ 10. But on account of the reasons set above, and especially on account of the authority of the great Lateran Council, in which the Master's opinion was approved (ch. 2), related in the *Decretals*, title *De summa Trinitate et fide catholica*, ch. "Firmiter credimus," one must assent rather to the Master than to Richard; and reply to the objections, that, in sentences of the Fathers of this kind, we must consider not so much what they said as what they wished to signify. For since very often they speak improperly and figuratively, sometimes even harshly, not all their sayings are to be strained to the rule prescribed for us, but certain of them are to be softened by a fitting interpretation, when from elsewhere their mind is sufficiently clear. Nor does it avail Richard's opinion that the Fathers are found to have spoken thus many times, and that no one is read to have openly condemned such a locution. For we say that the Fathers spoke improperly; and yet improper locutions, however often they are very much used, are not for that reason to be endowed with the right of propriety, nor to be received into the disciplines which wish to use proper sentences. For thus also the Fathers most frequently say: "the Word of God assumed a man," more rarely, "assumed humanity," whereas the latter is said properly, the former improperly, and therefore must be expounded by this proper locution. And if we were to contend that it is therefore said properly because it frequently occurs in the books of the ancients, we would be constructing from that the Nestorian heresy, which posits a human person assumed by the person of the Son of God. For "man" properly signifies a human person. But of that matter (in *Book 3*).

§ 11. Therefore, that we may explain the impropriety of the above-said sentences and reduce them to proper speech: The first of them signifies that the Father begot the Son who is this very thing which the Father is, although He is not the very same who is the Father. The second, that the Son, who is wisdom and essence

and counsel, etc., is from the Father, who is wisdom and essence, etc., and that the Son has wisdom and essence and all the rest by generation from the Father. The third, that the Son received the Deity from the Father by being born. The fourth, that the Son has nothing unless what He received by being born from the Father. The fifth, that the Son, being born, is of the same nature with the Father, from whom He was born. The sixth, that the begotten Son had the nature of the begetter, in which remaining He assumed human nature. The last, that from the unbegotten Father the only-begotten Son subsists in the nature communicated by a single generation.

§ 12. For this reason, moreover, the Fathers used these modes of speaking more confidently, because, against the Arians, with whom they had their disputation, they wished to inculcate that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, and that He is begotten of the Father, not made by the Father, and hence that whatever He has from the Father He has by generation. From these things it is already sufficiently understood how also other similar forms of locution occurring in the writings of the Fathers are to be expounded. For with St. Jerome "generation of the Divinity" is not other than "generation according to the Divinity," which is opposed to "generation according to the humanity," and each befits Christ. Augustine, moreover, said that God is the Father "of His Power and of His Wisdom," because He is the Father of the Son, who is the Power and Wisdom of the Father. The same said that "the Word is the Son of the substance of the Father," because He is the Son of the Father according to the substance, which the Father by begetting communicated to Him.

§ 13. But improper locutions of this kind are not to be affected by moderns, especially after the disapproval of the Lateran Council. Yet a certain order must be noted among abstract terms (*abstracta*), as St. Thomas and Scotus well admonish on this distinction: for "essence" abstracts more than "substance," and "substance" more than "wisdom," "power," "goodness," and the like. Whence it is less to be conceded that "essence generates" than that "substance [generates]," and less that "substance [generates]" than that "wisdom," "power," "goodness," and suchlike. All these, however, are said improperly; therefore no such locutions are to be extended (says St. Thomas), but, where they are found, are to be piously interpreted.

§ 14. Moreover, there is nothing absurd in the Son and the Holy Spirit being said "essentiated" (*essentiati*), just as also the Father "essentiator," if by "essentiator" there is understood "one who gives essence," and by "essentiated," "one who receives it"—which exposition seems sufficiently proper: for to give essence and to beget are not the same thing. For properly even among human beings a son is begotten, and essence is given or communicated.

§ 15. As regards the phrase which is in the Athanasian Symbol and frequent among the ancients—that the Son "is," or "is begotten, of," or "from, the substance of the Father"—St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others (on this distinction) teach rightly that the locution is proper and altogether to be retained, as also that which follows in the Symbol: "And man is born in time of the substance of his mother." For such a manner of speaking does not signify that the substance generates, or that he who is generated is the son of the substance; but that the father or mother generates a son of the same substance and nature with himself or herself. For the preposition "of" (*de*), or "from" (*ex*)—for these two prepositions are wont to be used indifferently in the matter of generation (although St. Thomas distinguishes them)—properly designates at once a principle and consubstantiality. Now in the present case this principle is twofold: one, that "from which" (*quod*), as the Father; the other, that "by which" (*quo*), as the essence. Therefore the Son is "of the Father" and "of the essence of the Father"—of the Father, indeed, as of the generating principle; of the essence of the Father, as of the communicated principle of generation. Whence also this principle, as St. Thomas bears

witness, approaches to the likeness of the material principle, if from matter there be removed whatever is of imperfection, and there remain these only among the conditions of matter: that it is permanent in the thing produced, and that by it the thing subsists. For this perfection befits the Divine essence with respect to the Son begotten of the Father.⁸

§ III — A declaration of the error of Abbot Joachim with its refutation (Declaratio erroris Abbatis Joachim cum ejus refutatione)

§ 16. The doctrine set above of the Master was so assailed by a certain Abbot Joachim, by the publication of a little book, that he called the Master heretical and insane, because he taught that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a certain supreme thing (*res quaedam summa*) which nevertheless would be neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding. Whence he used to say that the Master posits in God not so much a Trinity as a quaternity, to wit, three persons and that common essence as it were a fourth. But he himself, on the contrary, used to teach that there is no thing which is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, nor that three persons are one essence or substance or nature, except by an improper and as it were collective and similitudinary unity, in the way that many men are called one People, and many faithful one Church. And he used for proving this those testimonies of Scripture: "The multitude of believers had one heart and one soul" (Acts 4). "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit" (1 Cor. 6). "He who plants and he who waters are one" (1 Cor. 3). "We, being many, are one body in Christ" (Rom. 12). "My people and your people are one" (3 Reg. 22 [Vulgate numbering]). Above all he pressed that word of Christ in the Gospel, John 17, praying the Father for the elect "that they may be one, as we [are]." Elsewhere: "That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us." And again: "That they may be one, as we also are one; that they may be consummated in one." Lastly he adduced that in 1 John 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. And these three are one. And there are three who give testimony on earth, the Spirit, the water, the blood. And these three are one." From these, therefore, he thought it shown that the three persons are not one thing otherwise than in the manner in which the other things already mentioned are said to be one; especially since, for some of those, in comparison with the matter set forth, Scripture itself had applied the comparison.¹⁰

§ 17. This error, together with the little book written for its defense, the Lateran Synod under Innocent III condemned, whose decree is found "Extra, De summa Trinitate et fide catholica," ch. "Damnamus," in which the same error is learnedly refuted and the Catholic truth clearly declared. Now the Synod denies that a quaternity is established in God by the Master, because the Divine Persons are not distinct from the Divine essence, but each of those three is that supreme thing which we call the Divine essence. Which thing, however, is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding; but it is the Father who is generating, and the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that the distinctions are in the Persons and the unity in the nature.¹¹

§ 18. Moreover, as to the places of Scripture on which that author relied, it is not difficult to answer, according to those things which the Synod itself replies. For the first five do indeed prove that in Scripture sometimes many are called one improperly—namely, by consent, end, likeness, collection—but they do not prove that the three Divine Persons are said to be one thing and one substance only in that mode of unity; nay rather, since "God" is not a collective word like "People," "Body," "Church," and the like, but is significative of

one most perfect and therefore most simple nature, by so much the less can it be said that the three Divine Persons are one God by collection, than that three human persons are one man; which, however, would only be said very improperly, just as also many are said to be one man improperly, on account of consent, end, or likeness. And, on the contrary, rather, just as three human persons, however much consenting among themselves and similar, are most properly called three men: so, according to the opinion mentioned, it would be most properly to be said that the three Divine Persons are three Gods. Which is most alien to the Christian faith.

§ 19. As to that comparison which is brought from the words of Christ, the Lateran Synod indicates this reply: when likenesses are sought from Divine things for the sake of declaring human things, those likenesses are to be taken according to the mode and condition of the things which are compared on this side and on that—namely, by taking Divine [things] in a Divine and perfect mode; human [things], in a human and imperfect mode. For example, the Lord says in Matt. 5: "Be ye perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect," although God is perfect by nature, man only by grace, and God's perfection excludes every imperfection, not so man's perfection; thus too the Lord says frequently in Leviticus: "Be ye holy, because I am holy." Thus, therefore, also as to unity one must hold: for Christ prays that the faithful may be one by a unity of charity, as He with the Father is one by a unity of nature. For in the same place the Lord also says: "The glory which Thou hast given me, I have given to them" (Jn. 17), although between the glory of a natural Son and that of an adoptive there is the greatest difference. Accordingly, then, just as the glory of the natural and of the adoptive son is not of the same formal character, so neither is the unity of the faithful among themselves of the same formal character as the unity of the Son with the Father; rather each must be understood in its own mode. And in such comparisons we must beware lest we should compose, as it were, a certain analogy by which we are wont to join small things to great and imperfect things to perfect; which especially must take place when human things are compared with Divine; because, as in the same decree of the Synod it is said, between Creator and creature such likeness cannot be marked out that a greater unlikeness should not be noted.

§ 20. To the last place adduced the same reply avails: for just as in the former clause unity of nature is signified, so in the latter unity, that is, agreement of testimony, is signified. Although one can also answer that in the latter clause the words "And these three are one" are not in all [manuscripts], but only, as the Synod itself says there, are found in certain codices; indeed in certain Greek [codices] they are not read at all; and where they are read, in some it is read thus: "And these three are unto one" (in unum sunt), so that the latter three are one in a different way than the former three—these latter by reason of testimony, because they bear witness to one thing (for this is signified when it is said "are unto one," that is, that they agree to signify one and the same); but the former are one in nature and substance, of which there is said immediately before: "And these three are one."¹²

§ 21. that the faithful may be one by the union of charity, as He Himself with the Father is one by the unity of nature. For also in the same place the Lord says: "And I, the brightness, or glory, which You have given Me, have given to them"; whereas it is established that between the glory of the natural Son and the glory of the adopted there is the greatest difference.¹³ Just as therefore the brightness of the natural Son and that of the adopted are not of the same formal character, so neither are the unity of the faithful among themselves and the [unity] of the Son with the Father of the same formal character; but each must be understood in its own way, and there is in them a comparison of the one with the other only according to a certain analogy by which we are wont to compare great things with small, and the perfect with the imperfect; which most of all

must necessarily have place where human things are compared with divine: because, as in the same decree of the Synod it is said, between the Creator and the creature no such likeness can be noted that a greater unlikeness is not to be noted between them.¹¹ Lastly, the same reply has force: for just as in the former sentence unity of nature is signified, so in the latter unity, or agreement of testimony, is signified. Although it can also be replied to that which is set down in the second place, "And these three are one," that it is not found in all, but only, as the Synod there speaks, in certain codices: for also in some Greek [codices] it is not read at all; and in those in which it is read, it has the added preposition, in this way: "And the three are unto one."¹⁴ By which reading it is sufficiently given to understand that these three are one in one way, the three above in another: these by the formal character of testimony, because they bear testimony of one thing—for this is signified when it is said, "are unto one," that is, they agree to signify one and the same—whereas those are one in nature and substance, of whom accordingly it is most properly said: "And these three are one."¹⁵

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 5, in corp. and ad 3.

2. See above, the preceding distinction.

3. St. Thomas, *In I Sententias*, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1 (on this distinction).

4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 1; VII, ch. 1.

5. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 6; Lateran Council IV (1215) under Innocent III.

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 5.

7. St. Augustine, *De fide et symbolo*, ch. 3; idem, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 5. Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IV; V; IX. Athanasian Creed: "God, begotten of the substance of the Father before the ages." St. Jerome, Commentary on Matthew, prologue. St. Augustine, Sermon 63, *De diversis*, ch. 12; idem, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 2; XV, ch. 14; XV, ch. 15; XV, ch. 20. Prudentius, *Apotheosis contra Patropassianos*. Ludovicus Vives, preface to his exposition of the Lord's Prayer. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* II, with the interpreter Pachymeres. Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* I, ch. 4. Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate* VI, chs. 22–23.

8. St. Thomas, *In I Sententias*, dist. 5, q. 2, a. 1.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 2; a. 5.

10. Acts 4:32; 1 Cor. 6:17; 1 Cor. 3:8; Rom. 12:5; 1 Kgs 22:4 (Vulgate numbering). Jn. 17:11, 21–23. 1 Jn. 5:7–8.

11. Lateran Council IV, ch. "Damnamus," in the Decretals, title De summa Trinitate et fide catholica.

12. Lateran Council IV, *ibid.*, on the distinction between "unum sunt" (unity of substance) for the heavenly witnesses and "in unum sunt" (concord of testimony) for the earthly.

13. Jn. 17:22.

14. 1 Jn. 5:8 (textual variant: "et tres ad unum sunt"; noting also its absence in some Greek manuscripts).

15. 1 Jn. 5:7.

DISTINCTIO VI — ON THE GENERATION OF THE SON FROM THE FATHER (*DE GENERATIONE FILII A PATRE*)

§ L — Whether the Father begot the Son by will or by necessity (Utrum voluntate an necessitate Pater Filium genuerit)

§ 1. The Eunomian heretics formerly used, by a human subtlety, to put to Catholics, with a view to overthrowing the mystery of the natural generation of the Son of God from the Father, the question whether the Father had begotten the Son by will (*voluntas*), or by necessity (*necessitas*), laying ambushes for both sides of the answer. For if it were said that He begot the Son by necessity, it seemed to follow that He did this unwillingly, and therefore that He was miserable — which it is impious to think. If by will, they straightway concluded, in line with their heretical doctrine, that the Son of God is Son not by nature but by the counsel and will of the Father. For Eunomius, as St. Augustine reports, said that the Son of God is the Son not of nature but of the will of God; in the way in which St. James the Apostle says of us, the adoptive sons of God (Jas. 1): "Voluntarie genuit nos Deus verbo veritatis."² They put the question in other words thus: Whether willing or unwilling; and whether voluntarily or involuntarily the Father begot the Son. But before we answer, the words of the question, as it is set down in the first place, must be expounded; and it must be made clear in how many ways a thing is said to be done by will; and in how many by necessity.

§ 2. That something is done by will can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that it is set in opposition to what is to be done naturally; in which sense those things are said to be done by will which are in the power of the agent so that they either come to be or do not come to be: of which kind are the things that are done freely, and for the most part with prior deliberation. In the other way, those things are said to be done by will which are done by someone with his will approving and consenting. In which way we say that a man lives, is beautiful, and is healthy by will; although he did not bring these about by his will. And — which comes nearer to the matter proposed — that he loves himself by will and seeks his happiness by will, although he absolutely cannot will the contrary.

§ 3. Likewise, a thing is said to be done, or to be, by necessity in two ways: either by a necessity that is imposed from without and brings force to bear — in which way are done those things to the doing of which men are driven by fear of torments; and in the realm of natural things we rightly say likewise that a stone thrown up on high is driven upward by necessity — and of this kind the necessity is called in part coactive, or compelling and saddening, in part simply violent; and both kinds are contrary to what is voluntary: or by a natural necessity, and this either absolutely so — which is found in God alone — as when it is necessary that God be, and that He be good and wise: for it is altogether, in every way, impossible for these to be otherwise; or only absolutely with respect to a created power, in that a created power cannot make them to be otherwise:

in which way it is necessary that the world be, that angels be, that the heavens move, that mortals at some time die, that fire be hot, and the like; which, however, by the omnipotence of God, can be otherwise.

§ 4. Now this kind of necessity does indeed conflict with the choice of a free will and excludes deliberation; yet it does not always conflict with a will that approves and consents, but often concurs with it. For God is at once necessarily and voluntarily God, and man at once by necessity and by will seeks his own happiness, and the Blessed at once by necessity and by will love God whom they behold.

§ 5. These things having been explained thus, one can answer the question that the Father begot the Son both by will and by necessity; by will, indeed, not a deliberating will, as Eunomius taught, as though the will to beget had preceded the nativity of the Son of God — which sense, as impious, St. Augustine, in the place cited above, and St. Jerome (on Eph. 1), with the words recited in the text, rightly reject — but by an approving will, which they also call concomitant. He also begot by necessity, not a violent nor coactive necessity (for violence or compulsion cannot befall God the Omnipotent and Most Blessed), but by a natural necessity, whereby a thing is so, or comes to be, that it cannot be otherwise. For just as God cannot not be, so God the Father cannot not beget the Son.

§ 6. Hence, when the heretics of old asked whether God begot the Son willing or unwilling, and whether by will or by necessity, the Catholics in turn set against them this question: whether God is God willing or unwilling, whether by will or by necessity — for there is the same account for dissolving each question. The Master and the author of the Dialogue of 65 Questions (q. 7) among the works of St. Augustine, recall this from the place of St. Augustine cited above.³

§ 7. But as to what that same author answers to the question, namely that the Father begot the Son neither by will nor by necessity, this must be understood of an antecedent or choosing will, and of a coactive necessity, as is easily clear to one who looks at the place.

§ 8. And indeed, because that ablative, "by will" (*voluntate*), seems more to insinuate the relation of an active principle than a concomitance or complacency — so that those things are said to be done by will which proceed from the will as from the principle of the action — hence it is more fittingly denied than affirmed that the Father begot the Son by will.

§ 9. Wherefore St. Cyril, treating the same question, replies that the Son is begotten neither by the will nor besides the will of the Father, because He did not choose this, namely to beget; nor yet does He beget compelled by necessity.⁴

§ 10. More rightly, however (as the same authors indicate), the Father is said to beget the Son naturally, or by the fecundity of nature, than either by will or by necessity, since that is both properly said and has an open sense; whereas these two, on account of an ambiguous understanding, are liable to the cavils of the heretics. You would also more rightly say that God, willing, begets than that He begets by will: because just as the ablative more designates the principle of the action, so the participle is more apt to signify concomitance; as when I say: "Peter, standing, speaks."

§ 11. According to this sense there are also to be taken these words of Richard of St. Victor (De Trinitate VI, ch. 17): To will, as unbegotten, to have from Himself one like to Himself and worthy, seems to me the same as to beget the Son; and yet to will to have as Beloved one begotten rather than unbegotten seems the same as to produce the Holy Spirit.⁵ For if Richard were to understand his words properly, we shall answer

with Scotus that it seems otherwise to St. Augustine. But as to what a certain modern has written, namely that the Father willed His Son to be a participant in the Divinity and in His eternal kingdom together with the Holy Spirit, this does not seem to be free of just reproof. For that way of speaking signifies that the will of the Father is the principle and cause of the sharing of the Divinity with the Son and the Holy Spirit — which is alien to the mind of the orthodox Fathers.

§ II — How the Father is said to have begotten the Son by counsel (Quomodo Pater Filium consilio genuisse dicatur?)

§ 12. Some difficulty attaches to what is read in the Formula of Faith, issued in the Synod of Sardica, in this manner: "Those who say that neither by counsel nor by will (which is to say, not by counsel [*consilium*] nor by will [*voluntas*]) the Father begot the Son, the Holy and Catholic Church anathematizes."⁶ Expounding which, Hilary in the book *On the Synods* thus says: "So perfect is the nature of the nativity in Him, that is, in the Son, that He who is born of the substance of God is also born of His counsel and will. For 'of will' and 'of counsel,' and not 'of the passion of a bodily nature,' is the absolute perfection of the essence of God begotten of the essence of God."⁷ Thus he: "That the Son was born by the counsel of the Father; therefore, being begotten by One who chooses, He seems to be begotten not by approving will alone, but also by choosing; for counsel precedes choice, and is assumed for the sake of choice." This difficulty is increased by the fact that Hilary used the preposition "of" (*ex*), in saying that the Son was born "of the counsel" and "of the will" of the Father. For things which are done with a consenting and concomitant will may indeed be said to be done "by will," yet not "of will," and much less "of counsel." But we answer that the sense of the words of the Synod was indicated by Hilary from this fact, that he added "not of the passion of a bodily nature." For he opposed these two: to beget "by counsel and will," or—which is the same for Hilary—"of counsel and will," and to beget "by the passion of a bodily nature." Since the Son is the Word (*Verbum*) of the Father, His generation (*generatio*) must be thought of after the mode of a word which proceeds from the mind, which the Synod signified by the name of counsel and will, not after the mode of that thing which is generated by bodily affection from another. Therefore the Synod wished to commend the nobility of the divine generation, as being purely spiritual and very far removed from every bodily concretion. Finally, Hilary sufficiently discloses both his own opinion and that of the Synod (in the same book), when expounding the 24th and 25th anathemas of the Council of Sirmium, where he teaches that the Father begot the Son neither by natural necessity, as if constrained by a law, nor yet by such a will as that by which He founded creatures which He could have not made, but by nature together with will—understanding will as opposed to compulsion. "For," he says, "He was not compelled, nor led by natural necessity, when He begot the Son; but as soon as He willed, without time, and impassibly, He manifested from Himself the Only-begotten." And a little later: "Before all times the Father, from the essence (*essentia*) of His nature, impassibly willing, gave to the Son the natural nativity of essence." These things there.⁸

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 2.

2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 20; Jas. 1: "Voluntarie genuit nos Deus verbo veritatis."

3. The Master (of the Sentences) [as in source], recalling Augustine at the place cited; Author of the Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 7 (among the works of St. Augustine) [as in source].

4. St. Cyril, Dialogues with Hermias, book 2, toward the end.
5. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate VI, ch. 17.
6. Formula fidei of the Synod of Sardica.
7. St. Hilary, De synodis.
8. St. Hilary, De synodis, on the 24th and 25th anathemas of the Council of Sirmium.

DISTINCTIO VII — WHAT GENERATION IS IN THE DIVINE (*QUID SIT IN DIVINIS GENERATIO*)

§ 1. Before we come to treat the question which concerns the power and the will of begetting, we must premise about Divine generation (*generatio*) what it is, and in what way it befits God. And indeed, properly speaking, generation is nothing other than a communication of essence (*essentia*) in the mode of nature, which is found both in God and in creatures, though not in all of them. For men, and beasts, and plants generate; but the sun does not generate in this fashion, nor do the other inanimate things. But in particular, in the Divine, generation can be described thus: that it is the procession (*processio*) of one Person (*persona*) from another, in the mode of intellect (*intellectus*), with a perfect likeness of nature. In which description, what is said in the first place, "of one Person from another," shows that this generation is not accidental—such as in creatures is that by which a word proceeds from a mind, or heat from fire—but substantial, whereby namely a thing subsisting in itself (*res per se subsistens*) is produced; and not just any such, but personal, which is found only in things endowed with intellect, as is the generation of a man from a man.

§ 2. But that phrase, "in the mode of intellect," distinguishes the generation of the Son of God from the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son not in the mode of intellect but of will (*voluntas*), as will be declared below.² Finally, that last phrase, "with a perfect likeness of nature," not only excludes the metaphorical (among which is that which takes place by adoption), and any other generation so called in a more general sense, which is wont to be opposed to corruption in the genus and is defined as a change from not-being to being; but moreover denotes the singular perfection of Divine generation, whereby it is distinguished from the generation of animate things, and even of man, which among creatures is the most perfect.

§ 3. For Divine generation surpasses even this in perfection immeasurably; which is shown thus. A man begets a man of the same nature with himself, and also for the most part similar as regards qualities; yet not in such a way but that the singular nature is diverse in number in the begetter and in the begotten, being the same only in species. But also as to the qualities, although many are similar, yet many others can likewise be named dissimilar; and granted that all are similar, nevertheless none at all in both can be found as numerically the same. But in the Divine, with this alone excepted—that this one begot, that one is begotten—both the nature and all the properties, which indeed are not distinct from the nature in reality, are absolutely the same in number in the begetter and in the begotten; so much so that no more perfect likeness or agreement of nature between the begetter and the begotten can be conceived.

§ 4. Therefore, in order to take some sort of knowledge of this most perfect generation, we ought in thought to remove whatever in the generation of a creature is imperfect, but to retain whatever is perfect. Now, the perfections are these: that each—both the begetter and the begotten—is a thing subsisting in itself; indeed, in men, each is a person; that the begetter communicates to the begotten his own essence together

with properties; and conversely, that the begotten receives from the begetter the essence together with properties; and that the begotten is made like to the begetter according to essence and properties. But the imperfections are these: that the begetter is prior in time to the begotten; that he does not communicate to the begotten the numerically same nature together with properties; that the begotten is at first weak and powerless, and only by degrees thereafter receives increase; that it receives a nature not numerically the same but only specifically transfused from the begetter, nor the numerically same properties, but only specifically; and indeed very often it is, as regards properties, very dissimilar to the begetter; that the generation itself takes place from matter; that it takes place by the separation of a part, or by the cutting-off of seed; that it is successive and on account of the prior alterations in the matter necessarily requires a delay of time; that it proceeds from not-being to being; that in it there is found change both of the begetter and of the begotten, and of the subject matter itself; finally, that it is done *ad extra*, that is, toward producing that which is other and different from the producer. If all these things are in thought removed from generation (for none of these belongs to the proper formal character (*ratio*) of generation), it will be possible in some measure to grasp with the mind what generation is in the Divine, and already from what has been said how great its perfection is. This also is manifest: that in the Divine the words "Father" and "Son" are employed not by some transference taken from creatures, but properly, indeed most properly of all. For the propriety of these names follows the propriety of generation, which we have now shown to be most perfect in the Divine.

§ II — Whether generation in the Divine is rightly called conception (An generatio in Divinis recte vocetur conceptio?)

§ 5. Proof: it is proved from Prov. 8: "The depths were not yet, I was already conceived." Again, generation (*generatio*) is a procession after the manner of intellect; but such a procession is called the mind's conception (*conceptio*). Again, the Son of God is the Word; but a word is properly said to be conceived. On the contrary, conception sounds something imperfect, namely the reception of matter in the womb, that it may be formed into a fetus. It is answered: every imperfection here is to be removed, and only the perfect to be retained. And one must see whether conception in its proper formal character includes anything imperfect. For certainly the conception of the mind does not seem to include anything imperfect.

§ 6. Maximus says (Homily 6 on the Nativity of the Lord) that Christ proceeded from God the Father without conception. It is answered: he understands the conception of the Mother; for it follows: "For what He is as God, He is the Only-begotten of the Father alone; what He is as man, He is the son of the mother alone."⁴

§ III — Whether the Divine generation can be understood by us (An possit a nobis intelligi generatio Divina?)

§ 7. The Fathers seem commonly to affirm that the eternal generation (*generatio*) of the Son of God cannot be understood by us. For Hilary says, book 1 (On the Trinity): "Let not man think that by his understanding he can attain to the secret of the generation." And he also in book 12 (about the middle) holds that for this reason alone, that it is eternal, that generation cannot be comprehended by us.⁵ Likewise Ambrose, book 1 (On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 5.): "For me, it is impossible to know the secret of the generation: the mind fails, the voice

is silent—not mine only, but the Angels," etc., which the Master recites, dist. 9, § 11. And consonant with these the same Ambrose writes, book 4 (on Luke, at that [passage], ch. 5: "Put out into the deep").⁶ The same is affirmed by Prudentius (in the Apotheosis against the Unionitas).⁷ The same also other Fathers, employing to this end that testimony of the Prophet Is. 53: "Who shall declare His generation?" For Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria (in a letter to Alexander of Constantinople, which is extant among the writers of ecclesiastical history), Augustine (On the Creed to the Catechumens, book 1, ch. 3; book 2, ch. 3), Chrysostom (Hom. 1 On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, tom. 5), and in the same author, the Author of the Imperfect Work (On Matthew, hom. 1), Leo (Sermon 9 On the Nativity of the Lord), and many others take this as said of the eternal generation of the Son of God.⁸ To this also the Church accommodates that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 11: "O the depth of the riches," etc. And without doubt what they say about the generation of the Son, they wish also to pertain to the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit.

§ 8. However, this doctrine of the Fathers is to be taken not about just any cognition or understanding of the Divine generation, but about the full and perfect [cognition], which they call comprehension (*comprehensio*). For these things are said by the Fathers against the Arians, who, wishing to comprehend the mode of the Divine generation and not content with simple understanding according to the Catholic faith, were putting forward various modes of generation in creatures, by which they thought to show that the Son could not be begotten of the Father in such wise that He would be consubstantial with Him and coeternal at once; not noticing that it cannot happen that there be some creature which perfectly represents that which is in God, and therefore that there is need, for a more perfect representation, that likenesses drawn from many things be conjoined, so that what is lacking to one another may supply—just as Augustine teaches.⁹

§ 9. Whence, that the Son of God may be shown consubstantial with the Father, He is compared to the son of man; that He may be shown coeternal, He is compared to splendor; that He may be shown perfectly like, He is compared to the image rebounding in a pure mirror; that He may be shown begotten immaterially, He is compared to the word of the mind; and yet even all these taken together, however perfect in their own order, cannot perfectly express the mode of the thing for the sake of which they are assumed, as from the above it is sufficiently clear.

§ 10. Nor indeed does Jerome conflict with these things, who, writing on Ecclesiastes, says that the pronoun "who" is not always taken in the Scriptures for the impossible but for the difficult (for which the Master in distinction 9 has "most often"), adducing this same example from Isaiah: "Who shall declare His generation?" For the same Jerome (at the beginning of his Commentary on Matthew) from this very sentence of the Prophet asserts the generation of the Divinity to be impossible to express. And it is established elsewhere in the Sacred Scriptures that by the pronoun "who" the impossible is signified, as in Ps. 82: "O God, who is like to Thee?" and in Ps. 88: "Who is the man that shall live and shall not see death?" and the like.¹⁰

§ 11. Therefore it seems one must say that Jerome—where he says "always," for that let it be "for the most part" or "almost always"—was speaking either of the imperfect declaring of the Divine generation, or certainly of the generation of Christ according to the flesh; for it ought to seem absurd that he should in different places interpret the prophetic sentence of one and the same passage of a different generation, while in one and the same place, namely in the Commentary on Isaiah 53, he brings forward both expositions of that sentence: "Either," he says, "it can be taken of His Divinity, that it is impossible to know the mysteries of the Divine Birth, or of the Birth of the Virgin, that it can with difficulty be expounded." For both Pope Leo in Sermons 3 and 9 On the Nativity of the Lord refers the Prophecy to each of Christ's nativities. And Augustine, in a

Sermon on the Season, says that it is difficult to judge with which generation rather that saying ought to be taken. And perhaps neither exposition is [the intended one], but some third, whereby namely it is referred to the generation of the sons of God by adoption, that is, to the propagation and multiplication of the Church of Christ, according to that which likewise is said: "He shall see a long-lived seed; he shall see and shall be saved"; so that the sense is: "Who shall be able to number His generation?" But let us return to the question treated by the Master.¹¹

***§ IV — Whether the power and will of begetting also belong to the Son?
(Utrum potentia & voluntas gignendi competat etiam Filio?)***

§ 12. Once upon a time the Arians, wishing to prove that the Son was not equal in power, nor that the will of both was the same, used to object to the Catholics an argument of this sort: The Father could and willed to beget the Son; but the Son could not beget a Son, nor did He will it; therefore the Father could and willed something which the Son neither could nor willed; and consequently the Father and the Son are neither equal in power nor of the same will. The Catholics were asked whether it must be confessed and held that there belongs also to the Son the power and will of begetting (*potentia gignendi* and *voluntas gignendi*): which to some seems necessary, in order that they may defend the all-round equality of Father and Son.

§ 13. However, that this difficulty may be set right, one must carefully distinguish in God between power (*potentia*) and the power of begetting (*potentia gignendi*), and again between will (*voluntas*) and the will of begetting (*voluntas gignendi*). For power and will, if nothing else be added, signify principles of operating and of effecting something—the former indeed a remote principle, the latter a proximate. For when to power there accrues will, then at length the work is brought about. The act of both, therefore, of power as well as of will, is to do or to work something. But that is done either from pre-existing matter or from nothing. From which it is understood that the power and will of God are referred to creatures, which are brought about by both, not to the Divine Persons, of whom none can be said to be a thing made. And this is what the theologians hand down: that the power and will of God are principles of God's actions *ad extra* (that is, of those which God exercises in things placed outside His own essence). Having before his eyes this proper signification of power, Hilary had (in the book *On the Synods*), where he diligently distinguishes between that which is done by power or might, and that which is [done] by nature. For thus he has it (in the declaration of the fifth anathema of the Eastern bishops): "Every birth into nature consists from a begetting nature; but creation takes its beginning from the power of the one creating—namely, that the powerful Creator should establish a creature out of nothing." And a little after: "He who creates, brings about what he fashions according to power; and creation is a work of might, not of nature; birth is from a begetting nature." So he. From which it is clear that in the Divine [things] "power" is not properly said with respect to generation, nor "will" either, but only with respect to those actions which are carried on about things different from God, to be created or already created. Which operations, since they are common to the whole Trinity, it will now be easy to understand how, notwithstanding that the power and will of begetting are not common to the Son with the Father, yet there is absolutely the same power, and the same will, of the Father and of the Son; and how whatsoever the Father can and wills, all the same things the Son can and wills; and similarly must it be said of the Holy Spirit. On which matter, expressly and at Distinction 20, everything [...] will be treated.

§ 14. But if to power and will you add the term "of begetting," as it is in the proposed question, then these words, "power" and "will," alienated from their proper and native signification, are transferred to signify the principle of begetting; which indeed is not common to the three Persons, but is proper to the Father. Nor is it something attributed to the Divine essence, but [it is] the principle of a notional act (*actus notionalis*). Therefore now it does not follow: To the Father there belongs a power of begetting which does not [belong] to the Son; therefore the Father can something which the Son [cannot]: and similarly of the will. For in the antecedent there is assumed an alienating determination. But you will add that saying of Augustine, book 3 (Against Maximinus, ch. 7): "Where is the omnipotence of God the Father, if He could not beget an equal Son?" I answer that Augustine speaks improperly. For omnipotence properly has regard to actions ad extra, as was declared above, and is common to the three Persons. Augustine, however, under that name at once comprehends a certain power proper to the Father, which is the power of begetting. To signify which he did not say simply, "Where is the omnipotence of God," but added, "of the Father." Moreover it pertains to the power of the Father, as He is Father, that is, to the power of begetting, to beget another equal to Himself according to nature.

§ V — The comparison of two opinions concerning the power of begetting (Collatio duarum opinionum circa potentiam generandi)

§ 15. With the foregoing difficulty to be explained, the Doctors vary somewhat. For the Master in this Distinction, and after him St. Thomas (question 41, article 5), to whom also Scotus seems to subscribe, teach that the power of begetting (*potentia generandi*) is indeed proper to the Father and does not befit the Son; yet not insofar as it is a power, but insofar as it is of begetting—that is, not on account of that which is signified in the direct case, but on account of that which is signified in the oblique. In their view the power of begetting principally signifies an attribute of the Divine Nature, but, from an adjunct, a relation. Hence they also hold that the power of begetting belongs to the Father by reason of the Divine Nature, although the very act of begetting belongs to Him by reason of the person. They confirm this opinion by three arguments especially, of which this is the first: in created things the power of begetting belongs to the supposit by reason of nature, as to a man by reason of human nature; therefore also in divine things the power of begetting belongs to the Father by reason of the Divine Nature. The second: The begotten is like to the begetter in that, by reason of which, generation comes about; but the Son is not like to the Father according to personal property, but according to nature—which is evident as much in man as in God; therefore generation comes about not by reason of the person, but of nature. The third is from the authority of Hilary and John Damascene: the former, in book 5 (On the Trinity, near the end), bears witness that God, begotten of God, is begotten by the power and might of nature; he infers: "Therefore the birth of God cannot but hold the nature from which it has proceeded." Damascene, moreover, in book I (On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 8), says that generation is a work of nature.¹⁶

§ 16. Furthermore, the opinion of others, whose authors are St. Bonaventure and Durandus, attributes the power of begetting to the Father by reason of a personal property (*proprietas personalis*), such that the power of begetting also principally signifies something personal, not essential. This granted, it follows that not only the act of begetting, but also the power of that act, belongs to the Father, not as He is God, but as He is such a person. This opinion is proved by the same reasons by which the other is impugned, of which this is the first: if the power belongs to the Father by reason of nature; since the nature is common to the Son, it follows

that the power of begetting would also befit the Son. Nor does the reply seem sufficiently apt to this argument, if, with the Master, you say that the power of begetting which is in the Father is the same as the power of being begotten (*potentia nascendi*) which is in the Son; both because the power of begetting is a power of acting, which the power of being begotten is not; and because it is absurd to presuppose in that which is begotten some power before it is brought to exist—since by the very generation it receives, together with nature, all its power. This matter can easily be understood from the analogy of creatures.

§ 17. A second reason: to one asking why the Father begets, it is not rightly answered, "Because He is God." For thus it would be necessary that the Son also beget, who also is God; therefore, to one asking why the Father can beget, similarly the answer is not rendered, "Because He is God." For from this likewise, by an entirely similar argument, it would follow that the Son also can beget, since He also is God. A third: to beget befits the Father by reason of the power of begetting; therefore, just as begetting is proper and personal, so also is the power of begetting. For that which is common to many cannot be the, especially adequate, formal character of that which is proper to one—which formal character is the power of begetting conjoined with the will. These reasons, while they show the former opinion to be improbable, so much the more strongly confirm the latter. According to which also—as was declared in the preceding chapter—the immoderate importunity of the heretics is much more easily met, by replying that the power and will of begetting in God are not absolutely a power and a will, but only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*).

§ 18. But the arguments of the former opinion can be solved in this way. First indeed, because it is not true, if we speak properly, that in created things the power of begetting belongs by reason of nature or essence, but rather by reason of a certain natural property, namely fecundity, with which nature is read not to have been endowed in the very creation, but afterward by God (Gen. 1). Whence also nature in many subsists without such a faculty.

§ 19. To the second, thus is it answered: in order that likeness be established between the begetter and the begotten, it is not necessary that generation take place by reason of the nature in which they are alike, but it suffices that the begetter be in such a nature as he communicates to the begotten, or conversely that he communicate to the begotten such a nature as he himself has. But this holds even if the power of begetting belongs to the Father by reason of a personal property. Otherwise, by that argument, not only the power but also the act of begetting would be shown to be of nature, not of person.

§ 20. To the last: how Hilary's words are to be taken we have left evident from those things which were said above around Distinction 5; meanwhile we add this, that Hilary by the "virtue and power of nature" understands nothing other than natural fecundity, which we say is proper to the begetter alone. For he signifies that which is admitted by all in common confession: that the Father produces the Son by mode of nature, that is, of natural fecundity. And the same reply is to be given to Damascene. Whence neither do these Fathers say that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by the power of nature, or that spiration is a work of nature; which nevertheless, by the same line of reasoning, they could have said, if by "nature" they had wished to signify nothing other than the essence.

§ VI — Against those who say that the Son could have begotten, but was unwilling (*Contra eos, qui dicunt Filium potuisse gignere, sed noluisse*)

§ 21. There was the opinion of certain men that in the Divine things the power of begetting (*potentia gignendi*) truly belongs to the Son. Whence they also admitted that He could have begotten another Son, but was unwilling; leaning on the authority of St. Augustine, who, in Book 3 (Against Maximinus, ch. 12), denying that for this reason the Father is more powerful than the Son, namely because the Father begot but the Son did not beget, subjoins this reasoning: for, he says, "neither was He unable, but it was not fitting. For the Divine generation would have been immoderate," etc.¹⁸ But these men by this reply do not yet escape the snares of the Arians. For although they admit that the Son could have begotten, they nevertheless deny that He willed this; and thus for them there still remains the consequent that the Son, if not lesser in power, is at least different in will (*voluntas*) from the Father, since the Father wills to beget, but the Son is unwilling.

§ 22. Next, moreover, it is in itself absurd to ascribe to the Son the power of begetting without will and act (*actus*). First, because in the Divine and eternal things the being-able (*posse*) and the being (*esse*) are the same; if therefore a generation can be from the Son, it follows that it is. Second, because if we suppose that that power is only now at length reduced to act, it will follow that the person begotten is not coeternal with the begetter: wherefore neither will he be God, and consequently neither of the same nature with the begetter. But if this is so, that will not be generation in the true sense of the name, but the production of some creature. Whence it would still follow that the Son is not equal to the Father according to power, if the Father can beget God from Himself, but the Son cannot. Third, because in men the power of begetting sons and grandsons exists partly that a perfection which is not communicated to one son may be communicated to another or to others, and conversely; partly that by the continuous propagation of others from others nature may be perpetuated; neither of which has, nor can have, any use in the Divine things. For the Only-begotten Son of God both is the most perfect image of the Father and is coeternal with the Father. Wherefore it would be vain to posit in the Son a similar power. Fourth, because if to the Son there is ascribed the power of begetting without will and act, it will be permissible to ascribe the same also to the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*): it will be permissible also to ascribe to the Father the power of begetting many Sons, and likewise with respect to the power of spirating. All which things are utterly alien from Catholic sense.

§ 23. But as to what Augustine's words mean, the Master (of the Sentences) rightly explains. For their sense is as if he had said: not because He could not, but because it was not fitting; that is, that the fact that the Son did not beget another Son did not occur from a defect of power—that is, from some impotence or weakness of the Son—but from this, that it does not befit the excellence of the Divine Nature that the Son begotten from the Father should from Himself beget another Son. Therefore that negation, "non potuit," in Augustine's words is to be taken not strictly negatively, but privatively, so as to signify an impotence and weakness which in every way are to be removed both from the Son and from the Father.

1. S. Thom. 1. p. q. 27. art. 28 [abbreviation as in source].

2. See below, Distinctio 10 and Distinctio 13 [abbreviation as in source].

3. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 2.

4. Maximus, Homily 6 on the Nativity of the Lord.

5. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* I; St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* XII (midway).
6. St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* I, ch. 5; The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, dist. 9, § 11; St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* IV, on Luke 5 ("Duc in altum").
7. Prudentius, *Apotheosis contra Unionitas* [abbreviation as in source].
8. Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, *Epistle to Alexander of Constantinople* (extant among writers of ecclesiastical history) [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De symbolo ad catechumenos* I, ch. 3; II, ch. 3; St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 De incomprehensibili Dei natura*, tom. 5; Author of the *Opus imperfectum* (on Matthew), hom. 1; Pope Leo the Great, *Sermon 9 On the Nativity of the Lord*.
9. St. Augustine, *Sermon 38 De verbis Domini*, chs. 5, 9, 10.
10. St. Jerome, *In Ecclesiasten* (on Ecclesiastes), on the pronoun "quis"; The Master (of the Sentences), distinction 9: "saepissime" [abbreviation as in source]; St. Jerome, *Preface/Beginning of the Commentary on Matthew*; Scripture references: Ps. 82: "Deus, quis similis tibi?"; Ps. 88: "Quis est homo qui vivet, et non videbit mortem?".
11. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Isaiah 53*; Pope Leo the Great, *Sermons 3 and 9 On the Nativity of the Lord*; St. Augustine, *Sermo de tempore* [as in source].
12. S. Thom. 1. p. q. 41. ar. 6. 5. 6 [abbreviation as in source].
13. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Synodis*; specifically, the declaration of the fifth anathema of the Eastern bishops.
14. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum III*, ch. 7.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 5.
16. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* V, near the end; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 8.
17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 5 [ubi sup. in source].
18. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum III*, ch. 12.

DISTINCTIO VIII — HOW "TO BE" BELONGS TRULY AND PROPERLY TO GOD ALONE; AND WHAT NAME IS MOST PROPER TO GOD (QUOMODO SOLI DEO COMPETAT VERE, AC PROPRIE ESSE; ET QUOD NOMEN DEO MAXIME PROPRIUM?)

§ I — How "to be" belongs truly and properly to God alone (Quomodo soli Deo competat vere, ac proprie esse)

§ 1. For the understanding of the excellence of the Divine Nature (*Natura Divina*), that consideration helps first of all whereby one reflects how "to be" (*esse*) belongs truly and properly to God alone. For although God is incomprehensible and hence ineffable, and therefore cannot be enunciated by a proper word which would perfectly declare His nature to us—according to that saying in Prov. 30: "Quod nomen est ejus, quod nomen Filii ejus, si nosti?"—and it is by far easier, as St. Augustine bears witness, to say about God what He is not than what He is,² nevertheless, that we might, in some measure, be raised to behold the invisible things of God by those that are made, Sacred Scripture has used many metaphors and other improper locutions taken from the creature, and sometimes also certain words which more properly come close to declaring the excellence of that supreme Nature. Among which, as it were by way of principle, St. Augustine chose the name "essence" (*essentia*).³

§ 2. For the term "substance" (*substantia*) seemed to the same Augustine less apt for signifying the Nature of God, because, being said from "to stand under" (*substare*), it suggests something which either underlies or is subjected to accidental forms or to genera. Wherefore it does not by any means signify the simple and bare "to-be" of the thing, as the name "essence" does. And what in Greek is called οὐσία, one ought better and more properly to translate, with Quintilian, as "essence" rather than "substance," to which in Greek ὑπόστασις properly corresponds—if the etymon of each word is to be followed.⁴

§ 3. Moreover, Scripture claims the property of "being" for God in many places. For in Exod. 3, to Moses asking about His own name, God answered: "Ego sum qui sum"; and again: "Sic dices Filiis Israel: 'Qui est' misit me ad vos." And although in the Hebrew there is read a verb of the future tense, yet both the Seventy Interpreters and Jerome rightly rendered the present tense. For among the Hebrews it is customary to use the future tense, as a kind of common tense, for others and especially for the present. It was rendered the more significantly by the Seventy, who prefixed the article to the present participle, as if it were saying, "the Being" (*ille Ens*). And from this place of Scripture John Damascene proves that of all the names that are said of God the most principal is this which we have just mentioned.⁵ Christ Himself signified the same in the Gospel when, wishing to intimate His divinity to the Jews, He used the present tense of the same verb when

He was speaking of the past according to our mode of understanding, saying: "Antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum" (Jn. 8). Add that the Prophet Job once and again attributes "to be" to God alone, as in ch. 14: "Nonne tu, qui solus es," and in ch. 23: "Ipse enim solus est." To this also pertains that all created things are said to be as nothing in comparison with God, as in Is. 40: "Omnes gentes, quasi non sint, sic sunt coram Deo, et quasi nihilum et inane reputatae sunt ei"; and in Dan. 4: "Omnes habitatores terrae apud Deum in nihilum reputati sunt." If then all things, except God, are as nothing, God alone truly and properly is.

§ 4. Wherefore St. Augustine rightly concludes, in the book On Faith and the Creed, with the Lord's words alleged to Moses (Exod. 3), that of God alone this word "Is" (*Est*) can be said properly.⁶ Rightly also Isidore, and after him Rabanus, on that place of Exodus ("Qui est misit me ad vos")—whose words under the title of Jerome the Master reports—said that God alone truly holds the name of essence, because, in comparison with Him, He truly is, because He is immutable; those things which are mutable are not: thus they conclude, "Therefore God alone truly is; our being, compared with essence, is not."⁷ Sentences of this kind are also met with elsewhere in the Fathers.

§ 5. But it is clear from what has been said that "to be" is ascribed to God alone not as though the rest were not, but because that very "to be" belongs to Him in a most excellent mode, and in a way it does not belong to any of the creatures, and this in multiple respects. First, because it belongs to Him always; whereas those things which at some time were not—namely all creatures—and, much more, those which at some time will perish, do not thus belong. Secondly, because it belongs to Him necessarily, whereas absolutely nothing among created things is necessary. Whence St. Gregory of Nyssa says that all things besides God are contingent.⁸ But those things recede yet further from this perfection of God which are contingent also according to created causes, subject to rise and fall. Thirdly, because it belongs to Him immutably; whereas, according to whatever change you consider, creatures are mutable, as will be shown below. Now this belongs to no creature, not even to the blessed. For all are mutable in their own nature and in reality are changed in some respect. Fourthly, because it belongs to Him absolutely speaking; for this mode of being, as it belongs, can belong to no creature. Lastly, because not even any mode of being, however imperfect, can belong to a creature, except from God—who most perfectly is—giving and conserving: for which reason He is called by the Fathers the fountain of being.

§ 6. Why, moreover, among all the things that are predicated of God, the name of "essence" most of all demonstrates the excellence of the Deity (*Deitas*), there are two most cogent reasons. The former: because "to be" (*esse*) signifies a thing exempt from any determination either of time, or of place, or of quality, or of any other accident whatsoever; and for that very reason this word serves most to signify the state of His nature which is eternal, immense, infinite, simple, immutable, subjected to no accidents, encompassed by no spaces of place. Whence John Damascene, in rendering the account of this Divine name in Moses, says: "For the whole name, comprehending itself, has the very 'to be'—as though it were a certain ocean of substance, infinite and, as it were, without boundary."⁵

§ 7. The latter: because "to be" signifies act (*actus*), not potency (*potentia*). Hence it is most properly ascribed to Him who is only in act and in no way in potency. The consideration of this matter very greatly avails for understanding the pre-eminence of the Divine Nature over the rest. And although other attributes, such as wisdom, goodness, justice, and the like, signify acts and perfections, yet not in that mode in which essence does, which signifies act not as contracted to a certain genus, as those do, but altogether generally and simply: and therefore it more avails to indicate the nature of God, in which all the perfections signified by

other names are in reality one act, one perfection. But what Dionysius teaches in the book *On the Divine Names* (ch. 1 and the following), that the appellation "good" belongs to God in a peculiar manner above all, as primary and most perfect—and Damascene also bears witness (where cited above) with these words: "As St. Dionysius says, the primary name of God is 'good'; for it is not first to be said of God that He is 'being', but 'good' itself"—this, I say, is not at variance with what has been said above.⁹ For St. Dionysius speaks there, and Damascene in conformity with him, of God not insofar as He is in Himself, but insofar as by reason of His goodness He also diffuses Himself outside Himself, namely, by offering Himself to be participated by others. Which He chiefly does by reason of goodness, for the good is self-diffusive.

§ II — What name is most proper to God? (Quod nomen Deo maxime proprium?)

§ 8. From what has been said one can answer the one who asks which name, among those that are ascribed to God in Sacred Scripture, is most proper to Him. For if, as has now been said, the term "essence" (*essentia*) is most fitting for indicating the nature of God, that name by which essence, or "to be" (*esse*), is signified is most proper to God.

§ 9. Now among these there are two, among the ten which are enumerated and expounded by St. Jerome in the *Epistle to Marcella*, namely the sixth and the ninth.¹¹ The sixth is "Qui est," in Exod. 3, of which we have spoken above. The ninth is the Name which, from the number of its letters, is called the Tetragrammaton (*τετραγράμματον*), and on account of reverence the Jews are wont to abstain from pronouncing it outside the solemn ceremonies, and it has been called "ineffable" by the Fathers, both Greek and Latin. For the Jews, whenever this name occurred in reading, following a custom received from the ancients, were wont to pronounce in its place "Adonai," which means Lord, and sometimes "Elohim," which signifies God or "gods." This Jerome too imitated in his version at Exod. 3 in these words: "Ego Dominus qui apparui Abraham, Isaac, et Jacob in Deo omnipotente, et nomen meum Adonai non indicavi eis." For in Hebrew, in place of Adonai, it is Jehovah; as also, in place of omnipotent, Shaddai. Which name, among those of God, Jerome places in the tenth place in the *Epistle to Marcella*.¹² Although the same Jerome at Exod. 15 rendered Jehovah as "omnipotent," when he says: "Omnipotens, nomen ejus"; while the Seventy have translated in both places, as elsewhere, Κύριος, that is, "Dominus."¹³

§ 10. The learned in the Hebrew language judge that this word "Jehovah" is derived from "to be," and indeed from that very Hebrew word of which we have, in Exod. 3, "Qui est"; so that truly these two, "Qui est" and "Jehovah," are not among the Hebrews diverse names of God, but one and the same, expressed by a derivation a little differently. Though others prefer that by this latter name something more is signified than by the former; namely, "Him who so is that He also causes to be," that is, Him who is the principle and, as it were, the fountain of being to other things. Whence, not without reason, this name too is attributed to God as most proper. And this also was signified through the Prophet Isaiah, in whom (ch. 42) God thus speaks: "Ego Dominus, hoc est nomen meum." For in that place, as elsewhere throughout, the word is Jehovah.

§ 11. But a scruple remains about the understanding of the place, Exod. 3. For it is asked how by this name, Jehovah, God was not known to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, since both the very name was uttered to them by the mouth of God, as in Gen. 15, when He says: "Ego Dominus [Hebraice: Jehovah], qui eduxit te de Ur Chaldaeorum"; nor is it to be doubted that they grasped also the signification of this name, knowing that

God is such a Being as to be the fountain of every being. Nor, indeed, can the answer of those be approved who say that to those ancient Patriarchs a certain mystery, veiled, was unknown, and that twofold: namely, the mystery of the Trinity in God and of the future humanity in Christ. For they will have it that by the first three letters the three Divine Persons were signified; by the fourth, which is the same as the second, the Incarnation of the second Person, that is, of the Son of God, was signified. This Person, on account of the twofold Nature, Divine and human, they judge to be set down twice. But not even these mysteries were hidden from the holy Patriarchs, especially from Abraham, the father of all who believe. For this man, when three Men appeared to him (Gen. 18), adored One in the three, namely, recognising one God in three Persons (as many of the Fathers have understood that place), as the Church also sings of him: "Tres vidit et unum adoravit." Nor did he ignore the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ, to whom concerning Christ to be born of his seed the promise was made more than once; and of whom Christ Himself says (Jn. 8): "Abraham exultavit ut videret diem meum, et vidit et gavisus est."

§ 12. Accordingly others answer better, that what was said to Moses is to be referred not to the signification of the words, but to the declaration of the realities signified. For "Shaddai" signifies "powerful" or "sufficient"; "Jehovah," however, "Him who causes to be." The former indicates power alone; the latter joins act to power. The sense, therefore, seems to be this: to those ancient Patriarchs it was sufficiently persuaded that I am omnipotent, nor did they doubt that whatever I promised I both could and would make good. Whence also their faith in things promised is commended (Heb. 11). Yet I did not display to them works of my power so manifest and so illustrious as those which through you I am now going to display. For the things that God displayed through Moses are the most admirable of all those which the Old Scripture contains. Whence also in the Psalms by David, and by others elsewhere, they are often commemorated.

§ 13. More on the name of God that is most proper is to be seen in St. Thomas I, q. 13, a. 11, and in Paul of Burgos on Exod. 3, who treats this matter at length; where also he contends that the Tetragrammaton is more proper to God than the name "Qui est": for whose reasons let the studious reader consult him.¹

§ III — How the past and the future are attributed to God (Quomodo praeteritum, & futurum Deo tribuantur)

§ 14. When a verb is attributed to God, by far the most proper is that of the present time (*praesentis temporis*), by which namely there is signified the eternal and immutable stability and the stable eternity (*aeternitas*) of the divine essence (*essentia divina*), in which there is nothing past, nothing future; hence it follows that words of the past and of the future tense are attributed to God either not truly or less properly. Not truly, if they are understood with emphasis, that is, with the exclusion of the present time; in the way in which it was said by the Poet: "We were Trojans, Troy was," and by the Apostle in Ephesians 5: "You were once darkness"; likewise 1 Corinthians 6: "And such indeed were you."¹⁵ In this way St. Augustine at times teaches that of God it cannot be said "was" and "will be," but only "is"; because what was, now is not, and what will be, is not yet (as in the book On Faith and the Creed, ch. 4; and in the book Eighty-Three Questions, q. 17).¹⁶ So too the words cited by the Master are to be understood, in which it is said that God only is, who does not know of having been, or of being to be. Which words are not Jerome's, to whom the Master ascribes them, but Isidore's, as we noted above.

§ 15. Truly, however, but less properly, the same words are attributed to God if understood without the exclusion of the present time. Truly indeed, because thus Scripture speaks: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"; and in the Apocalypse, ch. 1: "Who is, and who was, and who is to come." Which was said to signify the sempiternity (*sempiternitas*) of God, according to that whereby in the same place He is called "Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning, the end"; as if He were lacking to no time, but were to embrace all times by His eternity. Likewise, ch. 4: "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God almighty, who was, and who is, and who is to come"; and again ch. 11: "Who art, and who wast, and who art to come": "to come," however, that is, "to be future."¹⁷ Whence Augustine, Tractate 99 on John (on that passage of ch. 16, "What things soever He shall hear, He shall speak"): "Although," he says, "that immutable, ineffable Nature does not receive 'was' and 'will be,' but only 'is,' nevertheless on account of the mutability of times in which our mortality is engaged, we do not speak falsely when we say both 'was' and 'is' and 'will be': He was in past ages; He is in the present; He will be in the future. He was, because He never failed; He is, because He always is; He will be, because He will never fail. According to human locution varied by times, of Him who could not, cannot, and will not be absent at any times, the words of any time are truly said." So he.¹⁸

§ 16. Less properly, however, "was" and "will be" are attributed to Him—as can be understood from those same words of Augustine—because words of the past and of the future tense were devised to signify changes of things which are measured by time and pass away with time. But in God there is nothing liable to change, nothing subject to time; to whom therefore the word of the present time alone is most aptly and most properly attributed, as being most fitting for signifying the Divine eternity. And this also is made clear from the congruence which the present time has with eternity: for the present time is so called by reason of the present moment (which we call the instant, *instans*) which couples the past part of time with the future; and since it is one and indivisible, it exists all at once; so too eternity, since it is one and indivisible, exists all at once. With this difference, however, that the instant of time passes, but eternity remains; wherefore you would rightly call it a certain never-passing instant, but ever remaining, which they call the instant of eternity. For which reason the verb "Is" is even more properly congruent for signifying eternity than for signifying the present time: because eternity always is, whereas the present time does not always exist, but passes into the past. To this line of reasoning it is manifest that Augustine had regard in Confessions, book 9, ch. 10, when he said: "'To have been' and 'to be going to be' are therefore not in the Divine Wisdom, but only 'to be'; because it is eternal." Which Jerome signified in the Epistle to Damasus, the beginning of which is: "Since by the ancient..."¹⁹

§ I — That the nature of God is immutable (Incommutabilem esse Dei naturam)

§ 17. From what was shown above, that God is most properly ipsum esse (*ipsum esse*), it follows that the nature of God (*Dei natura*) is immutable (*incommutabilis*), that is, liable to no change (*mutatio*) whatsoever. For where there is some change, there is not there an to-be (*esse*) in every way stable and perfect, but now being, now not being, whether absolutely speaking or in a qualified sense. But this must now be proved more fully both from Scripture and from reason. The Scriptures are manifest: Mal. 3, "I, the Lord, and I do not change"; Ps. 101, "Thou wilt change them, and they shall be changed, but Thou art the self-same"; Jas. 1, "With whom there is no transmutation, nor shadow of vicissitude." To this pertains also what the Apostle says

in 1 Tim. 6, "Who alone has immortality": in the manner in which St. Augustine expounds that, in the first book of De Trinitate, ch. 1, and in the third book Contra Maximinum, ch. 12, and St. Bernard in Sermon 81 on the Song of Songs.²¹ The rationale of whose interpretation is, because, as Augustine says, "Every change is a certain death"; and, as Bernard says, "Every change is a certain imitation of death; and everything that is changed, in a certain manner dies." For it is corrupted according to the form which it loses, just as it is generated according to the form which it acquires.

§ 18. Further, the same is shown by reason as follows. That some thing is mutable happens either from the greater power of another, or from the impotence of the very thing. In the former way, indeed, in two ways: if either another can absolutely change it (in the way in which the sun is moved, not because it needs motion, but on account of a more powerful cause that impresses motion upon it), or the cause conserving it withdraws itself from it and ceases to conserve. In the latter ways, if the thing itself strives to obtain a perfection which it does not have, or if it cannot conserve that which it has. Since therefore nothing is more powerful than God, and since there is in Him no imperfection that He should cast off, and no perfection is lacking to Him that He should acquire, it follows that no change at all can befall Him; but it can befall all creatures, since there is none of them which is not subject to a more powerful cause, and which cannot lose or acquire perfection.

§ 19. Another reason is added. For if God is changed, He is changed either for the better or for the worse—which both, since they are repugnant to His perfection, are absurd. Again another: If He is changed, either He acquires something or He loses something. But whatever is in God is His essence (*essentia*); therefore something begins or ceases to be the Divine essence—which likewise is absurd. Likewise another: God is pure act (*actus purus*), and in no way potency (*potentia*); but whatever is changed is in some way in potency; therefore God is not changed. Likewise another from Aristotle: "Whatever is moved is moved by another, until at length one arrives at some first unmoved mover." But this is God Himself; therefore God is not moved.²² Likewise another: Whatever is changed, in one respect remains, and in another passes over; for the subject remains, the form passes; but in God there is not one thing and another, since He is most simple; therefore He cannot be changed. Finally, this point can be declared by the several species of change. For He is not generated nor corrupted who is by nature eternal; He is not altered whose quality is His very essence; He is not increased nor diminished who is incorporeal; He is not changed in place who is wholly everywhere. Now this demonstration by natural reasons is so clear and evident that Augustine did not hesitate to say, in the last book Against Faustus, the last chapter, that it is implanted in every human mind by nature, provided only it is not disturbed by the depravity of perverse opinions, that the nature of God is altogether immutable.²³

§ V — That the will of God is immutable (Voluntatem Dei immutabilem esse)

§ 20. Since in God there is not one thing, essence or nature (*natura*), and another, will (*voluntas*)—as will be made more fully clear below, when the simplicity of God is treated—it is already sufficiently evident that the will of God is immutable, from this: because, as we have already shown, the nature of God is immutable.

§ 21. Now a change of will pertains to those changes which take place according to the affections of the soul, and it happens when someone at one time wills something, at another time does not will it, or at one time wills this, at another time that. For it is not the same thing to change the will and to will a change of certain things; as St. Thomas rightly teaches.²⁴ For not only God, but even in a certain way man too, with the same will remaining, can will that now this be done, and thereafter something else contrary to the former. But

then the will is changed, when someone begins to will what previously he did not will, or ceases to will what previously he willed. And this indeed, as St. Thomas hands on in the same place, cannot occur unless a change is presupposed either on the side of cognition (*cognitio*), or with respect to the disposition of the substance (*substantia*) of the will itself. For in two ways it happens that something becomes new to someone: either because something begins to be good to him—food to the hungry, heat to the cold, rest to the weary—or because he newly knows, or opines, something to be good for himself, whereas previously he thought otherwise. And in this latter way we are wont, in the case of man, to name a change of will, not so in the former; although that former occurs without a change of will, with one act and then another succeeding in him. But neither mode can obtain in God, in that both the substance of God and His knowledge (*scientia*) are altogether immutable; wherefore whatever God wills—of whatever sort are the things He does in time, although they are diverse and mutually contrary—He wills all by an eternal and immutable will.

§ 22. But that He never changes His will these Scriptures teach: Num. 23: "God is not as man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed. He said therefore, and shall He not do it? He hath spoken, and shall He not fulfil it?" 1 Kgs (1 Sam.) 15: "The Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and He will not be bent by repentance. For neither is He a man, that He should do penance." Ps. 113: "All things whatsoever He willed, He hath done." Ps. 32: "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever, the thoughts of His heart unto generation and generation." Is. 46: "My counsel shall stand; and all My will shall be done." 2 Cor. 1: "As many as are the promises of God, in Him is." From which and the like it is clear that the will and the counsel are never changed.

§ 23. Hence also St. Augustine, book 22 of the City (chapter 2), teaches that no new will befalls God which He did not have from eternity; but whatever things happen in time were from eternity prepared in His immutable will, which likewise is His eternal foreknowledge (*praescientia*).²⁵

§ VI — Reply to certain arguments to the contrary (Responsio ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta.)

§ 24. Now one must reply to those things which seem to argue some change (*mutatio*) in God, or in His will (*voluntas*); of which the first is this. The Catholic faith acknowledges and confesses the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both. But generation and procession are certain changes. It is answered: generation and procession in the Divine things are not changes. For in every change it happens that what was not begins to be, or that what was ceases to be, either absolutely speaking or in a qualified sense; but by generation and processions in the Divine reality the Son and the Holy Spirit did not at some time begin to be, but received to be from eternity: the Son indeed from the Father, but the Holy Spirit from the Father together with the Son.

§ 25. Second: in Wisdom 7, concerning the divine and uncreated Wisdom, it is said: "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobile things."²⁶ Reply. The sense is this: that the wisdom of God is nowhere absent, but by its presence and by its knowledge it penetrates all things and is intimately present to all, far more than any mobile and subtle body whatsoever (of which sort the air is especially) can insinuate itself within the pores of another body. This sense is indicated by what follows: "And she reacheth everywhere"; and again at the beginning of the next chapter: "She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily," and so forth.²⁷ To which sentence there is similar that of Heb. 4: "For the word of God is living and effectual, and more penetrating," and the rest.²⁸

§ 26. Third. In the Scriptures these and the like are everywhere attributed to God: to ascend, to descend, to walk, to come, and to draw near to us, and to withdraw from us. For also in the Symbol of Faith we confess that the Son of God, for our salvation, descended from heaven. But such words signify local motion. It is answered: all these things are not attributed to God properly, but figuratively, namely on account of certain effects which God begins to work, or ceases to work, in definite places or in definite men—to whom He is said to approach, or from whom He is said to withdraw. And sometimes also on account of the local motion of some thing which represents God. For in Gen. 3 God is said to have "walked in Paradise at the breeze after midday," because in a bodily appearance of one walking He presented Himself to the first human beings after they had sinned. Likewise, in 1 Kgs 7 He says that He "walked in the Tabernacle," and that He "passed through all the places with the sons of Israel."²⁹ And in Ps. 46 it is said of Him: "God ascended with jubilation," on account of the Ark of the testimony, in which the Lord presented Himself as present, by oracles and by the hearing of the prayers that were poured out there. But in that which is had in Gen. 11: "The Lord descended, that He might see the city. And again: The Lord said: Come, let us go down, and there let us confound their tongue," the Lord is said to descend, because He was about to work a certain peculiar work on earth, namely the confusion of tongues.³⁰ But that which in Gen. 18 the Lord says to Abraham concerning the Sodomites, "I will go down and will see whether they have done according to the cry that is come to Me," can be understood in either way. For both in bodily appearance the Lord was appearing to Abraham, and He was about to work the overthrow of Sodom; although what is said at the end of the same chapter, "And the Lord went His way, after He ceased to speak to Abraham," pertains only to the former way.³¹ Likewise, that which in the Symbol it is said that the Son of God descended from heaven is not to be taken as though, heaven being left behind, He had made for earth—He who never departed from the bosom of the Father, and by the presence of His Divinity fills all things. Nor was that said on account of the work of the Incarnation. For that work was common to the whole Trinity; yet neither the whole Trinity, nor the Father, nor the Holy Spirit descended from heaven, as can be said in a like sense: but this is said peculiarly of the Son, because He began to be on earth a man, which He had not been in heaven. Finally, God is said to draw near to us, Jas. 4, by the largess of grace, just as He is said to withdraw from us, Hos. 9, when He withdraws grace.³²

§ 27. Fourth. Scripture often attributes to God affections and perturbations like to human ones, such as to be angry, to grieve, to have mercy, to desire, to repent, and the like, which cannot be present without a transmutation of him in whom they are. For that such things are in God is signified by that Scripture (Gen. 6) which says that God "was touched by grief of heart within"; to which add that most often in Scripture God is said to remember and to forget—things which are not without change. It is answered: just as the members of the human body, so also the motions and perturbations of the human soul are ascribed to God figuratively and—speaking, as St. Jerome does in his Commentaries, anthropopathically—to signify certain works, such as among men are wont to be exercised by means of such members, or to proceed from such affections. For just as a "hand" is attributed to God on account of operation; an "eye" on account of knowledge; an "arm" on account of fortitude, and so forth; so He is said to be "angry" when He punishes, chastises, avenges, or threatens anything of that sort which angry men are wont to do; He is said to "have mercy" when He removes misery, or remits punishment, or bestows a benefit—which merciful men are wont to do; He is said to "repent" when He destroys a work which He had made before—which those are wont to do who repent of their deed—and so of the others. For that all such perturbations are absent from God, according to that of Wis. 12, "But Thou, being the Lord of power, judgest with tranquillity," St. Ambrose teaches (book On Noah and the Ark, ch. 4), Prosper on that Psalm, "And it repented Him according to the multitude of His mercy,"

St. Gregory (Morals, book 20, ch. 23, on that of Job 30, "Thou art changed to me into a cruel one")—which passage is worthy to be read—and Haimo (hom. 2, after the octave of Pentecost), together explaining how the Scriptures which sound diversely are to be understood.³³ Moreover to "remember" and to "forget," just as they do not argue ignorance in God, so neither do they argue change. For each is said of God on account of effects. For He is said to "remember" men when He bestows upon the afflicted the benefit of consolation; but He is said to "remember" sins when He punishes them: all of which one sentence has embraced, Tob. 3, saying: "And now, O Lord, remember me, and take not vengeance on my sins, neither remember my offenses, nor the offenses of my parents." On the contrary, He is said to "forget" men when He allows them to be afflicted and oppressed; but He is said to "forget" sins when He does not punish them.³⁴

§ 28. Fifth. The whole of Scripture attributes various operations to God; first, the creation of things, then their conservation and governance—of which the Lord says in the Gospel, Jn. 5: "My Father worketh until now; and I work." To this pertain whatever things happen in the whole course of the world concerning men, good Angels and evil, and concerning the remaining creatures—and these cannot come to be without change. But it is answered that every such change is in the things, not in God who works all these; He indeed is the author of every change, yet immutable Himself. But still you press and ask: how can it be that God is now working, now not working, now doing this, now that, without a change of Himself? I reply: because the action or operation of God is nothing other than His will, by which from eternity He willed something to be done in such a manner, place, and time, and with other circumstances, as He decreed from eternity that it be done. Accordingly, in the things, when they come to be, a change occurs; but God—because He makes them not by a new counsel, nor by a new action, but by an eternal will, equally of itself sufficient for working—is not changed. And although this be difficult to understand, as St. Augustine confesses (book 1 On the Trinity, ch. 1), nevertheless it is so far from being repugnant to human reason that even the Philosopher by sure argument demonstrates (book 8 of the Physics) that every motion must finally be reduced to some first cause moving the rest while unmoved itself.³⁵ For something somewhat similar occurs also in creatures: for the one and selfsame sun, and remaining disposed in the same way, at the same time hardens clay and softens wax; generates gold in the bowels of the earth, and silver; clears the sky and raises clouds—without any change of itself. And if the sun were to stand still, it would do these same things, as in its due seasons. And fire, unmoved, hardens, softens, heats, dries—without change of itself. Although there is this difference, that there these things act by natural necessity, but God by free will; and there the diversity arises from the matter subjected, but here from the sole Divine will.

§ 29. Sixth: St. Augustine (book 8 On Genesis ad litteram, ch. 20): "The creating Spirit," he says, "moves Himself without time and place: therefore God is moved at least by Himself and in Himself." We reply with St. Thomas: Augustine is speaking according to the mode in which the Philosopher used to say that the first mover moves itself—namely, including under the name of "motion" any action; in which way also to understand, to will, to love, are called certain motions. Insofar, therefore, as He understands and loves Himself, He is said to move Himself in the manner just stated. Yet Augustine seems to will nothing else, when he says that the creating Spirit moves Himself, than this: because He Himself is the first mover with respect to the whole creation, He is not moved by anyone; just as the created spirit is moved by God—to move, as subject to him, the bodily creature. For in that very place Augustine expressly teaches (even to the end of the book) that God is altogether immutable.³⁶

§ 30. Seventh: the same Augustine (book 5 On the Trinity, ch. 16): "Surely," he says, "that He might be Lord of man, this happened to God in time; whereupon by this happening God was changed." The sense of this is: God was not Lord of man from eternity, but only from the time when man began to be—not because a change was made in God, but because God created man, who previously was not.³⁷

§ 31. Eighth. In Ps. 17 it is said: "With the holy Thou shalt be holy; and with the perverse Thou shalt be perverted"; therefore with men God is changed. It is answered that this is to be understood of God's works toward different men: toward the good He exercises works of benignity and clemency; toward the evil, works of severity—always remaining the same in Himself.³⁸

§ 32. Ninth. Whatever goes forth from potency (*potentia*) into act (*actus*) is changed; but such is God, who from eternity was able to work, and in time works; therefore He is changed. I reply that the proposition is universally true only of passive potency, not of active potency, which alone is in God. For the act toward which active potency is ordered is not received in the agent as such; and although that sometimes happens per accidens, nevertheless it never happens, nor can it happen, in God.

§ 33. Tenth. God in one way foreknows the future, now sees the present, now remembers past things; therefore He does not always remain disposed in the same way. This was the argument of a certain Theophronius the Eunomian, as is in Nicephorus (book 12 of the Ecclesiastical History, ch. 30). It is answered: from this it does not follow that there is change in God, but in things. For God by one and the same knowledge (*scientia*), which is His essence (*essentia*), knows before they are the things which at one time will be future, at another time present, at another past. Yea rather, from eternity He knows in the same thing the formal character both of future and of present and of past—without any variation of knowledge; but this matter is treated at length below (dist. 39).³⁹

§ 34. Eleventh. Lactantius (book 2 of the Divine Institutions, ch. 17): "Some think," he says, "that God is in no way angry, because He is not subject to affections which are perturbations of the soul; which persuasion utterly destroys truth and religion." And in the book On the Anger of God he attacks that persuasion expressly; where, among other things, ch. 17, having rejected the philosophers' definitions, he establishes this his own definition of anger: "Anger is a motion of mind rising up to restrain sins"; and he contends that a motion of this kind is present in God. He extends this opinion (ch. 16) also to the affection of mercy and the like. And, generally (ch. 4): "What, then," he says, "can be the beatitude in God, if He, always at rest, immovable, is benumbed?" Finally (ch. 22) he testifies that he wrote that book for the refutation of those who make God immobile. Wherefore, according to the opinion of Lactantius, God is mobile, or mutable. It is answered: Lactantius was arguing properly against those who removed anger from God in such a way as to say that He does not punish sins. Although we admit that Lactantius in that book sometimes speaks a little untheologically, neither distinguishing nor seeing clearly how God is said to be angry without motion of mind; and in this he errs gravely, that (ch. 18) he reproaches the Stoics who deny there to be any figure of God, whereas he himself asserts that God has a figure.⁴⁰

§ 35. Twelfth. Many changes befell Christ; therefore God. For the things that befall Christ befall the Divine Person, which is eternal, and which is really the same as the Divine Nature—so that this be true: Christ is the Divine essence. It is answered that those changes befell Christ only in the assumed—that is, in the created—nature: not, however, in the nature of God. For thus must it be understood that nothing befalls God, and that God is immutable, namely in the Divine Nature. For in the human nature, without doubt,

God underwent many changes. Whence this proposition is no more to be shunned—speaking according to the assumed nature—"God is changed," than "God suffers," "dies," and the like.

§ 36. Thirteenth. The Son of God, being made mortal, ceased to be immortal, according to St. Cyprian (book On the Good of Patience) saying of Him: "Having laid aside immortality, He endured to make Himself mortal." I reply that the sense is that He ceased to be immortal negatively. For whereas previously, in no way—that is, according to no nature—was He mortal, because He was only God, once He had assumed a mortal nature, He ceased to be immortal in that respect. But this was without change of the Divine Nature, which nevertheless retained its perfect immortality and complete immutability.

§ 37. Finally. St. Gregory (Homily 2 on the Gospels) says that "the Divinity took on the defect of the nature of flesh"; therefore the very nature of God has been changed. Reply. The Divinity is said to have taken on the defect of our flesh, in the way that it is said to have assumed human nature—namely, thus, that that taking-on, or assumption, be terminated to the Person, not to the nature. Whence also it is more properly to be said that the Son of God, and the same God, assumed human nature: as is taught below (dist. 5 of book 3).

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§ VII — The objections against the immutability of the divine will are resolved (Solvuntur, quæ contra immutabilem Dei voluntatem objiciuntur)

§ 38. One must now also reply to those things which seem in a special way to show that the divine will (*voluntas*) can be changed. They are of this sort. First, from the Scriptures, in which we often read that God changed His will and sentence (*sententia*) concerning men, or that He will change it if they should sin, or should cease from sinning. For in 2 Kgs 20 by the humility and prayers of Hezekiah the divine sentence is read to have been changed, by which it had been said to him: "You shall die and not live." And in Jonah 3 the Ninevites by repentance (*poenitentia*) obtained the recall of the sentence by which it had been said: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown." Likewise Daniel (ch. 4) exhorts the King of Babylon, that he change by pious works the divine sentence pronounced against him; which also St. Jerome attests in his Commentary. And in 1 Sam. 2 God, through the prophet sent to Eli the Priest, openly recalls the word which He had spoken to his paternal house. And in 2 Sam. 14 God is said to retract His sentence. Since, therefore, word and sentence proceed from will, it follows that the will of God is changed. To this also pertain the Scriptures which ascribe repentance to God, as in Gen. 6: "It repented God that He had made man." 1 Sam. 15: "It repents Me that I have made Saul king." Jer. 18: "If that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I thought to do to it." And again: "If it shall do evil in My sight, I will repent of the good that I spoke to do to it." For although it has been shown above that this repentance is not a perturbation of mind in God, yet, whatever it be, it seems to bring with it a change of sentence and of will.

§ 39. But we answer to each point. The absolute will (*voluntas*) of God did not have that King Hezekiah, of the sickness by which he is read to have been afflicted, should die, but rather had that he should not die, as was afterwards revealed to him through Isaiah. But that "You shall die and not live" is a prediction of what would be in the order of natural causes, unless God had hindered it. For the sense is: this sickness, by which you are afflicted, is such that by human means you cannot escape death. Just as, on the contrary, the prediction of Elisha, by which he bade it be said to the sick King of Syria, "You shall recover" (2 Kgs 8), or, as it is in the Hebrew, "By living you shall live," does not signify what God had decreed would absolutely be. For

the Prophet adds of the absolute decree (*decretum*): "Moreover the Lord has shown me that he shall surely die"; but this declares what would be future with the condition of the sickness considered, which was not lethal. However, he died afterwards not by the force of the sickness by which he was laboring, but suffocated by a blanket by Hazael, as Scripture attests.⁴³

§ 40. Similarly the Lord's sentence against the Ninevites did not signify what would be absolutely, but what would be according to the present causes, that is, according to their merits, unless they did penance; which is called a comminatory sentence. For by an absolute decree God had established from eternity to spare the Ninevites on account of their repentance, just as also to prolong the life of Hezekiah on account of his prayer. The retraction also, of which that wise woman spoke to David (2 Sam. 14), pertains not to an absolute, but to a comminatory sentence. But Daniel's prediction about the King of Babylon was absolute; for indeed it had also been foreseen by God that he would not do penance. Nor therefore did Daniel exhort him to change the sentence of God, but to do penance by which he might escape the punishment announced. And if he had done so, already from eternity God would have decreed otherwise concerning him. Another solution of this, although in more obscure words, St. Jerome gives in his Commentary: for he holds that the sentence of God cannot be changed; and yet he says that it is changed by the confession of men. By which he intimates that this sentence against the King was not absolute, which he denies can be changed, but only comminatory; just as that against the Ninevites, the example of whom also he adduces there. But the former reply seems truer.[⁴⁴]

§ 41. To that which is objected from 1 Sam. 2 Lyranus replies that divine promises concerning the conferring of some good in the future life are to be understood under a condition, namely, that those to whom they are made use well of the benefit conferred. But this reply is repugnant, because the promise made to Aaron of the perpetuity of the priesthood was absolute, as also certain others in the Old Testament, such as the Land of Promise, and the Kingdom of David. Accordingly it seems one must say that some particular promise was perhaps made to the ancestors of Eli, which nevertheless was conditional, and on that account did not clash with the absolute promise made to Phinehas the Priest concerning the perpetuity of his priesthood, although that same priesthood suffered interruption both in Eli and his ancestors and in some of their descendants. But when God says: "It repents Me," etc., He does not change the decree (*decretum*), but destroys what had been done before, without any change of Himself or of His will; for thus also the human race, which He had made, He blotted out on account of sins, and the king Saul whom He had appointed He rejected, on account of disobedience; and daily He destroys many works which He had made. For both of these things He decreed from eternity, both to make works and then afterwards to destroy them, with no change of counsel (*consilium*); since also men often similarly do so.⁴⁴

§ 42. To the passage of Jeremiah one must reply that the prediction is to be understood not absolutely, but according to the causes then present, that is to say, according to the merits of men; which being changed, indeed the will of God is not changed, but it is declared that from eternity something else had been established in the wisdom of God. And thus God is seen to do repentance and to change His sentence, because He does not fulfill what in that way had been predicted; yet He does not change His counsel; as St. Thomas well explains in the reply to the second. Where, however, it must be noted that in the place of his, which he cites from St. Gregory—"God changes the sentence, yet He does not change the counsel"—I read thus in St. Gregory: "And because He Himself is unchangeable, what He wills He changes, He does not change the counsel." Which words contain no difficulty, but explain it; as also those of St. Augustine, Confessions I (ch. 4): "You change Your works, and You do not change the counsel."⁴⁵

§ 43. Moreover it is objected what Leo says in Sermon 2 on the Nativity of the Lord: that God changed some sentence concerning man. But it is replied that a conditional sentence is to be understood, by which it had been decreed that man should pass without death to the blessed life, if he did not sin. Which condition, because it was not kept by man, God is said to have changed the sentence; from this, namely, that He did not fulfill what He had decreed in such a conditional way. Likewise an objection is made from St. Augustine, who in Sermon 102 (De tempore) thus says: "Would that sinful man rise again to repentance as quickly as God also wishes to change even a settled sentence." And he proves it by that passage of Jer. 29: "And the Lord repented of the evil that He had spoken against them." It is replied that the sermon is not St. Augustine's; but Jeremiah speaks of evil conditionally, or as announced according to present causes and previously deserved merit, as we have just said about a similar passage of the same Prophet.⁴⁶

§ 44. Moreover they argue thus. In God there is free will (*liberum arbitrium*); therefore mutability of will (*voluntas*). For the formal character (*ratio*) of free will does not consist in this, that it can be bent to either of two alternatives; but to be bent is to be changed. It is replied that the will of God without doubt has the power for either alternative, since it is most free; yet it is not properly said to be bent, since bending implies a motion from one thing to another, but to will and to choose (*eligere*) one thing rather than another, although it can do either. But whatever He chooses, He chose from eternity and immutably; whence it follows that He cannot change will, counsel (*consilium*), choice (*electio*) into another. And this possibility of change is not of the formal character of free will, but rather pertains to its imperfection, as the ability to sin does.

§ 45. The last argument is of this sort. Whatever has power to opposites is mutable. For what can be and not be is mutable according to substance; and what can be in this place and not be, is mutable according to place; and so of the rest: therefore what can will and not will, as God, is mutable according to will. This argument moves St. Thomas (in the fourth place), but he does not explain it. One must say, however, that only that is mutable which has power to opposites successively, so that it receives one after the other; in which way power to opposites befits creatures; for example, that at one time they be, at another time they not be; at one time that they will something, at another time that they not will. But to God there befits the power for the choice of opposites without succession, because from eternity, where there is no succession of times, by most free will He chose one of the opposites. And therefore there is in God the highest freedom of will, but no mutability.⁴⁷

§ VIII — That the nature of God is perfectly simple (Dei naturam esse perfecte simplicem)

§ 46. Since the unchangeableness of the Divine Nature follows upon simplicity—for, as St. Augustine says, He is therefore an unchangeable good because He is a simple good—hence it remains that we now treat of His simplicity.⁴⁹ Therefore God, and the Divine Nature, are altogether and most perfectly simple, that is, devoid of all composition; which indeed can be shown by an induction through the several kinds of composition: for simplicity is opposed to composition.

§ 47. Therefore that must be most simple from which every composition is removed. The first and most well-known composition is that of a whole complete thing out of integral, or, as they say, quantitative parts. The second is the composition of something out of matter and form; which two compositions belong only to those things which are bodily and material. But God is not a body, but spirit (Jn. 4; 2 Cor. 3). And this St.

Thomas most excellently proves by arguments.⁵⁰ For not all creatures are bodily, but some are without quantity and matter, and therefore simple with respect to each of these two compositions, as the Angel and the rational soul. Wherefore the Anthropomorphites of old were entangled in a gross error, who, from Scriptures ill-understood, thought that God is corporeal, bears a human shape, and consists of members as though of a human body. On whom see Epiphanius and St. Augustine treating of heresies; and in ecclesiastical history Socrates, book 6, ch. 7, and Sozomen, book 8, ch. 12.⁵¹ But that heresy, as being too absurd and unworthy of a laborious discussion, the Church long ago condemned by tacit consent.

§ 48. The third composition is of subject and accident (*accidens*), of whatever genus that accident may be, whether quantity, or quality, or relative. This also is foreign to God; for it argues imperfection both of the subject—which borrows from the accident, as it were, an accessory perfection—and of the accident itself, which on that account is always convicted of imperfection, because its *esse* always depends on a subject; but in God nothing is imperfect. When therefore we attribute to God wisdom, justice, goodness, and the rest like to these, we are naming one thing by diverse names; because one and the same most simple reality, which is God's essence (*essentia*), embraces every perfection in itself. On which matter St. Augustine discourses more at large, De Trinitate, book 6, chs. 6–7.⁵²

§ 49. The fourth composition is of nature and supposit (*suppositum*), which likewise must be removed from God, in whom one and the same reality is the nature and the person (*persona*) that has the nature. As has been defined in the Lateran Council under Innocent III.⁵³ Which, assuredly, unless we admit, one would have to acknowledge a quaternity in God, namely three persons and a nature diverse from them. But that in creatures the nature is distinct from the supposit is sufficiently shown from the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God, whom, according to the Catholic Faith, we believe to have assumed a human nature, but we deny [that He assumed] a person. And because what was done in a human nature could also have been done in an angelic, hence it appears consequent that even in Angels the nature is really distinguished from the supposit; although St. Thomas seems to dissent.⁵⁴ Of this simplicity of God there is an explicit doctrine in St. Cyril, Thesaurus, book 6, ch. 8.⁵⁵

§ 50. The fifth composition is of genus and difference, which they call logical composition. But that this has no place in God is shown from this, that God is placed in no genus of things, as we shall teach below.

§ 51. Finally, the sixth kind of composition is that whereby in the same thing there concur essence and *esse* (*esse*). These two are distinguished not only by reason, but in reality in each created thing, just as act and potency (*actus et potentia*); but in God essence and *esse* are altogether the same. If they were distinguished, it would follow that there are distinct "to-be's," and that those proper to things would be uncreated—which is against the Catholic Faith. This kind of composition Hilary removes from God, De Trinitate, book 7, not far from the beginning, saying thus: "Esse is not an accident to God, but subsistent truth," etc.⁵⁶ Moreover, for excluding from God any kind whatsoever of composition, service is done by those testimonies of the Fathers which are recited in our last paragraph above. Further reasons also showing the simplicity of God, see St. Thomas, I, q. 3, a. 7.⁵⁷

§ IX — How God is multiple, and how without composition (*Quomodo Deus multiplex, quomodo sine compositione*)

§ 52. It does not clash with the perfect simplicity (*simplicitas*) of God that God is sometimes called multiple (*multiplex*), as in Wis. 7, where the Spirit of Wisdom, who is understood to be none other than God Himself, among the other things attributed to Him, is also affirmed to be multiple. For how He is so called St. Augustine explains (*De civitate Dei* XI, ch. 10): "He is called the Spirit of Wisdom 'multiple' (*multiplex*), because He has many things; but what He has, this He is; all things He is one."⁴⁹ For this reason, therefore, St. Augustine in book 6 (*De Trinitate*, chs. 4 and 7) ascribes the same multiplicity to God, in the sense already explained, because whatever is in Him and is attributed to God is His essence (*essentia*).⁵⁹ Absolutely speaking, however, as St. Fulgentius teaches (*De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2), God is to be called not multiple but simple, lest He at any time be thought composite (*compositus*).⁶⁰ But some answer thus: that God is indeed the same in reality, but is called multiple by appellation on account of the variety of names which are attributed to Him; while the same One is called good, and wise, and just, and so on with the rest. This, however, is not to be taken as though this were only a heap of synonymous names, but as that by several names various and multiple divine properties are signified, which are distinguished in God not in reality but by reason alone (*ratio*). For although "wisdom" signifies one thing, and "power" another, and so with the others, nevertheless the things signified are one and the same thing in God. Therefore, when the Master says (§ ...) that God is said to be multiple on account of the diversity and multitude of the names that are said of God—names which, although multiple, nevertheless signify one thing, namely the Divine Nature (*Natura Divina*)—that is not to be understood of the significate according to its proper formal character, but according to the thing; because (as the Master himself explains) all signify one, that is, one thing: namely, the Divine Nature.⁶¹

§ 53. Moreover, the passage (Wis. 7) can also be expounded otherwise, and indeed more probably: so that the Spirit of understanding is called at once Unique and multiple. Unique (*Unicus*), that is, Only-begotten, (for so the Greek word signifies), either because the Son of God, who is the Wisdom of the Father, is Only-begotten; or because whatever of that Spirit is partaken by man is one in kind, or origin—inasmuch as it proceeds from God its author. Multiple, however, because that same Spirit of understanding is exercised about many things, that is, about all things whatsoever that are to be understood, and it imbues man himself with the cognition of very many things. That this is the sense the things which immediately precede this sentence seem plainly to require.

§ 54. Now, however, neither does that distinction and plurality which we acknowledge in the Divine Persons (*Personae Divinae*) contradict the simplicity of God, nor does it introduce any composition (*compositio*). For composition is one thing, distinction another. For although in every composition there is a distinction of the parts that make up the whole, nevertheless composition does not necessarily follow upon distinction, not even in creatures. But why, you will say, cannot it be said that from those Three Persons the same one God is composed or consists? I reply: composition is the being of several things out of which there arises something one. But the Divine Persons, although really distinct, are nevertheless not several "things," but one "thing" according to the definition of the Lateran Council (under Innocent III, ch. 2).⁶² For which reason the ancients sometimes exclude number from divine matters: number, namely, understood not of the persons, but of the things that are to be numbered. On which matter it will be said below (on Distinction 24).⁶³ And also (in Distinction 19) it will be shown that God is to be called not "triple" (*triplex*) but "triune" (*trinus*).⁶⁴

§ X — That God is placed in no genus of things (Deum in nullo rerum genere collocari)

§ 55. That God is placed in no genus or category (*praedicamentum*), as the Master rightly infers from St. Augustine, book 5 (De Trinitate, ch. 1), although some dissent, is briefly proved in one and a second way as follows. The former reason: God is neither a genus nor a species nor an individual of any species: not a genus, because He contains no species under Himself; not a species, because, since He is the most simple reality, He is not composed of genus and difference; not an individual of a species, because an individual is composed of the same elements of which a species is. And neither can He be reduced to any category, because reduction is the passing of what is more imperfect to that which is more perfect: but God is the most perfect of all realities.⁶⁶ The latter: If God is to be placed in any genus of things, He will most of all pertain to the category of substance (*substantia*); but the nature of God is more distant from created substances than the nature of substance is from accidents (*accidentia*): but a substance together with an accident cannot be in the same genus; much less, therefore, will God be in the same genus with created substances. Whence also it has been shown above that the name "substance" is not attributed to God quite as properly as the name "essence" (*essentia*). On which matter St. Augustine's judgment is clear in book 7 (De Trinitate, chs. 4–5), where, among other things, he affirms it to be manifest that "God is called 'substance' by an abuse of speech."⁶⁷ To this is added the authority of St. Cyril who in book 1 (Thesaurus, ch. 4) writes: that God is not properly "substance," in the way the philosophers have spoken about substance, but "above substance," because He is neither under a genus nor does He subsist by accidents. St. Bede agrees, in whom (in the Sentences collected from Aristotle, under the letter M) one reads thus: "It is manifest that God has neither genus, nor quality, nor quantity."⁶⁸ As for the reasons by which this is proved, besides those said above let the student see St. Thomas (I, q. 3, a. 5).⁶⁵

1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. II [abbreviation as in source]; Paul of Burgos, on Exod. 3 [abbreviation as in source].

2. St. Augustine, "Super Psalm. 26. 85. Sermones 14. Paris. cap. 12." [abbreviation as in source].

3. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 2; VII, chs. 4–5.

4. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria III, ch. 7.

5. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 22.

6. St. Augustine, De fide et symbolo, ch. 4.

7. St. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae VII, ch. 1; Rabanus Maurus, on Exod. 3 ("Qui est misit me ad vos") [abbreviation as in source]; The Master (of the Sentences), reporting under the title of Jerome [abbreviation as in source].

8. St. Gregory of Nyssa, "De Philosophia" [abbreviation as in source].

9. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, De divinis Nominibus I, ch. 1 and the following [abbreviation as in source]; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I [ubi supra].

10. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 9, 11.

11. St. Jerome, Epistula ad Marcellam [abbreviation as in source].

12. St. Jerome, Vulgate, Exod. 3.

13. St. Jerome, Vulgate, Exod. 15; cf. the Septuagint, which renders Κύριος ("Dominus").

14. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 10, a. 2, ad 3.

15. Virgil, Aeneid II: "Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium"; St. Paul, Eph. 5:8: "Eratis aliquando tenebra(e)"; 1 Cor. 6:11: "Et haec quidam fuistis."
16. St. Augustine, De fide et symbolo, ch. 4; St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 17.
17. Jn. 1:1; Rev. 1:4, 8; Rev. 4:8; Rev. 11:17.
18. St. Augustine, In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus 99, on Jn. 16:13.
19. St. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. 9, ch. 10 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Jerome, Epistula ad Damasum (incipit: "Quoniam vetusto...").
20. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 9, a. 1.
21. Mal. 3: "Ego Dominus, et non mutor."; Ps. 101: "Mutabis eos, et mutabuntur; Tu autem idem ipse es."; Jas. 1: "Apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio."; 1 Tim. 6: "Qui solus habet immortalitatem."; St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, ch. 1; St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum III, ch. 12; St. Bernard, Sermones super Cantica, serm. 81.
22. Aristotle, Physics VIII (on the first unmoved mover).
23. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, last book, last chapter.
24. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 7.
25. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXII, ch. 2.
26. Wis. 7: "Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia."
27. Wis. 7: "Attingit autem ubique"; Wis. 8: "Attingit ergo a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter."
28. Heb. 4: "Vivus est enim sermo Dei et efficax, et penetrabilior..."
29. Gen. 3:8; 1 Kgs [1 Reg.] 7:6–7 (Vulgate sequence).
30. Ps. 46:6 (Vulgate 46:6): "Ascendit Deus in jubilo"; Gen. 11:5, 7.
31. Gen. 18:21, 33.
32. Jas. 4:8; Hos. 9 (chapter as in source).
33. Wis. 12:18; St. Ambrose, De Noe et Arca, ch. 4; Prosper of Aquitaine, on Ps. 105: "Et poenituit eum secundum multitudinem misericordiae suae"; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XX, ch. 23, on Job 30:21; Haimo of Auxerre, Homilia 2 (post octavam Pentecostes).
34. Tob. 3:3.
35. St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, ch. 1; Aristotle, Physics VIII.
36. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 20; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 9, a. 1.
37. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 16.
38. Ps. 17:26–27 (Vulgate numbering).
39. Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopulus, Historia Ecclesiastica XII, ch. 30; on God's knowledge as His essence, see below, dist. 39.
40. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones II, ch. 17; Lactantius, De ira Dei, chs. 17, 16, 4, 22, and 18.
41. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia II; cf. below, Book III, dist. 5.
42. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 1.
43. 2 Kgs 20; Jonah 3; Dan. 4; St. Jerome, Commentarii in Daniele, on ch. 4; 2 Kgs 8:10–15.
44. 1 Sam. 2; 2 Sam. 14.
45. Gen. 6; 1 Sam. 15; Jer. 18; St. Thomas, ad secundum [abbreviation as in source]; St. Gregory the Great, [as in source]; St. Augustine, Confessiones I, ch. 4.
46. Leo the Great, Sermon 2, De Nativitate Domini; Jer. 29; Sermon 102, De tempore [ascribed to Augustine in the source].
47. St. Thomas, [quarto loco; abbreviation as in source].

48. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3 (the whole question).
49. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, ch. 10.
50. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 2.
51. Epiphanius, on the heresies [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, on the heresies [abbreviation as in source]; Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica VI, ch. 7; Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica VIII, ch. 12.
52. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, chs. 6–7.
53. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III).
54. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 3.
55. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, VI, ch. 8.
56. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate VII, near the beginning.
57. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 7.
58. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 4; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 3.
59. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, chs. 4 and 7.
60. St. Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2.
61. The Master (§. ff.) [abbreviation as in source].
62. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 2.
63. Below, on Distinction 24.
64. Below, Distinction 19.
65. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 5.
66. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 1.
67. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, chs. 4–5.
68. St. Cyril, Thesaurus I, ch. 4; the Venerable Bede, Sentences collected from Aristotle [abbreviation as in source], letter M.

DISTINCTIO IX — ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS AND ON THE SON'S COETERNITY WITH THE FATHER (*DE PERSONARUM DISTINCTIONE ET DE FILII PATRI COAETERNITATE*)

§ I — Whence the distinction of Persons in God is to be sought, and how it is to be expressed (Personarum in Deo distinctio unde petenda, & qualiter exprimenda)

§ 1. Since the three divine Persons are one and the same most simple essence of God, it cannot be that their distinction among themselves be sought from any other source than from origin (*origo*), by which one proceeds from another. For one and the same nature is that of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; but what distinguishes the Father from the Son is that the former has begotten, the latter has been begotten; and likewise what distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is that He proceeds from them, whereas they produce Him by spirating. Again, since one nature is in the three, yet the Father has that same nature without origin, and the Son by generation (*generatio*) from the Father, and the Holy Spirit by procession (*processio*) from the Father and the Son. Since these things are so, it has been most rightly handed down by the Fathers that in that Holy Trinity the Father is not one thing, the Son another thing, and the Holy Spirit another thing, although the Father is another, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another. For "another thing" indicates diversity of reality or of nature, whereas "another" indicates only distinction of person. The reason for this is that, as St. Thomas says (I, q. 31, a. 2, ad 4), neither gender is formless; but the masculine and the feminine are formed and distinct; therefore by the neuter gender the common essence is fittingly signified; but by the masculine and feminine some determinate supposit (*suppositum*) in a common nature is signified. Whence even in human affairs, if one asks, Who is this? the reply is "Socrates," which is the name of a supposit; but if one asks, What is this? the reply is "man," or "a rational animal," by which the specific essence common to many is signified. Since, therefore, in divine things the distinction is according to Persons (*Personae*), not according to essence (*essentia*), we say that the Father is another than the Son, not another thing.²

§ 2. He explains the same matter somewhat differently, writing upon this Distinction (q. 1, a. 1). For he says: The neuter gender is substantivized when it is set by itself; not so the masculine and the feminine. Now substantives have their signification from the thing; adjectives, however, determine that signification by the substantive added, or understood. Whence "another thing" is said of what absolutely, according to substance, is diverse; "another," however, is said according to the notion of the adjunct term: if it is personal, only a personal distinction is signified, as when one says, "another than the Father"; if it is essential, a diversity of essence is signified, as if you say, "The Father is God other than the Son," which accordingly is false. But if

"another thing" is not substantivized, but is joined to a substantive of the neuter gender, the condition will be the same as that of the masculine and feminine; and so it is rightly said, "The Son is another supposit (*suppositum*) than the Father," for there the adjective is taken along with a substantive of the neuter gender. Although, if this latter explanation be well weighed, it seems to differ only as to the mode from the former.³

§ 3. Moreover, this diversity of speech is founded in Holy Scripture (*Scriptura Sacra*). For, as to the nature, the Son said in Jn. 10: "I and the Father are one." And in ch. 17: "As we also are one." He said "one," not "one person." If therefore "one," then not "another thing." But, as to the Person, He said the same in Jn. 5: "Another is he that beareth witness of me," meaning the Father; and in Jn. 14: "He shall give you another Paraclete," meaning the Holy Spirit. Thus also in the Athanasian Symbol: "Another is the Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit." Fulgentius sets these matters forth accurately (*De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1), and Vincent of Lérins likewise (in the *Commonitory* against heresies).⁴

§ 4. However, it must first be noted that when we speak of this mystery of the Trinity (*Trinitas*), we must not use just any words rashly which signify diversity and identity, but we must hold ourselves to the rule approved by the Fathers; and this in order to avoid the errors of Arius and Sabellius, as though two opposing reefs, between which the Catholic truth proceeds in the middle. Therefore, to avoid the error of Arius, terms of "diversity" and of "difference" must be shunned, lest the unity of essence be taken away. Rather, the term "distinction" is to be used, on account of the relative opposition among the Persons; and for that reason we say that the Son is another than the Father. Again, lest the simplicity of the Deity be taken away, terms of "separation" and of "division" are to be shunned. The term "disparity" must also be avoided, lest equality be taken away; and the term "alien and discrepant," lest likeness be taken away. On the contrary, to avoid the error of Sabellius, the Fathers abstained from the term "singularity," lest they destroy the communicability of the divine Essence. Hilary also avoided the term "unique," lest he take away the number of the Persons. Whence, although in the Symbol it is said "the only(-begotten) Son," yet Hilary did not wish to say "the only God," but "one God." The term "confusion" is also to be avoided, lest both the order and the distinction of the Persons be taken away; for confusion fights against each of these. Finally, the term "solitary" is to be avoided, lest the consort of the three Persons be taken away. On these matters see St. Thomas in the article of the *Summa* cited above.⁵

§ II — Positively, that the Son of God is coeternal with the Father (positive Filium Dei esse Patri coaeternum)

§ 5. The eternity of the Son of God was of old variously and much assailed by the Arians—namely, who said that they could not understand how these two could stand together: that the Son is from the Father, or begotten of the Father, and yet is not for that reason later than He in time, but coeternal. Hence those expressions about the Son of God which were employed by Arius and condemned by the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea: "There was when he was not," and "He was not before he was born," as is to be seen in Socrates, book 1, ch. 3, and in the Tripartite History, book 2, ch. 9; likewise in Ambrose, book 1, To Gratian on the Faith, ch. 9. For us, on the other hand, it must be held with firm faith that the Son is coeternal with the Father.⁷

§ 6. The first proof of this truth is from Sacred Scripture, in which this is most manifest and in diametrical contradiction to Arius's words, in John: "In the beginning was the Word." And again: "This was in the

beginning with God." And in 1 John 1: "That which was from the beginning." For if there was once God without the Word, then there was a time when He was not; therefore the Word was not "in the beginning with God." For "to be in the beginning" must at least be posited negatively, so that it be said that before that "beginning" nothing was. Wherefore, if the Word was in the beginning, then nothing was before the Word: therefore neither was God before the Word; which that sentence clearly signifies: "This was in the beginning with God." Therefore the Word was from eternity with God the Father, to whom accordingly He is coeternal. Likewise in the Apocalypse (ch. 1, 21, and 22) the Son of God is called the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End. Which titles concerning Him would be false if He had not been from eternity with the Father, especially since the same are attributed to God simply (Is. 41, 44, 46) to signify God's absolute eternity. In the same Prophet it is read (ch. 43) from the person of God: "Before me there was no God formed, and after me there shall not be." Which utterance, whether it be attributed to the Father or to the Son, proves that the Son, who is true God, is coeternal with the Father; which argument, among others, Ambrose employs (De Fide to Gratian, book 1, ch. 5).⁸

§ 7. Likewise in Heb. 1 the Apostle applies to the Son of God that verse of Ps. 102: "But thou art the selfsame." Whence, just as immutability, so consequently the eternity of the Son is concluded by necessary argument. Again, in 1 Cor. 1 the Apostle calls Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God; wherefore, since the Father was never without wisdom and power, and there is no power or wisdom of the Father other than the Son, it follows that the Son always was. This proof against the Arians is brought forward by St. Augustine (De Trinitate VI, ch. 1) and by Alexander of Alexandria the bishop (in the Letter to all the Bishops). Furthermore, Christ says in Jn. 16: "All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine," and in ch. 17, to the Father: "All mine are thine, and thine are mine"; therefore eternity is common to the Son with the Father. Moreover, the Church, taught by the Apostles, has always held and handed down this faith, and it defined it most clearly against Arius in the great Council of Nicaea; and to this day it professes it with a public voice in the Athanasian Symbol, saying: "The Father eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Spirit eternal." And again: "The whole three Persons are coeternal to one another and coequal." Finally, whatever authorities show that the Son of God is truly and properly God, whose essence is altogether the same as the Father's—of which below—avail to prove the point. For this being granted, it follows forthwith that He is eternal.⁹

§ 8. To these, which are most certain, there are added proper reasons, of which this is the first. If the Father precedes the Son in time, whom afterwards He begot, then He began at some time to be Father, since previously He was not; and hence He is mutable. For the relation (*relatio*) of paternity (which assuredly is real) could not, without a change of Himself, accrue to Him if He had not had it previously. This is the argument of Alexander and of Ambrose where cited above. Second: by begetting the Son, the Father communicates to Him His own nature; but that nature is eternal, therefore the Son is eternal. For He whose nature is eternal, indeed who is very eternity itself, cannot but be eternal. Third: in God's nature there is nothing prior or posterior; if, therefore, the Father has begotten, He has begotten from eternity; and if a Son is born to Him, He is born from eternity. Fourth: the most perfect intellect, since it is pure act, is always in act; therefore it has always had the Word in act; but this Word of the divine intellect is the Son of the Father; therefore the Son has always been. Fifth—and this is the chief one: The Son is begotten of the Father not by will or counsel, but by nature. Now what is produced by nature can be posterior to that by which it is produced in two ways: if either the producing cause does not have from the very beginning the perfection of natural power for acting, but acquires it in process of time—as is the case in animals, which do not have at once the power of generating—or if its action is successive on account of the motion necessary in preparing

the matter, as happens in the making of things which are made by art, which indeed cannot exist at once, even if made by a perfect craftsman—and this holds too, in almost all natural things. Since, therefore, neither of these has, or can have, a place in that divine generation, because both the nature of the Father was perfect from eternity, and the generation, since it begets the Son, is not successive but is whole at once, as being utterly immaterial, it is necessary that the Son has always been and from eternity with the Father. Upon this reason, which is in St. Thomas (I, q. 42, a. 2), rests the argumentation of Cyril (Thesaurus, book 1, ch. 6), which is of this sort: From a mortal is born a mortal; therefore from an immortal an immortal, and from the eternal an eternal. Likewise that of Hilary (On the Trinity, book 12, about the middle), when he says: "As the birth is from the author, so from an eternal author the birth is eternal," and what follows—cited by the Master.¹⁰

§ 9. However, one must know that the aforesaid reasons, although in truth most certainly conclusive, yet had little or no weight with the Arians, who denied that the Father begot the Son by nature; nor were they much moved to concede that God was not always Father, because they said that the Son was not begotten of the substance of the Father, but from non-existents—that is, from nothing—made by God's will and counsel after the manner of the other creatures; such things concerning Arius Alexander recounts in the letter cited above. And on this account, neither did the generation of the Son of God made in time argue mutation in God any more than the creation of other things made likewise in time, since each, according to them, was an operation *ad extra*. Wherefore, for confuting the Arians we must rely not so much on reasons as on Scripture and on the tradition of the Church, corroborated already by the authority of the Councils. Although the argument of St. Thomas at least proves (what they did not deny) that it does not clash with the reason of the nature of the thing that the Son be coeternal with the Father—nay, that this is altogether necessary, if we concede the name of generation in God.⁶

§ 10. This understanding is much aided by the likeness founded by the Fathers, and also in the Scriptures, of the sun and its splendor. For in Heb. 1 the Son is called "the splendor of the Father's glory." And in Wis. 7: "the brightness of eternal light." And in the Symbol: "Light of Light." Whence the Council of Ephesus says: "Let the splendor announce to you that the Son always exists coeternally; the comparison of splendor declares to you the Son's eternity: for as the sun produces brightness from itself, which, however, it does not precede by even a point of time—so that, if the sun were eternal, its splendor would be coeternal with it—so God the Father begets for Himself a coeternal Son." Cyril (in the source cited) and Augustine (De Trinitate VI, ch. 2) explain this matter in declaring the same thing.¹¹

§ 11. But Augustine also brings forward another likeness, which he deems to come nearer, so far as anything in human things can approach to represent to us the eternal generation of the Son; it is that of the human mind and its thought, or word. For if the human mind were eternal and known to itself eternally by contemplation, it would then always produce its own word, the image of its source—that is, of the mind. This likeness will make the matter clearer, if we keep in mind that the Son of God is the very Word (*Verbum*) of the Father, as the fourth reason set above has it.¹²

§ III — The objections raised against the foregoing are resolved (Solvuntur objectiones quae adversus praedicta)

§ 12. The arguments by which of old the Arians attacked the eternity of the Son of God are set forth, and are to be solved in this way. First. Generation (*generatio*) is a going forth from non-being to being; but the Son is

begotten; therefore He has gone forth from non-being to being, and thence He has not always been. The Arians proposed this argument thus: The Son of God was born; therefore there was a time when He was not: for how was He born, if He always was? St. Augustine recounts this (fragment 26), when he says that he cannot set forth the "how," but for himself opposes the Prophet, saying: "Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?" He does not deny that this argument can be solved, but only wishes to say that the mode of that eternal generation cannot be explained by us— which also we showed above (at Distinction 7). Therefore the Arians must be answered: for the proper formal character of generation it is not required that what is begotten proceed from non-being to being, although so the case stands in all created things; nay more, neither for other modes of producing is that necessarily and of itself required; as it is easy to show from the likenesses set down a little before. For splendor proceeds from the sun, and the word from the mind; yet each would be eternal if the sun and the mind had been from eternity; for they are coeval with their producers; therefore such production would not have been from a non-being. It is sufficient, then, for the formal character of generation, and likewise of production in general, that that which is said to be begotten or produced receive being (*esse*), even if non-being has not preceded: although in all creatures, on account of the condition of things, it is necessary that non-being has preceded, for the reason that no creature is eternal. Nor does it stand in the way that the terminus from which of generation is non-being: first, because the terminus from which of generation does not enter into the formal character of motion (*motus*); next, because the generation of the Son of God is not motion, but an eternal and perfect, without-succession production, in which one can assign neither a terminus from which, nor a thing moved. Indeed, neither is the production of rays from the sun, nor the procession (*processio*) of the word from the mind, properly motion: because it is not the act of that which is in potency (*potentia*), but of that which is in act (*actus*); although a procession of this sort is not begun without an instantaneous change of the subject from a certain non-being to being. But if such a procession were eternal, then there would now be, nor ever would have been, any change, but only procession; which nevertheless would still differ in this from the Divine procession: that that procession would at least by aptitude be from non-being to being by reason of the subject, in which form would be apt to succeed to privation; which is not so in the Divine procession, which, just as it does not need to have a subject apt for [privation], so neither a terminus from which.

§ 13. In the reply now given the solution of almost all the remaining arguments is contained. For they object in the second place: what is begotten is made; what is being made, so long as it is being made, is not yet; therefore the Son, at the time when He was being begotten, was not yet. One must answer first, that what is begotten, as begotten, is not being made; although in created things, everything that is begotten is also made, because every creature is a thing made by God. But the Son of God was neither created nor made, but begotten: "For all things were made by Him," Jn. 1. Wherefore, since He could not be made by Himself, it is manifest that He cannot be included within the generality of things made; as St. Augustine rightly reasons (Tract. 1 on John).¹³ But neither is the assumption universally true, that what is being made does not yet exist. For those things which have an instantaneous origin, while they are being made, exist; and to the production of such things in this respect the eternal generation of the Son of God is not inaptly compared; especially since eternity is a certain perpetual "now."

§ 14. Third. The Son of God is begotten, therefore He has a beginning; He has a beginning, therefore He has not always been: because that which always is has no beginning. St. Cyril replies (in the Thesaurus I, ch. 6) that the Son of God, by that account by which He is begotten, has a beginning of origin, not of duration; that is, He has a beginning from which, as from one begetting, He receives *esse*, which beginning is the Father; He

does not have a beginning in which, as in time, He begins to be, since from the eternal Father the Son is eternal.¹⁴

§ 15. Fourth. What is corrupted ceases to be; therefore what is begotten begins to be. The consequence must be denied; because to be generated, in its own formal character, is nothing other than to receive *esse*, even if non-being has not preceded, as has already been shown; but to be corrupted is not to receive non-being—since of non-being, properly, there is no cause (for that is called a cause which gives being to a thing)—but is to lose being. For this, properly, does the corrupting cause do, insofar as it is corrupting: namely, that it destroy what is. Wherefore, if we speak properly, just as what is corrupted loses being, so what is begotten receives being; which also is true in the Son of God. But you will say: Whatever loses being passes from being to non-being; therefore whatever receives being passes from non-being to being. I reply that it does not follow, because loss does not take place without change; which indeed is between opposite termini; acceptance, however, does not necessarily include change, as above has been sufficiently declared; and thus [change] presupposes a terminus from which. For that which is always had can always be received: but no one can lose what he neither has, nor ever has had.

§ 16. Fifth. The Father says to the Son: "This day have I begotten thee," in Psalm 2; therefore the Son was begotten in time. For this is what "today" signifies in the Scriptures: "Today if you shall hear His voice," etc. It is answered, that when speaking of God we use words customary among us, which nevertheless, when used in Divine matters, signify far other things. Whence, just as time is to be understood one way in Divine, another way in human things: so also the very "today." For in Divine things "time" signifies eternity, and "today" the day of eternity, in which there is nothing past, nothing future, nothing, in fine, changeable. In human things, however, "time" signifies the measure of the duration of all changeable things; and "today" a day, that is, the time of the present life, according to that saying Heb. 13: "As long as 'today' is named among you." And 2 Cor. 6: "Behold, now is the acceptable time; behold, now is the day of salvation." Accordingly, that utterance of the Father to the Son, "This day have I begotten thee," since it pertains to the Divine; and therefore signifies the day of eternity, in which there is no taking of before or after, rather confirms than destroys the eternity of the Son of God. Furthermore, besides these, but similar to the foregoing, the studious reader will find the Arians' objections with their solutions in St. Hilary, De Trinitate, book 12; nor are dissimilar ones lacking in St. Thomas (I, q. 41, a. 2) and in the Disputed Questions On Power, q. 3, a. 13.¹⁵

§ IV — *What order is to be recognized in the Divine (Quis Ordo sit agnoscendus in divinis)*

§ 17. Since in the Divine there is a plurality of Persons, and from it every confusion must be removed, it is necessary that some order (*ordo*) be recognized among them. And indeed it is manifest that there is not among them an order of time, since the Son is coeternal with the Father, as has already been shown, and the same judgment is to be made concerning the Holy Spirit, nor at all is it permissible concerning this matter to doubt according to the Catholic Faith. But neither does an order of nature (*natura*) have place in them—namely thus, that of them the one nature be prior, the other posterior. For that is said to be posterior by nature, whose nature depends on the nature of another; just as among human beings the nature of the son depends on the nature of the father. Which cannot be said of the Persons, of whom the three have one, and the same undivided nature. And hence we learn how far the likenesses set above, of the splendor of the sun and of the

word of the mind, recede from that which they are employed to declare; for these, being posterior by nature, depend. But the Son of God has the very same nature altogether with the Father; which therefore cannot itself be either prior or posterior. Moreover it follows that neither is an order of dignity found in the Trinity, in which, of the three Persons, the Deity is one, equal, the coeternal glory, the Majesty, where there is nothing earlier or later, nothing greater or less; but the three Persons are wholly coeternal among themselves and coequal, as the Church speaks in the Symbol. St. Ambrose excludes from the Trinity the three orders just named in the book *On the Institution of Virgins*, ch. 20, saying: "The unity of the Trinity is not distinguished by order, not by time."¹⁷ It remains therefore that there be only there an order of origin (*origo*), that is, of a principle (*principium*) to its principiate (*principiatum*), or conversely. For an order of origin is spoken of according to which one Person is principle, another from a principle. For the Father, inasmuch as He is Father, is the author and principle of the Son, and both of the Holy Spirit. Concerning which matter more below (at Distinction 29).

§ 18. Nor is it contrary to these things which we are saying, what is found in St. Thomas, I, q. 42, a. 3, where he acknowledges an order of nature in the Divine. For he does not understand an order of nature according to which the nature of the one follows upon the nature of the other, but that which is observed in the Divine Persons according to natural origin. Which order we call the order of origin.¹⁸

§ 19. Now indeed, if one asks whether by reason of this order it must be admitted that the Father is prior to the Son, and the Son posterior to the Father? One must answer, it seems, that although some wish to acknowledge no priority at all in the Trinity; yet because we necessarily confess that there is some order there, there will be nothing absurd—nay, it seems plainly consequent—if we also acknowledge some priority in it; whereby namely the principle, insofar as it is principle, is prior to that of which it is said to be the principle. For the formal character of origin, or of principle, altogether seems to include a certain formal character of the prior to the posterior, whereby it comes about that we rightly distinguish the Divine Persons into first, second, and third, signifying among them nothing other than the order of origin. Whence also that saying Jn. 13: "The Father is greater than I": although it is most rightly understood as said on account of the form of a servant, according to which Christ also was made lesser than the Angels, Paul being witness, Heb. 2. However, Hilary, book 9 *On the Trinity*, Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 4 On Theology*, and likewise the Fathers of the Council of Sardica (in the Epistle which is found in Book 4 of the *Tripartite History*, ch. 24), and other Greeks, of this more fully below (at Distinction 19).¹⁹ Therefore what Athanasius says, that in the Trinity there is nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or less, is either to be understood of the order which the diversity, or inequality, of nature, or of any of its attributes, could beget, not of that which the formal character of origin necessarily demands; or rather it must be said that Athanasius speaks of that which is most commonly called prior, that is, prior in time. Whence also among the modes of the prior in Aristotle's *Categories*, that mode holds first place whereby something is prior in time than another.²⁰ This sense of the Symbol is plain from the words subjoined of the same verse. For when he had said: "In the Trinity nothing is prior or posterior, nothing greater or less," he immediately subjoins adversatively: "but the three Persons are coeternal among themselves and coequal." Accordingly, against "prior and posterior" he said the three Persons are coeternal; just as against "greater and less" he said coequal. Since however "prior and posterior" very commonly, as I said, are wont to be referred to time, for that reason, if one must speak absolutely, it will be rather to be denied with the Symbol of Athanasius than to be conceded that in the Trinity something is prior to another. For that "greater"—that one thing is greater than another—in the Trinity cannot be said absolutely is beyond question.²¹

§ V — *Whether it must be admitted that there are three eternal, and the like*
(An fatendum fit tres esse æternos, & de similibus)

§ 20. What above we showed about the Son of God, that He is coeternal with the Father, the same without any doubt is also to be held about the Holy Spirit, as we have clearly expressed in the Athanasian Symbol. Therefore it is asked, whether the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three eternal, or one only eternal? Athanasius affirms the latter part of the question in the Symbol, saying: "And yet not three eternal, but one eternal." Likewise St. Augustine in book 15 (On the Trinity, chs. 8 and 10) denies that in the Divine [nature] there are three great [beings] and three omnipotent [beings], and about other such attributes, as about goodness, eternity, etc., he wishes the same judgment to be held.²¹ But the former part seems to be confirmed by the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in which the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are called consubstantial, coequal, co-omnipotent, and coeternal; by which words, he says, the three Persons (*personae*) are among themselves. And Athanasius himself in the same Symbol: "the three Persons are coeternal among themselves and coequal." St. Augustine also (Sermon 5, On Time) says that the Father and the Son are not equally Fathers, nor equally Sons, but equally eternal.²³

§ 21. But here it is needful to remember what we noted around Distinction 4: that substantive names, even though concrete, when employed in the Divinity in the plural number, insinuate not only a plurality of persons but also of natures; for they signify the thing after the manner of substance; not so adjectives, which introduce only a multitude of persons. Wherefore, just as we truly say that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three subsistents, three creating [ones], three operating [ones]: so too "three eternal," and "three omnipotents," "uncreated," "immense," seem able to be said without offense. For it is the same as if you were to say "three eternal, omnipotent, uncreated persons," etc. And this is the doctrine of St. Thomas (on this distinction, q. 1, art. 2).²⁴

§ 22. Moreover Athanasius (as St. Thomas in the same place explains), in denying "three eternal, [three] omnipotents," etc., took these names substantively, in which way they can not inaptly be taken; especially since they are not of such a kind as to signify an act, as verbs and participles do, which accordingly are attributed in the plural only to several persons, but [these signify] something closer to a substance. Thus therefore he denies "three eternal, uncreated, immense, omnipotent," in the way that he denies "three Gods" and "Lords," which are substantives.

§ 23. That there is not, however, altogether the same account of these names and of those, the same Athanasius indicates sufficiently, not only by this, that he bears witness in the plural number that the three persons are "coeternal," as has already been said, and "coequal"; but also in that, in the next verse as though concluding, he says: "Thus we are forbidden by the Catholic religion to say three Gods or three Lords." Wherefore he judged that nothing should be concluded from the four preceding words, because, to wit, he saw that, with no inconvenience incurred, it can be conceded that there are three eternal, uncreated, etc.²⁵

§ 24. Accordingly it must generally be noted that, although verbs and participles always have an adjectival signification, nevertheless very many nouns can and are wont to be taken in either way; and not only adjectives, as they say, can be used substantively, but even substantives are sometimes used adjectivally. Whence, although Prudentius (in the Hamartigenia), prudently and cautiously, not only denied there to be two Deities, but [also denied there to be] two artificers of things, authors, founders, creators (for these names are substantives rather than adjectives), nevertheless, because they can be taken adjectivally, it comes about

that the Fathers sometimes do not shrink from the plural number when they attribute them to the Divine Persons; as Hilary, book 2 (On the Trinity), saying that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son "as authors," that is, as those producing, or as those principling; whereas otherwise it has been defined by the Church that the Father and the Son are one principle (*principium*) of the Holy Spirit, not two, as will be said below (at Distinction 12). So too Chrysostom, or whoever is the author of the Homily on John the Baptist (tome 3), says that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the creators of all, that is, created all things. Nay more, Christ in the Gospel signifies that He and the Holy Spirit are two Paracletes—in Latin, "comforters"—when He says of the Father: "Alium Paracletum dabit vobis." Jn. 14. And because the Father also is a comforter, according to that [in] 2 Cor. 1, "Pater misericordiarum, & Deus totius consolationis," it will follow that there are three comforters, but by taking this word adjectivally.²⁶

§ VI — That the generation of the Son of God is never terminated (Generationem Filii Dei nunquam terminari)

§ 25. It is asked whether the generation (*generatio*) of the Son of God at some time received an end. Most certainly one must answer that, just as it did not have a beginning at which it would begin, so neither did it have, nor will it ever have, an end at which it would cease. For just as the Father and the Son are eternal, so the Son's generation from the Father is eternal—and not only "from eternity."

§ 26. On which account Cyril, book 1 (Thai ap. 6.), teaches that it is an impious tenet of those who say that the Father at some time ceased from generating; inasmuch as such a view ascribes change to an unchangeable nature—"now He generates, now He does not generate." And Fulgentius more expressly (in the Sermon on the Nativity of Christ): "always," he says, "[He is] from the Father, from whom for Him there is by nature an eternal nativity." And lest I bring more witnesses from the Fathers, the voice of the Church is most manifest, thus singing of Christ in the last responsory of Advent: "whose generation has no end."²⁸

§ 27. But in order that this eternal and unceasing generation be understood on both counts, the likenesses adduced above must be recalled to mind—of the Sun and radiance, of fire and heat, of Mind and Word. To these St. Augustine adds a similar example (Sermon 38 on the words of the Lord), of a twig sprung above the waters and its image. For in these cases, one is begotten from the other, and yet, the thing begotten being perfect, the generation or production (*productio*) does not cease. For a perfect radiance is produced from the Sun, and yet the Sun does not at any time cease to produce that radiance; and similarly in the other cases. Whence the Arians' objection is refuted, who say: "whatever generates ceases from generating when the thing begotten is perfect."

§ 28. That this is false is shown by Cyril (in the place already indicated). Nor is the generation superfluous, the thing now begotten and perfected, as the Arians cavilled; because a thing already established in the perfection of its nature can nevertheless continually depend upon the producing principle (*principium*), as the examples already recalled sufficiently manifest. And this holds true in all things which are so coeval with their causes (*causa*) and principles that from them they always receive their being. Therefore, just as these things, their principles existing, both are and come-to-be always, so the Son of God always is and is always being born.

§ 29. But what the Arians objected holds only in those cases whose generation is a motion (*motus*), in which accordingly, once the terminus has been acquired, the motion ceases—as in the generation of a man,

the building of a house, and other similar cases, in which to be and to be-becoming are not simultaneous but are distinct in time, so that first there is the becoming, later the being.

§ 30. For those things which are produced not by any motion but by an indivisible act (*actus indivisibilis*), while they are becoming, they also exist; and if they had their cause in perpetual act, they would always be becoming and nevertheless would always exist—just as Plato seems to have imagined about the world. For indeed the conservation of the world is nothing other than a certain continuous creation of the world, just as the conservation of light is nothing other than a certain continuous illumination.²⁹

§ VII — Whether the Son should be said to be always born, or always being born (Utrum Filius semper natus, an semper nasci dicendus sit)

§ 31. Now from what has been said it is clear that each can truly and properly be said, that the Son of God is being born (*nasci*) and that He has been born (*natum esse*); likewise, that He is always being born (*semper nasci*) and that He is always born (*semper natum esse*): yet thus, that by "always" is designated not time but eternity (*aeternitas*). In the former way Origen speaks in Homily 6 (on Jer. 12), saying that the Son of God, as the radiance of the eternal light, is always born.³⁰ On behalf of which he also adduces that saying of Prov. 8: "Before all the hills the Lord begets me." For thus indeed it is there read in the present tense (according to the truer reading).³¹ In the same way Hilary speaks in books 7, 9, and 12 of *On the Trinity* (with the sentences recited by the Master at § N.).³² Likewise St. Augustine in Sermon 22 (*De tempore*), saying "the Son to be born without end"; and in Epistle 174 (to Pascentius), saying that the Father always begets, and the Son is always being born.³³ In almost the same way, too, Cyril speaks in book 1 of the *Thesaurus*, ch. 6.³⁴ Thus finally, after the Master's age, the Lateran Council under Innocent III expressly decreed in these words: "From the beginning, always, and without end the Father begetting, the Son being born, and the Holy Spirit proceeding."³⁵ And this, to be sure, suitably with Sacred Scripture, where the Lord says of Himself in the present: "I am from Him" (Jn. 7); and of the Holy Spirit: "who proceeds from the Father" (Jn. 14); and in the Creed: "who proceeds from the Father and the Son."³⁶ But, on the other hand, Scripture and the Fathers commonly use the past tense, as in Ps. 109: "Before the daystar I begot you"; Jn. 8: "I from God have proceeded"; and in the Creed: "begotten, not made."³⁷ Whence St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 (on the Epistle to the Hebrews), affirms that the Son is always begotten from the Father's essence.³⁸ Scripture conjoined both in Ps. 2, saying: "This day I have begotten you." For "today" signifies the present, "I have begotten" the past—namely to indicate both that the birth of the Son of God is always present and nevertheless perfect; as St. Augustine noted (in the exposition of that same Psalm), in the words cited by the Master.³⁹ It could also be said in the future, "He will always be born," according to that of Heb. 1: "I will be to Him a Father, and He will be to me a Son"; and likewise of the Holy Spirit, "He will always proceed," according to that of Jn. 16: "Whatever He shall hear He shall speak"; and again: "because He shall receive of mine."⁴⁰ But because the future tense seems to intimate something imperfect, and serves less to signify eternity, hence it has come about that the Fathers are less read as having used this sort of expression. Yet St. Augustine (*Tractate 99 on John*), explaining the aforesaid place of Scripture, sufficiently signifies that we too can use the verb of the future tense when we speak of the divine procession (*processio*); the use of which locution will be for signifying that that procession is without limit and never to be terminated. The words of Augustine are with the Master (*Dist. 8, § 6*).⁴¹

§ 32. But against the locution of the present tense there is objected the authority of that same Augustine, in book 83 of Questions, question 37, writing in these words: "Better is 'always born' than 'one who is always being born'; because he who is always being born is not yet born, and is never born, or will have been born, if he is always being born. For to be born is one thing, to be born-already is another."⁴² Likewise of Gregory, who in book 29 (Morals, ch. 2) thus wishes the Son of God to be said: "born before times," or rather "always born," so that he denies that we can say "He is always being born," lest He seem imperfect.⁴³ But one must say that these Fathers, while they disapprove such a way of speaking, are dealing not so much with the words, which according to their proper signification are simply true, as with the sense which the common folk are wont to apprehend from these words. For, on hearing "He is always being born," they imagine the birth (*nativitas*), or —so to speak—the being-born (*nascentia*), as not yet perfect but to be perfected by a perpetual succession, plainly in the mode of a motion tending to perfection; which, as has already been shown, is not signified by the words in question. For that Gregory in truth felt nothing adverse to the others' sense is sufficiently evident from that very place, when he says "that the Son neither began to be born nor ceased," from which it clearly follows that He is always being born.⁴⁴ That the same is Augustine's opinion is clear from the testimonies set out above, most especially from his Commentary on Psalm 2 at that passage "This day I have begotten you," and from Epistle 147, where he by no means hesitates to admit that phrase "always being born," just as also "always begetting," provided imperfection be not thought.⁴⁵

§ 33. Finally he explains the matter more plainly (Sermon 12 De tempore): therefore both are truly and rightly said of the Son of God, "always being born" and "always born," with every thought of imperfection removed on both sides—lest either His birth be thought to be perfected by a succession of time when He is said to be "always being born," or so perfect be it thought that it is now not present but has passed into the past, by this fact that He is said to be "always born." Nor would I easily say whether it is more correctly said, "He is always born," or "He is always being born," even if I am not unaware that the Master prefers "always born" as the more congruous expression—which St. Thomas follows in this matter (on this Distinction, and ST I, q. 42, a. 2, ad ult.).⁴⁶ But a different view is recommended, both by the perfection of the present tense as congruent for signifying eternity, and by the authority of the Lateran Council, which in its decree of Faith preferred to use words signifying rather the present than the past. And so indeed the more perfect signification is that of one saying "He is always being born," although in the ears of the crowd "He is always born" sounds more perfect.³⁵

§ VIII — That the Son of God is consubstantial with the Father and properly God (Filius Dei esse Patri consubstantialem & proprie Deum)

§ 34. There have been of old heresies, and there are even now, by which the true Divinity (*Deitas*) of the Son of God, properly so called, has been opposed. For besides Ebion, Cerinthus, Paul of Samosata, and Photinus, who denied that Christ had been before He was born of the Father—whom today the new Samosatensians follow, asserting that Christ before the Incarnation was nothing except in the mind of God by an idea, and therefore make Christ very improperly both the Son of God and God, namely not by eternal generation but by the anointing of grace made in time and in assumed flesh—the Arians, attributing somewhat more to the Son of God, admitted that He had been before the Incarnation, that is, born or made by God before every other creature, yet not from eternity, nor from the Father's substance (*essentia*), but from nothing, or, as they used to speak, from things not existing, according to the express and much-sung sentence of Arius their

master; although later Arians, as St. Augustine testifies in book 6 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 1, admitted that the Son is eternal, yet nonetheless impugning His consubstantiality with the Father, and therefore His true Divinity.⁴⁸ In which matter they fought even with themselves: for these two are necessarily conjoined, that he who has acknowledged the Son to be consubstantial (*consubstantialis*) with the Father, must confess Him to be also truly and properly God; and conversely, he who has granted this cannot deny that also. For since there is one, singular, and individual substance of God, if that is common to the Son with the Father, it necessarily follows both that the Son is true God, as the Father; and indeed that the Son and the Father are one and the same God, as those who have one and the same essence, which is the very Deity.

§ 35. Nevertheless the new Arians who have arisen in this age so separate these two which we have said are necessarily conjoined, that they admit indeed the Son of God to be begotten of the Father's substance and to be consubstantial with the Father, yet deny Him to be the same God with the Father and coequal to the Father, but affirm the Father to be far more eminent both than the Son and than the Holy Spirit; as though the Divine essence were either divided threefold in such wise, yet so that from that division the Father retains for Himself the better part, or communicated by the Father to the other two according to a certain specific identity, of which nature of the species only the most perfect is possessed by the Father alone, less perfectly by the other two. All which are most absurd, and utterly at variance with the simplicity of the Divine Nature. Wherefore against these errors both of the new and of the old Arians together, and also against those who assign to Christ a beginning from the mother, it will be enough to have shown one of those two; either that the Son of God is truly and properly God; or that He is consubstantial with the Father; for of the Holy Spirit it will be said below in its own place. Now this doctrine, as always handed down by the Church and most keenly defended against heresies, is to be held with most certain faith. Its first and most solid proof is from the Scriptures of both Testaments, whose chief testimonies we will set forth in order.

§ 36. First. In Psalm 44, it is sung to the Son of God: "Sedes tua Deus in sæculum sæculi"; and again: "Propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus oleo lætitiæ, &c." Which places the Apostle in Heb. 1 interpreted of the Son of God.⁴⁹

§ 37. Second. In the same Psalm, still of Christ the Bridegroom to the Church the bride it is said: "Quoniam ipse est Dominus Deus tuus, & adorabunt, &c."⁵⁰

§ 38. Third. Prov. 30: "Quod nomen ejus & quod nomen Filius ejus si nosti?" By which words the Wise Man wants both the Son and the Father to be of an incomprehensible nature, and therefore the Son to be no less properly God than the Father, since the nature of God alone is incomprehensible. Likewise, Ps. 44: "Adducentur in templum Regis": therefore the King is God; because a temple is of God alone. And although the Hebrew word sometimes also signifies a palace—whence Pagninus translates "in palatium Regis"—nevertheless one must know that the Hebrew word in the whole volume of the Psalms is nowhere else taken than for the proper temple of God.⁵¹

§ 39. Fourth. Is. 7, of the Son of the Virgin: "Et vocabitur nomen ejus Emmanuel." Which Matthew interprets of Christ, adding the explication of the name, when he says: "Quod est interpretatum nobiscum Deus."⁵²

§ 40. Fifth. Is. 9, of the Little Child born to us: "Et vocabitur nomen ejus, Deus Fortis": which are two names of God, and are wont in the Scriptures to be ascribed to the one true God.⁵³

§ 41. Sixth. Is. 35: "Deus ipse veniet & salvabit nos; Tunc aperientur oculi cæcorum & aures Surdorum patebunt, &c." Which latter words declare that the former were said of Christ. And Christ Himself insinuated this in Matt. 11, when to the disciples of John asking about Him He answered by these words: "Cæci vident, claudi ambulant &c.", as if to say that He was the one whom Isaiah had foretold would come, God the Savior, and would do such things.⁵⁴

§ 42. Seventh. Is. 45, it is said to the Son: "tantum in te est Deus & non est absque te Deus. Vere tu es Deus absconditus, Deus Israel Salvator." Which words cannot be taken of the Father, both because the Father is Himself the one who speaks; and because you would not rightly say to the Father, "In te est Deus," if the Father alone is the true God, as the adversaries want. Again, what in the same chapter is said: "In memetipso juravi, quia mihi curvabitur omne genu, & jurabit omnis lingua," the Apostle testifies in Rom. 14 to have been said of Christ. But that very thing is most certain to be written by the Prophet in the person of God; both because God alone in the Scriptures swears by Himself, for He has not another greater than Himself (Heb. 6), and because immediately there precede these words: "Ego Deus & non est alius": therefore this God is Christ.⁵⁵

§ 43. Eighth. Zech. 2: "Hæc dicit Dominus Deus exercituum: Post gloriam misit me ad gentes," etc.; then He adds and repeats the second time: "Quia Dominus exercituum misit me." Where, since most plainly the Lord God of hosts says that He was sent to the nations by the Lord of hosts, and no one is sent by himself; and since the Son alone by the mystery of the Incarnation was sent to the nations; it is clear that the Son is here called the Lord God of hosts; which name it is evident in the Scriptures is wont to be attributed to the true God alone.⁵⁶

§ 44. Ninth. Zech. 3: "Et dixit Dominus ad Satan: Increpet Dominus in te Satan," clearly the Son says this of the Father. Now in both places there is the Tetragrammaton name, which without controversy is proper to the true God alone.⁵⁷

§ 45. Tenth. Zech. 12, among other things the Lord God speaks: "Et respicient ad me, quem confixerunt." That this sentence pertains to Christ, John the Evangelist is a weighty witness in ch. 19.⁵⁸

§ 46. Eleventh. Lk. 1, of John the Baptist: "Multos Filiorum Israël convertet ad Dominum Deum ipsorum: & ipse præcedet ante illum in spiritu & virtute Eliæ." Where what is said, "ante illum," can be referred to no other than to the Lord God. And John was the precursor of Christ, not of God the Father; therefore Christ is the Lord God. Whence also Mal. 3 God the Father says to the Son: "Mitto Angelum meum ante faciem tuam, qui præparabit viam tuam ante te." Thus indeed that place is alleged by the three Evangelists, although in the Hebrew it is had, "ante faciem meam"; under which reading the Son Himself speaks.⁵⁹

§ 47. Twelfth. Mk. 10 and Lk. 18, Christ says: "Nemo bonus, nisi unus Deus." And Matt. 19: "Unus est bonus Deus"; tacitly insinuating that He is that one God who alone is good, and by an answer of this sort wishing to introduce the hearers to the faith of this matter.⁶⁰

§ 48. Thirteenth. Jn. 1: "Verbum erat apud Deum, & Deus erat Verbum," that is, this Word which was with God was Himself God, not, I say, another God, but the same as He of whom he had said: "Verbum erat apud Deum."⁶¹

§ 49. Fourteenth. Jn. 5, of Christ: "Patrem suum dicebat Deum, æqualem se faciens Deo," as if to say that by the fact that He said God was His Father He signified that He was equal to God; and therefore truly and

properly God, because no one is equal to God who is not properly God. For the sense is not that the Jews only in this way thought this of Jesus, namely that He made Himself equal to God, from the fact that He had said the Father alone was God; but that it truly follows that He Himself, if He has God for Father, is equal to God. For the Evangelist ascribes the whole to Christ, that He should say that God was His Father, and that He should make Himself—i.e., should say Himself—to be equal to God. For "to make" is also elsewhere taken for "to say", as "Quem teipsum facis," i.e., dicis (Jn. 8). And again: "Quia tu homo cum sis, facis teipsum Deum" (Jn. 10).⁶²

§ 50. Fifteenth. Jn. 8: "Si non credideritis quia ego sum." And below: "Antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum." By which speech Christ signifies that He is He who said to Moses: "Ego sum, qui sum," and that that most proper name of God, "Qui est," and "Jehovah," befits Him.⁶³

§ 51. Sixteenth. Jn. 12: "Ego & Pater unum sumus," that is, I am of one and the same essence with the Father. Thus have all the Fathers understood that place. Therefore this place avails directly, by the judgment of all the Fathers, to prove the coessentiality of the Son with the Father: for the Jews also felt that Christ by those words wanted to signify Himself to be God. "De blasphemia, inquit, lapidamus te, quia tu homo cum sis, facis teipsum Deum."⁶⁴

§ 52. Seventeenth. Jn. 14: "Creditis in Deum, & in me credite." Which He would not say unless He wished to be believed to be the true God, no less than the Father. For in the true God alone do we properly believe; especially as Scripture speaks of believing "in" someone. The same argument from all the places in which Christ exhorts that men believe in Himself, as Jn. 7: "Qui credit in me flumina, &c." Likewise: "qui credit in me, non credit in me, sed &c." Which place sufficiently clearly convicts the Deity of Christ to be the same as the Father.⁶⁵

§ 53. Eighteenth. Jn. 16: "Omnia, quæ habet Pater, mea sunt"; among which "all things" most of all the essence must be understood; especially since whatever the Father has is His essence. Therefore the same essence of the Father and of the Son. Of the same sort is that in ch. 17, Christ to the Father: "Mea omnia tua sunt, & tua mea sunt."⁶⁶

§ 54. Nineteenth. Jn. 20. St. Thomas, now no longer unbelieving but faithful, by a most open confession affirms Christ to be God, saying: "Dominus meus & Deus meus."⁶⁷

§ 55. Twentieth. Acts 10. Paul says to the shepherds of the Lord's flock: "In quo vos Spiritus Sanctus posuit Episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei, quam acquisivit sanguine suo." In which sentence, "acquisivit sanguine suo," since it cannot be referred to the Holy Spirit, is necessarily referred to "God"; for nothing else has preceded to which it may be referred. But that God who "acquired the Church by His blood" cannot be understood as any other than the incarnate Son of God, etc.⁶⁸

§ 56. Twenty-first. Rom. 9: "Ex quibus est Christus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in sæcula, Amen."⁶⁹

§ 57. Twenty-second. Rom. 14: "Omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi, Scriptum est enim, vivo ego, dicit Dominus quoniam mihi flectetur omne genu, omnis lingua confitebitur Deo." Therefore Christ is that Lord who in Is. 45 says: "Vivo ego, quoniam mihi flectetur &c." But in that place is the Tetragrammaton name of God. To the same place of the Prophet the Apostle referred in Phil. 2 when he said: "Ut in nomine Jesu omne genu flectatur, &c."⁷⁰

§ 58. Twenty-third. 1 Cor. 10: "Neque tentemus Christum, sicut quidam eorum tentaverunt": and yet everywhere in Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Psalms, we read that the sons of Israel tempted God, whom Scripture calls "Jehovah," and who spoke to them: "Audi Israel: Deus tuus unus est"; therefore Christ was that God. Nay, even the term of tempting sufficiently proves this; for temptation is an act of unbelief, having God for its object. For we ill tempt Him in whom we well believe.⁷¹

§ 59. Twenty-fourth. Eph. 4, it is said of Christ: "Ascendens in altum captivam duxit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus." But the same words in Ps. 67 are ascribed to the God of Israel, of whom it is there said: "Dominus in Sinai in Sancto." Likewise Tit. 2: "Expectantes adventum gloriæ magni Dei, & Salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi." By "great God" he calls the true God, who is "over all gods," and who is "Deus benedictus in sæcula" (Rom. 9).⁷²

§ 60. Twenty-fifth. Phil. 2: "Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est, esse se æqualem Deo, sed semet ipsum exinanivit, formam servi accipiens." For in these words, just as the "form of a servant" signifies the human nature; so the "form of God" signifies the Divine Nature. And lest some Arian should say that the Divine Nature is attributed to Christ according to some imperfect participation, the Apostle adds that it is not robbery for Him, as once it was for the devil, to be equal to God, since He possesses that by nature.⁷³

§ 61. Twenty-sixth. Heb. 1, these things are attributed to Christ: "Et adorent eum omnes Angeli Dei: Tu in principio, Domine, terram fundasti, opera manuum tuarum sunt cæli: ipsi peribunt, tu autem permanes." And again: "Tu autem idem ipse es," Ps. 96 & 101. In which places it is established that those things were said of the one true God.⁷⁴

§ 62. Twenty-seventh. 1 Jn. 3: "In hoc cognovimus charitatem Dei; quoniam ille animam suam pro nobis posuit": which cannot be understood except of Christ.⁷⁵

§ 63. Twenty-eighth. 1 Jn. 5: "Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in Cælo, Pater, Verbum, & Spiritus Sanctus, & hi tres unum sunt." Which place is like that: "Ego, Pater unum sumus." Nor does it stand in the way, that presently there likewise it is similarly said of "the Spirit, the Water, and the Blood: Et hi tres unum sunt." For in many Latin codices this is not read. But in the Greek it is read in this way: "Et hi tres ad unum sunt," that is, they conspire into one testimony. By which reason also they could be said "to be one," according to the common codices. Of which matter we spoke at Distinction five, in the refutation of the error of Abbot Joachim.⁷⁶

§ 64. Twenty-ninth. In the same place at the end: "Scimus quoniam Filius Dei venit, & dedit nobis sensum, ut cognoscamus verum Deum, & simus in vero Filio ejus. Hic est verus Deus & vita æterna." But the true God is one, as Christ attests in Jn. 17: "Ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum": therefore Christ is that one God.⁷⁷

§ 65. Thirtieth. Rev. 1, 2, 21, and 22 Christ is called Alpha and Omega, "principium & finis," "primus & novissimus." Which epithets are of the one true God in Isaiah 41, 44, and 48. In the same place, ch. 2, Christ says: "Ego sum Scrutans renes & corda." But this the Scriptures make proper to God alone, in the places noted there at the margin.⁷⁸

§ 66. Thirty-first. Rev. 20: "Erunt Sacerdotes Dei & Christi": therefore Christ is the true God. For priests, temple, altar, sacrifice are instituted for the true God alone. And let these testimonies from Sacred Scripture suffice for the Divinity of the Son of God, together with the perpetual faith of the whole Church, handed

down and declared in plenary Councils, Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, Chalcedon, Lateran, and many other approved Synods, against diverse heresies, and confirmed by the opinions of all the holy Fathers and by unanimous consent.⁷⁹ There could furthermore be adduced for a fuller proof of this matter very many arguments from the names and properties of the true God ascribed to Christ in Scripture, and from His divine works; likewise, besides the testimonies of the Fathers, also the confessions of the holy Martyrs before pagan judges; of which sort is what Pliny the Younger (in a letter to Trajan) writes, that the Christians, inquiry having been held, confessed that "on stated days they sang a hymn to Christ, as to God."⁸⁰ Moreover, the Oracles of the Sibyls, which remain to this very day, no less open and illustrious than the prophecies of the Prophets; and finally the miracles done for the confirmation of this faith. But lest we be longer than is just, we leave these to be sought from elsewhere, content with those things which have now been brought; especially since the faith of the 318 Fathers of the Council of Nicaea, by which they preached the Son consubstantial, *ὁμοούσιον*, that is, consubstantial, with the Father, not only all Catholics but even Lutherans and Calvinists profess to hold and embrace against the new Arians and Samosatensians.⁸¹ But why rather did they say *ὁμοούσιον* than *συνουσίον* or *ἐνουσίω*? Perhaps because *συνουσία* has a more usual signification not very decent; for it signifies concubinage. Otherwise indeed it would be said just as well in Greek *συνουσίας* as in Latin "consubstantialis"; *ἐνούσιος*, however, that is "unisubstantial," does not import a relation to another person, but signifies him who is of the same substance not of several (in which way Eutyches wrongly made Christ *ἐνούσιος*), of one, I say, substance, whether with another or not. For God would be *ἐνουσίως* even if there were not more persons; but He would not be *ὁμοούσιος*, that is, consubstantial: for this is said with reference to another with whom He has the same substance. One must know, moreover, that in both ways it is rightly said according to the Greeks, *ὁμοούσιος*, and in contracted form *ὁμούσιος*. Which latter indeed is more used by Latin authors, that they call the Son of God *ὁμοούσιος* with the Father. But *ὁμοιούσιος*, that is, "of like substance with the Father," is not to be said, since He is of a substance altogether the same; for likeness is between several. But of this matter see Distinction 31. Now *συνουσίος* is said of him who with another is of the same substance or nature, even generic or only specific. Whence men among themselves are *συνούσιοι*; *ὁμοούσιος*, however, is he who with another is of the same individual nature. Whence Christ is *ὁμοούσιος* with the Father, *συνουσίος* with the Mother: although some also (perhaps not quite properly nor according to the signification intended by the Nicene Fathers) call Him *ὁμοούσιος* with the Mother.

§ IX — Reply to certain objections urged on the contrary (Responsio ad quasdam in contrarium objectiones)

§ 67. It remains, as usually happens in matters of doctrine, for arguments to be brought forward on the contrary, which we will answer forthwith. They are for the most part these. First. In Jn. 14 Christ says: "The Father is greater than I";⁸³ therefore the Son is neither of the same essence (*essentia*) with the Father, nor one God with the Father, nor in any way equal to the Father, but less than the Father. Now, as to the understanding of this saying, according to the diverse expositions of the Fathers, it will be more fittingly spoken of below (at Distinction 16). For now we can briefly answer: that Christ spoke this of Himself according to His humanity, in which, without doubt, He was less than the Father. But you will say: At least according to those Fathers who take that saying of Christ according to the divine nature, which He had from the Father as principle, it will follow that in some respect in the divine things the Father is greater than the Son. Wherefore the Son will not be in all things equal to the Father according to the same nature, and

consequently not consubstantial (*consubstantialis*). It is answered that even their exposition does not hinder the Son's being in all things equal to the Father according to nature, that is, with respect to those things according to which equality, properly so called, ought to be regarded and taken—an equality which is not taken from the relation of origin (*relatio originis*), by the consideration of which alone the Father is granted to be greater than the Son in the divine things, but from the quantity, or magnitude, which comprises only the essential attributes, and wholly from those things which are said absolutely in God, as are power, wisdom, goodness, etc., according to which the Father is not greater than the Son.

§ 68. Second. In Jn. 17 Christ says to the Father: "that they may know thee the only true God";⁸⁴ therefore the Father alone is the true God, but not the Son. Some reply that this Scripture is cited truncated: for that must be added which follows, "and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ," so that the sense may be: "That they may know thee, and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ, to be the only true God." But by this device the difficulty is not yet removed; for at least it will follow that the Holy Spirit is excluded from true divinity, because He is not there named; and if you say He is included in the Father and the Son being named, I for my part will say that the Son is included in the Father being named. Accordingly, it is otherwise and more rightly answered that in this sentence the Father alone is called the true God, yet not with the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit, but only of that which is other, that is, diverse by nature—as will be more fully set forth (at Distinction 21). Moreover He adds: "and whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ," to signify that it does not suffice to have faith in the one and triune God, but besides this it is necessary that the Mediator, Jesus Christ, be acknowledged.

§ 69. Third. Paul everywhere in the Epistles calls the Father alone God, but calls Christ Lord, as almost at the beginnings of the Epistles. Likewise 1 Cor. 8, when he says: "For us there is one God the Father, of whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things."⁸⁵ And Eph. 4, of the Father he says: "One God and Father of all"; of Christ: "one Lord";⁸⁶ and 1 Tim. 2: "For there is one God," of the Father; then he adds: "and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus."⁸⁷ To this Hilary and Ambrose reply well. For if from such Scriptures it were a consequence that the Son is not God, it would likewise follow that the Father is not Lord; because as the Father there is called God, so the Son is called Lord, and as much with respect to the Father as the Father with respect to the Son. Therefore it must be said that in "the Father" the whole Trinity is understood, in which there is no difference of essence; but that the Son, on account of the benefit of Redemption, is peculiarly called "Lord" by the Scripture of the New Testament, even according to the human nature—for with right and by just title He is called our Lord who by the price of His Blood redeemed us.

§ 70. Fourth. In 1 Cor. 15 the Apostle subjects the Son to the Father, saying: "But when all things shall have been subjected to him, then the Son also himself shall be subject to him that subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all."⁸⁸ It is answered that this also was said on account of the humanity of Christ, which not only up to the day of Judgment, but also thereafter unto eternity, as a creature will be subject to the Father—nay, to the Trinity.

§ 71. Fifth. The Son of God in the Sacred Books of both Testaments is often said to be created and made; as Sirach 24: "The Creator of all things said to me"—so speaks Divine Wisdom—"and he who created me rested in my tabernacle." And again: "From the beginning and before the ages I was created."⁸⁹ And Prov. 8, according to the Seventy: "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways."⁹⁰ Likewise Jn. 1: "He who comes after me is made before me."⁹¹ Acts 2: "Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly that God hath

made both Lord and Christ this Jesus, whom you crucified."⁹² Col. 1: "The firstborn of every creature."⁹³ Heb. 1: "Being made so much better than the angels, as he hath inherited a more excellent name than they."⁹⁴ Heb. 3: "Consider the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, Jesus Christ, who is faithful to him that made him."⁹⁵ It is answered that these Scriptures partly speak of the eternal generation of the Son of God under the name of creation, and partly of the temporal production of His human nature, or of the conferral of dominion or of the priesthood, or of some other preeminence which He has according to the human nature. And indeed, in Sirach 24 the name of creation signifies the production of a thing according to substance. For among Latin authors also "to create" and "to procreate" children are said of those who beget us. In which sense the Son of God is rightly said to be created, that is, procreated or begotten, by the Father. Thus too in Ps. 101 it is said: "The people that shall be created shall praise the Lord," that is, that shall be born; as it is sung in another Psalm: "A people that shall be born, whom the Lord hath made." Moreover, a reply can be given with regard to the place in Prov. 8, although it is more probable that the Seventy did not translate "created," but "possessed," as it is had in the Hebrew—two words which in Greek differ by only one letter. "Possessed" also stands in Scripture for "begot" elsewhere, as in Gen. 4: "I have possessed a man through God," and Deut. 32: "Is he not thy Father, that possessed thee?" As to the place in Jn. 1, it has this sense: "Jesus, who after me came according to humanity, has been preferred before me in dignity, because He was greater than I by divinity"—thus St. Augustine on John (Tractate 14), and Leo in a Homily (on the Epiphany of the Lord).⁹⁶ Furthermore, in Acts 2 it is not said absolutely that God "made" Jesus—though that could suitably be understood according to the humanity, in which respect also Christ is sometimes called a creature by the Fathers—but that He "made him Lord and Christ"; and both of these were done in the very Incarnation of the Word. For then too the Father anointed Him with the Holy Spirit, and made Him Lord of the human race by the right of Redemption then already begun. Christ also is called in Col. 1 "the firstborn of every creature," not because He is the first of creatures and thus a creature, but because He was begotten before any creature was made. For so speaks the Wisdom of God in Sirach 24: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before every creature"—which passage is in a way an explanation of that [in Colossians]. As to the place which is Heb. 1, it is replied that Christ was "made better" than the angels, that is, more honored, in the assumed flesh; because after His Passion it began to be made known to the whole world that this man is the Son of God. Finally, as to what is said in Heb. 3, "who made him," understand it of "High Priest." For this Christ was not from eternity, but in time He was made.

§ 72. Sixth argument, from Mk. 13: "Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels, nor the Son, but the Father only":⁹⁷ but it does not befit God to be ignorant of anything. It is answered that this is said of the Son inasmuch as He is man, as many other things in the Gospels. But how, inasmuch as He is man, He was ignorant of that day, must be explained in the Third Book of the Sentences, where there is treatment of the knowledge of the soul of Christ.

§ 73. Seventh. Acts 20: "It is more blessed to give than to receive";⁹⁸ since therefore to give is of the Father, to receive of the Son, it follows that the Father is more blessed than the Son, and consequently that the Son is not equal to the Father. This argument is confirmed from the fact that the Fathers sometimes express this sentence in these words: "Greater is he that gives than he that receives." For thus it is read, as quoted, in the Testament of St. Ephrem the Deacon (in Surius, February 1).⁹⁹ I reply that the sentence must be taken of him who gives to one in need, or to him who was in potency for receiving. But the Son was never in potency, but always in act. Wherefore neither did the Father give, nor could He give, to Him as though to one in need; inasmuch as whatever the Son has, from eternity He immutably received and had from the Father.

§ 74. Eighth. Rev. 5: "Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive Divinity," etc. But true God does not receive Divinity by merit, but has it by nature. It is answered that the sense is that Christ by His Passion merited that the Divinity which He had from eternity should come into the knowledge and manifestation of men. And yet it should be known that in the Greek is not read "Divinity," but "riches" (πλοῦτον). In this manner too Primasius among the Latins also reads it;¹⁰⁰ which reading signifies that Christ merited that, according to His human nature, He should obtain universal dominion of all things—at least as to act and possession, that is, the execution of power.

§ 75. Ninth. Hilary (in the book *On the Synods*) says that the Son is subject to the Father, speaking of the Son according to the higher nature.¹⁰¹ I reply that the subjection understood by Hilary is no other than that which consists in this, that the Son in all things follows the will of the Father; as He Himself bears witness of Himself in the Gospel. Now he who does this among men is said to be subject to another. This sense the context of the passage sufficiently shows.

§ 76. Tenth. The same Hilary (in the same book) says that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are indeed three by substance, but by consonance one; therefore the Son is not consubstantial with the Father. It is answered that "substance" (*substantia*) for Hilary is what the Greeks call "hypostasis" (*hypostasis*), that is, supposit (*suppositum*), or person (*persona*). Of which words below (at Distinction 23). But he says that they are one "by consonance," that is, by the agreement of nature.

§ 77. Eleventh. St. Augustine in Book 15 (*On the Trinity*, chapter 14) says that the Son is essence from essence; therefore He does not have numerically the same essence with the Father.¹⁰² But in what sense such locutions are to be taken we have already said above at the fifth Distinction.

§ 78. Lastly. Socrates, Book 3 (*Ecclesiastical History*, ch. 5), and after him Nicephorus, Book 10 (ch. 15), report that the Alexandrian Synod under Athanasius established that there is no need in God of the words "substance" and "subsistence," forasmuch as such words are nowhere extant in the Sacred Letters; that the Nicene Synod also judged the question about substance and subsistence unworthy to be treated.¹⁰³ I reply that at that time still (because of the craft of the Arians, who, from words of ambiguous signification, set ambushes for Catholic doctrine) the Greek name hypostasis was suspect—for by it some understood "substance," that is, essence; others "subsistence," that is, person; and therefore, during that ambiguity of the word, it seemed the wiser course to abstain from it altogether; afterwards, however, for the sake of distinction, that name was given to "person," so that three hypostases might be understood as three persons, not three substances. Whence also St. Jerome, about the same word, thought it necessary to consult Pope Damasus of Rome by letter—plainly fearing lest any poison lay hidden in the word—and therefore did not dare to use it until, the ambiguity removed, he had been more certainly instructed by the Apostolic See about its signification.¹⁰⁴

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 2–3; and I, q. 31, a. 2.

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 2, ad 4.

3. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, on this distinction, q. 1, a. 1 [abbreviation as in source].

4. Athanasian Creed (*Quicumque vult*); Fulgentius, *De Fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1; Vincent of Lérins, *Commonitorium*, against heresies.

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 2 (as cited above).

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 2.
7. Socrates Scholasticus, *Historia ecclesiastica* I, ch. 3 [abbreviation as in source]; Cassiodorus (ed.), *Historia Tripartita* II, ch. 9; St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* I, ch. 9.
8. Rev. 1; 21; 22; Is. 41; 44; 46; Is. 43: "Before me there was no God formed, and after me there shall not be"; St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* I, ch. 5.
9. Heb. 1 applying Ps. 102(101): "But thou art the selfsame"; 1 Cor. 1: Christ "the Power of God and the Wisdom of God"; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 1; Alexander of Alexandria, Letter to all the Bishops; Council of Nicaea I; Athanasian Creed.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 2; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* I, ch. 6; St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* XII (about the middle); the Master [Peter Lombard], citing this [abbreviation as in source].
11. Heb. 1: "the splendor of [the Father's] glory"; Wis. 7: "the brightness of eternal light"; Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed: "Light of Light"; Council of Ephesus [text alluded to as in source]; St. Cyril of Alexandria (as above); St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 2.
12. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 2.
13. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, Tract. 1; cf. also St. Augustine, fragment 26 [abbreviation as in source].
14. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* I, ch. 6.
15. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* XII; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 2; St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 3, a. 13; St. Augustine, fragment 26 [abbreviation as in source].
16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 3; and I, q. 41, a. 3.
17. St. Ambrose, *De institutione virginis*, ch. 20.
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 3.
19. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* IX; St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 4, On Theology*; Council of Sardica, *Epistle*, in Cassiodorus' *Historia Tripartita* IV, ch. 24.
20. Aristotle, *Categories*, on the modes of priority [abbreviation as in source].
21. Athanasian Creed (*Quicumque vult*).
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 3 and a. 4.
23. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, chs. 8 and 10; Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), cap. 1 [abbreviation as in source]; Athanasian Creed (*Quicumque vult*); St. Augustine, *Sermon 5, De tempore*.
24. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, on this distinction, q. 1, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source].
25. Athanasian Creed (*Quicumque vult*): "we are forbidden by the Catholic religion to say three Gods or three Lords."
26. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*; St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* II; St. John Chrysostom (or the author), *Homily on John the Baptist*, tome 3 [abbreviation as in source].
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 2, ad 4.
28. St. Cyril, *libr. 1. (Thai ap. 6.)* [abbreviation as in source]; St. Fulgentius, *Sermon on the Nativity of Christ*; Church, last responsory of Advent: "cujus generatio non habet finem."
29. St. Augustine, *Sermon 38, De verbis Domini*.
30. Origen, *Hom. 6 (super Hierem. 12.)* [abbreviation as in source].
31. Prov. 8: "Ante omnes colles generat me Dominus."
32. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, books 7, 9, and 12; "sententiis a Magistro recitatis (§. N.)" [abbreviation as in source].
33. St. Augustine, *Sermon 22 (De tempore)*; St. Augustine, *Epistle 174 (to Pascentius)*.
34. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus*, book 1, ch. 6.
35. Lateran Council under Innocent III (Fourth Lateran Council), decree: "Ab initio, semper, et sine fine Pater generans, Filius nascens, et Spiritus Sanctus procedens."

36. Jn. 7: "Ego ab ipso sum."; Jn. 14: "qui a Patre procedit"; and the Creed: "qui a Patre Filioque procedit."
37. Ps. 109 (110): "Ante luciferum genui te."; Jn. 8: "Ego ex Deo processi."; The Creed: "genitum non factum."
38. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 on the Epistle to the Hebrews.
39. St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 2; cited by the Master.
40. Heb. 1: "Ego ero illi in Patrem, et ipse erit mihi in Filium."; Jn. 16: "Quaecumque audiet loquetur"; and again: "quia de meo accipiet."
41. St. Augustine, Tractate 99 on the Gospel of John; The Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., Dist. 8, § 6 [abbreviation as in source].
42. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 37: "Melior est semper natus, quam qui semper nascitur; quia qui semper nascitur, nondum est natus, et numquam natus est, aut natus erit, si semper nascitur. Aliud enim est nasci, aliud natum esse."
43. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, book 29, ch. 2.
44. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, book 29, ch. 2: "quod Filius, nec coepit nasci, nec desiit."
45. St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 2; and Epistle 147.
46. The Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., on this Distinction; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 42, a. 2, ad ult.; and St. Thomas, In I Sent., on this Distinction.
47. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 2; also I, q. 42, a. 4, a. 6 ["art. 4.6" as in source].
48. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, ch. 1.
49. Ps. 44(45):7–8; Heb. 1 (esp. vv. 8–9).
50. Ps. 44(45):12.
51. Prov. 30:4; Ps. 44(45):16. For Pagninus's rendering, see Santes Pagnino, Thesaurus Linguae Sanctae.
52. Is. 7:14; Matt. 1:23.
53. Is. 9:6.
54. Is. 35:4–6; Matt. 11:4–5.
55. Is. 45:14–15, 23; Rom. 14:10–11; Heb. 6:13; Is. 45:22.
56. Zech. 2:8–9.
57. Zech. 3:2.
58. Zech. 12:10; Jn. 19:37.
59. Lk. 1:16–17; Mal. 3:1; Matt. 11:10; Mk. 1:2; Lk. 7:27.
60. Mk. 10:18; Lk. 18:19; Matt. 19:17.
61. Jn. 1:1–2.
62. Jn. 5:18; Jn. 8:53 (cf. 8:52–59); Jn. 10:33.
63. Jn. 8:24, 58; Exod. 3:14.
64. Jn. 10:30 ["Joan. 12" in source]; Jn. 10:33.
65. Jn. 14:1; Jn. 7:38; Jn. 12:44 (cf. 12:44–45).
66. Jn. 16:15; Jn. 17:10.
67. Jn. 20:28.
68. Acts 20:28 (printed "Act. 10" in source) [abbreviation as in source].
69. Rom. 9:5.
70. Rom. 14:10–11; Is. 45:23; Phil. 2:10–11.

71. 1 Cor. 10:9; cf. Exod. 17:2, 7; Num. 21:5–6; Deut. 6:16; Ps. 94(95):9; Deut. 6:4.
72. Eph. 4:8; Ps. 67(68):18; Tit. 2:13; Rom. 9:5.
73. Phil. 2:6–7.
74. Heb. 1:6, 10–12; Ps. 96(97):7; Ps. 101(102):26–28.
75. 1 Jn. 3:16 (Vulg. numbering and wording).
76. 1 Jn. 5:7–8; see above, Distinctio V, in the refutation of the error of Abbot Joachim.
77. 1 Jn. 5:20; Jn. 17:3.
78. Rev. 1:8, 17; 2:23; 21:6; 22:13; Is. 41:4; 44:6; 48:12; cf. Jer. 17:10; Ps. 7:10; 26(27):8; 138(139):1, 23 (divine scrutiny of hearts and reins).
79. The Councils of Nicaea I (A.D. 325), Constantinople I (381), Ephesus (431), Chalcedon (451), Lateran (various, esp. Lateran IV, 1215).
80. Pliny the Younger, Epistulae X, 96 (to Trajan): Christians "solem suum stato die ante lucem convenire; carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem" (paraphrased in text).
81. Nicaea I: profession of the Son "ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ" ("consubstantial with the Father"); Estius notes its acceptance also among Lutherans and Calvinists against new Arians and Samosatenians.
82. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 2; also I, q. 42, a. 2, 4, 6.
83. Jn. 14:28: "Pater maior me est."
84. Jn. 17:3: "Ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum."
85. 1 Cor. 8:6.
86. Eph. 4:5–6.
87. 1 Tim. 2:5.
88. 1 Cor. 15:27–28.
89. Sir. 24:8, 14 (Vulg.).
90. Prov. 8:22 (LXX: "ἔκτισέν με"; Heb.: "possedit me").
91. Jn. 1:15, 30.
92. Acts 2:36.
93. Col. 1:15.
94. Heb. 1:4.
95. Heb. 3:1–2.
96. St. Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus 14; St. Leo the Great, Homily on the Epiphany (as cited).
97. Mk. 13:32.
98. Acts 20:35.
99. Testament of St. Ephrem the Deacon, in Laurentius Surius, De probatis sanctorum historiis, February 1 (as cited).
100. Rev. 5:12; Primasius, Commentarius in Apocalypsim, ad loc.
101. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Synodis.
102. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 14.
103. Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica III, 5; Nicephorus Callistus, Historia ecclesiastica X, 15.
104. St. Jerome, epistle to Pope Damasus concerning the term hypostasis [as in source].

DISTINCTIO X — ON WHAT THE NAME "HOLY SPIRIT" SIGNIFIES (*DE NOMINE SPIRITUS SANCTI QUID SIGNIFICET*)

§ I — What the name "Holy Spirit" signifies (Nomen Spiritus sancti quid significet?)

§ 1. The third Person (*persona*) in the Trinity, about whom from now on we must treat together with the Master through several distinctions, is called by the proper name the Holy Spirit; although this name belongs to Him not so much by the force and propriety of the word as by the usage of Scripture and of the whole Church. For, if one looks to the signification which would belong to this word by the account of the parts of which it is composed, the whole Trinity, and each Person, is a holy spirit, and could be called by the one composite name "Holy Spirit." For this term "spirit" partly imports subtlety and immateriality, partly motion, impulse, and vehemence of acting—especially among the Hebrews; but these belong to God most of all and most properly; for God's Nature is most simple and farthest removed from matter, and it is pure and perpetual act (*actus*), and the most efficacious cause of all things.

§ 2. Hence, although "spirit" is said both of incorporeal creatures—an angel and a soul—and of certain corporeal things, as being more subtle, as air and wind; and in Ecclesiastes 3 we read not only of the spirit of men, but also of the spirit of beasts; nevertheless it most perfectly belongs to God. Whence Christ says, Jn. 4: "God is Spirit." And the Apostle, 2 Cor. 3: "The Lord is Spirit." Likewise, to be holy, that is, pure from every stain of uncleanness, does indeed belong to creatures by a certain participation, but essentially it belongs to God, according to that in Leviticus: "Be ye holy, for I am holy, the Lord your God." Therefore both may also in a certain way belong to some creatures, so that they may be called holy spirits. Those spirits to whom it is said: "Bless ye, spirits and souls of the just, the Lord," without doubt are holy; but essentially and supremely God alone is the Holy Spirit—which is common to the whole Trinity, if we measure the signification from both its parts. For each Person is Spirit, and each is Holy.

§ 3. But by the usage of the faithful this name has been properly ascribed to the third Person, and is taken as a complex name, so that the account of the parts of which it is composed is not considered in itself. In which way it is sometimes taken in Scripture, as in: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit"; "The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name," etc.; "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one"; and: "Thy Holy Spirit take not away from me."² But why this name has been so accommodated to the third Person that it has become proper to Him, two reasons can be adduced. One, which St. Augustine says in book 5 of *On the Trinity* (and in book 15, chapter 19), was that it was fitting that the Person who proceeds from two in common should be called properly by that name by which those are called in common.³ The other, that the Holy Spirit proceeds in the mode of love, as will be set out below. Now those who mutually love one

another are said to have one spirit, according to that of the Apostle, Eph. 4: "Careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace." Whence in the Divine Office it is sung of the Martyrs: "They went in the love of brotherhood, because one Spirit was in them."

§ 4. Moreover, since love has a force of impelling the lover toward the thing loved—for everyone is drawn by his own love, his own delight—and "spirit" imports a certain impulse, as has been said, hence it comes about that that Person who proceeds after the fashion of love is properly called the Holy Spirit; and indeed, since by His impulse and inspiration He is the author of all sanctification. Whence the Apostle, Rom. 8: "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God." For that in the name "spirit," even when attributed to God, a certain motion or impulse is understood, is manifest from other places of Scripture. For in Matt. 4 Jesus is said to have been led by the Spirit into the desert; for which in Mk. 1 it is read: "And immediately the spirit drove him into the desert." Likewise in Acts 8 the Spirit of the Lord is said to have caught up Philip and to have transferred him into another place; and we frequently read in Scripture that the Spirit of God rushed upon men for doing something. But since that impetus or motion is always unto something holy and divine, hence that same Person is most fittingly named not only Spirit but Holy Spirit. On which matter one may consult St. Thomas, I, q. 36, a. 1, and other places there noted in the margin.⁴

§ II — What is the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (Quis sit modus processionis Spiritus Sancti ex Patre et Filio)

§ 5. For the understanding of the mysteries of the Most High Divine Majesty, among all created things nothing is so helpful to man as the consideration of man himself according to his more noble part, namely the intellective soul (*anima intellectiva*), which, like the Angelic creature, bears the image (*imago*) of God impressed upon itself; according to that in Gen. 1: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." For since this is the voice of the Trinity, as we showed above (ad Distinctionem 2), it also signifies that the image of the Trinity was implanted in man by God; which likewise has in part been declared (ad Distinctionem 3).

§ 6. Therefore, that from this image, when inspected, we may in some measure perceive the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit (*processio Spiritus Sancti*), it must be known that, besides those actions proceeding from the soul which are exercised outwardly and are busied about external things—such as to speak, to see, to walk, to build—in which there is a certain likeness of the operations of God which are called ad extra (*ad extra*), there are others immanent (*actio immanens*), that is, not tending to external matter—namely, to understand and to will—to which there also corresponds a twofold procession remaining within the mind, which the Doctors of the Schools call procession ad intra (*processio ad intra*).

§ 7. For by the very fact that the mind understands a certain thing, there is produced, and in a certain way proceeds within it, the cognition of the thing understood, which cognition we call the word of the mind (*verbum mentis*). And again, by the very fact that the mind wills something, there proceeds within it the love of the thing willed. Now each action proceeds from the mind as from one principle, yet so that the latter action, which is the action of the will, proceeds from the mind through the prior action, that is, love through knowledge.

§ 8. After nearly the same fashion, one may imagine in the Divine Nature a twofold immanent action, namely to understand and to love, to which there likewise corresponds a twofold procession; the one after the manner of the intellect, the other after the manner of the will. For the Father, by eternally understanding

Himself, begets the Word equal to Himself and coeternal; and the same, by eternally loving the Son, and in turn the Son by loving the Father, both produce the Holy Spirit equal to Them and coeternal.

§ 9. Yet how this imagining is to be taken so that it answer to the truth of the Mystery will appear further in the course of the discussion, and most of all from those things which will be said (ad Distinctionem 3. 27. & 32.). There may also be applied to this matter a likeness, albeit a remoter one, drawn from those things which do not have in themselves the image of the Trinity but only its vestige; such as that taken from the sun, which produces brightness and, by means of this, heat from itself; for thus from the Father through the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds. For just as the Son is rightly compared to brightness on account of wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is rightly compared to heat on account of charity (*caritas*). But all such likenesses, although they help us somewhat to conceive some mode of the twin procession in the Divine, by no means, however, attain its perfection and propriety. For in these the procession is of accidents, there of persons, who, by that very procession, obtain the same nature and dignity as He from whom they proceed. Finally, as far as the creature is distant from the Creator, so far do these fall short of a clear representation of Him, for the declaring of which they are assumed as certain likenesses.

§ 10. Moreover, the difference between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit is more fully explained below (ad Distinctionem 13). We add only this, that the procession of the Holy Spirit has no proper name, but is called procession by a common name appropriated to itself; since otherwise generation too is a certain procession, the Son saying of Himself in Jn. 8: "I have proceeded from God," and in Sir. 24, under the name of the Wisdom of God: "I came forth out of the mouth of the Most High."⁶

§ 11. The relations (*relationes*) also, which are taken in accordance with this procession of the third Person, are wont to be signified by the names of spiration and procession (*spiratio et processio*); although those words seem to signify rather the notional acts (*actus notionales*) than the relations: for just as the Holy Spirit is said to proceed, so the Father and the Son are said to breathe forth (*spirare*). Others call these relations active and passive spiration (*spiratio activa et passiva*). Which is in accord with the words of St. Augustine, who (Epistle 174) says that the Spirit, according to that which is referred to something, belongs to the One who breathes (*Spirantis*); and that the One who breathes (*Spirans*) breathes by the Spirit. To which is consonant what St. Thomas says (I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 2), that some relation can be understood in the name "Holy Spirit," if the Holy Spirit be understood, as it were, as one breathed forth (*spiratus*).⁷

§ III — How love or charity in the Divine is to be taken (Amor seu Charitas in Divinis quomodo accipiat)

§ 12. These words—love, affection, charity (*amor, dilectio, caritas*)—sometimes, when taken as common, are taken essentially (*essentialiter*) and belong to the whole Trinity, as do the other essential attributes. Although when taken in this way they are for the most part appropriated, that is, ascribed in a special way to the Holy Spirit, just as the name Wisdom, though it be common to the Trinity, is nevertheless appropriated to the Son; as will be more fully taught (ad Distinctionem 34). In this sense, therefore, the Father is charity, and the Son is charity, but in a special respect the Holy Spirit is called charity; both because He proceeds in the manner of love, as has already been said; and because in the work of the conversion and sanctification of men, which Scripture is wont peculiarly to attribute to the Holy Spirit, there appears the singular charity of God toward men, as the Apostle bears witness, Eph. 2: "But God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity

wherewith He loved us, hath quickened us," etc. Then indeed also because the charity by which we love God, as the principal effect of our sanctification, Scripture attributes to the Holy Spirit as its author, Rom. 5.⁹

§ 13. At other times, however, those same words are taken personally (*personaliter*), namely so that by them there be signified the Person proceeding by way of love, together with the reference of that same Person to His principle; just as by the name "Word" there is signified the Person proceeding by way of the mental word, with relation to that whence He proceeds. In this sense, therefore, these words signify the third Person in the Deity, not only by appropriation, as they say, but properly, so that each of them is a personal name competent to the Holy Spirit, as "Word" is to the Son.

§ 14. But this signification suits those words not so much by force and propriety of the words themselves as by the usage of those who have handed on Theology by way and reason; according to whom also "to love" or "to have affection" (*amare seu diligere*), when taken personally, or rather notionally, signify the same as "to breathe forth" (*spirare*): so that to love is to produce love; and this again is nothing other than to produce the Person proceeding by way of love. Now these things have been adopted by the Doctors not rashly, but from the analogy explained above, which love has with the Word. That the name "Word" is proper to the Son is manifest from the Scriptures; but about this matter below (ad Distinct. 27). Whether, however, one must say that the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit—which from the foregoing seems consequent—will be treated expressly (ad Distinct. 32).

§ IV — In what sense Scripture calls God charity (Quo sensu Scriptura Deum charitatem vocet)

§ 15. Sacred Scripture cannot be brought forward to teach that the name of charity (*caritas*) so properly belongs to the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) as we read the name of the Word (*Verbum*) attributed to the Son—that is, as a personal name. St. Augustine does indeed teach, in book 15 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 17 (and in *Tractate 7 on the First Epistle of John*), that that statement in 1 John 4, "Charity is of God," and again, "God is charity," properly pertain to the Holy Spirit, who is God from God—of whom there follows a little later in the same place: "because He hath given us of His Spirit." Of whom also it is written in Rom. 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us."¹⁰ But Augustine does not wish in those places to make this the proper name of the Holy Spirit; he only teaches that this name is attributed to Him so properly or peculiarly as wisdom is attributed to the Son—namely, by appropriation, as the Schoolmen call it.¹¹

§ 16. For assuredly it is established that Augustine, both elsewhere and in the place already mentioned—namely, book 15 (*On the Trinity*, chs. 17 and 19)—acknowledges and employs in divine matters the name of charity as an essential name; whereas it is certain that the name of the Word has not been employed, either in Scripture or by the Fathers, in that way; wherefore it is the proper name only, and not appropriated from what is common, as the name of charity is, and many others. Therefore the name of love, or charity, does not stand related to the third Person in the same way as the Word to the second, if we have regard to the usage of the language of Scripture and of the holy Fathers; although, as has already been said, by the usage of the schools it has been received that it be attributed to the Holy Spirit as a proper name.

§ 17. Moreover, as regards the passage of John which Augustine interprets about uncreated charity, which God is, perhaps better—according to the interpretation of others—the former clause, which says, "Charity is

of God," is to be understood of created charity. For the Apostle exhorts the faithful that they love one another for this reason, because charity, or love (for so Augustine assiduously reads), "is of God"; that is, the love of brotherhood is a singular gift of God, and therefore is rightly to be embraced and exercised by us. But as to what immediately follows, and is repeated a second time, "God is charity," although some think it is said in like manner of created charity in this sense: "Charity is of God," or "God is the author and giver of charity"—in which sense the Psalmist said, "The Lord is my strength; my illumination, my salvation" (Ps. 17 and 26)—(for that which they are wont to adduce as an example from Ps. 70, "Thou art my patience," seems to be said more objectively, just as "Thou art my hope" and "Thou art my expectation," Ps. 38; and the sense is: "thou art he whom I sustain, and whom I wait for with patience")—nevertheless it is more correctly taken as said in the proper idiom, as it is said, "God is spirit," and as it could also be said, "God is goodness," "God is wisdom"; so that it be an essential name common to the whole Trinity, nor in this place be it referred particularly, not even according to appropriation, to any Person; and thus the sense will be: God by essence is charity, and therefore the fount of all created charity. Wherefore, if we abide in mutual and fraternal charity, we show that we abide in God and that God in us, because so great a good can be drawn from no other source than from that fount.¹²

§ 18. Whether, however, the name of charity is elsewhere in the Scriptures appropriated to a definite Person is not clear. For neither does that which is said of the Father in Col. 1, "He hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love"—or, as Augustine reads, "of His charity"—argue that the Father also is said peculiarly and by appropriation to be charity on the ground that the Son is of the Father alone; although Augustine presses this in book 15 (On the Trinity, ch. 19), with the words indicated by the Master at the end of the last section. It does not argue this, I say, both because "Son of charity," or of love, is said according to a Hebraic phrase, in place of "beloved Son," just as "son of perdition" means a man lost, or destined for perdition, as Theophylact noted; and because the Apostle did not simply say "the Son of charity," but "of His charity," that is, of the very Father. Which can have no other fitting sense than that the Son is understood to be loved by the Father Himself. For that the Father be called "the charity of Himself," although we do not deny that this can truly be said, nevertheless seems alien to the usage of Scripture.¹³

§ 19. Furthermore, outside of Scripture we find the name of charity appropriated to the Father, as in the ecclesiastical Office of the Holy Trinity, in which thus it is sung: "Charity is the Father, grace the Son, communion the Holy Spirit." Which seems to be taken from 2 Cor. 13, where it is said: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit," etc. Yet there the Apostle does not call the Father "charity," but prays for the charity of God the Father for the Corinthians. The rationale of this appropriation is that, as it is said in Jn. 3, "So God loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son."¹⁴

§ V — That the Holy Spirit is truly and properly God (Spiritus sanctum vere et proprie Deum esse)

§ 20. Wherever heretics have denied that the Son of God is truly and properly God, these same have at the same time also withdrawn from the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) the Deity (*Deitas*) in the proper sense of the name. For since in Matt. 28 the Holy Spirit is clearly set after the Son in the order of the three Persons, they did not think that there could be ascribed to the third Person an excellence of nature which was being denied of the second; especially since they judged that any doctrine which ascribes Divinity to a Person other than the

Father conflicts with our Faith, by which we believe and confess one only God. Therefore all the Arians thought wrongly about the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, just as they did about that of the Son: as St. Augustine openly testifies (Heresy 49, which is that of the Arians).¹⁶ There were, however, on the other hand those who, while acknowledging the Son to be properly God, stumbled at the third Person, that is, at the Holy Spirit, as the Macedonians, of whom St. Augustine (Heresy 52) says: "The Macedonians think rightly about the Father and the Son, that they are of one and the same substance or essence; but they are unwilling that this be believed of the Holy Spirit, saying that he is a creature: some rather call them Semi-Arians, because in this question they are partly with the Arians, partly with us." So he. But today there are no pure Macedonians, because whoever deny the Holy Spirit to be coessential to God the Father, these also deny the same of the Son, inasmuch as they think that the attribution of Deity to either conflicts with the unity of the divine essence. Therefore now it must briefly, and chiefly from Scripture, be proved that the Holy Spirit truly is God, and that He is consubstantial with the Father and the Son.

§ 21. Hence, these are the chief testimonies of Scripture. First, Wis. 1: "The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world, and containeth," that is, preserveth, "all things." But both of these are of God alone. Second. In the same place it is said of the Spirit of the Lord: "God is the witness of a man's reins; the true searcher of his heart." In which sentence the Spirit is called not only God, and indeed "true," but also there is ascribed to Him that which many other places of Scripture attest to belong to God alone, namely to search the reins and the hearts. Third. In Wis. 7 there is attributed to the Divine Spirit, among other things, that He is "possessing all power," that is, omnipotent; likewise that He is "looking upon all things," that is, having knowledge of all things even future. But these are without controversy divine properties. Fourth, 1 Kgs (Vulgate numbering) 23: David calls the Spirit of the Lord God, saying: "The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me; the God of Israel said to me." Fifth, Ps. 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all the host of them by the Spirit of His mouth." And Job 33: "The Spirit of God made me." But the work of creation is God's alone.

§ 22. Sixth, Ps. 139: "Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit?" Therefore the Spirit of God is everywhere, and consequently God. Seventh, Is. 48: the words are Christ's, "The Lord God hath sent me, and His Spirit." And in ch. 61: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me; He hath sent me to preach the gospel to the poor"; and yet no one could send Christ with authority, except God. Whence also in the Scripture of the New Testament it is ascribed to God the Father everywhere that He sent His Son into the world. Therefore the Holy Spirit is true God, like the Father [...]. Eighth: when the Prophets announced to the people the things that had been revealed to them, they said, "Thus saith the Lord God." But this same Lord God was the Holy Spirit, as Peter says in 2 Pet. 1: "Holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit." Whence Zechariah, in the Canticle, Lk. 1, openly calls Him who spoke by the mouth of the Prophets—that is, the Holy Spirit—the Lord God of Israel. And what Isaiah in ch. 6 says was said to him by the Lord of hosts, which title belongs to the true God alone, this the Acts, at the end, attribute to the Holy Spirit with these words: "Well did the Holy Spirit speak by Isaiah, saying," etc. Ninth, Matt. 12 and Mk. 3: blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, as uttered against God, is opposed to blasphemy against the Son of Man, who as such is not God. Tenth, in the same place the Lord says: "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils." And the Apostle, Heb. 2, calls all the miracles which were wrought by the Apostles "distributions of the Holy Spirit." But to work miracles is the prerogative of divine power alone.

§ 23. Eleventh, 1 Cor. 6: "Your bodies," says the Apostle, "are the temple of the Holy Spirit." But a temple properly belongs to God alone. Whence in the same place there is subjoined: "Glorify and bear God in your body," that is, the Holy Spirit Himself, of whom your bodies are the temple. Twelfth, 1 Cor. 12: the distributions of graces and of operations and of whatsoever gifts of God are ascribed to their author, the Holy Spirit, who in the same place is also called Lord and God: "He worketh all in all, dividing to everyone as He will." But all these are God's alone. Thirteenth, 2 Cor. 3: "When he shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away; now the Lord is the Spirit. And where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." By which words the Apostle signifies that the Spirit is that very Lord of whom he had just said, "When he shall turn to the Lord," and nonetheless that He is the Spirit of the Lord. Therefore the selfsame Spirit of God is at once God, just as the second Person, the Son of God, is at once God. Fourteenth, Acts 5: Peter says, "Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldst lie to the Holy Spirit?" Then he adds, "Thou hast not lied to men, but to God." Therefore the Holy Spirit is God. Fifteenth, 1 Jn. 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. And these three are one." Which passage, by the testimony of all the Fathers, proves that the three Persons in the Godhead are of the same essence. Sixteenth, 1 Cor. 6 and elsewhere, justification and our sanctification are ascribed to the Holy Spirit, which is of divine power alone. Let the final argument from the Scriptures be a negative one. For although the Scriptures of both Testaments make most frequent mention of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless nowhere do they call Him a creature, nowhere do they say He is made; nowhere do they call Him the minister of God: but often they call Him Lord, just as they do the Father and the Son. Whence also against the Macedonians and other heretics who said that the Holy Spirit was the minister of the Father and of the Son, and hence inferior to both, there was set in the Creed of Constantinople, by decree of an Ecumenical Council, this: "And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified."

§ 24. Whence also in the sacrifice of the Mass, and in the Litanies, as to the Father, so praying to the Holy Spirit, we say "Kyrie eleison," that is, "Lord, have mercy"; and "Christe eleison," so that the two natures in that Person conjoined, which are signified by the name of Christ, being set before our eyes by the very prayer, may bring to our thought the benefit of our Redemption, which He could not have wrought unless He were God and man. Finally, the Fathers join to these [arguments], who have diligently treated this argument of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit against the heretics, such as Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Didymus, Ambrose, Cyril of Alexandria, Rupert of Deutz, by books published expressly on the Holy Spirit. Likewise Basil in books 3 and 5 Against Eunomius; Gregory Nazianzen (the fifth Oration on Theology); Hilary (book 12 On the Trinity); Cyril of Jerusalem (Catecheses 16 and 18); Chrysostom in various homilies on the Holy Spirit; Epiphanius (Heresy 74; and Augustine, Heresy 32, which is that of the Macedonians); and again Augustine (On the Trinity I, ch. 6; and Against Maximinus I, at the end); Cyril of Alexandria (Dialogues on the Trinity, book 7; and Thesaurus books 13 and 14); Fulgentius (To King Thrasamund, book 3, ch. 35; To Donatus, ch. 8). St. Thomas also treats the same matter expressly in book 4 of the Contra gentiles, from chapter 16 through 27. The Councils, moreover, by whose authority this doctrine has been confirmed, are almost the same as those which assert the Divinity of the Son of God. Although the unanimous and perpetual consent of the whole Catholic Church, taught by the Holy Spirit, ought abundantly to have sufficed to produce most certain faith in this doctrine, even if no definitions of Councils had been added.

§ VI — Certain objections to the contrary are refuted (Quaedam in contrarium objectiones diluuntur)

§ 25. That we may dissolve those arguments which are usually objected against the Divinity of the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*), partly from authority and partly from reason. And, first indeed, from the Scriptures the Arians of old used to object that text of Amos 4 (according to the version of the Seventy): "The Lord it is who makes firm the thunder, and creates the spirit, and announces to men His Christ." From which place they wanted to show that the Holy Spirit, having come down upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost with a mighty sound as of thunder, to announce to men the Christ of the Lord, was created by God. But the reply is easy, that by "spirit" there is signified nothing other than "wind." For both Jerome translates "creating wind." Thus St. Basil in book 3 against Eunomius, and St. Athanasius to Serapion on the Holy Spirit, answer to this argument.³¹ Nor otherwise did the Hieronymian translator, Theodoret, Arethas, and Rupert understand this place; although the Seventy diverge much here from the Hebrew truth, according to which there is no appearance that the Prophet is here speaking of the Holy Spirit.³²

§ 26. The second argument. Rom. 8: "The Spirit Himself intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings. But He who searches hearts knows what the Spirit desires, because He intercedes for the saints according to God." Now that this is said of the Holy Spirit is not in doubt: therefore the Holy Spirit is less than God. For he who prays is less than he to whom prayer is made. Whence also Christ, because He is read to have prayed to the Father, is proved to be less than He, at least according to that nature by which He prays. A like place is Gal. 4, where God is read to have sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father. It is answered: the sense of this is this, that the Spirit intercedes for us and cries in us, that is, He makes us to ask, to desire, and to cry. For since goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and all our sanctification, to which pertain holy desires and prayers to God, hence He is said to intercede for us and in us to cry, because, to wit, He works in us every pious affection. Thus the Apostle himself in a certain manner explains himself, Rom. 8, speaking of the same Spirit: "In whom we cry, Abba, Father." Therefore this is the Holy Spirit's crying in us, which is our very selves crying in the Spirit, or through the Holy Spirit. Whence in Zech. 12 He is called the Spirit of grace and of prayers.

§ 27. But you will say: if the Holy Spirit intercedes for us in that He makes us intercede, therefore the Father also intercedes for us; because He too makes us intercede. I reply: just as the Father is not rightly said to be sent, although the operation to which some Divine Person (*persona divina*) is sent—say, for example, the sanctification of man—be common to the whole Trinity; because passive mission at once imports a procession (*processio*) of that Person who is said to be sent from the Person who sends; or that he who is sent receives from the sender the effect to which he is sent, from whom, to wit, he also receives the nature—as will be more fully explained below (at Distinction 14 and 15)—so one must speak of "interceding," which, although it signifies an effect in men which the whole Trinity works, yet does not on that account belong to all, but only to the Person who receives from another, in order to make men intercede. For "to intercede" at once includes receiving or expecting from another.

§ 28. The third. Eph. 4: "Do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God"; but sadness does not befall God. Likewise, 1 Thess. 5: "Do not quench the Spirit." It is answered: these are attributed figuratively and improperly to the Holy Spirit, as to that Divine Person (*persona*) to whom, as has been said, goodness is appropriated; to whom therefore all our sanctification and all gifts of grace are ascribed in a peculiar way.

Hence, on account of the ingratitude of men, who reject and despise His gifts, whether in themselves or in others, He is said to be grieved and to be quenched. Likewise because the saints, in whom the Holy Spirit is, are grieved.

§ 29. The fourth. The Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Father and the Son, Jn. 15, Gal. 4, and often elsewhere. But he who is sent is less than he who sends. But the solution of this argument will be clear from what will be said below (at Distinction 15). For the mission of one Person by another imports nothing else than a temporal operation of the Person proceeding from another, from whom He has this very thing, that He works.

§ 30. The fifth. Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him": therefore even the Holy Spirit was made through the Word. First, it is answered that "all things" are understood as those naturally diverse from the Word itself. For otherwise the consequence will be that the Father Himself also, because He is not the Word, was made through the Word. Then John explains himself when he subjoins: "And without Him was made nothing that was made," that is, nothing of those things which were made was made without the Word; but whatever was made by God, was made through the Word.

§ 31. The sixth. St. Augustine, q. 109 (among the Questions on the Old and New Testaments), says that the Holy Spirit is a priest not supreme, but that Christ is the supreme Priest. I reply: that work is not by Augustine, nor even by a Catholic writer.³³

§ 32. The seventh. If the Holy Spirit were God, since He is not begotten, there will be in the Divinity two unbegotten ones, the Father and the Holy Spirit. I reply: the Holy Spirit is neither begotten nor unbegotten, that is, not unproceeding, as will be more fully explained below (at Distinction 13).

§ 33. The last. The Holy Spirit does not proceed by way of nature (*per modum naturae*), but by way of will (*per modum voluntatis*): therefore He does not proceed from God naturally, but freely; in the way that creatures proceed from God. It is answered: in God each mode of procession, both by way of will and by way of nature, is natural. For not only does the intellect (*intellectus*) produce knowledge of the true, but also the will (*voluntas*) produces love of the good in itself naturally and necessarily: for as the intellect is naturally ordered to the act of knowing, so the will is naturally ordered to the act of loving. Why, however, it does not thence follow that the Spirit proceeds by way of nature will be made clear below (at Distinction 13).

1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36, a. 1.

2. Matt. 28:19; Jn. 14:26; 1 Jn. 5:7; Ps. 50:13 (Vulgate numbering).

3. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 19.

4. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36, a. 1; "aliis locis ibidem ad marginem notatis" [abbreviation as in source].

5. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 3; I, q. 41 [abbreviation as in source]; likewise I, q. 36, a. 1 and a. 4.

6. Jn. 8: "I have proceeded from God"; Sir. 24: "I came forth out of the mouth of the Most High."

7. St. Augustine, Epistle 174; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 2.

8. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 37, a. 1.

9. Eph. 2; Rom. 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us."

10. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 17; idem, Tractates on the First Epistle of John, tract. 7; 1 Jn. 4; Rom. 5.

11. On appropriation to the Son of wisdom, see St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 17; cf. scholastic usage.
12. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, chs. 17, 19; Ps. 17; Ps. 26; Ps. 70; Ps. 38; "God is spirit": Jn. 4:24.
13. Col. 1:13; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 19; Theophylact, *Commentary on Colossians* (on Col. 1:13).
14. 2 Cor. 13:13(14); Jn. 3:16.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1 (corpus); q. 39, a. 2; q. 42, a. 1–2, 6; and expressly, *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, ch. 16 ff.
16. St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 49 (on the Arians).
17. St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 52 (on the Macedonians).
18. The Creed of Constantinople (381): "Et in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum, et vivificantem, qui ex Patre [Filioque], cum Patre et Filio simul adoratur et conglorificatur."
19. Athanasius; St. Basil; St. Gregory of Nyssa; Didymus the Blind; St. Ambrose; St. Cyril of Alexandria; Rupert of Deutz, works specifically *On the Holy Spirit*.
20. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, books 3 and 5.
21. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration 5* (*On Theology*).
22. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, book 12.
23. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses* 16 and 18.
24. St. John Chrysostom, various homilies on the Holy Spirit.
25. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (Heresy 74); and St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 32 (on the Macedonians).
26. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 6; and *Contra Maximinum* I (at the end).
27. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Dialogues on the Trinity*, book 7; *Thesaurus*, books 13–14.
28. St. Fulgentius, *Ad Trasamundum regem* III, ch. 35; *Ad Donatum*, ch. 8.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, chs. 16–27.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39; and I, q. 42, a. 2 and 6.
31. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, book 3; St. Athanasius, *Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit*.
32. The Hieronymian translator (Jerome); Theodoret of Cyrus; Arethas of Caesarea; Rupert of Deutz, *ad loc.* (Amos 4:13).
33. Attributed to St. Augustine, *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 109; the work is spurious.

DISTINCTIO XI — ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT FROM THE SON (*DE PROCESSIONE SPIRITUS SANCTI EX FILIO*)

§ I — That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son is shown from the Scriptures (Spiritus sanctum ex Filio procedere per Scripturas ostenditur)

§ 1. The disputation of the present Distinction presupposes that the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) proceeds from the Father, which is so clear from the Scriptures that about it, as about a doubtful matter, there was never any question set on foot that disturbed the Church; although Eunomius denied this, whose absurd opinion, known to not many, did not endure after him. For it has been expressly said by Christ in Jn. 15 and 16 that the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, proceeds from the Father. Reason also manifestly proves this same thing. For since there is a certain order in the Divine things, it is necessary that among the three persons (*personae*) there be one from whom the other two proceed: for the nature of order requires this; namely, that whatever things are many, either they be so disposed that one of them is from another, or else the many themselves be referred back to one principle (*principium*) from which they are. Since therefore neither the Father is from the Holy Spirit, nor both are from some third, it follows of necessity that the Holy Spirit is, and proceeds, from the Father as from a principle. This same thing can be proved by this argument too: because, since it is agreed that the Father does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father, these two Persons would not be distinguished from one another; for neither can they be distinguished otherwise than by opposed relations (*relationes*), which relations there are none in the Divine things except by reason of the origin (*origo*) of one Person from another, as will be explained more fully below.

§ 2. This, then, being set down as outside controversy, as to the point that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the second Person, that is, from the Son, the Greeks even to this very day contend with the Latins, that is, with the Roman Church. Which dissension seems to have begun more than 800 years ago, with the Greeks asserting that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not also from the Son. This they then began to defend with greater vigor, and not without a show of obstinacy, about the year of the Lord 860, Nicholas I being Roman Pontiff. Finally, both on account of this dogma and of certain other matters regarding which there was a stubborn dissension of the Greeks from the Latins, the Greeks at length, in an open schism, separated themselves from the Roman Church about the year 1050. Therefore, as regards the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the Latins, against the Greeks, have demonstrated the truth of this doctrine not only by Ecclesiastical Tradition—which by itself ought to have sufficed—but indeed also with several testimonies of Scripture.

§ 3. Of which sort, first, are those that say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, as Rom. 8: "He who does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his." And Gal. 4: "God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba, Father." Likewise Acts 16: "And the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them." Such also is that in Ps.

32: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their host." For the Son, inasmuch as He is the Word, is the mouth of the Father. Therefore the Spirit of His mouth is the Spirit of the Son. Now it cannot be said that the Spirit is the Son's because He is His work, or because He is His instrument—things all of which are alien to God: since, in this dispute, the Greeks agree with us that the Holy Spirit is God. It remains, therefore, that He is called the Spirit of the Son on account of a relation (*relatio*) of origin which the one has from the other, that is, which the Spirit has from the Son; He is called the Spirit of the Son, as spirated (*spiratus*) by the Son. And this is proved even from this, that, in a wholly similar way of speaking, He is called the Spirit of the Father (Matt. 10; Rom. 8), namely, for no other reason than because He proceeds and is spirated (*spirare*) from the Father. And with this argument to prove the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son St. Augustine has made use.² Nor is the response of the Greeks of any weight, when they are willing that it was therefore said "the Spirit of the Son," because He is in the Son, that is, because He is intimate to the Son, as being consubstantial.

§ 4. For by an equal reason in turn it could be said that the Son is the Spirit's; for just as, on account of the unity of substance, the Spirit is in the Son, so too the Son is in the Holy Spirit. In which way, on account of this same unity of the Son with the Father, the Son Himself says: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me" (Jn. 14). But that the Son should be the Spirit's is utterly alien from the Scriptures and from the sense of the Fathers; indeed, as if most absurd.³ Therefore He is said to be the Spirit of the Son, not because He is in Him, but because He is His as of one who breathes forth. For by this relation the Spirit is said to be someone's, as was shown above in the preceding Distinction.⁴

§ 5. To make this matter clear, and at the same time for the proof of the present doctrine, what we read in Jn. 20 is of first importance: that Christ, when He had breathed upon His disciples, said: "Receive the Holy Spirit." Where first indeed, by the very deed, He was signifying that thus the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself in a spiritual and ineffable mode, according to the Divine Nature, just as that spirit, of which it is said "He breathed," proceeded from His mouth corporally, according to the human nature. Then, too, by those words "Receive the Holy Spirit," He signified that He is the giver of the Holy Spirit: which cannot be, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from Him. St. Cyril treats that Scripture in this way,⁵ and St. Augustine likewise,⁶ and St. Ambrose, on Luke at the end.⁷

§ 6. A third Scriptural passage, and one more apt, is Jn. 16, where the Lord, speaking about the Holy Spirit, says: "He will not speak from Himself; but whatever He shall hear, He will speak. He will glorify me; because He will receive of mine, and will announce it to you." And expounding this very thing He adds: "All things whatsoever the Father has are mine. Therefore I said that He will receive of mine, and will announce it to you." Such also is that of Jn. 17, Christ to the Father: "All thine are mine." These words clearly signify that the Holy Spirit receives from the Son, as from the Father, the office of glorifying the Son, and, consequently, the nature—since in God acts, power, and nature are not distinguished. And He receives from the Son because whatever things are the Father's are also the Son's. Yet this must be understood with this alone excepted, that this one is Father, that one Son; as St. Augustine, writing on that place, explains; and again in De Trinitate V, ch. 14.⁸ Wherefore, since to spirate is not to be Father (otherwise it would follow that the Holy Spirit is Son), it follows that that [to spirate] is common to the Son. You may also see the treatment of this passage in the same Cyril on John.⁹

§ 7. A fourth Scriptural testimony is that by which the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Son, as Jn. 15: "When the Paraclete has come, whom I will send to you from the Father." And ch. 16: "But if I shall go, I will

send Him to you." And at the end of Luke: "And I send the promise of my Father upon you." Since, therefore, it is necessary that the one who is sent receive something from the one who sends—whether he who sends be greater, or lesser, or equal (otherwise indeed there will be no reason why he should be said to be sent)—it follows that the Holy Spirit, who is sent by the Son, receives something from the Son. But whatever that be which He is said to receive, it cannot be diverse from His essence, since in the Divine things essence, power, and action are one and the same. The final passage is Jn. 14: "The Paraclete, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name"; that is, as Cyril explains, "through me, and by embassy and commission from me." Therefore, according to Cyril's mind, these two expressions signify the same thing: that the Son sends the Holy Spirit from the Father, and that the Father sends the Holy Spirit in the name of the Son, that is, through the Son. For it is signified that the Holy Spirit is sent by both, but in such a way that the Son receives from the Father this very thing, namely, that He sends the Holy Spirit.¹⁰

§ II — The same proof from the Fathers and Councils (Ejusdem probatio ex Patribus, & Conciliis)

§ 8. From the judgment of the Latin Fathers, or, that they may be reckoned under a more general name, of the Western Church—even of those who lived before the time of the controversy—there is no cause even probable for doubting that they all unanimously held that the Holy Spirit proceeds (*procedere*) from the Father and the Son. Since no one is read to have denied this, and very many even asserted this very thing in express words: as Hilary, book 2 On the Trinity, teaching: that it must without doubt be confessed that the Holy Spirit is "of the Father and the Son as authors"; Ambrose (On Luke, at the end), where from Christ's breathing upon the disciples he takes an argument for this matter; and book 2 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 12, where he cites that saying: "because he will receive of mine"; and Jerome (on Is. 57; and in the Epistle to Hedibia, question 9), saying: that on account of the fellowship of nature the Holy Spirit is sent together by the Father and the Son; Rufinus also (in the Exposition of the Creed) calls the Holy Spirit one proceeding from both; Prudentius likewise speaks very clearly about this matter, as in the Hymn After Food: "That same eternal Spirit reigns, sent at once by Christ and by the Parent"; and in the Hymn Before Sleep: "God, sent from both"; and in the Hymn for the Paschal Candle: "He who is our Lord, he whose only one breathes forth from the paternal heart the Paraclete"; and in the Hamartigenia: "O God Christ, from whose mouth there subsists one God, the Spirit." Augustine (in Tractate 99 on John) expressly raises the question about this matter, and answers: that it must be believed that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son; and the same he proves at length. Bede adduces the same words of Augustine (on that passage Gal. 4: "God sent the Spirit of his Son"). In the same author there are other places: book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 17; and To the Letter, chapters 26, 27; and book 10 On Genesis, chapter 15; and book 3 Against Maximinus, chapter 14. Prosper, book 1 On the Contemplative Life, chapter 18: "The Spirit," he says, "proceeds from the Father and the Son." Leo, Epistle 93 (to Turbus, chapter 1), affirms the same expressly. Likewise Fulgentius (On the Faith to Peter, ch. 2); Salvian in the Sermon on the Advent of the Holy Spirit (among the works of Cyprian); Boethius, book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 12; Pope Hormisdas in the Epistle to the Emperor Justin, chapter 2; Pope Gregory in the Creed composed by himself (which is found book 2 of his Life, ch. 2; book 1 of the Moralia, ch. 8; Homily 26 on the Gospels; and book 2 of the Dialogues, the last chapter); Bede, besides the place indicated above on the Epistle to the Galatians from Augustine, also affirms the same in book 1 On the Elements of Philosophy, and in the Homily for the Sunday within the Octave of the Ascension of the Lord. Finally,

Anselm, book On the Holy Spirit, and Rupert in a special work entitled On the Procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit. And any other Latin authors who wrote either around the time of the schism of the Greeks, or afterwards, by the authority of the Latins.

§ 9. However, because the Greeks are unwilling to be pressed (even though they can bring no just exception against those who lived before the time of the dissension, since there have already been alleged very many, illustrious in the Church of God for sanctity and learning), it must also be shown that the Fathers of the Eastern Church, that is, the Greeks themselves, who flourished in the Church before the controversy arose, thought nothing different from the Latins. Therefore, besides the testimonies which the Master adduces from Athanasius, Didymus, Chrysostom, and Cyril, there is most manifest doctrine of the same Cyril, in the places alleged above on John and in the Treasury. And although he was Greek, nevertheless he taught so openly, and so diligently inculcated, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, that he may seem to have assailed the contrary error of set purpose; namely for this reason, perhaps, that Nestorius, against whom he directs his pen, also thought ill on this article. Whence also Theodoret—who at one time was inclined to the party of Nestorius and opposed to Cyril (as is gathered from the refutations of the anathemas of Cyril, ch. 9)—although then that error had not spread widely, Theodoret shortly afterwards was reconciled to the Church; especially since such a thing was said by him only by the way. Moreover, the same thing, with the aforementioned Fathers, was felt and written by the three Gregories—of Nyssa, of Nazianzus, and of Neocaesarea, who also is the Wonderworker—whose Formula of Faith, containing this doctrine, exists in Gregory of Nyssa in his Life, and in the holy Council of Constantinople. Likewise Basil, Cyril, Jerome, Epiphanius, Simeon Metaphrastes, Anastasius, Tharasius, Maximus, and others, whose testimonies the Latins produced when disputing with the Greeks on this question in the Council of Florence, as at length may be seen in the acts of the same Council. Almost the same writers are commemorated by Cardinal Bessarion in the Oration delivered for union, chapters 6 and 7. Although it must be confessed that not all spoke equally openly about this matter. For some indeed said expressly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; but others said that he proceeds from the Father through the Son. Which, however, really is the same as the former; for he who proceeds through the Son is therefore in some manner from the Son, and consequently proceeds from the Son. For since the verb "to proceed" opens very widely, and is extended to everything which receives origin from another, it is sufficient against the Greeks to have shown that the Holy Spirit is in any manner whatever from the Son: for thus it will have been shown that he proceeds from the Son. In which way it is rightly taught that the whole creation both is, and proceeds, from the Son, because it is, and has been made, through the Son, according to that saying: "All things were made through him."

§ 10. Now to come to the Councils, the first place ought deservedly to be had by that in which it was decreed that to the Constantinopolitan Creed, in which it was read "who proceeds from the Father," there be added "and the Son." But what that Council was has not yet been sufficiently ascertained. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and some others think it was some Roman Council, but they do not remember which one, nor in what time it was held. Yet from the acts of the Council of Florence one may gather its antiquity; where the Catholic disputant against the Greeks produces an ancient copy of the Seventh Synod, in which it would be written that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Which Synod was held before this controversy arose. Therefore that addition is more ancient than this Synod. And indeed some refer it to the times of the Nestorian heresy.

§ 11. They say that the Council in which the addition was made is that very one which was celebrated under Pope Damasus, immediately after the first Ecumenical Synod of Constantinople, which condemned Macedonius. For they say that on account of certain heretics, who taught that the Holy Spirit was the son of the Son, and the grandson of the Father, this addition was made; in order that it might be clearly understood that the Holy Spirit is not begotten, but just as he proceeds from the Father, so also from the Son, namely by a procession distinct from generation. However, since in the acts of that Council nothing of this sort is read, and not even any of the ancient writers makes mention of this thing, it appears rather that this addition was made at a later time; namely around the times of the Sixth Synod, after the Year of the Lord six hundred; and this (as the Catholic disputant relates in the Council of Florence, session 7) by the Roman Pontiff in some very great Council of Latin Fathers, convoked on another occasion. And this to be that Roman Council to which certain Scholastic doctors ascribe that addition: although the name of the Pontiff, and the year of the Council held, are nowhere found to exist. A sign, moreover, of the matter is this: that before that time the Constantinopolitan Creed is not found with the addition; it is, however, found not long after; as in the Eighth Council of Toledo, which was held about the year 560, and then a hundred years later in the Seventh universal Synod. Let therefore in the second place be this same Seventh Synod, in which there were Greek Fathers in very great number; in whose seventh session the Creed was recited with this addition, "and the Son." That this was so transacted, although the Greeks deny it, the Latins proved in the Council of Florence, sessions 5 and 7. The third is the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in which, the Greeks, after a long schism, coming to their senses and consenting, the truth was openly defined, chapter 1; and concerning the consent of the Greeks it is evident from chapter 4. The fourth is the Council of Lyons under Gregory X, which also itself, just as the two Councils above, was General. In which, the Greeks again consenting, the same definition was repeated, and the Creed with the addition was sung in the full assembly of the Council three times in Greek and three times in Latin. Which definition is had at the beginning of book 6 of the Decretals. The fifth and last was the universal Council of Florence, convened chiefly for the cause of this controversy. In which, after a long contest between the Greeks and Latins, the Latins having carried the point, the same was established, and the union of the Western and Eastern Churches was by a happy outcome procured. But since the Greeks shortly afterwards returned to their vomit, fourteen years after the concord was entered into, at the Pentecost feasts—that is, of the Holy Spirit—the royal city Constantinople, together with the whole empire of the Greeks, came into the power of the Turks; not without a manifest sign of divine vengeance, on account of the stubbornness of the error concerning the Holy Spirit conjoined with a detestable schism.

§ 12. To these may be added particular Councils: as Toledo I, ch. 21; Toledo IV, VIII, and XI, each at ch. 1. All of which, held before the controversy, confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Likewise a certain Council held at Bari in the year 1097, in which Blessed Anselm convicted the Greeks, who had come together there, of their error, as is related in book 2 of his Life; of which Council Anselm himself also makes mention (book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 4). Furthermore, besides the Councils already mentioned, it must be known that there exists a certain Epistle of Cyril written to Nestorius from the Alexandrian Council, in which Epistle these words are read: "He is called the Spirit of truth; the truth is Christ. Whence also from him, just as from the Father, he proceeds." Now this epistle, after the Alexandrian Synod in which it was written, was approved first by the Council of Ephesus (tome 1, ch. 14), where it also is inserted; then by the Fourth Synod, in session 5; the Fifth Synod in the last session; and the Sixth Synod in session 17; and the Seventh Synod in session designated. From which it is plainly gathered that these Oecumenical Synods too—four of which were celebrated before the schism—approved with their votes the

judgment of the Greeks and the Roman Church concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son clearly expressed in that epistle.

§ 13. Here we judge that the reader must be warned that in the Paris edition of the year 1648 one reads "at Bari, about the year 1090." In the Neapolitan, however, "about the year 1097." For since Estius soon mentions Anselm, if you consult Labbe, the same Council is referred by the learned editor to the year 1097 in the Censure of the aforesaid book, p. 198; the same opinion is held also by Pagi in the *Critica Baroniana*.⁵⁵

§ III — The same doctrine confirmed by reasons (Eadem doctrina rationibus rata confirmata)

§ 14. The same doctrine is confirmed most of all by reasons derived from the Divine Persons themselves, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds (*procedit*) from the Son. The first and chief of which is this: It is certain that the Divine Persons are distinguished from one another, and that not by something absolute and essential (for whatever is of that sort is common to all, as the essence itself is common), but by what is relative, that is, by opposed relations (*relationes*)—for it is necessary that the Persons themselves be distinguished by relations that are opposed and real. Moreover, such relations in the Divine things are none save those of origin, whereby one Person proceeds from another; therefore, just as the Son is distinguished from the Father as begotten from the begetter, and again the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father as spirated from the spirator, so it is necessary that the Holy Spirit be distinguished from the Son by a reason of origin, and of procession, namely, of one proceeding from the other. But that the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit no one, not even of the Greeks, ever said. It remains, therefore, that one say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Nor is it the case that the Greek should answer that, for the distinction of Persons, multiple and real relations suffice, even if they are not opposed; and therefore that the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit still remains by filiation, which is in the one, and passive spiration, which is in the other, as if by distinct relations. This, I say, cannot be said, because it is established that in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, which nevertheless do not constitute two Persons in him: thus there would be four Persons in the Divine things. Wherefore for the distinction of Persons an opposition of relations is likewise altogether necessary. This the ancients also taught, both Greeks and Latins: as Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration 5, On Theology), Gregory of Nyssa (at the end of the book *Ad Ablabium*), Augustine, book 7 On the Trinity, last chapter, and book 15, ch. 14; and Boethius, book 1 On the Trinity, ch. 12. Whom were followed Anselm (On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2) and Richard of St. Victor (On the Trinity, book 2).⁵⁸

§ 15. The second reason. Whatever proceed naturally from the same source are wont to proceed in a fixed order; although that perhaps is not necessary in those things which proceed from will. Therefore, since the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, not by a free but by a natural action, it is necessary that some order be found between them; which surely can be no other than the order of origin, as was shown above in distinction 9. Wherefore the consequence is that the one proceeds from the other. The antecedent can easily be declared by examples: as of the mind, from which cognition proceeds, and through cognition love; of the sun, from which brightness proceeds, and through this heat; and of similar things. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will be no order between the Son and the Holy Spirit; and accordingly indeed the Father will be in the Divine things the first Person, because the other two proceed from the Father: but why the Son rather than the Holy Spirit should be called the second Person, there will be

no reason. And so it will not be rather to be said "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" than "the Father, the Holy Spirit, and the Son," which is surely very absurd.

§ 16. The third. Just as from the Father, as from the eternal mind, the Son proceeds by way of Word, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the same by way of love. But love does not proceed from the mind except through the Word: for nothing can be loved unless it be first known; therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father except through the Son. More reasons may be seen in St. Thomas, book 4 Against the Gentiles, ch. 24, and in the Disputed Questions On Power, q. 10, a. 4.⁵⁷

§ IV — A reply to the arguments of the Greeks (Respondetur ad argumenta Graecorum)

§ 17. That the Greeks, in the question concerning the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit from the Son, differ from the Latins not only in words—as the Master seems to think—but plainly in sense, is sufficiently proved by the schism of so many ages, whereby they were separated from the Roman Church chiefly on account of this article. More evidently, however, their writings prove it, and most keen and most toilsome disputations held with the Latins. For although they confessed that the Holy Spirit is of the Son, because Scripture expressly bears witness to this, nevertheless they denied that he either is, or proceeds, or is spirated, from the Son; which is, beyond doubt, contrary to the Catholic sense.

§ 18. Which is doubtless contrary to Catholic sense. But they use these arguments. First: because no Scripture says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but where His procession is mentioned, as in Jn. 15, it names the Father alone. But to this an easy reply is made, both because not all the mysteries of the Faith are contained in the Sacred Letters. For there are certain unwritten traditions having an equal force of authority with those that are written, as that most learned of the Greeks, Basil, splendidly wrote in his book On the Holy Spirit, ch. 27.⁵⁹ Then, because it is false that this which is in question is not contained in the Sacred Letters; as is evident from the Scriptures adduced above in testimony—unless perchance they should say that therefore it is not found in the Scriptures, because there those words are not expressly had: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. In this way, neither is it read there that God is three in Persons, nor is it read that the Son and the Holy Spirit are to the Father homoousios, that is, consubstantial; which things nevertheless the Greeks most certainly believe together with us. Finally, because this very thing, that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, convinces that He proceeds from the Son also. For He does not proceed from the Father, as He is Father; for thus He would be His Son, because the Father as Father is not referred except to the Son. Therefore He proceeds from the Father according as the Father is not distinguished from the Son; and hence He also proceeds from the Son; according to that which the Son Himself, speaking of the procession of the Holy Spirit, says in Jn. 16: "All things that the Father has are mine." Moreover, it ought not to be a wonder to see that in Jn. 15 Christ, His own name kept silent, named the Father alone, saying: "who proceeds from the Father." For the Son is wont to refer all His own to the Father, from whom He has even this very thing, namely that He is, as St. Augustine teaches in De Trinitate XV, ch. 27;⁶⁰ and in Tractate 69 on John, where at length he discusses this very question and solves the difficulty now proposed; and also in Contra Maximum III, ch. 14, he says that therefore the Father alone is named, not that the Son may be excluded, but because the Father is the principal author of the Holy Spirit, from whom indeed the Son has that He may breathe [Him forth], as also all other things. Whence elsewhere the Son says: "My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent

me, the Father." Likewise: "The Father abiding in me, He Himself does the works." And in another place: "The word which you have heard is not mine but the Father's who sent me." For since the Son received the essence from the Father, nothing remains which He should not have from the Father; which therefore whole, as befitted the Son, He referred to the Father as author. Although in the same sentence, in which He said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, He did not altogether keep Himself silent; for He had already said: "Whom I will send to you from the Father." Nay truly, even if He had said: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, He ought not immediately to be understood to have excluded Himself. For also in Matt. 11 He says: "No one knows the Son except the Father." Which is such as if He had said: The Father alone knows the Son; where nevertheless from the cognition of the Son neither the Holy Spirit nor the Son Himself is excluded, as will be set forth below (at Distinct. 21).

Second, they take an argument from the Constantinopolitan Creed, which, since it was studiously composed by the Fathers for the explication of the Faith, yet the Father alone is named there in these words: "who proceeds from the Father." Whence they will have it consequent that the mind of the Fathers of that Council was that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not from the Son. I answer: that the reason why those Fathers did not add to the Creed, "from the Son," but thought it enough to say, "who proceeds from the Father," is this; because at that time it was not called into question whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. For even the heretics attacking the Divinity of the Holy Spirit granted this to be true, as is evident from Basil, *Contra Eunomium* II.⁶¹ But whether He proceeded from the Father, this Eunomius called into doubt; nay he simply denied it, saying that the Holy Spirit was altogether alien from the Father, as the creature of the Son alone. This therefore, about which alone at that time the question turned, it seemed sufficient for the time that the Fathers of that Council should have put into the Creed.

Third. In the Passion of St. Andrew the Apostle (written by the Presbyters and Deacons of the Churches of Achaia) it is said near the beginning: "Peace to all who believe in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father, abiding in the Son, so that it may be shown that there is one Spirit in the Father and the Son"; but nothing proceeds from Him in whom it abides and rests. Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. To this it can be replied with St. Thomas, that by the fact it is said that the Holy Spirit abides in the Son, it is not excluded that He proceeds from Him, because the Son also is said to abide in the Father in Jn. 6, 14, and 15, and yet He proceeds from the Father.⁶² Nay, it must not be denied that the Holy Spirit abides in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. For He does not so proceed from the Father and the Son as to depart from them. Whence it was added, so that it may be shown that there is one Spirit in the Father and the Son. And rightly He is also said to have assumed, and to have dwelt upon, the manhood, on account of that which is written in Jn. 1 and Mk. 1, that the Holy Spirit descended in bodily appearance and remained upon Him. And in Is. 11: "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him." However, it must be known that in some manuscript copies, and in certain printed ones, those words are not had, "proceeding from the Father" and "abiding in the Son," so that the suspicion is not improbable that these were added by later Greeks.⁶³

Fourth. In the Council of Ephesus there was publicly read the Nestorian Creed together with the book of Theodoret written against the anathemas of Cyril; but in both it is denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Since therefore the Fathers of that Council are not read to have contradicted doctrine of this sort, they seem to have approved it. First I reply: that it does not stand that the Fathers did not contradict. For not all the things that were transacted in Councils are had in writing. Then too that there was read there the

Epistle of Cyril with the anathemas to Nestorius, in which it is twice read that the Holy Spirit has His to-be (*esse*) from the Son; and to this the Fathers so little contradicted, that also with great agreement they approved not only the Epistle but the whole doctrine of Cyril against the Nestorians: condemning those things which Theodoret had written against him. And the same also certain following Synods did.⁶⁴

Fifth. Dionysius, ch. 2 of *On the Divine Names*, says that the Father alone is the fount of the Deity. Therefore the Father alone is He from whom the Deity is received, as by the Son, so by the Holy Spirit. It is answered: that the Father alone is rightly said to be the fount of the Deity, because after the manner of a fount, which supplies water not received from elsewhere, the Father communicates the Divine Nature to the other Persons; which He did not receive from another. For otherwise, if in a fount you consider only this, which is to pour forth water of itself, whether it have it from elsewhere or not—in that way the Son too can be called a fount of the Deity; in which way Epiphanius said (her. 69) that the Son is a fount from a fount, just as God from God.⁶⁵

Sixth. Basil (Ep. 43) says that the proper notion (*notio*) of the Holy Spirit is that He is known through the Son, and with the Son, and that He has subsistence from the Father. Which distinct way of speaking seems to require that the Holy Spirit has subsistence from the Father in such wise that not from the Son. It is answered that, according to Basil's mind, the Holy Spirit is known through the Son, as through the Spirator; just as the Son is known through the Father as Father, that is, begetter; and hence by the former words is signified that the Holy Spirit is known through the Son as through the Spirator, rather than that the Holy Spirit subsists from the Father alone as principal author; as St. Augustine speaks in *Contra Maximum III*, ch. 14.⁶⁶

Seventh. Gregory of Nazianzus, in the *Oration to the Bishops of Egypt*: "All the things which the Father has, the Son also has, except causality." Therefore the Son does not communicate to the Father to be the cause of the Holy Spirit. It is answered that Gregory is understood to mean that causality which the Father has toward the Son, that is, active generation; for he compares only the Father and the Son among themselves. Or certainly he understands the causality whereby that which is the first principle is the principle without principle. For he did not remove all causality from the Son, whom it is established to be the cause of every creature, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit.⁶⁷

Eighth. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa I*, ch. 11: "We say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we name Him the Spirit of the Father. But from the Son we do not say the Holy Spirit, but we name Him the Spirit of the Son." St. Thomas replies in the *Disputed Questions De Potentia*, q. 10, a. 4, that one ought not to stand to the sentence of Damascene; because he followed the error of the Greeks, drawn from Theodoret. The same he answers in the *Summa I*, q. 36, a. 2, ad 3, yet adding also another reply of some, that Damascene, just as he does not confess that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, so also he does not deny it by force of those words. For Damascene seems not so much to deny the thing itself as to shun the mode of speaking: namely on account of the heresy of Macedonius and Eunomius, who used to say that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son as from the first and sole cause, alienating Him from the Father. For otherwise Damascene sufficiently insinuates his opinion on the thing itself there, when he says that the Holy Spirit has been delivered to us through the Son; according to Jn. 20: "He breathed on them and said: Receive the Holy Spirit"; and when he subjoins the comparison about the sun, the ray, and the splendor, which is imparted to us through the ray. But he indicates this same thing more in ch. 18, saying that the image of the Father is the Son, and of the Son the Holy Spirit, and that He is conjoined to the Father through the Son.⁶⁸

Ninth. Theophylact, on that Jn. 3: "He who is from above is above all." "The Latins," he says, "interpreting these things badly, and understanding them less correctly, say that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son." But it is answered that Theophylact lived after the controversy had already been stirred up by the Greeks, whose authority, since they lived at the same time, is deservedly rejected by the Latins. For although certain of them were learned and famous, yet they were held entangled by that common error of their nation. But because not immediately was an open division made for this cause of the Greeks from the Roman Church, nor was the question determined by a general Council, it comes about that they seem to be excused alike from heresy and from schism; in which way they cannot be excused who afterwards, following, persisted in error; among whom Nicephorus Callistus, as is seen in the preface of his Ecclesiastical History, and very many others even to the present day.⁶⁹

The tenth argument, by which the first reason adduced above is impugned, is such. In the Divine [Persons] paternity and passive spiration are really distinguished, and yet they are not opposite relations; therefore not only opposite relations are really distinguished in God; and the same judgment about filiation and passive spiration: and hence through these relations the Son and the Holy Spirit will be sufficiently distinguished among themselves, so that it is not necessary that their real distinction be sought from the opposite relations which follow the origination of one from the other. To this various answers are given by diverse [authors]; but the best reply seems, if we should say that although paternity is not opposed to passive spiration, yet it is distinguished from it by reason of some opposite relation. For not only are the opposite relations themselves really distinguished in the Divines, but on account of them also the relative supposita themselves, which are the subsisting persons; and thus consequently also the properties constitutive of the same persons are distinguished. Therefore, since the opposite relations are active spiration and passive spiration, which therefore are really distinguished, it follows from this that not only the relative supposita, namely the spirating and spirated person, are really distinguished, but also the properties constitutive of each person. But the person spirating is constituted by paternity; wherefore paternity must consequently be really distinct from passive spiration. Yet the reason of the distinction must always be sought from the relative opposition, which being taken away the distinction too will be taken away: wherefore if there were not between the Son and the Holy Spirit a relative opposition, namely by this that the one proceeds from the other, neither the person nor their properties, which are filiation and passive spiration, would be distinguished.

The eleventh, against the same reason: that the Son and the Holy Spirit are sufficiently distinguished among themselves by this, that one is begotten, the other is spirated: which are two impossible modes of production. And this too is proved by the testimony of Anselm, who in ch. 1 of *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* says that the Son and the Holy Spirit are others from each other by this, that they have to-be (*esse*) from the Father in a diverse way; namely the one by being born, the other by proceeding. "For," he says, "if they were not more [than one] by another [=relation], by this alone they would be diverse." Therefore, to find the distinction of these, it is not necessary to flee to opposite relations. We reply with the same Anselm (in the same place) and with St. Thomas in the *Summa* (in the place cited above), that the two modes of production are not distinct really, except on account of opposite relations, from which every real distinction in the Divines must necessarily be sought; as has just been said; because, according to the same Anselm, "in God all things are one, where the opposition of relation does not meet."⁷⁰

The twelfth, which is Theophylact's: The Holy Spirit is one, therefore from one principle by one spiration He proceeds. It is answered that this is true, and yet it does not further follow that He does not proceed from the Father and the Son; because the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, and produce Him by one spiration, as will be taught in the next Distinction. Likewise all three Persons are one principle of the whole creature; nor from this, that the Father is the principle of the creature, would you rightly collect that the same is not the principle the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The thirteenth. The Holy Spirit sufficiently and most perfectly proceeds from the Father; therefore in vain is the Son joined to the Father for His production. It is answered that the Son is joined not on account of any insufficiency of the Father, but because the Son has all things which the Father [has]. Whence neither in vain are creatures produced by the three Persons; for this is done on account of the essence and power common to all three.

The fourteenth. That it be a principle of the Holy Spirit belongs to the Son either by reason of Person, or of nature: but neither can be said. Not by nature, because thus it would belong to the Holy Spirit also, since the nature is common to the three. But not by reason of Person either; because thus it would belong to Him alone. One must reply that in neither way does this belong to the Son, just as neither to the Father. For the Father, as Father, is only the principle of the Son; but the Son, as Son, is not the principle of anyone, but [is] principled in respect of the Father. But to both it belongs to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, by reason of a certain notional act (*actus notionalis*), which is active spiration, which is a common notional act, and therefore does not constitute a Person; as will be more fully explained below (at Distinct. 26).

The last objection of the Greeks, which is not so much against the doctrine of the Latins as against the addition made by the Latins to the Creed. For as on the part of the Greeks the Master objects to himself, in the principal Councils, and expressly in the Ephesine, thus their Creeds, annexed with anathemas, were sanctioned, that it is not permitted to anyone to teach, or to preach otherwise, about the Faith of the Trinity, than is contained there. But in which Creeds, since only it was said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, whoever add to the Creed that He proceeds from the Son seem to incur anathema. To this objection let us first reply: that the Church without doubt has the power of adding something to the Creeds composed by herself; nor, if she do this, does she become liable to any anathema. Then, that the Latins were moved by a just reason to make that addition, "and from the Son," to the Creed. For the controversy having been stirred up demanded that the Catholic doctrine should be explained: which indeed was very conveniently done by the addition of one little word to the Creed. Nor truly does it hence follow that the Latins taught something other than is contained in the Creed according to the mind of the Council forbidding it under anathema. For the anathema of the Council ought not to be understood otherwise than the Apostle's, Gal. 1, saying: "If anyone should evangelize to you, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema." For, as St. Augustine, setting forth the same doctrine, says in Tractate 98 on John: "He who supplies what was lacking, adds not that which was there, removes not [what was there]." Therefore "other" is understood not as diverse in any manner whatsoever, but as fighting and contrary. And this is also proved by the example of the very Councils. For it is established that the later Councils almost always added something to the decrees of the earlier; and also issued Creeds which contained more than the earlier ones. For the Apostles' Creed contains fewer things than the Nicene, and this again than the Constantinopolitan, and so on; since, on account of emerging heresies or controversies arising, the Catholic doctrine, contained in the Scriptures and the Apostolic Tradition, is more and more opened. This reply the Fathers of the Council of Florence prosecute at

length in the disputation with the Greeks.⁷¹ Others reply that the addition was not made by the Latins, but an application; because that "and from the Son" is included in that which is said, "and from the Father," since the Son says: "What things soever the Father has are mine." And even this reply is to be read in the acts of the same Council. But the sense of this reply is that an addition was indeed made in word, but an explication in the thing; in that the part added was contained beforehand latently. Whence the Council of Florence, the Greeks consenting, thus concludes: "We define that the explication of those words, 'and from the Son,' for the sake of declaring the truth, and the necessity then imminent, was lawfully and reasonably added to the Creed."⁷² But yet someone will insist and say that it is permitted to no one, nay not even to the whole Church, to add anything to the Apostles' Creed, just as neither to Sacred Scripture; indeed nor to the writings of the Fathers and to the decrees of Councils. For he would be held a falsifier who should do this, if he should publish those with the addition, or recite them as Sacred Scripture, or as the decree of a Council, or as the book of some Father. But this the Latins seem to have done, while they recite the whole Creed increased by the addition as the Constantinopolitan Creed; by which name it is everywhere commonly called by the learned. It is answered that the Church simply recites, or sings, it as the Creed of the Faith; but not under the name of a certain Council by which it was issued. For she willingly acknowledges and professes that part, "and from the Son," not to pertain to the Creed, as it was issued in the Council of Constantinople, and hence that the Creed in that part is not of that Council. And this by the deed itself Pope Leo III declared, when, as the Master reports, he ordered that Creed, without the said addition, to be inscribed on a silver tablet and, placed behind the altar of blessed Peter, to be kept in custody for a perpetual memorial. For he did not do this in order to condemn the addition, as the adversaries calumniously say, but so that there might exist the memory of the very Constantinopolitan Creed such as it was issued by the Council. Yet we say that this very same, with the addition, is the Creed of the Church, which is not forbidden to add something to the Creed of some Council, and to recite it not as the Creed of that Council but as her own. Just as it is permitted also to join or intermix something pious to the words of Scripture, as in the Divine praises the Church often does; as, while to the individual Psalms she subjoins, "Glory be to the Father, etc."; while to the readings taken from Scripture she adds: "But you, O Lord, etc."; and other things of this sort. For the Greeks too append to the Lord's Prayer (which indeed is more venerable than any Creed) these words: "For thine is the kingdom and the power, the glory for ever. Amen." All which sufficiently show that in additions of this sort there is no crime of falsification, nor at all anything worthy of reproof; and hence that the Roman Church not only without danger of anathema, but lawfully and laudably, when a just reason so required, could have made an addition to the Creed.⁷³

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 2.
 2. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, tract. 99.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 19.
 4. St. Augustine, *Epistle* 174.
 5. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentary on John*, on John 20.
 6. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* X, ch. 15.
 7. St. Ambrose, *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, at the end.
 8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 14.

9. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, on John 16.
10. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, on John 14.
11. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate II.
12. St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto II, ch. 12.
13. St. Jerome, Commentarius in Isaiam 57; and Epistola ad Hedibiam, q. 9.
14. Rufinus of Aquileia, Expositio Symboli.
15. Prudentius, Hymnus post cibum.
16. Prudentius, Hymnus ante somnum.
17. Prudentius, Hymnus ad Cereum Paschalem.
18. Prudentius, Hamartigenia (line cited in source).
19. St. Augustine, Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis, tract. 99.
20. The Venerable Bede, In Epistolam ad Galatas, on Gal. 4: "Misit Deus Spiritum Filii sui."
21. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 17; XXVI–XXVII; De Genesi ad litteram X, ch. 15; Contra Maximinum III, ch. 14.
22. Prosper of Aquitaine, De vita contemplativa I, ch. 18.
23. Pope Leo I, Epistola 93, ad Turbum, ch. 1 [abbreviation as in source].
24. St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2.
25. Salvian, Sermo de Adventu Spiritus Sancti, among the works attributed to St. Cyprian.
26. Boethius, De Trinitate I, ch. 12.
27. Pope Hormisdas, Epistola ad Iustinum Imperatorem, ch. 2.
28. St. Gregory the Great, Symbolum a se compositum: cf. Vita Gregorii II, ch. 2; Moralia I, ch. 8; Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 26; Dialogi II, last chapter.
29. The Venerable Bede, De elementis philosophiae I.
30. The Venerable Bede, Homilia Dominica infra octavam Ascensionis Domini.
31. St. Anselm, De Spiritu Sancto.
32. Rupert of Deutz, De processione Spiritus Sancti.
33. The Master (Peter Lombard), testimonies from St. Athanasius, Didymus the Blind, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Cyril [as cited in the Sentences].
34. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarius in Ioannem, and Thesaurus.
35. Theodoret of Cyrus, Refutationes anathematismorum Cyrilli, ch. 9.
36. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Vita S. Gregorii Thaumaturgi; cf. the holy Council of Constantinople (Formula fidei of St. Gregory the Wonderworker).
37. St. Basil; St. Cyril; St. Jerome; St. Epiphanius; Simeon Metaphrastes; Anastasius; Tharasius; St. Maximus the Confessor; as cited by Latins and Greeks in the Council of Florence.
38. Acta Concilii Florentini (for the patristic testimonies in the Filioque debates).
39. Cardinal Bessarion, Oratio pro unione, chs. 6–7.
40. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36 (opining a Roman council); St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 11 (similar view) [general reference; cf. source].
41. Acta Concilii Florentini, where an ancient exemplar of the Seventh Synod is produced, containing "ex Patre Filioque procedere."
42. Attribution of the addition to the times of the Nestorian heresy [as in source].

43. Report of a council under Pope Damasus, after the First Council of Constantinople, adding "Filioque" to counter certain heretics [as in source].
44. Council of Florence, session 7 (Catholic disputant's report).
45. Eighth Council of Toledo (date as in source).
46. Seventh Ecumenical Synod (Nicaea II), with the Creed recited including "Filioque" according to Latin claims.
47. Council of Florence, sessions 5 and 7 (Latins' proof against Greek denial).
48. Fourth Lateran Council (1215) under Innocent III, ch. 1; and on Greek consent, ch. 4.
49. Second Council of Lyons (1274) under Gregory X; the definition recorded at the beginning of Liber Sextus Decretalium.
50. Council of Florence (1439), Decretum unionis.
51. Councils of Toledo I, ch. 21; IV, VIII, XI, each at ch. 1 (on the Filioque).
52. Council of Bari (1097), where St. Anselm refuted the Greeks; cf. Vita S. Anselmi II.
53. St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, ch. 4.
54. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistola ad Nestorium (from the Alexandrian Council); approved by the Council of Ephesus (tom. 1, ch. 14), the Fourth Council (session 5), the Fifth (last session), the Sixth (session 17), and the Seventh (session indicated).
55. Editorial note on the date of the Council of Bari: cf. Labbe's Concilia (censure of the cited book, p. 198), and Pagi, Critica Baroniana (agreeing with 1097).
56. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36, a. 2 (and "art. 26" in the source reading) [abbreviation as in source].
57. St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, ch. 24; St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q. 10, a. 4.
58. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 5 (Theological Orations); St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium (end); St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII (last ch.), XV, ch. 14; Boethius, De Trinitate I, ch. 12; St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, ch. 2; Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate II.
59. St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, ch. 27.
60. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 27; Tractates on the Gospel of John, Tract. 69; Contra Maximinum III, ch. 14.
61. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium II.
62. St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q. 10, a. 4.
63. On the apocryphal Passion of St. Andrew: see the recension attributed to presbyters and deacons of Achaia; textual note on the absence of the clauses "proceeding from the Father" and "abiding in the Son" in some manuscripts and prints.
64. Council of Ephesus (431), Acta; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Epistola ad Nestorium cum anathematismis (twice stating: Spiritum Sanctum a Filio habere suum esse); condemnations of Theodoret's writings; subsequent synods confirming the same.
65. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus II; St. Epiphanius, Panarion (Haer. 69): "Filium fontem de fonte, sicut Deum de Deo."
66. St. Basil, Ep. 43; St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum III, ch. 14.
67. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration to the Bishops of Egypt (context of "omnia quae habet Pater, habet et Filius, excepta causalitate").
68. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 11; ch. 18; St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De potentia, q. 10, a. 4; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 3.
69. Theophylact of Ohrid, In Joannem on Jn. 3; Nicephorus Callistus, Ecclesiastical History, Preface.
70. St. Anselm, De processione Spiritus Sancti, ch. 1; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 36 (ad loc.).
71. Council of Florence (1439), Acta disputationis cum Graecis (on the Filioque and creed-explication).
72. Council of Florence, Decretum unionis (definition concluding on the licit and reasonable addition of "Filioque" for the declaration of the truth).

73. The Master [of the Sentences], report on Pope Leo III's silver tablets with the Constantinopolitan Creed without the Filioque [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO XII — ON THE HOLY SPIRIT'S PROCESSION—NEITHER EARLIER NOR MORE FULLY FROM THE FATHER THAN FROM THE SON; AND THAT THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE ONE PRINCIPLE

§ I — The Holy Spirit does not proceed earlier nor more fully from the Father than from the Son (Spiritus sanctum nec prius, nec plenius a Patre procedere, quam a Filio.)

§ 1. Since it is sufficiently clear from the preceding that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is now asked whether He proceeds either earlier, or more fully and more perfectly, from the Father than from the Son. To which one must answer: if the order of time is being inquired into, there is no room for doubt that, just as from eternity the Son was begotten of the Father, so also from eternity the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son. For since God is immutable, whatever is in Him is eternal. Hence there is that profession of the Church in the Athanasian Creed: "In God there is nothing earlier or later."² But also St. Augustine, treating of this matter expressly and answering the cavilling of the heretics, in book 15 (On the Trinity, ch. 26), teaches that the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit from both is to be understood as without time, just as the generation of the Son from the Father is understood as without time.³ See the cavilling of the heretics with Augustine's answer in the Master, s. 1 and 2.⁴ Wherefore the Lateran Synod under Innocent III, ch. 1, defined the Holy Spirit to proceed from both equally, without beginning, always, and without end.⁵

§ 2. Furthermore, that in that Trinity there is nothing earlier or later in the order of dignity or of nature is clear from what was said above at Distinction 9. Hence it follows that the Holy Spirit does not proceed more, or more fully, or more perfectly (which three signify the same thing in the matter at hand) from the Father than from the Son. For thus there would be there an order of dignity or of nature. The same is shown by this argument. One and the same power of breathing (*virtus spirandi*) is in the Father and the Son, which by itself can be neither greater nor less; likewise the act of breathing (*actus spirandi*) is the same in each, which by itself cannot be more perfect or imperfect; just as in each there is the same act of knowing or of operating (*actus cognoscendi vel operandi*). It is therefore certain that the Holy Spirit proceeds neither earlier nor more fully, that is, more perfectly, from the Father than from the Son.

§ 3. But against these things they bring forward a passage of St. Basil concerning the Holy Spirit. For thus he has it in book 3 (Against Eunomius, near the beginning): "That in dignity the Holy Spirit is second to the Son, the rule of piety hands down. For just as the Son is second to the Father in order, since He is from Him; and in dignity, since the Father is to Him the origin and cause of being; so also the Holy Spirit is second to the

Son in dignity and in order."⁶ These are Basil's words. Therefore, if in dignity the Son is second to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to the Son, it follows that the Holy Spirit, in the order of dignity, proceeds from the Father earlier than from the Son.

§ 4. But it is answered: in these words of Basil, "dignity" is nothing other than "authority," that is, the formal character of principle (*ratio principii*). Therefore the Son is said to be posterior in dignity to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both; because the Father is the principle of the Son, and both are the principle of the Holy Spirit, or—as Basil himself explains it—the origin and cause of being. Yet for this reason the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father earlier than from the Son, since He proceeds by a single procession from both—unless only in this sense: because the fact that the Son is a principle (*principium*) of the Holy Spirit, He received by being begotten from the Father; as Augustine declares in book 15 (On the Trinity, ch. 17); and below, in § II, it is declared: that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.⁷

§ II — That the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit (Patrem & Filium esse unum principium Spiritus sancti.)

§ 5. Among other things which the Greeks objected to the Latins against the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit from the Son, there was also this: that they slandered the Latins, as though they made two principles (*principia*) of the Holy Spirit; as is also to be seen in Theophylact on John 3, where for this reason he denies that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, lest we introduce two principles of the Spirit, the Father and the Son.⁹

§ 6. But to this objection it was easy for the Latins to reply, by saying that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, not two, as we have already indicated above. And that it might be more certainly established what the mind of the Latins was, and at the same time for a fuller declaration of the Catholic doctrine about the procession of the Holy Spirit, it was defined in two Ecumenical Councils, Lyons and Florence—at which the Greeks themselves also were present and assented—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle, not by two spirations (*spirationes*), but by a single spiration, with an anathema subjoined upon those who should presume to assert the contrary.¹⁰ This definition stands in the sixth book of the Decretals (under the title "On the Supreme Trinity"), and the same matter is set forth at length in the final session of the Council of Florence.¹¹

§ 7. The same is taught by these arguments. First. The Son differs from the Father in no other way than by a relation of origin (*relatio originis*), whereby it is that the one is Father, the other Son, and it is impossible that the same be Father and Son; therefore, as regards spiration (*spiratio*), both are one and the same principle, producing the Holy Spirit by one and the same act of spiration (*actus spirationis*).

§ 8. Second. Whatever the Son has from the Father is numerically the same as that which is in the Father, as, for example, the same essence, power, goodness, and the like. But the Son has from the Father that He is a principle of the Holy Spirit; therefore He Himself with the Father is one and the same principle of the Holy Spirit.

§ 9. Third. Although creatures among themselves and in relation to God are by nature most diverse, nevertheless they all proceed from the one Trinity as from one principle, as is taught below (at Distinction 29). Wherefore, much more must it be believed that the Holy Spirit, who is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, proceeds from them as from one principle.

§ 10. Nor does what is read in Hilary, book 3 (On the Trinity), stand in the way: that the Holy Spirit is to be professed "from the Father and the Son as authors"; for there the word "authors" is put adjectively for "producing." For the producing Persons (*personae producentes*) are distinct, although the production itself is one and the same. But if you take the word "author" substantively, it will be just as necessary to admit that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one author, as we believe the world to have been produced by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as by one Creator. There is therefore for the Holy Spirit one author, that is, one spirator. Yet, according to Hilary, there are two authors, that is, spiring persons.¹²

§ III — In what sense the Spirit is said to proceed from the Father principally, properly, and through the Son (Quo sensu Spiritus a Patre procedere dicatur principaliter, proprie, & per Filium)

§ 11. Certain sayings of the Fathers seem to conflict with the foregoing doctrine, some of whom attest that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, as St. Augustine in book 15 (De Trinitate, ch. 17);⁷ others indeed say that He proceeds properly and from the Father, as is in the Exposition of the Faith to Cyril, which is carried under the name of Jerome, by whose name also it is cited by the Master; although it is quite clear that it is not his.¹³ Others, as the ancients Greeks commonly; and among the Latins, St. Hilary (at the end of book 12 of De Trinitate).¹⁴ For by no such sayings is it signified that the Holy Spirit proceeds more fully or more perfectly from the Father than from the Son; or that the Father and the Son are many, distinct, and unequal principles of the Holy Spirit or of His procession (the procession, that is, of the Holy Spirit: *processio Spiritus Sancti*); but He is said to proceed indeed principally (*principaliter*) and properly (*proprie*) from the Father; because the Father is His principle (*principium*) in such a way that He receives from no one else this very thing, namely, to be a principle. But the Son, receiving the nature from the Father by His eternal generation, at the same time receives to be a principle of the Holy Spirit; that is, He receives this by being born of the Father, namely, that from Him also, from eternity, and equally perfectly as from the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds, as it were from the same principle, which is the Father. For as the Son is God from God, and is one God with the Father; so He is a principle from a principle, and is one principle with the Father.

§ 12. Therefore, principally—so to say—the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone: because, although the Father and the Son are together one principle of the Holy Spirit, yet the Father alone is a principle without principle (*principium sine principio*), but the Son a principle from a principle (*principium ex principio*). Likewise, the Holy Spirit properly proceeds from the Father, because the Father does not receive from another that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him; but the Son receives this from the Father. For one is said properly to have that which he has as not communicated to him from elsewhere. The Son ascribes this property to the Father when He says: "My doctrine is not mine"; and, "The word which you have heard is not mine, but the Father's who sent me."

§ 13. Finally, the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father through the Son, not as through an instrument or a minister of the Father, and much less as through a helping cause (*causa adjuvans*), in the way that among men one helps another, as of himself insufficient, to do something; but as through that which is a mean according to origin—that is, the Son proceeding from the Father, such that also from Him the Holy Spirit proceeds. And this also has place in the works which are ad extra. For it is written of the Son: "All things

were made through Him"; and in the Creed, "Through whom all things were made."¹⁵ And by reason of this origin we most rightly confess the Father to be the first Person in the Godhead, the Son the second, the Holy Spirit the third; which order cannot stand according to the error of the Greeks, as was declared above in the distinction immediately preceding.

§ IV — Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Father? (An immediate procedat Spiritus sanctus a Patre?)

§ 14. But if you ask: Whether, because the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) proceeds from the Father through the Son, therefore it must be said that He proceeds from the Father mediately; or rather, nevertheless, it must be said that He proceeds immediately from both? I answer by distinguishing: for He proceeds from both immediately, if you consider the power of spirating (*potentia spirandi*), or the very active spiration (*spiratio activa*) itself, which is one in the Father and the Son, as we said above. But He proceeds mediately—namely through the Son, and as it were by the mediation of the Son—if you consider the order of origin among the Persons (*Personae*). In which sense it can also be conceded that all created things proceed from God the Father mediately, namely through the Son and the Holy Spirit; and that all the effects of second causes (*causae secundae*) proceed mediately from the first cause (*causa prima*), though it inwardly operates all things.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 3.
 2. Athanasian Creed (*Symbolum Athanasianum*): "In Deo nihil est prius aut posterius."
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 26.
 4. The Master [abbreviation as in source]: s. 1. & 2.
 5. Fourth Lateran Council (under Innocent III), ch. 1.
 6. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium* III (near the beginning).
 7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 17.
 8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 4.
 9. Theophylact, *In Ioannem* (on John), ch. 3.
 10. Second Council of Lyons (*Concilium Lugdunense* II) and Council of Florence (*Concilium Florentinum*): definition on the procession "ex Patre et Filio ... non tanquam ex duobus principiis ... non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione," with anathema on the contrary.
 11. *Liber Sextus Decretalium*, tit. De summa Trinitate et fide catholica; Council of Florence, final session.
 12. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* III.
 13. *Explanatio fidei ad Cyrillum*, under the name of St. Jerome; cited by the Master [abbreviation as in source]; although it is sufficiently established that it is not his.
 14. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* XII (end).
 15. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed: "Per quem omnia facta sunt."
 16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 3, ad 4.

DISTINCTIO XIII — ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GENERATION OF THE SON AND THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT (*EXPLICATUR DISCRIMEN INTER GENERATIONEM FILII, ET PROCESSIONEM SPIRITUS SANCTI*)

§ 1. For an understanding of the question, in which the distinction between the generation (*generatio*) of the Son of God and the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit is inquired into, it must first be noted that the name "procession" is of itself general for every mode whereby one thing arises and emanates from another; for even those who are born "proceed." Whence St. Augustine, book 3 (Against Maximinus, ch. 14): "Not everything," he says, "which proceeds is born, although everything that is born proceeds; and he who is sent proceeds from the one who sends."² Whence Christ in Jn. 8: "I proceeded from God" — which, whether it be understood of His eternal generation from the Father, or, as from the context more appears, of the temporal mission into the world, in either way serves the understanding of the matter set forth. And generally an effect proceeds from an efficient cause, as heat from fire, a creature from the Creator, a work from the craftsman; likewise from a material cause, as from wood a worm, from a garment a moth, from Adam proceeded Eve. The word "to produce" (*producere*) obtains a like breadth of signification in the genus of causes, as it is easy to prove by examples. For it wanders not only through the whole genus of efficient cause — indeed even (as theologians speak) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit — but also extends to the material cause: for certain matter produces its own effect, as wood the worm, and a garment the moth. Since these things are so, yet by the usage of the whole Church the name "procession" has long since been narrowed so as to signify in the Divine things peculiarly that mode whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; and this has been done in the same way in which the name of a genus is wont to be restricted to a certain species when the specific name is lacking: except that by the name "passive spiration" (*spiratio passiva*) that species is denoted not so much by the Ancients as by the Scholastic Doctors.

§ 2. Next, there is no doubt that this procession is really distinct from generation; for otherwise the persons — who are distinguished by properties — would not be really distinguished. Moreover, because together with a real distinction it can happen that certain emanations are of the same formal character (for in very reality the generation of this man and the generation of that man are distinct), therefore this too must be added: that the two emanations in the Divine are so really distinct as not to be of the same formal character, but diverse; so that one indeed has the formal character (*ratio*) of true generation, but the other by no means. For the Catholic Church acknowledges not two Sons in the Divine, but the one and only-begotten Son, as in Jn. 1 and elsewhere. With this argument, among others, St. Augustine, in order to prove the distinction of these processions, makes use (Tractate 99 on John).³

§ 3. These things then being established, it is asked by what formal character (*ratio*) the procession of the Holy Spirit must be distinguished from generation? For since both the Holy Spirit and the Son are of the same nature with the Father, it seems most difficult to show that that procession is not generation. Therefore one must first confess with St. Augustine, book 3 (Against Maximinus, ch. 14; Tractate 99 on John), that the human mind in the mortality of this life cannot have a proper cognition of that reality; especially since Scripture has not expressed some proper name of this procession, which is peculiar to the Holy Spirit; as likewise St. John Damascene bears witness (De fide orthodoxa, ch. 10).⁴

§ 4. Nevertheless, in order that answer may be given to heretics, and absurd and unworthy imaginations be excluded from the souls of the faithful, the Scholastic Doctors have endeavored, according to their capacity, not to leave a matter so great wholly unexplained, employing a likeness which is neither alien from the Scriptures and can be gathered from the Fathers, especially from several places of St. Augustine. Concerning which matter something also was said above (at the Distinction where we were treating of the generation of the Son and of the Holy Spirit).

§ 5. For since it has been said that the generation of the Son is like the production of a word in the mind, but the procession of the Holy Spirit is like the production of love, the Doctors rightly gather between these two such a distinction: that generation is an emanation by the mode of nature, or of natural fecundity; but procession, by the mode of will or of love. They do not mean by this that the Father breathes the Holy Spirit by will and not by nature (for just as the Son, so the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally from the Father); but they establish between the two natural emanations this distinction, that the one is effected only by the mode of nature, the other indeed by the mode of will.

§ 6. For although both love (*amor*) and knowledge (*cognitio*) proceed naturally from the mind, nevertheless the mode of each procession is not the same; but knowledge arises from the mind as a natural and perfect image (*imago*) of the thing known, whereas love is as it were a certain mutual nexus of the one loving and the thing loved.

§ 7. From which consideration others, explaining this distinction in other words, say that generation is by the mode of perfect assimilation (*assimilatio*), but the procession of the Holy Spirit by the mode of connection (*connexio*). Yet from this let no one again suspect that the Holy Spirit is not perfectly similar to the Father — which it is impious to say — since He is, no less than the Son, on account of the unity of nature, most like to the same Father. But the mode of His procession is not the mode of assimilation, as is the mode by which the Son proceeds.

§ 8. Of which thing we can fashion some sort of example in a painter painting his own image, which, although he makes it like to himself, he does not nevertheless make by the mode of assimilation; for he uses the same principle of making when he paints images unlike himself. Another example that follows more closely upon this matter is in the production of Eve from Adam, who, although in a likeness of his nature — namely, human — proceeded from him, nevertheless did not proceed by the mode of assimilation, because not by the mode of nature: whence neither is she born of Adam, nor is she his daughter, but only produced from him. But Abel and Cain and the others, because by the mode of nature, that is, by natural fecundity, they proceeded from Adam, hence are said to have been born of him, and are called sons. And so St. John Damascene rightly (De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 11; and ch. 10) said that the Holy Spirit is "from the Father," and that He is "brought forth" not "by being born," nor "as a son," but "by proceeding": as if he were to say,

although He is of the same nature with the Father, from whom He proceeds, nevertheless He does not proceed from Him by the way of generation, so that He might be said to be born of Him and His Son; but by the way of a certain unnamed procession.⁵

§ II — Some arguments on the contrary are resolved (Quaedam in contrarium argumenta solvuntur)

§ 9. That the distinction now given may shine out the more clearly, the arguments that are wont to be objected on the contrary must be resolved, of which let this be the first. That is said to be generated (*generari*) by someone, which receives from him its being; therefore the Holy Spirit, who receives His own being from the Father, ought to be said to be generated by Him. It is answered: generation (*generatio*) is not here to be taken so generally as to signify the origin or production of any thing whatsoever according to substance (*substantia*). Such a taking-in would include not only every physical generation, as of things generable and corruptible, but indeed also the creation of all things; so that one would have to concede that in this way every creature is begotten by God. Nor is this contrary to the Scripture's manner of speaking; thus it is said in Deut. 32: "Is he not your Father, who made you, and created you?"; and in Job 38: "Who is the father of rain? or who begot the drops of the dew?" But it is taken in a special and proper way, according to which he who is generated is properly called the Son (*Filius*) of the generator, and conversely the generator is properly the Father (*Pater*) of the generated. In order that this mode be understood, one must know that, first of all, it is required that that which is begotten proceed from the substance of the one begetting—after which manner those things which are created by God do not proceed from God; after which manner also, among creatures, fire does not proceed from fire, nor do these lower things from the sun. But that does not suffice, since in that manner also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and many things proceed from man, as nails, hairs, little worms, of which man cannot be called father. Therefore, in the second place, it is required that what is begotten be according to nature like to him from whom it is begotten; of which sort are not those superfluities which we said proceed from the substance of man. But not even this suffices; for in this manner too the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, as is clear from what was said above.

§ 10. And this again can be made clear by the example of Eve, who was produced similar in nature from the substance of Adam; and yet she was not from him begotten according to the proper mode of generation. Therefore something else is further required for the complete formal character (*ratio*) of generation: and this is, that what is begotten proceed from the begetter by the mode of assimilation (*per modum assimilationis*), as we said above, that is, that in the very mode of proceeding the begetter be seen, or become like; the reason why generation itself is a certain assimilation of the producer. In this mode, then, in the divine realities (*in Divinis*) the Holy Spirit does not proceed, but the Son alone. For He indeed proceeds like to the Father, but not by the mode of likeness; while the Son proceeds in both ways, which is proper to generation.

§ 11. Secondly, the definition of generation is objected from Damascene, book 1 (De fide orthodoxa, ch. 8): "'To be generated' (*Generari*), he says, is to be brought forth from the substance of the begetter, or to be produced as something similar according to substance"; all of which befits the Holy Spirit. It is answered: the same Damascene in that place (ch. 9, 10, and 11) openly distinguishes the procession (*processio*) of the Holy Spirit from the generation of the Son. Wherefore one must say that the definition of generation handed down by him is imperfect. For it was enough for him in that place to have distinguished generation from creation

and making. Therefore, that the definition be complete, there must be added what we have just said: "by the mode of assimilation."

§ 12. The third argument. To beget and to spirate (*generare et spirare*) in the divine realities are not distinguished, for both are one in the Father; therefore neither will "to be begotten" and "to be spirated" (*gigni et spirari*) be distinct. It is answered: "to beget" and "to spirate" are at least distinguished by reason; which is evident from this, that the Son spirates, not begets. And it is accidental that they are not really distinguished, because they fall in the same person (*persona*). But "to be begotten" and "to be spirated" are also distinguished really, inasmuch as they are personal properties (*proprietas personales*) of distinct Persons, which Persons, as was said above at Distinct. 11, receive real distinction from opposite relations (*relationes oppositae*). This also can in some measure be made clear from created things, in which it often happens that diverse actions are in the same being, although the passions corresponding to them cannot be in the same being; as to harden and to soften are in the sun, in fire, in hot air, yet to be hardened and to be softened cannot be in one and the same subject. Thus to create and to beget are in God, yet to be created and to be begotten cannot be in one and the same thing with respect to God. Therefore, although upon multiplied procession there follows a multiplication of persons, yet the same does not follow upon a multiplied active production.

§ 13. The fourth. As the Son is the image (*imago*) of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son, with Cyril as author, book 13 (ch. 1), saying that the Holy Spirit is the perfect image of the Son. The same is read in Basil, book 5 (Against Eunomius). Now they doubtless understand a natural image, not an artificial one; but a natural image is understood in generation, according to that which is said in Gen. 5: "Adam [begot] a son in his own image and likeness"; therefore, as the procession of the Son, so also the procession of the Holy Spirit is generation. It is answered, with St. Thomas in I (q. 35, a. 1), that two things are required for the formal character of "image" in general, and the same suffice; one of which is a procession, or its dependence on him of whom it is the image—for, as St. Augustine says in the book of 83 Questions (q. 73–74), although the egg is very like to the bird, nevertheless it is not said to be its image; the other, that it have an expressed likeness of him of whom it is said to be an image. Moreover it will be a natural image, if it proceeds naturally from its exemplar, as from a face an image results in a mirror. Therefore the Holy Spirit is rightly said to be the image of the Son, as also of the Father, because He proceeds from both in the most perfect likeness of nature; yet by a peculiar reason the Son is said to be the image of the Father, on account of the very mode of proceeding, which is of assimilation. And in this way it is not to be denied that "image" is properly understood in generation. But more on this matter below at Distinct. 27, where the question is disputed of the image in the divine. Now that Cyril does not ascribe the same mode of proceeding to the Holy Spirit as to the Son is clear from the end of book 6 of the Thesaurus, where expressly he teaches that the Holy Spirit is not begotten.

§ 14. The fifth. The Holy Spirit is the Word (*Verbum*) of the Son, as the Son is the Word of the Father; as Basil is author, book 5 (Against Eunomius; and in the homily on that passage of John, "In principio erat verbum"); therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of Word, just as the Son. Wherefore consequently His procession is generation. But, the antecedent being granted—about which there will be discussion elsewhere—the prior consequence must be denied: for in those places Basil does not consider in "Word" the mode of proceeding, but only the office of manifesting. For the use of the word is in this, that one bring forth outwardly, and manifest to others, the thought lying hidden in the mind. Therefore Basil holds that, just as through the incarnate Son, as it were a visible word, the Father was glorified—"I have glorified thee upon the earth" (Jn. 17)—so through the Holy Spirit poured into the hearts of men the Son has been manifested and

glorified, according to that of the same Son about the Holy Spirit: "He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine" (Jn. 16). Others answer a little differently, saying that Basil considered in "Word" the use of operating. For the Divine Word is operative according to the Scriptures: "He said, and they were made"; "All things were made by him"; "God said, Let there be light, and there was light"; "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established"; "He sent his word, and healed them," and many other things of this sort. And as the Word was the efficient cause of creation, so the Father and the Son through the Holy Spirit work the sanctification of men. Although whether it can absolutely be said that the Holy Spirit is the Word of God is another question, as we said, to be treated below at Distinct. 27. But that Basil distinguishes the processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is manifest from his homily 28 (Against the Sabellians), and elsewhere. Other things moreover that can be objected here, with their solutions, let the student see in St. Thomas, I (q. 27, a. 3–4).

§ III — Whether the Holy Spirit ought to be called unbegotten (Utrum Spiritus Sanctus ingenitus dici debeat)

§ 15. Since it has been shown that the Holy Spirit is not begotten (*genitus*), the next question is whether therefore He is to be called unbegotten (*ingenitus*). For this seems consequent by the argument of the gainsayers. To which replying, we say that the various signification of "unbegotten" must be distinguished. In one way, indeed, just as "begotten" among Greek and Latin authors sometimes signifies the same as "made," so "unbegotten" the same as "not made," that is, not produced by an external principle. In which signification it belongs essentially to God to be unbegotten; which consequently is common to the whole Trinity. In this sense Lactantius, book 1 (Divine Institutes, ch. 6 and ch. 7), approves the Oracle of the Erythraean Sibyl, in which God is called in Greek ἀγένητος, which he interprets ἀποίητος, that is, "not made." And Gregory Nazianzen (in the Oration on the Son) removes τὸ ἀγένητον, "unbegotten," as proper to God, from creatures. And after him Damascene, book 1 (ch. 3), reckons "unbegotten" among the essential properties of God; and its signification he explains (ch. 9) by distinguishing it. To this also pertains what Cyril, book 10 (Thes. 6. 1. 2. 1. 2. or 3 of the Dialogues with Hermias), affirms, that the Son has whatever He has from Himself—manifestly excluding from Him a principle set without.

§ 16. Secondly. According to the proper signification of "begotten," "unbegotten" can be taken so as to be opposed contradictorily to "begotten" thus taken, and be the same as "not begotten." In this way, since among the three Persons the Son alone is begotten, it will be permissible to say not only that the Father is unbegotten, but also that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, as One whom it is agreed is not begotten. And in this sense the Master rightly interprets in the text Jerome, in the Rules of Faith (to wit, against the heretics), as saying: "The Holy Spirit is not the Father, but unbegotten and not made." The same is signified by that sentence which is in these words in the Athanasian Creed: "The Holy Spirit [is] not made, nor begotten." Although, with Jerome, no book under that title exists, nor at all are the words recited by the Master found in him.

§ 17. Thirdly. "Unbegotten" by the usage of the Fathers and of Councils is taken for that which absolutely has its origin from none; so that "unbegotten" is the same as "without procession" (*improcessibile*), that is, lacking a principle or origin; which Hilary calls "inaccessible." In this acceptance of "unbegotten," neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone, is unbegotten. Thus speaks and defines, against the heretic Photinus, the Synod of Sirmium (Anathema 19), whose explanation is to be seen in Hilary, book On the

Synods. Thus the same Hilary speaks in book 4 On the Trinity; likewise Athanasius in a book written Against Eusebius of Nicomedia; Basil in homily 27 (Against the Sabellians); Augustine, book 15 On the Trinity, ch. 26, and in the Dialogue ascribed to him, Questions 65, q. 2; Cyril, Thesaurus, book 1, ch. 1, and book 11, the single chapter—where yet among the Greek expressions he distinguishes, as different, the first and third acceptations.

§ 18. Likewise Damascene, book 1 (On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 8 and 10). Moreover this very point is confirmed by the Roman Creed inserted in the Council of Chalcedon; by the Creed of Damasus (among the works of Jerome); and by the Creed of Gregory the First, which John the Deacon has in his Life, book 2 (near the beginning). Finally, the Council of Toledo (in article 1). In which formulas of Faith the Fathers agree that the Holy Spirit is neither begotten nor unbegotten. Wherefore, according to the definitions of the Fathers, it must simply be denied that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten; especially since it is found written nowhere among them that the Holy Spirit is said to be unbegotten. For about the passage of Jerome which is in the Master we have already spoken. But of these things speech will recur again below (at Distinct. 28).

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1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 3–4.
 2. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum Arianum III, ch. 14.
 3. St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, Tract. 99.
 4. St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum Arianum III, ch. 14; St. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, Tract. 99; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 10.
 5. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 11; and I, ch. 10.
 6. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, a. 3.
 7. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 8.
 8. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, chs. 9–11.
 9. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 13, ch. 1.
 10. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, lib. 5.
 11. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 35, a. 1.
 12. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, qq. 73–74.
 13. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 6 (at the end).
 14. St. Basil, Homily on John 1:1 ("In principio erat verbum").
 15. St. Basil, Homily 28, Against the Sabellians.
 16. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 27, aa. 3–4.
 17. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4.
 18. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones I, chs. 6–7.
 19. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration on the Son [abbreviation as in source].
 20. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, chs. 3 and 9.
 21. St. Cyril, Thesaurus, lib. 10, Thes. 6.1.2.1.2 (or 3), Dialogues with Hermias [abbreviation as in source].
 22. Council of Sirmium, Anathema 19; cf. St. Hilary, De synodis.
 23. St. Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate IV.

24. St. Athanasius, *Contra Eusebium Nicomediensem* [abbreviation as in source].
25. St. Basil, Homily 27, *Against the Sabellians*.
26. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 26; and the Dialogue ascribed to him, *Quaestiones* 65, q. 2 [abbreviation as in source].
27. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus* I, ch. 1; XI, cap. unicum.
28. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, chs. 8 and 10.
29. Roman Creed inserted into the Council of Chalcedon; Damasus's Creed (among the works of St. Jerome); and the Creed of St. Gregory the Great, in John the Deacon, *Vita S. Gregorii*, II (near the beginning).
30. Council of Toledo, article 1.

DISTINCTIO XIV — ON A CERTAIN TEMPORAL PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT (*ESSE QUAMDAM TEMPORALEM SPIRITUS SANCTI PROCESSIONEM*)

§ 1. Fifth: That there is a certain temporal procession (*processio temporalis*) of the Holy Spirit.² So much for these; therefore, now one must treat the third. Yet it must be known that one does not easily find among the Fathers that the mission (*missio*) of the Holy Spirit is signified by the name of procession (*processio*), except in Bede (in the homily for the Sunday within the Octave of the Ascension of the Lord), where he writes thus: "When the grace of the Holy Spirit is given to men, assuredly the Spirit is sent by the Father, and is sent also by the Son: He proceeds from the Father, He proceeds also from the Son; because, regarding His being sent, the very procession is that by which He proceeds from the Father and the Son." Thus he.³ The Master further adduces, to prove this, certain words of St. Augustine in book 15 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 26, wherein he says that Christ, after the resurrection, breathed upon the disciples and said (Jn. 20): "Accipite Spiritum Sanctum": "that by this," he says, "He might show the Spirit also to proceed from Himself." But there St. Augustine understands procession to be eternal, not temporal; for the sense is: that Christ, by the fact that He breathed upon the disciples and said, "Accipite Spiritum Sanctum," showed that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from Himself from eternity. For He would not give the Holy Spirit temporally unless He Himself eternally spirated the same.

§ 2. Although, following Bede's authority, the Master and the Scholastics rightly called the mission of the Holy Spirit a procession; especially since that way of speaking is not rejected by the Fathers, and, moreover, it agrees with Sacred Scripture, in which the Son, on account of His temporal mission into the world, says that He proceeded from the Father. John 8: "I," He says, "ex Deo processi, et veni. Neither did I come of myself, but He sent me": therefore His mission was a procession. A similar place is chap. 16, where He says: "Ego a Deo exivi"; and again: "Exivi a Patre, et veni in mundum." If, then, a temporal procession is fitting to the Son, nothing prevents its also being attributed to the Holy Spirit. For the common formal character lies in this, that each is sent.

§ 3. Moreover, this temporal procession of the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the eternal, in that by that one the Holy Spirit received the nature from the Father and the Son from eternity, whereas by this one He proceeds temporally to sanctify the creature, or also to some other effect. In order that this may be more fully understood: in the divine procession, just as in motion, it is fitting to imagine something, as it were, like a term "from which" (the "term from which," *terminus a quo*), and again something else, as it were, like a term "to which" (the "term to which," *terminus ad quem*), although these do not properly have place there. In the likeness of a term from which is the person from whom there is the going-forth or emanation, as the theologians speak; in the likeness of a term to which is the effect toward which the procession tends. If, accordingly, the name is taken from the term to which it tends, it is evident that that procession is called

eternal by which that which proceeds both proceeds and exists; or rather, because it is eternal. Thus the procession itself, considered in itself, is eternal. For what is eternal does not admit of change; and therefore, if it proceeds, it must needs proceed always. But that procession is called temporal by which a temporal thing exists, or by which something is acquired in time. The former procession is that of the Son from the Father, and of the Holy Spirit from both, according to nature. But the latter is that by which the Son proceeded to the work of the Incarnation; and that by which the Holy Spirit proceeds to sanctify men, who are temporal effects; although also according to other effects they are said in the Scriptures to have been sent, of which there will properly be discussion below (at Distinctio 16).

§ II — What difference there is between Mission and Giving of the Holy Spirit (Quid intersit inter Missionem, & dationem Spiritus Sancti)

§ 4. Mission (*missio*) of the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*), by another name, is called in the Scriptures giving (*datio*); and this is attributed in the Scriptures both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. For of the Son it is in Isa. 9: "A son is given to us"; and in Jn. 3: "So God loved the world as to give His Only-begotten Son"; and in Gal. 4: "He sent His Son"; and everywhere in the Gospel He bears witness that He has been sent by the Father. Of the Holy Spirit: Rom. 5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us"; and Gal. 4: "He sent the Spirit of His Son into our hearts," and elsewhere.

§ 5. But there is this difference between mission and giving, that mission first intimates for us a reference of the Person (*persona*) sent to the sender, as to its author and origin; and, moreover, it designates for that same Person a certain new mode of existing in a creature. For one who is sent begins to be where previously he was not, either simply or in a certain manner. Hence it comes about that we never read that the Father has ever been sent, because He does not have His origin from another; although He too comes to sanctify man, according to that of Jn. 14: "My Father will love him, and We will come to him, and We will make Our abode with him," and so forth. For this action, that is, the sanctification of man, is an operation *ad extra*, and therefore common to the whole Trinity. Furthermore, that is said to be given which is had by someone either simply or in a certain manner. Now this word does not import authority of the giver over that which is given, nor its origin from the giver; but it signifies only the liberal communication of that which is given. For he gives who brings it about that something is had from someone, whether he who makes it to be had is the author and origin of the very thing, or not. Whence the Son is said to give Himself, Gal. 1. And the Father, by coming to a man and communicating to him His gifts, is rightly said to give Himself to the man. Therefore, in divine matters, "to give" extends more widely than "to send," and similarly "to be given" than "to be sent." But of these things more in the next Distinction to follow immediately.

§ III — How the Holy Spirit is said to be given to men (Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus dari dicatur Hominibus)

§ 6. That the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) is given to men, and that He is received by men and dwells in men, Scripture often bears witness; the question is asked whether this is to be understood of the Holy Spirit according to Himself, or rather only according to His gifts and operations. For that the Holy Spirit Himself is given to us, and not only His gifts, the Master proves by several testimonies of Scripture and of the Saints

Ambrose and Augustine; to which there can be added the place of the same Augustine in book 15 of *De Trinitate*, chapters 18 and 19.⁶ For the contrary opinion, however, an apparently clear reason seems often to make the case: for since the Holy Spirit by nature is everywhere and fills all things, according to that in Wis. 1: "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world," and in Ps. 138: "Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit?" it does not seem able to be understood that He is given, or received, or dwells in men, except by reason of His gifts and operations. Whence Chrysostom, explaining that of Jn. 20, "Receive the Holy Spirit," says that by "the Holy Spirit" there the gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be understood, not only in that place but also in other passages of Scripture.⁷ And the same, in the Homily on the Holy and adorable Spirit, expressly affirms that not the Holy Spirit Himself is sent, but His gifts.⁸

§ 7. For the explanation of this question: first it must be established, as a dogma of faith, that God and each Divine Person is everywhere by essence, presence, and power (on which see below at *Distinctio* 17).⁹ Then it must nevertheless be granted that it is truly and rightly said that God begins to be somewhere, and that either simply or in a qualified sense; which indeed happens in several ways. First, by this, that the things themselves begin to be. For since God is in all existing things, but not in things which are not, therefore at the very moment at which some thing begins to be, God also begins to be in that thing. Second, properly and personally, someone begins to be somewhere according to an assumed nature. For by reason of this nature the Son of God is properly contained by place and was moved from place to place, indeed also began to be in a place when He assumed human nature in the Virgin's womb. Third, a Divine Person begins to be somewhere in a sign. In this way the Holy Spirit is said to have descended upon Christ in the form of a dove. For He did not then begin to be personally contained in that place, because He had not joined to Himself the nature of the dove into unity of person. Nor can it be said that by reason of any sanctification He then began to be there; because to Christ, who from the beginning of His Incarnation was full of grace, nothing of sanctifying grace accrued through this descent of the Holy Spirit; but in the form of a dove He represented Himself, as in His sign. For the dove signified the Holy Spirit, with whom Christ as man was full in Himself, and whom in His members He was to receive through Baptism. Fourth, God begins to be somewhere, namely in a man, when the man begins to have Him invisibly present, that is, through faith, hope, and charity, by which he is made a temple (*templum*) of God, and begins to have God as indweller; according to Eph. 3: "Christ to dwell by faith in your hearts." For just as God is said to have all things always present because He always knows and loves them, so a man then begins to have God present when he begins to know and love Him; but he will have Him perfectly present when he will perfectly know and love Him.

§ 8. These things premised, one answers to the proposed question: that it is rightly said with the Master, although perhaps not in the same sense as he, that the Holy Spirit is given to men, not only according to His gifts, but also according to Himself; because namely He is so given that He Himself, through cognition and love, begins to be present to a man. Although cognition and love are not God Himself, but gifts of God, yet they render God Himself present to the man in a certain mode in which previously He was not present.

§ 9. This answer is confirmed from the fact that by reason of this presence a man is called the Temple of the Holy Spirit. But this cannot be understood of the gifts of the Holy Spirit; because a Temple is properly owed to God alone, just as also sacrifice is owed to God alone; as St. Augustine says in *Sermon* 101 (*De diversis*, ch. 4): "A temple only the true God ought to have; a sacrifice only to the true God ought to be offered."¹⁰ Likewise, God is said to become present to a man when He begins to be known and loved by the man, as has already been said; but surely this is not to be understood of the gifts of God, but of God Himself,

whom by faith we know and by charity (*caritas*) we love. Wherefore it follows that God according to Himself becomes present to us, and accordingly that the Holy Spirit according to Himself is given to us.

§ 10. But I said, "although perhaps not in the same sense as the Master," because the Master in this his answer can seem to tend to this, that he teaches that charity, which is the gift of God, is none other than the Holy Spirit Himself, as he openly teaches (Dist. 27), where there is to be a fuller discussion about that opinion.¹¹

§ 11. From what has been said the reply to the reason brought forward to the contrary is clear. For it is evident that God, without any change of His own, begins to be somewhere according to the modes enumerated. For every change signified by those modes is either in the creature as it begins to be, or specifically in the assumed nature, or in the sign employed, or in the sanctified man. Nor is it surprising if God begins to be somewhere without change of His own, when even this bodily sun, without any change of its own, becomes present to a man who opens his eyes to look upon it.

§ 12. But that of Jn. 20, "Receive the Holy Spirit": although Chrysostom interprets it of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Augustine nevertheless, in the places indicated above, more fully and more rightly understands it to have been said of the Holy Spirit according to Himself, in the way now explained, although Chrysostom's interpretation also converges upon this sense. For this is brought about by the gifts of the Holy Spirit received in the good, that we may have God Himself, by faith, hope, and charity, joined to us and present to us. Nor indeed does Chrysostom wish anything else than that the Holy Spirit is not given to us as if He Himself were changed, but that we are changed by such an operation or gift, which is engaged about Him, and not only about His gifts.

§ IV — By what reason the Holy Spirit is said to indwell man (Qua ratione Spiritus Sanctus hominem inhabitare dicatur)

§ 13. Although the gifts of the Holy Spirit (*dona Spiritus Sancti*) are various, nevertheless not each one of them is such that by reason of it a man is said to have the Holy Spirit, or to be the temple of the Holy Spirit (*templum Spiritus Sancti*), or to have Him as an indweller, or to be led by the Spirit of God. For these, and the like, are only then ascribed to a man in the usage of Sacred Scripture, when a man, already reconciled to God, made acceptable and a friend, enjoys Him more freely and more familiarly as a thing possessed. This is what these Scriptures, and the like, signify: John 14, "If anyone loves me, ... we will make a dwelling with him";¹³ and in the same place: "The Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive,"¹⁴ Rom. 5: "The charity of God is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us,"¹⁵ Rom. 8: "You are not in the flesh but in the spirit; if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you: but if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, this one is not his,"¹⁶ And again: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God,"¹⁷ And 1 Cor. 3: "Do you not know that you are the Temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?"¹⁸

§ 14. But according to the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, many of which are enumerated by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12) and are called graces freely given (*gratiae gratis datae*), Scripture is not accustomed to say that the Holy Spirit is given to men, or that men have or receive the Holy Spirit, but only according to something, that is, for this or that effect; and much less, on account of such gifts alone, are men called the Temple of the Holy Spirit, or is the Holy Spirit Himself said to dwell in them.¹⁹ Furthermore, it must be noted that those who have the Holy Spirit do not all have Him equally, as St. Augustine rightly teaches, Epistle 57 (to Dardanus):

for by how much each one is holier and endowed with greater charity, by so much more perfectly, more fully, and more abundantly he has the Holy Spirit.²⁰ And how this comes about, without any change in Him who is had, St. Augustine in the same place teaches by the likeness of a sound, which, sounding equally in the air, the deaf man does not catch even when it is near at hand, while one who is somewhat hard of hearing receives it feebly; and among those who receive it perfectly, one still receives it more perfectly than another. Thus also the Holy Spirit, since He is immutable in Himself, and by the presence of His Deity is had by us more or less according to the degrees of charity and of other virtues by which we are joined to God.

§ V — Whether one must admit that men give the Holy Spirit (Utrum fatendum sit homines dare Spiritum Sanctum?)

§ 15. It was said above that by the word of mission (*missio*) in divine matters the origin (*origo*) of him who is sent is signified from him who sends. Whence it manifestly follows that in no way is it to be said that men send the Holy Spirit. For neither can it be said that the Holy Spirit has origin in any way from men; but since the name of giving (*dationis nomen*) imports nothing of the sort, the question is asked whether at least it is rightly said that the Holy Spirit can be given by men. To which question it will be answered more clearly, if we distinguish the various modes of giving, according to which it can be understood that the Holy Spirit is given by someone.

§ 16. In one mode, therefore, he is said to give some thing who, being lord of the thing, transfers its dominion (*dominium*) by a donation into another, as one is said to give to another a field or money; but in this mode it is impossible that the Holy Spirit be given, not even by God, since the Holy Spirit is subject to the dominion of no one, but He Himself with the Father and the Son is God and Lord of all.

§ 17. Secondly, he is said to give who by his own power or authority, as principal cause (*causa principalis*), brings it about that some thing be had by another, whether he be the cause of the thing itself or not; as among men the father is said to give the soul or life to the son, although he is not properly the cause of the soul itself. In this mode the Holy Spirit is given by the Father and the Son, and by Himself, but not by a mere man, however holy; for the sanctification (*sanctificatio*), whereby the Holy Spirit is had by men, is principally of the Divine power alone. For which reason it was said concerning Christ in Jn. 1: "This is he who baptizes in the Holy Spirit"; and in 1 Cor. 3: "He who gives the increase is God"; and in Is. 43: "I am He who blot out thy iniquities."²² Of this mode of giving the Holy Spirit St. Augustine speaks in book 15 of the Trinity, chapter 26, and in very many other places, in which he denies that men can give the Holy Spirit.²³

§ 18. Thirdly, someone is said to give something by his wish, suffrage, merit, or other like hidden communication of that which is in himself: in which mode only holy and just men, to wit, themselves having the Holy Spirit, are said to give the Holy Spirit. And of this mode it is said that the Church, that is, the Saints who are in the Church, and who are the better part of the Church and more closely joined to God, by their prayers and groans remit sins and give the Holy Spirit, as in book 3 against the Donatists, chapter 18; and book 7, chapter 12; and "43"; and Tractate 121 on John; and Homily 23 among the Fifty.²⁴ Likewise St. Ambrose on that [Gospel] of Luke 10, "Loose, and bring,"²⁵ and Theophylact on Matt. 18,²⁶ [teach the same].

§ 19. Lastly, someone is said to give something by his own ministry (*ministerium*), or by way of instrument (*per modum instrumenti*). In this mode even evil men can give the Holy Spirit, not all, however,

but only those who in the Church are constituted as ministers of the Sacraments. Hence with the Apostle, 2 Cor. 3, the ministry of the New Testament is called a "ministration of the Spirit."²⁷ Hence also, in general, to the Apostles—among whom was Judas—it was said by the Lord, Matt. 10: "Freely you have received; freely give."²⁸ Which indeed is sufficiently declared also to be understood of the Holy Spirit by Peter in Acts 8 in the rebuke of Simon Magus; and although in that same chapter it is not said openly that the Apostles gave the Holy Spirit, but only that by the imposition of the Apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given, the Ancients nevertheless understood this in such wise that it is signified that the Holy Spirit is given by the ministers of the Sacraments.²⁹ Whence Cyprian in book 1, epistle 13, says that everyone who baptizes gives the Holy Spirit.³⁰ Which to have much more truth in the Sacraments of Confirmation and Orders is sufficiently manifest from the writings of the Fathers. For also for those being initiated into the presbyterate the Bishop says in the very ordination: "Receive the Holy Spirit," clearly signifying that he by his ministry gives to those to be ordained the Holy Spirit.

§ 20. In this mode the Supreme Pontiffs speak, Innocent I, epistle 1, chapter 3; John III, in the epistle published against the Chorepiscopi; and Innocent III, in the Decretals, "On the Sacred Anointing," the sole chapter; likewise Isidore, book 7 of the Etymologies, chapter 12; and it is had in Gratian, distinction 21, "Clerus"; Bede and Oecumenius on Acts 8; and others.³¹

§ 21. Finally, just as the remission of sins is rightly said to be given by men on account of the ministry, according to that saying of Jn. 20: "Whose sins you shall forgive, etc.," so also the Holy Spirit is [said to be given] by reason of the same ministry, whereby a man brings it about that the Holy Spirit be had by someone. Whence in a certain prayer of the Church the Holy Spirit is called "the remission of sins" (Tuesday of Pentecost, after the Communion).³² And to this, moreover, is not dissimilar what the Apostle in Rom. 1 desires, to come to the Romans, that there be imparted to them some spiritual grace; and what in Eph. 4 he says, that good speech avails to this, "that it may give grace to the hearers."³³ Pope Leo (in the Sermon on All the Saints), speaking of St. Peter, says that he "gave so great a largess of divine grace, that he healed many thousands of believers in their hearts."³⁴

§ 22. But what Paul says in Gal. 3, "He who supplies the Spirit to you," does not pertain hither, but to the second mode: for the Apostle does not say this of himself, as the Master understood, but of God, according to almost everyone's interpretation.³⁵

1. The Latin lemma heading this section reads: "Esse quamdam Temporalem Spiritus Sancti processionem."

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 2–4.

3. Bede, *Homilia*: Dominica infra octavam Ascensionis Domini. See also the Master of the Sentences (Peter Lombard) adducing St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 26.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source].

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 3; I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2; II-II, q. 23, a. 2.

6. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, chs. 18–19.

7. St. John Chrysostom, on John 20:22 "Receive the Holy Spirit" [abbreviation as in source].

8. St. John Chrysostom, *Homily on the Holy and adorable Spirit* [abbreviation as in source].

9. *Distinctio* 17 below, where omnipresence is treated.

10. St. Augustine, Sermon 101, De diversis, ch. 4.
11. The Master (Peter Lombard), In I Sent., dist. 27.
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 13, a. 2.
13. Jn. 14: "Si quis diligit me, ... mansionem apud eum faciemus."
14. Jn. 14: "Spiritus veritatis, quem mundus non potest accipere."
15. Rom. 5: "Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis."
16. Rom. 8: "Vos in carne non estis, sed in spiritu; si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis: si quis autem Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius."
17. Rom. 8: "Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi sunt filii Dei."
18. 1 Cor. 3: "Nescitis quia templum Dei estis, et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis?"
19. 1 Cor. 12, on the charisms; "graces freely given" (gratiae gratis datae).
20. St. Augustine, Ep. 57 (ad Dardanum).
21. St. Thomas, Supplement to the Summa, q. 18, a. 1, ad 1.
22. Jn. 1:33: "Hic est, qui baptizat in Spiritu Sancto."; 1 Cor. 3:7: "Deus... qui incrementum dat."; Is. 43:25: "Ego sum, ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas."
23. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, ch. 26.
24. St. Augustine, De baptismo contra Donatistas III, ch. 18; VII, ch. 12; "43. Tract. 121 in Joan. Et homil. 23. inter 50." [abbreviation as in source].
25. St. Ambrose, on Luke 10, "Solvite, et adducite." [abbreviation as in source].
26. Theophylact, Commentary on Matt. 18.
27. 2 Cor. 3:8: "ministerium spiritus" (and cf. 3:6).
28. Matt. 10:8: "Gratis accepistis, gratis date."
29. Acts 8:14–24 (Simon Magus; imposition of hands: vv. 17–19).
30. St. Cyprian, Epistle 13 (old numbering), book 1. [abbreviation as in source].
31. Pope Innocent I, Ep. 1, ch. 3; Pope John III, Epistle against the Chorepiscopi; Innocent III, Decretals, Extra, De sacra unctione, cap. unicum; St. Isidore, Etymologiae VII, ch. 12; Gratian, Decretum, Dist. 21, c. "Clerus"; Bede and Oecumenius on Acts 8. [abbreviations as in source].
32. Roman liturgy, Tuesday within the Octave of Pentecost, Postcommunion: Spiritus Sanctus called "remissio peccatorum." [as in source: "feria 3. Pent. post com."].
33. Rom. 1:11; Eph. 4:29: "sed si quis bonus ad aedificationem opportunitatem ut det gratiam audientibus."
34. Pope Leo the Great, Sermon "De omnibus Sanctis." [abbreviation as in source].
35. Gal. 3:5. "The Master" = Peter Lombard, the Master of the Sentences.

DISTINCTIO XV — WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GIVEN OR SENT BY HIMSELF

§ 1. The explanation of this question, whether the Holy Spirit is given or sent by Himself, depends on those things which were said above in the preceding Distinction concerning Mission and Giving (*missio et datio*). For since the word "to send" imports a respect of the one who is sent to the sender as to the author, from whom he may receive the mandate, power, or operation, it follows that only that person is said to be sent by another who proceeds from that other. Whence also Hilary, in the book *On the Synods*, gathers procession (*processio*) from mission.² And when we were treating of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, we affirmed it from the Fathers by this argument, namely, because the Holy Spirit, according to the authority of Scripture, is sent by the Son. The same cause also we said above is the reason why we never read that the Father is sent—because, to wit, He proceeds from no one; which reason is given by St. Augustine in book 2 *On the Trinity*, chapter 5, and more explicitly in book 4, chapter 20.³ But that the Son is sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, we very often read. Hence it further follows that neither the Holy Spirit nor any other person whatsoever is sent by Himself: for He does not proceed from Himself.¹

§ 2. But since the word "to give" does not signify a relation of this sort, it is not unfitting that the Holy Spirit should be said to give Himself; in this sense, to be sure, that He by His own power and most free will gives and communicates Himself to another, according to that saying of Jn. 3: "Spiritus ubi vult spirat"; and that of 1 Cor. 12: "Omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult." Thus teaches St. Augustine, book 5 *On the Trinity*, chapter 19.⁴

§ 3. And it is confirmed by reason. For to give belongs most of all to him to whom something is so proper that he can make it to be another's; but the Holy Spirit is so His own that He can communicate and give Himself to whatever creatures He may wish, to men. It is proved also in this way, because the Father and the Son give the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit also gives Himself. For this is a work common to the whole Trinity, proceeding from the omnipotence which is common to the Three. On this foundation indeed rests the argument of the Master, who teaches that the Holy Spirit is given by Himself. "For if," he says, "He could not give Himself, whereas the Father and the Son can give Him, it would follow that the Father and the Son can do something which the Holy Spirit could not; and similarly with respect to the actual giving." Which argument is firm and solid from this, that "to give," when attributed to God, signifies only a work *ad extra* (*opus ad extra*), that is, what is done about the creature without the connotation of any personal property; but works of this sort are common to the whole Trinity, and with respect to such works power is said to be in God. Nor is the same judgment to be made about mission, because although mission signifies a work *ad extra*, nevertheless, as was said, it con-signifies an internal procession.

§ 4. Furthermore, the reasons already stated prove that the Father also gives Himself, the Son Himself; indeed, that each person gives each person, as the Son gives the Father, etc. Whence again it is inferred, correlatively, that each Person is given by each, as the Father by the Son, etc. Nor is this, assuredly, at variance with Sacred Scriptures. For that the Son is rightly said to give Himself was shown above, Gal. 1; and St.

Ambrose bears witness to this same thing more manifestly, book 3 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 2.⁵ Likewise, concerning the Father and the Son we have a signification of this matter in Jn. 14, where in His own and the Father's Person the Son says: "Ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus." And since by this coming a man receives the Father and the Son, it follows that by their very coming they give themselves to man; because to give and to receive are correlatives. To this may also be referred those general Scriptures: Jn. 3, "Non potest homo accipere quidquam, nisi fuerit ei datum de caelo"; 1 Cor. 4, "Quid habes, quod non accepisti?"; Jas. 1, "Omne datum optimum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum," etc. Now the just man has the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit (for he is the dwelling of the whole Trinity). He has therefore received this best gift, assuredly given to him from Heaven, from that same most holy Trinity.

§ 5. Finally, phrases of this sort are also proved, at least in this way, that we never read among the Fathers that they were disapproved. But on the contrary, it is objected: the locus of St. Thomas, I, question 43, article 2, where he says: "Some things, with a relation to a principle, import a temporal term, as mission and giving." He says something similar upon this Distinction: "Giving imports a respect to the giver, as to the author of that which is given."⁶ Reply: St. Thomas is indeed there chiefly urging the temporal term; for he adds: "For something is sent to this end, that it may be in someone; and it is given to this end, that it may be had." Then the same Doctor in the same place (article 4, to the first) distinguishes a twofold acceptance of "giving," but the former acceptance is according to the Scriptures, as we here have shown, not the latter. And note that he says: "But if it import authority, etc." For he does not dare to affirm. And he is clearer upon this Distinction (article 1), where he denies that "giving" imports a distinction of what is given from the principle by which it is given; because, he says, "the same can give Himself." And question 3 (article 1).⁷

§ 6. Moreover, as to what the Master similarly thinks must be conceded—that the Son and the Holy Spirit also proceed from themselves and are sent—although perhaps this could be conceded in some sense about temporal procession and mission, about which alone the Master declares himself to be speaking, nevertheless simply speaking, and safeguarding the proper signification of these words, it must not be conceded. For in words of this sort when attributed to God, besides that which is done in time, something eternal also is insinuated, as was sufficiently explained above; although the Master had regard only to that which is outside and is done in time.

§ 7. Add that if we grant with the Master that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself and is sent temporally, the Roman Church's proof against the Greeks would not be sufficiently solid: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son eternally, because He is sent by Him temporally according to Scripture. For thus it would follow that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Himself from eternity, if, as the Master concedes, He is sent and proceeds from Himself temporally; but that proof of the Latins, taken from the ancient Fathers, is without doubt most solid. Wherefore it seems by no means to be conceded that the Holy Spirit is sent or proceeds temporally from Himself. Nor does the Master sufficiently prove this from St. Augustine, book 2 On the Trinity, chapter 3. For there Augustine does not affirm that the Holy Spirit is sent by Himself, but that the Son is sent by Himself. How this is rightly said must now forthwith be explained.⁸

§ II — Whether the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit, or by Himself? (An Filius a Spiritu sancto, vel a se ipso missus sit?)

§ 8. That the Son was sent by the Father is indubitable from Scripture. Whether, however, one must also admit that He was sent by Himself, or by the Holy Spirit, is rightly asked. For the negative side, the property of the word "mission" (*missio*), of which above, makes in its favor. For since the Son of God neither receives anything from Himself nor from the Holy Spirit, but received all things together with the nature (*natura*) from the Father, it does not appear how He can be said to have been sent by any other than by the Father. And the Son also seems to have signified this when He said: "I did not come from myself" (Jn. 8), as if He were saying, "I was not sent by myself."

§ 9. On the other hand, Scripture seems to assert the contrary in two places, in which the Son bears witness that He was sent by the Spirit of the Lord. For He says in Is. 48: "The Lord God has sent me, His Spirit." And in ch. 61, cited by Lk. ch. 4: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, for which reason He anointed me; to evangelize the poor, He sent me; to heal the contrite of heart," etc. The Fathers also used these testimonies to show the same thing: with respect to the former, St. Ambrose in book 3 (On the Holy Spirit, chs. 1 and 2), and after him St. Augustine in book 2 (On the Trinity, ch. 5), and among his works Sermon 6 (On the Seasons); with respect to the latter, again Ambrose in the Prologue of book 3 (On the Holy Spirit).¹⁰

§ 10. However, it must be noted that, although in Lk. 4 it is read from the version of the Seventy as has just been recited, so that these words "unxit; misit" are seen to be said of the Spirit of the Lord, nevertheless in the Hebrew, from the version of St. Jerome, it is read thus in the Prophet himself: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, forasmuch as the Lord has anointed me; to announce to the meek, He has sent me, that I might heal the contrite of heart": where the verb "misit" seems to be referred more to "the Lord," that is, the Father, than to the Spirit of the Lord, because in the preceding verb "unxit" the expressed supposit is "Dominus." Wherefore also in Luke the same words seem to be referred rather to "the Lord" than to "the Spirit," in this way: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, for which reason the Lord has anointed me," etc., so that it may be signified that the Lord, that is, God the Father, anointed the Son with the Holy Spirit (as is openly said by the Apostle Peter in Acts 10), and that the same Lord sent Him, etc.

§ 11. Now indeed, although Scripture nowhere bears witness that the Son was sent by Himself, nevertheless Augustine, in the same place of On the Trinity, judges that not even this is said inaptly; because the mission of the Son is temporal, whereas whatever is done temporally by God is common to the whole Trinity.[^11]

§ 12. To the question we answer: with the property of the word "mission" preserved, it is nonetheless rightly said that the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit, and by Himself. For since in the Son there are two natures, Divine and Human, the former indeed He received from the Father alone; but the latter the whole Trinity wrought and gave to the Son, on account of which He is rightly said to have been sent by the whole Trinity to the entire work of human redemption.

§ 13. Nor is this a wonder, since for this reason He is also sent not only by the Father, but also by the Holy Spirit and by Himself, as will be said in the next distinction: in this way Ambrose's Prologue to the third book (On the Holy Spirit) plainly proves that the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit, according to Ambrose's mind.

§ 14. But the opinion of Augustine has more difficulty, who, although in the place mentioned he had said that the Son was sent in that very fact by which He was made of a woman, afterwards in book 4 (ch. 20) says that it can be understood that the Son is not said to have been sent only because "the Word was made flesh," but that He was sent in order that "the Word might be made flesh": that is, that not only the man be understood to have been sent, inasmuch as "the Word was made," but also the Word Himself, that He might become man; and a little later he repeats this, saying: "that the Wisdom of God was sent, that it might be man."[^11]

§ 15. Therefore Augustine seems to will that the Son of God, before He was man, was sent for this, that He might assume human nature. But if this is so, then He was not by this account sent as the Son of Man, but only as the Son of God.

§ 16. To this scruple a twofold reply is offered. One is: if, with the Master, we take the word "mission" (*missio*) so generally that by it nothing else is signified than that the person sending is the principle (*principium*) of that temporal effect which is produced by the mission itself; whence, since the works of the Trinity are inseparable, as often as for some new effect some person is sent, He would be understood to be sent by the whole Trinity. But since it sounds harsher, and is foreign both to the Scriptures and to the Fathers, that the Son be said to be sent by Himself or by the Holy Spirit in the respect in which He is the Son of God, and with the human nature in Him being preceded; therefore such a way of speaking, as simply false, must be rejected, as we have taught above; especially since, according to that general acceptance of "mission," a reason could not be rendered why the Father also should not be said to be sent, since for the work of sanctification He Himself, as well as the Son and the Holy Spirit, descends into the minds of men.

§ 17. And hence it is that Augustine himself, at the end of book 4 (On the Trinity), acknowledging that it is most absurd to say that the Father was sent by the Son or by the Holy Spirit, even if He had willed to appear visibly to men through an assumed nature, concludes: "Rather for the commendation of the principle (*principium*), than for the appearance in a visible creature, has mission (*missio*) been attributed to the Divine Persons." In which words it must be well noted that Augustine wishes that in the word "mission" the formal character (*ratio*) of a principle or origin be urged. For this avails to illustrate the things which up to now have been said concerning the property of the word "mission." Likewise Augustine wishes that in the word "mission" the authority of a principle be weighed and considered, lest he be forced to admit even the Father to be sent. From which an evident argument is taken against the Master himself, that it is not to be conceded that the Holy Spirit is sent by Himself, because manifestly He does not have the formal character of a principle with respect to Himself.

§ 18. The other reply, and truer, is that Augustine in the later place does not say that the Son is sent by Himself, or by the Holy Spirit, but makes mention only of the Father alone, from whom alone, just as He proceeded from eternity, so also He proceeded and was sent to the work of the Incarnation (*Incarnatio*) in time.

§ III — That the mission of the Son of God is multiple (Multiplicem esse Missionem Filii Dei)

§ 19. The mission (*missio*) of the Son of God has been noted by the authors as multiple. The first is the very generation of the Son of God from the Father from eternity, about which "mission" St. Gregory speaks thus,

Homily 26 (on the Gospels, upon that saying of Jn. 20: "As the Father has sent me"): "To be sent, he says, can also be understood according to the nature of the Divinity. For by that very fact the Son is said to be sent by the Father, by which He is begotten by the Father." And below, concerning the Holy Spirit: "But His mission is His very procession (*processio*), by which He proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore, just as the Holy Spirit is said to be sent because He proceeds, so the Son is not inaptly said to be sent because He is begotten." So he. But this is very improperly called a "mission," both because it is not *ad extra*, and because from it there would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent by the Father from eternity: which none of the Fathers said. Whence also Augustine, book 4 (On the Trinity, ch. 20), where he treats of the modes of mission by design, denies that the Son is said to be sent by that very fact alone by which He is born of the Father. And the Master, moreover, [abbrev. as in source] does not willingly acknowledge this mode of mission. For he says that, according to the eternal begetting, the Son could be said to be sent, as it seems to some; but "better and truer," he says, "He is said to be begotten according to it."¹²

§ 20. Moreover, if the whole passage of Gregory be considered more attentively, he is found to will nothing other than that the Son of God can be understood to be sent not only as He is man, but also as He is God; which he proves from this, that the Holy Spirit, who was not incarnate, is nevertheless said to be sent in the respect in which He proceeds from the Father and the Son: not that the mission of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than His procession from the Father and the Son; but because in the full formal character of His mission that [procession] is contained. So too, even if the mission of the Son were absolutely the same as His generation from the Father, nevertheless it is called "mission" because in the mission of the Son the generation is contained. For neither could it be said that either the Son is sent according to the Divine Nature, or the Holy Spirit, unless according to the same Nature They proceed from Him by whom They are said to be sent.

§ 21. There is therefore a second mission, by which the Son of God, not yet made man, was sent by the Father to assume the Human Nature. By this mission He is sent by the Father alone, just as the Holy Spirit is [sent] by the Father and the Son, as was said in the preceding chapter.

§ 22. The third is that by which, the same having been made man, He was sent by the whole Trinity to preach the Gospel and to execute the entire work of our redemption. And indeed in these two ways He is said to have been sent into the world; and they are called visible missions, because through them He appeared visible to the world.

§ 23. The fourth likewise is visible, namely by which He visibly appeared in an assumed or exhibited form of any body, yet not through a hypostatic union of the assumed or exhibited body: in which way also the Holy Spirit was sent. But about these things there will be fuller treatment in the next Distinction.

§ 24. The fifth is invisible, that is, that by which He invisibly, through sanctifying grace, enters into the minds of men; and in this way also the Holy Spirit is said to be sent: with this difference, however, that by a certain appropriation there are attributed to the Son of God, as the Word and Wisdom of the Father, those gifts of graces which pertain to cognition. Whence is that [word] of Wis. 9 concerning Wisdom: "Send her from Thy holy heavens, that I may know what is acceptable with Thee." But to the Holy Spirit there are

attributed those [gifts] which pertain to love and to the inflaming of the affections, as will be more evident from what follows.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 8.
 2. St. Hilary, *De Synodis*.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 5; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 20.
 4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 19.
 5. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* III, ch. 2.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 2; St. Thomas, in *I Sent.*, super hanc distinctionem [abbreviation as in source].
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 4, ad 1; St. Thomas, in hanc distinctionem, art. 1 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, *quaest.* 3, art. 1 [abbreviation as in source].
 8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 3.
 9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 8 (in corp.).
 10. St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* III, chs. 1–2; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 5; *Sermon 6* (De tempore); St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 5; St. Augustine, *Sermo 6* (De tempore) [attributed among Augustine's works]; St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, Prologue to Book III.
 11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, aa. 4, 5, 7.
 12. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 26 (on John 20: "As the Father has sent me"); St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 20; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 20; *The Master* (of the Sentences), [abbreviation as in source].

DISTINCTIO XVI — ON THE VISIBLE MISSION OF THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT; AND IN WHAT SENSE THE FATHER IS SAID TO BE GREATER THAN THE SON

§ I — How the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent visibly (Quomodo visibiliter missi Filius & Spiritus Sanctus?)

§ 1. The multiple ways in which either the Son or the Holy Spirit is said to be sent can be reduced to two kinds, namely, to a visible mission (*missio visibilis*) and to an invisible mission (*missio invisibilis*). And indeed of the invisible mission there will be treatment in the two Distinctions immediately following; but here one must treat of the visible. A mission is called visible when it takes place through a created subject set before sense, through which the person (*persona*) who is said to be sent is in some way represented. And although this is sometimes done through another sense than sight, and so in general this mission can be called sensible, yet it is rightly called visible with reference to what is more frequent.

§ 2. Now the Son was sent visibly once only, in an excellent and singular way, when, the Human Nature having been assumed, He appeared as a visible man among men. At other times, however, the Son of God appeared to men in that way in which we have learned from Sacred Scripture that the other Persons likewise have appeared from time to time (Gen. 18; Gen. 32; Exod. 3; Exod. 20; Is. 6; Dan. 3; Dan. 7; Rev. 1; elsewhere).² And in these modes the Son, appearing, is also rightly said to have been sent.

§ 3. The Holy Spirit is read to have been sent visibly very often. First, when in the form of a dove He descended upon Christ at His Baptism. Second, when after His Resurrection Christ, breathing upon the Disciples, said: "Receive the Holy Spirit." For in saying this He willed the Holy Spirit to be signified by that bodily breath which He breathed forth from His mouth. Third, when on the day of Pentecost, a sound having been made as of a mighty wind, there appeared above the Disciples tongues distributed, as it were of fire. For in these four—sound, wind, tongues, and fire—the Holy Spirit was then represented.

§ 4. To these it is fitting to add that same apparition of which in Gen. 18, where to holy Abraham the Trinity (*Trinitas*) appeared in the form of three men; whence the Church [sings]: "He saw three, and adored one."

§ 5. The Father, although at times He declared His presence by a sensible sign—for instance, when His voice was heard from the cloud saying: "This is my beloved Son, etc." (Matt. 17); when in Jn. 12 a voice from above of the Father was heard by the crowds saying: "And I have glorified, and will glorify again"; when He was seen by the Prophet Daniel as the Ancient of days (Dan. 7); and when also, as has just been said, He appeared to Abraham as one among the three men received by him as guests (Gen. 18)³—is nevertheless not to be said to have been sent visibly, but to have come visibly or sensibly. For just as He comes invisibly, and yet is

not sent, when He makes His dwelling in a man according to Scripture (Jn. 14), so He came visibly, and yet was not sent, according to the apparitions just mentioned—because the proper character (*ratio*) of mission, whether it be understood as visible or as invisible, does not belong to the Father, as was shown sufficiently above.

§ 6. As to what the created subjects may have been, through which the Divine Person is read to have been exhibited to human senses—except for that flesh which, assumed by the Word of God in the unity of person, is, according to the Catholic faith, not to be doubted—St. Augustine argues thus,⁴ so that neither does he doubt that such were true creatures. But whether they appeared with the employment also of a rational or intellectual spirit, not to the unity of person but only to the ministry of accomplishing sanctification, he does not dare to define. Nevertheless, he thinks that before Christ's Incarnation God worked such signs through Angels, and he shows that this agrees with the Scriptures. And although even after the Incarnation of the Word, as often as similar signs were or are exhibited, they are not exhibited without a rational or intellectual creature, he judges more probably. But on this matter there will be more things expressly below (at Distinct. 8 of Book 2).⁵

§ II — In what sense it was said that the Father is greater than the Son (Quo sensu dictum sit Patrem esse Filio majorem)

§ 7. Although from the formal character (*ratio*) of mission (*missio*) it does not follow that he who is sent is less than the one sending, any more than from the formal character of procession (*processio*) it follows that the one who proceeds is less than him from whom he proceeds—for it is, as St. Augustine says, a question of origin (*origo*), not of equality, who is of whom⁷—yet the Son truly said (Jn. 14): "The Father is greater than I." Whether the same can be said likewise of the Holy Spirit, namely that the Father is greater than He, must be inquired, if only we shall first have shown in what sense that was said of the Son.

§ 8. Now there are two celebrated expositions of this sentence. One is the more ready and expeditious, in which the Father is understood to be said to be greater than the Son considered according to the human nature, so that the sense is: The Father is greater than me as man. According to this exposition, therefore, Christ said this as the Son of Man, not as the Son of God. On this account not only the Father, but also the Holy Spirit, is greater than the Son, and the Son Himself is greater than Himself; and the same Son is less than the Father and the Holy Spirit and Himself—according to that of Phil. 2: "Whereas He was in the form of God, He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant," that is, He was made less than Himself. Indeed, according to the assumed nature, He is less not only than God, but also than the Angels, as the Psalmist says (Ps. 8): "Thou hast made Him a little less than the Angels"—which the Apostle interprets of Christ (Heb. 2).

§ 9. This understanding is made plausible from the very context of Christ's discourse. "If," He says, "you loved me, you would assuredly rejoice because I go to the Father, because the Father is greater than I"—as though He were saying: by that account the Father is greater than I by which I go to Him, namely according to the Human Nature; for according to the Divine Nature He had not departed from the Father. So St. Augustine understands it, and he proves the understanding from the context in that place;⁸ and the same often expounds it elsewhere,⁹ and among the Greeks Athanasius follows this exposition in the Symbol, where Christ is said: "Equal to the Father according to the Godhead, less than the Father according to the manhood," where also he expressly denies that in that Trinity there is anything greater or less; and the same in the Treatise

on the Human Nature assumed by the Word (at the end); and in the disputation against Arius in the Council of Nicaea (not far from the beginning); and in another disputation against Arius held at Laodicea (after the middle), although Athanasius himself is not the author of this; and in Book 3 On the One Deity of the Trinity—but neither is that by Athanasius.¹⁰ Likewise Chrysostom and Theophylact (on John), and Cyril, Book 2 of the Thesaurus, ch. 3.¹¹ Finally, it can be proved from other places of Scripture, by which it is signified that the Father is superior to the Son considered according to the assumed nature, as 1 Cor. 11: "The head of Christ is God"; and 1 Cor. 15: "When He shall have delivered the Kingdom to God and the Father, then the Son also Himself shall be made subject to Him who made all things subject to Him."

§ 10. The other exposition, and the more difficult, is that the Father is said to be greater than Christ even as the Son of God—not by some essential property which is in the Father and not in the Son, or which is greater and more perfect in the Father than in the Son, but by the authority of principle (*principium*) alone, that is, by this alone, that the Father is the author, principle, and origin of the Son. On this account also we said (above at Dist. 9), when we were treating of the order of the Divine Persons, that a certain priority belongs to the Father in comparison with the Son.¹² In this sense also it was said by St. Basil, at the beginning of Book 3 Against Eunomius, that the Son is second in dignity from the Father, and the Holy Spirit second from the Son—by the name of dignity understanding authority, that is, the formal character of principle, as we said elsewhere.¹³ This exposition is handed down by most Greek authors, as the Fathers of the Council of Sardica in the epistle written to all the bishops, which is had in Book 4 of the Tripartite History, ch. 24, and out of Theodoret, Book 2, ch. 8; Athanasius in Oration 2 against the Arians (not far from the end); Basil, Epistle 143 (ad "Cefarsens." [abbreviation as in source]), and at the end of Book 3 against Eunomius, and Book 4 against the same; Gregory Nazianzen in Oration 4, On Theology, objection 3, even with disapproval of the former exposition. To these is added John Damascene, Book 1 of *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 9. The same is followed among the Latins by Hilary in the book On the Trinity, and in the book On the Synods.¹⁴ Moreover, Chrysostom and Theophylact (on John), and Cyril, Book 2 of the Thesaurus, ch. 3, do not disapprove the former, to the point that they even prefer it to the latter.¹⁵

§ 11. According to this latter exposition, therefore, the Father is said to be greater than the Son because prior—not by nature, nor by time, nor by any perfection whatsoever, but by the formal character of origin only, because namely the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son. Nor does that of the Athanasian Creed—"In the Trinity there is nothing greater or less"—repugn. For thus there, nothing greater or less is to be acknowledged, just as neither anything earlier nor later. For these things were said to exclude from the Divine [Persons] every inequality which indeed is to be considered on the side of the nature and of essential properties, not to remove the formal character of origin and of principle.

§ 12. Although Augustine, Book 4 of *De Trinitate*, ch. 20, does not admit, by reason of principle, that the Father be said to be greater than the Son. But he understood greatness as absolute and properly so called, as is clear from the beginning of the chapter; for just as in creatures something is called great by reason of quantity, which is an absolute accident, so the greatness which is attributed to God ought to be grounded in things that are absolute, such as Wisdom, Omnipotence, Goodness. In which indeed the three Persons are so equal in greatness that none of them in relation to another can be said to be greater or less. From which it is clear that only improperly is the Father said to be greater than the Son by reason of principle, since principle is toward something; and therefore such sentences are to be used soberly, lest we seem to speak with Arius: in the same way also those words of Hilary, expounding the seventeenth and twenty-seventh anathemas of the Sirmian

Synod (in the book *On the Synods*), are to be soundly understood, in which he says that the Son even according to the Divine Nature ministers, is subject, and so forth, obedient to the Father. For these signify nothing other than that the Son in every action exactly corresponds to the will of the Father, from whom, together with the nature, He received the will and the very acting.

§ 13. Now in that the same Hilary, Book 9 of *On the Trinity*, denies that the Son is rightly said to be less than the Father, even if the Father be said to be greater than the Son—which, however, would seem entirely consequent from the nature of relative terms—we think that he had regard to the intention of the Arians, who from that place of Scripture used to contend that it follows that the Son is simply and by nature less than the Father. For Hilary says that from the fact that the Father is greater by the authority of the donor, it does not follow that the Son is less by the confession of the gift; because the Father gives to Him to be so great as He Himself is. He therefore denies that the Son is less by nature, as He who has received from Him the very same nature which the Father has—although meanwhile the Father is greater.

§ 14. For this, moreover, he cites Scripture, Phil. 2: "He hath given Him a name which is above every name," and so forth; although the Apostle there does not speak of the eternal donation of equal glory, as Hilary seems to have understood those words, but of the glorification of Christ the man—namely, in that for reward it was rendered to Him by the Father that He should be acknowledged by all as God equal to the Father.

§ III — The Arian objection against the former exposition is removed (Removetur objectio Arianorum contra priorem expositionem)

§ 15. The Arians of old tried to overthrow the former exposition of that sentence, "The Father is greater than I," with this argument: that every comparison is inept by which things of different genera are compared with each other; for just as it would be inept and absurd for someone to say that a man is wiser than a dog, so also is he who says that God is greater than man—and all the more so, the greater the distance of nature and perfection between God and man, namely infinite, than between man and beast. Cyril makes mention of this objection, book 10 on John.¹⁷ But one must answer to it that that general maxim, by which they deny that things of different genera are rightly compared among themselves, has multiple exceptions. First, things that are very diverse are rightly and properly compared with each other in an accident (*accidens*) which is one in species: as snow with milk in whiteness; man with a tree in length and thickness. Second, some things are not ineptly compared according to pre-eminence even in those matters in which they differ in species or in genus. Thus we say that man is an animal more excellent than the rest, and that substance (*substantia*) is more worthy than accident (*accidens*). Third, it happens that by a tropical locution (*tropica locutio*) things diverse are rightly compared even in a dissimilar accident on account of a certain analogy (*analogia*), while something is attributed to one properly, to the other figuratively: as when we say that speech is sweeter than honey, that the breast is whiter than snow. Fourth, some things that are very diverse are rightly and even properly compared in that respect which is conceived as competent to them under the same formal character, even if in reality it belongs to them under a very different formal character, and is attributed to one only according to a certain analogy: in which way we rightly say that man is more prudent than a beast; since prudence pertains to a beast only analogically, yet under an almost similar concept. And in this last way the term "greater" has been said in a qualified sense; and universally in this way it is most truly and most rightly said that God is greater, wiser,

more powerful, better than man. Thus in 1 Jn. 3: "God," he says, "is greater than our heart." And in Wis. 13 God is taught to be more beautiful than the things created by Himself. And in Eccl. 6 He is said to be stronger than man. Moreover, Cyril appositely turns the Arians' argument back upon themselves. For if only those things are rightly compared which are of the same genus and nature, it plainly follows from this comparison, whereby the Son of God said, "The Father is greater than I," that the Son is of the same nature with the Father. This granted, the Catholic will easily teach His equality with the Father, since the Divine Nature, which is most properly one, cannot be participated unequally. Finally, one must also reply to Nazianzen, who establishes the latter exposition in such a way as to seem to reject the former with an argument of this kind: "For that the Father is to be understood as greater than the Son by reason of the humanity can indeed truly be said, but not with equal honor. For what marvel is it that God is greater than man?" It is answered, however, that Christ sometimes, as man, sometimes, as the Son of God, rendered honor to His Father. Whence He sometimes calls Him His Father, sometimes His God, and indeed both expressly on the Cross and after the Resurrection. Although therefore the Father's honor is greater in that He is the Father of a Son equal to Himself, nevertheless that other honor also was not to be neglected, by which He should be acknowledged greater than the Son, as God than man, and Creator than creature.¹⁸

§ IV — Whether it can be said that the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit (An dici possit Patrem esse majorem, Spiritu sancto?)

§ 16. From the twofold interpretation of that saying, "The Father is greater than I" (in Latin: "Pater maior me est"), it can be understood what must be answered to the question raised above, Whether the Father is also greater than the Holy Spirit; for if we admit only the former exposition, it by no means follows that the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit, from the fact that He is greater than the Son; as St. Augustine rightly teaches.²⁰ For the Holy Spirit is God only, the Son is God and man; who indeed not as God, according to the said exposition, but only as man, acknowledges the Father as greater.

§ 17. For although the Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove, yet He did not become a dove itself, as the Son of God became man. Whence some heretics foolishly asserted, as St. John Chrysostom recounts, that the Holy Spirit is less than the Son, because the former appeared in a dove, the latter in a man—whereas there is a great difference between a man and a dove; which error Chrysostom refutes in the same place.²¹

§ 18. But if we receive the latter exposition, by precisely similar reasoning it will have to be admitted that the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit, because He is the Father greater than the Son, namely on account of origin. By the same reasoning also it will follow that the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit; since the Son together with the Father is one principle (*principium*) of the Holy Spirit. Finally, by the same reasoning it would follow that the Holy Spirit is less than the Father and the Son.

§ 19. But because locutions of this sort are found neither in Sacred Scripture nor in the writings of the holy Fathers, it will be better to abstain, especially since, as was said above, greatness is properly considered according to something absolute, not according to that which is relative. Hence also Augustine, in the same book, rejects a way of speaking of this sort, because it is not found in Scripture.²² And these statements are read in Tertullian, in the book *On the Trinity*, about the Paraclete, that is, the Holy Spirit: "If He received from Christ what He should announce, then therefore Christ is already greater than the Father; since neither would the Paraclete receive from Christ unless He were less than Christ; but the Paraclete being less than

Christ proves by this very fact that Christ is God," etc. But that the author of the book is not Tertullian, but Novatian the heretic, can be shown by sure arguments.²³

§ 20. One can also object that Basil, in book 3 Against Eunomius, says: that the Holy Spirit, in dignity, is according to being from the Father. But how this is to be understood, we will explain elsewhere.²⁴ And it suffices for the purpose in hand that it is read expressly neither in the Scriptures nor among the orthodox that the Father or the Son is greater than the Holy Spirit. And this very thing contributes greatly to confirming the former exposition of this saying, "he is greater than I"—inasmuch as, the latter exposition being admitted, no reason can be given why the same might not equally be said of the Holy Spirit as of the Son above.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 6.
 2. The Son's theophanies: Gen. 18; Gen. 32; Exod. 3; Exod. 20; Is. 6; Dan. 3; Dan. 7; Rev. 1.
 3. On the Abrahamic theophany, see St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, last chapter.
 4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, last chapter.
 5. Estius's cross-reference: below, Book II, Distinction 8.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 2; a. 4, ad t. [abbreviation as in source]; and a. 2 [as in source].
 7. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum (Arianum)* III.
 8. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* 78.
 9. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, chs. 7, 8, 11; II, chs. 5–6; *De fide et Symbolo*, ch. 9; *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, qq. 7, 69; *Contra Maximinum* III, chs. 24–25.
 10. Athanasian Creed; also [Pseudo-]Athanasius, *Tractatus de humana natura suscepta a Verbo* (at the end) [abbreviation as in source]; Disputation against Arius in the Council of Nicaea (near the beginning) [as in source]; another disputation against Arius held at Laodicea (after the middle), though not by Athanasius; and Book 3, *De unica Deitate Trinitatis* (also not by Athanasius) [abbreviations as in source].
 11. St. John Chrysostom, *In Ioannem*; Theophylact, *In Ioannem*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus*, II, ch. 3.
 12. Estius's cross-reference: above, Distinction 9, on the order of the Divine Persons.
 13. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium* III (at the beginning).
 14. Council of Sardica, Epistle to all the bishops (*Tripartite History* IV, ch. 24; see also Theodoret, *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, ch. 8); St. Basil, Ep. 143 (ad "Cefarsens." [abbreviation as in source]); Basil, *Contra Eunomium* III (end) and IV; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 4, *De theologia*, objection 3; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 9; St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*; *De Synodis*.
 15. St. John Chrysostom, *In Ioannem*; Theophylact, *In Ioannem*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* II, ch. 3. On their stance relative to the two expositions, Estius notes that they do not disapprove the former, to the point that they even prefer it to the latter.
 16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 1.
 17. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Ioannem*, book 10.
 18. St. Gregory Nazianzen, [abbreviation as in source].
 19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 1; I, q. 43, a. 8, ad 1.
 20. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 6.
 21. St. John Chrysostom, *In Ioannem*, hom. 12.
 22. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, ch. 5.
 23. Tertullian, *De Trinitate*, ch. 24 [as in source; Estius observes the work is by Novatian].

24. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium III.

DISTINCTIO XVII — ON THE INVISIBLE MISSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THAT CHARITY BY WHICH MAN LOVES GOD AND NEIGHBOR (*AN SPIRITUS SANCTUS SIT EA CARITAS, QUA HOMO DEUM ET PROXIMUM DILIGIT*)

§ 1. Next one must treat of the invisible mission (*missio*) of the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*), namely whereby the Holy Spirit is sent invisibly and secretly—which indeed He accomplishes by charity (*caritas*) poured forth in hearts, as the Apostle bears witness in Rom. 5. Concerning this mission, therefore, the first and chief question presents itself: Whether the Holy Spirit is that very charity by which each one loves God and his neighbor? To this the prompt answer is: that the Holy Spirit is said, in proper speech, to be the charity by which God loves both Himself and His creatures; not that by which we love God and our neighbor. For just as the Holy Spirit, in proper speech, is not the life by which we live, nor the wisdom by which we are wise, so neither can He properly be called the charity by which we are lovers; for properly we are named from those things which inhere in us, as from whiteness we are white, from health we are healthy. But the Holy Spirit is not an inhering form, but the first and highest substance.

§ 2. However, in an improper way of speaking it can be conceded that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we are lovers and by which we love; because, namely, He Himself is the fount and author of this love, inasmuch as He pours it into us by the hidden operation of His grace: and in this respect He is called Charity by a trope of speech taken from the effect; in the same way also God can be called our life; because, as the Apostle says in Acts 17: "In Him we live, and move, and are." In like manner also, as the same Apostle bears witness in 1 Cor. 1, "Christ was made for us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption"; because He was for us the impetratory cause of all these things by the merit of His Passion. But whether in this sense we read anywhere in the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is called Charity, depends on the interpretation of that sentence, 1 Jn. 4: "God is charity," of which we spoke a short time ago (above, Distinct. 10), and we showed that it is more probable that that statement should be understood in proper speech; namely, of the charity by which God loves Himself and other things besides Himself, for which charity is nothing other than the Divine essence itself.

§ 3. The opinion of the Master is that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God and our neighbor, not in a causal sense, as though He were called charity because He creates and produces charity in us, but in proper speech, as it has been said, "God is Spirit"; and to such an extent that now he acknowledges no created and habitual charity in man, but only the uncreated, that is, the Holy Spirit, as author. He sets forth his opinion at length in this whole distinction, and repeats the same also elsewhere.

§ 4. But as erroneous all the scholastic Doctors rightly reject and explode it, teaching that besides the uncreated Charity, which is God, one must altogether recognize in man a created and inherent charity, after the manner of other accidents, from which, as from a habit divinely infused, the works of charity proceed. That this is so, we shall show first by the testimonies of Scripture; then by the authority of the Fathers and of the Councils; third by reason; and finally we shall repel the arguments of the opposing opinion, especially those which led the Master into it. Further, that besides the Holy Spirit one must posit in man a created charity is taught by the Scriptures.

§ 5. First, in the Scriptures a manifest locus is Rom. 5: "The charity of God," says the Apostle, "is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us." By which words he openly distinguishes the charity in hearts from the Holy Spirit through whom it is poured forth; although the Master, by a certain constrained interpretation, strives to dissolve this argument.

§ 6. Likewise the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12 and 13, expressly numbers charity among the charisms of the Holy Spirit. For when he had said: "Emulate the better charisms," straightway he adds concerning charity: "And still I show you a more excellent way: If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not charity"—signifying that charity is among the number of the charisms of the Holy Spirit; although, a charism more excellent than the rest, in the same place charity is said: "It seeks not the things that are its own; it believes all things, it hopes all things, it bears all things." Which eulogies by no means aptly fit the Holy Spirit, but well fit a virtue, as commanding after the manner of an internal principle.

§ 7. Again, in the same place the Apostle compares charity with Faith and Hope—namely, a habit with habits—when he says: "But now there remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three; but the greatest of these is Charity." In which place indeed it must be noted that, if the Apostle had understood that charity, about which he was discoursing, to be properly the Holy Spirit, since there he recounted so many things in praise of Charity, he would never have omitted that which would be foremost and supreme, namely, that Charity is the Holy Spirit, and consequently God. Now, however, for its chief commendation he has only alleged that it never falls away, and that it is greater than Faith and Hope. Which two are assuredly trifling for the condign praise of Charity, if Charity is God; about whom many other and much more excellent things would be said. Nor can it be said that the Apostle spoke there of love (*dilectio*) taken as act; both because he himself in the text denies that the act of Charity is rightly called "Charity", and because that saying of the Apostle, "If I shall not have charity, it profits me nothing," and that, "Charity never falls away," and almost the other things which are said in chap. 13, cannot be understood of the act of love.

§ 8. For without actual love, by the habit of Charity alone, a man is pleasing to God while resting from action; and the act of love is transitory, a certain affection; and the other things which are said agree much more aptly with a habit than with an act.

§ 9. To these is an open locus Gal. 5: "But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, patience," and the rest. For if charity is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, therefore it is His effect, and consequently the same Charity is not the Holy Spirit Himself. Nor can this locus be understood of the act of Charity: for the Apostle enumerates the virtues, that is, habits, in order—such as patience, kindness, longanimity, modesty, faith, chastity.

§ 10. Moreover the Apostle says Eph. last: "Peace to the brethren, and charity with faith, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ," therefore thus Charity is from God, just as Faith is, namely as an affection created by God the Creator.

§ 11. Next, the Scriptures pertain here which teach that charity consists in the observance of the commandments of God, as 1 Jn. 5: "This is the charity of God, that we keep His commandments." And in the Second Epistle: "This is charity, that we walk according to His commandments." But it is evident that the Holy Spirit does not consist in the observance of the commandments of God, nor depend upon it, in the way in which Charity depends upon it. Therefore our Charity is not properly the Holy Spirit.

§ 12. Finally, to this point are to be referred the Scriptures which teach that Charity is increased and diminished. That it is increased these and the like teach: 1 Jn. 4: "Perfect charity casts out fear"; Jn. 15: "Greater than this charity no one has"; Phil. 1: "I pray that your charity may abound more and more"; 2 Thess. 1: "The charity of each one of you toward one another abounds." Whence also the Church prays to God on the 13th Sunday after Pentecost: "Give us an increase of Faith, Hope, and Charity." And St. Augustine, Tract. 5 (on John): "Charity," he says, "deserves to be increased, that when increased it may deserve to be perfected." The same, Sermon 2 (on diverse matters), ch. 4: "See and attend to what you have of Charity, and of that which you shall find increase." In a like manner he speaks in Tract. 6 (on the Epistle of John); in the book On Grace and Free Will, ch. 17; in the book 83 Questions, question 1.²

§ 13. But that it is diminished these Scriptures signify: Matt. 24: "The charity of many will grow cold." And Rev. 2: "Thy first charity thou hast left." Whence Gregory (Hom. 38 on the Gospels) reports concerning a certain woman, that her soul began, from the warmth of intimate love, by daily diminutions to grow tepid.³ Since therefore it is certain that the Holy Spirit can neither be increased nor diminished, it follows that this Charity, which is increased and diminished, is not the Holy Spirit Himself.

§ 14. Nor is the Master's reply sufficient for this argument when he says: that the Holy Spirit indeed is not increased or diminished in Himself, but in man: namely, when by man He is now more, now less had or participated; just as God is magnified and exalted not in Himself, but in man—He Himself being of Himself always greatest and most high; this, I say, is not said conveniently enough. For you cannot understand increase and decrease, in movement toward perfection and imperfection, without some created form in which that which is sometimes improperly attributed to God is properly found. Accordingly, although it is rightly said that God is increased or diminished in us in an improper way of speaking; yet that is not true without the progress or defect, properly so called, of some good which is in us. Which good, in the case proposed, cannot be assigned as anything other than created Charity.

§ III — Proof of the same from the Fathers and Councils (Ejusdem probatio ex Patribus, & Conciliis)

§ 15. Ecclesiastical writers, both the more recent and the ancients, call charity (*caritas*) a virtue (*virtus*), indeed the first and greatest virtue. But virtue, by the confession of all, is a habit (*habitus*), or at any rate a certain affection of the mind. Therefore charity is a habit, or an affection of the mind; and hence a certain created quality, and distinct from the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*).

§ 16. That charity is a virtue is, among other texts, the testimony of St. Augustine in many places; for example, in Tractate 8 on John, when he says that it is a virtue inspired by the Holy Spirit—plainly by this signifying that it is distinct from the Holy Spirit.⁵ And in the book On the Morals of the Church, ch. 11, where he calls charity a virtue, which is the most right affection of our mind.⁶ Likewise in the book On the Good of Marriage, ch. 24; in book 4 Against Julian, ch. 3; in the book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 20 and 21; and in Epistle 29 (which is to Jerome), where he calls it that virtue.⁷ And the same he testifies concerning Christian justice, which consists chiefly in charity, in the Exposition of Psalm 118, Discourse 26.⁸ Gregory likewise, Homily 8 on Ezekiel, bears witness that charity is a virtue, without which the remaining virtues cannot be.⁹

§ 17. All the theologians agree, since, taught by the Apostle, they make charity first in dignity among the theological virtues. And that every virtue is a habit, the same St. Augustine expressly teaches in Question 31 among the eighty-three; and the same is the opinion of all theologians and right philosophers: therefore the conclusion stands—charity is a habit.¹⁰ Moreover, St. Augustine sufficiently insinuates that charity as a habit is in man, when in book 15 On the Trinity, ch. 18, he says that the Holy Spirit makes a man a lover of God and of neighbor. For by this expression, not acts but a habit is signified.¹¹

§ 18. More manifestly, however, he teaches this in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 32, where, after he had said that charity is not in us except through the Holy Spirit, he adds: "For the charity of God is said to have been poured forth in our hearts, not by which He loves us, but by which He makes us His lovers: as the justice of God, by which we are made just by His gift; and the Lord's Salvation, by which He makes [us] safe; and the Faith of Jesus Christ, by which He makes us faithful."¹² These are St. Augustine's words; in which words these terms are to be noted: Charity, Justice, Faith, and these answering to them: lovers, just, faithful. Therefore, when he says that by charity we are made lovers, as by justice just, and by faith faithful; he openly signifies that habitual charity is in us, as justice and faith; and all the more, because again he expressly uses a word signifying a habit.

§ 19. Other passages of the same Doctor are added. For in book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 23, on the Apostle's sentence by which he says that charity is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, he teaches that the Pelagian heresy is overthrown, which taught that the charity by which we live well and piously is not from God given to us, but from ourselves.¹³ But it is not likely that the Pelagians thought so absurdly as to suppose that the Holy Spirit Himself is in us from ourselves. Nor is there any doubt that the Catholics would have objected this to them, if they had been persuaded that the charity by which we live well is properly the Holy Spirit.

§ 20. The same Augustine, Tractate 6 on the Epistle of John: "Charity," he says, "which in itself has been made by the Holy Spirit, itself groans, itself prays."¹⁴ But the Holy Spirit, according to the Catholic Faith, is not "made" but proceeds.

§ 21. Nor at all is there any procession except the Divine procession, which therefore alone is most properly called a procession ad intra, because that which there proceeds is not other than that from which it proceeds; and therefore it remains utterly most inward to it. And this Christ seems to have signified in the same place in John 14, when He says: "The Father abiding in me, He Himself does the works"; as if He had said: Thus do I proceed from the Father that nevertheless the Father remains in me, doing those works which you see me do.¹⁵

§ 22. A third reason is added from the opinion of St. Thomas: that it may be signified that one Person is understood in the other; and this from the nature of relatives, of which the one cannot be understood without the other. But this sense seems less to agree with the Lord's words. For the question is not whether Christ, as Son, had a Father—which follows manifestly from the nature of relatives—but who His Father was, that is, of what nature and dignity, or condition. Likewise, this mode of mutual in-existence is common to all correlatives. Furthermore, this reciprocal in-existence the Greek theologians call perichoresis, the Latins circuminsession. Of which indeed, although in other things certain examples can be produced (for according to the dialecticians the species is in the genus and the genus in the species; also those things are mutually in one another which mutually penetrate each other, whether bodies supernaturally, or accidents, as many lights in the same air naturally), nevertheless its absolute perfection is not found except in the Divine [Persons], according to the first and second reasons set above.

§ 23. Whence also that perichoresis which John Damascene establishes between the two natures of Christ, the divine and the human—book 3 On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 5, 6, 7; book 4, ch. 20—although it is founded on the unity of the Person of the Son of God, by reason of which those Natures interpenetrate one another without confusion, as Damascene speaks: nevertheless does not attain the perfection of perichoresis attributed to the Divine Persons among themselves; because there is not there consubstantiality.¹⁶ Nor even that which Hilary, book 8 On the Trinity, establishes between the faithful and the flesh of Christ, which the faithful so partake by the reception of the Eucharist that both they may abide in Christ and Christ in them, John 6, attains the said perfection; because although the faithful by this Sacrament are substantially united to Christ, and Christ, as Hilary speaks, is in us carnally: nevertheless by no means does so great a unity arise between Christ the man and us as exists between the Divine Persons, inasmuch as those are not one only in species, as Christ's [nature] and ours, but in number, and indeed by the same essence.¹⁷

§ 24. Moreover, further from that perfection recedes the in-existence which the Sacred Scriptures establish as mutual between God and holy men, as in John 17, when namely that which properly and most perfectly has place in the Divine Persons is, according to a certain analogy, transferred to men related among themselves or to God; in which way also they transfer the one and the perfect. Whence in the same place it is said: "That they may be one, as we also are one." And 1 Cor. 6: "He who adheres to the Lord is one spirit." And Matt. 5: "Be you perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." Which sentences, how they are to be taken, has been said above (on Distinction 5). Therefore God is in us, and we in God, by the conjunction of charity; but the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father, by the unity of nature.¹⁸

§ III — How the three Persons are one in nature (Quomodo tres Personae sint Unum natura)

§ 25. That the Divine Persons (*personae*) are not parts (*partes*) of God or of the Divine essence (*essentia divina*), the Master copiously proves from St. Augustine, book 3 against Maximinus, ch. 10.²⁰ Now St. Augustine speaks chiefly of integral parts (*partes integrales*), each of which is less than the whole, whether those parts have bodily bulk or not. For it is to be held with most certain faith that not only is one Person not greater than another, but neither are two, nor three taken together, greater than one or than two; as the same Augustine teaches in book 6 of On the Trinity—also in the last chapter of book 3, both in the preface and in ch. 1.²¹ Since, as was said above, the magnitude of God is nothing other than His perfection and excellence,

and one Person does not have less perfection or excellence than two or three, the consequence is that in the one there is the same magnitude as in the several.

Likewise, that the three Persons are not one in God as in a material cause, in the way that three statues made from the same gold are said to be one gold; as Augustine teaches in book 7 of *On the Trinity*; ²² and again he shows in the same place that neither are the three Persons in God one in the way that we are wont to say three men of the same sex and natural complexion are of one nature. For both in men and in statues, three are something more than two, and two, more than one. But indeed, since the unity of species (*species*) in a genus, and of individuals (*individua*) in a species, is far more perfect, it is asked whether at least this mode of unity may be attributed to the Divine Persons with respect to the Divine Essence. For to think this seems to signify a certain common Species; and the hypostases (*hypostases*), or persons, to be individuals in number, not differing in nature, subjected to a common substance (*substantia*) as to a species, in the way that particular men are subjected to the human species. But without any doubt one must answer that not even this mode of unity is fitting to the three Persons with respect to God; as St. Augustine most rightly teaches, book 7 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 5. ²³ This is manifestly proved from the fact that three human persons are not called one man, except improperly and according to the operation of the intellect only; most properly, however, they are called three men. But the three Divine Persons are most properly called, and are, one God; while to say "three Gods" is in no way permissible. Wherefore, in order that we may understand how the three Persons are one in nature, we must transcend every mode by which several created things are said to be one in nature. For these (created things) agree in a common nature in such a way that nevertheless each of them has its own particular to-be (*esse*) distinct from the particular to-be of another. This is not so in the Divine Persons, who are distinguished by personal properties (*proprietaes personales*) in such a way that nonetheless all three have one and the same—so to speak—individual *esse*; and the example of this unity is sought in vain among creatures, since that mode of unity is not communicable to creatures.

As for Damascene, when his opinion is more carefully weighed, it does not disagree with this truth. For he borrowed the dialectical words "species" and "individual" to explain in some measure the mystery of the unity of the Persons in God. In which mystery there is indeed found something similar to that logical unity, although coupled with great dissimilarity, as we have already shown. Therefore Damascene called "species" in the Divine things the Essence common to the three Persons, but designated the Persons themselves by the name of "individuals," namely by reason of predication and of mutual subjection; as the Master well explains. Now that Damascene held on this point in a Catholic manner can clearly be learned from book 1 of the same work, ch. 11, where, when at the beginning of the chapter he had said: "It is one thing to consider in reality, another by reason and by the intellect," he later adds, speaking of the Trinity: "For what is common and one is considered in reality on account of coeternity and identity of substance, [and not merely by reason; ...]." And again: "We have said," he says, "[by way of] likeness [...]. For one is the Substance [...]." ²⁴ Moreover, that Damascene acknowledges the unity of the Divine Nature in the three Persons, not only according to reason but in very reality; and that the same Persons also differ in number—not absurdly—was said by the same St. Damascene. By this way of speaking he wished to signify nothing else than that they are so distinguished among themselves by properties that the one is not the other. But on this matter more below (at *Distinct.* 24).

§ IV — Why God is said to be, not triple, but triune (Cur Deus non triplex, sed trinus dicatur)

§ 26. God subsisting in three Persons is to be called not a triple God, but triune. For triplicity, as St. Thomas hands down from Boethius, book 1 (On Arithmetic, ch. 24), in the place cited (I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 3), is a certain species of unequal proportion, like other words of a similar form. Whence something is said to be triple as if triplicated, that is, what is three times greater than that with which it is compared, which by arithmeticians is called the subtriple. Wherefore, since neither are the three Persons together, nor is the Divine Essence, something greater than the individual Persons, nor does it at all undergo the proportion of inequality in relation to them, it is clear that God in relation to those same [Persons] cannot be called triple; just as St. Augustine reasons well in the book On the Trinity, chs. 7 and 8, in the words adduced by the Master.²⁶

§ 27. We do read indeed in Chrysostom (in the homily on John the Baptist, tom. 3) that in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit there is a triple and one Divinity. But that homily is not Chrysostom's, but of an uncertain author. And that we may interpret the passage favorably, we ought to take "triple" there as put for "triune," just as also in Prudentius in the hymn on the Paschal candle, when he says of God: "He maintains his reign by a triple numen"; for the same Prudentius in the hymn "Before sleep" expressly put the name of Trinity. Similarly one must interpret what is read in Isidore, book 1 (Etymologies, ch. 4), that in God there is a singular Unity, but a multiple Trinity. For he wants nothing else than that there is in God a number, or plurality, of Persons. Moreover, in what other sense God can be said to be multiple, we have set out above (at Distinct. 8). Furthermore, "triune" in the singular number, hardly used by profane authors, by the custom of the Christian School signifies something having three supposita (*supposita*); and it is proper to God, if that "something" be understood to be one according to reality [...].²⁷

§ 28. That is what Sermon 25 (on Ps. 118) says, that by the Holy Spirit there is inspired in us the Charity (*caritas*) of right deeds. Finally, in book 15 (On the Trinity, ch. 17) he again makes the Charity by which we love God different from that by which God loves us. To these there is added that definition of Charity which is in the same Augustine, book 4 (On Christian Doctrine, ch. 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul to enjoy God for His own sake, and [to enjoy] himself and his neighbor for God's sake." And Question 36 (among the 83): "By 'charity,'" he says, "I call the movement of the soul by which that is loved which is eternal," etc. And in the book On the Morals of the Church (ch. 11): "Charity," he says, "is the most right affection of our soul, which joins us to God, and by which we love Him." Elsewhere indeed he defines Charity as "good will" (as in the book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 21; Discourse on Psalm 38; Homily 8 among the 50; and On the Trinity, book 15, ch. 20). Therefore for Augustine the Charity by which we love God is not God Himself, but a virtue, movement, and affection of the soul, and a good will, that is, a good habit, or movement of the will, and altogether a certain quality bestowed on us by God, and an inherent form.²⁸

§ 29. The same judgment is expressly stated by Bernard, a contemporary of the Master (at the end of the book On Loving God): "It is rightly said that Charity is God and the gift of God. Therefore Charity gives charity, the substantial [gives] the accidental. Where it signifies the giver, it is a noun of substance; where [it signifies] the gift, [it is a noun] of quality." The same words are found in his epistle 11 (to the Carthusians). Cyril too the Greek in book 10 (on John, at the beginning of ch. 13) says that the "gluing together" of the branches with the vine is habitual; clearly signifying that by a certain habit of Charity the branches cohere with the vine. To these opinions of the ancient Fathers one must add, in the last place, that when the Fathers

of the Council of Vienne under Clement V declared that opinion of the Doctors to be more probable and more consonant to the sayings of the Saints which says that to both little ones and adults there are conferred in Baptism the informing grace and the virtues as to habit, even if not according to the use appropriate to infant age (let us here for the moment omit that certain learned men, and by name Guido the Carmelite in the book *On Heresies*—on the heresy of Peter John—took that decree of the Council as an absolute definition, saying that there is there not understood a probable topic, but that what is implicitly true is proved): certainly the Fathers of the Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 7) judged that it must be defined absolutely, that the Charity of God is poured into the hearts of those who are justified, and that it inheres in them. Who also (of the same Session, canon 11) say anathema to him who shall have said that men are justified without that grace and Charity which is poured into their hearts through the Holy Spirit and which inheres in them. By which words it is most clearly declared that the Charity by the infusion of which we are justified is an inherent form; and therefore different from the Holy Spirit. Finally, whatever either the testimonies of Scripture or of the Fathers, or the decrees of Councils, confirm concerning the Catholic doctrine, against the heretics, of formal and inherent justice, all those same [testimonies] make for created Charity, and hence different from the Holy Spirit; since Charity is justice itself, especially in that part in which justice is an inherent quality. Which Augustine in the book (*On Nature and Grace*, the last ch.) teaches in these words: "Charity begun is begun justice; Charity advanced is advanced justice; great Charity is great justice; perfect Charity is perfect justice." Whence also in book 3 (*Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians*, ch. 7) he bears witness that the more we love, the more just we are.²⁹

§ V — The same doctrine confirmed by reasons (Eadem Doctrina rationibus confirmata)

§ 30. Now by several reasons it must be shown [...], of which this is the first. The act of the will does not so proceed from the Holy Spirit, that it would not also proceed from the will moving itself to love. For to love is a voluntary act, and not only one commanded by the will but elicited. But that act transcends the natural faculty of the will; therefore it is necessary that there be in the will the aforesaid form or some principle, by which it is moved to exercise such an operation perfectly, promptly, and delightfully: but such a principle superadded to a natural power is called a habit. Therefore there ought to be in man the habit of Charity (*caritas*), in order that he may exercise the works of Charity perfectly, promptly, and delightfully. This argument St. Thomas explains at greater length in many words.⁴

§ 31. Second. For the act of believing the intellect is healed and informed by the habit of faith; therefore, similarly, for the act of loving the will is healed and informed by the habit of Charity. The will needs healing; and just as one must not say that the Holy Spirit, without a mediating habit, produces in the intellect any act of faith whatsoever, so neither must one say that He, without a habit of that sort, produces in the will any act of Charity whatsoever.

§ 32. Third. Contraries are driven out by contraries; therefore, to expel the habit of cupidity, by which not only does man do evil but is also inclined to do evil, there is need of the habit of Charity, by which not only does he love the good, but is also inclined to love the good.

§ 33. Fourth. A just man who is sleeping, or otherwise for a time suspended from every action of the will, is nevertheless truly and properly called a lover of God: but he is not a lover in act; therefore [he is a lover] in

habit. Likewise such a man bears a good and God-loving will; not in act: therefore in habit. Therefore there is in him habitual Charity, by which his will is disposed toward the love of God.

§ 34. Fifth. Perfect Charity, which is in the Blessed, inheres to them formally: otherwise they would not have a will perfectly, and in every way, sound and right; therefore imperfect Charity, which is in the just of this age, is similarly an inherent form. And this consequence holds, because Charity, according to the Apostle, does not fall away, but the same in number, which is begun in this age, is perfected in the future.

§ 35. Sixth. Charity is increased and diminished. But to be increased and diminished in no way befits the Holy Spirit; in an imperfect way it befits an operation, as being a transient thing; and perfectly it is attributed to a habit. Therefore a habit of Charity is to be acknowledged, to which that [increase/diminution] is attributed perfectly and altogether according to the formal character of a habit. This reason above has been developed more fully from the Scriptures and the Fathers.

§ 36. Seventh. Every virtue is a habit; Charity is a virtue: therefore, etc. This argument too a little before was strengthened by the testimonies of the Fathers. The last reason is taken from inherent justice, of which also there has just now been mention. And in this place it must be carefully noted that, since it has been defined in the Council of Trent (Session 6, chs. 7, 16; and canon 11) that a man is said and is just, not imputatively only by the justice of God or of Christ, which is imputed to man, but truly and properly by the justice divinely bestowed on him and inhering [in him]—together also with this, which follows from it, that it has been expressly defined that Charity inheres in the justified—it becomes manifest from this that he who acknowledges no Charity in man besides the Holy Spirit imputes to him a condemned [heresy]. Which mark, however, we do not hesitate to remove from the Master, because in his time that matter had not yet been sufficiently clearly defined by the Church.³¹

§ V — Reply to the arguments of the Master and of others (Responsio ad argumenta Magistri, & aliorum.)

§ 37. Now, as what remains is to dispel those things—indeed, those which are brought forward against the Catholic doctrine concerning charity (*caritas*), partly by the Master, partly by others—they object first from Scripture, 1 Jn. 4: "God is charity, and he who remains in charity, remains in God." Since by these words the Apostle seems to make a syllogistic collection, such as this is: whiteness is a color; therefore he who sees whiteness sees a color; it is necessary that the same charity be understood there. To this it is answered that the collection which can be drawn from those words of the Apostle is not syllogistic. But since God by essence is charity; and therefore the source of every love (*amor*) which can be in creatures; John rightly concludes that he who remains in brotherly love remains in God; because by the created charity by which he loves his brother, he is made like to God, who by essence is charity. In the same way one may also say: he who remains in Wisdom remains in God, because God is Wisdom; and similarly of goodness, justice, holiness, and the like. Yet it will not follow from this that no created properties of this kind are in man. Although by a special reason, on account of charity, one is said to remain in God; for charity is the most excellent gift of God, by reason of which we are made most like to God.

§ 38. Second: the Master adduces certain passages from St. Augustine on his own behalf. The first place is Tract. 5 (on the Epistle of John), where he says that we do not so much make progress in charity in us as we in Charity; adding the reason: "For if Charity is God, it neither fails nor makes progress: but it is said to make

progress in you, because you make progress in it." Thus also the Church prays in a certain collect, saying: "that while we receive your gifts in tribulation, of our consolation we may grow in your love" (Monday of the Rogations).³³ The second is book 8 (On the Trinity, chs. 7, 8), where he teaches, and again repeatedly, that that love by which we love the brother is God; and therefore it is consequent that he who loves a brother loves God; because he cannot but love that very love by which he loves his brother.³⁴ The third is book 15 (On the Trinity, chs. 17, 18), in which he teaches that charity itself, which is the gift of God, is the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*); using an argument of this sort: The Holy Spirit makes us remain in God, and God in us. But this charity, by which we love one another, does this; therefore that same charity is the Holy Spirit.³⁵ The fourth is in the same book (ch. 19), where he concludes the same thing by a piece of reasoning of this kind: "If among the gifts of God nothing is greater than Charity, and no gift of God is greater than the Holy Spirit; what is more consequent than that he himself be charity, which is said both 'God' and 'from God'?" etc.³⁶ The fifth is in the book On the Morals of the Church (ch. 11), where he testifies that the charity which he had said to be the straightest affection of our mind is a good than which nothing is better. But this is said truly of God alone.⁶ A sixth place can be added from Tract. 9 (on the Gospel of John), where he says thus: "If your soul be without the Holy Spirit, that is, without charity, it will be accounted dead," etc.³⁷

§ 39. We answer: St. Augustine nowhere teaches that, besides the charity which is the Holy Spirit, there is no created and inherent habit (*habitus*) of charity in man, by which he loves God and neighbor. But in the first four places, and also in the last, he affirms the Holy Spirit to be charity—even brotherly charity—in this sense, that the Holy Spirit properly and essentially is charity, because he makes man a lover of his brother: which uncreated charity is also from God and is God's gift, as is clear from the things said above about the Holy Spirit (Distinctions 14, 15), and it will be clearer from the Distinction that follows next. This sense is sufficiently indicated by these his words in book 8 (On the Trinity, ch. 8): "Therefore, when from love we love the brother, from God we love the brother" ("Cum ergo de dilectione diligimus fratrem, de Deo diligimus fratrem"); where by the preposition "from" (*de*) he wished to signify the efficient and external cause; for had he wished to designate the formal cause (*causa formalis*), or that which would supply the place of the formal cause or of a habitual principle, he would have said in this fashion: "Therefore, by love we love the brother; by God we love the brother" ("Cum ergo dilectione diligimus fratrem, Deo diligimus fratrem").

§ 40. But that Augustine acknowledged a certain charity in us distinct from the Holy Spirit, besides the testimonies adduced a little ago, can be learned from that same book 8 (On the Trinity). For (ch. 10) he says that the charity so greatly commended to us in Scripture is nothing other than love of the good. Treating further of this love in book 9 (ch. 2), he says: "Our mind and love are not two spirits but one; nor two essences, but one"; which words could by no account be taken of uncreated love. The fifth place is to be understood of created charity, than which he says nothing is better, by a comparison made among God's created gifts, as are the virtues: for in that same place he clearly asserts charity to be a virtue. (a) These statements seem spoken more harshly than is fitting.

§ 41. Third they argue thus. The Holy Spirit, indwelling in man, of himself sufficiently acts and moves him to love; therefore it is in vain that some habit of charity is posited, from which the act of love should proceed. It is answered that by the same reasoning (if it be good) the habits of Faith and Hope are excluded, since otherwise the Holy Spirit would suffice of himself to move man to believe and to hope. Indeed, by such a piece of reasoning we will be taking away from the justified man, against the Church's definition, created and internal habitual justice: since, for producing in us all the works of justice, the same Holy Spirit, indweller of

the just man, suffices of himself. Thus of old Apollinaris the heretic used to say that it was superfluous to ascribe to Christ a mind or rational soul, because the offices of this were otherwise supplied by the Word of God. Therefore, just as the Fathers answered Apollinaris that mind was necessary to the man Christ in order that he might truly be man, so we say that created justice and charity are necessary to the just man and God-lover, in order that he may rightly and truly be just and a lover of God. Nor indeed could the Holy Spirit bring it about that man, without created and inherent justice, should properly, that is, formally, be just, and that without created charity he should be a lover; because this includes a contradiction: just as he could not bring it about that, without a rational soul, someone should properly be a man, or that something should be white without whiteness. If you object that the catechumen and the penitent love God without the habit of charity, it is answered that they are not properly called lovers from the single act of loving: hence we admit that in them, besides the transient act, there is something habitual, by which they already begin to please God; which, however, is not that charity which makes a man simply pleasing to God, which at length they receive in the remission of sins, but it passes into that charity when the man is justified. Of which matter there will be treatment in III, Dist. 27.

§ 42. (a) Fourth they object that those things which are ascribed to charity in the Scriptures cannot fall under any created form: such are, that it makes man live spiritually; that it transfers from death to life and sets him at the right hand; that it constitutes the temple of God; that it makes the Son of God; heir of the Kingdom, sharer of the nature. For all these are such that they can be brought about only by God the Author. They add St. Cyril, Thesaurus, book 13 (and in the book On the Holy Spirit, chs. 1 and 2), who proves the Holy Spirit to be God by this argument, because he vivifies spiritually and makes [men] the temple of God—since these are operations exceeding the nature of a creature.³⁸ Reply: if by this reasoning one concludes, by equal reasoning, together with heretics of this kind, we must remove habitual and inherent justice; because all those things which we read attributed to charity are also attributed to justice, which most of all consists in charity, as must be the case.

§ 43. Again, all these things are also rightly attributed to actual love; yet from that it does not follow, as according to the Master, that there is no created actual love in man. I say, therefore, that these things are attributed far otherwise to created charity than to uncreated. For uncreated charity bestows all these, as an efficient cause and the first cause, which indeed acts by its own proper power in such a way that it has received this from no prior. But created charity is said to bestow those things partly as a formal cause: for charity is life itself, by which the man lives actually; and it is the same by which one is a friend of God, and by adoption is constituted a son and a temple of the Holy Spirit; and by which also he is made, by grace, a sharer of the Divine Nature. Partly, as a cause of merit (*causa meriti*): for by charity a man merits to be justified, and, being made a son of God, obtains the inheritance of the heavenly Kingdom. Add that in some manner the same [charity] causes efficiently the free will of man itself, namely as a given cause. Whence in the Scriptures man is said to justify, to sanctify, to convert himself. For in the Scriptures the same effects are attributed both to God and to man, but not in the same manner.

§ 44. The last argument is of this sort: if God is the life of the soul; just as the soul is the life of the body, and the soul by itself, without any intermediary quality, vivifies the body, so God vivifies the soul by himself and without the intermediary of the habit of charity, as it were by uncreated charity. It must be answered that this is not entirely similar; for God is life of the soul efficiently through informing charity (*caritas*)—just as [he is life] of the body through the soul. But the soul is formally the life of the body, in the way in which form is

conjoined to matter immediately: created charity, however, is formally the life of the soul; the efficient cause informs a thing efficiently, by means of the form as formal cause.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 3; II-II, q. 23.
 2. St. Augustine, *Tract. 5 in Ioannem*; *Sermon 2 de diversis*, ch. 4; *Tract. 6 in Epistolam Ioannis*; *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 17; *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 1.
 3. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 38.
 4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 2.
 5. St. Augustine, *Tractate 8 on the Gospel of John*.
 6. St. Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae*, ch. 11.
 7. St. Augustine, *De bono coniugali*, ch. 24; St. Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, book 4, ch. 3; St. Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, ch. 20–21; St. Augustine, *Epistle 29* (to St. Jerome).
 8. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmum 118*, Discourse 26.
 9. St. Gregory the Great, *Homilies on Ezekiel*, hom. 8.
 10. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 31.
 11. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, book 15, ch. 18.
 12. St. Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 32.
 13. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, book 1, ch. 23.
 14. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the First Epistle of John*, *Tractate 6*.
 15. Jn. 14:10: "Pater in me manens ipse facit opera."
 16. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 5–7; IV, ch. 20.
 17. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, book 8; Jn. 6 (on mutual abiding of Christ and the faithful).
 18. Jn. 17:22: "Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus."; 1 Cor. 6:17: "Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est."; Matt. 5:48: "Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est."
 19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 1.
 20. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum Arianum* III, ch. 10.
 21. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI; also *De Trinitate* III (Preface and ch. 1; "c. ult. lib. 3. tum in praefatione, tum cap. 1." [abbreviation as in source]).
 22. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII.
 23. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 5.
 24. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 11. Quotations partially uncertain due to textual corruption in the source: "Aliud est in re considerare, aliud ratione, atque intelligentia ... Nam ipse commune, et unum re consideratur propter coeternitatem, et identitatem substantiae [...]. Et rursum: Nos dixi, inquit, similitudin[em] ... Una est enim Substan[...]."
 25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 3.
 26. Boethius, *De arithmetica* I, ch. 24; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 3.
 27. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, chs. 7–8 [abbreviation as in source]; St. John Chrysostom, *Homily on John the Baptist*, tom. 3 [as in source]; Prudentius, *Hymn on the Paschal candle*; also the hymn "Ante somnum" [abbreviation as in source]; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies* I, ch. 4.
 28. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes* (or *Concio*) on Psalm 118, sermon 25 ["Conc. 25 (in Psalm. 118.)" in source]; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 17; St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* IV, ch. 10; St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*,

- q. 36; St. Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae*, ch. 11; St. Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, ch. 21; St. Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm 38* ["Conc. super Psalm. 38" in source]; St. Augustine, *Homily 8 among the fifty*; also *De Trinitate XV*, ch. 20 [abbreviations as in source].
29. St. Bernard, *De diligendo Deo* (end of the work); and *Epistle 11 to the Carthusians*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem X*, at the beginning of ch. 13; Council of Vienne (under Clement V), decree on the infusion of grace and the virtues in Baptism; Guido Carmelita, *De haeresibus* (on the heresy of Peter John) [abbreviation as in source]; Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 7; Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 11; St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, last chapter; and *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum III*, ch. 7.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* ["loco jam allegato" in source; place already cited].
31. Council of Trent, Session 6, chs. 7, 16; canon 11.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* [ibidem in source; abbreviation as in source].
33. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the First Epistle of John*, Tractate 5 [abbreviation as in source].
34. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate VIII*, chs. 7–8.
35. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate XV*, chs. 17–18.
36. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate XV*, ch. 19.
37. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, Tractate 9.
38. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus*, book 13; also *De Spiritu Sancto*, chs. 1–2 [abbreviations as in source]. (Concerning the note on the condemned propositions: "propositiones 31, 32, & 33 Michaelis Baii a S. Pio & Gregorio XIII. damnatas," see the condemnations under St. Pius V and Gregory XIII [abbreviations as in source]. See nevertheless what is said at the place cited above; and let the novice reader be warned to consult the doctrine set forth in the places alleged here or elsewhere, or by the holy Councils, especially the Council of Trent, and further Bellarmine, vol. 3 of the *Controversies*, chs. 13–14; Aegidius Coninck, especially no. 70; and Soto on *IV Sent.* [abbreviations as in source].)

DISTINCTIO XVIII — ON THE HOLY SPIRIT AS "GIFT" AND "GIVEN" (*DE SPIRITU SANCTO UT DONO ET DATO*)

§ 1. Among the names that are attributed to the Holy Spirit, some are said in one way, others in another way; and there are ascribed to the Holy Spirit the names "gift" (*donum*) and "given" (*datum*), nor are these two—"gift" and "given"—although they are neighboring in signification, said of the Holy Spirit according to precisely the same formal character (*ratio*). And first, lest we err, one must know the distinction which is assigned by the Master and by the Scholastics between these two, which does not in all respects answer to the grammatical signification of these words, according to which "gift," rather than "given," requires an origin from another—since, as one can give, so also one can be given and receive. Therefore, according to the theologians, the distinction is of this sort: that "gift" is attributed to the Holy Spirit as a proper and personal name (*nomen proprium ac personale*), and that it befits Him from eternity; but "given" is neither a personal name nor from eternity, but is fitting to Him only in time.

§ 2. That this may be made plainer, one must know that by the Master (in this Distinction, and again in Distinction 26), whose doctrine in this matter all the Scholastics follow, the term "gift" when attributed to the Holy Spirit is so employed as principally to signify that relation (*relatio*) by which the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and the Son as His principle. Now the rationale of this usage is: because the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of gift (*per modum doni*), or of "being-able-to-be-given" (*donabilis*). For since, as was said above (at Distinction 10), the Holy Spirit is the love (*amor*) of the Father and the Son, proceeding by the mode of love; and love is the principle of every liberal and gratuitous donation; deservedly the Holy Spirit is called "gift," as the only one who proceeds in that mode in which the formal character of gift is contained; especially since love itself is the first and chief gift which a lover gives to the beloved, and which it is necessary should precede the other gifts.²

§ 3. Wherefore we rightly say both that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of love and by the mode of gift, and that from eternity. For although He was not "given" from eternity, He was nevertheless "able to be given" from eternity; which indeed suffices in order that He be said to have been "gift" from eternity, according to the present signification of "gift." Add that not only was He able to be given, but He also was "given" from eternity according to predestination. Then too, this name also signifies a respect to him to whom a donation can be made, that is, to the creature—but only secondarily; and therefore this signification does not prevent the name from being personal. For what is principally signified is eternal and proper to the third Person, namely His very procession from the Father and the Son; and this relation is real, whereas that other, by which He has regard to a creature, is only a relation of reason.

§ 4. Furthermore, "to have been given," or "to have been donated," likewise "to be given," or "to be donated," befit this same Holy Spirit only in time: namely then, when He is sent by the Father and the Son to sanctify the rational creature.

§ 5. Now this distinction between "gift" and "given" has not been devised by the Master, but handed down by the Ancients, and expressly by St. Augustine, whose authority the Master alleges for this matter (both in this Distinction and in Distinction 26). The passages of Augustine are: book 4 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 24, where he asserts that "for the Holy Spirit to be" is "to be the gift of God," and "to proceed from the Father and the Son," just as for the Son it is the same "to be begotten" and "to be from the Father"; and book 5 (chapters 11 and 12), where he teaches that the relation which the Holy Spirit has to the Father and the Son as to His principle does not appear in the word "Holy Spirit" as it appears in the word "gift"; and again of the same book (chapters 15 and 16), where he bears witness that the Holy Spirit was "gift" before there was anyone to whom He might be given, but that unless He be actually given, He can by no means be called "given."³

§ 6. But what is read in that same Augustine, book 15 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 19—namely, that the Holy Spirit is the gift of God only insofar as He is given to those to whom He is given—does not militate against the distinction already posited between "gift" and "given": for the formal character of "gift" also includes this, that He be given to someone either actually or at least in potency.⁴

§ II — Whether the Son also can be called a gift (Utrum etiam Filius donum dici possit?)

§ 7. That the Son of God is rightly said to be given (*datum*) has been shown (at Distinctions 14 and 15).⁶ However, that He cannot in the same way be called a gift (*donum*) is clear from the distinction already established between gift (*donum*) and given (*datum*). And Augustine's words, in book 4 (*On the Trinity*, ch. 20) a little earlier cited, plainly convince of this, by which he makes it as proper to the Holy Spirit to be a gift as it is to the Son to be begotten. If you ask: how is the Son not a gift, who was given in time, and therefore from eternity was able to be given (*donabilis*)? The Master answers that the Son from eternity proceeded from the Father, not only as able to be given, but also as begotten; but that the Holy Spirit proceeded only as gift; that is, although each proceeded as able to be given (*donabilis*), nevertheless the Son at once proceeded under the law of nativity (*nativitas*), whereas the Holy Spirit proceeded only under the formal character of gift; both because He proceeded from both [the Father and the Son], and because He proceeded as able to be given. Yet, according to the propriety of the word "gift" (*donum*) as attributed to the Holy Spirit, it seems one should answer somewhat otherwise; namely, that the Son from eternity did indeed proceed as able to be given, but not as able to be given. That is, the Son, proceeding from eternity, could be given, that is, be given gratuitously to a creature, but this does not befit Him by reason of His mode of procession, as it befits the Holy Spirit by reason of His mode of procession. For the Holy Spirit proceeds after the manner of love, and consequently after the manner of gift, but not so the Son. This answer is suggested to us by Augustine, book 5 (*On the Trinity*, ch. 15); let the words be consulted in their place.⁷ Therefore the name of gift (*donum*) properly taken, according to the distinction assigned above, is such that it cannot be communicated to the Son, just as nativity cannot be communicated to the Holy Spirit. But in a general consideration nothing forbids the Son to be called the gift of God; because indeed He was gratuitously given by the Father to all, according to that of Isaiah: "Filius datus est nobis." And this very thing, that it should come to pass in time, had been decreed from eternity. Wherefore, even in this respect the Son was from eternity able to be given (*donabilis*), and hence [may be called] a gift. Whence in the Sacrifice the mysteries of His Body and Blood are called "gifts and offerings," that is, the Son Himself, God and man, given to us by the Father. Thus St. Thomas: "among all

[things] He gave His Son"; according to that of Jn. 3, "Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret," etc.⁸

§ III — To whom is the Holy Spirit able to be given? (Cui donabilis fit Spiritus Sanctus?)

§ 8. To the question which the Master raises—To whom is the Holy Spirit able to be given (*donabilis*)?—one must reply briefly; it is sufficiently established that He is not able to be given to the Father and the Son. For He cannot be understood as able to be given to those of whom He has been the Spirit from eternity, and of whom He cannot but be; because, namely, the Spirit, and therefore as gift, is theirs by nature. But donation (*donatio*) signifies the largess of that which does not belong by right or by nature. Nor can He be said to be able to be given to just any creature, but only to that which is endowed with mind, by which it may be able to enjoy (*frui*) or to use (*uti*) the thing given. For this the name "donation" includes in its own signification, namely, that the thing to which the donation is made have the ability of using or enjoying the gift received. Whence no one would suitably say that he "donates" fodder to a beast of burden, but [that he] "gives," or rather "supplies" it; but that only the intellectual creature has the ability of using and enjoying, we showed at the first Distinction of this book. From which place also it is left manifest that although we ought to use the gifts of the Holy Spirit, among which virtues are to be numbered, and among these Faith, Hope, Charity, yet the Holy Spirit Himself, as God, is not to be used, but to be enjoyed.

§ IV — How the Son by being born, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding, receive the essence (Quomodo Filius nascendo, & Spiritus sanctus procedendo essentiam accipiant?)

§ 9. The Son of God, by being born from the Father, not only has it that He be the Son, but altogether that He be; that is, by being born He receives not only filiation but also the essence (*essentia*). Similarly, the Holy Spirit, by proceeding from the Father and the Son, not only has it that He be the Holy Spirit, but altogether that He be. Thus does St. Augustine teach in book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 15). And he repeats that doctrine in book 15 (ch. 26), saying: "Just as generation from the Father bestows the essence on the Son; so procession from both bestows the essence on the Holy Spirit." The words of St. Hilary in book 5 (On the Trinity, at the end) intend the same, when he says: "From the power of the nature the Son subsists in the same nature by birth: and from the powe[r ...] the Holy Spirit subsists."¹⁰

§ 10. How these opinions of the Fathers are to be taken can be doubted; since, as the same Augustine attests in book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 2), by names of this sort, such as generation (*generatio*), procession (*processio*), the essence is not shown, but only relation (*relatio*) is signified. But we answer: both are truly and suitably said; namely, that the Son and the Holy Spirit receive—He by being born, that He be the Son, and the other by proceeding, that He be the Holy Spirit—and again that each "be"; yet in different ways. For they receive the personal property (*proprietas personalis*) by birth and by procession, as these have themselves after the manner of a formal cause (*causa formalis*); but the essence not in this manner (for each, formally, is God by the Deity [*Deitas*], as Wisdom is wise), but as by a way and means, or mode of origin, to which in created things motion corresponds; in which accordingly the manner of speaking is similar. For we say that by being

born of a man one receives both, namely, that he be a son and that he be a man: but the former is bestowed on him by generation as the formal cause of the begotten, whereas the latter is bestowed as a certain way and mode of origin.

§ 11. But that the Son of God by being born receives the Nature or Essence from the Father—as Hilary and Augustine teach, and from both the Master (of the Sentences)—is also easy to show from the Scriptures. For the Son Himself says in Jn. 16: "Omnia quae habet Pater mea sunt"; and in Jn. 17 to the Father: "Omnia mea tua sunt, et tua mea sunt." Which statements signify that the Son—whatever He is and whatever He has, indeed whatever the Father has, with only the personal properties excepted—has and has received from the Father. But the Son is, and is God, and has the Divine essence, and likewise the Father; therefore the Son received from the Father that He be, and that He be God, and that He have the Divine essence. Now He could not have received otherwise than by being born; therefore the Son by being born received all these things from the Father. Whence that which the Lord says in Jn. 5, "Sicut habet Pater vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso," Augustine, treating that passage, interprets in this sense: "The Father, Life, begot the Son, Life."¹¹ Similarly, however, we can say: "The Father, God, begot the Son, God. The Father, Essence, begot the Son, Essence," and so with the other essential attributes of God; and what is said of the Son will likewise be to be understood of the Holy Spirit.

§ V — Whether the Son can be called "ours": as the Father and the Holy Spirit? (An Filius dici possit noster: sicut Pater, & Spiritus Sanctus?)

§ 12. Although we are said absolutely to be His, God's—namely, as His creatures, and therefore having from Him the whole of what we are and have—nevertheless God cannot thus absolutely be called "ours," as in this proposition, "God is ours," but only is called "ours" with an addition; namely, when some word is predicated of God which is understood to import some relation (*relatio*) to us—such as those which signify with respect to us the efficient cause, the end, the form, the exemplar, or something of the sort: of which kind are "Creator," "Savior," "Protector," "Lord," "Life," "Beatitude," "Protection." Indeed, God is also called "our God" inasmuch as He is worshiped by us, and "our Father," inasmuch as He made us and preserves us when made; and likewise in a special respect, inasmuch as by grace He adopts us as sons. He is also called "our Spirit" inasmuch as, being breathed into us, He breathes and works life in us. And all these things it is not difficult to prove by various testimonies of Scripture; on which matter see St. Augustine, book 5, On the Trinity, ch. 14.¹³ There are, however, certain other words attributed to God which, because they import no regard to us, do not admit such an addition. For neither can the Essence or the Person of God be called "our essence" or "our person," lest either the Divine Essence (*essentia*) or the Divine Person (*persona*) be thought to belong to us; so therefore neither is the Son of God rightly called "our Son," lest the Son of God be understood as begotten of us, or as in any way receiving to-be (*esse*) from us—just as He is called "our Father," because from Him we receive all our to-be. Whence also Christ in the Gospel, when He said: "Qui facit voluntatem Patris mei, ille meus frater, et soror, et mater est" (Matt. 12), does not add "and Father," lest the Son of God should be understood to be the son of any man, except the Mother alone, of whom according to the flesh He had been born; and this is what St. Augustine says (in the place just indicated): "What is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone"; although, inasmuch as under other names the Son is denominated, He can also be called "ours," as "Lord," "Redeemer," "our bread," and the like. Briefly, moreover, on this matter St. Thomas (I, q. 36, a. 1, ad 3) writes thus: "In the name 'Son' there is understood only the relation of him who is from a principle

(*principium*) to a principle. But in the name 'Father' there is understood the relation of a principle; and similarly in the name 'Spirit,' insofar as it imports a certain motive power: yet to no creature does it belong to be a principle with respect to any Divine Person, but conversely. And therefore it can be said 'our Father' and 'our Spirit'; but the Son cannot be called 'our Son.'"¹²

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 38, a. 1.
 2. "As was said above (at Distinction 10)." See above, Distinctio 10; "In this Distinction, and again in Distinction 26." Peter Lombard (the Master), In I Sent., Dist. 18 and Dist. 26.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 24; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, chs. 11–12; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, chs. 15–16; "Both in this Distinction and in Distinction 26." Peter Lombard (the Master), In I Sent., Dist. 18 and Dist. 26.
 4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 19.
 5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 38, a. 2.
 6. See above, Distinctio 14 and Distinctio 15.
 7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, ch. 20; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 15.
 8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 102, a. 3; citing Jn. 3:16: "Sic Deus dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret, &c."
 9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 2; III, q. 19, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source].
 10. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 15; *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 26. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* V (at the end).
 11. St. Augustine, on Jn. 5:26 (work unspecified in the source).
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 36, a. 1, ad 3.
 13. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 14.

DISTINCTIO XIX — ON THE EQUALITY OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (*DE AEQUALITATE PERSONARUM IN DIVINIS*)

§ I — The equality of the Divine Persons is proved and explained (*Aequalitas Personarum in Divinis probatur, et explicatur*)

§ 1. The Catholic Faith teaches that the Divine Persons (*Personae Divinae*) are not only one among themselves, but also equal (*aequales*). And indeed, after the ancient Councils held against the Arians, after the Athanasian Creed received throughout the whole Church; likewise after Hilary, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Augustine, Fulgentius, and other Fathers in various places; finally in the great Lateran Council it was repeated (ch. 1) in these words: "We firmly believe that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are consubstantial (*consubstantialēs*), coequal (*coaequalēs*), coomnipotent, and coeternal."²

§ 2. Nor has Scripture kept silence about this equality (*aequalitas*). For besides those testimonies which teach that the Son and the Holy Spirit are true God, consubstantial to the Father (whence the equality of the Persons follows), it is plainly said of the Son, Phil. 2: "Non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem Deo"; and Jn. 5: "Patrem suum dicebat Deum, equalem se faciens Deo." That equality was also signified by that which, as the Prophet was hearing, the Seraphim crying out said: "Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus" (Is. 6), and not "Sanctus, Sanctior, Sanctissimus"; as Rupert has well noted, book 3 (On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 15).³

§ 3. However, since equality is properly understood in quantity, of which the Divine Nature is devoid, one must ask in what sense equality in the Divine is to be taken. Therefore it must be noted that in created things these three are wont to be distinguished: unity or identity (*identitas*), similarity (*similitudo*), equality (*aequalitas*); and opposed to these: diversity, dissimilarity, inequality—of which relations the first is founded upon substance (*substantia*), the second upon quality (*qualitas*), the third upon quantity (*quantitas*). For according to substance some things are said to be the same or diverse; according to quality, similar or dissimilar; according to quantity, equal or unequal.

§ 4. But since in God properly there is neither quality nor quantity—for there is no accident, but substance alone—it follows that these three, identity, similarity, and equality, signify the same thing in God, albeit with a certain diversity of formal character. Therefore the three Persons are said to be one and the same; because they agree in the same perfection, as in Goodness, Wisdom, Power, and the like—things which, as attributed to creatures, are in truth certain accidental qualities, distinct among themselves and from their subjects. But as they belong to God, they differ neither among themselves nor really from the essence (*essentia*).

§ 5. Furthermore, the Divine Persons are said to be equal; because they so agree in each one and the same perfection, that the one does not in the least exceed another, nor is exceeded by another. For "in those things

which are great not by bulk," says Augustine, book 6 (On the Trinity, ch. 8), "that is 'greater' which is 'better,' or more excellent; just as we say that the teacher is greater than the disciple, and the master than the servant, not in quantity, but in knowledge or in power." Whence it appears clearly enough that "greatness" in the Divine is nothing other than "pre-eminence" according to any perfection whatsoever.⁴

§ 6. Therefore, besides similarity, we are compelled also to transfer the name "equality" to the Divine Persons—or rather to acknowledge it in the Divine—because equality excludes every diversity of perfection according to more and less, which similarity does not exclude. For if the Father were more powerful or wiser than the Son, as the Arians wanted, the Father and the Son would be similar among themselves, but not equal, because not perfectly similar; and this was what the Arians said, that the Son is to the Father "homoiousion," not "homoousion," that is, similar in substance, but not consubstantial.

§ 7. Moreover, it must be noted that among the three things aforesaid there is also this difference: that those things to which similarity or equality is attributed must be distinct among themselves, so that the one is not the other; for nothing is equal or similar to itself. But the thing to which unity is attributed requires no distinction. Nay rather, each thing is most properly one and the same with itself. From which difference it must be understood that when the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are said to be one in Essence, Goodness, Wisdom, from none of these attributes is the distinction of Persons among them proved; but when they are said to be similar or equal, then even from the same numerically one Essence, Goodness, Wisdom, it necessarily follows from such an attribute that those three are really distinct among themselves.

§ 8. From what has been said it is consequent that, the plurality of Persons in God being presupposed, the unity according to essence draws along with it both similarity and equality. For since in God the Essence and the perfection of the Essence do not differ, it follows from the fact that the three Persons are one according to essence, that they also are similar and equal according to every perfection of the same Essence.

§ II — In what sense each of the persons is said to be in the other (Quo sensu personarum unaquaeque in alia esse dicatur)

§ 9. What the Lord says to the Jews in Jn. 10, "that you may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father"; and to Philip in ch. 14, "Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me?"; and to the Father in ch. 17, "As thou, Father, in me, and I in thee": is to be understood altogether similarly of the Holy Spirit; for in the Father himself is both the Son, and he himself in both. This matter Fulgentius states severally of all the persons (*personae*).⁶ But by what account these things are said must be explained.

§ 10. The first and principal account is the unity of Nature (*Natura*) in distinct Persons. For this inexistence (*inexistentia*) requires both—both the distinction of persons and the unity of Nature. Therefore by such a manner of speech it is signified that the Persons are so distinct among themselves that nevertheless each with the other is altogether and most intimately one and the same— which sense the circumstances of the places we have cited from John demand. The same sense was expressed by St. Augustine in book 6 (the last chapter) of On the Trinity, by Fulgentius in On the Faith to Peter, and by Hilary in the words recited by the Master; likewise under the name of Ambrose (a commentary upon 2 Cor. 3 at the words: "God was in Christ"), whose words likewise you have in the Master.⁷ To these add St. Cyril writing on Jn. 14, and others upon the same place.⁸

§ 11. The second account is to signify a certain, as it were, straitened mode of the origin of one Person from another. For one Person does not so proceed from another as to come forth, as it were, outwardly and exist sundered from that from which it proceeds, in the way in which a house proceeds from the artificer and a human son from a human father—which procession is called a procession to the outside (*processio ad extra*); but rather so as to remain most intimately in that from which it is said to proceed, as a word proceeds from the mind and love from the will. Yet this example of word and love is not altogether similar: for a word is not coessential to the mind nor love to the will, but each inheres in each as an accident in a subject, or certainly as an act in its potential principle; whereas in God, in whom, according to the thing, one and the same [essence] subsists in three supposits (*supposita*), this belongs to the creator of creatures alone. He is therefore called triune, as it were "three-one."

§ 12. Now the Trinity (*Trinitas*), although according to the etymology of the word it may seem to signify one Essence (*Essentia*) of three Persons—so that Trinity be said, as it were, "three-unity"—yet rather, according to the propriety of the word as it has from the usage of the Church, signifies the number of Persons of one Essence, and that determinate, namely three; so that Trinity determinately signifies what "plurality" signifies indeterminately, as St. Thomas teaches in the place already alleged (in the body of the article and to the first objection).⁹ Whence it does not follow that each Person is a Trinity, although of each Person it is truly said that it is the unity of the Divine Essence, just as it is the Divine Essence. For each Person is not the number of Persons, that is, the very three Persons of one Essence. The Greeks name the Trinity the Triad (*Trias*) by a word used also by profane authors, among whom it signifies in general the number three, or a ternion; but by the usage of the Church, from the beginning, it has been appropriated to signify the ternary of Persons in God. Dionysius uses it in this signification (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 1), saying: he teaches that the Triad is the principle of the Hierarchy.¹⁰ Nor need one labor to show this name in the Sacred Scriptures, which the Arians of old demanded. For it is enough that the reality shown by this name is contained there, even with the expression of a determinate number, as in 1 Jn. 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven," etc., "and these three are one."

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 41.

2. "Ancient Councils held against the Arians" [as in source]; Athanasian Creed; Hilary, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Augustine, Fulgentius, "in various places" [as in source]; Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1.

3. Rupert of Deutz, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, book 3, ch. 15.

4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 8.

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 5.

6. St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 1.

7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 12 (last chapter); St. Hilary, as quoted by the Master [as in source]; Ambrose (under whose name the work circulates), *Commentary on 2 Cor. 3* at "Deus erat in Christo" [as in source]; see also the Master [as in source].

8. St. Cyril of Alexandria, on John 14 [as in source], and others on the same passage.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 5 (body and ad 1).

10. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* I: "He teaches that the Triad is the principle of the Hierarchy."

DISTINCTIO XX — ON THE EQUALITY OF POWER IN THE TRINITY AND THE INSEPARABILITY OF DIVINE OPERATIONS (*TRES PERSONAS POTENTIA ESSE AEQUALES; INSEPARABILIA ESSE TRINITATIS OPERA*)

§ I — The three Persons are equal in power (Tres Personas potentia esse aequales)

§ 1. Since the greatness, that is the simple excellence, which is among the three divine Persons has been shown (in the preceding Distinction), it follows that they are equal in power (*potentia*). For, as was said there, the greatness of God embraces His every perfection and pre-eminence. Indeed, by the name of greatness power is sometimes in particular designated. Whence is that statement of St. Augustine in Epistle 3 (which is to Volusianus): that God is great not by bulk, but by might, that is, by power.²

§ 2. Now then, besides those things which have been said in general, a special proof must be adduced of their equality according to power. Where first it must be noted that it is not rightly said that the Power of the Persons is equal, but that it is the same; it is the Persons themselves that ought to be said, in power—that is, according to power—equal and on a par. For equality, as we indicated (at the above Distinction), just as also likeness, is only among things distinct. But Power, just as Goodness and the other essential attributes of God, and likewise the Deity itself, are not distinguished in the distinct Persons, but, without distinction, belong to each Person.

§ 3. Accordingly, that the Son is of the same Power with the Father is taught by the Son Himself by this general statement, Jn. 16: "All things that the Father has are mine." From which it follows forthwith that the Omnipotence of the Father is the same also as the Son's. In particular, moreover, He signified His Omnipotence together with the Father when He said, Jn. 5: "My Father works until now, and I work"—understand, whatever the Father works. For from these words of Christ the Jews, by a right reasoning (as the Evangelist testifies), were inferring that "He said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God." Strengthening that inference, the Lord again added: "Whatever things the Father does, these also the Son does likewise." But wishing to evade this Scripture, the Arians used to answer that it was not said "the Son does these equally," but "likewise." To whom in turn it is answered that it was not said "the Son does things like these," but "these very things," that is, the same. Now it cannot be that the Son does altogether the same things that the Father does, unless He be endowed with the same Power. For from a lesser power there cannot proceed all the same works which proceed from a greater; for the greater each power is, the more it can do. If therefore the Father's power cannot do more than the Son's, assuredly it is not greater. Likewise, if the Son

does all things that the Father does, then either the Son is not made; or—which is most absurd and altogether impossible—He is made by Himself. In about this way St. Augustine answered the Arians (writing on this passage of John).³ Moreover, St. Cyril adds (in his own Commentary on the same passage) that by these words, "likewise," "as," there is sometimes signified a perfect likeness, that is, equality; just as when of two men worthy of equal honor we say, "This one is to be honored as that one," that is, "not less than that one."⁴ To this there is added the Scripture of Wis. 7, where, concerning the Wisdom of God, it is said: "Although she is one, she can do all things"; and Wis. 18: "Thy almighty word." Likewise in the Gospel it is everywhere confessed by believers that He is able to do all things, whenever He has willed.

§ 4. Furthermore, St. Augustine proves the Omnipotence of the Son in book 2 (Against Maximinus, ch. 7) by this sort of reasoning: The Father begot the Son, not from nothing, nor from any matter, but from Himself. If therefore He begot a Son lesser than Himself and less powerful, then either He could not beget Him equal in power to Himself—and He is weak; or He did not wish to—and He is envious. Weak indeed, because it is a mark of feebleness not to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself according to any perfection whatsoever; envious, however, because he is convicted of laboring under envy who, though he can, does not wish to communicate to another what is owed to him by the law of nature—and that all the more, if by a father it ought to be owed to a son, in whom above all the father's kindness ought to appear. Similar to this is the reasoning which in the same book St. Augustine indicates (ch. 13, 18), taken from the nature of begetters. For it is naturally innate in every man to desire to beget a son like himself as much as possible in all things that pertain to perfection—indeed even more perfect than himself, and that straightway, if it could be done; and that he does not bring this to pass proceeds from the impotence and imperfection of the begetter. Since therefore every impotence and imperfection ought to be removed as far as possible from God the Father, it follows that from eternity He begot such a Son as would have nothing less than the Father, neither on the side of Power nor of any other perfection whatsoever. These arguments produced by Augustine avail against Maximinus (who had already conceded that the Father begot the Son by nature and from Himself). But against other Arians, who denied that the Son was begotten from the Substance of the Father, and that He is Son by nature, they are not equally effective. For God need not be either weak or envious if He does not make a creature equal, since excellence is owed to a creature by no law or equity, namely so as to be equal to its Creator—which in fact cannot in any way be done.

§ 5. Moreover, the things that have been said concerning the Son's equality with the Father according to Power are to be understood likewise of the Holy Spirit; about whom in particular it is written in Wis. 1, that He "contains all things," namely, by His Virtue and His Power; and in Wis. 7, that He "has all power." But concerning the three Persons the Church's confession is clear in the Athanasian Creed: "The Father almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty; and yet not three almighties, but one Almighty." And in the great Council it is likewise confessed. And in the Gospel, everywhere by believers, there are proofs that the Son and the Holy Spirit are one true God consubstantial with the Father—a matter about which above (at Dist. 9, 10) it was treated: the very same things most certainly show them to be coequal with the Father, as much with respect to power as with respect to all the other perfections.⁵

§ II — Reply to the objections (Ad objectiones responsio)

§ 6. Against the Son's equality of power (*potentia*) with the Father, Maximinus the Arian objects, in St. Augustine, arguments of this sort. First: The Son receives Power from the Father; the Father from no one: therefore the Father is more powerful than the Son. Second: The Father begot the Son; He Himself is begotten by no one: therefore for this very reason He is greater and more powerful than the Son. These are read in St. Augustine, book 3 (Against Maximinus, chs. 12 and 18). It seems, however, that both are confirmed by this axiom: "On account of which each thing is such, that is more such."

§ 7. But St. Augustine turns both arguments back against the adversary. For if the Son received Power from the Father, assuredly He received the same which the Father has, because He also received the same Essence, as Maximinus was confessing; therefore the Son is equal to the Father according to Power. Likewise, if the Father begot the Son, and begot Him equal to Himself, as the character of the divine generation requires, then according to Power the Father is not greater than the Son. Nor is it an obstacle that the Son has His nature and power from the Father, but the Father from no one. For as in the same place (ch. 18) St. Augustine subjoins: "It is a question of origin, who is from whom; but of equality, of what sort or how great he is"—as if to say: by the things which Maximinus objected, it is only taught that the Son has His origin from the Father, but not that the Son is less than the Father. Nor does the stated axiom support the argument: for that must be understood of a form receiving more or less, and of that which is at least numerically diverse in the things which are compared with one another. Of which sort the Divine Power is not.

§ 8. A third argument. The Father could beget the Son, which the Son cannot; therefore the Father can do more than the Son. St. Augustine replies (at the end of ch. 12 of the same book) in these words: "The Son was begotten, not made, by the Father's nature"; that is, Power in God is not said with respect to generation or procession. Fulgentius also (book 3, On the Faith to Peter) signified this when he said that in this the Omnipotence of the Trinity consists, that It made every creature visible and invisible—that is, corporeal and incorporeal: this is to say that the Omnipotence of God regards creatures which are outside the substance of God, not the processional acts which do not go forth from the substance of God. But a fuller explanation of this argument may be sought from the things which were said (at Dist. 7 of this book), where it was disputed whether the power of begetting belongs to the Son; as also from the things which will be said below (at Dist. 42) concerning God's Omnipotence.⁷

§ 9. A fourth objection will be made by someone: that the Father seems more powerful than the Son from the fact that Power is appropriated to the Father. But an easy reply is that there is a difference between what is proper and what is appropriated. For things appropriated are in truth common; as will be clear from the things that will be said (at Dist. 31). And if this argument were to go through, it would follow that the Son is wiser than the Father, since Wisdom is appropriated to the Son. It would also follow, by the same reasoning, that the Holy Spirit is better than the Father and the Son.

§ 10. Lastly, one can object what the Lord says, Jn. 5: "I have come in my Father's name, and you do not receive me; if another shall have come in his own name, him you will receive." But name signifies power; therefore the Son's Power is not the Father's Power, because otherwise the Son would have come in His own name. It is answered that, if name there signifies power, Christ did not come in His own name only, but in that which He admits He has from the Father. However, that phrase "to come in the name of someone" seems

to signify only this, that someone comes sent by another. And so the Son came into the world only in the name of the Father, that is, only sent by the Father.

§ III — That the operations of the Trinity are inseparable (Inseparabilia esse Trinitatis opera)

§ 11. To these things it is fittingly to be added that the operations (*opera*) are common to the three Persons, so that whatever operations proceed from the Trinity are inseparable—that is, whatever God works ad extra. Indeed, it is altogether impossible that one Person should work anything without the other or the other two. For it is a ridiculous fable and plainly contrary to the Catholic faith—that of the Manichees—by which they assigned to each Person certain abodes, and asserted that each exercised His powers in different elements or creatures.

§ 12. But the Catholic doctrine is proved by this most certain reasoning. In God there is not one thing and another, but all these are one and the same, according to that which is wont to be said: that "in things divine all is one," where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. Therefore, just as of the three Persons there is one and undivided Essence, so there is one Power, and consequently one will and operation. Whence, whatever are the operations of one Person are also the operations of the others; and whatever works are produced by one Person are produced also by the other two, and that not by a different, but by one and undivided operation. And this is St. Augustine's proof in the book (*Against the Sermon of the Arians*, ch. 16), saying: "The operation cannot be divided where the Nature is not only equal but also indistinct."⁹

§ 13. It is proved also in particular from the unity of Power. For if of the three Persons there is one and the same Power, it is necessary that all the operations proceeding from that Power be common to the three Persons. The Scriptures show the same: for the creation of the world and its parts we read in the Scriptures to be attributed now to the Father, now to the Son, now to the Holy Spirit; as in Ps. 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and by the Spirit of His mouth all their host," and so forth. Whence also the Son, Jn. 5, testifies that He works all things together with the Father, saying: "My Father works until now, and I work"; and again: "Whatever things the Father does, these also the Son does likewise." And Prov. 8: "I was with Him, disposing all things." And again Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing"—that is, the Father did nothing without the Son. But the same Son does His works in the Holy Spirit, as He Himself says, Matt. 10: "If I in the Spirit of God cast out demons," and the like. Likewise our sanctification, both elsewhere and most explicitly (Matt. last), is attributed to the whole Trinity—when the Apostles are commanded to baptize believers "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." Finally, we read of no work in the Scriptures attributed to one of the three Persons which is removed from another or the others, and rather we sometimes read it attributed to the others as well; but in such a way that the Son, just as He receives to be, so also receives to work from the Father, as He Himself testifies, Jn. 5: "The Son cannot do anything of Himself, but what He sees the Father doing." Similarly also the Holy Spirit, just as to be, so also to work, receives from the Father and the Son. "For He shall not speak from Himself, but whatever He shall hear, He shall speak" (Jn. 16)—so that just as He is from the Father as a principle of being, so from the same He may be a principle of operating.

§ 14. Now this communion and inseparability of the Father's operations against the heretics—and especially the Arians, who were teaching that the Son could dissent from the Father in will and therefore in

operation—the Fathers have constantly handed down. Whence is, especially, that statement of Hilary, book 7 (On the Trinity): "In the divine Persons there is nothing diverse, nothing foreign, nothing separable." The same thing St. Augustine teaches in many places; as in Epistle 99 (to Evodius), where he also says: "What does the Son do without the Holy Spirit, or without the Father, when all the operations of the Trinity are inseparable?" Likewise, book 1 (On the Trinity, chs. 4–5); and in the book (Against the Sermon of the Arians, ch. 16); and Tractate 20 on John; and Sermon 11 (On the Words of the Lord, chs. 15–16); and Sermon 63 (through many sections); the Enchiridion, ch. 38; and the book (On True Religion, ch. 7). A book also passes under St. Augustine's name, titled On the Trinity and Unity of God, ch. 7 and the following (in vol. 4), which hands down the same doctrine. In the same the rest of the Fathers without doubt agree.¹⁰

§ IV — Reply to the objections (Respondetur ad objectiones)

§ 15. Certain things are commonly objected against the foregoing doctrine. The first is from the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God (*Incarnatio Filii Dei*), or the assumption of the human nature (*assumptio humanae naturae*). For the Son alone was incarnate; the Son alone assumed the human nature; the Son alone spoke in the flesh; He walked, ate, drank; the Son alone suffered and died, the Son alone finally rose again and ascended into the heavens: as, against the Patripassians, has long since been handed down by the Catholic Faith. But all these things are acknowledged to be certain operations *ad extra* (*opera ad extra*). Second. The Father alone, by a voice let down from heaven upon Christ, said: "This is my beloved Son," etc. Third. The Holy Spirit alone descended upon Christ in the form of a dove, and upon the Apostles in tongues of fire. Fourth. In Jn. 8 Christ says: "I do not seek my glory; there is One who seeks and judges," namely the Father. Therefore the Son was not seeking the same thing as the Father; and consequently both did not will the same thing either: because he who seeks, wills and desires.

§ 16. Fifth. In Heb. 5: "And no one takes the honor to himself, but he who is called by God, as Aaron was; so also Christ did not glorify Himself, to become High Priest, but He who spoke to Him, You are my Son." Therefore Christ did not bring about His own glorification. Sixth. The Son and the Holy Spirit intercede for us, they petition for us (Rom. 8), which cannot be said of the Father. Likewise for us the Son offers, and the Holy Spirit offers, as John Gerson teaches.¹¹ Seventh. St. Augustine in Sermon 63 (On the Words of the Lord, ch. 2): "I dare," he says, "to say the Trinity is, as it were, separable, when Jesus came to the river, the Dove descended from heaven to earth. The very voice of the Father sounded neither from earth nor from water, but from heaven. These three things are as it were separated by places, separated by offices, separated by operations." So he. To these we reply.

§ 17. And to the first indeed: although the Son alone was incarnate and assumed the human nature, nevertheless that Incarnation, or the assumption of the human nature, the whole Trinity operated (*operata est*), as also whatever other things Christ either did or suffered in the flesh, and likewise His very Resurrection and Ascension into heaven. For it is one thing to be incarnate, to assume the human nature, to speak, to walk, to eat, to drink, to suffer, to die, to rise again, to ascend; another thing to operate all these, or each of them. For some of these signify a bare passion, as to suffer, to die; some a termination, as this word "to be incarnate." Others signify indeed an action, but one terminated, or inhering in him who is said to act. For to assume the human nature is to bring forth the work of the Incarnation so as to be terminated in oneself, which belongs to the Son alone; as will be more fully explained (at Dist. 1 of Book 3). Likewise he is said to speak who produces

the act of speaking in himself; to walk, who produces the act of walking in himself; and so of the others. Therefore of the Son alone these things are said, not because He alone operates them, but because He alone receives them in Himself, namely according to the human nature.

§ 18. To the second it is answered that the Father alone said those words, not because He alone formed that sound of the words in the air; for this too was an operation, like the rest, common to the whole Trinity; but because the words were uttered in the Person of the Father alone (*solius Patris persona*), as He who alone had the Son Jesus Christ, whom those words were pointing out. He alone, he says, "said," because the thing signified pertained to the Person of the Father alone, as if He had said: "I am the Father."

§ 19. To the third likewise it is answered: that the Holy Spirit alone appeared in the form of a Dove and in tongues of fire, because those visible realities were signifying the Person of the Holy Spirit alone (*Spiritus Sancti persona*), although by one undivided operation (*una indivisa operatione*) the three Persons produced them. For a fuller treatment of these three arguments, see St. Augustine (Sermon 11; Sermon 63, On the Words of the Lord; and Enchiridion, ch. 38; in the first book of De Trinitate, chs. 4–5).¹²

§ 20. To the fourth it is answered: either He is speaking of Himself according to the manhood, because He had not come to be glorified, but to suffer; or else the very same He, as God, was not seeking His glory in an original way, but the Father, from whom He had received all things.

§ 21. To the fifth a like reply is given. For Christ did not glorify Himself as man, but as God. For the Godhead conferred upon the humanity the dignity of the high priesthood. And yet as God, to do this very thing He received from the Father.

§ 22. To the sixth. The Father neither intercedes, nor petitions, nor offers, not because He does not operate these actions, but because in those actions, as thus expressed, there is contained something foreign to the Father, namely, to receive from another that which is asked. For the Father alone grants the things asked in such a way that He does not receive from another the very act of granting.

§ 23. To the last. Augustine clearly explains himself, and expressly teaches the contrary in that place. He says therefore "the Trinity is as it were separable," because the works which he there commemorates are as it were separated. For although all things are done by all the Persons, nevertheless they do not pertain to all the Persons, according to those things which were said in solving the arguments of the first, second, and third.

1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 42, a. 2 and a. 6.

2. St. Augustine, Epistle 3 (to Volusianus).

3. St. Augustine, Tractates on John, on John 5 (ad loc.) [abbreviation as in source].

4. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentary on John, on John 5.

5. Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult). The reference "in the great Council" is to the public conciliar confession of the same truth.

6. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 42, a. 4.

7. Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum, III; see also above at Dist. 7 of this book (on whether the power of begetting belongs to the Son), and below at Dist. 42 (on God's Omnipotence) [abbreviations as in source].

8. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 45, a. 6.

9. St. Augustine, Contra sermonem Arianorum, ch. 16.

10. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* VII; St. Augustine, *Ep.* 99 (to Evodius); *De Trinitate* I, chs. 4–5; *Contra sermonem Arianorum*, ch. 16; *Tractatus* 20 in Iohannem; *Sermo* 11 (*De verbis Domini*), chs. 15–16; *Sermo* 63; *Enchiridion*, ch. 38; *De vera religione*, ch. 7; [Pseudo-Augustine], *De Trinitate et Unitate Dei*, ch. 7 and following (vol. 4).
11. Joannes Gerson, in tractatu [abbreviation as in source].
12. St. Augustine, *Sermo* 11 (*De verbis Domini*); *Sermo* 63 (*De verbis Domini*), ch. 2; *Enchiridion*, ch. 38; *De Trinitate* I, chs. 4–5.

DISTINCTIO XXI — HOW THE EXCLUSIVE WORD "ALONE" IS PREDICATED OF GOD AND OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

§ I — How the exclusive word "alone" is attributed to God (Quomodo vox exclusiva solus Deo tribuatur.)

§ 1. Since St. Augustine has said (whence St. Augustine says in De Trinitate VI, ch. 8) that the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as the whole Trinity, it is rightly asked how this word "alone" (*solus*), which seems to signify solitude, is rightly attributed to God and to the Divine Persons; and, in general, how it is employed in divine matters. To which, answering, we say that the usage of this word in common speech is various. For sometimes it signifies one who is solitary, in such a way as to exclude the companionship of things of the same nature or species. Thus it is said of Adam in Gen. 2: "Non est bonum hominem esse solum." In this sense neither God nor any Person in the Godhead is alone, since there is there the most blessed society of three Persons most perfectly agreeing in one Nature.

§ 2. In this way the Son of God says, Jn. 8: "Solus non sum, sed ego, et qui misit me Pater." And in 16: "Non sum solus, quia Pater mecum est." For what he says in the same place: "Relinquetis me ..." [...]. Thus St. Augustine in De Trinitate VI, ch. 7, teaches that God is not alone, although he is the only God. For he is denied to be alone, not only because he is with spirits and holy souls (as St. Augustine there says; for he was without them before the world was created), but chiefly on account of the most blessed fellowship of the three Persons. Wherefore neither can the Trinity itself be called alone, that is, solitary, since it embraces within itself that fellowship of the three Persons. Which indeed was indicated by those words, Gen. 1: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram." For Hilary used this Scripture to prove this very thing in De Trinitate IV.²

§ 3. Moreover, the word "alone" is taken almost in the said way when it is placed altogether solitarily on the side of the predicate in an enunciation, as when we say: "God is alone"; "John is alone." But if on the side of the predicate it has another element adjoined, it will not signify solitude, but will remove from the predicate every thing different from the subject. And in this fashion it is most truly said that the one God is the only God, as Augustine testifies in the place lately cited. Whence the Lord himself, Deut. 32, says: "Videte quod ego sim solus," understand "God." For he expounds it by the words that follow: "Et non sit alius Deus praeter me." Thus it has been said by the Apostle, 1 Tim.: "Soli Deo honor, gloria," that is, "to him who is the only God."

§ 4. Moreover, if the same word be joined to the subject of the proposition, it will far more manifestly signify the removal of the predicate from everything that is different from the subject. Thus it is said to God, Job 13: "Nonne tu qui solus es?" By which is signified that God alone is, namely, in that most excellent mode whereby that is said "to be" which has its to-be from no other. Thus in 1 Tim. 1 the only God is said to be

immortal, that is, by his Nature eternal and immutable; and in ch. 6, the only God Powerful; and in Rom. 16, the only Wise. So too in Deut. 32 it is written: "Dominus solus dux eius fuit." In these, I say, and in sentences of this sort Scripture signifies that the predicates of such propositions belong to God in such a way that they suit no thing different from God. On this mode of speaking in divine matters see St. Augustine, De Trinitate I, ch. 6; and De Maximinum III, ch. 9 and the four following; and St. Thomas, I, q. 31, a. 3.³

§ II — How exclusive expressions are attributed to the Divine Persons (Quomodo dictiones exclusivæ Personis Divinis tribuantur.)

§ 5. Exclusive expressions (*dictiones exclusivæ*) bring more difficulty if they are joined to the Divine Persons. Yet this matter seems able to be dispatched briefly as follows. If an exclusive expression is joined to a Person on the side of the subject, and a personal predicate is attributed to it, such a proposition has no doubt. For it is most truly said: only the Father is Father; only the Father begets; only the Son is begotten; only the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Thus (in the Athanasian Creed) "the Son is from the Father alone," that is, the Father alone begot the Son.⁵ In propositions of this kind, therefore, it is signified that the predicate is removed not only from that which is distinct in nature from the subject, but also from that which is distinguished only by the consideration of the supposit (*suppositum*).

§ 6. But if the predicate be absolute, in accordance with the property of speech the proposition will seem false; for example, "only the Father is God," since the Son also, who is other than the Father, is God. For such seems to be the force of an exclusive expression, that it removes everything of which the affected word cannot be affirmed; unless perhaps the circumstance of the speech should require otherwise, as if I say: "Only Peter is in the house"; I do not exclude the dog or the furniture, but other men. In this way the Ancients often speak in their writings, namely, when they deny that only the Father is God, or Omnipotent, or Eternal, writing against the Arians, who detracted these attributes from the Son and the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the falsity of propositions of this sort is more clearly evident when there is an explicit comparison of the Persons among themselves, as if someone were to say: only the Father creates; only the Son saves; only the Holy Spirit sanctifies. For there the things are so attributed to individuals with an exclusion, that they seem to be removed from the others.

§ 7. But if we also follow the manner of speaking used in the Scriptures, there will truly sometimes be found even propositions of this kind, that is, in which an absolute predicate is attributed to a Person affected with an exclusive sign. For thus the Father alone is said to be the true God, in these words, Jn. 17: "Ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum." So too Matt. 11 it is said: "Nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit, nisi Filius," that is, the Father alone knows the Son, and the Son alone knows the Father. And "... quod nemo novit nisi ipse," that is, that the Son alone knows. And 1 Cor. 2: "Quae Dei sunt, nemo novit, nisi Spiritus Dei," that is, the Spirit of God alone knows. And more openly in Sir. 24, the Wisdom of God says: "Gyrum caeli circui sola."

§ 8. Thus the Church sings in the Mass, with speech turned to the Son: "Tu solus Sanctus, Tu solus Dominus, Tu solus Altissimus"; for what follows, "Cum Sancto Spiritu," etc., seems to have this sense: "who with the Holy Spirit live and reign in the glory of God the Father." So in the Divine Office of the Martyrs John and Paul: "Nobis alius non est Dominus, nisi Jesus Christus." And in the Roman Martyrology, on the day before the Kalends of September, concerning St. Aristides: "That Christ Jesus alone was God he most

luminously concluded." Nay, thus Judas the Apostle speaks, saying that some "deny the only Dominator and our Lord Jesus Christ," that is, him who alone is the Dominator and our Lord; although the Greek has it somewhat otherwise, namely: "the only Dominator God and Lord," etc.

§ 9. In these, therefore, and in similar sentences the exclusive expression does not exclude everything of which the subject cannot be truly affirmed, but things different from the subject, that is, all those things which according to essence are not one and the same with that to which the sign of exclusion is adjoined. For example, if someone says that he believes in God the Father, "who alone created the world," he does not thereby straightway exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit, but is judged to exclude only all those things which are not that which the Father is, that is, which are not one and the same thing with the Father. Since therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same with the Father, they ought not in this manner of speaking to be seen as excluded from the work of creation, but only the creatures. On locutions of this sort, see St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IV (midway); and St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 9; and *Contra Maximinum* III, ch. 13; and St. Thomas, I, q. 31, a. 4.⁶

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 3.

2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 7; St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* IV.

3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 6; St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, chs. 9–13; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 3.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 4.

5. Athanasian Creed (*Quicumque vult*).

6. St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate* IV (ante medium); St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, ch. 13; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 4.

DISTINCTIO XXII — OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE NAMES ATTRIBUTED TO GOD (*DE NOMINIBUS DEO ATTRIBUTIS*)

§ 1. Concerning the diversity of the names (*nomina*) which we are wont to use when speaking of God, before we explain them by a division, certain things necessary to know must be premised. Of which this is the first: that none of them perfectly represents the nature (*natura*) to us; although some, more than others, either come closer to representing it, or recede less far from it, as can be understood from what was said above at Dist. 8, where the question was asked: what is the name most proper to God? The reason, moreover, is that each thing is named as it is understood; for names have been imposed upon things to signify their proper natures, which are explained by definitions. Since, therefore, the nature of God exceeds the capacity of the human intellect (*intellectus*) to infinity, it follows that that same nature, with respect to us, cannot be set forth by a proper name. And this is what St. Dionysius the Areopagite says in the book *On the Divine Names*, chapter 1, that of God neither does a name exist, nor is an opinion had—that is, that a proper and adequate concept (*conceptus*) of God cannot be formed—because, namely, every created intellect, since it is finite, is not able by thinking to attain that infinite nature as it is.²

§ 2. Second. For declaring the nature of God by speech, many and various names must be used. For since in God there are the perfections (*perfectiones*) of all things whatsoever in the most perfect mode, it is necessary that by several names that excellence of the Divine Nature be signified and made known to us, which individual names are less able to represent.

§ 3. Third. Not many things, but one and the very same thing, is signified by all that variety of names which are attributed to God.

§ 4. Fourth. Although many names of God signify one thing, and that most simple, nevertheless they are not synonyms, but by diverse notions (*notiones*), or proper concepts (*conceptus*), they signify one and the same thing.

§ 5. Lastly. That diversity of notions, which corresponds to the diverse names of God, involves no falsity; because nothing prevents a thing which is in itself one from being apprehended in various ways, inasmuch as it includes in itself various perfections. Whence although in God, for example, Power (*potentia*), Wisdom (*sapientia*), and Goodness (*bonitas*) are not different things, nevertheless we conceive the Divine Nature in one way and in another by the mind, as it is expressed by those diverse names.

§ II — Multiple division of the Divine names (*Multiplex divisio nominum Divinorum*)

§ 6. The variety of names which are attributed to God (*nomina Divina*) is to be explained by several divisions, the first of which is this. Either they are positive, namely by which something positive is primarily signified. Of

this sort are: God, Good, Eternal, Father, Son. Others are negative, that is, which, signifying the negation of some imperfection, consequently suggest to our thought the opposite perfection, as: Incorporeal, Infinite, Immortal.

§ 7. Second division. Of the Divine names, some are attributed to God properly, some figuratively and by transference. Of the former kind are: God, Just, Wise; of the latter: jealous, lion, rock. To this belong also those words which are transferred from human parts and members to signify certain properties of God, of which kind are: soul, mouth, eyes, arms, hands. The rationale and signification of all these in God St. John Damascene sets forth at length in book 1 of *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 4.⁴ On which there is also an entire Treatise (among the works of St. Jerome, under the title *De membris Dei*), although, as regards the author, it is pseudepigraphal.⁵

§ 8. But we say that certain names are attributed to God properly, not because by a proper and adequate concept they represent to us the Nature of God: for this, as we have already said, cannot be done; for which reason St. Augustine also denied that anything can be properly enunciated of God by the mouth of man, in book five of *De Trinitate*, ch. 10.⁶ But because they are attributed to God simply and without trope; of which sort for the most part are those which, while they befit creatures imperfectly, most perfectly befit God, such as these: Good, Just, Wise, Powerful. Which in a certain sense Scripture teaches to belong to God alone.

§ 9. Third: Of the Divine names some are absolute (*absoluta*), others relative (*relativa*). Absolute indeed are those whose signification does not consist in relation to another, but, as St. Augustine says in book five of *De Trinitate*, ch. 8, they are of such sort as to be said "to-self" (*ad se*).⁷ Hence they are attributed to God substantially, as: God, Great, Powerful. Relative, however, are those which designate reference to another, whether that other be a Divine Person or a creature, as: Father, Son, Governor, Creator. On this division something too was said at Dist. 4 above.

§ 10. Fourth: Of relative names, some are proper to one Person, as Father, Son; others belong to two only, as "breathing" (*spirans*) to the Father and the Son; "proceeding" (*procedens*), "sent" (*missus*), to the Son and the Holy Spirit; others are common to the three, as Creator, Lord.

§ 11. Fifth. Of the names of God, some are from eternity, others from time. Of the former kind are: God the Father, the Omnipotent; of the latter: Creator, Lord, Refuge.

§ 12. Sixth—of which also something was said at Dist. 4. Of the Divine names, some are concrete (*concreta*), others abstract (*abstracta*). Now between these, besides the difference set down in that place, this also holds: that abstract names commend the simplicity of the Divine Nature; but concrete names more expressly insinuate personal subsistence. Moreover, as to the extent to which concrete names, enunciated in the plural, can be attributed to the Divine Persons, one must seek it from the things which we said partly at Dist. 4, partly at Dist. 9.

§ 13. Lastly, there is one name of absolute signification which is indeed said of God taken by Himself, yet not taken by Himself of any one of the three Persons, but together and collectively of all, namely, Trinity, as is evident. But what is signified by the name Person will be said immediately.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, the whole question.

2. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* I, ch. 1.

3. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13 [ibidem in source].
4. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 4.
5. [As in source:] Treatise De membris Dei, transmitted among the works of St. Jerome; pseudepigraphal as to authorship.
6. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 10.
7. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 8.

DISTINCTIO XXIII — WHAT IS SIGNIFIED BY THE NAME PERSON (*QUID NOMINE PERSONAE SIGNIFICETUR*)

§ 1. The word Person (*persona*) has this peculiarity, that whereas the other things which are attributed to God as something peculiar either can or ought to be said in the singular number of several Persons taken together, this alone is such that, of several Persons taken together, it can never be predicated in the singular number, but only in the plural. For it is not lawful to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one Person, as [we say that they are] one Lord, one eternal, but [we must say that they are] three Persons. In order that the reason of this may be understood, it must be explained what is signified by the name Person. For the Church of Christ has used this name in matters divine (even before the heresy of the Arians arose, and almost from its own cradle).

§ 2. Thus we read in Tertullian: "For not once, but thrice, at each name, are we dipped into the individual Persons."² Therefore Boethius defines person as "an individual substance of a rational nature";³ but Richard (of St. Victor), in Book 4 (On the Trinity, chs. 18 and 23), says that it is "an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature."⁴ Somewhat also of the character of a definition is had from the fact that St. Ambrose calls the human person "a special man," that is, an individual.⁵

§ 3. In the definition of Boethius—which the Schools for the most part retain—by substance (*substantia*) one must understand some thing subsisting of itself, and complete at that. For the name person does not befit accidents, nor substantial forms; not even the separated soul; as the theologians teach at Distinction five of Book 3, although the Master (of the Sentences) dissents.⁶ And by individual substance understand that which (as Richard more clearly explains by his own definition) is incommunicable, that is, which cannot be communicated to several really distinct [supposits], but is itself distinguished from any other by an incommunicable property.

§ 4. Hence it follows that the Divine essence (*essentia*), considered under its own proper formal character (*ratio*) of Essence, is not a Person. For although in God the essence is really the Person, nevertheless the formal character of Essence is one thing, that of Person another. And Essence as such is in reality communicable; but Person is incommunicable. And again, although the Divine Essence can in a certain sense be called individual, and is rightly so called—since it is neither a genus nor a species, but one thing in number, and, so to speak, singular—thus St. Thomas speaks (I, q. 13, a. 11);⁷ nevertheless, according to the given definition of Person, it cannot be called individual, because it is not incommunicable; for it is communicated to three Persons.

§ 5. What is added in the definition, "of a rational nature," distinguishes person (*persona*) as something more special from a supposit (*suppositum*). For a supposit is an individual substance of any nature whatsoever, as "this horse," "this stone." But the word person is attributed, in the usage of those speaking Latin, only to rational, that is, intellectual, substance, as Richard's definition has it.

§ II — Whether Person signifies Essence or relation (Utrum Persona Essentiam, an relationem significet?)

§ 6. It has long since been a celebrated question: whether this word Person (*persona*) is predicated of God according to substance (*substantia*), or relatively according to relation (*relatio*). The Master (of the Sentences), on the authority of St. Augustine, teaches that it is said according to substance. For St. Augustine writes, book 7 (De Trinitate, ch. 6): "When we say the Person of the Father, nothing else is said than the Substance of the Father." And he proves this by the fact that the Father is called a person with respect to himself (*ad se*), not with respect to the Son or the Holy Spirit.⁹

§ 7. But if Person signifies nothing other than Essence (*essentia*), how then is it said in the plural number, when other words which signify substance, such as "God," "Essence," are not said similarly? Indeed, why is it not permissible to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one Person, just as they are said to be one God and one Essence? Thus he replies in such a way that he seems at times to have shunned this expression, "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Persons," as appears from a certain of his Tractates on John. For, making the adversary ask, "What are three said to be?" he answers nothing else than that he completes "three" by saying "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Elsewhere, however, as in book 5 (De Trinitate, ch. 9) and book 7 (ch. 4 and ch. 6), he indicates that Catholics, driven by a certain necessity, so as not entirely to be silent to heretics asking what "three" they say, when they confess that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three, have kept the word "Person" for this signification—or rather prepared it for that use—that, together with Substance, it might at the same time include property (*proprietas*). For this is what Augustine seems to intend in those places.¹⁰

§ 8. But an objection can be made to this Augustinian reply. If the Divine Person signifies nothing other than Essence, even if Catholics have bent its signification to another sense, namely to designate property, the calumny of the Arians would not on that account be repelled: because they, insisting on the proper signification of the word, would understand the three Persons, which the Catholics would confess, as three Essences. Therefore a truer, and also clearer and more expeditious, reply seems to be this: if, with St. Thomas, we say that Person signifies relation in the manner of substance, that is, absolutely and not relatively to another; or—which comes almost to the same thing—that it signifies Essence, not absolutely, but as it has conjoined to it an individual and incommunicable property, although it signifies that property indistinctly. On this account it comes about that it can be affirmed of many together in the plural number.⁸

§ 9. For when we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Persons, we signify that they are three such realities, each of which is distinct from any other by its own properties. But this word does not signify a bare relation; because, as was rightly said by St. Augustine, "the Father is not called a Person with respect to another," and likewise neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit. Rather, it signifies something subsisting in itself; insofar as it is distinguished from another by some property. Hence, the reason is evident why this word cannot be attributed to several at the same time in the singular number: because such a proposition would signify that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a substance which has one and the same incommunicable and undistinguished property—which is false: because whatever is attributed to the three Persons must be communicable to the same.

§ 10. However, the reasons by which it is taught that Person and Essence do not signify the same thing, together with the reply to objections to the contrary, may be seen below (at Dist. 25).¹¹

§ III — On the Greek words hypostasis and ousia corresponding to the Latin (De Graecis vocabulis hypostasis et usia latinis respondentibus)

§ 11. Just as the Latins, who confess three Persons in God, say that there are three Persons, so too the Greeks say that there are three Hypostases (*hypostasis*); although there is this difference between hypostasis and person (*persona*), that hypostasis can in general be extended to every individual substance (*substantia*), as among the Latins the term supposit (*suppositum*), whereas person is said only of an intellectual substance. Yet it must be known that the usage of this word among the Greek authors has not always been the same. For Jerome writes (in the Epistle to Damasus, whose beginning is: "Quoniam vetusto," etc.) that the whole school of secular letters knew nothing else by hypostasis but ousia (*ousia*); and there he interprets ousia as substance. And accordingly he says that under the word hypostasis—inasmuch as it was used by ecclesiastical men now thus, now otherwise—there lurks poison: to such a degree that he does not dare to confess three Hypostases in God (fearing, namely, from that confession the charge of three substances), unless, with an added exposition, he declare that he understands by "hypostases" "three enypostata," that is, three subsisting persons (*subsistentia, personae*).¹³

§ 12. Furthermore, in the Synod of Alexandria held under Athanasius it was established that there was no need, when the discourse is about God, to employ the words ousia and hypostasis, as Socrates relates in book 3 of the Ecclesiastical History (ch. 5), and Nicephorus in book 10 (ch. 15).¹⁴ And for that time the reason of that decree was this: because among secular authors ousia signified not so much the essence (*essentia*) as the substance, which in Aristotle is the first of the Categories—within which, however, the Divine Essence is not contained. Hypostasis also, if you consider the etymon of the word and express the Latin word from the Greek, signifies nothing other than substance.¹⁵ And therefore the Fathers of the Council of Sardica (which they assert to have been universal) defined: that there is one Hypostasis of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The same was also decreed, as Theodoret attests in the same book (ch. 22), in the Roman Council under Damasus; and there is a like decree of a certain Council of Antioch (in Hilary, in the book *De Synodis*).¹⁶ But it is certain that the Fathers of these Councils understood by the name hypostasis "ousia," or substance: as Theodoret, and they themselves in their own decrees, explain. Nor should this signification of that word seem foreign, since the Apostle in Heb. 1 likewise took it in that way, calling the Son of God "the character of [His] Hypostasis," that is (as our interpreter has translated), "the figure of the Father's Substance"; although Theophylact in that place understood hypostasis to be Person, following in that matter the authority of Gregory of Nyssa, whom he cites.¹⁷

§ 13. Moreover, in this latter signification, in which hypostasis signifies the same as what the Latins call person or supposit, the Greek Fathers already long ago employed that word, not at all doubting to confess three Hypostases in God. First indeed Dionysius the Areopagite (*On the Divine Names*, ch. 1); then Athanasius (in the Symbol); Basil in Epistle 43 (to his brother); Gregory of Nyssa, discoursing on the difference between ousia and hypostasis; Gregory Nazianzen, Sermon 2 (The Epiphany of the Lord); Epiphanius, Heresy 78; Cyril, book 1 (on John, ch. 2); and Damascene, book 1 (*On the Faith*, ch. 9), book 3 (ch. 5), and also in the book *On Logic* (ch. 25, 26), where he makes mention of both significations. Finally, that same usage of this word the Synod of Alexandria, mentioned above, does not disapprove, whenever Catholics have to do with Sabellians denying the distinction of Persons.¹⁸

§ 14. The later Greeks have followed the authority of these men in such wise that by hypostasis in divine matters they understand nothing other than what the Latins call Person—especially since there was not at hand some other word by which they might conveniently and inoffensively express that personal subsistence by which the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished among themselves. As Augustine bears witness, book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 4, 6). For although they call person "prosopon," nevertheless they did not wish to say "three prosopa" in God, lest they should seem to feel something similar to the Anthropomorphites, who assert a human form and members—and it would be most absurd to attribute three faces to the most holy Trinity, as to a three-faced man.¹⁹

§ 15. But as to ousia: although for Aristotle in the Categories that word signifies subsistent substance, nevertheless Christian writers, when discoursing about God, have consistently employed it for essence, which also it properly signifies, if the etymology of the word be considered. Whence in the Council of Nicaea, and thereafter by the whole Church, the Son of God is predicated of the Father as "homoousios," that is, coessential—which the Latins more commonly call consubstantial, as though "of the same substance"; although the word essence is more properly congruous to this signification than substance, which we said—considering the origin of the word—signifies the same as hypostasis. Whence it comes about that even among the Latin Fathers we sometimes read "Substance" put for "Hypostasis," or "Person." For thus Hilary, book 4 (On the Trinity), said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Substances. And in the book De Synodis (from the aforesaid Synod of Antioch) he explains that the three Substances in God are three Subsisting Persons. But that this signification of "substance" was less received among the Latins is argued in the first place by that sentence of Jerome in the Epistle already mentioned (to Damasus): "And who with sacrilegious mouth will proclaim three substances?" Augustine also, book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 9) and book 7 (ch. 4, 6), writes that "essence" and "substance" signify the same thing for the Latins, although the Greek words corresponding to them, ousia and hypostasis, do not signify the same thing for the Greeks when they speak of the ineffable Trinity. Therefore by the time of Augustine it had already prevailed that hypostasis among the Greeks signified person, not substance. But whenever the Latins wished to express hypostasis in their own tongue, so as to offend in nothing, they said "subsistence" rather than "substance"; as one may see in the Exposition of the Creed to Damasus (in Jerome) and elsewhere.²⁰

§ 16. Finally, this too must not be passed over, that Augustine, book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 1), judges that the Latin name "substance" is abusively attributed to God, for the reason that the Divine nature underlies no accident. But the name "essence" is properly attributed to God, because "to be" is most fittingly predicated of God, according to that saying: "Ego sum, qui sum." Now this about "substance" is true to this extent, insofar as regard is had to the etymon of the word, but not as to the proper signification of the word, which very often is established to be different from the etymon.²¹

§ IV — How in the Trinity there is neither diversity nor singularity (Quomodo in Trinitate, nec diversitas sit, nec singularitas)

§ 17. Those who have argued about the Trinity (*Trinitas*) against the Arians teach in such wise that there is in the Divine realities a distinction of persons, yet that they acknowledge no diversity (*diversitas*) there. And in turn they confess such unity of nature (*natura*) as to wish that singularity (*singularitas*) be removed from it. Thus speak Hilary, book 3 (On the Trinity, near the end), book 4 (midway), and book 7 (near the end),

Ambrose, book 1 (On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 2), book 2 (ch. 2), and book 5 (ch. 2), and Augustine, book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 4, 6); nor does the Author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament (in Augustine, q. 122) disagree with them.²³ Now they understood by the name of diversity not any and every distinction taken from anywhere, but only that by which a thing is distinguished according to nature, or at least according to something absolute, as man is diverse from horse, nay, as a white man is from a black man. Singularity, however, the same Fathers interpret as solitude, which, to wit, excludes fellowship. Likewise they understand as singular him who is alone, as it is taken in the little verse of the Psalm: "I am alone until I pass"; and as it is said of Christ the man in Mark 4: "When he was alone, they asked him." Therefore, since in God there is neither solitude, but the most blessed fellowship of three persons, nor again that difference whereby a nature or an absolute property belongs to one which does not belong to another, it is clear in this sense that both diversity, against the Arians, and singularity, against the Sabellians, must be removed from the Most Holy Trinity. But if anywhere the Fathers name singularity in God or diversity, as Isidore said, book 1 (Etymologies, ch. 4), "that unity in God is singular; but the Trinity multiple"; and as it is read somewhere that the Persons in God are diverse; these are suitably to be taken thus: as singular, that which is one and undivided; but as diverse and multiple, that which is distinct. Whence St. Thomas, not simply but with caution, used the name of singularity in the Divine things, saying: "That the substance of God is incommunicable, and—if it be permitted so to speak—singular."²⁴ But concerning this term there also seems to be something to be denied, lest this term, according to the signification which it has among the Logicians, can be used without offense in the Divine things; since it sufficiently appears that the ancients, shunning its use, had regard to another signification, namely that which we have now expounded.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 1.

2. Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean*, ch. 26.

3. Boethius, *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi contra Eutychem et Nestorium*.

4. Richard (of St. Victor), *De Trinitate* IV, chs. 18, 23.

5. St. Ambrose, [source not specified in the text].

6. Cross-reference to Book III, Distinction 5; the Master (of the Sentences) dissenting.

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 11.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 4.

9. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 6.

10. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John* [tractate unspecified in the source]; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 4; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 6.

11. See below at Distinctio 25.

12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 2.

13. St. Jerome, *Epistula ad Damasum* ("Quoniam vetusto...").

14. Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* III, ch. 5; Nicephorus, *Historia ecclesiastica* X, ch. 15.

15. "[Eccl. capit. 8.]" [abbreviation as in source].

16. Council of Sardica, definition: "One hypostasis of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" [as in source]; Theodoret, [reference as in source: "eodem libr. (capit. 22.)"] [abbreviation as in source]; cf. Council of Rome under Damasus.

17. Theophylact, on Heb. 1, following Gregory of Nyssa [as in source].

18. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 1; St. Athanasius, *Symbolum* [as in source]; St. Basil, Ep. 43 (to his brother); St. Gregory of Nyssa, on the difference between ousia and hypostasis [as in source]; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Sermon 2 (Epiphany of the Lord); St. Epiphanius, *Panarion* (Haer. 78); St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem* I, ch. 2; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, ch. 9; III, ch. 5; St. John Damascene, *De logica*, ch. 25–26.
19. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 4, 6.
20. Council of Nicaea; St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IV; St. Hilary, *De synodis*; St. Jerome, *Epistula ad Damasum* (as above); St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 9; VII, ch. 4, 6; *Expositio Symboli ad Damasum* (in St. Jerome); Synod of Antioch (as cited by St. Hilary, *De synodis*).
21. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 1; cf. Exod. 3:14: "Ego sum, qui sum."
22. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 2.
23. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* III (near the end); IV (midway); VII (near the end); St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* I, ch. 2; II, ch. 2; V, ch. 2; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 4, 6; *Auctor quaestionum veteris et novi Testamenti*, in St. Augustine, *quaest.* 122.
24. St. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* I, ch. 4; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a. 11.

DISTINCTIO XXIV — ON HOW UNITY AND NUMBER ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE DIVINE (*UNITAS ET NUMERUS QUOMODO ACCIPIENDA IN DIVINIS*)

§ 1. When in the divine we name unity, duality, Trinity, saying: one Father, one Son; two spirating, two proceeding; three persons, three creating, three sanctifying; it is commonly asked how these are to be taken in God. For it seems that the Master feels that the use of these words in the divine has been introduced rather to remove and exclude something from the simplicity of the Deity than to posit anything. But without doubt one must answer that unity is properly in God, nay rather that also the number signified by these words, "two, three, duality, Trinity," is in God. For truly and properly there is one God; two are the Father and the Son; three are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For neither did Moses speak improperly when he said: Deut. 6, "Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster Deus unus est"; nor the Apostle John when he said: "Tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in Celo, &c." But just as that number is not to be understood as in God which the dialecticians place in the predicament of quantity, namely that which is born from the division of the continuous, so neither is the unity which is the principle of this number to be understood as that which belongs to the predicament of quality—no more, indeed much less, than the wisdom or power which we attribute to God. For it is certain that none of those things which are placed in the predicaments belongs to God, and least of all anything of those things which follow upon the extension or division of quantity; but neither is unity or number of such a kind to be ascribed to God as is acknowledged in spiritual and incorporeal creatures, which are devoid of all quantity. For although the unity of this sort is something transcendent (as has been seen), nevertheless by reason of the subject thing it designates its nature as limited and set outside other things. On this account, in the case of several such things, or multiplied, there also arises a transcendent number, according to which one thing is understood as distinguished from another by nature or by qualities. But the unity attributed to God, although it is like transcendent unity inasmuch as it does not superadd any form to God, nevertheless does not in God signify anything as limited, but, over and above the formal character of being, only adds the negation of multitude, signifying, namely, an undivided being; just as also the number in God does indeed signify a real distinction of several among themselves, yet not so that those several are understood as distinguished by nature or by qualities, and each as if circumscribed by its own limits.

§ 2. From these things therefore it is evident that both unity and number in the divine not only remove something, but in truth posit something; namely the very thing signified by those words. But just as wisdom, although it posits something in God, is nevertheless in reality not other than the essence of God, so must one think concerning unity and number. For unity in God is not other than the nature or the person which is said to be one. And duality or Trinity is not other than the persons which are said to be two or three. Whence in this respect unity and number in the divine agree with transcendent unity and number in creatures.

§ 3. Moreover, as to what Hilary says in the book *On the Synods*, explaining the formula of the faith issued in the Council of Sardica, namely that "the divine substance rejects number," this is to be referred not to the persons but to the nature; Hilary himself declares this, repeating the words by which that Synod anathematizes those who said that there are three Gods.² In the same way Ambrose seems to be to be understood,³ Prudentius,⁴ and Boethius—whose words the Master recites⁵—although others interpret them as having spoken of numerical quantity, by which they would only have wished to remove from the divine what is discontinuous and, after the manner of bodily things, discrete. Although the former reply seems more to be according to the mind of the authors.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 30, a. 3; I, q. 11, a. 1.

2. St. Hilary, *De synodis*; on the Sardican creed.

3. St. Ambrose, *De fide* I, ch. 8; *De Spiritu Sancto* III, ch. 14.

4. Prudentius, *Hamartigenia*.

5. Boethius, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 3; cited by the Master, *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, § 1.

DISTINCTIO XXV — THAT "PERSON" AND "ESSENCE" DO NOT SIGNIFY THE SAME (*DE SIGNIFICATIONE PERSONAE ET ESSENTIAE*)

§ I — Reasons by which it is taught that person and essence do not signify the same (Rationes quibus docetur personam, & essentiam non idem significare)

§ 1. Besides those things which have been said (at Dist. 23) concerning the signification of this word "Person" (*Persona*), the Master, treating in the following the argument of this same question, again tries to persuade that "person" (*persona*) signifies the same as "essence" (*essentia*) if it is said in the singular number (for he admits that in the plural number not the nature, but the subsistences or hypostases are designated); by several reasons it must be shown that by that word, whether it has been expressed in the singular or in the plural number, it is not essence that is signified, but that which a little while ago was explained by us by a definition.

§ 2. First reason. If "person" signifies nothing other than essence, then, since there is one essence in God, there will likewise be one person.

§ 3. Second. The name "person," as it is employed among human realities, never signifies essence. For if one be asked what Paul is, he will answer "a person" ineptly; therefore neither among divine realities does it signify essence, since this name, like almost all the others, have been employed, according to a certain analogy, with the same signification among human and among divine realities: as "Father," "Son," "good," "wise." Hence also if one be asked what the Father is, it will not aptly be answered "a person," but "God"; for by that question someone will want to investigate the essence of the Father among divine realities.

§ 4. Third. "Person" among the Latins signifies what hypostasis (*hypostasis*) does among the Greeks, according to that signification which is frequented in usage by ecclesiastical writers, about which (at Dist. 23). But in that way it is established that hypostasis (*hypostasis*) and essence (*ousia*) are of diverse signification, as we showed there; therefore also for the Latins "person" signifies something other than "essence."

§ 5. Fourth. In Christ one thing is "person," another "essence." For the Catholic Church confesses a single person in Christ, two essences, or natures; therefore "person," even in the singular number, does not signify the same as "essence."

§ II — Reply to the reasons on the contrary (Respondetur ad rationes in contrarium)

§ 6. They object against the foregoing doctrine, first, on the ground of what is common to the three: for both the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person; and in this case "person" always

signifies the same; but nothing besides essence is common to the three; therefore "person" signifies essence. This reason is taken from St. Augustine, book 7 (De Trinitate, ch. 4),³ where, however, he does not expressly teach that "person" signifies the same as "essence," but, disputing and doubting rather than defining, he ventilates that question, as we shall explain more fully below (Dist. 33). Therefore one must answer that nothing besides essence is common to the three according to the thing, but that something else can be common to the three only according to the concept (the formal character, *ratio*); of which sort is "to be a person." This matter is easily understood from logical genera and species, each of which is common to several individuals only according to the concept, as "man" to Peter, Paul, Anthony. Whence, just as of each of these individually it is said that he is a man, but of the three together it is not said that they are one man, but that they are three men: so of each of the three among divine realities individually it is truly said that he is a person; but of the three together it cannot be said that they are one person, but three persons. And if "man," according to the thing, were common to three singulars, as "God" is to the three persons, then just as the three persons are called one God, so those three singulars would be called one man. But that "person," considering the whole of its signification, is not something common to the three according to the thing, but only according to the concept, is clear; because "person" (*persona*) in its signification includes an incommunicable property; but "to have an incommunicable property" is common to the three not according to the thing, but according to the concept; because they do not all have the same property, but each his own.

§ 7. They object again. "Person" is not other than "essence," but the very same thing, as St. Augustine teaches in book 7 (De Trinitate, ch. 6);⁴ therefore "person" signifies the same as "essence." It is answered that this does not follow, just as neither does this: "The Father is not other than essence; therefore 'Father' signifies essence." For although whatever is in God is essence, nevertheless not whatever is attributed to God signifies essence. For one must distinguish the attribution of words from their signification, as is manifest from Dialectic. Here, if you ask whether "person" at least signifies essence in that way in which "wisdom" and "goodness" signify essence in God, a negative answer must be given. For these, and other things of this sort, signify that which is common to the three according to the thing; and therefore it must be held that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one wisdom (*sapientia*), one goodness (*bonitas*), not three wisdoms, goodnesses. But "person" signifies that which is common to the three only according to the concept, as was declared a little before.

§ 8. Another objection. Since the Catholics confessed that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, when the Arians asked, "Three what?" the "what"-question seeks the essence; therefore what was returned to that question, namely "Person," signified the essence. We answer that the Arians by that question did not ask about the essence, but only wished to press the Catholics to utter and to designate a substantive of that adjective "three"; supposing, forsooth, that nothing else could be answered by them except "three Gods," or "three essences." Pressed by that importunity of theirs, the Catholics not inaptly answered "three Persons" or "Hypostases" (*hypostases*), according to the signification of those words explained above.

§ III — How "thing" and "being" are taken in divine matters (Res, et ens in divinis quomodo sumuntur)

§ 9. These two words, "thing" (*res*) and "being" (*ens*), among Catholic writers treating of the Trinity, are for the most part taken in such wise that they signify only the essence (*essentia*). Whence it is taught by them that

the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one thing, and one being, not several things or several beings. This is evident from the fact that, when the Arians asked, "What three?" or "What three things?" (*quid tres? aut quid tria?*), the Catholics were unwilling to answer, "three things," or "three beings," or "three beings (in the neuter)," although that answer seemed most ready to hand. For they feared lest by a reply of that sort they would seem to have admitted three essences in God.

§ 10. Nevertheless, sometimes these same words, where the discourse is about the Trinity, are taken transcendentally, so that by the breadth of their signification they include both relation (*relatio*) and substance (*substantia*). And in this way St. Augustine, book 1 (*De doctrina christiana*, chs. 3 and 5), says that, in the plural number, the things to be enjoyed are the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; yet he subjoins that the same Trinity is one supreme thing. To this, too, is to be referred what the same Augustine, book 7 (*De Trinitate*, chs. 4 and 6), writes: that there are in the Trinity not only three in the personal kind, but also certain three things; and he repeats this in succession, affirming that Sabellius fell into heresy because he denied that. So also against that same Sabellius Prudentius (in the Preface of the Apotheosis) sang: "Est tria summa Deus." Those three, moreover, we not inaptly supply by the transcendent word "beings" (*entia*), nor indeed can we conveniently supply them otherwise. In the same sense, it is written also by St. John Damascene, book 3 (*De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 5), that in the Deity one nature and three hypostases are to be confessed as existing according to truth. Nor is this surprising, since whether in the singular number a proposition is thus resolved, it is so resolved that "being" is made the predicate in the corresponding number. For just as this proposition, "God is," is thus resolved: "God [is] a being" (*Deus ens*), so this one, "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are," is resolved in this way: "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are beings (*entes*), or beings (*entia*)."

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 2.
 2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 29, a. 2–4.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 4.
 4. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 6.
 5. Bañez, *In Iam partem S. Thomae*, q. 19, a. 3.
 6. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, ch. 3, 5.
 7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 4, 6.
 8. Prudentius, *Praefatio*, Apotheosis.
 9. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, ch. 5.

DISTINCTIO XXVI — ON WHAT THE NOTIONS AND PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE (QUAE SINT DIVINARUM PERSONARUM NOTIONES, ET PROPRIETATES?)

§ 1. Among those names which are attributed to God, there are some which are called by the scholastic theologians notional (*notionalia*), and the things signified by those names are wont by the same to be called notions (*notiones*). For a notional name (*nomen notionale*) is that by which some Divine person (*persona divina*), and his distinction from another or others, becomes known to us. And indeed St. Augustine, before the Scholastics, used the word notion (*notio*) in this signification in book 5 of the Trinity, ch. 6, when he says: that there is one notion of the Father, by which He is understood as begetter, another by which as unbegotten.² Now there are five names of this kind in number, namely: Innascibility (*innascibilitas*), Paternity (*paternitas*), Filiation (*filiatio*), Spiration (*spiratio*), and Procession (*processio*). All of which, except innascibility, signify a relation (*relatio*) or respect of the persons among themselves.

§ 2. And again, among those which signify a respect, these three, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession (understand this as specially so called), each agree only with single persons: Paternity with the Father, Filiation with the Son, Procession with the Holy Spirit, which is also called passive spiration (*spiratio passiva*). Hence, most properly, these three alone are called personal properties (*proprietas personales*). Of which St. John Damascene says in book 2 of the Orthodox Faith, ch. 5: "We recognize the difference of the hypostases or persons in three properties, that is, the paternal, and the filial, and the processional."³

§ 3. Now because from the account of origin (*origo*) the discrimination of the persons among themselves must be sought, it is necessary that one of the three persons have an origin from the other two as from one principle. Whence that notion results which belongs to two persons, and in ordinary speech is called spiration, belonging equally to the Father and the Son, and having regard to the Holy Spirit proceeding from both. For if the Father and the Son were distinct principles of the Holy Spirit, a great absurdity would follow, namely that in the Holy Spirit there would be two persons by reason of the plurality of origin—since, to wit, the opposed relation would be multiplied.

§ 4. But if someone, in order to avoid this inconvenience, with the Greeks should deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it will follow for him to confess that the Holy Spirit is not personally distinct from the Son. For persons are distinguished according to opposed relations, consequent upon the origin of one from another. Which account of distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to the said opinion, will not be able to stand, as has been more fully demonstrated at Distinction 11. Therefore, since active spiration is not proper to one person but common to two, it follows that it is indeed a personal notion, yet not a personal property. For we say that personal properties are incommunicable. Finally, as regards innascibility, it

must be known that the Father, by this, that He is from no one, that is, lacking origin, is indeed distinguished from the other persons, yet has no respect to them; as St. Augustine teaches in book 5 of the Trinity, chs. 6 and 7.⁴ And from this there arises that notion which they call innascibility, fitting indeed to the Father alone, yet importing no relation. For which reason it falls short of the condition of those personal properties which we have said are most properly so called. From what has been said, one may observe the following order of the five personal notions with respect to the persons themselves: that three belong to the Father—Innascibility, Paternity, Spiration; two to the Son—Spiration, Filiation; one to the Holy Spirit, namely Procession.

§ II — A reply to certain doubts (Ad dubia quaedam responsio.)

§ 5. Since it has been said that active spiration (*spiratio activa*), which, being common to two—namely to the Father and to the Son—distinguishes them from the Holy Spirit, is one of the personal notions (*notiones personales*), someone may reasonably doubt why likewise Procession taken generally (*processio* generaliter sumpta), which indeed is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit, but distinguishes them from the Father, is not added to the number of the notions. Then the same can be asked concerning Innascibility (*innascibilitas*), by which nativity strictly taken is denied, and which is common to the Father and the Holy Spirit, distinguishing them from the Son, who alone is begotten.⁶ Thirdly, concerning Improcessibility or Inspirability (*improcessibilitas sive inspirabilitas*), by which, namely, Procession specially so called is denied—this is therefore common to the Father and the Son, distinguishing them from the Holy Spirit. Namely, active production (*productio activa*) is denied, which therefore is proper to the Holy Spirit, distinguishing him from the Father and the Son.

§ 6. To the first doubt it is answered: that Procession taken generally is therefore not to be reckoned among the notions, because it is not something in reality common to two, by which they are distinguished from a third, but only according to the concept; whereas active spiration is in reality common to the Father and the Son. With which answer there agrees the solution of St. Thomas, wherein he says that the Son and the Holy Spirit do not agree in one special mode of existing from the Father in the way that the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Spirit; but that that which is the principle of coming-to-be-known ought to be something special...

§ 7. To the second it is answered that Innascibility ought not to be numbered among the notions, except insofar as it pertains to the dignity of that person which is made known from it. Thus Innascibility is attributed to the Father, inasmuch as He exists from no other. Whence He is understood to be a principle without a principle. But it does not so belong to the Holy Spirit, in whom it only negates nativity.

§ 8. To the third one must say that Improcessibility, according to that which of dignity can be understood in that word, is contained in one notion among the five said above, namely in active spiration. For because spiration belongs to the Father and to the Son, therefore procession is denied of them.

§ 9. To the last there is a reply like to the second. For since the name Person, as St. Thomas says, imports dignity, there cannot be taken any notion of the Holy Spirit from this, that no person is from Him. For this does not pertain to His dignity, as it pertains to the authority of the Father that He is from no one. So he (I, q. 32, a. 3), in which question he expressly disputes concerning the notions of the three persons in God.⁷

§ III — What is said of God according to substance, and by which relations the persons are distinguished... (Quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicantur, & quibus relationibus personae distinguantur...)

§ 10. Because the Fathers teach that very many names of God are said according to substance (*substantia*), one must not think that there are certain other things which are said of God according to accident (*accidens*); since it must be held with most certain faith that there is no accident in God, and so whatever is in God is His substance. But those things which are predicated of God according to substance are common to the persons (*personae*), and are predicated of the same absolutely. For the essence (*essentia*) of any thing is absolute. Whence St. Augustine in Book 5 (De Trinitate, chs. 4–5) teaches that those things which are said of God according to substance are not opposed to those which are said of God according to accident—since there is nothing of that sort—but to those which are said relatively, that is, to something (*ad aliquid*). For these, since they signify opposed relations (*relationes*) in the Divine things, consequently distinguish the persons among themselves.⁹ For every distinction in the Divine things, as has been shown elsewhere, ought not to be sought from the substance which is common, but from the opposed relations. But understand this of those relations which are completed within the Trinity (*Trinitas*) itself and are not terminated outwardly, and which are real (*reales*) and not only of reason (*rationis tantum*). For those which are terminated outwardly are common to the three persons, and their opposed relations have their subjects in creatures. Of this sort are the relations signified by these words: Creator, creature; Lord, servant. Now whatever relations are of this sort, namely of God Himself to creatures, are not really in God, although the relations opposed to them are really in creatures: as St. Thomas teaches.¹⁰

§ 11. Certain relations, however, are completed and terminated within the Trinity itself, as are those signified by these words: one understanding and the understood; one willing and the willed; one loving and the loved; likewise Equality and Likeness, etc. Yet by these the distinction of the persons is not taken; because, absolutely speaking, they are not real relations, but only of reason; just as is the relation of the same to the same. St. Thomas teaches this.¹¹

§ 12. IV. That in Scripture men are called sons of God in many ways. The name Son in the Sacred Scriptures is taken variously, and is extended to many things.¹² Properly a Son is said of one who has origin from another by way of properly so-called generation, that is, who has proceeded from another as from a living conjoined principle, according to the formal character of likeness. And this is said more, and more commonly, in a rational or intellectual nature than in other living things. Now this agrees most properly with the Son of God, who received by generation from the Father the very same nature in number which is in the Father. And hence also among us a son is so called on account of the likeness of nature received by generation; yet less perfectly than the Son of God; because they do not receive numerically the same nature as their parents, but only specifically corresponding to it; and therefore they are not in all respects like to them. From this signification of son, the other significations of this word have been analogically derived. Whence it comes about that for various and manifold causes men also have been called sons of God in the Scriptures. And the modes of this appellation, in an order of imperfection, can be enumerated thus.

§ 13. First. They are called sons of God on account of creation, as in Deut. 32: "Is he not thy Father, who made and created thee?" And this is extended also to other created things, as in Job 38: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Second. Angels and men are called sons of God on account of the

image of God imprinted upon them in creation, even if it be deformed by sin. Whence in Lk. 15 the prodigal son did not lose the name of son. Likewise in Exod. 4, when the Lord says: "Israel is my first-born son," He signifies also that the other men are His sons; but Israel, by the privilege of benefits, prior to them. To this pertains also Is. 1: "I have brought up children and exalted them, but they have despised me." Third. On account of the worship of the true God, as in Gen. 6: "The sons of God, seeing the daughters of men." And for this reason all the faithful say without falsehood in the Lord's Prayer: "Our Father who art in heaven." Fourth. On account of judicial power, although attributed even to evil men, as in Ps. 81: "I have said, You are gods, and all of you the sons of the Most High." Fifth. On account of the likeness of God, which consists in the rectitude of mind, that is, in charity (*caritas*) and in other virtues. Whence that saying in Matt. 5: "That you may be the sons of your Father who is in heaven." And: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God." Hence too the Apostle bears witness that we cry in the spirit of the adoption of sons, "Abba, Father" (Rom. 8); and another Apostle, 1 Jn. 3: "The Father has given us charity, that we should be called and should be the sons of God." For this same reason sanctified men are called the brothers of the only Son of God, namely by the right of adoption; according to that saying in Ps. 21 and Heb. 2: "I will declare thy name to my brothers." Sixth. On account of election unto eternal life. For thus this name is taken in Jn. 12, when it is said: "That he might gather together into one the sons of God that were dispersed." Lastly. On account of the perfect assimilation with God, which is in the blessed. Whence also, in Lk. 20, concerning blessed men it is said thus: "They are the sons of God, since they are the sons of the resurrection." And in Wis. 5: "Behold how they are numbered among the sons of God." And this last mode, among those which are attributed to creatures, is highest and most perfect; as being nearer than the others to the ineffable mode according to which that Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, is called the Son of God; to whom alone it remains proper to be by nature the Son of God; and so proper that it is impossible that it be communicated to another. And this is signified (Ps. 88), when of those to whom this last mode of sonship—more perfect than all the rest—belongs, it is said: "Who shall be like to God among the sons of God?"

§ 14. Whether the same Son of God, insofar as He is man, can be called the adoptive Son of God is disputed expressly (at Distinction 10 of Book 3).¹³ Furthermore, by the same reason by which God is called the Father of men and men the sons of God, nothing forbids that the Trinity and any Person whatsoever in the Trinity be called the Father of men and men His sons; as St. Augustine sufficiently indicates in Book 5 (De Trinitate, ch. 11).¹⁴ This very point (from the testimonies of Scripture just adduced, and also from the reasons of the several modes of this appellation) is easily proved: for men are called the sons of God on account of creation, but the work of creation is common to the three Persons; it follows that men can be said, on this ground, to be the sons of the whole Trinity and of any one Person whatsoever; and so in the other modes too. Whence also when we say: "Our Father who art in heaven," we address not the Father alone in the Deity, but the whole Trinity.

1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 32, a. 2–4.

2. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 6.

3. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa II, ch. 5.

4. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, chs. 6–7.

5. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, [ibidem as in source].

6. "S. Thom. 1. par. 9. 33.art. 1.4.ad 1." [abbreviation as in source]
7. "1.9.32. art. 3." [abbreviation as in source]
8. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 2.
9. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, chs. 4–5.
10. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 40, a. 2; q. 28.
11. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 28, a. 4, ad 4; q. 42, a. 1, ad 4.
12. "S. Thom. 1. p. 9. 27. art. 2. 1" [abbreviation as in source].
13. "ad Distinct. 10. lib. 3." [as in source]
14. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 11.

DISTINCTIO XXVII — ON THE ORDER BETWEEN BEING SON AND BEING BEGOTTEN (*FILIUM ESSE, ET GENITUM ESSE, QUO ORDINE SE HABEANT*)

§ 1. The personal properties (*proprietas personales*) set down by St. Hilary (De Trinitate, where he says: "it is always proper to the Father that He is always Father, and it is always proper to the Son that He is always Son"—and the same is to be understood of the Holy Spirit) differ from those properties which Fulgentius (whom the Master, under Augustine's title, cites in the book De fide ad Petrum, chs. 1–2) enumerates, namely "to have begotten," "to be begotten," and "to proceed," in no other way than this: that the properties posited by Fulgentius insinuate to us more the notional acts (*actus notionales*), in which the relations (*relationes*) are founded; whereas those designated by Hilary signify more expressly the relations themselves.² Accordingly, to the question which the Master raises: whether it should rather be said, "he is begotten because he is Son," or "he is Son because he is begotten," it is answered: although in the thing itself the same is signified by these words, "Son" and "begotten," nevertheless, on account of the diversity of the formal character (*ratio*) and the order of our apprehension, it should rather be said that he is Son because he is begotten than the contrary; because, in the order of nature, we first conceive by the mind some act, than the relation consequent upon that act and founded upon it. For the foundation (*fundamentum*) is, in order, prior to the relation founded upon it. Wherefore likewise it must be said that the Father is because he begot, and that the Holy Spirit is because he proceeded, if you understand a relation in the name "Holy Spirit." But if, in the words "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit," we look not so much to the relations as to the persons (*personae*) distinguished by relations, the case of the three will not be alike. For the properties of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are understood prior in origin (*origo*) to the very persons; because nativity (*nativitas*) and procession (*processio*) are understood as a certain way, in order that the persons may be. On the contrary, however, the person of the Father is understood prior to his property. For, in the order of our intellect, it is prior that a thing be, than that it beget, or in general act anything. And in agreement with these are the things which St. Thomas teaches when treating this question: whether the notional acts are understood beforehand with respect to the properties.¹ Nor is what has been said impeded by what St. Augustine says, De Trinitate V, ch. 7: that therefore the Son is, because begotten, and again therefore begotten because Son, for the reason that the same thing is signified by either word. For he understands this in the thing itself, not, however, by the formal character or the mode of signifying. And because the thing is the same, he rightly teaches that each is gathered from the other by necessity of consequence; whatever may be the case as to the order of our understanding, about which Augustine is not treating there.³

§ II — The appellation "Word" in the Divine, whence it is taken (Verbi appellatio in Divinis, unde accepta)

§ 2. These words "Begetter" (*Genitor*), "Begotten" (*Genitus*), "Word" (*Verbum*), "Image" (*Imago*) signify personal properties (*proprietas personales*), yet not different from those spoken of above. For the first designates paternity (*Paternitas*), the remaining three designate filiation (*Filiatio*). But since the last two, "Word" and "Image," have some difficulty, it will be necessary to speak somewhat more fully.

The name "Word" is attributed in many places to the Son of God, but most excellently at the beginning of the Gospel of John: "In principio erat Verbum; et Verbum erat apud Deum, Deus erat Verbum." And again: "Et Verbum caro factum est," etc. Nor less plainly does the same John attribute the name "Word" to the Son of God, when in 1 John 5, in the enumeration of the divine persons (*personae*), he put "the Word" in the second place: "Tres sunt, inquit, qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus." And in Rev. 19, of the Son of God he thus wrote: "Vocatur nomen ejus Verbum Dei." This appellation, moreover, is taken from the human word, from the cognition (*cognitio*) of which we are, as it were, to be led by the hand to the cognition of that most hidden divine Word, just as St. Augustine teaches us, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 10.⁵ Origen also treats at very great length of this name (tome 1 on John);⁶ yet not so, however, that he seems, as Augustine does, to have attained the true account of the appellation taken from the analogy of the human word.

§ 3. Therefore the human word is twofold, namely external and internal: the external, which sounds outside; the internal, which, laid up within the mind, represents some thing. And the internal indeed is more principal, as the cause of the external; just as in turn the external is the sign (*signum*) of the internal, because, as the Philosopher rightly teaches (*On Interpretation*), "the things that are in voice are signs of those conceptions which are in the soul."⁷ And these conceptions are certain natural likenesses of things; and therefore they are to be called words with a more perfect formal character than those which are brought forth by the mouth—which have that they signify only by human institution. To the internal word (*verbum internum*) pertains the fact that Scripture very often calls those who are thinking "speaking" or "saying," as in the Psalms: "Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus"; and Wis. 5: "Dicentes intra se poenitentiam agentes"; and other suchlike. For no one brings forth anything by voice in order to make it manifest to others, which he has not previously spoken to himself in his heart. Whence also the discipline of Logic is rightly believed to be named rather from reason (*ratio*), as it were from the word of the mind, than from the outwardly sounding speech, so that it is called not the science "sermonical" (*sermocinalis*), but "rational" (*rationalis*). Therefore, whoever can understand this internal word, says Augustine (in the place mentioned), can already "through this mirror and in this enigma see some likeness of that Word of which it is said: 'In principio erat Verbum,'" etc. And the same a little after, indicating a description of the internal word, says: "A thought formed from the thing which we know is the word which we say in the heart."⁸

What "logos" is in Greek and how it is to be rendered in Latin (*Quid Graece logos & quomodo Latine reddendum...*)⁴

§ 4. Wherever Scripture calls the Son of God "Word," in Greek it is *logos*. One must know, however, that the signification of this Greek word extends more broadly than that of "word" among Latins. For it signifies both "reason" (*ratio*), and "definition" (*definitio*), and "computation" (*supputatio*), and many other things; yet its principal signification is "word" or "discourse" (*sermo*). And to this, indeed, the rest of its significations can

easily be reduced. And on account of this generality of its signification, Lactantius, Divine Institutions IV, ch. 9, judges that the Greeks more fittingly say *logos* than we "verbum" or "sermo."⁸ And St. Jerome, in the letter to Paulinus (which is On All the Books of Divine History, ch. 4), after he has enumerated several significations of the Greek term, adds that all those can rightly be understood in Christ.⁹ Furthermore, there are those who would prefer to render the Greek term as "reason" (*ratio*), as Filelphus admits (vol. 2 of the Letters, book 6, letter 1), and certain other more recent writers; in which way also Bishop Evodius, in a certain letter to Augustine (which is among Augustine's letters under number 246), is found to have gladly spoken. But this is less correct, because the Latin word "ratio" renders much less the generality of the Greek word than does "verbum." Wherefore Augustine (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 63) simply affirms that we render more correctly "verbum" than "ratio."¹⁰

Now indeed it does not matter much whether you render it "Word" (*Verbum*) or "Discourse" (*sermo*), since even the Vulgate translator himself indifferently renders either term in different places. For that which in John 1, and 1 John 1 and the last, and Rev. 19, he renders "Verbum," that in other places, in which by many the Son of God is equally understood—such as Jn. 17, Heb. 4, Wis. 18—he renders "sermo." The ancients too frequently said "sermo" for "verbum." For St. Cyprian, book 2 (Against the Jews, chs. 3, 5), recites in this way the beginning of the Gospel according to John: "In principio fuit sermo, et sermo fuit apud Deum," etc.¹¹ But St. Hilary, books 2 and 12 (On the Trinity), and St. Ambrose, the book On the Faith (Against the Arians, ch. 2), call the Son of God now "verbum," now "sermo," as if there were no difference between these two.¹² St. Jerome also, on Eph. 1, and Lactantius, Divine Institutions IV (chs. 8, 9), made use of the term "sermo."¹³ Finally, Augustine, Tractate 108 on John, on that text "Sermo tuus veritas est," thus teaches: that each of these words can be rendered from the Greek; so namely that to some it seems more correct to render "Verbum" than "sermo," because "sermo" for the most part does not signify a single word, but a discourse made up of many words; whereas "verbum" for the most part is understood in a single word. Whence the appellation "Word" seems to befit that most simple word of God rather than if it be called "Discourse." Although one must altogether admit that the signification of the Greek word *logos* can by no Latin expression be rendered either properly enough or fully.¹⁴

§ IV — In what respects the Divine and the human word agree (In quibus consentiant verbum Divinum & humanum)

§ 5. That from the human word we may be led into the knowledge of the Word of God (*verbum*), the things in which these two agree with one another must be considered. For the appellation of the one from the other has been made on account of the likeness of the one with the other. Therefore, first, they agree in this: that just as our word proceeds from the mind, so to the Son of God, by the formal character (*ratio*) of a word, it befits that He proceed from the Father. Second, just as the internal word—even if it has come forth from the mind—nevertheless remains intimately in the mind itself, nor can it be separated from it, so the Son of God, proceeding from the Father, remains most inwardly in Him, nor is He at all separable from Him. Third, just as our mind produces its word without any injury, division, or diminution of itself, so the Father brings forth from Himself the Son without any passion, or at all any change whatsoever of Himself. Fourth, just as the word of our mind, by which it understands itself, is the perfect image (*imago*) of the mind itself, so the Son of God is the perfect image of the Father. Fifth, just as the mind in its word, as in an image, sees not only itself but also things other than itself, so the Father in the Son, as in His word and image, most perfectly beholds

not Himself alone, but also all created things. Sixth, just as the internal word among men is manifested through the external word, so the eternal Word of God—most inward to the Father—made itself known to men through creatures as proclaiming the glory of God (Ps. 18), but most especially through the voices of the Prophets before Christ's advent, as through certain external and sounding words of God, and most of all through the word of the assumed humanity. Seventh, just as the internal word is, as it were, put on and clothed with the external word, so the Wisdom of the Father clothed Himself with human flesh as with a certain external word, that He might appear visible to men, and that through it divine secrets might become known to men. Lastly, just as any architect, by the word conceived in mind as the idea of his work, effects the work itself outwardly, so the Father by His Word, as by an idea, founded every creature, according to Jn. 1: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt," and Prov. 8: "Cum eo eram cuncta componens."

§ 6. The reasons of the comparison between the Word of God and the word of man now enumerated may be taken from various places of the Fathers. For St. Basil, in the homily on the beginning of the Gospel according to John, St. Gregory Nazianzen, book 4 (of the Theological Orations), St. Jerome at the beginning of the exposition of Ps. 44, St. Augustine in the book On Faith and the Creed, on that clause, "Et in Filium ejus unicum," teach that the Son of God is called λόγος, or Word, because He is, as it were, an offspring and a certain conception of the paternal mind.¹⁶ Besides these, Nazianzen also teaches for this reason that Christ is called λόγος, because He is the definition and demonstration of the Father, according to Jn. 1: "Unigenitus Filius, qui est in sinu Patris, ipse enarravit." He is also called by Jerome in the Epistle to Paulinus, ch. 4, λόγος, that is, computation, whereby namely out of many one sum is gathered together; both because "in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi" (Col. 2), and because, as Jerome himself explains on Eph. 1, in Christ all things are recapitulated, and, as it were, the prophecies of the Prophets are reduced into a sum.¹⁷ But that the Son of God is the Father's practical or operative word, such as is the idea in the mind of an artisan, Augustine teaches in Question 63 of the Eighty-three Questions, and in the book Against the Discourse of the Arians, ch. 3, and before him Tertullian in the Apologeticum against the Gentiles, ch. 21.¹⁸ In a special way, however, the incarnate Son of God is an operative word, inasmuch as through His grace (*gratia*) working in us there are done by us all good works that look to piety and salvation, as He Himself said to His own, Jn. 15: "Sine me nihil potestis facere."

§ V — In what respects the Divine Word differs from the human (In quibus discrepet verbum Divinum ab humano)

§ 7. Although in many respects the Divine Word (*verbum Divinum*) agrees with the human word (*verbum humanum*), nonetheless, conversely, it differs in some. For it cannot come about that anything pertaining to the divine reality should be found in created things that is in all respects similar to it. Moreover, this dissimilarity is therefore to be noted, so that, with the [human] word removed, which on account of its imperfection is dissimilar to it, we may more surely perceive the perfection and preeminence of this same Divine Word. The first dissimilarity, then, is that the word of a man is an accident (*accidens*), even in relation to the mind itself, and accordingly is very imperfect even among creatures themselves. But the Word of God is the very essence (*essentia*) of God, which is common to the Father and the Son. The second: that the word of man is not coeval with the mind, but at one time arises and exists in the mind, at another time dies and vanishes; but the Word of God is coeternal with the Father. The third: that the human mind, for various things both to be conceived and to be effected, needs various and multiple, and sometimes composite, words;

because a single notion of the mind cannot represent many things, and much less all things. But the Divine Mind understands and works all things by one and the same most simple word. The last: that the human word, although it is a certain offspring of the mind, nevertheless does not attain to the notion of a son, nor is it of the same substance (*substantia*) with the mind, nor is every such word of a kind to bear the image (*imago*) of the mind itself. Which three plainly belong to the Divine Word with respect to the Father.

§ VI — The manifold respect of the Divine Word to creatures (Multiplex Verbi Divini respectus ad creaturas)

§ 8. From what has been said above it is evident that in the formal character (*ratio*) of the Word, as it is said in things Divine, a twofold respect is contained: one toward the Father, the other toward creatures. Toward the Father indeed, because it is the Father's Word (*Verbum Divinum*), as proceeding from Him, and representing Him as His own proper image (*imago*). But toward creatures in multiple ways. First, inasmuch as it is a speculative word, it signifies the faculty or office of manifesting to us the Father and Divine things. Second, inasmuch as it is operative, it signifies the faculty of effecting and conserving all the works of God. Third, inasmuch as it is active, that is, the principle (*principium*) of human actions, there is contained in it the power of commanding, and of fulfilling in us what has been commanded. Lastly, inasmuch as it is the internal Word of God, it signifies a certain ordination to all the external words of God, which are works done by Him, as proceeding from the internal Word and approved by it; among which the most excellent is the Incarnation (*Incarnatio*) of the Son of God. For by this that internal and invisible word has, as it were, been uttered by the Divine mouth. But since none of these respects is signified by the name "Son" (for the Son is referred only to the Father), from these points it is easy to see how much difference there is between these two names, namely of "Word" and of "Son"...

§ VII — That the name and property of the Word befit the Son alone (Nomen, ac proprietatem Verbi soli Filio competere)

§ 9. That the name "Word" (*Verbum*) is so proper to the Son of God that it is shared neither with the Father nor with the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*), is in the first place manifest from those things which John the Apostle, the singular herald of the Divine Word, wrote: both at the beginning of his Gospel, saying, "In the beginning was the Word," and later, "And the Word was made flesh"; and at the beginning of the First Epistle: "What we have seen with our eyes of the Word of life." And again, ch. 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit"; then finally Rev. 19: "And His name is called the Word of God." Then too, if we consult the doctrine of the Fathers, it is not doubtful that the name "Word" has by them been attributed to the Son alone, and that they plainly deny that it is common in the other persons.²¹ And whoever have interpreted the passages of Scripture alleged above have taken the name "Word" as proper to the Son.

§ 10. This can also be proved by reasons taken from the congruence which obtains between the Son of God, inasmuch as He is the Word of the Father (*Pater*), and the word of our mind. First: as the word proceeds from the mind, so the Son proceeds from the Father; therefore the Father Himself is not the word, because neither is the mind, from which the word proceeds, the word. Second: as the word proceeds from the mind

alone, so the Son proceeds from the Father alone; therefore the Holy Spirit is not the word, who does not proceed from the Father alone. Third: as the word proceeds proximately and immediately from the mind, so the Son from the Father; but the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, as love (*amor*) from the mind through the word; therefore the Holy Spirit is not the word. Fourth: as the word proceeds from the mind by way of concept or offspring—whence it happens that our thoughts are called the conceptions of our souls, and the things which have been devised by us we are wont to call our offspring and births—so too the Son proceeds from the Father, according to that saying of Divine Wisdom, Prov. 8: "And I was already conceived." But it is established that this mode of procession (*processio*) does not befit the Holy Spirit. Lastly: as there inheres in our internal word a certain natural aptitude or instinct of manifesting itself by an external word, so by God's most orderly counsel it has been decreed that among the Divine persons the Son of God alone, as the internal and invisible word of God, should through assumed flesh become an external and visible word, and thus should manifest Himself to men. From whose person that saying of old is rightly understood to have been uttered, Prov. 8: "My delights are to be with the sons of men." Finally, those things which were said above (at Dist. 13) about the twofold mental emanation, one of the word, the other of love, pertain here for explaining the difference between the generation of the Son of God and the procession of the Holy Spirit.²²

§ VIII — To certain arguments to the contrary (Ad quaedam in contrarium argumenta)

§ 11. Against the Catholic doctrine, which attributes the name of "Word" (*Verbum*) to the Son alone, there are found in Cyril (Thesaurus, book 7; also book 1 on John, ch. 4) certain objections of Eunomius the Arian, of which the first is this: If the Son is of the same substance with the Father, and the Son is the Word, the Father will also be the Word. Cyril replies that by the name of "Word," as also by that of "Son," not the substance but the personal property (*proprietas*) is signified. And the same argument could just as well be proposed about the name "Son." The second [objection]: Scripture witnesses that the Father spoke to the Son, as in Ps. 2: "The Lord hath said to me, Thou art my Son"; and Ps. 109: "The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand." But He said this by some word, and yet not by that very word to whom He was speaking. Therefore, besides the Son, there is still another Word inherent in God. Cyril replies that the Father speaks to the Son not in a human way, but in a certain ineffable mode; whereby it comes about that from eternity the will of the Father has been known to the Son of God fully and perfectly and naturally, so that there is no need of a sounding and signifying word as though of a middle thing between the Father and the Son. Therefore for the Father to speak to the Son is nothing other in that eternity than for the Father to beget the Son of Himself; inasmuch namely as the Son proceeds from the Father by the mode of a word proceeding from the mind. The third [objection]: the name of "word" is attributed to many other things—to the word both internal and external in man; therefore it is not proper to the Son of God. The same Cyril replies that by equal reasoning it could be concluded that neither is the name "God" proper to God, nor the name "Father" to the Father, nor the name "Son" to the Son, because these too in their way befit creatures. Accordingly one must say: just as these—either according to nature, as "God," or according to personal property, as "Father" and "Son"—are properly and most perfectly in God, but abusively or imperfectly in creatures; so by the name of "Word" in the Divine [realities] there is signified the property of the Son, by which He is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit; although in creatures it signifies something similar to this property, and corresponding by a certain analogy.

§ 12. Besides these arguments of Eunomius, there are also some passages of the Fathers which seem to make the name of "Word" common to the other persons. The first place is in Dionysius the Areopagite (On the Divine Names, ch. 7), where he says that God is for that reason "logos," because He is the largitor of wisdom—a description that fits all the persons. Add that the same Dionysius (ch. 1 of the same book) reckons that same term among the essential names of God. The second is in Origen, who, when writing upon that [text] of John 1, "In the beginning was the Word," affirms that "Word" is said metaphorically in the Divine [realities]. But those things which are said metaphorically of God are not personal but essential. The third is in Basil, book 5 (Against Eunomius), where he also calls the Holy Spirit "word," adducing for this the testimony of Scripture (Heb. 1), where the Son is said to "bear all things by the word of His power"; and Eph. 6, where it is said: "The sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." The fourth is in Jerome, on Eph. 1 (upon that [text], "the Father of glory"), where "sermo," or "verbum," is set forth by him as an essential name. The fifth is in Anselm, who in the Monologion (ch. 58) says that just as the Father is intelligent, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; so the Father is "speaking," and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and similarly each of them is said [to speak]. But that which is said is the word; therefore each of them is the word.²⁴

§ 13. But to these we reply—and indeed to the words of Dionysius St. Thomas replies (in his Commentary on that place), that Dionysius used "word" as an essential name only in that place, and that not with regard to the words of John the Apostle, but with a diverse signification. For among other things he says that "logos" is the law of faith, that is, of Divine truth, in those things which God says, or especially in His own words. Something similar Jerome also seems to have had in view in the term "sermo." Nor is there any doubt that each of them elsewhere acknowledged the proper signification of "Word" in the Divine [realities]. For Dionysius (ch. 2 of the same book) writes that the "Word" alone assumed flesh—which certainly is understood of the Son alone; and as to Jerome's judgment, it sufficiently appears from his Epistle to Paulinus (cited above once and again). The authority of Origen St. Thomas rejects (I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1), on the ground that, as he says, Origen is found to have been the source of the Arians. Although one can also reply: there is nothing to prevent our using a term transferred from creatures to signify something personal in the Divine [realities]; yet this is not to be granted in this expression "Word," no more surely than in the term "Son,"—unless someone should say that everything is said metaphorically in God which is said by us as more known in creatures. But that is a very improper acceptance of "metaphor." And thus it would likewise have to be said that "Son" and "Father" are said metaphorically in the Divine [realities]—which assuredly is not to be admitted. As for the words of Basil, the places of Scripture produced by him do not have in Greek "logos" but "rhema"; which Greek word we do not read in the Scriptures as properly attributed to the Son of God. And in the former place "word" signifies a nod or command; in the latter, however, the evangelical word. Nor is the sense of the latter place that the Spirit Himself is the word of God, but that the sword of the Spirit is the word of God; although even among the Greeks the construction can be ambiguous. Moreover, Basil himself, in the name "word," in that place considered nothing other than that it proceeds in whatever manner from one understanding. By that reason nothing would forbid this name to be attributed to the Holy Spirit with respect to the Son; because namely He proceeds from the Son, and through Him the Son works. But the Apostle John has left us to consider something more in the name "Word," as is already sufficiently clear from what was said above. And this the same Basil elsewhere acknowledges: for in a homily (upon the beginning of the Gospel according to John) he teaches that by the name "Word" the generation of the Son is signified. Finally, as to Anselm, St. Thomas replies (as above, ad 3) that he used "to say" improperly for "to understand,"

since "to say," properly taken, imports something more. For "to say" is the same as to utter a word; whereas "to understand" imports only the relation of the intelligent to the thing understood.

§ 14. Finally, Durandus is mistaken, teaching on this Distinction that "word," according to its proper signification in the Divine [realities], is said essentially, not personally. The reasons on which he relies are almost the same as the arguments which St. Thomas adduces and resolves in the places indicated above. Moreover he frames an argument of this sort: Love in the Divine [realities] is said properly essentially, and by appropriation personally; therefore so too "word." For just as the Son proceeds by way of intellect as "word," so the Holy Spirit by way of will as "love." But the consequent is to be denied. For the formal character (*ratio*) of each is not the same: because there is not available to us one proper name to signify that which proceeds by will and another by which the act of will is signified; but the name "love" is common to both. There are, however, names available to signify distinctly the term produced by intellection, as "word," "image"—which do not signify intellection itself. On which matter see also St. Thomas on this Distinction (q. 2, a. 1, ad 2).²⁵

§ VIII — That the Son of God, and He alone, is the image of the Father (Filium Dei eumque solum esse imaginem Patris)

§ 15. The name of image (*imago*) with respect to God, or to the Father in the divine things, is attributed by Sacred Scripture to the Son of God alone; although with less evident distinctiveness than the name Word (*Verbum*). There are passages²⁷ where the wisdom of God is called the image of the divine goodness; and others²⁸ where Christ is called the image of God; and another²⁹ where the same is called the character, that is, the express figure of the substance of God. Relying on these testimonies of Scripture, Hilary and St. Augustine did not hesitate to pronounce that in the divine things the Son alone is the image of God (namely, of the Father—so that the Holy Spirit is not also the image of the Father or of the Son). Hilary indeed at the end of book 8 of *On the Trinity*; St. Augustine, however, in book 6 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 2, and in book 7, ch. 1.³⁰ Nay more, St. Ambrose, book 10 on Luke, on that passage: "Facta est contentio," says that Christ alone is the full image of God, "on account of the expressed unity in Himself of the Father's brightness." "But the just man," he says, "is after the image of God."³¹ And although it can be said that there he only distinguishes Christ from other just men, nevertheless the exclusive expression can also be so taken as to exclude the other divine Persons.

§ 16. By the proper formal character (*ratio*) of image. For an image is a likeness, not just any likeness, but an expressed likeness from that of which it is called an image; as we showed (at Distinctio 13).³² For image and exemplar answer to one another as correlatives; therefore not whatever things are mutually very similar to one another, as egg to egg, are of such a kind that the one is the image of the other. For not in all such cases—for example, in the case of eggs—does one bear the expressed figure of the other; but that which results from an object in a mirror, and the likeness of a seal impressed upon wax, and other such things are properly called images. St. Augustine sets forth this formal character of image most clearly in the book *On Genesis* according to the Letter, the Unfinished Work, ch. 16, and in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 74; and Hilary, in the book *Against Constantius* and in the book *On the Synods* (not far from the beginning); and St. Ambrose in the words cited above.³³ And for a fuller understanding of this doctrine one or other division of image must be noted. For some images are made by art, like those which a painter or sculptor makes; others subsist by nature, in the way that among men the image of a man is his son. Thus Adam³⁴ is said to have begotten a

son "after his image." Furthermore, a natural image is either imperfect or perfect. For not every image equals its exemplar; as St. Augustine teaches in the question cited a little above.³³ These divisions help us to understand the most excellent perfection of image in the divine things; seeing that it is not artificial but natural; and that same image is different from its exemplar by no dissimilarity, but corresponds to it most exactly in all things.

§ 17. Therefore, these points having been premised, and with this further point established as self-evident, that the Father in the divine things is not an image, because He is not from another, that the Son alone in the divine things is an image can be taught as follows. First: because among men the son alone is the natural image of the father. Second: because, among the things that proceed from the mind, not love but word is the natural image. Third: because the Son alone proceeds by way of assimilation, which manner of proceeding is proper to an image. Fourth: because the Son alone assumed the human nature, in which, both by miracles and by doctrine, He declared that both He and His Father are God, and by that same assumed nature He exhibited His Father to men in Himself as in an image, according to that saying: "He who sees me, sees also the Father."³⁵ This rationale the Apostle had in view²⁸—as Hilary understood that passage, book 8 of *On the Trinity*—teaching that in Christ, as in an image, the Father is seen, albeit invisible, because Christ does the works of the Father.³⁶ Hence also one can gather that by the name "image" in the Apostle there is signified not only a relation to the exemplar, that is, to the Father, but also to those who can look upon the image, that is, to the rational creature—so that, looking upon Christ as upon an image presented to the eyes, it may know the Father.

§ 18. But that it is also attributed to man in Gen. 1 and, in a special way, to the man in 1 Cor. 11, that he is the image of God, must be taken according to analogy; both on account of the mind, by which man exists as most like to God; and on account of the principate, which, after the pattern of the divine principate, the man has over the woman, and man over the remaining bodily creatures. On which matter a fuller treatment will be given (at *Distinctio* 16, book 2).³⁷

§ IX — What the opinion of the Greeks was about the image (Quae fuerit Graecorum de imagine sententia)

§ 19. The Greek writers did not speak about the image (*imago*) in divine matters as accurately as the Latins. For they make the common name of "image" belong even to the Holy Spirit; as Athanasius, in *On the Holy Spirit* (Treatise or Epistle 2 to Serapion), Basil (Against Eunomius), Gregory of Neocaesarea, otherwise the Wonder-Worker, in the Confession of Faith which is found in his Life by Gregory of Nyssa, and which Eusebius of Caesarea also mentions, book 7, History, ch. 25.³⁹ In these passages those Fathers teach that the Holy Spirit is the image not only of the Father but also of the Son. Cyril follows them, book 13 (Thesaurus, ch. 1), and John Damascene, book 1 (On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 18).⁴⁰ All these, in the name "image," regarded nothing other than His procession (*processio*) from the exemplar and His perfect likeness with His exemplar; both of which befit the Holy Spirit with respect to the Father and the Son. For He proceeds from both, and He is perfectly like to each; and they are thought, on account of those who tried to remove the Holy Spirit from the divine [mysteries], to have spoken these things thus. But the full formal character (*ratio*) of "image" explained above by us, which Paul, Hilary, and Augustine before others considered.

§ 20. They adduce also testimonies of Scripture, to prove that the Holy Spirit is the image of God, of which one is Rom. 8: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son"; the other, 1 Cor. 15: "As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly." But in these places the name "image" is not attributed to the Holy Spirit, but to men. For in the former place, by a certain transference of language, it is signified that those predestined are rendered conform—namely, are made so conformed to the Son of God—that they become, as it were, a certain image of Him. But in the latter the Apostle exhorts that they who by the conduct of life were the image of the earthly man should so order their life that in it they may express the image of the heavenly man, that is, of Christ.

§ 21. Finally, it must be known that the Fathers, both Greeks and Latins, sometimes take the name "image" in divine matters as something common to the three persons (*personae*), as when they say that the whole Trinity (*Trinitas*) is the image to which man was made; according to that in Gen. 1: "Let us make man to our image." The Master proves this at the end of the distinction immediately following, from Hilary, book 5 (On the Trinity), and Augustine, or rather Fulgentius (On the Faith to Peter, ch. 1).⁴¹ The same Hilary speaks likewise (books 1, 3, 4 On the Trinity), Basil, homily 10 (Hexaemeron), Chrysostom, homily 8 (On Genesis), Augustine, book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 6), book 12 (ch. 6), the book On Genesis, the imperfect work, ch. 16, and book 3 On Genesis to the Letter, ch. 19, and others, who all thus understood the Scripture (Gen. 1), in which God is said to be the image to which man was to be made.⁴² But perhaps more rightly by that opinion there is meant that man is the image of God; as it is openly said by the Apostle in 1 Cor. 11, namely looking back to the place Gen. 1: "The man is the image of the glory of God." But about this also expressly below (at Distinctio 16, book 2).⁴³

§ 22. But if nevertheless, with the aforesaid authorities, you understand that in that place the Trinity itself is called the image, know that "image" is put for its correlative, which is "exemplar." For God is the exemplar, according to which men and angels were made. Nor, however, in this signification will "image" be properly an essential name in the divine, but it will signify a relation to the creature, like these names, "Creator," "Lord."

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 4.

2. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, "[Propriet. 12]" [abbreviation as in source]; Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, chs. 1–2; cited by the Master (of the Sentences) under Augustine's name.

3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 7.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 34.

5. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 10.

6. Origen, *Commentary on John*, tome 1.

7. Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, ch. 1 (on spoken sounds as signs of affections of the soul).

8. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* IV, ch. 9.

9. St. Jerome, *Epistle to Paulinus*, "De omnibus divinae historiae libris," ch. 4.

10. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 63.

11. St. Cyprian, *Contra Iudaeos* II, chs. 3, 5.

12. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* II, XII; St. Ambrose, *De fide contra Arianos*, ch. 2.

13. St. Jerome, *In Epistolam ad Ephesios*, on ch. 1; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* IV, chs. 8–9.

14. St. Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus 108.
15. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 14, a. 1.
16. St. Basil, Homily on the beginning of the Gospel according to John; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Theological Orations, Oration 30 (book 4) [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 4 (Theologiae)"]; St. Jerome, In Psalmos, on Ps. 44, at the beginning; St. Augustine, De fide et symbolo, on the clause "Et in Filium eius unicum".
17. St. Jerome, Epistle to Paulinus, ch. 4; St. Jerome, In Epistolam ad Ephesios, on ch. 1.
18. St. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 63; St. Augustine, Contra sermonem Arianorum, ch. 3; Tertullian, Apologeticum, ch. 21.
19. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 3.
20. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34, aa. 1–2.
21. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 13; VI, ch. 2; VII, chs. 1–3; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, book 7 (against Eunomius); and Commentary on John, book 1, ch. 4; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 18.
22. See above, Distinctio 13.
23. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 34 [loco citato; abbreviation as in source].
24. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ch. 7; and ch. 1; Origen, Commentary on John, on John 1:1 ("In principio erat Verbum"); St. Basil, Contra Eunomium, book 5; adducing Heb. 1 and Eph. 6; St. Jerome, In Epistolam ad Ephesios, on Eph. 1 ("Pater gloriae"); St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 58.
25. For St. Thomas's replies, see Summa theologiae I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1; ad 3; and his Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, on ch. 7; St. Thomas, In I Sent., on this Distinction, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.
26. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 35, a. 1, ad 2.
27. Wis. 7.
28. 2 Cor. 4; Col. 1.
29. Heb. 1.
30. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII (end); St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, ch. 2; VII, ch. 1.
31. St. Ambrose, Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam X, on "Facta est contentio."
32. Above, Distinctio 13.
33. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, ch. 16; and De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 74. St. Hilary, Contra Constantium; and De synodis (near the beginning). St. Ambrose as cited above.
34. Gen. 5.
35. Jn. 14: "He who sees me, sees also the Father."
36. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII, on those passages.
37. Gen. 1; 1 Cor. 11; below, Distinctio 16, book 2.
38. S. Thom. 1. par. 9. 35. 93.art.9. [abbreviation as in source]
39. St. Athanasius, Ep. 2 to Serapion on the Holy Spirit; St. Basil, Contra Eunomium; St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Confession of Faith, in his Life by St. Gregory of Nyssa; Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History VII, ch. 25.
40. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, bk. 13, ch. 1; St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 18.
41. The Master (Peter Lombard), end of the next distinction; St. Hilary, De Trinitate V; St. Augustine, or rather Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 1.
42. St. Hilary, De Trinitate I; III; IV; St. Basil, Homilia X in Hexaemeron; St. John Chrysostom, Homilia VIII in Genesim; St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, ch. 6; XII, ch. 6; De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, ch. 16; De Genesi ad litteram III, ch. 19.
43. See below, Distinctio 16, book 2.

DISTINCTIO XXVIII — WHY THE NAME "UNBEGOTTEN" IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FATHER ALONE (*INGENITI NOMEN QUARE SOLI PATRI ATTRIBUTUM?*)

§ 1. We say that the Father alone is unbegotten (*ingenitus*) (as was shown above at distinction 13). Although indeed it is true that the Holy Spirit is not begotten, and thus is "non-begotten" (*non genitus*), which follows by the law of contradictories, nevertheless the Fathers did not wish on that account to admit that He is unbegotten. We can give this reason for it. Since in created things there is no natural procession (*processio naturalis*) of one from another except nativity (*nativitas*), it comes about that, nativity being denied, every natural procession is taken away. Hence it came about that in Divine matters—where we necessarily ascribe names taken from human things as being better known—"unbegotten" (*ingenitum*) is said not only of that which does not proceed by nativity from another, but of that which does not proceed at all. But this, in the Divine, befits the Father alone. Therefore "unbegotten," or "innascible" (*innascibile*), as St. Hilary commonly speaks, or "innate" (*innatum*), as Prudentius in the Apotheosis (against the Patripassians), or "to be without principle" (*esse sine principio*), as Basil, book I Against Eunomius, is the notion and property of the Father (the notion, *notio*, and property, *proprietas*), as was said above at the preceding distinction.²

§ 2. For Hilary also, in book 12 of On the Trinity near the end, says that only the Father is "innascible"; and in book 4, not far from the end, he calls "innascibility" the property of the Father.³

§ 3. That this is the Father's notion, distinct from that by which He is called Father, Augustine expressly teaches in book 5 of On the Trinity, ch. 6, and by the words recited in the text by the Master. And this is confirmed by reason. For the formal character (*ratio*) of fatherhood (*paternitas*) consists without the formal character of "unbegotten," and conversely—as Augustine clearly proves in the same place. For those who among us are fathers are themselves also begotten from their own parents; and if in the Divine there were not the Trinity of persons, God would be unbegotten, but not Father.⁴

§ 4. But you will object that the same Augustine there (ch. 6) writes thus: "When the Father is said to be 'unbegotten'—not what He is, but what He is not, is said"; and in ch. 7: "If 'non-begotten' is said in place of what is said 'unbegotten', nothing else is said"; and below: "Unbegotten, what are you except non-begotten?" Therefore, since the Holy Spirit is non-begotten, it seems to follow that, according to Augustine's mind, He is unbegotten. It is answered: that for Augustine indeed "unbegotten" (*ingenitus*) is nothing other than "non-begotten" (*non genitus*); but when "non-begotten" is said, by that composite term not only nativity is removed, but every natural procession, according to what has already been said. Therefore, in this sense it is not to be conceded that the Holy Spirit is non-begotten.⁵

§ II — Whether the name "unbegotten" signifies substance or relation (Utrum nomen ingeniti substantiam, an relationem significet?)

§ 5. With the name "unbegotten" (*ingenitus*) the Arians of old were laying snares for the Catholics, striving to destroy the Divinity of the Son of God. And for this reason the Catholics sometimes judged that they ought to abstain from this name, as Basil in book 1 (Against Eunomius), where, although he admits that the appellation "unbegotten" accords most fittingly with our thoughts, yet, because it is found nowhere in Scripture and, as he says, it was "the first element of Arian blasphemy," he thinks it should be passed over in silence.⁷ Nor are dissimilar things read in Ambrose, book (On the Mystery of the Lord's Incarnation, ch. 8).⁸ Moreover, the Arians' argument sought from this word was of this sort: The Father is unbegotten, and this signifies His substance (*substantia*). But the Son is not unbegotten. Therefore the Son is not of the same substance with the Father. That by this word substance is signified they proved, because it is an absolute name, not a relative one (*relatio*). For under the name "unbegotten" the Father is not referred to another person. To this argument Augustine replies thus in book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 7), where he denies that "unbegotten" signifies substance, since it is a negative name, by which neither is substance signified, nor properly relation, but the negation of relation—just as conversely this expression "not-man" signifies neither relation nor substance, but the negation of a substance. But since negations are wont to be reduced to the predicaments of their opposite affirmations, by this reasoning indeed one could not absurdly concede that that word is relative, namely by a certain reduction, which Augustine in the same place teaches at greater length. Although therefore this name is not referred to another person, yet it removes from the Father the relations that are fitting to the other persons, namely, of one begotten and of one proceeding. Nearly the same reply is that of other Fathers, as of Basil in book 2 (Against Eunomius), diligently distinguishing between "unbegotten" and "eternal," of Ambrose (On the Mystery of the Lord's Incarnation, ch. 9), and of Epiphanius, book 1 of the Thesaurus, and likewise book 2.⁹

§ III — Whether the divine nature can be said to be unbegotten (An divina natura dici possit ingenita?)

§ 6. It is wont to be asked in this place whether it is permissible to call the divine nature unbegotten (*ingenita*). For thus it can seem from this, that the divine nature simply is not from another, nor in the mode of generation and procession.

§ 7. We answer that unbegotten (*ingenitum*), insofar as it is the distinctive property of the persons, belongs first and per se to the Father, not however to the divine essence (*essentia divina*), unless as it is in the Father (*in Patre*). For it signifies the negation of that which belongs to the other persons (*personae*), and therefore it inheres first not to the essence, but to the person. Then, if it were attributed to the essence in itself, and not by reason of the person, it would be common to the three persons, which is manifestly false. Finally, as was said at Distinction 5, the divine essence is neither begotten nor proceeding; therefore it is unbegotten. For it rightly follows that the Father is unbegotten, because He is neither begotten nor proceeds. True; as we said, this is attributed to the essence by reason of the person of the Father.

§ 8. Moreover, if unbegotten is understood as that which has not origin from something which is of an external and other nature, in this way per se and first it belongs to the divine nature, and on this account to the

three persons. But that unbegotten is sometimes taken in this way among the ancients, we have above noted (at Distinction 13).

§ 9. Now if you ask why it does not follow, "The Son is begotten; therefore the essence is begotten," just as it follows, "The Father is unbegotten; therefore the essence is unbegotten." It is answered that unbegotten does not signify a notional act (*actus notionalis*) as begotten does, but the negation of such an act or of acts of this sort, which nothing forbids to be attributed to the essence. Nay rather, if an act does not belong to the essence, then it necessarily follows, by an argument from contradictories, that the negation of the act belongs to it.¹¹

§ IV — Whether any negative notion is fitting to the Son and the Holy Spirit (An Filio, & Spiritui sancto aliqua competat negativa notio?)

§ 10. It is asked whether, just as the Father's notion is unbegottenness (*innascibilitas*), so also there is for the Son some negative notion (*notio negativa*), such as "improcessible" (*improcessibile*), insofar as it denies procession in the special sense. Likewise for the Holy Spirit, such as "unbegotten" (*ingenitum*), or "innascible" (*innascibile*), insofar as it precisely denies generation or nativity (*generatio sive nativitas*), and "non-productive" (*improductivum*).

§ 11. To this question it has in part been satisfied above (at Distinction 26), where we showed that negations of this sort are not to be numbered among personal notions. And this chiefly for this reason, that by them no dignity of the persons to whom they are attributed is made known, just as by unbegottenness there is made known the dignity of the Father, which is such that He is not from another, that is, a principle without a principle. Now first principles are wont to be defined and made known by negations. For we say that the first is that before which there is nothing; and so in other cases. Likewise, by this, that one is posited to be innascible, unity (*unitas*) in the divine nature is signified, as Hilary noted in the book On the Synods. Whence also in the Constantinopolitan Creed we confess that we believe in one God the Father; and therefore unity is appropriated to the Father, as will appear below (at Distinction 31).

§ 12. But if two were innascible, two gods would be posited. For since they could not be distinguished by origin of the one from the other (by which sole reason the divine persons are distinguished), it would be necessary that they differ in nature.

§ 13. Moreover, it must be known that the property of unbegottenness is attributed to the Father not only for the distinction of the other persons, to whom paternity in the divine does not belong, but also for the distinction of men, who indeed are fathers, but are not unbegotten; for they are begotten from other men, or at any rate produced immediately by God, as the first men. But indeed that similar negative properties be attributed to the Son and the Holy Spirit, no necessity requires for signifying either the dignity of those persons themselves, or this sort of distinction.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 33, a. 4.

2. Prudentius, *Apotheosis* (against the Patripassians); St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium*, I.

3. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* XII, near the end; St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IV, near the end.

4. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 6.
5. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 7; On the terminological usage "non-begotten" as excluding every natural procession, see the reasoning above in this distinction.
6. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4, ad 3.
7. St. Basil, Contra Eunomium I.
8. St. Ambrose, De incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, ch. 8.
9. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 7; St. Basil, Contra Eunomium II; St. Ambrose, De incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, ch. 9; St. Epiphanius, Thesaurus, book I; likewise, book II.
10. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, ibidem [abbreviation as in source].
11. Above, Distinctio 5; and cf. the remark above at Distinctio 13.
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, ubi supra [abbreviation as in source].
13. Above, Distinctio 26.
14. St. Hilary, De synodis.
15. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed; see below, Distinctio 31.

DISTINCTIO XXIX — WHAT THE NAME "PRINCIPLE" SIGNIFIES WHEN ATTRIBUTED TO GOD; AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM "CAUSE" (*PRINCIPII NOMEN DEO ATTRIBUTUM, QUID SIGNIFICET; INTER PRINCIPIUM, ET CAUSAM QUID INTERSIT*)

§ 1. The name of principle (*principium*) as it is attributed to God or to the Divine persons can signify a twofold relation (*relatio*), namely, internal (*interna*) and external (*externa*).^[1] Now, in general, a principle is everything by which or from which another thing is produced in any way. The internal relation is that which is not terminated in something diverse, but in that which is contained within the same nature, as is the relation of person to person. In this way, therefore, the Father is the principle of the Son, and likewise the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, as was shown (Dist. 12).^[2] But the Holy Spirit in this way is not a principle of any person.

§ 2. Furthermore, in turn one must also grant, according to this mode of relation, that the Son is from a principle and has a principle (*principium*). For thus the Fathers speak, and by name St. Augustine in book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 14).^[3] And precisely the same account holds for the Holy Spirit. Nor ought we to be deterred from this way of speaking by the fact that Hilary teaches in book 4 (On the Trinity) that the Son is without beginning—although from this the Master gathers, not rightly, that this way of speaking is not to be conceded, namely that the Son has a principle.^[4] For Hilary said this of the beginning of duration. In this sense too it was defined in the great Lateran Council (ch. 1) that the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, without beginning always and without end.^[5] For just as the end, so also the beginning is removed from the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit—namely, the beginning and end of duration—since that the Father is the productive principle of the Son admits of no doubt. But if this is so, and the Son has the Father, therefore He necessarily has a productive principle; and this consequence is evident and manifest.

§ 3. But the external relation is that which tends toward a thing diverse in nature, of which sort in God is the relation of principle with respect to creatures. This belongs to God in time, and is common to the whole Trinity, as also are the other things by which God is said in relation to creatures: for the whole Trinity is, as the Lateran Council in the same place pronounces, one principle of the universe, that is, of the whole, not three principles.^[6] Likewise one must acknowledge that the whole Trinity is the one and first cause of the whole creation, not three causes—first, second, and third. For what is read in Eusebius, book 1 (Ecclesiastical History, ch. 1), that the Son of God and the Word is the second cause of things, must be referred to Arianism, with which that author was infected.^[7] In this way the Son called Himself a principle in Jn. 8, when, asked

who He was, He replied: "Principium, who also speak to you," and this according to the interpretation of Augustine in book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 13; and in the book Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, ch. 3; and in his exposition of this passage upon John), of Ambrose, book 1 (Hexameron, chs. 2 and 4; and book 3, On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 4), and of Fulgentius, book 2 (To King Thrasimund); although the Greeks—Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others—by no improbable reading hand down a different exposition of that passage.[⁸] Nor are other passages of Scripture lacking in which Christ is openly called a principle, as in Col. 1; Rev. 1, 21, and 22. Thus Nazianzen, in an Oration, says: "They have called God principle" ("Dei principium appellaverunt").[⁹] Now therefore the name of principle also befits the Son of God, although He Himself has a principle; it follows that it likewise befits the Holy Spirit, but to both only by an external relation, as we have said.

§ 4. Finally, it must be known that in the Scriptures the name of principle is attributed to God, not as it is referred to what is principled or to the thing produced, but as it signifies the same as first, that is, that than which nothing is prior; in which way also He is called the end, that is, that than which nothing is posterior. Thus in Rev. 1, in the last [verse], God and Christ call themselves the principle and the end, the first and the last, namely to signify perfect eternity; for there follows, "Who is, and who was, and who is to come."[¹⁰] And in this way also, even without respect to creatures, not only the Father and the Son, but also the Holy Spirit is a principle.

§ 5. What the difference is between principle and cause (*Inter principium, et causam quid intersit*).[¹¹] Among Latin writers, especially the Scholastics, this is the difference between principle (*principium*) and cause (*causa*): that principle extends more widely than cause, inasmuch as cause is referred only to an effect (*effectus*), and effect is not rightly said except of that which has been made. Wherefore, since in that supreme Trinity it is impious to say that anything has been made, our writers deny that in things divine a person, with respect to a person, is either a cause or an effect. Whence it comes about that they are unwilling to attribute the name of cause to God except with respect to creatures. They prove the same from this definition of cause: a cause is that upon whose being there follows something else; therefore there is not in that case anything which is the cause of another. But principle, generally, is referred to what is principled (*principiatum*), which there is no necessity to include among things that have been made. Wherefore nothing forbids that in things divine a person, with respect to a person, be called a principle. However, the Greeks use these two words, cause and principle, promiscuously and indifferently, referring cause not to an effected thing (*effectum*), but to everything which by any account is produced by another and depends upon it, which by one general name can be called the caused thing (*causatum*). In this sense indeed cause is nothing other than principle. In this sense, therefore, the same Greeks everywhere acknowledge and teach that the Father is the cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as Ignatius in the Epistle (to the Philippians), Basil in books 2 and 3 (Against Eunomius), Gregory Nazianzen in book 2 (On Theology), and in book 4 against Gregory of Nyssa in the book (To Ablabius), where, distinguishing the three Persons, he says that among them the cause is one thing, what is from the cause another, and what is from that which is from the cause another; likewise Chrysostom, hom. 2 (on the Epistle to the Hebrews), and St. John Damascene, book 1 (On the Faith, chs. 8, 9, 10, 11; and book 4, ch. 20).[¹²] Moreover, one must know that not even the old Latins altogether shrank from this manner of speaking. For Hilary, book 12 (On the Trinity), when he was speaking of the Son: "Of him who is, with respect to that which is, the Father is the cause," he says.[¹³] And openly St. Augustine (book 83, question 16) shows that God is the eternal cause of His eternal wisdom, that is, of the Son.[¹⁴] But much later than they, Hugh of St. Victor, question 214 (on the Epistle to the Romans), teaches that the Son is the cause of the

Holy Spirit.[¹⁵] Whence also the Latins in the Council of Florence (last session) repeatedly inculcate that the Father and the Son are the cause of the Holy Spirit—namely, using the name cause conformably with the Greek Fathers.[¹⁶] From which it amply appears that even now this manner of speaking can without offense be pronounced, provided that the sense is settled, and it be understood that cause is referred not to an effect but to the caused thing, that is, to that which is produced. Finally, it must be noted that among the ancients the Father is sometimes called the author (*auctor*) of the Son, as very often in St. Hilary. Thus also St. Augustine, book 3 (Against Maximinus, ch. 14), said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone as the principal Author. And in the same author, Sermon 22 (on time), the Son is said to be coeternal to the author, that is, to the Father. Thus too Prudentius in the Apotheosis (Against the Unionites) says of Christ, "With that Author as His begetter; none before whom was there an Author." [¹⁷] But Ambrose, book 10 (on Luke, at the beginning), says that the Father is the root of the Son. And again Prudentius in the Apotheosis (Against the Patripassians) calls the Father the fount of God, indeed also the fount of the Deity; which same is read also in Dionysius (On the Divine Names, ch. 1). The Latin Fathers repeat all this in the Council of Florence (last session), saying that the Father is the fount, the root, and the cause of the Divinity; by which names nothing other than principle is signified.[¹⁸] Nor do the aforesaid Fathers wish there to be, properly, any cause of the Deity itself, or any principle of it, since the Divine essence neither begets, nor is begotten, nor is produced at all, as we have taught elsewhere; rather, either they put the abstract in place of the concrete, or the sense is that the Father is the cause and author of communicated Deity.

§ I — Which names are fitting to God only from time (Quae nomina Deo tantum ex tempore convenient)

§ 6. In order that it may be understood which names befit God not from eternity but from some beginning of time, first it must be known that no essential name is of this kind, nor yet any of those by which only an internal relation (*relatio*) is signified: for these names, just as the thing signified, belong to God from eternity. Therefore only those names by which a reference to creatures is signified befit God from time, and yet not all of them. Which, however, are such, and which are not, must be explained by a distinction. There are certain names which, in order that they can truly be ascribed to God, require the existence of a created thing: such as are whatever things signify some present operation of God to the outside (*ad extra*): for an operation of this sort cannot exist except in a created thing. Such are: to create, to rule, to sanctify, to save, to punish, and innumerable others. For there is no operation in creatures which does not proceed from God as cause.

§ 7. There are other names which, although they signify a reference to creatures, nevertheless, in order that they be truly ascribed to God, require no co-existence of a created thing. And these are in a twofold kind. For some signify actions like the operations of the intellect and will (*voluntas*), as to will, to know, to foreknow, to choose, to reprobate. For whatever are of this kind do not require the existence of the things to which they are referred. Others, however, do not signify actions, but the power (*potentia*) of acting, or assuredly are said of God after the manner of a habit (*habitus*), and therefore do not require the co-existence of a subject thing, as Creator, Savior, Helper, Bestower, Maker. For nothing prevents, says Cyril, someone from being able to be called a maker, even if he works nothing. Which, by equal reasoning, we can say also of the rest.²⁰ Therefore the names which are of the first kind alone, and all of them, are ascribed to God from time—yet with those also being included which disjunctively require a present or a past act (*actus*), as Father with respect to a creature. For he is called Father who begets or has begotten, but not he who can beget or is at some time going

to beget. But all the rest befit God from eternity. And indeed, about those which are of the former kind there is no doubt; for God willed and foreknew from eternity that the world would at some time be made; and the same God from eternity chose some and reprobated others.

§ 8. But concerning those which are of the latter kind, not all have the same opinion. The Master in this place, and St. Thomas, think that they signify actions about the creature, and therefore are said of God only from time.²¹ But to others it seems more probable that not actions, but—as we said—the power of acting together with a habit or propensity of the will is designated by those expressions, so that God is called Creator on account of the power of creating and the will, to be made manifest in reality at a set time, or already made manifest; and by like reasoning, Savior, Helper, etc. An argument for this is that even today God is called Creator, although He has long since ceased from the act of creation. Although this argument does not altogether prove the point. For one could reply that He is called Creator from a present or past act, just as one is said to be a father with respect to a creature, as we have just shown. But whether also from a future act, the will for which already exists, He is called Creator—and therefore from eternity—that, to be sure, is what is at issue in the question. Assuredly, each opinion has its own probability. And in favor of either opinion avails what St. Augustine says (or whoever is the author of the Sermon 9 on the Nativity of the Lord): "Our Lord Jesus Christ, who is for eternity the Creator of all things, today by being born of a Mother has been made our Savior." For in the words "Creator," indeed, He seems to acknowledge God from eternity, and yet he bears witness that He is Savior from time; unless this latter can be understood thus: Today by being born of a Mother He has been made our Savior, according to the nature assumed from the Mother; who nevertheless from eternity according to the Divine nature was Savior, just as also Creator.²²

§ 9. Furthermore, as to why it does not follow that some mutability befalls God, from the fact that certain things do not befit Him from eternity but only temporally, St. Augustine, having adduced some examples, teaches (De Trinitate V, ch. 16): namely, making clear that all that change which is signified by those names recently attributed to God is not in God, but in the subject creature, which either begins to be, when previously it was not, or receives into itself a new form, or an operation from the immutable God. About which matter also something has been said above (at Distinction 8). But as to the relations which arise and exist between God and creatures, plainly one must say with St. Thomas (in the place a little before cited) that they are real on the part of the creatures, because in them real changes occur; but on the part of God they consist only in a being of reason, because neither something absolute nor something relative can newly befall God; and St. Thomas teaches (in the same place) that something of the sort has place also in certain other relations.²³

§ II — Whether God is Lord from time, or from eternity? (Utrum Deus ex tempore, an ab aeterno sit Dominus?)

§ 10. This question: whether God has been Lord always, St. Augustine judges to have appeared difficult (City of God XII, ch. 15).²⁵ Hence, in that place he determines nothing certain, only affirming that God is said from time to be my Lord or your Lord; but whether absolutely He was made Lord in time, he left in question.

§ 11. Moreover, a twofold cause of doubting seems to have existed for St. Augustine. The first, from the word "always," which, if it signifies the same as "at every time," then, as is evident, it will be permissible truly to say that God has always been Lord, because at every time He was Lord, at least, of time itself. But that this

answer less fits the question proposed, Augustine himself well understood. For when we say, for example, that God has always been just or wise, we do not only signify created time, which is the measure, according to duration, of the other things (for thus too it would have to be maintained that the world has always existed), but we understand real or imaginary time, or certainly eternity itself, which is the same as God's essence (*essentia*). For it is the same, whether we ask whether "always," or whether "from eternity," God was Lord.

§ 12. The Fathers also of the Nicene Synod, condemning this opinion of the Arians about the Son of God: "There was when he was not," and confessing that to have truth in every creature, by this word "when" they wished all that span of duration to be comprehended which can be conceived by us in intellect before the world was created.²⁶ Therefore, not in this way is it rightly shown that God has always been Lord.

§ 13. The other cause of doubting was that he would seem not to think piously enough about God who should deny that He has always been Lord. And since this does not seem altogether without reason, for the determination of the present question a twofold signification of "Lord" must be distinguished.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 33, aa. 1 and 4.

2. Above, *Distinctio* 12.

3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 14.

4. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IV; the Master (of the Sentences) is Peter Lombard.

5. Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1.

6. Fourth Lateran Council, in the same place [abbreviation as in source].

7. Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica* I, ch. 1.

8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 13; Augustine, *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*, ch. 3; Augustine, *Tractates on John* (on this passage) [abbreviation as in source]; St. Ambrose, *Hexaemeron* I, chs. 2 and 4; St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* III, ch. 4; Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Ad Thrasimundum regem* II; St. John Chrysostom, *Homilies on John* (on Jn. 8) [abbreviation as in source]; Theophylact, *Commentary on John* [abbreviation as in source].

9. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oration* [title illegible in the source]: "Dei principium appellaverunt."

10. Rev. 1, the last verse.

11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.

12. St. Ignatius, *Epistula ad Philippenses*; St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium* II–III; St. Gregory Nazianzen, *De Theologia* II; and lib. 4 against Gregory of Nyssa in the book *Ad Ablabium* [abbreviation as in source]; St. John Chrysostom, *Hom. 2 in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* I, chs. 8–11; IV, ch. 20.

13. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* XII.

14. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 16.

15. Hugh of St. Victor, *Question 214*, on the Epistle to the Romans.

16. Council of Florence, last session.

17. Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, Against the Unionites.

18. St. Ambrose, *In Lucam* X (at the beginning); Prudentius, *Apotheosis*, Against the Patripassians; (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* I; Council of Florence, last session.

19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 7; I, q. 34, a. 3; and I, q. 43, a. 2.

20. St. Cyril (of Alexandria), *Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate* I, ch. 5.

21. The Master [in this place; as in the source]; and St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7.
22. St. Augustine (or the author), Sermon 9 De Nativitate Domini.
23. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 16; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7.
24. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7.
25. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, ch. 15.
26. Council of Nicaea, condemning the Arian formula "Erat quando non erat" ("There was when he was not").

DISTINCTIO XXX — ON THE DIVINE NAME "LORD," AND WHETHER SUCH NAMES BELONG TO GOD FROM ETERNITY

§ 1. ...who has him; just as a father, who has a son. Or else one who has the power of ruling, at the discretion of his will, and who can, when he wishes, have at hand those things over which he rules—even if perhaps in act he neither does nor has anything of the sort. Therefore, in the former way, that God was not always Lord is convincingly proved by manifest reason, because He did not always have a servant over whom He might rule. For just as he is not a father who does not have a son, so neither will anyone be called a lord who does not have a servant. And in this way St. Augustine, in Book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 16), unhesitatingly affirms that God was not Lord from eternity, lest he be forced to admit that there is some creature coeternal with God. Likewise the Master (in this Distinction), and St. Thomas (in the place cited a little above).¹

§ 2. But in the latter way, there is no doubt that from eternity God is Lord—especially if this also be added, that from eternity He preordained to make a creature over whom He would rule: as we said above about this name Creator, and the like. In this sense the Fathers of the Council (of Constantinople) defined that the Holy Spirit is Lord, that is, endowed with an equal power of ruling along with the Father and the Son—against those who were teaching that He is the minister of the Father and the Son.²

§ 3. Also in this way the Latin interpreter of Scripture everywhere calls God Lord, not only where in Hebrew it is Adonai, but much more frequently where in Hebrew it is the Tetragrammaton of the divine name. And the Seventy likewise everywhere render it by the Greek word κύριος, that is, Lord.³ And this is that name which we said (above, Dist. 8) is held to be chief among the names of God.⁴ It is therefore consistent that it in no way belongs to Him from the beginning of time, but from eternity. And about this, too, it is written in Is. 40: "God eternal, Lord"; or, as in the Hebrew, "always Lord."

§ 4. Moreover, the Ancients also attended to this latter signification in the term Lord, as Dionysius the Areopagite (On the Divine Names, ch. 2), Athanasius (in the Creed), Hilary (On the Trinity, Book 8), Basil (On the Holy Spirit, chs. 20, 21), Ambrose (On the Faith to Gratian, Book 1, ch. 1; and On the Holy Spirit, Book 3, chs. 16, 17), and Cyril (Against Julian, Book 8), in the words by which he affirms that dominion has always been conjoined to the Divinity.⁵ Nor does Damascene think differently, who, after he had said (On the Faith, Book 1, ch. 12) that by the word Lord a relation is signified, afterwards (Book 2, ch. 12) teaches that the Divine substance is signified.⁶ These two do not conflict: for Lord signifies the very power—which is the substance of God itself; yet in such a way that, as expressed by that name, it has regard to the creatures over whom God rules, or can rule.

§ 5. But that statement which is read in Arnobius (On Ps. 103), "Before the Son of God came, He was not Lord of men," lest it seem contrary to the things said above, yes, to the Catholic Faith, must be understood of Christ according to the human nature: according to which He Himself says in Matt. 11, "All things have been handed over to me by my Father"; and in 28, "All power is given to me," etc. And what is said of Him in Ps. 8,

as the Apostle expounds in Heb. 2: "You have constituted Him over the works of your hands; and You have subjected all things under His feet."⁷

§ 6. Now from what has been said it is also sufficiently apparent what is to be answered to the question: Whether God was King from eternity? For a similar distinction must be employed. Nor indeed do these Scriptures prove that He was King from eternity: Ps. 144, "Your kingdom is a kingdom of all ages"; 1 Tim. 1, "To the King of ages, immortal," etc. For in both places ages are rightly understood, that is, created times; especially since in the Psalm there is subjoined: "And your dominion is in every generation and generation." Which plainly pertains to the mutability of the world and the rolling on of times.

§ 7. Finally, one can ask about many other things: Whether they belong to God from eternity; as, whether He was from eternity merciful, clement, just, a remunerator, an avenger, jealous, glorious, praiseworthy, etc.? But to all these a probable reply can be taken from the things which have been said either in this chapter, or generally in the preceding chapter.

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1. St. Augustine, De Trinitate V, ch. 16; The Master (of the Sentences), [hac Dist. — abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, [loco dudum allegato — abbreviation as in source].
 2. The Council (of Constantinople): definition that the Holy Spirit is Lord (Dominum).
 3. The Seventy (i.e., the Septuagint) render the Tetragrammaton as κύριος.
 4. Estius's own cross-reference above, Dist. 8.
 5. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ch. 2; St. Athanasius, in the Creed (the so-called Athanasian Creed); St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII; St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, chs. 20–21; St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum I, ch. 1; De Spiritu Sancto III, chs. 16–17; St. Cyril, Contra Julianum VIII.
 6. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 12; II, ch. 12.
 7. Arnobius, In Psalmum 103.

DISTINCTIO XXXI — HOW THE EQUALITY AND LIKENESS OF THE DIVINE PERSONS IS TO BE TAKEN (ÆQUALITAS & SIMILITUDO DIVINARUM PERSONARUM QUOMODO SIT ACCIPIENDA)

§ 1. When the three Divine Persons (*Divinae Personae*) are said to be equal and like to one another, the question is asked: according to what is that equality (*aequalitas*) and likeness (*similitudo*) to be taken? To this question, that it may be answered briefly, one must repeat in this place what elsewhere has often been said, that no accident (*accidens*) is in God, but that whatever is attributed to God by way of quality (*qualitas*) or quantity (*quantitas*) is His essence (*essentia*). Whence it follows that the equality and likeness which is among the Divine Persons must be taken according to the essence; so, however, that at the same time the signification of these words be set forth for us: "equality" is between those having the same magnitude, of which, however, neither surpasses the other in magnitude. But "likeness" is between those whose quality is one. Since therefore in God magnitude and quality are His very essence, it is manifest that equality and likeness in God are said according to the essence, not according to relation.

§ 2. This is also shown from this, that neither is the Father said to be like or equal to the Son, nor the Son to the Father, in that this One begot, that One was begotten: for by this consideration they are distinguished. Then too, neither can any relation (*relatio*) be assigned in which, as to reality, all the Persons agree. Hence, if equality or likeness were to be taken among them according to relation, one could not say that the three Persons are equal or like among themselves. This is the doctrine of St. Augustine, book 5 (On the Trinity, ch. 6; book 6, chs. 4–5).²

§ 3. To these add that neither according to relations could the Divine Persons be said to be unlike among themselves. For just as in created things unlikeness is not taken according to relation but according to quality, so would it have to be taken in God. But because according to quality, that is, according to the essence, there is no diversity there, hence absolutely no unlikeness (*dissimilitudo*) ought to be acknowledged in God.

§ 4. But if it be asked whether equality and likeness in the Divine signify relation, and whether "equal" and "like" are predicated of them relatively, one must altogether answer in the affirmative. For the equal is equal to the equal, and the like is like to the like, both in Divine things and in created things. Yet these words do not signify some peculiar relation or notion (*notio*) in the Divine Persons, as paternity, filiation, and the like, but that which is common to all three, and belongs to each with respect to another. For each Divine Person is like to any other and equal to any other.

§ 5. However, these relations attributed to God are only of reason; because although the Persons, who are said to be like and equal, and in whom the relation is understood to be founded, are really distinct, nevertheless the very ground of founding that relation in the Divine Persons is altogether the same. For as we

said, the three Persons are similar and equal to one another according to the essence, which is one and undivided in the three: in the way in which we would say that a wall and its surface are similar according to the same numerically one whiteness which is in the wall, by means of the surface; they would not be said to be similar by a real relation, but only by a relation of reason.

§ 6. But since neither likeness nor equality can consist except between a plurality of things, that is, things really distinct, hence, when in God the Persons are said to be similar and equal among themselves, both are insinuated to us: both that they are really many, and that one is their essence.

§ 7. From these things finally it is understood that the Master is mistaken when he thinks (s. B.) that likeness and equality in God posit nothing, but only remove something. For in reality they do posit something, namely the same magnitude or quality; but as to the very things themselves which are said to be like or equal, that is, the plurality of the Persons—unless rather you say that this they do not posit but presuppose.

§ II — What is meant by "appropriations" of the Divine Persons (Appropriata Divinarum Personarum quae dicantur)

§ 8. Among the names by which, in the Divine, the notions (*notiones*) and, besides the properties (*proprietates*) of the persons, are signified, there are some which are wont to be called by the scholastic theologians "appropriated" (*appropriata*). Now they are of the number of those which belong to God according to the essence, and therefore are common equally to the three persons. Yet they are called appropriated, because each is ascribed by the sacred writers peculiarly to each of the persons on account of a certain congruity which each of them has with the property of some person: for example, that divine attribute which has greater congruity with the property of the Father, as eternity; although it is common to the three persons, is appropriated to the Father, and so with the others. Hence one must not think that attributes of this kind are to be counted among the properties of the persons: in the way in which the Master seems to have thought, who in the text endeavors to show that these appropriated [attributes] so belong, each to each person, that they are not common to all. And, in order to do this, by "eternity," which is accommodated to the Father, he understands innascibility (*innascibilitas*), and in expounding the others he similarly labors. But it seems that what moved him was that St. Augustine, when treating of attributes of this sort, everywhere calls them "the properties of the Persons." But by "proper" St. Augustine understood not what we call "properties," but those things which, as we said, are accommodated peculiarly (*accommodatio*) to the persons. Moreover, the use of this accommodation is that we may be more helped toward understanding the properties of the persons. For since all our conception of God ought to be sought from created things, from which we can scarcely understand anything about God, besides those things which pertain to the essence, it seemed good, for the purpose of making known the persons, to employ those essential attributes which seem more to agree with their properties; and that for a similar reason to that by which we taught above, at Distinction Three, that the image (*imago*) and vestige (*vestigium*) of the Trinity are found in creatures. Thus teaches St. Thomas.⁴

§ III — The appropriations assigned by Hilary are explained (Appropriata ab Hilario assignata explicantur)

§ 9. Four principal triads of appropriations (*appropriationes*) are wont to be assigned, about which one may see St. Thomas (throughout article 8 of the question just now cited).⁶ For since in creatures four things occur to be considered by us—namely, first, that each of them is a certain being; then that it is one thing; third, inasmuch as there is in it a power for operating and causing; and fourth, inasmuch as the things caused themselves regard their effects—in a similar way a fourfold consideration concerning God occurs to us. Therefore according to the first consideration, whereby God is considered absolutely, as being, the Holy Doctor judges that the appropriations assigned by Hilary are to be taken, which are eternity, species, and use. But to the second consideration, whereby He is considered as one, he says there pertain the appropriations handed down by St. Augustine, which are unity, equality, and concord or connection. To the third, indeed, whereby there is considered in God a power sufficient for causing, there pertain these three, power, wisdom, goodness. Finally, to the fourth, whereby He is considered as He regards His effects, there pertain those set down by the Apostle: "of whom, and through whom, and in whom"—so that in all these, what is first is appropriated to the Father, what is second to the Son, what is third to the Holy Spirit. But the first triad, which Hilary posited (at the beginning of book 2 On the Trinity), has more difficulty than the others. Now it is set down by him in these words: "Infinity in the Eternal, 'species' in the Image, 'use' in the Gift."⁷

§ 10. Treating and expounding this assignment of Hilary, St. Augustine, book 6 (On the Trinity, chapter 10), and from St. Augustine the Master in this distinction expressed what was appropriated to the Father by another name, assigning "eternity" to the Father in place of "infinity." Yet they signified the same thing; for that is called eternal which is infinite in duration.⁸

§ 11. Moreover, these can be accommodated severally to the three persons (*personae*). Eternity, or infinity, is appropriated to the Father on account of the congruity which it has with the property (*proprietas*) of the Father. For just as the Father has no principle (*principium*) from which He originates, and on that account is called "innascible" (*innascibilis*) and "unbegotten," so eternity has no beginning from which it began. Whence also eternity is by us more easily understood in the unbegotten Father than in the begotten Son, or in the Holy Spirit proceeding by procession (*processio*).

§ 12. But "species," or beauty, is appropriated to the Son, who is the image (*imago*) of the Father. In order that the rationale of this may be explained, it must be noted with St. Thomas (in the place above) that three things are required for beauty in corporeal things.⁹ First, that a thing be perfect in its genus. The second, that it have a fitting proportion of limbs or parts. The third, that it have a sweet and pleasing color. These three are found in the Son of God by a likeness of rationale. For, first, the Son of God is most perfect in Himself; then, since He is the image of the Father, He represents Him most perfectly. For on this account in corporeal things we call that image beautiful which perfectly represents its exemplar; even if perchance the thing represented be deformed, and much more if it itself also be marked by beauty. Therefore, since the Son of God is the most perfect image of a thing—not of just any, but of the most excellent and most beautiful, that is, of God the Father—it follows that in Him there is the highest beauty befitting an image. The third rationale of beauty is in Him, because, as "light from light," and, as the Wise Man speaks, chapter 7, "as brightness from eternal light," He proceeds.¹⁰ And indeed this chiefly befits Him, inasmuch as He is the most excellent Word (*Verbum*), emanating from the Father as from the first and highest mind. For in spiritual things, the

appellation of "light" is most manifestly ascribed to the mind and to the word of the mind. Whence also by the Apostle, Heb. 1, Christ is called "the Splendor of the glory" of the Father.¹¹

§ 13. Furthermore, Hilary appropriated "use" (*usus*) to the Holy Spirit, when he says, "use in the Gift." How this is to be taken is not sufficiently clear. St. Augustine, in the place a little earlier cited, examining Hilary's meaning in the said words, does not distinguish "use" from fruit or enjoyment (*fruitio*); but he thinks that by "use" enjoyment itself is understood—not that by which men enjoy God, but that by which God the Father and the Son most blessedly rest in the Holy Spirit. For just as each created thing naturally desires something in which it may rest with joy and sweetness, desiring nothing further, so we can, in a human manner, conceive of the Holy Spirit as a terminus (*terminus*), so that their will is not borne toward producing another person, but rests most fully in Him as in the terminus of a common action and production; inasmuch as in Him, proceeding from both, both the nature is the same and the highest felicity. By which consideration St. Augustine says that the Holy Spirit is "a certain ineffable embrace of the Father and the Image." And again he calls the same One "the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten."⁸

§ 14. From this interpretation of Hilary's appropriations, there has been taken by certain Doctors that triad, differing in words, that to the Father there belongs "to be" (*esse*), to the Son "to be fittingly" (*esse convenienter*), to the Holy Spirit "to be delectably" (*esse delectabiliter*). The rationale is evident from what has been said: because, since the Father is a principle without principle, "to be" absolutely is rightly accommodated to Him. But since the Son proceeds by way of likeness, "to be fittingly" is rightly attributed to Him by this peculiar rationale. And since the Holy Spirit proceeds after the manner of love, rest, and end, "to be delectably" is rightly accommodated to Him.

§ 15. Nevertheless, although these are said appositely, it is likely, however, that Hilary had regard to something else in the name "use," which he appropriated to the Holy Spirit; and that he rather wished to signify that the Holy Spirit is for men the author of every good use, of all the gifts which are conferred upon them by God, so that by using these rightly they may attain to the enjoyment of the highest good.

§ 16. Therefore the sense of these words, "use in the Gift," seems to be this here. "In the Gift," that is, in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as gift, there is regarded that He is the author of every good use of the gifts received from God; so that to Him to whom their bestowal is wont to be attributed, to the same also the good use of them may be ascribed.

§ 17. That Hilary thought this in these words is altogether probable, both from this, because he sets "use" "in the Gift." Now the Holy Spirit is a gift, or a donum, which is used not by those who give—namely, the Father and the Son—but by those who receive the thing given, that is, men; and most of all because the things which follow in St. Hilary require this sense, and especially that which toward the end of the same book, speaking about the Holy Spirit and His gifts, he says: "Therefore let us use such liberal gifts, and let us seek the use of the most necessary Gift." Then finally because the Holy Spirit is considered by Hilary as the third person, from whom no other person proceeds. Whence he accommodates to Him a name which signifies the going-forth and communication of His gifts into creatures. And the rationale of this accommodation is, because just as love, which is the origin of all liberality and of all donation, proceeds from the mind and from the word of the mind, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

§ IV — How Augustine says that the image is made equal to the exemplar, not conversely (Quomodo dicat Augustinus imaginem coaequari exemplari, non contra)

§ 18. What St. Thomas says above (in the place cited), that St. Augustine says that the image (*imago*) is made equal (*coaequari*) to him of whom it is the image, that is, to the exemplar (*exemplar*), not conversely that that [exemplar] be made equal to its image, can be asked how it is to be understood, since equality (*aequalitas*) and likeness (*similitudo*) stand on both sides, and it cannot come about that an equal should not correspond to an equal and a like to a like. However, in that view St. Augustine seems to have had regard to certain words of Hilary in the book *On the Synods* not far from the beginning, which are as follows: "The image, with respect to that of which it is imaged, is indistinguishable in species. For no one is an image of himself, but along with him of whom he is the image it must be that the image be shown. Therefore an image is a conceived and undivided likeness of a thing to a thing to be made equal," and so forth.¹³ Therefore, to the doubt one must answer first, that St. Augustine does not deny that the exemplar is equal and like to the image, but he denies [that it is said] "to be made equal" and "to be made like" (*assimilari*). For the Father, who is the exemplar of the Son as of an image, did not receive from the Son through any procession that He be like and equal to Him; whereas, on the contrary, the Son receives this from the Father through generation, namely that He be "made equal" and "made like": for to be made equal and to be made like is to receive equality and likeness. Thus, following the Master (of the Sentences), St. Thomas teaches as much in I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3.¹²

§ 19. Then it must be noted, that, as St. Dionysius teaches, although equality and likeness recur among the divine persons—because the nature of God is not more perfect in one person than in another—yet they do not recur between God and creatures. For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as in some way they participate in the forms and perfections of their causes. Yet, on the contrary, causes are not wont to be said to be like their effects, because the name of "likeness" between two unequal things is attributed rather to the more imperfect than to the more perfect. And in this way it is a relative of disparity, of the kind that an image is with respect to the exemplar. Whence the same St. Dionysius teaches that men indeed are said to be like to God, namely on account of the imitation of divine perfection, according to that: "Be ye perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect," yet not, conversely, that God is said to be like to us. For we do not read that God is good, just, perfect, and the like, as we are. Something of this sort, however, is said between the Son and the Father—not, indeed, as between unequal things, but—in that respect in which the Father is the principle and cause of the Son, not conversely.¹⁴

§ V — The appropriations assigned by St. Augustine are explained (Appropriata ab Augustino assignata explicantur)

§ 20. The second ternion of appropriations is handed on by St. Augustine in Book 1 of *On Christian Doctrine*, ch. 5, in these words: "In the Father there is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality."¹⁵ The rationale of these can be explained thus. Unity (*unitas*) is ascribed to the Father in a peculiar way; because, just as unity requires nothing beforehand, but is itself the principle (*principium*) of number, so the Father is of no other, and presupposes no person (*persona*), but He Himself is the principle of the other persons. Equality (*aequalitas*) is attributed to the Son, because, in order that something be equal, another thing is necessarily required to which it be equal; nor can equality subsist except

between two at the least. In this way the Son necessarily presupposes the person of the Father distinct from Himself, and in Him plurality first arises, because the Son proceeds from the Father alone, and indeed immediately. To this rationale there also accrues that, just as equality—that is, perfect proportion—is especially observed in the image (*imago*) with respect to the exemplar, so in the Son, as in the natural and most absolute image of the Father, His equality with the Father shines forth. To the Holy Spirit St. Augustine attributes the concord (*concordia*) of unity and equality, both because the connection, which is signified by the name of concord, cannot exist unless there pre-exist two things which are connected, to which very concord, as a third, accedes. For thus the Holy Spirit, the two persons—the Father and the Son—coming together into the same spiration (*spiratio*), accedes as the third person, as it were the concord of the two; and because the Holy Spirit proceeds after the manner of love, whose office it is to glue together the hearts of many and, as it were, to make them one.

§ 21. But as to what St. Augustine subjoins: "These three are all one on account of the Father, all equal on account of the Son, all connected on account of the Holy Spirit," it must not be taken as though by the expression "on account of" he had wished to signify the cause or principle whence unity, equality, and connection exist in the divine persons. For although from the Father the other persons receive, as they receive the nature, so also unity, nevertheless neither is the Father Himself the principle and cause of unity for Himself; nor do the other persons receive equality from the Son; nor do they receive from the Holy Spirit the connection of unity and equality—since it is established that neither does the Father receive anything from the Son or the Holy Spirit, nor does the Son receive anything from the Holy Spirit; but the Son receives all from the Father, and the Holy Spirit all from the Father and the Son.

§ 22. The sense therefore seems to be this: All three persons are one by the unity which, for the aforesaid reason, is appropriated to the Father; they are equal by the equality which, as has been said, is accommodated to the Son; they are connected and concordant by the concord which we have shown to be accommodated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore these three are said in a peculiar way to be in the Divinity on account of those persons in whom the rationale of them more appears and is more readily known by us. The remaining orders of appropriations are left, namely the third, of which we shall treat with the Master below at Distinction 34, and the fourth, of which at Distinction 36. There occur also other ternaries of appropriations in the sacred authors, as in St. Cyprian in the Sermon on the Baptism of Christ, and in the ecclesiastical Office of the Most Holy Trinity, and elsewhere; the rationales of which it will not be difficult for the studious, by inquiry, to discover.¹⁶

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 42.

2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 6; VI, chs. 4–5.

3. "s. B." [abbreviation as in source], referring to the Master (of the Sentences), i.e., Peter Lombard.

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 7.

5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 8.

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 8 (throughout).

7. Rom. 11:36: "For of him, and through him, and in him are all things."; St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* II (at the beginning).

8. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 10.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 39, a. 8 (as above).

10. Wis. 7:26 ("a brightness of eternal light").
11. Heb. 1:3 ("the Splendor of [the Father's] glory").
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3.
13. St. Hilary, De Synodis, near the beginning.
14. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ch. 9; Matt. 5:48.
15. St. Augustine, De doctrina christiana I, ch. 5.
16. St. Cyprian, Sermon on the Baptism of Christ [abbreviation as in source: "Sermo de Baptismo Christi"]; The ecclesiastical Office of the Most Holy Trinity [abbreviation as in source: "in officio Ecclesiastico de Sanctissima Trinitate"].

DISTINCTIO XXXII — WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON LOVE EACH OTHER IN THE HOLY SPIRIT; AND WHETHER THE FATHER IS WISE WITH BEGOTTEN WISDOM

§ I — Whether the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit (Utrum Pater & Filius se mutuo diligant Spiritu sancto?)

§ 1. The question which the Master (of the Sentences) above raised in its place (Distinction 10), and now repeats, must be explained: Whether it is rightly said that the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*). For some statements of St. Augustine seem to assert this: of which sort are found in book 5 (On the Trinity, chapter 11), book 6, chapter 10, book 7, chapter 3, and in On Christian Doctrine, book 1, chapter 5, in which places he says that the Holy Spirit is the concord, and the embrace, and the communion of the Father and the Son.² But he more plainly proves what he says in book 6 (On the Trinity, chapter 5): that the Holy Spirit is that by which (namely the Father and the Son) are joined, that by which the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and in turn loves His Begetter, and that by which, as by His own gift, the Father and the Son keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace; and in book 15 (chapter 17): "The Holy Spirit," he says, "intimates to us the common [charity], by which the Father and the Son love each other mutually," where "charity" (*caritas*) and "love" (*dilectio*) are spoken of.³ In like manner the Commentary ascribed to St. Jerome (on Ps. 17 at the beginning) bears witness that the Holy Spirit is the love (*dilectio*) which the Father has toward the Son and the Son toward the Father.⁴ Such also is what St. Bernard (Sermon 8 on the Song) says, that the most intimate [union], that is, the Holy Spirit.⁵

§ 2. These and the like places not only seem to establish the affirmative side of the above-said question, but also have given occasion for asking more generally: Whether the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit each loves Himself, and whatever other things are different from Himself, in the Holy Spirit. For the sake of which it must be noted that the ablative "in the Holy Spirit" can be understood in this question in almost three ways. First, so that there be signified the relation of a producing principle; as when we say that iron or water is made hot by fire. Second, so that it be the mark of the formal cause (*causa formalis*); as when someone is said to be strong by strength, and learned by knowledge. Third, so that it denote the effect or the thing produced, whose denomination is attributed to the cause; as when we say that a tree blossoms by its flowers, because, to wit, it produces the flowers by which it is denominated as blossoming.

§ 3. With this declaration premised, one must answer: first of all, it is certain and undoubted that the Father and the Son neither love each other, nor themselves, nor anything whatsoever else "in the Holy Spirit" according to the first way. For they do not receive from the Holy Spirit, as from a productive principle, that they should love; but rather, on the contrary, the Holy Spirit receives from the Father and the Son, together with the Nature, also this, that He should love both Himself, and the Father, and the Son, and whatsoever

other things. But neither can this be understood according to the second way. For the Father and the Son formally love with that love (*dilectio*) which is the Divine Nature—even if we improperly name the formal character (*ratio formalis*) in divine things, since there love and to love are not distinct. But we speak thus, because the one, in reference to the other, is represented to our intellect after the mode of a formal cause. As to the third way, it can in a certain sense be conceded that the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit, namely if "to love" (*diligere*) is taken not essentially, but notionally. For the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, who is called not only by appropriation but even by His own proper name "charity" and "love" (as was said at Distinction 10). Therefore, since to love is to produce love, just as to blossom is to put forth flowers, it can thus be said that the Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit, by this fact that they produce love, that is, the Holy Spirit; just as a tree is said to blossom "by its flowers," because it brings forth from itself its own flowers; so that "to love" or "to have love" in discourse of this kind is a notional name, signifying the same as that by which the Father and the Son are said to love each other in the Holy Spirit, and nothing else will be signified than that the Father and the Son by one and concordant action produce the Holy Spirit, who is Love (*amor*). But in this way the Holy Spirit does not love, neither Himself nor anything else, because He does not produce from Himself another person.

§ 4. Thus St. Thomas explains (writing on the present distinction, and in I, q. 37, a. 2), and his commentators Cajetan and Bañez; even if Durandus and Scotus protest, who only grant this proposition to be true improperly: "The Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit," and they say that it was retracted by St. Augustine in a similar case, which will be treated in the next chapter.⁶ Assuredly, the propriety of the locution is argued by a similar expression in St. Augustine, book 7 (On the Trinity, ch. 1 and 3), when he says that "the Father alone says by the Word both Himself and whatever other things," because the Father alone begot the Word, by which He manifested Himself and all other things; so that "to say by the Word" is nothing other than "to beget the Word." And St. Augustine retracted that very locution, or one like it, in a similar case.⁷ Hence, moreover, it can consequently be deduced that St. Augustine—who, as was said (at Distinction 10), does not seem anywhere to have used the names "charity" (*caritas*) and "love" (*dilectio*) as the proper name of the Holy Spirit—yet, in the above-cited places in which he says that the Father and the Son love each other mutually in the Holy Spirit, employed this name "to love" (*diligere*) as a notional [name], just as also "to say," when he says that "the Father alone says by the Word." The given reply is also confirmed by this, that the same St. Augustine, book 15 (On the Trinity, ch. 7), writes thus: "Who would dare to say that the Father neither loves Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, except through the Holy Spirit?" For by these words he sufficiently signifies that the Father loves through the Holy Spirit, but not only through the Holy Spirit: because, to wit, if "to love" is taken notionally, He loves through the Holy Spirit in the sense lately set forth; but if essentially, He loves through essential love, not through the Holy Spirit; lest—which is absurd—He also be said to be essentially "through the Holy Spirit"; just as the Master correctly argues (at the end of § A), whose words from the place "good, great," etc., are wrongly connected in our codices under the same clause with the words of St. Augustine there cited, as though written by the same.⁸

§ 5. But each of these can rightly be said: namely, that the Father and the Son love each other by their own essence, and that they love each other by their own proper gift, that is, the Holy Spirit—so plainly affirmed that it seems there is no further room for doubt.

§ II — Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom (Utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita)

§ 6. There is asked a question partly similar, partly dissimilar, to the foregoing question: Whether the Father is wise with begotten wisdom (*sapientia*). Similar indeed in this, that both "to be wise" and "to love" are essential names. Dissimilar, however, in this, that "to be wise" is never taken notionally in divine things, as we said this name "to love" (*diligere*) is sometimes taken. In resolving this question the Master toils much. But the absolute and indubitable response is that the Father is not rightly said to be wise with begotten wisdom. The reason is that, since for the Father to be wise is the same as to be, if He were wise with begotten wisdom, it would follow that He simply is through begotten wisdom, that is, through the Son—which is most absurd. For not the Father from the Son, but the Son from the Father receives to-be (*esse*).

§ 7. By the same reasoning it must be denied that the Father is powerful by the power which He begot, or good by the goodness which He produced by spiration. For these names "to be powerful," "to be good," and the like, are essential only. And accordingly the locutions just mentioned receive no other sense than that by which, through ablatives, the producing principle or the formal character is signified; in which either sense it is established that they are false. Thus teaches St. Augustine, book 6 (On the Trinity, ch. 1 and 2), book 7, ch. 1 and 3, and book 15, ch. 7.¹⁰

§ 8. Finally, in book 1 (Retractions, ch. 26) he retracts what he had said in book (Eighty-Three Questions, q. 23): that God is wise by the wisdom which He Himself begot; sending the reader to a more exact treatment of the same question in the books On the Trinity.¹¹ But what the same St. Augustine says, Sermon 63 (On Diverse Subjects, ch. 12): that God is the Father of His Word, and of His Wisdom, and of His Power—does not stand against our reply. For the sense is not that He is the Father of His Wisdom, that is, by which He is wise, and of His Power, that is, by which He is powerful; but "of His," that is, begotten from Himself, just as He is the Father of His Word, that is, produced from Himself.¹²

§ 9. Nor does that stand in the way, that the Fathers—at times, as St. Hilary, book 12 (On the Trinity, near the end), and others—prove against the Arians from this, that God had the Son from eternity; otherwise God would at some time have been without wisdom and power, since the Son, according to the Scriptures, is the Power (*virtus*) and Wisdom (*sapientia*) of the Father. For they do not understand by this that there is wisdom distinct from that wisdom which is the Father, but one and the same; if begotten wisdom be taken away, that is, the wisdom which is the Son, there is also taken away the wisdom by which the Father is, and by which the Father is wise. Nor indeed does it follow: The Father is wise through wisdom; but the Son is that same wisdom; therefore the Father is wise through begotten wisdom. The vice of the argument is in this, that, as the dialecticians say, "the appellation is changed": for although "wisdom" is an essential name, nevertheless, when "begotten" is added to it, it puts on the condition of a personal name. But from an essential name to a personal one, argumentation does not proceed legitimately whenever something is joined to the essential name which does not have the same formal character in all the persons. Therefore it will be no more consequent that the Father is wise with begotten wisdom than that the Father simply is through the Son. Moreover, in what sense it is rightly said that the Son is begotten wisdom can be understood from what has been said (at Distinction 5). For just as essence (*essentia*) properly neither begets nor is begotten, so neither does wisdom; but only in this sense, because the Father, who is wisdom, begets, and the Son, who is the same wisdom, is begotten. But because wisdom is appropriated to the Son, it is more accepted that the Son be called begotten wisdom than

that the Father be called begetting wisdom. More fittingly, however, the Father is called unbegotten wisdom, just as [He is called] unbegotten nature, as was explained at Distinction 28.

§ III — Whether it is rightly said that the Son acts from Himself (An recte dicatur Filius agere a seipso?)

§ 10. Although it is undoubted that the Son of God, together with the very nature, receives by being begotten from the Father His every operation, nevertheless the question can not without reason be asked whether it can be conceded that the Son acts, or operates, from Himself (*a se ipso*). And that this is so can be confirmed by these arguments. First: because the Son is the principle and cause of His own operations. Then because we too, although whatever good we do we receive from God, yet rightly does the Apostle acknowledge (2 Cor. 3) that we are not able to think anything good of ourselves; yet not as if of ourselves, that is, as if we had received this very thing from no other — just as also St. Augustine confesses, in Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 22, that it lies within our power to change the will unto good, which power nevertheless is from God.¹³ Wherefore, similarly, although the Son has received all things from the Father, nothing nevertheless hinders His being said to operate from Himself: the Father gave Him to have in Himself that by which He would act together with the Father. There is added the authority of Basil, who in Book 4 against Eunomius asserts that the Son acts from Himself.¹⁴ Nay rather, St. Methodius in the homily on Simeon and Anna so addresses Christ: "From Thyself, and not according to grace, from Thyself, O King of all." [^15]

§ 11. But indeed Sacred Scripture seems to confirm the negative part of the question; for in John 5 Christ says of Himself: "The Son cannot do anything." And again: "I do nothing from myself." And in the same chapter: "From myself I do nothing, but as the Father taught me, so I speak." And in John 14: "From myself I do not speak; the Father abiding in me, he himself does the works." Of the Holy Spirit: "For he shall not speak from himself, but whatever things he shall hear, he shall speak." These passages St. Hilary, throughout his books On the Trinity, and St. Augustine, On John, understand so as to signify that the Son according to the divine nature has from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, whatever He has; with whom agree Didymus, Book 2 On the Holy Spirit, and Basil, On the Holy Spirit, ch. 8.¹⁶ Yet again St. Hilary, Book 9 On the Trinity (about the middle), admits that the Son Himself acts, yet nevertheless explicitly denies [that He acts] from Himself.¹⁷ However, St. Chrysostom, Cyril, and the other Greeks writing on John take the scriptural sentences just cited in another sense — namely, so as to signify that the Son in the assumed nature does nothing which is diverse from the will of the Father, as men do when they carry out their own and not God's will; which sense St. Ambrose too seems to embrace, Book 4 On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 3.¹⁸ But this latter sense follows upon the former. For it is for this very reason that the Son of God is not able to do anything diverse from the will of God: because the Son of God is the same [God], having the same nature with the Father.

§ 12. But as to the proposed question, one must answer with a distinction. In what sense, then, does the Son act from Himself, whatever He acts? He acts, I say, from Himself (*a se ipso*), because He has in Himself — although received from the Father — namely, the divine nature, [by which He acts].¹⁹ He does not, however, act not from Himself, as if from Himself; because this very thing which He works He does not have from Himself in such a way as not to have received it from another author, since it is certain that He has received from the Father the nature by which He operates, and the very act of operating. Furthermore, "wise from

Himself" (*sapiens a se ipso*) cannot similarly be said; because this name does not signify an operation tending outward (*ad extra*), but an immanent quality, which is the same as His essence. Nor can it be said that the Son has in Himself the principle of His wisdom, as He is said to have in Himself the principle of operation; because, as for nature, so for wisdom, the Son has no principle except from the Father. Wherefore, if anywhere among the Fathers this expression occurs, it must be expounded in that sense in which it is said that God is, and is wise, from Himself — namely, because He has essence and wisdom in such wise that He has not received it from another, that is, from someone other than Himself. But to be in itself (*per se*) and to be wise in itself (*per se sapiens esse*) is said most rightly both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, because by their own nature it is so; and much more can to act in itself (*per se agere*) be truly and suitably attributed to both. Whence, although the Son is not to be called "wise from Himself" (*a seipso sapiens*), nevertheless He is rightly called "wise of Himself" (*seipso sapiens*), that is, by His own nature. See other matters pertaining hither at Distinction 4, where it was shown against the Autotheans that the Son does not act, nor is, from Himself.²⁰

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 2.
 2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 11; VI, ch. 10; VII, ch. 3; *On Christian Doctrine* I, ch. 5.
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 5; XV, ch. 17.
 4. [Pseudo-]Jerome, In Psalmum 17, at the beginning.
 5. St. Bernard, *Sermons on the Song of Songs*, Sermon 8.
 6. St. Thomas, In I Sent., on the present Distinction; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 2; Cajetan, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 2; Bañez, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 2; Durandus (of Saint-Pourçain); Scotus, In I Sent. [abbreviation as in source].
 7. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VII, ch. 1, 3; cf. his retraction on a similar locution, as noted by Estius.
 8. The Master (Peter Lombard), at the end of § A [abbreviation as in source]; the words beginning "bonus, magnus," etc., are in some codices wrongly connected with the words of St. Augustine there cited.
 9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 2, ad 1.
 10. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 1–2; VII, ch. 1, 3; XV, ch. 7.
 11. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 26; *Eighty-Three Questions*, q. 23.
 12. St. Augustine, *Sermon 63, De diversis*, ch. 12; St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* XII, near the end.
 13. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 22.
 14. St. Basil, *Contra Eunomium* IV.
 15. St. Methodius, *Homily on Simeon and Anna*.
 16. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* [passim]; St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*; Didymus the Blind, *De Spiritu Sancto* II; St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ch. 8.
 17. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IX, near the middle.
 18. St. John Chrysostom, *Homilies on John*; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Commentary on John* [abbreviation as in source]; St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* IV, ch. 3.
 19. On the Autotheans, the author whose class they are reckoned with at length both reports and refutes their error, and censures it by the most illustrious testimonies of the Fathers and of Councils; and more recently likewise others of the same leaven of heretics are rebuked by "charias Boyerius de Unitate Relig. (Athe lic. Praescript. adversus haereticos tom. 1. theani fol. 66., & in calce ejusdem tom. us, per" [abbreviation as in source].
 20. See above, Distinctio 4, where it was shown against the Autotheans that the Son does not act, nor is, from Himself.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII — ON THE DIVINE RELATIONS: THAT THEY ARE REALLY DISTINCT, AND THAT THE PERSONAL RELATIONS ARE NOT REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE PERSONS NOR FROM THE ESSENCE

§ I — That the relations of the Persons in God are really distinct (Relationes personarum in Divinis re ipsa distinctas esse)

§ 1. Just as in the foregoing it has often and very clearly been declared that the divine Persons (*personae divinae*) are not only by reason but in reality (*re ipsa*) distinct among themselves, so likewise one must say the same concerning the relations (*relationes*) themselves, from which the difference of the Persons is taken; against the heresy of Sabellius, who set only a rational difference, as well among the Persons as among the relations. Moreover there is the same proof (*probatio*) about both, the Persons as well as the relations. For if the relations are distinguished only by reason, the Persons, whose difference is taken from opposed relations, will not be able to be distinguished otherwise than by reason. But now that the Persons are not distinguished only by reason, but in reality, was long ago defined against Sabellius by various Councils; wherefore also the relations, from which the distinction of the Persons is received, must of necessity be distinguished in reality.²

§ 2. Then too the very ratio of the origin (*ratio originis*) of the Persons both requires and proves this. For since the Persons are distinguished by this, and have a mutual relation, that one produces another, and in turn another proceeds from another, and the same cannot be principle to itself so as to be, or to proceed, from itself; it manifestly follows that not only among the Persons but also among the relations themselves a real difference must be acknowledged. Accordingly, whatsoever testimonies of Scripture declare the origin of one Person from another, these very same insinuate to us the real distinction of the Persons—and those especially which so signify that one is or acts from another, as to deny that it is or acts from itself; of which kind are those out of which (in the preceding Distinction) it was shown that the Son does not act from Himself; which would in every way be false, if the Father and the Son were really one and the same.

§ 3. From these things moreover it follows that not only does a real difference consist among the personal relations (*relationes personales*), but also that the relations themselves are real, that is, of such a kind as, anticipating every operation of a created intellect, really to exist. For a real distinction of the Persons could not be sought from relations which are feigned in the divine by the consideration of our mind alone. More fully of these matters St. Thomas treats, where he teaches that the relations which are in the divine are real, from the fact that they are taken according to processions in an identity of nature; and in the third article, where, further, from the fact that the relations are real, he infers a real opposition, which cannot be where there is not

a real distinction. Whence, he says, it must be that in God there be a real distinction, not indeed according to the absolute thing (*res absoluta*), which is the essence (*essentia*), in which there is highest unity and simplicity, but according to the relative thing (*res relativa*).³

§ II — The personal relations are not really distinct from the Persons nor from the Essence (Relationes Personales nec a Personis, nec ab Essentia re ipsa distingui)

§ 4. Besides the real distinction (*distinctio realis*) of the three Persons among themselves, the Catholic Faith acknowledges no other real difference in the divine. Accordingly the relations, or personal properties (*proprietates personales*), are not distinguished in reality, but by reason alone, from the Persons to whom they belong, as paternity from the Father, filiation from the Son. For in the divine the Father really is the same as paternity, and the Son the same as filiation, and altogether the three personal relations are nothing other than the three Persons. This is certain from that Catholic doctrine, which acknowledges in the divine only three things really distinct, to wit three Persons, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But if from these also their properties were really distinct, now not a Trinity, but a quaternity, and even some greater number, would arise in the divine. Which is condemned in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in the first and second chapter.⁵

§ 5. Already from the same foundation this also most certainly follows, that the personal relations are not really distinct from the divine essence. For since they are not distinguished from the Persons; but the Persons are the divine essence; it follows also that the personal relations are the divine essence. But that the Persons are not distinguished from the essence was proved at Distinction Five, in the refutation of the error of Abbot Joachim, and also at Distinction Eight, where there was treatment of the simplicity of the divine nature. From the things said there is also refuted the error of those who taught that a Person is composed of essence and property—namely, supposing the property to be really distinct from the essence—and in this way introducing a real composition into the mystery of the Trinity, in which we ought to believe there to be highest simplicity, and removed from all composition.

§ 6. Moreover, that we may in some measure understand how the three relations, really distinct, are one numerically and most simple essence, it must be noted that whatever is in creatures and does not involve imperfection is in God in the most excellent mode: for example, wisdom (*sapientia*) is in men, but imperfect; in God, however, it is most perfect; so that there it is not one thing to be wise and another to be wisdom, and again another to be wisdom and another to be essence; but all these are one and the same thing. Now this also has place in respectives, as to be Father, to be Son (*esse Patrem, esse Filium*). Since therefore God is a highest and most perfect thing, and therefore also most simple, it is necessary that all things, both relatives and absolutes, be one in God; yet so that the nature of relatives be saved, which consists in this, that opposed relations be distinguished among themselves, and, moreover, distinguish the things to which they are ascribed. Whence it follows that all things are one in God in such a way that nevertheless the real distinction must be acknowledged, which the nature of relatives requires. This proof, explained in more words, may be seen in St. Thomas, where he teaches that relation in God is the same as His essence. But that the relations are the same as the Persons, he teaches elsewhere.⁶

§ II — The errors are refuted concerning the things by which the Persons are distinguished (Refelluntur errores circa ea, quibus Personae distinguuntur)

§ 7. Concerning the distinction of the Divine Persons (*personae Divinae*), not only Sabellius erred, who altogether did away with it and located it in a mere figment of human reason, but others also, who, while confessing that it is true and real, have not attempted to defend and to explain it in sufficiently catholic fashion. For, to pass over Arius the heretic, who taught that the persons are distinguished essentially, as the Creator differs from the creature, certain more recent men said that the persons are distinguished not by relations (*relationes*), but by certain absolutes, positing these not only as distinct in themselves, but even as separate from the essence (*essentia*) and from the persons. Which opinion is altogether absurd and alien to the sense of the Church. For neither the Fathers nor the Councils acknowledged anything absolute in the things of God which they did not make common to the three persons. Others indeed admitted that the persons receive distinction from relations, but said that these relations are in very reality distinguished from the essence and from the persons; to wit, that they are not internal to God, or to the Divine persons, but, as they said, are affixed to them from without. The author of this error was Gilbert of Poitiers (Gilbertus Porretanus), Bishop of Poitiers, who also went forward to such an absurdity as to deny that the very Divinity (*Divinitas*) is God. This error of his St. Bernard recounts and refutes in Sermon 80 (on the Canticles), adding that, he being present, that man at length recanted his errors in the Council of Reims convoked by order of Eugene III.⁸

§ 8. But that you may see clearly this his error, of which we are now treating, it must be noted that in created relations (*relationes*) two things are to be considered: the one, that they are accidents (*accidentia*); the other, that their nature consists in a reference to another. The former is common to them with many other things, namely with absolute accidents; but the latter is proper to relatives (*relativa*), that is, to things that are to something (*ad aliquid*).

§ 9. Now indeed whatever is an accident (*accidens*) in creatures, when attributed to God, is substance (*substantia*), as power, wisdom (*sapientia*), goodness, and the rest. Wherefore relation also, inasmuch as in creatures it is an accident and something inhaerent, if in this manner it be attributed to God, is substance, as paternity (*paternitas*), filiation (*filiatio*). Moreover, besides this, relation retains in God even the proper formal character (*ratio*) of those things that are to something, whereby namely it comes about that by it a person regards a person as something distinct from himself, and, as they speak, extrinsic.

§ 10. Now Porretanus had so before his eyes this proper formal character of relatives that he did not consider that other aspect which is common to them with absolute accidents, namely, to inhere and to be internal to that to which it is befitting; by which common formal character it has already been shown that relation attributed to God is His very substance. And from this foundation this error is rightly refuted; as St. Thomas learnedly does (q. 28, a. 2). Moreover, to the refutation of this error there pertain the things that were said against the opinion of Abbot Joachim (above, Distinction 5), and the things concerning the simplicity of the Divine essence (above, Distinction 8), and, in the present distinction, the things concerning the identity of relations with the essence and with the persons.⁹

§ 11. Finally, by the same argument by which St. Bernard (in the sermon aforementioned) proves that the Divinity is God—namely, that it is not something other than God—by the same, equivalently, it is proved that paternity is the Father; and so of the other relations. And from the very many places of St. Augustine, by which this same point can be shown, it shall suffice for the present what is read in him in book II (of the City

of God, ch. 10), where he expressly teaches that for this reason the nature of God is simple, that in it there is not one thing that has, and another thing that is had; except that relatively one is said to another. Since therefore paternity is not said relatively to the Father, but only to the Son, it is established that there it is not one thing to be Father (*esse Patrem*) and another paternity (*paternitas*); but this is that. The same judgment holds for the rest.⁸

§ IV — Reply to the objections on the contrary (Responsio ad objectiones in contrarium)

§ 12. The authors of the aforesaid error seem to have been moved by almost these reasons. First. The persons are determined and distinguished by properties; therefore the properties must be distinct from the persons, since no thing can be determined, or be distinguished, by itself. But an easy reply is given: that a thing can be determined and distinguished not only by another, but also by itself. For if the distinction of things exists only through other things, there will be an infinite regress; because even those things, or the distinguishing forms, will have to be distinguished through other further ones. Wherefore, when we say that the divine persons (*personae*) are distinguished and determined by properties (*proprietaes*), we are truly saying nothing other than that the persons are distinguished and determined by themselves: just as in created things the simple forms and the properties of individuals are distinguished by themselves from others. Nevertheless we rather say that the persons are distinguished by properties than the reverse; because to distinguish befits properties, as they are such, whereas it befits persons, or supposits, to be distinguished by those.

§ 13. Second. The three persons do not differ in essence (*essentia*), but they do differ by properties; therefore the properties are not the essence. I reply that the conclusion does not follow; because although we confess that the properties are the divine essence, nevertheless they do not signify the essence but relations (*relationes*), and for this reason it is by them that the person is distinguished.

§ 14. Third. If the properties are the divine essence, since this is simple and unique, it will follow that the properties are confounded, so that one is the other, according to the saying: "things which are the same as one and the same third are the same among themselves." Reply: things which agree in the same common thing do not forthwith agree among themselves. Now the essence of God is something common to the three persons, not indeed as a genus or species, but in a certain ineffable way; on which matter enough was said above.¹¹ St. Thomas replies a little otherwise in the First Part (question 28, article 3, to the first); let the reader weigh both solutions.¹² And indeed this argument, if it had any force, would equally conclude that the three persons are not God.¹³

§ 15. Besides these reasons the Porretan adduced the authority of Boethius, who in book I (On the Trinity, chapter 6) affirms that all things which can be attributed to God pass into His substance; but those things which are "towards something" cannot be predicated of God; and things agreeing with this he writes also in chapter ten and eleven of the same book.¹⁴ But one must reply that Boethius did not wish to signify anything else by words of this sort than that relation, considered according only to its own proper formal character, with that namely being set aside which it has in common with the other accidents, cannot be predicated of God as something inhering, but only after the manner of that which is from without and tends toward another; which sense of the Author (from chapter 10) is easily gathered.

§ 16. Finally. If anywhere the Fathers seem to deny that the properties of the persons are the essence of God, they mean nothing else than that the different names in God have a different mode of signifying. For some signify God after the mode of substance, others after the mode of a personal property. And therefore the proper mode of signifying is diverse in these and those. The thing, however, signified is altogether the same.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 3.
 2. Petavius, *Theologia dogmatica*, vol. 1, book 2, ch. 3, no. 3; and book 6, ch. 11, *passim*, where he overwhelms and refutes Calvin, Beza, and Lambert Daneau, and the rest of their followers, by the most evident testimonies; see the same place, and "Zas. 10. exam. 1. Luth." [abbreviation as in source]; likewise "Dominic. Gravin. Catho- (in Catalogo sectar. haereticor. nostri temporis verbo Autol. pag. 647. lit. L.)" [abbreviation as in source].
 3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 1; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 3.
 4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 3; q. 40, a. 1.
 5. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), chs. 1–2.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 1.
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, qq. 28 and 40.
 8. St. Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Song of Songs; Council of Reims (1148), convoked by Pope Eugene III; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* II, ch. 10.
 9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2; See above, *Distinctio* V, against the opinion of Abbot Joachim; See above, *Distinctio* VIII, on the simplicity of the Divine essence.
 10. St. Thomas, in the place cited above [abbreviation as in source].
 11. See above at *Distinctio* 19.
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1.
 13. The place cited by the Author furnishes to the proposed objection this solution. Namely, St. Thomas teaches that the axiom "things which are the same as one and the same third are the same among themselves" holds in those cases which are the same both in reality and in concept, not, however, in those which differ in concept; since, as the Philosopher notes in *Physics* III, text 22, although action and passion are the same in reality—because the motion is the same—yet it does not follow that action and passion are the same, for in action there is imported a respect to that from which the motion is, whereas in passion there is imported a respect to that which is from another. Hence the Holy Doctor infers that, although paternity and filiation are identified with the essence, they are not identified with each other, since in their proper formal characters they import opposite respects. Certainly the reply of St. Thomas seems preferable to the Author's, at least because it explains the matter more clearly, whereas the Author's solution is too involved and does not exhaust the difficulty; for there would still have to be inquiry about that ineffable mode by which he says that the essence is something common to the three persons. But in very truth, from the response of St. Thomas adduced there straightway it appears how that axiom is to be understood, and in what sense it is true that things which are the same as one and the same third are the same among themselves; for it is sufficiently clear that things are the same with the divine essence in one way according to the absolute concept—namely, insofar as the persons have the same numerically one nature—whereas according to the relative concept the persons do not regard the essence but one the other. It is therefore evident from St. Thomas's reply, sufficiently for the capacity of understanding, both that the objection is solved and that the Author's solution is made plain. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 22; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1.
 14. Boethius, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 6; Boethius, *De Trinitate* I, chs. 10–11.

DISTINCTIO XXXIV — ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATURE AND PERSON (*QUID INTERFIT INTER NATURAM, & PERSONAM.*)

§ 1. It has been shown, partly at the preceding distinction and partly elsewhere, that one must not so distinguish between nature (*natura*) and person (*persona*) in God that the one is not the other. In truth, in God nature and person are the same in reality. For unless nature and person were thus the same, it would follow that we ought to confess a quaternity in God, namely three persons and a nature distinct from them. Yet that there is some difference between person and nature is evident even from this, that the ancient heretics, Arians, Sabellians, Nestorians, Eutychians, failing to distinguish these two as was fitting, fell most grievously. For the Arians, from the three hypostases, concluded three ousiai, that is, essences; the Sabellians, from one ousia, [concluded] one hypostasis; the Nestorians, because in Christ there are two natures, likewise posited two persons in Him; finally, the Eutychians thought that the unity of person in Christ could not consist otherwise than if the two natures were contracted into one, or the one were consumed by the other. Briefly, therefore, that distinction, whose ignorance begot these errors, must be explained by us.

§ 2. Therefore in created things, in reality nature is one thing, person another, and in general the supposit (*suppositum*) [another]. For man is not the human nature, nor Peter the nature of Peter. And this too holds in Christ, who, insofar as He is man, is not a nature but only a person, although He has a human nature.

§ 3. But in God, because of His supreme simplicity, person is the same in reality as nature, as St. Thomas rightly teaches.² Whence also St. Augustine, book 7 of *On the Trinity*, says: "When we say the person of the Father, we say nothing else than the substance of the Father." [^3] Wherefore Christ Himself, inasmuch as He is the Son of God, is said not only to have the nature but also to be the very nature, or the divine essence (*essentia*).

§ 4. Nonetheless, even here a distinction of reason must be acknowledged between nature and person. For the formal character of nature is one thing, the formal character of person another. For nature as such is communicable to a supposit or supposits, and subsists in them; but person is the very supposit in which the nature subsists, and is incommunicable, as is clear from its definition set out above.⁴ This distinction of reason brings it about that neither does the distinction of persons in God multiply the natures, nor does the unity of the nature confound the persons. On which matter see more above.⁵

§ II — How Hilary said that nature is one thing, the thing of the nature another (Quomodo Hilarius dixerit aliud esse naturam, aliud rem naturae)

§ 5. Those who distinguish the thing from the nature according to the person (*persona*) misuse, to prove that, the testimony of Hilary, who in book 8 (*On the Trinity*, around the middle) says thus: "It is not the same,

'nature' and 'the thing of the nature' (*natura ... naturae res*), just as it is not the same, 'man' and 'what is man's' (*homo ... quod hominis est*), nor the same, 'fire' and 'what is fire's' (*ignis ... quod ignis ipsius est*); and according to this it is not the same, 'God' and 'what is God's' (*Deus ... quod Dei est*).⁷ In which words they say that by "the thing of the nature" (*res naturae*) is signified the person in which the nature (*natura*) subsists.

§ 6. But replying to this we say that from various places of St. Hilary it is sufficiently established that he does not posit a real distinction between nature and person; which passages, partly in Distinctio 8, partly in the one immediately preceding, have been adduced by the Master. For in book 7 (after the middle) he affirms: "Everything that is in God is one."⁸ And in book 8 (not far from the end) he denies that in God there is one thing which is had from Him and another the very one who has it, but says that "the whole is life," that is, a perfect and infinite nature.⁹ Nay more, in this very place brought forward to the contrary, not far after the words cited, he expressly teaches: "The things that are God's, in such wise as to be within, are not other than what God Himself is."¹⁰ Moreover, he adds "in such wise as to be within" because of creatures, which indeed are God's, but are not within Him intrinsically. Therefore, as to his saying that nature is not the same as the thing of the nature, in what sense it was said must be seen. The Master replies that in those words St. Hilary had regard to the nature of created things, because he subjoined examples from creatures; and therefore he said, "and according to this, God is not the same as what is God's," as if he were saying: if we think of God in a human manner, we shall be forced to admit that God is not the same as what is God's. Others think that St. Hilary only wished to indicate a distinction of reason between nature and person, about which distinction something was said a little above.

§ 7. But more probable is the solution of those who say that Hilary by "the thing of the nature" understood not simply the person (for he did not mean just any person), but that thing, that is, the person, which is produced and proceeds from another, whose nature it shares. For to St. Hilary the Son is the "thing of the Father's nature," and the Holy Spirit the "thing of the nature of the Father and the Son." The same sense is confirmed by the examples produced by St. Hilary of man and fire; where by "what is man's" and "what is fire's" is not rightly understood the suppositum (*suppositum*) of the man or of the fire (for he did not preface the nature of these), but their effects, as a man begotten of man, fire produced from fire. Therefore St. Hilary wished to signify nothing else than that that which proceeds from someone—albeit within unity of nature—is not the same as the producing nature, that is, as him from whom it proceeds in likeness of nature: just as the begotten man is not the same as the begetting man.

§ III — Why is power appropriated to the Father in divine things? (Quare Patri in Divinis approprietur potentia?)

§ 8. Among the appropriated things (*appropriata*) of the Divine persons, this triad—power, wisdom, goodness (*potentia, sapientia, bonitas*)—is most of all in frequent use in Sacred Scripture and in the writings of the Saints; so that power is accommodated to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. To these three, in the same order, there also correspond these three, as if acts of them: creation, redemption, and sanctification or beatification (*creatio, redemptio, et sanctificatio vel beatificatio*).

§ 9. And first indeed, these places of Scripture, and the like, attribute power to the Father: Matt. 11, "I confess to Thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth." And Matt. 26, "Dost thou think that I cannot ask My Father; He will furnish Me now more than twelve legions of Angels?" Mk. 14, "Abba Father, all things are

possible to Thee." And Ps. 88, "Lord God of hosts, who is like to Thee? Thou art mighty, O Lord." That this is said of the Father is made sufficiently clear by what follows in the same psalm. Hence too it is that the Apostle (1 Tim. 6) calls the Father the only Powerful One. To these is added that in the Apostles' Creed, and in the later symbols of the faith, we profess that we believe in God the Father Almighty, and Creator of all things. By which words we see attributed to the Father in a peculiar way not only omnipotence but also the work of creation.

§ 10. Now why omnipotence (*omnipotentia*) is accommodated to the Father, this seems to be the formal character (*ratio*): because the Father is the origin and principle (*origo et principium*) not only of all created things, but also of the Divine persons. But the more things someone is able to effect and produce, the more he is wont among men to be reckoned powerful. Therefore, since power more befits the personal property (*proprietas personalis*) of the Father, it comes about that it is accommodated to the Father in a peculiar way.

§ 11. And because in the work of the creation of the whole world the Divine power shines forth most of all, hence creation also is appropriated to the Father; of which, however, another formal character too can be given: namely, that just as the Father is first among the Divine persons and the origin of the others, so too the work of creation is first among the works of God, and the foundation of all the rest, as of redemption and sanctification.

§ 12. Nor is it an obstacle to these things that the Son is sometimes in the Scriptures called the power and the strength and the arm of the Father, as in 1 Cor. 1, and Is. 53 and 63. For these are attributed to the Son—and sometimes also to the Holy Spirit—in such a way, however, that both are signified to have received them from the Father, who, as it were the first author, exercises His power through them. Although St. Thomas thinks that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not otherwise called the power of God than that by the name "power" there is understood that which proceeds from power and is produced by it. But this does not appear: since the Apostle has in like manner called Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. See St. Thomas on that place of the Apostle.¹²

§ IV — Why wisdom is appropriated to the Son (Cur Filio approprietur sapientia)

§ 13. That wisdom (*sapientia*) is accommodated to the Son, many words of Sacred Scripture testify. And in Prov. 8 and Sir. 24, the Son of God is introduced, speaking under the name of wisdom.¹⁴ In Wis. 7 and in the four chapters that follow, many things are said in praise of wisdom, which must necessarily be referred to uncreated wisdom, that is, to the Son of God.¹⁵ In Baruch 3 the discourse about wisdom is concluded thus: "After these things he was seen upon the earth, and conversed with men."¹⁶ Which also could have been translated in the feminine gender, so that it be referred to wisdom, as it altogether seems that it ought to be referred, as it altogether seems that it ought to be referred. In Matt. 11 and Lk. 8 the Son of God says of Himself: "And Wisdom is justified by her children."¹⁷ In Lk. 11 it is said: "Therefore also the Wisdom of God said: I will send to them prophets," etc.¹⁸ Which words in Matt. 23 the Son of God speaks in His own person.¹⁹ Paul also in 1 Cor. 1 called Christ the Wisdom of God; and again he says: "Who became for us wisdom from God." [^20] And in Col. 2: "In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden." [^21]

§ 14. Moreover, the reason of this accommodation is manifold; and it can be taken from each nature (*natura*) of the Son, the Divine and the human. For according to the Divine nature the Son proceeds as the Word (*Verbum*): but the Word, says St. Thomas, is nothing other than the concept of wisdom. And as the Son, according to the form (*forma*) of God, from eternity was the middle Person (*persona*) between the Father and the Holy Spirit, as a word is the middle between mind and love, so it was fitting that the same Son, through the assumed form of a servant, in the fullness of time should become the middle between God and man. For which reason it came about that through that same One the work of human Redemption (*Redemptio*) was perfected, which also in very reality is a middle between creation and beatification. Therefore in the assumed form the wisdom of the Son of God has been declared in many ways. And this too has been noted by St. Augustine in book 7 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 3.²² First indeed, because He was made for us a Teacher of Wisdom, teaching to despise earthly things, to love heavenly things, and handing down very many other precepts of true wisdom. Second, because, lying hidden under the form of a servant and made like to sinners, He tricked the enemy of the human race; while through passion and death He perfected the work of our Redemption. Third, because through extreme humility He was raised to the highest glory, and He willed that His Gospel be propagated by the ignoble and contemptible things of this world (1 Cor. 2).²³ And all these things, indeed, were works of the highest wisdom.

§ V — Why goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit (Cur bonitas approprietur Spiritui Sancto?)

§ 15. Goodness (*bonitas*) is everywhere attributed to the Holy Spirit (*Spiritus Sanctus*) by Sacred Scripture, as in Ps. 142: "Your good Spirit will lead me."²⁴ Wis. 1: "Kind is the Spirit of wisdom."²⁵ And in ch. 7 the "Spirit of wisdom" is described as sweet, humane, kindly.²⁶ And in ch. 12 it is said: "O how good and sweet, O Lord, is your Spirit in all things!"²⁷ Sir. 24: "His Spirit upon me! sweet."²⁸ Lk. 11: "Your Father from heaven will give a good Spirit to those asking him."¹⁸ Moreover, every abundance of the gifts of God is for the most part ascribed to the Holy Spirit, as in Is. 11, Joel 2, Jn. 7, 14 and 16, Acts 2, 1 Cor. 12, and Tit. 3.²⁹ Nay rather, the whole of what the Son of God accomplished, for the cause of our salvation, in the assumed flesh, Scripture attributes to the Holy Spirit: namely, His conception (Lk. 1), His fasting in the desert (Matt. 4), His miracles (Matt. 12), His oblation upon the cross (Heb. 9), His resurrection (Rom. 8).³⁰ For all these are works of highest goodness, kindness, and mercy.

§ 16. But why these are ascribed to the Holy Spirit, the reason is that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love (*amor*). For since He is the third Person (*persona*) in the Trinity (*Trinitas*), proceeding from the other two, from whom there is no going on to another, but in whom one comes to a halt and in a certain way comes to rest, He is rightly compared to love—unto which indeed the mind advances by knowing, but from which it does not go on to a further act, being content with the very delectation (*delectatio*) which consists in loving; and it is evident that love is the proper work of goodness.

§ 17. Hence it is also clear why sanctification (*sanctificatio*) and beatification (*beatificatio*) are in a peculiar way attributed to the Holy Spirit. For sanctification is a work of surpassing charity (*caritas*). But beatification is the last work of God, to which the preceding works of creation (*creatio*) and redemption (*redemptio*) are destined. For men were first created, and then redeemed, in order that they might sometime attain to beatitude (*beatitudo*).

§ 18. Furthermore, as regards the reasons for the three appropriations just now mentioned which are adduced by the Master (and originally taken from the Summa of Sentences of Hugh, Treatise 1, ch. 10)—namely, that power be attributed to the Father, lest on account of antiquity He be thought weak; and wisdom to the Son, lest, as posterior to the Father, He appear less wise (both of which are wont to occur among men); finally, that goodness be attributed to the Holy Spirit, lest He be thought cruel and implacable, because "spirit" in human affairs imports a certain inflation and violence: these reasons, I say, are for that reason less probable, because they are not taken from the congruity which these appropriations have with the properties of the Persons, but are only, on the contrary, alleged to the human understanding, lest perhaps concerning the very properties, from a likeness of human things, it conceive an error; wherefore they are founded neither in Sacred Scripture nor in the writings of the ancients. But both sets of reasons St. Thomas has encompassed briefly enough in I, q. 39, a. 8, in the body.³¹

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1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2; I, q. 39, a. 1; and again I, q. 3, a. 1.
 2. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 3; I, q. 39, a. 1.
 3. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, ch. 6.
 4. See above, Distinctio 23, where the definition of person was set out.
 5. See above, Distinctio 23, § 5.
 6. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 2, ad 6.
 7. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII [around the middle].
 8. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VII [after the middle].
 9. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII [not far from the end].
 10. St. Hilary, De Trinitate VIII, the same place, a little after the previously cited words.
 11. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8.
 12. St. Thomas, In I ad Corinthios, lect. 3 (on 1 Cor. 1:24). He writes: "But it is said—that is, Christ—'the Power of God' and 'the Wisdom of God' by a certain appropriation. 'Power' indeed insofar as through Him the Father works all things ('All things were made through Him,' Jn. 1); but 'Wisdom' insofar as He is the very Word which is the Son, nothing other than begotten or conceived Wisdom ('I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before every creature,' Sir. 24)." And further: "Nor is the Father said to be Strong or Wise by 'virtue' or by begotten Wisdom, lest it follow that the Father would have His to-be from the Son; for, as St. Augustine proves in De Trinitate VI, this is the same thing for God—to be God—as to be Strong and to be Wise." These are the words of the holy Doctor in the place cited, which are not contrary to what he likewise teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8, in the body; as will be easily clear to one who reads and compares the places.
 13. St. Thomas, in the same place [abbreviation as in source].
 14. Prov. 8; Sir. 24.
 15. Wis. 7 and the four following chapters.
 16. Baruch 3.
 17. Matt. 11; Lk. 8.
 18. Lk. 11.
 19. Matt. 23.
 20. 1 Cor. 1: "Christ the Wisdom of God" (v. 24); "who became for us wisdom from God" (v. 30).
 21. Col. 2:3.

22. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VII, ch. 3.

23. 1 Cor. 2.

24. Ps. 142: "Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me."

25. Wis. 1: "Benignus est Spiritus sapientiae."

26. Wis. 7.

27. Wis. 12: "O quam bonus et suavis est, Domine, spiritus tuus in omnibus!"

28. Sir. 24.

29. Is. 11; Joel 2; Jn. 7; Jn. 14; Jn. 16; Acts 2; 1 Cor. 12; Tit. 3.

30. Lk. 1; Matt. 4; Matt. 12; Heb. 9; Rom. 8.

31. The Master (of the Sentences) [Peter Lombard]; cf. Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sententiarum I, ch. 10; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8 (in corp.).

DISTINCTIO XXXV — A SUMMARY ANNOTATION ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND ITS PARTS (*DE SCIENTIA DEI, EJUSQUE PARTIBUS SUMMARIA ANNOTATIO*)

§ 1. The principal attributes of God are referred to these three in relation to creatures, namely Knowledge (*scientia*), Power (*potentia*), and Will (*voluntas*). Concerning which, in this very order, it must henceforth be treated with the Master; namely, proceeding from the more universal to the less universal. For the knowledge of God extends to more things than His will. Therefore, we speak first about the knowledge of God.

§ 2. Now this, taken in general, is so broad that absolutely nothing escapes it; as almost the whole of Psalm 138 beautifully teaches. For indeed God knows both Himself and all other things besides Himself, whether good or evil; past, present, future; both singulars and universals; both contingent and necessary; possibles and impossibles; yes, and even infinite things. Concerning each of these individually St. Thomas argues with precision in I, q. 14.¹ And that the Divine knowledge extends also to all things, even to the infinite, and to those which are incomprehensible to us, St. Augustine teaches against the Philosophers in book 12 of the City of God, chapters 17 and 18.²

§ 3. And although the knowledge of God is in reality one, as being the same as the most simple essence of God, nevertheless by reason of the things known it gets different names, as though constituting its different parts or species. For it is called Foreknowledge (*praescientia*), Disposition (*dispositio*), Providence (*providentia*), Wisdom (*sapientia*), Predestination (*praedestinatio*), Reprobation (*reprobatio*); each of which can be thus briefly distinguished and explained.

§ 4. Foreknowledge is only of future things, and of all of them, whether they be good or evil. Disposition, the Master says, is about things to be done, as though it regarded only future things, and those to be done by God, that is, good things, in view. But Scripture (Wis. 8) also confirms that disposition is of present things, when it says of the wisdom of God that "She reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly."³ Therefore God disposes present things by governing, and He also disposes future things, that is, by providing about future things; yet He disposes about future things properly indeed about those to be done by Himself; in a certain manner, however, also about those which are not by Himself, but by the deficient will of a rational creature, that is, sins—namely not that they be done, but that they be ordered and have a fitting place among the works of God, as will be explained below (at Distinctio 39).

§ 5. Most do not distinguish providence from disposition; and this seems to be the Master's view as well. Yet the opinion of St. Thomas pleases more, who, treating of providence (I, q. 22, a. 1), says that it presupposes the work of creation, and defines it to be the plan of the order of things to an end; that is, that disposition, or practical knowledge of God, by which He wills to govern things already created and to direct

them to their ends.⁴ For the execution of providence is governance, namely Divine governance. Therefore providence itself seems to be a certain species of disposition, both because it regards future things only, and because it signifies the plan of the order of things to an end, whereas disposition moreover embraces the plan of the order of parts within a whole; as St. Thomas affirms in the same place.⁴

§ 6. And by the same reason by which there can be disposition about evils, so also can there be providence. For although God does not provide evils, yet He provides about evils in the sense already declared, and to be declared more fully below (at Distinctio 39).

§ 7. Further, Wisdom attributed to God signifies knowledge of things, inasmuch as God knows them in Himself as in the first cause. Although, besides this, it seems to convey the conjoined disposition of knowledge about the things to be made and to be governed. For in the creation and governance of things the wisdom of God is chiefly commended.

§ 8. Predestination and Reprobation are certain parts of Divine providence directing the intellectual creature to a determinate end. For Predestination regards all the goods by which the Elect are led to eternal salvation, and indeed especially regards salvation itself, to which they are led: for providence is not only about the means, but also and chiefly about the very end. Reprobation, however, regards punishment, the effect of Divine providence concerning the reprobate in this life. Concerning all of which, their proper place will treat more exactly.

§ 9. To these, briefly, it must be added that, besides the kinds of Divine knowledge already mentioned, the Doctors are accustomed to distinguish Knowledge of Vision (*scientia visionis*), to which, namely, those things alone are subject which at some time exist in the nature of things, whether present, past, or future; and Knowledge of Simple Understanding (*scientia simplicis notitiae*), to which are subject those things which never exist. The former is called Knowledge of Vision because, just as things are not subject to our eyes except those which are present to us, so to the Divine sight only those things are subject which are present to Him; but present to God are whatever things exist at any time. For eternity, in which God contemplates things, embraces the whole created time from the beginning even to the end, or rather into the infinite. And hence in one gaze God looks upon both time as a whole itself, and whatever is contained in the whole time, as Boethius clearly teaches, Consolation of Philosophy, book 5, meter 2,⁵ after St. Augustine writing on Psalm 49,⁶ and St. Thomas in many places.⁷

§ I — Whether foreknowledge could have failed to be in God (Utrum praescientia potuerit non esse in Deo)

§ 10. About foreknowledge, and other things of this sort, which are attributed to God from eternity only with respect to creatures, as are Providence, Predestination, Reprobation, one can ask: Whether they could have failed to be in God? For if God had willed never to create anything, or to operate ad extra, which indeed without doubt was possible, then neither would there have been in God foreknowledge of future things, nor providence, nor anything similar. But on the contrary, since God's foreknowledge is the same as His knowledge and His essence, while indeed it could not have been that in God there was not knowledge or essence, it seems consequent that foreknowledge could not have failed to be in God.

§ 11. But to the question an absolute reply is that foreknowledge, providence, and other things of the same kind could have failed to be in God; and are altogether such as do not necessarily befit God. For it could have been, if God had so willed (and without doubt He could have willed), that nothing would be future; but the future being removed, foreknowledge and providence are necessarily taken away, which are only of things future.

§ 12. However, when future things are posited, to take away from God foreknowledge and providence of them—to the point, as it were, of making Him not God at all—is sacrilegious, as Augustine has well noted, *City of God*, book 5, chapter 9.⁸ For he (scil. the author of *De divinatione*) in book 2 of *De divinatione* taught that with a certain and infallible foreknowledge of future things the freedom of human actions cannot stand.⁹ And thus, while he wished to make men free, says Augustine, he made them sacrilegious, that is, without God: for, as Augustine says there, "To confess that God is, and to deny that He is foreknowing of future things, is most manifest madness."

§ 13. But to that which was objected on the contrary, one must answer that, in the full formal character of that which is signified by the word Foreknowledge (and the same judgment is to be made about providence and the like), two things are contained, namely knowledge, which is the very essence of God, as justice, goodness, etc., and a relation to future things; which relation indeed is in God only as a certain being of reason. Therefore, when future things are removed, this respect of the knowledge of God to those same things is taken away; it follows that foreknowledge is taken away, in whose full formal character that respect is contained. Nor on that account is knowledge, or the Divine essence, taken away absolutely, but only insofar as it is expressed by the name foreknowledge. Whence also, when things that were to be future are now present or past, their foreknowledge is extinguished; because that formal character of knowledge perishes with respect to something future now converted into the present or the past; concerning which matter we shall say more below (at *Distinctio* 39).

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14.

2. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, chs. 17–18.

3. Wis. 8: "She reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly."

4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 1.

5. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae* V, metr. 2.

6. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 49.

7. St. Thomas, in many places [as in source].

8. St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* V, ch. 9.

9. *De divinatione* II [as in source].

DISTINCTIO XXXVI — ON ALL THINGS BEING IN GOD ACCORDING TO IDEAS, NOT ACCORDING TO ESSENCE; AND THAT EVILS ARE NOT IN GOD (*DE IDEIS: OMNIA ESSE IN DEO SECUNDUM IDEAS, NON SECUNDUM ESSENTIAM; ET MALA NON ESSE IN DEO*)

§ I — All things are in God according to ideas, not according to essence (Omnia esse in Deo secundum ideas, non secundum essentiam)

§ 1. All things which are made by God with some difference of time do not come to be by chance, but according to an exemplar pre-existing from eternity in the Divine mind; it is necessary that these same things be in God according to certain ideas (*ideae*) coeternal with God. For ideas are, by the definition of St. Augustine, certain principal forms, or stable and unchangeable formal characters (*rationes*) of things, which are not themselves formed, and therefore are eternal, and always stand in the same way, which are contained in the Divine intelligence.² And although they themselves neither arise nor perish, nonetheless everything that can arise and perish, and everything that does arise and perish, is said to be formed according to them. Thus far Augustine, who, after a little, adds that single things have been created to their proper formal characters, and that by participation created things exist from those formal characters, and have their own modes of existing.

§ 2. From which Augustinian doctrine, gather first, that the ideas are truly nothing other than the essence (*essentia*) of God: for whatever is eternal and unchangeable is God. Thus teaches the same Augustine.³ Likewise Dionysius,⁴ Clement of Alexandria,⁵ and Boethius,⁶ all, to wit, attributing to the ideas those conditions which belong to God alone. With whom even the Gentile Philosophers—Cicero, Seneca, and others of greater weight—seem to agree; and many not without probability think this to have been also the opinion of Plato and the Platonists concerning ideas. Nor does it stand in the way that the ideas are many, while the essence of God is one and simple. For the ideas are said to be the essence of God, inasmuch as the essence of God is a likeness (*similitudo*), or the formal character of each single thing. Wherefore, since by the number of things there are many formal characters understood by God in His own essence, it is established that there are also many ideas; as St. Thomas more fully teaches.⁷

§ 3. Second: it follows that the ideas are in God as understood by Him, not as the intelligible species (*species*) by which He understands: for the exemplars (*exemplaria*) of things are objectively in the mind of the craftsman. Nor does it from this follow that the ideas are not the essence of God, because nothing prevents God from understanding Himself—that is, His essence—whether as it is in itself, or as, according to some mode of likeness, it is participated by creatures.

§ 4. Third it follows, that the ideas are only of the things made or to be made by God, and in some way also of things makeable which will never come to be. For inasmuch as the ideas are the exemplars of the craftsman, and pertain to practical cognition (*cognitio practica*), they are only of those things which at some time proceed from the craftsman God: but inasmuch as they are the proper likenesses, and certain formal characters for cognizing the things of which they are the ideas, with no regard had to operation, thus they are of all possible things. And this genus Augustine seems to have wished to include, when he said that by the ideas there is formed everything that can arise and perish—namely, distinguishing this from everything that does arise and that perishes.

§ 5. Fourth it follows, that neither of evil things nor of impossibles are there ideas: for of these there are not proper formal characters in God. Yet they are known under the formal character of the good and of possible things—whether by negation, or by composition, or in some other way. For each thing is known by the intellect inasmuch as it is. Since therefore evil is not properly a being (for being and the good are convertible), it is evident that it is not known by the intellect through itself, but through the good; and He who is the highest good knows evils. Whence Dionysius, in chapter 7 of *On the Divine Names*, says that God knows the darknesses through Himself, who is the highest light.⁴ But impossibles are understood by the composition of possible things.

§ 6. Lastly, since things known by God are not in God according to themselves, but only according to intellectual forms, one must not say that things are in God by essence; whether you understand by this God's own essence, or that of the things known. For that phrase, to be in God by essence, signifies that a thing is of the same essence with God; in the way that the Son is said to be in the Father by essence. Yet that the very essences of things are in God by cognition, one could most truly say.

§ 7. Moreover, let students see a more copious treatment of the ideas in St. Thomas,⁸ and his commentators, and upon this distinction.

§ II — That evils are not in God, or with God (Mala non esse in Deo, aut cum Deo)

§ 8. In whatever knowledge of God you speak, all things, whether good or evil, are said to be known by God. But in God, or with God, we say that only those things are, of which God is the author, that is, good things. Concerning these the Apostle, Rom. 11: "In Him, that is, in God, are all things." By which generality of speech it is manifest from the adjuncts that only good things are included. For he says that all those things are in Him which are from Him and through Him; but these are only good things. To the same pertains what in Acts 17 the same Apostle says: "For in Him we live and move and are." For these are good things, not evil—to be, to be moved, to live. The Apostle John also, and indeed in more open words, denies that evils are in God, when he says in the First Epistle, chapter 1: "God is light, and darknesses in Him are not any"—by "darknesses" plainly understanding evils contrary to the Divine light, that is, sins; as is clear from the same chapter and those that follow.

§ 9. But why it must be said that only good things are in God can be given a reason from the Apostle's sentence. For since he likewise says that all things are "from God, through God, and in God"; as by the two prior members things are referred to God as beginning and cause, so also by the last. Whence it is clear that something is understood to be in God as in the author, lover, and conserver: not however by bare cognition.

§ 10. Hence St. Augustine says that this very sentence of the Apostle declares thus.¹⁰ But sins are excluded from that generality, which do not preserve but vitiate nature. In this way therefore the other place of Augustine also must be understood, which is in the exposition of Psalm 49 (on that, "Behold, the beauty of the field is with me"), where he says that with God are, and always have been, all things present and future. And then he adds: "With Him are all things, by a certain knowledge of the ineffable wisdom of God established in the Word; and into the Word itself are all things." And again: "What is there that is not with Him, of whom it is said: 'If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there,' etc.? With Him is the whole; but it is not so with Him that He should suffer any contagion from these things which He created, or any need of them." Then after a few words: "And why are all things with Him? because even before all things were, or were created, all things were known to Him." Thus he. In which words understand a knowledge of approbation (*notitia approbationis*), or practical knowledge (*notitia practica*), that is, conjoined with operation, or with the will to operate.

§ 11. Now therefore, from the fact that evils are in the knowledge of God, although that [knowledge] is not other than God, you do not rightly conclude that evils are in God. For "to be in God" and "to be in the knowledge of God" are diverse phrases: by the former is signified what we said above; by the latter, nothing other than that something is known by God. And yet, in a certain true sense—as already indicated also according to the Scriptures—you would rightly deny that evils are in the knowledge of God, if namely you speak of knowledge of approbation; in which way it has been said: "I know you not." And: "Thine eyes are pure, that Thou mayest not see evil." And many other suchlike.

§ III — How all things are life in God (Quomodo omnia sint in Deo vita?)

§ 12. From this sentence of John (Jn. 1), "Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat," there has arisen a question: how are all the things that have been made by God through the Word (*Verbum*) life (*vita*) in the Word? It is answered, that as regards the Evangelist's sentence it admits various distinctions and interpretations. St. Augustine (on John), and almost all the Latin interpreters following Augustine, read this sentence as disjoined from the preceding, and thus they read and distinguish: "Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat." They interpret it in this way: everything that was made, even before it was made, was life, not in itself because it did not yet exist, but in the Word; for—as philosophers are wont to speak of the craftsman—the work is said to be previously in the art, that is, in the mind of the craftsman, in a certain more excellent mode than that in which it afterwards exists in the nature of things.¹² According to this sense, but wrongly taken, John Wyclif dared to teach from the Evangelist's words and Augustine's commentary: that all things are God, and that all things have been from eternity, and that according to the propriety of the expression; taking also for the confirmation of his error that which the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15: "Ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus." Moreover, the same distinction is followed among the Greeks by Cyril, book 1 (on John, ch. 6), but with a different interpretation. For he arranges and expounds it in this wise: "Verbum Dei vita erat in ipso, quod factum est," that is, He imparts life, vigor, and motion to the things made and created. For he interprets "life" generally as motion and action.¹³ There are others, such as Hilary, book 2 (On the Trinity), Epiphanius (in the Ancoratus), and Ambrose, book 3 (On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 3), who distinguish thus: "Et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est in ipso": so that then a new sentence follows: "Vita erat," and the rest. But their interpretation in turn is not one, but several and various, which whoever will may see in their own places.¹⁴ Finally, different from these is the distinction and interpretation of Chrysostom and of almost all the Greeks. For they read and

interpret in this way: "Et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est": then a new sentence, "In ipso vita erat," and the rest. That is, nothing of the things which were made was made without the Word; according to that which the preceding sentence has, which the following sets forth: "Omnia per ipsum Verbum facta sunt." But the Word itself was by nature life, and therefore was able to supply life to all living things. Ambrose, book 3 (On the Faith, ch. 4), praises this distinction with these words: "Plerique docti, fideles sic pronunciant: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est." Nor is there any doubt that he wished it to be understood in the same sense as the Greeks. Therefore this sense, because simpler than the others and easier, and more in accord with the context, is deservedly to be set before all those.¹⁵

§ 13. But according to the first distinction alone the proposed question has a place, and, according to the said interpretation of Augustine, is to be explained thus: Whatever has been made is life in the Word; indeed from eternity it was life in the Word, because in God from eternity there are the exemplar reasons of all things to be created; wherefore each thing is life in God; although even in its own nature it does not have life, as a stone, wood; or even does not at all yet exist. Hence it follows that each thing has in God a more excellent to-be (*esse*) than in itself; since living things themselves also have life in God more nobly than in themselves.

§ IV — How "All things are of him, through him, and in him" is to be understood (Omnia ex ipso, per ipsum, & in ipso quomodo intelligendum)

§ 14. What the Apostle says in Rom. 11, "Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia," is not to be taken as though in those three members absolutely the same thing were signified. For although all three contain the signification of cause (*causa*), nevertheless not of the same mode and formal character (*ratio*). For by the first member an efficient, or producing, cause (*causa efficiens seu producens*) is signified; by the second, an exemplary cause (*causa exemplaris*); by the third, a conserving and final cause (*causa conservans et finalis*). Now although these three are equally common to the three Persons, nevertheless the several [members] are appropriated to the several [Persons], in the order in which they were set down by the Apostle, by a triad of appropriations (*appropriatio*) among those four which were enumerated above at Dist. 31. Therefore to the Father it is appropriated that "ex ipso sunt omnia"; because, as was said above at Dist. 34, in the Father power (*potentia*) is in a peculiar way considered, whose proper work is to effect things subject to it. Whence of the Father in particular it is said 1 Cor. 8: "Unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia."

§ 15. To the Son it is ascribed that all things are "per ipsum," both because the Son is the middle Person—and the preposition "per" is wont to signify the relation of a middle—and because to the Son, as the Word (*Verbum*), it is most plainly attributed that He is the idea and exemplary cause of all the things which the Father brings about. Whence of the Word John says, ch. 1: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt." And Paul, 1 Cor. 8: "Unus Dominus Jesus Christus, per quem omnia"; although St. Thomas in I, q. 39, a. 8 wishes that what John says be not appropriated, but proper to the Son, inasmuch as there is signified a principle from a principle (*principium de principio*). Then finally, because Wisdom (*Sapientia*) is appropriated to the Son, by which, in Prov. 8 and elsewhere, all things are said to have been made by God.¹⁶

§ 16. Moreover, to the Holy Spirit it is attributed that all things are "in ipso," one reason of which is that goodness (*bonitas*) is appropriated to Him. But to goodness it belongs not to wish to destroy, but to preserve, the things which have been made by power. Another reason, because in each of the living the spirit, that is, the soul, fosters and preserves life. A third: the Holy Spirit is as it were the end (*finis*) in the Trinity, from whom

there is no progress to another Person; and therefore it is rightly accommodated to Him that He be the final cause (*causa finalis*), to which all things are to be referred.

§ 17. This distinction and appropriation, signified by the three prepositions now stated, can be gathered not only from the words of St. Augustine, book 6 of *De Trinitate*, ch. 10 (which place the Master adduces), but also from other authors, as St. Basil (Book on the Holy Spirit, ch. 3 and the following), St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 5 On Theology, St. Gregory the Roman, Homily 16 on Ezekiel, and St. Ambrose, book 2 On the Holy Spirit, ch. 10, and again from St. Augustine, book 4 of *De Trinitate*, ch. 6. To these there is added St. Thomas, I, q. 39, a. 8, and in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.¹⁷

§ 18. Therefore what the same St. Ambrose said, book 3 of the work already mentioned, ch. 12, namely that these three, "ex ipso, per ipsum, et in ipso," are one and have the same force, he wished to say nothing other than that these three belong equally to the three Persons, and to argue no inequality among them, as the Arians wished.

§ 19. To these, finally, add that one must not speak similarly in saying that all things are "de ipso" as that all things are "ex ipso," as St. Augustine noted in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, ch. 27, and the Master from Augustine (in the Text), and likewise St. Thomas in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. For "de ipso" is only that which is of His substance, as the Son is of the substance of the Father, and the Holy Spirit is of the substance of the Father and of the Son; on account of which each is said to be "Deus de Deo." But "ex ipso" is whatever has God as its author; although the distinction of those prepositions is not perpetual, as is evident from this, that in the Creed we confess: "conceptum de Spiritu Sancto, natum ex Maria Virgine"; since Christ can in no way be said to have been conceived of the substance of the Holy Spirit, but He is said to have been conceived "de Spiritu Sancto" as by an efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), as St. Augustine teaches (*Enchir.* 58).¹⁸

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 15, a. 3.

2. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 46.

3. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* VII, ch. 28.

4. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 7.

5. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* IV and V.

6. Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae* III.

7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 15, a. 2.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 15.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 1.

10. St. Augustine, *De natura boni*, ch. 28. Also see St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 49.

11. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 18, a. 4.

12. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* [super Joan.].

13. St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Joannem* I, ch. 6.

14. St. Hilary, *De Trinitate* II; St. Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*; St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* III, ch. 3.

15. St. John Chrysostom, [as in source]; St. Ambrose, *De fide* III, ch. 4.

16. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8.
17. St. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, ch. 10; the Master [Peter Lombard], [in text, as in source]; St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, chs. 3ff.; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 5, De Theologia; St. Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel, hom. 16; St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto II, ch. 10; St. Augustine, De Trinitate IV, ch. 6; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8; St. Thomas, In Epistolam ad Romanos, proem./comment.
18. St. Augustine, De natura boni, ch. 27; the Master [abbreviation as in source: "in Textu"]; St. Thomas, In Epistolam ad Romanos, proem./comment.; St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 58.

DISTINCTIO XXXVII — ON GOD'S BEING EVERYWHERE AND IN ALL THINGS, IN THREE WAYS (*DEUM ESSE UBIQUE & IN OMNIBUS REBUS, IDQUE TRIBUS MODIS*)

§ I — That God is everywhere and in all things, and that in three ways (Deum esse ubique & in omnibus rebus, idque tribus modis)

§ 1. In God one must acknowledge not only that all things are in God, as was shown in the preceding distinction; but conversely, truly and in accordance with the sacred Scriptures it is said that God is in all things. For it is written in Jeremiah; and in Wis. 1: "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world." If God, and the Spirit of God, fill all things, it is plainly a consequence that He is in all things. But if He is in all things, then also in all places, because places too are certain things. Wherefore, that God is everywhere must, according to the Catholic faith, be confessed, whether by that word "everywhere" there be designated the universe of things, or places. To this pertains that of Ps. 138: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy face? If I shall ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I shall descend into hell, thou art present," and the things that follow. And that of Job 11: "It is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea," as if he said: so He is in all things that nevertheless He comprehends all things — which St. Gregory more fully explains (on that passage, and in Homily 17 on Ezekiel).²

§ 2. Now there are three ways in which it is fitting to understand that God is present to all things whatsoever that have been created: namely, by Power (*potentia*), by Presence (*praesentia*), by Essence (*essentia*). Which ways St. Augustine has embraced in a brief sentence (De civitate Dei VII, ch. 30), saying that God fills heaven and earth "by a presence of power, not by an absence of nature."³ More expressly the same are enumerated by the Ordinary Gloss (on Song 5), affirming that God is in all things by Presence, Power, and Substance.⁴

§ 3. But these three, according to St. Thomas (I, q. 8, a. 3), are to be distinguished thus, that by Power God is said to be in all things, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; for by the immensity of His virtue He reaches to all things, and He works all in all; and indeed in such a mode of perfection, that He turns all things to Himself as to the final cause. This through-all-diffused and most inward operation of the Divine power the Sage signified in ch. 7, when he said that wisdom "is more mobile than all mobile things, and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity"; and again (ch. 8), when he bears witness that she "reacheth therefore from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly."

§ 4. Moreover, this mode of the existence (*existentia*) of God in things commends Divine providence (*providentia*), against those who supposed that God first created certain most noble intelligences, through

which thereafter the other lower things would be made and governed; and also against those who subtract motion or any action of any creature from the operation of Divine providence.

§ 5. By Presence, God is said to be in all things; because all things whatsoever that anywhere are done or acted are done, as it were, before Him, and in His sight; wherefore we too are said to be present to some place which we light up with our eyes — just as the sun, although placed in heaven, is said to be present to us, and we to it, when we look upon it. To this pertains that Scripture, Heb. 4: "Neither is there any creature invisible in his sight: but all things are naked and open to his eyes." And this mode too commends providence, and the knowledge (*scientia*) of God in individual things, against those whose voice is Job 22: "What doth God know? and he judgeth as it were through a mist. The clouds are his covert, and he doth not consider our things; he walketh about the poles of heaven." This mode teaches also that God does not administer all things in such a way as some kingdom is administered by a king, who, although he has the care of the whole kingdom, nevertheless is not able to exhibit himself as present in all the parts of the kingdom, so as to know by himself what things are done throughout the whole kingdom.

§ 6. By Essence, according to some, God is said to be in all things, because His nature, or substance, is nowhere lacking, nor can it be lacking: but to all and individual things the whole is inwardly present by itself. Which mode, although it is proper to God and altogether incommunicable, as St. John Chrysostom testifies (Hom. 2 on the Epistle to the Hebrews), cited by the Master, nevertheless has a certain vestige in the human soul, which is whole in the whole body, and in its individual parts. The same soul, moreover, exhibits to us also a certain image of the Divine power in this, that, as being in all the members of the human body, as it were of a certain microcosm, it does not exercise the same operations in all, but, according to the diversity of the parts, diverse ones; so God acts in the greater world.⁵

§ 7. But, as regards this mode of being in things, which is called by Essence, St. Thomas explains it somewhat otherwise. For writing on this distinction, q. 1, a. 2, he says thus: "The essence of God, since it is absolute from every creature, unless inasmuch as it is applied to it by operation; and according to this, that He operates in the thing, He is said to be in the thing by presence, inasmuch as it is necessary that the agent be in some way present to what is acted upon. And because the operation does not desert the Divine virtue, from which it proceeds, therefore He is said to be in the thing by power. And because the virtue is the very essence, therefore it follows that He be also in the thing by essence." These are his words.⁶

§ 8. Whence it appears, from the sentence of St. Thomas, that God is not otherwise in things by essence than because He is in things by virtue, or power, which is the same as the essence. This, however, the Master (in the text, letter G) seems to reprove as insufficient. "Although," he says, "these things are true which they assert, in explaining the understandings of those aforesaid; yet in those words by which it is said that God is everywhere by essence, it must be believed that more is contained than a living man can grasp"; to which reply even St. Thomas himself seems to subscribe in the exposition of the text, denying that they sufficiently explained the mode of existing in things by essence who said that God is in all things by essence, inasmuch as every essence is from Him; and inasmuch as He by the power of His essence operates.⁷

§ 9. But the same Doctor opens more clearly his own mind and the Master's in the Summa (in the place cited above). For he says that God is in all things by essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of to-be (*causa essendi*). And (in the reply to the first) he says: "God is in all things by essence, because by His substance He is present to all as the cause of to-be." How then, someone will say, does not this mode coincide

with the mode by power? since even by power God is in all things as the cause of to-be. Cajetan answers, and rightly, that the mode by power posits the immediacy of the virtue; but the mode by essence the immediacy of the supposit (*suppositum*). And the former indeed is with respect to all things and as to all things. But the latter is with respect to all things, not however as to all things, but as to something of each, namely, as to its very to-be (*esse*). But those whom the Master reproves acknowledged indeed that God is in all things immediately according to virtue; not however according to essence. Which is against the Catholic truth, the Apostle saying in Acts 17: "Whereas he is not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and are." More things on God's indwelling in all things may be read in St. Augustine (Epistle 57 to Dardanus; and De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 26).⁸

§ II — That God is in certain persons in a special way (Deum in quibusdam esse peculiari modo)

§ 10. Although in all things God is in the three ways already declared, yet in a different and certain special way He is in the just and holy, both Angels and men. For in these He is said to dwell (*inhabitare*), according to the usage of Sacred Scripture; and conversely, they are joined to Him, and as it were consecrated after the fashion of a temple. For He is not said to dwell in all by whom God is known in some manner, or even in whom He works some things which pertain to salvation; but in those only whom He rules propitiously: remission having been bestowed of sins, and the grace of justification (*gratia iustificationis*) through the Spirit of the adoption of sons (*spiritus adoptionis filiorum*), whether they be adults or little ones. On which matter see St. Augustine (Ep. 57; 105).¹⁰

§ 11. Moreover, this phrase has been transferred to Divine things from human custom. For just as men frequent, yea, and if they can, inhabit those places which they love and in which they take delight: so God is said to dwell in the just, whom He loves. Whence that of Jn. 14: "If any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and will make our abode with him." Furthermore, the more just, the more perfect, and the more blessed one is, the more perfectly and more fully he has God dwelling in him. Whence it follows that God is much more perfectly and more fully in the Blessed, whether Angels or men, than in any just whatsoever who are still constituted in this life. But in a most far perfect and ineffable way God is in the man Christ, in whom the Divinity so excellently dwells that He Himself is truly and properly God. Of whom it was said by the Apostle (Col. 2) that "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally." Corporally, I say, not only so as to be opposed to the figure, according to which God was said to be, and to dwell, in the Ark of the covenant; but rather on account of that Hypostatic union (*unio hypostatica*), by reason of which the Divine nature with the human and the body came together into one person, so that it may truly be said that the Divinity, having taken up humanity, is incarnate and incorporated. On which matter see St. Leo (at the end of Ep. 97). But on this argument more things, and ex professo, in the third book of the Sentences (Dist. 5).¹¹

§ III — How God is in place and how in time (Quomodo Deus sit in loco, et quomodo in tempore)

§ 12. Since God is in all things, it follows that He is both in place (*locus*) and in time (*tempus*); although by a far different mode than created things. For the understanding of this matter, let us first speak about place; the modes are to be considered by which something is said to be in a place. First, indeed, we say that something is in a place circumscribed (*circumscriptive*), which is enclosed, contained, and circumscribed by a space, such that its parts correspond to the parts of the place and of the space—greater to greater, lesser to lesser. This mode belongs to bodies alone. But from incorporeal things, such as the soul and the Angel, and much more from the nature of God, it is alien. According to this mode, therefore, the Scriptures and the Fathers very often deny that God is contained by a place, as in 1 Kgs 8, and 2 Chron. 6 in the prayer of Solomon.¹³ Whence also the Church sings: "Him whom the whole world does not contain, in thy womb's flesh He enclosed Himself, made man." For Christ, as God, is not contained circumscribedly by the whole world, whom nevertheless, as man, the womb of the Virgin both circumscribed and enclosed. Thus teach St. Augustine, book 8 of *On Genesis to the Letter*, ch. 19, and in the book *On 83 Questions*, q. 20; and Boethius, book 1 of *On the Trinity*.¹⁴ Moreover, just as names of bodily things and members of the human body are often attributed to God metaphorically, so by a transference a place also is often attributed to Him as if it were circumscriptive; while Scripture accommodates itself to the human and carnal sense, which by thinking comprehends nothing except bodies and the spaces of bodies, as St. Augustine says, book 6 of the *City of God*, ch. 7.¹⁵ Whence it comes about that He is sometimes said to stand, to sit, to change place, to walk, to dwell; all of which denote a certain determinate presence or operation of God with respect to places, or to men.

§ 13. Second, a thing is said to be in a place definitively (*definitive*), because, although it is not circumscribed by the place, nevertheless it is somewhere in such wise that it is not elsewhere: in this mode an Angel is in a place. For he is not contained by a place in such wise that the surface, figure, and parts of the container correspond to the surface, figure, and parts of the contained; but in a spiritual mode he is in a place, inasmuch as he is present to the things which he moves, or around which he operates: for this is what is wont to be said, that spiritual substances are there where they operate. St. John Damascene treats of this mode, book 1 of the *Orthodox Faith*, ch. 17, and book 2, ch. 3; and St. Ambrose, *Sermon 1 on Ps. 118*.¹⁶ And since Angels are of finite power, so that by nature they cannot operate in many places at once; hence they are not, nor can they be by nature at the same time in many places, but only in one, and that one as great or as small as their operation extends: but that operation is extended according to the extension of the body with respect to which it is. Nor can it be extended to infinity, even if a body of infinite magnitude should be granted, because their power is not infinite.

§ 14. Third, something is said to be in a place repletively (*repletive*). To be in a place repletively can be understood in a twofold way: both because it gives to a place to be and to place, or to contain—whereby God is said to be in all other things whatsoever, because He gives them to be and to operate, as was said above—and also because He fills the place, not indeed after the fashion of a body, but by this that He gives to those placed to be, and makes them to be in a place and to fill it. This, therefore, third mode is in each respect the most excellent, and the mode of being in a place proper to God; which, in the sense we have said, St. Thomas explains (I, q. 8, a. 2).¹⁷ Moreover, by as many modes as a thing is said to be in a place, by so many also is it said to be in time. For either something is in time because it is moved with motion properly so called, by reason of

which it is measured by time, as bodily things are; or because it is changed according to affections, as incorporeal things are—for which *aevum* (*aevum*) is assigned as the measure of duration; or because, since it is immutable and immense, nevertheless it is the author of time and of every change, and makes it so that all other things (under which let *aevum* be comprised) are measured: which mode belongs to God alone, as St. Augustine rightly teaches, book 8 of *On Genesis to the Letter*, ch. 26.¹⁷ By the same reason it is rightly said that God is outside of, and above, all time and place, as St. Augustine in the same place teaches, and likewise St. Jerome on Is. 40, and St. Gregory, Homily 17 on Ezekiel, and the Master (in the Text).¹⁷

§ IV — Whether it is proper to God to be everywhere (An Deo proprium sit esse ubique)

§ 15. As to the question which is wont to be raised in this place, whether to be everywhere (*esse ubique*) is proper to God, it must without doubt be answered in the affirmative: for thus do the Scriptures and the Fathers make it proper to God to be everywhere, just as to be always. The Scriptures indeed—Ps. 138; Jer. 23; Wis. 1; Job 11; and elsewhere. The Fathers, moreover, when by this argument they prove against the Arians that the Holy Spirit is not a creature, because He is everywhere; as St. Ambrose, book 1 of *On the Holy Spirit*, chs. 7, 9, 10; and St. Augustine, book 3 *Against Maximinus*, ch. 21; and others whom we alleged when we were treating of the Divinity of the Holy Spirit.¹⁹

§ 16. Yet this must be understood according to a determinate mode. For if the whole universe were one body, that would be everywhere; because in every place it would have some part of itself. Thus the world is everywhere according to some parts, so too first matter: but also an Angel, just as he can be in many places, so through the whole world he could be, his operative power being increased by the Divine power. But God is everywhere first and in Himself (*primo et per se*). First indeed because in all and individual places and parts of places He is whole. In reality, because He is not there by accident by some supposition made, as we just now said of the Angel—how also the soul would be everywhere if no creature existed except one man. Thus therefore (says St. Thomas, a. 4 of the question cited above): "To be everywhere first and in itself (*primo, et per se*) belongs to God, and is proper to Him, because wherever a place is posited, it is necessary that in each there be God, not a part of Himself, but according to Himself." These are his words.¹⁸ And this doctrine indeed has truth, according to the three modes declared at the beginning; namely, by power (*potentia*), by presence (*praesentia*), by essence (*essentia*). Therefore it must be held that this—namely, to be everywhere, according to the understanding now given—cannot be communicated to any creature, just as neither can that which is to be by nature eternal. For there is no creature which, on whatever hypothesis posited, would be everywhere. Whence deservedly there comes to condemnation the error of certain heretics of our time, who taught that the body or flesh of Christ is everywhere. For although that body is hypostatically united to the Divine person, nevertheless it is not God or the Divine Person, but only a creature, in the same way as the soul of Christ. To whom, therefore, it must by no means be attributed, nor can it be fitting, that they are everywhere. But on this matter, *ex professo*, see Distinction 10 of Book 4.²⁰ Nor indeed is it contrary to this doctrine that there is read in St. Cyril of Jerusalem (in the 14th Catechesis) that the Angels of the illumined are everywhere present. For he does not signify that one and the same Angel is everywhere present; but that God so uses the ministry of Angels around men that wherever men are, there also some Angels are present—just as we can say that all things around us are full of Angels, although we do not see them.²¹ The treatment of this question may be seen in St. Thomas in various places, namely upon this distinction, and in the *Summa* in the question and

articles indicated above, and in Quodlibet XI, q. 1, a. 2, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 68, and book 4, chs. 16, 17.²²

§ V — Where God was before the world was created (Ubi fuerit Deus ante mundum conditum)

§ 17. Moreover the question is commonly raised: where God was, or where He dwelt, before the world was created, that is, before the creation of things. To this question some answer that God was then in imaginary spaces (*spatia imaginaria*), since even now He is in them outside the world. And the fact that in places of this sort, or spaces, one must admit God to be, these reasons seem to persuade. First. If God is not outside the world, there will follow a difficulty as to how He is in the world not definitively in a body; for thus He will be in the world in such wise that He will not be elsewhere, which is to be in a place definitively (*definitive esse in loco*). Second. An angel is said to be in some place when his operative power (*virtus operativa*) is so applied that, without any mutation of itself, by reason of its being applied to some place, it can operate there, even if it does not actually operate; but God outside the world can operate and produce something in imaginary spaces without any mutation of Himself; therefore He is in them. Third. If the whole universe were moved to another place, nevertheless God would not be moved, not even accidentally (*per accidens*), as the soul is moved when the body is moved; therefore God was already before in that place to which we suppose the whole universe to be moved. For if He were not, He would be moved to it accidentally by the motion of the universe, and at the same time would leave the prior place. Fourth. God was before every real time (*tempus reale*): therefore He is outside every real place. Fifth. Scripture is brought forward, 1 Kgs 8: "Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee"; and Job 11: "He is higher than heaven, deeper than hell, longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." These words seem figuratively to signify that God is, as it were, outside the whole of this universe which is enclosed by the outermost body. To this there pertains also that which the Church sings to the Blessed Virgin: "Because Him whom the heavens could not contain, thou didst carry in thy womb"; likewise: "Whom the whole world does not contain, in thy womb He was enclosed, made man." Sixth. The same seems to be proved by the authority of the Fathers. For St. Augustine says, in book 8 (On Genesis to the letter, ch. 26), that God is both more inward than every thing, because in Him all things are; and more outward than every thing, because He Himself is before all things; and more recent than all, because He Himself is after all things. Again, in book 11 (Confessions, chs. 2, 3; and book 7, ch. 5) he compares God to the sea, saying that as the sea fills up the sponge, so God fills all, and yet outside it in every direction the sea is extended most vast. There is added Prudentius, who in the hymn (On the Roman martyr) thus writes, speaking of God: "And He fills outside and within, and overflows."

§ 18. But the question must be answered thus: if we speak properly, that God was nowhere, that is, in no place (*locus*), or dwelt nowhere, before the world was created, because there was not a place, or any creature at all, in which He was and which He actually contained or preserved; but besides God there was absolutely nothing. Nor must it be said that God is in nothing; and consequently neither can it now be said that God is outside the world in imaginary spaces, because there is no creature outside the world, nor does God operate anything at all outside the world. Likewise, in those imaginary spaces God is neither by essence (*essentia*), nor by power (*potentia*), nor by presence (*praesentia*), as can easily be understood from the explication of these modes made above. Moreover: if God is in infinite spaces of places, which in truth are not, but are conceived by us only in imagination, He will therefore similarly be in infinite spaces of times, which neither are, nor will

be, nor have been, but are only thought by us; for the case is the same. He will also be in infinite imaginary worlds; likewise in chimeras, and whatever else our fancy will be able to feign; all of which are absurd. This answer is further clear from what was said above, where it was declared how God is everywhere, and how He is in place, and how in time. But since certain things which are imaginary can be in the nature of things: as imaginary places outside the world, because God can make and fill them; hence Scotus and St. Bonaventure, with others, rightly teach on the present distinction that God is actually (*actu*) only in true places; but by potency (*potentia*) and not actually in imaginary places.²³ Now what is only in potency simply is not; and in this way we acknowledge that God "is" not only in imaginary spaces, but also in an imaginary world—namely in potency. Rightly, moreover, by St. Augustine (in his exposition on Ps. 122) to a question of this sort it has been answered that, before the creature was made, God was and dwelt in Himself; because thus He was and rested that He needed no other thing in which He might be, or in which He might rest. So Scripture says of the Wisdom of God in Wis. 7: "Abiding in herself she reneweth all things." And in a hymn of the Church it is sung: "Impetus in te permanens." And 1 Tim. 6: "Who inhabiteth light inaccessible," that is, who dwells in Himself: for that inaccessible light is none other than God Himself; according to that 1 Jn. 1: "God is light, and in Him there are no darknesses at all." There are similar things in St. Augustine (On the Faith against the Manichees, ch. 37) and in Nazianzen in Oration 2 (On Theology); in which place there are treated also other questions pertaining hereunto.²⁴

§ 19. But to the objections, the reply is as follows. It does not follow that God is in the world definitively, which was what the first reason aimed to prove; because although He is not elsewhere, yet He can also be elsewhere: since, being of infinite power, He can still make other creatures, nay other worlds, outside this world, and that without limit. Which supposition made, He will necessarily be in them, and yet will be no less in this world. The second reason—whatever be the truth of the antecedent—concludes nothing; because God does not have a power of operating applied outside the world. To the third it is answered that there is no true motion except to a real terminus, such as there is not outside the world. If, however, it be posited that there is, God will not be moved to it when the world is moved: not even accidentally, because He already is in it. But nothing is moved to a terminus in which it is. This is the reason why God, since He is in all things, is nevertheless not moved when they are moved. To the fourth: Just as God before every real time was in Himself, and not in imaginary times, so outside every real place He is in Himself, and not in imaginary places. And as before the world He was only in Himself, so outside the world He is only in Himself. For it must be noted that those locutions, "before the world" and "outside the world," can be taken in a twofold way: either in this way, "in some time before the world," and "in some place outside the world." In which sense it is false, properly speaking, that God "was" before the world and "is" outside the world; because neither before the world was there time, nor outside the world is there place, nor did any of the Fathers so speak; or thus, so that there be signified something not bounded by the time or space of the world: in which sense it is true that God was before the world and is outside the world, because His to-be (*esse*) and His power (*posse*), since it is uncreated and infinite, cannot be constrained and defined by those limits. And hence it is clear what must be answered to those things which were objected from Scripture and the Fathers: for they signify the immensity of the Divine power, which is not bound to this universe and to this order of things.²⁵

§ VI — Why God is not defiled by the filths of the things in which He is (Quare Deus rerum in quibus est, sordibus non inquinetur)

§ 20. The Master raises the question: since God is in all things, why is He not defiled by their filths? To which a brief and easy answer is given: that God is not stained by the defilements of things for a twofold reason; both because He is of such a nature that He cannot at all be defiled, nor in any way suffer anything, or be affected by any thing whatsoever, as is clear from what has been said elsewhere; and because no thing, inasmuch as it is, is sordid or defiled with respect to God; although something is rightly called unclean corporeally with respect to us, or to another creature, whose nature it offends, vitiates, or corrupts. But only sin, which is not a thing but the vice and defect of a thing, and which God neither does nor touches, is a spiritual uncleanness and an abomination before God. Of both kinds of filths that saying of Wis. 7 can be understood: "Nothing defiled entereth into her." There are at hand concerning this matter in St. Augustine many passages against the Manichees, who for this reason denied the truth of the flesh and of the nativity of Christ, attributing to Him a phantasmal body, because they thought that God, if He should assume flesh in a woman's womb, would be defiled by its filths. The passages are: On the Combat of Christ, ch. 18; On the Nature of the Good, ch. 29; On the Faith against the Manichees, ch. 23; in the Oration on the Five Heresies, ch. 5; and Sermon 63 de diversis, ch. 2.²⁶

1. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1–3.
2. St. Gregory the Great, on Ps. 138 "super illum locum"; and Homilia 17 on Ezekiel.
3. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei VII, ch. 30.
4. Glossa ordinaria on Song of Songs 5.
5. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 2 on the Epistle to the Hebrews; cited by the Master (of the Sentences).
6. St. Thomas, In I Sent., on this distinction, q. 1, a. 2.
7. The Master (of the Sentences), in the text, letter G [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, exposition of the text [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.
8. Acts 17:27–28; St. Augustine, Epistle 57 to Dardanus; and De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 26.
9. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1, ad 4 and ad 6.
10. St. Augustine, Ep. 57; Ep. 105.
11. St. Leo the Great, Ep. 97 (end); Estius, In III Sent., dist. 5.
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 2.
13. 1 Kgs 8 (Solomon's prayer); 2 Chron. 6 (in the prayer of Solomon).
14. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 19; and Id., De 83 quaestionibus, q. 20; Boethius, De Trinitate I.
15. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei VI, ch. 7.
16. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 17; II, ch. 3; St. Ambrose, Sermon 1 on Ps. 118.
17. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 26; St. Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah 40; St. Gregory the Great, Homilia 17 on Ezekiel; the Master (of the Sentences), in the Text [abbreviation as in source].
18. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 4.
19. Ps. 138; Jer. 23; Wis. 1; Job 11; St. Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto I, chs. 7, 9, 10; St. Augustine, Contra Maximinum III, ch. 21.

20. Estius, In IV Sent., dist. 10.
21. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 14.
22. St. Thomas, In I Sent., on this distinction; and Summa theologiae I, q. 8, aa. 2, 4; Quodlibet XI, q. 1, a. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles III, ch. 68; IV, chs. 16–17.
23. Scotus, In I Sent., on the present distinction [abbreviation as in source]; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., on the present distinction [abbreviation as in source].
24. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VIII, ch. 26; Id., Confessiones, lib. 11 [abbreviation as in source], chs. 2–3; and lib. 7, ch. 5 [abbreviation as in source]; Prudentius, Hymnus "De Romano martyre"; St. Augustine, De fide contra Manichaeos, ch. 37; St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 2, "De Theologia".
25. 1 Kgs 8; Job 11; Wis. 7; 1 Tim. 6; 1 Jn. 1; Hymn of the Church to the Blessed Virgin: "Quia quem caeli capere non poterant, tuo gremio contulisti"; and: "Quem totus non capit orbis, in tua se clausit viscera, factus homo" [abbreviation as in source]; Hymnus Ecclesiae: "Impetus in te permanens" [abbreviation as in source].
26. Wis. 7: "Nothing defiled entereth into her"; St. Augustine, De agone Christiano, ch. 18; Id., De natura boni, ch. 29; Id., De fide contra Manichaeos, ch. 23; Id., Oratio de quinque haeresibus, ch. 5; Id., Sermo 63 de diversis, ch. 2.

DISTINCTIO XXXVIII — WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS THE CAUSE OF THE THINGS KNOWN, AND CONVERSELY (*UTRUM DEI SCIENTIA SIT CAUSA RERUM COGNITARUM; ET E CONVERSO*)

§ 1. Let us return to the knowledge of God (*scientia Dei*), about which the discussion had begun to be undertaken above (Distinct. 33), since there is no room to doubt that the knowledge of all things is in God; the question is asked whether one must likewise confess that the knowledge of God is the cause (*caussa*) of the things known. And the same can in particular be asked with respect to foreknowledge (*praescientia*) in regard to things foreknown. It is answered, however: God's knowledge, considered only under the formal character (*ratio*) of knowledge, that is, as the bare cognition of an object (*nuda objecti notitia*), is not the cause of the things known. For the act of knowledge, as such, contributes nothing to the being of the thing known, but only knows. This is clear from the fact that many things are known not only by us, but also by God, the cause of which is not in the knower. For we know God, heaven and earth, and the things that are in them, of which nevertheless we are not the cause. God's knowledge too embraces not only goods, but also evils, and not only those things which at some time exist in the nature of things, but also those which neither are nor have been, nor ever will be, whether possible or impossible. But of those which never exist, there is no cause. Of evils, however, that is, of sins, not God, but the will—intellectual and changeable—of the creature that falls away from God is the cause. Whence St. Augustine, writing in Tractate 53 (on John), says that God, foreknowing the future, through the Prophet foretold the unbelief of the Jews, not made it. Generally, moreover, it has been said by Origen (writing on Rom. 8): Not therefore is something going to be because God knows it will be, but because it is going to be, therefore it is foreknown by God. Which is repeated by St. Jerome in almost the same words in the commentary (on Jer. 26).²

§ 2. Since these things are so, nevertheless for a twofold reason one must concede that God's knowledge is the cause of the things known by Him. First indeed, if God's knowledge is considered insofar as it is the same as His essence, power, and will, which assuredly is established to be the cause of things. In which way indeed the knowledge of God will be the cause of things per accidens (*per accidens*); inasmuch, namely, as it is the same as the three aforesaid, each one of which is per se the cause of things.

§ 3. In a second way: God's knowledge also is, per se and under its proper formal character, the cause of things; namely, insofar as it is considered as practical or operative (*practica seu operativa*); or—which comes to the same thing—insofar as it is understood as conjoined with the will, or with the Divine good pleasure (*beneplacitum Divinum*). For as St. Thomas rightly teaches, treating this very question (I, q. 14, a. 8): As the knowledge of the craftsman stands to the things that are made by art, so does the knowledge of God stand to all created things. Wherefore, since art is the cause of those things which are made by art, it follows also that the knowledge of God, insofar as it is operative, and—as it were—the art of the supreme craftsman, is the

cause of things. And this is the knowledge which, as St. Thomas says, is called by another name the knowledge of approval (*scientia approbationis*), customary everywhere in the Scriptures. See, moreover, things consonant with these in St. Thomas (on this Distinction, article 1; in the first book of the Summa contra Gentiles, chs. 61, 62; in De veritate, q. 2, a. 14; and in a certain special tract together with Scripture), when the production and governance of things is ascribed to the Wisdom, and the Intellect, and the Counsel of God, as in Ps. 103: "Omnia in sapientia fecisti"; Ps. 135: "Qui fecit caelos in intellectu"; Eph. 1: "Qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae." For counsel pertains to the intellective part. According to this same mode of knowing, therefore, that too must be taken which St. Augustine writes—that all creatures are not therefore known by God because they are, but therefore are because they are known by God. Thus indeed he teaches in book 6 (On the Trinity, ch. 10) and in book 15, ch. 13, in the very words adduced by the Master; and moreover in On the City of God, book 5, chs. 9 and 10. To this also looks that which in book 11 (On the City of God, ch. 10) he says in these words: "This world known to us could not be unless it were; but to God, unless it were known, it could not be." Thus there.³

§ 4. Furthermore, by a similar distinction of knowledge this question is dispatched by Hugh of St. Victor, question 217 (On the Epistle to the Romans), whose title is: Whether the foreknowledge of God is the cause of future things; or the future [is the cause of] foreknowledge; and by the Master in the text of the present Distinction.⁴

§ 5. II. Whether the things known are the cause of God's knowledge? St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1. The other question is: whether conversely one can say that the things known are the cause of the divine knowledge. That seems manifestly consequent from the words of Origen, Jerome, and others indicated above, wherein they affirm that something is therefore foreknown by God because it will be. But nonetheless it is answered absolutely that the things known are not the cause of God's knowledge, nor, in like manner, future things of His foreknowledge. The reason is, because since the knowledge and foreknowledge of God are the very essence of God, of which no cause can be given, it cannot be that any of them should be a cause. But neither can that which is later in time be the efficient cause of that which has preceded in time, especially if it has been from eternity. For which reason too Boethius in book 5 (Consolation of Philosophy, prose 3) teaches it to be preposterous that the events of temporal things should be said to be the cause of eternal foreknowledge.⁵

§ 6. To that which was adduced from Origen and Jerome, Hugh (in the place cited above) replies that by those words no cause is signified except that which is called a sine qua non. The Master's answer is the same (in the Text). Which solution of both St. Thomas (in the exposition ad 1) seems to interpret thus: that only a cause of consequence is understood, and not an efficient cause. For it follows, he says, if certain things are future, that God will have foreknown them; yet future things are not the cause that God should know. But this solution fits less well. For if you take a cause sine qua non so generally, as they seem to have taken it, then in turn it will also be permissible to say by way of counter-speech that something is therefore going to be because it is foreknown, since this too is a necessary consequence: if it is foreknown, it will be. But this those authors, in the words objected, expressly deny, saying that something is not therefore going to be because God has foreseen that it will be.⁶

§ 7. Therefore one must answer, in accordance with the things said above (to Distinct. 35, at the end): that if under the name of foreknowledge we look to the relation alone to things foreknown, it is rightly said that future things are its cause. For just as, if nothing were going to be, there would be no foreknowledge of God—His essence nevertheless remaining—so nothing prevents that which is going to be from being in this fashion

called the cause of the Divine foreknowledge; in the same way as in the sins of men there is rightly posited a cause of the Divine hatred, wrath, and vengeance. Nor from this does it follow that a created thing is the cause of an uncreated thing, namely, of the Divine essence; because the relation which is included in such terms is only a being of reason, and is affixed to the Divine essence only by our consideration. Whence neither can a cause in the proper sense of the name be signified in such a way of speaking. Nor, however, would you rightly say in similar fashion: because a thing is future, therefore God wills to do it; for even in created things the will of the craftsman is the efficient cause of the thing, not conversely; much less indeed could a future thing be said to be the cause of the Divine will, even insofar as in it there is considered the relation alone by which it looks to the things to be produced. For that relation is founded upon the will, which in itself is the cause; and it must be considered as the cause with respect to future things.

§ III — That the prescience of God extends to all future things—even contingent ones (Praescientiam Dei ad omnia futura etiam contingentia extendi)

§ 8. It must be held by faith that the prescience (*praescientia*) of God is certain, and that it, certain and infallible, extends to all future things, not only to the necessary, that is, those which proceed from second causes always in the same way, so that those causes cannot be impeded naturally; but also to the contingent, that is, those which can also fail to occur, because their causes can naturally be impeded: and therefore to those actions which proceed from a free will (*voluntas*), which indeed themselves too are contained under the general name of contingent things (*contingentia*).

§ 2. **Proof:** This Catholic truth is proved first and foremost from the certainty of the knowledge (*scientia*) of God in general, of which prescience is a certain part. For it is established that all things whatsoever are subject to the knowledge of God, as well future as present and past: as Scripture bears witness in Ps. 138 and in very many other places, and as it has been more fully explained above (at Distinction 35). But these are the places that pertain particularly to future things. Dan. 13: "Qui nosti omnia, antequam fiant." Sir. 23: "Domino Deo antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita." Wis. 8: "Signa monstra scit antequam fiant; et eventus temporum, et seculorum." Rom. 4: "Qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt." And, briefly, all the places of Scripture in which God either immediately, or through Angels, or through Prophets, or through His Son incarnate, foretold the future events of things and human actions: such as monarchies and their overthrows; the unbelief of the Jews, the denial of Peter, the betrayal by Judas, the conversion of the gentiles. All of which, just as they establish the prescience of God with respect to future things, and by name of contingents, so they prove the same to be certain and infallible, because whatever things have been foretold have come to pass as they were foretold.

§ 9. Furthermore, the reasons by which this certainty of the Divine prescience is shown are of this sort. First—general. God certainly and infallibly knows all things that are in the potency (*potentia*) of God or of a creature. But among these are contained all future things, even contingent ones. Second—special. God knows contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as they are in themselves: therefore He has a certain and infallible knowledge of them. A third confirms this reason, and it is as follows. God understands things in His eternity, in which there is no succession, which by its immensity comprehends all created time: therefore the present gaze of God is borne at once upon the whole of time, and upon all the things that are in whatever

part of time, as upon those which are subject to His eyes and are present: wherefore, just as present things are certainly and infallibly known to God, so also are future things.

§ 10. By nearly these modes St. Thomas proves this doctrine.⁸

§ 11. But to these there must be added also another reason, which Scotus judges to be better than those already stated—namely, that God most certainly knows all future things for this reason, that He most certainly knows from eternity all the things that are in His will (*voluntas*), that is, whatever He decreed from eternity to do in time; of which sort are all beings (*entia*) outside God. But sins, which are not beings but privations (*privatio*) of beings, He foreknows because He knows from eternity of which acts He is going to produce the substance in time, and which defects of those same acts, proceeding from a defectible created will, He is going to permit. See the same Scotus (on Distinction 47), where he hands on the same doctrine and refers back to the things he said (on Distinction 31).⁹ I too approve more the demonstration of Scotus, namely one taken from the will and the operation of God. And that verse of the psalm insinuates it: "Qui fingit sigillatim corda eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum." For the heart of man is in the hand of God his maker.

§ 12. The same is proved more fully from Ps. 138, in which the omniscience of God is so proclaimed that the reason from the creation or formation of things is thereupon interposed: so that after he said, "Intellexisti cogitationes meas de longe, et omnes vias meas praevidisti," as if by way of giving the reason: "Tu formasti." And below, when he had said: "Si sumpsero pennas meas diluculo, et habitavero in extremis maris," namely, that I might escape Thy knowledge so that I may be able to lie hidden, he subjoins the cause why he cannot lie hidden, saying: "Etenim illuc manus tua deducet me, tenebit me dextera tua"; as if he were to say: how couldst Thou be ignorant where I am, since Thou Thyself leadest me to whatever place I shall have gone, and in the same Thou preservest me; for Thou canst not fail to know Thy work. Whence again afterwards, giving the reason for the things said, he says: "Quia tu possedisti renes meos, suscepisti me de utero matris meae": Thou possessest me wholly, as Thy work Thou continually keepest and governest me from the day of my birth: therefore nothing of mine can be hidden from Thee. Hence it follows yet more manifestly: "Non est occultatum os meum ante te quod fecisti in occulto," as if he were to say: for this reason not even one, and the least, of my bones is hidden from Thee; because there is none which Thou didst not make in the hidden fashioning of me in my mother's womb. This pertains to what St. Thomas teaches, that for this reason He alone can move the wills of men. See him (Quodlibet XII, a. 6).¹⁰

§ IV — That the foreknowledge of all future things belongs to God alone (Soli Deo competere futurorum omnium praescientiam)

§ 13. From the things that have just been said, this also follows, that to God alone there belongs the foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of all future things. For God alone knows certainly and infallibly all things that are in His power or in the creature's power; He alone likewise knows future contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as they are in themselves; because to God alone there belongs an eternity (*aeternitas*) comprehending all things, in which therefore by a single gaze He sees all things as present, whatsoever are done in any part of time. Thus teaches St. Thomas, where he asks: Whether the angels know the future? and where he asks: Whether our intellect knows future things? and also in the Compendium of Theology.¹² Finally, to subjoin also Scotus's argument, which is weightier: God alone knows all things that are in His Divine will,

that is, whatsoever He Himself from eternity has decreed to operate in time. He alone also knows what defects of created wills He is going to permit.

§ 14. To these add the testimonies of Scripture, which claim the prenotation of future things for God alone, as in Is. 8: "Numquid non populus a Deo suo requiret visionem?" And 41: "Annuntiate quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos." And 25: "Haec dicit Dominus Deus; quae ventura sunt interrogate me." This the Scriptures themselves show too, which testify that many future things are unknown to angels and to men. For angels, concerning many things which previously they did not know, receive illumination from God; many things they learn by experience, many things by utterances they learn from each other (Dan. 8 and 10, and Zech. 2). No angels know the day and the hour of the last Judgment (Matt. 24; Mk. 13). Nay more, the mystery of our redemption and the calling of the Gentiles they did not at once all of them know perfectly and according to all the circumstances, as the Apostle says, Eph. 3: "Ut innotescat principatibus, et potestatibus in caelestibus," etc.; on which matter more above.¹³ Finally, this is proved by the manifold ignorance of the demons, especially that without which there is no sin.

§ 15. What need to say, since the matter is clear of itself; and since Ecclesiastes 8 says that "there is much affliction for man, because he is ignorant of the past, and of the future he can in no wise be informed by a messenger." And Wis. 9: "Quis hominum poterit scire consilium Dei? Aut quis poterit cogitare quid volet Deus? Cogitationes enim mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae."

§ 16. It is therefore evident that the knowledge of future things, such as we have said, is proper to the Divinity: for this was persuaded even to the Gentiles and idolaters, who in doubtful events were accustomed to consult only those whom they venerated as gods, or thought to speak as if inspired by some divine breath; whence also him who foretold future things they used to say "to divine" (*divinare*), as if to do a divine thing, that is, that which is proper to God. Wherefore with good reason St. Augustine branded as impious the opinion of Cicero, by which he took away from God the foreknowledge of human actions, in book 5.¹⁴

§ V — The objections urged against God's foreknowledge are resolved (Solvuntur ea, quae contra Dei praescientiam obiiciuntur)

§ 17. Now the reasons must be resolved which seem to remove from God the foreknowledge (*praescientia*) especially of future contingents. Of which let this be the first: for God nothing is really future, but all things are present to Him; for therefore there is attributed to Him the knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), because all things whatsoever at any time exist are present to His eyes from eternity. And St. Augustine attests this in book 2 (question 2 to Simplicianus, in the exposition of Ps. 49). And St. Thomas in many places, some of which we have noted above.¹⁶ The second: Of future contingents there is no determinate truth; wherefore neither is there certain foreknowledge; since the certitude of knowledge ought to rest upon the certitude of the thing known. The third: Enunciations about a future contingent, as some wish, are neither true nor false; therefore there is no foreknowledge of them; for neither can there be any knowledge, except of those things which are true, the Philosopher affirming that what is not cannot be known.¹⁷ The fourth: If there were in God some prospect of future contingents, He could be deceived in foreseeing them. For since contingents do not lose their nature from the fact that they are foreseen, they could come about otherwise than they were foreseen.

§ 18. To these we thus answer in order: to the first indeed; that future things are not said to be present to God, as if they exist in reality when they are known by God: for from that many absurdities would follow, namely that all things always exist, and that all things are coeternal with God, as, forsooth, coexisting with the knowing God from eternity. Likewise that contradictories exist at once, and hence that contradictory propositions are at once true, and other things of this sort: but just as to a man, according to place, that is present which is seen by the man, in whatever place it be situated; so to God, according to time, all that is present which is subjected to the Divine gaze, in whatever time it be, whether past, or present, or future. For in this sole manner to God, situated in His invisible eternity, all things which happen in any part of time are said to be present; because God by His eternal intuition surveys and encompasses all things, and sees them as clearly as if they were now present; so that truly with respect to all these things there is attributed to God an intuitive cognition (*cognitio intuitiva*). From which explication this also is understood, that God not only knows future things in their causes or formal characters (*rationes*), which He has present with Himself from eternity, as some taught; but that He knows all future things according to themselves, just as He knows present and past things: the reason, because God, even all the effects for which He has prepared created causes, immediately reaches by His power.

§ 19. To that which in the second and third place is objected there is one answer; namely, that of all contingent things, both future and present and past, there is with God, who in His eternity beholds all things as present, a determinate truth; although with men ignorant of the future it is not determinate: for God sees all future contingents determinately, just as we see present things and remember past things. Therefore absurd is the doctrine of those who say that enunciations concerning future contingents are neither true nor false. First, because it is contrary to dialectical principles, nay to the first conceptions. For according to the dialecticians it is necessary that every enunciation be true or false. For that pertains to the formal character, that is, the definition, of enunciation. But it rests upon this principle: whatever is, or is not; which principle indeed is to be taken determinately of any particular, whether complex or incomplex. Therefore no enunciation can be given which is not determinately true or false. Hence manifestly this is proved from the event of things: for even if there were no foreknowledge of future things, nevertheless the event of things, known by experience, would sufficiently show that, of whatever two contradictories about a future contingent, one was true, the other false; I do not say either one indistinctly, but the one determinately, although it had been hidden before the event. For this was determinately going to be which afterwards we would see; as, if Peter dies today, yesterday it was determinately true, although hidden from us, "Peter will die tomorrow." Lastly, because God, as has been said, in His eternity, which, existing all at once, encompasses all things, sees determinately the one of the contradictories; namely that very one which will come to pass. The solution of the fourth argument will be evident from the things which are to be said next.

§ VI — That God's foreknowledge does not bring necessity to the foreseen things (Praescientiam Dei non adferre necessitatem rebus praevisis)

§ 20. From what has been shown, it can be sufficiently understood that God's foreknowledge (*praescientia*) does not bring in a necessity (*necessitas*) of occurring to the things foreknown: for contingent things (*contingentia*) are those which occur not necessarily but contingently. But, since long ago some, both philosophers and heretics, from the certainty of the Divine foreknowledge, have established a certain

unchangeable and fatal necessity of all future events, it must be proved by us more fully that this is not rightly established from that. Then reply must be made to the arguments which are brought forward by them.

§ 21. First, therefore, it cannot be said that God's foreknowledge imposes necessity upon the things foreseen; because foreknowledge, insofar as it is the bare knowledge of future things, is not the cause of things; as it has been most truly said by Origen and St. Jerome (in the places cited above), that a thing is not on that account going to be because it has been foreknown. Therefore foreknowledge does not make something occur necessarily; for from that whence a thing has its being, from the same it has its mode of being, so as to be either necessarily or contingently.¹⁹

§ 22. Second. God's foreknowledge is not necessary, as we showed (at Distinctio 35); therefore it does not make the things foreseen to be necessary. For what is not necessary, but only contingent, cannot be the cause of a necessary. This argument concludes to a necessitation.²⁰

§ 23. Third. God beholds future things with the same gaze with which He beholds present and past things. But the gaze upon present things does not compel a thing to be necessarily: for it does not follow that someone walks necessarily because I see him walking: so therefore neither does God, beholding future things in His eternity (*aeternitas*) as though present, necessitate them to come to be; but He leaves them to their natural condition, that they may occur either necessarily or contingently. Similarly, the memory of past things does not bring necessity to the things past: therefore neither does presence to future things. The former part of this reasoning, which proceeds from the cognition of presents, Boethius pursues learnedly and copiously, book 5 (On the Consolation of Philosophy, near the end). The latter, taken from the memory of past things, St. Augustine supplies to us, book 3 (On Free Choice of the Will, ch. 4).²¹

§ 24. Fourth. If God's foreknowledge to the things foreknown imports necessity, since God also has foreseen His own actions, it will follow that God Himself acts necessarily and not freely; which is far the most absurd. St. Augustine uses this argument (of the same book, ch. 3). It is confirmed, moreover, because although God is in His immutable eternity, nevertheless His actions ad extra, which He truly and properly works, are in time.²²

§ 25. Lastly. Once the necessity of the foreknown events is posited, many other absurdities will follow. For the freedom of the will (*liberum arbitrium*) will be taken away, and the deliberation of things to be done, and consequently the usefulness of laws, exhortations, corrections, and threats will be taken away, the zeal and solicitude of living well, and the justice of punishments and rewards. To these are added the Scriptures, which, while they most openly teach that God is foreknower of all future things, as has been shown above, nevertheless acknowledge no whit more obscurely, indeed everywhere inculcate, the contingency of things and the freedom of our will. For they teach that many things come to pass in realities, many also are done, or omitted, by men, which could not have come to pass, and not have been done, or have been omitted; as in Sir. 31: "He who could transgress and did not transgress, to do evils and did not do them." Matt. 26: "Can I not ask the Father," etc. 1 Thess. 2: "When we could be a burden to you," etc. And Wis. 13, where it is taught that the Gentiles could have recognized God from creatures, and many other things of this sort.

§ 26. This doctrine the Fathers hand down in many places, some of whom we cited above: as St. Jerome on Jer. 26; St. Augustine, book 5 (City of God, chs. 9, 10; book 3 of On Free Choice of the Will, chs. 2, 3, 4; the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10; and Tractate 63 on John); Prosper, book 1 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, ch. 34; Boethius, book 5 of On the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 3, 4, and the

following down to the end; St. Anselm, the book On the Concord of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Will; and Hugh, question 218, On the Epistle to the Romans; in which places all these teach that from the foreknowledge of God, although it be certain and infallible, no necessity of future events follows.²³

§ VII — The distinction of a threefold necessity (Distinctio triplicis necessitatis)

§ 27. As to the things which are wont to be objected on the contrary, before we come to those, for the greater understanding of what has been said and of what is to be said, a threefold necessity (*necessitas*) must be distinguished. The first, and most perfect, which they call absolute (*absoluta*), is that by which a thing is so that it cannot not be, no matter the power of any agent. This necessity belongs to the Divine nature alone on account of its supreme perfection, which admits no change, and much less non-being, or a potency toward non-being; for it is pure being, unmixed with any potentiality. But all other things, however perfect, are such that they can not be, if God who made them should withdraw, if He willed, His conserving hand; and whatever things are going to be, are such that they can fail to happen, if so it had seemed good to God.

§ 28. The second is natural necessity, whereby, to wit, something is so that by virtue of the natural agent it cannot be otherwise; which indeed is most broad and extends through all the genera of things: for the celestial bodies are necessary according to this mode of necessity, because they are naturally incorruptible; and they are necessarily moved, so that they cannot be naturally impeded from motion. Other things, although they do not exist necessarily, inasmuch as they are corruptible, nevertheless are subject by nature to necessity in motions and in other accidents, and in corruptibility itself; for fire is necessarily hot, and necessarily burns, if the matter be present; and necessarily is borne upward, the impediment being removed; finally, it is necessarily corrupted by a stronger agent: likewise beasts also, although they share in sense, by natural necessity are carried to those things which are suitable to their nature and senses; nay rather, even men, impelled naturally by this necessity, flee misery, they seek happiness; and this necessity, wherever it is found in actions, excludes from them the liberty of choosing.

§ 29. The third is the necessity which they call of the consequent; for this is not a necessity of the things themselves, but of the coherence of things or of propositions among themselves; even if the propositions themselves be either contingent or impossible. Which is easy to show by examples, as: if a man, or a stone, runs, it is moved, etc. This is otherwise called necessity from a hypothesis, or hypothetical necessity (*necessitas ex hypothesi*, or *hypothetica necessitas*), whereby, to wit, something is said to be necessary upon some supposition.

§ 30. Therefore, concerning this threefold kind of necessity, for the present undertaking it must be noted that neither does the first necessity arise from any foreknowledge (*praescientia*), since no foreknowledge precedes it; for nothing is prior to God: nor the second, because although the Divine foreknowledge has preceded it, nevertheless it is not the cause of it; except in so far as it was shown above that the knowledge of God is the cause of the things known; and the same judgment is to be made about the third kind of necessity; for just as the second flows from the natural principles of created things, even with no regard had to the foreknowledge of God, so the third results from a certain relation of things, or of propositions, among themselves. From which we conclude that the foreknowledge of God, in so far as it is bare foreknowledge, is the cause of no necessity in any genus of things whatsoever.

§ VIII — The arguments are resolved which infer the necessity of events from foreknowledge (*Solvuntur argumenta, quae ex praescientia colligunt eventuum necessitatem*)

§ 31. There are many things which are wont to be objected against the harmony of the Divine foreknowledge (*praescientia Divina*) and the contingency of things; but which, partly by the distinction of necessity already explained, partly by the distinction of the divided and composite sense (*sensus divisus et compositus*), which must be taken from the dialecticians, almost all can be dissolved. Of this kind is this argument: if what has been foreseen can fail to happen, the Divine foreknowledge will be deceived; but it cannot be deceived; therefore what has been foreseen cannot fail to happen; therefore it happens necessarily. One must answer that this proposition, namely, "that what has been foreseen does not happen," can admit a twofold sense: composite and divided. In the composite sense indeed this: that both its being foreseen and yet its not happening should at once stand together; in which sense the proposition is false. In the divided sense, however, this: it can come about that this (with that which has been foreseen pointed out) does not happen; in which sense it is true. But from this it does not follow that the Divine foreknowledge can be deceived; because if that which has been pointed out does not happen, it was not foreseen.

§ 32. With equal ease this argument is solved: God foreknew that this would happen; but it is impossible that His foreknowledge be deceived; therefore it will happen necessarily. For if you understand the necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*), it does not follow. For since the first part of the antecedent is not necessary, the conclusion cannot from that be gathered as necessary; or—which comes to the same thing—never from a contingent antecedent, whether in part or as a whole, does the necessity of the conclusion follow. For although it follows rightly: a stone is moved, therefore some body is moved; and although the antecedent of this argument be contingent, and the consequent necessary; nevertheless the consequent does not have its necessity from the antecedent; and so it will not be permissible to infer: therefore some body is necessarily moved. But if you understand the necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*), it follows well; for the consequence is necessary: God foreknew that this would happen, therefore this will happen: but just as the antecedent is contingent, so too the consequent.

§ 33. But John Wyclif, setting himself in opposition to this reply, contends that the antecedent is necessary, and therefore that the necessity of the consequent is rightly concluded therefrom; the same about the antecedent is held by Cajetan and certain other Catholic Doctors, relying on the authority of St. Thomas in I, q. 14, a. 13, in the reply to the second, where he affirms that in this conditional (*conditionalis*): if God knew this would be future, this will be, the antecedent is absolutely necessary, with express reprobation of the opinion of those who say that it is contingent. Moreover, he proves that it is necessary in the argument both because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past; which same he again teaches in II-II, q. 171, a. 5, ad 3.²⁵ But whatever be the opinion of St. Thomas—about which there is no light altercation among his Commentators and followers—answer is made that the foundation of that opinion about the antecedent being absolutely necessary, namely this: that a proposition about the past, if it is true, is necessary, because it now cannot be changed, is false: for one must admit that contingency is found in past things as well as in present and future things. For just as in the present something is called contingent (*contingens*), because it can not be, although everything which is, while it is, must be, namely from a hypothesis (*ex hypothesi*), which is necessity of consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*), as St. Thomas adduces from the Philosopher; so likewise

with regard to the future, because it will be able not to be: thus the past is said to be contingent because it was able not to be; not, however, because now it can be brought about that it was not; for the necessity—and likewise the contingent or fortuitous connection of things—is to be evaluated from the connection of things, which is signified by the predicate and the subject, and that according to the time designated by the verb; for example, this proposition is contingent: Adam sinned; because then, when he was sinning, he was able not to sin: for which reason, this too is contingent: God foreknew that Adam would sin, because what He foreknew, He could have not foreknown. But the contingency of each is proved more fully from this: because each proposition will remain true, if you add to it the mode "contingently" (*contingenter*): in this way: Adam sinned contingently, God foreknew contingently that Adam would sin. Now every proposition is contingent, to which the mode "contingently" can truly be added; and the same judgment is to be made about the necessary, the possible, and the impossible. Nor does that which is wont to be said stand in the way, that there is no power over the past, and there is no deliberation about things done and over with; for these things only signify that that which has once been done and has passed into the past cannot thereafter be changed: not, however, that it was necessarily then done at the time when it was being done; which suffices for it to be rightly reckoned contingent.

§ 34. Another argument, taken from the second argument of St. Thomas in the words cited above, is this: Every eternal thing is necessary; but the foreknowledge of God about this event is eternal; therefore it is necessary: and hence the event itself is necessary, because if the antecedent is necessary, so too the consequent. Answer is made that the foreknowledge of God, in so far as it is the essence of God, is both eternal and necessary; but in so far as it connotes a respect to future things, it is not properly eternal, since it is only a being of reason (*ens rationis*); yet it is said improperly to be eternal, because it was from eternity, just as the essence of God was from eternity, together with this rational respect to a thing future in time. But that which is eternal only in this manner need not be necessary; for just as something can be from eternity without being necessary; likewise, if God had made the world from eternity, the world would indeed be eternal and from eternity, yet it would not be absolutely necessary; because God could have not produced it from eternity.

§ 35. Again they object: What God foreknew would happen, will happen certainly and infallibly; therefore it will happen necessarily. For it seems that "certain or infallible" and "necessary" are the same. It is answered that these two are very different. For certainty or infallibility is in the knower, and signifies a certain relation of the knower to the thing known; namely, that regarding it he is not mistaken: whether the thing itself can be otherwise or not. Many things are known certainly and infallibly by us and by the Angels, and much more by God; but necessity is in the things themselves, which cannot be otherwise, whether they are known certainly and infallibly or not: and they are said to be necessary to be known fallibly, in the way in which there is opinion about them, that is, an uncertain assent; accordingly "necessary" and "infallible" exceed each other with respect to our intellect; for to God nothing is fallible, but all things are to Him certain and infallible.

§ 36. Besides these they object the authority of St. Augustine and St. Anselm; of whom the former (in the exposition of Psalm 106) says about certain men who had departed from the Church: "If perchance they are ours in the hidden foreknowledge of God, it is necessary that they should return"; while the latter (in the book *On the Harmony of the Foreknowledge of God and Free Will*, ch. 2) says: "Those things which God foreknew, it is necessary that they be going to be." But the sense of each is the same. For they mean that these two things cohere necessarily, namely that God should foreknow something, and that this very thing should

happen; just as also these two: that God should not foreknow something, and that this very thing should not happen: but that they are not speaking of absolute necessity, the context of each place sufficiently teaches, and clearly with respect to the latter it is established from the aim of the writer and the title of the book.²⁶

§ 37. Finally, since the same account obtains of foreknowledge and of Divine prediction, they endeavor to prove that from prediction the necessity of the thing predicted follows by this testimony of the Evangelist in Jn. 12: "Therefore they could not believe, because again Isaiah said: He has blinded their eyes," etc. To which one must reply, first indeed, that the Prophetic oracle itself is not assigned as the cause why some could not believe, but the thing predicted; namely the blindness of their heart, so that the sense be: they could not believe on account of the blindness of their heart, which had been predicted by the Prophet: in the same way as elsewhere they are denied to be able to believe on account of the affection of vain glory, as in Jn. 5: "How can you believe, who receive glory one from another." And in the same way Peter could not yet follow Christ on account of the weakness of the flesh. Then, sentences of this sort do not signify something absolutely impossible, but either impossible on a supposition, namely with the vice that impedes remaining in place, or absolutely difficult: for on account of the great blindness of mind with which those of whom John speaks were struggling, it was most difficult that they should receive the light of truth.

§ IX — That the providence of God does not bring necessity to things (Providentiam Dei non adferre necessitatem rebus)

§ 38. They who today ascribe necessity (*necessitas*) to all events and to human actions, such as Calvin and others, think that it should be established not so much from prescience (*praescientia*) as from the providence of God (*providentia Dei*). For they confess that bare prescience, since it is not the cause (*causa*) of events but only their index and, as it were, their fore-announcement when future things are revealed to us by God, likewise is not the cause of their necessity. But as for the providence of God, since it at once includes the efficacious will of God with respect to those things which will happen, so that it is evident that it is the cause of events, thus they contend that it imports necessity into the same. Catholics, however, teach that the providence of God is no more the cause of the necessity of those events than is prescience; such that from the very fact that something is provided for and disposed, or preordained by God, it does not follow consequently that it will happen of necessity. And that this may be understood, one must consider that God indeed makes and governs all things universally and even in particular by His will and providence; just as will be shown more fully in the distinction immediately following; but He does so according to the natures inborn in individual things in the first creation. For He so established certain things that they act freely (*libere*); and with this freedom preserved He governs them, while He operates in them even the very free actions, as in man and in the Angel. Again, for some effects He preordained necessary causes; for others, however, not necessary but contingent (*contingentes*) causes, in order to those things of which they are causes; namely in such a way that by a created power they can be impeded from producing them; whence it follows that some things happen necessarily and some contingently; although God did not will even the causes which are necessary according to their nature to be withdrawn from His power, so that He could not, if He should will, hinder even them from producing their own effects. Therefore the providence of God so far from taking away the contingency of its effects, actually establishes it in certain cases, namely in all those for which causes have been provided that are not necessary but, according to their nature, able to be impeded: for, as Dionysius bears witness, "To corrupt nature is not of Divine Providence."²⁸ This Catholic doctrine was plainly and briefly set out at once by St.

Augustine, book 7 of the City of God, ch. 30, in these words: "Thus does God administer all the things that He has made, that He even permit the very things themselves to exercise and to perform their proper motions; that is, that He not impede secondary causes (*causae secundae*) from acting, nor take away their proper and natural mode of acting; but rather that He operate in them according to the very natures which He has attributed to them."

§ 39. And this is what St. Thomas says in II-II, q. 52, a. 1 and elsewhere: that God moves each thing according to the mode of that which is moved.²⁹ From which it can be concluded that, given the providence of God, man is no less free in his actions, and other events are no less contingent, than if we were to feign that providence to be absent. For Providence, as Dionysius attests, is the conservatrix of the nature of things; and according to Augustine, it does not hinder things from exercising their proper motions. To these there can be added two reasons common with prescience. The first is this: God not only provides and preordains what we are going to do, but also what He Himself is going to do; but He Himself through His own providence does not hinder Himself from exercising His own acts freely, and from being able not to act; wherefore neither does He, by that same providence, bring necessity upon human actions nor upon any other events, for which He has prepared non-necessary causes. The second is this: God does not dispose and provide for things by a necessity; therefore neither do the things, of which there is a disposition and providence, happen by necessity: understand this, as far as concerns the general formal character (*ratio*) of providence, which does not require this, that if something has been provided by God, it happen necessarily: for those things, for which God has provided necessary causes, will happen necessarily; not because they are provided, but because they have been provided in such a manner, that is, to happen through such causes.

§ 40. St. Thomas hands down this doctrine and explains it learnedly in various places, as in I, q. 22, a. 4; and I, q. 19, a. 8; see on this passage the learned and solid commentary of Domingo Bañez; likewise in De veritate q. 5, a. 5; in book three Against the Gentiles, chs. 69, 70, 71, 73, 93, and 94; in Quodlibet 10, a. 4; in the Compendium of Theology, chs. 141 and 142; in Opusculum 15, ch. 15; on the 39th distinction, q. 2, a. 2.³⁰ Moreover the Council of Constance condemned the contrary opinion, asserted by the heretic John Wyclif (sess. 8, art. 27): namely, "All things happen by absolute necessity"; which he asserted, both on account of God's infallible prescience, as we indicated above, and most especially on account of God's inevitable providence.³¹ The same was the opinion of the Stoics, which St. Augustine refutes.³² More on this matter below in the following distinction, where it is taught that human acts are subject to the providence of God. Now let us answer the things which are wont to be objected.

§ X — Reply to the arguments on the contrary (*Respondetur ad argumenta in contrarium*)

§ 41. The first argument, by which the Adversaries endeavor to conclude the necessity of things from the providence of God, has been indicated above, taken from this, that providence is the cause of things; and indeed such a cause that, once it is posited, the effect necessarily follows. Whence it seems to follow that the effects themselves are necessary, as having a necessary cause—that is, such as cannot be impeded by any created power from producing the effect. The second, already long ago set in opposition to Catholics by John Wyclif, is this. A creature cannot impede the eternal determination of God, according to that: "Voluntati ejus quis resistet?" therefore, it necessarily comes to be what God from eternity has decreed and determined to come to

be in time: for what cannot be impeded, we say happens necessarily. The third. The eternal decree of God is immutable. For neither can God Himself revoke or change His absolute decree, so far is it from being the case that a creature can overthrow it; therefore the thing decreed happens necessarily. The fourth. Things which are always in the same way, happen necessarily, as the Philosopher testifies (Physics, book 2). For hence we are taught that the sun moves from east to west by necessity, because it always moves thus; but such are all events with respect to Divine providence: for the events provided for always follow the providence of God; therefore they come about necessarily. The fifth. Fate, such as was posited either by the Stoics or by the astrologers, took away the contingency of things and the freedom of human actions: therefore Divine providence also takes away both. For the same reason seems to hold, because in both cases there follows a like and same-genus necessity. For just as according to those men, once a certain motion or aspect of the stars is posited, it necessarily follows that this or that will come to pass, either from the will of man or from other causes: so, once the providence of God is posited, it necessarily follows that all those things, either to be done by man, or to happen otherwise, whichsoever God has provided will happen through such causes. The sixth. Boethius in book 4 (Consolation of Philosophy, prose 6) says that Fate proceeds from immovables, and "binds the dispositions and actions of men with an indissoluble connection of causes." Therefore the causes of things provided by God cannot be impeded; and consequently, with respect to the effects, they are necessary; wherefore the effects themselves are necessary. Finally. Three passages are adduced from St. Augustine. The first is in the Enchiridion, ch. 103, where he thus says: "God must be besought to will, because it is necessary that it be done, if He shall have willed." The second is book 6 (On Genesis ad litteram, ch. 15), where he says that "the will of the Creator is the necessity of things." The third is book 26 (Against Faustus, ch. 4), where it is said that "the will of God does not have that it be absolutely impossible not to be done concerning anyone." From which the consequence is: what the will of God has, cannot not be done, and therefore is done necessarily. And these things indeed are objected generally against the harmony of Divine providence and the contingency of things. But concerning Divine predestination and reprobation—how through them the freedom of our actions and contingency are not taken away—will be explained below (at Dist. 40).

§ 42. To the first argument, therefore, it is answered, first of all, that from it there cannot be gathered an absolute and all-round necessity of events: because the cause itself, namely the providence of God, is not necessary in that manner, as we said above. For just as God could not have foreknown, so He could not have preordained. Then it is answered more fully, that those events are said to be necessary with that necessity which is opposed to their contingency, for which God has prepared proximate necessary causes in order to those very effects; namely in such a way that they cannot naturally be impeded from producing them: but those are contingent for which He has prepared contingent causes, that is, defectible and capable of being impeded. Although therefore Divine providence is a necessary cause, inasmuch as, once it is posited, the effect necessarily follows, nevertheless the effect is not simply necessary, if the providence of God has this, that it be produced through secondary causes that are contingent and capable of being impeded: I say secondary; for the first cause cannot be impeded. But you will object: secondary causes cannot take away from their effects the necessity which they would have without them; and yet if God were to produce effects of this sort immediately without secondary causes, the effects would not be contingent but necessary. For no effect of which God alone is the cause can be contingent: therefore also when they are produced through the mediation of secondary causes, although defectible, they are necessary, not contingent. I reply by denying the major. For effects otherwise necessary become contingent from the fact that causes are given to them which can be impeded: just as actions otherwise necessary are on this account free, that they are done through choice.

Whence it must be granted that the effect which would be necessary in the formal character of an effect, if it were produced by God alone, is contingent through this, that for producing it the first cause also employs a secondary cause that is defectible. But you will say: whatever God can do with a secondary cause, He can do by Himself alone, as they are wont to say: if therefore He produces contingent effects through secondary causes, He will be able to produce them alone. But this He cannot do, as has been said; therefore nor that. It is answered that the major must be understood with this limitation, unless the effect be such as in the full formal character of itself includes an order to some secondary cause; of which sort are the effects, walking, speaking, sitting; thus an effect contingent as such says an order to a defectible cause; and therefore, as such, it cannot be produced by God alone; although the same effect, as to its substance, can be produced by God alone; in which case it will now not be a contingent effect, but necessary, inasmuch as it proceeds from a cause not able to be impeded.

§ 43. The second argument concludes nothing other than a necessity of the consequence: for it necessarily follows that a thing will be in time, if God has predetermined from eternity that it will be. But neither from the fact that a thing can fail to be does it follow that the eternal decree of God can be impeded: but only this follows, that God could not have decreed that this thing would be future; although it does not consist with His decree that the thing not be done. For these two are impossible, that God has decreed that this should happen, and this not happen; yet each is possible taken singly, as happens in many contradictories. Add that this argument proves no more a necessity of acting in the creature than in the Creator; since not even God Himself can impede or change His own purpose; whom nevertheless one must admit to act all things in the most free manner; because whatever He does, He thus purposed from eternity that He could not have purposed. Nay rather, to speak more properly, the very purpose of God never passes into the past, but stands in one stable and immutable now of eternity. Whence He acts no less freely what He has decreed from eternity, than if He were now for the first time determining to do something. And from this the solution of the third argument is clear, which had been taken from the immutability of the Divine decree. For just as the immutability of God's will does not prejudice His liberty, so neither does it take away in creatures the contingency of events: for liberty does not consist in this, that the decree can be changed; but that it can, or could, fail to be posited by the will, as was explained more fully above (at Dist. 8).

§ 44. The reply to the fourth is evident from the things that were said concerning the first argument. For those things which, once the providence of God is posited as the first cause, happen necessarily, with a necessity of the consequence receive that same contingency from the secondary causes, if they are capable of being impeded, as we have just said. And the division of the Philosopher must be taken of effects referred to secondary causes.

§ 45. To the fifth it is answered that Fate, as it was posited by the pagans, is rightly reprobated. First indeed, because it subjected the will and mind of man to the heavenly bodies, that is, to more ignoble things, whereas the mind of man is immaterial, but those are material and created for the use and ministry of man as of the more excellent creature, as Moses attests (Deut. 4).³⁴ Whence St. Gregory, Hom. 10 on the Gospels: "Far be it," he says, "from the hearts of the faithful to say that there is any Fate. For the life of men is governed by Him alone, the Maker, who created it; for it is not for the stars that man has been made, but the stars have been made for man; and if a star is said to be the Fate of a man, man is asserted to be subject to the very ministries of the stars." Thus he.³⁵ Then, because just as the heavenly bodies are moved not freely but by necessity, so, if the wills of men were subject to them, they would be moved not freely but by necessity. But

God in the most free manner preordained from eternity and in time moves the wills of men. Yet this does not suffice for man to act freely; for thus also all other agents would act freely, since God moves all things in the most free manner. But in addition it must be said that God moves the will of man in such a way that it operates freely, that is, through choice. For God operates in created things according to certain grades proper to their nature: for He causes a stone to be moved merely naturally, without any cognition; but He causes beasts to be moved to food through sense and the sensitive appetite; but He causes man to be moved to his works through the judgment of reason, through which, namely, man is also moved by himself, having a free choice of his acts. From which it is clear that the account of Fate as posited by the Gentiles is not the same as that of Divine providence with respect to the necessity or contingency of effects, of which human liberty is a certain part. To the sixth St. Thomas replies that the indissolubility and immutability of which Boethius speaks pertain to the certainty of providence, which does not fail either from its effect or from the mode of coming to be which it has provided; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects themselves.³⁶

§ 46. Finally, to those things which are objected from Augustine, the reply is easy. One must say that in all those places St. Augustine speaks of a necessity of the consequence. Nay, the first sentence manifestly opposes the Adversaries: for if God must be besought to will, as St. Augustine says, then therefore God can not will, and the very thing which we ask can fail to happen; because God is asked in vain to will or to do that which is going to happen of necessity.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 8.
 2. St. Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, tract. 53; Origen, *Commentary on Romans*, on Rom. 8; St. Jerome, *Commentary on Jeremiah*, on Jer. 26.
 3. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, on this Distinction, a. 1 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, chs. 61–62; St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 2, a. 14; St. Thomas, in quodam tractatu peculiari cum Scriptura [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 10; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 13; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, chs. 9–10; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, ch. 10.
 4. Hugh (of St. Victor), *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, q. 217; The Master (of the Sentences), in the text of the present Distinction.
 5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1; Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, prose 3.
 6. Hugh (of St. Victor), loc. cit; The Master (of the Sentences), loc. cit; St. Thomas, ad 1 [abbreviation as in source].
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13.
 8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 5, in corp.; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 86, a. 4; St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, on this Distinction, a. 5; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, ch. 67; St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae De veritate*, q. 12; St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* XII, q. 3; St. Thomas, *Tractatus de praescientia et praedestinatione*, a. 4 [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae* I, chs. 133 and 140.
 9. Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 47; see also dist. 31.
 10. St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* XII, a. 6.
 11. St. Thomas, "S. Thom. 1. art. 9. 57. art. 3. & 86. art. 4." [abbreviation as in source].
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 3; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 4; cf. also I, q. 86, a. 4; St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae* I, ch. 134.
 13. See above, Distinctio 11, §§ 1–2.
 14. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, ch. 9.
 15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13.

16. St. Augustine, lib. 2 (quest. 2 ad Simplicianum, in expositione Ps. 49) [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, many places; some cited above [as in source].
17. Aristotle [generic attribution in source]: "that what is not cannot be known."
18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 1–3.
19. Origen and St. Jerome, as cited above [abbreviation as in source].
20. Above, *Distinctio* 35.
21. Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* V, near the end; St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 4.
22. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 3.
23. St. Jerome, *Commentarii in Jeremiam*, on Jer. 26; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, chs. 9–10; St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, chs. 2–4; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 10; St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem*, tract. 63; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 34; Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* V, pros. 3–4 and following to the end; St. Anselm, *De concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio*; Hugh (of St. Victor), *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, q. 218.
24. St. Thomas, *ubi sup.* [abbreviation as in source].
25. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 2; II-II, q. 171, a. 5, ad 3.
26. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Ps.* 106; St. Anselm, *De concordia praescientiae Dei et liberi arbitrii*, ch. 2. Wyclif, *Triologus*, ch. 9; Cajetan is cited by Estius along with other Catholic Doctors.
27. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 4.
28. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 4.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 52, a. 1.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 4; I, q. 19, a. 8. See also Domingo Bañez, commentary ad loc. St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, chs. 69–71, 73, 93–94; *Quodlibet* 10, a. 4; *Compendium theologiae*, chs. 141–142; *Opusc.* 15, ch. 15; *In I Sent.*, dist. 39, q. 2, a. 2.
31. Council of Constance, Session 8, art. 27; John Wyclif, thesis: "Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt."
32. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, chs. 9–11.
33. St. Thomas, *ibid.* [abbreviation as in source].
34. Deut. 4.
35. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 10.
36. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* IV, prose 6; cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit.

DISTINCTIO XXXIX — ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (*DE IMMUTABILITATE SCIENTIAE DEI*)

§ I — That the knowledge of God is immutable (Scientiam Dei immutabilem esse)

§ 1. Altogether the knowledge of God (*scientia Dei*) is considered to be immutable in two ways. First, if it be considered as the same thing as the essence (*essentia*) of God, which indeed is established to be immutable. And in this way St. Augustine teaches that the knowledge of God is invariable,² and St. Thomas uses the same argument to prove this.¹ Secondly, if it be considered according to the proper formal character (*ratio*) of knowledge, by which, namely, it regards those things which are known in whatever way. For since to the knowledge of God there are altogether subject all the things which can fall under the cognition of the Divine mind, that is, those to which it is not repugnant to be known or cognized; and since these are not only possible things, but also whatever things cannot come to be, indeed even infinitely many things, of which nothing can be withdrawn from that same Divine knowledge: it is evident that also in this way the knowledge of God is immutable, which therefore can neither be diminished nor increased, and can embrace neither more nor fewer knowables; for the knowledge of God is nothing other than a certain simple cognitive comprehension of all things. For God does not know either by ratiocinating or by enunciating, as rational creatures do. For the former mode argues a certain progress from ignorance to knowledge, or at least from imperfect knowledge to perfect; but the latter argues a certain composition in the knower—whereas such composition is not in the things themselves. But both of these are very far removed from the Divine mind, which, since it has the most perfect knowledge of all things from eternity, does not proceed from things known to unknown, nor from imperfect cognition to perfect; and since He knows all things by the simple intuition of His essence (*essentia*), He does not understand by way of enunciation, namely by composing and dividing. Wherefore He knows even enunciations, or enunciable things, not through enunciations, but by one most simple concept. Thus St. Augustine teaches this in the aforesaid book, saying that God does not see all things in a piecemeal or item-by-item fashion; as though with an alternating concept from here to there, from there to here; but sees all things at once.³ And St. Thomas teaches this same point more fully.⁴ Moreover, how even the cognition of the Angels, although far inferior to the Divine, nevertheless takes place without discursive reasoning, composition, and division, the same Author sets forth.⁵

§ 2. But against what has been said someone will object. More things can be true than are; therefore than are known: more things can be known by God—since knowledge is only of truths, and the proper object of the intellect is the true, as the good is of the will. St. Thomas answers that even those things which are false are in some way true: for, he says, those things which are not in act have truth inasmuch as they are in potency; for it is true that they are in potency, and thus they are known by God.⁶ Now they are said to be in potency, according to that same Doctor (in the body of the same article), the things which are in potency either of God

Himself, or of the creature; whether in active potency, or in passive; whether in the potency of opining, or imagining, or of signifying in any way, etc.⁷ In this way, therefore, it is manifest that even false and impossible things are in potency, and hence have truth, just as also being, in some way. For being and the true are convertible.

§ 3. One must know, however, that that sentence of the Philosopher, that what is not cannot be known—from which the common axiom is taken, that knowledge is only of the true—was said of knowledge properly so called, which is only of necessary things; but not of the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is being disputed here, which extends itself to all intelligibles.⁸

§ II — Whether the knowledge of vision in God is changeable (Scientia visionis in Deo utrum mutabilis?)

§ 4. As to the knowledge of God which regards creatures, that is, things at some time existing, or their defects, which above (at *Distinctio 35*) we said is called the knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), one must speak somewhat otherwise than of the knowledge of God in general. For of this it must be admitted that God can know more or fewer things than He knows: just as we rightly admit that He can do more or fewer things than He does. And similarly, speaking of the same, it must be admitted that God can be able to know something which He neither knows, nor knew, nor will ever know. All which must be understood in the divided sense (*sensus divisus*). For it cannot come about that what He now knows by the knowledge of vision should afterwards He begin not to know, or conversely; but it could be from eternity that He did not know what He now, from eternity, knows; because from eternity He could have willed to make something which now, from eternity, He has not willed to make, referring that from eternity to willing and to not-willing.

§ 5. Further, from this it does not follow that the knowledge of vision in God can be increased or diminished, or altogether be changed: for such a manner of speaking, in which increase, diminution, change is posited, always involves the composite sense (*sensus compositus*), and so, in the matter proposed, is false: for when you say "the knowledge of God can be increased or diminished or changed," you effect this sense: that God knows certain things from eternity, to which afterwards certain things can be added or taken away; or in whose place others can succeed; namely, thus, that He afterwards should know more or fewer things than before; or that afterwards He should absolutely know certain things which He did not before; or conversely. Whence it would follow that it could come about that God should at some time begin to know what He did not know, or not to know what He knew: but this is absurd, and conflicts with the eternal decree of God about the things to be produced in time. Wherefore it must be most certainly held that the knowledge of God, even when taken also in this way, is unchangeable.

§ III — How far the knowledge of God with respect to propositions can be varied (Scientia Dei circa propositiones quatenus variari possit)

§ 6. It befits indeed every knowledge of God not to be able to be changed. For even the knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*), as was just now said, although it can be extended to more or to fewer, to embrace now more, now fewer things; although from eternity it could have encompassed more or fewer than it now encompasses. But this fact no more argues a mutability of the knowledge of God than of His will, by which from eternity

He could have willed other things than those which He now wills. Moreover, the knowledge of God can also be referred to enunciations or propositions (*enuntiationes, seu propositiones*); or—which comes to the same—to things-enunciable, or enunciated, that is, to things, insofar as they are signified by enunciations. On which matter, although the Master treats it (Dist. 41),¹⁰ nevertheless that disputation is more conveniently recalled to this place. Concerning this knowledge of God, although it too without doubt is in itself unchangeable, yet we must speak in various ways, as propositions vary according to times. For since a man is said to know no proposition in this mode of knowing except a true one, and the same proposition, on account of the mutation of things and of times, is now true, now false; it will follow that God now knows some proposition which afterwards He does not know; and conversely. Which it is easy to set forth by the several differences of times. For a true proposition about the past in general, as "Christ was born," He did not know two thousand years earlier, but when Christ was born He began to know it, yet He will never cease to know the same, just as He will not cease to know any other that is of past time, because a proposition about the past, being true, will always be true. Understand this about the past in general. For if it designates a definite time, as "Yesterday Christ was born," He ceased to know it; and similarly about the future, as "After two days the Passover will take place." Again, a true proposition about the future in general, as "We shall all rise," He did indeed know from eternity, nor can it come about that He should ever begin to know such a proposition, because a proposition about the future, being true, has always been true; speaking likewise about the future in general. But He will at some time cease to know it, namely, after the resurrection has been accomplished, because then the proposition itself will cease to be true. Finally, a true proposition about the present, He always knows as long as it remains true, as this one: "The Church is militant"; but such a proposition He at some time begins to know, and at some time ceases to know; unless perchance the truth of the proposition is perpetual; either simply, as "God is omnipotent"; or into the future, as "The Angels are blessed."

§ 7. Furthermore, all this variety of speaking does not arise from the fact that any mutation occurs around the knowledge of God, but because the things subjected are changed. Whence it is necessary that the propositions themselves, which we use when speaking about things, be changed; namely, so as to signify to us what is fitting to each, and according to what it is fitting. Yet it is manifest that, things having been changed, knowledge is not necessarily changed; not even created knowledge, unless something else concurs: for instance, composition and division, or a greater certitude, received from the experience of a present thing—which have no place in God. Thus the knowledge of a physician remains invariable, while to the same man, on account of his varied condition, he prescribes now these medicines, now others different. And, what pertains more to the present matter, just as our Faith is the same as the Faith of the ancients who preceded Christ, although they believed that Christ would be born, but we believe that He has been born, as is taught (at Dist. 23, Book 3),¹¹ so also the knowledge of God remains the same and invariable, by which He formerly foreknew that some thing—the nativity of Christ, for example—would be future, but now knows it as past; although, on account of the lapse of time in which that thing was accomplished, we enunciate it by one set of propositions and then by another.

§ 8. Finally, just as God Himself, without a mutation of His will, works many things in time which previously He does not work, and afterwards ceases from working certain things; because all that mutation proceeding from the first immutable cause does not occur in the will of God, which is perpetual and constant, but in the things themselves: so too, without a mutation of His knowledge, on account of the mere mutation brought about in things, He is said now to know certain propositions, now not to know them, according as the proposition which is true is said to be known, that which is false not to be known. This matter will

become clearer, if we think that God in His eternity knows every variety of things and of propositions which occurs in time. And this knowledge of God, just as it is not varied from this—that He knows one and the same thing at one time to be, and at another time not to be—so it is not varied from this, that He knows some enunciable at one time to be true and at another time to be false; as St. Thomas learnedly explains (q. 14, a. 15, ad 3).¹² But St. Augustine differs on this matter, Epistle 5 (to Marcellinus).¹³ Moreover, there make for the explication of this doctrine the things that were said around the eighth distinction about the immutability of the Divine nature and will, where, among other things, reply was made to the argument of a certain Theophronius, who was arguing that God is mutable from the fact that the same things He now foreknows as future, now beholds as present, now recalls as past.

§ 9. The providence of God—what it is, and which acts execute it? (*Providentia Dei quae sit, & qui actus eam exequentes?*) St. Thomas rightly defines the providence (*providentia*) of God (I, q. 22, a. 1) as the pre-existing plan in the Divine mind of the order of things to an end, that is, the practical knowledge of God, by which He preordained from eternity, and in time directs, each and every thing to its end, and especially to the ultimate end. Hence it is clear that the providence of God is indeed from eternity, but its execution—which consists most of all in the governance (*gubernatio*) of things—takes place in time. It is also clear that the providence of God is the cause of things, since it is a certain practical knowledge. Now if it be asked what acts there are by which God executes providence, one must say that first of all the work of the creation (*creatio*) of things looks to this. "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself," says the Sage (Prov. 16); and Moses (Deut. 26) bears witness that God created all the nations for His praise, and His name, and His glory.¹⁴ Therefore, by creation itself, things are ordered to their own ultimate end. Nor does it stand in the way that creation is not an act of governance, but is presupposed to it. For providence extends to more things than governance.

§ 10. Secondly, the conservation (*conservatio*) of things pertains here. For creation and conservation are of the same formal character, since conservation is nothing other than a certain continued creation. But that the conservation of things is an effect of Divine governance, and therefore of providence, St. Thomas teaches and presupposes (I, q. 104), whose title is "On the effects of Divine governance in particular"; where he treats especially of the conservation of things.¹⁵

§ 11. Thirdly, it is an effect—indeed the principal effect—of Divine providence, to supply to things existing the means conducing to the ends to which they are directed, and most of all to the ultimate end.

§ 12. Lastly, although it is doubted by some whether it also pertains to Divine providence to lead the things themselves to their ends, and consequently to the ultimate end, and some think that this is extraneous to the formal character of providence—because providence is only the plan of ordering the means to the end, not however the plan of the attainment of the end itself—yet the truer opinion is that this also is contained in the formal character of providence attributed to God, that by it things are led to their own end. For the Divine providence is perfect and efficacious, and in no part frustrable, and consequently it so supplies to things the means ordered to the end, that through those same means it also efficaciously leads them to the end. Whence the Church prays: "O God, whose providence in its own ordering is not deceived," etc. This is the opinion of St. Thomas himself (the aforesaid q. 22, a. 2, ad 1; and more expressly a. 4, ad 1, 2, 3; and q. 23, a. 6), where he makes the very events provided, that is, the attainment of the end—and that certain and infallible—to be effects of the providence of God; which likewise he teaches in Book 3 against the Gentiles, ch. 94.¹⁶ From which places it is understood that he retracted what he had said contrary to this (q. 6 of *De veritate*, a. 1), as Cajetan observed.¹⁷ Nor is it repugnant to the definition of providence, by which it is said to be the plan of

means to be ordered to the end, as if the attainment of the end did not pertain here, but only the ordering of the means to the end. For the very attainment of the end is also ordered to the ultimate end, that is, to the Divine goodness. Although it must be admitted that providence, considered as it is in man—being as it is defective and frustrable, and therefore imperfect—often consists without the attainment by the provider of the intended end; for it suffices for suchlike providence that the means be provided and applied which by the judgment of a prudent man are apt and sufficient for attaining the end, even if the end does not follow: "For the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our providences uncertain" (Wis. 9). But someone will say: The providence of God regards also the reprobate in the order to the ultimate end, which nevertheless they do not attain; therefore the attainment of the ultimate end is not an effect of the providence of God: for otherwise it would follow that providence is in many instances frustrated, and therefore imperfect, which is absurd. It is answered that in God there is not a plan of ordering the reprobate to beatitude, as the ultimate end, but of the elect only. But there is a providence of God concerning the reprobate, by which they are ordered to another good, as to an ultimate end, namely to the manifestation of the Divine justice; as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 9); and this end, ordained by God, comes about infallibly. And one must judge similarly of any other things that do not attain the ends to which they are directed by a particular agent. For that always comes about which God, as the universal provider of all, ordained and intended would come about.

§ 13. 5. That all things are subject to the Divine providence. From the providence of God, how far it extends, there have been various opinions among the ancients. Some have altogether abolished it, denying that the world, or anything of the things that are in the world, is a care to God; such as Democritus, Epicurus, and all the Epicureans, and by name Lucretius, Book 6 of *On the Nature of Things*, and Pliny, Book 2 of the *Natural History*, ch. 7; and in general all atheists who said in their hearts, "There is no God": for it scarcely stands together that someone should believe that there is a God and take away from Him the providence of the world. Whence to those same impious ones these voices are attributed in the Psalms: "Is there knowledge in the Most High?" "He will not require." Therefore this opinion overthrows not only the Christian, but simply every religion. Others, acknowledging the providence of God about heavenly and incorruptible things, removed from it the things that are done in this lower world, as if fortuitous and casual; whose saying about God is, Job 22: "The clouds are His hiding place, and He does not consider our things, and He walks about the hinges of heaven": against whom it is said in Ecclesiastes 5: "Do not say before the Angel, There is no providence," that is, of the things which are done here. On these St. Augustine, Book 5 of *On Genesis* according to the Letter, ch. 21.¹⁸ Others, moreover, have taken away the providence of God with respect to acts of free choice, supposing that the freedom of our acts, or the indifference of the will to opposites, does not stand together with the providence of God, which must be certain and infallible. Thus, among others, Cicero thought, according to the testimony of St. Augustine, Book 5 of *The City of God*, ch. 9; and Lactantius, Book 2, ch. 3, saying that Cicero thought that nothing is to be worshiped, because the gods do not care for human things. And (ch. 8) that he denied that the world was made by Divine providence.¹⁹ Against errors of this kind it must be established, and held with firm faith, that in God there is a providence of absolutely all things, both singular and universal; both of corruptible and contingent or fortuitous things, and of incorruptible and necessary ones; both of vile and weak things, and of those that have a more excellent nature; finally, of the forms, actions, and motions of all things, as also of places and times. Which doctrine Sacred Scripture inculcates upon us everywhere; as in Wisdom 7, where among the epithets of the Divine Spirit it is put that He is the "omnipotence of God," it is said: "She reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly." And ch. 11: "How could anything remain, unless Thou willedst it?" Again (ch. 6,

22) it is said of God that He has care over all things; which care is nothing other than providence. But also (ch. 14), although in some darkened Bibles only these words are read: "But Thy providence, O Father, governs," and not, as most by adding cite, "governs all things from the beginning," nevertheless a universal sense is required by the Greek word διακυβερνᾷ, which signifies "to govern everywhere, in all directions, and through all things." Likewise Ps. 118: "By Thy ordinance the day perseveres, for all things serve Thee": that is, Thou dost govern and moderate all things, as the Lord of all. And Christ in Jn. 5: "My Father works even until now, and I work."

§ 14. Then the scriptures that descend to singulars pertain hither, as Ps. 32: "From heaven the Lord looked forth; He saw all the sons of men; who formed their hearts one by one; who understands all their works." Ps. 103: "All things look to Thee, that Thou mayest give them food in due season"; Ps. 144: "The eyes of all hope in Thee, and Thou givest them food in due season"; Ps. 146: "Who gives to the beasts their food, and to the young ravens crying out"; and many other such things. Whence Christ (Matt. 6 and 10 and Lk. 12) so commends to us the providence of God that He teaches that neither the birds of the air, nor the lilies of the gardens, nor the grass of the field, nor the hairs of the head, are exempted from the care and providence of God; to such a degree that not one of them falls or perishes without the will of the Father. But to signify this (Exod. 26, 27, and the following) the Divine Spirit willed the Tabernacle and its parts to be described in such a way that not even the very smallest things—which otherwise might seem unworthy of mention—should be omitted. Such also is that about the dog following the younger Tobias; and that which in Genesis, Numbers, Joshua, Chronicles, Ezra we read of so many names of persons, of families, of cities, and of other places: all of which, although minute, and not necessary to the history, the Holy Spirit dictated should be written in detail and willed to be written, in order to show that He has care for all things whatsoever even the most minute in particular. Whence also in particular the Prophet says, Ps. 39: "The Lord is solicitous for me." And the Apostle, Gal. 2: "Who loved me, and gave Himself up for me."

§ 15. Hither too must be referred the scriptures that attribute to God the efficiency of all things, actions, and motions, as 1 Cor. 12: "Who works all things in us." Rom. 11: "From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things." Acts 17: "In Him we live and move and are": and a little above: "Since He Himself gives to all life and breath and all things." Wis. 14: "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing of those things that Thou hast made": where for the same things the Sage has, "the things that are," and "the things that God has made." Since therefore God does nothing in time which He has not from eternity decreed to be done, and decreed that it be done just as He does, that is, each single thing in particular—whence 1 Cor. 15 it is said: God "gives to that which is born from seed a body as He willed," that is, as He disposed from eternity (for the Greek and the Latin Missals have "He willed," not "He wills": ὁ δὲ θεὸς δίδωσιν αὐτῷ σῶμα, καθὼς ἠθέλησε, ἐκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα)—and since He does all things on account of an end: "For the Lord has worked all things for Himself" (Prov. 16): plainly it follows that of all the things that are and are done in the world there is in God from eternity a plan, by which they are ordered to their ends. But this is providence; therefore all things, even in particular, are subject to the Divine providence.

§ 16. Which doctrine, as certain and indubitable, the holy Fathers have consistently held, as Dionysius, Book On the Divine Names, ch. 5, where in many ways he commends the Divine providence concerning all things. And Origen does the same, Homily 3 on Genesis. And St. Ambrose, Book 1 of Duties, chs. 13, 14, 15. And John Chrysostom, in the book On Providence, Hom. 9, 10, to the people of Antioch.²⁰ St. Jerome also, expounding that Matt. 10, "Are not two sparrows...", renders this sense of that place: "If small, vile animals do

not fall without God as their Author, and there is providence in all things, and those which are perishing in these do not perish without the will of God, you who are eternal ought not to fear that you live without the providence of God." And, writing on that Jer. 32, "I am the Lord God of all flesh," he says: "Not by any means the God of all the nations, nor of the people of Israel, or of the court, as he is accustomed often to say of the Saints, 'the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob,' but 'God,' he said, 'of all flesh'; so that both rational animals and brute animals may be believed to have been made by Him." For there are those who acknowledge the providence of the Creator up to rational beings, but assert that brute animals either perish or live by fortuitous chances; and the prophetic utterance declares that there is nothing which escapes the providence of God. Likewise, that certain things were created for the use of men. Thus that writer, who even, with Blessed Paul unwilling, makes Anthony speak in this fashion: "God watches over the tree; without whose nod neither a leaf nor a single sparrow falls to the earth." St. Augustine likewise in many places establishes this catholic truth. For in Book 1 of *On Order*, ch. 1, he writes that it is impious if it be said that the Divine providence is not extended down even to these lowest and humblest things. And Book 1 of the *Retractations*, ch. 1, retracting the name of Fortune which he had at times employed, he says that all effects of things, even fortuitous ones, are to be referred to the Divine providence. The same, Book 5 of *On Genesis* according to the Letter, ch. 21: "What the Savior says, that not one sparrow falls to the earth without the will of God, and that the grass of the field, to be thrown shortly into the oven, He nevertheless clothes—does He not confirm that not only this whole part of the world, assigned to mortal and corruptible things, but even its vilest and most abject particles are governed by the Divine providence?" He teaches like things in the same book, chs. 21, 22, bringing forward many testimonies from the sacred letters, by which he shows that all things are so ruled by providence that not even for a point of time does God cease from the governance of all and singular things, especially human affairs. Moreover, the things which the same Doctor writes in Book 5 of *The City of God*, chs. 9, 10, and especially ch. 11, make for this; where, discussing the universal providence of God, he teaches that all and singular things are contained by its laws; which he repeats in Book 9, chs. 29, 30, and finally Book 19, ch. 12: "In no way is anything withdrawn from the laws of that supreme God, the Creator and Ordainer, by whom the peace of the universe is administered." Again, the same, *Tractate 104 on John*: "The Lord shows that all time, and what He would do and permit to be done, and when, has been disposed by Him who is not subject to time; since the things that were to be through the several times have efficient causes in the wisdom of God, in which there are no times." A splendid prayer of the same St. Augustine is in Book 3 of the *Confessions*, ch. 11: "O God, who so carest for each one of us as if Thou caredst for him alone; so for all, as if for each single one," etc. See the same in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 12; and Book 3 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 4; and Book 3 of *On Free Choice*, ch. 2.²¹ To these is added St. Cyril, Book 5 of the *Treasury*, ch. 2, writing in this manner: "But if you think it is unseemly for the providence of God to descend to each and every least thing, be somewhat abashed, I beg, as you hear Christ: 'Are not two sparrows...', etc." And he (also Book 12, ch. 14) affirms that it is proper to the nature of the Deity that by His providence He should contain and govern all things.²²

§ III — Whether all things are subject to Divine providence (Omnia subjecta esse providentiae Divinae)

§ 17. Prosper, in *Sentences* 81, teaches, in the very words of St. Augustine cited above, that even the vilest and most abject particles of the world are governed by Divine providence (*providentia*).²⁴ St. Gregory, book 25 of

the Moralia, ch. 13: "Thus are Divine judgments directed over one soul, as over one worm; because thus the Lord attends to individuals, as if He were free from all the rest, and thus at the same time attends to all, as if He were free from individuals," and the rest.²⁵ Boethius, book 4 of the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 6, says that providence is "the Divine plan set in the supreme Ruler of all, which disposes all things," and the rest.²⁶ And these, out of many, from the Fathers—whose opinion is not disapproved even by the sounder of the philosophers themselves. For Plotinus, a follower of Plato, who wrote four books on providence, in that work proves that providence extends from the highest God down to these earthly and lowest things by the beauty of blossoms and leaves; all of which, though as it were abject and passing away most swiftly, he affirms cannot have the most fitting measures of their forms unless they are fashioned from that region where the unchangeable form, at once having all things, endures—namely, in order to prove providence, he used almost the same argument as Christ in the Gospel; as St. Augustine reports in book 10 of the City of God, ch. 14.²⁷ The same view pleased the Platonist Proclus, who said that providence proceeds through all things from above down to the very last, and that it omits nowhere even the least thing devoid of its share. Nay more, it is quite clear that Plato himself felt this very thing, from the fact that in the Epimenides he prescribes that this is to be held before other things: that Divine providence cares for both the greatest things and each of the least. And he writes things consonant with these in book 10 of the Laws, although he names the gods in the gentile manner; so that it is a matter for wonder that St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 8 On providence, ch. 3, ascribes to him a certain different opinion, which St. Thomas reports in I, q. 22, a. 3, which is not found today in Plato's writings.²⁸

§ 18. But now let us also confirm this doctrine by arguments—of which let this be the first, which we have already indicated above. God is the cause (*causa*) of all things and of each single thing, nor is there anything at all in the universe, however minute and vile, to which the causality of God does not extend; therefore, since every agent acts for the sake of an end, God orders all things and each single thing to their own ends. For neither can any effect go forth beyond the order (*ordo*) of its cause, except insofar as it follows from another cause besides the intention of this [first cause]; indeed, this cannot be done here, because the first cause comprehends all the others by its universality. St. Thomas hands down this reason in the Summa, as also a second, which is this: God knows all things (*cognitio*), both in particular and in universal; and the knowledge of God stands in relation to the things themselves as the knowledge of an art to those things which are made through art; for both kinds of knowing are practical knowledge. Therefore, just as whatever things are made by an art are subjected to the order of the art, so it is necessary that all beings be subject to the Divine order. Now the account of that order, to be sure, we have said is providence. Hence Scripture everywhere says that one and the same thing is in turn done and known by God; as in Exod. 4 the Lord says of Aaron: "I know that he is eloquent"; and a little before He had said: "Who made man's mouth? was it not I?" Likewise in the Gospel John says of the Lord: "He himself knew what he would do" (Jn. 6). David explains this beautifully (Ps. 138), where he teaches that God knows all things, and that there is nothing that is hidden from Him; and he proves it because God makes them: "Behold, O Lord, Thou hast known all the last things and the ancient"; then it follows, "Thou hast formed me, Thou hast laid Thy hand upon me"; as if he were to say, therefore rightly Thou knowest all my things. And afterwards: "For there also Thy hand shall lead me," and so on. Likewise, "Because Thou hast possessed my reins." Likewise, "Wonderful are Thy works." Likewise, "My bone is not hidden from Thee, which Thou hast made in secret"; as if he were to say, therefore it is not hidden from Thee, because Thou madest it. Finally, the doctrine of the whole of Scripture is that God knows all things and works all in all. Thus in Mark 5 and Luke 8 it is said that Christ "knew that power had gone out from him,"

when He Himself had done this very thing, namely that power should go out from Himself to heal that woman.

§ 19. A third reason can be taken from the ideas which are from eternity in the Divine mind, according to which God in time works all things; whence it follows that in God from eternity there is the plan of all things to be done in time. And this is what Augustine says in Tractate 104 on John: that all things which are done have in the wisdom of God their efficient causes.²⁹ And (Pseudo-)Dionysius, disputing about the ideas in *De divinis nominibus*, ch. c, calls them predestinations; which he says are decreative, definitive, and distinctive, and also causative, according to which God has pre-defined all things that are, and has brought them into being.³⁰

§ 20. A fourth reason: God is the universal end of all things; therefore He orders and directs all things to Himself as to an end, and consequently all things are governed by Divine providence. Thus St. Thomas argues in the *Compendium of Theology*, ch. 123: for whatever is attributed to God must of necessity be most perfectly fitting to Him; but the most perfect providence is that from which nothing at all is subtracted; therefore it is necessary that the ordination of Divine providence extend to all things and to each single thing, even to the least things. St. Thomas uses this argument in the same place, ch. 130.³¹ But on this argument see the same Doctor, I, q. 22, a. 2, where he treats this question expressly; and likewise I, q. 103, a. 5; and on this very distinction, q. 2, a. 2. Likewise book 3 of the *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 64 and the following; in *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 2 and 4; in the *Compendium of Theology*, chs. 123, 124 and the following; and in *Opusculum* 15, which is *On the Angels*, chs. 13, 14, 15. I admonish, moreover, the reader who desires to be fully and soundly instructed about this matter, that he diligently and attentively read these places of the holy Doctor.

§ VII — That human acts are subject to the providence of God (Actus humanos subesse providentiae Dei)

§ 21. From what has been said it can be sufficiently understood that neither human acts, and by name those which proceed from free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), can be withdrawn from the providence of God (*providentia Dei*). For it is certain that those acts are included under the generality of things, of which nothing in the whole universe is exempted from the laws of Divine providence—this has already been shown; for the reasons already adduced prove this also. For since, as St. Thomas says, "the acts of free choice are reduced to God as to their cause; it is necessary that the things which are done by free choice be subjected to Divine providence: for the providence of man is contained under the providence of God, as a particular cause under a universal."³² Hence, by the same reason, it will be permitted to apply to this doctrine the other reasons set out above. Now truly one must grant that, the greater care God has for man than for other things lacking understanding, by so much the more are all his actions subjected to the providence of God than are the actions and motions of other things. For although God sees and provides for all things, nevertheless it has been said peculiarly by the Psalmist (Ps. 32): "From heaven the Lord looked forth, He saw all the sons of men. He who formed their hearts one by one, who understands all their works." And in this way, from other things that are subject to the providence of God, St. Augustine draws an argument to the morals and actions of men.³³

§ 22. Hither, then, pertain in a peculiar way all the Scriptures which signify that the hearts, wills (*voluntates*), and actions of men are in the hand, power, and disposition of God; as in Prov. 21: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; into whatsoever He will, He will incline it." For what he says of the heart of the king must be understood no less of the hearts of other men; but he named the heart of the king because

that is most free and less subject to another's power. Whence also elsewhere Scripture repeats this concerning the hearts of princes being placed in the hand of God (as in Ezra 6; Job 12; Esther 14, 15; Is. 10; Exod. 7 and the following).³⁴

§ 23. Other Scriptures there are which ascribe all good works of men to God, and therefore to Divine providence; as in Is. 26: "Thou hast wrought all our works for us." In Jn. 3: "A man cannot receive anything, unless it has been given him from heaven." In Jas. 1: "Every best gift is from above," and the like. In Phil. 2: "God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish"; and others of this sort.

§ 24. Again, other Scriptures teach that the events and successes of all our actions depend on God; as in Jer. 10: "The way of man is not his own; nor of a man to direct his steps." In Prov. 16: "It is the Lord's to direct the steps of man." And in 20: "A man's steps are directed by the Lord." In Ps. 30: "My lots are in Thy hands." And again in Prov. 16: "Lots are cast into the lap, and they are tempered by the Lord"; or, as it is more expressly in the Hebrew: "The lot is cast into the lap, and from the Lord is every judgment thereof."

§ 25. Finally, other Scriptures teach that God will render to each according to his works (as in Matt. 17; Rom. 2; and most frequently elsewhere). All which most clearly prove that human actions are in many ways subjected to Divine providence. And indeed this doctrine was most much-celebrated among the Fathers against the error of certain Gentiles, who exempted human affairs from the care of the gods, as they themselves spoke. Besides the passages already indicated from the Fathers, a passage of St. Augustine is to be noted, book 3 of the *On the Trinity*, ch. 4, where, after he had said that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all corporeal species and motions, he subjoined thus: "For nothing happens invisibly and sensibly which is not from the inner invisible and intelligible hall of the supreme Emperor either commanded or permitted, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces, and retributions, in this most ample and boundless commonwealth of the whole creature"; so he. But he said "or permitted" on account of sins, which are done not with God commanding, but with God permitting, as St. Bonaventure has noted on the text; whereas the things which are done with God commanding, that is, willing and causing, are certain.³⁵

§ 26. Now because the reconciliation of God's providence with our free choice seems difficult—so much so that Guitmundus, book 1 (*Against Berengarius*), wrote thus: "Concerning providence and concerning free choice, since we hold both faithfully and both ought to be held, human reasons seem so to clash with each other on the other side that they rather mutually destroy both than grant even one of them to be"—therefore, for the declaration of this matter, it must be carefully noted that the intellectual creature was not so created by God that in the actions of free choice it be exempt from the order of the first cause. For neither could God make any creature which, either in being or in operating, would go out beyond the order of the first cause, such that it did not depend on it as on a conserving and operating principle—that is, giving to-be (*esse*) and to operate; but it is altogether necessary that into God, as into the first and most perfect, and therefore most efficacious, cause, every creature, and every action of it, and of each action whatsoever every mode and perfection be reduced. Whence, as there is no wisdom in creatures which is not from participation of the uncreated wisdom, and no justice in them which is not had from participation of the uncreated justice—thus, namely, that God, who is uncreated wisdom and justice, be the first, proper, and most inward cause of every created wisdom and justice and of every wise and just action; and thus concerning any other created goods whatsoever, which cannot be save inasmuch as they participate the uncreated good—so there is no freedom of will in creatures which is not from participation of the highest uncreated freedom which is in the Divine will; so namely, that that uncreated freedom of the Divine will be the first, proper, and most inward cause of every

created freedom and of all free actions, inasmuch as they are such. Therefore so far is it from being the case that the operation of Divine providence destroys the freedom of the created will that this cannot at all subsist without that.

§ 27. This is the opinion, with that of almost all the other scholastics, most of all of St. Thomas, and a distinguished doctrine in very many places; first and foremost, in the place and words adduced above. Then in I, q. 19, a. 8 and 10; and in q. 103, a. 5 and the following; and in q. 105, a. 4 and 5; and in book 3 of the *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 67, 19 and the following; and also chs. 73, 94, 101 and the following, 146. Likewise he hands this down expressly in *De veritate*. And in an article 10, where he refutes Cicero's opinion, which reduces human acts only to our providence, he argues thus against it: "The will moves the moved; therefore it is necessary to reduce the act to some first principle which is a mover, not moved: but this is God, who alone, as he teaches in the same place, can immediately have power over our will"; which very thing he teaches (I, q. 8, a. 3; and I, q. 105, a. 7). See the same (*Opusculum* 25, ch. 4, about the middle), where in detail he explains this and by Scriptures proves in what ways human acts are subject to Divine providence.³⁶

§ 28. To this also there accrue words of the same Doctor in I-II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1, in which he says that the choice of a man in this or that direction ought to be from a deliberation preceding; and since there is not a progression to infinity, "it is necessary," he says, "that finally it come to this, that the free choice of man be moved by some higher principle which is above the human mind, namely by God, as even the Philosopher proves. Whence the mind of man, even sound and innocent, has dominion of its act, yet not so as not to need to be moved by God," and so forth.³⁷ It must also be noted that in the *Questions On Evil* (q. 6, a. 1) he writes these words: "God moves the will naturally, on account of the efficacy of the will of the mover, which cannot fail; but according to the nature of the moved will, which is indifferently disposed toward diverse things, necessity is not induced, but freedom remains. Just as also in all things the Divine providence is infallibly ordered, and yet from contingent causes effects come contingently, inasmuch as God moves all things proportionally, so that each according to its mode." So he. And this very thing is what above I noted from Dionysius and St. Augustine, that it is not of Divine providence to corrupt nature, but that God so administers all things that even they exercise their own proper motions. And from St. Thomas, that God moves each thing according to its mode, preserving the nature of that which is moved. For not, as Durandus writing on the *Second Book* (dist. 37, q. 1) and certain others imagine, is God indifferently disposed toward the particular effects of second causes and the actions of free choice itself. For this is impossible, and it is also against the formal character of the first cause, and of the first and primary mover, into which it is necessary that all particular motions and acts be referred. Wherefore it must be said absolutely that God, by the operation of His providence, so works all things in all that even the mode of actions and of effects is from Him—and this on account of the efficacy of His will, which, as St. Thomas says (I, q. 19, a. 8), is most efficacious not only as to effects but also as to mode. Whence from the fact that He assigns to things a determinate mode of acting, God is not to be thought to influence the actions themselves less efficaciously than if He did not assign such a mode. For as God gives to some to be, to others moreover He gives to live; and from the fact that He gives them to live, He no less efficaciously and perfectly gives them to be: so He gives to some to act, to others moreover He gives to act freely and by choice; and from the fact that He gives these to act freely, He no less efficaciously and perfectly gives them to act. Wherefore God no less properly operates in the free agent a free action, and that entire, than in a natural agent a natural action. Since therefore not only every action whatsoever of a creature but also the mode of the action depends on the efficacy of the Divine will, it follows that by God's providence the freedom of human acts is not destroyed but established. The same must be said

concerning the contingency of things in general, as much as we have shown above in the preceding distinction.³⁸

§ 29. (a) The reader is here to be warned that the Author's doctrine—indeed rather St. Thomas's—as is clear from the passages adduced and other places, and that of the Thomists, has nothing in common, nay is far removed from the Theses of Paschasius Quesnel, especially the ninth and the twenty-second, and no less does it abhor the Jansenist propositions, and most of those struck down by Alexander VIII; since the efficacious grace which Quesnel in his theses, almost all of them, strove to assert as the same with the doctrine of predetermination—Jansen himself in book 1 (On the Grace of Christ, ch. 3) openly confesses to be different, and with good reason: for Jansen says that the efficacy of grace makes the human will altogether enervated and inert; and he judges it necessary for this reason, because he thinks the human will after the fall of the first parent so weak that it cannot be healed save by efficacious grace, so as to be rendered able for acting; and Quesnel aims at this very thing, that they remove sufficient grace altogether from the midst. The Author, however, and the Thomists say that predetermination, which they affirm to an act, is demanded for the moment of effecting; they require it for this reason alone, that the subordination of the second [cause] under the free One be preserved, and that the indifference of the created will be determined by the First Determiner to this act rather than to another; just as in the places alleged St. Thomas most clearly teaches—especially in the Compendium of Theology, which Louis-Ellies Dupin, in the Bibliotheca of Ecclesiastical Authors, counts among the doubtful works of St. Thomas, and judged rather to be attributed to Ulrich of Strasbourg.³⁹ Moreover, the defenders of predetermination most earnestly maintain sufficient grace, which is given for potency, or first act; [and they teach that] consent is required for the second [act]. These things are put here in advance; more, though briefly, will be given in the places below.

§ VIII — Whether God provides immediately for all things (*Utrum Deus omnia provideat immediate?*)

§ 30. Since in providence (*providentia*) two things must be considered, namely the plan (*ratio*) of the ordering of things foreseen to an end, and the execution (*executio*) of this order, which chiefly consists in governance (*gubernatio*): as regards the first of these, God provides for all things, or for all immediately, because in the Divine mind there is, and from eternity there was, the practical plan (*ratio practica*) of absolutely all things whatsoever that exist in any difference of time, even of the least, in particular—just as in the mind of an artisan there is the practical plan of the whole work to be made by him, and of its singular parts; and the more particularly an art, or operative science, considers particulars, the more perfect it is, which is most evident in the art of medicine. Hence, since God's knowledge is most perfect, it is necessary that it consider in detail all things that fall under it as operable, as St. Thomas rightly proves in the body of the article and in the reply to the first objection,⁴¹ and again where he treats of the governance of things.⁴² Wherefore those erred gravely, whether Platonists or whoever else (about whom in the same article St. Thomas speaks, drawing from St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine), who attributed to God only the immediate providence of spiritual things, as well as of the bodily world as regards genera and species and universal causes, but not of corruptible singulars, nor of human affairs, whose care they ascribed to inferior gods, or intelligences—as if the most high God did not take care of them by Himself, but only entrusted the care to others; as kings are compelled to do with many things in the administering of their kingdoms.⁴³

§ 31. Yet as regards the latter—namely the execution of providence—one must say, in one sense, that God does not provide immediately, that is, not without a medium, for things. For there are certain media of Divine providence, when He governs lower things through higher; and when He establishes secondary, or intermediate, causes (*causae secundae*), and uses them to produce further effects: which indeed He does not because of a defect of power, nor as if He were accomplishing less when He employs those causes than if He were to act without them; but on account of the abundance of His goodness, in that He wills to communicate even to creatures the dignity of causality—as St. Thomas teaches in the article cited above; and again elsewhere; and in the second book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*; and St. Bonaventure in the first book of the *Sentences*.⁴⁴

§ 32. Nevertheless, in another sense one must admit that, even as to the execution of providence, God provides immediately for all things, that is, intimately, and without dependence on intermediate causes, even if He employs them and acts through them. He provides, I say, immediately in this way; because He operates immediately in all things, namely by the immediation of power and of supposit (*immediatio virtutis et suppositi*), as they say. And this is evident from the fact that both the power and the essence (*essentia*) of God are present to all things intimately, and without dependence on any other whatsoever; for a fuller explanation of which see Domingo Bañez.⁴⁵ Now this is the doctrine of St. Thomas, both in that very place where he concludes that God is present intimately to all things, and in very many other places besides. For, writing in the *Sentences*, he proves that God works immediately in all things from this, that since God is the first cause of all things, His power is most immediate to all, and since He Himself is His own power, therefore He is immediately operative in all things.⁴⁶ He teaches the same copiously in book 5 [abbreviation as in source] (*Against the Gentiles* III, ch. 75 and following), and in the *Compendium of Theology* (chapter 131, and more fully chapter 135), and in *De veritate* (q. 22, a. 8), and in *Opusculum* 9 (q. 74), and in *Opusculum* 15 (ch. 14), and in the *Summa theologiae* I (q. 103, a. 6; q. 105, a. 5), and elsewhere.⁴⁷ Likewise St. Bonaventure (where cited above) teaches that, from the fact that the Divine will (*voluntas*) is the first, most universal, and most actual cause, it is necessary that it be the immediate cause in every action and in every thing. And in the second book of the *Sentences* he says that in every operation God works intimately and immediately, since the will of God is the first and highest cause of all kinds and motions; and the things that follow; and that every free will (*liberum arbitrium*) is constituted immediately under God.⁴⁸ To these, moreover, consent Scotus, Richard, Paludanus, Cajetan, and all the other more probable scholastics; to which opinion the Catechism for Parish Priests openly bears witness, when, in the explanation of the Creed at the article, Creator of heaven and earth, it uses these words: "Not only does God by His providence protect and administer all things that are, but also the things that are moved and do something He so impels by an intimate power to motion and action, that although He does not hinder the efficiency of secondary causes, nevertheless He forestalls it, since His most hidden power reaches to each single thing," and so forth.⁴⁹ And this is what St. Gregory says no less significantly than briefly, speaking of God, in book 24 of the *Moralia*, at those words of Job 34, "Whom did He appoint other over the earth, or whom did He set over the world which He fashioned?": "He governs by Himself the world which He created by Himself"; as if to say, although in the governance of things God uses secondary and intermediate causes, nevertheless no less immediately does He by Himself and by His own power touch singular effects, than in creation itself, for which He used no other causes.⁵⁰

§ 33. From these things, therefore, it is clear that Durandus errs gravely, who, writing in the second book of the *Sentences*, removes this immediate operation of Divine providence in singular actions; inasmuch as he teaches that those things which are from God by the mediation of secondary causes are not done by Him

immediately, but only mediately; that in the fourth [book] God produced secondary causes, and bestowed on them the power of acting, and preserves both the causes and the powers implanted in them; and that the actions of free will proceed from God only according to indifference to good and evil. Therefore God is not the cause of the actions of free will, except because He moves their nature, by which they are moved. For God does not, as Durandus writing in the second book (dist. 37, q. 1) and some others imagined, stand indifferent with respect to the particular effects of secondary causes and to the actions of free will. For this is impossible, and contrary to the formal character (*ratio*) of the first cause. Wherefore one must altogether say that, by the operation of His providence, God works in all operations, not only regarding their being done, but also that the modes of actions and of effects be from Him; and this on account of the efficacy of His will, which, as St. Thomas says, "is causative of being, not only as to effects, but also as to modes of being."⁵¹ Hence, in that He assigns to things a certain mode of acting, He is to be considered as no less efficaciously present in the very actions than in their modes: for just as God gives to some to be, to others in addition to live; and from the fact that He gives them to live, He no less efficaciously and perfectly gives them to be: so He gives to some to act, to others in addition to act freely and by choice; and from the fact that He gives these to act freely, He no less efficaciously and perfectly gives them to act. Wherefore God works in a free agent a free action as properly and wholly as in a natural agent a natural action. Since therefore upon the efficacy of the Divine will depends not only the action of any creature whatsoever, but also the mode of action, it follows that by God's providence the freedom of human acts is not destroyed but established. The same must be said of the contingency of things in general, as we showed above in the earlier distinction;⁵² from which opinion, besides this, there follows the absurdity that the secondary cause, with respect to singular operations, will have the formal character of the first cause and the first mover, because it will move while not moved, and thus there would be several first principles; and again, that God, who is the first Being, will not properly be the universal cause of all beings. These two absurdities St. Thomas reckons to follow from that opinion as two errors.⁵³ I said, besides other things: for this also tends toward Pelagianism as regards good works.

§ IX — Whether sins are subject to Divine providence (Utrum peccata subjecta sint providentiae Divinae)

§ 34. To the question whether sins are subject to the providence of God (*providentia Dei*), one must answer with a distinction. For if the sense is: Whether God provides (*providet*; to provide, namely, is to procure, *providere enim est procurare*), a negative answer must be given: for to provide is to procure; but it is impious to say that God procures sins; and the same seems to be signified if it be said that Divine providence is of sins: for the providence is of those things which are foreseen and procured. But if the sense is: Whether God provides concerning sins; it must be conceded; for although He does not provide sins, yet He foresees them, and He wills to permit, and, being foreseen, He orders them to some good, either particular or universal, whether to the manifestation of His mercy or of His justice, or to whatever other [good]: and thus, while He disposes to bring forth good from them, He is rightly said to provide concerning them. On which matter see Cajetan (on I, q. 22, a. 2), and St. Thomas himself in I, q. 14, a. 16; and in I-II, q. 79, a. 4, in the body and to the first; and in *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 4 and a. 7, in which article he expressly discusses how sinners are governed by the providence of God.⁵⁵

§ 35. But if in sin there be considered only that which is real and positive, which others call the material [element], namely being (*ens*), or action, in this respect even sins can be said to have been provided by God.

Yet this is not to have been provided absolutely (*absolute*), but only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), because the formal character (*ratio formalis*) of sin consists in the privation of being and of good, that is, in a certain deformity, which is not from God, and therefore cannot have been provided by Him. And although sins are not, absolutely speaking, provided by God, nevertheless God provides the permission of them all; for although they themselves cannot be good, yet their permission is good, which therefore God both wills and directly orders to some greater good than is that good the privation of which is the evil that is permitted, as St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2, and he proves it from St. Augustine writing thus in the Enchiridion, ch. 11: "God Almighty, since He is supremely good, would in no wise permit that there should be anything of evil in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good that He would do well even of evil."⁵⁶

§ 36. Hence the same St. Augustine, in De Trinitate III, ch. 4, refers to the providence of God not only the commanding of the things which are done in the world, but also the permitting of certain things, that is, sins.⁵⁷ Which very thing he expressed more clearly in the Exposition of Psalm 7, saying that even that disposition is to be attributed to the Divine providence, whereby it happens that certain persons, according to their merits, are seduced by heretics, "not because," he says, "it makes them sinners, but because it orders [them] when they have sinned."⁵⁸ And in this manner it was said by Hugh of St. Victor, Hom. 11 on Ecclesiastes, that God disposes all things without exception, even the crooked and evil, because, to wit, He orders them to good, as he himself explains in the same place.⁵⁹ Hence, it must be noted, if we wish to speak properly, that God provides only those things which He does, or of which He is the cause, that is, the good things, in which sense also with the Apostle "to provide" is taken (Rom. 12), when it is said: "Providing good things not only before God, but also before all men." But He does not only dispose, or order, those [good] things: for He disposes and orders even sins, in that, namely, He so permits them that from them He elicits greater goods: by this, indeed, they are ordered, that is, they receive a certain fitting order in the universe.

§ X — Reply to the things objected against the universal providence of God (Ad ea quae contra universalem Dei providentiam objiciuntur responsio)

§ 37. Against the foregoing doctrine about the universal providence (*providentia*) of God, these are the chief things that are wont to be objected. First. The Apostle says in 1 Cor. 9: "Numquid de bobus cura est Deo?"⁶¹ Second, in Sirach 15 it is said: "Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui."⁶² And likewise He is said to permit certain good things (Heb. 6 and 1 Cor. 16), the Apostle saying, of a thing assuredly good: "Si Deus permiserit."⁶³ Therefore in such matters man is not governed by the providence of God, but rather by his own, God only here permitting. Third. St. Jerome writing (on Habakkuk 1) says that it is absurd to drag down the majesty of God to this point, that He should know at each several moment how many gnats are born and how many die, etc. And he adds: "Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that, while we drag down His" (the Master [of the Sentences] reads: "providence"; but in St. Jerome there is read: "power") "even to the lowest things, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that He has the same providence for rational beings as for irrational."⁶⁴ Fourth. Providence is repugnant to chance and fortune. Since therefore in many things chance and fortune have a place, indeed in all human affairs, as Ecclesiastes 9 testifies, Providence will be excluded from them.⁶⁵ Fifth. God stands in relation to the whole universe as some king to his kingdom: yet many things are carried out in a kingdom through royal ministers, whose particular care does not touch the person of the king; indeed it does not befit his dignity: therefore also in the universe many things thus come to be through intermediate causes, so that concerning them in particular God does not take

care. Finally. God utterly deserts certain men, permitting them to fall into very grave sins and to perish eternally: therefore He does not have care of them, which is called providence. For providence has been defined as that by which God has destined each thing to its end, especially the ultimate end. To these, severally, we answer thus.

§ 38. To the first the Apostle denies in this manner that God has so particular a care for oxen that He should give precepts to men principally on their account; but rather, on the contrary, it must be thought that that precept (Deut. 25) about not muzzling the ox that treads out the grain was given for man's sake; so that he might understand that what is forbidden to do to brute animals, he ought much less to commit in the case of a man, especially in one who is occupied in spiritual labor; for this the Holy Spirit principally attended to in that precept, as is both evident from that same passage of the Apostle, and from 1 Tim. 5. On which matter see also St. Augustine (in the exposition of Ps. 145, and St. Thomas, where above, at the end).⁶⁶

§ 39. To the second. God left man in the hand of his counsel, not by removing him from His providence, but because He did not fix for him an operative faculty determined to one thing, as for brute animals and other natural things, but, in that He put into him free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), He gave him the power of deliberating about things to be done; and when He is said to permit, He not only permits, but also does. Nevertheless He is said to permit, because He does not impede secondary causes (*causae secundae*), whether free or natural, from their proper mode of acting—just as God permits fire to act upon Lawrence, but in the case of the three youths He did not permit.⁶⁷ In which sense we showed above that it was said by St. Augustine that God, with providence preserved, allows things themselves to exercise their proper motions. For otherwise what the Apostle Paul said, "If God permit," the Apostle James referred to the will of God, saying in ch. 4, "If God will"; and Paul himself elsewhere.[^68]

§ 40. To the third. Although, with the Master, it can be answered that Jerome by those words excludes from God the multiplicity of cares and the succession through times and moments, according as individual things change, arise, and pass away (for thus the providence of God is simple and stable, as is His essence), nevertheless the latter words of Jerome suggested to us another solution: namely, that God does not have the same nor an equal care of beasts as of men; and thus, in comparison with men, whom He cares for in a singular manner, the care which He has of the irrational may seem to be none. For this is indicated by the words that follow, in which he condemns as foolish those who assign to almost each class of things its own Angels as guardians; since that dignity is peculiar to men. Moreover Jerome sufficiently declares his opinion about the providence of God poured out even upon the least things (in the places cited above), so that there should be no doubt about that Doctor's mind. Therefore to the proposed passage one must either answer as we have said, or say, as some answer, that he wrote these things not from his own judgment, but from the opinion of others, which he himself admits in his commentaries not to be infrequent with him, in book 1 Against Rufinus.⁶⁴

§ 41. To the fourth. Chance and fortune do not clash with the providence of God. For something is said to happen by chance or fortuitously with respect to a particular cause, beyond whose intention it occurs: for nothing escapes the intention, providence, and order of the universal cause, that is, of God. In respect therefore of Him nothing is casual, nothing fortuitous; just as St. Augustine rightly teaches (Questions, 83, q. 34). See also Boethius, book 5 (Consolation of Philosophy, prose 1), where he solves this argument by distinguishing chance.⁶⁸

§ 42. To the fifth. Although it belongs to royal dignity to have ministers as executors of his providence, yet not to such a degree that he should not have particular consideration of the things which are to be done through them. Then too, in a human kingdom there are and are done many things which exceed the order of royal administration: for example, that a soldier move his hand to fight, that a herald move his tongue to speak; for they do not have that from the king, but from nature, although command is from the king. But in the universe there is absolutely nothing which can go forth beyond the order and efficiency of the first cause.

§ 43. To the last. God is said to desert the reprobate, not because He utterly excludes them from His providence; for thus it would be necessary that they perish utterly and relapse into nothingness; but in comparison with the elect, for whom He provides in a more excellent manner, namely, thus that they do not finally fall from justice; in which manner He does not provide for the reprobate, of whom, nevertheless, He also is said to have care, not only by preserving their nature, but also by providing those things which the order of providence requires concerning the wicked, that is, by inflicting the punishments due to sins. Which, although it be an evil for them, yet absolutely speaking it is good and ordered, and congruent with the whole universe. And at the same time in this way the formal character of providence is preserved, which requires that each thing be directed to its end. For the end is to be understood as the end of the thing either absolutely, or insofar as it is a part of the whole universe. Although we can say—and perhaps better—that it does not pertain to providence that through it each thing be directed into its own end, but absolutely into an end, namely that which is congruent to the whole work; just as the steward of a household, when burning wood, does not order it to an end suitable to the wood, but to the household, whose care he bears.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 15.
 2. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, cap. 13–14 [abbreviation as in source].
 3. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, cap. 14 [abbreviation as in source].
 4. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 7 and a. 14.
 5. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 3–4.
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 9, ad 1.
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 9 (body of the article).
 8. Aristotle (the Philosopher), dictum: "quod non est, sciri non potest" [abbreviation as in source].
 9. "S. Thom. loco jam allegato." [abbreviation as in source]
 10. The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, dist. 41.
 11. Estius, *In III Sent.*, dist. 23 [abbreviation as in source].
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3.
 13. St. Augustine, Epistle 5 (to Marcellinus).
 14. Prov. 16; Deut. 26.
 15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 104.
 16. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 1; a. 4, ad 1–3; I, q. 23, a. 6; idem, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 94.
 17. St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 1; Cajetan, on the aforementioned places.
 18. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, ch. 21.
 19. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, ch. 9; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* II, chs. 3, 8.

20. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* V, ch. 5; Origen, Hom. 3 on Genesis; St. Ambrose, *De officiis* I, chs. 13–15; St. John Chrysostom, *De providentia*, Hom. 9–10 (to the people of Antioch).
21. St. Jerome, Commentary on Matt. 10 ("Nonne duo passeret..."); idem, on Jer. 32: "Ego Dominus Deus universae carnis"; St. Augustine, *De ordine* I, ch. 1; *Retractationes* I, ch. 1; *De Genesi ad litteram* V, chs. 21–22; *De civitate Dei* V, chs. 9–11; IX, chs. 29–30; XIX, ch. 12; *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 104; *Confessiones* III, ch. 11; *De dono perseverantiae* ch. 12; *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4; *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 2.
22. St. Cyril, *Thesaurus* V, ch. 2; XII, ch. 14.
23. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2.
24. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sententiae ex Augustino*, 81.
25. St. Gregory (the Great), *Moralia in Iob* XXV, ch. 13.
26. Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* IV, pr. 6.
27. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* X, ch. 14.
28. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De providentia* VIII, ch. 3; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 3.
29. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 104.
30. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, cap. c [abbreviation as in source].
31. St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae*, ch. 123; ch. 130; cf. also I, q. 22, a. 2; I, q. 103, a. 5; In I Sent., on the present distinction, q. 2, a. 2 [abbreviation as in source]; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 64 and following; *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 2, 4; *Compendium theologiae*, chs. 123–124 and following; *Opusc. 15 (De angelis)*, chs. 13–15.
32. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 4.
33. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, ch. 22.
34. For repeated Scriptural teaching about the hearts of rulers in God's hand, see Ezra 6; Job 12; Esther 14–15; Is. 10; Exod. 7 and following.
35. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4; St. Bonaventure, ad text. [abbreviation as in source].
36. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8, 10; I, q. 103, a. 5 and following; I, q. 105, a. 4–5; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 67, 19 and following [abbreviation as in source]; also chs. 73, 94, 101 and following, 146; St. Thomas, *De veritate*, a. 10 [abbreviation as in source], where he refutes Cicero's opinion reducing human acts only to our providence; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 8, a. 3; I, q. 105, a. 7; St. Thomas, *Opusculum* 25, ch. 4, about the middle [abbreviation as in source]; "The will moves the moved; therefore the act must be reduced to some first principle which is a mover, not moved: but this is God, who alone, as he teaches in the same place, can immediately have power over our will" — paraphrasing St. Thomas's argument cited in the text.
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1.
38. St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, In II Sent., dist. 37, q. 1; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8.
39. Jansen, *De gratia Christi* I, ch. 3; Louis-Ellies Dupin, *Bibliotheca Auctorum Ecclesiasticorum*, lib. 13, ch. [as in source] [abbreviation as in source].
40. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 3.
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 3, in corp., ad 1.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 6.
43. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 3, citing St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine.
44. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2; I, q. 103, a. 6; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II, ch. 70; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., dist. 45, a. 2, q. 2.
45. Domingo Báñez, In I, q. 8, a. 1.
46. St. Thomas, In I Sent., dist. 35, q. 1, a. 1.

47. "libr. 5. (contra Gentes cap. 75. & seqq.)" [abbreviation as in source]; St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae*, chs. 131, 135; *De veritate* q. 22, a. 8; *Opusculum* 9, q. 74; *Opusculum* 15, ch. 14; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 6; I, q. 105, a. 5.
48. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 14, a. 3, q. 1; dist. 25, a. 2, q. 1.
49. Catechism of the Council of Trent (*Catechismus Romanus*), Part I, on "Creator of heaven and earth."
50. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXIV, ch. 26; cf. *Job* 34.
51. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8.
52. The edition appends here an editorial note (marked "a") arguing at length that Estius's, that is, St. Thomas's, doctrine stands far from the theses of Quesnel and from Jansenist propositions—especially as to the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace and the preservation of true freedom of the will—and collecting places in St. Thomas to that effect, with references also to Dupin and (as is judged) Ulric of Strasbourg.
53. St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2.
54. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; I-II, q. 79, a. 1–2, 4.
55. Cajetan, *In I*, q. 22, a. 2; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 16; I-II, q. 79, a. 4, in corp., ad 1; *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 4, a. 7.
56. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 11.
57. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4.
58. St. Augustine, *Exposition of Psalm 7* [in source: "in expositione Psalm. 7"].
59. Hugh of St. Victor, *Homily 11 on Ecclesiastes*.
60. S. Thom. 2. part. qu. 22. art. 2. [abbreviation as in source]
61. 1 Cor. 9: "Numquid de bobus cura est Deo?"
62. Sir. 15: "Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui."
63. Heb. 6: "Si Deus permiserit."; 1 Cor. 16: "Si Deus permiserit.".
64. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Habakkuk*, ch. 1.
65. Eccl. 9; cf. "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong..."
66. Deut. 25:4: "Non alligabis os bovi trituranti."; 1 Tim. 5:18; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 145; St. Thomas, [abbreviation as in source: "ubi sup. ad ult."].
67. Dan. 3 (the three youths in the furnace).
68. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 34; Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* V, pr. 1.

DISTINCTIO XL — ON PREDESTINATION: WHAT IS SIGNIFIED BY THE NAME "PREDESTINATION" (*PRAEDESTINATIONIS NOMINE QUID SIGNIFICETUR*)

§ I — What is signified by the name predestination (Praedestinationis nomine quid significetur)

§ 1. The parts indeed and varieties of Divine providence (*providentia*) are ultimate and manifold, in proportion to the multitude and variety of things that are subject to the Divine government. But our chief consideration is of the providence of God concerning men, of which there are two parts, Predestination (*praedestinatio*) and Reprobation (*reprobatio*); about which there is now henceforth to be a treatment. In which disputation, lest it should happen—as it befalls many—that we lapse into harmful errors, these principles must be firmly held: that God is the author and cause of every good, and that most efficacious; of evils, the cause of none. Likewise, that God is debtor to no one, except in so far as by His own generous promise He constitutes Himself a debtor. Finally, that He is faithful in His promises.

§ 2. Predestination, if you weigh the force of the Latin word, seems to signify nothing other than the pre-ordination of someone to something, that is, an ordination, before the thing itself is made, conceived in mind and decreed. Therefore to predestine, in general, is to destine and to order something to another thing, before the thing is made, in intention. Not, however, as certain have tried to interpret that word, to destine something, or someone, before another, to some good. For it is not an order of dignity that the preposition in that word, "prae," denotes, but of time, as is evident from the corresponding Greek word which the Apostles used in the Scriptures; for it signifies to destine and to define beforehand in mind that which is afterwards to be carried into effect. Thus the Apostle clearly expounds this word in 1 Cor. 2, saying: "Quem praedestinavit Deus ante saecula." And other Scriptures confirm this, signifying predestination with other words, as Matt. 25: "Possidete paratum vobis Regnum a constitutione mundi," that is, prepared and predestined from the beginning; Eph. 1: "Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem"; 2 Tim. 1: "Ante tempora saecularia"; Rom. 8: "Quos praescivit, praedestinavit." And ch. 9: "Antequam aliquid boni egissent, aut mali."

§ 3. Moreover, this general signification of predestination we can so accommodate to men that nevertheless we make it common to the reprobate as well as to the elect, and so there will be predestination one to good, another to evil. For the word "predestination" does not include this, that it be understood of the good only: for even the ecclesiastical writers sometimes name predestination thus generally, so as to refer it also to the wicked, as St. Augustine (book *On the Perfection of Justice*, ch. 13; *Enchiridion*, ch. 100; book 2 *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, ch. 17; book 15 of the *City of God*, ch. 1; and book 21, ch. 24; *Tractate 14 on John*; and the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10).² And this is argued also by the title of that same book, indicating that there is a certain other predestination of the impious. And after Augustine,

Prosper (in Responses 14 and 15, and in Sententia 1 to the Chapters of the Gauls; and also Responses 10 and 11 to the Objections of Vincent).³ And Fulgentius, book 1 (To Monimus, throughout the whole book), whose book's title also is (On the Double Predestination of God).⁴ Likewise Isidore, book 2 (On the Highest Good, ch. 6).⁵ And St. Anselm, book (On the Harmony of Grace and Free Will, ch. 7).⁶ And Honorius (in the Dialogue on Predestination, at the beginning and passim).⁷ In which places they thus divide predestination, that they say some are predestined to salvation, others to destruction.

§ 4. Thus in general it is also taken in the Synod of Trent (Session 6, canon 17, from the Council of Orange, can. 25).⁸ Nor does it stand in the way that Prosper (in almost the same places, and especially in the Response to the 14th objection of the Gauls) says that the predestination of God is always in the good: for he adds that it pertains either to the retribution of justice or to the giving of grace; therefore the predestination of God is always in the good, even as it is common to the reprobate; because in their damnation the good of justice is preserved.⁹

§ 5. But in truth, far more frequently and more usually, predestination is understood only in the good, that is, in the elect, both among the ancients and especially among the Scholastic Doctors, who perpetually distinguish between predestination and reprobation as opposite species, and prefer to call the reprobate "foreknown" rather than predestined—about which elsewhere. Which special acceptance of predestination is also conformable to the Scriptures, in which predestination, when attributed to persons, is referred only to the elect (as in Rom. 1, 8, and Eph. 1). Nay more, when attributed to things, it regards the good of the elect (as in 1 Cor. 2), where the wisdom of God is said to be predestined, that is, the work of the wisdom of God, which He willed to use for saving the human race. And in Acts 4, where it is said: "Convenerunt facere, quae manus tua, consilium tuum decreverunt fieri," in Greek *proorisen*, "predestined." In the same way Prosper also alleges that sentence (in the Response to objection 13 of the Gauls).¹⁰

§ 6. Finally, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that predestination, in the usage of the ecclesiastical writers, is not said except concerning the intellectual creature, nor is it referred to just any good, when it is taken in a favorable sense, but to the highest and chief good, which is eternal life; or to other things, in so far as they lead to that highest good, as means to the end. I say the intellectual creature, because although here there is chiefly a treatment of the predestination of men, nevertheless predestination and election are common to the Angels with men; although not altogether by the same formal character, as will be taught below. But as it is common to both, it can thus be described: Predestination is the purpose, or decree, or determination, by which God from eternity with Himself has established, decreed, and pre-defined to lead certain intellectual creatures to eternal life, as to their ultimate end and highest good. But St. Thomas briefly defines it in this way: Predestination is a certain formal character of the ordering of certain persons to eternal salvation, existing in the Divine mind.¹¹ The sense of which definition it is permitted to take from those things which were a short time ago said by us about providence, from the same Author. Nor is it ill defined in this way: Predestination is the gratuitous preparation of eternal life to be bestowed according to the just and holy will. For all the predestined, both men and Angels, receive eternal life as the crown of justice or as a reward; yet so that justice itself also falls under the same predestination, and thus the whole predestination is gratuitous; which will be shown more fully in what follows, when there will be a treatment of the effects of predestination.

§ II — In what Predestination, Love, and Choice differ, and to what they are referred (Praedestinatio, Dilectio, Electio in quo differant, & quo referantur)

§ 7. These three—predestination (*praedestinatio*), love (*dilectio*), and choice (*electio*)—although they are attributed to God with respect to us, are terms of kindred signification, yet not altogether of the same. For although they are occupied objectively about the very same persons, and that in order to saving goods, most of all to eternal life, nevertheless they differ in formal character. For, as St. Thomas explains,¹³ predestination, in its formal character, presupposes choice, and choice presupposes love. For since predestination is a part of providence (*providentia*), whose office is to preordain something to an end (*finis*), which indeed pertains to the intellect, it is necessary that it be preceded, in the order of our thought, by the will (*voluntas*) of the end itself. Therefore the predestination of certain persons to eternal life presupposes that God wills their salvation, which is to love. For, as the same St. Thomas teaches,¹⁴ to love is nothing else than to will a good to someone.

§ 8. Hence it has been fittingly said by the Apostle in Rom. 8: "Whom he foreknew, that is, 'preloved' (idest, 'praedilexit'), them also he predestinated." To the same point pertains choice, whereby, namely, God wills that same good which is eternal life for some in preference to others, namely for the reprobate, for whom He does not will that same good: for if all without distinction were loved unto eternal life, there would be no Divine choice; therefore choice includes more than love; and for this reason also: because the will of God, by which in loving He wills a good to someone, is the cause that this good is had by him before others, as St. Thomas says.¹⁷

§ 9. Furthermore, one must know that these same three—love, choice, and predestination—do chiefly indeed look to the end to which some are loved, chosen, and predestined, namely to eternal life; yet they are also referred to those goods by which one arrives at eternal life, as to justice, grace, virtues, good works, the increase of virtues, and perseverance in good. For God loves us when He wills for us eternal beatitude; He also loves when He wills the goods by which we attain it—which both the Lord signifies in the Gospel (Jn. 3), saying: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but may have life everlasting." And John in the First Epistle, ch. 4: "In this hath the charity of God appeared in us, because God hath sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we may live by him," namely with eternal life, as he himself interprets (in the following chapter). And again the Lord (Jn. 13) promises that He will declare the love of the Father and His own toward the disciples in this, that He will manifest Himself to them, and that with the Father He will make an abode with them. But Paul also (Eph. 2) attributes to the charity of God toward us goods of both kinds.

§ 10. Likewise God chooses us to eternal life (as in Matt. 20, 22; 2 Tim. 2; and elsewhere). He also chooses to justice and holiness of this life, as a means of attaining to eternal life, as in Eph. 1: "He chose us, that we should be holy and unspotted." Whence also choice unto glory is prior, in our way of understanding, to choice unto grace; because the will of the end is prior to the choice of the means, as will be shown more fully below.

§ 11. Finally, God predestines us to eternal life, and also to the goods of this life by which we are led to it. For by His eternal decree, which is called predestination, He prepared both for man, both glory as the ultimate end, and grace as the means for attaining that end, as has just been said. But that predestination is referred to both is sufficiently understood from those words of the Apostle in Rom. 8: "For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son." Which conformity, begun here, is at length

perfectly attained in the age to come, just as also the adoption of sons, of which the same Apostle (Eph. 1): "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of sons." Again, moreover, in Rom. 8, in these words: "And whom he predestinated, them he also called, and justified, and glorified," it is signified that we are predestined to all these things.

§ 12. Likewise in 1 Cor. 2 it is said that God predestined unto our glory the wisdom of the divine counsel concerning the salvation of men. Wherefore in like manner we ourselves are to be said to have been predestined to that same glory. And in this way ecclesiastical writers more frequently speak, so as to say that we are predestined to glory and eternal life; because, namely, they consider predestination as a certain destination of men to an end as to a target, as an arrow is sent by the archer into the mark, as St. Thomas says.¹⁵ Yet those same writers do not deny that men are also predestined to grace; since St. Augustine defined predestination to be the preparation of grace, the sense of which will be explained below.¹⁶ Moreover, predestination referred to both is also read under the name of preordination; to glory indeed in Acts 13: "And as many as were preordained to eternal life believed;" to grace, however, in Acts 22, Ananias saying to Paul: "God hath preordained thee, that thou shouldest know his will," etc. The same also can easily be shown from the Scriptures in the term "preparation" (as in Rom. 9; 1 Cor. 2; Eph. 2).

§ III — The names by which the predestined are called in Scripture (Praedestinati quibus appellantur nominibus in Scriptura)

§ 13. Sacred Scripture calls those predestined by God to eternal life by various names; and it is worth the effort to consider this, so that the thing signified may become more fully known. And first, indeed, it calls them by the most usual name throughout the whole Church, predestined (*praedestinati*) (Rom. 8; Eph. 1), although the Greek word can also be rendered "fore-appointed" or "pre-determined." Secondly, they are called beloved (*dilecti*). Thirdly, elect (*electi*). Both are found in various places of Scripture. And although these three—predestined, beloved, elect—differ in formal character previously explained, nevertheless in reality they are convertible among themselves, as St. Thomas teaches (in the article cited there).¹⁹ Fourthly, they are called known (*cogniti*) to God, as in 2 Tim. 2: "The Lord hath known who are his." For in the Scriptures it is most frequent that "to know" and "to recognize" are put for what is "to love" and "to approve," and that with a peculiar Hebrew turn of phrase. Whence is that which is called by the Doctors "knowledge of approval" (*scientia approbationis*), founded most of all in the Scriptures. They are therefore said to be known as being beloved. Thus also elsewhere; as in Jn. 10: "I know my sheep." And 1 Cor. 13: "Then shall I know, even as I am known." Likewise 1 Cor. 8; and Gal. 4.

§ 14. Fifthly, they are called foreknown (*praesciti*), or preknown (*praecogniti*), that is, "pre-beloved" (*praedilecti*), namely from eternity. For just as "to know" and "to recognize" are taken in the Scriptures for "to love," so "to foreknow" and "to pre-recognize" are taken for what is "to pre-love"—in a manner indeed contrary to that in which this expression "foreknown" is wont to be received by the Schoolmen, about which below. Thus the Apostle in Rom. 8: "Whom he foreknew," that is, loved from eternity, "them he predestinated," namely according to the order of love and predestination explained above. And in the same epistle: "God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew." And Peter, 1 Pet. 1: "According to the foreknowledge of God the Father." And again: "Preknown before the foundation of the world." Which, although it is said of Christ, yet pertains also to us, as members of that Head, according to the

same general signification. For Scripture and the Fathers teach that Christ also was predestined. Thus in a prayer of the Church: "And thou hast mercy upon all whom thou foreknows to be thine as to faith and work, that is, whom thou pre-loves to this end, that they may be thine in faith and work; upon the same in time thou hast mercy, granting faith and work."

§ 15. Sixthly, they are called approved (*probati*). Which term also signifies love: just as, on the contrary, the reprobate are said to be hated. Thus the Apostle, 1 Cor. 11: "That they who are approved"—namely to God—"may be made manifest among you." Seventhly, they are called ordained (*ordinati*) to eternal life (as in Acts 13), where, in place of what we read as "preordained," the Greeks, without the preposition, read "ordained." Eighthly, they are called preordained (*praecordinati*), both in that place according to the Vulgate version, and in ch. 22 in the words of Ananias to Paul. Ninthly, they are called prepared (*praeparati*), namely by the eternal decree of God unto salvation—in which way some render out of the Greek the place already mentioned. Thus also the Apostle in Rom. 9: "Which God prepared unto glory." Tenthly, they are said to be called (*vocati*)—not indeed in those places of Scripture in which it is said that many are called, but few elect, where "called" also comprises many unbelievers; nor in those places in which all and only the faithful are said to be called, as in Rom. 1 and 1 Cor. 1, etc.; but elsewhere. And first of all Rev. 17, where it is said: "They who are with him are called, elect, faithful." And Rev. 19: "Blessed are they who are called to the marriage supper of the Lamb." And Rom. 8: "But whom moreover he called..." and these same, in the same place, the Apostle calls "called according to purpose." And Eph. 1: "Called by lot"; and Heb. 9: "That they may receive the promise, who are called, of the eternal inheritance."

§ 16. Eleventhly, they are called blessed (*benedicti*), as in Matt. 25: "Come, ye blessed of my Father." Twelfthly, they are called vessels of mercy (*vasa misericordiae*), Rom. 9. Thirteenthly, vessels unto honor (*vasa in honorem*), as in the same epistle, and 2 Tim. 2. Fourteenthly, they are called Christ's sheep (*oves Christi*), not indeed in Jn. 21, where it is said to Peter: "Feed my sheep"—for this is said of all the faithful—but in Jn. 10, where the Lord discourses concerning his sheep to be gathered into one fold, whom also he denies will perish unto eternity. Fifteenthly, they are called sons of God (*fili Dei*), Jn. 11: "That he might gather together in one the sons of God who were dispersed." Finally, it must be noted that just as Peter calls God's pre-love "foreknowledge" (1 Pet. 1), so predestination (*praedestinatio*) is several times called by Paul "purpose" (*propositum*), that is, the eternal decree of God preparing for man grace and eternal life. For it is not to be understood as the purpose of man willing or running, in the way the Pelagians used to interpret that word in Rom. 8—"who are called according to purpose"—of the purpose of the human will following God's calling; but of the purpose of God having mercy upon man. For thus expressly it is called by the same Apostle (Rom. 4; 9; Eph. 1; 2 Tim. 1).²⁰

§ IV — Against those who do not want all who are to be saved to be predestined (Contra eos qui non omnes salvandos volunt esse praedestinos)

§ 17. Some, by a new contrivance, set up two kinds, as it were two classes, of those who arrive at salvation. One kind, those whom Scripture names the elect and predestined, and the sheep of Christ; in whom they make the grace of Christ so efficacious that they simply cannot fall away from salvation, but are led to a saving outcome undeviatingly, and by a certain necessity—understanding by "necessity" not a necessity of consequence, but of the thing. These they say are called predestined (*praedestinati*), as destined by a singular

benefit of grace before others to a more sublime degree of dignity. On which account they will the same to be called elect (*electi*), as certain few from the whole number of those to be saved, peculiarly preordained and to be taken up to a greater dignity of glory.

§ 18. In the other class they place all the rest who are to be saved, to whom they admit that sufficient grace is indeed given for obtaining salvation; yet not so efficacious that they arrive at salvation undeviatingly; for they can fall away from it by free will, and nonetheless are going to remain in it by free will. In this century the assertor of this opinion was Catharinus. Although long ago it appears the Pelagians thought something of the sort (from book 6 of the Hypognosticon under Augustine's name). For at the end of that book the author says that the Pelagians were wont to say that predestination is to be understood only in the Apostles, namely on account of a confirmation of will in the charity of God which they ascribe to them.²²

§ 19. But that doctrine is just as not difficult to refute from the Scriptures and the Fathers, as it is alien from the common sense of Catholics—indeed contrary to the Catholic faith. Certainly Domingo Bañez calls it manifest heresy; I shall note the place below.²³ For, first, it is established among all the Doctors of the Church that these three—predestinate, elect, saved—are used without distinction, as those which are convertible among themselves. In which manner also the Master uses these words throughout this whole distinction; nor, before Catharinus, is even one of the Catholic writers found to have thought as he thinks. Next, it is manifest in the Scriptures that by the name of "elect" all who are to be saved are understood, and they are distinguished from the reprobate, not from those to be saved of an inferior order. For in Matt. 22 the elect are set in opposition to those who are to be sent into exterior darkness. And in ch. 24 all the elect, that is the just, are said to be gathered by the Angels to Christ coming in the clouds of heaven to judgment; but the just on the day of judgment are the same as those to be saved. Whence also in that place they are opposed to those of whom it is said: "Then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn," that is, the reprobate. So also ch. 13, in the parable of the drag-net, the good fish are said to be chosen into vessels, the bad being cast out. Likewise Jn. 13 the Lord says: "I know whom I have chosen," and that on account of Judas, not chosen but reprobated. And ch. 15 the Apostles are said to be chosen out of the world, which there the Lord doubtless takes in a bad sense, as is clear to one attending to the passage. Therefore the elect are not called "pre-elect," according to dignity—that is, chosen before others who are to be saved, eminently. Add to these other places of Scripture, as Rom. 8; 9; Eph. 1; Matt. 25; Jn. 10; 2 Pet. 1; Rev. 17—in all of which by "elect," "predestined," and "sheep of Christ" are understood all who are to be saved, even of the lowest order. Among which that opposition of the sheep and the goats in Matthew is most clear, and that for all the sheep—that is, for all placed on the right hand—the kingdom is said to be prepared from the world's foundation. Such also is that of John: "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep." For from that there follows by most certain inference that only the sheep of Christ believe—namely with that faith which leads to salvation. Paul also, Rom. 9, calls all the children of the promise elect; and in the same place he opposes election to hatred, just as mercy to wrath. The same man's sentence is plain (ch. 11), where he says: "But the election hath obtained it; and the rest were blinded." Whence it is manifest that none are saved except the elect. Finally, the Fathers of the Council of Trent in many places, and expressly (Session 6, ch. 12), understand by "predestined" and "elect" none other than those who are to be saved.²⁴ Hence also is that sentence of Fulgentius (book On the Faith to Peter, ch. 35), in which he denies that any of those whom God has not predestined to life can in any wise be saved; and he says that this is to be held most firmly. He adds moreover that all those whom God has made vessels of mercy were predestined by the same before the foundation of the world. Which is also expressly against Catharinus, who says that, for some indeed as predestined, the Kingdom has been prepared before the foundation of the world;

but for the rest who are to be saved, it has been prepared only from the foundation of the world, as is said in Matt. 25. Which distinction is vain and inept, since in Sacred Letters these two, "from the foundation of the world" and "before the foundation of the world," as also certain other expressions of the same kind, are held as the same. Whence what is said in Matt. 25, "from the foundation of the world," and in Rev. 13, "from the beginning of the world,"—this same in Eph. 1 is said: "before the foundation of the world"; and elsewhere: "before times eternal," as in 2 Tim. 1 and Tit. 1; and elsewhere: "before the world was," as in Jn. 17. Sometimes indeed the very beginning of the man is named, as conception or birth, as in Jer. 1 and Gal. 1. All of which only signify something eternal on God's part; nay, and it is absurd in itself to say that for some the Kingdom was prepared from the beginning of the world, and for others before the beginning; since God determines nothing new in time or at the beginning of time, but His every decree is eternal and from eternity.

§ 20. Besides these things, the usage of the whole Church, both in the Divine Offices and elsewhere, shows clearly enough that the elect and predestined are altogether the same as those to be saved, and not others: as when it is said: "Grant that we may be thine, and command that we be numbered in the flock of thine elect." And in a certain prayer: "O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in supernal felicity." And again: "And let the book of blessed predestination retain the names of all the faithful as inscribed." And in another: "Grant that the intercession of all thine elect may everywhere gladden us," that is, of all the Saints, or blessed. And for the departed: "That, in the glory of the resurrection, he, raised up among thy Saints elect, may breathe again." Let the student also see Domingo Bañez (on I, q. 23, a. 7), where he calls Catharinus's contrivance manifestly heretical; and he refutes it by five arguments from Scripture: the first from Matt. 25, where it is said to all placed at the right hand: "Receive the Kingdom which hath been prepared for you from the foundation of the world," that is, to which you have been predestined; for predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, according to the sentence of St. Augustine and of all the Doctors. The second from Rom. 8, where it is said: "Whom he foreknew and predestined," "to be made conformable," etc. The third from Rom. 9, where in general the vessels of mercy are said to be "prepared," that is, predestined unto glory. The fourth from Eph. 1, where those who are to be saved are signified by "elect" and "predestined" by God. The fifth from the same chapter where it is said that God, with regard to the blessed—that is, those to be saved—"worketh all things according to the counsel of his will," which, with respect to these same, is nothing else than the Divine predestination. And indeed these places of Scripture, just as by all interpreters are expounded concerning all who are to be saved, so can hardly be taken into another sense except very forcibly. Nor yet do we deny that "election," both in Sacred and in profane letters, is sometimes understood to be "from the number of the good." In which way we read that Christ chose twelve Apostles, and that seven deacons were chosen by the Apostles; in which way also we say that a king, or a bishop, or a magistrate is chosen not from the evil, but from the good, as being more excellent; in which way too St. Augustine in book 17 (*City of God*, ch. 1) affirms that certain gods of the Gentiles could be said to be chosen before other lesser ones. But wherever it is a question of election unto salvation, only that election is understood by which some are so chosen that the rest are reprobated; whether the election is referred to men or also to angels. For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5) called angels "elect," beyond doubt all the blessed.

§ 21. Hence "the reprobate" are understood to be none other than those who are not elect; nor must any such kind be acknowledged, namely of those who, having received only sufficient, not efficacious, grace, attain salvation by free will—whom Catharinus says are saved, yet denies to be elect (in *II Sentences*, where there is a treatment of grace, it will be shown). For to this it is to be noted that there is no good, not even the least, nor any use of free will, except from grace (about which a little later more fully); and everything by which man is

led to salvation is the effect of predestination. Whence errors very similar to this opinion have already been exploded and condemned among Catholics: one, that of John Cassian (Conference 13), thus distinguishing that some have the beginning of good will, others have received it from God—against whom Prosper has disputed learnedly; the other, condemned by the Synod of Orange (ch. 8 and last), of those saying that some by the mercy of God, others by free will, attain the grace of Baptism. For just as those attribute the beginning, so these of whom we are speaking attribute the completion of a good work to free will alone. But as to what is said by the same, that the predestined are necessary to be saved, so far as the truth stands, will be declared below.

§ V — Reply to the principal objection (Ad objectionem praecipuam respondetur)

§ 22. Catharinus brings forward many things for his opinion, but almost all are trifling and admit an easy solution according to the common interpretation of the Doctors. One point alone has difficulty, which is gathered from Matt. 20, in the conclusion of the parable about those hired into the vineyard: "So the last shall be first, and the first last; for many are called, but few elect." For from this it seems to follow that by "elect" are not understood just any who are to be saved, but some exceptional ones, that is, those who are going to be of a higher degree of felicity among the saved; for the Lord seems to call "elect" those whom he had called "first"; but only the first are called elect.

§ 23. To this difficulty one should reply, as seems sufficient to us, in this way. "First" and "last" are said in this parable in two manners, as also at the end of the preceding chapter, whence the parable takes its occasion: namely, with respect to men themselves, and with respect to God; for the sense of the saying is twofold. Many who are "first" in the judgment of men will be "last" before God; and many who are "last" in the judgment of men will be "first" in God's judgment. Now "first" are called those who are prior in dignity, holiness, merit; "last," those who are posterior—whether you take the comparison properly, so that they be indeed holy and going to be blessed, though less so than those who are called prior; or improperly, so that holiness does not truly belong to these, and therefore they are not among the number of those who are going to be blessed. For in Lk. 13 it is manifest that by "last" are understood those who will be cast out by God, and to whom it will be said: "I know you not." So also in Matt. 5 "least in the kingdom of heaven" is said, according to some, of one who will not be in the Kingdom; according to others, of one who in the present Church is contemptible and of no account; but, according to both, of one who is unworthy of the Kingdom of heaven. And ch. 21 publicans and harlots are said to go before the Pharisees into the Kingdom of God; not as if at least the Pharisees were going to follow, but because they will not be there at all. From which clarification it is clear how the elect, that is, all who are to be saved, are "first," but the reprobate "last," so that there is no reason to be forced to understand by "elect" the first in the comparison of those to be saved of an inferior order.

§ 24. Now to that which is objected concerning the perseverance of the work, I reply that not all among those in the Church who work have their labors approved by the heavenly Householder, namely those who work servilely—that is, who serve God on account of temporal goods, or only by the movement of fear of punishment—such as were the Jews whom the parable notes. For their labor in working cannot be called a heavenly reward, since it is from a merely natural motive. Indeed, among the theses condemned by Alexander VIII is this one [...]; likewise, "Attrition ..."; and, "The fear of Gehenna is not supernatural," etc.²⁶ But

although it can be said that in parables not every detail is to be pressed, but the principal aim is to be looked to on account of which they are adduced (in which manner Chrysostom more than once replies to scruples of this sort), still we can say even that those whose work was not approved by the heavenly Householder received their denarius—not the one which they merited, but the one which, as it were by a certain pact, they expected. For this parable has been stated on account of the Jews and the Gentiles: those received what was theirs, that is, the temporal denarius promised by Moses; these, however, the eternal denarius, which Grace promises. Although we do not deny that this parable contains also other manifold doctrine, about which see Jansenius.²⁷

Note to (a): "Namely temporal [denarius], such as Augustine notes of the Jews. Moreover, those who are moved by fear of punishment, as they are forthwith raised by hope and begin to love in charity—as the Council of Trent teaches (Session 6, ch. ...)—are not to be judged displeasing to the Householder; but works flowing from a merely natural motive are altogether displeasing to God. It must be said ... '[The] fear of Gehenna is not supernatural.'" [This note reproduces the sense of the author's marginal note marked "(a)" in the source; parts are uncertain due to textual corruption.]

§ VI — That the preparation of grace is the predestination of man (Cujus gratiae praeparatio fit hominis praedestinatio)

§ 25. There is one predestination (*praedestinatio*) of men, another of the angels; of this latter we shall speak afterwards. But as to the former, one must know that there is not one predestination of the first man and another of fallen man, but the same. For in the first man all men carnally propagated from him fell. Therefore the predestination of man, or what is the same thing, of fallen man, is briefly defined by St. Augustine thus: the preparation of grace (*gratia*)²⁸. Now this is nothing other than the eternal purpose, counsel, decree, ordering of God, by which He prepared grace for man, that is, determined at some time to confer grace. For that is said to be prepared by God for someone which, by the Providence of God, is most certainly to be given to him, or altogether is going to be. Which manner of speaking is frequent in the Scriptures. Whence in Ps. 88 it is said: "Even unto eternity I will prepare thy seed"; in Is. 64 it is said: "Eye hath not seen, O God, except thee, the things which thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee"; in Eph. 2: "Created in good works, which God prepared that we should walk in them"; in Rom. 9: "Vessels of mercy, which He prepared unto glory"; and in the Gospel in the good part: "Possess the kingdom prepared for you." And in the bad part in the same place: "Depart into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels." For even the evils of punishment, by the just judgment of God, are prepared for sinners.³³

§ 26. But this divine preparation of grace, which St. Augustine defines to be predestination, Fulgentius beautifully explains.²⁹ In truth, that by this Augustinian definition the predestination of fallen man alone is comprehended, let us see what he wishes to be understood by the name of grace. For in several modes grace is said. In one mode, therefore, grace—as it is opposed to the debt of justice (*justitia*)—can be called what is not due; in which mode even nature (*natura*) is grace, and whatever together with nature, in the very institution of it, has been conferred upon it, and is called natural—such as the members of man and his natural faculties. In a second mode, grace—as it is opposed to the debt of nature—is called whatever is bestowed over and above those things which belong to it naturally, for the elevation and sublimation of its nature. In which way St. Augustine (De Civitate Dei XII, ch. 9; XIV, ch. 17), and after him the scholastic Doctors, called grace the

supernatural gift that gives grace, in which the angel and man were created.³⁰ Now this grace of the first and second mode cannot so properly be called mercy (*miser cordia*), for this reason, that it does not presuppose the misery of fault or of punishment; although, in a certain general acceptation of mercy which is not alien from the Scriptures, it can be said (as St. Thomas says) that every bestowal of a good beyond the due of him to whom it is conferred pertains to mercy. In which sense also he teaches that in every work of God mercy and justice are found.³¹ In a third mode, most properly grace is called a benefaction which is not only undue—whether you consider nature or the merit of justice—but is of such a sort that it is conferred upon one unworthy and ill-deserving; which is properly called in the Scriptures the grace of Christ and by another name mercy. But to this belong every kind of benefactions by which man is delivered from eternal death and is promoted unto salvation; as Augustine teaches:³² Although indeed even life eternal is grace; yet that from unworthy he be made worthy is mercy; and life eternal itself was prepared for him before the foreseeing of good merits.

§ 27. And these three modes are so related that the first, by its generality, embraces the second, and the second the third; which it is easy to observe by comparing the several modes with the several particulars. Moreover, the grace of the last kind alone is to be understood, in the definition of predestination now given, according to the mind of Augustine (who repeatedly calls predestination the purpose of having mercy), which can properly be referred only to fallen man. Therefore the preparation of this grace, which is the same as the purpose of having mercy, is the predestination, not of an angel, not of a man keeping innocence, but of one fallen into sin and to be raised from sin. Nevertheless we do not so name the predestination of fallen man as if, in God, according to the mode of our understanding, the foreseeing of the fall of the first man, and in him of the whole human race, had preceded the predestination of some out of the whole race of men unto eternal life. For whether these ought to be understood by us in that order or rather in another, will be said more suitably elsewhere.

§ 28. But since God prepared for many men the grace of faith and of justice, who nevertheless are not predestined, but will abandon the grace received and are to be damned unto eternity; it is clear that this definition of predestination given by Augustine is not full, if in it you understand any particular grace whatsoever. It will, however, be full, if either conjointly we interpret both graces, namely of this age and of the future; or we understand grace as producing the due end; or—as some do—we join glory (*gloria*) to grace in this way: Predestination is the preparation of grace and glory, according to that of the Psalm: "The Lord will give grace and glory."

§ 29. But that which I said in the first place is more consonant with Augustine, who seems by the name of grace to have signified the whole heap of the benefactions of God toward the predestined man, life eternal itself also being included; for he subjoins that grace is the donation of that which has been prepared. And below he generally calls the effect of predestination "grace," as if the whole and entire effect of predestination were grace: nor is there any doubt that for Augustine life eternal is the effect of predestination. And this way of speaking, by which life eternal is called grace, is conformable to Scripture. For John says (Jn. 1) that "through Christ we receive grace for grace"; and Paul (Rom. 6) speaks of "grace," or the "gift of God" (for in Greek it is *charisma*, not *charis*, although these two signify nearly the same).

§ 30. Moreover Augustine, that which here he named grace by a general name, calls the preparation of the benefactions of God by which man is delivered. For (De Dono Perseverantiae, ch. 14) he says: "The predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefactions of

God, by which most certainly there are delivered, whoever are delivered." Now no one will deny that life eternal is such a benefaction; since by it man is delivered not only from eternal death but also from all other evils whatsoever. For before its attainment there will not be perfected the freedom from every evil of the adoption of sons, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 8). From these same words of Augustine, which contain the definition of predestination, this also is clear, that he is speaking only of the predestination of fallen men. For there is no place for deliverance where servitude has not preceded, which man incurs through sin. Wherefore it stands sufficiently established that by this definition the predestination of the angels—inasmuch as they incurred no servitude—is not contained.

§ VII — What are the effects of predestination (Qui sint effectus praedestinationis)

§ 31. The effects of predestination (*effectus praedestinationis*) are of multiple kinds in the Divine order; for some are common to the predestined and to the reprobate (*reprobatio*), and of these some are by their nature remote, yet nevertheless presupposed and ordained by God to the end of beatitude. Of this sort is the creation and conservation of those whom God has predestined, both men and angels; others are indeed more proximate, but still such as can remain common to both, as the Incarnation, the Passion, the merit (*meritum*), and the sacrifice of Christ, the preaching of the Gospel, and other things of this sort, which indeed per se pertain to the order of predestination, yet nevertheless, for certain ones who by their own unbelief and malice turn them into the material of a graver damnation, become effects of reprobation. So too conversely the permission of the first man's sin, by which he dragged down with himself the ruin of the whole race, pertains indeed in itself to the order of reprobation; but out of God's mercy it is ordered to the salvation of many, and becomes an effect of their predestination.

§ 32. Moreover, other effects of predestination are yet more special; as those three which the Apostle briefly indicates in Rom. 8 with these words: "Whom moreover he predestined, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; but whom he justified, them also he glorified": [he has made manifest]. In the two latter members of whose statement what was expressed in the first must be understood as repeated, so that, as the Apostle wills, each single member is referred to the predestined alone. For God called all the predestined; but those same called He justified; and those same justified, He glorified. Among these effects, therefore, the first is calling (*vocatio*); not that by which a thing is called so as to be, of which Rom. 4: "Who calls the things that are not, as the things that are." Nor that by which someone is called to Christ through the bare preaching of the Gospel, even if he does not give faith to the preaching—just as those are read to have been called to the marriage feast who refused to come—but that calling by which one is efficaciously called to faith; that is, he is so called that he believes; the Apostle everywhere in his epistles calls men of this sort "the called." To this there pertains, in the first place, faith; then knowledge of the law, fear of Gehenna, good inspirations and thoughts, and certain beginnings of good will, and the first consent to salutary good.

§ 33. The second is justification (*justificatio*), to which there pertains true repentance and detestation of sins, love of God above all things, the conversion of the sinner to God, the remission of sins, the renewal of the mind by grace, the adoption of sons, progress and increase in justice, good works, and perseverance (*perseverantia*) in these. The third is glorification (*glorificatio*), which consists in the possession of eternal life, comprising the perfect happiness of man, according to soul and body. These three effects of predestination

have this order: that the first is referred to the second, and the second to the third, as to the end. Now this is the difference among them, that Calling and Justification are not, in all in whom they occur, an effect of predestination. For many reprobates are called and justified. But Glorification, since it is the end of the others and therefore the chief effect, befalls no one who is not predestined; nor, likewise, does perseverance, by which it comes about that one does not finally recede from the effect of justification: according to that of Job 27: "Justificationem, quam cepi tenere, non deferam." Therefore, as above it was said of certain things, that although per se they pertain to the order of predestination, yet very often through man's malice they become effects of reprobation: so too it must be said of calling and justification; for those who forsake the benefit of calling and of justification received, for them both turn to a graver damnation, with Peter saying in 2 Pet. 2: "Melius erat illis non cognoscere viam iustitiae, quam post agnitam retrorsum converti." Which also happened to the philosophers: "Who when they had known God, did not glorify him as God" (Rom. 1).

§ 34. Moreover, among the effects of predestination some are common, others singular. Common are those which happen commonly to all, or to most, of the predestined, as are the effects thus far enumerated. I say "to most," because calling properly so called, and good works, and increase of justice, do not befit all the predestined, as is evident in the case of little ones. On this account there are counted among common effects the pious care of parents for their children, Catholic teachers, good formation, association with the good, etc. For by these and suchlike means God for the most part leads His elect to salvation. Likewise a good natural disposition, good talent, and natural prudence, by which one readily acquiesces in truth rationally proposed. These, I say, are in the predestined certain effects of predestination, as often as any of these turns to their salvation. Hence St. Augustine says that in some there is a natural talent, by which, when signs are applied, they are moved, etc.

§ 35. Singular are those which regard the singular predestination of each one, as are the miraculous or extraordinary conversions of some, as of Paul, of the thief, of the sinful woman. Likewise God's special inspirations, or even revelations made to some, and miracles seen. Hither too can be referred knowledge of the stars, if by it someone is led to salvation. And a similar judgment is to be made of every science affording to man an aid or occasion of knowing God: as Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics; as "On the Soul," on herbs, on animals; on the harmony of the human body. Sciences of this sort, considered in themselves, are nearer as effects of predestination in those who by them are led to salvation than Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic; although these too can fall under the order of predestination. Hence, regarding things indifferent in themselves as to their being, many are to be noted in their kind as belonging to predestination and to reprobation—yet the greatest difference arises from the more ordered Divine providence—such as acumen of mind and its auxiliary endowments, or dullness of intellect; [temperament]; health of body; [pursuits of life, or state of life, lineage and nobility], poverty, bodily infirmity; contraries, wealth, honors, and the like; likewise peace, war, persecutions, etc. Insofar as all these are subjected to the order of God's providence, for some they are effects of predestination; for others, of reprobation. We know—says the Apostle in Rom. 8—"to those who love God all things work together unto good," "who according to purpose are called saints"; that is, the predestined, as St. Augustine explains,³⁵ adding moreover that God so far utterly makes all things cooperate for good for them, that if any of them stray and step out of line, even this very thing He makes to profit them for good, because they return more humble and more taught. The same is taught by St. Bernard.³⁶ But this is not to be so taken, as if sins themselves were at times effects of Divine predestination—for sin cannot be from God—but because God sometimes permits His elect to fall grievously, that from this they may be rendered more humble and more cautious; and so then the permission of sin is of predestination, not the sin itself.

§ 36. Again, concerning things indifferent we have instruction from the same Apostle in Rom. 14, when he says: "He who eats, to God he eats, giving thanks to God: for whether we live, to the Lord we live," etc. And elsewhere he bids that we do all things to the glory of God. From which there can be fashioned an argument of this sort: all temporal things, although in themselves indifferent, or even evil, can be certain means and instruments of charity (*caritas*), and its material object able to be ordered to the glory of God; therefore they can be effects of predestination. Likewise on the contrary, if, with God permitting, all these things are ordered by man's malice to the evil of fault, by the same token they will be effects of reprobation; the antecedent is evident from the Apostle's testimonies and the other things said above. And moreover, as to temporal goods, it is proved: because goods of this sort fall under merit, as St. Thomas teaches,³⁷ and fall under the object of hope (*spes*), as he likewise teaches.³⁸ Finally, in the Litanies and in other prayers the Church asks many goods of this sort from God, which too are comprised under these parts of the Lord's Prayer: "Our bread"; and "Deliver us from evil." Now they are asked for on no other ground than that through them we may tend to eternal goods.

§ 37. Lastly, it must be noted that the effects of predestination can be considered in a twofold way, namely either with respect to the predestination of the whole mystical body of the predestined, or with respect to individuals, that is, of this or that man in particular. And indeed the latter mode of consideration is now sufficiently evident from what has been said. As to the former, not only [all the goods done to creatures], but even every permission of whatsoever sins, is an effect of predestination. For all these things are ordered to the greater perfection and beauty of the heavenly Jerusalem, so that here that may perfectly obtain which the Apostle says Rom. 8: "To those who love God all things work together unto good." Whence too in ch. 9 he says that God "endured with much patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction; that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory." And in ch. 11 he wills this mystery not to be unknown, that "blindness in part has happened in Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles should enter"; that is, that God for the salvation of the Gentiles permitted the unbelief of the Jews. Which those earlier words signify yet more plainly: "Have they so stumbled, that they should fall? God forbid: but by their offence salvation is to the Gentiles"; and what follows. Now this is what St. Augustine, and after him St. Thomas, and other Doctors teach, that God does not make sins but orders them; and that they teach it to pertain to the goodness of God that He should not permit evils, unless He can and wills to elicit a greater good from them—of which the foremost is the perfection of the City of the elect, to which every other particular good is ordered; about which matter we spoke above (at the preceding Distinction), where it was asked: Whether sins fall under Divine providence? This same thing St. Augustine bears clear witness to in book XI of the City of God. For when in ch. 17 he had said that God created the angel whom He foreknew would be evil, because at the same time He foresaw what goods He Himself would thus be going to make out of his evil, straightway (in ch. 18) he subjoins generally: "For neither would God create any— I do not say of the angels, but even of men—whom He foreknew would be evil, unless likewise He knew to what uses of goods He would fit them; and thus He would adorn the order of the ages, as a most beautiful poem, even with certain, as it were, antitheses." So he. Now the reason of this Divine disposition St. Thomas beautifully explains: because, he says, when men in providing do not preserve order, but provide after the manner of brute animals, then too the Divine providence ordains concerning them according to the order which befits brutes, namely, that the things which in them are either good or evil are not ordered to their own proper good, but to the good of others, according to that of the Psalm: "Comparatus est jumentis insipientibus," etc. When

[on the other hand they do preserve order, their things are ordered] to their own proper good, according to that of the Apostle: "To those who love God," etc., with other things which follow in the same sense.³⁹

§ VIII — Whether predestination to glory is prior to that which is to grace (Utrum praedestinatio ad gloriam prior sit ea, quae ad gratiam?)

§ 38. Although in Divine things all things are together, and nothing there can be either prior or posterior in any genus of cause—much less according to time—yet, according to our mode of understanding (*secundum nostrum intelligendi modum*), a certain order of prior and posterior is rightly assigned to the Divine actions, which are eternal and have regard to creatures; and since, according to our mode of understanding, with respect to the same thing, it can happen that something is prior and posterior in diverse kinds of causes, we can also say that God understands, or wills, or pre-ordains something as prior, together, and posterior to another, according to the different kinds of causes. For He wills the end before the means, according to the formal character (*ratio*) of the final cause (*causa finalis*). And, conversely, He wills the means before the end, according to the formal character of the material cause and of that which disposes to the end. But because, absolutely speaking, the end is the first of causes in the formal character of causing (for the end is first in intention, and on account of it all things act, and when it ceases every action ceases—since the end is the best, and that for the sake of which), therefore the absolute priority of the final cause must hold first place, with respect to Divine providence (*providentia*), in the order of our understanding. Since therefore grace (*gratia*) is ordered to glory (*gloria*) as to an end, not conversely; for that reason one must say absolutely that the predestination (*praedestinatio*) of men to glory is prior to that by which they are pre-ordained to grace; that is, that God first predestined men to glory, and then that by a certain middle they would attain glory; for each one first wills the end than the means, as health rather than the remedy, learning rather than study, notwithstanding that the means have a certain other formal character of priority with respect to the end.⁴⁰

§ 39. Wherefore it is evident what must be answered to this argument: the order which a thing has in being, that it has in the concept of the mind and in the providence of God; therefore, just as in being grace is prior to glory, so also in the predestination of God. The reply is that even in being, not indeed in the order of time, but in the order of dignity—which befits causes with respect to their effects and among themselves—the end is first of all things; as has already been said. Although it is also true that a thing has in the providence of God the same order which it has in being; namely in this sense: because God from eternity provided and decreed that things should have this order of time in being. Now St. Thomas indicates the ground of this doctrine when he says that predestination is a part of providence.⁴¹ But providence is the prescriptive plan (*ratio praeceptiva*) of the ordering of certain things to an end; moreover, nothing should be prescribed to be ordered to an end unless there is a pre-existing will of the end. Whence he says that the predestination of certain men to eternal salvation presupposes, according to the formal character, that God wills their salvation.

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§ 40. Where that phrase, "according to the formal character" (*secundum rationem*), is the same as what we say, "according to our mode of understanding." Again he indicates the same ground, where he expressly teaches that the book of life properly regards the life of glory; and as to the life of grace, he says, no one is said to be chosen except insofar as the life of grace is ordered to glory; because the life of grace does not have the formal character of an end, but of that which is to the end.⁴²

§ 41. Furthermore, Scotus hands on this same reasoning more explicitly (on Distinction 41) in these words: "Willing in an orderly way the end and the things that are to the end, He first wills the end than any of the beings ordered to the end; because on account of the end He wills the other things; therefore, since in the whole process by which a creatable-to-beatitude creature is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude; God, willing anything of this order to this creatable-to-beatitude creature, first wills to this creature the end, and, as it were, afterwards He wills also the other things which are in the order of those things which pertain to that end; but the good use of free will, grace, faith, merits, are all ordered to that end, albeit some more remotely and some more proximately; therefore God wills beatitude for this one before any of those things, and He wills for him any one of those things before He foresees that he will have any of those things; therefore He wills beatitude for him on account of none of those foreseen." Thus far he.⁴³

§ 42. Which doctrine is very consonant with the Scriptures and the Fathers; for thus it is written in Acts 13: "And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed." Which words signify rather clearly that the preordination to life was the cause of faith being given to those who were thus preordained: as if it were said, God preordained them to life, as to their ultimate end; but because to that end He decreed that it could not be come to except through certain means, therefore He also provided and prepared those means for them, and in time supplied and conferred them—among which the first is faith.

§ 43. Another passage is Rom. 8: "Whom he predestined, them he also called, and justified, and glorified." Which words first signify the order of the end and the means, then also of the means among themselves. For the sense is: those whom God from eternity predestined to life, to them in time He confers the means leading to that end, and through these He finally led them to the end itself. Nor does it stand in the way that it is not said, He predestined to life, or to glory, but, He predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son, as if predestination to the grace of this life were signified by those words. For perfect conformity is understood, which belongs to the future age, which also he straightway set forth under the name of glory, saying, "them he also glorified." Of which conformity the same Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15: "As is the heavenly one, such also are the heavenly"; and in 1 Jn. 3: "When he shall appear, we shall be like him."

§ 44. Finally, thus it was said: "Whom he predestined, them he also called"; just as in the following chapter it is said that God "prepared vessels of mercy unto glory," and then it is subjoined: "and whom he called" etc.; namely to signify that the preparation unto glory is prior to the resolve of calling to faith. That order is also proved by this, that in the same chapter 9 the Apostle teaches that Jacob, as a figure of the predestined, "when as yet he was not born, nor had done any good, was, before his elder brother, loved" by God. By this he means to signify that it is prior that men be loved and predestined unto glory than that there be taken into account the works and merits by which they are to be lifted up to glory; for this is what he adds: "Not of works, but of him that calls."

§ 45. And this Moses wished to signify in figure, when he said to the sons of Israel, Deut. 9: "Say not in thy heart: For my justice the Lord hath brought me in to possess this land. For neither for thy justices shalt thou enter," etc., "but that the Lord may accomplish his word," etc. For the land of promise was a certain figure of the heavenly inheritance promised to all the elect. Whence one must also admit that men are chosen or predestined to glory immediately and independently of the foreknowledge of merits, or the predestination of grace; which will come to light more from the things which will be said below (in the next Distinction).

§ 46. But now let us briefly confirm the same doctrine from St. Augustine. He teaches in book 1 (to Simplicianus, q. 2, from the passage of Rom. 9 already cited) that Jacob was not loved, that is, predestined to life, by the merit of justice—not even of that justice which is from faith; and he teaches the same at greater length (Enchiridion 98), among other things expressly affirming that without any merits of good works, not even of future and foreseen ones, Jacob was loved; and for this he adduces also that of the Apostle: "It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy." He understands by works any whatsoever, even those which are done from grace; of which kind were the works which Jacob later did.⁴⁴

§ 47. The same, in book 2 (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, ch. 7), again adduces and presses those words of the Apostle: "Not of works, but of him that calls," in order to teach that Jacob is not loved from future works—that is, that men are predestined to eternal life; which would not be true if this predestination required beforehand the consideration of any works whatsoever.⁴⁵

§ 48. To the same Augustine there plainly subscribes Fulgentius, book 1 (To Monimus, ch. 13), saying that God, those whom He predestined to life, those same He also predestined to justice. And in the book (On the Faith to Peter, ch. 3), looking to the passage of the Apostle in Rom. [he says]: "They will reign with Christ whom God by His gratuitous goodness predestined to the kingdom; for since by predestining He prepared them in such a way that they would be worthy of the kingdom; He prepared, to be sure, those to be called according to purpose, that they might obey; He prepared those to be justified, that, grace having been received, they might believe rightly and live well; He prepared also those to be glorified, that, made heirs of Christ, they might possess the kingdom of heaven without end." Thus he.⁴⁶

§ 49. This same order Leo (Sermon 2 on the Nativity of the Lord) manifestly signified in these words: "There was need of the secret dispensation of counsel, that the unchangeable God, whose will cannot be deprived of His own goodness, should complete, by a more hidden sacrament, the first disposition of His mercy; and that man, cast by the craft of diabolical iniquity into guilt, should not perish contrary to the purpose of God." Which words of the Pontiff show not only that the first disposition and purpose of God was concerning saving man, and the second concerning the means to salvation; but they also prove that the predestination of men to salvation is prior to the consideration of the fall and of the misery into which the human race fell. For God willed to lead certain men to glory; but that He might do this more wonderfully and more gloriously, He willed to permit the fall of Adam, and in him the ruin of the whole human race; namely that thus His mercy and the eminent grace which is given to the unworthy and to the ill-deserving (which had no place among the Angels), and moreover His wondrous wisdom in the work of human salvation, might be shown forth.⁴⁷

§ 50. But against this doctrine the following argument is brought. Although the worker first intends the reward than the work, nevertheless he who hires the worker by nature first looks to his work than to the reward to be given him: therefore also God, who hires us into His vineyard as workers, first looks to what we work or are going to work than to what He is going to give us in the end. But an easy reply is given: that the case stands far otherwise in God and in men. For men chiefly look to their own utility in hiring workers, and therefore first they intend and will the work, which they need to have; because they cannot have it unless they give the reward; secondly, they intend and will to give the reward. But God does not look to His own utility, as one who has no need of our goods, but [He looks to] His own glory and our salvation and happiness; and so, first, He wills for us from eternity our beatitude, in which He is most of all glorified; and that this beatitude

should not befall us without our merit, secondly He wills for us grace, justice, and good works, through which we may attain the prepared happiness.

§ 51. More rightly, therefore, will you compare God (preparing for us from eternity glory and grace) with a rich and beneficent man who, wishing to do good to a poor man and to succor his indigence, requires some work from him by which he may deserve the benefit to be given to him; although otherwise the rich man perhaps has no need of his work: in which case he who hires the worker first looks to the sustenance of the poor man than to his work.

§ 52. Although not even this likeness fits entirely; for God does much more, who not only prepares for all eternal life and has decreed to give it as a reward, but also prepares even the good works themselves by which they may attain it; since His goodness is so great that He wills our merits to be His gifts: which the rich man, however beneficent, cannot bestow upon the poor man.

§ IX — What reprobation is, and how Scripture names the reprobate (Quid reprobatio, & quomodo reprobos Scriptura appellet?)

§ 53. Concerning the creature endowed with intellect, the other part of Divine providence is reprobation (*reprobatio*); by which name, generally among Latin authors, is signified the rejection of any thing as evil, or at least less good. Whence is that in Heb. 7: "There is made a reprobation of the former commandment, because of its weakness and unprofitableness"; and 1 Cor. 1: "I will reprobate the prudence of the prudent." Thus Christ, in the Psalms and in the Gospels and elsewhere, is signified by the "stone which the builders rejected." Likewise "reprobate" in Scripture is called generally that which is vile, abject, and contemptible; as if you should say "castaway"; as in Jer. 6: "Call them reprobate silver"; and 1 Kgs 15: "Whatsoever was vile and reprobate, this they destroyed." And of the person, 2 Cor. 13: "But we [pray to God] ... we ourselves [are content] to be as reprobate," that is, lest perhaps on account of our sins we be rejected by God, and so at last be found in the number of the reprobate.

§ 54. Sometimes it signifies "useless," as Tit. 1: "Unto every good work reprobate." But by the usage of the holy Fathers and scholastic Doctors, reprobation thus stands over-against predestination (spoken of above): as predestination is the eternal decree of God by which He wills to save certain and to make them blessed, so reprobation is the eternal decree of God by which He wills to damn certain and to deprive them of beatitude.

§ 55. And as those are said to be predestined for whom eternal beatitude was prepared from eternity, so the reprobate or reprobated, for whom from eternity eternal damnation was prepared. For as it will be said to the elect: "Come, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world," so it will be said to the reprobate: "Depart into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." For in both cases that is said to be "prepared" which is prepared, or preordained, by the eternal decree of God.

§ 56. From these things it is also understood that, just as predestination formally signifies an act of the Divine intellect, decreeing and prescribing, yet presupposing an act of the will—as St. Thomas teaches—so also does reprobation.⁴¹ For reprobation is—just as he likewise teaches there—a certain part of providence, which is the plan of the order of means to the end.⁴⁸ And so, according to St. Thomas, reprobation could be defined as the plan of the order of the reprobate to the end intended by God—namely, that He may show His

vindicative justice in the punishment of sinners; which showing of justice is further ordered to a greater showing of mercy in the predestined, as the Apostle teaches in Rom. 9.

§ 57. And although it is certain that eternal damnation is inflicted for merits, that is, sins; yet, since the Doctors disputably discuss whether reprobation itself is "from foreseen merits," we shall remit a fuller treatment of this matter to the next Distinction, content to have set down this undoubted definition of reprobation: reprobation is the preparation of eternal punishment to be inflicted on account of foreseen sins.

§ 58. Moreover, the reprobate are variously named in the Scriptures; and first indeed "reprobate," as 2 Cor. 13: "Unless perhaps you are reprobates"; to which is akin the signification of the same word in 1 Cor. 9, when the Apostle says, "Lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a reprobate," that is, lest perhaps on account of my sins I be rejected by God, and so at last be found in the number of the reprobate—thus, however, they are called reprobate, just as, on the contrary, "approved" are named in 2 Cor. 11.

§ 59. Secondly, they are called "not known," that is, not loved—Matt. 25 and elsewhere, "I know you not"—just as, on the contrary, the predestined are called "foreknown."

§ 60. Thirdly, they are called "hated," just as also reprobation is called "hatred," Rom. 9: "Jacob I loved; but Esau I hated." Conversely, the predestined are called "beloved."

§ 61. Fourthly, they are called "repulsed," Rom. 11: "God hath not cast away his people, which he foreknew"; and Ps. 87: "And they themselves were repulsed from thy hand."

§ 62. Fifthly, they are called "despised," Eccl. 7: "No one can correct him whom God has despised."

§ 63. Sixthly, they are called "cursed," Matt. 25: "Depart, ye cursed."

§ 64. Seventhly, they are called "goats," in the same place.

§ 65. Eighthly, "forewritten into the judgment of God," that is, to damnation, as in the Epistle of Jude.

§ 66. Ninthly, they are said to be "made for the evil day," Prov. 16.

§ 67. Tenthly, they are called "vessels of wrath," Rom. 9.

§ 68. Eleventhly, "vessels of dishonor," in the same place; and 2 Tim. 2.

§ 69. Twelfthly, they are called "fit," or, as it is in Greek, "fitted for destruction," Rom. 9.

§ 70. Thirteenthly, they are sometimes by the Fathers called "predestined to death and destruction," as we showed above.

§ 71. Finally, it must be noted that the reprobate are everywhere by the Scholastics called "foreknown" (*praesciti*). Yet by what reason this was done is not quite certain; since in the Scriptures that name—as we taught above—has a meaning plainly different and contrary. It can, however, seem that the reprobate are therefore peculiarly called "foreknown" in the schools, because it seemed good to draw the common name "foreknowledge" to the worse species, as happens in many other cases; although sometimes also the reverse is done, as in the name "predestined," yea and in this name "foreknown," according to the usage of Sacred Scripture. Or certainly this is the reason: because in the reprobate there is something only foreknown, not also preordained or prepared—namely sin, on account of which they are damned; for that on account of which the predestined are saved, the whole of it falls under Divine predestination itself, and is its effect.

§ 72. And so the reprobate, as sinners, are only foreknown; but the elect, insofar as they are just, are not only foreknown; rather, insofar as they are just they are foreknown because, that they might be just, they were predestined, as the Apostle says, Eph. 1: "He chose us, that we should be holy and immaculate."

§ 73. The Council of Constance understands the "foreknown" in this scholastic way, in the condemnation of certain articles of John Wyclif and of John Huss.⁴⁹

§ X — Which effects are to be referred to reprobation (Qui effectus in reprobationem referendi?)

§ 74. When the effects of Divine reprobation (*reprobatio*) are treated, this must first and most certainly be established: that no sin, whether of man or of angel, can be referred to Divine reprobation as to a cause; for God is not the author of sin, but the avenger. But more fully on this matter below. Now this also, nevertheless, is certain and indubitable: that the effect of the same Divine reprobation is damnation and eternal punishment (*damnatio et poena aeterna*), which can be sufficiently understood from the definition of reprobation. And the same is manifest from the Scriptures. For in Matt. 25 the eternal fire is said to be prepared for the Devil and his angels; just as the Kingdom [is said to be] prepared for the Just. In Prov. 16 the impious is said to be made by God, that is, appointed, for the evil day. In Rom. 9 the reprobate are called vessels fitted, or prepared, for destruction; just as the elect [are] prepared for glory. In Eccl. 26, of him who transgresses from justice unto sin it is said: God has prepared him for the rhomphaea, that is, the vengeance of the Divine judgment. And Jude in his Epistle says that certain persons are of old set forth for judgment, that is, for condemnation, for whom also the storm of darkness has been kept in store forever. Which Peter in 2 Pet. 2 expressed in these words: "Whose judgment now of a long time ceaseth not, and their destruction slumbereth not," etc. And below: "The unjust [are] to be reserved unto the day of judgment to be tormented." And again: "For whom the mist of darkness is reserved." The Fathers teach the same, especially in those words with which they say that some are predestined by God unto life, others unto eternal death. Thus St. Augustine, City of God XV, ch. 1, says that there are two societies of men: one which is predestined to reign forever with God; the other which is predestined to undergo eternal punishment with the Devil. And in the same work XXI, ch. 24, [he says that] there are certain men who are predestined to go into eternal fire with the Devil.⁵¹ But we indicated above other such passages both of St. Augustine and of others, when we were treating of the name Predestination. From which it is clear that the reprobate are predestined by God unto eternal punishment, or—what is the same—eternal punishment has been prepared for them by God; which accordingly is an effect of reprobation. For an effect of Divine reprobation is called whatever God does regarding the reprobate with a view to the manifestation of His justice through their just damnation: but such, in the first place, is their very just damnation. This is further proved in general from the fact that, according to the unanimous opinion of the theologians which is wont to be handed down (on II Sent., dists. 36–37), God is the author of every punishment, both eternal and temporal. But whatever God does in time, that He determined to be done from eternity; since His will is immutable and eternal: therefore He determined from eternity to punish certain persons forever; seeing that He does this same thing in time.⁵²

§ 75. Besides this effect of reprobation, there are also certain others likewise to be referred to the God who reprobates. And first is abandonment (*derelictio*), or desertion (*dimissio*), whereby someone, abandoned by merit of preceding sin, subsequently slipping into other and yet other sins, is made worse, and aggravates for

himself the guilt of eternal damnation. Of which desertion there is frequent mention in the Scriptures, as in Ps. 80: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart." Is. 50: "In your crimes your mother has been dismissed." Matt. 23: "Behold, your house shall be left to you desolate." Acts 14: "He let all the nations go in their own ways." To the same pertains that of Ps. 2: "Embrace discipline, lest at any time the Lord be angry, and you perish from the just way." And as often as in the Scriptures it is said that the Lord turns away His face on account of the sins of men, a desertion of this sort is signified, and this same, in the reprobate, is an effect of reprobation.

§ 76. To this desertion moreover there are subjoined blindness (*excaecatio*) and obduracy (*obduratio*), which by another name in the Scriptures is called "aggravation" (*aggravatio*). For when a man is there left, bereft of the light and help of the grace (*gratia*) of God, it comes about that both his intellect is presently wrapped in greater shadows of ignorance, and his will more and more runs upon those things which are contrary to piety; while each faculty, by a natural propensity, is borne to its objects. In this way, therefore, men are said to be blinded and hardened; namely, by a certain progress and increase of ignorance and malice. Nor is God said to blind or harden little ones who have only original sin and are to die in it; although they are left in that ignorance and malice in which they were born; but only those who, with God deserting them, wander the more—yet not all, if one attends to the force of the words. But Scripture peculiarly, and as it were by way of excellence, is wont to say that those are blinded and hardened by God who—when some notable light and aid had been set before them, by which they ought even to have been moved to believe or to act—by neglecting so great a good, are rendered much more darkened, depraved, and rebellious to God, so that it becomes impossible to convert them, just as indeed it is impossible to enlighten a blind man, or to soften a hard stone; in which sense the Lord (in Exodus) says, and repeats many times, that He will harden the heart of Pharaoh and of his servants, to the end that he who, with so many portents seen and the most mighty signs of Divine power, was nevertheless not induced to believe and obey God, should become harder and more headstrong to resist. Thus too it was said of the Jews in Is. 6, and in the New Testament it is repeated several times in different words: "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes, lest perhaps they see," etc. This in Jn. 12 is attributed to God in these words: "He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart." Of the same men it is read in Ps. 68: "Let their eyes be darkened, and bow down their back always." And again: "Add iniquity upon their iniquity." And in 2 Thess. 2: "God shall send them the operation of error, to believe a lie." And in Rom. 11: "The rest have been blinded, as it is written: God gave them the spirit of compunction; eyes that they should not see," etc. And again Is. 63, in the person of that same Jewish people: "Why hast Thou made us to err from Thy ways? Thou hast hardened our heart, that we fear Thee not." Now all this is by a just desertion, or forsaking, of that people, on account of preceding sin, because they did not receive the truth of the Gospel announced by Christ's disciples, and attested by so many signs of the same; as 2 Thess. 1 and 2, and other Scriptures, bear witness. For from this it came to pass by the judgment of God that, at that same preaching of Christ's Apostles and [their] miracles, they became the more hardened.

§ 77. For since through the things that were made God had indeed made Himself manifest, they were given up by God "unto the desires of their heart," and "unto passions of ignominy," and "unto a reprobate sense"; as the Apostle pursues this matter in Rom. 1. From these things it is evident that the effects of reprobation which in the Scriptures are called blindness and obduracy, or aggravation, are not common to all the reprobate, but belong only to certain fewer ones. But besides these, it can further be said, according to those things which above we said concerning the essentials of predestination (*praedestinatio*), that there are

many other things which are often rightly set down as effects of reprobation: some of which are remote, others proximate; and some common, others singular; finally, some in themselves indifferent, but ordered by God to the end of reprobation; while others are in themselves determinate: to assign examples of each is not difficult from what was said above.

§ 78. Whence it is not to be denied—although perhaps it seems so—that even the very creation of a reprobate man can, in this general way, be called an effect of his reprobation: for men of this sort are created for the manifestation of the justice of God through their just damnation; in the manner in which above we defined an effect of reprobation. From which it also appears that the creation of the highest Angel was an effect, at least a remote one, of his reprobation; and the same must be said of the conferring upon him of so great excellence in natural and gratuitous gifts; for God ordained all these things in him to the end stated above. And this is quite consonant with Scripture (Job 40. 103.).⁵³ But elsewhere more fully and more exactly on this matter.

§ 79. Meanwhile it must here be noted, what is read in St. Augustine (in the Soliloquies, ch. 28): "As for those predestined unto life all things work together unto good, even sins themselves: so for those foreknown unto eternal death all things work together unto evil, and even faith itself and prayer are turned into sin." Which, however, must not be taken as though the good works of the reprobate truly become sins; but because, while by sinning they lose even those good things which perchance they had done, even from this they procure punishment for themselves. For it is just that one to whom good things had been given should also be tormented by the desert of their voluntary loss.⁵⁴

§ XI — Whether the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation? (Utrum permissio peccati sit effectus reprobationis?)

§ 80. Concerning the permission of sin (*permissio peccati*), that is, the subtraction of efficacious help (*auxilium efficax*), by which the sin, by whose demerit someone falls into eternal death, would be prevented; whether it ought to be referred to reprobation (*reprobatio*) as to a cause, there is doubt. For some utterly deny that the permission by which God permitted either the Angel or the first man, with innocence left behind, to fall into sin, can be said to be an effect of the reprobation of the Angel, or of men dying in original sin (*peccatum originale*). Others add besides, that neither can that permission, by which someone already justified (*justificatus*) from sin is permitted to relapse into sin on account of which he is condemned, rightly be referred to God as reprobating. Lastly, others will the same concerning the permission of all subsequent sins, on account of which someone is to be damned, and therefore also concerning that permission of sin which is the punishment of a prior sin, about which (in the preceding chapter) we spoke.

§ 81. The reasons, however, by which they are moved, are of this sort. First, because, as regards the Angels and the first man, that permission on God's part was common to all, to the predestined as well as to the reprobate. For equally, as they say, help from God had been prepared for all, which some deserted by their own free choice, while others used it well by that same free choice. For thus, they will have it, was the intellectual creature originally instituted, that it should be in its own power to stand or to fall, to persevere or to fail, with God alone giving the help by which it would be able to stand or to persevere.

§ 82. Second, because that permission on God's part posits nothing in the reprobated man, nor indeed in any other whatsoever; because to permit is only not to impede; wherefore it cannot have the formal character (*ratio*) of a divine effect.

§ 83. Third, because one must not posit two effects: the good work of man, and the operation of God by which in man He works a good work; for on the part indeed of the man that divine operation is not other than the very good work itself; on the part of God, however, it is the same as the Divine essence. Wherefore neither will the permission of sin be able to be called an effect of reprobation, or at all of Divine providence (*providentia*); since in man no effect of this sort can be designated; but in itself it is not other than God permitting.

§ 84. Fourth, because even if we suppose, they say, that permission have the formal character of some effect, nevertheless it could not be an effect of reprobation. For just as predestination (*praedestinatio*) is love, and to predestine is to love, at least in the concomitative sense; so reprobation is hatred, and to reprobate is to hate, according to that: "Jacob I loved, Esau I have hated" (Rom. 9). Wherefore, since hatred presupposes the fault of him who is hated, it seems to follow that the permission of the first sin, on account of which man or Angel is condemned, cannot be referred to the purpose of God reprobating as to a cause: because no other sin had preceded, by whose merit he might incur this effect of hatred.

§ 85. Fifth. Nor can it be said that a permission of this sort is an effect of divine wrath, similarly for the cause already named; because wrath presupposes sin: therefore neither can it be an effect of reprobation; for reprobation is the wrath of God, and the reprobate men are of the wrath of the Son.

§ 86. Sixth. The permission by which they are permitted to be stained by original sin, from which they are not set free, does not seem to be numbered among the effects of reprobation: because, as they say, both the reprobation of men and predestination presuppose the mass of the human race infected with sin and liable to damnation; and consequently original sin itself.

§ 87. Lastly. Hither are brought those testimonies of the Fathers, which seem to teach that no one is reprobated except from foreseen merit. Of which below, when there will be a treatment concerning the demerit of reprobation. For from this it seems to follow that the permission of the first sin, since no evil demerit preceded, cannot be established as an effect of reprobation.

§ 88. Moreover, the opinion of others is that the permission of any sin whatsoever, even of that first which man or Angel committed, is an effect of Divine providence concerning each; and accordingly also of the reprobation both of Angels and of men who from that sin have been led, or are to be led, into damnation. Which opinion they render probable in many ways.

§ 89. First, by this general reason: whatever in time is done in an ordered way by God, that was from eternity, that it be done thus, preordered and willed; but in time the permission of any sin whatsoever has the formal character of a good, for no other reason except because it is ordered to some good; therefore from eternity God foresaw and preordered such permission to every good to which it has an order in time. Wherefore also the permission of the sin, on account of which someone is damned, is ordered by God to some good, namely to the manifestation of the justice of God avenging sin: and consequently it was from eternity preordered to this very thing; therefore it is contained under the order of Divine reprobation as its effect, whether the sin permitted be the first, or any other whatsoever.

§ 90. Second. The permission of Adam's sin was willed and intended by God on account of some good: therefore God did not comport Himself only negatively by permitting that sin, but also positively. The antecedent is evident, because if it is asked why God permitted Adam to fall into sin, it is truly and rightly answered, in order that from that evil He might elicit a great good, namely the Incarnation of His Son through the hypostatic union (*unio hypostatica*) of the Divine nature with the human, and that remarkable work of God's mercy by which He would redeem lost man by the death of His Son. But the same reason holds of the permission of that same sin ordered to the manifestation of the justice of God in punishing the reprobate; and consequently of the permission of the angelic sin.

§ 91. Third. The permission of the sin of David, of Peter, and of other elect belongs to the providence of God, inasmuch as by it there is ordained their greater humiliation, or some other like good, according to that: "To those who love God all things work together for good" (Rom. 8). And we have taught above that St. Augustine even extends that to the sins themselves. Whence the same Augustine, and St. Thomas and others, hand down the general doctrine that so great is the goodness and power of God, that by no means would He permit an evil, unless being omnipotent He could bring good even out of evil. Therefore the permission of sin is intended by God for another good; and consequently concerning it God has a positive act, by which He wills it. Hence likewise, if it be asked: why does God permit some to fall into sin, by whose demerit afterwards they are damned? that is, why does He permit the sins of the reprobate? It is rightly answered: in order that in them He may show forth His justice.

§ 92. Fourth. It is not only true to say, God permits sin: but also, God wills to permit sin. For if it be asked: Does He permit willing, or unwilling? the answer is certainly, willing; and that is truly said of any sin whatsoever, even of the Angel and of the first man. But He wills on account of some good, as has now been declared: therefore He has a positive act concerning the permission of any sin whatsoever; for to will signifies such an act.

§ 93. Fifth. The abandonment of the sinner into other sins is positively willed by God, namely as the just punishment of the preceding sin, and consequently in the reprobate it is an effect of reprobation, as we showed above. Which is against those who universally deny that any permission of sin is positively willed by God. But if that is willed and intended on account of some good, by a like reason the permission of the first sin, into which someone lapses from innocence or restored justice, ought to be said to be willed and intended on account of another good that is elicited from it.

§ 94. Sixth. Nay, all the more the permission of sin and the lapse of the just ought to have been intended only on account of some good, as in the Angel, the first man, and those who sin after restoration and desert justice—either because the nature that was permitted to fall is more excellent, as the angelic, and in it the highest of the Angels; or because man was still entire and altogether immune from the corruption of sin; or at least just, and therefore a friend of God—than that permission by which man, already corrupted by sin, unjust, and an enemy of God, is permitted, from one sin into another, to grow more and more filthy. The more, I say, inasmuch as the lapse of a better, more excellent, and more integral creature ought the less to be permitted, if no notable good were elicited thence, than the lapse of a vile sinner, as it were of a vessel of clay, and now broken, about whom there is almost no care. Therefore if God positively wills the permission of that sin, as has now been proved, much more does He will that other.

§ 95. Seventh. Men have a positive intention of permitting evil, and that rightly, when they will to permit some evil for the sake of a greater good, as public usuries, or the crimes of a single man: therefore also God. For no reason can be rendered why God should have less of such a good intention, since every perfection of the creature is in God.

§ 96. Eighth. When praying God not to lead us into temptation, we beseech some effect of reprobation; just as when we pray that He may not forsake us because of our sins, and may not punish us with eternal death: therefore to lead into temptation is, in the reprobate, an effect of reprobation, even then when someone previously just, and assailed by some temptation, by consent falls into sin. But that "to lead in" is to permit. And indeed that permission is called "leading," because of the positive will in God of permitting, or of not impeding the lapse, from which will the lapse follows infallibly.

§ 97. Ninth. If the permission of sin were not an effect of the providence of God, it would follow that sin is fortuitous or casual with respect to the foreknowledge of God: it would follow that the discrimination of the elect from the reprobate is casual with respect to His providence—which are absurd: since in the order to God nothing at all can be casual. Therefore, just as it pertains to the providence of God predestining to assume some, so to that same providence of God reprobating it pertains to abandon some.

§ 98. Tenth. The same is proved by the authority of Scripture, as Prov. 16: "The Lord has made all things for Himself: the impious also for the evil day." And Rom. 9: "For this very thing I raised thee up, that I might show in thee my power." And again there: "What if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, bore with much patience the vessels of wrath," etc. And in the same place: "He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens." So then one may likewise say: whom He wills, He permits to fall into sin. And ch. 11: "God has concluded all things under sin, that He may have mercy on all." From this indeed it appears that one may similarly say: He has concluded some under sin, assuredly willing to permit their sin, that in them He may make His justice manifest.

§ 99. Eleventh. By the authority of St. Augustine, who (Enchiridion, ch. 100), adducing the words of Ps. 110: "Therefore," he says, "great are the works of the Lord, sought out in all His wills, so that in a wondrous and ineffable way nothing is done apart from His will, even what is done against His will. For it would not be done, if He did not permit it; nor does He indeed permit unwillingly, but willingly. Nor would the good God permit evil to be done, unless being omnipotent He could bring good even out of evil." And what follows thereafter in the next chapter.⁵⁶ The same Augustine, and in many places, attributes to God concerning sin such things as do not consist with a merely negative permission.⁵⁷

§ 100. Twelfth. By the authority of St. Thomas, whose opinion is clear (Summa I, q. 23, a. 3): "As predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into fault, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for fault."⁵⁵ To this passage some reply that St. Thomas speaks not of the permission of the first lapse, but of that by which, by the merit of a preceding sin, someone is permitted to lapse into other sins. For thus, they say, he expounds himself elsewhere, namely in I-II (q. 79, a. 1, ad 1 and ad 3), where he teaches that "by the merit of a preceding sin it comes about that God does not impede someone, lest he should sin."⁵⁸ But this reply does not agree. For St. Thomas speaks of reprobation at least of men in the whole genus, as is clear; nay indeed also of Angels, because he does not distinguish. But the said interpretation of permission does not have place in many reprobate men, as is manifest concerning infants. Others reply that the holy Thomas changed his opinion. But that this is false is

shown from his earlier writings. For writing on Rom. ch. 9 (lecture 4), thus he says: "The act which God exercises toward the reprobate is not that He disposes them to evil: but this alone does God do concerning them, that He permits them to follow those things which they desire." Thus he: openly saying that God acts in that which He permits.⁵⁹ But he speaks of the effect of reprobation; and likewise a little after he teaches what are the acts, that is, the effects, of Divine predestination concerning man. Nor does it matter whether he be understood to speak of the permission of the first sin, or of the subsequent sins which have the character of punishment with respect to the preceding; because always the same is the formal character of permission, as willed by God, which therefore St. Thomas calls an act. The same (in the Compendium of Theology, ch. 142; and "in is. quest. 113. art. 6. in corp." [abbreviation as in source]) teaches that it pertains to the order of Divine providence that He permit evils to be, and to be done. From which it follows that a permission of this sort in the reprobate is contained under the order of reprobation, and therefore is its effect.⁶⁰ Nor does Scotus seem to think otherwise, who above says expressly (Dist. 41 of this book), that concerning Judas, and any reprobate whatsoever, there is a positive act of the Divine will, by which He wills to permit him to be a son of perdition, whether on account of original sin or on account of actual.⁶¹

§ 101. But even older than these, Hugh (of St. Victor), in *De Sacramentis*, book 1, part 4, chs. 4–5 and the following, hands down sentences of this sort concerning the permission of evils: "God permits nothing unless willing, and whatever He permits He permits voluntarily. And as often as something is done, it is said to be 'the will of God': because by God's will it was brought about that this be done, or permitted." Then (ch. 10 and following), repeating like things, he teaches that both the permission of evils and the operation of goods are to be ascribed to the will of God's good-pleasure. Again, he hands down like things from Augustine (in *Summa Sententiarum*, tract. 1, ch. 13).⁶² So also altogether must that be understood which the same Hugh teaches almost in the same places: that although God does not will evil, yet He wills evil to be. Concerning which there will be treatment (at Dist. 46).⁶³

§ 102. Likewise, almost contemporaneous with Hugh, the Venerable Philip, Abbot of Bonne-Esperance (in the book which he wrote *On the Damnation of Solomon*), when someone asks why God permitted Solomon to lapse into sin, from which his damnation ensued, in turn asks about the first Angel, and replies in these words: "It is not for us to discuss why God permitted it so to be done: but with fear it is to be known that He permitted it so to be done. For He permits by a hidden, but just, judgment," etc.⁶⁴

§ 103. Lastly. Here pertain the arguments to be adduced in the next distinction, which contend that reprobation, as to its first special effect, is not from merits. For that effect is none other than the permission of the first sin leading into damnation. Hither also pertain those things which, above in the distinction on the providence of God concerning sins, and likewise in this very distinction, on the effects of predestination, were said: for among those effects we showed there to be the permission of the sin on the occasion of which someone, humbled, is saved. Whence it is consequent similarly that the permission of the sin, on account of which someone is damned, is an effect of reprobation.

§ 104. Retaining therefore this opinion as the truer, we will briefly answer to those things which have been brought forward on the contrary. To the first, therefore, it is answered that that permission of sin of which we are here speaking is in no way common to the good and to the evil, to the predestined and to the reprobate. For to those alone, properly speaking, did God permit to sin whom He permitted to fall. For speaking properly of permission, God permitted the first Angel to sin; He did not permit Michael; He permitted Judas to remain in sin; He did not permit Peter. For neither does God comport Himself

indifferently toward these and those; for it is of a special benefit that we ask of God in the Lord's Prayer that He "lead us not," that is, permit us not "to fall, into temptation." Therefore He permits some, He does not permit others, to fall. But what must be said about the perseverance and predestination of Angels will be declared below in its own place.

§ 105. To the second. The permission of sin in man is not a pure negation, but a privation. And it is said to be an effect of Divine providence, not because it is some being produced in man by God, but because it is an object of the Divine will, namely willed by it, and ordered to the good of the universe and to the glory of God; just as death, blindness, and other defects and privations are certain objects of the Divine will and providence. But you will say: to permit is not other than not to impede. I reply that more is included in the permitter as such. For neither what is not, nor a stone, nor a man deprived of power is said to "permit" usuries or public depredations, because these do not pertain to his care and power: but a king or a prince is said to permit such things, whether he have a just cause of permitting, or not. Therefore he does not for that precise reason permit, because he does not impede; but because, being providential, or bound to provide, he does not impede. And thus the very will and intention of permission, at least implicit or interpretative, is included in these things.

§ 106. To the third argument, which in like manner, as a general one, has place as much in subsequent sins as in the first; whence it would follow that neither the abandonment of the sinful man is an effect of reprobation; it is answered: not the very volition of God which is in God is the effect of reprobation, but the permission willed, which in man is the privation of a good, as has just been said.

§ 107. The solution of the fourth argument will be clear from those things which will be said below about the merit of reprobation.

§ 108. To the fifth. The wrath of God against the reprobate is not reprobation, but its effect, that is, the punishment and damnation of the reprobate on account of sins. If nevertheless reprobation is sometimes called wrath, the appellation is taken from the posterior effect. But about this also, more fully below in its own place.

§ 109. To the sixth. No necessity compels us to say that the reprobation and predestination of men presuppose a mass corrupted, and infected with sin and liable to damnation; and, consequently, original sin itself.

§ 110. Yet the greatness of predestination shines forth more from that mass into which, from the sin of the first man, all have come, and from which the predestined are delivered. Therefore also this very thing, that certain persons were permitted to be infected with original sin, and thus to come into that mass of damnation, from which they will not be snatched away, pertains to their reprobation. The solution to the last is likewise to be sought from those things which will be said in the next distinction.

§ 111. But if it be further asked whether these things and things of this sort are to be numbered among the effects of reprobation (*reprobatio*): that to an unbelieving man, or to a sinner, the Gospel is not preached; that to him faith in Christ, the conversion of heart, the grace of justification (*gratia justificationis*), etc., is not given. It seems that one must answer affirmatively from those things which some time ago were said about the effects of predestination (*praedestinatio*). And this is in agreement with Scripture in Acts 16, where we read: "Paulum & Silam vetitos a Spiritu sancto loqui verbum in Asia, ac rursum non fuisse permissos, ut praedicarent in Bithynia."⁶⁵ Which without doubt seems to have pertained to the reprobation of those to

whom it was not preached, whether this was repaid to them as a punishment of sins or not; although St. Augustine writes (Ep. 105) that those to whom God does not impart grace are worthy of this, and by this merit that it not be imparted; for which reason, much more will a denial of benefits of this sort be an effect of reprobation.⁶⁶

§ XII — Not all the reprobate are damned on account of original sin, with an explication of Augustine's passages (Non omnes reprobos damnari propter originale peccatum cum explicatione locorum Augustini)

§ 112. Certain people, seeking the cause of reprobation (*reprobatio*), have said that all men who perish are reprobated and damned on account of original sin (*peccatum originale*). For they posit that God from eternity foresaw that the whole mass of the human race, from the prevarication of the first parent, would be infected with the stain of original sin; from which mass He determined mercifully to free some; but others He determined justly to leave in it, who accordingly are all reprobated and damned on account of original sin, by which the whole mass has been vitiated; God, namely, exacting from them as for that sin the debt of just damnation. They strive to prove this opinion from various passages of St. Augustine; for in Epistle 105 he has this: "For what did God love in Jacob, before he was born had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of His mercy? or what did He hate in Esau, before he was born had done anything evil, except original sin?" and what follows;⁶⁷ where indeed he altogether seems to will this: that Esau, left in the mass of original iniquity, was justly reprobated and damned on account of the same iniquity. But what he says about Esau, he wills the same to be judged about all the reprobate, even the baptized, or the circumcised: because in Esau the Apostle in Rom. 9 constitutes the type of the reprobate. For as to Esau himself, the son of the holy Patriarch Isaac, that he, according to the command of the Lord, on the eighth day was circumcised together with his brother Jacob, there is nothing that is to be doubted. Another passage of Augustine is in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 7, where he says that all the reprobate go into damnation from one sin, understanding by the one sin original sin, which is common to all; in which place also once and again he denies that the just who do not persevere are separated from the mass of perdition. He hands down nearly the same in On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus, book 1, question 2; in the Enchiridion, ch. 94; elsewhere in several following places; in Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, book 2, ch. 7; in On the Predestination of the Saints, chs. 8, 9; and in On the Predestination of Grace, chs. 3, 6, 7, 16.⁶⁸

§ 113. Not dissimilar is what St. Thomas writes (II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1): that the help of grace, to whomsoever it is given, is given mercifully; but to whom it is not given, it is not given out of justice, as a punishment of preceding sin, and at least of original sin, as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace; where he seems to approve Augustine's opinion.⁶⁹ This opinion, conceived from a perverse understanding of Augustine's sayings, is plainly false and erroneous. For the Catholic Faith, according to the doctrine of the ancient Fathers and of the Council of Trent (Session 5, ch. 5), teaches that in Baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted; the Apostle saying, that there is nothing of condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. Therefore the reprobate, in whom original sin has been remitted, are not damned on account of that very sin. Nor can it be said that God from eternity had the purpose of depriving someone of eternal life, or of damning him with eternal death, on account of original sin to be remitted to him in time, as for a demerit to which that punishment is rendered—unless one should say that, on account of a relapse into sin, the remission of original

sin once effected is revoked by God, according to the opinion of those who think that sins once remitted, if someone should slip into the same or similar sins, are again imputed by God unto eternal vengeance; which doctrine is sufficiently refuted by all the Doctors.⁷⁰

§ 114. It must be added that the aforesaid testimonies from Augustine are adduced in vain, since it is not Augustine's position that the reprobate, who are such for a time, fall back into the mass vitiated by original sin when they forsake justice; but rather that they were never separated from it. This opinion, therefore, and its defense having been rejected, one must confess, according to the Catholic doctrine, that of the reprobate some are damned on account of original sin alone, such as infants, in whom through the Sacrament it is not washed away; others on account of actual [sin] alone, namely adult relapsers, who, cleansed from original sin and justified, do not persevere in justice; but others on account of both, namely adults not regenerated. This doctrine is openly gathered from those things which Augustine writes (On Rebuke and Grace, chs. 8, 9, 13; and elsewhere often), and from other Fathers also, while, according to the Scriptures, they teach that there are many who, having received the remission of sins, live well for a time, but remain in injustice. Further, Prosper (Response 2 to the Capitula of the Gauls) proves the aforesaid opinion, as erroneous, on account of which Augustine was being made the occasion for those above-cited assertions being imposed upon him, namely this article: That by those who are not destined unto life, the grace of Baptism does not take away original sin. Thus about him who does not persevere in the grace he has received, he responds on behalf of Augustine: "He who departs from justice and becomes alien from grace—into what does this life fall except into perdition? But that which was remitted does not relapse, nor will he be damned in original sin; yet he will be afflicted with that death for his last crimes, which he owed for those things that were remitted; and because this neither escaped nor deceived the foreknowledge of God, without doubt He never chose such a man nor predestined him, and, as one who would perish, He never separated him from eternal perdition."⁷¹ Thus he. Indicating plainly thereby how that must be taken which Augustine says, that the just who do not persevere are not separated from the mass of perdition: namely, not so separated as not to be going to perish, in the way that those destined [for life] are separated from it; although for a short time they appear to be separated from it, soon to relapse into it—not by the act of original sin, but by the iniquity of life; which very short time, however, in comparison with the whole of eternity, since in it they are to remain and with it to be punished, is reckoned as nothing.⁷²

§ 115. To that, indeed, which Augustine says, that Esau was hated on account of original sin, we reply that that prophetic saying, "I have hated Esau," as to the literal sense, does not so much regard the person of Esau himself—who never served his brother, in order that in himself there should be fulfilled, "The elder shall serve the younger"; but rather he seems to have surpassed him in wealth and power (Gen. 32–33)—as it regards his descendants, since the descendants of Jacob are read to have been subdued in the time of David (2 Kgs 8). Whence also to the mother the Divine Oracle said: "Two nations are in thy womb," etc.; thus neither allegorically does it regard the person of Esau himself, since it is quite probable that he came to salvation; but it is to be referred to that people whose type he bore, that is, to the whole genus of the reprobate, of whom by far the greater part perish by the merit of original sin, while the rest, who received pardon of this sin, by the incentive of concupiscence left from original sin are precipitated into damnation. Although, therefore, here many are damned not on account of original sin, which has been remitted in them, but only on account of actual [sins], nevertheless the permission of original sin even in these seems to be a certain effect, inasmuch as on the occasion of this sin they fall back into other sins for which they are damned. And we say this not as though Augustine had wished otherwise.

§ 116. To the other passage a similar reply is made: that it was said that all go into damnation from one original sin, because in that one sin, according to the sense now explained, there is a certain origin of the damnation of all; for although in many it has been remitted, and as to guilt it passes away, nevertheless as to act it remains the same, as Augustine teaches in book 1 of *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, chs. 15, 26, 27, and elsewhere. For the tinder of sins, concupiscence, remains, which afterwards, through consent, draws a man into damnation. For each one, as James 1 says, "is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. Then, when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; but sin, when it is consummated, begetteth death." Whence Prosper (Response 1 to the Capitula of the Gauls; Response 10 to the Objections of Vincent) refers this proclivity to the prevarication of the first parent, from whom the evil of original sin has been contracted.⁷³ From which things also this is confirmed: that the permission of that first prevarication is not ill-placed as a certain effect of reprobation with respect to all the reprobate. Moreover, St. Thomas speaks about those to whom original sin has not been remitted, not about all the reprobate universally. Whence he does not say, "to whomsoever," as in the former part, but "to whom it is not given": which is well to be noted, lest it be thought that the subtraction of the help of grace is in all, and always, a punishment of some preceding sin of theirs: since that about the Angel and the first man can in no way be said.⁷⁴

§ 117. By the way, I warn that the book *On Predestination and Grace*, which among others was alleged on the contrary side, is not by St. Augustine, but by an unknown, and not very approved, author.⁷⁵

§ XIII — God's reprobation is not the cause of sins (Reprobationem Dei non esse causam peccatorum)

§ 118. What above, when we were treating of the effects of reprobation (*reprobatio*), we at once warned at the outset—namely, that no sin at all, neither of man nor of Angel, can be referred to the Divine reprobation as to a cause—must now be proved more fully. Now there is a general, and moreover most certain, proof from the Catholic dogma of our Religion, that God is not the author of evils, that is, of sins (*peccatorum*). For if the Divine reprobation is the cause of sins, then the providence of God, of which that is a certain part, and consequently God Himself, by His providence will be the cause of sins: which indeed to say is as impious as it is manifestly contrary to the Scriptures. For the Psalmist says: "For thou art not a God that willeth iniquity." And Jas. 1: "God is a tempter of evils; for He Himself tempteth no one." And 1 Jn. 1: "God is light, and in Him there are no darknesses at all." And Sir. 15: "God commanded no one to act impiously, He gave to no one space for sinning." To this pertain also those Scriptures which testify that God hates sins and those who do them, as Wis. 14: "The ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful to God"; Ps. 5: "Thou hast hated all who work iniquity"—"his soul," namely God's, according to the Hebrew truth; Sir. 15: "The things which God hates, do not thou do"; and, "Every execration of error the Lord hates"; and many other suchlike in many places. For since elsewhere the same Scripture teaches, as in Wis. 11, that God "loves all things that are" and "hates nothing of the things that He has made," it follows most plainly from these that God does not make sins; which if He made, He would not only hate something of the things that He has made, but also He would hate Himself—inasmuch as He hates all who work iniquity.

§ 119. Add that in the Scriptures sins are called not the works of God, but of the Devil. "For this," says John in 1 Jn. 3, "the Son of God appeared, that He might dissolve the works of the devil." And the Lord in Jn.

8 thus says of him: "When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own; because he is a liar, and the father of it," namely of the lie; therefore not God, but the Devil, is the first author and parent of sin. Moreover. If God, by the force of His reprobation, impels men into sins, how will He judge this world?—as the Apostle asks in a like argument (Rom. 3); and that with reason. For since it is judged unjust and cruel to punish some innocent person for another's sin, it will be of far greater injustice and cruelty to punish in another that which you yourself have done; but this will have to be ascribed to God, if He Himself will be the author of sins. Finally, to work sin and to be its author so greatly repugns to God, who is supreme goodness and who is good by essence, that it plainly involves a contradiction, that God be, and that He be the author of sin. Whence it is that the Church of God has always abhorred as heretics those who would make God the author of sin—such as the Marcionites, Manichees, Priscillianists, and the like—beyond others, as conspicuously impious against God; as St. Augustine says (book 1, *De ordine*, ch. 1): "It is more impious to say that all evils are committed by the will of God than to deny His providence"; and yet those who have done this have been ill spoken of as impious even among the pagans.

§ 120. One must know, moreover, that this pernicious dogma was formerly by calumny imputed even to Augustine himself by the Pelagians, interpreting certain of his writings as if he taught that men are destined by God not only to punishment but also to fault. But for him, after his death, Prosper most learnedly answered in two little books: in the one, wherein he refutes; in the other, wherein he replies to the objections of Vincent (responses to 5, 7, and some following); in which places he not only removes from Augustine and from Catholics the suspicion of that dogma, but also professes that opinion to be detestable and abominable which believes God to be the author of anyone's evil will or evil action (as in response to Vincent, 10). Whence he also thus replies: "To the transgression of the law, to the neglect of religion, to the corruption of discipline, to the desertion of the Faith, to the perpetration of whatever sin, there is in no way the predestination of God. Nor can it be that through Him by whom one flees from such evils, through Him one falls into such things." Yet Augustine himself has sufficiently everywhere in his writings defended himself from that calumny, when he teaches that God foresees such things, He does not make them, nor does He predestine anyone to them, or impel him; but He punishes the things done, and that punishment He has preordained from eternity from the foresight of those things: Tractate 53 on John; *Enchiridion*, ch. 104; Letter, book 1, to Simplicianus, question 2; and elsewhere. This very thing Fulgentius repeatedly inculcates (book *On the Twofold Predestination* to Monymus), together with a defense of certain assertions of Augustine. For in that book he is wholly set to teach that the predestination of the good is to glory and grace; but that of the wicked is to punishment, but not to fault; because God is not the author of sin. For that which (as he says in ch. 6) is not in His work has never been in His predestination. And in ch. 19: "To an evil will God did not destine man; because He was not going to give it to man; for how could God have predestined the man whom He made to His image to an evil will, when He was going to command him to love God and his neighbor?" (a) And in ch. 24: "God foreknew all the works of men, but He predestined only the good [works], which He foreknew that He would do in the sons of grace." And finally in ch. 26, setting forth those words of the future malediction, "Depart into everlasting fire, which is prepared, etc.," he says: "Mark to what the Lord predestined the impious, that is, to just punishment, not to any unjust work; to punishment, not to fault; to penal retribution, not to transgression; to the destruction which the wrath of the just Judge rendered to sinners, not to the destruction to which the iniquity of sinners provoked the wrath of God against themselves." These things that man says, and many other things of this sort. Whence the Ordinary Gloss (on that Rom. 8: "For

whom He foreknew") hands down this rule to be altogether held: Sinners are foreknown in sins, not prepared for sins; but punishment is prepared, according as they are foreknown.

§ 121. To these, moreover, there has been added long since the condemnation of this dogma in the Synod of Orange, made in the time of Prosper (in the last chapter), in these words: "But that certain persons are predestined by the Divine power to evil we not only do not believe; but also, if there be any who would wish to believe so great an evil, with all detestation we pronounce anathema upon them"; which condemnation has been repeated in just so many words in the Council of Valence (ch. 3). Finally, the same was repeated by the Council of Trent (Session 6, canon 17). Note, however, that in the Arausican canon it was not without cause added by the Fathers, the little clause "if there be any," because in this the Massilians were fastening upon Catholics, and defaming them under the name of the "Predestinarians," as if heretics: which today certain persons themselves do with excessive impropriety; by name Isidore Clarius in the Narrations upon the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount, in which he accuses of the heresy of predestinating; and as to whether they really existed, and in what century they existed, is a matter of controversy; to be consulted, among others, are Henricus [abbreviation as in source], and in the Appendix to the Fifth Synod, ch. 3, [abbreviation as in source]; Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, Commentary on Theology, tract 6, disputation 115, and in the book whose title is Author. 1, disputation 8, section 8, subsections 1, 2, 3; Natalis Alexander, book 9, ch. 2, no. 2; Joannes Cabalutius, Notes on the Arles III; dissertation on Predestination; Vincentius and Cordis in the Appendix to dissertation 3. Moreover, in Predestination, part 1, § 1, no. 10, he casts down most explicitly, as also most learnedly, the foundations of this heresy and overturns them; he calls the predestinated the predestinators, meanwhile himself intermixing in his own somewhat slight errors, as it is easy for the learned Reader to observe.

§ XIV — Reply to the adversaries' arguments (*Responsio ad argumenta adversariorum*)

§ 122. What of old was falsely imputed by the Pelagians to the Catholics, that two hundred years ago John Wycliffe did not fear in earnest to affirm; whose error thereafter, in our own century, Luther and Calvin revived. Therefore we must now refute their arguments, namely those by which they strive to show that Divine reprobation (*reprobatio*) is the cause why men perpetrate those sins for which they are damned. For the other arguments by which, in general, either the same or other heretics attempt to prove that God is the author of sin, since that disputation does not properly belong to this undertaking, must be relegated to another place.

§ 123. The first passage of Scripture is that Acts 2, where Peter says to the Jews about Christ: "Him, delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, you, afflicting, slew by the hands of the wicked." The determinate counsel of God, however, is the cause of that which He has determined is to be in the future. The second: from ch. 4 of the same book, where, in the Apostles' common voice, it is said that they "gathered together against Christ to do those things which the hand and the counsel of God decreed to be done." The third: from what the Wise Man says in Prov. 16: "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself, the impious man also for the evil day," namely, for which He had predestined him. The fourth: 1 Kgs 2, Scripture says about the sons of Heli: "And they did not hear the voice of their father, because the Lord willed to slay them"; therefore the reprobation of God was a cause to them that they should not hear. The fifth: Ecclesiastes

9, according to the Hebrew truth, is read thus: "Who will be able to direct him whom God has depraved?" or, as the Seventy have it, "has perverted": where we read, "No one can correct him whom He has despised." He is speaking about reprobation. The sixth: the Apostle in Rom. 9 compares God to a potter who from the same clay makes some vessels unto honor, others unto dishonor. There also the reprobate are called "vessels of wrath fitted, or fitted up, that is, prepared by God for destruction"; just as the vessels of mercy are prepared unto glory.⁹⁸

§ 124. The seventh argument is taken from hardening (*obduratio*) and blinding (*excaecatio*). For since, as was said above, reprobation is the cause of hardening, and hardening is the cause of sin, it is a necessary consequence that reprobation is the cause of sin; but that hardening is a cause of sin Scripture both seems to indicate everywhere (as in Exod. 7 and the following about Pharaoh; Ps. 68; Is. 6; 63; Jn. 12; Acts the last; Rom. 9; 11), and also it seems to be shown by reason. For to harden is the same as to produce hardness in someone, just as to heat is to produce heat; but the hardness which is ascribed to the heart is sin, about which in Ezek. 11 and 36: "I will take away from you the stony heart, and I will give you a heart of flesh." And the same showing holds about blinding, which is followed by blindness of mind, which likewise is sin. Finally, by the authority of Augustine and Thomas—of whom the former, book 5, Against Julian, ch. 3, replies thus to certain words of Julian: "But what is it, that you say, when they are said to be delivered up to their desires, they are to be understood as left by Divine patience, not compelled into sins by power? as if the same Apostle had not at once set down these two, both patience and power, where he says: 'Thus, wishing to show forth wrath and to make known His power, God bore with much patience the vessels of wrath which are perfected unto perdition.'"⁹⁹ From these words it appears that Augustine means that God not only by forsaking, but also by power impelling, delivers men over to their desires and hardens them in sins. The same man, On Grace and Free Will chs. 20–21, at length teaches that the wills of evil men even in those things in which they sin, indeed unto sins, are inclined by God; and he shows that by the Scriptures, with the examples of Pharaoh, Absalom, and others, yes and of the devil himself—saying that God acts in their hearts, even the very motion of their will by which they sin. Whence finally he concludes thus: "By such testimonies of the divine oracles it is made manifest that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills whither He will, either to good by His mercy, or to evil according to their merits."¹⁰⁰ And he confirms these things which he has said in On the Predestination of the Saints ch. 20.¹⁰¹ St. Thomas moreover, On Romans 9, lect. 15, at the words, "For this very thing I have raised you up," says—by a reading which we have not been able to emend—that in the same manner as by permission and desertion, so too by a hidden interior instigation men are moved by God, not only to good, but to evil; and presently he proves it from the place of Augustine just alleged (On Grace and Free Will) and from the Scriptures.¹⁰² Eighth argument. The same Augustine (On Correction and Grace ch. 7) writes that God indeed chose the other Apostles for attaining His kingdom; Judas, however, "for the pouring out of His blood": therefore Judas was chosen unto sin.¹⁰³ Ninth, they thus reason: If God governs and administers all things such that not even sins are withdrawn from His providence, therefore the providence of God is the cause of sins, just as of other things which are subject to providence. Tenth. The reprobate are created by God on account of an end; nor yet for the same as the elect: for thus the end proposed to Himself in their creation would be frustrated; therefore they were created on account of eternal damnation, and consequently He Himself provided means to that same end, that is, the fall and sin of man. For it belongs to the same agent to intend the end and to procure the means to the end. For he who efficaciously wills the end, wills all those things without which the end is not had. By the same argument it is proved that the means which lead to eternal life are from God, Who has appointed the end itself. Lastly. The effects of reprobation

(*reprobatio*) are the permission of sins (*permissio peccatorum*), the withdrawal of grace (*substractio gratiae*), and abandonment in sins (*derelectio in peccatis*). But from these it necessarily follows that man sins; therefore Divine reprobation is the cause of sin, at least indirectly. For what is the cause of the antecedent is the cause of the consequent; and he who removes an impediment is at least an indirect cause of that which follows the removal. To these arguments, in order, the reply is as follows.

§ 125. To the first it is replied that in that place of Acts the phrase "by the determinate counsel" ought to be referred to Christ Himself as delivered up; whom nevertheless they, impelled by their malice, received: and therefore the depraved acceptance is not to be attributed by Divine counsel to Judas and to the Jews; but Scripture in that place intends the impious will of Judas and of the Jews.¹⁰⁴ Truly the Greek reading, to which the Author appeals, reads thus: τοῦτον τῇ ὀρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ, λαβόντες διὰ χειρῶν ἀνόμων προσηλώσαντες ἀνείλετε. From which Erasmus thus translates: "This man, when you had received Him, you slew by crucifying through the hands of the wicked, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God delivered up." From this reading moreover it is most clearly joined: not that the "delivered up" is to be taken of Judas's or of the Jews' delivering up, but of that thing in which God the Father delivered His Son to death for the redemption of the human race, to those receiving Him—the Jews—and by the hands of the wicked killing Him. Which meaning the Greek reading most clearly shows.¹⁰⁵

§ 126. To the second it is replied that the same thing—namely the passion and death of Christ—was done both by the Jews impiously persecuting Christ, and by God the Father, and by Christ Himself; for both the Father delivered the Son to death, and the Son Himself laid down His life by His own power; as is taught expressly above at Dist. 20, Book III.¹⁰⁶ Therefore the same thing which the Jews did, that is, the same effect, God decreed from eternity to be done, and He brought it about in time; but they did it unjustly, persecuting Christ; God, however, did it mercifully, succoring man. For that which is said, "they came together to do," is not referred to sin, but to the effect of the work which for the Jews was sin, that is, to the passion and death; therefore the passion and death of Christ, just as the passions and deaths of all the martyrs, have not only men but also God as author. In what way one and the same succor of a poor man, if it takes place at the same time, can be done with good intention by one, with evil by another.

§ 127. What in the third place is objected (from Prov.) has this sense: God made all things for Himself, that is, for His glory. The impious man, however, as he is impious, He did not make simply; but He made him "for the evil day," that is, He preordained the man whom He foresaw would be impious, to the day of vengeance, that is, to just punishments; and that too on account of Himself, according to that which was said by the Lord to Pharaoh: "For this very thing I have raised you up, that I may show in you My power," etc. The sense of the fourth place is this: that God therefore willed to permit that sin of the sons of Heli, namely, that they should not hear their father admonishing them, because on account of their own sin He had determined their punishment; and the punishment of both, however, was subsequently their slaying—whereof itself the slaying was a punishment. Of this and similar places which occur in the sacred Scriptures St. Augustine treats differently in *On Grace and Free Will*; of whom shortly in the solution of the seventh.¹⁰⁷

§ 128. To the fifth. A man is said to be perverted by God improperly, namely, that man to whom, by His just judgment, He has decided not to give the grace by which he would be converted and saved. This, however—namely in what sense elsewhere it is to be explained that no one can correct him—must be explained in its own place.

§ 129. To the sixth. God is said, after the manner of a potter, to make certain vessels unto dishonor, not by working the fault in them, but by permitting that they fall into fault. Nor is it amiss to say that He "makes," since that permission, as we showed above, is a certain act of Divine reprobation. But the reprobate are said to be "fitted," or "prepared," by God unto destruction, not as if God procures for them the sins by which they merit destruction, but because He prepares destruction for them on account of their foreseen sins. But He prepares, not in time, but by the eternal decree which is called reprobation. And hence also Scripture in matters of this sort for the most part uses a past-tense verb, as Matt. 25: "Who is prepared, or 'prepared,' for the devil," etc.; Sir. 26: "God has prepared him unto the sword"; and in this place, "vessels fitted, or prepared, unto destruction"; just as, on the contrary, there likewise of the vessels of mercy, God is said to have "prepared" unto glory—namely by His eternal predestination.

§ 130. To the seventh it is replied that the hardening of man (and the same judgment holds about blinding) is ascribed to God improperly, as is clear from those things which we said above about the effects of reprobation. For God is said to harden a man, not because He of Himself does this, that a man's heart be hardened in evil, but because He does something concerning the man, whence per accidens there follows in his heart a hardness. But that comes about in a twofold way: either by deserting the man and withdrawing certain customary helps of salvation, which being withdrawn the man becomes worse and harder—which mode the Fathers often indicate, as St. Augustine (On Nature and Grace ch. 22), St. Gregory, book 25 (Moralia ch. 9), and others; or moreover by placing before the man's senses from without, or even before his imagination from within, those things which, he being now depraved by sin and prone to sins, become for him as stumbling blocks and occasions of further and graver ruin. Therefore hardening and blinding are only punishment, not a cause of sin; although they do not take place without the sin of him who is hardened or blinded. About which matter more below, at Dist. 36 of Book II, where there is treatment of those sins which are also almost the punishments of sinners.

§ 131. From this declaration one must reply further to the places of Augustine alleged to confirm the argument. For in the former place, although in rather obscure words, St. Augustine means nothing other than that God sometimes afflicts proud men—such as Pharaoh once was—by certain very great calamities and scourges, in which He declares His power; by which they are so far from being corrected that, on that occasion, they harden themselves even more and more against God. Although St. Augustine does not admit that men, delivered up to their desires, are compelled into sins by power; but he says that God, in their desertion, does not so much exhibit patience, which Julian wanted, as show forth His power; just as the Apostle (Rom. 9) testifies. But the sense of the latter place is that God determines, by certain circumstances, the wills of men evil by their own fault; or, as Augustine speaks, inclines them to certain works, which are sins—namely in such wise that neither the very malice of the sinner nor the sin itself, as it is sin, but the occasions and certain adjuncts of sin, which are not sins; indeed, and the very act underlying the sin, insofar as it is an act, are referred to God as author. And in nearly these ways St. Augustine himself explains himself, book 5 Against Julian ch. 4; and On Grace and Free Will ch. 20. One may consult also about this matter book 1 To Simplician, q. 2; book 1 Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians ch. 18; and ep. 105; and q. 18 on Exodus, where he clearly explains the matter. And Prosper, to the Capitula of the Gauls, replies 11, 16. Moreover, as to St. Thomas's commentary the reply is clear from his very words. For thus he subjoins: "Yet God inclines to good otherwise than to evil. For He inclines the wills of men to good directly and of Himself, as the author of goods; but to evil He is said to incline or to stir men up occasionally, inasmuch namely as God proposes something to the man either outwardly or inwardly, which, so far as it is of itself, is inductive to good; but the

man, because of his malice, uses it perversely unto evil"; and what follows.¹⁰⁸ From these there is also opened the understanding of many places of Scripture which otherwise would seem to attribute to God the cause of sin; as Lk. 2: "This one is set for the fall of many"; Rom. 9: "I will place in Sion a stone of offense, a rock upon their iniquity"; Ezek. 3: "An offense before him," and 14: "I have deceived that prophet"; and other such, by which are signified in the reprobate those effects of reprobation which we said to be withdrawal, desertion, hardening, and the like.

§ 132. To the eighth it is replied that this is the sense of Augustine's meaning: that Judas, whose malice He had foreseen and was about to use, out of many evils He chose one, so as to use his malice for the pouring out of His blood, that is, for the work of our redemption to be accomplished. For thus also He elsewhere said that Judas had been chosen for an office, as befitted. But he explains it clearly in the subsequent words: "For he was elected by Him who knows how to use well also evil things, in order that that work, damnable on account of which he was to be punished, might be fulfilled as a venerable work"; now this is the work of our redemption. Nor can it be doubted that the sense of Augustine is this: whether Judas be said to be elected that "He might pour out the blood of Christ," or that "he might pour out the blood of Christ," or "that Christ might pour out His blood"; for under all these it can rightly be understood, "for the pouring out of His blood." For the first sense alone seems to give offense, truly not the other two; because "to pour out the blood of Christ" does not involve malice. For it could also be ascribed to Christ, and to the priest who offered Him upon the altar (Lk. 22); and for that same reading what precedes is cited, namely that Christ chose them to obtain His kingdom, that they might obtain the kingdom of Christ.¹⁰⁹

§ 133. To the ninth it is replied. Sins are subject to Divine providence, but otherwise than other things; as we have shown above. For God makes and conserves and directs to the end and brings to the end all things of that sort; sins, however, He neither makes nor conserves; but He permits, orders, restrains, forgives to the penitent, avenges: which are also works of providence and works of God.¹¹⁰

§ 134. To the tenth it is replied, first, that in the creation of man, as also of other things, God appointed some end not for Himself but for the things themselves: for of God there is no cause, no perfection outside Himself; but He so created man that his end should be eternal happiness in God, from which when by sinning he fell, it is not God but man who is frustrated of his end. Next, although the reprobate man does not attain the end appointed by God for him, that is, eternal beatitude, yet God Himself is by no means frustrated of the end He Himself intended in that work. For just as "He wrought all things for Himself," that is, for the manifestation of His glory, so He attains this end in all His works, even the vilest; and individually even in reprobate men. For God is glorified in their just punishment. Yet He did not create them that He might punish; nor that He might desert or permit to sin: but all these effects of reprobation He ordains, as certain means, to that end which He looked to in their creation, namely the showing forth of His justice.

§ 135. To the last it is replied that from the effects of reprobation, and therefore from reprobation itself, it necessarily follows that the man sins, not by a necessity of the thing or of causality, but by a necessity of consequence; just as this same thing necessarily follows from God's vision, or foreknowledge. And this necessity Pope Celestine openly signified in the letter to the bishops of Gaul.¹¹¹

§ 136. In chapter 6, with the words taken from the Letter of Pope Innocent to the Council of Carthage, when he says: "For it is necessary that by that by whose aiding we conquer, by that same, not aiding, we be overcome again."[^91] But that which is assumed, that the cause of the antecedent is the same as that of the

consequent, must be denied; and its falsity is shown by this example: "Man exists; therefore God exists," and by many others. But it holds true only where the antecedent is the cause of the consequent. Nor is that point, which is subjoined for confirmation concerning "the remover of an impediment" (*removens prohibens*), universally true; but only if from the removal of the impediment the effect follows immediately and necessarily, or if the cause which removes the impediment was bound to prevent the effect—neither of which is found here. For to the absence of the Divine help sin does not follow immediately and necessarily, if we speak of the necessity of the event, but by the mediation of the free will of him to whom that help is not present. Nor indeed is God bound to impede an effect of this sort. Wherefore neither can He be called the cause of mortal sin, not even an indirect one.¹¹²

§ 137. V. That by predestination and reprobation freedom of choice is not taken away.¹¹³ After the explication of those points which are proper both to predestination and to reprobation, now let us consider those that are common to each. Among which, first is this: that neither predestination nor reprobation bring necessity to bear upon human actions. And indeed this is easily shown from those things which, concerning the foreknowledge and providence of God, were said in the two preceding distinctions. For reprobation includes foreknowledge only with the will of permitting, not also providence of evil actions: for God foresees them, He does not provide for them, as has already been shown. But predestination, as regards the good actions in us, is Divine providence. Wherefore, if (as above at Dist. 38) it has been sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor even the providence of God imposes necessity upon things foreknown and provided for, for this reason alone that they are foreknown or provided for, it is manifest that neither reprobation nor predestination, by reason of foreknowledge or providence, brings necessity to bear upon human actions: which is also more fully proved by those things which we said in particular (at Dist. 39) about human actions subject to Divine providence.

§ 138. Therefore, as regards reprobation: although it is the cause of Divine dereliction and permission, whereby indeed someone is left by God's grace and is permitted to sin, nevertheless the sin itself proceeds from the free will of the reprobate and derelict man; not even withstanding the fact that sin follows by a certain necessity of consequence from that dereliction and its permission, as we were saying a little before. For although reprobation withdraws the help necessary for not sinning, it does not, however, withdraw anything of the power of the reprobate, whereby he can freely choose either alternative. Thus St. Thomas both teaches and declares this matter (I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 2 and ad 3).¹¹⁴ Moreover, there exists a fine clarification concerning this matter in the Council of Valence, ch. 2 (found in vol. 3, fol. 888): "Nor has the foreknowledge of God at all imposed necessity upon any evil, so that it could not be otherwise; but that he was going to be such by his own will, God, who knows all things before they come to be, foreknows by His own omnipotence and unchangeable majesty. Nor do we believe anyone to be condemned by His prejudgment, but by the merit of his own iniquity. Nor do the wicked perish on this account, because they could not be good, but because they were unwilling to be good, and by their own fault remained in the mass of perdition, either by original desert, or even by actual [desert]."¹¹⁵

§ 139. But as regards predestination: although it is the efficacious cause of living well, nevertheless it does not for that reason take away from man the freedom of choice, but rather establishes it more: for it brings it about that man freely chooses what is good. For providence, of which predestination is a part, is not only the cause of things and of their operation, but also of the very mode whereby things and operations are brought forth: namely, that they come to be either necessarily, or contingently, or even freely; as St. Thomas teaches (I,

q. 22, a. 4, both in the body and in the replies to the arguments).¹¹⁶ Of whom also these are the words (III, q. 24, a. 4): "Under eternal predestination there falls not only that which is to be done in time, but also the mode and order according to which it is to be fulfilled in time."¹¹⁷ Whence, concerning the just man and the predestined, Ecclesiasticus 31 says: "He who could transgress, has not transgressed; to do evil, and has not done it" (Sir. 31). And the Apostle, 2 Tim. 2: "I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may obtain salvation." Which he would not say unless the means of the elect to salvation—namely good works—were contingent and free. Wherefore, in this respect, predestination of good works does not at all more prejudice the freedom of acting than does foreknowledge; indeed rather it prejudices it less, inasmuch as it is also the cause of the mode, that is, of the liberty of the works—which is not so in the case of foreknowledge, which, considered in this respect, is the cause neither of things nor of their mode.¹¹⁸

§ 140. Since these things are so, blessed Augustine rightly teaches, against certain people offended at those things which he had written about predestination and its efficacy (of the same book, ch. 14), that the doctrine of predestination does not at all stand opposed to the usefulness of preaching and exhortation, but that by those, as by certain means ordained by God, God wills His eternal decree concerning the salvation of men, that is, predestination, to be fulfilled.³² He teaches this same (ch. 16–17) about our prayers, by which we ask perseverance from God. For he shows that these are so far from clashing with that doctrine, that by them that very predestination is to be fulfilled, whereby God has decreed to bestow upon us the gift of perseverance and salvation only through our prayers.¹¹⁹ But if the predestination of God were opposed to the freedom of choice, the same would also be opposed by faith, piety, chastity, and the other virtues, or works of virtues, all of which we know to be gifts of God, as given in time, so prepared from eternity, as Augustine argues in the same place. Where also thereafter, over several chapters, he warns and teaches how cautiously and prudently the mystery of predestination is to be handled before the people, lest by the imprudence of the preacher the weakness of the hearer be offended—while he should perhaps think that that is now not free to him which he understands to have been preordained infallibly from eternity.

§ XVI — Reply to the objections on the contrary (Ad objectiones in contrarium responsio)

§ 141. Against the foregoing doctrine, besides the things which were discussed when treating of providence in general (at Dist. 38), the objections are of this sort. First. The predestination of God (*praedestinatio*) brings it about that those who are elect cannot be deceived, according to that of Matt. 24: "That they may be led into error, if it can be done, even the Elect," as if to say that this cannot happen; therefore by predestination liberty to believe error is taken away. Second. Predestination brings it about that the predestined cannot be snatched away from Christ, according to that of Jn. 10: "No one can snatch my sheep out of my hand": therefore there does not remain in them the liberty to withdraw from Christ. Third. No creature can separate the elect from the charity (*caritas*) of God, as the Apostle attests (Rom. 8): therefore liberty to forsake charity is taken away. Fourth. Reprobation (*reprobatio*) brings it about that the reprobate cannot come to Christ, since He Himself says in Jn. 6: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draw him." And again: "No one can come to me unless it has been given to him by my Father"; neither of which is granted to the reprobate: therefore there does not remain in them liberty to come to Christ. Fifth. Reprobation brings it about that those who, with God reprobating, have been blinded and hardened, cannot believe. For it is said in Jn. 12: "They could not believe, because Isaiah said, He blinded their eyes," etc. therefore liberty in them to believe

has perished. Sixth. Reprobation brings it about that someone who is reprobate cannot be corrected, Ecclesiastes saying in ch. 9: "No one can correct him whom God has despised": therefore there is not in him liberty to receive correction. Seventh. Man, with respect to divine predestination and reprobation, is compared to the clay that is in the hand of the potter (Rom. 9); but the clay in the shaping of the potter's work does nothing, but only suffers: therefore also man, in that he is predestined or reprobate, is disposed only passively, and hence not freely. Eighth. The same account holds for predestination and for the divine promise: for the very goods which God has predestined, He has also promised, as Prosper teaches, book 1, *De vocatione Gentium*, ch. 9;¹²¹ but the divine promise is not about the works of our free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). For St. Augustine says (Sermon 2, *De verbis Apostoli*):¹²² "He who promised what He does, did not promise what you do: if you were going to do it, God would be a foreteller, not a promiser": therefore neither are those things which are subject to predestination of our free choice, but of God alone. Ninth. The efficacy of the predestination of God is not less than the efficacy of the prayer of Christ; but the prayer of Christ takes away liberty from him for whom He prays. For St. Augustine says (*De correptione et gratia*, ch. 8)¹²³ that on account of Christ's prayer the faith of Peter would not fail, even if Peter had willed that it fail: therefore predestination does the same in the predestined. Tenth. The same Augustine says (in the *Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans*, prop. 62)¹²⁴ that the heart of Pharaoh was so hardened that he could not obey God. And (*Tract. 54 on John*)¹²⁵ that the Jews could not believe, because by the hidden judgment of God they had been blinded and hardened, He deserting them who resists the proud. Eleventh. Predestination predetermines the will (*voluntas*); therefore it does not leave it free. The antecedent is proved both from the Greek word which the Scriptures use, which signifies a predefinition, or predetermination; and from the efficacy of divine predestination with respect to the things predestined; and by the authority of St. Thomas, who, book 2 *Contra Gentiles*, ch. 89, and in I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1,¹²⁶ acknowledges and defends this predetermination. Twelfth. It follows necessarily: Peter is predestined to this good work; therefore he will do this good work: but the antecedent is not free to Peter; therefore neither is the consequent.

§ 142. Others too could be brought forward, the treatment of which will be more opportune at Dist. 24 of book 2, where it is taught that the efficacy of the grace (*gratia*) of God does not conflict with free choice. But as regards the objections proposed, one must know that those propositions which signify that something is impossible in the composite sense (*sensus compositus*), which nevertheless is possible in the divided sense (*sensus divisus*), do not take away the liberty of the will with respect to that which is possible in the divided sense. Such in the present matter are these propositions: it is impossible that those who are predestined, or elect, or the sheep of Christ, be deceived, be snatched from Christ, be separated from the charity of God; likewise, it is impossible that those who are reprobated persevere in coming to Christ, believe, be corrected, or be converted. For in all these there is included a certain necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*), which stands together with the contingency, indeed with the liberty, of the consequent (*consequens*), as can easily be shown one by one in these very cases themselves; as, for instance, in what I say: The elect cannot be deceived: this necessary consequence is contained: he is elect; therefore he will not be deceived: which consequent, however, is contingent and free, in such a way that the opposite can come about and be chosen. Thus, then, the solution of the first six objections is clear; except that the Scripture adduced in the fifth place is rightly so taken as to signify not an all-out impossibility but a great difficulty of receiving the light of faith; in which way we said it can fittingly be understood at Dist. 38, where the foreknowledge of God was being treated.

§ 143. To the seventh, it is answered that man is most rightly compared to clay with respect to divine predestination and reprobation; because although man is free in the actions which God has predestined or foreknown that he will do, nevertheless he is not free with respect to predestination itself or reprobation, since each of these depends on the will of God, just as the shaping of the clay depends on the will of the potter.

§ 144. The divine promise is about the works of our free choice, insofar as the same are works of God who causes that we do them. The same Augustine says: "God did not promise what you do—understand it thus: He did not promise what you do from yourself, but what He Himself causes you to do."

§ 145. To the ninth I reply that the sense of Augustine's words is this: that even if Peter had willed to fall from the faith, and by consequence had fallen, nevertheless by Christ's prayer it would have been effected that he be converted, and that that falling from the faith not be final; or certainly it is signified that Peter's imperfect will, or inclination to fall away, because of Christ's prayer would have been changed into a will stably and steadfastly not failing.

§ 146. The things objected in the tenth place out of the same Augustine have a meaning similar to those to which we replied in the first place.

§ 147. To the eleventh objection, the antecedent being granted, as it must be granted, the reply is by denying the consequence. And if you go on to prove it thus: because whatever is determined earlier in time or by nature is no longer free; the assumption must be denied, if the discussion is about that which is determined by God. For that divine determination or predetermination is common to all second causes, both to agents that act freely and to the rest. For it pertains to the formal character (*ratio*) of a second cause, as created, that in all its actions it be first by nature determined by the first cause, from which it has not only to act but also every mode of acting, that is, that it act either necessarily, or contingently, or even freely.

§ 148. Similarly, in the last argument the consequence must be denied. For by the same reasoning it would follow that the foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of God alone takes away the liberty of human actions; since neither is the foreknowledge of God in man's power. Therefore one must say that it is enough if the antecedent be free to God, and hence not necessary, just as neither is the consequent... But you will say: man cannot falsify the antecedent; for the antecedent is not in man's power: therefore neither [can he falsify] the consequent. For if the consequent could be falsified without the antecedent, the antecedent would be true while the consequent was false, which is against the law of good consequence. I reply that indeed the consequent is in the power of man, but not the antecedent, as has already been said: yet a man cannot falsify the consequent without a falsity's following upon the antecedent; and thus it is shown that the antecedent is not necessary. Note here that if to falsify be to render false a proposition which previously was true, neither the consequent can be falsified nor the antecedent; but if to falsify be to do something from which it follows that the proposition is false, in this way not only the consequent can falsify, but also the antecedent; and finally, if the falsifier is so called who brings it about that the proposition not be true, as having power over the thing signified, in this way he can falsify the consequent, but not the antecedent; by which, however, its contingency is not taken away, so that it be false when the consequent has been falsified.

§ XVII — Whether one predestined can be damned, and the reprobate be saved (*Utrum praedestinatus damnari possit, & reprobus salvari*)

§ 149. From the foregoing doctrine a ready answer is given to this question: whether he who is predestined can be damned, and he who is reprobated be saved. For if predestination and reprobation do not take away the faculty of acting well or ill, and of persevering in either, the consequence is that the predestined can be damned and the reprobate be saved.

§ 150. Manifest Scriptures confirm this doctrine, which teach that the predestined are not necessarily saved, but can fail to be saved, as in Wis. 4: "He was snatched away lest wickedness change his understanding." Eccl. 31: "He who could transgress and did not transgress." Ezek. 18: "If the just man turns himself away from his justice," etc. 1 Cor. 9: "Lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become reprobate." 2 Tim. 2: "I endure all things for the sake of the Elect, that they also may obtain salvation." Rev. 3: "Hold what thou hast, that no one take thy crown."

§ 151. There pertains to this that general exhortation to all the faithful, and hence also to the Elect, that "with fear and trembling they work out their salvation" (Phil. 2), that "they be not high-minded, but fear, lest perhaps He spare not even them" (Rom. 11), that "they serve the Lord in fear, lest at some time the Lord be angry, and they perish" (Ps. 2); and in general whatever things prove that the just can fall from grace and salvation, the same prove this about the predestined. For that doctrine is not about a certain kind of just, but about all who are situated on the way of this life, among whose number it is certain that the predestined are, although not all the just are among the number of the predestined.

§ 152. No less from the Scriptures we hold as certain that the reprobate can, by believing and doing well, attain salvation. For the Lord says in Jer. 36: "If perhaps each one should return from his evil way," etc. And Ezek. 18: "If the impious man shall have done penance, he shall live and not die." Likewise Matt. 11: "If the mighty works that are done in thee had been done long ago in sackcloth and ashes, they would have done penance." And the Apostle in Rom. 11: "But they also, if they have not remained in unbelief, shall be grafted in, for God is able to graft them in again." And 2 Tim. 2: "Lest at some time God give them repentance," etc.

§ 153. Nay more, in general those testimonies of Scripture by which absolutely all sinners, by no means excluding the reprobate, are invited to penance and salvation—which, therefore, show that those same all, while they are in this life, can be converted to God and attain salvation—amply and more than sufficiently prove that even the reprobate can be saved.

§ 154. Finally, common arguments applicable to both alike, both the predestined and the reprobate, can be taken from free choice unconfirmed to either part, but flexible to each, both good and evil, as long as this life goes on. For it pertains to the recompense of the age to come that some can no longer do evil, others no longer do good.

§ 155. From these things, therefore, it is clear that the predestined, while they are in this life, can sin and consequently be damned, just as also the reprobate can do well and attain to salvation; and hence—so as to say nothing now about certain persons erring perniciously in this matter—Ambrosius Catharinus is gravely mistaken, when he wills this to be the force of the divine election, that those who are elect from eternity be saved of necessity.

§ XVIII — Reply to the things that seem opposed to what has been said (*Ad ea quae dictis videntur adversa, responsio*)

§ 156. To the things that seem opposed to what has been said, a reply. What they are wont to object against this doctrine—sought for the most part from the certitude and infallibility of Divine Providence (*Providentia Divina*)—is almost entirely resolved by means of the distinction between the composite and the divided sense (*sensus compositus et divisus*), spoken of above. For that which has already been said against the heretics John Wycliffe, John Calvin, and others—namely, that a predestined person can be damned, and a reprobate saved—must be taken in the divided sense; whereby it is signified that this man (with some predestined person pointed out) can be damned; and that man (with a reprobate pointed out) can be saved, that is, in order to signify that these are possible propositions: "this man is damned," "that man is saved." For in the composite sense neither can a predestined person be damned, nor can a reprobate be saved. For these propositions are not possible: "the predestined is damned," "the reprobate is saved." The reason for which will be set out shortly.

§ 157. Therefore, in this composite sense the sayings of the Fathers must be taken, by which they sometimes deny that one can attain salvation, as in St. Augustine, book 18 of the City of God, chapter 51, and in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 20; and in Fulgentius, book On the Faith to Peter, chapter 35. Likewise St. Gregory, book 1 of the Dialogues, chapter 8: "Things that were not predestined by no means can be obtained." Bede in the homily on Palm Sunday: "Although," he says, "the persecutor be savage and monstrous, he cannot oppose the salvation of those whom the Lord knows to be His, because they are His, whom He predestined to life eternal." And Bernard, Sermon 3 on the Gospel "Missus est": "They cannot perish, for whom the Son prays that they may not perish." That all these are true in the composite sense, there is no doubt. In which sense also that saying was uttered by St. Job 14 concerning the life of man: "You have set his bounds, which cannot be passed." For just as, the ordinance of God standing, the days set cannot be passed by; so, the predestination (*praedestinatio*) of God standing, he who is predestined cannot perish.¹²⁹

§ 158. But still someone will object. Everything past is simply necessary, because the things past no longer fall under the Divine power; for God cannot make it to be that what is already past has not been; but we posit that this man has been predestined from eternity; therefore his predestination is simply necessary; therefore also the salvation of the same, which follows of necessity from predestination. Nor does that response seem sufficiently apt to this argument, if you say that predestination in God does not pass into the past, but is always present in the one stable "now" of eternity, so that in God "to-have-predestined," "to-predestine," and "to-be-about-to-predestine" are the same. For although properly in God there is not the past, yet there is in men, to whom God sometimes reveals His secrets; and therefore at least, if to someone his own or another's predestination were revealed, as to Christ the Lord, according to the human nature, the predestination of all was known already from the beginning of His conception: since there is no power with respect to the past, it follows that the truth of the consequent—namely salvation—is as necessary as the prediction or antecedent knowledge. Therefore what is assumed must be denied: that everything past is simply necessary. For, for example, the transgression of Adam, the fratricide of Cain, the betrayal of Judas, although they are past, are not simply necessary; nay rather, simply speaking, they now are not. And neither were they necessary, but when they were, they were contingent. Therefore, just as when they were being done, they were being done not necessarily but contingently, so now it must be said that they are not necessarily but contingently done, or past. And this is a necessary consequent: that if something happens contingently, afterwards we say of it, "it happened contingently"; although after it has happened, it cannot now be made not to have happened, not

even by the Divine power. But this also holds in present things: for while a thing is, it cannot come about that it is not, and hence it is necessary. But that which is thus called necessary is not necessary simply, but only under a hypothesis (*ex hypothesis*); as above we have declared (at Dist. 38) in the resolution of the arguments which gathered the necessity of events from foreknowledge.¹³⁰

§ 159. But again you will object. The predestination and reprobation (*reprobatio*) of God cannot be deceived. But they would be deceived, if one who is predestined should perish; or one who is reprobated should not perish; because the thing would turn out otherwise than it had been decreed by predestining or reprobating. I reply. If the one whom we posit as predestined should perish, then he would no longer be predestined—something which indeed is possible—and thus the predestination of God would not be deceived. For we have said this of the predestined person: that "this is possible, 'this man is damned'"; but "this is impossible, 'the predestined is damned'." And similarly of the reprobate.¹³¹

§ 160. Finally someone will say: If we knew someone to be a reprobate, it would not be permitted us to pray for his salvation, for no other reason than that by the same revelation we would know him not to be going to be saved; just as we know this about the demons, for whom, therefore, it is not permitted to pray. Whence Augustine, book 21 of the City of God, chapter [as in source]: "If," he says, "the Church were certain concerning some persons established in this life, that they are predestined to go into eternal fire with the devils, it would no more pray for them than for the devils; but because it is certain about no one, it prays for all." It is answered that that would not be the cause why the Church would not pray for those whom it would know not to be going to be saved; but this would be the cause, namely that the hope of their salvation would be taken away; and with that taken away, prayer also is taken away. And there is another cause, when it would not be permitted to pray for them: because he who thus prayed would will to make God a liar. For since, by decree or settled purpose, God says, "that man will be damned," the one praying says to God: "Bring it about that he be not damned," that is, that what You have said be false.¹³²

§ XIX — That the predestined can sin, and the reprobate be justified (Praedestinatum peccare, & reprobum justificari posse)

§ 161. The question whether the predestined can sin (mortally after having received justice), and the reprobate be justified, is different from the preceding. For here it is asked not only in the divided sense (*sensus divisus*), but in the asserted and posited sense (*positio*), namely whether these possible propositions are at some time true: "a predestined person sins, by sinning he loses justice"; and "a reprobate is justified," or "is just." The answer to this question will be most certain—namely, an affirmative—according to the definition of the Council of Trent (Session 6, chapter 17), which declares anathema on him who says that the grace of justification (*justificatio*) comes only to those predestined to life, and that the rest, although called, do not receive grace (*gratia*); and (canon 23) condemns those who say that every man once justified can no longer sin, nor lose grace, and that therefore the one who falls and sins was never truly justified.¹³⁴

§ 162. The final proof of this matter is both from the authority of Scripture and of the Fathers, and from reason. For Adam, Eve, Aaron, David, Peter with the other Apostles of Christ, and others whom Scripture records, were predestined, who yet—Scripture itself attesting—by grievously sinning against God lost the justice once received, being about afterwards to recover the same by penance.

§ 163. The Scriptures themselves prove this, which exhort all the just to perseverance; which teach that not all the just persevere unto the end, but that many fall away. As these are everywhere obvious, we do not care here to recount them in detail. Likewise, the Catholic doctrine of the Fathers proves it: concerning the penance and justification of the lapsed, against the Novatians. The examples of baptized little ones also prove it, of whom some retain and keep their baptismal innocence, others lose it and perish in part. The doctrine set forth above proves it too: that not all the reprobate are damned on account of original sin—namely those who had at some time been justified. Reason proves it, taken from the mutability of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) to either part during this life, together with the experience of the fall and withdrawal of very many from the way of justice.¹³⁵

§ 164. Finally, whatever things generally show that charity (*caritas*), justice, grace once received can be lost, prove it. A fuller treatment of which pertains to the common locus on justification, and to Distinction 31 of book 3, where the loss of charity is discussed. For if charity or justice once received can be lost, indeed is often lost, then either it is afterwards recovered and kept, and it is true that a predestined person has sinned mortally; or it is not recovered, and it is true that a reprobate has been just. For he who recovers charity and keeps it unto the end is predestined; but he who does not recover what he once had is reprobated. Which again is shown by examples taken from Holy Scripture, as of Saul, Solomon, and the like, whom it is established to have fallen from justice. Whether, however, they were predestined or reprobate does not equally meet with agreement among the Doctors. Yet whichever is said, an argument is had for the present doctrine: for either they were predestined, and it is taught that the predestined can sin; or they were reprobate, and it is taught that the reprobate can be justified, potency reduced to act. Most clear and very frequent on this matter are the testimonies of the Fathers—as of Augustine (On Correction and Grace, chs. 8–9; Sermon 63 De diversis, ch. 1; Tractate 45 on John; Expositions on Psalms 56, 85, and elsewhere), Jerome in the Commentary on Ezekiel 26, Ambrose (On the Good of Death, ch. 8), Gregory (Moralia, book 14, ch. 19; book 25, chs. 7–8; book 29, ch. 9), Leo (Sermon 2 on Quadragesima and Sermon 7 on the Passion of the Lord), and others, on the citing of whom there is here no need to linger.¹³⁶

§ XX — Certain objections to the contrary are resolved (*Quaedam in contrarium objectiones solvuntur*)

§ 165. But the things which are now objected on the contrary, to which reply must be made, are these; and they are of this sort. First, all the just (*iusti*) at length come to glory, according to that of Rom. 8: "Whom He justified, them also He glorified"; therefore no reprobate (*reprobi*) are justified (*iustificantur*). Second, whoever are justified are given to Christ by the Father, but none of these perishes, the Lord saying in Jn. 6: "This is the will of the Father, that of all that He has given Me I should lose nothing." And in ch. 17: "That of all that Thou hast given Him, He may give them life eternal." And ch. 18: "Of those whom Thou hast given Me I have not lost any one"; therefore those who perish were not justified. Third, Christ in Jn. 17 denies that He prays for the world, that is, for the reprobate; therefore to them the merit of Christ's Passion is not applied; wherefore neither are they justified. Fourth, in 1 Jn. 3 it is said: "Every one who abides in God does not sin, and every one who sins has not seen Him, nor known Him." And again: "Every one who is born of God does not do sin, because His seed (*semen*) remains in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." And in ch. 5: "We know that every one who is born of God does not sin, but the begetting of God keeps him, and the evil one does not touch him." From which it appears that neither can the predestined (*praedestinati*), after

once receiving justice or grace (*gratia*), which is the seed of God, sin; nor have the reprobate ever at any time known God, that is, loved Him. Fifth, in Jn. 10 the Lord says to the Jews: "You do not believe, because you are not of My sheep"; but He understands by "sheep" the predestined; therefore of those not predestined, that is, of the reprobate, no one believes, and therefore neither is justified. And in the same place: "No one can snatch them out of My Father's hand"; therefore the sheep, that is, the predestined, cannot sin mortally; for he who sins mortally falls from the hand of the Father, that is, from the grace of God. Sixth, God hates the reprobate from eternity; therefore He never justifies them, because justification is an effect of the Divine Love. This also can, conversely, be accommodated to the predestined, whom God loves from eternity; and therefore He never deserts them; because to desert is to hate. Lastly, these passages of St. Augustine are produced: in Book 7 (of the City of God, ch. 1) he signifies that all good faithful are elect.¹³⁸ Writing on Ps. 130 he affirms that the names of all good faithful, and of those who love Christ, are written in heaven.¹³⁹ In Tractate 14 on John he says that no reprobate receives the testimony of Christ; and he adds that God leads no reprobate to salutary and spiritual repentance.¹⁴⁰ In the book On the Perfection of Justice, ch. 13, he says that that saying of the Psalm pertains to the reprobate: "There is none who does good, there is not even to one."¹⁴¹ And in ch. 20 he signifies that those alone are helped by the grace of God who are called according to purpose, that is, the predestined.¹⁴² Many other things too can be adduced here, but they must be reserved for their places, where there is treated of the lapsed and of their repentance to be iterated once and again (Book 4, dist. 14), and of the loss of charity (Book 3, dist. 31). For even what was shown above—that not all the reprobate are damned on account of original sin—also sufficiently proves that certain reprobates are justified; and the solutions there to the objections are of use also for this place. Therefore let us now make reply to the things proposed.

§ 166. As to what is alleged in the first place from the scope of the Apostle, it is to be supplied thus: whomsoever God foreknew, or fore-loved, He justified, those also He glorified. For the Apostle wills that to all who are by God fore-loved unto eternal life, there be furnished by the same God the means by which they may arrive at it, and that at length eternal life itself be conferred upon them. Yet he does not deny that certain means befall some by which, however, they are not led through to the end.

§ 167. To the second it is answered: by a certain peculiar phrase of Scripture only the predestined are said to be given to Christ by the Father, because they are so given that they do not perish, but Christ is going to have them forever as His own. For what is going to perish is not reckoned as having been given; therefore only those are given who are ordained to eternal life, as St. Augustine witnesses in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 9,¹⁴³ and, expounding upon John, on the place set in the argument.¹⁴⁴

§ 168. To the third: Christ does not pray for the world, that is, for the salvation of the world, but for those alone whom the Father gave Him out of the world, that is, for the elect alone. Nevertheless, even grace and justification, to last for a time, Christ obtains from the Father for certain who are of the world, not for their sake, but for the sake of the elect, to whom at length all the goods conferred upon the reprobate return. And thus also that prayer of Christ, as if made for the reprobate, profits the elect more.

§ 169. The fourth place means nothing other than that a man born of God, that is, the just man and a son of God, while that filiation lasts, or the seed of the grace of God by which he is a Son, does not sin; indeed, neither can he sin with that sin by which friendship with the Father is dissolved, and the right of inheritance is lost. In this way St. Jerome responded to Jovinian when he objected this very place (Book 2 Against Jovinian, ch. 1).¹⁴⁵ But what John adds, that he who sins has not seen nor known God, one must understand the past

tense there as put for the present, so that the sense be: he who sins does not see God nor know Him, namely with that vision and knowledge by which the thing seen and known pleases and is loved.

§ 170. The first sentence adduced in the fifth place does not contain a consequence but a reason, and has this sense: since you are not preordained to eternal life, therefore the Father willed not to give you faith—with which, however, it is consistent that He give the same to certain who are not preordained to life. Although the sentence can also be understood of persevering faith. But the latter denies that the sheep can be snatched out of the Father's hand in such wise that they should perish and altogether cease to be His.

§ 171. To the sixth: God hates the reprobate as regards the good of eternal life, which He has determined not to give them; yet He loves certain of them according to some temporal good of justice, which He has determined to give them. So too He loves the predestined simply speaking; but He hates them in a qualified sense, while He wills to leave them for a time in sin. Concerning which diversity of the Divine Love, let the doctrine be consulted (dist. 32, Book 3).¹⁴⁶

§ 172. Finally, to the passages of St. Augustine adduced last, answer must be made. And indeed, in the first place, he does not say that all good faithful are elect, but that they are deservedly called elect, namely on account of the confidence which, from the fact that we see them to be good, we ought deservedly to conceive concerning them: according to that which the Apostle says to the Philippians (Phil. 1): "Being confident of this very thing, that He who has begun in you a good work will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus," so far as "it is right for me to think this for you all." And with this confidence every good faithful one was of old saluted "elect," as is to be seen in the Apostolic Epistles. What he says in the second place is to be understood according to present justice, not according to predestination; in which way that saying of Christ to the 72 disciples is also rightly understood (Lk. 10): "Rejoice that your names are written in the heavens." For it is not to be thought that Christ by those words revealed to them their predestination, since it is agreed that neither to the Apostles was it revealed, unless perhaps a short time before their death. The third place denies that any of the reprobate receives the testimony of Christ perseveringly, as St. Augustine himself explains himself. The fourth removes repentance from the reprobate—not just any repentance, but salutary, that is, such from which the effect of salvation is at length obtained. For we do not say that a medicine was salutary for him who was not healed by it. Now what temporal health is with respect to medicine, this eternal salvation is with respect to repentance. The fifth, likewise, is to be understood of salutary good, that is, of that which leads to salvation. But the last place does not have the exclusive little word "only," but says that a man is helped if he is called according to purpose; that all these are helped, but not likewise all the others.

§ XXI — That God's predestination and reprobation are most certain and unchangeable (Praedestinationem, ac Reprobationem Dei certissimam, & invariabilem esse)

§ 173. It must be held with certain faith that the election, or predestination (*praedestinatio*) of God is most certain, that is, will most certainly and infallibly attain its effect; nor is what follows from this any less certain, namely, that the number of the predestined is certain to God, not only formally but also materially, that is, not only as regards the very number of those who are elect, but also as regards the thing numbered. Which is said thus in other words: that God has not only from eternity preordained, and most certainly knows, how many are to be saved, but also who they are. From these things, furthermore, it follows that this number of the elect

can be neither increased nor diminished nor in any way changed. The reason of all these things is manifest, which is taken from the certainty of the will, knowledge, and providence of God: because God's will cannot be changed, nor His intellect be deceived, nor His eternal purpose be impeded. For although from eternity God could have predestined more or fewer, or also others than He predestined, and so have something else in His prescience than He now has or had; nevertheless He cannot change what once from eternity He established: since, just as His essence, so His will and decree are immutable, as we show elsewhere.

§ 174. Scripture also in many places commends to us this certainty of predestination and of the number of the predestined, even according to the thing numbered. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2): "Cognovit Dominus qui sunt ejus." And the Lord Himself in Jn. 6: "Omne, quod dat mihi Pater, ad me veniet." The reason of which He subjoins from the will (*voluntas*) of the Father: "Haec est enim voluntas Patris, ut omne quod dedit mihi, non perdam ex eo." And in ch. 10, speaking of His sheep: "Non peribunt in aeternum, et non rapiet eas quisquam de manu mea." And again: "Nemo potest rapere de manu Patris mei." And in ch. 13: "Ego scio quos elegerim." And ch. 17: "Quos dedisti mihi, nemo ex iis periit." Which He also repeats in ch. 17. Likewise Matt. 24: "Ut in errorem inducantur si fieri potest, etiam electi."

§ 175. Pertinent here those things which are said by the Apostle (Rom. 8), partly of the elect, partly of the person of the elect, from that place: "Scimus quoniam diligentibus Deum," etc., down to the end of the chapter; by which he shows the infallible certainty and insuperable power of the divine election. Which also John signified (1 Jn. 2), saying of certain persons: "Si fuissent ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum." To these are added the public prayers of the Church, by which she professes that the number of the elect, to be placed in supernal felicity, is known to God, and that He has mercy on all whom by faith and by work He foreknew would be His. For mercy signifies the effect of election, according to that: "Cujus vult, miseretur" (Rom. 9). Moreover, the same judgment is to be made of reprobation (*reprobatio*) and the reprobate; although those things which we said of the number are wont to be said by a certain peculiar reason of the elect; because God has a singular and eminent care of His elect, which those Scriptures signify: Ps. 39: "Dominus sollicitus est mei." Gal. 2: "Qui dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me." Matt. 10: "Vestri capilli capitis omnes numerati sunt." On which matter see Origen (Hom. 1 on Numbers).¹⁴⁷

§ 176. Nevertheless we must not doubt that reprobation also is most certain, and will infallibly attain its effect; and that the number of the reprobate is certain to God, even as regards the thing numbered, and that it can be neither increased, nor diminished, nor in any way changed for the same reasons which a little above we said about predestination. This certainty too the Scriptures declare to us, as Jn. 6: "Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum." And again: "Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi fuerit ei datum a Patre meo." And ch. 10: "Vos non creditis; quia non estis ex ovibus meis." And Eccl. 7: "Nemo potest corrigere, quem ille despexerit," and other similar sentences. But in general to both, as well the reprobate as the elect, pertains that of Ps. 138: "In libro tuo omnes scribentur," that is, you have the most exact knowledge of all, as if in a catalogue of the described. And St. Augustine learnedly explains this whole doctrine of the certainty and immutability of divine predestination and reprobation (the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 7, 9, 12, and 13; and in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14),¹⁴⁸ where, among other things by which he shows from the Scriptures, and also from the authority of Cyprian, the most certain [truth]: "Who will dare to say that God did not foreknow to whom He would give that they should believe, or whom He would give to His Son, that of them He might lose no one? Which indeed, if He foreknew, He most assuredly foreknew His benefits, by which He deigns to free us. This predestination of the Saints is nothing else than, namely, the

foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly all who are freed, are freed. But the rest—where, if not in the mass of perdition—are left by just divine judgment?" These are there. The same he teaches in book 5 (Against Julian, ch. 3; and book 18 of the City of God, ch. 51).¹⁴⁹ So too Prosper (Answers to the 12th and 16th Vincentian objections; and To the Extracts of the Genoans, doubt 4). More copiously, however, book 2 (On the Calling of the Gentiles, ch. 33 and thereafter down to the end). And in the epistle to Ruffinus, where he says that it is impious to deny this doctrine.¹⁵⁰ Fulgentius likewise (book On the Faith to Peter, ch. 33, 34, 35) puts this among those dogmas which are to be held most firmly and without any doubt.¹⁵¹ But also Gregory, book 25 (Moralia, ch. 8): "It must be noted," he says, "that while some, as others fall, are said to be made firm for the stadium, the number of the elect is shown to be certain and defined," and so on.¹⁵² The same is the doctrine of Bernard (Sermon 3 on "Missus est"), and of Hugh, question 220 (On the Epistle to the Romans), of Honorius in the Dialogue (On Predestination), and of others.¹⁵³ Moreover, St. Thomas sets it forth learnedly and scholastically (I, q. 23, a. 6–7; and De veritate, q. 6, a. 3), solving ten arguments to the contrary; and in a. 4 with the solution of eleven arguments.¹⁵⁴

§ 177. From the things said it is evident that the certainty and immutability of predestination is not taken from prescience alone; but that it presupposes the Divine will (*voluntas divina*), by which He determined from eternity whom He would in time save; and that the number of the predestined is certain to God, not only by reason of knowledge, but by reason of election and of a certain definition, as St. Thomas says (a. 7). For this is what St. Augustine says, in the words mentioned above, that predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly all who are freed, are freed; and what he says (On Correction and Grace, ch. 12), that by Divine grace (*gratia*) the human will is acted upon unturnably and insuperably, that it may not fail; for what the grace of God works in time, that was by His will, that thus it should be, decreed from eternity. But the same must be said correspondingly of reprobation; except that the reprobate are preordained to punishment on account of foreseen sin, and that their number is not certain, in relation to the elect, as will be explained below.

§ 178. But from these things the error of Ambrosius Catharinus becomes clear, who wishes the said certainty of predestination and reprobation not to be understood of all those who are saved or damned, but only of certain more remarkable ones in each kind; thinking that all the rest are saved or damned by the election of free choice, in such wise that God did not predefine but only foreknew their salvation or destruction; which, to be silent about the others, as regards the predestined, openly fights with what was said by St. Augustine and approved by the votes of all theologians who think well: that from the very predestination of God all who are freed, that is, all who are saved, are most certainly freed; and consequently not only those whom Catharinus imagines to have been peculiarly elected.

§ 179. Now from the things said above this also follows, that neither from a predestined [man] can anyone become reprobate, nor from a reprobate [man] predestined; for if this were to happen, the eternal purpose of God would be changed, which is impossible. For such ways of speaking as signify that it can happen that someone by God at some time predestined is afterwards reprobated; or that someone at some time reprobated is afterwards predestined: in this matter a change of will and decree is clearly contained. Nevertheless you would rightly say that one predestined can be reprobate, and conversely, in a divided sense (*sensus divisus*); because he who is predestined could from eternity be reprobated: indeed, and can be reprobated, because in God's eternity there is no succession of time; which way of speaking St. Thomas seems to grant (a. 6, ad 3), writing thus: "Hence it is not necessary to say that God can not predestine him whom He has predestined,

taking [the proposition] in the composite sense (*in sensu composito*); although absolutely considered He can." But this proposition—"the predestined can become reprobate," or conversely—although it can admit this true interpretation: "This man" (pointing out the predestined) "can become reprobate," that is, can be reprobated by God, because assuredly from eternity he could and can be reprobated; since there is no succession of time in God; still this seems rather to signify what those propositions signify: "From a predestined one someone can become reprobate," or, "someone previously predestined can afterwards become reprobate"; which, since they are false, it is fitting also to deny that former [proposition] as false.

§ XXII — The solution of the things objected against the said certainty (Solutio eorum, quae contra dictam certitudinem objiciuntur)

§ 180. Certain persons attack the certainty and immutability of predestination (*praedestinatio*) and of divine reprobation (*reprobatio*) with these and similar arguments. First. Some can be blotted out of the book of life. For Moses says in Exod. 32: "Aut dimitte eis hanc noxam, aut dele me de libro tuo, quem scripsisti." Nay, and sometimes some are blotted out, according to that prophetic imprecation Ps. 68: "Deleantur de libro viventium." Whence also the Lord, answering Moses: "Qui peccaverit mihi, delebo eum de libro meo." Now Augustine (in the exposition of that Psalm) understands this book to be the catalogue of those predestined to the kingdom, as also it is taken (Rev. 20). Second. Some can be added to the same number, Moses saying Deut. 1: "Dominus addat ad hunc numerum multa millia"; which the Ordinary Gloss interprets of the number defined with God, who knows who are His, who numbers the multitude of the stars. Third. That this addition is made, is proved by that of Ps. 39: "Annunciavi, et locutus sum: multiplicati sunt super numerum"; where again Augustine, expounding that place, understands the "number" as the number of those predestined to the heavenly Jerusalem. Fourth. In Ps. 17, where it is said: "Cum electo electus eris": therefore from being reprobate you will become elect by conversing with the elect. Fifth. Paul is afraid lest from being elect he become reprobate, when he says 1 Cor. 9: "Ne forte, cum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar." Whence Gregory, book 29 (*Moralia*, ch. 9), writes that the Apostle, saying this, feared to be reprobated even after he had been called. Sixth. Catharinus objects that, of those who are given to Christ by the Father, sometimes some perish; Christ saying to the Father, Jn. 17: "Ex his, quos dedisti mihi, nemo perit, nisi filius perditionis": therefore the number of those who are saved is not certain and defined. Seventh. Peter attests (2 Pet. 1) that by good works we make our calling and election sure; therefore without them it was uncertain. Eighth. Rev. 7: besides the number of one hundred forty-four thousand of the sealed, John saw "a great multitude, which no man could number" of nations—and therefore, above the number of the elect, whom he wishes to be understood by the sealed, many and innumerable, that is, comprehended by no defined number, will be saved. Ninth. Rev. 11: John is commanded to measure the temple of God and the adorers therein, by whom the elect are signified. But the court, which is without the temple, he is forbidden to measure: therefore at least the reprobate, whom that court signifies as to be cast forth, are not measured, that is, numbered with God. Tenth. The Church prays God in the Canon of the Mass that He "deign to command us to be numbered in the flock of His elect." And in the prayer for the living and for the dead, that "the book of predestination retain their names written": therefore some can be added to the number of the elect. Likewise the Church prays: "Absolve the souls of the faithful departed from every bond of sins, that in the glory of the resurrection, raised up, they may breathe among thy holy elect." Eleventh. Predestination can be helped by the prayers of the Saints, as St. Thomas teaches (q. 23, a. 8); and that common saying is widespread: "If you are not predestined, pray that

you may be predestined," taken, as I think, from what Augustine has (Tract. 26 on John): "If you are not drawn, pray that you may be drawn." Therefore someone can from not being predestined become predestined, if either he himself pray for himself, or others pray for him. Twelfth. More, or fewer, can be saved, or damned, than are saved or damned. Therefore the number of the elect and of the reprobate can be increased, diminished, changed. For the elect and those to be saved are the same, [and so are] the reprobate and those to be damned. Thirteenth. Although the number of the elect be certain, yet the numbered themselves are not certain; since a change of the elect can be made with the reprobate—when some elect fall away, others from the reprobate succeed into their place—according to that of the Apostle (Rev. 3): "Tene quod habes, ut nemo accipiat coronam tuam." Which also Augustine seems to wish (On Correction and Grace, ch. 13), when he cites that same place: "If," he says, "another is not going to receive it, unless this one lose it, the number is certain." Fourteenth. If the number of the elect is certain and defined with God from eternity, even as regards the very persons numbered; therefore, whatever they may do, they will be saved; because what from eternity has been fixed and decreed cannot now be changed: and consequently all endeavor and study of good works and care of obtaining salvation is taken away. The same can be objected on the contrary about the reprobate; for in vain do they toil to salvation, if already from eternity their sentence of damnation is defined with God. Therefore not without cause someone may say what is wont here to be said by some: If I am predestined, whatever I may do, I shall obtain salvation; if reprobated, whatever I may do, I shall not escape damnation. Finally. A scruple is stirred from the doctrine of St. Thomas, according to whom the number of the reprobate does not seem to be absolutely predefined by God; for (a. 7, in the body), from the comparison of the parts of the whole universe, of which some are principal, others secondary, he teaches that the number of the predestined is indeed certain, not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a certain principal predefinition; but that thus the same is not altogether the case about the number of the reprobate, who seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect, to whom all things cooperate unto good. And there he also compares the number of the reprobate to the number of oxen or gnats, or of some suchlike, which he says is not per se preordained by God; which place also is produced by some to prove, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, that corruptible singulars are not immediately provided for by God, but only through the mediation of the provision of species, for the conservation of which they are destined.

§ 181. But to all these things we reply. And to the first indeed: it is not amiss that by the book of life is understood a catalogue, or enrollment, that is, a firm knowledge in the mind of God of those who are ordained to eternal life. But one must know that some are ordained to eternal life simply by predestination, of whom therefore no one can be blotted out of the book of life; but some are ordained to it in a qualified sense, by present justice. And in this way all those are blotted out of the book of life who lose justice. Thus St. Thomas explains this matter (I, q. 24, a. 3).¹⁵⁶ Although the place of the Psalm can be taken negatively, according to that which immediately precedes, "Et non intrent in justitiam tuam"; and that which immediately follows, "Et cum justis non scribantur": so that the sense be: let them not be found written in the book of life, nor be of the number of those who are going to receive eternal life. Which sense is confirmed from this, that they were not just but wicked, of whom the Psalmist speaks; whence neither according to present justice were they written in the book of life, so as to be blotted thence by losing justice; unless perhaps according to the opinion of men; in which way the verse of the psalm is expounded by the Ordinary Gloss; although St. Thomas less approves that response. Moreover that same Augustine understands by the book of life the book of predestination: but he says that some are to be blotted out of it, not those who were written there, but those who thought themselves written there, namely when at length it will be evident that they are

not written there. But as to what Moses says: "Dele me de libro tuo"; some interpret [it] of the book of the living in this world, in this sense: "Tolle me ex hac vita," as Eliseus was saying, "Tolle animam meam" (3 Kgs 19); and as Moses himself elsewhere: "Obsecro, ut interficias me" (Num. 11). Others understand the book of the friends of God; from which, however, Moses did not ask absolutely to be expunged, but only disjunctively, saying: "Aut dimitte eis, aut dele me"; so that, the latter being removed—because he knew that God would not do this without his grave fault—he might more effectually obtain pardon for the people, who had grievously sinned.

§ 182. To the second. Moses speaks of the number of the Israelite people, which he vehemently wishes to be increased. But the Gloss transfers that to the mystical sense, not so that to the number of the elect others may be added as elect—for this is contrary even to the Gloss itself, which confesses, and proves by the words of the Apostle, that the number of the elect is defined—but so that to the number of the elect many not-elect may be added, who by faith, or even by a certain temporary justice, are to be [found] in the Church of God as if in one people. Which solution suits also the third argument; for many are in the Church who are not elect; and by this they are above the number of the elect. Although in that verse of the psalm, because for the masculine gender "multiplicati," one can read the feminine or the neuter from the Greek; the multiplication can be referred not to men, but to the marvelous works of God, or His thoughts, of which there had been mention in the preceding verse.

§ 183. To the fourth it is answered that those words of the Psalm are not said to man, but to God, who "with the elect," that is, with men whole and pure, is "elect," that is, excellent in goodness, when He shows Himself to be good and benign, according to that: "Quam bonus Israel Deus iis, qui recto sunt corde"; for there God is considered as a just rewarder.

§ 184. To the fifth. To be "reprobate" in Paul does not mean to be destined to destruction, but in fact to be rejected, to be condemned, to be cast into the exterior darkness, which are the effects of eternal reprobation. The same also "to be reprobated" signifies in the words of Gregory. Or the sense of the Apostle is "reprobis efficiar," that is, "reprobis inveniar"; as Jerome expounds (in the Epitaph of Paula).¹⁵⁷ The former sense, however, pleases more.

§ 185. But it is only placed by a very common Hebrew phrase in the Scriptures. For thus Naaman says in 4 Kgs 5: "Thy servant will not henceforth make a holocaust to foreign gods, except to the Lord," that is, but only to the Lord. Thus Paul to the Galatians, ch. 2: "Man is not justified by works of the law, except by the faith of Jesus Christ." And John in Rev. 21: "Nothing defiled shall enter into it, except those who are written in the book of life of the Lamb," and countless other things. So in this place the sense is: Of those whom Thou hast given me, no one has perished, but only Judas perished, whom Thou didst not give me; but he was the son of perdition, that is, destined to perdition; whence also (ch. 18) this sentence of the Lord is repeated by the Evangelist absolutely, when he says: "That the word might be fulfilled which he spoke, that of those whom Thou hast given me I have not lost any one of them."

§ 186. To the seventh. We make our calling and election sure by good works, not for God but for ourselves; because, as John says, 1 Jn. 3: "If our heart does not reproach us, we have confidence toward God," and with a certain moral certainty we know that we are of the number of the elect. For to apply oneself earnestly to good works and carefully to avoid sins are the chief signs of divine election.

§ 187. To the eighth it is answered that by the 144,000 are signified those who are to be saved from the Israelite people, or, as it says there, "from every tribe of the sons of Israel"; but by the innumerable multitude it signifies the elect from the Gentiles. For this too follows: "From every nation, and peoples, and tongues." But also from elsewhere it is clear that the elect are gathered from all nations, the Lord Himself attesting in Matt. 25: "And they shall gather His elect from the four winds," etc. And all these are sealed on their foreheads, and not only those 144,000, as is easily proved from that passage. They are called innumerable, not as if their number were not defined in the eternal predestination of God, but because, in comparison with the elect from the Jews, the number of the elect from the Gentiles is as it were infinite.

§ 188. To the ninth. John is commanded to cast out the court which is outside the temple, and not to measure it; because although the number of the reprobate, just as of the elect, is certain and defined with God, nevertheless they are not said to be numbered by God, because God with His special providence does not care for them, but neglects, rejects, reprobates them. For one is said to have in the numbered what he loves, and diligently cares for, and for which he has singular providence above other things. Origen writes in Homily 1 (on Numbers) that those who perish are said by Solomon to be innumerable, but all those who are saved to be numbered—plainly with reference to that of Ecclesiastes 1: "The number of fools is infinite"; as if this were said not only because, in comparison with the wise, they are very numerous and as it were innumerable, but also because there is not on God's part for them that singular care which there is for the wise.¹⁴⁷ From which answer it is also understood why one does not say "book of death" as one says "book of life." For although it could not badly be understood by "book of death" the perfect knowledge of those to be damned, just as by "book of life" the perfect knowledge of those to be saved, nevertheless, since one is not wont to have care for evil and vile things, nor to write down the number of such, therefore neither does Scripture so speak as to name a "book of death"; of which matter St. Thomas assigns the reason (a. 1, q. 24, reply to obj. 3).¹⁵⁸

§ 189. To the tenth and eleventh, that by prayers of this sort we do not ask that the eternal purpose of God be changed, but we put the cause in place of the effect, praying that God convert us or others to Himself, and confirm us in holy conversation, and lead us to eternal happiness—these are the effects of divine predestination. Wherefore to say, "If you are not predestined, pray that you may be predestined," is nothing other than to say, "If as yet you do not perceive in yourself the effects and signs of predestination—which are chiefly good works—pray to God and labor that you may obtain them." Nor is that to be understood otherwise which is said, that predestination can be helped by the prayers of the Saints. For it is helped not as regards the preordination itself, which is in God from eternity, but as regards certain of its effects, which are obtained by the prayers of the Saints and other pious works, all of which nevertheless are subject to the same providence of God, infallibly directing man to salvation. For man's salvation is so predestined by God that, under the order of predestination, there also falls whatever promotes him to salvation, whether it be his own prayers, or those of others, or anything else whatever; as St. Thomas learnedly declares in that very place which was alleged in the argument.¹⁵⁹

§ 190. To the twelfth. We rightly say, in a divided sense, that more or fewer than these who are elect or reprobate can be saved or damned, because those who are elect can be not elect, and reprobates similarly; but we do not rightly say that the number of the elect or of the reprobate can be increased or diminished. For it signifies that afterwards it can become greater or smaller, which is repugnant to the immutability of the divine will, as was shown above.

§ 191. To the thirteenth. Although that only proves the certitude of the number even of the thing numbered, just as the words of Augustine adduced do; nevertheless the latter point has been sufficiently proved both from Scripture and from Augustine. In the Apocalypse understand "thy crown" as the crown of present justice owed, as if he were saying: Nothing will be cut off from the number of the elect; and do not you fail from the crown owed to it, because if you will have lost your crown, another will receive it. Yet some understand that passage of the adversary taking away the crown, while by the temptation of sin he impels into ruin and damnation; for it is not said "let him receive," etc., as it is commonly cited, but "let no one," or as it is in the Greek, "let no one receive thy crown," that is, let no one despoil thee of thy crown—which is proper to the devil; in the Gospel he is said to "take away" and to "snatch away" what has been sown in the hearts of the hearers (Matt. 13; Mk. 4). Nor indeed does that seem true which St. Thomas says in resolving this argument, namely that God does not permit some to fall without raising up others in their stead—especially if you refer this precisely to the number. For many fall, and few are raised up. Often even whole kingdoms fail, to which no others are substituted. And at the end of the age very many will fall away from the faith, while very few will remain unconquered, as is signified (Matt. 24 and elsewhere). But let this, as it happens, be referred to the inscrutable judgments of God.

§ 192. (a) But St. Thomas in that place does not seem to have said this, but only to have meant it so far as concerns the quantity of glory: that is, by the eternal decree of Divine Providence, to those who have fallen—although innumerable—there ought to be substituted for those who have fallen [...] for example, that eight rather than a hundred would have had it, if they had been substituted. Certainly the words of St. Thomas in that place do not indicate number; they are these: (to the first) "And in one way from divine predestination; and of grace, that we may be numbered, in a certain manner [...] following mortal sin. Another way [...] for God indeed permits some to fall, who are [...] innumerable; and He will make others stand in their place—men, and in the place of the Jews the Gentiles. He who receives the crown of one who falls receives it inasmuch as he is substituted in his place," etc.—of St. Thomas; in which words concerning subrogation [...] [the text here is corrupt]. "He will crush many, and [...] and He will make others stand in their place," according to that of Job: "He will crush many, and [...] and He will make others stand in their place." Thus, in the place of the fallen Angels the Saints have been substituted. But one substituted in the state of grace even as regards [...] in the eternal life you will rejoice in the goods which another does. These things, however, as to the number, indeed nothing [...] [the text here is corrupt].¹⁶⁰

§ 193. To the fourteenth it is answered that by the certitude of predestination (*praedestinatio*) solicitude in living well, and the hope of obtaining salvation through good works, are in no way taken away, but rather that these are made more stable by it. These things are from Augustine; for such are the effects and signs of predestination, through which God wills to lead man to salvation as to the ultimate effect of predestination, and the same salvation He gives to man as it were prognostics. On this account, says St. Thomas (q. 23, a. 8), it must be noted for doing good works and praying; because by effects of predestination of this sort certitudinally it is brought to fulfillment; according to that of Peter: "Strive by good works to make your calling and election sure." But what they say: "If I am predestined, whatever I shall do," etc.—this is not rightly but rather falsely said. For it is not that he who is predestined will be saved whatever he shall do, whether well or ill; although it is true and most certain that he will be saved. But just as by predestination eternal life is prepared, so too are the means prepared, so that he may not do just anything, but may perseveringly do what is good. By reprobation, however, eternal death is prepared—not to one doing just anything, but to one persevering in evil; and in almost this very way those harmful sophistries, which Prosper and Hilary report as

having often been objected by the foolish against Augustine's doctrine of predestination, are repelled by Augustine himself (in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 14 and the following).¹⁶¹

§ 194. Finally, to the scruple which is raised last from the doctrine of St. Thomas, it is answered that he by no means denies that the number of the reprobate is predetermined by God. For when he denies (I, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1) that, as to number precisely, a crown taken from some is given to others, he means this only as to degree, that when some fall from the state of grace there are substituted some to whom the whole glory and all its degrees, which were owed to the others, are given. From this, however, it does not follow that they are equal in number; for nothing prevents our saying that all the glory and all its degrees which a hundred would have had, if they had remained, are received by one who is as it were put in their place [...]. Just as in that comparison which he adduces he does not deny that the number of the drops of rain and of the sand of the sea is predetermined by God, likewise of oxen and gnats, etc. But he teaches that the election of the predestined (to use his very words) stands in the manner of a certain principal predefinition. For the understanding of which matter it must be noted—as in the same place St. Thomas teaches—that God has indeed preordained all things from eternity, but that some things were ordained principally, others secondarily, to the good of the universe. Principally, as the essential parts of the world, such as the celestial spheres, the stars, the elements, the species of mixed bodies—whatever, namely, have in some way an order to perpetuity. Secondarily, as corruptible individuals, in which the good of the species is preserved. Thus, therefore, of those things which are principally ordained to the good of the universe, the number also, per se, as St. Thomas speaks—that is, principally and primarily—has been preordained by God; but the number of the others is not per se but secondarily—that is, on account of another thing, which is per se ordained to the perfection of the universe—predefined by God. "For so many of this sort," he says, "has Divine Providence produced as suffice for the conservation of the species." There is some like consideration in the elect and the reprobate. For the elect are principally ordained to the good of the universe, namely to the glory of God, inasmuch as they attain to beatitude itself; but the reprobate secondarily, inasmuch as they are for the sake of the elect, for whom all things work together unto good; whence St. Thomas rightly concludes that the number of the elect is certain to God by way of a certain principal predefinition, but not so the number of the reprobate; not denying in the meantime, but rather by the same words signifying, that the number of these also is certain to God by way of a certain predefinition, although not a principal one. And why this same doctrine of St. Thomas does not take away the immediate provision of singular corruptible things is easy to show from those things which were said above in the higher distinction concerning the immediate providence of things.¹⁶²

§ XXIII — What is the number of the elect and of the reprobate (Quis sit numerus electorum, & reproborum)

§ 195. A certain and definite number of the elect, as also of the reprobate, has not been revealed to the Church by God; nor are there probable [arguments that] there are. Wherefore it would be rash to establish anything on this point, whether the discourse be about men or about Angels, both elect and reprobate.

§ 196. This ignorance therefore being posited and confessed, some have said that out of men as many are to be saved as Angels fell. In this opinion is St. Anselm (book 2, *Cur Deus homo*, ch. 16).¹⁶⁴ Which a reason seems to confirm, because, as the Fathers teach, man was created to repair the Angelic nature. Wherefore out

of men there seem to be taken up to the heavenly fatherland as many as Angels fell. But the weakness of this argument we shall declare in its place, namely at dist. 6, book 2.

§ 197. But some are thought to hold that as many out of men are to be saved as Angels remained, so that the number of elect men may be equal to the elect Angels. Thus Gregory thinks in Homily 34 on the Gospels, with an argument taken from Deut. 32, where according to the Seventy it is thus read: "He set the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the Angels of God." Which argument, however, Rupert well solves in book 3 (On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chs. 20, 22).¹⁶⁵

§ 198. Others have said that as many out of men are to be saved as Angels fell, and moreover as many as were Angels created. To which opinion, so far as I know, no probable reason or authority lends support, although St. Thomas mentions it.¹⁶⁶

§ 199. Furthermore, St. Augustine (Enchiridion 29) says that that supreme City is not to be defrauded of the multitude of its citizens, and perhaps will reign even with a richer abundance. Which indeed thus stands; therefore there are more elect men than reprobate Angels.¹⁶⁶ But all opinions of this sort are propped up by arguments so weak that it is better, concerning this matter—removed as it is most far from our knowledge—to suspend judgment altogether. Whence St. Thomas (q. 23, a. 7), after enumerating the three aforesaid opinions, subjoining his own says: "But it is better said that the number of the elect to be placed in heavenly felicity is known to God alone," as the prayer of the Church has it. Which very thing those sentences also will it: "The Lord knows who are His" (2 Tim. 2); "I know My sheep" (Jn. 10); "I know whom I have chosen" (Jn. 13); and the like.

§ 200. Wherefore neither do we judge that that is true which is read in Augustine (Enchiridion 62), namely that the holy Angels have been taught by God what number of supplement from the human race the integrity of that supernal City awaits. For if the Angels knew this, then the number of the elect would no longer be known to God alone.¹⁶⁷

§ 201. Nor is it to be sought by curious investigation whether, for example, more men or women are saved; the married or the celibate; laymen or ecclesiastics. Assertions of questions of this sort, to one side or the other, Alphonsus de Castro rightly numbers among rash ones, that is, those which are utterly lacking in authority and reason (book 1 On the Punishment of Heretics, ch. 3).¹⁶⁸

§ 202. But this is said neither falsely nor rashly, but much too truly, that the number of the reprobate is far greater than that of the elect, if the whole human race be considered. This matter is clearly evident. For from the beginning of the human race down to Christ there were very few in the whole world who were worshipers of the true God; nor, however, were all these good. And although after the coming of Christ the true Religion began to be widely diffused, nevertheless in all ages and at all times up to this day there have been more unbelievers than believers.

§ 203. Moreover, among the faithful themselves there are more evil than good, and hence more reprobate than elect—so that we may say nothing of experience, which in a matter of this sort can be deceptive in either direction—this is taught both by Scripture and by the authority of the Fathers. For concerning the faithful, that is, those aggregated to the Church, it was said by the Lord: "Many are called, but few are elect" (Matt. 20); as Gregory understood that passage in book 25 of the Morals, ch. 8, adducing also other testimonies of Scripture for that matter.¹⁵² And the Lord seems to have signified this same thing in Lk. 13, when to one asking whether those who are saved are few He answered: "Strive to enter by the narrow gate, for many seek to

enter and shall not be able." For this likewise appears to have been said of the faithful. For the unbelievers, since they do not recognize the narrow gate, do not seek to enter through it. The Apostle also, speaking of the faithful: "All," he says, "seek the things that are their own," that is, the greater part of all (Phil. 2). To which that of Jerome on Gal. 5 agrees: "The possession of charity is rare."¹⁶⁹ Plainly too Gregory in Homily 38 (on the Gospels) says that in the Church there are many bad, few good. And he proves that from the figures and parables of Sacred Scripture, as of the ark, in which the clean animals were few in comparison to the unclean; and of the threshing floor, in which there is much more chaff than wheat. The same affirms Bede (on Lk. 3). Nor indeed is any of the Fathers found who has written the contrary.¹⁷⁰ But if the Fathers thought thus of the Church, there is now no doubt that, in general—as we were saying, that is, in the whole human race—since it is established that outside the Church no one can be saved.

§ 204. Moreover, Thomas proves this (above, reply to obj. 3) by a reason of this sort: because although a good proportioned to the common state of nature happens in the many and fails, as it were, in the few; the case is otherwise as to a good exceeding the common state of nature. For this is found, as it were, in the few, and fails, as it were, in the many. To this reason is subordinated another which is taken from the difficulty of the good leading to salvation; the cause of which difficulty is the proneness to evil and the ignorance of the good introduced into the human race by the sin of the first parent.¹⁷¹ Hence therefore it was most truly said by Christ in Matt. 7: "Broad is the gate and wide the way that leads to perdition, and many there are who enter by it. But narrow is the gate and strait is the way that leads to life, and few there are who find it." Of which also in 4 Esdras, ch. 8, it is read thus: "Many indeed are created, but few shall be saved." But more vehement is that in ch. 9: "There are more who perish than who shall be saved, as the drop multiplies [i.e., as tears multiply] over a drop." And in ch. 10: "That almost all walk into perdition." Although of that book, as being apocryphal, there is not sure authority. However, this doctrine is useful, that, in so great a fewness of the elect, each one may understand with how great solicitude, by living well, he ought to work out his salvation, that he may be found among those few.

§ XXIV — That no one in this life is certain about his own predestination or reprobation (Neminem in hac vita certum esse de sua praedestinatione vel reprobatione)

§ 205. It belongs to the condemned doctrines of the sectaries to assert that every Christian ought to have it persuaded to himself for certain that he is predestined (*praedestinatio*), and among the number of those to be saved, namely with that certitude to which falsehood cannot be annexed; for that teaching is contrary both to Scripture and to the Fathers and to the sense of the whole Church. Scripture is wont to attribute the knowledge of our predestination to God alone, as when the Lord says: "I know whom I have chosen," and the Apostle: "The Lord has known who are his," and wherever the knowledge of things future and contingent is attributed to God alone, as of things hidden.¹⁷² Among which things, for many reasons, the future state of each individual man is to be counted—on account, namely, of the mutability of free will, the frailty of fallen nature, the greatness and frequency of temptations from the flesh, the world, the devil, the secret of the Divine counsel, and the rest. Hence too Ecclesiasticus forbids the inquiry into matters of this sort as vain and harmful, saying: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy strength; but the things God has commanded thee, think on them always," and what follows.¹⁷³ For the knowledge of

the way that leads to the glory of the elect ought to be sufficient for each one; which way, if he hold fast to it, he will most certainly come to where it leads; now that way is the way of the commandments of God. Hither pertain all those utterances of Scripture which exhort man, even after however great a progress in justice, to fear and solicitude, and forbid him to be secure: "Blessed is the man that is always fearful," says Solomon; and Micah, ch. 6: "The Lord requires of thee, walking solicitous with thy God."¹⁷⁴ Hence so often in the Psalms and elsewhere those who fear the Lord are praised and proclaimed blessed. And the Apostle's exhortation in Phil. 2 is well known, that each should "work out his salvation with fear and trembling"; "For," he says, "it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish according to his good will": that is to say, your salvation depends on God's grace and good pleasure, and therefore you are not secure about it; for we are not certain what God will do, unless He reveal it to us. Whence also in Rom. 11, from the will of God inscrutable to us, the same Apostle rendered the reason why we ought to fear: "Thou standest by faith; be not high-minded, but fear. For if God hath not spared the natural branches, perhaps neither will He spare thee," and so forth.¹⁷⁵ Hither also pertain those Scriptures which deny that a man can know what is going to happen to him in the future. Of which, first of all, is that of Ecclesiastes 9: "Man knows not whether he be worthy of love or of hatred; but all things are kept uncertain for the future." Which is most fittingly taken of eternal hatred or love; just as that, "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated": for anyone who knowingly commits mortal sin knows himself to be worthy of present hatred. I call it present hatred, which is considered according to present injustice, not that God is changed from love into hatred. Moreover, since we are not certain about our present justice, as can be shown in many ways (which proof we remit to the matter on justification), much less shall we be certain about future and persevering justice. For in every kind, the things that are future are less certain than things present. We have an example of both in the Apostle Paul, saying: "I am conscious to myself of nothing; yet am I not hereby justified." Of the future, truly, ch. 9: "Lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself become reprobate."¹⁷⁶

§ 206. As to the Fathers, it is superfluous to heap up testimonies here, since they are innumerable; of which, however, we shall indicate some from St. Augustine. There is also a certain notable place to be marked in St. Gregory (Hom. 38 on the Gospels), where he says thus: "That we have been called, we know; whether we are elect, we do not know," adding a twofold reason: one from the instability of our state; the other from the will of God, because, he says, no one knows what is being transacted about himself in the hidden judgments of God.¹⁷⁷ But the reason why God has willed our predestination to be hidden from us, St. Augustine gives as this: lest by the revelation of so great a matter the human mind be puffed up and grow insolent, or certainly lest it grow torpid in the pursuit of good works, secure about the reward. Things of this sort are read in him, in Book 11 of the City of God, ch. 12; in the book On Correction and Grace, chs. 13 and 16; and in On the Gift of Perseverance, chs. 8 and 13.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, to one asking why God does not also remove the very danger of becoming proud (which can likewise be asked about torpor), the same St. Augustine replies at length (in the book On Nature and Grace, ch. 27 and some following). The sum of whose reply is this: that God, as the best physician, procures man's health through determinate means according to the order of His wisdom, who would not will to take away from Paul, although asked a third time, the sting of the flesh lest he be exalted; and yet, without that remedy, He could, if He willed, preserve the virtue of humility in His Apostle. Thus too in the predestined He willed to leave a health-giving fear, as a medicine for pride and sloth; although these evils, if He willed, He could avert from them, or heal, even by the mere nod of His will.¹⁷⁹ Since therefore this has been, and always was, the doctrine of the Church about the uncertainty of our predestination, the Fathers of the Council of Trent rightly teach (Session 6, ch. 12) that no mortal ought

so far to presume concerning the hidden mystery of the divine predestination as to determine for certain that he is altogether in the number of the predestined; for they say: Unless by special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen for Himself. And ch. 13: Let no one promise himself something certain by an absolute and infallible certitude concerning the gift of perseverance—which belongs to the elect alone—but let him "work out his salvation with fear and trembling"; which doctrine thereafter (can. 15 and 16) they confirm.¹⁸⁰

§ 207. For that to some at some time their predestination has been revealed is not to be denied: as to Peter, as he himself indicates (2 Pet. 1); and to Paul, as St. Augustine gathers from his words (2 Tim., last chapter); and to the Thief, to whom it was said by the Lord: "This day thou shalt be with me in Paradise"; and to Stephen, when he saw the heavens opened to him, of whom the Church chants: "He saw, he entered in; blessed the man to whom the heavens lay open"; and to some others to whom likewise Christ is read to have appeared shortly before death, as also to some martyrs in their last agony.¹⁸¹ But to those to whom God granted this, to those same He also bestowed so great a benefit of His grace that they neither fell into elation because their election was known, nor grew torpid from good work.

§ 208. Conversely too, although reprobation (*reprobatio*) is altogether certain for no one, however evil and perverse, in this life: nevertheless to some even that seems to have been revealed; as to Judas, to whom it was said: "It were good for that man if he had not been born": for although he did not at once believe the words of the Lord, yet afterwards, the crime of treachery perpetrated, remembering them he seems to have conceived despair of salvation; although it can be doubted whether God then revealed it to him, or rather Judas, merely mindful of the Lord's words, conceived despair in his soul, his conscience torturing him for so great a crime. A like example is read in Gregory, Dialogues, Book 4, ch. 38, and in Bede, Ecclesiastical History, Book 5, chs. 14 and 15.¹⁸² Yet to these there is not to be numbered what in Jn. 8 the Lord is read to have said to the Jews: "You shall die in your sin"; both because the Jews to whom this was being said did not have faith in Christ; and because it is clear from the fact that a little after it is repeated and explained with a condition added that that sentence was only menacing: "I said to you," He says, "that you shall die in your sins. For if you believe not that I am he, you shall die in your sin." From which words it sufficiently appears that the Lord did not will simply to take from them the hope of salvation.¹⁸³ So too, on the contrary, in that which was said to the Apostles in Matt. 19, "You who have followed me shall sit upon twelve seats," it is not to be thought that the twelve Apostles had their predestination revealed; for among those twelve at that time was Judas. Wherefore even there a condition is understood, if you remain in that which you profess. For the Lord only willed to signify what reward they are to receive who, leaving all things, follow Him. And similarly one must judge concerning that which was said by the Lord to the same Apostles in Lk. 22: "I dispose to you a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel": for at the same Supper at which these things were said, the Lord terrified Peter, saying: "If I wash thee not, thou shalt have no part with me." He terrified also the others when He said: "If you know these things, blessed shall you be if you do them," and straightway subjoins: "I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen," Jn. 13.¹⁸⁴ Much less, therefore, in those words uttered long before: "Rejoice, because your names are written in heaven," Lk. 10, is such a revelation of predestination contained—especially because those words were spoken not to the Apostles but to the seventy Disciples; of whom, both by reason of rank and of number, it is much less credible than of the Apostles that they had already at that time received the revelation of their predestination; for if of the twelve Apostles one fell, how much more credible is it that one or more of the seventy-two Disciples fell? Wherefore more rightly, as to the inscription, the words of the Lord are taken as said according to present

justice, in the way that elsewhere often in the Scriptures some are said to be written in the book of life. In which way too it was said by St. Augustine (on the exposition of Ps. 130) that the names of all good Christians are written in heaven.¹⁸⁵ Nor yet does the Lord universally say: "Rejoice because the names of you all," and so on, but only, "because your names." Whence neither could the seventy Disciples be certain about their present justice from those words, any more than the twelve Apostles from those words, Jn. 13: "You are clean, but not all." From which it is clear that Cajetan is mistaken (in his Commentary) when he asserts that from those words of the Lord, "Rejoice," and so on, it is clearly had that all the seventy Disciples were predestined, and already are blessed, and in this respect the college of the seventy Disciples was better than that of the twelve Apostles, of whom one perished; for these things, as we have now shown, have no probability.¹⁸⁶ More on the uncertainty of predestination and of our salvation may be seen (at Dist. 41, where it is treated).

§ XXV — The solution of certain objections (*Quarundam objectionum solutio*)

§ 209. Now it must briefly be replied to certain arguments of the adversaries, by which they contend that each of the faithful certainly knows his own election (*electio*). They are of this sort. First. The Apostle in Rom. 8, in the person of any believer, says assertively: "I am sure that neither death, nor life, etc., nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God" — for St. Augustine also applies the Apostle's words to each and every just man (writing on Ps. 7).¹⁸⁷ Second. The same Apostle (1 Cor. 2) says that we know the things that are given to us by God. Now among them is the gift of perseverance (*perseverantia*).¹⁸⁸ Third. The same (1 Thess. 1) says that he knows the election of others when he says: "Knowing, brethren beloved of God, your election"; wherefore, much more can each one know his own election; for each one sees his own conscience better than another's.¹⁸⁹ Fourth. (1 Jn. 3) it is said: "And in this we know that he abides in us [by] the Spirit which he has given us." And ch. 4: "In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us: because he has given us of his Spirit." Now to abide signifies perseverance. And ch. 5: "He that believes in the Son of God, has the testimony of God in himself." And straightway, explaining what sort this testimony is, he subjoins: "And this is the testimony, that God has given to us eternal life."¹⁹⁰ Fifth. Origen, Hom. 2 (on Leviticus), says that he who offers saving victims is without a doubt already conscious of his own salvation.¹⁹¹ Sixth. St. Augustine, in the exposition of Ps. 88 (serm. 2, on that verse: "But my mercy I will not scatter from him"): "Each one," he says, "is of necessity scourged for his sins; but from him, if he is a Christian, God's mercy is not scattered"; and after many things he subjoins: "Hear your security, if you know yourself to be in the members of Christ: I have sworn once," etc., where from the oath of God he wishes each and every Christian to be secure of his salvation.¹⁹² Seventh. John Cassian (Conference 9, ch. 19, explaining that [petition], "Thy kingdom come") speaks thus about the just man: "For he knows by the testimony of his conscience that, when that Kingdom has appeared, straightway he will be its companion."¹⁹³ Eighth. St. Bernard (serm. 2 on Pentecost) affirms that the Holy Spirit imprints on our heart the most certain signs of predestination (*praedestinatio*).¹⁹⁴

§ 210. Wherefore, now let us reply to the proposed question. As to the first, drawn from the Apostle: it was not said in the person of any believer, or of any just man, but of the elect, in whose number the Apostle, with good confidence, reckoned those to whom he was writing. For that those there are elect is clear from the antecedents; from which you gather nothing else than that none of the elect is to be finally separated from the charity (*caritas*) of God. But who are elect the Apostle determined neither of himself nor of others. And if

you refer Augustine's sentence, let it not be so taken that someone could on that account know with certainty that he is predestined (*praedestinatus*); for neither did he learn this very thing with certainty to be so. For Augustine, accommodating those words to the just man, sets the certainty not as infallible but as moral, that is, a great confidence which is engendered by conscience. He also is the [Greek...] commentator.[...] ¹⁹⁶

§ 211. To the second. The Apostle does not say that we know all things, nor that we know certainly and infallibly whatever things have been given us by God. And perseverance itself is not complete so long as the course of this life lasts; it is completed at the end, for it is that which is accomplished in the term. Add that even then the Apostle does not seem to speak of the gifts of grace that makes pleasing (grace of sanctification), but of the mysteries of the Christian religion: it follows, "Which also we speak," etc. Now these are of the Church, and this the faithful can know for certain. ¹⁹⁷

§ 212. To the third. The Apostle is not speaking of individuals, but of the Church of the Thessalonians, which he knew to be elect: because he in no way doubted that some — indeed, many — of that Church were elect.

§ 213. To that which in the fourth place is brought from the 3rd and 1st Epistles of John, I reply: what is there written is to be understood of all the just, that the Spirit abides in them, and that they themselves abide in him. For by this is not signified their perseverance unto the end, but the state and repose in God, and in turn God's indwelling through grace; in the way in which John says of everyone loving Christ: "We will come to him, and we will make a mansion with him." Nor does John speak there of individuals, but rather of the body of the faithful.[...] ¹⁹⁸

§ 214. But to that which is sent in from the fifth chapter, one must say that there the testimony is understood to be concerning the divinity of the Son, borne by the Father; and another testimony is added, [namely that] in those who believe, love, and persevere.[...]

§ 215. To the fifth. Origen means nothing other than that he who offers saving victims, that is, holy works, is not conscious to himself of any sin which would exclude from salvation. Nor does he add "without a doubt" in any other sense, because doubt signifies wavering, which ought to be absent from the confidence of the just man, as not consisting with the moral certainty which we posit in the just.

§ 216. To the sixth. St. Augustine in that place clearly enough declares that he is not speaking about all Christians, but about the elect alone, of whom it is written: "The Lord knows who are his." Insofar, however, as someone is by confidence certain that he is in the number of these, so far he has security of salvation. ¹⁹⁹

§ 217. To the seventh. That testimony of conscience of which Cassian speaks, he does not understand as altogether infallible; and hence he does not denote an infallible knowledge, but a certain confidence of some sort.

§ 218. To the last. The "most certain signs of predestination," in St. Bernard, are called such not as if they could in no way be false for us, but as being most certain in the kind of signs, or of probable conjectures. Now these are imprinted so much the more surely on the hearts of the faithful, the more each one has advanced in the Christian life.

1. St. Thomas, [abbreviation as in source]: "1. par. qu. 23. art. 12..."

2. St. Augustine, De perfectione iustitiae hominis, ch. 13; Enchiridion, ch. 100; De peccatorum meritis et remissione II, ch. 17; De civitate Dei XV, ch. 1; XXI, ch. 24; In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus 14; De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 10.
3. Prosper of Aquitaine, Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum, resp. 14, 15; Sententia 1 ad capitula Gallorum; Responsiones ad objectiones Vincentianas, resp. 10, 11.
4. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum I [throughout the book]; cf. also De duplici praedestinatione Dei [book title as in source].
5. St. Isidore of Seville, De summo bono II, ch. 6.
6. St. Anselm, De concordia gratiae et liberi arbitrii, ch. 7.
7. Honorius [Augustodunensis], Dialogus de praedestinatione, at the beginning and passim.
8. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 17; from the Council of Orange (Arausicanum), canon 25.
9. Prosper of Aquitaine, especially in Responsio ad 14 objectionem Gallorum [as in source].
10. Prosper of Aquitaine, Responsio ad objectionem 13 Gallorum [as in source].
11. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 2.
12. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 4, in corp.
13. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 4–5; St. Thomas, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 9.
14. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 20, a. 2–3.
15. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 1.
16. St. Augustine, [as in source; no specific work cited].
17. St. Thomas, [as in source].
18. St. Thomas, "ubi sup." [abbreviation as in source].
19. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 4.
20. On "purpose" as predestination: Rom. 4; Rom. 9; Eph. 1; 2 Tim. 1.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 7.
22. "Lib. 6. Hypogn. apud Augustinum" [abbreviation as in source].
23. Domingo Bañez, *In Iam*, q. 23, a. 7.
24. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 12.
25. St. Thomas, "ubi supra" [abbreviation as in source].
26. Alexander VIII, condemned theses [abbreviation as in source]. Cf. also: "Timor Gehennae non est supernaturalis" [as in source]. The intervening references to "Attritio ..." are abbreviated in the source.
27. Jansenius, [as in source].
28. St. Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 10.
29. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Ad Monimum, chs. 7 and 9.
30. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XII, ch. 9; XIV, ch. 17.
31. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 3; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 21, aa. 3–4.
32. St. Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14.
33. Marginal note (a): "Jansenius (of Ghent), namely in Part 3, Commentary ch. 101, is altogether to be consulted: for he expounds the parable according to those words. See also Alfonso Salmeron, tract 23, especially no. 35, where he gives another understanding more consonant to the words of Christ the Lord. Likewise, in his Evangelical Harmony and entire evangelical history he admirably sets it out and gathers its various senses from the holy Fathers; and in vol. 7 (of the Commentaries on the evangelical history, tract. sententiae), on 'Many are called, but few chosen,' altogether conformable and answerable to the scope of the parable."

34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 2 (in corp.).
35. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, chs. 7 and 9; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 9; *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 17; adding also *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 9.
36. St. Bernard, *Sermon 2 on the Psalm "Qui habitat"* (on Ps. 90 [91]).
37. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 10.
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2.
39. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, chs. 17–18; St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 7.
40. Dionysius Petavius criticizes this line of reasoning as overly minute and subtle, maintaining that God does not set before Himself works and merits earlier than the reward, but establishes both together and, as it were, indivisibly as the prize to be given; for otherwise, he says, the contrary argument would have force. Since, however, that same resolve cannot in any way be separated from merits and works, he holds that these are included with it. See Petavius, *De theologicis dogmatibus* I, especially books 9–10, where, with some zeal for his own side, as it seems, he arrays the opinions of this Author and of other theologians—above all St. Augustine—together with the passages adduced and compared.
41. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 4.
42. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 24, a. 2; "ad. 9. cap. 22. num. 2" [abbreviation as in source].
43. Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 41.
44. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 98.
45. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 7.
46. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Ad Monimum* I, ch. 13; idem, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 3.
47. St. Leo the Great, *Sermon 2 on the Nativity of the Lord*.
48. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3.
49. Council of Constance, condemnation of certain articles of John Wyclif and John Huss.
50. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, in the body and ad 2.
51. St. Augustine, *City of God* XV, ch. 1; XXI, ch. 24.
52. On God as author of punishment according to the common theological opinion: cf. St. Thomas and the schools, *In II Sent.*, dists. 36–37.
53. Job 40. 103. [as in source].
54. On the Soliloquies attributed to Augustine: the book called *Liber Soliloquiorum*, formerly included among Augustine's works, had long since been counted among the suspect writings and was placed (as the author also hints elsewhere) in an appendix to vol. 9 of the editions of St. Augustine's works by the Maurists; now, however, the Benedictine Fathers of the Congregation of St. Maur, in their edition of the works of St. Augustine prepared by themselves, have rejected that same book among the spurious and relegated it to the appendix of vol. 6, and removed it from the books of the Soliloquies.
55. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, in the body.
56. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 100 (on Ps. 110: "Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius").
57. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* V, ch. 3; *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, chs. 20–21; *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 7; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 20.
58. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1 and ad 3.
59. St. Thomas, *Super Romanos*, cap. 9, lect. 4.
60. St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae*, ch. 142; "in is. quest. 113. art. 6. in corp." [abbreviation as in source].
61. Scotus, *In I Sent.*, dist. 41 [as cited: "supra (Dist. 41. huius libri)"].
62. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* I, part 4, chs. 4–5, 10ff.; idem, *Summa sententiarum*, tract. 1, ch. 13.

63. On the thesis that God wills evil to be (non vult malum, sed vult malum esse), see Hugh of St. Victor, loc. cit.; Estius promises treatment at Distinctio 46.
64. Philip, Abbot of Bonne-Esperance, *De damnatione Salomonis*.
65. Acts 16.
66. St. Augustine, Ep. 105.
67. St. Augustine, Ep. 105: "Quid enim diligebat Deus in Jacob, antequam natus fecisset aliquid boni, nisi gratuitum misericordiae suae donum? aut quid oderat in Esau, antequam natus fecisset aliquid mali, nisi originale peccatum?"
68. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 7; St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 94; St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 7; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chs. 8–9; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione gratiae*, chs. 3, 6, 7, 16.
69. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1; St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*.
70. Cross-reference in Estius: "ad Dist. ..." [abbreviation as in source].
71. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 2: "Qui recedit a iustitia, & alienus a gratia fit: hujus vitae quid nisi in perditionem cadit? Sed non id quod remissum est recidit, nec in originali peccato damnabitur; qui tamen postrema crimina ea morte afficietur, quam propter illa, quae remissa sunt, debebat; quod quia Dei praescientiam nec latuit nec fefellit, sine dubio talem numquam elegit, nec praedestinavit; & perituum numquam ab aeterna perditione discrevit."
72. This accords with St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 74 (see esp. a. 1) and I-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2, on the remission of the guilt of original sin in Baptism while the fomes remains; cf. also Rom. 9; Gen. 32–33; 2 Kgs 8.
73. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 1; idem, *Responsiones ad objectiones Vincentii*, resp. 10. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2.
74. St. Thomas's wording distinguishes "to whom it is not given" from "to whomsoever"; see ST II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1. Cf. also the Council of Trent, Session 5, ch. 5, and Rom. 8:1.
75. The treatise titled *De praedestinatione et gratia* is not by St. Augustine, but by an unknown and not very reliable author.
76. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 2; see also idem, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 1.
77. Ps. 5:5 (Vulg.): "Quoniam non Deus volens iniquitatem es tu."
78. Jas. 1:13.
79. 1 Jn. 1:5.
80. Sir. 15:20.
81. Wis. 14:9.
82. Ps. 5:6.
83. Sir. 15:11, 13 (Vulg. versification varies).
84. Wis. 11:24–26.
85. 1 Jn. 3:8.
86. Jn. 8:44.
87. Rom. 3:6.
88. St. Augustine, *De ordine* I, ch. 1.
89. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*; idem, *Responsiones ad objectiones Vincentii* (esp. resp. 5, 7, 10) [abbreviation as in source].
90. St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium* 53; *Enchiridion* 104; *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2.
91. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De duplici praedestinatione ad Monimum*, chs. 6, 19, 24, 26.
92. Glossae Ordinariae on Rom. 8:29 ("Nam quos praescivit").

93. Council of Orange II (Arausicanum), canon last (cap. ult.).
94. Council of Valence III, ch. 3.
95. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 17.
96. Isidore Clarius, *Narrationes in Sermonem Domini in monte* [abbreviation as in source].
97. "Seu praedestinatorum..." — the extended editorial note cites: Cardinal de Noris, *Historia Pelagiana* II, ch. 15 (on Faustus of Riez/Reggio, bishop); St. Anselm, works, tome 3, to ch. 68 of the *Monologion*; "Auctoritas infallibilis Cathedrae S. Petri" [abbreviation as in source]; Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica Novi Testamenti* [abbreviation as in source]; Denis Petau (Dionysius Petavius), *Theologia Dogmatica* I; "Ecclesiastica Historia, Concilia, etc., cent. v, post Conc." [abbreviation as in source]; Vincent Contenson, *Theologia*, book VIII; Cardinal Caelestinus Sfondrati, "Nodus" [abbreviation as in source]; Henricus [abbreviation as in source]; Appendix to the Fifth Synod, ch. 3 [abbreviation as in source]; Joseph Cardinal de Aguirre, *Comment. in Theol.*, tract. 6, disp. 115; idem, "Aut. 1. disput. 8. sect. 8. subsect. 1. 2. 3" [abbreviations as in source]; Natalis Alexander, book 9, ch. 2, no. 2; Joannes Cabalutius, *Not.*; Arlatense III; dissertation "de Praedestinationis"; Vincentius and Cordis in Appendix to dissertation 3; "Porro Praedestinationis p. 1. §. 1. numer. 10" [abbreviations as in source]. The strings are transmitted in this form in the source; many are corrupt or truncated.
98. The Latin margin notes: "Videtur mendosus hic locus ... Forte lege sicut vasa misericordiae praeparata in gloriam" [abbreviation as in source].
99. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* V, ch. 3.
100. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, chs. 20–21.
101. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 20.
102. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, c. 9, lect. 15, ad illud: "In hoc ipsum excitavi te."
103. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 7.
104. The editor's note in the Latin observes that the author's reply seems obscure in the Douai and Paris editions; the Greek reading is appealed to, and the sense is that the "delivered up" (*traditum*) refers not to Judas's or the Jews' act of betrayal, but to the Father's delivery of the Son unto death for the redemption of the human race.
105. Greek as in the editions cited: "τοῦτον τῇ ὀρισμένη βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ, λαβόντες διὰ χειρῶν ἀνόμων προσηλώσαντες ἀνείλετε." Erasmus translates: "Hunc, cum accepissetis, per manus iniquorum crucifixum interfecistis, Dei consilio ac praesentia traditum" [abbreviation as in source].
106. Estius, above, *Distinctio* 20, Book III [abbreviation as in source].
107. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *passim*.
108. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Epistolam ad Romanos*, c. 9, lect. 15, on God's different mode of inclining to good and to evil. See also Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 11, 16.
109. The editor adds a critical note expressing doubt whether Augustine's words should be taken as the Author expounds them, and suggests they may be understood of God's decree concerning the permission of Judas's sin, with his evil will foreseen; he cites Augustine's continuation: "Did not I choose you twelve, and one of you is a devil?"—those are said to be chosen by mercy, that one by judgment; the former for obtaining the kingdom, the latter "for the pouring out of His blood" [abbreviation as in source].
110. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 7; idem, *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 23.
111. Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad episcopos Galliae*, cap. [as in source].
112. Pope Innocent I, *Letter to the Council of Carthage*, ch. 6.
113. "S. Thom. Vide1. eumdem par. qu. qu. 23.22. ar. art. 3. ad 2.9 4. 3." [abbreviation as in source].
114. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 2; ad 3.
115. Council of Valence (Valentinum), ch. 2; noted as found in vol. 3, fol. 888.
116. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 4 (both in the body and in the replies to the objections).
117. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 24, a. 4.
118. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 15.

119. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 16–17.
120. St. Thomas, *ubi supra* [abbreviation as in source].
121. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione Gentium* I, ch. 9.
122. St. Augustine, *Serm. 2, De verbis Apostoli*.
123. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 8.
124. St. Augustine, *Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, prop. 62.
125. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus* 54.
126. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, ch. 89; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1.
127. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 6–7.
128. St. Thomas, *above* [abbreviation as in source].
129. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XVIII, ch. 51; St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 20; Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 35; St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* I, ch. 8; Bede, *Homilia in Dominica Palmarum*; St. Bernard, *Serm. 3 super Evangelio "Missus est"*. For Job 14, cf. "You have set his bounds, which cannot be passed."
130. *Above*, Dist. 38, in the solution of the arguments from foreknowledge.
131. St. Thomas sets out the whole matter most precisely: see *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2: "It must be said that, although, absolutely speaking and considered in itself, it is possible for God not to predestine, nevertheless, once it is posited that He has predestined, this stands immutably." And in the same place, ad 3: "It must be said that predestination imports the will; and therefore, as was said above, because of the immutability of the Divine will, God cannot not will what He wills; hence one ought not to say that God can not-predestine what He has predestined—although, considered absolutely, God can predestine or not predestine." Likewise I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3: "Although effects are infallibly connected with the Divine will, nevertheless there is no defect of power in God; however, the following are impossible: that God should will this man to be saved, and that this man be damned." Other places from St. Thomas we omit for the present, perhaps to be produced elsewhere.
132. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI, ch. [chapter as in source] [abbreviation as in source].
133. "S. Thom. 2. 2. qu. qu. 84. 24. art. art. 10. 11. & 3." [abbreviation as in source].
134. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 17; Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 23.
135. Beware lest from this Author's reply you should deduce that Christ, as foreknowing reprobation, shed not His blood for all, but only for the faithful, or for the elect; propositions which are proscribed—by Trent (Session 6, ch. 3), by Innocent X and Alexander VII in the condemnation of the five Jansenist propositions, and by Alexander VIII in the fifth condemnation among the censures—and likewise the others connected with it; and also by our Lord Pope Clement XI among the Quesnel propositions in the second condemnation. For the oblation of Christ—and, as the Theologians say, His merit—was for all, and sufficient for all, although consequent and efficacious only for those who participate in it, according as they participate. Wherefore, according to the antecedent will, prayer is for all men, although according to the consequent will, as regards final attainment, it was not for all. These things are said here in passing; more will be said in its place.
136. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, chs. 8–9; St. Augustine, *Sermo 63 De diversis*, ch. 1; St. Augustine, *Tractatus 45 in Ioannem*; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 56, 85; St. Jerome, *In Ezechielem*, on ch. 26; St. Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, ch. 8; St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XIV, ch. 19; XXV, chs. 7–8; XXIX, ch. 9; St. Leo the Great, *Sermo 2 De Quadragesima*; *Sermo 7 De passione Domini*.
137. St. Thomas, *ubi sup.* [abbreviation as in source].
138. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* VII, ch. 1.
139. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 130.
140. St. Augustine, *Tractatus 14 in Ioannem*; and *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 7: that God leads none of the reprobate to salutary and spiritual repentance.
141. St. Augustine, *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, ch. 13.
142. St. Augustine, *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, ch. 20.

143. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, ch. 9.
144. St. Augustine, Tractates on John, on the place adduced.
145. St. Jerome, Contra Iovinianum II, ch. 1.
146. Estius, In III Sent., dist. 32.
147. Origen, Homilia 1 in Numeros.
148. St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, chs. 7, 9, 12–13; De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14.
149. St. Augustine, Contra Julianum V, ch. 3; De civitate Dei XVIII, ch. 51.
150. Prosper of Aquitaine, Responsiones ad capitula objectionum Vincentianarum 12, 16; Ad excerpta Genuensium, dub. 4; De vocatione gentium II, ch. 33–end; Epistola ad Ruffinum.
151. Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum, chs. 33–35.
152. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob XXV, ch. 8.
153. St. Bernard, Sermon 3 super Missus est; Hugh of St. Victor, Super Epistolam ad Romanos, q. 220; Honorius Augustodunensis, Dialogus de praedestinatione.
154. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 4, 6–7; De veritate, q. 6, a. 3.
155. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 6–7.
156. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 3.
157. St. Jerome, Epitaphium Paulae.
158. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 24, a. 1, ad 3 [abbreviation as in source].
159. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 8.
160. The quotation and discussion here are corrupt in the source; Estius alludes to Job ("He will crush many ... and will make others stand in their place") and to a Thomistic "substitution" for those who fall; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1.
161. Prosper of Aquitaine and Hilary, letters to St. Augustine [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14 and following.
162. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1; St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 7.
163. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 7.
164. St. Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, ch. 16.
165. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 34; Rupert of Deutz, De processione Spiritus Sancti III, chs. 20, 22.
166. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 29; cf. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 7.
167. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 62.
168. Alphonsus de Castro, De punitione haereticorum I, ch. 3.
169. St. Jerome, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas, on Gal. 5.
170. St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 38; The imagery of clean/unclean animals (Gen. 7) and of the threshing floor (Matt. 3:12) is applied by Gregory; cf. Hom. 38 in Evangelia; The Venerable Bede, In Lucam, on Lk. 3.
171. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 7, ad 3 [ubi supra].
172. Jn. 13:18: "I know whom I have chosen"; 2 Tim. 2:19: "The Lord has known who are his."
173. Sir. 3:22–23 (Vulg. 3:21–22): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee... but the things God has commanded thee, think on them always."
174. Prov. 28:14: "Blessed is the man that is always fearful"; Mic. 6:8 (cf. Vulg.): "...to walk solicitous with thy God."
175. Phil. 2:12–13; Rom. 11:20–21.

176. Eccl. 9:1 (Vulg. 9:1–2): "Man knows not whether he be worthy of love or of hatred..."; Mal. 1:2–3 (cf. Rom. 9:13): "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated"; 1 Cor. 4:4: "I am conscious to myself of nothing; yet am I not hereby justified"; 1 Cor. 9:27: "Lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself become reprobate."
177. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 38.
178. St. Augustine, *City of God* XI, ch. 12; *On Correction and Grace*, chs. 13, 16; *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chs. 8, 13.
179. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 27 and following; cf. 2 Cor. 12:7–9 on the "sting of the flesh."
180. Council of Trent, Session 6, chs. 12–13; canons 15–16.
181. 2 Pet. 1:14; 2 Tim. 4:7–8; Lk. 23:43; Acts 7:55–56. On Stephen, cf. liturgical antiphon: "Vidit, introivit, beatus homo, cui caeli patebant."
182. Matt. 26:24; St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* IV, ch. 38; the Venerable Bede, *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* V, chs. 14–15.
183. Jn. 8:21–24.
184. Matt. 19:28; Lk. 22:29–30; Jn. 13:8, 17–18.
185. Lk. 10:20; cf. "book of life" imagery, e.g., Phil. 4:3; Rev. 3:5; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 130.
186. Cajetan, *Commentary* [abbreviation as in source].
187. Rom. 8:38–39; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 7.
188. 1 Cor. 2:12.
189. 1 Thess. 1:4.
190. 1 Jn. 3:24; 4:13; 5:10–11.
191. Origen, *Homiliae in Leviticum*, hom. 2.
192. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 88 (89), sermon 2, on "Misericordiam autem meam non dispergam ab eo".
193. John Cassian, *Collationes (Conferences)* 9, ch. 19.
194. St. Bernard, *Sermones in Pentecosten*, serm. 2.
195. Commonly received sentence of the theologians: that God, by His ordinary power (*potentia ordinaria*), cannot reveal to anyone by a particular revelation his reprobation (*reprobatio*), that is to say his absolute destination to perdition and eternal death — which the Author notes in this book (on Dist. 48, q. 2 [abbreviation as in source]). For St. Thomas has this (Dist. 48, a. 4, ad 2 [abbreviation as in source]): "One must say that God does not reveal to anyone his damnation; nor even to the Angels," as St. Augustine says, *On Genesis* literal, book 11, ch. 17.[...] And if such a revelation were posited according to a comminatory prophecy, one could believe it according to the threat, and not according to a will of damnation taken in itself, nor the guilt as placed according to the order of justice, by which God wills the punishment of sin and not damnation for its own sake; nor would such a revelation compel one to despair; and if to someone such a revelation of prophecy about predestination or foreknowledge (*praescientia*) were given, it is understood as with the supposition of merits; but granted such a prophecy, the one to whom such a thing is proposed would still not be bound to believe that God on His part wills absolutely to damn him, but [to understand it] according to the order of justice, by which God wills what is on the part of our will of sin.[...] Certainly, St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, says that that position is as it were impossible (namely, that anyone's own damnation should be revealed), because no one's own damnation is revealed; likewise in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2: although by absolute power (*potentia absoluta*) God can reveal, nevertheless it ought not to be done by ordinary power (*potentia ordinaria*), because such a revelation would be by way of a comminatory prophecy, by which He threatens to damn those persisting in sin; for He does not will to confirm His divine will by a revelation that would be understood according to foreknowledge taken absolutely.[...] On predestination and reprobation, what must be said is to be explained more fully in its own place, indicated above, where the matter is marvelously illustrated and almost wholly to be contemplated.[...]
196. The closing clause is garbled in the source; sense uncertain: "[He also is the commentator of the Greeks]" [...].
197. 1 Cor. 2:13.
198. Jn. 14:23. The concluding qualification is slightly garbled in the source; sense supplied.
199. 2 Tim. 2:19.

DISTINCTIO XLI — ON THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION AND OF REPROBATION

§ 1. For indeed various opinions are recounted concerning the cause of predestination (*praedestinatio*).^[^1] It now remains to be asked whether there is any cause of predestination; and if there is some, what it is; and, similarly, of reprobation (*reprobatio*).^[^2] Where, first of all, one must know that, since, according to the mode in which inquiry is made about the cause of predestination or of reprobation, it is not being asked whether of the eternal will (*voluntas*) or of the divine decree by which He either reprobates or predestines future men there is any cause in itself; for it is certain that in itself there can be no cause, since it is the very essence (*essentia*) of God, which is altogether uncausable.

§ 2. But the question is of predestination and of reprobation, not as to the thing itself, but according to the effects (*effectus*) which God, as predestining or reprobating, works in men or about men. About which effects we have treated above in the preceding distinction. Whence again it is clear that what is not being sought here is the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of those effects; for already it is manifest that God, and the divine predestination, is the efficient cause.

§ II — How it is to be understood that predestination is not from merits (Quomodo intelligendum, praedestinationem non esse ex meritis)

§ 3. From the definition of predestination (*praedestinatio*) and from the explication of its effects (*effectus*), and from many other things which, on this subject, were said and explained in the above distinction, it is clearly evident that men are not predestined by God to eternal life from foreseen merits (*merita praevisa*), but from the gratuitous mercy of God Himself, whereby assuredly He forestalls every merit of the predestined. Yet because it greatly matters that this gratuitous benefit of our predestination be well understood and acknowledged, and since this doctrine long ago suffered manifold contradiction from adversaries, let us now expressly confirm it, both from Scripture and from the Fathers, and also by arguments drawn from reason. In which matter, before all else, one must know that, when it is denied that a man is predestined from foreseen merits, there is excluded not only condign merit, such as is that of good works unto eternal life, but also congruent, or disposing, merit (*meritum congruum, sive disponens*); which St. Augustine acknowledges in faith and penance with respect to the remission of sins.⁴ Moreover, learned men of great weight, in their studies on this question, have shown from the Fathers and from the tradition of the Church how alien it is to Catholic piety to make our predestination depend upon merits; and those who attempt to prove the contrary from Scripture have always fared ill with the Latin Fathers, who counted St. Augustine as their chief.⁵ Denis Petau by many arguments, especially from Augustine, demonstrates equally and clearly that Augustine establishes that sentence.⁶ And from the judgment of that same author it is taught that the Latin Fathers went before, and that the Greeks, both before and after Augustine, admitted grace—but not unto glory—which he tries to demonstrate by many alleged testimonies in the controversies which Pelagius and his remnants stirred

up. Moreover, the aforementioned Dionysius (Petau) in the same volume maintains from the aforesaid testimonies that in that controversy the authority of Augustine was not prejudged, in which the question of predestination was taken in the schools to both sides; and as to those whom he adduces as the chief patrons of this sentence, they have no need of confirmation. It will suffice to read once and again the places alleged by the author with a mind not preoccupied by prejudices. Nor were there lacking those who tried to draw St. Thomas to the opposite party, among whose defenders there is numbered Cardinal Sfondratus—though not so openly—and Gabriel Vásquez.⁷

§ 4. Furthermore, Petau, in the Theological Dogmas, volume 1, book 9, by arguments drawn from the same Augustine, has learnedly defended the doctrine that predestination is altogether gratuitous; and that the Latin Fathers, whose chief author is Augustine, held the same. He declares the election unto first grace altogether gratuitous, not made after foreseen merits; which also Gerardus Vossius did not hesitate to assert.⁸ He adds that the contrary opinion, which he himself refutes, had long been disputed in the schools about predestination, nor can it avail as a prejudice for anyone. But now, as to Augustine and Thomas, the matter seems so well known—a thing which the author himself will say—that it does not need demonstration; let him consult the places, and read them with attentive mind, not preoccupied by prejudices, who enlists the Saints Augustine and Thomas for his own side of the contrary opinion. Among such there stand out the Most Eminent Cardinal in the oft-cited work *Knots of Predestination*, and Leonardus Lessius in the little work *On the grace of predestination*; some things indeed he says which are not against this sentence, as is evident in the case of the reprobate, to whom nevertheless grace, if any is given, is not given according to merits.⁹ Just as, therefore, the acceptance of the word "merit" is general when it is denied that grace (*gratia*) is given according to our merits—as is taught above at Distinction 26 of book 2—so also in this place, when the same is denied about predestination.

§ 5. Moreover, in expounding this sentence—namely, that there is absolutely no merit (*meritum*) of predestination, that is, of the grace or benefit which is conferred upon the predestined man by God, in the one who is predestined—the Doctors vary somewhat. At times, namely, they understand by merit what accrues to a man from himself; according to which understanding, this sentence is to be referred to the individual effects of predestination. For although a prior grace is the merit of a subsequent one, and therefore some effect of predestination falls under merit, as eternal life, which is given as the reward of good works; nevertheless there is no effect of predestination which a man merits from himself. This way of explaining—in what it is that grace is not given according to merits—is followed by St. Augustine (book *On Grace and Free Will*, chs. 6, 14) and by Prosper, book 1 *On the Vocation of the Gentiles*, ch. 7.¹⁰ Otherwise, however, they understand by merit whatever comes to man from wherever—whether he have it from himself or receive it from elsewhere—according to which sense it cannot be said that no effect of predestination, that is, no benefit of grace, is rendered to man for merits. For, as was said, eternal life is rendered for the merits of justice; and the remission of sins for the merit of faith and penance, as the Fathers often speak. Therefore, according to this understanding of the sentence, when we say that there is no merit of predestination in man, we signify that the entire heap of God's benefits by which a man is directed and ordered to eternal life—eternal life itself being included—does not have any merit in the man himself; and this for the reason that every merit of man ordering him to eternal life, however imperfect a formal character (*ratio*) of merit it obtain, is comprehended under his very predestination; whether you posit the merit of faith, or of a good thought, or of an attempt, or of acceptance, or whatever other thing—as will become more manifest from what follows.

§ 6. In reality, however, these two ways in which this doctrine has been explained do not differ in such wise that in both it is taught that for the first grace, or the first effect of predestination, there is no merit at all in man; but for any subsequent grace, there is no such merit as is from himself. Which latter explanation—whereby it is simply denied that man is predestined from merits—is more absolute, excluding not only any merits whatsoever of the man himself, even if received through the grace of Christ, but also the merit of Christ; because this very merit is contained under the order of our predestination, as is to be more fully declared elsewhere. And this absolute sense is more in conformity with the intention of the Doctors treating the present question about the merit of predestination, as is clear from St. Thomas (in the place cited above, and in others). For they deny that the foreseen good works merit predestination, not because they are not merits in the sense of the question (for truly such are they with respect to the reward of eternal life), but because the formal character of merit with respect to predestination does not befit them, since they are contained under predestination itself.

§ 7. Predestination of men and reprobation (*reprobatio*) are not the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of those effects. But the whole question turns on the meritorious cause. For the question is asked: Whether there is in a predestined man any merit of his predestination? and likewise: Whether there is in a reprobate any merit of his reprobation? Before we answer this question, it is worthwhile to recount the various opinions of authors about the cause, or merit, of predestination, so that, the false ones being known and removed, what is true may be found more easily.

§ 8. The first opinion is that of Origen, who in the books *On First Principles* and elsewhere, from Platonic philosophy, taught that human souls, in some other life before they were sent into bodies, did good or evil works; by the merit of which, just as they would obtain various bodies in this life, so also the men themselves, of whom those souls were, would be destined to salvation or destruction.

§ 9. But this fabrication, as St. Augustine teaches, *Sermon 7 On the Words of the Apostle*, is rejected by the Catholic faith, because of the manifest sentence of the Apostle, who says: "When they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil," etc. (Rom. 9). Therefore this is to be numbered among the other condemned errors of Origen. Its fuller refutation pertains to the disputation on the soul and its origin, about which in book 2, *Distinction 17*.

§ 10. The second opinion is that of the Pelagians: for Pelagius taught that therefore one man is predestined, or elected, by God rather than another, because God foresaw that he would live piously and holily, and would persevere in such a life unto the end; and this not from the grace of God, but from the sole powers of free will. This opinion is known to be heretical, as having been long since, together with its author, condemned and proscribed by the Church in the sacred Councils, and that with most just reason. For it both evidently contradicts the sacred Scriptures, which everywhere inculcate for us the necessity of the grace of God, and it evacuates the mystery of the incarnation and passion of Christ. "If by nature and by free will" there is righteousness, "then Christ died for nothing." The Catholic Fathers wrote most keenly against this error—St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and others—in those books which they published against the Pelagian heresy. And the refutation of this too is to be sought from those things which are set out in book 2 concerning the grace of Christ and its necessity.

§ 11. For if a man cannot live well without the grace of God, and persevere in a good life, therefore God did not predestine anyone because He foresaw that he would, by his own powers, without His grace, live well with perseverance.

§ 12. The third opinion was also that of certain Pelagians, who, moderating the foregoing error, said that indeed the beginning of good works is from us, but the consummation is from the grace of God. Wherefore they taught that some above others are therefore predestined by God, because He foresaw that they would make the beginning of a good life by the powers of free will, preparing themselves for the consummating grace. Which error is overthrown by all those things which prove that the beginning of good works and of holy conduct is from the prevenient grace of God; about which matter also we must treat in book 2, at Distinction 26.

§ 13. To this must also be referred the error of those who, although they ascribed to God the beginnings of other good works, nevertheless said that faith, which is the first of all, is not given by God, but, the preaching having gone before, is had from the powers of nature. Whence, consequently, they taught that those are predestined by God in whom God foresaw there would be faith, or some beginning of faith, in view of which He would grant the rest—namely, attributing their election to the merit of faith. In this error at one time was St. Augustine before his episcopate; but afterwards he corrected it, as is clear from book 1 of the *Retractations*, ch. 23; and he not only corrected it but expressly fought against it, as in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 3 and the following, and in very many other places. The Massilian presbyters stood in the same error, as is plain from the letters of Prosper and Hilary prefixed to St. Augustine's book *On the Predestination of the Saints*. But it is refuted by all those arguments which prove that faith is the gift of God; about which matter we must treat in book 3.

§ 14. The fourth opinion is that of those who attribute faith and holy conduct indeed to the grace of God, but think that therefore some above others are predestined by God, because God foresaw that they would accept the grace, which they say is offered to all, by free will and would persevere in it—so that the offering of grace be the work of God, but its reception, or acceptance and use, properly be of free will alone. And so even according to these predestination is not purely gratuitous, nor altogether absolute; for it presupposes and preresquires the foreknowledge of a certain merit, namely, of a good motion of free will; and upon this, as upon a condition, it depends. This was the opinion of Faustus, bishop of Riez, and also of Cassian and Gennadius, presbyters of the Massilians, and of some others of the same stock; against whom Prosper, Maxentius, Fulgentius, and Peter Damian wrote. And St. Augustine too, in his latest works in which he handled the cause of the grace of Christ, wrote most copiously and expressly against this opinion; these are the books *On Correction and Grace*, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*.

§ 15. Moreover akin to this is what others have said: that God indeed does not offer grace and the means of salvation to all, but to some only; yet the cause of this is, that He foresaw that those to whom He does not offer them would not have accepted, and—having accepted—would not have persevered in grace. For according to this opinion, again the cause of predestination, and of the very offering of grace in those to whom they are offered, must be posited to be the foreseen acceptance of grace. This is the opinion of Rupert (writing on Matt. 11), where he thinks that to the men of Tyre and Sidon the means of salvation were not offered, because, even if they had been offered to them, they would not have done true penance, but only penance for the age, as they did—like Ahab and the Ninevites. And therefore of Tyre and Sidon the Lord did not say that "they would have been saved if the miracles had been done in them," but that "they would have

done penance"; because indeed that penance would not have been unto salvation. And perhaps one could, and St. Augustine at some time did, think something of the sort, from that place where, in Ep. 49 to Deogratias, q. 2, he seems to have said that the Christian religion was never removed from anyone who was worthy, and to whom it was lacking, that it was not removed. But St. Augustine has set forth in book 2 of the Retractations, ch. 18, how that place can be understood rightly and about retracting it.¹¹

§ 16. And there is also a fifth opinion of certain men (different from the preceding two), who say that God indeed from eternity elected a certain number of men to salvation—not, however, absolutely, but dependently upon a certain conditioned foreknowledge (*praescientia quaedam conditionata*); whereby He foresaw, as it were in detail, concerning men, what each one would do, if by such or such a kind of excitation, moving, persuading—congruently to his mind and affections—he were to be called. With this foreseeing presupposed, they want God to have prepared this very grace of vocation, and consequently eternal life, for certain men, that is, to have elected and predestined those very ones. Wherefore even according to this opinion predestination will not be absolutely, and purely gratuitous, but dependent on the condition "of a good motion of free will, if he be so or so excited," foreseen by God.

§ 17. There can be added also a sixth opinion, which Valentia handed down, writing on the First Part (on the Summa of St. Thomas): namely, that predestination is not indeed from any merits or any condition whatsoever, yet not to be done without respect to the foreknowledge of a motion of free will.

§ 18. The seventh position is that of those who acknowledge no merit in a predestined man of his predestination, but teach that it is merely gratuitous, and dependent on no condition of any motion or act of him who is predestined by God, foreseen by God, but as it were embracing within itself such a motion or act whereby someone is in some way ordered to salvation. This doctrine is handed down by the chief Doctors of the Church, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, whom most others follow; so much so that Thomas of Argentina, writing in the present distinction, although he himself, under correction of a better judgment, holds a different opinion, nevertheless admits this to be the common sentence of the Doctors. Which, therefore, we—other opinions having been rejected—will henceforth undertake to explain and prove.

§ III — That foreseen merits are not the cause of predestination is shown from the Scriptures (Merita praevisa non esse causam praedestinationis ex Scripturis ostenditur)

§ 19. That the predestination of men is not from foreseen merits, but is merely gratuitous, is taught chiefly from the authority of sacred Scripture, of which very many testimonies can be brought forward for this matter, but these are the chief. First. In Jn. 15 the Lord says to the disciples, and in them to all the elect: "You have not chosen me; but I have chosen you; and have appointed you, that you should go, and should bring forth fruit; and your fruit should remain." These words signify that there is nothing in us which forestalls the divine election, but that God, by choosing us, forestalls us, so that from the same grace of election all our good proceeds. Like to this testimony is that of 1 Jn. 4: "In this is charity, not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us," that is, He forestalled us by His love, by granting every good of salvation.

§ 20. Second. The Apostle in Rom. 9 wished to signify the elect by those whom he calls "called according to purpose, saints"; where it is manifest that not the purpose of the man called (as Pelagius used to interpret)

but of God calling, that is, choosing, is to be understood from other places of the same Apostle to be cited below. And by that phrase the Apostle refers our whole election to the divine purpose and will.

§ 21. Third. The same Apostle, Rom. 9, treating by design of the cause of our predestination, refers it to the sole will of God who has mercy. For, the example—or rather the type—of the two sons of Isaac having been proposed: "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand; not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said: that the elder shall serve the younger; as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." But he declares the matter more fully still by the words that follow. For, alleging that which had been said by God to Moses in Exod. 33, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy," that is, to whomever I shall have willed to have mercy, thus he concludes from this: "So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy"; because assuredly our every willing and running is an effect of mercy, and therefore,

§ 22. ...of God's predestination. Hence again he infers: "Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens." And the other things which follow look to the same point; and that especially about the potter's clay. Fourth. In Rom. 11, still disputing about election, the Apostle says: "So then also at this present time there is a remnant saved according to the election of grace; and if by grace, now not of works; otherwise grace is now grace." By which words the Apostle manifestly opposes these two things, to be saved by grace, or according to the election of grace, and to be saved by works—and by positing the former he removes the latter. But understand "salvation" according to every saving good, even of this life; as it was said by the Angel about Jesus our Savior in Matt. 1: "For He shall save His people from their sins." Therefore the Apostle denies that salvation, that is, the whole effect of predestination, is of works. Fifth. The same Apostle, at the end of the same chapter, after that exclamation "O the depth," etc., by which he professes that the judgments of God's election cannot be comprehended by us, subjoined among others this sentence excluding every merit of predestination: "Or who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Which he then confirms by these closing words: "For from Him, and through Him, and unto Him are all things," as if he were to say: since God is the author and fount of every good, it cannot come to pass that there be found in us any merit of the election by which He prepared salvation for us from eternity. Sixth. The same Apostle in Eph. 1 again reduces the whole business of our salvation and predestination to the good pleasure and gratuitousness of the divine will, saying: "He chose us in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity," as if he were to say: God did not choose us because He had foreseen that we would be holy, but that we might be holy and unspotted, that is, by the grace of His election He decreed to make us such; therefore He foreknew that we would be such as He proposed to make us. He inculcates the same thing in the following words: "Who predestined us unto the adoption of sons according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of the glory of His grace," etc. And below: "In whom we also have been called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will." Among other things it must here be noted that predestination is called by the Apostle a "lot"; likewise also in Col. 1, when he says: "Who has made us worthy for a share in the lot of the saints." The reason of this is surely that, just as something befalls one by lot without any pre-existing cause and study in him upon whom it falls, so no cause of predestination is found on the part of him who is predestined. And the like passages, in which the election of the saints is designated by the name of "lot," are these: Dan. 12; Wis. 3, 5; Ps. 124; and Acts 26. Moreover, this very thing was signified by the fact that the land of promise, which was a type of the heavenly kingdom, was ordered to be distributed by lot by Joshua. For this is understood to

pertain to the predestination of the saints even from the fact that the same distribution by lots is repeated in a Mystery (in Ezek. 45). And St. Augustine uses this argument, drawn from the appellation "lot" (Sermon 2 on Ps. 30).¹³ This matter is confirmed by the vision of Mordecai, which is had (Esth. 10), in which it is said that God commanded there to be two lots, one of the people of God, the other of all the nations. By which is assuredly signified that that people was separated from the other nations, not by merits, but as if by lot, that it might be the people of God. Seventh. 2 Tim. 1. "God called, delivered us," says the same Apostle, "by His holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His purpose, and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before secular times." Where again he willed the whole benefit of our salvation to be comprehended under the name of "calling" and "deliverance." Eighth. Words of the same Apostle are in Tit. 3: "Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy God saved us." Which testimony St. Thomas adduces to prove that predestination is not from merits, subsuming thus: as He saved us, so He also predestined us to be made so.¹ And that by "salvation" one ought to understand, as we explained above in the fourth argument, not only eternal life but also every saving good; this is clear from the words themselves; for of life he would not speak in the past, "He saved us," but "He will save," as elsewhere; nor does he there affirm that eternal life is given for works, as he often does elsewhere. Moreover, nothing that pertains to works which we ourselves have done is here to be taken generally; since even the good works, which are from God alone, are all reduced to the order of predestination. Ninth. In Ps. 17 the Psalmist referred his whole salvation to the will and good pleasure of God, saying: "He saved me, because He willed me." For he says this in the way that Mark 3 says of Christ with respect to the apostolic company: "He called to Himself whom He willed"—manifestly looking at nothing in them by reason of which they would be worthy of the Apostolate, but He Himself about to make them fit for that office. Basil uses this very little verse for the present subject (On I, dist. 40).¹⁴ Tenth. In Ezek. 36 God attributes to Himself, on behalf of His elect, all the benefits of the New Testament—such as cleansing from sins, the renovation of heart, the observance of God's precepts—which are all effects of predestination; and He says once and again: "Not for your sakes will I do this, but for My holy name." Therefore not the merit of man, but the goodness of God, is the cause of our predestination. For elsewhere too Scripture, wishing to exclude merit, thus speaks, when it says that God does this or that for His name. Thus Samuel speaks 1 Kgs 12. David, Ps. 22: "He has converted my soul, and He has led me over the paths of justice, for His name's sake." Ps. 43: "Redeem us for Thy name's sake." Ps. 78: "For the glory of Thy name deliver us." Ps. 105: "And He saved them for His name's sake." Is. 48: "For My name's sake I will remove My fury far off." Jer. 14: "Do Thou, O Lord, for Thy name's sake, for our turnings-away are many." Jer. 20: "And I have done it for My name's sake," etc. "When I shall have done good to you for My name, not according to your evil ways." In all which places human merit is excluded, as is easy to see from the context of the places. Finally, all the Scriptures pertain here which prove that grace is not given according to our merits. For, as we said above, under the general name of grace is comprehended every effect of predestination. If therefore grace is not of merits, neither is predestination of merits. But here—that grace is not given according to merits, as is taught (below at Distinct. 26 of Book II)—we shall take demonstration. Likewise there pertain all the Scriptures which refer to the benefit of God's grace every good of ours by which we are saved, and which transfer wholly and solidly to God our whole beginning, progress, and consummation in good; so that nothing is left to man in which he may glory as in his own, which he has not received from God; since whatever of merit is ours in these things takes its rise from the grace of God predestining. And since all these are effects of predestination in the elect, it is manifestly consequent that there is no merit of their predestination in themselves; and such Scriptures are these: Jn. 14: "Without Me you can do nothing"; 1 Cor.

4: "For who distinguishes thee? And what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?"; 2 Cor. 3: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God."; 2 Cor. 10: "He who glories, let him glory in the Lord."; Phil. 2: "It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish."; 1 Cor. 12: "The same God who works all things in all." Add those promises of the New Testament which we have (Deut. 30; Jer. 31; Ezek. 11, 26; Heb. 8), by which "I am the Lord your God" has promised that He will work in His elect every good of salvation by His grace: and many other things of this sort to be more diligently enumerated in the Treatise on grace (in Book II of the Sentences).¹⁵ More specially, however, that (Eph. 2) bears on this: "Created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared, that we should walk in them." For since according to St. Augustine (*De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 14) predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, by which we are freed and saved, if good works, that is, all our merits, have been prepared for us by God, that is, predestined, then they themselves cannot be from some prior merit of ours; for whatever of that sort you would grant, that also must be comprehended under predestination. Whence St. Augustine (in the same book, the following chapter, and in the two following) teaches that to preach God's predestination is nothing other than to preach that God works all goods in His elect. For in this way every merit of predestination is excluded, while every merit of the elect is referred to the grace of predestination.¹⁶

§ IV — Proof of the same doctrine from the Fathers (Ejusdem Doctrinae probatio ex Patribus)

§ 23. Among the ecclesiastical writers whom we call Fathers, St. Augustine above all illustrated by his own writings the doctrine of gratuitous predestination (*praedestinatio*), having been stirred up to this by the occasion of the Pelagian heresy which arose in his own time, which, just as it either denied the grace (*gratia*) of God to be necessary for us in order to act well, or wanted it to be given according to merits (*merita*), so too acknowledged no other predestination than that whose cause is the foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of merits.¹⁸ Therefore, among those things which that Doctor most copiously disputed against the Pelagians concerning the grace of Christ, there are many by which he also handed down and defended this doctrine of gratuitous predestination. From these we will cull some.

§ 24. In the *Enchiridion* (ch. 98), disputing of this matter according to the sentence of the Apostle in Romans 9, and after other things producing that testimony repeated by the Apostle from the Prophet, "Jacob have I loved, but Esau I have hated," he subjoins thus: "But the Apostle, perceiving how this which is said could disturb those who by understanding cannot penetrate the height of grace, says: What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. For it seems unjust that without any merits of good or evil works God should love one and hate another. In which matter, if he had wished future works—either the good of this one or the evil of that one—which God of course foreknew, to be understood, by no means would he have said, not of works, but he would have said, of future works, and in that way he would solve that question; indeed he would make no question which it would be necessary to solve. Now however, when he had answered, God forbid—that is, God forbid that there be injustice with God—presently, that he might prove that this happens by no injustice of God, he says: For to Moses he says: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, etc. For who but a foolish man would think God unjust, whether He inflict a penal judgment on one who is worthy, or show mercy to one who is unworthy?" And what follows.¹⁹ But this passage clearly shows that the love or predestination of Jacob was not only not from the foreknowledge of works which he would be

thought to do by the powers of nature without grace; but not even from the foreknowledge of the good works which he did by grace: for of this sort were to be the future works of Jacob himself, from the foresight of which St. Augustine denies that he was predestined.²⁰

§ 25. In the work *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* (ch. 7), relying on the Apostle's testimony just named, he concludes against certain persons thus: "Wherefore assuredly you are foolish, who, while Truth says: Not of works, but of him that calls, it was said, you say that Jacob was loved on account of future works, which God foreknew that he would do; and thus you contradict the Apostle saying, not of works, as if he could not have said, not of present works but of future works. But he says, not of works, in order to commend grace." These things there, and others to the same purport.²¹

§ 26. In favor of which many things also are read in the same Author's Book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, although he wrote that book before Pelagius had arisen.²² Moreover, there are other more illustrious places in him: *Enchiridion* ch. 36; Letter 59, question 6; Letter 135 to Sixtus; and Letter 106 to Paulinus; Sermon 11 on the words of the Apostle; and Book 1 *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, ch. 22; and Book 2, ch. 17; Tractate 82 on John; and in the exposition of Psalm 55 at that verse, "For nothing shalt thou save them"; and Book 1 of the *Retractations*, ch. 25; Book 4 *Against Julian*, ch. 8; the book *On the Grace of Christ*, chs. 44 and 46.²³

§ 27. Likewise, in the *Soliloquies* gathered out of Augustine (chs. 28, 29), and finally in almost whole books *On Correction and Grace*; *On the Predestination of the Saints*; and *On the Gift of Perseverance*. In the last-mentioned book (chs. 18, 19) he also commemorates the more ancient Fathers—Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen—agreeing with him. Where at last establishing the certitude of this doctrine he pronounces thus: "This I know, that no one could have disputed against that predestination which we defend according to the holy Scriptures, except by erring."²⁴

§ 28. Prosper, the disciple of Augustine and a defender of his writings against the calumnies of certain persons, handed down the same doctrine in very many places expressly, and especially in the letter which he wrote on grace and free will to Ruffinus, in which he teaches these two dogmas to be connected and equally to be retained: that grace is not given according to merits; and that men are predestined not out of merits foreseen, but according to the purpose of God who calls.²⁵ To this also pertains his letter written to Augustine regarding the complaints of the Massilienses, whom the doctrine of Augustine about predestination had offended.²⁶ And when Augustine had answered him with two books, one *On the Predestination of the Saints*, the other *On the Gift of Perseverance*, the doctrine of gratuitous predestination repeated in them and further confirmed, afterwards Prosper, against the objectors, both in that letter to Ruffinus of which we spoke, and in certain other little works (*Responses to the Chapters of the Gauls*, the *Excerpts of the Genoans*, and the *Replies to the Vincentian Objections*), vigorously and learnedly defended it. Moreover, in the book *Against the Collator*, ch. 43, he shows that the doctrine of Augustine defended in those two already named books of his was approved by the judgment of the Apostolic See—that is, of Pope Celestine writing to the bishops of Gaul—no less than those things which he had taught in his earlier writings.²⁷

§ 29. No less explicit is the doctrine of Fulgentius, who also was a diligent follower of Augustine, and treated of the gratuitous predestination of God, especially in these books: *On Predestination to Monimus*; *On the Incarnation of Christ*; and *On the Faith to Peter the Deacon*.²⁸ Peter the Deacon likewise, at the end of the book *On the Incarnation*, anathematizes the books of Faustus, bishop of the Gauls, written against the

sentence of gratuitous predestination; and he says that he does this as one following the doctrine of the holy Fathers. Likewise on predestination wrote the Author of the Prognosticon, Book 6 (as printed among the works of Augustine, vol. 7).²⁹ (a) Although before the rise of Pelagius the Fathers may have been less exact in their writings about the grace of Christ and predestination—since they had not yet been stirred up to this by the disputations of heretics—nevertheless that they thought otherwise on this argument Augustine proves (in the book *On the Grace of Christ*, chs. 44, 45; and in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chs. 19, 20). And Peter the Deacon (the last chapter in the book *On the Incarnation*). Of whom the former produces Cyprian, Book 3 (to Quirinus, ch. 4), and Ambrose (Book *On the Flight of the Age*, ch. 1), and the same Ambrose again on Luke (in the exposition of the preface and in that work, Books 2, 6, 7, 10), and Gregory Nazianzen (the *Oration on Pentecost*). This latter adduces Basil as well, in that part of the Liturgy which contains the *Oration of the Holy Altar*: "Which oration," says Peter, "the East almost universally uses, in which, to wit, the Churches of the Greeks are contained." To these furthermore we add Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, ch. 5.³⁰

(a) The Benedictine Fathers attest, in vol. X of Augustine's Works, that these books are to be restored to Marius Mercator, who supplied them to many Fathers; and Louis Ellies Dupin, in the *Bibliotheca of the Century*, praises several of the reasons.³¹

§ 30. Likewise Jerome (on Eph. 1); Gregory [the Great], Homily 8 (on Ezekiel), and Book 25 of the *Morals*, ch. 32; Franconius, *On the Grace of God* (Tomes 7 and 12); Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa of Sentences* (Tractate 1, ch. 12, from Augustine, where he holds this sentence: "When God predestined His work, He foreknew [it]"); also on the *Epistle to the Romans*, question 233 and some following; and the Master of the *Sentences* of this very book, *Distinctions* 40 and 41; and Honorius, in a twofold *Dialogue* (*On Predestination*). Indeed, in general all the testimonies of the Fathers that teach that every merit and our saving good must be ascribed to the efficacious grace of God, make for this point. Which doctrine of grace Pope Celestine, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul, set forth through several chapters and handed on as to be held; and later the Council of Orange, by the authority of Leo the Great, exposed and illustrated it in many canons. But of that matter we shall treat expressly in Book 2, where there will be the treatment of grace.³²

§ 31. Moreover, just as in this doctrine among the Fathers Augustine excelled, so among the scholastic Doctors of Theology on the same matter—that is, on gratuitous predestination not depending on any forevision of merits—St. Thomas Aquinas wrote most learnedly of all, and that in many places, but especially in these: in the *Summa*, Part I, q. 23, a. 5; in *I Sentences*, Dist. 41, last; in *On Truth*, q. 6, a. 2, where also he solves 14 arguments to the contrary, and alleges the Gloss on chap. 9 of the *Epistle to the Romans*; and in Book 3 of the *Against the Gentiles*, the last chapter. The same he teaches in his *Commentary on John*, chap. 15, lecture 3; on the *Epistle to the Romans*, chap. 1, lecture 3; and chap. 8, lecture 6; and chap. 9, lectures 2 and 3; on the *Epistle to the Ephesians*, chap. 1, lectures 1 and 4. Likewise in his own treatise *On Predestination*, in the epilogue of which he concludes from St. Augustine, that no reason of the divine predestination is to be sought.³³

§ 32. This same opinion moreover was held by very many other scholastics, as by Aegidius Romanus, who confesses that he was a solemn [i.e., principal] disciple of St. Thomas; and others, who establish it by the force of arguments, some of which Louis Ellies Dupin praises in the *Bibliotheca of the Century* (in the Appendix to vol. X of Augustine's Works). That this is the common doctrine of the Theologians, as we said above, is asserted. Scotus, writing on this same distinction (and in III, Dist. 7, q. 3), where he also attacks the contrary

opinion of Henry of Ghent, teaches that under predestination there fall even congruent merits (*meritum de congruo*), just as also in Christ the union of the human nature with the Word (*Verbum*). Thus likewise think St. Bonaventure, Durandus, the Antissiodorensis, John Bassolinus, Francis Maironius, and others writing partly in Dist. 40, partly in Dist. 41 of this book. Likewise Marsilius (in I, q. 14), Ambrosius Spira (in the Sermons), Nicolaus Denisius (Part I), Domingo de Soto (on Romans 9 and 11), Peter de Soto in a letter to Ruardus, and Ruardus himself (in the explication of article 7 at Louvain); Cajetan also, and Domingo Bañez (on I, q. 24, a. 5); of whom the former refutes as erring about this doctrine Henry [of Ghent] and Aureolus, the latter that same Henry and Gabriel [Biel], and besides a certain Javellus. To these at last is added the authority of the Parisian school, by which almost 250 years ago these three articles are found to have been condemned: That on account of the future good works of someone God preordained someone from eternity; That someone is predestined from eternity on account of the good use of free will (*liberum arbitrium*), which God foresaw that he would have; That not so gratuitously and mercifully did God predestine him whom He predestined, but also for all his future goods, or another's.³⁴

§ V — The same doctrine confirmed by reasons (Eadem Doctrina rationibus confirmata)

§ 33. It remains now to subjoin reasons to authority; though these too have their foundation in the sacred Scriptures and the writings of the Fathers. They are, however, as follows. First. Every merit of man, by which in any way whatever he is ordered to eternal life, is an effect of predestination (*praedestinatio*); for whatever there is in man that orders him to salvation, the whole of that is contained under the effect of predestination, as is evident from the things which have been said above to the preceding distinction. Therefore it is impossible that predestination, that is, the whole effect of predestination, should find any merit on the part of man. St. Thomas hands on and explains this reason.¹ Now this reason, for proving the altogether gratuitous character of God's predestination, is most efficacious, and one which even by itself could deservedly suffice as demonstrative, and also excels in perspicuity; yet, for the sake of fuller doctrine, let us add others as well.

§ 34. Let this, therefore, be the second reason. If predestination were from merits (*meritum*), then now there would be some merit of grace (*gratia*) in man; for every effect of predestination pertains to grace. But it is contrary to the sacred Scriptures and to the definitions of the Fathers that grace be given according to merits, as in II of the Sentences we shall show; therefore predestination is not from merits. Whence St. Augustine teaches that, when the merit of predestination is sought, nothing else is being sought than whether there be some merit of grace, that is, of a gratuitous gift and favor.³⁵ And that there is not, he proves by the testimony of the Apostle, saying: "If grace, now not of works; otherwise grace is now not grace" (Rom. 11).

§ 35. Third. The promises of the New Testament do not depend on merits, but even themselves include merits; for God has promised to His elect not only eternal life, but also the means by which they are ordered to it, such as faith, repentance, the remission of sins, the renovation of the heart, the fulfillment of the law, perseverance, and whatever else of this sort there is, as is evident from the passage in Ezek. 36 and elsewhere. Now the same formal character belongs to promise and to predestination. For whatever New Testament goods God has promised, the same He has predestined; and whatever He has predestined, He has deigned also to promise. And just as He Himself does whatever He has predestined, so He Himself furnishes and fulfills whatever He has promised. Wherefore neither does predestination depend on merit, but it comprehends the

whole of merit. Now that the promises of the New Testament do not depend on merits but are altogether gratuitous, besides that of Ezek. 36, "Not for your sakes will I do this," the Scriptures teach (Rom. 4; and to the Galatians 3 and 4); and likewise St. Augustine; and Prosper.³⁶ And even the type of this matter is that promise of the Old Testament concerning the land of Canaan to be given to the sons of Israel: it did not rest on any foreseen merits of that people, but on the sheer bounty of the Divine will, as Moses bears witness (Deut. 9).

§ 36. Fourth reason. It is inscrutable to us why God predestines or chooses this man rather than that to eternal life. Which those words signify, Rom. 9: "O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus?" and so on; and: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God; how incomprehensible are his judgments," and what follows (Rom. 11). And St. Augustine in many places; St. Gregory; St. Thomas expressly; whence also the Council of Trent calls predestination an "arcane mystery."³⁷ But it would not be arcane and inscrutable, if anyone were predestined on account of foreseen merits. For although those merits themselves would be unknown to us, nevertheless they could be known even in this life; and even if they were not known, still it would be known, particularly, that this man rather than that—for example, Simon Peter rather than Simon Magus—was chosen by God on account of his foreseen merits.

§ 37. Fifth reason can be taken from the fact that Scripture repeatedly names predestination under the title of "lot." But the force of this argument has been explained above.

§ 38. Sixth. It is taken from the example of little children, who, after receiving the sacrament of regeneration, die before the use of reason. For it is manifest that these have been predestined from the sole preordination of God, not from any foreknowledge of an act of free will; so that it must be referred to the inscrutable judgments of God why these rather than other little children should be predestined. Since therefore the predestination of adults is not of a different formal character than that of little children—lest some be said to be predestined from merits and others gratuitously, an error which the Council of Orange condemns—it must be confessed that the predestination of adults is equally gratuitous. For although they have the merits of works, nevertheless all those proceed from the grace of predestination. St. Augustine uses this argument, taken from little children; Prosper and Hilary too in their letters to Augustine; Prosper also in his letter to Ruffinus, and in *De vocatione gentium*; and Fulgentius. Therefore it ought not to seem alien or incongruous that the case of little children be adduced as an example for their elders, as it seemed to those whose objections against Augustine's doctrine Hilary recounts in a letter; but God is Lord of both alike, and the same formal character of gratuitous salvation [in the Scriptures] obtains.³⁸

§ 39. Seventh. Christ is the head of all the predestined, whose predestination therefore is the exemplar of our predestination; but Christ as man was predestined to that dignity—that the man Himself should be the Son of God—on account of no preceding or foreseen merits; therefore we too, from no foreseen merits, have been predestined to that dignity, that according to participation of the Son we should be called and should be sons of God. St. Augustine frequently uses this reasoning. St. Thomas also uses it, in addition alleging the authority of Augustine from *De Trinitate*.³⁹

§ 40. Eighth. The gratuitous character of God's predestination is argued from this, that God has reprobated many who were less evil, if natural goods and the duties of morals be considered—of which sort very many were among the pagans—having been left in their unbelief; but He has chosen certain worse men,

such as blasphemers and persecutors, as Paul was, and those liable to other crimes, of whom the same Apostle speaks (Tit. 3). For by this, as by a certain sign, He has willed to commend to us the grace of predestination as plainly gratuitous, lest man should think that he can merit by any good of his own the mercy of God who predestines; as Prosper teaches, and before him St. Augustine.⁴⁰

§ 41. Ninth. A sign also of gratuitous predestination was this, that God once chose, before all other nations, the Israelite people to the true worship of Himself; although it was a people of most stiff neck, as Moses himself attests (Deut. 9), where also with many words he enlarges upon this benefit of God as gratuitous and altogether unmerited.

§ 42. Lastly. Most efficacious arguments could be taken from our prayers, and likewise from boasting and thanksgiving, by which it is taught that every salutary good of the elect is to be referred to the grace of God who predestines. For there is no such good which the faithful do not ask of God for themselves or for others; none, on account of which they do not think that one should boast in God as author; none, finally, on account of which they do not give thanks to God as bestower. And all these things it is not difficult to confirm by various testimonies of Scripture; but they will be set forth more opportunely in the treatise on Grace, book 2.⁴¹

§ 43. Furthermore, although it has now been sufficiently shown that there is no meritorious cause (*causa*) of our predestination on our part, nevertheless the same doctrine can be extended to every kind of cause, namely that neither a final, nor an efficient, nor a formal, nor a material cause of our predestination be said to be found on our part. Which matter Dominic Bañez explains learnedly; in which same place he also explains and resolves, by five conclusions, this question: Whether on the part of the merits of Christ—who is the head of all the predestined—there can be assigned a cause of the predestination of the members.⁴²

§ VI — The foreseen acceptance of grace is not the cause of predestination (Praevisam gratiae acceptionem, non esse praedestinationis causam)

§ 44. Those who have referred the cause (*causa*) of predestination (*praedestinatio*) to the foreseen acceptance (*acceptio praevisa*) of grace (*gratia*) to be offered by God did not depart, except in word only, from the error of those who said that the cause of predestination is foreseen merits. For the acceptance of grace offered is in truth a certain merit, as is evident from those things which we said above concerning the signification of merit. Whence also St. Thomas places this opinion under that which establishes the cause of predestination in foreseen merits.¹ Wherefore whatever things prove that predestination is not from merits, the same things also destroy this opinion, which seeks the formal character (*ratio*) of predestination from foreseen acceptance or good use of grace—that is, of those who say that someone is therefore predestined by God, because He foresaw him as about to accept the grace offered and as about to use it well even to the end of life; but on the contrary, that he is reprobated whom He foresaw as about to reject the grace offered. Nevertheless, that the falsity of this opinion may appear more clearly, we refute it by certain other arguments more proper to it. To this pertains, first, what the Apostle pronounces in Rom. 11, that it cannot be investigated by us why God of old chose Israel with the nations left, but afterwards, the Jews having been blinded and forsaken, called a multitude of the nations to the faith. For from this he exclaims: "O the depth of the riches," and the rest—namely, referring the whole matter to the incomprehensible judgments of God, and the unsearchable ways, and the inscrutable counsel; as Gregory beautifully declares, *Moralia*, book 29, chapter 12.⁴³ Nor indeed can it

be said that from the whole Gentility none would have believed if the grace of Faith had been offered to them, since from that People so many believed, whom Moses affirms to have been "of a most stiff neck." And this reason is also accommodated to individual men. Whence St. Augustine (Epistle 105): why this man should believe, that man should not believe, although both hear the same and see the same miracle, he refers, with the Apostle, to the inscrutable judgments of God. And below: "Let him search, he says, why He should free this one rather than that one—he who can; but let him beware the precipice." And in Tractate 26 on John: "Why He draws this man, does not draw that man—do not be willing to pass judgment, if you do not wish to err." He writes similar things in book 4 Against Julian, chapter 8; and in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chapter 8; and in *De dono perseverantiae*, chapter 8. And Prosper, *De vocatione gentium* I, chapters 7 and 9.⁴⁴

§ 45. Second. Scripture is manifest (Matt. 11), where the Lord, reproaching certain cities for their unbelief, says: "For if in Tyre and Sidon had been done the mighty works which have been done in you, long ago in sackcloth and ashes they would have done penance." Similar is what Ezek. 3 says to the Prophet from the Lord concerning certain persons: "And if thou shouldst be sent to them, they would hear thee." Therefore it is false that someone is predestined on this account, that he was about to accept the grace offered and to use it well, since to these the grace through which they would have been about to believe and to do penance was not offered. Augustine uses this argument (*De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 9, 10, 14), and Prosper, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 5.⁴⁵ But what Rupert (as we have recalled above) answers to this argument—that therefore the mighty works were not done among the Tyrians and Sidonians, nor other means of salvation offered to them, because God foresaw that, even if they were offered, they would not have been about to do true penance, that is, salutary penance, but such as Ahab and the Ninevites did—that is, extorted solely by fear of the divine threat—is in no way agreeable to the Scriptures and to the sentence of Christ.⁴⁶ For although, with respect to Ahab, it is not improbably said that his penance was conceived from mere fear of temporal evil, and therefore not salutary; nevertheless, about the Ninevites there appears altogether another thing. For it is said of them in Jon. 3 that "they believed in God," and also that "they were converted from their evil way"—with which words Scripture is wont to designate true penance. And this Christ also signifies in the Gospel of Matt. 12 and Lk. 11, which assuredly He would not do, unless they had had such penance as He Himself approves and such as He required of the Jews. Whence the Church, on the feria 2 after the Lord's Day, proposes in the Mass the deed of the Ninevites to the faithful to be imitated, as an example of true and great piety. Therefore also the penance of the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been of that sort. This is evident from the fact that the Lord, saying: "If in Tyre and Sidon," etc., was speaking of true penance—namely, to which He was exhorting the cities Capharnaum, Chorazin, and Bethsaida. For He had not come to announce judgment according to this world, but salvation: "Do penance," He says, "for the kingdom of heaven hath drawn nigh." But certain others, seeing that Rupert's reply does not stand with Scripture, say that indeed the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done true penance, but that they would not have been about to persevere in good; and since the Lord foresaw this, therefore He did not send preachers to them nor did He do miracles among them. To whom it is answered that this is said very rashly concerning all, when nevertheless it can scarcely be thought that, out of so many who—Christ being witness—"would have done penance in sackcloth and ashes," no one would have persevered. Nay rather, the following words exclude an evasion of this sort: straightway concerning Sodom (and the same judgment concerning Tyre and Sidon) He subjoins: "If in Sodom had been done the mighty works which have been done in thee, perhaps they would have remained even to this day"—by which permanence is signified. Nor does that word "perhaps" cause doubt: for in the Greek it is not dubitatively but affirmatively expressed, although our language often renders the Greek particle by "perhaps."

Rightly therefore Bede, in the Commentary on Matt. 11 and on Lk. 10, says: "Why it has not been evangelized to those who could have believed, and it has been preached to those who as it were would not believe, it is for Him to know whose is the whole; such are the ways of mercy and truth"—as if he were to say, that this is inscrutable to us. Whence also Christ Himself, in the same place of the Gospel, refers the reason of this diversity to the sole good-pleasure of God, when He says: "Yea, Father, for so it hath seemed good before Thee."⁴⁷

(a) I wish here to have the reader forewarned, lest he pass a rash judgment upon the Author, nor do him wrong in his cause: as if he dictated certain things which might seem not far removed from the doctrine common to Quesnel and to Jansenius. For Jansenius in many theses attributes to grace an unconquered efficacy; they even make the will altogether passive with respect to grace, and that indeed in the very work which they call the triumph of grace; and they so extol the efficacy of grace as triumphing and conquering, that they altogether remove sufficient grace, and admit no other than the efficacious; and they acknowledge the grace of Jesus Christ to be altogether efficacious, while they utterly reject a grace that gives powers to free will in the order of the first act. But the Author, as a most faithful follower of St. Thomas, altogether abhors these errors; as from those things which, God granting, we shall note below, it will easily be seen. He therefore calls grace sufficient for salvation at once proximate and, as it were, remote; and he asserts that sufficient help for salvation is not wanting to all unbelievers, yes and to sinners. He reckons among the censured, along with others, those propositions 26, 27, 28, 29, noted by Alexander VIII; and among those fixed by the Supreme Pontiffs against Quesnel, especially 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 18, 20, 21. For Quesnel's perpetual assertion is that the grace of Jesus Christ is given only to the good—namely, to those who do a work good and perfected by charity, if we listen to Quesnel. But the Author's sentences, and the opinions of Jansenius and of Quesnel, are immensely distant: for Jansenius altogether enervates the wills of men, rendering them passive with respect to grace, which he exalts as triumphant and victorious, so that he entirely takes away sufficient grace, and admits no other but the efficacious one; nor does he acknowledge any other. Hence it is that the Author, as a most faithful follower of St. Thomas, is far removed from these errors; as from those things which in book 2 On Grace, especially in chapter 11, and likewise, against Jansenius in book 3 On the Grace of Christ the Savior, and in other places, he sets out, it can easily be gathered.⁴⁸

§ 46. Third, the aforesaid opinion is refuted by this most firm reason. The acceptance of grace offered (whatever it may be), and its good use, and perseverance in it, are effects of predestination itself; therefore predestination is not to be ascribed to them as to causes. The antecedent is evident, because by the grace of predestination it comes about that someone accepts the grace offered, and uses it well, and perseveres in the same: for this properly pertains to the grace of Christ (*gratia Christi*). The consequence also is manifest. For that cannot be assigned as the merit of predestination which is itself contained under predestination as its effect. But that the acceptance and good use of grace properly pertain to the grace of Christ—to will well and to do well, and to persevere in good work and in holy conversation—many places of Scripture teach us, and, everywhere in his writings against the Pelagians, Augustine teaches this; and he proves it especially by this argument: because the grace of Christ is not common to the good and to the evil, but distinguishes between the good and the evil—namely, effecting that the grace itself, when offered, is not rejected.⁴⁹ This very truth—that the acceptance and use of grace is from the efficacious operation of the grace of Christ—is demonstrated by the prayers of the Church, which she pours forth for the conversion of unbelievers and of sinners of every kind. It is demonstrated also by the thanksgivings which the Faithful are wont to render to God for the conversion of such persons. For these most plainly convince that God works in them the very conversion, and

the very good conversion—that is, the acceptance and the use of grace. And Augustine very often presses and weighs this argument, and likewise Pope Celestine in the Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul.⁵⁰ The same truth is proved by this reason: for if the mere offering of grace were the divine gift, but acceptance were of free will, then that which man would have from free will—that is, from himself—would be better than what he would have from God; whereas in many things it is better to will well and to do well than to be able. With this argument Augustine uses Book 2 of *De peccatorum meritis*, ch. 18.

And that this acceptance of grace is included under the effect of predestination, and that the grace of which the Author is speaking is that which so helps a man that it at length leads him to the attainment of the end—this grace is efficacious. But what the Author says in this very place, that to all men there is not given grace, or help sufficient for salvation (about which matter there will be fuller treatment in the second book), you must not understand in such a way that you should enroll the Author with that same Jansenius, book 3 *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, ch. 11, whose title is: "That unbelievers lack grace sufficient for salvation both proximate and remote," and with all its principles; or with Quesnel, whose propositions 26, 27, 28, 29 were, among others, removed from Catholic sense by Alexander VIII—propositions in which, universally, to all unbelievers, and, according to Quesnel, even to sinners not repenting, any grace whatsoever is denied, since they acknowledge no other than efficacious grace. For the Author asserts only, in a merely negative way, that not to all is sufficient help given; whereas those aforementioned authors positively assert that to all unbelievers, and, in Quesnel's judgment, even to some sinners not repenting, any grace whatsoever is denied, since they acknowledge no other than efficacious grace. As to unbelievers, there is another negative cause; and concerning certain sinners, Cardinal Sfondrati, in the place cited, judges the opinion not discordant from right reason to be probable.⁵¹ I would never indeed believe that the Author wished to brand with censure the sentences of most approved theologians about conditional predestination, or election after foreseen merits—although Augustine and Thomas in no way thought thus against the Pelagians; for the Semi-Pelagians admitted no gratuitous predestination either to glory or even to grace—which Semi-Pelagian sentence was heretical; but the theologians we have commended profess predestination to grace as altogether gratuitous, while they wish election to glory to be made with a view to merits. On which matter, among others, see Natalis Alexander, tome 6 of the *Ecclesiastical History*, century 5, ch. 3, art. 8.⁵²

And this truth indeed could be variously and copiously proved both from Scripture and from the Fathers and Councils, as also that truth connected to this one—that not to all men is grace, or help sufficient for salvation, given; but since (in the second book) there is its proper treatment, let it now be enough, from this doctrine, by a deduced argument, to have shown that someone is not therefore predestined, because he will use grace well; but that therefore he will use it well with perseverance, because, that he may so use it, God, by predestining, has prepared [it] for him.

§ 47. Fourth, in a peculiar way the authority of St. Thomas bears on this, who, in the clearest words, rejects the said opinion and, by that reason which we have just mentioned, most solidly refutes it (I, q. 23, a. 5). For thus he writes: "There have been others who said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; so that it be understood that God therefore gives grace to someone and preordained that He would give it to him, because He knew he would use grace well—just as if a king gives to some soldier a horse which he knows he will use well; but these seem to have distinguished between that which is from grace and that which is from free will, as if the same could not be from both. But it is manifest that that which is of grace is an effect of predestination; and this cannot be posited as the reason of predestination,

since this is included under predestination. If therefore something else on our part be the reason of predestination, this will be besides the effect of predestination. Now that which is from free will is not distinct from predestination, just as neither is that which is from a second cause distinct from the first cause. For the Divine providence produces effects through the operations of second causes. Whence also that which is through free will is from predestination." So he.⁵³

§ 48. From which it is plain that the acceptance, or use, of grace could not for this reason be posited as the formal character of predestination, because it is an effect of predestination—inasmuch as it is wrought at once both by free will and by God moving free will; and that those are gravely mistaken who, in a good work, strive to distinguish that which is on the part of free will and that which is on the part of grace—since these are no more to be distinguished than, in a natural work, that which is from the first cause and that which is from the second cause. Again, the same Doctor, in words no less clear, and by the very same reasoning, refutes the aforesaid opinion in the Commentary on Rom. 9, lecture 3; and in *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 11. By a similar reasoning also Scotus overturns it, writing upon this distinction, where he disputes against Henry of Ghent, similarly erring in this, that in a good work he distinguished that which is from grace and that which is from free will. Whence he used to say that man is predestined on account of the foreseen acceptance of grace by the good use of free will. Against whom most rightly Scotus argues that God does not foresee man as about to use free will well, unless because He wills and preordains that he should use it well; and therefore the formal character of predestination is not to be sought except in the Divine will.⁵⁴ Lastly, that opinion is refuted by this—that its authors, Bishop Faustus, Cassian, and Gennadius the Presbyter, and certain other writers of the same time, as detractors from the doctrine of Blessed Augustine and imbued with the leaven of the Pelagian dogma, were in part rejected by Pope Gelasius in a council of seventy bishops, together with their little works, as apocryphal; were in part gravely censured in published books by Prosper and Fulgentius, whom the Church venerates as Saints and Doctors of sound faith; and were disapproved also by other Catholic writers. And that the same doctrine, which consists for the most part in establishing gratuitous predestination, was approved by Pope Celestine in the Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul. Finally, that the heads of the same Epistle and the canons of the Council of Orange, against Pelagian remnants, for the most part collected from Augustine's writings, as also the Synod of 214 bishops, of which Prosper makes mention (*Resp. 8 ad capita Gallorum*), and in *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 10, not obscurely contain this doctrine concerning the grace of Christ; which can in no way consist with the opinion which up to this point we have been impugning.⁵⁵

§ VII — The solution to objections from Scripture against the foregoing (Objectionum ex scripturis adversus praedicta solutio)

§ 49. The things that are wont to be objected against the gratuitous predestination (*praedestinatio*) of God which we have set forth are many and various; we shall distribute them in such a way that we dissolve, in the first place, those which are adduced from Scripture, then those which are brought from the Fathers, and finally those which are taken from reason. First, then, from the Scriptures is brought forward that saying of Matt. 25: "Come, and possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I hungered, and you gave me to eat," and the rest. For by these words Christ seems to signify that the kingdom is prepared, that is, preordained and predestined to the elect on account of the merits (*merita*) of good works. Second, the Apostle Paul seems to define predestination from the knowledge of merits; when he says in Rom. 8: "For whom He foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son." Third, the Apostle

Peter seems to will the same thing, in his second epistle, ch. 1 (commonly cited ch. 3), writing: "To the elect sojourners according to the foreknowledge (*praescientia*) of God the Father." Fourth, again Paul, 1 Tim. 1, testifies that he obtained the mercy of God because he had sinned ignorantly in unbelief; therefore there was in him some cause or formal character (*ratio*) why God willed to have mercy on him, though a very great sinner, by preparing for him grace (*gratia*) and glory. Fifth, in the same epistle ch. 2 the Apostle writes that God "wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Whence it seems to follow that God offers His grace to all, but predestined only those whom He foresaw would embrace His grace and use it well unto the end. Sixth was this argument: "I cannot of myself do anything, but as I hear, I judge"; therefore Christ predestines no one to glory from the mere good pleasure of His will, but according to that which He hears, that is, knows in His eternal prescience concerning the future works of men; thus He judges and determines about those to be predestined or not predestined. In this manner Rupert reasons from this Scripture (Rupert, book 3 on Matthew).⁵⁷ Seventh, Jn. 16, again the Lord says: "The Father loves you, because you have loved me"; therefore on account of the love of the Son foreseen in the disciples of Christ the Father loved them from eternity. Eighth, in Ps. 58 it is said: "Have regard to visit all nations: do not have mercy on all who work iniquity"; therefore, that God may bestow mercy on someone, He waits that he not work iniquity, that is, that he turn himself away from iniquity; wherefore predestination, which embraces the effects of the divine mercy toward man, will depend upon a foreseen merit of this sort. Lastly, Scripture often signifies that God confers the grace of redemption on those who are humble, meek, poor, and little in their own eyes, as Jas. 4: "But He gives grace to the humble." Is. 61 and Lk. 4: "He has sent me to evangelize the poor," or meek. Matt. 11: "Thou hast revealed these things to little ones." Lk. 1: "He has filled the hungry with good things"; and elsewhere. Whence it appears that the first effect of predestination, which is held on the part of God, presupposes in man, on man's part, some preparation of soul which has the formal character of a certain merit with respect to the divine benefit. Other things of this sort too can be objected from the Scriptures, but their true understanding will readily be elicited from the solution of those which have now been brought forward. Although very many of these rather demand their own proper treatment in book 2, where it is taught that grace is not given according to merits. Let us reply, then, to the objections.

§ 50. In what is objected in the first place, it is not signified that the merits of good works are the cause of the preparation of the kingdom, but of its possession. For that causal clause, "For I hungered, and you gave me," and the rest, is not to be referred to the phrase "prepared," but to the words "Come and possess." For if it regarded the preparation, it ought now not to be said "I hungered, and you gave," but "I was going to hunger, and you were going to give me to eat." This is also most clearly proved from the other sentence which will be said to the reprobate: "Depart from me into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels"; for that causal clause can in no way be referred to this: "Which is prepared for the devil and his angels": for the fire is not prepared for the devil and his angels because the reprobate men did not do, or were going to do, works of mercy. Therefore it must necessarily be referred to the word: "Depart from me," and the rest. Wherefore likewise there the rendering of a cause regards that "Come and possess," so that from that place there is very well established against the heretics of our time that eternal life is the reward of good works.

§ 51. To the second it is answered that the sense of the Apostle's words is this: Those whom God foreknew, that is, from eternity preloved to this, that they should be conformed to Christ His Son, those same He predestined to that good, that is, by a certain and fixed decree from eternity He determined to bring them at some time to that good; and that through certain means which in the subsequent words are subjoined by the Apostle; to wit, that according to that same Apostle, 1 Cor. 15, "As is the heavenly," that is, Christ,

"such also are the heavenly," that is, all His elect. Which exposition very much agrees with the customary phrasing of Scripture. For just as "to know" for "to love" and "to approve" is frequent in the Scriptures, so "to foreknow" for what is "to prede love" is likewise again and again put in the same: as ch. 11 of this same epistle: "God has not cast away His people whom He foreknew"; and elsewhere; as we showed more fully above at the previous distinction. And in this way St. Augustine also expounds this place of the Apostle, and Origen likewise.⁵⁸ And so, according to this interpretation consonant with the Scriptures, from this place there is plainly established the contrary of that which the Adversaries will: namely, that the sole love of God, by which He has loved us from eternity, is the cause of our predestination. And this sense is further confirmed by the fact that the Apostle did not say: "Whom He foreknew would live well," or "would be of good will," but absolutely, "whom He foreknew," so that, assuredly, it ought to be referred to the same thing to which the word "He predestined" is referred, namely to the conformity to the image of the Son of God, by which is signified consummate beatitude in body and soul; in which way the same Apostle also below explains that conformity by "glorification," and elsewhere similarly (as, namely, 1 Cor. 15; Phil. 3; Col. 3; and 1 Jn. 3).⁵⁹ Thus he said absolutely in Rom. 11: "God has not repelled His people whom He foreknew"; not adding "who would live well," or "who would use grace well," or anything similar that belongs to predilection.

§ 52. By which also sign Peter without doubt took "foreknowledge," which was objected in the third place; for there Peter meant what he elsewhere most diligently commends to us, that the charity and benignity of God the Father is the cause of our election and salvation, as Jn. 3: "God so loved the world," and so forth. 1 Jn. 4: "In this the charity of God appeared in us." Titus 3: "The benignity and love-for-man (in Greek *φιανθρωπία*) of our Savior God appeared."⁶⁰ Wherefore also here Peter's place signifies rather the contrary. For he signifies our election to be from the mere love of God; and in the same place there follows: "Who according to His great mercy has regenerated us unto a living hope," and so forth, as Paul likewise says: "According to His mercy He saved us," as cited. Moreover, in the same signification and in the same chapter "foreknowledge" is taken also when he says that Christ "was foreknown before the constitution of the world," that is, from eternity loved and predestined by the Father, not from a forevision of works or of any act of free choice, but purely by grace.

§ 53. To the fourth it is answered that, in the words of the Apostle, "because I did it ignorantly in unbelief," no merit can be understood, however generally taken; for in its entirety, that he did this as ignorant in unbelief, includes nothing of good which could truly have the formal character of merit, the many and great evils previously enumerated notwithstanding, although on account of ignorance they had some excuse. Therefore the Apostle signifies only this: that he, although a very great sinner, was nevertheless not so far removed from the benefit of the mercy of God as those who out of malice persecuted Christ and His disciples knowingly; such as they were who said: "This is the heir; let us kill him," Matt. 21; and who, seeing, were unwilling to see and understand; against whom the Lord everywhere in the Gospel inveighs, and the Apostle in the Acts and in the epistles. And this very thing too, namely, to have sinned less out of malice than those, the Apostle both elsewhere teaches and points out to us by that saying of St. Augustine, book 2 of the Confessions, ch. 7: "I ascribe to Thy grace whatever evils I have not done."⁶¹ Of whom also these are the words (Homily 23 among the fifty): "Acknowledge His grace, to whom you owe it, even that you have not committed sins: there is no sin which a good man has done which another man could not commit, if there be lacking the Ruler by whom man has been made a man."⁶² Sentences of the same Doctor to this effect are in the book On Holy Virginitv (ch. 40, n. 41).⁶³ Wherefore even if some merit of congruity were acknowledged with respect to the mercy of God calling to the same good, in a man sinning out of ignorance and not out of

malice—such also were they to whom Peter says, Acts 3: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as also your princes"—nevertheless it would not follow that in such there is found any merit of predestination; because, since to have sinned less is also in the elect comprehended under the effect of predestination, as something foreordained beforehand to their salvation, it must certainly be understood that in that matter there is no merit, in whatever way it be thought to provoke God to have mercy—since, as we said above from St. Augustine and Prosper, by far the worse are reprobated by God, whereas by far worse are predestined. For indeed many Jews, in like manner as Paul, persecuted the faith of Christ out of ignorance, and they persecute it even to this day, who nevertheless have not obtained the mercy of God.

§ 54. The solution to the fifth argument will be evident from those things which will be said at the 46th distinction, where the Master is to be treated concerning the true sense of that Scripture and other similar ones, which are manifestly twisted by Rupert into an alien sense. To the sixth we answer that the words of Christ are twisted; the genuine sense is: "I cannot do anything of myself, which I do not have from the Father as Author: wherefore neither can my judgment be unjust; because, just as I hear, that is, I receive from my Father who is most just, that it is to be judged, so do I judge." Therefore that "of myself" is opposed to the cognition of merits, nor does the word "I hear" signify that same cognition or examination of merits, as Rupert seems to will; but in sentences of this sort Christ refers all His own to the Father as Author.⁶⁴

§ 55. To the seventh it is answered that this is not the sense: "The Father loved you from eternity, because you in time have loved me." For thus rather it ought to have been said, "because you were going to love me"; but this is the sense: "The Father loves you in time by heaping up greater gifts of grace, because you have loved me," that is, have adhered to me, and have followed me—just as He had said above, ch. 14: "He who loves me shall be loved by my Father." In this way Bede solves it (Homily on the Gospel of the Sunday before the Ascension of the Lord).⁶⁵ Now these and similar sentences signify that grace merits grace, and that among the effects of predestination this is the order, that one merits another, namely the prior the posterior; as St. Thomas teaches (article 5, often cited): for that the very love of the disciples toward Christ was the benefit of prevenient grace, no Catholic will have doubted.¹

§ 56. To the eighth I reply that the Psalmist is speaking not of the mercy calling to faith or to justice, but of the mercy freeing from punishments: so that the sense may be: "Thou wilt have regard to visit and judge all nations, and Thou wilt not have mercy on any that work iniquity," by freeing them from the punishments due, unless they be converted to Thee by penance. But this conversion is so from their free will that it is also an effect of predestination and of the grace of God moving free will.

§ 57. To the last it is answered that God beforehand softens the hearts of certain ones for Himself, that is, prepares them by humility and meekness even before they hear the Gospel—namely, to this, that, once the Gospel is heard, they do not resist but obey. For God humbles the proud, according to that which the Church prays God, that He deign to humble His enemies. And so God indeed finds the humble and the meek, but such as He Himself has already before made so. Whence Leo, Sermon 1 (On the fast of the tenth month): "That God may find in us the form of His goodness, He also gives that we ourselves may work what He works."⁶⁶ Wherefore it must be said that even the very affections of souls, by which men are seen as it were prepared to receive the Gospel—according as it is written Jn. 4: "Behold the regions, for they are white already unto the harvest"—are contained in the elect under the amplitude of the divine predestination.⁶⁷

§ VIII — Objections from the Fathers are resolved (*Objectiones ex Patribus solvantur.*)

§ 58. Those who have seemed chiefly to rely on the authority of the Fathers in the Church for the cause of predestination (*praedestinatio*) in foreknowledge (*praescientia*), as Prosper reports in an Epistle to St. Augustine, write thus: "Many of the servants of Christ, who live in the city of Marseilles, think whatever you discussed in your writings, which you composed against the Pelagian heretics, about the calling of the Saints according to God's purpose, to be contrary to the opinion of the Fathers and to the ecclesiastical sense." And below about the same men: "They defend their obstinacy," he says, "by antiquity, and those things which are proposed from the Epistle of the Apostle Paul writing to the Romans for the manifestation of the divine grace returning, namely the merits of the elect, they affirm to have by no ecclesiastical writer ever been understood as they are now taken. He himself indeed asks to be taught how that is to be refuted, that, upon the earlier opinions having been withdrawn, there is found nearly one and the same view and one sentence of almost all, who received 'the purpose' and 'predestination of God' according to foreknowledge, namely that on this account God made some vessels of honor, others of dishonor, because He foresaw the end of each one, and, under the very help of grace (*gratia*), He anticipated in what will and action each would be." These things are from Prosper.⁶⁸ It must therefore be seen which ecclesiastical writers, both before and also after that time, seemed to hand down that opinion, and what altogether ought to be answered concerning their authority or words.

§ 59. Irenaeus, book 4 (Against Heresies, ch. 38), writes that it was said from the foreknowledge of future things: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated."⁶⁹ Origen, book 3 (Periarchon, and book 1 on the Epistle to the Romans, explaining the beginning of the Epistle; and again book 7, expounding that in ch. 9, "Or has not the potter power over the clay," etc., and homily 3 on Numbers), with many and open words teaches that men are predestined by God from works foreseen, and he interprets the "purpose" of which the Apostle speaks (Rom. 8) to be the purpose of a man, not of God.⁷⁰ Hilary (on Ps. 64) writes thus: "Election is not the thing of an indiscriminate judgment, but a discrimination was made from the choice of merit. Blessed therefore is he whom God has chosen. Blessed on this account, because he was worthy to be made the object of election."⁷¹ Arnobius (on Pss. 90, 91, 108, 147), and in other places of the same commentary, plainly establishes grace and election from preceding or foreseen merits.⁷² Ambrose, in the commentary (on the Epistle to the Romans at that in ch. 8, 'to them who are called according to the purpose'): "They," he says, "are called according to the purpose, whom God has foreknown as going to be believers, fit for Himself, so that, before they believed, they might be known." And forthwith: "Those whom He foreknew as going to be devoted to Himself, those He chose to lay hold of the promised rewards." And upon ch. 9, among many other things by which he seems to refer predestination to the foreknowledge of works, even that saying, "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy," etc., he explains from foreknowledge in this way: "I shall give mercy to him whom I have foreknown as, after his error, with altogether upright heart returning to me. This is to give to him to whom it ought to be given, and not to give to him to whom it ought not to be given, so that, when He calls, it is him whom He knows will obey," etc. Which words are also found reported in the Glossa ordinaria.⁷³ A similar passage exists from the same commentary (on Gal. 1, at that, "who set me apart from the womb"). The same man, book 5 (On the Faith to Gratian, ch. 3): "What," he says, "is this that God says: 'It is not mine to give to you'? It is not mine, who maintain justice, not grace. Finally, referring it to the Father He added, 'for whom it has been prepared,' so as to show that the Father also is not wont to defer to petitions, but to merits; because God is no

acceptor of persons. Whence also the Apostle says: 'Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.' For He did not predestine before He foreknew, but those whose merits He foreknew, their rewards He predestined."⁷⁴ Jerome (on Mal. 1, expounding that, "Jacob I loved," Esau, etc.) says that the love and hatred of God are born either from the foreknowledge of future things, or from works, namely already done. "Otherwise," he says, "we know that God loves all things, nor does He hate any of those which He has created; but He especially vindicates to His charity those who are enemies of vices and not rebellious," etc.⁷⁵ The same man, in an epistle (to Hedibia, question 10), says that not men are chosen, but the wills of men.⁷⁶ There is a like passage in him (in the exposition of Gal. 1 and 5). Which very thing, too, is taught more manifestly by the brief commentary which exists among his works (on Romans 8 and 9).⁷⁷ Chrysostom, hom. 15, on the Epistle to the Romans, treating that in ch. 8, "To them who according to the purpose": he interprets it of the purpose not of God who calls, but of the men who are called. And hom. 16 (upon that in ch. 9, "Jacob I loved," etc.): "By what cause, then," he says, "was this man held in love, but that man in hatred? Because indeed this man was evil, but that one was good." And on that: "The elder shall serve the younger." "Why then did God say this? Because He does not wait, as man does, to see from the outcome of things who is good or evil; but even before, He knows who is going to be such-and-such or such-and-such." And a little below he says, "Paul's effort especially turns on this, to teach that God is one who knows the worthy, that they may win crowns, or punishment." Also that, "That according to purpose the election of God might remain," he thus explains: "So that the election of God may appear to have been made according to foreknowledge." And forthwith he subjoins: "How many therefore seemed to be better than Matthew from the apparent argument of works? But He who knows secrets, and who is able to approve the aptitude of thought, He also knows the pearl lying in the mud, and, all others set aside, admiring the beauty of this one, He chose him, and, when He had joined His grace to the nobility of his will, He proclaimed him approved." Which also thereafter he proves by more examples from artificers. But he also writes many other such things in the same place. The same man, hom. 1 (on Eph. 1): "Now if men," he says, "when they choose, choose the best for themselves, much more God. For to be chosen is the judgment of divine goodness and of the virtue of those who are chosen." He repeats similar things in hom. 2 on the same Epistle. Again, the same man, hom. 80 (on Matt., those words of Christ): "Receive the kingdom which has been prepared for you," etc., he thus expounds: "Before you were born, because I knew you were going to be of this sort, these things were prepared for you by me." Likewise he writes about the calling of the Apostles (hom. 31 of the same work), and about the hired laborers in the vineyard (hom. 56), to which add the homily entitled "On Jacob and Esau."⁷⁸

§ 60. Theodoret (on Rom. 8) likewise refers "purpose" to men, saying thus: "For God does not call simply, but those who have a purpose." And below: "Those whose purpose He foreknew, them He predestined from the beginning." And on ch. 9: "God did not wait for the experience of things, but while they (Jacob and Esau) were still being borne in the womb, He foretold their difference. But He foretold it when He had foreknown their purpose: for the election is not unjust, but that which agrees with the purpose of men."⁷⁹ Faustus, in the two books which he wrote on predestination, most openly hands down and defends the doctrine of predestination from the foreknowledge of works. Of whom among other things (book 2, ch. 5) this sentence is read: "Unless foreknowledge shall have explored, predestination decides nothing."⁸⁰ Sedulius (on the Epistle to the Romans) has many things the same with the Ambrosian Commentary (on chs. 8 and 9), some of which we cited above.⁸¹ John Damascene, book 2 (On the Faith, ch. 30): "Therefore already," he says, "God has prejudged all things according to His foreknowledge, according to His goodness and justice." And book 4 (ch. 20), adducing that (Rom. 9), "Or has not the potter power over the clay," etc.: "God Himself," he says, "does

not fashion vessels for honor or for ignominy, but the choice proper to each individual."⁸² Theophylact (on Matt. 22) writes in these words: "Few, who are saved; who are worthy to be chosen by God; so that it is God's indeed to call, but that they be made elect or not is ours," etc. The same man (on Jn. 6; on Rom. 8 and 9) has certain similar things; Oecumenius likewise makes not dissimilar commentaries on the same passages of Paul.⁸³ Finally, Rupert, book 13 (on Matthew, and elsewhere), by no obscure testimony declares that this is plainly his own opinion.⁸⁴ Moreover, that they may make it the more plausible, the adversaries even bring forward Augustine for it, seeing that in him (book 38, question 68) these words are read: "Absolutely, 'He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens': but this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, because even if sinners, when on account of the general sin they have made one mass, nevertheless there is not no diversity among them." Which words, since he does not mention in the retraction of that book, they want it to follow that by keeping silence he approved them. The same man (in the Exposition of Certain Propositions of the Epistle to the Romans, prop. 55): "God of the saints," he says, "predestined no one, except one whom He foreknew would believe and follow His calling." And prop. 60, to the objection which he moves to himself about Jacob elected and Esau reprobated before they had done any good or evil, he replies that this was brought about by the foreknowledge of God, by which He knows also concerning those not yet born what they are going to be. And below: "For if by no merit, there is no election nor hatred: for all are equal before merit, nor can election be named among things altogether equal." And a little after: "God," he says, "chose faith in foreknowledge, so that whom He foreknew would believe in Him, that one He chose." And (question 2 to Simplicianus) about Jacob he thus writes: "Therefore he was not elected that he might be made good, but, having been made good, he could be chosen." And after many things: "For no one is chosen, unless already distant from him who is rejected. Whence that which is said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it is said, unless in foreknowledge." They are the words of the same man in tractate 76 (on John): "For they who love, because they love they are chosen." And in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, ch. 5: "He foreknew, that He might predestine." And *Concio 2* on Ps. 30: "Where merits are considered, there is election, not chance." Nay more, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance* he affirms that God predestined by a most just judgment; but a just judgment considers the merits of him who is judged. The same man, moreover, in almost the whole little book *On Predestination and Grace*, and in another, *On the Predestination of God*, ch. 5, proves that sentence which establishes predestination from the forevision of merits. Which is also furthered by those words (book *Hypognosticon*) among the same Augustine: "For this reason God predestines, because He knows, He foreknows, what sort of a man he is going to be."⁸⁵

§ 61. These, therefore, are the things which are wont to be adduced from the Fathers against the gratuitous predestination of God. But that an answer may be given to them, since the authority of all is not equal, nor are all the sayings to be taken in one and the same sense, we shall first set down certain things that must in general be noted. Of which the first is, that Augustine, when consulted by Prosper about this difficulty, with a firm assertion replied: that he knew this, that no one could have disputed against that predestination, which he defended according to the sacred Scriptures, except by erring (book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 18).⁸⁶ If, therefore, certain of the aforesaid Authors have disputed thus about the predestination of the elect properly so called, that they judged its cause ought to be sought from the works of men foreseen, with Augustine we must candidly confess that they cannot be vindicated from error.

(a) Here the Author seems to have spoken of the Semipelagian sense: to wit, the Author intends to fasten a mark upon the opinion asserting predestination, as having a cause from merits which are not from the first

grace (*gratia*), as not gratuitous and such that no, not even the beginnings, of merit preceded the first grace, either really or in foreknowledge. Moreover, we have already above forewarned that the sentence of certain Catholic Theologians concerning predestination from merits foreseen must be understood in the way just now explained; hence their opinion is very far removed from the Pelagian heresy, namely that any merits should have preceded the first grace, or could precede it, or be foreseen as about to precede it. About this matter ample and copious things can be noted; and that the doctrine of predestination from merits foreseen is not understood by those Doctors in the manner now set down above by the Author, in the sense of the Pelagians. Richard of St. Victor and many others have disputed those matters less clearly and expressly, and less circumspectly about the prevenient grace of God and about gratuitous predestination, and altogether perhaps not very exactly and accurately, inasmuch as the question had not yet been stirred up by a heresy which would force a more diligent search for the truth; and that all the more, since at that time the heresy of the Manichees, which destroyed free will, required them to be on their guard in the other direction all the more vigilantly for the time. Which also befell Augustine (notwithstanding that he entirely and clearly explained the Catholic opinion) as is very clear from his *Retractations* themselves. Whence also in the *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 20, speaking about himself and other Catholic writers: "This predestination," he says, "we afterwards were compelled to defend more diligently, when already we were disputing against the Pelagians. For we learned that each of the peculiar questions of the universal Church was to be defended more diligently by the Scriptures than if no such necessity had urged." These things are his. Which indeed, as they have happened regarding other heresies, so manifestly also befell the Arian with respect to the writings of the Fathers. For Arius likewise, when he first began to open up his heresy, boasted that all the bishops of the East were of his sentiment; but the contrary doctrine of his own bishop Alexander he assailed as new and with condemned words, as can be seen in his writing to Eusebius of Nicomedia, according to Theodoret, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 1, ch. 5, and Nicephorus. But this bravado too was answered by Jerome (*Apology against Rufinus*). For thus he wrote about the writers before the Council of Nicaea: "If I shall have prudently answered that I do not know the causes of vices, I will not at once judge those men heretics by grace. For it can happen either that they simply erred, or that they wrote in another sense, or that by the unskilled their writings were gradually corrupted, or certainly that, before the demon at midday, as it were, Arius should be born in Alexandria, they spoke innocently and not very cautiously, and things which could not be suspected of the calumny of perverse men." Thus he. Which words very well fit also the present subject, as we have already shown from Augustine.

§ 62. The third thing is, that it cannot be denied that both before and after Pelagius there also existed certain writers from among those who were adduced above, whom it is evident were not far removed from the error of Pelagius. Chief among whom is Origen, about whom the same Jerome (in the *Epistle to Ctesiphon*) says: "The doctrine of Pelagius is a little branch of Origen"; to omit for now also another error of his concerning predestination far more absurd, which Jerome under a tacit name attributes to him (in the *Commentary on Eph. 1*), about which we spoke not long ago. Faustus also, bishop of Riez, must be reckoned in this number, as one who very much cherished with the Massilienses the remnants of the Pelagian heresy. By reason of which his books were reprov'd by Pope Gelasius in a Council of seventy bishops, and anathematized by Peter the Deacon and the Oriental Colleges, and impugned as heretical by Fulgentius, Maxentius, Avitus, and John of Antioch; moreover, they were severely branded and condemned by Isidore, Ado, and Vincent; wherefore with those who have been so often branded and condemned of Pelagianism, our sentence about predestination, as a corollary understood in a sinful way, you will often find appended by the much-praised

Author in the work on predestination. Among these, moreover, is reckoned St. Francis in the Treatise on the Love of God, ch. 5, and in the letter to Father Leonard Le Sa..., to be inserted September of the year 1618, whose autograph is at Pant... Certain of these Doctors contend (if it be lawful to say so) that Augustine and Thomas have been condemned as the defenders of many errors in the seventeenth-century condemnation at Liège: against whom Henry the Cardinal, in Theol., book 9, ch. 2, wrote copiously; they rank Faustus as well among the leaders of the Semipelagians; Antiquity counts him among the Semipelagians and the most hostile to Augustine, and with a fairly long Apology, in advanced age, stoutly defends him with a great spirit in the Christian commonwealth and marked with learning and doctrine. Let the Reader consider with what outcome, from the things which certain Authors, both ancient and modern, have often given; meanwhile the most praised Cardinal concerning predestination. (a) Origen, condemned by the Fifth Council and the [Sixth?], was vindicated in these times by Peter the Cardinal de Noris in the Historical Dissertations; Petavius calls him the Synod in volume 1 of the Dogmata; Baronius defended him in the Annals at the year 406, and James Sirmond, very renowned in the literary sphere, reckoned him universally; and he tried to defend in the History of the Predestination-controversy; moreover, certain things at times are tortuous: If I shall have prudently answered that I do not know the causes of vices, I will not at once judge those men heretics by grace. For it can happen either that they erred simply, or that they wrote in another sense, or that their writings were gradually corrupted by unskilled copyists, or certainly that, before in Alexandria the demon at midday, as it were, Arius, should be born, they spoke innocently, and not very cautiously, and things which could not incline to the calumny of perverse men. Thus he. Which words very well fit also the present subject, as we have already shown from Augustine. (The Author here seems to have spoken of the doctrine of predestination from merits foreseen not in the manner just now set forth by the Author in the Semipelagian sense, but in that sense which many of the Catholic Theologians held.)⁸⁷

§ 63. Therefore, let it be concluded from these things that, as regards Faustus, his doctrine on predestination confirms from the opposite side as much as possible ours: since he said, "Unless foreknowledge shall have explored, predestination decides nothing," it is ours on the contrary to say that, in order that predestination may decide, there is no need for foreknowledge to explore: because whatever good is foreprovided is the effect of predestination itself; as Augustine, Prosper, [and] Fulgentius most openly profess.⁸⁸ Arnobius too, the interpreter of the Psalms—very different from Arnobius the Rhetor, the teacher of Lactantius—in many points alludes not obscurely to Pelagius. For in one place he openly denies original sin; for which reason also by Gelasius his writings are proscribed as apocryphal. Which censure of Gelasius certain men have wrongly ascribed to Arnobius the Rhetor.⁸⁹ Theodoret, following Origen in the Commentary, is rightly rejected with him; as also Theophylact and Oecumenius, who have almost inserted into their Commentaries things drawn from the fountains of Origen. Whom, therefore, as regards the matter of the grace of God, some men long ago prudently warned in marginal annotations to be read cautiously. Rupert, because he openly reproves the doctrine of Blessed Augustine, merits no authority here; who yet elsewhere confesses gratuitous predestination in open words, as in the Commentary (on Rev. 21), writing thus: "This very thing, that a man thirsts by working; that he works by thirsting and desiring God, is wholly of the divine gift, of a gratuitous gift. For He both made us freely, and freely before we were, He predestined all His Saints to life."⁹⁰ Moreover the commentary on the Epistles of Paul ascribed to Ambrose sufficiently is agreed not to be his, but [to be] of some obscure Author and of a doctrine not altogether approved. Since Sedulius received its words as his own and also added certain things from Faustus, there is no reason why its authority should cause trouble to us. The Glossa ordinaria indeed (on Rom. 9) contains certain words taken from this pseudo-

Ambrosian Commentary, which seem to ascribe predestination to works foreseen; but straightway it applied a remedy by subjoining the words of Augustine that sound far otherwise. But the Author of the brief commentary, or rather scholia, on the Epistles of Paul, which are had among the works of Jerome, is more than probable to be Pelagius himself. Likewise the Epistle On the Knowledge of the Divine Law.⁹¹

§ 64. The tract, which is found in vol. 9 of the Works of Jerome, is by some Pelagian. The Homily on Jacob and Esau, which is reported among the Works of Chrysostom, is so far from being Chrysostom's that it is evident to any learned person that it is not even by a Greek author but by some Latin. The book On Predestination and Grace, which elsewhere even bears Jerome's name in the title, the style clearly declares to be neither his nor St. Augustine's; and it rather appears to have been written against St. Augustine. And not much differently must one judge about another little book, which is inscribed On the Predestination of God. Therefore, concerning these authors, some known, some unknown, we have no need to labor as to what they thought about predestination, or wrote. Arnobius the African flourished under the Emperor Diocletian; and when, while still a pagan, he urgently asked in Africa for the Baptism of the Christian Faith, having suffered a refusal as one puffed up by his own learning and most hostile to the Christian Religion, he presented to the Church books written against his former superstition; the pledge having been accepted, under Diocletian down to Constantine the Great, around the year [...].¹¹⁰ Of that author's [books], although Jerome, writing to Paulinus, admits [them] to be confused without any division of the whole work, he nevertheless confesses that some are felicitously worked out. Arnobius, moreover, wrote in the fourth century—controversies not being settled among the learned as to whether this [is so] concerning his time of writing—when the Pelagian heresy had now arisen and been condemned; as is attested in the place cited, and in [the letters] to Laurentius and Rusticus,⁹² and by Natalis Alexander.⁹³ Furthermore, this author is thought to be the same Arnobius whose writings [the ancients] mention; and to be the author stricken with the Pelagian taint; from many things which [...]. Erasmus of Rotterdam, however, in his Commentaries [...], contends at great length that the work is beyond any controversy [...]. Even if some [of them] perhaps wrote; although the words of some can receive a good sense.

§ 65. Finally, it must be noted that the words of the holy Fathers, who in this part deserve authority, can be expounded in many ways without prejudice to gratuitous predestination. In one way, so that by the foreknowledge of works is understood their very predestination or preparation, or—which comes to the same thing—foreknowledge together with such preparation, in the way that we have elsewhere shown foreknowledge to be taken sometimes in the Scriptures.⁹⁴ And this very thing St. Augustine also teaches from the Scriptures.⁸⁶ And drawing from there the solution of an objection, he thus says: "What, then, hinders us, when we read in some handlers of the word of God the foreknowledge of God, when the calling of the elect is being treated, to understand the same [as] predestination? Or perhaps rather they wished to use this word in that matter because it is more easily understood, and it does not conflict—indeed it accords—with the truth which is preached about the predestination of grace."⁹⁵ Thus he [means], namely to show that the ancient handlers delivered the same thing which he himself [delivered] about predestination, although in different words. Therefore, what they sometimes say, that God chose those whom He foreknew would be good, or whose works He foreknew would be good, is, according to this understanding, most true. For He foreknew because He prepared, as the Apostle says: that we have been "creati in operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus" (Eph. 2). For although He foreknows some things which He Himself does not make, as sins, nevertheless He makes nothing in time which He did not from eternity foreknow. And He foreknew all these things because He was going to make [them]. Nor, if they are said to be foreknown by Him, must they

on that account be denied to be made by Him. For "ipse enim sciebat quid esset factururus" (Jn. 6). And the Psalmist: "Deus prospicit quod veniet dies ejus," namely of the sinner (Ps. 36), although God Himself is He who brings the evil day upon the sinner, according to that of Jeremiah 17: "Induc super eum diem afflictionis."

§ 66. In another way, if we consider that among the effects of predestination not only does the prior have, with respect to the posterior, the formal character of a meritorious cause; but also the posterior, with respect to the prior, has the formal character of a final cause. As if we were to say (says St. Thomas), that God has preordained that He will give someone grace, that he may merit glory.⁹⁶ Whence, in the same place, to the words objected from the Ambrosian commentary, he replies that the foreknown use of grace does not belong to the formal character of a meritorious cause, but to that of a final cause; because, for this very thing, grace is conferred, that we may use it well: thus the Apostle says in Eph. 1 that God "elegit nos ... ut essemus sancti et immaculati."

§ 67. Third, if we think that sometimes the Fathers speak of predestination according to its ultimate and principal effect, which the Apostle calls glorification; they say that therefore God predestined or chose some because He foresaw that they would be good and would live well; so that the sense may be: that God prepared eternal glory for certain [persons], to be given for good works which He foresaw they would perseveringly perform; but He foresaw [this], as has already been said, because He prepared [it]. And indeed this exposition refers the meritorious cause signified by such sentences of the Fathers, which they place in foreseen works, not to the preparation of glory, and much less to predestination as a whole, but to the glory itself which has been prepared. For we showed above that this is also signified by those words of the Lord: "Percipite regnum vobis praeparatum; esurivi enim, et cetera."⁹⁷

§ 68. Fourth—which, however, comes back to almost the same thing—if we say that in such sentences the Fathers considered glory or eternal life as a wage and reward, which, as such, is prepared for man for the merits of preceding or foreseen works. For God from eternity decreed to give glory to man for grace, as a wage for merit, just as He does this in time; yet in such a way that both [glory and the merits] are recognized to be a gift of the divine [liberality], the Psalmist singing: "gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus." Moreover, besides this preparation of reward, which pertains to the justice of God, the preparation of eternal life as of a grace must especially be acknowledged, according to that of the Apostle, Rom. 6: "gratia Dei vita aeterna." Which character of grace eternal life would not have, unless in a certain respect it were undue, and prepared as purely gratuitous for man who brings nothing of merits from himself. And this preparation, as of grace, Augustine properly defined as predestination.

§ 69. From these things, then, premised, it is easy to dissolve most of the objections. For as to what Irenaeus wants to have been said from foreknowledge, "Jacob dilexi," it is not to be wondered at; since God foreknew in Jacob what He Himself was going to do, which indeed Irenaeus does not deny.⁹⁸ In Hilary, by "election" there does not seem to be understood the eternal purpose of God, but a temporal assumption by which He assumes a man to glory, or to greater grace. Thus: "assumpsisti; inhabitabit in atriis tuis."⁹⁹ This assumption is made for preceding merits, but [merits] deriving from prevenient grace of God. Ambrose, writing to Gratian, speaks of eternal life under the formal character of a wage, which, considered thus, we have already said to have been prepared with a view to merits, and therefore to be due from justice.¹⁰⁰ The sense of Jerome, writing on Malachi, is that God loves no one unto glory—that is, has decreed to give glory to no one—except him who has hated vices. But this very thing, for those whom He foreknew, He also prepared. His

passage to Hedibia wants nothing else, than that men are chosen unto salvation, not on account of its being to be given to one because he is a Jew or a Greek, but according to the merits of good will.¹⁰¹ Chrysostom likewise speaks everywhere of election unto glory considered under the formal character of a reward, which, inasmuch as it is such, proceeds from the foresight of merits. But that these [merits] are therefore foreseen because they are prepared, nowhere does the same Doctor deny; nay rather elsewhere he clearly affirms it, as in book 1 On Providence, at the end; and Hom. 12 on that [text] 1 Cor. 4: "Quid habes, quod non accepisti"; and that [text] ch. 10: "Fidelis Deus, qui non sinit vos tentari," etc.; and that [text] Phil. 2: "Deus est qui operatur in vobis velle et perficere"; and Hom. 8 on the Second Epistle to Timothy.¹⁰² From which it is also understood that Chrysostom does not so ascribe grace to the preparation of our will, that he [does] not [ascribe it] also to the Lord, that [our will] may be made apt for receiving grace and actually receive it.

§ 70. As for what is adduced from John Damascene in the former place, it has this sense: that God according to foreknowledge, whereby He knew that some would live well and others ill, already from eternity "praejudicavit" that He would render to some rewards according to His goodness; to others punishments according to His justice.¹⁰³ Therefore, in the word "praejudicavit," which Faber Stapulensis less rightly translated "praelegit," there is contained the reason of justice and of recompense with respect to a good work. And yet, to signify the gratuitous predestination even of glory itself, he added, "secundum bonitatem suam." For it belongs to the Divine goodness alone to prepare glory for man having no merits, although [glory is] not to be attained without merit. Wherefore this passage of Damascene rather helps the true opinion. The other passage does not treat of predestination, but of the present merit of human works, by which each one makes himself a vessel unto honor or unto contumely—that is, worthy of honor or of contumely; not, however, [does] God [make him so], not even unto good things, without the choice of our will as a second and subordinated cause. There remains Augustine, drawn up into battle-line against Augustine, just as the Massilian reprovers of his doctrine once drew him up; as, among the other places recounted, Hilary of Arles attests in a letter written to him.¹⁰⁴ But [the author] yields. For if Augustine had written anything, whether otherwise than the truth of Holy Scripture holds, or less exactly, about grace and predestination, in his earlier little works before Pelagius had arisen, he either explicitly, or in a like [case], retracted it; see in many places of the Retractationes.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, concerning the words alleged from the book Of Eighty-Three Questions, most, together with the Master, answer that although Augustine did not explicitly, nevertheless tacitly, and in a like [place], retracted them; and that not by correcting them as if they were evil, but by expounding [those things] which, being less explicit, could be badly understood.¹⁰⁶ For in other words of the same question, in which he had said, "God does not reconcile to peace the one whom He calls to peace, unless the will bears [him] to peace," in expounding he says: "Hoc est post paenitentiam." For "est misericordia Dei etiam ipsam praeveniens voluntatem, quae si non esset, non praepararetur a Domino." Thus also in the foregoing words which are objected to us about the merits of justification, or about the will preceding unto peace, Augustine is speaking; and these things of his that follow prove [it] more fully: "Praecedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus, quamvis nondum sint justificati, digni dicantur justificatione; et item praecedit aliis peccatoribus, quae digni sint obtinere," etc.¹⁰⁷ Thus he, namely speaking of works preceding the grace of justification—faith, prayer, repentance—by which justification is impetrated; which therefore precede the gift of righteousness, but yet are themselves also gifts; as both by the words subjoined, and in the Retractationes already mentioned, Augustine himself declares. And from this, as Augustine acknowledges both there and elsewhere often, there is not on that account some merit of predestination acknowledged by him; because although one effect of predestination has the formal character of merit with respect to another, nevertheless not with respect to

predestination as a whole, since under it every merit is included. There is, moreover, a like passage in Augustine, and to be expounded in like manner (book 21 Against Faustus, ch. 2).¹⁰⁸ What are then objected from the book Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, and from question 2 to Simplician, are retracted by their author in book 1, Retractationes, ch. 23, and book 2, ch. 1; about which also see the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 3, and On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 11.¹⁰⁹ In that, which elsewhere he says, "Because they love, let them be chosen," he understands an election unto seeing God, and indeed considered under the formal character of a reward, so that the sense may be: God wills to give Himself to be seen by them for the merit of love. But in that [phrase], "He foreknew, that He might predestine," to foreknow is to forelove. The same also speaks of human election, not divine: for, what he says there, [is that] God saved us by the good pleasure of His will, because He considers no merits. But God predestines by the most just judgment, because the judgment, or decree, of the predestinating God is irreprehensible, not because it is according to merits. What, finally, is objected from the Hypognosticon—[a book] which, however, is not Augustine's, but by an unknown author—has an easy solution from the place itself; for that author wants nothing other than what Augustine diligently inculcates in On the Gift of Perseverance, namely that the predestination and foreknowledge of God are referred to one and the same object; because He does not foreknow anything else in the good than what He predestines; but whatever He foreknows as going to be, He predestines so that it be going to be.

§ IX — The arguments from reason are resolved (Solvuntur argumenta ex ratione)

§ 71. The arguments taken from reason, by which the gratuitous predestination (*praedestinatio*) of God is wont to be attacked, remain for us to answer; and they are these. First: the will of God, by which He chooses some before others, cannot be irrational, but no reason for this seems able to be rendered except from preceding or foreseen merits (*merita*). Second: if to two equals God gives, or prepares, unequal things—namely, choosing the one, reprobating (*reprobatio*) the other—He will be an acceptor of persons; for Peter in Acts 10 says that from this he has learned that God is not an acceptor of persons, because "in every nation, he who fears God and does justice is acceptable to Him"; and Paul in Rom. 2: "Glory," he says, "honor, and peace to all who work good, to the Jew first and to the Greek: for there is no respect of persons with God." Third: the predestination of the holy Angels who persevered in the righteousness received was from the foreknowledge of merits. Likewise the predestination of a righteous man, if he had persevered in original righteousness, would have been from the foreknowledge of merits; therefore also the predestination of fallen man seems to bear itself so. Fourth: contraries have contrary causes; but predestination and reprobation are contraries; therefore they have contrary causes. Accordingly, just as the cause of reprobation is the foreknowledge of evil works, so the cause of predestination will be the foreknowledge of good ones. Fifth: God predestines by choosing others before others; but prudent choice (*electio*) is the acceptance of the better from among several: therefore there is in those who are chosen something by which they excel the rest. Otherwise, indeed, the choice will be either foolish or blind, if either there is not, or is not attended to, a discrimination of those chosen from others. In almost this manner does Pelagius on Rom. 11 say: "What choice where there is no diversity of merits?"¹¹¹ They confirm this argument from Chrysostom, who, in Homily 1 (treating, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, that of ch. 1, "He chose us in Him"), says: if men who choose choose the things that are best, most beautiful, how much more God.¹¹² Sixth: predestination is

helped by the prayers of the Saints, as St. Thomas teaches,¹¹³ and Gregory, book 1 (Dialogues, ch. 8): "Those things were not predestined which the holy men make to be by praying, but those things which holy men make to be by praying are so predestined that they may be obtained by prayers; for even the predestination of the everlasting kingdom has been so disposed by the omnipotent God, that to this the elect may come through labor, inasmuch as, by asking, they may merit to receive what the omnipotent God has disposed before the ages to bestow on them."¹¹⁴ Then, to Peter asking to be shown more plainly that predestination can be helped by prayers, he replies that this is shown by the example of Isaac, who besought the Lord for his barren wife, through whom nevertheless God had already predestined to multiply the seed of Abraham; and finally he concludes that it is established that predestination is fulfilled by prayers; which very thing he teaches as well concerning the prayers of the Saints for others as concerning the prayers of the predestined person himself for his own. Since therefore prayers are a certain kind of merits, it follows that predestination is helped and accordingly is obtained and acquired through merits; and to this there pertains also that prayer of the Priest in the Canon of the Mass: "order that we may be numbered in the flock of Thy elect." Seventh: we merit eternal life, which is the last and principal effect of predestination, by good works; therefore at least to eternal life we are predestined from foreseen merits. Especially since merits under the name of means are placed in the definition of predestination; "there is also predestination, by which men are ordered by God through certain means to eternal life." Eighth: the promises of eternal life are not absolute but conditional, namely, depending on the merits of our works, according to that: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; and thus also the Council of Trent teaches;¹¹⁵ therefore similarly predestination to life is not absolute but suspended upon foreseen merits. Ninth: the opinion which posits predestination from foreseen merits shows an easy way to reconcile the grace (*gratia*) of God and predestination with the free will (*liberum arbitrium*) of the predestined; therefore it is to be embraced, especially since this line of reasoning has moved many, even learned men, to think that they ought to withdraw from the opinion of Augustine and St. Thomas, according to which it is most difficult to understand how the liberty of free will is preserved in the predestined. Tenth: the doctrine of the absolute and efficacious predestination of God, before every foreknowledge of the movements of free will, removes human endeavor and study of good works, and brings a torpor and, in all respect for the future, a despair into souls—inasmuch as that which is so fixed can by no works be obtained; therefore either it is not true, or at least it is not to be preached. By this argument the Massilians disapproved the doctrine of blessed Augustine concerning predestination, as Prosper and Hilary report, in their letters written to Augustine.¹¹⁶

§ 72. But to these we answer: and indeed the first argument St. Thomas solves,¹¹⁷ where he teaches that, the consideration of merits being set aside, a multiple reason can be assigned in general why God willed to choose some, to reprobate others; yet the chief is this which the Apostle recounts in Rom. 9 and indicates in 2 Tim. 2—namely, that to the human race there be manifested the divine goodness and justice; goodness indeed in those whom He elects; justice however in those whom He reprobates; that thus in both He Himself be glorified. But why in particular He chose this one, rejected that one, there is no other reason to be sought by us than the divine will (*voluntas*); which reply he makes clear by the example of prime matter, which, since in itself it is wholly uniform, a reason indeed can be given in general why, according to diverse parts, it had one and another form attributed to it in creation—namely that there might be variety in the universe of things; but why this part of it received this form, that other another, depends on the simple divine will. Add that this argument, if it had force, would conclude that God could not even choose some before others, the equality of all men being posited, because the will of God cannot be irrational—which surely it is too absurd to assert.

Now when St. Thomas says that of that difference whereby God in particular chooses this one, reprobates that one, there is no reason except the divine will—just as it depends upon the simple divine will that this part of matter be under this form and that under another—and whereas in the body of the same article he says that predestination has as its reason the divine will, to which the whole being of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which it proceeds as from a first moving principle, he seems to will this: that God, by the freedom of His will, which in Him is supreme, when otherwise in things no diversity can be attended, should choose this one, not that, and should have attributed this form to this part of matter, not to that; and that, to manifest this supreme liberty, He should thus do: "Is it not permitted me to do what I will?" For this most properly befits God, inasmuch as He alone is absolutely master of Himself and at His own disposal, to whom alone it befits to say: "Thus I will, thus I command; let will stand in place of reason." But one could ask, if sole will is the reason of the said difference, how according to the Apostle in Rom. 11 and Augustine, attending the Apostle in many places, it is inscrutable for us why God chose this one before that; which at last, as the same Augustine bears witness,¹¹⁸ will become known on the day of the last judgment. For if sole divine will is the reason, it is easy for anyone to assign that reason, as Bonaventure argues. This too could be asked: whether likewise it must be said to be inscrutable why this part of matter have this form, that other another? But questions of this sort demand a higher inquiry, which is not of this place.

§ 73. To the second we answer with St. Thomas in the article mentioned,¹¹⁹ that in gratuitous things the acceptance of persons has no place, but rather that evangelical saying which we just now said: "Is it not permitted me to do what I will?" Thus also does Augustine answer¹²⁰ and Fulgentius.¹²¹ But what is objected from the words of the Apostles Peter and Paul—that God rejects no man, of whatever nation or condition, because with Him there is no acceptance of persons—that was said by them in no other way than with some merit presupposed, to which, according to the divine ordination, some further good of salvation is owed, as from both places it is manifest. But that merit does not come from elsewhere than from the prevenient grace of God; and therefore it itself is contained under the effect of predestination.

§ 74. To the third argument, whether it must be answered by a denial of the antecedent, or of the consequence (for there are diverse opinions of the Doctors on this matter), will be plain from those things which will be said below concerning the predestination of the Angels.

§ 75. To the fourth some answer, that to the reprobation of man or Angel there is not properly opposed the predestination of fallen man, because reprobation pertains to the kind of providence (*providentia*) by which things are governed according to their first institution, to which they also will that the predestination of Angels pertain, which accordingly they admit to be properly opposed to reprobation, and in that case the proposed argument proceeds rightly; but that the predestination of fallen man pertains to a different part of providence, whereby, namely by a as it were new counsel, beyond the first institution, some thing is administered by God. But to this predestination they deny that there is any reprobation properly opposed; for the reason that concerning those to be reprobated there is no new counsel of God, as there is concerning those to be predestined; whence, they say, it will be said to reprobate men: "Depart into the fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels"; but to the elect it will not be said: receive the kingdom which is prepared for the Angels, but "for you," because the reprobation of Angels and of men is indeed similar, but not their predestination. But how rightly these things are said will likewise be understood from those things which we shall say below concerning the predestination of Angels. Meanwhile, according to their opinion, one can briefly answer that for predestination and reprobation there is not an equal formal character, because

predestination is of grace, reprobation of justice, and because the former is a preparation of goods, the latter of evils. Therefore in these the merit is to be sought, not in those; while they who think that reprobation is not from merits are not pressed by this argument.

§ 76. To the fifth it is answered that there is one formal character of choice in God, another in men. For men will that it be well with themselves by the fact that they choose, and therefore they choose what is better: but God chooses, that it may be well with the chosen. Whence nothing prevents Him from choosing from evils equally evil things, or even worse, so that He may make them good. Again, man chooses something because it is good: God chooses, that it may become good—according to that of the Apostle (Eph. 1): "He chose us, that we should be holy and immaculate." Hence it was aptly said of God by Augustine: "He does not choose the good, but He chooses, to the end that He may make them good."¹²² To the confirmation subjoined from Chrysostom I reply that, in the mind of Chrysostom, God chooses the better things to be made by Himself; which sense is proved from what precedes and what follows. For there precedes: "He chose us for this, that we should be holy and immaculate." And afterwards there follows: "For certainly, if He chooses the upright, He Himself made us holy."¹¹²

§ 77. The solution of the sixth argument is evident from St. Thomas himself; who there teaches that predestination, as to the effect, is helped by the prayers of the Saints and other good works, in this sense: because providence, of which a certain part is predestination, does not withdraw secondary causes; but thus provides the effects that there also be subject to the order of secondary causes. For just as natural effects are thus provided that natural causes also be ordered to them, without which they would not come about, so the salvation of someone is predestined by God, that under the order of predestination there fall also whatever promotes a man to salvation—either his own prayers, or those of others, or other good things, or whatever of this sort, without which a man does not attain salvation. So much for him.¹¹³ From which things it is manifest that predestination, according to St. Thomas, is helped by prayers and by other pious works, both one's own and others', to this extent: because through these, as through secondary causes, yet included under predestination itself, the salvation of man—which is the ultimate effect of predestination—is promoted; not that these works in any way merit predestination itself. The same reply is easy to gather from the words of Gregory; for when he says: "those things which holy men make to be by praying are so predestined that they may be obtained by prayers," he signifies that both are predestined by God, both that thing which is obtained by prayers, and the prayers themselves as means by which that thing is obtained. Whence he does not say that the predestination of the everlasting kingdom is so disposed by God that someone, by laboring or by asking, may merit it; but that to this, namely the kingdom, the elect may come from labor, inasmuch as by asking they may merit to receive what God before the ages has disposed to grant to him.¹¹⁴

§ 78. To the seventh it is answered that eternal life, since it is the end for the sake of which the other salvific goods are bestowed, is in execution indeed the last effect of predestination, but in intention the first. For God first prepared glory for His elect, and then the means by which they might be led to it; and this according to the order which, according to the mode of our understanding, we imagine in the divine actions from the order of things, or of effects, so bearing themselves that one of them is the cause of another; as we showed above at the prior distinction. But in this way eternal life properly falls under predestination. Whence by the Apostle it is called grace. Although therefore we are not led to eternal life except through merits, nevertheless we are not predestined to it from foreseen merits. For just as it is one thing to be predestined to eternal life and another to be led to it, so one order and another is to be considered in this and in that. Which

matter also can be declared from human proposals; for although one does not arrive at learning except through prior study, nevertheless the plan or desire of studying is not from the learning, but the contrary. For the order of execution must be distinguished from the order of purpose. Rightly, nonetheless, in the definition of predestination there are placed the means, under which merits are comprehended, inasmuch as these very merits fall also under predestination, as its effects. For this whole thing is purely gratuitous—to lead man through merits to eternal life. Whence the predestination by which God decreed to do this is to be called purely gratuitous.

§ 79. To the eighth it is answered that between the promise of eternal life and its predestination there is much difference. First, because the promise is temporal, predestination eternal; then because the promise pertains to all to whom that is announced: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; predestination however is of the few, namely of those to whom by an eternal decree life has been prepared. Finally, because the promise does not bestow the condition required, but only prerequisites it; predestination however bestows the condition adjoined to the promise and encloses it within itself. Whence it is clear that it is not consequent, if the promise of eternal life depends upon the condition of the observance of the commandments, that therefore also the predestination of life depends upon a condition of this sort: for it cannot depend upon that which it itself bestows, includes.

§ 80. To the ninth we answer that in opinions and doctrines those are not always to be embraced which are, or are thought to be, easier to understand, but those which are truer. But the investigation of truth in many things is difficult, especially in the graver heads of our religion, of which one is this mystery of predestination, as it is called by the Fathers of the Council of Trent.¹²³ Concerning which also Augustine has peculiarly professed, in many places, that the greatest difficulty lies in explaining it and composing it with the liberty of free will, such that he confesses that there are few who are able to penetrate this mystery by understanding. The places are these: book 2 (Against the Letters of Petilian, ch. 84); book 4 (Against Julian, ch. 8; On the Grace of Christ, chs. 24 and 47); and book 2 (On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 18; and On the Predestination of the Saints, chs. 8 and 20).¹²⁴ From which it is concluded that that doctrine which seems to show an easy account of reconciling the predestination of God with the free will of man is not consonant with the doctrine of Augustine and of other outstanding Doctors of the Church, who always judged this in the highest degree difficult; wherefore that opinion—however much it may flatter reason—which on that account seems to be more acceptable, nonetheless justly bears suspicion, and is for that very reason to be rejected.

§ 81. To the last argument, objected to him by the Massilians, Augustine replies: "Let them see what sort of thing it is which they have persuaded themselves—that by the preaching of predestination (namely, such as Augustine preached in his writings, that is, established from the mere good pleasure of God) more of despair than of exhortation is brought. For this is to say that then a man despairs of his salvation, when he has learned to place his hope not in himself but in God; whereas the Prophet cries out: 'Cursed is every one who has his hope in man.'" And then, at length and learnedly, he shows how even in public exhortations to the people this doctrine of predestination can be proposed without offense, nay rather usefully.¹²⁵

§ X — That predestination does not presuppose the foreknowledge of works under a condition (*Praedestinationem non praesupponere praescientiam operum conditionatam*)

§ 82. Among the various opinions about the cause of predestination (*praedestinatio*), we said that there is this one of certain people: although they admit that for the whole of predestination there is no merit in the one predestined, nevertheless they think that men are not predestined by God absolutely, but dependently upon a certain conditional foreknowledge (*praescientia*), that is, upon that by which God has foreknown concerning each individual man what he would be going to do by a free choice of will (*liberum arbitrium*), if in this or that manner he were called or stirred by interior inspirations; with which foreknowledge presupposed, they say that from the entire mass of the human race certain persons are predestined by God's good pleasure alone, inasmuch as for them this very grace of calling and of stirring is prepared by God in order to eternal life. And, just as they wish predestination to depend upon this same conditional foreknowledge, so also its certainty. This opinion, although it is not difficult to refute from those things by which it has been shown that the cause of our predestination is not foreseen merits but God's goodness alone, yet some arguments must be adduced here briefly which may avail more closely to argue it. Of which let this be the First. The effect of predestination is not only to call, to move, to stir a man, or his will, but also to make the one called, moved, stirred, follow, and obey, consent, and acquiesce; therefore predestination does not presuppose the foreknowledge of the sequel, consent, and obedience, if a man were thus called, but rather such foreknowledge presupposes predestination. For the reason why God sees that men will follow, if they are called thus or thus, is that by that very calling of His, which is according to purpose, He will efficaciously bring it about that they follow and come. For in God, with respect to the same effect, foreknowledge is not prior to the purpose, or the will of doing; but on the contrary, this is prior to that. For God knows something will be future because He has determined that He will do it, not that He therefore wills to do because He foreknows it as future or to be done, as was shown above at distinction 38.

§ 83. Second. Predestination, in order that it may be fulfilled in time, presupposes in man no affection, disposition, or preparation, but produces it; for God, according to what He has purposed from eternity, affects, disposes, and prepares whatever man He wills, and as He wills, to receive His gifts (*gratia*). Therefore the predestination of God does not presuppose the foreknowledge of dispositions and affections of this sort, but is presupposed by this foreknowledge.

§ 84. Third. The will excited in that mode in which God knows it will follow either will follow, with God Himself bringing it about that it follow, and thus it is prior to foreknow the sequel-effect to predestining, as has already been proved; or it will follow by its own motion, which God shall not have operated in it—and thus we will divide the work of grace from the work of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), so that to grace there belong to call and to stir, but to free choice to follow and to acquiesce: which cannot be said without grave error.

§ 85. Fourth. If predestination presupposes this foreknowledge, then predestination will in some way be from foreseen merit and by this not purely gratuitous. For in this way it will be dependent upon the foreknowledge of merit (*meritum*). Since the sequel, that is, the consent of the will excited or moved to the good, without doubt has the formal character (*ratio*) of merit, in the sense in which we are here disputing about merit.

§ 86. Fifth. Scripture and the Fathers and the prayers of the Church, when speaking of the grace and predestination of God, attribute to the foreknowing not of God but to His power that men are converted to God, and that those called follow and use well the gifts offered by God; therefore, although God foreknows these things, yet He foreknows them because by His omnipotence and the efficacious operation of His grace He is going to bring them about; and hence predestination does not depend on foreknowledge of this sort.

§ 87. Sixth. St. Augustine in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints* says: "By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do." And below: "For He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men [were going to do]; because when men do good things which pertain to the worship of God, He Himself makes that they do what He has commanded, not they make that He do what He has promised. Otherwise, that the promises of God be fulfilled is not in God's but in man's power." So he. But this last can likewise be said of predestination, if it hangs from foreknowledge of a human work.¹²⁷

§ 88. Seventh. Prosper in the book *On the Vocation of the Gentiles* says: "It remains altogether, and is daily fulfilled, what the Lord promised to Abraham without condition, He gave without law." Thus he, speaking of the vocation and conversion and salvation of the Gentiles. But as God promised this without condition, so He also predestined it without condition.¹²⁸

§ 89. Eighth. St. Thomas (in the oft-cited article 5) clearly teaches that that very thing which is through free will is from predestination, and that those are mistaken who distinguish between what is from grace and what is from free will, as if the same could not be from both. Whence he concludes that that which is from free will cannot be the formal character of predestination. But one can by the same argument similarly conclude that that which is from free will cannot, according to foreknowledge, be presupposed to predestination.¹²⁹

§ 90. Ninth. The predestination of all men is of the same formal character, both of adults and of little children; but the predestination of little children does not presuppose the foreknowledge of any movement of their free will, "if they were called thus or thus," since they are saved without a movement of free will, and are not able to have such a movement at that age in which they are taken away. Wherefore neither does the predestination of adults presuppose foreknowledge of this sort, but is equally absolute and independent.

§ 91. Tenth. This opinion is sufficiently refuted from the fact that the Fathers teach that God converts to Himself, by the mighty operation of His grace, the wills of men that are averse, contrary, and rebellious, according to that which the Church prays to God, that He may even compel our rebellious wills to Himself, as is in the appointed prayer on the 4th Sunday after Pentecost. Whence St. Augustine says: "Who is so impious as to say that God cannot convert into good the evil wills of men, which He will, when He will, where He will?" And in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "The grace which is bestowed secretly upon human hearts by divine largess is by no hard heart refused nor taken away." And he teaches similar things in Epistle 107, likewise in *On Correction and Grace*, chs. 8 and 14, and in 88.¹³⁰ And after him Prosper (in the letter to book 1 of *On the Vocation of the Gentiles*, in the last chapter; in the *Response to the Excerpta* of St. [Augustine], in doubt 8; and in the *Poem On the Ungrateful*, ch. 15) that a rebellious and obstinate will does not follow nor obey God calling, even if it should in some manner be called, unless it be called by a calling which efficaciously makes it from unwilling willing, and from rebellious docile, that is, by that grace which, as Augustine says, removes the very hardness of the heart: therefore the will is not apt to follow unless by God, nor does it follow in any way, as Augustine also says, unless it be drawn by God. Therefore, as to

God's calling in such a way as He knows a man apt to follow, and drawing in such a way as He knows he will come, it must be answered that He not only knows him apt, but also makes him apt; and He sees him a follower not only because He sees him apt to follow, but because He makes him follow; for these are properly works of God's grace, and the will does not do them because it follows, but follows because God does them. Finally, it cannot be denied that God could convert even the devil, his liberty (*libertas*) remaining intact. Nor, however, must it be said that God cannot do this otherwise unless there be presupposed a conditional foreknowledge by which He knows that he would consent to the divine suasion, if such or such a suasion be employed; or that altogether he ought to be called thus, since God knows him apt so that he follow, when his will is so affected that it will admit no sort of suasion unless God efficaciously move him and by so moving persuade him; which would be absurd to posit any necessity of this sort in the devil, by which he is said apt to follow if he be called so or so. Therefore neither, under the supposition of the said foreknowledge, could God convert even a sinful man with his freedom of choice remaining intact, and, consequently, predestine him to this good.¹³¹

§ XI — The arguments of the already-stated opinion are resolved (Solvuntur opinionis jam dictae argumenta)

§ 92. The upholders of the already-stated opinion seem to be moved to embrace it especially by this reason, because, as they say, it does not appear how the free will of the predestined (*liberum arbitrium*) is saved together with God's predestination (*praedestinatio*), unless that be posited to depend upon the foreknowledge of works under a condition, and to require it as presupposed. But this argument has been satisfied elsewhere—namely, above at distinction 38, where we showed that God's providence (*providentia*), of which predestination is a certain part, brings no necessity to the things provided for because they are efficaciously provided, nor does it derogate from the liberty of human acts; and at the distinction immediately preceding, where it has been shown that by predestination free will is not taken away, but is saved; and this too will be satisfied more fully elsewhere, namely, in the following book, when there will be a more proper place for disputing concerning the concord of grace and free will.

§ 93. Then one and another passage from Augustine is objected. For in book 1 (On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14) he so defines the predestination of the saints that he says it is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which most certainly all those who are liberated are liberated; and because in the definition of predestination he not only posits foreknowledge but also sets it before preparation, he seems to think this: that the preparation of God's benefits, which is the same as predestination, presupposes the foreknowledge of the things which are going to proceed from free will. But to this objection it is easily answered that Augustine is by no means in that place speaking of such foreknowledge as would be conditional or presupposed to predestination, but of absolute foreknowledge, and that referred to precisely the same object to which predestination, or the preparation of God's benefits, is referred; that is, of that by which God foreknows that which He Himself is going to do—according to which also the Apostle James speaks in Acts 15: "Known from eternity is to the Lord His work." This is clear, what I say, from the very passage of Augustine, where to the words alleged he prefaces these: "Will anyone dare to say that God did not foreknow to whom He was going to give, that they should believe? or whom He was going to give to His Son, that of them He should lose none? And if He foreknew these things, surely He foreknew His benefits by which He deigns to set us free. This is the predestination of the saints." Words which, as having a great weight

of truth, Prosper confirmed (responding to Excerpta from Gen., in doubt 8), and the same (Response to the last Sentence on the last chapter to the Gauls) teaches to be the same in good men, namely, foreknowledge and predestination. Since therefore Augustine and Prosper refer foreknowledge and predestination to precisely the same object, that is, to the gifts and benefits of God, it cannot be said that the latter depends on the former; but rather on the contrary, since with respect to the same thing in God the will is prior to the knowledge. [^134]

§ 94. Moreover Augustine repeats the same things with other and more words (chs. 17, 19, 20 of the same book), namely, most plainly teaching that God's predestination and the foreknowledge by which that is defined aim altogether at the same thing, to wit, at the future works and gifts of God; about which, when he says (ch. 17) that no one is able to deny that they are foreknown by God and, through this, predestined, he does not mean that they are predestined because they are foreknown, but he signifies this necessary consequence: if they are good things foreknown by God, therefore they are predestined by Him; since no good can be foreknown by God which He Himself is not going to do, and therefore He has predestined that He will do it. But you will ask: if foreknowledge and preparation are referred by Augustine precisely to the same thing, what need was there to place foreknowledge in the definition of predestination, since to no one can it be doubtful that God foreknows all things predestined by Him? I answer: by this Augustine wished to commend to us the certitude of divine predestination, which is distinguished from human predestinations or purposes, in which there is for the most part great uncertainty because of ignorance of future things, as the Apostle James attests (in his Epistle, ch. 4). Whence also the Wise Man (Wis. 9) says: "The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our foresight is uncertain." But God's predestination cannot be without foreknowledge, that is, without a sure knowledge of future things. The whole reason of which is taken from the divine will (*voluntas*), which cannot be hindered from what it has resolved to do, according to that: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done." That Augustine willed this is evident both from the definition itself—in which he says, "by which most certainly they are liberated"—and from ch. 17, where he has thus: "These His gifts, to whomsoever God gives them, He most surely foreknew that He was going to give, and in His foreknowledge He prepared [them]." And a little afterward: "For in His foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived or changed, to dispose His future works—this altogether, and nothing else, is to predestine." So he. But again you will ask: why did he put foreknowledge in the prior place, if not to signify that, in the order of our understanding, it is prior to preparation or predestination, so that we understand the latter to depend on the former? I answer that this is the reason: because foreknowledge extends more widely and to more things than predestination. For, as Augustine says in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 10: "By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do." But He is also able to foreknow those things which He Himself does not do, such as whatever sins. The same also Prosper teaches (to the Gauls, Response to the last Sentence on the last chapter). Therefore Augustine placed foreknowledge in the first place in the definition of predestination, just as the genus of the thing to be defined is wont to obtain the first place in a definition.

§ 95. Furthermore, another passage which seems to press more is book 1 (To Simplicianus), where treating that saying of the Apostle, "On whom He wills He has mercy," Augustine says that God has mercy on those whom He so calls as He knows it to be apt for them, that they be moved and follow, and as He knows to be congruent for them, that they not spurn the One calling; since we see others, when the same things are demonstrated or signified to them, to be moved otherwise to believe. Whence it seems to follow that the resolve to have mercy, which is predestination, presupposes a foreknowledge by which God foreknows

concerning each man that he will follow the One calling, if he be called in this or that way. But it is answered that although in that book—composed, as it was, before the Pelagian heresy arose—Augustine may not in all things have treated adequately about grace and predestination, as he himself confesses of it (book 2, ch. 1 of the *Retractations*, and in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chs. 20, 21); and therefore we ought not to be pressed too much with testimonies brought forward in this business of predestination; nevertheless the things alleged, if they be rightly understood, are not adverse, nor do they make anything for a conditional foreknowledge which predestination presupposes. For Augustine there does not explain the nature of predestination, but merely teaches that those whom He predestines are called by God in a special way, in such a way, namely, as He knows that they will follow. Which, without doubt, is true. For God knows the power and efficacy of His grace, by which He thus calls certain people that He efficaciously converts them and makes them followers. But He knows because by His efficacious will He has decreed this. For that Augustine does not make predestination depend upon foreknowledge of a human act these words of his in the same book sufficiently show, in which he says: "It cannot be that the mercy of God be in men to no purpose, so that He have mercy in vain if man is unwilling." And the following shortly after: "This I know not how it can be said, that God has mercy to no purpose, if we are unwilling; for if God has mercy, we also will. For to the same mercy it pertains that we will." And these things near the end. "When those things delight us by which we profit to God, this is inspired and bestowed by God's grace, not by our nod and industry, nor is it procured by our merits; for although for the industry of study, and for the works fervent with charity, the will is necessary, He Himself gives and bestows [it]." These things there, and certain others, assert the same opinion. Therefore, if it is the work of divine mercy that very willing, and if that motion of the will, by which the will follows the One calling, God bestows and grants, therefore according to Augustine's teaching too in that book, predestination does not depend upon the foreknowledge of such human things, but rather therefore they are foreknown because they are predestined. Wherefore neither does that which he says (*On Perseverance*, ch. 9), that some are so called that they follow the One calling, but others not so, make any scruple; since God Himself (*Retractations*, ch. 33) clearly teaches in the same chapter that those whom He calls according to purpose He works this in their hearts, that they both follow the One calling and remain in that to which they have been called. But if anyone should think an objection must be brought from what Augustine had said, that certain reprobates, such as the Tyrians and Sidonians, would have believed if they had seen miracles, he subjoined these words: "Whence it appears that certain people have in their very natural cast a divine gift of understanding, by which they are moved to faith, if, suitable to their measures, they either hear words or behold signs. And yet if by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of damnation by the predestination of grace, those very words or signs are not employed or done, by which they could believe, if they were to hear such things or to see them." We answer: Augustine in those words is teaching that, if those of whom he is speaking had been predestined, their predestination would have been future from foreknowledge; namely, that God would have taken care to employ for them such suitable words and signs, by which He would have foreknown them to be moved to belief. For thus it would follow that external helps suffice for believing, whereas it is established that Augustine is speaking of such as these; but he signifies rather that their predestination was not going to be, because they were not going to persevere, nor would He have willed to give it; and to this to employ outwardly fitting words and signs, by which, namely, with His grace working within, they might receive faith. Indeed this sense is clearly demanded by the sentence immediately preceding: "But since it was not given to them to believe, it is also denied to them to have that by which they might

believe." Whence also, in the things that follow, he most openly teaches that to believe, that is, to obey by hearing, is God's gift, which is given to some, to others it is not given.¹³²

§ XII — Whether predestination has a conjoined reference to foreknowledge of our cooperation (An praedestinatio conjunctum habeat respectum praescientiae ad nostram cooperationem)

§ 96. It is assigned in the De Dono that the book to Simplicianus was written before the Pelagian heresy arose, at the beginning of his episcopate, perhaps in the year 397; and that he did not publish it before the year—at the latest—405, learned men attest and piece together. Certainly before the year 411 Augustine had written nothing against the Pelagians; the Benedictines in the preface to volume X bear witness to this, and Augustine himself, in the work On the Merits and Remission of Sins, attests that the first books against the Pelagians were by him composed.

§ 97. There is a certain opinion, by which it is posited that God does not predestine anyone adult, at least in the ordinary way, except with a certain reference of His foreknowledge (*praescientia*) to the cooperation (*cooperatio*) of the predestined person, as it will be in the future from grace and free will (*liberum arbitrium*). Which opinion, if it be understood thus, namely, that in God predestining (*praedestinatio*) there is a foreknowledge of the cooperation of the predestined person—whereby, to wit, he will freely cooperate with the grace of God—and that without that foreknowledge there is no predestination of adults, has a true sense in general. For without doubt there is suchlike foreknowledge in God predestining, but one which is posterior to predestination itself; because, as has been said often already, therefore God foreknows every saving good of the predestined, because He preordains, and not conversely. Now the cooperation of free will is a good of this sort; wherefore it must of necessity be foreknown, because it is preordained.

§ 98. But if the foreknowledge of cooperation be understood as prior to predestination, already from what has been said the falsity of the opinion is manifest. In like manner also it is found false, if you feign a foreknowledge which is neither prior to predestination nor posterior to it in the order of reason, but one which is conjoined with the decree of Divine predestination in the order of reason. For if—as has been said and repeated from St. Thomas—that which is contained under predestination, as its effect, cannot be the formal character, or cause, of predestination, by the same token neither will it be able to exist together with it in the order of reason, in such a way that predestination is not therefore absolute because it has such a conjoined reference of foreknowledge. For since the cooperation of the predestined person is an effect of predestination itself, not only as it is from grace, but also as it is from free will efficaciously moved by grace, just as it cannot be the formal character of predestination, as it were anterior to it, so neither can it be its companion, as it were concurring with it simultaneously in the order of reason.

§ 99. Wherefore to this opinion there lends no support the subtlety by which the good work of man is considered in a twofold way, either as it is from grace, or as it is from free will; for in whichever way it be considered, it falls under Divine predestination; as Scotus teaches well, refuting a not dissimilar opinion—indeed one differing only in words—of Henry of Ghent in such a distinction, that what is from free will and from predestination is not distinct, just as neither is what is from a second cause and from a first: since Divine providence produces its effects through the operations of second causes. Whence, he says, even that which is through free will is from predestination.

§ 100. From which doctrine of his it is evident that the cooperation of free will to those things which pertain to salvation is contained under the order of Divine predestination just as the operations or cooperations of other second causes are contained under the order of Divine providence. Now the reason is manifest, because predestination is a part of providence, and therefore it ought to be compared thus to second causes, through which it carries out the things predestined, as providence is related to second causes, through which it carries out the things that are provided. Wherefore to say that God preordained a good work of man with a reference of foreknowledge to the cooperation of his free will, is the same as if it were said, for example, that God preordained the action of fire with a reference of foreknowledge to the cooperation of its form. Which for that reason cannot be said, according to the sense reproved above; because the whole cooperation of fire, or of its form, as also of other second causes, is comprehended under that preordination of God as first cause: so therefore the whole cooperation of free will is comprehended under God's predestination, notwithstanding that it cooperates freely; because just as there the mode of cooperating naturally is from God preordaining, so here the mode of cooperating freely, in like manner and equally properly and perfectly, is from God predestining.

§ 101. Far be it that therefore a good work should be less properly and perfectly from God because it is from man's free will. Nay rather, this operation of God is more perfect, inasmuch as by it an action is produced not of just any sort, but with that perfection, that it is free: which accordingly, both as it is an action and as it is free, is wholly from God; because not only the action itself, but also every mode of it is from God. Whence of it this is truly said, that in every way it is preordained before it is foreknown; since whatever in things has existence according to any difference of time whatever, whether it be a thing, or a mode of a thing, is not therefore preordained by God because it is foreknown; but it is therefore foreknown, because God preordained that He would do it—as was said elsewhere, namely where there was treatment of God's knowledge. Which point must be kept before the eyes in this whole disputation.

§ 102. Besides this, however, the aforesaid things do not seem able to avail so as to escape falling into that which posits predestination on merits; as is the case also with the opinion above. For if God, in predestining a man, looks to his cooperation—which indeed is some good provocative of a Divine benefit—plainly it follows that in these predestinations God looks to the future, and, as it were, to his merit. For insofar as this foreknowledge is posited as neither posterior to predestination in the order of reason nor as concurring with it, insofar the good itself is foreknown and considered by the predestining One, and seems to have the formal character of merit with respect to predestination. Whence it seems that by a certain obliquity of words they have merely played at shunning the odium of the infamous opinion about predestination from the foreknowledge of merits, whereas in reality it falls back into it.

§ 103. Moreover this opinion has with the aforesaid things this feature, that of necessity, if it be admitted, it must be confessed that there is one formal character of the predestination of little children, another of adults; for the predestination of little children is altogether absolute, and includes no reference of foreknowledge to the cooperation of free will; which reference, however, according to this sentence, the predestination of adults includes. Yet it must be noted that those who thus opine seem to except certain adults; they say that the predestination of adults in the ordinary way stands thus; that in some adults predestination can be preserved without a foreknowledge with reference to human reason, and altogether without that of free will—why not in all? Since it is decreed by God that no one using it not shall be saved without a motion of free will by which he tends unto salvation, it is sufficiently evident that that new figment

is vain, by which it is said that adults are ordinarily predestined by an absolute decree of God, with a foreknowledge of the cooperation of the predestined supporting and accompanying it.

§ 104. Moreover this opinion, while it makes foreknowledge run, as it were, step-for-step together with predestination, seems to rely on this supposition, that God, that is the first cause, in causing is not by nature prior to second causes, or at least to created free will with respect to free actions, but that He either concurs with them, or with it, together at the same pace.

§ 105. Other arguments as well, by which this opinion about predestination, already stated and now refuted, may be overthrown, it is easy to gather from those things which were set forth above on grace and predestination. To which, finally, there pertain the things that are sought from the prayer, thanksgiving, and glorying of the faithful. For these clearly convince that all the means of our salvation, in which without doubt there is the cooperation of free will, are from God preventing and therefore also from God predestining, foreknown integrally; whereby it comes about that the foreknowledge of all such things cannot but in every way be posterior to predestination. But what is to be answered to the places of Scripture which in the business of predestination make mention of foreknowledge, as in Rom. 8 and 12, and 1 Pet. 1; in what way also the places of St. Augustine are to be understood in which he joins foreknowledge to predestination, as in the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, has also been sufficiently explained above; to which I now add this: if sacred Scripture, naming foreknowledge where it speaks of predestination, wished to signify that predestination has some dependence on a foreknowledge of cooperation, as on that which in the order of reason could be thought prior, or together with predestination itself of beatitude, it would follow likewise that Christ's predestination would have such a dependence. For just as we the elect are called foreknown by both Apostles, so Peter in the same chapter says that Christ was foreknown before the foundation of the world; and yet that Christ was predestined to be the Son of God with a reference of foreknowledge to the cooperation of free will, no one unless a Nestorian will say. And neither can it without error be said that His good works, by which He merited for us redemption and salvation, were predestined with a reference of foreknowledge to the cooperation of His human will; which works, such as they were, to have been performed by His free will there is no doubt. Wherefore the freedom of human actions in Christ did not impede the absolute predetermination and predestination of them, as effected by the Divine will, which in every way precedes His human will (which seems necessary to be confessed because of the union of the natures made in the Divine Person). Hence there is no reason anyone should complain that liberty of will is destroyed in us, if its actions are said to be subjected to the absolute decree of God, having no dependence on a forevision of them. Therefore the example of Christ alone, as of the Head of all the predestined, suffices, as elsewhere in the matter at hand, to be demonstrated; as also it alone suffices to refute certain pronouncements which are wont to be brought forward hither by some as if axioms, such as these: that what follows by a necessary consequence—on the ground that something is not impedible—that very thing also is not impedible, and hence is necessary; that, whenever some hypothesis is not in our power to be posited or not posited, that which follows by necessary consequence from it is absolutely necessary; that the necessity of an act from some such hypothesis, which neither is the act itself nor includes in itself a reference to the exercise of the act, is necessity absolutely speaking. But of these things elsewhere more exactly.

§ XIII — Whether the election of the Angels was from foreseen merits (Utrum Angelorum electio fuerit ex praevisis meritis)

§ 106. Holy Scripture calls the holy Angels "elect" (1 Tim. 5); for which reason we can also call them predestined (*praedestinati*), although Scripture has never expressly stated this. For just as they were elected from eternity unto beatitude (*beatitudo*), together also unto the means by which they would attain it, so they were predestined (*praedestinatio*) unto the same. For these good things would not in time have been bestowed upon them by God, unless the same, to be conferred in time, had been preordained and prepared from eternity. Therefore this preordination or preparation of the benefits of God to be conferred upon the Angels is the predestination of the Angels themselves. Whence it is established that even in the Angels predestination is the preparation of grace (*gratia*) and glory (*gloria*). Yet not altogether similarly as in men: for, as we were saying above in a higher Distinction, the grace prepared for the Angels is a certain gratuitous and undue benefit (*beneficium*) of God, whether you consider the nature of the Angels or the merit (*meritum*) of justice. For neither was such sublimity owed to their nature, nor to their justice—which, since none had preceded, could not be owed. Yet it is not of such a sort as would be conferred upon the unworthy and ill-deserving, such as is the benefit of the grace of Christ prepared for fallen man, turned away from God by sin, and by this very fact surely unworthy and ill-deserving. But with this difference established, the question still remains: whether the election of the Angels or their predestination was from foreseen merits, that is, from the good use of grace to be conferred, which God had foreseen in them; or rather was absolutely and purely gratuitous, and absolute and independent of the forevision of a movement.

§ 107. Since the question has no small difficulty on account of the opinions of the Fathers that are to appearance discordant, it must be explained by us in such wise that first, for that side which seems to us more consonant with the truth, we shall bring forward arguments; then also we shall subjoin those which seem to establish the contrary, and at the same time we shall consider what may be answered to them. The negative side, therefore, is proved, in the first place, by the general account of Divine providence (*providentia*), under which, to wit, there is included, as its effect, whatever could order the Angels unto salvation, even the very movements and acts of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) accepting grace offered, and using what is accepted well and perseveringly. "For," says St. Thomas (I, q. 23, a. 4), "what is from free will and from predestination is not distinct, just as what is from the secondary cause and from the first cause is not distinct; since the Divine providence produces its effects in being through the operations of secondary causes." Whence he concludes that what is through free will is from predestination, and therefore cannot be posited as the account of predestination, since it is concluded under predestination itself as its effect.¹³³ And although in that place St. Thomas seems to be treating of the predestination of man alone, nevertheless the account, nay the demonstration which he brings forward, as I have said, is general, embracing also the predestination of the Angels. And yet this too is to be diligently noted there, that through the whole article he names predestination generally, scarcely anywhere adding anything by which he descends specially to the predestination of men, except that the Scriptures which he alleges pertain to men. Whence he did not judge it necessary to compose a special question or article on the predestination of the Angels. In like manner he uses a general account embracing even the Angels when writing on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 9, lesson 3. And to this account there agree also the general Scriptures, which teach that God is the author and cause of all things, of forms, of actions, of motions, such that, besides all other things, He is not only the cause of being and existing, but also of doing and acting: such Scriptures are Rom. 11, "For from Him and through Him and in

Him are all things"; 1 Cor. 12, "Who works all things in all"; Eph. 1, "Who works all things according to the counsel of His will"; Acts 15, "In Him..." Likewise those of this sort were brought forward by us above at Distinction 39, to prove that the providence of God extends to all things, whether they be things or the qualities of things, and even free motions and actions—because in all things God works intimately and immediately, not receiving the determination of His operation from the subject causes, but He Himself determining all causes unto acting. But if it is so, the predestination of the Angels could not have depended on the forevision of merits: since their merits too were contained, in subordination to the providence of God, in that part wherein predestination is, as it were, its effect.

§ 108. Third. Scriptures more specially pertaining hither assign all works of piety to the Divine operation; although indeed such are very often in the sacred letters referred to men, because to wit they were written on account of men, not on account of Angels; reason, however, and piety require that they be understood equally of the Angels—such as is 1 Cor. 4: "For who distinguishes thee? But what hast thou that thou didst not receive? But if thou didst receive, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received?" For the good Angels did not distinguish themselves from the others, except by that which they received from God, so that their boasting may be not in themselves but in God, as the Apostle says: "He that glories, let him glory in the Lord," and the Psalmist: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to Thy name give glory." Wherefore of the Angels it is true that in them God "works to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2), and that they "are not sufficient to think anything of good of themselves, but their sufficiency is of God" (2 Cor. 3); since the account of these sayings regards even the Angels, according to that which is said universally by James, ch. 1: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." Nor is there any doubt that that which the Apostle enjoins on us, 1 Thess. 5, saying: "In all things give thanks," the holy Angels do so much the more perfectly, by how much more fully they acknowledge the benefits bestowed on them by God. If, therefore, they glory not in themselves but in God, and give Him thanks for all good things, it is manifest that all their good things are from God: even unto the very acceptance of the gifts of God, the assuming, and the perseverance in using; which if it were not so, they would already have something for which they could glory not in God but in themselves, and hence they would not owe to give thanks to God; which opinion is very absurd and utterly unworthy. It must be noted moreover that St. Anselm, of whose opinion we shall speak below, affirms in the book *On the Fall of the Devil* that that saying of the Apostle has place in the holy Angels: "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?"¹³⁴

§ 109. Fourth. More specially yet to the point seems that passage (Dan. 4), where the King of Babylon, now turned to God and acknowledging His power, confesses that God "does according to His will, both in the powers of heaven and in the inhabitants of the earth, and that there is none who can resist His hand, and say to Him: Why hast Thou done this?" Hence it appears as a consequence that both the predestination of Angels and that of men is from the mere good pleasure of God.

§ 110. Fifth. There is also a special passage concerning the Angels in Rev. 7. For there the confession of all the Angels falling down in the sight of the throne of God is this: "Blessing, and clarity, that is, glory, and wisdom, and thanksgiving, honor, power, and might to our God unto the ages of ages, Amen." By which words, attributing to God the glory of all goods, and giving thanks to God for all things, they acknowledge without doubt among other things also that all their merit is the gift of God; and therefore of such a sort as is contained under His predestination.

§ 111. Sixth. Here has place also the reason of Scotus, by which he showed the absolute predestination of men. Since the will of the end is prior to that of the means, it follows that God willed first even for the Angels beatitude as the end, and thereafter the means leading to it: therefore He did not will the end from the forevision of any means. If you say that God willed the end from the forevision of a means which would hold on the part of the Angels, not however on the part of God—against this there will be the seventh argument.

§ 112. God not only predestines the end, but also all the means leading to the end; therefore every merit of the angelic will, however it is considered, insofar as it is a means ordainable to that end, is predestined by God. For, as from what was said above is clear, in the order of reason it is prior to predestine something than to foreknow. Therefore it cannot be said that the end was willed by God from the forevision of a means holding on the part of the Angels: for even such could not be foreseen unless it had first been provided and predestined.

§ 113. Eighth. Just as men, so also Angels were created from nothing; but a creature, by that very thing that it was made from nothing, can have absolutely no motion or action originally from itself, but acts only insofar as it is acted upon and moved by the first Agent and Mover: therefore both Angels and men have every motion and action of free will from God directing them unto the end of their beatitude, that is, from the universal, principal, and efficacious predestination of God in all operations.

§ 114. Ninth. If the predestination of the Angels is from the forevision of a good will accepting grace offered—so that to be able indeed is from God, but to will and to accept is from free will alone—already that which the Angels have from free will, that is, from themselves, will be better than that which they have from God: for it is better to will the good than to be able. With which argument St. Augustine uses in some place against the Pelagians, to prove that even to will is given to men by God, and not only to be able, or to be able easily, which they taught.

§ 115. Tenth. Of man St. Augustine reasons thus in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance* (chapters 17, 22): that if his predestination were from merits, he could place confidence in himself. But if he did so, he would be accursed, according to that of Jer. 17: "Cursed is the man who trusts in man": therefore similarly it will be permissible to reason of the Angel: if he were predestined from merits, he would have been able to trust in himself, and thus become liable to the curse. For if "cursed is the man who, trusting in himself as man"; therefore similarly also the Angel trusting in himself as Angel. For to each, trusting in himself, there will befall what follows with the Prophet: "And his heart departs from the Lord." Wherefore even of the Angel it seems entirely true to be able to be said what of man the Tridentine Synod affirms, Session 6, chapter 16, saying: "Far be it that a Christian man either trust in himself or glory in himself, and not in the Lord, whose so great is the goodness toward all men that He wishes their merits to be His gifts."¹³⁵

§ 116. Eleventh. Christ, in all His works—even as proceeding from His human will—glorified the Father, and sought in no way at all His own glory, knowing and confessing that all His works were given to Him by the Father, and that He could do nothing of Himself, but that the Father, abiding in Him, does all (Jn. 5; 7; 8; 14; and elsewhere). Whence it is rightly gathered that the rest of men can much less do anything good of themselves, but that all which they have, they have from God working in them. Whence St. Augustine, expounding that of Psalm 3, where Christ says to the Father, "My glory," thus speaks: "He too says God to be his glory, whom the Word of God so assumed that together with it he should become God. Let the proud learn, who do not willingly hear it when it is said to them: What hast thou that thou didst not receive? But if

thou didst receive, why dost thou glo[riest]?"—nor must anything at all be left, even to Angels who are far inferior to Christ (Heb. 1), as proper to themselves, in view of which they can be said to be predestined by God.

§ 117. Lastly. This doctrine is confirmed by the opinions of the Fathers, who either expressly teach that the election of the Angels was gratuitous, or so speak of the Angels that they refer all their merit to God as author; whence it follows that they were predestined not from any foreseen merit, but altogether gratuitously; or finally they speak in a similar mode of man in integrity, namely that all his merit, with perseverance—if he had persevered—would have been the gift of God, and therefore that the predestination of the same was purely gratuitous. For concerning integral man—if he had persevered—and Angels, with respect to the matter of grace and predestination, almost all grant the account to be equal. These Fathers, then, are: Fulgentius, book 3 To King Thrasimund, chapter 2, says that all the Angels could have been oppressed by a fellowship of uniform ruin, unless the Divine power, as it willed, had defended from the fall of perversity. And thereafter, chapter 3, that no other power could guard the Angel standing from ruin, except that which could restore fallen man after the ruin: "There is," he says, "one grace operating in both—in this one that he might rise; in that one that he might not fall; in that one that he might not be wounded, in this one that he might be healed; from this one He drove back infirmity, that one He did not permit to be made infirm." He speaks these things, namely referring to the will of God the difference between those Angels and the fallen, and the perseverance of those; just as also he ascribes the restoration of men to the Divine power.¹³⁶ St. Gregory refers to the hidden judgments of God that He has appointed some of the Angels to remain in eternal light without fall, others, fallen of their own accord, He has condemned (*Moralia*, book 15, ch. 32); and book 25 (chapter 8) he says that with others falling, others were made firm by God—surely those who in like manner would have fallen, unless they had been made firm.¹³⁷ St. Bernard, book *On Grace and Free Will*, says that to the good Angels it was given by God that they should endure without sin, which was not given to the first man. The same (*Sermon 22 on the Song*) speaks thus: "He who created man when fallen, gave to the Angel standing that he should not fall; thus delivering that one from captivity, thus defending this one from captivity. And on this account there was equal redemption for each—loosing that one, preserving this one." And in the book *On Loving God*, near the beginning, speaking of the fall of man: "He who," he says, "succored men in such necessity, preserved the Angels; [by the same loving He made them such that they should not remain such; and by loving He gave even to the Angels that they should not fall]." The same (the last sermon *On All [the Saints]*) says that the holy Angels were preserved from temptation by the benignity of God.¹³⁸ Franco, tome 1 *On Grace*, among other things: "Whatever is created, in order that it may stand in the received dignity of its condition, has it from God." And thereafter specially of the blessed ranks of spirits he says that they refer less, nay much more, to the Creator what they are, what they understand, and what they can, everything to His grace; and that with unceasing voice they give thanks to Him both for the excellence of their condition and for the perseverance of their beatitude. Finally, he shows how much debtors the blessed are to the grace of God, by whose gift—when so many, upon impulse, were rushing from such a summit of dignity—they themselves stood firm in the solidity of eternal beatitude.¹³⁹ The author of the *Sermon on the Assumption*, among the works under the name of St. Jerome, speaking of the Angels: "Because," he says, "they too would have fallen by gratuitous grace, they were saved. Whence David: The heavens are established of the Lord," etc.¹⁴⁰ Nay even from the Council of Orange this seems able to be established; it has of integral man in its canon 19 these words taken from St. Augustine, epistle 106: "Human nature, even if in the integrity in which it was created it had remained, could in no way preserve itself to its Creator without His grace; whence, since without the grace of God it cannot

guard that which it has received, without the grace of God will it be able to restore what it has lost?" This, however, concerns integral man; therefore it can be said also of the Angel, namely that to keep salvation, to persevere in good, he could not without the grace of God, that is, of Him who bestows the very gift of perseverance—which is how those Fathers seem to have understood his words.¹⁴¹

§ 118. That this is also the doctrine of St. Thomas can be shown not only from the first argument adduced by us by his authority, but it is confirmed not less from other places. For in the same part (I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 3) he says that Angels are predestined in the same way as men. He indicates, however, that it is not from merits of the holy ones, when he says that that definition of St. Augustine—predestination is the purpose of having mercy—applies in this respect also to Angels; because he says every bestowal of good above the due of him to whom it is bestowed pertains to mercy. He therefore wills that the predestination of the Angels, like that of men, be gratuitous and undue; although he acknowledges a difference in this, that the predestination of men is the purpose of freeing man from the misery of guilt and of punishment, but not so that of the Angels, as they incurred no misery from which grace of predestination might free them. Of which difference we spoke at the beginning. This passage, on the gratuitous predestination of the Angels according to the sentence of St. Thomas, Dominic Bañez also judged worthy of note in his commentary on that place. Another passage of the same part (q. 62, a. 2, in the body, and ad 3) teaches that the Angel could not by his will be converted to God as the beatific good, except by the help of the grace of God; because no rational creature can have a movement of will ordered to that beatitude unless it is moved by its connatural Agent. Which very thing he teaches yet more expressly and clearly of integral man in I-II (q. 109, arts. 8 and 9); whence this follows, that every angelic merit must be referred to the will of God preventing and pre-working with assisting grace. But because what St. Augustine thought concerning this matter is much debated on account of diverse places apparently dissonant, we shall here adduce from him some things that agree with the opinions of others set down above. First of all is this, that in book 12 of the City of God, chapter 19, seeking the efficient cause of the good will in the Angels, he teaches that if they received it in their creation, it is not doubtful that they received it from God; if after they were created, not even so is it to be doubted that they received it from God working in them; otherwise there would follow a most absurd consequence, that they were made better by themselves than by God. Which argument of Augustine is well to be noted, as of very great moment for showing the gratuitousness, both of the Angels' and of men's pre[...] [continues]

§ 119. Predestination. For if the acceptance of grace, as some will have it, belongs to free will alone, distinguishing the elect from the reprobate, since by it man is made better, certainly it will follow that man is made better by himself than he was made by God. Moreover, with certain things interposed, the same St. Augustine subjoins these words: "The evil Angels," he says, "either received a lesser grace of Divine Love than those who persevered in the same, or, if both alike were created good, these, falling by an evil will; those, being more helped, came to that fullness of Beatitude, from which they would become most certain that they would never fall." By which words Augustine seems altogether to have referred the difference of the Angels who stood from those who fell to a greater grace, or a greater help given by God to the former before the latter. But to this some reply that Augustine, when he says that those were "more helped," is not speaking of merit, but of reward, which those received "more," that is, more abundantly above their former justice; because, namely, persevering in justice, they received eternal life, which consists in full and perfect justice. And that this sense of Augustine's words is insinuated both by this, that he says, "with the others falling," namely into eternal misery, to which he opposes beatitude, to the receiving of which he says the good were helped. For thus the same Augustine speaks of the fall of the wicked in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 10, when he says that

they did not previously know that they would fall into misery,¹⁴⁶ and this also is sufficiently understood from the fact that the same man (ch. 12 of the same book) has designated beatitude itself by the name of help.¹⁴⁷ But to others the present passage seems too plain to admit of such an exposition. For throughout this whole chapter Augustine is disputing about the efficient cause of the good, better, and persevering will in the rational creature, especially in Angels, which cause he concludes to be God. He also seems to oppose the fall of the wicked not to the beatitude of the good, but to perseverance, by which they merited beatitude; in the same way as the Doctors speak everywhere about the fall of the Demons, as one may also see in the words of the Fathers cited above. And although elsewhere once, in a certain proper sense, he may call beatitude "help," yet not in this place, when he says that the Angels were "more helped" to have come to beatitude. For if this help, by which they are said to have been helped, were beatitude itself, the sense would be inept: namely, that beatitude was conferred upon the Angels by which they came to beatitude.

§ 120. But other passages of the same Doctor are to be subjoined; "...tate c. 27," where, speaking of man in integrity, he says that he could not even consider the help of God without the help of God. Which, in like manner, he there signifies is to be thought concerning the Angel.¹⁴⁸ The same, Confessions, book 13, ch. 3, says that the spiritual, that is, the Angelic, creature, just as it had not merited, that it should be such a life as could be illumined, so neither, when it existed, had it merited, that it should be illumined by God; but that both what life it has in any wise, and what life it has in blessedness, it owes to nothing but the grace of God.¹⁴⁹ The same, On Genesis to the Letter, book 11, ch. 8, speaking both about Angels and about men: "Thus," he says, "he who glories, glories not except in the Lord, when he recognizes that it is not his, but His, not only that he be, but also that it be well with him only from Him, from whom he has that he be." And (ch. 10, on evils) thus he objects and replies: "But God could," they say, "also convert even their will unto good; since He is omnipotent." "He could indeed; why therefore did He not do it? Because He willed not. Why He willed not is with Himself. For we ought not to be wise beyond what we ought." Thus he. Therefore, it seems from Augustine's judgment that it must be referred to the inscrutable counsel of God, why even in the Angels themselves He willed to convert the will of some unto good, and willed not to convert that of others; since both alike were in His power. Again, the same, in the exposition of Psalm 33, sermon 2, on that: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were solidified," "For," he says, "they were not to themselves a solidifying; nor did the heavens themselves furnish a firmness proper to themselves; by the word of the Lord they were made firm: And by the spirit of His mouth all the power of them. They had nothing from themselves, and as it were a supplement they received from the Lord. For by the spirit of His mouth not a part, but all the power of them." Thus he about the heavens, that is, the Angels.¹⁵⁰ Finally, to this belong all the passages both of Augustine and of St. Thomas which prove the efficacy of Divine providence with respect to all the motions and operations of any creature whatsoever. Of which we have said elsewhere.

§ XIV — The arguments of the diverse opinion are proposed with a reply (Proponuntur argumenta diversae opinionis cum responsione)

§ 121. Now therefore the opinion must be explained of those who establish the election (*electio*) of the holy Angels from foreseen merits. For these men, although they admit that God also in the holy Angels and in the first men while still integral was the author of all good works and of the very perseverance of the Angels—something which, they say, has been sufficiently shown by those things of ours which were brought forward from St. Augustine—yet deny that in the same manner did God work unto the good in them as He works in

man after the fall. For in those, they say, He worked according to the principles implanted or conferred in their very nature, that is, according to justice and other habits of virtue, with the aid of His assistance joined to them for persevering; but in fallen man He works in a very different manner. For since the gift of justice once received man by sinning lost, and now there is found in him no seed or principle concreated in the first condition which would be contrary to divine operations; God now works according to the plan of His grace (*propositum gratiae*), whereby He decreed to have mercy on man and to do him good—namely, by efficaciously converting his will, and in it and through it bringing about to will and to accomplish whatever things are according to the plan of His grace. From these things they wish to be understood that, if the same kind of difference had obtained between the predestination (*praedestinatio*) of Angels and of integral man on the one hand, and the predestination of fallen man on the other—namely, that the latter's predestination is the plan of having mercy, that is, of gratuitously exhibiting mercy to the sinner, who could contribute nothing, from what he had received in creation, toward deserving or obtaining salvation; whereas the predestination of the Angels is the plan of giving eternal life for justice, in which by their own free choice they were to persevere—then this perseverance, as foreseen, would be the cause of their predestination. Wherefore, as to be maintained with respect to the Angels' predestination, it is not necessary that it be said that God bestowed more help upon those who stood than upon those who fell; since both alike could have persevered by that which they had received, nothing, namely, being added which would make them actually persevere—such a thing as is necessary, and through Christ is given, to predestined men after the fall. And they further admit that this is to be asked of the Angels' free choice, not, however, that it is to be sought from the will of God.¹⁵¹

§ 122. Likewise, Prosper seems to have followed Augustine in this opinion, as is to be seen in book 1, On the Contemplative Life, ch. 3, and Against the Collator, ch. 18, and in the Responses to the Chapters of the Gauls, Response 8; also Gregory, book 5, Morals, ch. 28, where he says that the good Angels stood by free choice. The same doctrine is found quite plainly in Anselm, book On the Fall of the Devil: where although in ch. 1 he says that even in the Angels a place holds for that of the Apostle: "What have you that you have not received?", and other such sayings of Scripture by which our whole good is referred to God, yet afterwards (ch. 2, 3, 4) he teaches that God for this reason did not give the apostate Angel perseverance, because he did not accept it. And indeed in ch. 18 he affirms that to God the good Angel and the bad owe equal grace; because, he says, the Devil removed from himself what God gave, and did not wish to accept what God offered, and so forth. Finally, Rupert most openly concurs with the same opinion, book 13 On Matthew, where, among other things, raising the question whether it was in the power of God that the Angel and man should not fall, he answers it in such a way as also to signify that this was not in God's power: "For," he says, "God, as He hears, judges, and therefore could not communicate Himself to a creature which is the cause of willing itself to suffice for itself"—which indeed he says as though God could not prevent this willing of the creature. Whence he also rebukes Augustine in a certain place for saying: "Who would dare to believe or to say that it was not in the power of God that neither Angel nor man should fall?" Augustine says this, book 14 of the City of God, ch. 27. To these they add an argument from Scripture, Matt. 24, where to predestined men it is not said: "Receive the kingdom which is prepared for the Angels," as to reprobate men it is said: "Depart into the fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels." For the reason of this diversity in the words of the Judge's sentence they wish to be this: that the reprobation indeed of men and of Angels is similar, but not predestination; rather, of the latter (men) it is from the mere good pleasure of God, but of the former (Angels) from the foreknowledge of a persevering will.¹⁵²

§ 123. But these arguments are not of such weight that for their sake we should think we must depart from the doctrine of gratuitous predestination even of the Angels, which we have shown to agree most of all with the Scriptures and with reason and with the sayings of the Fathers. For, first, as regards the distinction of the divine operation in Angels or in integral man and in fallen man, it cannot be understood in such a way that not in those equally as in this God is said to have efficaciously worked every movement of good will—even if He were doing this according to the principles implanted at creation—as He works in any other creatures whatsoever. For neither do natural powers and inclinations, even with superadded habits, so suffice for eliciting operations, that such principles need not be applied to the very actions by the First Mover; as St. Thomas teaches in many places.¹⁵³

§ 124. Then, if the principles of creation sufficed, at least with the daily aid which indeed was prepared for man but would not give unless he would; why do not the principles of well-doing, which fallen man receives through Christ, that is, the virtues and gifts, likewise suffice for him now repaired, with similar aid, for eliciting good actions—at least at that time when he is not attacked by contrary concupiscence and temptation? For that it can happen that, although evil concupiscence is in man, nevertheless he is moved by no temptation at all, Augustine affirms, book 6 Against Julian, ch. 8. Wherefore, that with respect to divine aid we may distinguish well between the state of the Angel and of integral man, and the state of fallen man, the doctrine of St. Thomas must by all means be retained, which he hands down in I-II, q. 109, a. 1, saying: however perfect a nature be posited, whether bodily or spiritual, it is not able to proceed into its own act unless it be moved by God according to the order of His providence; and in a. 2, where, distinguishing man's nature integral from corrupt, he says that in either state it needs the divine aid for doing or willing whatever good, as of the First Mover. But that there is a difference as to operative power: because man in the state of integral nature needed gratuitous power as to one thing, that is, for doing and willing supernatural good; but in the state of corrupt nature, as to two things, namely that he be healed; and further, that he work the good of supernatural virtue. And in reply to the argument taken from the fact that man is master of his own acts: "The human mind," he says, "even when healthy, does not so have dominion over its act as not to need to be moved by God; and much more does man's free choice, being sick after sin, by which it is impeded from the good on account of the corruption of nature." Likewise in a. 9 he teaches that fallen man needs the help of God for living rightly in a twofold way: In one way as regards some habitual gift, by which corrupt human nature is healed, and, even when healed, is elevated for working works meritorious of eternal life; in the other way as regards the help of grace, by which he is moved by God to act; and this for two reasons. First indeed for a general reason, because no thing can proceed into any act unless by the power of the divine motion: Secondly for a special reason on account of the condition of the state of human nature, which indeed, although it is healed as to the mind by grace, nevertheless there remains in it a corruption or infection as to the flesh, by which it serves the law of sin. By which words he again signifies that the first man, although not for a special reason on account of the corruption of nature, yet for a general reason, needed the help of God moving him to the good; since even in the state of glory, when grace will be altogether perfect, man will need the divine help, as he says in the reply to the first there. He also writes things similar (a. 3, 8, 10 of the same question); likewise, *De malo*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9; and *In II Sent.*, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 5.¹⁵⁴

§ 125. But as to those things which are objected on the contrary from Augustine, the same St. Thomas seems to have understood them thus: that what he says—that man in the first state received a gift by which he could persevere if he would, but that the willing itself was left in his free choice—is to be taken of the habitual gift of grace, which, in the genus of a habitual gift, was sufficient for persevering; not, however, in such a way

that for actual perseverance there was not need of the actual help of God, conserving him in the good: and yet that the willing itself is said to have been left in his free choice on account of the utmost facility of persevering; to wit, according to his special state there was no rebellion of the flesh which he suffered against the spirit. For this is what St. Thomas says (ad 3 of the aforesaid q. 109, a. 10, I-II): "Although, as Augustine testifies, man in the first state received a gift by which he could persevere, nevertheless he did not receive it in such wise that he should persevere; now, however, through the grace of Christ many receive both the gift of grace, by which they can persevere, and further it is given to them that they persevere; yet it was easier for man to be able to persevere by the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which, namely, there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, than now we can," and so forth.¹⁵⁵

§ 126. This also he seems to signify (a. 8, ad 3), where replying to that of Ecclesiasticus 15: "Before man are life and death, good and evil; whichever shall have pleased him shall be given to him," he says that with Augustine that sentence is to be understood of man according to the state of integral nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin, but could sin and not sin. Now, however, it is also given to man whatever he shall have willed; but this, he says, that he will the good, he has from the help of grace—understand, necessarily, not only for the general reason explained above, for which also to integral man the help was necessary whereby the very willing might be given; but for the special reason on account of the corruption of nature. And indeed unless we receive this understanding of Augustine's words intimated by St. Thomas, it will be most difficult, nay not even possible, to reconcile Augustine with himself, that is, to show how those things which have been objected are not opposed to those which earlier in the contrary sense from the same Augustine had been adduced, especially from book 12 of the City of God, ch. 9. To which place I now add another so manifest about the first man as that other was about the Angels. For book 8 On Genesis to the Letter, ch. 12, when, discussing man as he was established by God, he had said that he in this wise straightway receives justice from God as the air by the presence of light is straightway illuminated; to declare this he adduced those Scriptures which speak of fallen man, such as that Eph. 2: "By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from you, but it is the gift of God, not from works, lest perhaps anyone be lifted up. For we are His handiwork, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God prepared, that in them we should walk."¹⁵⁶

§ 127. in you. Therefore, since from these Scriptures it is taught in net fashion that the predestination of fallen man is purely gratuitous, in that all his salutary good is ascribed to a preparation, that is, to the Divine predestination, and since also by that which is said, "lest perchance someone be lifted up" (for which our interpreter better translates from the Greek, "that no one may glory"), all boasting is excluded; it follows from the same that also the predestination of an integral man, if he had remained in that state, would have been equally gratuitous and absolute, and hence that such is the predestination of the Angels—and this according to the sentiment of Augustine, who uses testimonies of Scripture of this sort to set forth what kind of help of God was granted to man in integrity. But if, nonetheless, someone should still maintain that Augustine's words which have been adduced cannot be bent this way, and should think that he was in truth of another opinion; then we shall reply that those things which he discussed more obscurely, and, as it seems, outside the authority of Scripture, about the aid of the first man and of the Angels, were for this purpose: that by that comparison the grace of our restoration through Christ might shine forth the more; they ought not to prejudice the doctrine which is found more expressly among other Fathers, and in St. Thomas himself, the most exact Doctor in matters of this kind; especially because of most weighty reasons on that side, and, as it seems to us, unanswerable, and clearly founded in Scripture.¹⁵⁷ We answer the same concerning Prosper, who set down almost Augustine's very words, and was a most diligent follower of his doctrine. But Gregory says

that the Angels stood by free choice, and fixed the movement of their mutability by the station of will; not that they did not receive from God perseverance itself by which they stood, but because they did not need a grace healing a weak will, as having from the beginning a will that was sound and robust.

§ 128. Moreover Anselm, constrained by this sentence of the Apostle, "What have you that you have not received?", could not slip away otherwise, while he strives to refer the distinction between the good and the evil Angel originally to their wills, than by saying and repeatedly inculcating that therefore God did not give perseverance to the evil Angel, because he did not receive it. Which answer of his, explained by him by a certain similitude of a giver and of one unwilling to receive, Judocus Tiletanus affirms in a certain writing to Ruardus to be more popular than exact and solid.¹⁵⁸ Nor without cause; because by this the question is not solved, why the very receiving was given to this one and not to that one. For that it was given is proved by the Apostolic sentence. For it was thus said, "what you have not received," as if it were said, "what was not given to you," even as in Jn. 3 the Baptist speaks: "A man cannot receive anything, unless it shall have been given him from heaven."¹⁵⁹ But Anselm seems to have passed over that of the same Apostle saying in the same place: "For who distinguishes you?"¹⁶⁰ For the reply given by him would least of all have fitted this objection.

§ 129. About Rupert—who suspends the predestination not only of the Angels, but also of fallen men, on foreknowledge—we have said elsewhere that his authority in this matter is not of great weight. And meanwhile it must be noted that he, in that in which he reproves Augustine, readily recognized that Augustine would not think the same as he about the predestination of the Angel and of man in integrity; nay, the same man elsewhere, overcome by the truth itself, seems to hand on something different, and to think with us. For in the book *De victoria Verbi Dei*, ch. 27, he says that the good Angels, lest they fall with the devil, were prevented and held back by the very Word, by whom they had been created; and in the last chapter he says that they acknowledge in themselves the grace and mercy of God, by which they are not ignorant that they were prevented lest they also fall.¹⁶¹ "Since they were of the same condition, they were able, or can, not lightly to weigh that their salvation was reserved in the perdition of others and their state retained," he says. Which words are well to be noted. For he plainly signifies that that distinction, whereby some stood rather than others, was of a peculiar grace of God preventing and holding them back lest they fall with the others.

§ 130. Finally, as to what is objected from the Gospel, I answer that it is not for this reason, in the former sentence of the Judge, that the Angels are silent, that their election is not similar with that of men; for otherwise there ought here to have been mention of grace rather than of works; but rather this seems to be the reason, because in those words, "Receive the Kingdom" (*Percipite Regnum*), is understood the Kingdom of Christ, which He has by right of redemption, acquired by His blood as man over redeemed men. For this is the kingdom which Christ often calls His, as in Jn. 18: "My kingdom is not of this world," and in Lk. 22: "That you may eat and drink at my table," and [the words] addressed to Christ: "Remember me; when you shall have come into your kingdom."¹⁶² But this Kingdom, as such, is not prepared for the Angels, as not included under the benefit of Christ's redemption; although they do pertain to the same Church triumphant with the redeemed, under Christ the head, as Scripture bears witness in Eph. 1; Col. 1; Heb. 12, and elsewhere.¹⁶³

§ XV — *Whether reprobation is from foreseen merits (Utrum reprobatio fit ex praevisis meritis)*

§ 131. There remains finally the question concerning the merit of Divine reprobation (*reprobatio*); whether any should be acknowledged in him who is reprobated by God as foreseen, not indeed as a cause or the formal character (*ratio*) of the divine act which is called reprobation—for of that no cause can be, as also in its place we noted concerning predestination (*praedestinatio*)—but as the formal character of reprobation on the side of the effect. For this is what is asked: whether in the reprobate there is some cause, namely his own merit, on account of which, being foreseen by God, the whole effect of Divine reprobation falls upon him. And although this question is almost always raised about the reprobation of men, nevertheless it can also be extended to the reprobation of Angels; as will be clear from the arguments of either side. Now these are for the affirmative.

§ 132. First. Reprobation is the hatred of God, according to that in Rom. 9: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated"; but God, before sin, hates no creature: for in Wis. 11 it is said, "Thou lovest all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made"; therefore neither does He reprobate anyone unless, sin being presupposed in them, they are foreknown as to be reprobated.

§ 133. Second. Reprobation is only of the wicked: for this seems to be demanded by the ratio of the name. But before the prevision of sin no one is wicked in the eyes of God; therefore before it no one is reprobated.

§ 134. Third. God reprobates in anger: whence also the reprobate are called "vessels of wrath" (Rom. 9). But God is angry only at sin, otherwise He would be unjust, as the Apostle says in Rom. 3: "Is God unjust who inflicts wrath?" Therefore He reprobates only a sinner foreknown.

§ 135. Fourth. In Ps. 68 it is said on account of the merit of sinners: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and with the just let them not be written," that is, let them be reprobated.

§ 136. Fifth. God does not desert unless first He is deserted, as the Council of Trent teaches (Session 6, ch. 11) after St. Augustine, book On Nature and Grace, ch. 26, and Prosper (Sent. 7 ad Cap. [as in source]); therefore neither does He reprobate except from the prevision of the sin by which someone is going to desert God.¹⁶⁵

§ 137. Sixth. Reprobation is defined to be the eternal decree of God whereby He wills to deprive some of eternal beatitude. But this God wills on account of foreseen sins. For it would seem cruel if God absolutely and independently of the prevision of sin were to prepare for a man eternal damnation, and then to order to it as to means the other effects of reprobation, namely the permission of sin, the dereliction of man, the blinding, etc. But the Scriptures also protest: Ezek. 18 and 33, "I will not the death of the sinner. I have no pleasure in the death of the impious; why will you die, O house of Israel?" and Wis. 1, "God made not death, neither does He delight in the destruction of the living." Whence neither do we read the eternal fire to be prepared simply for the Angel, but "prepared for the devil" in Matt. 24; but the name of "devil" involves malice. Hence also St. Thomas in I Sent. (dist., q. unica, a. 4, ad 2) says that God does not will the damnation of anyone per se, but He wills this order of justice, that he who dies in sin should be damned.¹⁶⁶

§ 138. Seventh. Reprobation is not an act of the Divine mercy; therefore it is an act of justice: nor of remunerative justice; therefore of punitive and vindicative [justice], which has no place where there has not preceded some merit of fault to which the debt of punishment is rendered.

§ 139. Eighth. Thus argue Henry of Ghent, Thomas of Argentina, and Aureolus: No just judge intends punitive justice of itself, but only on the hypothesis of a punishable fault: therefore God, the most just Judge, does not for this reason permit sins to be committed by His certain providence, that afterwards in their punishment there may appear His vindicative justice; but first, foreseeing men to be going to sin, He wills then to elicit from that evil the good of His justice.¹⁶⁷

§ 140. Ninth, the same add: Granted that the permission of sin is rightly ordered to the showing forth of the justice of God as to an end, nevertheless for this the permission of the sins of the Angels and their just punishment would have sufficed: therefore there was no need for the same end also to permit and to punish the sins of men.

§ 141. Tenth. This opinion is maintained especially from the authority of St. Augustine, who in many places teaches that reprobation pertains to the retribution of justice, and that in it the just judgment of God ought to be acknowledged; as in book 1 (To Simplician, q. 2), where this is his express sentence: "If Esau was reprobated with no demerit, how can his reprobation be said to be just? And if it is without demerit, it is unjust." And finally, concluding that disputation of his on the reprobation of man, he says that God in man hates nothing but sin, with this epiphonema added: "Therefore God does not hate Esau the man; but God hates Esau the sinner." The same (Enchiridion 98), treating the place of the Apostle in Rom. 9, "Jacob I loved," etc.: "Who, he says, unless a fool would think God unjust, whether He inflict a penal judgment upon the worthy, or bestow mercy upon the unworthy?"; and a little after: "Jacob He loved by gratuitous mercy, but Esau He hated by due judgment," etc.—to which he subjoins like things in the next chapter. Of the same sentence is (Epistle 105): "What did God hate in Esau, unless original sin?" And (Epistle 257) to Optatus: "It would with reason seem unjust that there should be vessels of wrath for perdition, if the whole mass were not damned in Adam. That therefore there are vessels of wrath by being born from it pertains to due punishment; but that there are vessels of mercy by being reborn pertains to undeserved grace." The same, book 2 (On the Merits of Sins, ch. 17), says of the reprobate that those to be damned are predestined on account of the iniquity of pride, and that as to their not being helped, the cause is in them, not in God. Other places of the same Doctor are [found in] the book (On the Predestination of the Saints, chs. 8, 9), book 2 (Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, ch. 7), to which add of an uncertain Author the book (On the Predestination of Grace, chs. 3, 6, 7) among the works of Augustine. Hither too they bring that the same Augustine in the book of 83 Questions (q. 68) says that the will of God by which He hardens whom He wills cannot be unjust, because it comes from most hidden merits; and that in book 21 (Against Faustus, ch. 2) he says that something hidden precedes in the hidden things, wherein God carries out a most just examination, so that the minds of some are blinded; and also that in the book (On Grace and Free Choice, chs. 21 and 23) he says that when we read in Scripture that certain persons are led astray or hardened by God, it must not be doubted that their evil merits have preceded, so that they might justly suffer these things. With Augustine agree Prosper and Fulgentius, of whom the former, responding (to the 3rd Chapter of the Gauls), says that those who, having fallen into sin, die without penance, are for this reason not predestined: because they were foreknown to be going to be such from voluntary prevarication. Which in like words he repeats both in the Response and in the sentence to the 7th chapter, and again in the Response to the 12th. And if the prevision of sin is a cause of not predestining, it seems to be a cause of reprobating, and that from the sentence of the same Prosper. Whence in the same place (in the Response to the 14th chapter and to Vincent's 11th objection) he openly says that predestination with respect to those to be damned—that is, reprobation—pertains to due retribution of justice. And to the 10th objection: that God in the reprobate predestines not their sins but His

judgment, by which He is about to render to each, as he has acted. But Fulgentius, book 1 (To Monymus, last chapter), confirms the words of Prosper taken from the 14th Response to the Chapters of the Gauls. And (ch. 28) concerning those who are predestined to damnation he says that, as to their not being helped by God, the cause is in them, not in God. Which also he proves by the words of Augustine, brought from book 2 (On the Baptism of little ones, or On the Merits of Sins, ch. 17); and elsewhere everywhere in the same book he seems in reprobation to acknowledge only just punishment. To which sentence Hugh too seems to subscribe in the Summa of Sentences (tract. 1, ch. 12): "Judas," he says, "God had from eternity in hatred, because He saw that he would be such in the future." And in the same place he calls the reprobate "pre-appointed unto death." Although this latter does not argue the point. For similarly, adding subjoined, he says that the predestinate are foreseen unto life, not however by this willing to establish predestination from prevision. Lastly, certain places too from St. Thomas are brought forward into this sentence; as at the end of the second lecture on Rom. 9, at "Jacob I loved," etc., where, after he had said that predestination differs from reprobation in this, that predestination imports a preparation of merits (by which one arrives at glory), but reprobation does not import a preparation of sins (by which one arrives at punishment), he thus subjoined: "And therefore the preknowledge of merits cannot be any formal character of predestination, because the merits foreknown fall under predestination; but the preknowledge of sins can be some formal character of reprobation." And in q. 6 of De Veritate, art. 2, ad 9, where he says that the formal character of reprobation in men is original sin, and for this he alleges Augustine. A place is also produced from book 3 (Against the Gentiles, ch. 159), where he teaches that it is not without reason imputed unto fault to him who furnishes an impediment to the reception of grace. Hence it seems to follow that men are reprobated on account of this impediment which they furnish to the grace of God.¹⁶⁸

§ 142. This opinion about the merit of reprobation Scotus, writing on the present distinction, holds as more probable, and confirms it by this reason: because damnation does not seem good except insofar as it is just; for, according to St. Augustine, book 11 (On Genesis), chapter 24, "God is not first an avenger before someone is a sinner." "For," he says, "it seems an act of cruelty to punish someone, if there does not preexist in him guilt: therefore by the like [reason] God does not first will to punish someone, before He sees him to be a sinner," etc. and finally he infers: therefore, since to reprobate is to will to damn, reprobation has on the side of the object some formal character, namely the sin final foreseen. Thus he. Which opinion not a few others follow, although they do not all agree in the manner of explaining it.¹⁶⁹

§ 143. For when it is asked by them of what sin's prevision the cause of reprobation is, some answer in one way, others in another. For certain say that the cause of it in all men is original sin. Which response they attempt to prove from Augustine, who (Epistle 105, and q. 1 To Simplician, and in some other places) so speaks as though original sin alone were for men the cause why they are reprobated, even for those to whom this sin has been taken away by the sacrament of regeneration. But the falsity of this doctrine we have shown above at the former distinction. Wherefore more rightly others distinguish, saying that in some reprobate the cause of reprobation is only original sin, as in little ones who die not regenerated; in some only actual [sin], as in the Angels, and in men for whom original [sin] has been remitted. But in some both, as in those who, original [sin] not remitted, have added sins of their own acting. Although these last two members still have a question. For if by the merit of original sin a man is permitted to slip into actual sins, already that permission, as the punishment of a preceding sin, would seem to pertain to the effects of reprobation, of which accordingly the sins consequent upon a permission of this sort could not be the cause. Likewise, if by the merit of preceding actual sin a man is permitted to slip into others, that permission too will by the same reason

seem to pertain to the effects of reprobation; and therefore the later sins consequent upon that permission will not be the cause of the same reprobation; unless it be said with Scotus that to reprobate is nothing other than to will to damn. For thus it will easily be shown that the sins whichsoever are the cause of damnation, the same are also of reprobation. Which Scotus intended when he said that the cause of reprobation is the final sin of the reprobate foreseen. But now from the things which have been said at the former distinction it is manifest that not only damnation is the effect of reprobation.

§ XVI — Arguments for the negative side (Argumenta pro parte negativa.)

§ 144. Now let us look at the arguments for the negative side, that is to say, those by which it seems to be shown that no one is reprobated by God on account of foreseen merits, but that reprobation (*reprobatio*), just like predestination (*praedestinatio*) of both angels and men, is to be ascribed to the sole choice of the divine will. The first argument, then, taken from reason, is this: The permission of the first sin on account of which someone is damned, whether a man or an angel, is an effect of reprobation, as was shown at length above on the preceding distinction; but in that permission there is no merit on the part of the reprobate: for to the first sin nothing is prior; but the merit of reprobation can be nothing other than sin; therefore reprobation, considered according to the whole of its effect (in the manner in which we said above that it must be considered in this question), is not from foreseen merit. And this is the principal reason on which that doctrine relies. Wherefore the foundation of this reasoning must here briefly be repeated; and it is of this sort: It pertains to the providence (*providentia*) of God, as universal provider, not only to produce goods, but also to permit evils in certain particular things, lest, to wit, the perfect good of the Universe be impeded. For if all evils were impeded, many goods would be wanting to the universe. For there would not be the life of the lion, if there were not the killing of animals; nor would there be the patience of martyrs if there were not the persecution of tyrants. So teaches St. Thomas,¹⁷¹ and likewise in the Compendium of Theology:¹⁷¹ Therefore, since by divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it pertains to that same providence to permit some to fail of this end. For otherwise a great good would be lacking to the universe, namely the manifestation of God's justice, whereby He justly punishes sins, and at the same time the manifestation of His goodness toward the elect; for unless some were permitted to fall away from that end which is eternal life, neither could God's vindictory justice be perfectly manifested, namely as to the eternal punishment which is properly due to sin, nor would it sufficiently appear how great is God's goodness toward the elect, which without doubt appears more and more evidently from comparison with many others to whom the same benefit was not prepared. But just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence with respect to those who fall away from this end. Wherefore just as predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will of permitting some to fall into fault, and of inflicting the punishment of eternal damnation for fault. Thus does St. Thomas reason.¹⁷² From which things not only is the thesis proved, namely that there is not a cause of reprobation in the reprobate, because in him there is no cause of the permission of the first sin; but it also seems to be clearly evident that this is the very opinion of St. Thomas. Yet this will be shown more fully below. Now in the second place let us bring forward the Scriptures on this side.

§ 145. First, the Apostle seems to exclude every merit of reprobation in Rom. 9, where, disputing about divine election and reprobation, he says: "Cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid boni egissent aut mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est ei: Quia major serviet minori, sicut scriptum est: Jacob dilexi, Esau

autem odio habui." For by the same reasoning by which the exclusion of merit for election is proved by these words, it seems also to be proved for reprobation. For if the Apostle had willed to exclude only the merit of election, it would have sufficed for him to say, "before they had done anything good"; therefore, by adding "or evil" (*aut mali*), he also excluded the merit of reprobation. Second. The same Apostle there manifestly seems to refer reprobation to the mere will of God, when, after the aforesaid words, he subjoins: "Quid ergo dicemus? Numquid iniquitas apud Deum? Absit." For that there is not iniquity with God he does not declare from merits but from the will of God. For when he had said that God says to Moses: "Miserebor cuius misereor," with a testimony interposed about Pharaoh raised up by God to this end, that He might show His power in him, etc., thus he infers: "Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat." Then, making as it were someone argue against him, he says: "Dicis itaque mihi: Quid adhuc quaeritur? voluntati enim eius quis resistit? O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo?"—as if to say: let it suffice for you that God so wills, and do not inquire into the reason of His will, certain that He wills nothing unjustly. Third. It seems to be proved more plainly still from the comparison of the potter, which the Apostle forthwith subjoins. For it follows: "Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam?" Therefore, according to the Apostle's mind, just as in the parts of the clay mass there is no rationale why from this part there should be made a vessel unto honor and from that a vessel unto dishonor, so in men, as parts of one human race, there is no rationale why this one should be chosen and that one reprobated. Fourth. It is confirmed from this, that there the Apostle, since he had found no other reason than the will of God why in particular He chooses these, those He reprobates, at length assigns the sole reason why in common He chooses some, reprobates some: "Quod si Deus volens ostendere iram"—that is, the vindication of justice—"et notam facere potentiam suam, qua potest etiam in malos et potentes iustitiam exercere, sustinuit"—that is, permitted—"in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam." Which common reason he had indicated above also when he said that God had raised up Pharaoh to this end, that He might show His power in him, etc. On which common reason St. Thomas treats more fully.

¹⁷³ Wherefore, according to the Apostle, the cause of the reprobation of individuals is not to be sought from their merits, just as neither is the cause of election. Fifth. In Prov. 16 it is said: "Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; impium quoque ad diem malum." Whence it appears that even in reprobating God first looks to His own glory, that is, to the manifestation of His justice, and then orders to it the other effects of reprobation, whose first is the permission of impiety, or sin. Sixth. Sir. 33 refers to the mere will of God that He has blessed some men, cursed others. For it compares them to clay, which the potter shapes as he wills, and thus it speaks of men, as of days, of which He sanctifies some, profanes others. But he seems to understand by "curse" reprobation, just as by "blessing" election: wherefore reprobation, like election, will depend on the will alone. Seventh. In Jn. 10 the Lord says to some: "Non creditis quia non estis ex ovibus meis." Where He posits reprobation, that is predestination not to be of His sheep, as the rationale why they do not believe. But if reprobation were from a foreseen sin, rather the contrary should have been said: "You are not of my sheep because you do not believe." Eighth. Scripture often refers a man's destruction to the reprobation and preparation of God, which it seems to do for no other reason than that, although a man by his sins merits destruction, nevertheless that he is permitted to fall into sins through which he falls into destruction has no cause on man's side, but only on God's own side, so that the whole of reprobation may rightly be referred originally to God. For otherwise we are not wont to refer the destruction and punishments of wicked men to the will of a king or prince, but rather to the wicked men's evil merits, because it does not belong to kings or

princes to permit crimes so that the good of justice may appear, but only to provide the good of justice from their foreknowledge or from the event. The Scriptures, however, are Rom. 9, where certain "vessels" are said to be "fitted" or "prepared by God unto destruction"; Sir. 26, where God is said to have "prepared for the sword" him "who passes from righteousness to sin"; Matt. 25, where the eternal fire is said to be "prepared for the devil and his angels." Thus Jude in his Epistle says that certain men "have been of old prescribed" unto judgment, that is, condemnation. And Bar. 3 says about some: "Non hos elegit Dominus, nec viam disciplinae dedit illis; propterea perierunt." Ninth. The same seems to be shown from the Scriptures which testify that God's judgments are inscrutable to us, as Ps. 35: "Iustitia tua sicut montes Dei, iudicia tua abyssus multa," and Rom. 11: "Quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius et investigabiles viae eius." In which place, since the Apostle is speaking about the election of the nations and the reprobation of the Jews, he seems to have referred both alike to the inscrutable depth of God's counsels; nay, taken generically, Scriptures of this sort seem to signify that although there is a certain order of causes in things which can be known by us, nevertheless the original rationale of all is to be referred to the will of God, inscrutable to us, to such an extent that neither are sins excluded on this account as to their permission and the substance of acts. Tenth. To this are referred also the sentiments of the Fathers, and notably of St. Augustine himself, who in more than one place seems to refer the reprobation of men to the sole inscrutable will of God. For in q. 2 on Deuteronomy he says something of this sort, and subjoins: "Cujus rei iustitiam si quaesierimus, inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei"; and in "q. a. ad Simplic." [abbreviation as in source] where that phrase in Rom. 9, "non ex operibus," he refers as much to Esau "hated" as to Jacob "beloved." This passage of Augustine Peter Soto uses, in a certain tract to Ruard, to prove reprobation without merit. And indeed Augustine similarly speaks of the Apostle's passage in the Enchiridion, ch. 98: "Si," he says, "futura opera vel bona huius, vel mala illius, quae Deus utique praesciebat, vellet Apostolus intelligi; nequaquam diceret, *Non ex operibus*, sed diceret ex futuris operibus." Moreover, when Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius say that there are certain persons predestined by God to destruction, or to eternal death, they seem to deny the merit of the whole of reprobation, according to the reasoning indicated in the eighth argument. The places are Augustine, Tractate 14 on John; Book XV of the City of God, ch. 1; and Book XXI, ch. 24; Prosper, Response 14 and 19 (to the Chapters of the Gauls and to the 10th and 11th Objections of Vincent); and Fulgentius, Book I to Monimus.¹⁷⁶ Likewise, when they say that it is inscrutable why, out of two just men, God gives perseverance to the one, not to the other; or, in other words, why out of two just men He permits one to fall into the sin on account of which he is to be damned, not the other. For thus there seems to be shown to be no merit not only of that man's election, but also of this man's reprobation; which most especially appears among the angels and among men fully cleansed from sin, as are baptized infants. Augustine's places are scattered in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, especially chs. 8 and 9; in the book On Correction and Grace, ch. 8; and in Ep. 59, q. 6; and Prosper's place is most evident in the Response "to the 14th Objection of Vincent": "Cur," he says, "ex duobus justis illum retineat Deus, illum non retineat, nec possibile est comprehendere, nec licitum investigare: cum scire sufficias et ab illo esse, quod statur, et non ab illo esse quod ruistur." Another place in the same author is in the Response 7 "to the Chapters of the Gauls."¹⁷⁷ Again, here can be brought forward what is read in Augustine, On the Predestination of Grace, ch. 19, in these words: "Si humanum genus, quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo, non cum debito mortis et peccati origine nasceretur, et tamen ex eis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum, quis omnipotenti Creatori diceret: Quare fecisti sic?" Which also he proves from the Apostolic comparison of the potter.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, certain sentences of St. Gregory seem not a little to confirm this opinion. For in *Moralia*, book 29, ch. 9, he refers to the abyss of the divine

judgments, which the eye of the human mind by no means penetrates, that many shining with the light of justice are darkened by the obscurity of wickedness as to their end; and that by fear of this thing the Apostle said: "Castigo corpus meum, et in servitutem redigo, ne forte cum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar," 1 Cor. 9. A similar point he inculcates in the same book, chs. 17 and 18, where, among other things whose rationes he denies can be investigated by us, he sets down that someone born in the womb of Mother Church, at the end of life is swallowed up by the whirlpool of error. And in Homily 8 on Ezekiel: "Quantus," he says, "super nos terror consiliorum Dei quando alter ex virtutibus in finem tendit ad vitia, alter ex vitiis in virtutibus concludit finem." And these he says are the hidden and deep judgments of God. From all which things it appears that, according to Gregory, the merit of reprobation is not to be sought in man. Which indeed has been expressed in plainer words by the Master (of the Sentences) in the present distinction. For in speaking of Jacob and Esau he says that God, neither on account of present merits, which as yet were none, nor on account of future ones, which He foresaw, either chose the one or reprobated the other. And in the same place he says: "Just as He chose whom He would by gratuitous mercy, so too He reprobated whom He would, not on account of future merits which He would foresee, yet by a rightmost truth removed from our senses." Likewise, Baudinus in the same place of his Sentences affirms that there is no merit of election and of reprobation, since it is openly said by the Apostle: "non ex operibus."¹⁷⁹

§ 146. But so that we may descend to the scholastics, first it seems that this is the undoubted doctrine of St. Thomas. For besides the two places alleged in the first argument, from which it is clear, according to his mind, that it pertains to God's providence, and hence to reprobation, to will to permit the sin by which someone is damned (which he also sufficiently signifies in the replies to the 2nd and 3rd of article 3 of question 23 above alleged), there are also other places no less manifest, as in the same question, article 5, to the 3rd objection, where he denies that a rationale of election and reprobation can be assigned in particular, in these words: "But why He chooses these into glory, and those He has reprobated, cannot be assigned, except the Divine will alone." And he proves this by these words of Augustine from Tractate 26 on John: "Quare hunc trahat, illum non trahat, noli velle judicare, si non vis errare." He proves it also from the comparison of the parts of matter, in which the fact that this part has this form and that another depends on the simple Divine will. And both Cajetan and Domingo Bañez, writing on this article, gravely defend that this is St. Thomas's opinion against Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Aureolus, and certain others.¹⁷³ Whence it is clear that certain moderns attempt ill to drag St. Thomas into a different opinion; since Scotus, and Thomas of Argentina, and the others already named, together with the Thomists themselves, have understood him in no other way, nor indeed could they have understood him otherwise—which is also proved from his other writings. For, writing on Rom. 9, lesson 3, he says that God, without preceding merit and altogether without consideration of merits, chooses one and reprobates another; and lesson 4, on that "O homo," he denies that there is any rationale of reprobation on our part, and he teaches that, just as of predestination, so too of reprobation in particular no rationale can be rendered by us, but only in general, which the Apostle does in that place.¹⁸⁰ The same, in De veritate, q. 6, a. 2, with the authority of the Gloss interposed on that Rom. 9, "Numquid iniquitas apud Deum," speaking thus: "Nemo dicat Deum, quia futura opera praevidebat, alterum elegerisse, alterum reprobasse," again affirms that the things which are on our part are not the cause either of predestination or of reprobation; and, replying to the 11th argument, he denies that the foreknowledge of the abuse of grace was the cause of the reprobation of Judas, except perhaps on the part of the effect, because by this he merited to be utterly forsaken and damned—things which are later effects of reprobation and fall under merit.¹⁸¹ Giles of Rome, the celebrated Doctor, follows this opinion of St. Thomas his master, as

Thomas of Argentina reports on this distinction. John of Bassolis likewise follows it, writing on the same distinction, and he judges it to be Augustine's opinion, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Scotus his own master. The same are followed by Dionysius the Cistercian on this distinction, and Lyra on Rom. 9, and not a few others; to such an extent that Argentina confesses that this is the common opinion, just as is that which posits predestination without merits, which William of Auxerre also indicates, book 1.¹⁸² In the same sentiment also are found Ferrariensis in his commentary on St. Thomas's *Contra Gentiles*, book 3, chs. 161 and 163; Cajetan on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 9; Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca sancta*, book 2 (under the letter R), where he treats of the book of Repudiation, and book 6, annotation 252; Domingo Soto in the *Retractations* which he subjoined to his work on book 4, where he inclines to this opinion as more probable, retracting what in his commentary on Romans he had written for a different opinion, although he thinks it to be the opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas—in which matter, as to St. Thomas, he is assuredly mistaken. Likewise Peter Soto and Jodocus Tiletanus in the *Diatribes to Ruard, Titelmann, Viguerius and Guilandus* on Rom. 9, and Jansenius on *Ecclesiasticus* 41, who calls it an error of those who affirm that certain are reprobated by God on account of the foreseen evil merits of the impious—which he thinks contrary to the Apostle's doctrine in Rom. 9.¹⁸³

§ XVII — Certain things to be noted for the solution of the question (Quaedam notanda pro solutione quaestionis)

§ 147. Finally, to the proposed question, therefore, and for its clearing up, certain things must be noted. First, that a manifold acceptance of reprobation (*reprobatio*) has given rise to a diversity of opinions. For the Doctors have not spoken in one way about reprobation and its effects. For some refer reprobation to eternal damnation (*aeterna damnatio*) alone as to its effect—in which mode Scotus seems to speak about reprobation when he says that to reprobate is nothing else than to will to damn. Although he acknowledges in God a will of permitting a man to fall into sin, as we said elsewhere, nevertheless he does not say that permission (*permissio*) to be an effect of reprobation; although neither does he expressly deny it. But some extend reprobation even to certain effects occurring in this life, such as the dereliction (*derelictio*) of a man in sin, blindness, hardening—yet not to the permission of the sin into which someone, by his own injustice, slips, especially of original sin. Thus St. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and others who have more closely followed them, seem for the most part to speak about reprobation. And according to these, the reprobation of God presupposes the corrupt mass (*massa corrupta*) of the human race. Finally, others also subject to divine reprobation the permission of this sort as a certain effect. Which without doubt fits best, especially with reference to the preceding distinction, where we were treating of the effects of reprobation. In which place also we proved this position at greater length, the sum of whose proof is, that reprobation is the providence of God with respect to those who fail of eternal salvation, namely ordering them to a certain end, which is the manifestation of His justice. In which order the first place is specially held by the permission of sin to be avenged by divine justice. Which acceptance of reprobation seems the most proper, inasmuch as reprobation is set in opposition to predestination (*praedestinatio*), and both are contained under the providence of God concerning the rational creature. Hence St. Thomas, when, he says, by the divine providence men are ordained to eternal life, it also pertains to the same that He permit some to fall short of this end. And this is called to reprobate.¹⁸⁴ See the same in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, ch. 9.¹⁸⁵

§ 148. Secondly it must be noted that the question itself can be taken in a twofold way. In one way comparatively, so that the sense is: whether in the reprobated—for example, in Esau—there was a cause why he was reprobated rather than Jacob. In which sense St. Augustine often answers in the negative, because, even presupposing original sin, there was not a greater reason for reprobating Esau than Jacob on their part, inasmuch as it is clear that they were equally sinners in the vitiated mass, just as all other men likewise are with respect to original sin. Which answer also holds according to the third acceptation of reprobation, as is self-evident. For why God, foreseeing every sin, permitted one rather than another to fall into the sin from which afterward he would be damned—there is no reason on the part of man. But it does not hold according to the first acceptation. For a great inequality of sins precedes eternal damnation. In the other way absolutely and without comparison, so that the sense is: whether there is altogether in him who is reprobated any merit on account of which, foreseen by God, he is reprobated. Thus understood, the question is answered: if reprobation regards eternal damnation alone, the cause of it is sins, on account of which, foreseen, God damns a man. And the same answer obtains if you extend reprobation to the effects subsequent to the permission of the first sin. For for this reason God deserts a man, and blinds, and hardens him in sin, because by preceding sins he has merited this punishment.

§ 149. But if you take reprobation according to the whole breadth of its effects, among which is the permission of sin, already a different answer must be given, namely that there is in the reprobate no merit of his reprobation. For if the permission of the first sin is contained under reprobation, since the same sin cannot be the cause of that permission, the consequence is that it can neither be said to be the cause of the whole reprobation. And this indeed is the plain sentence of St. Thomas and of his followers. But that it may be better understood, thirdly it must be noted that there is a difference between reprobation and predestination with respect to the effects of each. For the effects of predestination have a certain order among themselves according to the formal character (*ratio*) of merit and of final cause, which order is not found among the effects of reprobation. For although predestination does not fall under merit, yet its effects are so ordered among themselves that the first merits the second, and the second the third, and so on to the last. Whence conversely they are so related that the last effect is the proximate end, and so on up to the first. But the effects of reprobation do not have this order among themselves. For the permission of sin does not merit the dereliction of a man in sin, nor does either of those, or both together, merit eternal damnation. For they are acts of God's providence concerning man, and therefore good; but both dereliction and damnation are merited by the sins of the man himself, which are not from God, but only come to be with Him permitting and deserting. So too as regards the final cause. For eternal damnation is not the end of dereliction in sin, or of its permission; nor again is dereliction the end of permission. Nor must one imagine these effects in such a way as if God immediately preordained man to eternal damnation, just as He immediately preordains him to glory, and then ordered the remaining effects as certain means to that end, as in predestination; but He ordains all the effects of reprobation together to one end, which is the manifestation of His justice in the universe; which, while it is brought about in regard to the reprobate, there follows also a more illustrious manifestation of His mercy toward the predestined, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 9). Therefore God does not for this reason permit men to fall into sin, that He may desert and punish them; nor does He for this reason desert, that He may damn—as certain persons ill understand the sentence of St. Thomas—but He permits, deserts, and damns in order that He may display His justice in them, and His mercy in others, and that in all He Himself may appear glorious. In this way Ferrariensis, Cajetan, and others handle this matter well.¹⁸⁶ Hence it is clear that when it is said that God reprobates men or Angels not from foreseen merits, it is not signified that their

ordination to eternal punishment is from His will alone and not from the foreknowledge of sins—and much less that God inflicts the punishment itself without merits, a sense which is heretical and openly contrary to the Scriptures; nor again is it signified that damnation itself is the end of the permission of sin and of dereliction in sin, as if God therefore ordained that sins should happen in order that He might punish them; but only that the whole complex of the effects of reprobation is referred to the manifestation of divine justice, not to a prior intention of damning this or that man, as if that were the end to which the other effects were subordinated.¹⁸⁷

§ 150. (a) Theologians who are reckoned of the Augustinian school affirm the reprobation of the Angels (as also—had Adam stood fast in obedience—the predestination of men) to have been after the foreknowledge of merits, and, for the state of the first man in innocence, to have been otherwise disposed than for the state of fallen nature; and consequently, when reprobation is taken in the way now set forth, they suppose original sin.¹⁸⁸ The disciples, however, of St. Thomas, while they hold and profess that the predestination of Angels and of men precedes the foreknowledge of sins or demerits, according to their own principles are wont to assert even the reprobation of men—inasmuch as it is the exclusion from an undue benefit—to be negative reprobation; they commonly call it negative reprobation.¹⁸⁹ Vincentius Contenson, *Theologiae Mentis et Cordis*, brands as contrary the opinion of John Baptist Gonet (*Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, de reprobatione, disp. V, art. 3), who defends also the reprobation of men as negative, and he asserts that, from among the disciples of St. Thomas, some hold that the reprobation of Demons is before the foreknowledge of sin, but that the reprobation of men, inasmuch as it is an exclusion from an undue benefit, supposes original sin; he contends against those who, without acknowledging the diversity of this sort of help, nevertheless establish that predestination of men would have been if Adam had stood, and that the reprobation of Demons precedes the foreknowledge of sin—a thing which they cannot assert without forgetting their own doctrine and their principles.¹⁹⁰ The same author expresses astonishment at others who, in the fourth tome of the *Clypeus* of Thomistic Theology, tract V on predestination, have approved this sentence concerning the foreknowledge of original sin as preceding reprobation, and he charges the first author with having published that opinion in print out of offense to Thomism.¹⁹¹ Moreover the common Thomistic sentence is affirmed by almost all Thomists—at least by all whom I have seen—with the exception of the above-mentioned P. Gonet, and a few whom he himself cites. See also Carrov. (book 2, On grace and free will, chs. 16–17), who explicitly defends negative reprobation, and in book 2 (On the state of souls) he vindicates the Thomists' sentence from the note of Calvinism with which it is rather severely branded by some; likewise Gonet in the place cited (arts. 2–3), the *Salmanticenses*, John of St. Thomas.¹⁹² Petavius (*Theologica Dogmata*, tome 1, book X, ch. 3, where at n. 5 he says there is no negative reprobation, and book IX, n. 1) notes with a severity the opinion distinguishing between positive and negative reprobation; and he explains St. Augustine's sentence about the reprobation of original sin, and affirms that it is immensely distant from the Calvinist dogma; the illustrious Peter de Godoy, Bishop, in the *Commentary on the Prima Pars* of St. Thomas (tract VIII, disp. 69, q. 6), where he says that original sin was the motive of the efficacious intention of exclusion even when original guilt had been remitted, defends the Thomist sentence.¹⁹³ An important passage of St. Thomas in I, to Annibaldus, distinction 41, in the response to the objections, is alleged for this Thomist sentence by the same Thomists (which passage we omit from transcribing here, lest we furnish material for typographical cavils); I wonder, however, that a certain most accurate investigator of St. Thomas's doctrine refrained from citing that place, because its authorship is called into doubt by some, who assert that the work should not be attributed to St. Thomas, as Dupin reports in the *Ecclesiastical Library* (Century

XIII, ch. IV); whether it should be judged otherwise concerning Annibaldus and St. Thomas, or otherwise, we leave to others to judge.¹⁹⁴ See also Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (tome 4 of the Controversies), where he defends almost throughout the Thomists' sentence about reprobation without the foreknowledge of sin from the note of Calvinism; for certain men indiscreetly fasten upon many the stain that they take the same sentence from St. Thomas, and the rest who assert Calvin's dogma about positive reprobation, and have willed to posit God as the author of sin, as if He by His decree impelled man to sin, and as if He inflicted the punishment itself without merits.¹⁹⁵ Concerning the error of Calvin and of his followers, Petavius treats (*Theologica Dogmata*, tome 1, book X, ch. 3), where he also impugns negative reprobation, and by a too harsh censure he brands the Augustinian sentence—which also he impugns book 9—concerning the reprobation of men at least from a foreknowledge of sin; he shows to the eye that the cause of reprobation or its reason is not sin, since it cannot be the cause of the permission of falling into it; which permission, according to the aforesaid sentence of St. Thomas, reprobation comprehends.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the Oxonian Work from the Dominican family says this: that it can probably be defended that denial of the Kingdom is found even in those reprobates to whom St. Augustine's sentence—because of its [rigor]—is applied.¹⁹⁷ The most illustrious and most learned Prelate, Cardinal Henry de Noris (on Rom. 9:15), adds this; and, in his Vindications of this Augustinian sentence, he says much, shows in what sense it is to be taken, vindicates it from the Calvinian error by the places alleged, and shows that the same sentence of Augustine is defended by the most learned of the Thomists and even by learned men of the Society of Jesus; and he seems to suggest that this sentence is to be defended by the School of the Society, since indeed the reason or cause of reprobation is not sin, since it cannot be the cause of the permission of falling into it—which permission, according to the aforesaid sentence of St. Thomas, reprobation comprehends.

§ XVIII — Replies to the arguments proposed (Respondetur ad argumenta proposita)

§ 151. In light of what we have now said, it is not at all difficult to reconcile the positions that seem to clash, especially those of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and to reply to the proposed arguments. For as regards the Doctors mentioned, their positions seem to differ in no other way than this: that St. Augustine does not seem to have extended reprobation (*reprobatio*) as St. Thomas extends it to the providence permitting sin, whether original or actual, in which first someone is abandoned. With that opinion posited, it is clear that reprobation is from the merit (*meritum*) of that sin into which God first permits man to slip, to be abandoned in the same. And this is even more plain on the position of Scotus, for whom reprobation is nothing other than to will to damn (*damnare*), whose cause without doubt is sin. It remains, therefore, that we weigh the arguments of the affirmative side.

§ 152. To the first it can indeed be answered that the hatred of God (*odium Dei*) can be understood in two ways, namely negatively and affirmatively. In the former way God hates without merits, inasmuch as He does not love certain persons unto life eternal. Thus St. Thomas (I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1) says: "Inasmuch as God does not will this good, which is life eternal, for certain ones, He is said to have them in hatred or to reprobate them."¹⁹⁸ Which negative acceptance of hatred is not foreign to Holy Scripture, in which to hate is sometimes taken comparatively, for what it is to postpone, or to love less; as when a man coming to Christ is commanded to hate not only father and mother, but even his own soul—that is, to postpone them to Christ and not to love them before Him (cf. Lk. 14). Thus too (1 Kgs 16) of Eliab: "Since I have rejected him," that is, I have not

chosen him for the kingdom, as it is interpreted in what follows. In the latter way, hatred signifies the act of God refusing and casting off, which act is only about evil. Whence it is said (Wis. 13): "To God the impious man and his impiety are in hatred." Thus, then, God does not hate anyone before foreseen sin; because this hatred tends toward sin itself, and toward the sinner as such. And in this way the hatred of God seems to be posited by St. Augustine, as elsewhere, but especially in *Quaestio 2 ad Simplicianum*, book 1.¹⁹⁹

§ 153. The second argument concludes well, if we think the account of the name (*ratio nominis*) must be pressed—which St. Augustine seems to have done; but this is not necessary, since the accounts (*rationes*) of names do not always correspond to their signification, which depends more upon the usage of speakers than upon the etymology of words.

§ 154. To the third it is answered that the reprobate are called "vessels of wrath" on account of the later effects of reprobation, especially the last. Whence it is not necessary to concede that proposition which is assumed: God reprobates in anger; just as we do not concede this: God predestines (*praedestinare*) as appeased, or as having been invited.

§ 155. To the fourth, the Psalmist is not speaking in that place of reprobation simply, but according to a certain effect, which is the abandonment (*derelictio*) of man in sin, and which seems to be signified by this: "And let them not be written with the just." Which effect is clearly the punishment (*poena*) of the preceding sin. It can also be said that there is regard to the ultimate effect of reprobation, which is the privation of glory and the lack of life; although the literal sense seems to be: Let them be taken away from this life on account of sins.

§ 156. To the fifth it is answered that, in testimonies of the Fathers of this sort, for God to desert a man is not the same as to permit him to slip into sin, nor therefore is it the first effect of reprobation. For this saying, "God does not desert unless He is first deserted," seems, according to the mind of the Council, to be taken of habitual grace (*gratia*), by which we are justified, so that the sense is that God never takes away justifying grace from a man except on account of the sin by which he deserts God—namely, that although mortal sin and the loss of grace are simultaneous in time, nevertheless sin is the meritorious cause of the loss. But that God should permit a man or an Angel to fall into sin, by which he deserts God—namely by not supplying efficacious help that he not fall—this does not have its cause in them. Thus Bartholomaeus Medina teaches and explains this point (on I-II, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3).²⁰⁰ And this indeed is what the words of the Council of Trent mean, which are as follows: "For God by His grace does not desert those once justified, unless He is first deserted by them."²⁰¹

§ 157. The sixth argument, with the Scriptures alleged, rightly proves that God does not will immediately the damnation of certain ones, but only from foreseen fault. But it does not follow from this that reprobation is simply from the foreknowledge of fault (because the permission of fault is not from the foreknowledge of it), but only in so far as it looks to damnation. For this is what those Scriptures mean: that God does not preordain a man to punishment except from the foreknowledge of sin.

§ 158. To the seventh it is answered that not every action of God belongs formally to mercy (*misericordia*) or justice (*iustitia*); but at least is of such a sort that it is ordered to the manifestation of the mercy or the justice of God, or of both. Such is reprobation; whose later effects, however, are also formally acts of vindictive justice. But as to their saying that in every work of God there is mercy and justice, according to that

of the Psalm: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth"—in what sense this is to be taken, St. Thomas teaches (I, q. 21, a. 4).²⁰²

§ 159. To the eighth: God does not intend primarily and *per se* punitive justice, or its act, which is to punish sins; but, so to speak, *per se* secondarily (*per se secundo*), inasmuch as the just punishment of the sinner is a means ordered to manifesting in the universe the justice of God, and by this to declaring more the mercy of God toward the predestined, as to the end intended *per se*, for the sake of which He both permits sins and afterwards punishes the same. Nor is this a wonder, since even human kings sometimes rightly permit in the commonwealth certain lesser evils—which they could prevent—not only to avoid greater evils but also to procure greater goods for the commonwealth.

§ 160. To the ninth it is answered that the human race is, as it were, a certain universe; and therefore, although the justice of God punishing would appear in Angels, it was nevertheless fitting that it should also shine forth in men. St. Thomas considers the human race in this way with regard to the matter proposed (I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3).²⁰³ And this reply is confirmed by the fact that from the permission of man's sin there has followed also another, even greater good of the manifestation of the Divine justice, namely, through the most full satisfaction of Christ for the sins of the whole human race.

§ 161. As to those things which in the tenth place are produced from St. Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius, the reply is now evident from what has been said above. For under the name of reprobation those Fathers did not include the providence of God by which He wills to permit sin, but only that by which He wills to punish the foreseen sin; which also they frequently signify under the name of hatred along with the Apostle. Yet that it belongs to the providence of God also to will to permit sins, the same Fathers hold, and by name St. Augustine, as was shown at the above distinction. And thus their position seems to differ from that which we defend according to St. Thomas by name alone. But that they say that blindness and hardening are from merits has no difficulty. For these are later effects of reprobation, and therefore are the punishment of the preceding sin.

§ 162. But as to what St. Augustine says: "What did God hate in Esau except original sin?"—as if in all the reprobate original sin, and that alone, were the cause of reprobation; in what sense this was said we set forth at the above distinction, namely that St. Augustine wills nothing other than that in most of the reprobate original sin is the cause of reprobation, but for all the occasion of damnation.

§ 163. Finally, what is objected from St. Thomas is easily resolved from the passages themselves. For in the first place it is said thus: The foreknowledge of sins can be some rationale of reprobation on the side of the punishment which is prepared for the reprobate, inasmuch, namely, as God proposes that He will punish the wicked on account of sins which they have from themselves, not from God. Thus he. Therefore he wills the foreknowledge of sins to be the cause of reprobation not simply, but on the side of the punishment prepared.

²⁰⁴ We showed above, in the arguments of the negative side, that the second passage suffices for a different opinion. Whence what is said in the same place, that the rationale of reprobation in men is original sin, is not said from the Author's absolute position; which is clear from the words that follow, both because he adds "as St. Augustine says," and because there still follows the other disjunctive part: "or in the future, by this very fact, that they do not have the due claim to this, that grace be conferred on them; yet one can reasonably will to deny something to someone which is not owed to him." For these words declare, in the Author's mind, that up to this point this alone is the rationale of reprobation in the reprobate: because grace is not owed to him,

and thus it can reasonably not be given to him. But this rationale is negative; and does not posit merit; but only shows that the reprobation of some is not unjust. The third passage only proves that those are justly punished who place an obstacle to the grace of God, by which they are called to salvation. Whence there does not follow a merit of reprobation. Yet, that this passage may be understood more clearly, the things which follow are to be read, chapter 161, where he teaches that God, notwithstanding the impediment which men set up, out of the superabundance of His goodness converts some, not others; and that there is not to be sought a rationale why He converts these rather than those, since that depends upon the simple will of God.²⁰⁵ He therefore thinks that all set up the obstacle of sin at least original; for sin is at odds with grace. Furthermore, we have already spoken above about the opinion of Scotus. For Scotus rightly proves that reprobation is from merits according to that signification in which it regards damnation alone.

§ 164. Concerning the arguments of the negative side, it must be noted that, to what is alleged first (from Rom. 9), some reply that by those words the Apostle only willed to teach that between those two twins no difference of merits can be assigned on account of which, the one being reprobated, the other should be chosen, and at the same time he excluded the error of Origen, who fabricated that in a life before this age a disparity of merits had been contracted. And that what he says, "not from works," is to be referred only to the election of Jacob, because it follows, "but from the One calling." For calling is referred by the Apostle to the elect alone in the preceding chapter and elsewhere; the same can sufficiently be understood from that parenthesis, "that according to election the purpose of God might abide." Which words clearly pertain to Jacob alone. To the other things also brought from the same chapter they reply that the whole disputation of the Apostle presupposes the corruption of the mass through sin; this posited, the Apostle teaches that, with no consideration had of merits, God distinguishes some from others, while from thence whom He wills He plucks out by grace, and whom He wills He leaves by justice. And to this they allege passages of St. Augustine, as in Epistle 106, Quaestio 2 ad Simplicianum, and in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, ch. 23.²⁰⁶ But these replies do not seem to me to agree altogether with the mind and scope of the Apostle. For the Apostle excludes even evil merits when he says, "before they had done any good or evil"; then he throws the question back to the will of God alone, saying: "Who resists His will?" Likewise: "Who are you, O man, who answer back to God?" Which he would not do if he saw in man himself some merit of reprobation. Finally, he does not adduce the likeness of a vitiated mass, but of an indifferent one. Nor does he bring forward the example of a judge who, from two equally guilty men, condemns one; but he speaks absolutely of the will of God. In the same way Ecclesiasticus (ch. 33) speaks. And the other arguments also very probably prove this position.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5.

2. "4. cap. similiter" [abbreviation as in source].

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23 (ibidem).

4. St. Augustine, Ep. 105; Ep. 106; and passim on faith and penance with respect to the remission of sins.

5. On the ill success of the Massilian opponents with the Latin Fathers, see testimonies gathered under the names of popes Celestine, Leo, and Gelasius [abbreviations as in the source].

6. Denis Petau (Petavius), *Theologia dogmatica* I, book 9.

7. Cardinal Paolo Sfondrati, *Nodi praedestinationis*; Gabriel Vásquez, *In prima parte S. Thomae*, disp. 89, c. 4.

8. Gerardus Vossius, citing at length for the gratuitousness of first grace and election [as in the source].

9. Leonardus Lessius, *Opusculum de gratia praedestinationis*.
10. St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, chs. 6 and 14; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 7.
11. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 18; Ep. 49 ad Deogratias, q. 2.
12. St. Thomas, in the place just cited.
13. St. Augustine, "Conc. 2. Super Psal. 30" [abbreviation as in source].
14. "Baffolius (Super 1. dist. 40.)" [abbreviation as in source].
15. Estius, *Tractatus de gratia*, in II Sent.
16. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 14 and the following chapters.
17. S. Thom. *ibidem*. [abbreviation as in source]
18. On Pelagian claims about grace and merits, see St. Augustine's anti-Pelagian corpus generally.
19. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 98; cf. St. Paul, *Rom.* 9; and *Mal.* 1:2–3 as cited in *Rom.* 9:13.
20. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 98.
21. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, ch. 7. ["Epist.. Pel. cap. 7." in source]
22. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum*, Book 1, q. 2.
23. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 36; St. Augustine, Ep. 59, q. 6; St. Augustine, Ep. 135, to Sixtus; St. Augustine, Ep. 106, to Paulinus; St. Augustine, *Sermon 11, De verbis Apostoli*; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, ch. 22; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 17; St. Augustine, *Tractatus in Iohannem*, Tract. 82; St. Augustine, *Expositio in Ps. 55*, on "Pro nihilo salvos facies eos"; St. Augustine, *Retractationes* I, ch. 25; St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; St. Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, chs. 44, 46.
24. *Soliloquia ex Augustino collecta*, chs. 28–29; St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 18–19; with citations of St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and St. Gregory Nazianzen.
25. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola de gratia et libero arbitrio ad Ruffinum*.
26. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Letter to St. Augustine on the complaints of the Massilians (Massilienses)*.
27. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Excerpta Genuensium*; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad objectiones Vincentianas*; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 43; cf. Pope Celestine I's letter to the bishops of Gaul.
28. St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De praedestinatione ad Monimum*; *De incarnatione Christi*; *De fide ad Petrum*.
29. *Auctor Prognosticon*, Book 6 (as printed in vol. 7 of Augustine's Works).
30. St. Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, chs. 44–45; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 19–20; Peter the Deacon, last chapter of *De incarnatione*; St. Cyprian, *Ad Quirinum* III, ch. 4; St. Ambrose, *De fuga saeculi*, ch. 1; and *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, proem., and Books 2, 6, 7, 10; St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio in Pentecosten*; St. Basil, the *Oration of the Holy Altar in the Liturgy*; Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 5.
31. Editorial note: The Benedictine Fathers reject these books to an Appendix of vol. X of Augustine's Works, and assert that they should be restored to Marius Mercator; Louis Ellies Dupin commends several of their reasons.
32. St. Jerome, *Comment. in Eph.* 1; St. Gregory the Great, *Hom. 8 (Super Ezech.)*; *Moralia*, Book 25, ch. 32; Franconius, *De gratia Dei* (Tomes 7 and 12). [abbreviation as in source]; Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa sententiarum*, Tract. 1, ch. 12 (ex St. Augustine: "Cum praedestinavit Deus opus suum praescivit"); Super Ep. ad Rom., q. 233 and several following. [abbreviation as in source]; Peter Lombard, *Sentences*, Dist. 40 and 41; Honorius, *Duplex Dialogus (De praedestinatione)*; Pope Celestine I, *Epistola ad Episcopos Galliae*; Second Council of Orange (*Arausicanum*), canons under the authority of St. Leo the Great.
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5; St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 41, at the end; St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2 (with 14 replies to objections; citing the Gloss on *Rom.* 9); St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, last chapter; St. Thomas, *Super Iohannem*, chap. 15, lect. 3; St. Thomas, *Super Rom.*, chap. 1, lect. 3; chap. 8, lect. 6; chap. 9, lectt. 2–3; St. Thomas, *Super Ephes.*,

- chap. 1, lectt. 1 and 4; and the tract *On Predestination* (epilogue), concluding from St. Augustine that no reason of divine predestination is to be sought.
34. Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome), student of St. Thomas; Louis Ellies Dupin, *Bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques* (Appendix to vol. X of Augustine's Works); John Duns Scotus, In I Sent., on this distinction; and In III Sent., dist. 7, q. 3; against Henry of Ghent; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., on dists. 40–41; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, In I Sent., on dists. 40–41; Antissiodorensis (William of Auxerre), In I Sent., on dists. 40–41. [abbreviation as in source]; John Bassolinus (Baffolinus), In I Sent., on dists. 40–41; Francis Mairone (Maironius), In I Sent., on dists. 40–41; Marsilius (of Inghen), In I, q. 14. [abbreviation as in source]; Ambrosius Spira, *Sermones*. [abbreviation as in source]; Nicolaus Denisius, Part I. [abbreviation as in source]; Domingo de Soto, *Super Rom.* 9 and 11; Peter de Soto, Letter to Ruardus; Ruardus (Tapper), *Explicatio articuli 7* (Louvain); Cajetan, and Domingo Bañez, on I, q. 24, a. 5; refuting Henry of Ghent, Peter Aureol, Gabriel [Biel], and also one Javellus; The Parisian school's condemnation (ca. 250 years prior) of three articles on predestination: (1) That God preordained someone from eternity because of his future good works; (2) That someone is predestined from eternity because of the good use of free will which God foresaw he would have; (3) That God did not thus gratuitously and mercifully predestine him whom He predestined, but also for all his future goods, or another's.
35. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 16.
36. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 10; St. Augustine, Epistle 105 to Sixtus; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium I*, ch. 9.
37. St. Augustine, Epistles 59 and 105; at the end of *Ad Simplicianum I*; Tractate 26 on John; Sermon 7 *De verbis Apostoli*; *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 8; *De peccatorum meritis et remissione II*, chs. 18–19; *Soliloquia*, chs. 28–29. [abbreviations as in source]; St. Gregory the Great, *Hom.* 8 on Ezekiel; *Moralia in Iob XV*, ch. 32; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles III*, ch. 161; Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 12.
38. Council of Orange II (Arausicanum), last canon; St. Augustine, Epistles 105 and 106; St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 19 and 98; St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum IV*, ch. 8; *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 12; Prosper of Aquitaine and Hilary (of Arles), Letters to St. Augustine. [abbreviations as in source]; Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistle to Ruffinus; and *De vocatione gentium I*, ch. 16; and Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De incarnatione Christi*, ch. 30.
39. St. Augustine, Tractate 82 on John; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 36; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione II*, ch. 17; St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 11; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, ch. 15; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, last chapter; St. Augustine, Sermon 8 *De verbis Domini*, ch. 4; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae III*, q. 1, a. 2; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate XIII*, ch. 17.
40. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium I*, ch. 5; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione I*, ch. 22; St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum I*, end of the book.
41. Estius, *De gratia*, book 2. [abbreviation as in source]
42. Domingo Bañez, In *Iam partem*, q. 23, a. 5 (commentary), on the causes of predestination and on whether Christ's merits can be assigned as a cause of the predestination of His members.
43. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob XXIX*, ch. 12.
44. St. Augustine, Ep. 105; Tractates on John 26; *Contra Julianum IV*, ch. 8; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 8; *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 8. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium I*, chs. 7 and 9.
45. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 9, 10, 14. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium I*, ch. 5.
46. Rupertus [abbreviation as in source].
47. The Venerable Bede, Commentary on Matthew 11 and on Luke 10 [abbreviation as in source].
48. Condemnations of Pasquier Quesnel's propositions by Pope Clement XI; censures of certain propositions by Pope Alexander VIII; references to Estius's book 2 *De gratia* and to his replies to Jansenius, *De gratia Christi Salvatoris III*, ch. 11 [abbreviations as in source].
49. For Augustine's loci: Epistles 105–107; Sermon 11 *De verbis Apostoli*; Tractate 26 on John; *De peccatorum meritis et remissione I*, chs. 21–22; *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 23; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chs. 5, 6, 9; *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 8. Prosper of Aquitaine likewise: *De vocatione gentium I*, last chapter; *Responsiones ad Excerpta Genuensia*, resps. 4, 5, 6, 8; and elsewhere. Fulgentius of Ruspe: *De incarnatione et gratia Christi*, ch. 28.

50. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 11 [abbreviation as in source].
51. Cardinal Sfondrati, *De praedestinatione* I, bk. 2, no. 13 [abbreviation as in source].
52. Natalis Alexander, *Historia ecclesiastica*, tom. 6, century 5, ch. 3, art. 8.
53. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5 (quoted).
54. St. Thomas, In *Epistolam ad Romanos*, ch. 9, lect. 3; *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 11. Scotus, In I Sent., this distinction; against Henry of Ghent [abbreviations as in source].
55. Pope Gelasius I, decree of a council of 70 bishops [abbreviation as in source]. Prosper of Aquitaine and Fulgentius of Ruspe, as cited. Pope Celestine I, Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul. Council of Orange (Arausicanum), canons. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 8; and *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 10.
56. St. Thomas, as above [abbreviation as in source].
57. Rupert of Deutz, book 3 on Matthew.
58. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 18; Origen, Commentary [on Romans], ad loc. [abbreviation as in source].
59. 1 Cor. 15; Phil. 3; Col. 3; 1 Jn. 3.
60. John 3:16; 1 John 4:9; Titus 3:4.
61. St. Augustine, *Confessiones* II, ch. 7.
62. St. Augustine, Homily 23 among the Fifty Homilies [abbreviation as in source].
63. St. Augustine, *De sancta virginitate*, ch. 40 (n. 41).
64. Cf. John 5:30. Benedictine edition of St. Augustine, Sermon 99, ch. 6, vol. V, which altogether illustrates this doctrine and removes every difficulty that might arise before it is understood; by this doctrine are refuted the Quesnellian Theses, the twenty-sixth, the twenty-seventh, and the twenty-eighth: "Faith is the first grace, and the source of all the others"; "The first grace which God grants to the sinner is the remission of sins"; and "Outside the Church no grace is granted" [abbreviations as in source].
65. Bede, Homily on the Gospel of the Sunday before the Ascension of the Lord.
66. St. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 On the fast of the tenth month.
67. In the ancient Edition; but in the Paris edition it must be read in full: for indeed the matter is marvellously cleared up from this place when it has not been fully read or not [accurately] understood. See moreover how rightly from this place the Author confutes the Quesnellian thesis, "No graces are given except through faith," together with the cognate ones [abbreviation and numbering as in source].
68. Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistle to St. Augustine [abbreviation as in source].
69. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* IV, ch. 38.
70. Origen, *De principiis* III; *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Romanos* I (prologue), VII (on Rom. 9); *Homiliae in Numeros* III.
71. St. Hilary of Poitiers, In *Psalmum* 64.
72. Arnobius the Younger, *Commentarii in Psalmos* (on Pss. 90, 91, 108, 147).
73. Ambrosiaster (so-called), *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos* (on Rom. 8 and 9); *Glossa ordinaria* on Rom. 9.
74. St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* V, ch. 3.
75. St. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Malachiam* I.
76. St. Jerome, *Epistula ad Hedibiam*, quaestio 10.
77. *Brevis commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanos* 8 et 9, among the works of Jerome [abbreviation as in source].
78. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 15 in Ep. ad Romanos (on Rom. 8), Hom. 16 in Ep. ad Romanos (on Rom. 9); Hom. 1, 2 in Ep. ad Ephesios; Hom. 80 in *Matthaeum*; Hom. 31 (on the calling of the Apostles) and Hom. 56 (on the hired laborers in the vineyard) in *Matthaeum*; Homilia "De Jacob et Esau" [abbreviations as in source].
79. Theodoret of Cyrus, In *Epistolam ad Romanos* 8 et 9.

80. Faustus of Riez, *De praedestinatione*, II, ch. 5 [title reconstructed; abbreviation as in source].
81. Sedulius Scotus, *In Epistolam ad Romanos* (on chs. 8–9).
82. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 30; IV, ch. 20.
83. Theophylact of Ohrid, *In Matthaeum* 22; *In Ioannem* 6; *In Romanos* 8–9; Oecumenius, *In Epistolas Paulinas* (on Rom. 8–9).
84. Rupert of Deutz, *In Matthaeum* XIII; and elsewhere [abbreviation as in source].
85. St. Augustine, [abbreviation as in source: "lib. 38. q. 68"]; *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, props. 55, 60; *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum* II; *Tractatus* 76 *In Ioannem*; *De Spiritu et Littera*, ch. 5; *Concio* 2 *in Psalmum* 30 [abbreviation as in source]; *De dono perseverantiae*; *De praedestinatione et gratia*; *Hypognosticon* [abbreviations as in source].
86. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 18.
87. Editorial note concerning Semipelagian sense; references to Richard of St. Victor; the Arian controversy; St. Jerome, *Apologia contra Rufinum*; Theodoret, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I, ch. 5; Nicephorus [abbreviations as in source].
88. Sts. Augustine, Prosper of Aquitaine, and Fulgentius of Ruspe [abbreviations as in source].
89. Gelasius I, *Decretum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis* (re. Arnobius the Younger) [abbreviation as in source].
90. Rupert of Deutz, *In Apocalypsim* (on Rev. 21).
91. Pseudo-Ambrose (Ambrosiaster), *Commentarii in Epistolas Paulinas*; *Glossa ordinaria* on Rom. 9; Pseudo-Jerome scholia on the Epistles of Paul; Pelagius, *Epistola De scientia divinae legis* [abbreviations as in source].
92. References in the source to letters "ad Laurentium, & Rusticum," and related notices; see [abbreviation as in source].
93. Natalis Alexander, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vol. V, on the fifth century [abbreviation as in source].
94. On the usage of "foreknowledge" (*praescientia*) in Scripture, see above.
95. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 19.
96. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5; ad 3 (on the Ambrosian commentary).
97. Matt. 25:34–35.
98. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* [abbreviation as in source], on "Jacob dilexi."
99. Ps. 64(65):5: "Beatus quem elegisti et assumpsisti; inhabitabit in atriis tuis."
100. St. Ambrose, *De fide ad Gratianum* [abbreviation as in source].
101. St. Jerome, *In Malachiam*; *Epistula ad Hedibiam* [abbreviations as in source].
102. St. John Chrysostom, *De providentia*, book 1 (at the end); Hom. 12 on 1 Cor. 4:7; Hom. on 1 Cor. 10:13; Hom. on Phil. 2:13; Hom. 8 on 2 Tim. [abbreviations as in source].
103. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* [abbreviation as in source]. On Faber Stapulensis's translation of "praeiudicavit" as "praelegit," see Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (Faber Stapulensis) [abbreviation as in source].
104. Hilary of Arles, *Epistola ad Augustinum* [abbreviation as in source]. On the contested identity of "Hilary the disciple of Augustine" versus Hilary of Arles, see Cardinal Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici* ad an. 426; Cardinal Henry Noris, *Historia Pelagiana*, book 2, ch. 2; the Benedictine Fathers (preface and notes to Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*); Dupin, *Bibliotheca scriptorum ecclesiasticorum*, on Hilary; and other writers of our century, as cited in the source [abbreviations as in source].
105. St. Augustine, *Retractationes*, *passim*.
106. On the Master: Peter Lombard, the Master of the Sentences. The reference "lib. 26." is as in the source [abbreviation as in source].
107. St. Augustine, words cited in the source from the same question in *De diversis quaestionibus* LXXXIII [abbreviation as in source]; see also *Retractationes* I, ch. 23.
108. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, book 21, ch. 2.
109. St. Augustine, *Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*; *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum* II; *Retractationes* I, ch. 23; II, ch. 1; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 3; *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 11.

110. The scattered notices here about Arnobius (the Elder) are taken from the sources as in the text, with several readings uncertain due to the transmission; see Jerome's *Epistula ad Paulinum* and related testimonies [abbreviations as in source]. The discussion of Arnobius the Younger and Pelagian influence is likewise reported from the cited ecclesiastical historians [abbreviations as in source].
111. Pelagius, *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos*, on Rom. 11 [abbreviation as in source].
112. St. John Chrysostom, In *Epistolam ad Ephesios*, hom. 1, on Eph. 1: "He chose us in Him."
113. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 8.
114. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialogi* I, ch. 8.
115. Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 20.
116. Prosper of Aquitaine and Hilary, letters to St. Augustine [abbreviations as in source].
117. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 2 and ad 3.
118. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 95.
119. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 63, a. 1, ad 3.
120. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 98; *Epistula* 105 [abbreviation as in source]; *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 7.
121. St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De gratia Christi*, ch. 21.
122. St. Augustine, In *Iohannis Evangelium tractatus* 89.
123. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 12.
124. St. Augustine, *Contra litteras Petiliani* II, ch. 84; *Contra Iulianum* IV, ch. 8; *De gratia Christi*, chs. 24, 47; *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 18; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chs. 8, 20.
125. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 17; chs. 22, 24.
126. St. Thomas, "ubi sup." [abbreviation as in source].
127. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 10.
128. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium*, ch. 9.
129. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5.
130. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 28; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 8; *Epistula* 107 [abbreviation as in source]; *De correptione et gratia*, chs. 8, 14; "in 88" [abbreviation as in source].
131. The long parenthetical note in the source reads: "The ancient Fathers and theologians proclaim the omnipotence of grace, which is invincible and indefectible; but a sense alien to theirs is preferred by the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth Quesnelian theses: for Quesnel in the theses just now reviewed entirely snatches away from the will the free cooperation, namely, that by which the will can be won by the force of attracting and delighting. But this sense is very far removed from the sense both of the Author and—at its place, when we treat of grace—we will note this—of our Cardinal Sfondratus in the *Knots of Predestination* (part 1, § 4, no. 1), who strongly shows by many arguments that by the triumphant and victorious grace he understood nothing other than a certain moral suasion which can persuade; and that St. Thomas's disciple professes from St. Thomas's principles—even from his very clear assertions—that free choice, with no injury to liberty, is led on to a supernatural good work by the physical, not moral, promotion and predetermination of grace. Denis Petau defends the opinion of Cardinal Sfondrati (*Theological Dogmatics*, on the Pelagians, expounded bk. 5, XI. Rus. On the Origin of the Gentiles, bk. 3), and from there of the Fathers and theologians, and of our own day; and indeed he names St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Concerning Augustine perhaps certain people think that by the triumphant and victorious grace he understood nothing else than a merely moral suasion which can persuade; and about St. Thomas, let a Jew believe it! Indeed, from St. Thomas's principles and even his very clear assertions it can be deduced that, without any wound to liberty, the will is converted by grace's physical, not moral, power, without delay, to the performance of a supernatural good. The opinion of Cardinal Sfondrati is supported by Denis Petau (*Theological Dogmatics*, History of the Dogmas, ch. 8, no. 9 and ch. 10, no. 9)."
132. St. Thomas, "eodem loco" [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 14; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 17, 19, 20.
133. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 4.

134. St. Anselm, *De casu diaboli*.
135. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 16.
136. St. Fulgentius, *Ad Trasamundum regem*, III, chs. 2–3.
137. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XV, ch. 32; XXV, ch. 8.
138. St. Bernard, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*; *Sermones super Cantica*, s. 22; *De diligendo Deo* (near the beginning); *Sermo de omnibus sanctis* (the last).
139. Franco of Affligem, *De gratia*, tom. 1; on the author, cf. Trithemius; praised in the Lyon edition of 1677.
140. Pseudo-Jerome, *Sermo de Assumptione*; cf. Ps. 32(33):6: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established."
141. Council of Orange (Arausicanum II), can. 19; the words are taken from St. Augustine, *Epist.* 106.
142. St. Thomas, *Super Romanos*, cap. 9, lect. 3.
143. Dominic Bañez, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3.
144. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2.
145. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, aa. 8–9.
146. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 10.
147. St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 12.
148. St. Augustine, "...tate c. 27" [abbreviation as in source].
149. St. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, ch. 3.
150. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 33, sermon 2.
151. Author's note (a): "The theologians who are called Augustinians, and profess themselves disciples of Augustine, in this business of predestination argue thus: they assert that the predestination of the Angels was made after foreseen merits; and that such would have been the predestination of men, if Adam, having received justice, had stood; but that in the state of nature repaired by Christ the predestination of men precedes every merit altogether, and is from the merits of Christ alone. Cornelius Jansenius, book 2, *De gratia primi hominis*, ch. 14 and 15, lays the foundation of the original difference between the good and the bad, and of the predestined and the reprobate. Nay, some of those who think thus proceed so far that they say the first man in the integral state did not have need of prayer, but only of giving thanks to God for the gifts received, since those abundantly sufficed him for attaining beatitude, provided he would use them—because that he should will was placed solely in his free choice. All which they similarly hand down concerning the Angels. But they especially strive to prove this their doctrine of the predestination of the Angels from Augustine, who above establishes the aforesaid difference between man on the one part and man fallen on the other in various places. Chief among which is book *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 10, 11, 12; for (in ch. 10) he says that God so ordained the life of Angels and of men, that He should first show what their free choice could do, then what the benefit of His grace and the judgment of His justice could do. And thus that some Angels were made fugitives from God by free choice, but others stood in the truth by the same free choice, by which indeed both those who fell were able to fall and those who stood were able to stand. Wherefore likewise man, by that very free choice, could remain in the uprightness in which he had been created. And in ch. 11 he so distinguishes the grace which was given to integral man and that which is given to the fallen, that he says that in the former God left man in his free choice, that in it he should remain, if he would. "Such," he says, "was the aid which would desert when he willed, and in which he would remain, if he willed; not whereby it would be brought about that he should will." This, to be sure, is the grace which was given to the first Adam, but the more powerful is in the second Adam. For the first is that by which it comes about that man have justice, if he will; the second more, by which it also comes about that he will." And other things in the same sense, where he adds also about the holy Angels that by free choice, while others were falling, they stood; and indeed he repeats very many things of this sort in ch. 12, where he also seems to say that integral man by himself could glory in his merits. Another place is book *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 7, where he says that in the powers of man, before he fell, it was that he should not depart from God; and that this liberty of will appeared in the Angels, who, with the devil and his own falling, stood in the truth. But after man's fall, God willed that it should pertain only to His grace that man come to Him or not depart from Him. Similarly in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 104 and the four following, in the aforesaid manner he distinguishes between the state of integral and of fallen man as to the grace which is necessary for persevering and for meriting salvation. He also indicates such a difference in book 14 of the *City of God*, ch. 27, and in *De natura et gratia*, ch. 48. In this opinion Prosper seems to follow Augustine (see book 1, *De vita contemplativa*, ch. 3; and *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 18; and *Ad Capitula Gallorum*, Resp. 8).

- Likewise Gregory, book 5, Morals, ch. 28, where he says that the good Angels stood by free choice. The same doctrine is found quite openly in St. Anselm, book *De casu diaboli*: although in ch. 1 he says that even in the Angels a place holds for that of the Apostle: "What have you that you have not received?"; afterwards in ch. 2, 3, 4 he teaches that for this reason God did not give perseverance to the apostate Angel, because he did not accept it. And in ch. 18 he affirms that to God the good Angel and the bad owe equal grace; because, he says, the devil removed from himself what God gave, and did not wish to accept what God offered, and so forth. But in truth, those who wrote after Jansenius—especially de Cham [abbreviation as in source], John Baptist Gonet, *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, tom. 3, tract. 3, disp. 7, § 1; Vincent Contenson, *Theologiae scholasticae et positivae, speculatione prima*; and, most recently, Cardinal de Aguirre, in the *Commentaries on the Theology of St. Anselm*, tom. 3, disput. 132 almost throughout—teach that this opinion is connected with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bajan propositions thundered under the Apostolic censure; nay, and from section eight all the way to the end of the tenth he rebukes at length the singular manner of explaining Augustine's thought which Contenson in the second speculation introduced, against the common way of the other authors, especially the Thomists. Contenson indeed in that place contends that man in integrity did not need an aid whereby he should act actually: so that, if by the sole possible or impossible subordination of a second cause to a first such aid would not be demanded by primal integrity. Moreover, the aforesaid Cardinal de Aguirre in the place cited most clearly shows that this aid, or assistance, which according to Augustine's mind is necessary on account of the dependence of the creature in being, being conserved, and operating upon the Creator, is general only—namely, in the natural order—and is not in the supernatural genus as is required for supernatural works; just as is required for acts ordained to the attainment of salvation, even if man in accepted justice should have persevered. But to assign this to Augustine is to accuse Augustine of Bajanism and make him guilty of the condemned propositions—especially the first, in which it is said: "Neither to angels nor to the first man while as yet integral could merits properly be merits and rewards, and not grace"; and also the third, which says: "And eternal life to integral man and to the righteous Angel would have been given from the law of nature to be attained by themselves"; and others like these: we shall, if God wills, treat of the same elsewhere." [References as in the source: "Cornelius Jansenius lib. 2. de gratia primi hominis cap. 14. & 15."; "Joannes Baptista Gonet tom. 3. Clypei Theologiae Thomisticae tract. 3. disp. 7. quo loci §. 1."; "Vincentius Contensonus Theologiae scholasticae, & positivae speculatione prima"; "Cardinalis de Aguirre in commentariis Theologiae S. Anselmi tom. 3. disput. 132."].
152. Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vita contemplativa* I, ch. 3; *Contra Collatorem*, ch. 18; *Ad Capitula Gallorum*, Resp. 8; St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* V, ch. 28; St. Anselm, *De casu diaboli*, ch. 1–4, 18; Rupert of Deutz, *In Matthaeum* XIII; Matt. 24 [abbreviation as in source].
153. On the First Mover's application of principles to act in creatures, see St. Thomas, *passim*; cf. especially *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 9–10; I, q. 105.
154. St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum* VI, ch. 8; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2; a. 9; a. 10, ad 1; St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9; St. Thomas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 5.
155. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3.
156. *Ecclus.* (Sirach) 15:17; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XII, ch. 9; *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, ch. 12; cf. *Eph.* 2:8–10.
157. Siglum "(a)" as in the source.
158. Judocus Tiletanus, "in quodam scripto ad Ruardum" [as in the source].
159. *Jn.* 3:27: "Non potest homo accipere quicquam, nisi fuerit ei datum de caelo."
160. *1 Cor.* 4:7: "Quis te discernit? quid autem habes quod non accepisti?"
161. Rupert of Deutz, *De victoria Verbi Dei*, ch. 27; and the last chapter.
162. *Jn.* 18:36; *Lk.* 22:30; *Lk.* 23:42.
163. *Eph.* 1; *Col.* 1; *Heb.* 12.
164. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, 5.
165. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11; St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 26; Prosper, "Sent. 7. ad Cap." [abbreviation as in source].
166. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. [unspecified in source], q. unica, a. 4, ad 2.
167. Henry of Ghent; Thomas of Argentina; Peter Aureol.

168. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 98; St. Augustine, *Ep.* 105; St. Augustine, *Ep.* 257, ad Optatum; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 17; St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, chs. 8–9; St. Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, ch. 7; [Ps.-Augustine], *De praedestinatione gratiae*, chs. 3, 6, 7; St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 68; St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXI, ch. 2; St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, chs. 21, 23; Prosper, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, ad cap. 3; idem, ad cap. 7 (in *Responsio* and in *Sententia*); idem, ad cap. 12; idem, ad cap. 14; idem, *Ad objectionem XI Vincentii*; idem, *Ad objectionem X*; Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Ad Monimum* I, last ch.; idem, *Ad Monimum* I, ch. 28; St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, ch. 17 (as cited by Fulgentius); Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa sententiarum*, tract. 1, ch. 12; St. Thomas, *Super Romanos*, cap. 9, lect. 2 (ad fin.); St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 9; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 159.
169. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, ch. 24; Scotus, *In I Sent.*, on the present distinction [as in source].
170. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3–4.
171. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae*, ch. 142.
172. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, in corp.
173. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3; Cajetan, *Commentary on the Summa theologiae* I, q. 23; Domingo Bañez, *Commentaria on the Summa theologiae* I, q. 23.
174. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, on Deuteronomy, q. 2.
175. St. Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* [abbreviation as in source].
176. St. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 14; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XV, ch. 1; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI, ch. 24; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 14; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Ad objectiones Vincentii*, resp. 19 (to objections 10–11) [abbreviation as in source]; Fulgentius of Ruspe, *Ad Monimum* I.
177. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, especially chs. 8–9; St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 8; St. Augustine, *Ep.* 59, q. 6 [abbreviation as in source]; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Ad objectiones Vincentii*, ad objectionem 14; Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, ad cap. 7.
178. St. Augustine, *De praedestinatione gratiae*, ch. 19.
179. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXIX, ch. 9; *Moralia in Iob* XXIX, chs. 17–18; *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* I, hom. 8; Peter Lombard, *Sentences*, in the present distinction; Baudinus, *Sententiae*, in the same place [abbreviation as in source].
180. St. Thomas, *Super Romanos*, cap. 9, lectiones 3–4.
181. St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2; *Glossa ordinaria* on Rom. 9: "Numquid iniquitas apud Deum."
182. Giles of Rome, *In I Sent.*, on this distinction; reported by Thomas of Argentina, *In I Sent.*, on this distinction; John of Bassolis, *In I Sent.*, on this distinction; Dionysius Cisterciensis, on this distinction [abbreviation as in source]; Nicholas of Lyra, *Postillae* on Rom. 9; William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, book 1.
183. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), *Commentary on St. Thomas's Summa contra Gentiles* III, chs. 161, 163; Cajetan, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, on Rom. 9; Sixtus of Siena, *Bibliotheca sancta*, book 2 (under letter R), and book 6, annotation 252; Domingo de Soto, *Retractationes* appended to his work on IV *Sentences*; Peter Soto and Jodocus Tiletanus, *Diatribes ad Ruardum*; Titelmannus; Viguerius; Guilandus, on Rom. 9 [abbreviations as in source]; Jansenius (of Ghent), *Commentary on Ecclesiasticus* 41.
184. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3.
185. St. Thomas, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, on Rom. 9.
186. Ferrariensis (Francisco de Sylvestris), on St. Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles* III (see esp. chs. 161, 163); Cajetan, various places on ST I, q. 23.
187. For the Pauline locus classicus on the manifestation of justice and mercy in this matter, see Rom. 9.
188. On the Augustinian line concerning the reprobation of Angels and the condition of man before and after the fall, see the Augustinian school generally (as in the sources Estius cites).
189. On "negative reprobation" in Thomistic authors, see the Thomist school generally (as in the sources Estius cites).

190. Vincentius Contenson, *Theologia mentis et cordis*, lib. 2, differentia 6, cap. 2, speculatio 2; Jean-Baptiste Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, tract. V De praedestinatione, disp. V, art. 3.
191. Contenson, loc. cit.; Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, tom. 4, tract. V De praedestinatione.
192. "Carrov." = Carolus de Vrio (Carrau), *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, lib. 2, cap. 16–17; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus*; John of St. Thomas.
193. Petrus de Godoy, *In primam partem S. Thomae*, tract. VIII, disp. 69, q. 6.
194. Louis Ellies Dupin, *Bibliotheca scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*, Century XIII, ch. IV. The reference to "ad Annibaldum, distinct. 41" is as in the source.
195. Robert Bellarmine, *Controversiae*, tome 4.
196. Denis Petau (Petavius), *Theologica Dogmata*, tome 1, book X, ch. 3; also book IX.
197. "Opus Oxoniense ex familia Dominicanorum" [as in source]; Estius cites it for the proposition that "the denial of the Kingdom may probably be defended even with respect to those reprobates to whom Augustine's sentence is applied," adding his own summary as in the text.
198. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1.
199. St. Augustine, *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2.
200. Bartholomaeus Medina, *In I-IIam S. Thomae*, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3.
201. Council of Trent, Session 6, ch. 11.
202. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 21, a. 4.
203. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3.
204. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 3 (on reprobation ex parte poenae).
205. "cap. 161" is given as such in the source [abbreviation as in source]; the place teaches that God, notwithstanding the impediment placed by men, out of His superabundant goodness converts some rather than others, and that no rationale is to be sought why He converts these rather than those, since it depends on God's simple will.
206. St. Augustine, *Epistle* 106; St. Augustine, *Quaestiones ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2; St. Augustine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, ch. 23.

DISTINCTIO XLII — OF THE POWER IN GOD AND HOW HE IS CALLED OMNIPOTENT (*QUAE SIT POTENTIA IN DEO, ET QUOMODO DICATUR OMNIPOTENS*)

§ I — What the power in God is, and how He is called omnipotent (Quae sit potentia in Deo, et quomodo dicatur omnipotens)

§ 1. After the consideration of those things which pertain to the knowledge of God, in the order proposed it follows that we should speak of His power (*potentia*). Now since a twofold power is wont to be distinguished by the Physicists: one toward acting, and the other toward undergoing or receiving—of which the former is called active power (*potentia activa*), the latter passive (*potentia passiva*)—it is manifest that a power of the latter kind is in no way in God, because God, since He is pure act (*actus purus*) and absolutely and universally perfect, and no imperfection has or can have place in Him, is receptive of no form whatsoever, but in Himself contains from eternity the perfection of all forms. But the active power, for the same reason, is in God highest and most perfect. For to be an active principle befits each thing inasmuch as it is in act and is perfect. Hence there must be the highest active power in that which is most perfect act, that is, in God, as St. Thomas well proves.²

§ 2. Moreover, this power of God is distinguished from His knowledge, providence, and will according to our mode and order of understanding. For knowledge is understood as apprehending; providence as directing; will as commanding; power as executing. From this very power God is called omnipotent (*omnipotens*). Which omnipotence the whole Church confesses in the Creed and in the general Councils, and the same the Scripture proclaims in many places, as in Matt. 19 and Mk. 10, Christ saying: "With God all things are possible"; and in Mk. 14: "Father, all things are possible to Thee"; and the Angel bearing witness in Lk. 1: "There shall not be impossible with God any word"; and Job speaking to God (Job 42): "I know that Thou canst do all things." And hence most frequently there is ascribed to God the epithet "omnipotent" in Scripture, as here and there in Genesis, in the book of Job, in the Second Book of Maccabees, in the Apocalypse of John, and elsewhere, the enumeration of which places would here be superfluous.

§ 3. Now the following are, so to speak, the principal works of the Divine omnipotence (*omnipotentia*), and most of all commended to us in the Scriptures: the creation of the world with its parts from nothing; and the operation of the same which surpasses the mode of nature; the Incarnation of Christ, whereby God was made man; the calling of the Gentiles; the protection of the Church; the conversion and justification of sinners; the resurrection of all the dead at the end of the age; finally, the beatification of the just and the eternal punishment of the impious. For although to God all His works are equally easy to do, since He by the sole command of His will does whatever He does, according to that: "He said, and they were made"; nevertheless those things which we have mentioned are, by reason of their object, greater and fitter for the manifestation of

the power of God. Now the account (*ratio*) of the Divine omnipotence is taken from His very essence (*essentia*). For God acts through His essence. But by how much more perfectly in any given agent there is the form through which it acts, by so much greater is its power in acting. Therefore, since the essence of God is infinite, it is necessary that His power be infinite, as St. Thomas reasons.³

§ 4. However, that universality which is signified by the name "omnipotence" is not explained in the same way by all. But it will be most fittingly explained if, with St. Thomas, we say that God is for this reason called omnipotent, because He can do all things that are possible, or doable. For active power is referred to the doable, the makeable, the possible (which in the present matter are the same) as to its proper object. But just as the power of God is absolute, infinite, and unlimited, so the possible which is subjected to that power must be understood to be that which is absolutely such. Of this sort is everything which, if it be done, will in no way involve a contradiction. For things which are of such a kind as to imply a contradiction are more rightly said "not to be able to be done" than that someone is not able to do them. With this explanation of the omnipotence of God agrees sufficiently that which others adduce, namely that God is therefore said to be able to do all things because He can do all those whose production is of perfection and power, not of imperfection, weakness, or defect. But certain persons, that they may explain this matter more fully, conjoin both, saying that God is able to do all things because He can do whatever are doable and whose production would not argue any imperfection of the maker. But there is no need of this conjunction, since the former mode is of itself sufficient and includes the latter. For by that very fact by which something is said to be absolutely possible or doable, it is understood to be such that its production regards an active power, by which it can be made—which power without doubt is a perfection. As to what the explanation of certain men avails, who will have God therefore to be called omnipotent, because whatever He wills He can do, we shall speak in the next distinction. Now this omnipotence of God, perfectly known to us by the sole light of Faith (*Fides*), not only did the Philosophers ignore—especially those who were measuring every power by the strengths of nature—but certain heretics also attacked it, as of old the Hermiani and Seleuciani, who, following the Platonists, posited prime matter therefore coeternal with God, because they denied that God could make anything out of nothing—of whom Epiphanius and St. Augustine write, and again St. Augustine in the book *On Faith and the Creed*, ch. 2.⁴ But more gravely, and not without blasphemy of the Most Holy Trinity, did one Peter Abelard fall upon the Divine power in the time of St. Bernard, when he posited the Father to be full power, the Son a certain power, and the Holy Spirit no power, as Bernard testifies.⁵ But also the heretical Sacramentarians of today not a little restrict the power of God when they deny that by Divine power it can be brought about that the same body be in diverse places. For this involves no contradiction, no more than that in the same place there be two bodies. Of which we have examples in the Scriptures; it is also evident that it itself is contained under the genus of possibles (to which all the power of God extends). On which matter more in the Fourth Book, where there will be treatment of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

§ II — Solution of the objections (Objectionum solutio)

§ 5. To those things which are wont to be objected against the Divine omnipotence (*omnipotentia*), to answer from those things which have already been said is not difficult. Now these are they: that God cannot be deceived, deceive, lie; be perfidious or perjured, and altogether sin. Likewise to hate, and to deny Himself, as the Apostle bears witness (2 Tim. 2). Likewise to grow, decrease, walk, speak, be moved, if these be taken properly, and the discussion be about God inasmuch as He is God. And in sum, to be evil, miserable,

imperfect. Moreover, that He cannot bring it to pass that the same be being and non-being, true and false, that man not be an animal, that there be a mountain without a valley; and St. Anselm says (*Cur Deus homo*, ch. 20): "The least incongruity is impossible for God."⁷ Lastly, that He can neither make Himself nor another God; that neither can the Son beget, nor the Holy Spirit produce another person. There is also objected this argument: just as a finite power can produce a finite effect, so an infinite power—if there be any—could produce an infinite effect; but no effect of this kind can be produced. For thus a creature would be infinite; therefore there is no infinite power, which we call omnipotence.

§ 6. But to all these things there is almost one response: none of those things which have been objected are, according to the whole of their formal character (*ratio*), possible or doable—the which is, as we said before, the object of power (*potentia*). For certain things do not signify an action but only a passion or privation, as to suffer, to be moved, to be deceived, to be ignorant. Certain things, indeed, do signify an action, but with defect and deformity, as to lie, to deceive, to deny oneself, and altogether to sin—which is nothing other than to fall short of perfect action. Other things import motion or change in that to which they are attributed, as to walk, to speak, to grow, to decrease. For although the first two of these signify an operation whose Author is God, nevertheless they cannot be attributed to God, because they signify it as it is undergone in the very one operating; which does not take place without passion and motion; and consequently they include imperfection, namely to be in potency—for example: he is said to walk who produces the motion of walking, not in any manner whatsoever, but in himself; and so of the others. And all these things already mentioned imply a contradictory repugnance—not simply, and considered by themselves apart. For they truly befit men, but inasmuch as they are conjoined to God, that is, inasmuch as they are understood to be done by God. For it will follow, if these things be posited as done by God, that God is not God, as being in some respect imperfect and defectible. But others do absolutely fight with themselves, and therefore by no means are comprised in the number of possibles, as the same to be and not to be, that the true be false, and the like—to which are deservedly counted those things which were set in the last place. For none of these is subjected to power. For if God were a thing that could be made, He would not be God. But to beget in the Divine things, as also to breathe (that is, to spirate), are not acts of such a kind as that there be to them a power properly so called, since, as was noted above at Distinction 7, that which is properly called power in God is the principle of operations *ad extra*; not of the coessential [operations] in Himself, namely generation and spiration. In almost these ways the Fathers defend and declare the omnipotence of God against the aforesaid and other common objections, as Dionysius in the book *On the Divine Names*, ch. 8; St. Ambrose, *Epistle* 37; St. Augustine, book 1 *On the Creed to the Catechumens*, ch. 1; book 15 of the *City of God*, ch. 10; book 15 *On the Trinity*, ch. 13.⁸ But rightly St. Thomas refers the examination of impossibility to contradiction. For if something be absolutely incongruous, although it does not straightway occur to us to explain what contradiction follows from it, nevertheless it truly implies a contradiction. Wherefore those think improbably who subtract from the omnipotence of God something, however absurd in appearance, from which nevertheless a contradiction does not follow. For if it does not imply a contradiction, it can have the formal character of being (*entis*), and thus is contained under the absolute possibles, with respect to which God is called omnipotent, as St. Thomas expressly teaches;⁶ and upon this head depend the multiple questions which are disputed by the Doctors concerning those things which God can or cannot do. For of all such the fixed response is, that God can do them, if they are possible; but that they are possible if they imply no contradiction. Although the judgment of this matter in particular is oftentimes most difficult, so that the variety of opinions in such matters is not to be wondered at.

§ 7. To the argument drawn from the effect St. Thomas responds that God is not a univocal agent, and therefore His effect is always less than His power. And hence it does not follow, if His power be infinite, that He can produce an infinite effect, as was proposed in the argument.⁹ But more fully there is answered that from infinite power there follows in some way the possibility of an infinite effect. For God through His infinite power can produce infinite perfections formally distinct, in this sense: because whatever He will have produced, He can always still produce other and more. Nor is it similar to what certain persons object about the intellect producing in this way infinite intellections, and the heaven producing infinite revolutions. For these effects are not formally distinct perfections, and are confined within a certain genus of things; but the power of God extends itself to all possibles, which are infinite, and the same, as we have said, formally distinct. But there are also other things by which the omnipotence of God is wont to be assailed, the explanation of which pertains to the doctrine of the two following distinctions.

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 1 et 1 [abbreviation as in source].

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 1.

3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 2.

4. Epiphanius, [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, [abbreviation as in source]; St. Augustine, *De fide et symbolo*, ch. 2.

5. St. Bernard, *Epistle* 109.

6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 3.

7. St. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, ch. 20.

8. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 8; St. Ambrose, *Epistle* 37; St. Augustine, *De symbolo ad catechumenos* I, ch. 1; *De civitate Dei* XV, ch. 10; *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 13.

9. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2.

DISTINCTIO XLIII — THAT GOD CAN DO THINGS WHICH HE DOES NOT DO (*DEUM POSSE FACERE QUAE NON FACIT*)

§ 1. They detract from the Divine omnipotence (*omnipotentia divina*), nay very many simply take it away, who teach that God cannot do other things than those which He does, nor can omit the things which He does. This of old Peter Abelard and John Wyclif taught, and in this age Bucer and Calvin have taught the same: who, however, lest they seem to deny that God is omnipotent, say that for this, that He be called omnipotent, it suffices that He be able to do what He does, and that He do whatever He wills. And this, they say, they gladly confess of God according to the Scriptures. But not all adduce the same account of that their dogma. For some, as Abelard and Wyclif, rely on this foundation: that God acts by necessity of nature, not by free will. Others, that He acts by necessity of His justice and wisdom, so that things do not suffer either to be otherwise, or to be made in another order, than as we now see established. But the Catholic faith condemns this error as manifest heresy, which both acknowledges in God a supreme liberty of acting (*summa libertas agendi*), and confesses that for the divine wisdom there is neither end nor number (Ps. 146), so that God can declare it in infinitely many other ways, whether you attend to works of justice, or of mercy. These two therefore, namely the liberty of the divine will and the infinity of His wisdom, altogether and evidently prove both that God can do many things which He has not done, and that He can omit the things which He has done.

§ 2. Third. No less does the infinite power (*potentia infinita*) of God prove this, which by no multitude or variety of the things produced can be exhausted, since not only individual creatures, but all of them together, are finite, and therefore cannot equal an infinite power. Whence it remains that, after whatsoever multitude and variety of things has been produced, yet other things, and accordingly new perfections of things, can proceed from that power. For thus it was said above, that the power of God is proved to be infinite.

§ 3. Fourth. If God cannot do except the things which He does, the grace of God is taken away. For grace cannot have place where there is absolute necessity, as in the divine generation of the Son. Furthermore, grace being taken away, all our prayers and thanksgivings are taken away; since prayer asks that what is freely bestowed be granted, and thanksgiving is rendered for gratuitous benefits, whereas where absolute necessity holds there is nothing either to implore or to return thanks for.

§ 4. Fifth. If God cannot do except the things which He does, therefore He cannot convert, justify, save more, nor others, than those who are converted, are justified. Nor therefore could He have predestined Judas, nor preserved Adam from transgression, nor David from adultery, nor Peter from the triple denial, nor softened the heart of Pharaoh. Likewise He cannot today make the sun stand still, as in the days of Joshua, nor darken the day, as in the Lord's Passion, nor stir up a tempest, as in the days of Samuel, and innumerable other things of this sort.

§ 5. Sixth. If God acts by necessity, then also men, whatever they do, do by necessity. Wherefore, if God cannot do other than what He does, much less will men be able; both because liberty of acting, since it is a perfection, cannot belong to a creature if it do not first belong to God; and because all the effects of lower causes proceed from the first cause, which, if it cannot produce others, neither therefore will a secondary cause, as man, be able to produce other effects, that is, to do other than what he does. This being granted, now counsels, deliberations, exhortations, precepts, threats, promises, punishments, rewards will be taken away universally. Nor does it matter whether you say that God acts by necessity of nature or of wisdom; because from either necessity the same absurdities follow.

§ 6. Seventh. If therefore God is omnipotent only because He can do all the things that He wills, but not because He can both will and do such things, then by this reasoning all the blessed will be omnipotent. For they can do all that they will, since they will nothing inordinate or impossible, namely conforming their will to the will of God. And indeed this belonged also to the first man in the state of innocence, as St. Augustine testifies.² Moreover, the Scriptures also manifestly contradict this dogma. For the Lord says in Matt. 26: "Do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and He will now furnish me more than twelve legions of angels?" Therefore Christ could ask, and the Father could furnish. Yet neither of these was done. And in ch. 19: "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle," where He added this sentence: "With God all things are possible," evidently comprehending under it the example proposed. Yet this is nowhere read to have been done; just as neither is that which He says ch. 3, that God is able "of these stones to raise up children to Abraham."

§ 7. Likewise, to the same purport, when in the garden He prayed, a sentence repeated by Himself, the Lord relates of Himself: "Abba, Father, all things are possible to Thee; remove this chalice from Me; yet not what I will, but what Thou [wilt]." Yet nevertheless the chalice was not taken away from Him, namely the Father willing that He should drink it. The same is shown from the Scripture of the Old Testament. For in Wis. 11 and 12 it is said in many ways that God could have afflicted the Egyptians, and exterminated the nations which inhabited the land of promise, which yet He willed not to do. And Is. 59: "The hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save, but your iniquities have made a separation between you and your God"; as if He should say, He can save, but on account of your iniquities He wills not. Thus (Dan. 3) the three boys are read to have said to the king: "Our God, whom we serve, is able to deliver us from the furnace of burning fire, and to deliver us out of thy hands. But if He will not, be it known to thee," etc. Clearly they say these things as being certain of the power, uncertain of the will and of the effect, just as also that evangelical leper, saying: "Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean" (Matt. 8). Whence also in the next chapter the Lord says to some: "Do you believe that I can do this to you?" He does not say: "that I am about to do it." For the former indeed they ought to believe, but not the latter.

§ 8. Nor is there a dissimilar example in Judas Maccabaeus, saying (2 Macc. 8): "But we trusting in the omnipotent Lord, who is able both to destroy them that come against us, and all the world, with one nod." Surely this thing which he says, that God can destroy the whole world with one nod, will never come to pass, and yet by him it is predicated as possible.

§ 9. Again, if God cannot do except what He does, then they did not sin by doubting who said: "Can He also give bread, or prepare a table for His people?" (Ps. 77). For they could have doubted of the fact. And again: If He can only those things which He does, therefore Christ could not give a sign from heaven to the scribes asking, because He did not do that: nor could He save Himself from death, nor come down from the

Cross, nor could the Father deliver Him: and true will be the voices of the blasphemies of the Jews, by which they reproached Him with incapacity for these things, saying among other things: "He saved others; Himself He cannot save." True also will be the suspicion of those saying (Jn. 11): "Could not he that opened the eyes of the man born blind have caused that this man should not die?" Nor will the infirmity of faith be blameworthy in him who was saying: "If thou canst do any thing, help us" (Mk. 9). All which things how absurd they are, it is easy for anyone to understand.

§ 10. This same is the constant and sure doctrine of the Fathers. Of whom we shall mark down only these passages.³

§ II — The arguments of the adversaries are refuted (Argumenta Adversariorum diluuntur)

§ 11. The chief counter-arguments that are wont to be brought against the foregoing doctrine are almost all grounded in a supposed necessity of the Divine wisdom and justice. To refute these, one reply suffices: although God cannot act except wisely and justly, and therefore it is true, in some sense, that He acts by a necessity of wisdom and justice—because, namely, if He act at all, it is necessary that He act wisely and justly—nevertheless by His wisdom and justice (which in this place we understand as rectitude excluding any fault) He is in no necessity bound to a determinate mode and order of acting; since He can also do infinitely many other things, which, if He were to do them, He would do wisely and justly. Such are, moreover, whatever things are in the power (*potentia*) of God. For, as St. Thomas says in the cited article 5 of question 25 of the First Part, the Divine Wisdom comprehends the whole possibility of power.¹

§ 12. And on this foundation the Master, in the text, rightly solves six arguments, proposed by him in order, which all proceeded from the said necessity—except the last, which is taken from the Divine prescience, and is to be solved by a distinction of the composite and divided sense. For God can do, in the divided sense, other things than those which He has foreknown and preordained that He will do, not in the composite sense. For He could have foreknown otherwise, although at the same time that composition involves a contradiction.

⁴

§ 13. But the heretics of our day argue thus: If God can do other things than those which He does, His power with respect to those things will be futile and idle. For this is Calvin's argument, who says that Catholics posit an idle power in God. We reply that God could, if He had willed (*voluntas*), have done nothing at all; nor yet on that account would His power have been in vain. For that is said to be in vain which does not attain the end for which it was destined; but the power of God, since it is His essence (*essentia*), is not a means to some end, but is itself the end of all things. Nor again is the power of God idle, by which so many things are done and have been done; although we admit that in a certain respect it is idle, namely, insofar as it is ordered to those things which never come to be—which is not absurd. Nay more, in an unqualified sense the same power would be idle, and that without any absurdity, if God had willed to do absolutely nothing. For such idleness denotes not a fault, but only the negation of operation, which cannot be blameworthy in Him whom no necessity of justice constrains to act.

§ 14. They object, moreover, the authority of St. Augustine, who seems to establish the formal character (*ratio*) of God's omnipotence in this, that He does whatever He wills. Whence they would have it follow that He cannot do more things than He wills to do. The places of Augustine are these: the Enchiridion, ch. 69; On

the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 31 (the last); The City of God, book 21, ch. 7; the Confessions, ch. 4. There is also a like place in St. John Chrysostom (Homily 2 on the Creed). Likewise St. John Damascene, book 1 (De fide orthodoxa, ch. 8): "We believe the power of God known by no measure, but measured only by His own proper will. For all things whatsoever He wills, He is able."⁵ But to all these there is one brief reply; the sense of such sayings is this: God is omnipotent because He can do whatever He can will, that is, whatever can be subject to His will; in such wise, namely, that His will can never be impeded or frustrated. Hence also those Scriptures which assert that God does whatever He wills intend this very thing, and by this are testimonies of the omnipotence of God. For in such passages the word "wills" is to be understood in an ampliative way, so as to be extended to the four differences of time. For even when we say of a man who is his own master that he does whatever he wills, we are wont to understand a certain similar extension of the same word.

§ 15. They object further the authority of Jerome, who in book 1 Against the Pelagians contends that that is impossible of which no example is given, and among other things approves the opinion of the philosopher Diodorus, saying that what never happens cannot happen; and he rejects the objection from the Gospel concerning the passage of a camel through the eye of a needle, and likewise in the Commentary on Jeremiah 31 he rejects the instance of the twelve legions. It is answered that Jerome in those places is not disputing what is possible to God; for he makes no mention of the Divine power, but of what ought to be said to be possible for a man, or for any other creature whatsoever, to do. Therefore, treating in this way of possibility, he rightly denies that to be possible which has never been done in something similar, such as that a man live without sin. For about this he is disputing there, against the Pelagians, contending that this is impossible—namely, for a man. Yet that the same thing is possible with God, this same Jerome affirms in book 2 of the same work Against the Pelagians; and in book 3 he commends the books of Augustine On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, in which it is taught that it is possible for God to work this, that a man live without sin.⁶

§ 16. But someone will say: in things perpetual, to be and to be able do not differ, as Aristotle teaches in book 3 of the Physics; but the will (*voluntas*) of God is perpetual; therefore the power (*potentia*) of God is not extended except to those things to which His will is extended; and consequently He cannot do other things than those which He wills and does. It is answered that the Philosopher's statement must be taken of passive potency (*potentia passiva*), which, if at some time it were separated from act (*actus*), then the act would not be perpetual, and thus the subject would not be perpetual, at least in a qualified sense—namely, according to a certain act of its own. But it is not so with active power (*potentia activa*), whose act is not necessarily received in the agent. He rightly, however, proves the position that no new perfection can accrue to God.

§ 17. But still they object from the Scriptures: God says to Lot (Gen. 19), "I cannot do anything until you enter there." And Christ to the Father (Matt. 26), "If it is possible, let this cup pass from me." But both are denied to be possible for God, since otherwise it had been decreed by Him. From which they think it follows that those things alone are possible for God which He has decreed to do. Although this argument can be solved by the distinction of the twofold sense of which we spoke above, nevertheless for the sake of fuller explication the theologians here distinguish the power of God into the absolute and the ordered. The absolute power of God is that according to which He can do all those things which, considered simply and in themselves, are possible—that is, whatever does not include a contradiction; as to save Judas, to damn Peter, to recall the demons to penance, to free souls from hell and to deprive those who are in heaven of felicity; to forsake the Church; to reduce this world to nothing and to create many other worlds; and many other such things. But as to what is called ordered power, there is not agreement among all. St. Thomas (ad 1 of the same

article 5, where he makes mention of this twofold power) seems to call "ordered power" that which regards only those things which God has foreknown and preordained that He would do, so that power is called "ordered" from the Divine ordination, which is only of those things which are done. In this way the aforesaid Scriptures are rightly understood, especially the latter, together with the place of it which Matthew has, "If it is possible," etc., while in Luke 22 it is said: "If You will, transfer this cup from me," as though it were the same: "If You will," and "If it is possible." Others, however, call that "ordered power" by which alone God can do those things which do not conflict with the order once instituted by Him and fixed by a certain law for the preservation of His justice; and some prefer to call this power "ordinary" rather than "ordered."⁷

§ 18. In this way, therefore, one who is damned cannot be saved, because the Divine Law has once and for all established that the damned are not to be saved. This is not so as regards wayfarers. Whence we say that God can convert and save any one of the wayfarers, but not any one of the damned. Thus, then, the cup could not pass from Christ, not only because the Father had from eternity so ordained, but also because through the Prophets He had foretold and promised that He would deliver the human race through the passion and death of Christ His Son. And this is signified whenever in the Gospel it is said: "That the scripture might be fulfilled." "How then shall the scriptures be fulfilled?" "It must needs be that the scriptures be fulfilled," or the like.

§ 19. In this way also what is objected from Genesis can be taken. Which place Augustine, expounding it in book 1 Against Gaudentius, ch. 30, says: "He could, indeed, by power, but He could not by justice. For God had promised that Lot would be saved from the burning of Sodom in Zoar." Therefore, this promise standing, God could not overthrow Sodom before Lot had come into Zoar; because otherwise Lot would not afterwards have entered there—although perhaps those same words can be taken as spoken in the person of the Angel, who, by reason of the mandate given him by God, could do nothing, as regards the overthrow of the cities, before Lot had entered into Zoar.⁸

§ 20. Moreover, from what has now been said it is also clear that it is not wrongly nor inappropriately said that by His promises God becomes our debtor, so that otherwise than He has promised He cannot act, with His justice and truth safe. And thus the Fathers sometimes speak of God, as Augustine (Sermon 16 on the words of the Apostle, and the second Exposition on Psalm 31) and Gregory (Homily 37 on the Gospels). For it is from condescension, not from necessity, that, by covenanting with us and by promising, He constitutes Himself our debtor, He who has no need of our goods, and who grants that we do that whereby He is our debtor.⁹

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 5.

2. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIV, ch. 26.

3. St. Cyprian, *Epistles*, book 4, ep. 1 (to the Confessors); St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Epistle* 1 (epist. 1. ad — [abbreviation as in source]); St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam*, on ch. 3 ("Potens est Deus de lapidibus," etc.); St. John Chrysostom, *Homilies on Matthew*, on the same words; St. Jerome, on the same place in Matthew (on ch. 26, on "more than twelve legions"); St. Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, chs. 1 and 34; St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, chs. 17–18; St. Augustine, *De fide contra Manichaeos*, ch. 30; St. Augustine, *De consensu evangelistarum* III, ch. 25; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 10; St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIII, ch. 18; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 95; St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. [cap. as in source]; St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, chs. 8–9; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Julianum*, book 8 (toward the end); St. Leo the Great, *Sermon* 14 on the Passion of the Lord; St. Gregory the Great,

Moralia in Iob, book 20, ch. 26; St. Bernard, Epistle 190 (arguing against the errors of Abelard); Thomas of Wales (Thomas Walensis), Doctrinale fidei, from ch. 10 through 39, disputing against Wyclif.

4. Peter Lombard (the Master), in the text of this Distinction ["Magister in textu" in the source].
5. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 69; St. Augustine, De spiritu et littera, ch. 31 (final chapter); St. Augustine, De civitate Dei XXI, ch. 7; St. Augustine, Confessiones, ch. 4 [abbreviation as in source]. St. John Chrysostom, Homily 2 on the Creed. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, ch. 8.
6. St. Jerome, Contra Pelagianos I; St. Jerome, Commentarius in Jeremiam, on ch. 31; St. Jerome, Contra Pelagianos II; St. Jerome, Contra Pelagianos III; commending St. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione.
7. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1.
8. St. Augustine, Contra Gaudentium I, ch. 30.
9. St. Augustine, Sermon 16 De verbis Apostoli; St. Augustine, Enarratio secunda in Psalmum 31; St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 37.

DISTINCTIO XLIV — THAT GOD CAN MAKE THINGS BETTER THAN THOSE WHICH HE MAKES

1

§ 1. From the infinity of the divine power and wisdom it follows not only that God can make other things besides those which He makes, but also that, with their substance remaining, He can make better all the things which are made by Him. He is also able, with any thing made by Himself, to make another better; or to make, among things to be made, a better one.

§ 2. For if in creatures one were ever to arrive at such a degree of goodness that nothing better could be either effected or devised by God, both the wisdom and the power of God would be contained within certain bounds. Wherefore, it must be confessed that in creatures there is nothing supreme, or, as they say, the extreme of the divine power.

§ 3. This has been signified by the Apostle's words, whereby he bears witness (Eph. 3) that God is able to do all things "exceedingly above what we ask or understand." And St. Augustine expressly teaches this in several places, for example, in *De libero arbitrio*, book 3, chapter 9, and in *De Genesi ad litteram*, book 11, chapters 7 and 10.²

§ 4. Moreover, altogether whatever proves that God is omnipotent avails to prove that He can both make more things and make these things better; for He does all the things which are included in the number of things possible, since such are of a kind as not to include a contradiction. Meanwhile St. Thomas rightly denies (in the cited place) that God can make some thing better than itself, or more perfect according to essence, namely in such a way that the same thing remains; as to make the ternary greater than itself.³ For this is not something that can be made, because it involves a contradiction. For it would follow that some thing would be, and would not be, the same.

§ II — Solution of the objections (Solutio eorum quae obijciuntur)

§ 5. Against what has been said, that God can make better things, there are several objections, most of all from St. Augustine, who in book 3 *Against Maximinus*, chapters 7 and 18, and in the 83 Questions, question 50, thus argues: "If God could beget a Son equal to Himself and was unwilling, He was envious." Whence in like manner it will be permissible for us to reason: "If He could make a better creature and was unwilling, He was envious." But to this we answer with the Master that the formal character (*ratio*) is not the same in the two arguments. For envy has its place only among those who do not differ much in nature or in dignity. Therefore, if the Father could beget a Son equal to Himself and would not, He would rightly be charged as envious; especially since equality of nature is owed to the Son. But where there is a very great distance either of nature or of dignity, no place is left for envy, as between a man and a dog, between a king and a rustic. Now there is

an infinite distance between God and creatures. Wherefore God cannot be accused of envy, if, although He can, He is unwilling to make a better creature. Again they object that Augustine elsewhere accommodates the same reasoning to creatures. For in book 4 of *De Genesi ad litteram*, chapter 16: "If," he says, "God could make good things and did not make them, there would be great envy." Which we also will be able by similar reasoning to say of better things, in this way: If He could make better things, and so forth. Perhaps someone will reply that Augustine's sense is this: if God, although He could, would not make good things but evil ones; but this sense is easily refuted from the context of the very place. Therefore the truer reply is from the *Retractationes* of St. Augustine. For in book 2, chapter 24, he confesses that he did not dispute accurately enough in this work, in which he says that many things were asked, not all found, fewer established, but others were so set forth as if still to be sought; among which we can also refer this opinion as not sufficiently weighed. For what the true opinion of Augustine is has been noted above. And indeed also in book 3 of *De libero arbitrio*, chapter 9, where he affirms that better things could have been instituted by God, yet explicitly rejects that inference about envy.

§ 6. Another [objection] from Augustine, who in book 13 of *De Trinitate*, chapter 10, disputing about the work of human redemption, says both that another mode of our redemption was possible to God, but that no other was more fitting for the healing of our misery. From which it seems to follow that God could not heal our misery more fittingly than through the Incarnation and death of His Son. Reply: Augustine holds that it is not possible for God to save man in a more fitting way than through the Son of God made man. For this work is most excellent and infinitely good, inasmuch as God was made man. Wherefore, if the substance of this work be attended to, no more fitting mode could be devised, because for God, who deigned to be made His own work, nothing is better; but, with respect to everything that is not God, something better could have been made by God.

§ 7. A fourth [argument] still from Augustine, who in book 29 of *Contra Faustum*, chapter 2, says that the Lord could have come with flesh to men without a birth. "But that," he says, "was better which He did, that He should also be born of the Virgin." And in chapter 4, when again he had said that Christ could have come even if He had not been born of a woman, he subjoined thus: "He could but would not, and this is better which He willed." From which it appears that Augustine wishes this: that what God does is always better than the things which He does not do, although He could do them. But in truth we reply that Augustine is not establishing a general rule, but is only speaking according to the subject at hand; because it was better that the Lord be born of a virgin than that He come to men without a birth. For thus He would be thought a phantasm, not a true man. And thus He would not take flesh from our stock, wherefore He would not be our brother. Finally, He would seem to repel the female sex from salvation if, having assumed the male sex, He also did not deign to be born of the female sex, as in the same place Augustine reasons. And in sum, it is not ours to judge concerning the works of God which, among those which He does, would be better, and to say, it were better that He do thus or thus; but rather we ought to venerate all the things whatsoever that He does as very good.

§ 8. A fifth argument from John Damascene, who in book 2 of *De fide orthodoxa*, chapter 29: "It is necessary," he says, "that all the things which are done by God's providence be done according to right reason, and be both best and most befitting to God, and so that they cannot be made better." But Damascene is speaking not of the goodness of the thing, but of the mode of making, which is attributed to God. For his sense is that they cannot be done better, that is, in a better mode, or with greater wisdom, than He does them.

For all the works of God proceed from one and the same operation of His wisdom. But if nevertheless the mode of effecting be referred to the things which are made, it is certain that, as they can be better, so they can be made in a better mode.

§ 9. The last argument is of this sort: Since God is best, it was necessary, or at any rate fitting, that He make His works best, not only as to the mode of making on the part of God, but also as to the things made; namely, in such a way that nothing could be better than they. This is confirmed by this sentence of Plato in the *Timaeus*: "It is the part of what is best to bring about things that are best." It is confirmed also by this reasoning. A good man makes good works, a better man better works, and what is best makes what are best; therefore God, who is best, always makes what is best. It is answered that it does not pertain to what is best to make things best, but to make in the best way, that is, out of supreme power and wisdom. But it pertains to each of these, that, whatever work has been made by Himself, He can still make another better. For otherwise God would neither have supreme power nor supreme wisdom, that is, infinite [power and wisdom], but each would be limited in the work already made, as in the extreme of power and of wisdom, because nothing could be better. To the appended proof from Plato one can similarly reply, as has already been answered to Damascene. For whatever things God makes are and ought to be best on the part of the maker and of the mode, but not on the part of the thing. For they are made by God, who is supreme goodness and supreme wisdom, and therefore they are made in the best and most wise way. To the other confirmation it is answered that it is one thing about man, another about God. For man by his operations makes progress in goodness, since he is accidentally good, and in turn he operates from acquired goodness; and therefore the more he makes better works, the more he becomes better; and the better he is, the more he makes better works. But God is essentially good; nor in any way does His goodness depend on the goodness of the works which He makes. Whence, with His goodness safe, He could do absolutely nothing; He could also make things less good than those which He makes, and that to show that not only greater goods but also lesser goods flow forth from Him Himself as from the fount of every good. Likewise God acts not as one acting morally, whose goodness is estimated from the goodness of the work, but as a perfect craftsman, who can produce works of any kind according to His art, and who, to show that He does not do vulgar works, by comparison with which nevertheless the pre-eminence of others may appear.

§ III — Whether God can make that things past have not been? (An facere possit Deus ut praeterita non fuerint?)

§ 10. Since the claim that what is said to be past not to have been includes a contradiction with itself, namely this: that the same thing both has been and has not been; it is clear, according to what has been said above at Distinction 42, that this does not belong to the number of things absolutely possible, and therefore is not comprised under the omnipotence of God (*omnipotentia Dei*)—as St. Thomas rightly teaches, and with him almost all the scholastic Doctors in concord.¹⁴ St. Augustine taught this same thing in Book 26 against Faustus, chs. 4 and 5, by an argument taken from truth, against which God, who is the highest truth, cannot act.¹⁵ But He would act against it if He were to make that what is, or is set down as true because it is set down as having been done, had not been done. Wherefore it is altogether futile that Pliny, by this argument among others, strives to show that God, if there is any, cannot do all things.

§ 11. Also, what St. Jerome writes to Eustochium, On the custody of virginity, ch. 2, is wont to be alleged for this opinion, saying thus: "I will speak boldly: though God can do all things, He cannot raise up a virgin after her downfall"—as if he were saying that God cannot make that a virgin who has been corrupted had not been corrupted.¹⁶ But Jerome's subsequent words seem to suggest another sense; for he subjoins: "He is indeed able to free from punishment, but He does not will to crown one who has been corrupted"; although some codices have: "but He is not able to crown one who has been corrupted." The sense, however, comes to the same: for it is signified that, although God absolutely can do all things, nevertheless by justice, or by ordered power (*potentia ordinata*), He cannot crown as a virgin one who is corrupted, namely by bestowing the aureole of virginity (the aureole, *aureola*, of virginity). For this is repugnant to His ordination and decree, by which He willed and established that only virgins should be gifted with that laurel-wreath. Although that saying of Jerome seems to have been uttered with a certain allusion to the absolute impossibility of abolishing what has once been done. Concerning which, that saying also is current, and likewise most true: "what has been done cannot be made not-done."

§ 12. Where nevertheless one must know that, with the thing done and past remaining, God without doubt can make whole again one who is corrupted, and restore virginity both of mind and of body once lost; just as He restores charity and other virtues, and likewise the bodily senses and qualities. What we say of virginity will likewise be [the case] in His elect by the glory of the resurrection, by which He will take away from them every corruption.

§ IV — The objections are resolved (Solvuntur objectiones)

§ 13. But someone will object against this doctrine: if there is not in God power (*potentia*) toward the past, then neither is there toward the future. For just as "past" and "not past" are repugnant, so "future" and "not future" are repugnant. Yet, this notwithstanding, God could make that future things not be future; therefore, similarly, that past things not be past. We answer that it is not similar in the case of the past and the future. For what is called past is already posited in the order of things; but what is called future is not yet posited. Although, therefore, God cannot make that something be future and not be future, because that is a contradiction, nevertheless He can make that this which we suppose to be future, and which in truth would be future, not come to pass—in the divided sense (*sensu diviso*), which has no place with respect to pasts, inasmuch as those are already posited and are held to have been done. But whether there be in God power toward the present, so that it not be, someone might doubt, because the condition of the past and of the present seems the same. For just as the past is posited, so also what is present is posited. Wherefore a like contradiction too would follow, namely that the same thing be and not be. But it must be answered that neither here is it similar. For what is being posited is posited freely by its cause, which therefore, while it posits, has power toward the opposite. Whence it is truly said "to be able not to do." But what is already posited, although when it was being posited it was freely posited by its cause, now, however, with respect to it the cause no longer has liberty, and therefore not power. Whence is clear the reason why it is rightly said that God can make that the sun not shine now, and yet cannot make that yesterday it did not shine, although yesterday He could have made this; and so in other cases.

§ 14. From these things one can understand what must be answered to a similar question which the Master treats in the text: whether God can always do what He once could. One must distinguish: if the thing

alone be attended to without a determination of time, the answer is affirmative, as some say that what is once possible is always possible. Yet, if one speak properly and exactly, account being taken of the whole signification of propositions, with time also included, one must answer rather negatively. For example, this is not true: "God can make that Adam did not sin," because "to make" in that proposition denotes a present or future action, which cannot terminate in a thing of past time. But if you use a past-tense verb, you will make a true proposition in this way: "God could make, or He can have made, that Adam not sin." For when I say "He can have made," I signify—under the amplitude and non-restriction of the power of God, which is eternal and immutable, and therefore is suitably expressed by a present-tense verb—that there is also comprehended whatever things were once done or could have been done. Whence St. Thomas, in the reply to the second [objection] of the question and article cited above, says: "If the immutability of the divine power be attended to, whatever God could, He can."¹⁷ Which things being so, certain persons do not rightly number the Master's simply affirmative reply among his erroneous opinions; since both according to the asserter's mind it is true, and in a not unfit sense it comes about that it can be defended as true.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 6.
 2. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 9; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, chs. 7, 10.
 3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 6 [abbreviation as in source: "art. 6. citat. qu. 25."].
 4. St. Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* III, chs. 7, 18.
 5. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 50.
 6. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 16.
 7. St. Augustine, *Retractationes* II, ch. 24.
 8. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, ch. 9.
 9. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 10.
 10. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXIX, ch. 2.
 11. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXIX, ch. 4.
 12. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 29.
 13. Plato, *Timaeus* ("Optimi est optima adducere").
 14. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 4.
 15. St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXVI, chs. 4–5.
 16. St. Jerome, *Ad Eustochium, De custodia virginitatis*, ch. 2.
 17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 4, ad 2.

DISTINCTIO XLV — THAT GOD DOES NOT OPERATE BY NECESSITY OF NATURE BUT BY FREE WILL; OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

§ 1. According to the order established by us, which we pointed out above at Distinction 35, it remains now also to treat with the Master, down to the end of this first book, concerning the will of God; at the outset we will show that God does not operate by necessity of nature, but by free will. This indeed is a Catholic and most certain dogma of the Christian religion. The reason for it St. Thomas adduces thus: although God wills His own goodness by necessity, in that it is proper to His will and therefore its object, just as also our will rightly of necessity wills beatitude, and likewise any other power has a necessary inclination to its proper and principal object, as sight to color; nevertheless He does not will other things except inasmuch as they are ordered to His goodness as to an end. But those things which are for an end we do not necessarily will by willing the end, unless they are such that without them the end cannot be; since therefore the Divine goodness is in itself most perfect, and can be without others, nor is it possible that anything of perfection should accrue to it from others, the consequence is that God, whatever He operates (for He does not operate save things other than Himself), operates by free will—because the operation of the will is the execution.¹

§ 2. This is most plainly attested by the Apostle (Eph. 1), thus writing of God: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." And 1 Cor. 12, where, after he had said that God works all things in all, afterward referring this to His free will he says: "But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." Explaining these words, St. Ambrose, *De fide* II, ch. 3, says: "'As He will'—that is, by the choice of free will, not by the compliance of necessity."² To this pertain the things which above at Distinctions 43 and 44 were brought forward from the Scriptures and the Fathers, together with the manifest force of reasons to show that God is able both to omit the things which He does, and to do the things which He does not do, and even to do things better than those which He does—none of all which would be possible, if He operated not by free will but by natural necessity.

§ 3. There is also this argument from the posterior: every perfection of the creature is in God, either formally or eminently; formally indeed, if it is a pure perfection; but eminently, if it includes something of imperfection. Now the perfection and dignity of certain creatures, as of the Angel and of man, is to have the free choice of will; nor does anything of imperfection fall under that description; therefore it is necessary that that perfection be acknowledged formally in God, and indeed in the most perfect mode—namely, so that just as His goodness is the principle and source of all goodness which is in creatures, and likewise His wisdom, power, etc., so His freedom is the principle and cause of the freedom which is found in creatures and their actions; and as the creature is not good, wise, etc., except by participation of the Divine goodness, wisdom, etc., so neither is it free, except by participation of the Divine freedom.

§ 4. Another reason: if God acted by necessity and not freely, it would have been necessary that the world be eternal; because in an eternal cause, which always has itself in the same way, and operates of necessity, there

could not be any reason why it should operate now and not at another time; therefore its operation would be eternal and the effect eternal; just as if the Sun were eternal, since of itself it emits brightness not freely but of necessity, it would be necessary that its brightness be eternal. This very point of the freedom of the Divine operation. S. II.

§ 5. The objections are resolved. It is objected against the freedom of the Divine will. First: The will of God is immutable; therefore it is not free; for that is called free which can be bent to either of the opposites; but this cannot be without change. Second: Whoever has free will is by his nature indifferent to either of those things about which his free will is conversant; but such indifference is repugnant to God, as to one who always has himself in one way and cannot have himself otherwise; therefore He does not have free will. Third: God knows all things by necessity; therefore He wills all things by necessity; for, as the knowledge of God is His essence, so too is His will. Fourth: St. Jerome, in the epistle to Damasus on the prodigal son, which is numbered 146, denies God to be of free will, in these words: "God alone is He into whom sin does not fall; the rest, since they are of free will, can bend their will to either part." And in the explication of the symbol to the same, which is had in tome 9 under the title of epistle 17, he says that Jovinian took away the liberty of free choice, because he asserted that man cannot sin. "But we," he says, "say that man can always both sin and not sin, so that we may always confess ourselves to be of free will." Whence in like manner it follows that God is not of free will, because He cannot sin. Fifth: The good is self-diffusive; therefore God necessarily at least produces some creature; for otherwise He would not be good; for He would not pour Himself forth by any work outwardly. Sixth: It is proper to God to have mercy and to spare and to do good, as the voices of the Church testify; therefore He could not fail to exhibit some work of mercy, of benignity, and of beneficence. For if He had willed to do nothing at all *ad extra*, it is not apparent how He could truly have been called benign, beneficent, merciful. For these things are not said from the power of doing good, but from the inclination of the will, which in God is not separated from act; because His most powerful will cannot be impeded. Seventh: God moves and makes each thing as it is born (i.e., *apt*) to be moved or to be made; but certain things are born to be or to be made of necessity, certain contingently, certain freely; therefore God moves and makes some things of necessity—as the heaven, day, time, the year, the eclipse; some contingently—as this horse, this stone, fire, and their motions or operations; others freely—as the will of man and its acts. Therefore He does not operate all things freely, but only certain things.

§ 6. To these arguments there was a first reply above at Distinction 8, where we were treating of the immutability of the will, and it was shown that the will is not said to be free from this, that it can be bent to either, in such wise namely that it can pass from one to the other, but from this, that it has a potency to either. And since this potency in God is not determined to the other part by some other, but by the same eternal inclination of His will, no mutability of the will of God follows, if it be posited as free; nor again, if mutability be posited, is freedom thereby taken away; nor is necessity introduced, except that which is merely *ex hypothesi*. For, supposing that God wills, says St. Thomas (I, q. 19), He cannot not will, because His will cannot be changed.¹

§ 7. To the second it is answered that God is by His nature indifferent to either in this sense, that from His nature, that is, from His very nature, He does not have a determination that He should will anything outside Himself. Nevertheless He cannot be said to be indifferent, as though by His proper will He were determined to the one or the other. Nor is such indifference of the formal character of free will. But you will say: Nature and will are the same in God; if therefore by will God is determined to the one or the other from eternity, by

nature likewise He is. It is answered that nature and will in God are the same in reality, but are distinguished by reason; on account of which distinction of reason the argument does not proceed rightly from will to nature, because formally it ought to be taken. The will indeed...

§ 8. To the third St. Thomas answers in the same place, in the same article, ad 6, that the will of God does not have a necessary habitude to the things willed, as knowledge has to the things known; because knowledge has an order to things as they are in the knower; the will, however, is compared to things as they are in themselves. Since therefore all things other than God have being and actions necessary inasmuch as they are in God, but not inasmuch as they are in themselves, the consequence is that God, whatever things He knows, He knows by necessity, but not whatever things He wills does He will by necessity.³

§ 9. As for the fourth argument, this seems to prove that in the notion of free will is contained the power of sinning. The place for that question is earlier, in book 2 (Distinction 24). Meanwhile, to St. Jerome we answer that he does not absolutely deny free will in God; in his commentary upon the Epistle to Philemon, at that passage, "Without thy counsel I was unwilling to do anything," he openly affirms that God is of free will; but he only excludes from God free will according to that condition which belongs to created free will, which is the being able to bend oneself to evil. For men, when speaking of free will, are wont for the most part to involve this in its concept, although it does not truly pertain to it, but is the defect of it from the fall of nature; just as some have defined man as a rational mortal animal, whereas mortality is not a natural property but a vice of man from sin.⁴ (Here a suspicion must be forestalled, and the words of that Author be vindicated; namely, whether he glides into the condemned Proposition 58 among the Baian propositions: "The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but a natural condition." Away then with the scruple that could be injected into certain persons on occasion of this sentence; for, as much as can be gathered from the propositions cited elsewhere out of the things which in book ...) What is objected in the latter place, however, is not of Jerome writing to Damasus, but is of Pelagius before Pope Innocent, of a man vainly trying to purge himself by a certain confession of faith by no means sufficient. Whose testimony therefore is easily despised.⁵

§ 10. To the fifth it is answered that the good is said to be self-diffusive not after the manner of an efficient cause, but of a final cause, in the same way in which an end is said to move, as St. Thomas says (I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2). But whether "self-diffusive" be said as of an end, or as of an efficient cause, it is not signified that it must communicate itself, but that it can communicate itself. Moreover, to this there is added in the supreme good a certain necessity of diffusing itself ex hypothesi. For, things posited as diverse from that, it is necessary that they be good by participation of it and not otherwise; and therefore it is necessary that the supreme good diffuse itself upon them.⁶

§ 11. To the sixth also it is answered that, since God antecedently owes nothing to anyone, those properties—benignity, beneficence, mercy, and other things of this sort—are not to be attributed to God as though they necessarily included an inclination of the will to acts of these; without which inclination they would not rightly be attributed to men. For among men he cannot be called beneficent who should will never to do good to anyone, nor merciful who should will to have mercy on no one. But they are attributed to God, inasmuch as they signify the power of such acts under the mode of a habit. And since a habit does not necessarily incline the will, as is evident also in certain human habits, as in arts and sciences (for a man can be a grammarian who is unwilling either to write or to speak), it comes about that the said properties, as certain virtues, belong to God even if He should operate nothing according to them. Although in that case it would

be true that God did not manifest those virtues of His. Conducive, however, to a fuller understanding of this solution are the things disputed at Distinction 30 about the names which befit God from time. From which also it is understood that in some sense it can be said that the aforesaid properties and the like would not belong to God, if He had willed to produce no works of such virtues—namely, according to that acceptance of them in which they simultaneously involve a propensity of the will to such acts.

§ 12. To the last: God is not said to move or to make each thing as it is born to be moved or to be made, as though from Him things proceeded in such modes, that is, either necessarily, or contingently, or freely. For God is a most free cause acting with respect to all His effects; nothing, however, necessarily or contingently; but the sense is: that God adapts to the effects which He wills to be necessary, necessary secondary causes; to contingent effects, contingent causes; and to free effects, free causes. Whence it is not to be said that God moves heaven, or a stone, naturally or necessarily; but that He moves them freely, although it is true that they are moved naturally and necessarily by the causes through which God freely moves.

§ 13. Other arguments which could be adduced here let the student seek in St. Thomas (I, q. 19, a. 3) and his commentators upon the same articles. Elsewhere also does the same Doctor discourse upon this matter, as in *Contra Gentiles* I, chs. 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89; II, chs. 25, 27; III, ch. 97; and in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 3, 4; *De malo*, q. 16, a. 3.⁷

§ III — That the will of God is the cause of all things (Voluntatem Dei esse omnium rerum causam)

§ 14. The will of God (*voluntas Dei*), which we have shown above to be free in all its works, is the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) of every work and of all things which are not what God is, and it is likewise the first of all causes. And this, according to the Scriptures, is so certain that it is not lawful for a Christian man to doubt it. For it is written in Eph. 1: "Who works all things according to the counsel of His will"; and in Rev. 4: "Thou hast created all things, and for Thy will they were and were created"; and in Wis. 11: "How could anything endure, unless Thou willedst it?" Hence St. Augustine, book 1 against the Manichees, ch. 2, pronounced without exception that the will of God is the cause of all things that are.⁹ And in book 3 of *On the Trinity*, ch. 4, he said that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all species and of motions.¹⁰ And St. Jerome, book 3 of the *Dialogue* against the Pelagians, ch. 3, after reciting the words of the Patriarch Jacob, "If the Lord shall have been with me and shall have kept me in the way," etc., subjoins: "He attributes all things to the will of the Lord, that he may deserve to receive what he prays for."¹¹

§ 15. Now, whatever passages teach that God is the cause of all things serve for the proof of this doctrine, as Rom. 11: "From Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things"; Jn. 1: "All things were made through Him"; 1 Cor. 12: "Who works all things in all." For since, as was proved above, God in all that He works, works freely, and therefore is the cause of all those things through His will, it follows that the very will of God is the cause of the same, that is, absolutely of all things. Of which doctrine three reasons assigned by St. Thomas may be seen in the article cited above.⁸ There, however, one may ask—since from the foregoing it is also established that knowledge (*scientia*) and power (*potentia*) are causes, and these three differ, as to the manner of causing, according to the mode and order of our understanding—how the order is to be understood in God. It is answered, with St. Thomas in the reply to the fourth, that it is to be understood in God in a way similar to the manner and order in which it stands in us.¹² In us, for one and the same effect,

knowledge is a cause as directing (for by it, to wit, the form of the work is conceived), then the will as commanding, because a form as it is in the intellect alone is not determined to this, that it be or not be in the effect, save through the will—for the speculative intellect says nothing about operating; but power is a cause as executing, because it names the immediate principle of operation. Although all these in God are one.

§ 16. From this explication it is clear that knowledge does not have the formal character of a cause in act except from the will's determining and applying the knowledge to the work; nor does an effect proceed from the will unless the decree of the will be carried out by power, as we plainly see to occur in us, for whom to will is not enough unless there be present also to be able. Nevertheless, in a certain consideration the will is a nearer principle of things than power, inasmuch as it determines the generality of power. For the will is only of those things which are, or sometime come to be, whereas power extends also to those which never come to be; and for this reason it is a more remote principle, which, unless it be determined by the will unto operation, does not produce an effect. For just as it is written: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done," so we do not also read: "All things whatsoever He was able, He has done," since it was shown above that God is able to do many things which He will never do. You will ask, then, how the will is the first cause (*prima causa*), since knowledge, and in a certain sense power, precede it according to order. I answer that it is first according to the thing, just as also the knowledge and the power and the goodness of God are the first cause of all things. For they are the same as God Himself, although they differ in formal consideration and have a certain order among themselves. But second causes (*secundae causae*) are created things, really diverse from God.

§ IV — That there is no cause of the Divine will (Voluntatis Divinae nullam esse causam)

§ 17. The Divine will (*voluntas divina*) is so much the cause (*causa*) of all things that of it there can be no further cause. For in us, indeed, one will is the cause of another, speaking of the act of will (*actus voluntatis*); as, for example, the will whereby we desire health brings about in us the will of going to the physician and of seeking remedies for the disease. But God by a single will, or operation of will, which is nothing other than His essence (*essentia*), wills all the things whatsoever He wills; just as by a single intuitive gaze of His mind He sees all the things whatsoever He sees, using no discourse of reason, by which He might infer one thing from another. Rightly, therefore, does St. Augustine, in the words cited by the Master, teach that one must not seek any cause of the will of God, since nothing is prior to it or greater than it; but that it is itself the first and highest cause of all things.¹³ Nor, for all that, ought the will of God to be thought irrational. For by His will God orders other things as means to ends. Now the end is the formal character (*ratio*) of the means. Wherefore a will disposing things in this way cannot be called irrational. God also wills that He be the formal character of all other things, because "He has wrought all things for Himself" (Prov. 16). In these ways, therefore, we are not forbidden to investigate the cause of the divine will. For although it, taken in itself, has no cause, as we have now shown; nevertheless its effect has a cause and the formal character, as the creation of the world, of man, of the angels. From these things, moreover, it follows that there is nothing outside of God which, as it were, moves Him to will or to do anything, neither as efficient cause nor as end. For no cause of God can exist in any genus; but He proceeds to act out of His own goodness, which He wills to communicate to others, and therefore He Himself is the efficient and also the final cause of all things. Wherefore what is said in the Creed, that "for us men and for our salvation He came down" to the work of the Incarnation, is to be understood in no other way than that by His own goodness, by which He willed to succor the human race

and to bring salvation, He undertook such a work; so that the work of the Incarnation was destined by Him as a means to our salvation. Expressions of a like form, whether they contain an express mention of the Divine will or not, are to be taken in the same manner; as in Is. 53: "For the sin of my people I struck him." Which also could have been said thus, "I willed to strike," just as a little later it is said: "The Lord willed to bruise him," namely on account of our iniquities. For also earlier in that same chapter it had preceded: "He was wounded for our iniquities, he was bruised for our crimes." Therefore this whole thing was willed by God on account of something else. And universally, as often as it is truly said: God did this on account of that, it can also truly be said: God willed this on account of that. For whatever He did, He willed to do, and not on account of anything other than on account of which He did it; yet in such wise that the cause or the formal character is referred not to the Divine will itself, but to His deed, that is, to the thing willed. And indeed in this way St. Thomas speaks, when he says that one thing willed by God is the cause of another, so that it may fall under the order of the Divine will.¹⁴ Nor is it contrary to this that the same Doctor, concluding his reply in these words: "Therefore God wills this to be on account of that, but not on account of that does He will this."¹⁵ Whence Cajetan teaches that this proposition is, in the rigor of speech, false, "God wills this, because He wills something." For both deny those propositions to be true in which it seems to be signified that there is some cause of the Divine will itself or of the volition; because no other verb is expressed to which the signified causality can be referred, as is evident in the said propositions. But when one says: God wills this to be on account of that, or He wills to do this, or that this be done, on account of that; another verb is expressed to which the causality may conveniently be referred; as if I should say, God willed to create the world, because He willed to communicate His goodness to others; God willed grace for Peter, because He willed glory for him. For He did not properly "willed, because He willed," as if one willing in God were the cause of another according to the thing itself; but by one and the same act of willing He willed this to be on account of that, that is, that the one be the effect of the other.¹⁶

§ 18. It must be noted, finally, concerning this doctrine, that the ultimate resolution of all causes and formal characters is in the Divine will alone, as St. Thomas declares by an example in the reply to the third. Likewise, therefore, if it be asked out of many possible goods why God willed this and not that, especially since He could also have made things better than those which He made, nevertheless a term must be set to a question of this sort in the will of God, by saying: because He so willed; namely, that beyond the simple will of God no further formal character of the fact is to be sought: just as the same Doctor teaches in the same article, in the reply to the second, and in q. 23, a. 5, which is about the cause of predestination, in the body of the article and in the reply to the third.¹⁷ Whence also St. Augustine, in the places alleged above, sets as the final terminus of those questions in which it is asked why God did this or that, the will of God, answering: because He willed; nor, as to why He willed, is any further cause to be sought. For in truth, although God wills some things to be on account of others; nevertheless His will supposes absolutely nothing, nor can it suppose anything, of which it is not itself the cause; and therefore it is necessary that to the will of God, as to the first and cause, all other causes and formal characters be referred.

§ V — Whether the will of God is the cause of evils? (An voluntas Dei sit causa malorum?)

§ 19. When it is said that the will of God (*voluntas Dei*) is the cause of all things, by the name of "things" only good things are to be understood. For those which are called simply evil, that is sins, which we call the evils of

fault (*mala culpae*), although they are in things, are nevertheless not things, but the vices and defects of things, and privations of goods. These therefore are foreign to the will of God, whose object can be nothing except what is truly good, according to that of Ps. 5: "For thou art not a God willing iniquity," and of Wis. 14: "The impious and his impiety are hateful to God." And Hab. 1: "Thy eyes are pure, that thou mayest not see evil; and thou canst not look on iniquity," that is, to will and approve it. Likewise Deut. 32: "The works of God are perfect and all His ways are judgments; God is faithful and without any iniquity, just and right," and other places of this sort without number. But those things which are called evils of punishment (*mala poenae*), as death, hunger, thirst, diseases, and other afflictions and miseries, are simply good, and therefore must of necessity be referred to the will of God as to their cause, as the Scriptures bear witness, Amos 3: "Shall there be evil in a city which God hath not done?" Is. 45: "I am the Lord, making peace and creating evil." Sir.: "Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and honor [honestas], are from God." And Sir. 39: "Good things for the good were created from the beginning; so also for the most wicked, good things and evil things," and what follows, and other of this sort everywhere.

§ 20. The former doctrine has been most celebrated in the writings of the Fathers, namely, that God is not the author of evil, that is of sin, and those who asserted the contrary they have always execrated as heretics and as blasphemers against God. Whence it plainly follows that the will of God is not the cause of evils. For whatever is caused by the will of God, is caused by God; and conversely, as is clear from the above.

§ 21. But let us subjoin some places from the Fathers. Dionysius the Areopagite, in the book *On the Divine Names*, ch. 4, at length shows that God is not, nor can be, the author of evil.¹⁹ Antony, in Athanasius, in his *Life*: "This first," he says, "must we fix upon our minds, that God has made nothing which is evil."²⁰ St. Basil wrote a peculiar homily, the ninth in number, with this title: that God is not the author of evils.²¹ St. John Chrysostom teaches the same in almost innumerable places against the Manichees.²² Epiphanius, Philastrius, and St. Augustine, in the books which they composed on heresies, reckon the Manichees, Florinians, Seleucians, Hermians, and some others, under this head as heretics, because they said that God is the cause of evil.²³ And Eusebius too, *Ecclesiastical History*, book 5 (ch. 20), reports that Irenaeus, against Florinus and the heretic Blastus, published books in which he disputed on this same argument.²⁴ Again, St. Augustine, in the book *Eighty-Three Questions* (qq. 3, 4, and 21), shows by arguments that, God willing and being the author, no one becomes evil or worse.²⁵ Which arguments the Master adduces from him in the distinction immediately following [f. K. T. M.].²⁶ Prosper, in the *Response* (to the 10th objection of Vincent), calls detestable the opinion of those who make God the author of an evil will.²⁷ But let these few out of many suffice, since also above, at Dist. 40, when reprobation was being treated, we showed that sins can in no way be said to be effects of Divine reprobation, the arguments brought on the contrary being refuted as well.

§ 22. But the latter doctrine too is sufficiently clearly handed down by the Fathers, as especially by St. Augustine, who, book 1 (*On the Trinity*, ch. 4), when he had said that the will of God is the first and highest cause of all kinds and of motions, subjoined that the same will of God is the cause of health and sickness, of rewards and punishments, etc.²⁸ But because the Master and, with him, almost all the scholastic Doctors treat this question—whether God is the author of all punishment—at Distinctions 36 and 37 of book 2, we too will defer the handling of it to that same place; yet, for clarification, and so that the reason of the difference already posited between the evil of fault and the evil of punishment may be more fully understood, the reply

of St. Thomas to the question in which he asks whether the will of God is the cause of evils (art. 9 of q. 19) must be carefully considered.¹⁸

§ 23. For he replies that God on that account in no way wills the evil of fault, because God loves no good more than His own goodness; therefore He cannot in any way will the evil which deprives of the order to the Divine good—such, namely, is the evil of fault. The reason of which consequence is that it is impossible for evil to be desired under the formal character (*ratio*) of evil, because the formal character of the good is the proper formal character of what is appetible. But evil can sometimes be desired by accident, inasmuch as it is conjoined to a good which is loved more than that good which the evil deprives. But this cannot be said of the evil of fault with respect to God: because God, as has just been said, loves nothing more than His own goodness, to which the evil of fault is opposed. Wherefore it cannot come about that He should will the evil of fault. Moreover, God wills the evil of natural defect, or the evil of punishment, by willing some good to which such evil is conjoined; for example, He wills punishment, because by it man is brought back to the order of justice. Likewise He wills the corruptions of certain things on account of the good of the whole Universe, in which various grades of things are required. Wherefore God is said to will the evils of punishment, and universally the natural defects and corruptions, not indeed per se, but per accidens, inasmuch as He wills them for the sake of some good greater than those goods of which those evils deprive. But the evils of fault He wills neither per se nor per accidens, neither directly nor indirectly, and that on account of their opposition to the Divine good.

§ 24. In almost the same way the same Doctor explains this difference, I, q. 48, a. 6: "God," he says, "is the author of the evil of punishment, not of fault; the reason of which is that the evil of punishment deprives the creature of a good—whether you take the creature's good as something created, as blindness deprives of sight, or whether it be the uncreated good, as by the lack of the Divine vision the creature's uncreated good is taken away. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to the uncreated good. For it is contrary to the fulfillment of the Divine will and to the Divine love, by which the Divine good is loved in itself, and not only as it is participated by the creature." Thus there. Again, in I-II, q. 76, a. 1, from this he proves that God is not the cause of sin, because every sin comes about through a recession from the order which is to the last end; but God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to the ultimate end, as Dionysius attests (ch. 1 of *On the Divine Names*).²⁹ Wherefore it is impossible that He be to anyone a cause of departing from the order which is toward Himself, and consequently a cause of sin. And in the same place, in the reply to the fourth argument, which was of this sort: Every evil is opposed to good. Now it is not repugnant to the Divine goodness that He be the cause of the evil of punishment; therefore neither is it repugnant that He be the cause of fault: "It must be said," he says, "that punishment is opposed to the good of him who is punished, who is deprived of some good; but fault is opposed to the good of order which is toward God. Whence it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness, and for this reason there is not a like account of fault and of punishment."

§ 25. Likewise, II-II, q. 19, a. 1: "Since," he says, "the good is said with reference to order to an end, but evil imports the privation of this order; that is evil simply which excludes the order from the ultimate end, which is the evil of fault. But the evil of punishment is indeed evil, inasmuch as it deprives of some particular good; it is nevertheless good simply, inasmuch as it depends on the order of the ultimate end." Thus there.³⁰

§ 26. Moreover, the same St. Thomas declares the same matter a little differently, I, q. 49, a. 2, where, replying to the question whether the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil, he distinguishes in this way, saying that the evil which consists in a defect of action, or is caused by a defect of the agent, cannot be

reduced to God as to a cause; because God, who is the highest perfection, cannot fail in acting. But that evil which consists in the corruption of certain things can be reduced to God as to a cause. Which he thus proves: because any agent, insofar as by its own power it produces some form upon which corruption and defect follow, by its own power causes that corruption and defect. But the good of the Universe, which is as it were the form principally intended by God as the author of the world, requires that there be certain things which can fail and sometimes do fail. Therefore God, by willing and causing the good of the Universe, consequently and as it were per accidens wills and causes the corruptions of certain things. And since to the good of the Universe there pertains also the order of justice, which requires that punishment be inflicted on sinners, it follows by the same reasoning that even the evil of punishment is from God. But not the evil of fault; because this evil consists in a defect of action and is caused by a defect of the agent—which, as has already been said, is not referred to God as a cause, not so that this evil be in the Universe, but so that it be permitted to be, which very permission is good, and is from God.³¹

§ 27. From these are gathered two most principal reasons why God is not the author of the evil of fault as He is of the evil of punishment: namely, because the evil of fault deprives of the good of the order which is toward God; and because it consists in a defect of action—neither of which can be said of the evil of punishment, insofar as it is only an evil of punishment. Of these two reasons, however, the one follows from the other. For therefore does an agent morally fail in action, because it recedes from the order into the highest good. Nevertheless it must be known that the very actions which are sins, insofar as they are actions, and whatever of entity, as they say, or of actuality there is in sins, is from God—just as St. Thomas teaches in many places, and the Doctors commonly hand down (at Dist. 36 and 37 of book 2), where also we shall speak more fully of this matter.³²

§ VI — Whether the will of God imposes necessity upon things (An Dei voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat?)

§ 28. Although, as was shown above, God, whatever things He works, does not work by necessity but freely, nevertheless it is certain that in the works of God, that is, in created things, there is found a certain necessity not only opposed to liberty but also to contingency—many things in reality have absolute necessity. Hence, with good reason it is asked whether the will of God (*voluntas Dei*) imposes necessity (*necessitas*) upon the things willed. Which question can be understood in two ways. In one way thus: whether by the very fact that things are, or come forth, from the will of God, they are necessary, or come to be necessarily. To which one must answer in the negative. For it does not follow that a thing is, or comes to be, necessarily with an absolute necessity (*necessitas absoluta*—of which there is question here) because God wills it to be or to come to be; even though the consequence from the will of God to the thing willed is necessary, in that the will of God cannot be frustrated. But this is a hypothetical necessity (*necessitas hypothetica*) of things, not an absolute one. In the other way the sense is: whether the will of God causes necessity in all, or in some, of the things willed by Himself. To which St. Thomas rightly answers by distinguishing³³ that the divine will imposes necessity upon certain things willed, yet not upon all. For among the things willed by God some are necessary, and some contingent.

§ 29. Certain men, as St. Thomas reports in the same place, wished to assign the reason from intermediate causes (*causae mediae*), namely, that those things which God produces through necessary causes are necessary,

but those which He produces through contingent causes are contingent. But he denies that this is a sufficient reason, for two causes. First, because the effect of some first cause is said to be contingent on account of a second cause (*causa secunda*), in that by the defect of this latter it is impeded—just as the power of the sun is impeded through the defect of a plant. Yet no effect of a second cause can hinder the will of God from producing its own effect. Second, because if the distinction of contingent from necessary things be referred solely to second causes, it will follow that this is beside the intention and will of the Divine, which is absurd and impossible. He therefore answers that the reason must be sought from the efficacy of the divine will itself. For when, he says, some cause (*causa*) has been efficacious for acting, the effect follows the cause not only according to that which is done, but also according to the mode of becoming or of being. Wherefore, since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things come to be which God wills to come to be, but also that they come to be in that mode in which God wills them to come to be. But God wills that, for this purpose—that by diverse grades of things the universe may be completed—certain things should happen of necessity, and certain things contingently. And therefore for certain effects He has provided and fitted necessary causes, that is, indefectible in causing, from which effects follow of necessity; but for others He has fitted contingent causes, that is, defectible and able to be impeded, from which accordingly the effects come about contingently.

§ 30. Hence, therefore, it is clear that effects willed by God do not for this reason, as others were saying, happen contingently because the proximate causes are contingent; but on the contrary, because God willed that certain effects should happen contingently, He prepared for them contingent causes—namely, in order that the whole account of the diversity be referred not to intermediate causes but at length to the will of God as to the first cause, and by this very fact the most efficacious.

§ 31. Which doctrine the commentators on St. Thomas, Cajetan and Domingo Bañez, carefully and at length explain through many conclusions and noteworthy points, applying also solutions of the arguments which could be adduced for the diverse opinion. To these authors we remit the student, although from those things which, at Dist. 38, on the Foreknowledge (*praescientia*) and Providence (*providentia*) of God, and those which, at Dist. 40, on Predestination (*praedestinatio*), we have discussed, it can sufficiently be established that those examples adduced in those places do not impose necessity upon the things willed by God, nor destroy free will (*liberum arbitrium*) in them—however the remaining matters pertaining to this present question can be understood. For the objections also which are wont to be brought here are almost the same as those to which in those places we gave the solution.

§ VII — The various acceptions of the will of God are explained (Varia acceptio voluntatis Dei explicatur)

§ 32. For the understanding of those sacred places which make mention, in the Scriptures, of the will (*voluntas*) of the Divine, and signify that God wills something or does not will it, there is of greatest use, first and foremost, that celebrated division of the will of God among the Doctors of the schools, whereby it is divided into the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*) and the will of sign (*voluntas signi*). Of these, the former is said in God simply and properly to be will; the latter, as such, only metaphorically. For the will of good pleasure in God is said to be that by which He wills something in the proper sense—namely, that by which something has been absolutely pleasing to God and established, to be or to come to be; in which

manner we say it is God's will that the world be and be conserved; that none of the elect perish; that none of the reprobate be saved; that as well the punishment of these as the glory of those endure forever. This will of God is eternal, wherefore it can never be changed or be frustrated of its effect, but always and in all things to which it extends it is efficacious, and is always fulfilled, even though the created will be unwilling and sometimes resist—as will be taught below. And in terms of this will all those things, whatever have hitherto been disputed concerning the will of God, are to be understood.

§ 33. But the will of sign is called some temporary sign of will, that is, some thing or action which is wont to be a sign of will. Of which kind five are numbered by the Master and by other Doctors, namely precept (*praeceptum*), counsel (*consilium*), prohibition (*prohibitio*), operation (*operatio*), permission (*permissio*). Each of which is called, improperly, the will of God, with the appellation taken from what happens around the human will. For these are wont to be signs of will in men, as can be made clear one by one. For if we give a precept or counsel about something, that, so far as in us lies, we will and we are promoters of, that it be done. If we prohibit something, we will it not be done. If we perform something, it is certain that we absolutely will that—at least in most cases. For in some cases it can happen that we do things unwittingly or unwillingly. If we permit something which it is in our power to impede, we are said to will that too, even if perchance we directly will that it not be done.

§ 34. But whatever God operates, in like manner He absolutely and properly wills. For the divine operation is the most certain sign of will—and of His will itself—and as an effect it most certainly argues its cause. And in this respect the will of sign always coincides in God with the will of good pleasure: as St. Thomas rightly teaches.³⁵ But not everything which He commands or counsels does He absolutely will to be done, just as not all the things which He prohibits does He absolutely will not to be done; rather, of all these things He wills some and does not will others. Of the things, however, which He merely permits and tolerates, He is by no means to be said properly to will any, because He is not the author of them. For sins alone and defects are ascribed to God as permitting. But of these God properly wills none, or does any. Nor yet is permission badly numbered among those signs which also in God take the name of will; because, in the manner in which Scripture sometimes says that God does evils, that is, sins—namely, by permitting—one must also concede that He wills evils. For in such cases to will does not sound any harsher than to do, although each is said improperly. Whence St. Augustine also affirms that God wills to be done those things which He allows to be done; but such improper locutions are neither to be extended nor everywhere to be employed.³⁶

§ 35. Furthermore, to the five signs already explained there seems of necessity to be added a sixth, which is preparation (*praeformatio*), such that by a will of preparation God is said to will that which, although in itself He neither wills nor does nor is going to do, nevertheless He wills according to a prior and preparing cause—because such preparation is wont among us to be a sign that we will to do that thing. For example: he who threatens, or permits something, is said to will to do this; he who draws a sword against someone is said to will to kill him. Thus indeed when Abraham once, having seized the knife, stretched forth his hand against his son, he truly willed to kill him.

§ 36. According to this mode of sign, therefore, it is said of Christ in Mk. 6: "He willed to pass by them," who nevertheless did not pass by; but He is said to have willed this, because He was going in a different direction, as St. Augustine interprets it.³⁷ Now this was the beginning and a certain preparation for passing by, and among us it is wont to be a sign that we will to pass by. And in ch. 7: "He willed that no one should

know," namely because He withdrew Himself, and entered secretly into a house, and perhaps even ordered the doors to be shut—something which those are wont to do who will not be known. So also that saying in the last chapter of Luke can be understood: "He feigned that He would go further," so that the sense be: that Christ had gone on a little way, as if about to depart and to go further. In the same way one must understand what is said in Exod. 4: that the Lord willed to kill Moses, and elsewhere that He willed to destroy His people; namely, that He said or did those things which are wont to be causes and preparations of actions of this sort, even if the effect did not follow. Thus indeed Moses says to the people in Deut. 9: "And the Lord, being angry, willed to destroy thee." And below: "I feared His anger, with which, being stirred up against you, He willed to destroy you." "Against Aaron too, being vehemently angry, He willed to crush him." For it is evident that all these things are to be taken of the will of preparation; inasmuch as commination is a certain preparation for the thing threatened. Which the following words of Moses also make clear, with which he says: "I besought the Lord that He would not destroy you, as He had threatened."

§ 37. This same kind of will can also be understood in that which Isaiah says at Is. 53: "The Lord willed to crush him in infirmity"—not indeed as though the Father had threatened the Son; but because He so treated Him by the hands of the wicked, as if He altogether willed to crush Him. Although this too is rightly taken of the will of good pleasure, because He truly crushed Him by the most bitter passion, delivering Him over to death. Finally, according to this mode God is said to will the salvation of those to whom He promises salvation, and prepares the means by which they can attain it, although through their fault salvation does not follow. Concerning which will of God, more in the distinction immediately following.

§ 38. Moreover, vulgar speech confirms this mode, even where it is evident that properly so called will is not present: as when we say, "This man wills to perish," "This house wills to fall," "The sky wills to rain"—namely, on account of causes that are very proximate.

§ 39. It is manifest, however, that this mode of will, which is according to preparation, is not included under any one of the five modes. For he who commands, or counsels, or permits, is not said to will to do, but to will that it be done by another—just as he who prohibits wills that it not be done. But he who operates does not prepare, but already does.

§ 40. Lastly it must be noted that the will of sign, in that part wherein it embraces precepts, prohibitions, and counsels, is indeed called by the Apostle in Rom. 12 the "good-pleasing will of God" (*voluntas Dei beneplacita*), but not in the respect in which the Master here alleges the will, but from the object—because, if that which God commands or counsels be done and fulfilled by us, this assuredly pleases God; as in a certain prayer the Church says to God: "That we may accomplish those things which are pleasing to Thee with worthy deeds." Whence also Christ in Jn. 8 says: "I, the things that are pleasing to Him, I do always." For this reason certain people refer the three already mentioned signs of will to what they call the complacency of God (*complacentia Dei*), whereby God is said to will, whether by commanding or by exhorting, every work of virtue. To which will, therefore, whatever we say to displease God is contrary—that is, every vicious work.

§ 41. But someone will ask how the precept, counsel, and other things which we have said are rightly called signs of the Divine will—since very often God does not will those things which He commands or counsels, and never those things which He only permits—and thereby they seem to be false signs. But from what has been said the reply is easy: these are not signs of the Divine will, or signs of God's good pleasure—although the Master speaks both ways—but simply signs of will or of good pleasure. And these signs, as St.

Thomas says,³⁸ are called the "Divine wills," not because they are signs that God wills, but because those things which among us are wont to be signs of willing are in God called "wills." "Just as," he says, "punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but punishment, from the very fact that among us it is a sign of anger, is called in God 'anger'." Which matter he also now explains more fully in the body of the same article.

§ VIII — Another division of the Divine will is explained (Alia quaedam voluntatis Dei divisio declaratur)

§ 42. St. John Damascene indicates in Book 2 (De fide orthodoxa, ch. 29) another division of the Divine will (*voluntas divina*), namely into antecedent and consequent, or into the first and the second.⁴⁰ This distinction the Scholastic Doctors not rarely employ. This St. Thomas also explains (a. 6, ad 1),³⁹ and first he says that this distinction is not taken on the part of the Divine will itself, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, but on the part of the things willed.

§ 43. Then he sets out the matter thus: because each thing, insofar as it is good, is thus willed by God. But it can happen that something, if absolutely considered, is good or evil; which, however, insofar as it is considered with some adjunct—which indeed is its consequent consideration—stands in the opposite way. For example, a man's living is good, and a man's being killed is evil, if these two are considered absolutely; but if something be added about the man, as that he is a murderer, or otherwise pernicious to the commonwealth, then it will be evil for him to live, and good that he be taken out of the midst. Whence you would rightly say that a judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills certain men to be killed, as murderers and sacrilegious persons. Similarly, therefore, God is said to will certain things antecedently according to the first and bare consideration of things, but certain things consequently, namely if things are considered according to certain adjuncts. Whatever things therefore, according to the first, that is, absolute, consideration of things, are good, these God is said to will by a first, that is, antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*), such as the life, salvation, happiness of men. But the things which are good by a second consideration, whereby things are considered with an adjunct, these He wills by a second, or consequent will (*voluntas consequens*), such as the death, ruin, damnation of impious men. Therefore to the prior will of God it pertains, to will all men to be saved, to will no one to perish; to will not anyone's death or misery. To the posterior, to will certain persons to be damned, to be destroyed, to be afflicted with temporal and eternal punishments. Of all which examples it is easy to draw from Sacred Scripture.

§ 44. It seems, moreover, that to the antecedent will of God those things too can be referred, which God wills indeed with sin presupposed, yet not with sin requiring it, but beyond its merit—of which kind are all the works of the mercy of God toward sinners, such as calling, conversion, remission of sins, etc.—in the way that the Lord says in Ezek. 18: "Numquid voluntatis meae est mors impii, et non ut convertatur et vivat?", and in 33: "Nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur et vivat." But about the understanding of these and the like, more fully below at the next distinction, where also the use of this division will be made plain.

§ 45. It must also be noted that sins pertain to neither member of this division; because neither antecedently does God will them, nor consequently; though He wills them by permitting them (by a permissive will, *voluntate permittente*); on this point the preceding division of the Divine will extends more broadly. Although this one too contains certain things which are not contained in the preceding, as is: to destroy all sinners. For God wills this consequently, yet not absolutely, because many sinners He does not

destroy, but converts and saves; nor does He will this by any will of sign (*voluntas signi*), as appears to one going through particulars. And if also the members of each division be compared hither and thither, it will be found that there are certain things which God wills by antecedent will which He does not [will] by a will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*), and conversely. Likewise that there are certain things He wills antecedently which [He does] not by a will of sign, and conversely. Again that there are certain things He wills by a consequent will which [He does] not by a will of good pleasure, and conversely. Likewise that there are certain things He wills by a consequent will which [He does] not by a will of sign, and conversely; although certain others think otherwise about these matters, about which affair in the next distinction.

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1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3.
 2. St. Ambrose, *De fide* II, ch. 3.
 3. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 6.
 4. St. Jerome, *Commentarius in Epistolam ad Philemonem*, on "Sine consilio tuo nihil volui facere" [abbreviation as in source].
 5. St. Jerome, Ep. 146 (to Damasus), *De filio prodigo*; St. Jerome, *Explicatio symboli ad Damasum*, in tom. 9, sub titulo epistolae 17 [abbreviation as in source]; Pelagius before Pope Innocent, a confession of faith cited in the sources [abbreviation as in source].
 6. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2.
 7. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3, and the commentators on the same; St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, chs. 80–83, 88–89; II, chs. 25, 27; III, ch. 97; *De veritate* q. 23, a. 3–4; *De malo* q. 16, a. 3.
 8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 4.
 9. St. Augustine, *Contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 2 [abbreviation as in source].
 10. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, ch. 4.
 11. St. Jerome, *Dialogi contra Pelagianos* III, ch. 3.
 12. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 4, ad 4.
 13. St. Augustine, *Contra Manichaeos* I, ch. 2; St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 28.
 14. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* I, chs. 87–88.
 15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 5, corpus.
 16. Cajetan, *Commentary on Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 5.
 17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 5, ad 2; ad 3; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 5, corpus; ad 3.
 18. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 9.
 19. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 4.
 20. St. Athanasius, *Vita Antonii*, ch. 1 (quoting St. Antony).
 21. St. Basil, *Homilia* 9, "Quod Deus non est auctor malorum."
 22. St. John Chrysostom, various places against the Manichees [general reference as in source].
 23. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion*; St. Philastrius, *De haeresibus*; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus*: on Manichees, Florinians, Seleucians, Hermians, and others [general reference as in source].
 24. Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia ecclesiastica* V, ch. 20.
 25. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, qq. 3, 4, 21.
 26. The Master (of the Sentences), *In I Sent.*, "distinctione proxime sequenti f. K. T. M." [abbreviation as in source].
 27. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Responsiones* (ad 10. ob. Vinc.) [abbreviation as in source].

28. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 4.
29. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 48, a. 6; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 76, a. 1; (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 1.
30. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 1.
31. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 49, a. 2.
32. On this common teaching, see the Doctors at *In II Sent.*, dists. 36–37 [reference as in source].
33. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8.
34. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. II [abbreviation as in source].
35. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 12.
36. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, chs. 95, 96, 100.
37. St. Augustine, *De consensu evangelistarum* II, ch. 47.
38. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 11, ad 2.
39. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
40. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 29.

DISTINCTIO XLVI — ON THE FULFILLMENT OF THE DIVINE WILL (*AN DEI VOLUNTAS SEMPER IMPLEATUR?*)

§ I — Whether the will of God is always fulfilled (An Dei voluntas semper impleatur?)

§ 1. To the question in which it is asked whether the will of God (*voluntas Dei*) is always and in all things fulfilled, that is, whether whatever God wills comes to be, one must answer with a distinction taken from what was said above. For the will of God's good-pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*), which we said is simply and properly the will of God, must always be fulfilled; but the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), which is improperly called the will of God, is not always fulfilled. And each part of this answer is proved by most certain testimonies of Scripture, and therefore is to be held with certain faith.

§ 2. The former are proved by these Scriptures: Is. 14: "The Lord of hosts has sworn, saying: If it be not as I thought, so shall it be; and as I have devised in my mind, so shall it fall out"; and again: "The Lord has decreed, and who can weaken it?"² And Is. 46 (Vulg. 45): "My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done."³ And Is. 55: "My word that shall go forth from my mouth shall not return to me void, but it shall do whatsoever I please."⁴ Ps. 32 and 148: "He spoke and they were made. He commanded and they were created."⁵ Ps. [Ft.] and 134: "All things whatsoever he willed, he has done."⁶ Eccl. 8: "All that he will he shall do; his word is full of power."⁷ Job 23: "No one can turn away his thought; and his soul hath done whatsoever it would"—"and there is none who resisteth his will? who resisteth?"⁸ To this also pertain those passages which bear witness that the will, the word, the counsel, the thought of God remain forever, as in Ps. 32, Prov. 19, Is. 40, and elsewhere.⁹ For the sense is that these can never be changed or rendered void, but are always fulfilled.

§ 3. Now the rationale of this doctrine is twofold: one, because God is omnipotent, and therefore cannot be impeded by anyone so that He should not Himself fulfill whatever He will. For the will of God's good-pleasure is fulfilled by God Himself, as most of the above Scripture testimonies declare, and we shall immediately teach more fully; the other, because He is immutable and therefore cannot withdraw or be turned aside from that which once He has willed and decreed. St. Thomas also (I, q. 19, a. 6) proves the same doctrine by this argument: because although something can come to be outside the order of some particular efficient cause, yet not outside the order of some universal cause, under which all particular causes are comprehended. For it can in no way be that an effect should go out beyond the order of a universal cause. Since, therefore, the will of God is the most universal cause of all things, it is altogether impossible that it should ever fail to attain its effect. Whence it is that the same Doctor in the Compendium of Theology (chapter ...), and that work incomplete by reason of death, pronounces that the very divine good-pleasure (*divinum beneplacitum*) is efficacious for the fulfilling of everything that it disposes. From which it is

understood that the will of God is not only fulfilled always and in all things, but that by its own efficacy it fulfills itself, since it is itself the cause of all the things that it wills.

§ 4. St. Augustine teaches this (Enchiridion 25), when he says that there will sometime come about that with most splendid light it is seen what now the faith of the pious holds, how certain and immutable and most efficacious the will of God is, how much it can do; and that He does not will anything that He cannot, and that thus it is true what is sung in the Psalm: "But our God in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever he willed." "Which assuredly," he says, "is not true if He willed something and did not do it, and, what is more unworthy, that therefore He did not do it because the will of man impeded it, so that what the Omnipotent willed should not be done." And in chapter 96: "For truly He is not for any other reason called Omnipotent than because He can do whatever He wills, nor is the effect of the omnipotent will impeded by the will of any creature."¹⁰ He teaches the same in what follows down to ..., and in book 3 of De Trinitate, chapters 1 and 2.¹¹ Jerome likewise, in book 5 on Isaiah, on that passage in chapter 14, "This is the counsel which I have devised over all the earth," etc., and in book 6, treating allegorically the same place of the Prophet, says that it is impossible that the will, the decree, the counsel of God should not be fulfilled, or that it should be hindered by anyone's power.¹²

§ 5. But the latter part of the answer is proved by these Scriptures: Ezek. 24: "I would have purified thee, and thou art not purified." Matt. 23: "How often would I have gathered thy children, and thou wouldst not."¹³ And by whatever else proves the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), which consists in precepts, prohibitions, and counsels. For that this will of God can be contemned, neglected, changed, frustrated, wide experience teaches. Nor is there any sin at all that is not done against this will of God. For what is read in Jerome on Ezek. 30, that the precepts of the Lord cannot be rendered void, was not said of the precepts properly so called, the obedience to which is commended, but of the absolute wills of God, which are called "precepts" improperly on account of the imperial authority of the divine will, in which sense it is said in the Psalm: "He commanded, and they were created."¹⁴

§ 6. In like manner it is evident that the will of preparation (*voluntas praeparationis*) is not always fulfilled. For thus it is said in Mark 7: "He would that no man should know it, and he could not be hid," that is, the preparatory fact by which, as it were, He willed to lie hidden was not sufficient to that effect that He should be hidden. The same is clear from Deut. 9, Exod. 4, and other places.¹⁵ Yet this exception does not have place in the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), in that part in which it consists in permission and operation. For whatever God permits to be done, is done, and much more are done whatever things God operates. For these latter are done effectively, because they are done by God; the former, however, are done defectively, for they are not done by God but by the deficient creature.

§ 7. Now if it be asked further concerning the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*), whether it is always fulfilled, and similarly concerning the consequent will (*voluntas consequens*), the answer concerning the antecedent will is easy from what has been said: namely, that it is not always fulfilled—precisely in that part in which it does not concur with the will of good-pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*); for example: God by antecedent will wills all men to be saved, but that will is fulfilled in those alone whom He wills to be saved by the will of good-pleasure. But concerning the consequent will the question is more difficult, some denying that it is always fulfilled, others on the contrary affirming it. The cause of this dissension is the different acceptance of the consequent will.

§ 8. For some take the consequent will generally, and understand it to be that which regards that which, when considered together with some adjunct, is good, as also we have explained above. For St. Thomas says that this consequent consideration of a thing is that by which a thing is considered with some adjunct, such as that a sinful man should be damned. Others, however, strictly taking the consequent will define it to be that which regards something which, with all its circumstances, is good. And to this acceptance the following words of St. Thomas a little later seem to favor, by which he says that we simply will something according as we will that thing with all the particular circumstances considered. "Which," he says, "is to will consequently" (*consequenter velle*); although he does not say that this alone is to will consequently, in the manner in which we will.

§ 9. Therefore, in the former acceptance the consequent will of God is not always fulfilled. For by that will He wills all sinners to be damned, and according to it was said: "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed," and many other things in the Sacred Letters that are not fulfilled.¹⁶ But in the latter acceptance it is always fulfilled. The reason of which is, because, as St. Thomas says in the same place: "The will which is simply such is compared to things according as they are in themselves. But in themselves they are in particular; and therefore we simply will that which we will considered with all the particular circumstances." But the simple, that is, the absolute will of God (*voluntas simplex seu absoluta*), as has already been shown, is always fulfilled. According to this acceptance, therefore, of the consequent will it must be admitted that God neither by antecedent will nor by consequent will wills all sinners to be damned; and whatever evils of this sort besides, which He could inflict, with justice requiring it, He remits by His mercy.

§ II — That it is not the absolute will of God that all be saved (Non esse absolutam Dei voluntatem ut omnes salventur)

§ 10. Since it is most certain that very many do not attain to eternal salvation, that also from what has now been said is established with certainty: that it is not the good-pleasure of the divine will (*divinae voluntatis beneplacitum*) that all men obtain eternal salvation. For by no perversity of human will could that be impeded which God would will absolutely to be done, as we showed above from St. Augustine; because He is also the Lord of our very wills, so that He is able to bend them into whatever part He shall will. Whence the Wise Man, Prov. 21: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he shall incline it whithersoever he will." And again Augustine (Enchiridion 99): "Who is so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert to good the evil wills of men, when He will, where He will, as He will?" Therefore concerning all who are not converted, it is true to say according to Augustine that God did not will to convert them. And he plainly affirms this in the same book (chapter 95, concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians), saying that God did not will them to be made saved, although they could indeed be saved if He should will. For thus it must be read, not, however, in the plural number, "if they were willing," but in the singular, "if He were willing" (*si vellet*). This same he repeats concerning them (chapter 103), where also these general sentences to the same effect are read: that it is not true that there is no man whom God does not will to be made saved; that God the Omnipotent cannot will in vain whatever He shall will; that God, who has done all things whatsoever He willed, willed not to do whatever things He has not done; that no one is made saved unless God will him to be made saved, and that therefore He is to be asked that He should will, because it is necessary that it be if He shall will. In which last sentence, where it is said that God is to be asked that He should will, understand it thus: that He should operate salvation, not, however, that He should receive a new will of saving, which is impossible. Since He

operates from will which is eternal, Augustine rightly added: because it is necessary that it be, if He shall will —necessary, I say, with a necessity of consequence.¹⁸

§ 11. But because, when the cause is sought why not all are saved, it is wont to be answered, says Augustine in the same place (chapter 97), "because they themselves do not will this," he avers in the same place that this certainly cannot be said of infants, as of whom there is not yet a "to will" or "not to will." From the example, therefore, of these, it is shown yet more manifestly that it is not the absolute will of God (*absoluta voluntas Dei*) that all be saved. For Augustine says, in epistle 107 to Vitalis, that infants are not baptized and therefore not saved, not because they themselves do not will, but because God does not will. And this very thing he ascribes to divine Providence and its hidden judgments, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 2. He writes also to the same effect of infants in epistle 105 to Sixtus, and in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 8; and after him Prosper, in book 1 *On the Calling of the Gentiles*, chapter 3, and in book 3, chapter 22.¹⁹ But if thus the matter stands concerning infants, that absolutely God does not will all of them to be saved, this must be granted still more concerning adults. For it is absurd, as Augustine reasons in that same place *Against Julian*, that God should will all to be Christians, of whom many are unwilling, that is, adults; but should not will all, of whom there is no one who is unwilling, that is, infants. Therefore, as touching the salvation of men, the absolute will of God is that not all be saved, but that both of adults and of infants, some should have eternal life, others be punished with eternal death. For this judgment upon men will be exercised by Him "who does whatsoever He wills." Since these things are thus, we ought not to imagine in God (as there is in men) a will, an eagerness, some effort, by which He should will, so far as lies in Him, and strive, and do whatever He can, that all men be saved, and yet for all that should not attain it, lest the evil of men resist His will, and, prevailing and acting, the will of God be frustrated.²⁰

§ III — How the antecedent will of the salvation of all is in God (Quomodo voluntas antecedens salutis omnium in Deo sit?)

§ 12. Because by certain testimonies of Scripture there seems to be signified that God wills the salvation of all men, as in 1 Tim. 2, 2 Pet. 3, Ezek. 18, and others of which below, it is asked whether the antecedent will (the antecedent will, in Latin, is called the *voluntas antecedens*), according to which it was said above that God wills the salvation of all men, is in God formally and properly, as the consequent will (*voluntas consequens*) is; that is, whether the act signified by these words, "I would have all men to be saved," is in God properly and without metaphor, just as this act is, "I will Peter to be saved"—as a merchant in peril of the sea properly has both these acts: "I would keep my wares," and "I will to throw them overboard"; or rather whether a will of this sort is in God only improperly and eminently. The same may be asked concerning the antecedent will with respect to other goods, which, although God does not will them absolutely, are nevertheless either commanded or counseled by God, or are so proposed to men that they can be obtained by the observance of precepts or counsels, or by the reception of the sacraments—as are the remission of sins, grace, justice, virtues. For these goods too God seems antecedently to will for all, while by His goodness He has provided means by which they may be acquired.

§ 13. Therefore it is asked whether also the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*) of these things is properly in God. For to some it has seemed so, both because the usages of Scripture, by which God seems to be said to have a will and desire of this sort formally and properly constituted in Him, appear to be more simulated

modes of speaking than true declarations of divine love and affection toward the human race if they be not taken properly; and because Christ properly had such a will, by which He would have all to be saved; wherefore it would not be absurd to ascribe that will to God. They confirm this same point by the authority of St. Thomas, who (on the place cited above) says that God thus antecedently wills every man to be saved, as a just judge antecedently wills every man to live. Therefore, since a judge wills this properly, it would seem that God also properly wills that.²¹

§ 14. But those think far more probably who deny that in God there is formally and properly an antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*) to which the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*) does not respond, that is, the will signified by the name of velleity (*velleitas*), and they say it suffices that a will of this sort be constituted in God eminently, or by a trope—just as repentance, mercy, and whatever good affections there are, which are in men in such a way as to include some imperfection, as change, passion, defect, are ascribed to God only metaphorically or eminently, on account of which imperfections it is necessary that they be attributed to God either by the eminence of causality, or by some other trope of speech. Now it is established that God works this affection in the hearts of the pious, namely that one should will all to be saved; therefore an affection of this sort is in God eminently. Moreover, that that will includes imperfection, and for that reason cannot be in God formally, is first argued by the name of velleity (*velleitas*). For by this name St. Thomas, in the place cited above, judges that this will should rather be called. But velleity seems to be nothing other than a certain imperfect and suspended will. Then because this will signifies the inefficacious desire of some thing—such as cannot be in God. Third, because such a will in God would be idle, and therefore in vain, since it would have no effect in things properly corresponding to itself.

§ 15. Fourth, because if in respect of men such a will is in God, it will also be in respect of angels—which, however, the Scriptures nowhere signify. And indeed this seems to have no other reason than that by such a mode of speaking it is signified not what God properly wills, but what men ought to will, and what the pious, God Himself working in them, do will; and the pious do not will, nor ought they to will, the salvation of all angels, but only of men living in this life. Fifth, because neither does God say that He wills the salvation of damned men, namely for the same reason that we have just said. For this He does not work in the pious, that they will it. Sixth; because if formally that will is in God, it will be perpetual, and therefore God will always will the salvation of all men. Which seems absurd; since not even the pious after this life will be going to will this. Whence the last argument also arises: because the holy angels and the spirits of the just in heaven do not have a will of this sort by reason of the perfection of their state—by which it also comes about that neither do they pray for the reprobate, nor are they moved by any compassion over the damned, but purely and perfectly in their punishment they praise the justice of God; as is taught at the end of Book IV;²² therefore much less ought a will of this sort to be posited formally in God.

§ 16. Therefore to the arguments of the opposite party it is answered that the Scriptures require nothing else than that we posit the will of the salvation of all in God eminently, or by some other trope—by which Scripture speaks also in other places, but improperly. For it is very well known that Scripture is full of figurative modes of speech concerning God, when it ascribes to Him repentance, anger, and other human passions, and the members of the human body according to the human manner of speaking. To the second it is answered that, granted such a velleity (*velleitas*) was in Christ, it does not follow that it is in God as He is God. For Christ, together with the truth of the human nature, assumed human affections. But what is objected from St. Thomas does not at all prove the point. For he makes a comparison in the general formal

character (*ratio*) of antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*), not descending to the special mode in which a will of this sort ought to be understood by us in God. Therefore this no more follows than if you were to infer, therefore God wills mutably, or with passion, since a human judge so wills. For Scripture also uses a likeness of this sort, saying: "As a mother has mercy on her children, so will God have mercy on you." And yet mercy is not properly in God, but only eminently. You will object: It is proper to God to have mercy and to spare, as the prayer of the Church has it; but to punish is an alien work from God, as the Prophet says; but to will all to be saved pertains to the mercy and goodness of God; therefore it is properly in God. It is answered: The prayer of the Church speaks not of velleity (*velleitas*), but of the works of mercy and of divine clemency, which are said to be proper to God, because the object of the divine will is the true good, nor can it be anything else. Now this is more manifest in the works of mercy than of vindictive justice. For the latter infers an evil. But evil as such is not willed by God, but only under the notion of a certain good, as of the just. And therefore this is called an alien work from God, inasmuch, namely, as it deals with evil.

§ IV — In what sense Scripture says that God wills all men to be saved (Quo sensu dicat Scriptura Deum velle omnes salvos fieri)

§ 17. For a greater explication of the question sought, it must be seen how the Scriptures are to be understood which signify that God wills or has willed something which nevertheless is not fulfilled, nor to be fulfilled. Among them the chief is that in the Apostle, 1 Tim. 2: "Who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." For not all are saved absolutely, and brought to the knowledge of the truth. Wherefore neither can it be said that God wills this by the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*), as is plain from the foregoing. Therefore, this sense being removed—for it plainly contains falsity—there are found among the Authors various and not a little different expositions of this place. Some hand down this sense: that God wills all to be saved, because He gives to all sufficient grace for salvation. Others, that God offers His grace to all, although not all accept the grace offered. Others think that the saying of the Apostle must be understood with a condition, namely, that God wills all to be saved, provided they will. This exposition the Pauline commentary under the name of Ambrose contains: "God wills," he says, "all men to be saved; but if they come to Him. For He does not so will that the unwilling be saved, but He wills those to be saved, if they also will." The same interpretation is found in a brief commentary which is borne among the works of St. Jerome, but is not doubted to be by Pelagius, in which to the words of the Apostle there is subjoined this condition: "If they themselves, however, will to consent to God calling," and a little after: "He gave Himself for all, if all were willing to be redeemed."²³ But these interpretations, as little consistent with the doctrine which Scripture hands down concerning the grace of Christ—by whose working it is precisely this, that men accept and will—St. Augustine refutes everywhere, most especially from the case of little ones who die without baptism. For these by age are not able to will; to whom therefore neither is sufficient grace given for salvation, nor is grace offered to be accepted. And it is frivolous that some restrict the Apostolic sentence to adults only—as though God were more inclined to save adults, even the worst, than little ones, who, as regards the sin of their own act, are innocent. The places of St. Augustine are his letter 107 to Vitalis; Book 4 against Julian, ch. 8; Book on the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10; and what we noted above from the Enchiridion.²⁴ Similar things are read in St. Prosper in the Epistle to Rufinus; in the book on Free Choice, in the Responses to the Chapters of the Gauls, reply 3; and Book 1 On the Vocation of the Gentiles, ch. 12, and Book 1, chs. 2, 19, 25; and likewise in St. Fulgentius, in the book On the Grace of Christ, ch. 29 and the following.²⁵ Nor must it be

denied, however, that they can be admitted, especially as accommodated to adults only; but because the words present another sense, and one which has been disapproved by the Fathers, those interpretations are not simply to be received. Nor is that exposition to be held in any other place which Rupert presents, writing on Matt. 11. For he says that God wills all to be saved, that if He knew that they would perform true and salutary repentance, He would offer them the means of salvation; and for that reason He did not offer them to the Tyrians and Sidonians, because they would have performed not true repentance, but one extorted by fear alone—such as he judges Ahab and the Ninevites to have performed. Which his singular opinion, and no less false, we refuted when we treated of predestination.²⁶

§ 18. These expositions, therefore, being rejected, let us see how the Apostolic words can rightly be taken. One exposition, then, is that which the Master presents out of St. Augustine: that God wills all to be saved and to come to the acknowledgment of the truth, because whoever are saved and come to the acknowledgment of the truth are saved and acknowledge the truth by God's will; nor can they obtain salvation and the knowledge of the truth otherwise than with God willing. This exposition is in St. Augustine (Enchiridion, ch. 103), where he explains it by the comparison of another place, and shows it to be conformable to the context; because if no one is saved unless God wills it, therefore God must be besought by the faithful that He will that which the preceding sentence wills. He has the same in Book 4 against Julian, ch. 8; in Letter 107; and in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 8. Likewise St. Prosper, in the Epistle to Rufinus and in Response 8 to the Chapters of the Gauls.²⁷

§ 19. The second exposition is that in the Apostle's words "all men" are not to be understood as each and every individual, but men of whatever kind and condition—namely, rulers, private persons, Jews, Greeks, free, slaves, learned, unlearned, rich, poor, and so on. Which exposition receives probability from the preceding words of the Apostle, by which he had said to pray for all men—what, as it were, expounding by the kinds of men, he subjoins, "for kings," etc. Similar places of Scripture are Luke 11: "You tithe every herb" [that is, every kind of herb]; John 12: "I will draw all things to myself"; Gen. 1, where it is said that on the fifth day God created "every winged" thing, and on the sixth day "every creeping" thing upon the earth. St. Augustine also has and explains this exposition (Enchiridion, ch. 103; Sermon 37 On Various Matters).²⁸

§ 20. The third exposition is of St. John Damascene, who interprets the words of the Apostle of the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*) of God. God, he says, antecedently wills all to be saved and to attain His kingdom. For He did not create us to be punished, but that He might make us partakers of His goodness, as good. Of the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*) of God enough was said above. To this sense there seems to look also St. Jerome (on Is. 28), on that passage, "His strange work"; nay, St. Augustine even hints at the exposition in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 33. St. Thomas also adduces this in the third place after the two preceding expositions (I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1). Nor does it seem to stand in the way of this sense that the Apostle speaks of the will which regards men through the Mediator, as his following words declare. For even the will which regards the repairing of fallen human nature, and all the works of divine mercy, we warned above can be understood under the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*).²⁹

§ 21. The fourth exposition is that the Apostle is speaking of Christ, who by the human will and by the velleity (*velleitas*) spoken of above willed to save all men. That, moreover, the Apostle is speaking of Christ they prove from those words, for he says: "For this is good and acceptable before our Savior God, who wills, etc." For Christ is frequently called "Savior" in the Scriptures.³⁰

§ 22. The fifth exposition is gathered by some from St. Augustine, who says that it is the custom to speak of the whole by the part (*De doctrina christiana*, Book 3; Letter 59, question 6); as in Jer. 26, where now "all the people" are said to demand that Jeremiah be put to death, and a little later "all the people" to will that he be freed; and in 1 Cor. 1, where the Corinthians are at the beginning highly praised, and afterward are gravely rebuked—namely, while now some, now others of whom, taken together under a certain universality, "all" were—as they think it can be understood: that God wills "all of you" to be saved, because of those who are saved there is such a multitude that, after its manner, it is called "all"; as in that other saying of the same Apostle: "All seek their own interests" (Phil. 2).³¹

§ 23. The sixth exposition is that God wills all to be saved, because He wills and makes pious men to will, or to desire, the salvation of all. For God wills and makes us to will many things which He Himself does not properly will—such as was that Abraham willed the city of Sodom and Gomorrah to be spared; that David willed to build the temple of the Lord; that the same willed the salvation of his son Absalom; and other things of this sort, which were not done, because God did not absolutely will them. Therefore, since God commands, moves, inspires, works in us that we should be solicitous for the salvation of all, and that we should strive to lead all to the acknowledgment of the truth, God is said to will these things, according to that mode of speaking by which in Holy Scripture there is attributed to God that action which He effects in us by His gift—as St. Augustine speaks in Book 4 *On Genesis* according to the Letter, ch. 9. For thus in Rom. 8 the Holy Spirit is said to intercede and to groan, because He makes us to intercede and to groan; and in Gal. 4 to cry, because He makes us to cry; and in 1 Cor. 2 to "search all things," because He makes us to speak all things; and in Gen. 22 it is said to Abraham: "Now I know that you fear God," that is, "I have made you to be known," and other things of this kind. For since the very will of God in itself is most hidden, rightly and fittingly do we say that He wills that which He wills in His friends—not only by commanding that they will, but also by working this very thing in them. St. Augustine hands down this sense and learnedly explains it in *City of God*, Book 22, ch. 1 and ch. 32, and in the book *On Rebuke and Grace*, ch. 15. And for this also the Scriptures make, which he writes in the place just cited of *Genesis* according to the Letter. Now this sense is conformable to the Apostolic text. For the Apostle, exhorting the faithful to pray for all men, subjoins the reason: because this is good and acceptable to God, who wills all men to be saved—that is, He wills that we desire the salvation of all men, and He works this very desire in us. Whence it most rightly follows that this is to be done: to pray for all, the pious desire urging. He confirms also this sense by the fact that the Apostle does not say that God wills to save all and to lead them to the acknowledgment of the truth.³²

§ 24. ...to lead; but "all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Which expression pertains more to declaring our will which we have from God for the salvation of all, than to the will which is properly that of God Himself. For God, with respect to the elect who are saved, does not so much have a will whereby He wills that they be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, as a will whereby He wills to save them, and to grant them the knowledge of the truth. For the will of God, whatever it properly wills, it itself by itself accomplishes. But if, however, someone should object that pious men hold it for certain that God does not will all without exception to be saved, and therefore that they too ought not to will this; it is answered: the pious neither will nor pray God that all together, with no one excluded, be saved, but in such wise do they in general desire the salvation of all, and pray for all, that they be unwilling to see anyone in particular excluded from their prayer, because they are certain of no one's reprobation in this life.

§ 25. There is also a seventh exposition: that God in this sense wills all to be saved, because He has bestowed certain external helps and means upon the human race in general, and upon many in particular, by which they can be led to salvation—such as the creation of man unto that end which is eternal happiness, the gift of justice conferred upon him in creation and to be propagated into the whole race, the natural light of reason, and the law of nature inscribed upon the minds of all, common to all; the proclamation of the heaven and of the elements; the mission of the Apostles into the whole world; the price of the Blood of Christ poured out for all; and the whole benefit of our Redemption through Christ so set forth to all, that the Church has no precept whereby any Nation or person is forbidden to preach, or to hinder the things that belong to salvation, but rather ought to propose that to all, and to lead all, as far as lies in her, even infants, to salvation through Christ—He who "is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world" (1 Jn. 2). This sense is handed down by Prosper (resp. 1. 2. ad Ob. Vinc. & lib. 2. de Vocat. Gent. cap. 1. 6. 7. 1958.), and by Bonaventure on this distinction, q. 1, where, while he says that grace is offered to all, he understands and expounds the grace offered not of some inward help which is at hand for all thus, but of the Passion of the Son of God and of the whole benefit of our redemption, which is offered to all in the manner we have said.⁴³ Words of the Apostle also favor this sense, by which he commends creation. For "there is one God," he says, namely the Creator; "there is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus," that is, the Redeemer. Whence it follows: "who gave himself a redemption," in Greek ἀντὶ λύτρωσιν, that is, the price of redemption, "for all," namely as to sufficiency.

§ 26. According to this exposition, therefore, the will of God can be understood as the ordination of a cause to some effect, or of a means to an end, even if the effect or the end does not follow. And this is the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), which above we called the will of preparation, in that such an ordination in men is wont to signify their will concerning the effect. Yet it can also in some manner be called the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*), not indeed with respect to the effect to which it is referred, but with respect to the means per se conducive to an effect of this sort.

§ 27. Moreover, although each one of the aforesaid expositions has something of probability, yet the last two seem most probable, and are to be preferred to all the rest. For against the first and second exposition there seems to stand the fact that God is said to will all to be saved in such wise that in the same mode of will He wills no one to perish; for both are conjoined (2 Pet. 3). That also seems contrary to both the first and the second exposition, that the Apostle exhorts that we pray not only for every kind of men, but for all men, so that we exclude absolutely no one from general prayer; and again, what he subjoins as a reason, concerning God the Creator and Christ the Redeemer of all.

§ 28. St. Thomas seems most to approve the third exposition, and many others embrace the same.⁴⁴ Yet this sense is not without a scruple. For if the antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*) is understood, a reason does not seem to be rendered for that which preceded. Since, by antecedent will, God wills to be saved not only the men who are in this life, or in Purgatory, for whom alone one must pray, but as many as have lived, nor only men, but also all the Angels. Wherefore this reason alone does not avail to this end, that it be urged that one must pray for all men; for thus it would be urged also that one must pray for the demons; but it avails in so far as it is at the same time included in the last exposition.

§ 29. The fourth is not established with sufficient solidity in the text. For God the Father is often called our Savior in the Scriptures, even by the same Apostle, as at the beginning and at chapter 4 of this same epistle, and to Titus 1, 2.⁴⁵ Then although a human will of desiring the salvation of all is said to have been in

Christ, at the time when He was conversant in mortal flesh, yet it is not attributed to Him now reigning in heaven with equal probability, as neither to the other Blessed, unless we also judge such a will to be in the Angels. But the Apostle uses a verb of the present time: "who wills," etc., when already Christ is in heaven. The fifth agrees neither with the things preceding nor with the words following of the Apostle, for on both sides a universality different from this sense is signified. But the other two expositions both of themselves contain a sense very agreeable to the Scriptures, and seem most conformable to the context, as has been declared. Which probability will appear yet more from the explanation of other like sentences with which this passage is to be compared.

§ V — How that "How often I willed to gather..." is to be understood (Quomodo intelligendum illud quoties volui congregare, &c.)

§ 30. Not dissimilar to the foregoing sentence is that which Christ uttered in Matt. 23 to the city Jerusalem, saying: "Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, quemadmodum gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti?" The same sentence is had almost in the same words (Lk. 13). For it seems hence also to be shown that God willed something which was not fulfilled. Wherefore its true sense must be sought. Some explain it thus: I willed on my part, but you were unwilling on your part. This sense is read in a certain homily under Jerome's title among the Homilies of the Fathers on the feast of St. Stephen.⁴⁶ But one must know that that homily was indeed taken from Jerome's Commentary on Matthew, yet that the words just mentioned are not had in him, but that they, together with some others, were inserted by him who turned the Commentary into a homily; although that gloss can be tolerated if it be taken of Christ's human will (the will, *voluntas*).⁴⁷

§ 31. For there is a second exposition, namely that Christ be understood according to the human nature, and the will of that nature not absolute, but optative (the optative will, *voluntas optativa*), whether it be said that there was a certain rational velleity (*velleitas*)—such as is in a merchant who, while he throws away goods by a deliberate will, yet desires to preserve them—or a certain natural desire with respect to those toward whom men are naturally wont to wish well. That desire is wont to be called the natural will (the natural will, *voluntas naturalis*); but Christ's rational will (the rational will, *voluntas rationalis*), by which He willed anything absolutely and deliberately, was always conformable to the divine will; yet the same rational will, considered insofar as it is nature, willed the salvation of the Jews, first as men, then as those who were of the same stock and nation with Him—toward whom the affection of natural love is wont to be more vehement. The sense, therefore, will be: As often as, moved by natural love and the affection of mercy, I have desired the gathering of your sons, etc. For just as He naturally grieved and had compassion over their destruction, so He naturally desired their salvation, since these affections are conversant in the same subject. Jerome intimates this sense in the place on Is. 1.⁴⁸ And indeed the Sixth Ecumenical Council acknowledges this natural will in Christ, and in it the letter of Pope Agatho was read and approved, in which several Scriptures pertaining here are cited.⁴⁹ Concerning which matter we shall have to treat more fully at Distinction 17 of Book 3.⁵⁰

§ 32. But this exposition is repugnant to what He says, "quoties volui," and to what He had said before, "quae occidis Prophetas et lapidas eos qui ad te missi sunt." By this, as also Jerome observed, He signifies that the prophets of all former times were sent by Himself, and thus that He many times willed to gather the sons of Jerusalem, not only at that time when He was living in the flesh, but also long ago in the time of the prophets. But then He could not have willed it by a human will, because He had not yet assumed the human

nature. Whence also the Fathers are not wont to use this Scripture for proving Christ's human will. Finally, both the first and the second exposition are hindered by what He says, "quoties volui." For the velleity by which God is said to will on His part, if it is in God, is continuous also according to the effect of grace offered, as the adversaries will; whence it should not be said, "quoties volui," that is, "I often willed," but "I have always willed." Likewise of the optative will of Christ.

§ 33. The third exposition is of the absolute will of God (the will, *voluntas*), by which the Lord also did that which He willed, so that the sense be: even the impious city being unwilling and resisting, the Lord gathered all her sons whom He willed. Thus does St. Augustine expound (Ench. 97).⁵¹ But there stands in the way that in Ezek. 24 the Lord, with a similar reproach, says to the same city: "Mundare te volui, et non es mundata a sordibus tuis." Whence it appears that also in this place the Lord signifies that that has not been done which He says He willed.

§ 34. The fourth exposition is that "He willed" be taken not in Himself, but in those prophets and holy men whom He had sent and had caused to will, so that the sense be: As often as, in those whom I sent to you—priests and prophets and other just men—I inspired a holy desire for your salvation, and made them labor for the conversion of your sons? But you have always frustrated their pious endeavors and vows. This sense agrees with the text and is illustrated from those things which were said in the preceding chapter.

§ 35. The fifth exposition is that the will of sign (the will of sign, *voluntas signi*) be signified, consisting in precepts, exhortations, corrections, miracles, sacred institutions, and other means and helps opportune for salvation, which were supplied by God through Moses and other prophets to that people. All of which things, nevertheless, the ungrateful and in sins hardened people rejected and despised. This sense was expressed in their commentaries by Hilary and Jerome; and not amiss, since it is very conformable to the context, which speaks of the sending of the prophets. These, therefore, the last two expositions, as most probable, we do not hesitate to prefer to the others.⁵²

§ VI — Other similar Scriptures are briefly explained (Aliæ consimiles scripturæ breviter explicantur)

§ 36. Besides the two opinions already explained, there are also others like them in Scripture, both of the Old and of the New Testament, which signify that God wills, or has willed, something which has not been done. The explanation of which, now from what was said above, will be easier. The first is 2 Pet. 3: "The Lord acts patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to repentance." Which sentence can probably be taken in the way in which it was said by Paul, that God wills all to be saved, according to the last two expositions. Although others prefer to expound it of the elect alone, and to understand the absolute will (the absolute will, *voluntas absoluta*), in this way: "God acts patiently for your sake," that is, for the sake of the elect, "not willing that any of the elect should perish, but that all the elect should return to repentance," as if he were to say, Christ defers His glorious coming for the sake of the elect, that their number may be fulfilled. Thus Paul says that he endures all things for the sake of the elect, that they also may obtain salvation (2 Tim. 2). And as the coming of the Lord is deferred for the sake of the elect, so too the days of tribulations are shortened [on account of the elect].

§ 37. The second is Matt. 18: "So it is not the will before your Father who is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish." This sentence also, like the preceding, is rightly understood of the elect, who in

Scripture are called "little ones," and "a little flock." It can also be understood thus, that God is said not to will this, because He inspires into the hearts of the pious this will, by which He willed that no one—especially of the little ones, that is, the humble who believe in Christ—should perish, but that all should be saved. Whence also it is said of Christ that "a smoking flax he will not quench, and a bruised reed he will not break" (Matt. 12). Moreover, in this sentence it must be noted that, when it is said that it is not the will of God that anyone of the little ones perish, there is, conversely, signified that it is His will that the proud perish—who are unwilling to bring their intellect into captivity unto the obedience of the faith of Christ.

§ 38. The third is Ezek. 18 and 33: "I do not will the death of the sinner, but that he be converted and live." This must be understood either of the antecedent will (the antecedent will, *voluntas antecedens*) according to the third exposition of Paul's sentence, or of the will which He works in the pious according to the sixth, or of the will of sign (the will of sign, *voluntas signi*) according to the seventh.

§ 39. The fourth is 2 Kgs 14: "Nor does God will the soul to perish, but He recalls it, thinking lest he be utterly lost who has been cast away." The words are not God's own in Scripture, but of the wise woman speaking to the king, and yet they are suitably understood in the three ways already said.

§ 40. The fifth is Is. 28, where to be angry and to punish is called a "strange" and "alien" work from the Lord, as if contrary to His will. Which is most rightly said, because God does not intend the punishment nor the damnation of anyone, except on the supposition of a preceding sin. Therefore the antecedent will is insinuated, according to which to punish and to smite is a work alien to Him.

§ 41. The sixth is Is. 42: "The Lord willed to sanctify him. But the people itself has been plundered and laid waste." It is rightly understood of the will of sign, which is considered in the precepts, and in other external helps ordained to the sanctification of that people.

§ 42. The seventh is Ezek. 24: "I willed to cleanse you, and you are not cleansed from your filth." This also, they teach, has been said in the same sense by those things which immediately precede. "With much labor," he says, "it has been sweated, and its excessive rust has not gone out of it, not even by fire." Hence it is evident that there are to be understood the labors of the Prophets announcing the will of God, and the fire of tribulation.

§ 43. The eighth is Hos. 7: "When I was willing to heal Israel, Samaria..." The sense is the same. For the Lord signifies that the Israelite people, through the exhortations of the Prophets whom He sent to it, and through other remedies applied to their sins, was so far from being healed that it even turned out worse—according to that of the Apostle: "When the commandment came, sin revived" (Rom. 7).

§ 44. The ninth is Deut. 5: "Who will give them to have such a mind, that they may fear me, keep all my commandments," etc. The tenth: Deut. 10: "What does the Lord your God ask of you, but that you fear the Lord your God, and walk in His ways," etc. The eleventh: Deut. 32: "O that they were wise and understood, and would consider their last things." The twelfth: Is. 48: "O that you had attended to my commandments." These wishes, or desires, are attributed to God in a figurative manner of speaking, just as the affections of anger, mercy, repentance, and the like. Whence as God is said to be angry when He does the things which men who are angry are wont to do, that is, He threatens, punishes, avenges—and so of the others: so He is said to wish and to desire, because He does works like to those which men wishing and desiring are wont to do. For as a father, desiring to have a son learned and upright, takes care to have him diligently instructed, so God—diligently instructing His people by precepts, and sending to them teachers and prophets, and doing other things like to these—is said to wish and to desire that His people be wise and understand and keep His

commandments. Therefore by these sentences is signified the optative will of God (the optative will, *voluntas optativa*), that is, the will of sign, inasmuch as it consists in precepts, warnings, promises, threats, and other like things by which men are wont to be directed to the good.

§ 45. To these are added the Scriptures which attribute to God patience, long-suffering, expectation. As Rom. 2: "Or do you despise the riches of His goodness and patience and long-suffering?" And ch. 9: "He endured with much patience the vessels of wrath." 2 Pet. 3: "He acts patiently for your sake." And below: "Account the long-suffering of our Lord salvation." Is. 5: "He waited that it should bring forth grapes, and it brought forth wild grapes." And again: "I looked that it should do judgment, behold iniquity." And ch. 30: "The Lord waits that He may have mercy on you." The same in Exod. 34; Num. 14; Ps. 7; 55; 102; Joel 2; and whatever other Scriptures proclaim God to us as patient and long-suffering. For from all these one could take an argument of the unfulfilled will of God. For patience regards those things which, we being unwilling, are not done—what He, while waiting, was desiring [to be done]; but long-suffering includes patience together with expectation. But one must say that these and suchlike are attributed to God metaphorically. For He is said to be patient and long-suffering when He defers to punish the sins committed against His preceptive goodness (His preceptive goodness, *bonitas praeceptiva*), and meanwhile grants a space for repentance, by which men may be able to escape His vengeance. By this same reason He is said by them to expect the fruits of repentance and of good works, since this is, beyond doubt, in God's power, and it is to be expected from nowhere else than from His efficacious grace, that men be converted from sin, and bring forth the fruits of good works. For we have clearly defined in canon 4 of the Council of Orange by these words that, properly speaking, God does not expect our will unto the good: "If anyone contends that, in order that we be cleansed from sin, God awaits our will, and does not confess that even to will to be cleansed is brought about in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the very Holy Spirit," etc.⁵³

§ 46. Finally, there are certain prayers of the Church which sound as if God willed something which is not fulfilled; but the understanding of these also is easy to gather from the above. Now these are they: The Prayer for the avoidance of mortality: "O God, who desirest not the death but the repentance of sinners." For the tempted and afflicted: "O God, who justifiest the ungodly, and dost not will the death of sinners." On the day of the Holy Parasceve (Good Friday): "O God, who seekest not the death of sinners, but life always." And another on the same day: "O God, who savest all, and willest none to perish, look upon the souls deceived by diabolic fraud," etc. Nor is it dissimilar what Prudentius sings in the hymn on Cyprian: "Christ, Father of man; whom thou lovest and for whom thou forbiddest to perish." For God both desires and wills not the death but the repentance of sinners, in the same sense in which this was said by the Prophet Ezekiel. Likewise He "always seeks" not the death of sinners but life, because He does not cease to inspire pious solicitude of this sort and desires into pious men, by which they are moved to pray to God for the salvation of sinners. Whence in the same prayer it follows: "Graciously receive our prayer," etc., as if the Church were to say: because thou makest us, by pious vows and efforts, always to seek the life of sinners, hence it is that we ask thee to hear our prayer going forth from that thy inspiration. Moreover, the following prayer seems to have this sense: O God, because, according to the Prophet, thou willest not the death of the sinner, look, etc. Finally, what is adduced from Prudentius seems most of all to have been said on account of the Incarnation and death of the Son of God, by which the salvation of the human race was procured, which was a work of the immense love of God toward man. For it has regard to that of Jn. 3: "So God loved the world," etc.

§ VII — Whether God wills evils to be or to come to be (Utrum Deus mala esse aut fieri velit)

§ 47. The Master (of the Sentences) raises in the text and treats at length the question, whether God wills evils, that is, sins, to be or to come to be; and certain Catholics thought one ought to answer in the affirmative, following the author of their assertion, Hugh of St. Victor, who, partly by the authority of St. Augustine, partly by arguments—the chief of which the Master recounts at letter E—endeavors to establish that position.⁵⁵ Rupert too makes mention of the same question as having been debated by ecclesiastical men.⁵⁶ Yet he himself does not examine it sufficiently either. Now the question is about the will not only permitting (*voluntas permittens*); for in this mode it is altogether indubitable that evils come to be by God willing that they be permitted; but about the absolute will (*voluntas absoluta*). This Hugh's arguments make sufficiently clear. But in this matter the doctrine of the Master must altogether be held, who after a long discussion of the question finally concludes that evils neither are nor come to be with God willing it. The same is taught by St. Thomas,⁵⁷ to whom also consent most of the other Doctors of the schools who write upon this same distinction. The rationale of this doctrine is that the will (*voluntas*) of God is only of goods, whereas that evils be, or be done, is not a good.

§ 48. This is proved: because since evil is the privation of good, for evil to be, or to be done, is nothing else than to be deprived of good or to be in a state of privation. But this certainly is nothing other than evil, as St. Thomas well explains in the question already cited. Hence there is also another reason. To will evils and to will that evils be or be done is the same. For the will with respect to a thing simply is toward the thing as to be, as is evident in all other cases, for example: he who wills a thing wills the thing to be. But God does not will evils, therefore He does not will evils to be, or to be done.

§ 49. Likewise a third reason. If God wills evils to be done, therefore evils will be done with God willing it. But whatever is done with God willing it is done by God as author, according to that saying: "All things whatsoever He willed, He has done"; therefore evils are done by God as author, which it is impious to assert. Likewise a fourth. Will is only of the end and of those things which are unto the end; but evils are only by a deordination from the end; therefore it is not of the Divine will that evils be done. No less clear is the proof from the Scriptures: Ps. 5, "Not a God willing iniquity art thou." Wis. 14, "The impious man and his impiety are to God for hatred." For these plainly signify that God does not will iniquity to be done by men. Moreover, Scripture attests that Christ came in order to take away and to destroy sin and the reign of sin (Jn. 1; 1 Jn. 3; Rom. 6). Therefore He does not will sins to be, just as one who destroys a house does not will the house to be. To these add what the Master adduces from St. Augustine,⁵⁸ where by a certain ratiocination he demonstrates that no man becomes worse with God as author and therefore neither with Him willing it. But this would tell against him, if God willed evils to be done. For by the same reason by which He would will evils to be done, He would also will man to become evil—nay more, He would will to make man evil. For whatever God wills to be done, the same He also wills to do. Since the will of God with respect to what is outside is effective of all the things which He wills, as has often been said. Finally, we said above at the previous distinction that, in that the will of God is called the cause of all things, only goods are encompassed, which assuredly is not that evils be, as will presently be shown in the solution of the objections. And altogether whatever can be produced to prove the Catholic dogma that God is not the author of evils, avails equally to show that evils are not done by God willing; since for God to will and to do is the same. Nor is it different to will evils, and to will evils to be or to be done; as the reasons already alleged prove.

Refutation of the things that are objected.⁵⁹

§ 50. The arguments on which those rely who think that with God willing it evils are and are done, are recounted by the Master. They are of this sort. First. These two contradict, that God wills and that God does not will sins to be done; but it is false that God does not will sins to be done, for not even one sin could be done against an unwilling omnipotent God; therefore it is true that they are done with God willing it. Second. That evils be or be done is a good; and yet every good is done with God willing it: therefore with God willing it evils are done and exist. But that it is good that evils be and be done they prove in two ways: both because evils conduce to the perfection and beauty of the universe—indeed to perfection, because many goods would be lacking to the universe if there were not evils, as the patience of martyrs, if there were not the persecution of tyrants; to beauty, truly, because evils set next to goods commend them the more, as St. Augustine attests;⁶⁰ and by the authority of the same St. Augustine who plainly and expressly asserts that it is a good that there be not only goods but also evils.⁶¹ A third reason. Nothing can be or be done unless God wills those things to be or to be done. And St. Augustine bears witness to this, thus concluding also about evils: "Therefore nothing is done unless the Omnipotent wills it to be done": therefore now God wills evils to be and to be done.⁶² A fourth, not of Hugh's but of the Sophists, as the Master says at letter N. "Every truth is from God; that evils are and are done is a truth: therefore that evils are and are done is from God." Finally they object further from St. Augustine, where he says that "in a wondrous and ineffable way what is done against His will, that is, sin, is not done apart from the will of God: but what is not done apart from the will of God is done with God willing."[^53]

§ 51. To these things, however, we reply; and first indeed to the first argument, that the propositions stated are not contradictory: because "not to will" (*nolle*) is here taken not negatively, but positively, such that "not to will it to be done" is "to will it not to be done." We say therefore that sins are done neither with God willing nor with God not-willing, that is, with God unwilling, but with Him permitting (*permissio*). For God does not will them to be done, of whom the Psalmist says, "For not a God willing iniquity art thou"; nor does He will that they not be done, for then they would not be done; but He only permits, such that the will of God has for its objects not the sin itself, nor its being or being done, but only its permission. "For God wills to permit evils to be done," says St. Thomas.⁵⁴

§ 52. The proposition of the second argument must be denied. And to the first of its proofs one must reply that evils do not of themselves (*per se*) pertain to the ornament and perfection of the universe: as Dionysius rightly teaches.⁶⁴ For they do not adorn nor perfect, but they disfigure and deprave the workmanship of God, if they be considered according to themselves: for they are privations of order and of good. Only *per accidens* (*per accidens*) can it be conceded that they make for the perfection of the universe, insofar as upon them there follows occasionally some good, by which the universe is perfected; as St. Thomas explains.⁶⁵ And this happens, however, with God as author, who knows also how to use evils well, and to elicit goods from evils, and who, as St. Augustine says, "would by no means permit anything of evil to be in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good that He would do well even out of evil."[^56] On account of which use of evils the same St. Augustine writes that God judged it better to do well out of evils than to permit there to be no evils.⁶⁷ But this good use of evils, if it belonged to evils of themselves, it would follow that they were simply good. For that of which the proper and *per se* use is good, the thing itself also is simply good.

§ 53. To the other proof it is answered that St. Augustine means nothing else than that it is a good that evil be permitted (*malum permitti*), as is clear from the words immediately following, in which he says: "For unless this were a good, that there should be also evils, by no means would they be permitted to be by the Omnipotent Good."⁶¹

§ 54. The third reason assumes what is false, if it be understood generally with evil also included. Nor does St. Augustine support it; for explaining himself he subjoins thus: "either by permitting that it be done, or by Himself doing [it]."⁶²

§ 55. To the fourth the Master replies at letter O, that the truth of this proposition, "evils are done," is from God, and therefore a good thing; although the thing signified is evil. For concerning evil things there are concepts of the mind which are true and good. Therefore what was taken, "Every truth is from God," thus understand it insofar as it is true, or rather thus explain the consequent, "that evils are from God," insofar as it is true and is some entity. A fuller explication of this argument see in St. Thomas upon this distinction.⁶⁸

§ 56. The last argument again from St. Augustine is to be expounded by these words: "Because it would not be done, if He did not permit; nor indeed does He permit unwillingly, but willingly." Therefore St. Augustine is speaking of the will with respect to the permission of evil and not of the evil itself.⁶³

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6.

2. Is. 14:24, 27: "Juravit Dominus exercituum, dicens: Si non ut putavi, ita erit, et quomodo mente tractavi, sic eveniet" ... "Dominus exercituum decrevit, et quis poterit infirmare?" (Vulgate).

3. Is. 46:10 (Vulg. 45:10): "Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet."

4. Is. 55:11: "Verbum meum quod egredietur de ore meo non revertetur ad me vacuum, sed faciet quaecumque volui."

5. Ps. 32:9 (Vulg. 33:9) and Ps. 148:5: "Ipse dixit, et facta sunt; ipse mandavit, et creata sunt."

6. Ps. [Ft.] [abbreviation as in source] and Ps. 134:6 (Vulg. 135:6): "Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit."

7. Eccl. 8:3–4 (Vulgate sense): "Omne quod voluerit faciet; sermo ejus potestate plenus est."

8. Job 23:13–14; cf. Rom. 9:19: "quis resistit voluntati ejus?"

9. Ps. 32:11; Prov. 19:21; Is. 40:8: testimonies to the abiding of the counsel/word of God.

10. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 25 and 96.

11. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* III, chs. 1–2. The Latin string "in sequentibus usque 1. 2." is as in the source and ambiguous. [abbreviation as in source]

12. St. Jerome, *Commentary on Isaiah* V, on Is. 14; and VI, on the same place treated allegorically.

13. Ezek. 24:13: "Volui mundare te, et non es mundata"; Matt. 23:37: "Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, et noluisti."

14. St. Jerome, on Ezek. 30; cf. Ps. 148:5: "Ipse mandavit et creata sunt."

15. Mk. 7:24: "Et voluit ut nemo sciret, et non potuit latere"; Deut. 9; Exod. 4.

16. Jon. 3:4: "Adhuc quadraginta dies et Ninive subvertetur."

17. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1; I, q. 23, a. 4, ad 3.

18. Prov. 21:1; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 99; 95; 103.

19. St. Augustine, Ep. 107 (to Vitalis); *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 2; Ep. 105 (to Sixtus); *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; Prosper of Aquitaine, *De vocatione gentium* I, ch. 3; III, ch. 22.

20. The following editorial and historical notes in the source are here summarized in translation: (a) "Or 217, as in the new Benedictine edition." (b) "Or 194, as in the aforesaid Benedictine edition." (c) "Concerning the book *De vocatione gentium*, which are commonly supposed to be by Gennadius the defender, almost all the learned conjecture Vossius, *Ecclesiastical History*, that the author is the Bishop of Orléans, successor of St. Aignan. Others have judged that this work must be attributed to St. Prosper of Aquitaine; but all, unsuccessfully if we credit the *Dissertations on the true works of St. Leo the Great and of Prosper of Aquitaine*, assign these books to St. Leo; Joseph Antelmi, a learned man, vigorously contends that the author of the books *De vocatione gentium* is St. Prosper of Aquitaine. Louis-Ellies Dupin (*Bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques*, vol. 3, part 2, or vol. 4, century 5) adjudges them to Leo with most abundant arguments and reasons, and to Prosper denies them and with almost innumerable arguments. One thing only can be set down as certain in this matter: that the author of these books is uncertain and unknown. See after the works ..." [The Latin of these notes is garbled in the source; the substance here preserves the claim that the authorship of *De vocatione gentium* is disputed among St. Prosper, St. Leo the Great, and others.]
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
22. Peter Lombard, *Sentences* IV, at the end; cf. the scholastic tradition on the state of the blessed not praying for the reprobate.
23. Ambrosiaster (the Pauline commentator under the name of Ambrose), on 1 Tim. 2; and the spurious commentary among the works of St. Jerome, attributed to Pelagius [abbreviation as in source].
24. St. Augustine, *Epistle* 107 (to Vitalis); *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 10; *Enchiridion* (as cited above).
25. St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Epistola ad Rufinum*; *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 3; *De vocatione gentium* I, chs. 2, 12, 19, 25. St. Fulgentius, *De gratia Christi*, ch. 29 and following.
26. Rupert of Deutz, In *Matthaeum*, on Matt. 11.
27. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 103; *Contra Julianum* IV, ch. 8; *Epistle* 107; *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 8. St. Prosper, *Epistola ad Rufinum*; *Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum*, resp. 8.
28. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 103; *Sermon* 37 *De diversis*. Editorial note: In the Benedictine edition, the ancient *Sermon* 37 *De diversis* corresponds to part of *Sermon* 279, otherwise the 24th among the *Sirmondian sermons*; by that edition two were conflated, namely the fourteenth on the Saints and the thirty-sixth *On Various Matters* [abbreviation as in source].
29. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, ch. 29 (on the antecedent and consequent will of God); St. Jerome, In *Isaiam*, on Is. 28:21 ("His strange work"); St. Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 33; St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
30. On "our Savior God," see e.g. Tit. 2:10, 13; 3:4–6.
31. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* III; *Epistle* 59, q. 6; Jer. 26; 1 Cor. 1; Phil. 2:21 ("All seek the things that are their own").
32. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 9; Rom. 8:26; Gal. 4:6; 1 Cor. 2:10; Gen. 22:12; *De civitate Dei* XXII, chs. 1, 32; *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 15.
33. Gabriel Vásquez, [abbreviation as in source], asserting that that place of Paul was rightly expounded by the Author in the text [abbreviation as in source].
34. Cardinal Henry Noris, *Vindiciae Augustinianae*, defending St. Augustine against the calumnies and irreverences of certain Authors [abbreviation as in source].
35. Auctor libri *Hypognosticon*, book 6, at the end [abbreviation as in source].
36. St. Fulgentius, *De incarnatione et gratia*, ch. 11; and the Letter of the African Bishops in exile in Sardinia to their Archbishop; and the Acts of the Church of Lyons under Blessed Remigius—by which these expositions are to be understood as insinuated and admitted [abbreviation as in source].
37. Vincent Contenson, *Theologia mentis et cordis* (Speculatio 3), calling this will of God for salvation sincere [abbreviation as in source].
38. The Carmelite Fathers of Salamanca, *Cursus theologicus*, in various places rejecting absolutely the opinion that this will is formally and properly in God [abbreviation as in source].
39. John Baptist Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, defending keenly the contrary and calling the antecedent will a metaphoric will [abbreviation as in source].
40. Diego Álvarez, *De auxiliis divinae gratiae*, tract. 4, disp. 9, dub. 3, and other Thomists of name [abbreviation as in source].

41. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus*, tom. 3, tract. 3, disp. 4, a. 3, with others of the most learned Thomists, who approve as more probable that the antecedent will for the salvation of all be posited eminently and tropically in God [abbreviation as in source].
42. St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 2, where he says more properly of God the will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*), than elsewhere of the will of sign (*voluntas signi*), by which the antecedent and the consequent will are distinguished [abbreviation as in source].
43. Prosper of Aquitaine, "resp. 1. 2. ad Ob. Vinc. & lib. 2. de Vocat. Gent. cap. 1. 6. 7. 1958." [abbreviation as in source]; St. Bonaventure, "super hac distinctione q. 1." [abbreviation as in source].
44. St. Thomas, "S. Thom." [abbreviation as in source].
45. The same Apostle calls God the Father "our Savior" at the beginning and at chapter 4 of the same epistle (sc. 1 Tim.), and Titus 1 and 2 [abbreviation as in source].
46. A homily under Jerome's name "inter Homilias Patrum in festo B. Stephani" [abbreviation as in source].
47. Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew* ["Hieronymi commentario in Matth."; abbreviation as in source].
48. St. Jerome, on Is. 1 ["Hieronymus in Ha 1." — abbreviation as in source].
49. The Sixth Ecumenical Council (Third Council of Constantinople); the letter of Pope Agatho read and approved therein.
50. Estius, below: Book 3, Distinction 17.
51. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 97.
52. Hilary and Jerome, "in suis commentariis" [as in source].
53. Council of Orange II, canon 4.
54. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 9.
55. Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa sententiarum*, tract. 1, ch. 63; idem, *De sacramentis* I, part 4, chs. 12–13 and following.
56. Rupert of Deutz, *In Matthaeum*, book 3.
57. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 9, ad 1, ad 3; idem, *In I Sent.*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 2 and a. 4.
58. St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 3; q. 4; q. 21.
59. St. Thomas, *ibid.* [abbreviation as in source].
60. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 10–11.
61. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 96.
62. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 95.
63. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 100.
64. (Pseudo-)Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 3.
65. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
66. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 11.
67. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 27 [printed as 37 in some editions; abbreviation as in source].
68. St. Thomas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.

DISTINCTIO 47 — HOW SOME THINGS ARE SAID TO BE AGAINST GOD'S WILL, WHY GOD COMMANDS WHAT HE DOES NOT WILL TO BE DONE, AND WHETHER HE CAN COMMAND AGAINST HIS OWN LAW

§ I — How certain things are said to be done against God's will (Quomodo fieri quaedam dicantur contra Dei voluntatem)

§ 1. That something is done against God's will (*voluntas*) can be understood in many ways. In one way, if something is said to be done with God unwilling, that is, with Him as it were compelled. In this sense it is certain from what was said above that nothing can be done against God's will.

§ 2. In another way, "against God's will" means against God's precept (*praeceptum*) or prohibition (*prohibitio*); in which sense all and only sins are done against God's will, while under sins there are to be included concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and its involuntary movements.

§ 3. In a third way, the will of simple complacency is understood, which they call that by which God is said to will every good, whether it be done or not be done. For in this way, just as every good work is according to God's will, so every evil work is against His will: because just as every good work, if it be done, pleases God, so every evil work, if it be done, displeases God. Now this way almost coincides with the second. Yet it differs somewhat, because although every sin is committed against the law of God, nevertheless not every good work is by the prescription of the law; for there are certain goods not of precept but of counsel, which nevertheless are also done according to the divine will of complacency.

§ 4. Lastly, something is said to be done against God's will not absolutely, but in so far as it is on the side of the perverse will of the impious who try to impede the effect of the divine will; in which way the devil tried to impede and to dissipate God's counsel concerning the liberation of the human race, so far as pertains to the impious. "As far as in them was concerned," says St. Augustine, "they did what God did not will; but as far as God's omnipotence is concerned, in no way were they able to do that."³ In a similar sense Augustine interprets that saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. 5), "Quench not the Spirit," namely, "in so far as it is in you," since in reality the Spirit of God cannot be quenched.⁴

§ 5. Now concerning this last mode, it must be noted that by the marvelous providence of God it very often happens that, while the impious strive to impede the will of God—that is, certain goods willed and predestined by God—by their contrary efforts this very will of God is fulfilled; so far is it from being the case that they can in any way frustrate it. We have not a few examples of this thing in Sacred Scripture: as what has already been said about the devil, who, while he procured the death of Christ, destroyed his own kingdom, and thus cooperated for the fulfillment of God's will. Such also is that the same devil, when he had received

the power to strike holy Job, gave an occasion for the increase of his virtue. Likewise that Joseph's brothers, in order to impede the event of his dream, sold him into Egypt, where he became prefect of the land and lord of his brothers. And that Saul, envying the glory of David, exposed him to the Philistines, on which occasion he became much more glorious. And that the princes of the Jews, desiring to extinguish the name of Christ, inflicted on Him a shameful death; by the merit of whose passion there was "given to Him a name which is above every name." To the same effect the pagans, by persecuting the Christians, while they strive to suppress the Christian religion, made it much more illustrious. So too heretics, while they attack the Catholic truth, make it shine more. On this matter one may see St. Gregory⁵ and St. Leo;⁶ and how the wicked, in the Passion of the Lord, either act or do not act against God's will, and yet are not able to impede His omnipotent will, St. Augustine discusses.⁷

§ II — Why God commands things that He does not will to be done (Quare Deus praecipiat quae fieri non vult?)

§ 6. Some raise the question, why God has given to all men precepts (*praeceptum*) which nevertheless He does not will to be fulfilled by all. But this question is the same as why God does not make all men keep His commandments; for they cannot keep them unless He Himself makes them keep them. Concerning this, first it must be known that from the precept given by God we ought not to estimate His secret will, by which He has established what He Himself would do, but only that from the rule prescribed to us we ought to gather what it behooves us to do; and therefore it is altogether impertinent to refer the authority of the divine precept to His will of good pleasure regarding the fulfillment of the precept. And Ecclesiasticus teaches the same thing, saying: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability; ... in many of His works be not curious" (Sir. 3); as if he were to say: Do not curiously search what God will do, but what He has commanded you to do—consider and think upon that.⁹ Therefore, since absolutely speaking no necessity follows from God's will which is contained in the precepts, it is evident that it ought not to be that God should fulfill in all those to whom He has given precepts what He has commanded.

§ 7. Now the reason why He does not will this is not that which certain people imagine when they say that God does not will it because men do not will it. For assuredly, if He willed it, men would also will it; because God's will is omnipotent and the mistress of all things. Whence St. Augustine rightly rejects that reason.¹⁰ Therefore, not for this false reason, but other good reasons can be given: first, that God might show the intellectual nature to be defectible. For to show this, it was fitting to permit a defect to occur in the rational creature. Second, that He might show what free will (*liberum arbitrium*) can do: namely, indeed toward the evil side without God, but toward the good side not unless with God and through God. Third, that from comparison with the evil of sin it might be understood how great the good of obedience (*obedientia*) is. Fourth, that some from obedience, others from disobedience, might receive punishment—not that there fall a sin in order that He may punish, but that He may punish justly; that is, in order that there may be place for just punishment, or for justice, which consists in the inflicting of punishments. And this reason is completed by a fifth reason, namely, that God in some might declare His goodness, in others His justice; as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 9).¹¹ The Master adds also this reason: that the wicked might be inexcusable, namely, on receiving a positive precept.¹² And this again is not to be understood as though men would be altogether excused from sin if they had received from God no positive law. For, "who have sinned without the law," says the same Apostle (Rom. 2), "shall perish without the law." For they sinned against the law of nature, by which

all are bound, and ignorance of which excuses no one. Yet they would be excusable in some respect; in the way in which, says Augustine, the promulgation and explication of the law, so that the will of God might be more clearly shown, makes those not excusable to whom the express manifestation and explication of the law has been given.¹³ Moreover, to the present question is akin that which is wont to be raised concerning the first man: why God made him and permitted him to be tempted, when He foreknew that he would sin. Of which we shall speak below.¹⁴

§ III — Whether God can command something contrary to the law laid down by Himself (An Deus praecipere possit aliquid contra legem a se latam)

§ 8. In one way it must be admitted that God does not will all the things to be done which He has commanded; indeed, sometimes He even wills that what He has commanded not be done. But understand this thus: that the earlier precept is taken away by a contrary precept. To prove this the Master, at the end of this distinction, adduces the example of Abraham, to whom it had been commanded by God that he should immolate his son (Gen. 22). Yet he was afterwards forbidden to carry this out, namely, by that prohibition through which there was an abolition of the prior precept.¹ The other example adduced by the Master, of certain persons healed by Christ to whom it was commanded that they should not divulge the matter (Mk. 1; Matt. 8–9), does not suit the proposition set forth. For in that case it was not a proper precept strictly so called, nor a prohibition, but only a signification of humility and modesty; by which the faithful were warned and taught not to seek human praise in good and splendid works, but rather, as far as lies within them, to avoid it.¹⁶ Nor, moreover, does this favor that proposition among the others condemned by Alexander VIII, namely, that invincible ignorance of the natural law excuses, in the state of nature, from formal sin.¹⁷

§ 9. On occasion of these instances, and most of all of that which was commanded to Abraham—that he should slay and immolate his son—it is commonly asked in general: Can God command something against His own law? Which, as we have already warned, must not be understood so that contraries be simultaneously contained in a precept. For in that way a necessity of sinning would be imposed on a man, since he could not fulfill contraries; but it must be understood in such a way that by the later command the abolition or dispensation of the earlier takes place. One must reply that, since the law commands only what is good, and a precept is a directive principle of acting, whatever is so evil that God cannot do it, neither can God command it. To make this clear by examples: God cannot command lying, perjury, contempt and hatred of Himself, blasphemy, idolatry; because He Himself cannot do these things nor be the author of them, since they are of such a sort as involve malice in their very formal character. Of the same sort also is "the flesh ruling over the spirit." For this is to be against God's eternal law (*lex aeterna*), as Augustine attests.¹⁸ In this number also, according to the same Augustine, some place that the good live a miserable life and the evil a blessed one, although others doubt about it; yet this pertains nothing to precepts, but only to the works of God.¹⁹ St. Bernard also teaches that certain precepts of God are so unchangeable that they cannot even by Him be changed; and therefore He cannot command things contrary to them.²⁰ But whatever in human actions is of such a sort that it does not necessarily imply malice, and can have God as its author, all this can be commanded by God. Such are whatever do not run counter to the eternal law; but if they seem contrary to certain precepts, they are contrary only to those precepts which are established for a time, as certain modes and aids, or even determinations for observing the eternal law, and they admit of change; such as the ceremonial precepts, and, in general, all things that are decreed only by positive law.

§ 10. For thus, the ceremonial law of Moses, which assuredly was divine, was by divine authority wholly abrogated; and likewise, while its state endured, something could be commanded by God contrary to it; in which way we read that Elijah was commanded to walk continually for forty days, among which there were at least five sabbaths; from which, according to the law, one had to abstain even from the work of a longer journey. In which way also Christ was able to command certain works otherwise illicit on the sabbath; and, according to some, He did command them (as in Jn. 5); who also for this reason, according to the same people, calls Himself the Lord of the sabbath (Matt. 12). Others, however, say otherwise, and perhaps think more probably: namely, that He never either did anything or commanded anything against the law of the sabbath.

§ 11. Moreover, concerning both kinds of precepts already mentioned—namely, the commutable and the incommutable—let one see St. Thomas, where he discusses whether the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable. The place for treating that question more properly will be below; where in turn reply will also be made to the place of Bernard which is wont to be brought forward, from his book cited above, against the doctrine of this place.²¹

§ 12. Furthermore, one must know that in Scripture certain evils and illicit things are sometimes said of God in a preceptive mode, which, however, are in no way properly commanded, but must be taken according to some other sense, as the circumstance of the discourse requires; for example: "Go, and call upon the gods whom you have chosen" (Judg. 10); "Let each one walk after his idols, and serve them" (Ezek. 20); "Make the tree evil, and its fruit evil" (Matt. 12); "That which thou doest, do more quickly" (Jn. 13); "He that hurteth, let him hurt still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still" (Rev. 22). Of the same sort also is what God says to Satan (1 Kgs [3 Reg.] 22), "Go forth, and do so," when He was speaking about deceiving Ahab. And what David says about Shimei (2 Sam. [2 Reg.] 16): "The Lord hath commanded him to curse David." For these and the like do not properly signify that God commands, as though the obedience were to be praised of the man, or of the demon, doing those evils which seem to be commanded; but they are partly the words of God permitting, partly of God deserting, partly of God mocking and reproaching, partly of God predicting what would be, and partly they signify God's ordering, by which He ordains what is evil unto good—for example, unto the punishment of sinners, or unto the execution of other counsels of God concerning men; which is easily seen by someone who examines the aforesaid places of Scripture more carefully.²²

1. Editorial caution in the margin: "Do not suppose that the Author is teaching that 'second' sense [so as to imply that God positively wills sin]; his meaning is not that God causes a fall in order to punish, but, as the text itself immediately explains, that He permits it so that He may punish justly, that is, that just punishment may have place."

2. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6; a. 11.

3. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 100.

4. St. Augustine, *Epistle* 23 (=Benedictine ed. 98), where he explains the Apostle's words "Spiritus nolite extinguere" (1 Thess. 5:19).

5. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* IX, ch. 11.

6. St. Leo the Great, *Sermon* 10, *De passione Domini*.

7. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 100, seq.

8. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 12, in the body and in the replies to the objections.

9. Sir. 3:22, 24 (Vulgate): "Altiora te ne quaesieris ... in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus."
10. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 97; and elsewhere.
11. Rom. 9.
12. The Master (of the Sentences), at the end of this distinction.
13. Rom. 2:12; St. Augustine, Epistle 105 to Sixtus (on the clearer promulgation and explication of the law so that the will of God might be shown).
14. See below, *Distinctio* 23 of Book II.
15. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 8.
16. Mk. 1:44; Matt. 8:4; 9:30–31.
17. Reference to the condemnations of Alexander VIII (decree of Dec. 7, 1690): among the condemned theses is the claim that invincible ignorance of the natural law excuses, in the state of pure nature, from formal sin.
18. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 8.
19. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* I, ch. 6.
20. St. Bernard, *De praecepto et dispensatione*.
21. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 100, a. 8; see below, *Distinctio* 38 of Book III; St. Bernard, *De praecepto et dispensatione*.
22. Judg. 10:14; Ezek. 20:39; Matt. 12:33; Jn. 13:27; Rev. 22:11; 1 Kgs (3 Reg.) 22:22; 2 Sam. (2 Reg.) 16:10–11.

DISTINCTIO XLVIII — TO WHAT EXTENT OUR WILL OUGHT TO BE CONFORMED TO THE WILL OF GOD (*QUATENUS VOLUNTAS NOSTRA CONFORMIS ESSE DEBET VOLUNTATI DEI*)

§ I — To what extent our will ought to be conformed to the will of God (Quatenus voluntas nostra conformis esse debet voluntati Dei)

§ 1. Since the will (*voluntas*) of God cannot but be most upright—whether that which consists in precepts, or that which is called the will of good-pleasure (*beneplaciti voluntas*)—and what is most upright becomes the measure of the rest of the same genus, it is evident that our will ought to be conformed and fitted to the will of God as to its rule. I say, to the will of God not only preceptively (that is, to the preceptive will, *voluntas praeceptiva*), but also to that by which He absolutely and properly wills something; although the obligation is not equal in both conformities. For we are bound to inquire into and scrutinize the preceptive will as a rule of our actions prescribed to us by God, according to that of Sir. 3: "What God commands you, these things think on always"; and Ps. 1: "In the law of the Lord is his will, and in his law he shall meditate day and night"; and Ps. 118: "I will scrutinize the commandments of my God."² But we are not bound to scrutinize the will of God's good-pleasure; nay rather, we are bound not to scrutinize it, and, as hidden from us and not necessary for the establishing of our actions, we are bidden to abstain from inquiring into it, Ecclesiasticus again admonishing there: "Seek not the things that are too high for you, and search not into things stronger than you." And he subjoins the reason for this: "For it is not necessary for you to see with your eyes the things that are hidden." Therefore, as long as this will of God is hidden and unknown to us, it is not necessary that our will be conformed to it. Nay rather, it can laudably, and sometimes ought to, be dissimilar to it, as St. Augustine teaches about a son who well-wills, and is not ill-unwilling, that his father live, whom God wills to die, while God's will lies hidden.³

§ 2. But if it should happen to become known to us, either by the event of things and experience, or by a revelation of future things, then it is not permitted us, first of all, to will the contrary absolutely; and hence, neither to murmur against it, nor to vituperate that which proceeds from it, nor in any way to strive to impede its effect. For he indeed fights against God, while he not only reprehends His will and prefers his own to it, but also strives to frustrate and render it void. Whence it also follows that it is not permitted us to pray for the salvation of demons or of damned men: for whoever would do this would directly be opposed to the will of God made manifest to him, and would will, by praying, to induce God to change it. Wherefore neither, if the reprobation of any man who is placed in this life were revealed to us, would it be permitted us to pray for his salvation. For even Christ denies that He asks the Father for the world, that is, for the reprobate, because He knew that they had not been given to Him by the Father.⁴ And indeed on this matter the opinion of St.

Augustine is clear, book 21 of the City of God, ch. 24: "If regarding some the Church were so certain as even to know who they are, who, although as yet they are constituted in this life, nevertheless are predestined to go into eternal fire with the devil, then she would no more pray for them than for the devil himself." Thus he. But in truth these things are not enough; rather, it is further required that we will the same thing which God wills, that is, that we approve the will of God, once known, with respect to the thing willed by Him, in time and place, and that we also praise God in that will.

§ 3. For it is not enough if the works of God do not displease us; nor is it enough that we approve the volition of God, that is, the act of the Divine will by which He wills this or that; but, in addition, whatever proceeds from the will of God, which is always just and right, ought to please us according to our rational and deliberated will. Now this is for our will to be conformed to the will of the Divine good-pleasure. But because Durandus and some others, writing upon this distinction, are of a different opinion—thinking that man is not bound to this, namely that in all adversities and molestations which befall he conform his will to the Divine will, but that it is enough if he bear them patiently and not with a contrary will make head against his Creator—our doctrine must be proved to us a little more fully by testimonies and examples of Scripture, and also by the authority of the Fathers, and by reason.

§ 4. First, therefore, Holy Scripture commands that we confess, praise, and magnify the works of God without any exception, as in Deut. 32: "Give magnificence to our God"; in Ps. 102: "Bless the Lord, all His works"—which is repeated in the Canticle of the Three Boys; and in Ps. 144: "Let all thy works confess to thee, O Lord." By these sayings men are figuratively admonished to the praising of God in all His works. Wherefore Peter (Matt. 16) is rebuked not only because he willed to take counsel for Christ, against the will of God revealed to him, concerning His ignominious passion, saying: "Be it far from thee, O Lord. This shall not be to thee"; but also because he did not savor the things that are of God, but the things that are of men, that is, because he did not, by his will, approve the divine decree, but preferred to it his own human willing. And, in general, to this pertain whatever admonitions of Scripture urge us, not only to praise the works of God's goodness and mercy, but also of His severity and justice, as also those which exact from us thanksgiving in all things. For this the Apostle admonishes (Eph. 5), saying: "Giving thanks always for all things"; and 1 Thess. 5: "In all things give thanks."⁵

§ 5. The examples indeed of Holy Scripture for confirming this matter are everywhere obvious, as in 4 Kgs 20, where the pious king Hezekiah, upon hearing the prediction of the evils impending, approves the decree of God, saying: "The word of the Lord which he has spoken is good"; which Isaiah also repeats of him (ch. 39). To which is similar that which Eli, the high priest, upon hearing a like prediction (1 Kgs 3), said: "The Lord is, let him do what is good in his eyes." And that which David (2 Kgs 15): "If the Lord shall say to me, Thou pleasest me not, I am ready; let him do what is good before himself." Thus blessed Job, recounting the will of the divine good-pleasure amid very great adversities in these words: "As it has pleased the Lord, so it has been done"; then he brought forth that which has been praised by all, and deservedly to be imitated by all: "Let the name of the Lord be blessed." And Tobias (ch. 2) was not grieved against God, because a stroke of blindness befell him, but he gave thanks to God all the days of his life. The same man (ch. 3) approves the just judgments of God toward himself and his people; and the three boys, cast into the furnace (Dan. 3), do this same thing with many words.⁶

§ 6. We have the example of the Lord Himself the Savior, who (Matt. 11) by a confession of praise to the Father approves His just judgment, by which He had hidden the mysteries of salvation from the wise and

revealed them to little ones, with the reason of the divine good-pleasure added, just as also blessed Job: "Because," He says, "so it has pleased before thee." And in ch. 26, concerning the Chalice of His Passion, He says to the Father: "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou"; and with another Evangelist (Lk. 22): "Nevertheless not my will, but thine be done." In imitation of whom the disciples (in Acts 21), upon understanding from the prophet Agabus the will of God concerning Paul—that he would suffer many things at Jerusalem—said: "The will of the Lord be done," that is, "let us acquiesce in the will of God," as St. Augustine explains.⁷ To which is similar what Judas Maccabaeus, about to join battle (1 Macc. 3), was saying: "As it shall have been the will in heaven, so let it be done." In this sense also the third petition of the Lord's Prayer is fittingly taken of the will of God's good-pleasure, so that its sense be: "As the blessed spirits approve and praise thy will in all things and through all things, so do, that our will also become through all things conformed to thy will made known to us." And indeed, whoever in any thing should be unwilling to conform and subject his will to the Divine will, would seem as it were to be saying to God: "Not thy will be done, but mine." Whoever would say this would without doubt sin.

§ 7. But also, that we may bring forth something from the Fathers: Augustine, in the aforesaid Sermon de diversis, ch. 2, treating that of Ps. 67, "Let sinners perish from the face of God," beautifully teaches and proves by examples that, the sentence of God made known to us on whatever matter, it ought not only not to displease us, but also to please us and be approved by us.⁸ The same man, book 1 de Symbolo ad catechumenos, ch. 3, says: "As it has pleased the Lord, so also it has been done; because it pleases Him, let it please me: let that which has pleased the good Lord not displease the subject servant; let that which has pleased the physician not displease the sick man."⁹ St. Jerome, in a consolatory letter to Paula on the death of Blesilla, writes many things learnedly and eloquently to the same effect.¹⁰ Leo, Sermon 1 on the fast of the tenth month, whose title is: "On the solemnity of the Maccabees," Cardinal Bellarmine reckons the first among the works of St. Augustine; he notes that the first savor of Augustine's style, the other three do not. In that sermon he teaches that thanks are to be given to God even in adversities, and that He is to be praised in all things, alleging that saying of the Apostle, "In all things give thanks." And among other things he says: "God kindles us with the fire of His charity, that we may love not only Himself, but also whatever He loves." Since therefore to love is to will, plainly it follows, from Leo's opinion, that it pertains to the charity (*caritas*) of God that whatever He wills, we too should will. In the same place he adds: "For if among men that friendship is at length firm which the likeness of manners has joined, how much is it to be sought and striven for by us, that in nothing we disagree from the things that are pleasing to God?" The same man, in a Sermon on All Saints: "Religious sadness," he says, "either bewails another's sin or its own. Nor does it grieve over this, that Divine Justice is carried out, but it mourns over that which is committed by human iniquity." To these St. Basil agrees, Hom. 5 on the martyr Julitta, where likewise he alleges the aforesaid sentence of the Apostle.¹¹ To these also Lactantius agrees, book 6, last chapter, writing: "If any evil has befallen, let him confess that it has come to him on account of his sins, and nonetheless even in evils let him give thanks." He repeats this same thing, ch. 6 of the Epitome.¹² Finally, the Interlinear Gloss on that of Ps. 100, "A perverse heart has not cleaved to me," thus speaks: "He has a perverse heart who does not will all the things which God wills. For although the weak man fears that which Jesus, being afraid, has foreshown, nevertheless let him subject himself to God saying: Let thy will only be done. Let him avoid the evil as much as he can; if he cannot, let him undergo it." Which Gloss is taken from Augustine on that same place, where he teaches this same thing with more and clearer words.¹³ Durandus interprets and glosses that Gloss thus: "He has a perverse heart who does not will that

which God wills him to will." But that glossing is against the mind of the Gloss, as is manifestly clear from the words subjoined, and from the place of Augustine, who speaks generally also of the evils of punishment.

§ 8. To these there is added the proof from reason. This indeed has already been indicated at the beginning as the weightiest: namely, that the will of God not only preceptive, but also absolute, when it shall have become known to us, is a rule to which our will ought to be fitted. For by the very fact that something is willed by God it receives a peculiar formal character (*ratio*) of good. Wherefore our will, consequent upon the apprehension of that good, is bound to tend into it, namely by willing it absolutely as God wills it. For otherwise the motion of the will would not be good, nor conformed to God, if it were to flee the good, as St. Thomas says.¹⁴

§ 9. Moreover, it is to be distinguished with the Doctor that there are diverse grades of appetite, or of will, consequent upon diverse apprehensions. For there is in us a sensitive appetite consequent upon the apprehension of sense, which is only of sensible good. There is likewise in us a certain natural will by which we desire that which is in itself good for man as he is man, which will follows the apprehension of reason, by which something is considered in itself—how we will knowledge, virtue, life, health, and the like. Besides these, however, there is in us a deliberated will, which indeed follows the act of reason deliberating concerning the end and the diverse circumstances. According to which will we tend into that which has the formal character of good from the end, or from another circumstance. If, therefore, something be apprehended as willed by God (which indeed is made known to us especially through the sign of the divine operation, that is to say, through the event of the thing), man is bound, with his deliberated will, to will it—even if the natural will and the sensitive appetite recoil from that very thing—if, namely, it be such as does not have the formal character of sensible good, but of evil; nor of human good in itself, but of evil; yet has the formal character of good only from the circumstances, of which the chief is to be willed by God, as, for example, the death of a parent or a friend.

§ 10. Yet it must be known that, just as in evil men the motion of the deliberated will is depraved and corrupt, so that they follow neither right reason nor acquiesce in the will of God, but rather murmur against it; so in the good, while they are in this mortality, that motion indeed is right and sound, but imperfect—both on the part of cognition, because they do not fully know the will of God; and on the part of affection, which is retarded for them by the lower motions. Whence it is not required that they should take joy from that which in this manner they deliberately will; but it suffices that they simply acquiesce in the good-pleasure (*beneplacitum*) of God, just as it happens in him who wills the amputation of one member for the soundness of the rest of the body; in which manner also the Philosopher says that it suffices for the act of fortitude if someone be not saddened in dangers, although he is not delighted, as in the acts of the other virtues.¹⁵ And this, says St. Thomas, is the conformity of the wayfarer; for in the blessed the motion of the deliberated will is perfect—both on the part of cognition, because they fully know the will of God, and on the part of affection, which suffers no impediment, but perfectly dominates every lower will. Hence in them it comes to pass that, seeing and willing all that which God wills, they also take joy therefrom and will rejoice; according to that of the Psalm: "The just man, when he will have seen vengeance, will rejoice." [^16]

§ 11. Finally, other reasons also can be added, as that it belongs to friends to will and to nill the same, and therefore our friendship with God demands that we will the same which He wills. Leo uses this reason, Sermon 1 on the fast of the tenth month cited above. Likewise: We ought to hold the will of God in greater esteem than our own; therefore what He wills, that rather ought we to will than what our judgment suggests,

saying with Christ: "Not my will, but thine be done." For by His own example Christ has shown us what we ought to do. Likewise: He who prefers his own will to the Divine, as it were speaks thus: "If I were as God, thus rather would I do." Which thought can by no means be excused from sin. Likewise: Such a man as it were gives advice to God, saying: "Thus wouldst thou do better"—against that saying: "Who has been His counselor?" Likewise: The blessed are bound to conform their will through all things to the Divine; therefore we also. For there is equal reason founded in the eternal law. Nor have the blessed received any positive precept about this matter beyond us. Likewise: What we know that we shall will when we shall have a will altogether right, that we ought now to will, as far as in us lies; but indeed we know that then—that is, when we shall be blessed—we shall will whatever God wills; therefore, now too we ought to will that, as far as we can, that is, as far as God's willing becomes known to us, and as far as our will in this corruption can accommodate itself to the will of God. For although in this life we are not bound to have the perfection of the Fatherland, nevertheless we are bound to strive and to draw near to it according to the state of the way.

§ II — Reply to the arguments to the contrary (Responsio ad argumenta in contrarium)

§ 12. The foregoing doctrine is attacked by certain persons with arguments of this sort. First. One thing befits a man to will, another God, as St. Augustine teaches.¹⁸ And for that reason it happens that a man sometimes with good will wills what God does not will, and conversely; therefore a man is not bound to fit his own will (*voluntas*) to the divine will (*voluntas Divina*), even when it is known. I reply: whatever God wills, it befits Him to will. But whatever has been commanded to a man by God, it befits the man to will. Now these two are often diverse, to wit, when the will of God's good-pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*) lies hidden; but when this becomes known, then plainly it befits—indeed, it is necessary—that our will be conformed (*conformetur*) to it, according to what has been said above. Moreover Augustine is speaking of the will of the divine good-pleasure unknown to us. But that it does befit a man to will the same things that God wills is manifest from the state of the coming age, in which we shall be perfectly conformed to God.

§ 13. Second. A man is not bound to will, nor to love, troubles or miseries, but it is enough if he bear them. For St. Augustine says: "Who would will to suffer troubles and difficulties? Thou commandest that they be borne, not that they be loved. No one loves what he endures"; and Prosper says: "No one loves what he endures, even if he loves to endure."¹⁹ Therefore, since it is clear to us that God wills these same things, it will not be necessary for us to be conformed to Him by willing them. I answer: first, that a man is not bound to will future miseries, or to love them, or to bring them upon himself, since he is not certain that God wills to send them to him; and even if God does will this, nevertheless for the most part He does not will that a man bring them upon or inflict them on himself, but only that he bear with patience those that supervene, as is manifest in the case of death. Then, although miseries, when not considered under a certain formal character (*ratio*), do not have the formal character of something lovable or desirable—which is what Augustine meant to signify by the words cited—still, considered under the formal character of the just, or insofar as they purge and prove a man and increase his merit, they are rightly desired when absent and, when present, they are loved. The Scriptures teach us this and others like them: "Count it all joy, my brethren, when you fall into various temptations"—that is, tribulations—"knowing," etc.; "We glory in tribulations"; "I rejoice in my sufferings for you"; "Rejoice as you share in the sufferings of Christ."²⁰ And the same has been shown by the examples of Ignatius, Lawrence, Agatha, and many other martyrs.²¹

§ 14. Third. This doctrine seems to exclude from men's hearts not only sadness and mourning over one's own miseries, but also compassion, that is, fellow-feeling, over the miseries of others. But, as has already been said, miseries have, as it were, a twofold consideration: one, insofar as by some respect they deprive one of some good; the other, insofar as they are ordained by God to justice or something similar. Under the former consideration it is sometimes permissible, indeed fitting, to be saddened over them, as we are admonished: "Rejoice with those who rejoice; weep with those who weep." Whence in that same epistle those are blamed who are without affection and mercy. Hence what was said in reproach of the philosophers teaching apatheia can be thought to apply here.²² The Apostle himself also writes that he was saddened over the death of Epaphroditus.²³ We read that Samuel mourned over Saul rejected; David was grievously saddened over the death of his son; Jeremiah composed Lamentations over the death of King Josiah and the destruction of Jerusalem; devout men made great lamentation over Stephen; and other like things.²⁴ Indeed, both over Lazarus dead and over Jerusalem He wept, and over His impending death—although certain of the will of God. In whose Passion as well the sword of sorrow passed through His holy Mother's soul. By this very example, then, Christians rightly, under a like consideration of the persons of Christ and the Saints, piously sympathize, lest that word be said of them: "I looked for one who would be grieved together with me, and there was none."²⁵ On which matter let Augustine be read.²⁶ However, under the latter consideration, calamities and miseries ought to be pleasing to us also, insofar as they are works of God and proceed from His most upright will. But they ought to be pleasing absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), because, since God wills them to be or to come about, they ought absolutely to be pleasing. And just as it is not to be doubted that the works of the Father were in this way pleasing to Christ, so likewise must it be thought about the others whom we have mentioned.

§ 15. Fourth. If our will is to be conformed to the will of God, then neither will it be permissible to resist evils assailing us, nor to meet diseases, nor to extinguish fires, nor to repel any other human ills either impending or present, inasmuch as all these things are known to be sent to us by the divine will. I reply: it is not lawful to resist them insofar as the will of God is manifest; but insofar as the will of God is still hidden, it is lawful and fitting for us to do things against the evils that are coming upon us, provided this can be done with the law of God kept safe. For example: when an enemy attacks us, we know that it is the will of God that we be attacked by the enemy, and therefore we ought, insofar as it is willed, to will and approve this; but since it is not yet clear that it is the divine will that we be overcome by the enemy, a defense must be employed against him. And the same judgment is to be made about diseases, fires, and similar evils. But if God were to reveal that a city is to be conquered by enemies, by no means would it be permissible to strive to prevent this. Whence Sedecias and his princes are gravely reproved, because they did not acquiesce in the divine will—declared to them through Jeremiah—that Jerusalem was to be handed over to the Chaldeans, but would have resisted and wished to prevent what was divinely predicted by resisting it.²⁷

§ 16. Fifth. Thus Durandus argues: that we are bound to conform our will to the divine will proceeds either from the nature of the thing willed, or from the precept (*praeceptum*) of God. But there are many things in which neither ground holds, as the death of a friend, the sterility of the earth, a hostile invasion, etc. For neither are these things of themselves such that we ought to will them; nor does there exist any precept of God by which we are commanded to will them with such an affection: therefore in these cases we are not bound to accommodate our will to the divine will. But it is answered that this obligation is neither from the nature of the things willed, nor originally from some positive precept of God, but from the law of nature (*lex naturae*), which requires the conformity of the created will (*voluntas creata*) with the first and uncreated will, as with its

rule and measure (*regula... mensura*), to which it befits that it be fitted, as has been said above, whatever may be the kind or mode of the things willed.²⁸

§ 17. Sixth, Durandus objects further: a subject is not bound to conform his will to the will of his prelate about doing some work from this alone, that the prelate wills it to be done; but from this, that he wills that it be done by him, and therefore wills that he himself do or will this very thing; therefore neither are we bound to will whatever God wills, even if God's willing be made known to us, but only then, if God commands that we do or will it. It is answered that there is a marked dissimilitude between a man's prelate and God. For a man is subject to God in such wise that his will is in no respect the most perfect rule of the will of God; for the will of one man cannot be set down as the rule of another man's will, however much the latter be subject to him—but only with respect to commands, the observance of which he who is subject is bound to.

§ 18. Seventh and last argument is of this sort. No one is bound to will his own damnation, even if it has been revealed to him; therefore a man is not always bound to conform his will to the divine. It is answered that it is impossible that to anyone not yet damned, but still constituted in this life as on the way (*in via*), his own damnation be revealed. For it implies a contradiction to be on the way and to have such a revelation. For in the former is included an obligation to this precept, by which each wayfarer is bound to tend by faith, hope, and charity to the heavenly fatherland; otherwise, he would not be on the way. But in the latter is included despair of attaining to that same heavenly fatherland. Accordingly, if such a revelation were made to someone (such as perhaps was made to Judas the betrayer by those words: "It were better for him if that man had not been born," and such as are also read in Gregory and Bede), he would thereby cease to be a wayfarer and would be placed in the state of damnation, as it were receiving the beginning of his hell in this life, namely as to a certain principal evil in it, which is the certain despair of eternal life.²⁹ For just as a great part of eternal happiness is to be certain of obtaining it, so also no small part of eternal misery is to be certain of the never-ending lack of happiness. Now that what we have said is impossible is taught by Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, and the Altisiodorensis, and after them Dionysius the Carthusian, in his conference on the particular judgment of souls, in which he also cites those earlier authors.³⁰ But if a revelation of this sort were made to some wayfarer, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, writing on this distinction, teach that it must be taken by way of threat, not of absolute prediction—inasmuch as it was said, "Nineveh shall be overthrown." Understand this, unless perhaps the revelation were such as to make the man certain of his damnation. For in that case, as has now been said, he would be set outside the way, at the term and in the state of damnation.³¹ And yet nevertheless he would be held by the eternal law of God to the approval of the divine justice and to the conformity of his will with the divine will, although this would be impossible to him by reason of his state, as it is to the demons and the other damned. For the impotence of doing what the eternal law of God dictates and prescribes—to love God above all things, and other things of this sort—does not excuse the damned from sin, as from what is handed down at the end of the fourth book we suppose as manifestly true.³²

1. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 10.

2. Sir. 3: "Qua praecepit tibi Deus, ea cogita semper"; Ps. 1:2; Ps. 118(119):94.

3. St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, ch. 101.

4. Jn. 17.

5. Eph. 5:20; 1 Thess. 5:18.

6. 4 Kgs 20:19; Is. 39:8; 1 Kgs 3:18; 2 Kgs 15:26; Job 1:21; Tob. 2:14; Tob. 3; Dan. 3.
7. Acts 21:14; St. Augustine, Sermon 109 de diversis (in the Benedictine edition numbered 300). On the authenticity of this sermon see the Benedictine editors' note.
8. St. Augustine, Sermon 109 de diversis, ch. 2.
9. St. Augustine, De symbolo ad catechumenos I, ch. 3. The Benedictine editors list the books De symbolo among the doubtful works and therefore printed them in a different type in the preface.
10. St. Jerome, Epistle to Paula, consolatory letter on the death of Blesilla.
11. St. Basil, Homily 5 on the martyr Julitta.
12. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones VI, last chapter; Epitome, ch. 6.
13. Glossa interlinearis on Ps. 100(101): "Non adhesit mihi cor pravam"; cf. St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Ps. 100(101).
14. "ut ait S. Th." [abbreviation as in source].
15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.
16. Ps. 57(58):11 Vulg.: "Justus cum viderit vindictam laetabitur."
17. St. Thomas, "ubi sup." [abbreviation as in source].
18. St. Augustine, Enchiridion 101.
19. St. Augustine, Confessions X, ch. 28; Prosper of Aquitaine, Sententiae 181.
20. Jas. 1:2–3; Rom. 5:3; Col. 1:24; 1 Pet. 4:13.
21. The martyrdoms of St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Lawrence, and St. Agatha are recounted in the ancient Acts and liturgical tradition.
22. Rom. 12:15; cf. Rom. 1:31; the reproach of philosophers teaching apatheia is a commonplace in patristic polemic.
23. Phil. 2:27.
24. 1 Kgs 15:35; 2 Kgs 18:33; Lam. 1–5 (attributed to Jeremiah); Acts 8:2.
25. Jn. 11:35; Lk. 19:41; Lk. 2:35; Ps. 68(69):21 Vulg.: "Et sustinui qui simul contristaretur, et non fuit; et consolantes, et non inveni."
26. St. Augustine, De civitate Dei I, ch. 9.
27. Jer. 34; 38.
28. Durandus [as in source].
29. Matt. 26:24; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob IV, ch. 38; the Venerable Bede, Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum V, chs. 14–15.
30. Albert the Great; Alexander of Hales; the Altisiodorensis [abbreviation as in source]; Dionysius the Carthusian, Colloquium de particulari iudicio animarum.
31. St. Thomas, In I Sent., on this distinction; St. Bonaventure, In I Sent., on this distinction; cf. Jon. 3:4: "Adhuc quadraginta dies, et Ninive subvertetur."
32. On the obligation of loving God above all and the non-excusatory character of impotence in the damned, see the conclusion of Book IV [as referred to by Estius].